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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 31, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: RICHARD CLARKE
DON STEINBERG

FROM: TIMOTHY J. ATKIN/SUSAN PRICE

SUBJECT: Rwanda Update

Declassified Under Authority of the
Interagency Security Declassification Appeals Panel,
E.O. 13526, Section 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040

Document No. 1

Declassification Date: March 18, 2014

UN Report on Camp Security

The Secretary General released his Second Report on Security in the Rwandan Refugee Camps January 27, 1995. In consultation with Mrs. Ogata, the Secretary General decided the quickest way to improve camp security would be for UNHCR to make appropriate arrangements with Zaire.

The report notes it has traditionally been host country responsibility to provide security for refugees. On January 27, UNHCR and Zairian government representatives signed a security agreement. The agreement covers five months with the option for three month renewals until December 1995. UNHCR will pay soldiers a salary complement and provide uniforms and equipment at an estimated cost of \$13M (raised by voluntary donation). UNHCR will also establish a liaison group to provide training and logistical support. The pact calls for 1500 Zairian troops to:

- maintain law and order in the camps;
- prevent intimidation of refugees who wish to return home and escort returning refugees as far as the Rwandan border; and,
- protect humanitarian agency installations and personnel.

UNHCR is relying on USG backing for and financial support of this proposal. It would be helpful, at an Ad Hoc level, to establish the level of USG assistance.

The Secretary General ruled out peacekeeping, contracted training and monitors, and international police monitors/military observers because of a lack of contributing countries and/or costs.

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Operation Retour

As of January 26, over 22,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) have returned to their home communes via transport and unofficial reports estimate another 20,000 have returned on foot. Open Relief Centers (ORCs) are set up in the communes to provide temporary assistance and, in the case of land tenure disputes, shelter. Most ORCs are receiving little use as people return home directly and the majority of land tenure cases are being resolved in a few days.

Refugee Repatriation and the Volcanoes

The likelihood of a volcanic eruption near Goma in February or March provides an opportunity to press refugee repatriation. The present level of activity seen in one volcano has been experienced five times in the last 10 years; the volcano has erupted each time.

Our new Rwanda coordinator, Ambassador Townsend Friedman, met last week with Mrs. Ogata. UNHCR, acutely aware of the potential danger, has stepped up monitoring of the volcanoes' activities and is drawing up evacuation contingency plans. At the same time, UNHCR is exploring the possibility of moving the camps 30 miles north in Zaire. Friedman urged UNHCR to use the volcano threat to encourage repatriation. While he found some receptivity among mid-level UNHCR officials, there seems to be little enthusiasm at high levels for induced repatriation.

We continue to stress to Friedman the importance of repatriation as opposed to camp relocation. He and others in State are focused on the possibility that the international community will be culpable if the volcano erupts and masses of Rwandans and relief workers are killed. Thus, State is more concerned with moving the refugees away from Goma in general rather than back into Rwanda in particular.

State will finish an options paper by noon Thursday for consideration by the Ad Hoc Group. The bureaucracy needs a strong push on this one.

UNAMIR

The Ethiopians indicated they may pull their battalion out of UNAMIR. They are frustrated with the absence of vision and direction for UNAMIR (measured in part by a lack of refugees returning), and with slow payment by the UN. We have pressed the UN and the U/SYG Annan has personally overseen payment to the Ethiopians. We and the UN are stressing to the Ethiopians the

importance of their participation and strongly urging troop rotation in mid-February rather than withdrawal.

International War Crimes Tribunal

Justice Goldstone has a four member team in Kigali to finalize arrangements. We anticipate the permanent seat to be up and running around the end of February in Arusha with a small contingent in Kigali. The USG has already ordered computer equipment for the tribunal headquarters.

While DOJ and FBI have not yet provided any investigators for the Rwandan Tribunal, while talking with Nancy, Jamie Gorelick assured us DOJ is supportive. To address DOJ concerns and help offset USG agency resource demands of the Rwandan tribunal, State has been pressing the UN to reimburse the U.S. for some Yugoslav tribunal detailees and believes we are close to securing that commitment. At DOJ's request in November, we ensured that security for investigators was added in UNAMIR's mandate.

AID Efforts

AID indicates the Kigali mission will be operating this week and should accelerate their efforts. AID has been reluctant to tackle the most critical need in Rwanda's justice system:

- funding foreign jurists to adjudicate criminal cases; and,
- technical assistance to the National Commission charged with making administrative determinations about the appropriateness of detaining the 10,000+ criminals in overcrowded prisons.

AID believes U.S. assistance in resolving criminal cases is problematic and could be a lose-lose proposition. If the criteria for release are interpreted too stringently we could be blamed for stalling reconciliation, and if those released are publicized as legitimate criminals we could be blamed for watering down the justice system.

Furthermore, AID believes there may be a legislative prohibition on helping the National Commission (if it's deemed law enforcement assistance). If so, we could use a legislative exception or presidential waiver to provide the assistance.

The decision regarding appropriateness of USG support for these elements of Rwanda's judicial program is reportedly with Brian Atwood and may need to be discussed at an Ad Hoc meeting.

Military Equipment and Training

State and OSD are researching if amended legislation for **IMET training** will get through Congress or whether a Presidential waiver may be required.

OSD has proposed redrafting the **UNSC arms embargo** to authorize the provision of non-lethal support for the Rwandan military (communications and logistics equipment). State is drafting an issues paper. This will need to be resolved at the Ad Hoc level.

Intelligence indicates around a dozen **APCs missing** from Zairian containment areas are likely in ex-FAR control. State has moved slowly to have the UN press Zaire to control the vehicles, return them to Rwanda or destroy them (with GOR approval). State is developing a review of the options and the impact of the arms embargo and international law.

The **DATT in Kigali** is scheduled to depart next month and no replacement is identified or anticipated. Walt Slocombe and the DIA Administrator hope to resolve this issue Wednesday.

Next Steps

The last Ad Hoc meeting was November 29, 1994. An Ad Hoc meeting this week would help rejuvenate the interagency process and clarify USG direction regarding assistance for the Zairian security force, refugee repatriation, criminal justice system support and the arms embargo.

A U.S. delegation departs February 10th for the regional refugee conference in Bujumbura.

RECOMMENDATION

That you agree to an Ad Hoc Meeting ^{Wed.} ~~this Friday~~ with the agenda at Tab I.

Approve Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Agenda for Proposed Ad Hoc Meeting

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

5700

July 21, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: SUSAN E. RICE

FROM: SHAWN H. MCCORMICK *SM*

SUBJECT: Lifting of the Arms Embargo on Rwanda

Declassified Under Authority of the
Interagency Security Declassification Appeals Panel,
E.O. 13526, Section 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 2

Declassification Date: March 18, 2014

BACKGROUND

Rwanda has formally requested that the UNSC lift the arms embargo on Rwanda. Action will likely occur during the week of July 24.

Resolution 918 of May 17, 1994, barred the sale or supply of arms or other military material (including non-lethal equipment) to Rwanda. The embargo was aimed primarily at the former Rwandan government during the height of the genocide and civil war. Resolution 997 of June 9, 1995, affirms the arms embargo applies to the sale and transfer of arms to persons in neighboring states, if the arms are for use in Rwanda.

Nine votes with no Perm-5 vetoes are required to pass a UNSC resolution. We estimate Rwanda can count on NAM support (6 votes, including Rwanda), China (7) and possibly Russia and Argentina (9). USUN anticipates that France and UK will not veto, but likely abstain. However, we would not discount the possibility of a French veto. The Czech Republic, German and Italian positions are not known. Our vote may be pivotal.

OPTIONS

1) Support Lifting - The ex-FAR is actively rearming in neighboring states and possibly planning an August offensive. The GOR claims that it needs arms to exercise its right to self-defense (Article 51). The existing embargo clearly works in favor of the ex-FAR and militias. The GOR remains the main defense against renewed genocide.

Lifting the embargo will allow badly needed logistics, communications and transport equipment to enter the country. Lifting will also facilitate our IMET program and allow countries to train Rwandan troops in human rights and non-violent crowd control. DIA (Tab A) estimates ~~that~~ a lift will not result in a

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substantial amount of additional weapons entering the country, because the GOR already has them in supply.

If war resumes, some may label the UN and U.S. as complicitous. Several countries in the region are likely to oppose lifting the embargo. A vote to lift, however, may be exploited by those who argue for lifting the Bosnia embargo.

2) Oppose Lifting Arms Embargo - The GOR already violates the embargo and receives arms from Uganda and elsewhere. Lifting could enable the GOR to funnel surplus weapons to the Burundi army or associated Tutsi gangs. Reports of GOR-GOB military links are worrisome since the GOB military has been conducting genocide in northern Burundi. Lifting the embargo may also cause a diversion of funds from reconstruction and development programs. Finally, even if unenforceable, the embargo has significant symbolic value in communicating international concern about stopping weapons flows into the region.

3) Support Lifting for Non-Lethal Goods Only - Permit GOR to purchase trucks, communications gear, uniforms, etc. This had been the USG position because the UNSC would not endorse a full lift. While France and others may support this step, it does not address the full needs of the GOR, and would be interpreted as indicative of our lack of support for the GOR.

4) Support Lifting With Conditions - Lifting could be accompanied by conditions. These would include reaffirmation of the prohibition on arms transfers to persons in neighboring states (i.e. ex-FAR, Burundi military and militias) for use in Rwanda and the requirement that weapons be marked with the country of destination and registered in some fashion. Finally, UNAMIR should be mandated to monitor the Burundi border and, if feasible, increased in size to accomplish this additional task.

This move could increase our leverage to press the GOR to announce its intention to prosecute only those 400-plus people accused of war crimes - NOT the myriad of other suspects. This announcement should be coupled with a general amnesty for others to help allay Hutu refugees' fear of persecution. For its part, the international community must demonstrate its commitment to arrest and prosecute the key 400-plus war criminals.

AGENCY POSITIONS

All agencies (at the deputies level or above) support Option 4. They agree the resolution must include language prohibiting Rwanda from transferring arms to other countries as well as the other conditions described above.

The GOR will likely support UN conditions that ban transfer/sale of weapons to other countries and that mandate end-user certificates or markings. Kagame, however, is unlikely to accept any increase in UNAMIR to monitor the Burundi border.

Ambassador Krueger is likely to oppose Option 4, because of the potential effects of any lift on Burundi. If we decide to support lift, we must take care to put our spin on the decision rather than allow potential detractors to do so. We could accomplish some of this press backgrounders. We would also work with Legislative Affairs to apprise the Hill of our plans.

Concurrence by: ^{no copy provided} Alan Kreczko, Richard Clarke

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve option 4. (If you approve, we will clear expected crosshatch).

Approve PK Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A DIA analysis



Background Paper for the Senior Africa Director, NSC

SUBJECT: Possible Consequences of Lifting the Arms Embargo against Rwanda (U)

1. ~~(S)~~ PURPOSE: To provide information to Ms. Susan Rice, the Senior Africa Director, NSC concerning possible consequences of lifting the UN arms embargo against the government of Rwanda.

2. (U) POINTS OF MAJOR INTEREST:

a. ~~(S/NF)~~ Effect on Regional Arms Flows: Lifting the embargo against Kigali while maintaining it against the Rwanda Hutu insurgents would do little to change the current flow of arms into central Africa. DIA believes that the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA) receives intermittent shipments of arms and munitions, ranging from small arms to artillery from various sources via Uganda which is sufficient to sustain its current level of operations. However, large and more sophisticated pieces of equipment have been difficult to obtain. The Hutu insurgents continue to receive small arms, machine guns, mortars, and explosives in sufficient quantities to sustain their insurgent operations despite increased international attention and the current arms embargo.

-- ~~(S/NF)~~ The RPA apparently has problems procuring various non-lethal military assistance such as communications equipment, trucks, night vision devices and conventional military training support essential for a conventional military because of the arms embargo. This hinders its ability to transition from an insurgent to a conventional army better able to combat the on going insurgency and thus improve security in Rwanda.

-- ~~(S/NF)~~ If the embargo were lifted the RPA would likely purchase light armored vehicles and military patrol boats. It would probably like to obtain helicopters, however, at present they are too expensive for the government. These weapons systems would increase the army's capability to interdict and respond to insurgent attacks through increased fire power and mobility. These systems are difficult to obtain clandestinely.

-- ~~(S/NF)~~ Currently, the majority of the RPA's weapons are either Eastern Bloc (China and North Korea) or captured from the former Rwanda Armed Forces (FAR) (primarily French). These sources were out of necessity rather than desire. The army seems to favor the west and would probably seek western sources for their needs. Again, they probably would not seek to replace small arms and artillery, but purchase equipment to meet its transition to a conventional force. To sustain its fleet of French built armored cars, the RPA needs repair parts. France is an unlikely source, however, South Africa's Eland armored car is similar to the French AML 90, thus a likely supplier of repair parts and light armored vehicles.

Declassified Under Authority of the
Interagency Security Declassification Appeals Panel,
E.O. 13526, Section 5.3(b)(3)

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~~DECLASSIFY ON OADR~~

ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 54
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014

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~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~

-- (C/NF) Foreign military training and not high priced weapons appear to be Kigali's most important need. Furthermore, the government cannot afford massive quantities or high priced weapons. MG Kagame has proven himself as a shrewd and pragmatic leader who recognizes the constraints faced by the Rwanda government.

b. (C/NF) Impact on Arms flows to the Burundi Armed Forces (FAB): While the RPA and the FAB have increased official meetings and appear to be prepared to conduct joint operations, especially along the southwestern Rwanda/northwestern Burundi border, it is unlikely that the RPA would provide substantial materiel support directly to the FAB. Although both forces are dominated by Tutsis, recent (b)(1) indicate that the RPA high command has contempt for their Burundi counterparts and the latter's force as a whole. Recent (b)(1) indicates that the RPA has taken extensive defensive measures to protect its bases while the FAB has not. E.O. 13526
1.4(c)

-- (C/NF) The RPA's main motivating factor for cooperation with the FAB probably stems from the increasing threat from northwestern Burundi by Rwanda Hutu insurgents operating with Burundi Hutu insurgents. Kigali would rather ignore Burundi, although clearly events in either country impact on the other.

-- (C/NF) The Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) political program officially stresses a Rwandese identity over maintaining separate Hutu and Tutsi identities. This policy stems from many of the key RPF leaders having grown up in Uganda. Their Uganda experience, unlike that in Hutu dominated Rwanda and Tutsi dominated Burundi did not reenforce severe ethnic cleavages. That said, if the increasing Hutu insurgency threatens the security of Rwanda's southern border and it appeared that the Burundi Tutsi faced an all out ethnic conflict the RPA would likely assist the FAB with materiel support.

3. (C/NF) EXPECTED DEVELOPMENTS: The RPA has demonstrated that it is the most capable, disciplined and battle-hardened force in Central Africa. Therefore, little impact would occur to upset the current military balance with regard to conventional forces (Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi). What would likely occur is an increase in regional instability over the short term. The RPA with foreign assistance would accelerate its conversion to a professional conventional force better able to contain the regional insurgency. Insurgency in all likelihood will never go away, however, its destabilizing affect on Rwanda and the region as whole would diminish in the long term as result.

-- (C/NF) The most significant threat to regional stability comes from the Rwandan Hutu insurgents because not only do they destabilize Rwanda, but eastern Zaire and Burundi and possibly western Tanzania. Given the RPA's increased capability it would probably aggressively contain the insurgents through interdiction and cross-border strikes. The likelihood of the latter is great regardless of the status of the arms embargo. The difference would be a more professional and highly trained force better able to control itself unlike at


Kibeho and one less likely to generate massive panic amongst the Hutu refugee population. The professionalization and conventionalization of the RPA is just a small portion of an overall counterinsurgency plan involving all aspects of the Rwanda government.

COORDINATION: DIO/AFRICA.

PREPARED BY:



APPROVED BY:



[10 U.S.C. 424]

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Interagency Security Declassification Appeals Panel,
E.O. 13526, Section 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 039
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014

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DECL:7/21/05

TO: G - Mr. Wirth

FROM: AF - George E. Moose

SUBJECT: Your Meeting on Burundi with NGOs, White House,
July 25, 1630

I. PURPOSE

- o Inform NGOs of USG policy objectives, accomplishments to date and challenges ahead.
- o Engage NGOs in discussion of initiatives they and USG can take.
- o Convince NGOs Rwanda/Burundi is receiving both the high level attention and resources necessary to meet our policy objectives.

II. KEY POINTS

State of Play

- o Security has been steadily declining over the last two months, as Tutsi extremists have moved to push Hutus out of parts of the capital, Bujumbura. Meanwhile, the Hutu opposition has reportedly formed a government in exile and threatened military reprisals. The Hutu-majority government has become increasingly marginalized and essentially reduced to a near-impotent facade. Some observers predict a descent into massacres on the Rwandan scale. Others expect that the current level of violence and insecurity will continue or increase (but not to Rwanda levels) for months. NGOs, like many players in the international community, are becoming frustrated by the lack of visible forward progress in Burundi. They sometimes express this frustration by criticizing the USG for a perceived lack of high level attention and activity.

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Format and NGO Participants

- o A tentative list of NGO participants is attached. The tentative schedule is that NSC Advisor Tony Lake will give welcoming remarks, introduce yourself, Brian Atwood and DOD Undersecretary Walter Slocum, and then give a short overview of USG policy in the region and USG leadership in organizing the international community. You will then be asked to speak for three minutes, followed by three minute presentations by Atwood and Slocum. Afterwards, Lake will open the floor and moderate 40 minutes of discussion before making concluding remarks. Though the subject is Burundi, questions might be asked about Rwanda. Everything said is off the record.

III. TALKING POINTS

- o Emphasize the high degree of attention which you are giving to Burundi and Rwanda.
- o State that, from the beginning, we have followed a deliberate strategy focused on preventing the kind of explosion in Burundi which we saw in Rwanda. That strategy has been to provide as much support as we can to the Secretary-General's representative, and to make the Burundians aware that they are an object of international attention by sending high level visitors and messages, and through the good work of Amb. Krueger in highlighting reality as we see it. In some aspects, that strategy has worked. We still have a Hutu President and a National Assembly. But, we are not fooling ourselves into thinking that things are going well. In fact, everybody in this room knows that things are further deteriorating. And, for our part, we have seen the need to take increasingly vigorous measures, but always with the adage in mind "This above all, do no harm."
- o Hand out copies of the attached fact sheet on preventive diplomacy and other USG initiatives.
- o Briefly discuss some of these preventive diplomacy initiatives.

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-----Give the status of the Burundi Commission of Inquiry. We applaud UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's July 17 announcement that he is setting up a Commission of Inquiry into the October, 1993 coup attempt in Burundi and its aftermath. We are proud to say that this announcement is a direct result of our discussions with the UN in the days leading up to his speech.

-----Along with the OAU and other members of the international community, we are pushing hard for an all-party regional political conference. We are disappointed that politicians in Bujumbura rejected a call for all-Burundi conference in Addis Ababa for July 24, but will continue to apply pressure on this issue.

-----We understand that, in response to the rejection of the July 24 conference, the OAU will be convening a conference of regional African foreign ministers and the OAU Central Organ to seek an African solution to the Burundi situation, a move which we applaud and support.

- o Discuss military intervention. State that we have been experiencing concern about the security situation in Burundi since early March, and started contingency planning at that time. We shared this plan with a number of our allies, saying that we would do lift and other limited support, and we have gotten no takers.

IV. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

- o Q. How will the US vote on Rwanda's request to lift the arms embargo against its government?
 - A. We will vote for it, with certain conditions. The most important of these is that the arms not be passed on to third parties, i.e., to Burundi. This was a tough call, and I know it won't be universally popular. However, you have to remember that the government of Rwanda is one which we support. They are trying to defend themselves against armed genocidists. To continue the embargo denies them the tools to do that.
- o Q. Is consideration being given to an arms embargo against Burundi and Burundians?

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A. Yes, it is being considered. Many observers believe that implementing an embargo on Burundi will lead the military to undertake a coup. We believe that an embargo is the right step, and are proceeding cautiously, due to these concerns.

o Q. What is the US doing to halt arms flows into the sub-region?

A. We are pushing hard to get observers put into the airports in the region, especially in Eastern Zaire, and think that we are very close to achieving this. We are also supporting calls for a Commission of Inquiry into arms flows in the area.

o Q. Aren't the French and others supplying arms to the rebel Hutus?

A. Since this allegation was first made by Human Rights Watch and others, we have asked the intelligence community to look hard for any foreign government involvement, including the French, and they haven't found any. The French categorically deny any involvement. We are pushing for a Commission of Inquiry to look into the whole question of arms flows.

o Q. What is the status of human rights observers for Burundi?

A. The plan to put civilian human rights monitors on the ground in Burundi has necessarily been revised to include only Bujumbura. Due to security concerns, it appears that observers will not be put in the countryside for now.

o Q. Is it true that the OAU is pulling its military observers out of Burundi?

A. We too have heard rumors, and have recently learned that the OAU Ambassador has asked to withdraw the observers. We are checking this with OAU Secretary General Salim Salim, and will ask him to leave them in.

o Q. Why doesn't the US bar Burundian extremists from coming here?

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- 5 -

o A. We do. We have placed a number of extremists in our look-out system. They and their families are barred from receiving visas. Other nations are doing the same. Given our concerns for the security of personnel on the ground, we have not publicized our actions.

o Q. What is the status of a UN regional special envoy for Rwanda and Burundi?

A. This is an idea we have given full support to. We are hopeful that the Secretary-General will make an announcement soon. It has been suggested that statesmen such as Brian Mulroney of Canada or Julius Nyerere of Tanzania would be good candidates. I would be interested in hearing any suggestions from this group as to who would be a good candidate for this job.

o Q. What is the status of the War Crimes Tribunal in Rwanda?

A. Justice Goldstone is meeting with Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali tomorrow to try to straighten out some of the administrative and bureaucratic issues. The Tribunal already has a budget of \$10 million, a staff of 10 and two shipments of supplies on the ground in Kigali. There will be 21 more investigators in August. The Tribunal plans to have some indictments before the end of 1995. The slow progress on setting up this Tribunal is a source of frustration to everybody, but it's beginning to look like it will work.

Q. Why don't Western countries freeze the assets of extremists?

A. We're taking a hard look at effective ways of doing this, and will be working on it.

Attachments:

Tab 1 - Preventive Diplomacy in Burundi (copies to be handed out)

Tab 2 - Preventive Diplomacy in Rwanda (copies to be handed out)

Tab 3 - Tentative List of Attendees

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Drafted: AF/C:DHefflin
7-3139
SEALLAF 6376

Cleared:

AF:PBushnell
P:SSymington
AF/C:ARender
PM:RWharton
IO/UNP:GStanton
DRL/MLA:JRosenblatt
PRM/AAA:MMcKelvey



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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DECL:10/02/05

October 11, 1995


MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW D. SENS
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Subject: Request for a meeting between National Security
Advisor Lake and Rwandan President Pasteur
Bizimungu

The State Department requests that National Security
Advisor Lake meet with Rwandan President Pasteur Bizimungu.
President Bizimungu will be at UNGA October 22 through 24. The
Rwandan Embassy has indicated that President Bizimungu will
come to Washington October 17 through 21 for meetings and the
Africare dinner.

The purpose of the meeting would be to reaffirm our general
support for the Government of Rwanda and its goals of
repatriation, reconciliation, reconstruction and bringing those
guilty of genocide to justice. In addition, it would provide
an opportunity to press the Rwandans to reform their prisons.

The United States provides significant amounts of
humanitarian and bilateral aid to the sub-region. The current
Government of Rwanda contains both Tutsis and moderate Hutus,
and has brought some stability to the country. We are now
pressing them to create conditions within Rwanda which will
encourage voluntary repatriation of exiles, given that Zaire is
threatening involuntary repatriation in January.



Kenneth C. Brill
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
Biographic Information

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Declassified Under Authority of the
Interagency Security Declassification Appeals Panel,
E.O. 13526, Section 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 040
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEETING WITH RWANDAN PRESIDENT PASTEUR BIZIMUNGU

CONTEXT OF MEETING

President Pasteur Bizimungu, a moderate Hutu and member of the (mainly Tutsi) RPF has been in power since the then-guerrilla RPA took Kigali in July, 1994. His family and political supporters suffered at the hands of extremist Hutus during the events of April, 1994. The RPF-led coalition government has brought a large measure of stability to the country. The USG has supported the current government. We have given over \$600 million in emergency and humanitarian aid to the sub-region; AID has given substantial sums in development aid, DOD has provided humanitarian assistance and IMET training; various agencies have contributed money and personnel to efforts to ready the International Tribunal and Rwandan court system to try those suspected of crimes against humanity, including genocide. We have also supported the Rwandan government at the UN, including support for lifting the arms embargo against Rwanda. European governments believe that the USG is especially credible with the GOR.

Despite considerable progress under very difficult circumstances, President Bizimungu's government has encountered several significant problems since taking power. The judicial system was decimated in 1994. There are over 55,000 prisoners in Rwandan jails in horrific conditions, most arrested since Bizimungu took office. Members of Congress, NGOs and the international community are concerned about this problem, and the GOR's apparent lack of response to it. Zaire has given Rwanda and the UNHCR until December 31 to show substantial progress on repatriating the one million Rwandans in Zaire, at which time Zaire threatens to repatriate them involuntarily, as they started to do in August. Rwandan troops have committed atrocities in April at Kibeho and again in September near Gisenyi, resulting in the deaths of several hundreds. Both incidents were promptly investigated with the full participation of the government (the investigation into the September incidents is not yet complete).

The Government of Rwanda is keenly interested in receiving further development aid and diplomatic/political support from the USG. They have indicated an interest in obtaining non-lethal military equipment from DOD stocks. President Bizimungu has met with Defense Secretary Perry, AID Administrator Atwood, and Assistant Secretary of State George

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Moose during his visit, and also met Secretary Christopher, Vice President Gore and President Clinton as one of the six Africare honorees.

OBJECTIVES

- o To assure President Bizimungu that the USG supports the Government of Rwanda and its goals of repatriation, reconciliation, reconstruction and bringing those guilty of genocide to justice.
- o To discuss the future direction of U.S./Rwanda relations with President Bizimungu.
- o To reaffirm to the President that we are very interested in seeing a successful repatriation of Rwanda refugees, and note that a key step towards this goal would be reducing the prison population so that refugees feel less of a threat of arrest and imprisonment.

TALKING POINTS

- o We wish to reaffirm our support for your government. The situation in Rwanda has not been easy. Despite the very difficult problems you have had to face, you have brought a measure of stability to your country, and we wish to continue to work with you.
- o What do you see as the future direction of U.S./Rwanda relations? We would like a relationship where we can be candid and honest with each other like true friends; where we can support and criticize each other as necessary, but always with the purpose of helping each other.
- o It is very important that there be a successful and timely voluntary repatriation of Rwandan refugees in Zaire. An involuntary repatriation, as threatened by the Zairians if they do not see progress before January 1, would be chaotic and potentially destabilizing to the region. We will continue to work with you and UNHCR to see that this does not happen.
- o In order to encourage voluntary repatriation, it is essential that conditions be created inside Rwanda which will encourage refugees to return. There has been progress, but it is particularly important that measurable progress be taken towards reducing the prison population. This is of growing concern to the human rights community.

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The large numbers of prisoners in Rwanda, and their conditions, are being used by the extremist Hutus to make refugees fear for their safety upon return.

If Asked:

- o. Military Equipment: We will consider requests for acquisition of non-lethal U.S. military equipment by Rwanda on a case-by-case basis. However, we note that public concern about prisons, especially on Capitol Hill, could limit our ability to act.
- o. UNAMIR: We note that UNAMIR's mandate comes up for renewal on December 8. What does your government consider to be the best way to provide for security of returning refugees, security for the International Tribunal, military observers and human rights monitors?

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Rwanda-Burundi Paper: Prerequisites for Success

One key lesson of successful peacekeeping operations is the vital role of consensus among interested major powers, regional countries and border states. This lesson is particularly applicable in the case of Rwanda and Burundi. The chance of success in this troubled region even with French and British cooperation will be small. However, without a common understanding among the interested players, especially France, long-term success will be very difficult to achieve.

Recent efforts to deal with the conflict have been hampered by the perception that the major powers (the U.S., France and Britain) tacitly or overtly support opposite sides in the conflict. Differences among regional players, notably Zaire and Uganda, reflect the preferences of France and Britain. Lack of consensus contributes to the poor showing of the international community: little of the \$700 million pledged has been disbursed; support for UNAMIR has dwindled; the flow of arms to ex-FAR forces has increased; few refugees have been repatriated; and political turmoil, especially in Burundi, remains rampant.

Whatever the specific option, therefore, an effective strategy for dealing with Rwanda and Burundi must have three elements:

- (1) Agreement among the major powers (the U.S., France and Britain) on a common approach. Private bilateral meetings (at the principal or deputy level) with Britain and France will be necessary to develop a common understanding. Once achieved, a high-level, private channel should be established to discuss sensitive political issues such as arms flows, hate radios or indictments of high-level leaders for war crimes.
- (2) A concerted effort by the major powers to persuade key neighboring states, especially Zaire, Tanzania and Uganda, to accept and implement an integrated strategy for Rwanda/Burundi. Working together, the major powers can persuade their regional allies to support a strategy that will promote political reconciliation, control the flow of arms, bring to justice those responsible for war crimes and repatriate refugees.
- (3) A key coordinating role for the United Nations. Our limited humanitarian interests and constrained resources preclude a lead role outside the UN framework. To date, the UN has taken the lead in Rwanda and Burundi, and it should continue to do so. The available UN instruments are peacekeepers, human rights monitors, war crimes tribunals, political good offices and coordination mechanisms for emergency and development assistance.

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E.O. 13526, Section 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 3
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014

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MEETING WITH JUSTICE RICHARD GOLDSTONE

CONTEXT OF MEETING

Justice Richard Goldstone, Chief Prosecutor for the Rwanda War Crimes Tribunal, has had a distinguished career on the South African bench with a key role in his native country's reconciliation process. He is concerned with issues (e.g., information sharing) which are relevant to the Rwanda Tribunal. The USG has supported the Rwanda Tribunal both politically and financially, giving \$3.5 million thus far. The Tribunal has had some administrative growing pains, which are being addressed. It had been expected that the Rwanda Tribunal would issue indictments in November, but it's now clear that won't happen until December. Our own draft legislation to authorize surrender to the Tribunal of alleged offenders found in the U.S. is stalled on the Hill. Goldstone is very concerned about security for the Tribunal, and wants to see that the UNAMIR peacekeeping force is kept in Rwanda to guard the Tribunal, should the GOR agree to a continuation of UNAMIR. The USG peacekeeping core group has decided to go along with the emerging Security Council consensus to renew UNAMIR with its current size and mandate for six months beyond its expiry on December 8.

OBJECTIVES

- o To reiterate U.S. political and financial support for the Tribunal.
- o To assure Justice Goldstone that the USG is concerned about security for the Tribunal, and to seek his views.
- o To discuss our position on UNAMIR renewal.
- o To convey our concern over the long time it is taking the Tribunal to return indictments.
- o To remind Justice Goldstone that we are concerned that there may be one or two alleged violators in the U.S. and ask how the Tribunal staff is progressing on their cases.

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-2-

- o To bring up the fact that Zambia has performed admirably in apprehending several alleged offenders, but that there are concerns that any delays in removing them from Zambia may result in their release (we understand that Goldstone may go to Zambia).

TALKING POINTS

- o We wish to reaffirm our support, both political and financial, for the Rwanda Tribunal. Thus far, our government has committed \$3.5 million, including secondments of experts, and we have been glad to support the creation and funding of the Tribunal at the UN.
- o We regret that the International Tribunal for Rwanda will not issue indictments until December. Early action by the Tribunal is crucial to maintaining the credibility of the international community with the GOR and our ability to press the Rwandans to take appropriate judicial and non-judicial action themselves.
- o As you know, discussions are going on at the UN now regarding a renewal of UNAMIR, whose mandate expires December 8. While we generally support the Security Council consensus that the mandate should be renewed for six months, the outcome is far from certain at this point.
- o We are committed to seeing that the International Tribunal for Rwanda has adequate and appropriate security. It strikes us that some, though not all, of the security could be provided by the Government of Rwanda. What are the specific security needs you foresee that will require a UNAMIR or other international presence? Could these needs be fulfilled some other way?
- o Members of various agencies of our government have been working with the Rwanda Tribunal staff regarding the case of a Rwandan, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, who has immigrated to Texas and has now been accused by Rwandan human rights activists of involvement in massacres in 1994. It now appears that his son may have joined him in Texas over the summer. What progress has your staff made on these cases?
- o Zambia has done an admirable job in detaining several alleged offenders. Observers there are concerned that delays in removing the suspects from Zambia could result in their being freed by the Zambian court system. What could be done to address this problem?

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Action Items
APNSA Trip To Rwanda Dec 94

ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040
Document no. 4
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014

1. Ensure prompt delivery of \$2.5M to clear World Bank arrears and urge rapid obligation of \$50M in World Bank reconstruction funds;
2. Obligate funds to support Rwandan Government, including help for National Assembly, water supply, electricity, demining education;
3. Continue to urge reconciliation and integration between Government and moderate ex-government ministers (who have standing with refugees);
4. Continue U.S. support for International War Crimes Tribunal, urge appointment of other justices;
5. Ensure deployment of 147 UN Human Rights Monitors;
6. Continue consideration of options for improving security in refugee camps, including working more closely with Zaire and Tanzania, and possibly provide foreign trainers for local gendarmerie; explore approach to Zaire with, through or supported by Israelis;
7. Encourage UN and Rwandan government efforts to provide for security for displaced persons returning to their villages;
8. Continue to ensure human rights observers have free access country-wide;
9. Find more ways to publicize reconciliation progress, in camps and in Washington; UNAMIR radio;
10. Continue to press government to provide for safe return and protect rights of refugees;
11. Status of Mr. Gacombitsi.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions of
Ad Hoc Meeting on Rwanda

DATE: Wednesday, February 8, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 3:00 p.m. - 4:00 p.m.

Declassified Under the Authority of
the Interagency Declassification
Appeals Panel, E.O. 13526, Section
5.3(b)(3)

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of the Ad Hoc Meeting
on Rwanda (S)

ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040
Document No. 5
Declassification: March 18, 2014

PARTICIPANTS:

Office of the Vice President

Leon Fuerth
Mark Thomas

CIA

(b)(3)

STATE

George Moose
Townsend Friedman
Phyllis Oakley

JCS

David McIlvoy
Wayne Young

AID

Brian Atwood

JUSTICE

Jamie Gorelick

OSD

Walter Slocombe
Vincent Kern

The White House

Anthony Lake
Nancy Soderberg

USUN

David Scheffer

NSC

Don Steinberg
Susan Rice
Mac DeShazer

OMB

Gordon Adams

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

Camp Security

-- State/RPM will provide at least \$3.5-5 million to the UNHCR
security program for the Rwandan refugee camps in Zaire. (C)

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Threat from Volcanoes

-- During the refugee conference next week in Bujumbura, State will press UNHCR to prepare concrete, viable contingency plans to respond to the potential eruption of one or both volcanoes. (C)

-- Beginning immediately, senior State Department officials will use our substantial leverage with UNHCR to urge Mrs. Ogata to take the opportunity of the threat from the volcanoes to encourage refugees to return home to Rwanda. If necessary, State will apply earmarks to UNHCR funds to ensure that its efforts in Zaire are focused primarily on repatriation. (C)

-- By COB February 15, State will prepare cost estimates of the various options for moving the refugees to new camps outside the Goma area, including to locations further north in Zaire. (U)

Assistance to Rwandan Government and War Crimes Tribunal

-- AID will continue disbursement of programmed funds to Rwanda as swiftly as possible, particularly the \$4 million in the pipeline to support government ministries. (U)

-- AID will take immediate steps to ensure that funds are made available to support the National Triage Commission. (C)

-- The Department of Justice will provide four experts (possibly retirees) to assist the Rwandan War Crimes Tribunal. USUN will ensure that the Prosecutor's Office of the Rwandan War Crimes Tribunal promptly fulfills its commitment to reimburse the USG for the cost of providing four individuals (two prosecutors and two investigators) for a year. (U)

-- USUN will provide DOJ with an analysis of the January 12 Mansfield field report by February 13. (U)

-- USUN will explore with Treasury the possibility of securing several detailees for the Rwanda War Crimes Tribunal from its law enforcement divisions. (U)

Military Issues

-- USUN will initiate consultations in New York to build the case for a partial lift of the UN arms embargo against Rwanda in order to enable provision to the GOR of non-lethal military equipment (e.g. vehicles, parts, communications equipment, etc.) (S)

-- State will instruct Embassy Kigali to approach the GOR to ask if the GOR wants USG assistance to try to convince the Government

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of Zaire to destroy in place the remaining APCs in Zairian custody so they cannot be used for future military activities. Embassy Kigali will ensure the GOR understands we can by no means guarantee the success of such efforts. (C)

-- Starting the week of February 13, State will consult with key members of Congress and relevant committees on the Administration's intention to resume the IMET program for Rwanda in FY95. State will solicit congressional views as to how to remove the existing legal barriers, while stressing our preference for using a Presidential waiver to speed resumption of the program. Based on congressional reaction, State will proceed either with the waiver or with legislation. (U)

Burundi

-- State will continue its efforts to promote stability in Burundi. The White House will pursue the possibility of taping a one minute Presidential radio address urging calm. (U)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 7, 1995

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: DON STEINBERG *DS*
SUSAN RICE *SR*

SUBJECT: Rwanda-Burundi Ad Hoc Meeting, 3 p.m.,
Wednesday, February 8

Declassified Under Authority of the
Interagency Security Declassification Appeals Panel,
E.O. 13526, Section 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 6
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014

This meeting is held against the backdrop of increasingly gloomy projections by the intelligence agencies on the prospects for peace and national reconciliation in Rwanda and for avoiding an ethnic blow-up in Burundi. While our support programs for these countries are proceeding, there are numerous specific issues that need impetus at the senior level.

ISSUE I: To what extent should the USG provide support for UNHCR camp security program?

Background: UNHCR plans to use Zairian troops to provide security in the Zairian refugee camps. UNHCR will pay salary supplements for up to 1500 Zairian troops who will be supported by a UNHCR trainers and logisticians. We anticipate the cost to UNHCR will be \$13-15 million, raised through voluntary contributions. Absent willing troop contributors, this unorthodox method of providing security remains the only game in town. Private contractors were considered but deemed prohibitively expensive. State previously indicated its intention to provide as much as \$5 million for this effort, but has recently indicated they may instead provide 25 percent of whatever the total cost will be.

Goal

-- Nail down State's commitment to contribute at least 25% percent of the cost of the UNHCR mission.

ISSUE II: How should the U.S. respond to the threat to the refugee population posed by the potential eruption of the volcanos?

Background: There is a body of convincing evidence that one or both of the two volcanos near Goma will soon erupt. Experts estimate one may well blow in next couple months; the other may likely within six months. State conveyed its concerns for safety of refugees to UNHCR. UNHCR is conducting a public information

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campaign, preparing contingency plans to evacuate refugees and considering moving refugees to a site 30 miles north in Zaire.

We have urged State to press UNHCR to use the threat posed by the volcanos to encourage substantial refugee repatriation. We have sought to discourage notions of moving camps as costly and ultimately counterproductive. State has done little so far as it seems torn between the customary reluctance to pressure refugees to return and the various problems posed by a permanent refugee population. State's draft paper, proposing another approach to Mrs. Ogata, is at Tab II.

Goal:

-- Instruct State to press Ogata next week at regional refugee conference in Bujumbura to pursue activist repatriation campaign, using volcanoes as impetus.

ISSUE III: Assistance/Justice Programs

a) Is AID moving sufficiently quickly to provide agreed assistance to the GOR for rehabilitation of ministries, administration of justice programs, and the National Triage Commission?

b) Will DOJ/FBI Provide Personnel to support the Rwandan War Crimes Tribunal?

Background:

AID Programs: AID's project grant agreement for \$3.4 million for assistance to ministries (other than Justice) was signed January 11. The project procurement of vehicles, computers, other office equipment and technical assistance has begun, but is going slowly. Separately, on January 31, the World Bank made available the \$50 million line of credit to the GOR.

We remain concerned about the slow pace of the National Triage Commission (NTC) in reviewing the files of some 20,000 persons arrested (including 10,000 held in overcrowded prisons) to determine if there are grounds to hold them. Brian Atwood is still reviewing the appropriateness and legality of direct U.S. assistance to the GOR for this purpose. Some in AID are concerned there may be a legal prohibition against using AID funds for what may be construed as law enforcement purposes. At present, AID is providing \$600,000 in supplies to the Ministry of Justice, which oversees the NTC, and is preparing a longer-term \$4 million MOJ support project. In addition, State will provide \$1.4 million for the War Crimes Tribunal once the 15-day notification period expires the week of February 20.

DOJ/FBI Personnel: DOJ and FBI have not provided any of the 13 investigators requested from them for the War Crimes Tribunal. Jamie Gorelick assures us DOJ is supportive but the problem is funding. State has none for this purpose and believes either DOJ or the Tribunal itself should identify the resources. Goldstone is willing to pay for four DOJ investigators for Yugoslavia, which may relieve some constraints on DOJ support for Rwanda, but he may not be able to deliver the UN bureaucracy. Gorelick has tasked DOJ to determine the maximum support it can provide. USUN is pressing the UN to help with funding. L

Goals

-- Ask AID for update on assist provided/planned; Direct AID to move asap to provide assistance for the rehabilitation of ministries.

-- Within legal constraints, instruct AID to provide as much assistance as possible directly to NTC or through Ministry of Justice for the rapid processing of cases, especially those of individuals held in overcrowded prisons. Request status from AID report to NSC by COB Monday.

-- Obtain commitment from DOJ directly and on behalf of FBI for commitment a minimum of 5 investigators; ask USUN to continue pressing UN agreement to some USG investigators and provide status report by COB Monday. ✓

ISSUE VI: Military Issues

a) Should the U.S. seek a partial lifting of the UN arms embargo against Rwanda to enable the provision of non-lethal aid to GOR?

b) Should the USG seek GOR agreement to destruction by GOZ of ex-FAR APCs in Zaire?

c) Should the Administration use Presidential waiver authorities to lift legal restrictions on providing IMET to Rwanda in FY 95?

Background:

Arms Embargo: At our urging, the UNSC imposed a sweeping arms/related materiel embargo on Rwanda last May. Kagame wants the embargo lifted so the RPA may receive non-lethal equipment, including communications gear and vehicles. He argues this equipment will help stabilize the security situation and improve command and control, thereby reducing RPA indiscipline. DOD supports modifying the embargo to allow provision of non-lethal assistance (trucks, commo gear etc.). We agree with DOD that

partial lift and possible provision of non-lethal aid is fully consistent with our policy of bolstering GOR. State believes even partial lift would be a mistake, sending signal that a military solution is possible in Rwanda.

Obtaining agreement even to partial lift in UNSC would be difficult. French and UK at minimum are likely to resist.

APCs in Zaire: Intelligence indicates about a dozen of the 20 ex-FAR APCs, known to have been in GOZ custody, are missing. The presumption is they are in ex-FAR hands. The remainder are in GOZ cantonment sites. We would like to prevent ex-FAR from obtaining remaining APCs for use in counter-offensives. The UN arms embargo against Rwanda prevents return of APCs to GOR. State is resisting an alternative approach of urging GOR to ask GOZ to destroy the vehicles in place. State thinks such an approach places us in an awkward position. While we think this less than a top-priority issue, we believe we should try to prevent ex-FAR from acquiring the remaining APCs.

IMET: The FY95 Foreign Operations Act prohibits provision of IMET to GOR in FY95. The legislation was enacted in the wake of the genocide last year and was not directed at the present government. While the law does not prohibit IMET in FY96, the prohibition could be rolled over into the next FY. State has agreed to work with Congress to ensure that the prohibition is not extended.

Kagame requested IMET in December. All agencies agree we should resume IMET immediately to promote professionalism and respect for civilian authority and human rights, and we have \$50,000 still available in FY 95. The issue is under what legal authorities do we resume the program. There are two options: getting legislative relief, or; using a Presidential waiver authority (e.g. 614). Legislative relief is uncertain and would not come for months until there is an appropriate legislative vehicle, which may be too late in the FY. State is resisting using a waiver, arguing we have used such waivers too frequently in the past and risk angering Congress if we use this tool. Initial Hill consultations reveal no resistance to lifting the FY-95 IMET prohibition.

Kigali DATT: Earlier issue of whether DOD would extend tour of US DATT in Kigali has been resolved at least temporarily. Current DATT will stay six more months. We may have to revisit issue at end of that period.

Goals

-- Obtain agreement that State will begin consultations in New York and regional capitals on potential resolution lifting arms embargo partially to allow provision of non-lethal aid. ✓

-- Encourage State to approach GOR to urge that it request GOZ to destroy APCs in place. ✓

-- Instruct State to sound out key Members of Congress on how best to provide IMET to GOR in FY95. State should stress Administration's preference for using waiver due to slow pace of legislation. If no significant negative reaction, State should proceed with waiver. State should report to NSC by Feb. 17. ✓

ISSUE V: What more can/should USG do to prevent major, new outbreak of violence in Burundi?

Background:

Burundi seems to lurch from crisis to crisis, playing an increasingly dangerous game of "chicken" with ethnic warfare. While it is up to the FRODEBU and UPRONA leadership to take the tough steps needed for national reconciliation, we have undertaken a number of activities to build up the core of moderates, ease the external pressures and keep the country in the spotlight.

These actions include: enhanced assistance focused largely on national reconciliation; ensuring steady stream of visitors, most recently a UN Security Council team that leaves NY February 8; supporting a regional refugee conference in Bujumbura next week; supporting OAU and other human rights monitors; and issuing strong statements from Embassy Kigali and State. We are now considering additional steps, including a statement by POTUS to the refugee conference and a taped VOA message. W

Goals

-- Press Ad Hoc Group for ideas to expand efforts to prevent a major blow-up in Burundi. ✓

-- Urge State to prepare a public affairs strategy highlighting Administration efforts to address this potential crisis, including letter from A/S Moose to either New York Times or Washington Post. ✓

Attachments

Tab I Agenda

Tab II State Paper on Volcanos

Hall, Wilma G.

ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 7

Declassification Date: March 18, 2014

From: Steinberg, Donald K.
To: @UP - APNSA Special Assistants
Cc: /R, Record at A1; @GLOBAL - Global Affairs; @AFRICA - African Affairs;
@DEMOCRACY - Democracy Affairs
Subject: Efforts to Ease Tensions in Burundi [CONFIDENTIAL]
Date: Friday, February 03, 1995 10:27AM
Priority: High

Tony/Nancy:

To follow-up on Burundi: Our efforts to keep ethnic tensions in check in Burundi have intensified since the outbreak of killings in Rwanda. We have sought to build up the core of moderates, ease the external pressures and keep the country in the spotlight. We have enhanced our aid program focussed largely on national reconciliation, maintained a steady stream of visitors (including the Presidential mission in September and your visit in December), encouraged Ambassador Krueger to be a visible presence and urged the UN, OAU and private groups to support these efforts. Given the history of ethnic violence and the pressure that society is under, the absence of a major blow-up in the past year is an achievement. At present, in addition to your letter to Ntibantunganya, the strong press statement from State and Krueger's powerful speech, we have the following activities in train:

o We are helping fund the regional refugee conference in Bujumbura from February 15-17, in part to have the positive effects of the presence of 750 international experts in the country. This is a joint UNHCR/OAU activity that will address the issues of Rwandan and Burundian refugees. A/S Phyllis Oakley will head a large American delegation. In addition, we are scheduling a meeting of the major donors to Burundi on the margins of this conference to consider additional efforts.

o The Western ambassadors in Bujumbura are working together to call on all the senior leaders of the Government and opposition to urge restraint. Today, for example, they are doing a joint demarche on the defense minister. The UN Special Representative Abdullah has been equally active.

o The 45 OAU human rights monitors have been moving more actively throughout the country to demonstrate a more visible presence. As you know, their mandate has been renewed until at least June.

o We are supporting a conference, now taking place this week in London, where key Burundians have been drawn together from across the political spectrum by the International Alert (an NGO with expertise in conflict management), with the goal of creating a core group of moderates.

o I met with the Carter Center Africa director yesterday, in part to discuss the Center sending out another mission to Burundi, as they did last year when Obassanjo, Deng and others went out on a democracy mission. They are considering the request. AF/C officer director Arlene Render has also been meeting with a wide variety of NGO's to see if there are other activities they can undertake.

If you think it appropriate, additional steps could go to the Presidential level. A letter or brief phone call to Ntibantunganya; a taped message of reconciliation like the one we did for Rwanda for broadcast by VOA into Burundi; a letter to the delegates to the refugee conference or at least a strong White House/Presidential statement -- any of these would seem appropriate. What do you think?

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20933

Summary of Conclusions of
Ad Hoc Meeting on Rwanda/Burundi

DATE: Wednesday, August 9, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 1:00-3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Ad Hoc Meeting on
Rwanda/Burundi

PARTICIPANTS:

Office of the Vice President
Bill Wise

State
Dick Bogosian
Pru Bushnell
Phyllis Oakley

Defense
Bernd McConnell
Greg Saunders

USUN
Rick Inderfurth
Lori Shestack

CIA

(b)(3)

JCS
Dave McIlvoy
Orrin Young

AID
Dick McCall

White House
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
MacArthur DeShazer
Shawn McCormick
Mike Sheehan

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Interagency Security Classification
Appeals Panel, E.O. 13526, Section
5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040
Document No. 8
Declassification: March 18, 2014

Summary of Conclusions


It was agreed that the following actions would be completed by
COB on Tuesday, August 15 unless otherwise stated:

Arms Embargo:

Following the expected lifting of the arms embargo, we would
consider provisions of non-lethal equipment (communications,
trucks) if requested. DOD agreed to review what might be
available in the near term. Any decision on provision of lethal
aid was deferred. State will work up ideas to press for progress
in prison conditions/release as we consider aid requests.

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Prison Conditions:

- By Friday, August 11, State will provide NSC a report on availability of funds to assist with construction of prisons, prefabricated housing and tents (work w/ICRC). (C)

War Crimes Tribunal:

- By Friday, August 11, AID will work with State on a plan of action to remove obstacles to assist with getting the Tribunal up and running. As part of the plan, AID will work to resolve issues involving UN reimbursements for personnel in Bosnia to free up funds to support DOJ personnel for Rwanda. (C)
- Also, State will send to Justice the plan regarding security for DOJ officials working with the Tribunal. (C)

International Mediation:

- State will report on a plan of forming a Bosnia-style contact group as well as a possible regional conference on Burundi and Rwanda. Indicate plans for regional travel. (C)

IMET Funds:

- State, with DOD assistance, will determine whether and when there might be an additional \$50,000 in IMET funds for Rwanda. (C)

Refugees:

- State/PRM in consultation with the Belgians will push UNHCR to implement a plan to relocate UNHCR camps from Rwandan border. (C)
- State will develop a prospective plan for engaging Mobutu on Rwandan issues. (C)

Burundi:

- All agencies will review the situation in Burundi and whether current efforts are adequate to stem ethnic violence. We will also review possibilities relating to an ICITAP program. (C)


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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20983

August 18, 1995

NOTED



INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR NANCY E. SODERBERG

THROUGH: SUSAN E. RICE *SR*

FROM: SHAWN H. MCCORMICK *SM*

SUBJECT: Rwanda/Burundi Ad Hoc Meeting Taskings Update

We have received most but not all of the taskings from the August 9 Ad Hoc Meeting on Rwanda/Burundi. Those that remain include Bogosian's big think piece on the contact group and substantive policy proposal, IMET (which is being debated inside State), and Mobutu (which will come as soon as Moose returns and reviews it on Monday).

At Tab I are the original taskings and status report. At Tab II are the responses received to date.

Attachments

Tab I Taskings from August 9 Meeting and Status Report

Tab II Responses to Taskings

cc: Michael Sheehan

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Interagency Security Declassification Appeals Panel,
E.O. 13526, Section 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP Appeal no. 2013-040, document no. 9
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014

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CONTACT GROUP / REGIONAL CONFERENCE

(RWSFD) - SUBSTANTIVE - PAPER TO FOLLOW

1

DRAFT - CIRCULATED FOR COMMENT:

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E.O. 13526, Section 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 43
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014

INTRODUCTION: At the August 9 White House meeting on Rwanda and Burundi, we briefly considered our overall diplomatic strategy and agreed to discuss this matter in more detail at the next meeting which has been set for Thursday, August 17. At the August 9 meeting we distributed an unclassified draft strategy paper ("Great Lakes Political Conference: Objectives and Methods). This paper outlines the strategy behind a comprehensive regional political conference. Two other unclassified, internal State/AF memos provide additional information and describe the operational context in which we will implement our diplomatic strategy. One is an undated draft regional strategy paper which was prepared in late July and can serve as a good overall current action checklist. The other is the August 2 Bogosian-Wirth memo that divides the many specific issues and actions into five priority policy areas. Copies of all three memos are enclosed under cover of this memorandum.

OBJECTIVES: Our diplomacy is aimed at restoring stability to the Great Lakes region. With stability, the international community, together with local governments and inhabitants can turn their attention to the more enduring challenges of development and governance. To get to that point, it is imperative to resolve the refugee crisis and achieve reconciliation within Rwanda and Burundi. This will require judicial and other reforms including of the military and the police.

We have other diplomatic objectives as well including the success of the Rwanda Tribunal given the implications of genocide in Rwanda. Achieving our objectives requires that the USG maximize its influence and "diplomatic reach" at a time of reduced resources and urgent problems clamoring for attention in other parts of the world. We, therefore, need the support of the other key players in the Great Lakes area, and we need to minimize conflicts with such key players as the French.

CONTACT GROUPS: As noted at last Wednesday's meeting, the relationship with France could be crucial; therefore, we will play particularly close attention to the French, largely through the US-France-Belgium contact group that we have initiated. There will also be a larger contact group of key donors including the Germans, British, Dutch and Canadians who may occasionally play helpful political roles and have been among the most active donors in the region. The European governments will assure that the EU continues to make a positive contribution in the region.

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In addition, we need to maintain active contact with the key African players, i.e., Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, Ethiopia and the OAU. In New York and Geneva important multilateral officials comprise the third contact group. Of course, we will have continuing diplomatic contact with the governments of Rwanda and Burundi.

As we move toward a regional conference, the diplomatic pace is likely to intensify. Our Embassies and Missions will carry out the majority of contacts, but the Rwanda/Burundi Coordinator should take the lead in developing and implementing our strategy, and he should establish personal contact with key decisionmakers in the relevant capitals. He will work closely with the French and Belgian Embassies in Washington and will travel as necessary to New York, Europe and Africa. In early September he will make an extensive trip to Europe (Brussels, Paris, Geneva, London, The Hague, Bonn, and Rome) and to Africa (Addis Ababa, Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, Kampala, Kinshasa, Bujumbura, and Kigali) and will follow-up as feasible. His principal focus during the trip will be to lay the groundwork for a comprehensive regional conference, but inevitably the other issues will have to be addressed as well.

Attachments:

1. Great Lakes Political Conference Memorandum dated Aug. 7, 1995
2. Rwanda/Burundi/Eastern Zaire/Western Tanzanian Regional Strategy paper
3. Rwanda/Burundi Priorities Memorandum dated August 2, 1995

Distribution:

AF/FO:P/DAS Bushnell
AF/C:ARender
AID:RMCCall
NSC:SRice
G:AJoyce
IO-GWard
PRM:POakley
DRL:JShattuck

Drafted by:AF/FO:Rwanda/Burundi Coordinator:Amb.RBogosian
SERWB 5 x7-1818

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MEMORANDUM

(revised)
August 7, 1995

TO: AF - George E. Moose
THRU: AF - Prudence Bushnell
FROM: AF/C - Arlene Render
SUBJECT: Great Lakes Political Conference: Objectives and
Methods

CONCEPT

A fundamental component of our African Great Lakes regional strategy -- probably essential to breaking the downward spiral of violence emanating from unresolved conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi which threatens to destabilize the entire region -- is the urgent convening of an international conference to deal with the central issues confronting those countries. Key Western countries, including France, Belgium, Germany and the UK support the conference concept and the Spanish Presidency of the EU has prepared a preliminary draft position paper regarding the scope and goals for such a conference. In addition, following the international conference, all-parties conferences could be organized for Burundi and Rwanda, if necessary.

There is general agreement that the international conference should be convened jointly by the UN and OAU, probably with the respective organizations' Secretaries-General chairing at least the initial sessions. In addition to the immediately affected regional countries (Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, and probably Kenya), important neighbors need to be invited, at least in observer capacity. In awareness of the anglophone/francophone cleavage, an equitable number of invitations to African observers should be given to a influential Arab and francophone observers as well as anglophones. Most importantly, major donors including, France, Belgium, UK, Japan, Netherlands, and the U.S. among others need to be present as observers and to lend impetus to

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the process. To enhance the African sense of importance of the international conference, it should, if possible, be held in Europe; Addis Ababa, as both OAU headquarters and seat of the current OAU president would also be suitable but might diminish the importance Africans attach to the conference. An alternative site might be South Africa. Given deteriorating security conditions in Burundi and fears of an imminent clash between the ex-FAR and RPA, the conference should be convened as soon as possible on the understanding that it be carefully prepared and that the international community is in agreement on the goals.

ORGANIZATION

The conference should be viewed as two parallel tracks. The first track would be an interlocking set of international understandings and agreements between Great Lakes states dealing with repatriation of refugees, security, and economic development. The second track would focus on internal reconciliation which would require the presence of all key factions and political parties, both civilian and military from Rwanda and Burundi. A crucial issue which would need to be resolved if this track has any hope of success would be agreement that acceptable (non-criminal or genocidally responsible) exile representatives, particularly of the Hutu communities of Burundi and Rwanda, would have to be present. There could be no unilateral vetoes by one group of another. Both the RPA and extremist Tutsi factions in Burundi would have to be convinced to participate with these groups, however great their reluctance. To assist in the internal reconciliation track, considerable reliance could be placed on experienced NGOs such as South Africa's ACCORD or the Vatican's San Egidio order.

Given the probable lack of time on the part of the UN and OAU to prepare the organization of the conference, we should consider soliciting an outside group such as the Global Coalition for Africa (GCA). (Since the GCA is part of the World Bank and both the UN and all African states are members of the GCA, it should be an acceptable entity to provide both conference services and to assist in the political spadework of persuading the various possibly recalcitrant parties to attend and be forthcoming.) The U.S. should be prepared, in concert with the donor community, to help get participants to the table

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and to assist in funding conference preparations. To maximize the chances of success of the international conference, a preliminary meeting should be held to go over conference logistics and more importantly pre-agree on goals, and, if possible, tactics.

The conference agenda could follow the Spanish EU draft paper (attached) whose main agenda items are:

- I. Political and Security
 - A. Political Dialogue/Protection of Minority Rights
 - B. Legal Security (respect for human rights, establishment of rule of law)
 - C. Military Security
- II. Economic Rehabilitation and Development
- III. Refugees and the Human Dimension

The goals of the conference would be as follows (some are more properly defined as tactics encapsulating overall goals):

Track I: POLITICAL RECONCILIATION

- an end to internal violence, external incursions and armed irregular militias;
- progressive installation (in carefully phased stages) of majority democratic rule (as registered in a free, fair, and transparent election process), tightly bound to guarantees for minority rights;
- an end to impunity and the cycles of violence through establishment of a professional, neutral multiethnic judiciary;
- creation of a multiethnic, professional army obedient to democratically elected civilian authority and respectful of human rights;
- repatriation and/or resettlement of refugees;
- creation of a follow-up mechanism to assure rigorous enforcement of agreements;

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- carefully structured regional economic development/rehabilitation program with adequate infusion of donor assistance. Emphasis should be given to: maximum employment strategies, especially for male youth; family planning; improved agricultural practices; regional economic integration focusing on comparative advantage.
- careful preparation of educational, cultural and media programs designed to promote inter-ethnic reconciliation while pointing out the moral, physical and national costs of hate, genocide and community strife.

Following the conference, some working groups could meet from time to time to follow-up on agreed actions. A second track could be an all-parties internal conference, particularly for Burundi.

U.S. ROLE

The U.S. would have overlapping, reinforcing roles in both the international and all-parties conferences, if necessary. Its principal roles would be both facilitative and active. Among them are:

- providing behind-the-scenes organizational expertise for the conferences;
- funding significant aspects of the conferences including transportation, accommodation and security;
- acting effectively, where necessary, to break deadlocks and generally to serve as honest broker. To be most effective, such a role would have to be performed "off camera";
- galvanizing donor community to fund directly and in-kind services of activities deemed essential to break the cycle of violence i.e. alternative employment generation, professionalizing military to serve democratically elected civilian government, establishing media and cultural programs designed to counter ethnic hatred propaganda.

To engender the necessary atmosphere conducive to obtaining assent to participate from reluctant parties, the U.S. should consider the following steps:

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- having the President personally and publicly appeal to all regional governments to participate; private warnings of aid -- both development and humanitarian -- freeze/reduction/cutoffs could be made to recalcitrant parties;
- getting key Western donors heads of government and NGOs to make similar appeals;

France has strongly supported the concept of an international regional political conference. Nevertheless, France had been a staunch supporter of the Habyarimana government in Rwanda and has complex relations with Burundi.



Attachments:

As stated

Approved:RCS:RWBogolian
8/3/95, X7-2080
W-SECB 6754

Drafted:AF/C:RJFendrick
Cleared:AF/C:DLHeflin
AF/RA:SFisher
IO/UNP:GStanton

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Rwanda/Burundi/Eastern Zaire/ Western
Tanzanian Regional Strategy

The situation in the sub-region requires a united long-term strategy to deal with the complex, multifaceted issues. Demographics, ethnicity and poverty are the underlying causes of the problems we now face. These problems are exacerbated by lack of sufficient land within the two countries of Burundi and Rwanda and poverty. A short-term solution may be the separation of the two groups but it is not likely to succeed given their strong ties to their respective countries. We must continue to work for reconciliation underscoring clearly that we support majority rule but with protection of minority rights, the cornerstones of democracy. We should continue to take advantage of opportunities to explain our policy with a view to continue building a broad consensus for it in Washington and abroad.

Principles Governing Our Policy

- o We support a democratic process in both Rwanda and Burundi. This means governments that practice genuine powersharing and protection of minority rights.
- o We will continue to highlight human rights abuses within both countries and push for punishment for abusers.
- o Above all, do no harm.

U. S. Interests

Rwanda/Burundi

- a. Regional Stability. Promotion of strong internal institutions, particularly through effective judicial administration and a multi-ethnic military.
- b. Establishment of a climate conducive to trading opportunities and the establishment of businesses.
- c. Avoiding future large-scale humanitarian crisis.
- d. Stopping the cycles of impunity in Africa and of genocide.

Regional Stability

Assumptions:

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- o Tutsi hegemony is growing in the sub-region. Cooperation between the militaries of Rwanda and Burundi exists and will grow as Hutus rearm themselves and cross border violence increases. Given Tutsi minority status, this is an inherently unstable development and conducive to state disintegration/failure.
- o The militaries in both countries do not necessarily share our sub-regional vision of powersharing in the two countries.
- o The majority of Hutu refugees will not return to Rwanda for many years. Therefore, we must relocate refugees to minimize economic costs to the international community.
- o Continued presence of refugees in eastern Zaire and western Tanzania will continue to have a destabilizing effect not only on the two countries but the region.
- o Zaire and Tanzania will tire of refugees on their soil and perhaps resort to closing borders, aiding Hutus against GOR, invading Rwanda, Burundi or both, etc. (Tanzania has already closed its borders to refugees.)
- o The RPA may stage preemptive strikes into Zaire to get at the EX-FAR. Rwanda Hutus will use an insurgency to force political settlement with the RPA.

Goals and Objectives.

1. Push for genuine powersharing in Rwanda. Our actions must strengthen the civilian government.

Internal Rwanda Elements:

- Provide IMET.
- Push donors on contributing to re-establishment of a judicial system. Begin at provincial level.
- Push International Tribunal to begin indictments and prosecution of genocide cases before end of the year.
- Push GOR to begin trials of military accused of human rights abuses.
- Push GOR to announce its list of war criminals. This will have a positive effect on Hutus living in refugee camps.
- Push GOR to relieve prison conditions by releasing detainees and issuing warnings to population not to engage in individual retribution.

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- Human Rights Training for all groups across the political spectrum. Get Gov't to make it a required course for all government employees including military personnel.
- Push GOR to establish benchmarks for broadening political base.
- Demobilize children in RPA.
- Broaden base of military.
- Encourage aid programs in areas of education and development (for demobilize youth) of job training skills in areas which will encourage outside investments.
- IMET to Rwanda. Stress role of a military in a civilian government as well as provide other courses.
- o Internal Burundi Elements:
 - In Burundi, support peace and reconciliation programs underway with appropriate human rights safeguards and plans for a national debate.
 - IMET program should stress role of a military in a civilian government and provide courses.
 - Work with political parties to combat ethnic hatred; provide IV grants to study party process in the U.S.
 - Encourage aid programs in areas of education and development of job training skills in areas which will encourage outside investments.
 - Create work programs for youth, thus marginalizing Bagaza's/Nyangoma's influence on them.
 - Get churches more active in reconciliation efforts/ Work with Catholic Dioceses and others to take lead;
 - Create a multi-ethnic police force.
 - Increase OAU/Human Rights monitors.
 - Create a non-government peace radio.
- 2. Support an international political conference of countries in the Great Lakes region with five perm reps of UNSC as observers. Conference and follow-up sessions should be organized along Middle East talks format.

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o Refugees

- Resettle refugees away from borders and provide them with tools/ etc. to begin new lives.
- Explore with Tanzania/Zaire possibilities for relocating those refugees on its soil in Tanzania/Zaire for the medium-term.
- Explore possibility with Tribunal officials of setting up shop on edge of camps to inform inhabitants whether or not they can expect to face prosecution upon return to Rwanda. This may speed up voluntary repatriation of those who are skeptical about their future.
- Decrease rations to refugees. This will decrease funds available to refugees to buy weapons, etc.
- Explore possibility of further separating military from civilians in camps.
- Explore placing Zairian/Tanzanian monitors in non-UNHCR camps to monitor activities of ex-Far.

Track II Diplomacy:

Working with NGOs interested in Burundi. A number of U.S. and international NGOs are active in Burundi. We should continue to work with them and pursue the following:

- Solicit highly respected US NGOs to form the corps of a friends of the Great Lakes group.

Objectives:

- Support "formal diplomatic track" with insights, contacts, people to people reconciliation (they can put Hutus together with Tutsis in patterns that USG can't for "reasons of State" o/e/ "bad" old government guys and others).
- Provide "live" feedback on human rights efforts -- what's working, what isn't, where are the gaps -- people, money.
- Strengthen international "NGO loop. (What do the French and others see and say.?)

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- Designate a person (FSO 1 or 2) to specifically work with these groups.
- Build a media campaign around "peace and reconciliation"
 - regional solution for regional problems.
- VOA campaign but reset beyond to French, Belgian and British.
- "PsyOps" campaign in local press and media.
- Find hi-profile U.S. and other pop artists to deliver message -- "We Are The World."
- Host conference or provide NGO "seed" money to host conference on "land-pressure" problems -- other solutions elsewhere.

Short-Term Actions to Reinvigorate Preventive Diplomacy Efforts in Burundi.

A. Current U.S. and international community efforts underway. These attempts help to bolster moderates and deter extremists and should continue.

- High-level visits and public statements.
- Promote dialogue. [We have devoted USD 5 million to a democracy/governance program that helps promote peaceful conflict resolution.]
- Move forward on the UN commission of inquiry.
- Move forward on aid to the Burundi judiciary. [The U.S. has USD 400,000 in ESF to make available for this; the Belgians are taking the lead.]
- Move forward with deployment of human rights monitors, provided they have adequate training, a clear mandate, and adequate security arrangements, and they coordinate their efforts with the Secretary General's special representative.
- continue visa sanctions. The U.S. has entered the names of 47 extremists in our look-out system, and will try to exclude them if they apply.

B. The U.S. proposed the following additional measures:

- Encourage more meetings between regional leaders to address regional security and refugee issues.
- Encourage an African elder statesman such as Mugabe or Nyerere to become engaged over the long term to facilitate dialogue between the two communities.

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ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 46

Declassification Date: March 18, 2014



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

August 2, 1995

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MEMORANDUM

TO: G - Timothy E. Wirth

THROUGH: AF - George E. Moose

FROM: Rwanda/Burundi Coordinator - R.W. Bogosian

SUBJECT: Rwanda/Burundi Priorities

TO 8/2/95

Over the near term, five sets of activities or priority issues will dominate my agenda as Rwanda/Burundi Coordinator. They are:

- A Regional Conference
- Human Rights/Administration of Justice
- Refugees
- Support of Government of Rwanda/Burundi Centrists
- Emergency Planning

The following is an annotated outline of some of the most important or delicate aspects of each set of issues and actions:

REGIONAL CONFERENCE: There is a fairly broad consensus that the time is ripe for a comprehensive regional conference. We will provide our views on how best to organize and prepare for such a conference in a separate memorandum. Over the near term, we will consult closely with several important constituencies, viz., the UN and OAU; key European governments including, perhaps, the Vatican; Rwanda and Burundi neighbors, which could touch on sensitive bilateral issues, notably with Zaire; and with the Hill, the NGOs and the press. In addition to basic political issues, many of the specific points noted below would have to be considered at the Regional Conference or follow-on meetings.

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HUMAN RIGHTS/ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: Past or present human rights abuses are central concerns for us in both Rwanda and Burundi. In both countries it is essential to make progress in improving very weak, virtually moribund, systems of justice. It seems that at last we are making progress with the Rwanda tribunal and the Burundi Commission of Inquiry, but much more remains to be done. In addition, prison overcrowding in Rwanda, administration of justice legislation, the issue of foreign magistrates and related issues all require priority attention if there is to be progress on the human rights front and if we are to succeed in encouraging repatriation of refugees. Tactically, we have opportunities to exert leverage as we support Rwanda's request to have the arms embargo lifted.

REFUGEES: The whole range of refugee issues will continue to require urgent attention, including issues arising out of the actual return of refugees such as reconciliation at the local level. Current concerns include the presence of arms among Rwandan refugees in Zaire. There are logistical problems related to managing the refugee camps and moving them. We are also concerned about the possibility of fresh refugee movements out of Burundi and the possible closure of Tanzania's border with Burundi.

SUPPORT FOR THE GOR AND BURUNDI CENTRISTS: This is a shorthand way of referring to the several efforts underway to shore-up moderates in both countries. As you know, there are several AID, USIS and IMET programs already being implemented and others being requested and/or considered. In addition, there is the UNDP Roundtable process where disbursements have been very disappointing, especially compared to pledges. SRSR Abdallah informally has proposed having a UNDP Roundtable for Burundi. One aspect of this set of issues is the military element. We need to consider what military assistance, if any, we or our allies should consider providing either country. We are talking of lifting the arms embargo on Rwanda while looking into whether one should be imposed on Burundi. Related to the need to improve the administration of justice is the need to professionalize local police capabilities. What role, if any, should the U.S. play in this regard?

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EMERGENCY PLANNING: Even as we plan specific programs with their staffing implications, we have to plan for contingencies. These include OFDA-type planning for sudden, massive refugee flows. Such thorny problems as being able to provide adequate water remain to be resolved. We also have continually to review the safety of Americans in Rwanda and Burundi. The latter situation, should it deteriorate precipitously, may require an emergency evacuation or further reduction in staff at the Embassy in Bujumbura. As long as the security situation in Burundi remains potentially hazardous, we will have to review other normally routine staffing and management issues through the security filter.

Cleared by: AF/FO:DAS Bushnell
AF/C:Arlene Renden

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NOTED

August 21, 1995

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR NANCY E. SODERBERG

THROUGH: SUSAN E. RICE

FROM: SHAWN H. MCCORMICK *gm*

SUBJECT: Briefing Memo for Ad Hoc Meeting on
Rwanda/Burundi, August 22, 1995, ~~1 p.m.~~

Declassified Under Authority of the
Interagency Security Declassification Appeals Panel,
E.O. 13526, Section 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 10
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014

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ISSUES FOR DECISION

SITREP: You should ask the CIA to provide an update covering intensification of war in Burundi, Rwanda after the lifting of the arms embargo and Mobutu's decision to forcibly repatriate refugees to both countries.

JOE NYE: Just returned from a visit to the region. He is fired up to do more on Rwanda/Burundi. This is a posture we should encourage. Ask him to briefly summarize his conclusions from his trip. Nye will likely argue for pursuing the notion of an all African intervention force for Burundi as originally proposed by Tanzania (see Tab III). Welcome his thinking and task the IWG to continue reviewing. **DO NOT** allow this to become topic of conversation in this meeting. Agenda is too full.

TASKINGS: Acknowledge positive response to taskings in previous meeting. Mandate the Working Group to continue implementing these items under Bogosian's leadership.

Issue 1: Should the U.S. Lead a Diplomatic Effort to Promote Long-term Solutions to the Problems in Rwanda and Burundi?

Achieving our objective of restoring stability to the Great Lakes region requires that the U.S. exert maximum influence and "diplomatic reach" at a time of reduced resources and urgent problems in other parts of the world. We therefore need to decide whether the U.S. is prepared to make such an investment, particularly with respect to Burundi - the problem that will be more costly and difficult to restore.

Rwanda: Zairian troops expelled more than 2,000 refugees by dumping them on the border Monday prompting at least 26,000 others to flee to the hills to escape. The situation remains unclear but remains dangerous while also presenting an opportunity to pursue long-term solutions.

Burundi: State has produced only threads of a political framework. More work needs to be done to put meat on the bones of a political framework (see paper at Tab V). We need a decision in principle to continue thinking/planning on these lines in preparation for Principals concurrence. If we are to move forward, we need: 1) principals sign-off given the required high expenditure of money and diplomatic capital.

Your Goal: A) Rwanda - Ask State to report on situation in general and efforts taken to date to respond to forced repatriation of refugees. Ask AID to brief on UNHCR's preparedness to deal with this potential humanitarian crisis. Seek agreement to pursue immediately long-term Rwanda strategy at Tab IV. This is similar to Option 1 in original NSC paper.

B) Burundi - Gain agreement that State should continue its efforts to add detail to a draft political framework that would serve as the basis of negotiations with a contact group and for an eventual regional conference. The proposed political framework should cull from relevant elements of the Convention of Government and the Arusha Peace Accords as well as from U.S. government experts on Burundi. Ask State to provide a paper by c.o.b. Friday (8/25). Authorize Bogosian in principle to consult with European allies and countries on basis of paper at Tab V. Flag need for Principals concurrence. Lead discussions on whether USG should make investment of resources and political capital to try to achieve lasting Burundi solution.

Issue 2: Should the U.S. Support an Arms Embargo on Burundi?

Burundi risks spiraling downward into widespread violence, as occurred in October 1993. Government military forces have actively pursued a policy of ethnic cleansing through terror and reported massacres. As of late, however, Burundian Hutu forces have combined efforts with Rwandan extremists in their ethnic battle against the Burundian army and possibly against a vulnerable southern Rwandan border. A classic African guerrilla war is developing. See pros/cons at Tab VI. See CIA assessment at Tab VII.

Your Goal: To gain agreement on terms of an arms embargo but hold-off introducing any such resolution.

Issue 3: Should the U.S. Support a Freeze of Assets Belonging to Burundian Extremists?

There are approximately 40 Burundian extremist leaders, both Hutu and Tutsi, to whom the United States and European countries deny visas. These individuals have limited if any holdings in the U.S. but larger amounts in Europe. A UN resolution calling on countries to freeze assets of these leaders will send an important signal that we want to isolate extremists, bolster moderates and end the cycle of impunity. Such a move could also limit funds available to purchase weapons. Although Treasury and State EB are traditionally reluctant to implement asset freezes, State AF supports such a move. We agree. If we proceed, we should expect resistance from other UNSC members, particularly several of the Europeans who resist such sanctions as a matter of policy. See pros/cons at Tab VIII.

Your Goal: To gain agreement that the U.S. support a UN resolution freezing the assets of specific Burundian extremists.

Attachment

Tab I Agenda
Tab II List of Participants
Tab III OSD Considerations on All-African Force
Tab IV Long-term Rwanda Strategy
Tab V Long-term Burundi Strategy
Tab VI Burundi Arms Embargo Pros/Cons
Tab VII CIA Report on Implications of Burundi Arms Embargo
Tab VIII Burundi Asset Freeze Pros/Cons

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**Considerations on All-African Force (AAF)
for Burundi Crisis Response**

BACKGROUND: While there are some highly qualified Chapter VI peacekeeping forces in Africa, the Chapter VII military capabilities of many of the proposed intervention force participants are generally poor, necessitating an almost ground-up approach to equipping, training, deploying and sustaining. PDD-25 and the Joint Staff's Concept for a Multinational Force intervention serve as the basis for this analysis.

PEACEKEEPING POLICY CONSIDERATIONS: At this preliminary stage, many of the PDD-25 considerations have not yet been adequately addressed. Key issues include the lack of an analysis of mandate provisions and clearly defined peacekeeping and humanitarian objectives. Nonetheless, here is a rough analysis of the utility of an AAF based on the options for peace operations:

Chapter VI Option: The AAF would have potential as a Chapter VI force, subject to the consent of the parties involved and the establishment of realistic objectives. Given the force size of 6,000 troops, with substantial training, the AAF would have limited capability to monitor and supervise the implementation of peace settlement. However, the AAF could only be deployed after all major parties agree to forego fighting.

Chapter VII Options: By itself, the AAF would not have viable capabilities as Chapter VII force. As an ad hoc military coalition of 6,000 troops, the AAF would be entirely too small, poorly trained, ill-led, and ill-equipped to be successful performing required military operations. If the AAF were to fail as a Chapter VII force in Burundi, the U.S. could be called upon to assist and protect the AAF during its extraction. Clearly, some other Chapter VII option is preferable. For instance, should a Western power such as France decide to lead a UN coalition including some 6,000 -10,000 French troops, the AAF could augment this force with 6,000 troops and perform less demanding support missions. Another possibility would be to use the AAF as follow-on Chapter VI force, once a Chapter VII mission, performed under the direction of a major power, is complete.

FORCE CONSIDERATIONS

Ethiopia: Requested lift, NVGs, flak jackets for UNAMIR deployment, a Chapter VI operation, not Chapter VII. Our contribution would have to be sweetened considerably as CIA paper notes.

Francophone units: Battalion in UNAMIR was pushed by French, who want no part of this operation.

South Africa: As the continent's most capable force, the SANDF could be an important participant, even if they were only to provide logistical support. However, money is a major factor for even our richest partner in Africa. Further, our general policy is that we not press the South Africans to participate in PK/PF operations, allowing them time to stabilize their internal situation.

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Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel,
E. O. 13526, Section 5.3(b)(3)
Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 55
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Tanzania: The Tanzanian military's performance during the 1978 intervention in Uganda was poor (their armed forces today are even worse). Also, there are grave doubts about their neutrality if involved in Burundi.

Francophone v. Anglophone: Most of the proposed forces are Anglophone. Not only does this raise suspicions with Francophone Africans and France, but it creates major communications problems for AAF interaction with the local population.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

U.S. Troop Participation: U.S. support troops would be involved in the crisis area if TALCEs (and security teams) deployed to facilitate air movement of the AAF. Should the AAF fail, U.S. could be called upon to extract the AAF.

Equipment and logistical support required (for all forces currently named save South Africa, Ethiopia partial): Communications gear, ammunition, armored vehicles, helicopters (we have excess helos, but who will train, maintain and sustain), some personal weapons and uniforms, and equipment maintenance capacity. Intra-theater airlift would be provided for oversized/oversized equipment and then some. Inter-theater lift could be provided by many other countries.

Command and Control: With different levels of capability, no experience in working together in a combat environment, and probably incompatible communications structure, the AAF would be severely hamstrung in its ability to deploy across northern Burundi.

Operational security: Word of intervention prep will be impossible to contain as the AAF will require marrying up African troops with equipment and training prior to deployment. This may doom the operation before it gets off the ground and, worse, cause the very explosion we are hoping to avoid.

Time requirement: Deployment of African forces for other peace operations has almost never been done quickly. The force concept requires the force be ready at a moment's notice to deploy to deter ethnic violence and help prevent an explosion.

Troops Available: The Joint Staff plan calls for a Western-led force of at least 6,000 to accomplish the mission - a less capable force would require larger numbers of troops, not necessarily available from potential contributors; this would drive up transportation costs. The intervention force also requires airmobile assets which the AAF (without South Africa) would not have.

Change of Mission: A whole host of problems ensues if the Burundian military becomes hostile to AAF presence and the African forces are forced to fight. While recent reports suggest the Burundian military has only a limited capability to counter an intervention force's actions, the Burundi Ambassador warned that an intervention force "would wind up fighting Tutsi guerrillas for years."

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FINANCIAL SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS

State and Joint Staff Legal papers list the applicable authorities. Much of the support for this force, if not mitigated by State monies [FAA Sections 551, 552(c)(1) and (2)], would probably come out of DoD funds. An international trust fund would be a potential source of funds but might be nearly impossible to put together in advance of a crisis. Some additional notes:

- Drawdown only allows us to provide stocked items and services - no procurement is allowed and usually there is some readiness degradation.
- There is no FMF for Sub-Saharan Africa.
- Procurement authorized if done on a reimbursable basis.
- OAU FMF account for PKO?
- There is no known authority for loaning this equipment.
- Assumption: EDA is not a viable means of helping equip the AAF because of maintenance and availability drawbacks.
- Training on any new equipment will place an additional burden on available funds and time considerations.
- Leasing is a means to provide much of the equipment needed on a low cost basis.

CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATIONS Congressional support to equip, train, deploy and maintain part of this force will be problematic.

Bottom Line: Even if funding for the AAF is found, there is no reasonable expectation it could deter ethnic violence in Burundi successfully, even with several months of equipping and training by Western forces. The burden of equipping, training, moving and maintaining the AAF will be tremendous. This effort helps to underline the need to develop the OAU's peacekeeping mechanism. The AAF option may have utility as a Chapter VI force, should the conditions in Burundi permit. However, the AAF could not be successful as a stand-alone Chapter VII force in Burundi.

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Interagency Security Declassification Appeals Panel,
E.O. 13526, Section 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 11
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014

Proposed Elements of USG Strategy for Bringing Long-Term Stability to Rwanda

The Need for a Long-Term Strategy: At the August 9, interagency Ad Hoc Meeting on Rwanda and Burundi chaired by the NSC, participants briefly discussed elements of a long-term strategy for enhancing political stability in Rwanda and the region. *This strategy would supplement, not replace, the important diplomatic and development efforts the USG has already taken in Rwanda,* which include but are not limited to support for the War Crimes Tribunal, assistance to the GOR, particularly for administration of justice activities, support for UNAMIR, humanitarian assistance, military training, etc.

In addition to these efforts, however, it is necessary for the international community and the Rwandan government to agree on an over-arching strategy to bring lasting peace/stability to Rwanda and the region. Doing so entails active support for the GOR so long as it pursues policies of peace and national reconciliation as well as pro-active efforts to address the destabilizing refugee problem by creating a climate conducive to refugee return and energizing the international community to prosecute swiftly the several hundred ring-leaders of last year's genocide.

Key elements of a long-term strategy are summarized below.

Recent Developments -- A Window of Opportunity?: In the time that has elapsed since the August 9 meeting, there have been a number of important developments. The first element of the strategy below -- lifting the Rwandan arms embargo -- has been accomplished. More recently, Zaire has begun to implement its threat to forcibly return all Rwandan and Burundian refugees as a consequence of the UNSC decision to suspend the arms embargo. Already, we have reports that thousands of refugees are fleeing or being forced both towards the Rwandan border and further into the interior of Zaire. If not stemmed quickly or managed effectively, this situation has the potential to become extremely violent and result in a humanitarian crisis culminating in significant loss of life.

Most elements of the strategy outlined below have not yet been pursued by the USG, although we appear to have a unique window of opportunity to do so, given the USG's enhanced credibility with the GOR following our leadership role in lifting the arms embargo and the dangers inherent in forced repatriation of Rwandan refugees from Zaire.

LONG-TERM STRATEGY

It is proposed that the U.S. begin immediately to lobby the Government of Rwanda, other countries in the region and concerned donors as appropriate with the aim of implementing the strategy outlined below:

- a) **Lift Arms Embargo with Conditions** to deter arms transfers to Burundi. [*Status: Accomplished August 16, 1995.*]

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~~SECRET~~**b) Create a Climate in Rwanda Conducive to Safe Refugee Repatriation.**

-- *Urge GOR to issue swiftly a blanket amnesty for all those except known military/militia leaders and key alleged war criminals.* (NB: Any future Rwandan amnesty would not affect the jurisdiction of the War Crimes Tribunal established by the Security Council nor our obligation to deport alleged war criminals to stand trial before the Tribunal.)

- Urge GOR to work with UNHCR/ICRC to screen returning refugees in orderly process at the border. UNHCR should provide repatriation package.
- GOR, with UNAMIR support, should guarantee safe passage for refugees as they return to their communes.
- International assistance should be directed in part to building additional housing for returning refugees and adjudicating property disputes. U.S. assistance would continue to be directed primarily to capacity-building and administration of justice activities.

In pursuing a general amnesty, the GOR will have taken an important step toward solving the refugee problem. While repatriation is certain to be slow and partial, by announcing an amnesty, the GOR can assume the moral high-ground, reduce tensions with neighboring countries and demonstrate clearly to international donors that it is serious about reconciliation.

-- *Encourage GOR to name 400+ most heinous genocide perpetrators and issue warrants for their arrest.* If the GOR and the international community are ever to prosecute war criminals effectively and move forward with national reconciliation, we must focus our prosecutorial efforts on the ringleaders and allow a return to normalcy for the remaining refugees/prisoners. The GOR has a list of approximately 400 ringleaders. The War Crimes Tribunal reportedly has a similar list. These individuals should be the focus of international efforts. To pursue this approach credibly and effectively, the international community must demonstrate swiftly and surely its readiness to bring the ringleaders to justice. This will require:

- The U.S. and other countries making a concerted effort worldwide to apprehend perpetrators by surprise.
- The U.S. and others reiterating their commitment to capture, deport/detain all 400+ and begin by widely publicizing names and suspected whereabouts of key genocide perpetrators. This must be part of an aggressive international campaign (w/newspaper ads, etc.) to shame countries harboring war criminals to turn them over. For our part, the U.S. would deport suspected criminals in U.S. to the Hague or Rwanda as appropriate.
- International community/UN must do all possible to expedite work of War Crimes Tribunal.

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e) Press UNHCR to Endorse Efforts by GOR to Encourage Refugee Return (assuming this occurs) and Announce that Within Six Months UNHCR will Close Existing Refugee Camps in Zaire, Burundi and Tanzania.

-- Refugees would be encouraged but not compelled to return under UN or other international escort.

-- Those that wish to remain would have two options: 1) resettlement on a more permanent basis inside the country of first asylum, or; 2) move to new, presumably smaller UNHCR camps constructed further away from the Rwandan border. Both these steps will require the consent of the asylum countries, which will be difficult to obtain. However, if coupled with a GOR general amnesty and serious efforts to encourage refugee return, host governments may be persuaded to assent.

-- These steps would be taken in conjunction with efforts to create a climate conducive to repatriation to Rwanda.

d) Improve Prison Conditions. The USG has made plain to the GOR our strong concern about the horrid prison conditions in which more than 50,000 people are being held. While providing tents to ease prison crowding, the USG must increase pressure on the GOR to release from prison all but the key suspected genocide perpetrators and improve living conditions for those that remain. The USG approach should include the elements outlined in the State paper (attached).

e) Intensify Support for Current Government Via "Tough Love" Campaign.

The international community needs to make plain both the benefits of cooperation on the elements above and the consequences of failure to move forward. If Rwanda pursues the steps above, the U.S. ought to push its allies to recognize these accomplishments in a tangible way and reward the Rwandan leadership directly. Rewards might include the following, in addition to rapid release of pledged assistance and other direct support to the GOR:

- France initiates bilateral assistance to the GOR
- Europeans invite senior GOR leaders for official visits
- U.S. receives Rwandan leaders at the White House

On the other hand, we have to make plain to Rwandan leaders that if the GOR fails to move forward on the key issues above, we will have reassess of policy of continued strong support for the GOR.

f) Consider Enlisting Help from Mobutu. [Status: State is preparing paper on possible role for Mobutu in resolving the regional crisis.]

Mobutu might be enlisted to take immediate steps to halt involuntary refugee repatriation, curtail arms flows in Zaire, allow stationing of monitors at key airports in eastern Zaire and movement of refugee camps inland, use his forces to disarm/close ex-FAR camps in Zaire, put forces on border

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to prevent/deter ex-FAR incursions. In exchange, we may have to agree to help fund Zairian forces through UNHCR and provide Mobutu with a degree of international recognition. These efforts should not be divorced from our principal goal of pushing Mobutu towards a serious democratic transition in Zaire.

President Carter has initiated a dialogue with Mobutu on his own. The USG must decide whether we believe it worthwhile to engage Mobutu at all on these issues and, if so, whether we want to do so directly or work in conjunction with Carter.

Progress on the above items need not be stalled while the USG resolves the broader issue of whether and how to engage Mobutu.

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~~SECRET~~Prison Reduction Strategy

Goal: To dramatically reduce the prison population in Rwanda and start trials of the most serious offenders in national custody.

Background: Although the GOR has made some noises about reducing the prison capacity and appears willing to form a Presidential Commission on the issue, hardliners within the government have shown little interest in reducing the prison population, making the jails more humane or beginning trials. Indeed, the prison population has surged from 30,000 in May to 50,000 at present. Although the USG has made various demarches to the Rwandan Government, greater political pressure is needed to gain a reduction in the prison population. Pressure is timely given the lifting of the arms embargo. We may wish to underscore the importance we place on the prison issue by a visit to Rwanda from a senior State Department official to lay out our position. We should also seek support from the ROSG. When appropriate, President Clinton could follow with a call or letter to President Bizimungu and Vice President Kagame.

Message:

To pressure the GOR, we should tell them that we must see tangible progress within one month in the areas enumerated below or the USG will have to review its assistance to the GOR. Given the level of concern within the Congress and the USG about prison conditions, we will tell the GOR that it will be extremely difficult for the US to maintain the level of support we have (e.g., aid to government ministries). It will be difficult to authorize new support (e.g., lethal or non-lethal arms equipment) until we see tangible improvements in the prison situation.

To ensure continued USG assistance, the GOR must show progress in the following areas within the next month:

1. Work with international humanitarian organizations to increase the capacity of its prisons and spread out the population. (We have given \$625,000 to the ICRC to expand prison capacity but could give more money or equipment for this purpose).
2. Release the young (over 400 under age 14), the elderly (over 3,200 age 55 and over), the pregnant and the infirm on humanitarian grounds.
3. Dramatically reduce the number of arrests (currently at 500 a week) by only making arrests where there is sufficient evidence of guilt.

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4. Take steps necessary to appoint Rwandan judges and begin trials in Rwanda.

5. Provide for the security of released prisoners and make clear that reprisal killings will not be tolerated.

6. Give high-level support to a Presidential Commission to develop a political strategy for reducing the prison population, triaging prisoners and re-integrating Hutus. (AID will provide \$300,000 out of the \$4 million rule of law assistance to the Commission, as suggested by post).

Drafted: DRL: CNix
8/15/95 SENIX 211

Cleared: DRL:NEly-Raphel(subs); AF:RBogosian(subs);
G:AJoyce(subs) AF/C:ARender

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Elements of a Regional Solution to the Crisis in Burundi

As tasked at the August 9 interagency meeting on Burundi, State has drafted several papers outlining a potential diplomatic process for building a Bosnia-style Contact Group to prepare for a regional peace conference on Burundi (and possibly Rwanda). State has also begun considering the elements of a political framework that would serve as the basis for discussions with our allies. Once refined with allies' input and that of countries/players in the region, this framework could form the basis for negotiations at a regional conference.

This paper summarizes key elements of the State-prepared papers and outlines in general terms the substance of a potential USG proposal to reach a long-term solution to the problems in Burundi. Finally and most importantly, it poses a central policy question: *is the USG prepared to invest the resources and diplomatic capital necessary to make a serious attempt at finding a long-term solution to the problem in Burundi on the basis of the proposal below?*

I. Outlines of Proposed USG Initiative for Burundi

Proposed Political Framework: The current crisis in Burundi, like those in its past, is rooted in a fundamental struggle between rival ethnic groups for power and scarce resources. Hence, any long-term solution to this problem must take into account both the need for a *political* solution to the power struggle, while seeking to contain the struggle for resources by demonstrating that there are economic benefits to peace and a high price for continued warfare.

Burundi is a long way from Jeffersonian democracy, which should not be the immediate goal of U.S. policy. Our immediate goal must be to end the killings and achieve relative stability in Burundi and the region. Once these conditions are achieved, restoration of genuine democracy in Burundi is a reasonable objective.

Any near-term and lasting political solution in Burundi must entail genuine power-sharing among the ethnic groups. The details of a power-sharing agreement must ultimately be worked out among the Burundians themselves, but the international community can and should assist by suggesting a starting point for their discussions. Towards this end, the USG should work to refine a proposal for power-sharing based on the following elements: *decentralized governmental authority/greater regional autonomy* (localities are increasingly ethnically homogenous, so local authorities would likely be run by representatives of one or the other ethnic group) and; *loose federal structure bound together by a multi-ethnic civilian central government* that has genuine control of the military and provides key services to all parts of the country.

The above elements of a proposed political framework are overly general and need amplification. While our final proposal should not be too specific, it should be sufficiently developed to serve as the basis for renewed discussions with our allies and fresh negotiations among the parties to the conflict. A more detailed political framework should cull from relevant elements of the Burundi Convention of Government agreed last year, the Arusha Accords, and the perspectives of USG experts on Burundi. State will develop a more detailed political framework as soon as possible.

Essential Societal Reforms: To be viable, any political framework must be buttressed by essential reforms including integration of the military, eradication of widespread human rights abuses in the military, police training and judicial reform. In addition, Burundi must embark on a concerted long-term program to ensure equal opportunity for members of each ethnic group in education, government, the military, judiciary and other key segments of civil society.

International Assistance Required: Burundi has proved itself incapable of implementing such sweeping social reforms alone. It will need the active support of the international community in the form of substantial development assistance and help in keeping the peace and building key institutions. One method of providing this support is to establish a broad UN presence -- a la the temporary UN interim administration in Cambodia (or West Irian in the early 1960s). The UN would assist in implementing the agreed political settlement, help run key ministries as they embark on reform programs, deploy peacekeepers to deter acts of violence, and help with police training and military integration.

Such a proposal may be the best solution but would require substantial resources. (The UN mission in Cambodia -- a significantly larger country than Burundi -- required 20,000 peacekeepers and cost approximately \$1 billion.) Today, the UN faces a serious funding crisis, in large part due to U.S. arrearages. Without a new injection of funds, the UN does not have the ability to embark on such a mission in Burundi. U.S. financial support to the UN could not be forthcoming without large appropriations from Congress, which almost certainly will not be available. In addition, given the UN's recent track record in peacekeeping, it is highly questionable whether another ambitious UN mission could succeed. While a UN mission is by no means the only method of providing sustained international support, other methods are likely also to be costly. The U.S. should consult with our allies on alternative means of providing international support following any negotiated settlement in Burundi.

Carrots and Sticks: The parties to the conflict in Burundi have exhibited little, if any, interest in reaching a negotiated political solution to their problems. Both sides are poised for war and have rejected OAU-proposed peace talks. Any serious international effort to negotiate a lasting solution to Burundi's problems must be coupled with tempting carrots and heavy sticks.

The international community, led by key donors and countries in the region, would seek the parties' agreement to a political settlement. If successful, the international community will commit to provide substantial economic assistance and political and security assistance to a reconstituted Burundian federal government.

If the parties refuse to work toward or reach agreement, the international community would cut all development assistance to Burundi, seek to try the extremists for crimes against humanity and impose an economic as well as arms embargo. These tough steps would be aimed at weakening the extremists, taking away the resources for which they compete, and stimulating the population to recommit themselves and their leaders to the establishment of a viable national entity.

PROS

- Threat of harsh, concerted international action along with risks of continued ethnic conflict, may be sufficient to bring parties to a viable, lasting settlement.
- May be achievable in the relative short term.
- If implemented swiftly, could forestall/prevent widespread genocide.
- Allows international community to try one last step short of the use of force to resolve the current crisis.

CONS

- International community must reach agreement on outlines of settlement and tough measures to be imposed if settlement fails. Thus far, donors have been able to agree on little with respect to Burundi.
- Chances of success are limited.
- Costly. Would require substantial political/diplomatic, economic and military investment in Burundi. International involvement should be expected to last at least five years.
- Burundi leaders may divide and conquer international community by neither rejecting agreement outright nor negotiating in good faith.

II. Building a Contact Group and Preparing a Regional Conference

To negotiate a comprehensive political settlement in Burundi, the United States needs the active support and assistance of key donors (who must be equal partners in this endeavor) and the constructive support of countries in the region. These factors are key to any successful approach to the conflicting parties in Burundi.

STEP 1: Contact Group. An important first step would be the establishment of an international Bosnia-style 'contact group' consisting at least of the United States, France, Belgium, UK, Germany, Canada and the Netherlands. An essential prerequisite to any diplomatic initiative is gaining the agreement of the French and Belgians. The U.S. must start with these two countries in building an international negotiating team. Ambassador Bogosian should initiate this effort by conducting intense consultations with the French and Belgians in early September on the modalities of a lasting political solution in Burundi and seek their agreement to participate actively in an international contact group. Bogosian's efforts must be back-stopped by active interventions, when necessary, by top officials at State and the White House. Once constructive French and Belgian participation is assured, the contact group should be broadened to include the other countries listed above.

In approaching key donors, the U.S. should seek support for a political solution along the broad lines described above. However, we should be flexible and welcome any helpful modifications to the U.S. proposal.

STEP 2: Regional Conference. Following agreement among members of the contact group, we would seek support for a regional conference from countries in the region, the UN and the OAU. If obtained, we would support a joint UN/OAU effort to convene a regional conference. (For details of conference process/modalities, see attached State memo.) Ambassador Bogosian

would lead consultations with countries in the region and the UN and OAU. However, most of the day-to-day spade work would be done by our missions in the field. Bogosian plans a trip to the region in mid-September, which provides an important opportunity to solicit support for a contact group plan and lay the foundation for a regional conference. The contact group would provide financial and diplomatic support to the conference by working in conjunction with the UN and OAU to put forward a proposed political framework, offer good offices and serve as honest brokers. Key countries in the region would join us as full partners in these efforts and participate with us in an observer capacity at the conference.

If successful, the regional conference would result in tangible progress towards a long-term political solution in Burundi. If other countries insist that Rwanda also be on the agenda, the U.S. should not object but focus its own energies on solving the more difficult conceptual problem -- Burundi. The regional conference should be viewed not as an end in itself but the substantive launching of what must -- by necessity -- be an extended negotiation process.

III. Is It Worth The Investment?

As noted above, pursuit of the above diplomatic strategy to achieve a long-term political solution to the crisis in Burundi will require a substantial investment of scarce U.S. financial resources (possibly tens of millions of dollars), political capital, and the time and attention of the most senior members of the Administration's foreign policy team. Before we embark on this effort, we must obtain the commitment of senior leaders in the relevant agencies to devote the substantial priority, time and resources that this effort requires. Moreover, there is a substantial risk of failure and hence, embarrassment. In the worst case, by proving the futility of the best efforts of the international community, failure could also conceivably hasten intensified conflict and a humanitarian crisis.

On the other hand, failure to act now to try to achieve a political solution leaves a festering regional crisis unattended. No other countries are offering the leadership required to find a lasting solution. In the absence of a lasting solution, the odds of a massive and even more costly humanitarian crisis are greatest. The Administration could be open to charges yet again of not taking adequate steps to prevent a potential genocide -- this time one for which we have had ample warning. Finally, the fact of recurrent genocide in Central Africa, on top of that in the former Yugoslavia, would seriously erode the already frayed normative fabric that binds the international community and could undermine, possibly irreparably, the international instruments of collective security.

Before the U.S. embarks on the strategy outlined above, the principals must agree to invest their own time, resources and political capital, which are necessary, but far from sufficient for success.

1. Options Regarding an Arms Embargo Against Burundi

A. Introduce Embargo Now

Pros

- o Aimed at arms flows to extremist Hutus, who are launching frequent armed attacks in the countryside.
- o Aimed at arms flows to the Tutsi-dominated Army and Tutsi extremists, both of whom are launching reprisals, often against civilian populations.
- o No cost.
- o Sends a signal that the international community is appalled by the continuing violence in Burundi, and wishes to do something about it.

Cons

- o Given the recent suspension/lifting of the embargo against Rwandans, which some persons worried would lead to more arms finding their way to Burundi, the timing is bad.
- o An embargo against Burundi, with none against Rwanda, would not be effective.
- o Difficult to enforce.
- o Over time, likely to affect the Army's ability to fight insurgencies, while not affecting the insurgents or ethnic cleansing operations as much.

B. Holding an Arms Embargo in Reserve

Pros

- o As it represents no outward change in status quo, is less likely to have destabilizing effect or prompt Tutsi hardliner action.

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- o We retain the leverage which a threat to impose an embargo gives us.
- o We avoid the possibility of floating the idea, only to see it go nowhere at the UN, due to possible European opposition.
- o If/when we do call for an embargo, it could be used in a broader context, as part of a concerted series of actions.

Cons

- o The status quo, which is not acceptable as far as the security situation is concerned, continues.
- o We miss, for now, the opportunity to send a strong signal about violence in Burundi.
- o Arms continue to flow to the Army and to extremists of both ethnic groups, fuelling the cycle of extremist attack and reprisal, as well as providing the materiel for any coup attempt.

2. Options Regarding an Assets Freeze Against Burundians

A. Introduce Freeze Resolution

Pros

- o Bolsters the work of the moderates.
- o Cuts off funds which are being used to purchase weapons by extremists on both sides.
- o Sends strong signal that we want to isolate extremists and break the cycle of impunity.
- o Low cost.
- o More surgical than a sweeping arms embargo---more calculated to affect only extremists.
- o Gives Europeans political cover for something they may wish to do.

Cons

- o May provoke panic response by extremists.
- o Difficult to enforce---mainly symbolic.

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- o Europeans are sometimes reluctant about assets freezes. The relevant bank accounts are more likely to be in Europe than in the U.S., so European cooperation is key.
- o Because of above considerations, may be difficult to obtain enough votes on the Security Council.
- o Treasury traditionally is reluctant about assets freezes, for policy, legal and technical reasons.

B. Hold Off on Assets Freeze

Pros

- o Leaves us with the leverage to threaten an assets freeze, e.g. to help force extremists to the conference table.
- o As it represents no outward change in status quo, is less likely to prompt extremist reaction.
- o We avoid the possibility of floating the idea, only to see it go nowhere at the UN.

Cons

- o We would cease to commit to already agreed upon preventive measure.
- o The cycle of impunity continues.
- o We miss, for now, the opportunity to send a strong signal about extremists in Burundi.
- o We miss, for now, the opportunity to send such a message in what would be a basically low cost, symbolic manner for us, there being few such bank accounts here.
- o Extremists will use the money to buy arms and pay fighters.

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Summary of Conclusions of
Ad Hoc Meeting on Rwanda/Burundi
DATE: Tuesday, August 22, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 11:00 a.m.-12:40 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Ad Hoc Meeting on
Rwanda/Burundi

PARTICIPANTS:

Office of the Vice President

Marc Thomas

State

Tim Wirth
George Moose
Richard Bogosian
Phyllis Oakley

Treasury

Richard Newcomb

Defense

Joseph Nye
Vince Kern

USUN

Laurie Shestack

OMB

Jeff Ashford

CIA

(b)(3)

Edward Gistaro

JCS

Dave McIlvoy
Orrin Young

AID

Dick McCall
Douglas Stafford

White House

Nancy Soderberg

NSC

Susan Rice
Mike Sheehan
Eric Schwartz
Shawn McCormick

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E.O. 13526, Section 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 13
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

Taskings from 8/9 Meeting:

-- The interagency working group chaired by the Rwanda-Burundi
Coordinator will ensure swift implementation of taskings from the
August 9 Ad Hoc Group meeting. (C)

Refugee Repatriation:

-- USUN will work to assure swift passage of a UN Security Council statement demanding a halt to Zaire's forced repatriation of refugees, while acknowledging the substantial burdens borne by asylum countries in Central Africa. (U)

-- State will issue a press release condemning forced repatriation. (U)

-- State will contact Kengo and Mobutu to make clear to Zairian leaders the risks inherent in forced repatriation and the negative ramifications for Zaire's international standing. State will also stress we have no indications of any offensive military build-up by the Rwandan government across the border and our intention to continue urging the GOR to exercise restraint. (C)

-- USUN will ask Boutros-Ghali to telephone Mobutu to encourage him to walk Zaire back from the brink. (C)

-- State will urge Belgium and France to take actions similar to our own. (C)

-- The Administration will pursue the policy steps outlined in Rwanda paper agreed in this meeting. Specifically, these steps include but are not limited to: encouraging the GOR to grant broad amnesty and create a climate conducive to safe refugee repatriation; pressing UNHCR to encourage refugee return and announce within six months the closure of existing refugee camps and movement of any remaining camps away from the borders in Zaire, Burundi and Tanzania; pressuring the GOR to improve prison conditions; and considering enlisting help from Mobutu. (C)

Joseph Nye Trip:

-- The interagency working group will generate options for providing material assistance to an All-African military force for potential deployment to Burundi. (C)

Humanitarian Assistance:

NSC, OMB and State/PRM will identify options for use of remaining FY 95 refugee/humanitarian funds for the Rwanda crisis area with the aim of making funds available to support the regional refugee population. (U)

Burundi:

-- NSC will bring together a group of experts to flesh out a notional political framework for resolution of the crisis in

Burundi. The framework would serve as the starting point for discussions with our allies and countries in the region in preparation for a regional conference. Separate groups will generate options for international support for a peace settlement, should one occur, as well as the costs and funding sources for such support. State will produce a paper on these issues by Monday (August 28) in preparation for Principals-level consideration of whether the USG should lead pursuit of a long-term strategy to resolve the crisis in Burundi. (C)

-- The U.S. will not move forward on a UNSC resolution imposing an arms embargo on Burundi as this time. However, NSC and State will collaborate on a paper due Monday (August 28) on alternatives for freezing the assets of Burundi extremists. (C)

Next Meeting:

-- The Ad Hoc group may reconvene after Labor Day to discuss outstanding issues. (U)

ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 14

Declassification Date: March 18, 2014

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 15, 1996

Dear Mr. President:

As the new year begins, I extend my best wishes and those of the American people to you and the people of Rwanda.

These remain difficult times for Rwanda, and I want you to know I follow events in your country closely. Rwanda needs peace and its people need security to enable political and economic development to flourish. Ambassador Albright's visit at this time is a reflection of the United States' interest in ensuring lasting peace and security in your country.

Be assured the United States is ready to continue its strong support for reconstruction and development in Rwanda as long as Rwanda moves steadily forward toward achieving peace and stability. The greatest challenge in this regard is to nourish the healing process in the aftermath of the genocide, to bring justice through the International War Crimes Tribunal, to make every effort to bring together the peoples of Rwanda and to lay the groundwork so there will never again be a repetition of those horrific events.

We continue to believe that as a crucial part of this process, your government must fulfill its pledge to take all necessary steps to enable the early repatriation of Rwandan refugees in neighboring countries. In addition, and in accordance with the commitments your government made in Bujumbura, Cairo and Geneva, Rwanda should take immediate measures to alleviate the inhumane overcrowding in Rwanda's prisons. We also think it essential to ensure adequate security for the War Crimes Tribunal and other international personnel after UNAMIR's mandate expires in March.

We remain prepared to play an energetic diplomatic role to achieve those ends. We recognize that they represent a major challenge. However, as I know you agree, the alternative -- more suffering for the people of Rwanda -- is unacceptable.

I welcome your thoughts on how the United States and the international community, including the United Nations and its specialized agencies, can assist you and your government in achieving these goals.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

His Excellency
Pasteur Bizimungu
President of the Republic of Rwanda
Kigali

ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 15
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 15, 1996

Dear Mr. President:

As the new year begins, I extend to you and the people of Burundi the best wishes of the American people as well as my personal regards. I know these are difficult times for Burundi, and I want you to know I follow developments in your country closely. I have asked Ambassador Albright to visit Burundi to reiterate the importance we attach to ending the cycle of violence and the culture of impunity, without which Burundi cannot achieve the economic development that is so urgently required.

Unfortunately, it is difficult to achieve development in the absence of security, particularly when the targets of violence include those who have come to help the people of Burundi. The United States along with Burundi's many other friends in the international community, is deeply concerned about the escalating violence, rampant killings and other human rights abuses that have become daily occurrences in recent months. It is imperative that Burundi's leaders work vigorously to stop the violence, isolate extremists and seek a lasting peace.

I know that you have pledged to combat the violence that plagues Burundi. The United States fully supports you in that endeavor. Like you, we view the Convention of Government and a spirit of compromise and conciliation as the basis upon which to build a lasting peace in Burundi. My government will continue to support international efforts to facilitate political reconciliation in Burundi including those of neighboring governments, the United Nations and its agencies, President Carter, and other private groups working to that end. We also remain prepared to help strengthen Burundi's political, judicial, social and economic institutions so that peaceful development can resume.

However, the United States will provide no political recognition or economic assistance to any government in Burundi that comes to power by force.

I know you share our views and I would welcome your ideas on how the international community, including the United Nations and its agencies, can further help Burundi.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Bill Clinton", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

His Excellency
Sylvestre Ntibantunganya
President of the Republic of Burundi
Bujumbura

CONFIDENTIAL

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 15, 1996

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE ✓

SUBJECT: Letters for Ambassador Albright to Deliver to Angolan President dos Santos, Rwandan President Bizimungu and Burundian President Ntibantunganya

Purpose

To provide Ambassador Albright with letters that she can deliver to Angolan President dos Santos, Rwandan President Bizimungu and Burundian President Ntibantunganya during her visit to Africa next week.

Background

Angola: President dos Santos has carried out several of the commitments he made to you during his visit to Washington last month to push the peace process forward. To date, UNITA has not reciprocated despite indications that they would. The most pressing concern is the quartering of UNITA troops, which is several months behind schedule. President dos Santos must remain patient as we apply continued pressure on UNITA to adhere to their commitments under the peace accord.

Rwanda: Donor patience with the government continues to be tested as little has been done to address the two most pressing problems facing the country: more than two million refugees remain outside the country, and the government has done little to alleviate serious overcrowding in its prisons. In addition, more than 40 NGOs were recently forced to cease operations because they had failed to provide the government with the requisite documentation. The political leadership in Kigali must take more forceful action to promote reconciliation among its people to enable political and economic development to occur.

Burundi: The situation has degenerated significantly over the last 30 days as political murders, violence against civilians and attacks against Westerners increase. Several embassies (including ours) are drawing down staff and many NGOs have scaled back or suspended operations. Extremist elements are gaining strength as the position of the moderate president and his government becomes more precarious.

CONFIDENTIAL

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 1.6, X6

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Declassified Under Authority of the
Interagency Security Declassification Appeals Panel,
E.O. 13526, Section 5-3(b)(3)

ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 16

Declassification Date: March 18, 2014

Ambassador Albright's trip is important and timely because each of these three countries is currently facing critical transition periods in which American influence could be an important determining factor. She will also travel to Liberia.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters to Angolan President dos Santos (Tab A), Rwandan President Bizimungu (Tab B) and Burundian President Ntibantunganya (Tab C).

Attachments

Tab A Letter to President dos Santos
Tab B Letter to President Bizimungu
Tab C Letter to President Ntibantunganya

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

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has seen

January 30, 1996

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: SUSAN E. RICE

SUBJECT: Report on Trip to Liberia, Angola, Burundi and
Rwanda with Ambassador Albright, January 16-23,
1996

NOTED

Ambassador Albright will forward separately a memo to the President on her trip to Africa. I endorse her general conclusions. Below are my personal impressions, conclusions and a summary of action items (Tab A) jointly drafted with USUN.

Albright's delegation included staff from USUN, State/AF PDAS Prudence Bushnell, BG Doc Fogelsong (J-5, Mid East/Africa/Asia/UN Director), Col. Mike Turner (J-5 Africa), NYT Columnist Tom Friedman, a CNN crew and various other journalists for portions of the trip.

Overview

The purpose of the trip was to advance the peace processes at critical stages in Liberia and Angola, to seek to deter widespread conflict in Burundi and enhance prospects for lasting peace in Rwanda. Given these lofty objectives, success can only be measured with certainty over the longer run. However, in each place, I believe Albright's visit made a positive contribution and, in Angola in particular, may have had a direct bearing on the success of the peace process.

Liberia

Key Meetings/Events: UN SRSR Nyakyi; ECOMOG Commander Ineinger and top staff along with ECOWAS Special Representative Victor Gbeho; The Council of State (Wilton Sankowolo -- chair, Oscar Quiah, Chief Tamba Tailor, Charles Taylor, Alhaji Kromah, George Boley); Roosevelt Johnson; Telcon with President Rawlings of Ghana; Lunch with UN agency reps; Visit to WFP-funded job training center for ex-combatants; Visit to UNHCR refugee center.

Impressions: We were struck by how devastated Monrovia is -- no electricity, bombed out buildings, key ministries are squatter camps. Yet, the population was active, the markets were bustling and there was no evidence in Monrovia of the sense of despair the

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Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify On: 1/29/06

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ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 17

Declassification Date: March 18, 2014

surroundings might indicate. As one who has always rejected as simplistic and patronizing the notion that the U.S. has some special obligation to Liberia, I was nevertheless moved by the mess that is Liberia. I noted with some shame the contrast between Cote d'Ivoire (where the French had comparative success) and Liberia -- potentially a very rich country run amok.

It is difficult to tell whether the 13th accord will be the lucky one for Liberia or whether it too will pass. There is good news and bad news. The good news is that the mixed civilian-faction leader **Council of State** (CoS) seems to be working well together. There were no signs of animosity, and many indications its members are cooperating rather effectively. All on the CoS profess commitment to peace. All also look to the U.S. for support. We stressed that Liberians made the war; they must make the peace. Some understood that message well (i.e., Taylor and the other faction leaders); the civilians, in particular, seemed to look to the U.S. as a crutch.

The bad news is it appears the faction leaders on the CoS cannot maintain full control of their respective **factions** as well as of factions not represented on the Council, such as Roosevelt Johnson's ULIMO-J. ULIMO-J has not only been fighting in recent weeks with ULIMO-K but also with ECOMOG, undermining the fragile Abuja Accords. In addition, some are concerned that the CoS may assume powers beyond those granted in the Abuja Accord. Elections are slated for August, although no one expects them to occur so soon.

ECOMOG is managing pretty well, despite its recent losses. The Nigerian commander appears sensible, competent and determined to proceed with deployment and disarmament. ECOMOG deployed without adequate logistical support (at our urging) and took a beating. It will be reluctant to deploy further to outlying areas until it has more trucks and improved communications. The U.S. is the only country that is providing any meaningful support to ECOMOG. We pledged \$10 million in late October for **logistical support** -- trucks, helicopters. U.S. support has been slow in arriving due to the normal, glacial process of disbursing compounded by the USG shutdown. Only 20 U.S.-leased trucks are in use. Helicopters have been due for the past couple of weeks. The remaining 80+ trucks will be leased locally or from the Dutch who have trucks in Cote d'Ivoire. They are not expected in Liberia until next month. Special Envoy Dane Smith is now traveling in Europe and West Africa to try to remove some remaining roadblocks.

Disarmament and demobilization have not yet commenced, and the factions may be losing control over hungry soldiers. The Council of State is seeking to alter the disarmament plan so that ECOMOG

goes to soldiers in the field and disarms them in place rather than soldiers gathering at designated assembly areas. The new plan may be better for faction leaders who may have difficulty persuading their soldiers to go to assembly areas, but it is all but impossible for ECOMOG and the UN to fulfill. The UN and ECOMOG are coordinating -- at least superficially -- but it is unclear whether the relevant UN agencies have an effective and viable disarmament/demobilization plan. Without one, the whole process could fall apart even if the factions try to do the right thing. This is also a key issue for Dane Smith.

Conclusions: This peace accord may fail for reasons beyond the control of the key faction leaders. One important factor will be whether ECOMOG can mobilize quickly to begin the disarmament/demobilization process and whether the international community will fashion a sufficiently attractive and efficient disarmament/demobilization program to attract and retain ex-combatants. Resources are a real problem. **There is not enough for ECOMOG to do its job. In contrast to Mozambique, there is not an attractive demobilization package for ex-combatants in Liberia.**

I am convinced (for the first time) that the U.S. can and should do more in Liberia. We have made a number of mistakes there in the past. While it is not our responsibility to make the peace, our assistance -- or lack thereof -- can make or break the peace process, even if sufficient political will exists on all sides. We ought to try to provide additional assistance to ECOMOG directly or through other means. We ought to revisit the issue of whether or not we could partially support ECOMOG on the UN peacekeeping budget in a post-UNPROFOR world. AID also should be pressed to do more on demobilization. Above all, since we cannot carry this ball alone, we must press other Western countries to share the financial burden with us on Liberia. Thus far, our appeals -- issued at a relatively low level -- have fallen on deaf ears.

Angola

Key Meetings/Events: President dos Santos, Dr. Savimbi (in Bailundo), President of the Parliament Moco, SRSG Beye, the Joint Commission, FM de Moura, Visit to Vila Nova Assembly Area, Visit to Kuito.

Impressions: In Angola, the United States is playing a crucial role in shepherding the peace process. We should relish that role and use it to the greatest advantage. Years of hard work are paying off, as both sides now clearly see the U.S. as a fair and honest broker. As one party leader said, "the U.S. is the only country in the world that really matters to us." In several places on our trip, our interlocutors were keen to remind us how

powerful the U.S. is and lamented that others appear to appreciate our power more than we ourselves do. Well, in Angola, the peace process is obviously the Angolans to use or lose, but our influence is palpable and we must use it to the maximum extent possible.

Dos Santos evinced a surprising comfort in his relationship with the U.S. in the wake of his visit to Washington. He clearly wants to be given credit for largely fulfilling the pledges he made at the White House. On the whole, dos Santos seems intent on maintaining credibility in our eyes, which means keeping his word.

(b)(1) E.O. 13526 14(d)

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(b)(1) Nevertheless, we should applaud his positive steps and let the GRA know we know when they are cheating.

UNITA is the real stumbling block at the moment. We arrived at Bailundo in the middle of UNITA's annual conference, which Savimbi claimed he called to build political support for the difficult decision to quarter his troops. Having secured that support, he is prepared, he says, (finally) to start quartering. At our request, Savimbi pledged to Albright and to the press to quarter 16,500 men by February 8 (when the UNAVEM mandate comes up for renewal). We told him that international patience is wearing thin, and we would not look kindly on a broken pledge. As President of the UNSC in February, we have great influence over whether or not UNAVEM III's mandate is renewed and for how long. Now, we are watching and waiting. According to Embassy Luanda, UNITA forces are gathering near 2 of the 4 open quartering areas but have yet to enter. If they try to enter en masse, there could be a logistical difficulties.

UNAVEM III is an impressive peacekeeping mission that seems to be working. The UNAVEM-run quartering site we visited was an impressive, if relatively empty, place. The UN seems well prepared to handle the UNITA troops -- at least at the one site we saw. All the essentials -- water, food, kit, shelter, medical supplies, in-processing mechanisms, recreation, training programs, etc. -- seem to be in place. A family site is located just down the road. The challenge will be to occupy the UNITA forces productively while they are in the camps and to get them out into the new army or civilian life promptly. The former requires completion of the military integration talks and the GRA getting its act together. The latter requires international resources, which may prove to be lacking.

Kuito is both the same and much better than when we were there. The buildings remain bombed out, but some are starting to be repaired. The squatter camp/orphanage/WFP feeding site we visited is gone. Far fewer people are starving. The hospital

still has many malnourished babies but not as many or as emaciated as when we were there. Halo Trust continues its demining efforts -- clearing fields. The population is right on its heels planting every new square foot the deminers clear.

Don Steinberg seems to be doing very well. He's clearly happy and in his element. He seems to have won the respect of both sides and is playing an energetic, effective role. He put on a great stop for Albright and crew.

Conclusions: I am hopeful but not sanguine about Angola. I'd give it just better than even chances of success. I think dos Santos is committed. The danger he faces is a hard-line coup. This he can guard against if UNITA shows solid commitment. At the moment, dos Santos is vulnerable because he has taken some bold steps and UNITA has not come with him. The hard-liners will pounce shortly, if Savimbi does not make good on his pledge.

Savimbi remains an enigma. My hunch is he wants peace, but I would not bet on it. We will learn a lot in the next 10 days. If UNITA fails to start quartering in earnest (the precise number is less important than momentum), we will have to conclude they are not serious. The FAA may then try to push dos Santos to finish UNITA off, and it would be hard to blame them -- twice burned. If UNITA does quarter, there is real hope. We pressed dos Santos to keep his nose clean while we pressured UNITA and not to react with force, if UNITA fails to quarter. He demurred on the latter but promised to consult with us before acting, if UNITA reneges.

Burundi

Key Meetings/Events: President Ntibantunganya; PM Nduwayo; Chief of the Army and Chief of the Gendarme; Speaker of the Parliament; UN Commission of Inquiry; Visit to Orphanage; Lunch with Human Rights activists and Parliamentarians; Drop-by Burundian Women's conference on peace and reconciliation.

Impressions: Bujumbura is one of the creepiest places I've ever been. Beautiful, lush city with people quietly going about their daily business. No overt signs of hostility or tension on the day we were there; yet fear pervades the place. As one person said to a member of our delegation: "we are all buying guns." Bujumbura is now virtually ethnically cleansed. Only Tutsis on the streets.

We delivered a very **tough message** to the military directly and to extremists via the press: "Stop the killing or you will pay a high price. We have just seen your future (Liberia, Angola). Civil war stinks. Don't go there. We will totally isolate a

regime that comes to power by force. We know the military is responsible for the bulk of the killing, and we hold the leadership responsible." We were heard. I think we even shook them up a bit, but I doubt we will be heeded.

All of the leadership blamed someone else -- the Hutu insurgency, the political leaders, the military leaders, the "hate radio," the international community. As Albright noted, it was "**the dog ate my homework.**" In addition, it is clear this is a power struggle among elites. The people do not share the hatred. Hutu and Tutsi women can share a crowded ballroom in a downtown hotel in a common quest for peace, but the orchestrated killing continues.

At the same time, I was struck by the sense that **the people with whom we met do not feel the same sense of urgency as we do about Burundi.** Perhaps, the killing is far away or they are used to it. No one we met advocated (or even understood the logic of) foreign intervention, including the President. They all want help in silencing the "hate radio." They also want constructive, sustained international assistance (resources). And a "super-envoy," some say. They are clearly sick of being buzzed by high-level delegations who do not understand and leave as quickly as they come. They are as frustrated with us as we are with them.

It is uncertain that the **worst case scenario** is another Rwanda-style genocide. It may be, but it may also be continued daily killing. In seeking to avert a genocide, we cannot forget the daily killings are adding up -- into the tens of thousands.

Conclusions: We must continue to exert all the pressure we can to keep the lid on things and shine the light. Warnings of the type we've recently issued, possible UNSC sanctions, preventive planning -- all must continue. **If we can reach a plateau in the crisis, we then need to throw all our energies behind finding a lasting solution to the problem in Burundi -- a negotiated power-sharing formula that works.** We have talked about this before but not acted. We will need a high-level, sustained effort. The risk of failure is real, but the costs of inaction are greater. I think we must try.

To do so, we must clear the decks of all the miscellaneous, half-hearted initiatives out there (Carter, Ogata, OAU, French Great Lakes Conference) and, with the rest of the international community, back one horse fully. **Nyerere** may be that horse. We then need to support him with a top-rate U.S. envoy who spends lots of time on the ground in Burundi -- a la Paul Hare in Angola. (b)(6) If Nyerere won't step up to the plate, we may have to do it ourselves. Otherwise, it won't get done.

Finally, we must do something about our **embassy**.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

-- polar opposite of Krueger (perhaps by design). We have reduced staff for security reasons, which may be short-sighted. Burundi needs more U.S. involvement, not less. We urgently need to get **Krueger** back briefly so we are not perceived as cutting and running. We then need to get a **new ambassador** out asap. One is chosen --Rusty Hughes. He has got a good reputation. He must still go through D-Committee and then we ought to consider getting both he and Krueger out through recess appointments this coming month.

Rwanda

Key Meetings/Events: President Bizimungu and Vice President Kagame; Lunch with UN officials; Visit to Kibuye near Zaire border (War Crimes exhumation site, killing stadium, discussions with recently returned refugees); Kigali Women's Prison; Orphanage in Kigali.

Impressions: Rwanda is coming back to life. It is quite amazing. Infrastructure is being repaired. The roads are fixed, buildings rehabilitated. There is a good quality hotel in the city. The President lives in a decent place. The electricity works. Ministries are being repaired. The city is clean, flowers in the city center. The bodies are gone from the churches and the stench is all but gone. This Government is determined to rebuild the country, and is doing so.

At the same time, the **burden of psychological reconstruction** seems incredibly daunting. How do you forgive? How can you bring justice to tens of thousands and do justice to hundreds of thousand more? How can people kill their own family members and neighbors? How do you begin?

The GOR has made great strides and yet is severely lacking in certain respects. There is a sense of pride, stubbornness and determination that reminds me of the Eritreans. It gives me hope that these people will at least try to reconstruct their country -- mentally and physically. Yet, they also do stupid things that drive us crazy -- the prisons, the NGO expulsions, etc. The risk is either that hard-liners gain ascendancy or that our patience runs out before the current leadership can persuade us they really want to do the right thing.

I come away from Rwanda more hopeful than cynical. Yet so much depends on the justice system. The **War Crimes Tribunal** is just getting started, and its method of work appears impressive. They need our sustained support. The men's jail (although not the

women's) is by all accounts abysmal. The GOR needs to stop messing around and do something real. We hit them hard on this. They want our political and technical support for a domestic Tribunal to triage and try those of the 60,000+ prisoners who must be punished. They are frustrated by the refugee issue. While we pressed them for innovative solutions, the reality is there is nothing they are doing deliberately to dissuade refugees from returning. UNHCR also needs to be pressed to drop its rigid opposition to anything other than purely voluntary repatriation (i.e., ordered camp closings).

Conclusions: We need to do all we can to support the War Crimes Tribunal, UN human rights monitors, etc. A post-UNAMIR UN presence will remain. The GOR is amenable to UN police to protect the Tribunal. The biggest threat to the international presence may be lack of coordination and lack of funds. We plan to make available an additional \$1 million for the human rights monitors. However, both the Tribunal and the HR monitors need to be put on a firmer financial footing. We ought to consider funding the post-UNAMIR UN presence on the UN regular budget rather than through voluntary contributions, which are unpredictable and often inadequate.

We also need to continue impressing upon the GOR that our support is not unconditional. While we should laud the progress made, we must be firm in conditioning continued support on specific judicial reforms and genuine adherence to a policy of reconciliation.

Attachment
Tab A Action Items

cc: Richard Clarke

Declassified Under Authority of the
Interagency Security Declassification Appeals Panel,
E.O. 13526, Section 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 49

Declassification Date: March 18, 2014

RECOMMENDATIONS

Burundi and Rwanda:

Appoint a distinguished, high-profile individual as the President's "Special Envoy to Burundi" to help end genocidal violence and help build a democratic and stable government in Burundi. It may be useful to expand his or her duties to cover Rwanda, namely to facilitate the return of Hutu refugees to Rwanda peacefully, the resettlement of Rwanda in a manner conducive to a peaceful and stable society, and the administration of justice within Rwanda fairly and efficiently. The Special Envoy must have direct access to government leaders and freedom to move among competing factions. He or she also must deal directly and frequently with international and non-governmental organizations operating in the region. The Special Envoy's personal safety probably would be at risk much of the time, and the measure of success largely not within our control. But he or she would serve as the catalyst for peace and reconciliation that is now lacking.

Burundi:

- Encourage President Chirac during his forthcoming visit to coordinate with us for a more activist role in Burundi, including what diplomatic and military steps may be required to prevent genocide.
- Use diplomatic intervention to convene a roundtable of key political and military leaders, moderates and extremists, in Burundi, to discuss means to resolve differences and restore peace and security within the country.
- Launch a major planning effort with the United Nations to prepare for, and hopefully deter, accelerated genocide in Burundi:
 - (1) Two contingencies should be immediately addressed by Pentagon and State planners: deployment of an international force (perhaps stationed in Zaire) to intervene in Burundi and stop genocidal violence; deployment of a U.N. peacekeeping operation with the consent of the Government of Burundi to create safety zones or otherwise establish a more peaceful environment. (The Pentagon has already undertaken some of this contingency planning.)
 - (2) With our own plans informing our request, we should press hard to activate the U.N.'s "Standby Arrangements for Peacekeeping Operations" which the United States has been instrumental in supporting pursuant to PDD-25. This is a

data base of forces and logistical support that 47 nations have voluntarily notified the United Nations could be made available for peacekeeping operations. For example, the United States has identified a range of logistical resources that could be tapped to support U.N.-mandated operations.

(3) Determine which type of deployment, if any, should and can be undertaken and within what time frame.

(4) Demarche potential contributors and move within the Security Council to create such a military presence near or in Burundi.

- Take necessary action to silence Radio Democracy (located in Zaire) if we confirm that its broadcasts are aimed at violence and genocide within Burundi.

- Increase our diplomatic presence at Embassy Bujumbura, including the immediate assignment of a "hands-on" ambassador.

- As proposed by the Burundian Prime Minister, send a special envoy (of the type described above) for an extended assessment of the situation throughout the country.

- Arrange for assignment of additional U.N. Human Rights Monitors to Burundi, including adequate funding.

- Follow through on the Burundi Government's willingness to permit U.N. security guards for members of the International Commission of Inquiry examining the 1993 massacres.

- Condition provision of humanitarian aid on Burundi Government approval of adequate U.N. or other international security for aid workers.

- Use Burundi as a test case for active implementation of the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative.

Rwanda:

- Establish a post-UNAMIR presence in Rwanda (after March 8) that maintains U.N. humanitarian, judicial, and development operations with adequate transportation and security. Explore funding through regular (not peacekeeping) U.N. assessments.

- Use diplomatic intervention to resolve apparent differences between the U.N. High Commissioner of Refugees and the Government of Rwanda on strategy for repatriation of refugees.

- Respond to Rwanda's appeal for expert assistance on administration of justice and assign Department of Justice and legal experts to work closely with the Government of Rwanda to establish a "Special Tribunal(s)" to adjudicate expeditiously (and with due process) the tens of thousands of Rwandan citizens (about 64,000) jailed in Rwandan prisons.

- Urgently assist the Government of Rwanda to find a solution to the prison problem at all of the prison facilities in Rwanda.
- Fulfill our pledge to contribute up to \$1 million to the U.N. Human Rights Field Operation before the end of 1996.
- Provide further personnel and logistical assistance to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.

Liberia:

- Issue a Presidential statement or letter praising the peace process but emphasizing the need for all parties to adhere strictly to the Abuja Peace Accord.
- Initiate a new and more stable funding scheme for ECOMOG, the Nigerian-led and dominated regional peacekeeping force in Liberia and currently funded entirely by voluntary contributions. Consider funding at least some of ECOMOG on an assessed basis at the United Nations, either on the regular or peacekeeping budget.
- Help create more incentives for soldiers to disarm and demobilize.
- Use U.S. expertise to formulate job-training and public works programs for soldiers being demobilized under the Abuja Peace Accord.
- Explore urgently a strategy to forgive Liberia's U.N. arrears, which are hampering access to international financing.
- Explore how to assist in re-opening Roberts International Airport. (Senator Kassebaum has expressed her interest in this project.)

Angola:

- Press Savimbi directly to fulfill his pledge to me at Bailundo to quarter 16,500 UNITA soldiers by February 8. (Though it may not be realistic now to expect such a large number by Feb. 8, we should keep the heat on Savimbi to perform.)
- Press Savimbi on his other commitments, including cessation of propaganda broadcasts, release of prisoners, ending cease-fire violations, submission of names of officials pursuant to the Lusaka Peace Agreement, permit free circulation of goods and people, and end the harassment of UNAVEM troops.
- Plan for contingency of Savimbi reneging on quartering pledge.
- Discuss UNITA violations of arms embargo in the U.N. Sanctions Committee.

- Press the Government of Angola to take more affirmative steps to integrate UNITA politically into political institutions and militarily into the Angolan Army. Press Government to follow through generally on its commitments under the Lusaka Peace Agreement and commitments President Dos Santos made in Washington in December. Also engage in private discussions with Angolan officials about continued arms flows into the country.
- Follow through on U.S. commitments at the Brussels Donors Conference (\$190 million of reconstruction and humanitarian aid), and press other governments to do their share.
- Assist UNAVEM and the Government of Angola to provide transitional training to UNITA soldiers in the quartering areas, and means to integrate into civilian life those not joining the Angolan Army.
- Undertake high-visibility U.S. missions to bolster the quartering process, such as a U.S. medical mission into a quartering site, and a JCET (Joint Combined Exercise Training) to help build a quartering camp (including medical facility).
- Send in more medical supplies for local hospitals, and more tents for quartering areas.
- Provide more U.S. de-mining expertise and equipment.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

Declassified Under Authority of the
Interagency Security Declassification Appeals Panel,
E.O. 13526, Section 5.3(b)(3)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 18
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Recent U.S. Initiative on Burundi

This memorandum provides you with an update on recent U.S. efforts to help resolve the crisis in Burundi.

Current Situation: The situation in Burundi continues to deteriorate. Hundreds of people are dying weekly. Analysts predict that a high-level assassination, coup attempt or insurgent attack on the capital Bujumbura could precipitate massive killing and refugee flows, possibly on a scale approaching that of Rwanda in 1994.

Purpose of My Trip: To launch a new U.S. strategy to prevent a humanitarian disaster in Burundi. Our strategy has three components: 1) shoring up the fragile "moderate" Hutu-Tutsi coalition government; 2) urging the Tutsi moderates to rein in Tutsi extremists responsible for much of the killing; and 3) curbing the deadly and destabilizing extremist Hutu insurgency based in Zaire. We will also strengthen the negotiating efforts of former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere by appointing a special envoy to assist him.

Results of My Trip: Our message was well-received. I believe my trip advanced the first two elements of our strategy by encouraging Burundian moderates to remain in positions of influence. Their departure would cause a dangerous power vacuum that the extremists would eagerly fill. While we continue to try to influence Tutsi extremists by threatening to isolate any government that comes to power by force, our actual leverage with them is limited. Those with greatest influence are Tutsi moderates in the Government and Army. In the past, they have curbed extremist activity by arresting perpetrators and appealing to the population to exercise restraint. I pushed them to do so again.

They asked for our assistance, in return, to curb Hutu extremist activity. We pledged to do all we could in that regard.

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Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 5/20/06
Derived From: Multiple Sources

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

The Need to Engage Mobutu: Fulfilling this pledge requires prevailing upon the Hutu insurgents and their Zairian sponsors to halt the civil war and commit to power-sharing negotiations under Nyerere's auspices. President Mobutu of Zaire can do much to rein in the Hutu insurgents and curb arms flows to the region.

At present, Zaire serves as a base for the Hutu insurgency as well as their main source of arms. Zaire also allows inflammatory radio broadcasts into Burundi from Zaire. Mobutu has failed, moreover, to arrest Rwandan war criminals resident in Zaire and allow UN monitors at airports used for arms shipments.

Meeting With Mobutu: To pressure Mobutu to play a more constructive role, we sent a high-level team to Zaire from May 20-21 to press Mobutu to take specific steps to curb the violence in Burundi. While our team made no commitments regarding U.S. support, they indicated we would be prepared to reciprocate in some fashion if Mobutu first took concrete, positive action. U.S. "carrots" might include ensuring that Mobutu receives full credit internationally for his role in a peace agreement, reconsidering providing him a visa to participate in the Atlanta Great Lakes conference, looking at ways to enhance our support for the upcoming elections in Zaire and supporting reestablishment of the Economic Community of Great Lakes States.

Mobutu assured our delegation of his control over the Hutu insurgents and offered to obtain a cease-fire declaration from them in return for a cease-fire from the Burundi government and the start of negotiations. Mobutu asked us to engage the Burundi government on a possible cease-fire date. After a cease-fire, Mobutu pledged to stop arms flows through Zaire.

While Mobutu is well-known for his grand promises and lack of action, we have various indications that he may be taking some of the steps he pledged. We must be cautious, however, to judge Mobutu on what he actually does and not on what he promises.

Moose Mission: To this end, George Moose and an interagency team returned to the region this week. Their goal is to try to broker a cease-fire and the start of all-party negotiations under President Nyerere's auspices.

Military Contingency Planning: Finally, the United States continues to press for joint military planning to enable the international community to respond rapidly to a humanitarian crisis should preventive diplomacy fail. We have reiterated our pledge made over a year ago to provide airlift and related support for an emergency humanitarian force, while making clear no U.S. ground troops will deploy to Burundi.

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The UK, Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, Canada, Germany, France and the UN have recently agreed to join in planning efforts. Several African countries have indicated a willingness to participate in a Burundi force, if provided equipment, logistical and financial support. However, at present the international community is far from ready to deploy such a force.

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Recent U.S. Initiative on Burundi

Declassified Under Authority of the
Interagency Security Declassification Appeals Panel,
E.O. 13526, Section 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 19
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014

Purpose

To provide an update on our recent efforts to help resolve the crisis in Burundi.

Background

Current Situation: The situation in Burundi continues to deteriorate. ~~Estimates are~~ ^{thousands} of people are dying weekly. Analysts predict a high-level assassination, coup attempt or insurgent attack on the capital Bujumbura (all serious possibilities) could precipitate massive killing and refugee flows, possibly on a scale approaching that of Rwanda in 1994.

Purpose of My Trip: ~~In an effort to ensure the United States has done all it reasonably could to try to avert disaster in Burundi, I traveled to France, Kenya, Burundi and Rwanda, May 11-16. My objective was to launch a new U.S. strategy agreed at senior levels May 6 aimed at trying to prevent a humanitarian disaster in Burundi.~~ *Respite*

U.S. Strategy in Burundi: Our strategy has three components: 1) shoring up the "moderate" ~~center in Burundi~~ ^{and strategy} which leads the ~~fragile~~ Hutu-Tutsi coalition government; 2) urging the Tutsi moderates to rein in Tutsi extremists responsible for much of the killing; 3) curbing the deadly and destabilizing extremist Hutu insurgency based in Zaire. ~~In addition, We will increase support to the negotiating efforts of former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere by appointing a special envoy to assist him in the region.~~ *also*

Results of My Trip: Our message ~~of continued support for the moderates, determination to isolate any extremists who come to power by force and readiness to welcome to the negotiating table any extremists who moderate their views~~ was well received by all with whom we met. ~~Burundian government officials and army~~ *were*

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Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 5/20/06

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~leaders thanked us for our presence, strategy and continued concern.~~

While it is impossible to measure our success in any concrete terms, I believe my trip served to advance the first two elements of our Burundi strategy. In the past, U.S. visits have helped quell violence and encouraged Burundian moderate leaders who fear for their lives to remain in positions of influence. This is crucial since their departure would result in a dangerous power vacuum and enable extremists to seize power. Several Burundian leaders with whom I met thanked me for my visit and commented that our continued support gave them the strength to persevere.

While the United States can continue to try to influence Tutsi extremists by threatening to isolate any government that comes to power by force, our leverage is limited. Those with greatest influence over Tutsi extremists are Tutsi moderates in the Government and Army. In the past, when willing, they have been able to curb extremist activity by arresting perpetrators and appealing to the population to exercise restraint. I pushed them to do so again. They said they recognized their responsibility and would do their best. However, they asked for our assistance, in return, to curb Hutu extremist activity. I said we would do all that we could in this regard consistent with the third element of our strategy.

The Need to Engage Mobutu: Implementing the third element of our strategy requires prevailing upon the Hutu insurgents and their Zairian sponsors to halt the civil war and commit to power-sharing negotiations under the auspices of former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere. Key to resolving the crisis in Burundi is persuading President Mobutu of Zaire to rein in the Hutu insurgents and curb arms flows to the region.

At present With Mobutu's assent, Zaire serves as a base for the Hutu insurgency. Mobutu's generals and personal associates are selling large quantities of arms to the Hutu insurgents as well as allowing inflammatory radio broadcasts into Burundi from Zaire. Mobutu has also refused to implement pledges to arrest suspected Rwandan war criminals resident in Zaire and allow UN monitoring of airports used for arms shipments.

Meeting With Mobutu: In an effort to pressure Mobutu to play a more constructive role with respect to Burundi, with your approval, we took the unprecedented step of sending a high-level team to Zaire May 20-21. DDCI George Tenet, Assistant Secretary George Moose and NSC Director Shawn McCormick pressed Mobutu to take six specific steps to curb the violence in Burundi. These steps include: 1) pressing extremist Hutus to implement an immediate cease-fire, stop insurgent activity and accept

unconditionally negotiations under Nyerere's auspices; 2) stopping weapons shipments to the Hutu insurgents; 3) permitting UN observers at key boarder airports to monitor arms flows; 4) halting extremist Hutu radio broadcasts emanating from Zaire; 5) continuing to detain intimidators in the Rwandan refugee camps; and 6) arresting suspected Rwandan war criminals in Zaire.

While the U.S. team made no commitments regarding U.S. support, they indicated we would be prepared to reciprocate in some fashion if Mobutu first took concrete, positive action. U.S. "carrots" might include ^{we would like to} ensuring that Mobutu receives full credit internationally for ~~bringing about~~ a peace agreement, reconsidering providing him a visa to ~~visit the Carter Center in~~ Atlanta to participate in a Great Lakes Conference, looking at ways to enhance our support for the upcoming elections in Zaire and perhaps assisting in supporting the re-establishment of an Economic Community of Great Lakes States (CEPGL).

~~In response to U.S. requests, Mobutu assured our delegation of his control over the Hutu insurgents and offered to obtain a cease-fire declaration from them in return for a cease-fire from the Burundian government and the beginning of negotiations. Mobutu asked our side to engage the Burundi government on a possible date for a cease-fire. He also said that a cease-fire, ^{after a} would include a cessation of arms flows through Zaire. ^{we would stop}~~

While Mobutu did not immediately agree to stationing UN observers at key airports, he did agree to review the issue. Moreover, his National Security Advisor privately promised DDCI Tenet that he would push Mobutu hard on this point. Mobutu promised to deal with extremist radio broadcasts emanating from Zaire, if we could pinpoint exactly where the transmissions were coming from. We agreed to do so. Unfortunately, Mobutu made no commitments to continue detaining intimidators in the Rwandan refugee camps or to arrest war crimes suspects.

~~Mobutu's positive response was significant because he did not deny his nefarious actions toward Burundi, as he usually does. Instead, he took our approach seriously and focused on areas in which he can potentially deliver ^{and} The Zairian leader is well known for his grand promises but ^{lack of action,} so we must wait and judge him on what he actually does.~~ ^{While Mobutu} ^{call his bluff}

Military Contingency Planning: Finally, as we work to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe in Burundi, ~~we continue to lead efforts to conduct joint military planning to enable the international community to respond rapidly should preventive diplomacy fail. We have reiterated our pledge made over a year ago to assist in planning for a humanitarian intervention force as well as to~~ ^{We have various indications that he may be taking some of the steps he pledged.} ^{Assistant Secretary Morse}

press of

The U.S.

will lead an advisory team to the region this with the aim of deriving cannot reach from both sides to a cease-fire talks + negotiations.

provide airlift and related support! ^{for any deploying humanitarian force, while} ~~We also continue to stress~~ ^{making clear} ~~that~~ no U.S. ground troops will deploy to Burundi.

~~In contrast to our unsuccessful efforts last year to interest Western partners in contingency planning, we have recently had some success. The UK, Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, Canada and Germany and the UN have agreed to participate in joint planning efforts. The French, who had opposed such planning for over a year, informed me in Paris they are willing to participate in contingency planning under UN auspices. President Chirac stressed that although no French troops would deploy to Burundi, his government may provide logistical and financial support. In addition, several African countries have indicated a willingness to participate in a humanitarian intervention force, if provided the necessary equipment, logistical and financial support.~~

The United States will proceed on two tracks: ^{Burundi} accelerating and refining internal USG political-military plans, and folding this work into joint planning efforts in New York with interested western and African partners. ^{this now} ^{but not provide ground troops}

The international community still however, remains far from ready to deploy such a force in the near term.

CONFIDENTIAL

with SECRET ATTACHMENT NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

5426

August 8, 1996

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: MACARTHUR DeSHAZER *lms*

FROM: SHAWN McCORMICK *SM*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Rwandan Vice President Paul Kagame, 11:15 a.m., Friday, August 9

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

NOTED

Recent Developments

Rwanda -- Internal: The RPF-led coalition government has brought a measure of stability to the country, but has both adopted and created several formidable problems. The judicial system and administrative state were decimated in 1994. At least 75,000 people suspected of genocide but as yet uncharged live in squalid prisons with more being added daily. The Parliament has repeatedly delayed passage of a draft genocide law which would categorize crimes, allow charges to be brought and permit limited amnesty. Members of Congress, NGOs and the international community are concerned about these ongoing problems. Guerrillas linked to the former genocidist regime now launch attacks into western Rwanda, and have committed hundreds of assassinations throughout the country. This fuels the RPF's feeling of insecurity, which in turn makes it unwilling to act on the draft genocide law. It also raises the spectre of retaliatory raids into Zaire. Rwandan troops have also committed atrocities since Kagame took office.

Refugees: There are 1.7 million Rwandan refugees living in camps under the care of international organizations (1 million in eastern Zaire and 700,000 in Tanzania). Reconstituted elements of the former regime, their army and militias which were responsible for the 1994 genocide largely control the camps and have prevented any substantive efforts at repatriation. The presence of these camps has become a serious destabilizing element in the region. The international community is spending approximately \$1 million on these camps of which the United States provides 30 percent.

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with SECRET ATTACHMENT

Classified by: Derivative

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 8/5/06

Derived From: 8/5/96 Burns Memo to Sens

Declassified Under Authority of the
Interagency Security Declassification Appeals Panel,
E.O. 13526, Section 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 20

Declassification Date: March 18, 2014

BACKGROUND

Vice President, Minister of Defense and pre-eminent RPF military tactician and politician Paul Kagame, is here on a private visit at the invitation of the Council on Foreign Relations where he is scheduled to speak on August 8. His itinerary includes events at CSIS, the Holocaust Museum, U.S. Committee for Refugees, IMF, World Bank and the Corporate Council on Africa. He has already met with Tim Wirth, George Moose and Secretary Perry during this visit. **You last met with Kagame in your office in December 1994 and again during your ten-day trip to the continent the same month.**

The U.S. is a strong supporter of the GOR. AID has provided transition assistance, DOD humanitarian assistance and IMET, and various agencies have contributed money and personnel to assist the International War Crimes Tribunal and Rwandan court system. We have also supported Rwanda at the UN, including support for lifting the arms embargo. European governments believe the U.S. has a heightened degree of credibility with the GOR.

Vice President Kagame's Agenda

Kagame will want to discuss continued cross border attacks from elements of the former regime based among the camps in eastern Zaire. He may also raise the larger security threat posed by the continued existence of the camps and the unwillingness of camp leaders to permit repatriation. He can be expected to seek further development aid and diplomatic/political support. Kagame has indicated an interest in obtaining non-lethal military equipment from DOD stocks.

OBJECTIVES

You should emphasize your commitment to a strong U.S.-Rwandan relationship. Stress need to attain GOR goals of repatriation, reconciliation, reconstruction and bringing those guilty of genocide to justice.

General Kagame has expressed concern about general security situation and cross-border incursions into Rwanda. **You should inform him that the United States is preparing to take the lead in developing a plan with the international community to stimulate voluntary repatriation and camp relocation away from the Rwanda border.** Kagame will likely be very supportive of such measures but may express concern about how best to separate the ex-FAR from the returning refugees. You should highlight important GOR role in protecting and welcoming refugees home and stress need for Rwandan Parliament to pass draft genocide law.

Burundi: The GOR has supported small-scale transfers of weapons to the Burundi military over the last two years. While it is willing to support sanctions against the Buyoya regime, the GOR felt deceived by other regional states which moved last week to implement sanctions immediately rather than using the threat as leverage for beginning talks with Hutu insurgents. ^{You should} Express interest in working to end arms flows to Burundi and press, with the regional leadership, for talks between the Burundi government and Hutu insurgents.

Concurrence by: Eric Schwartz ^{ESW}

Attachments

Tab I Talking Points

Tab II Bio

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Declassified Under Authority of the
Interagency Security Declassification Appeals Panel,
E.O. 13526, Section 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 21

Declassification Date: March 18, 2014

TALKING POINTS

Bilateral Relationship:

- Despite difficult problems, you have brought measure of stability to Rwanda and we wish to continue working with you. Want to reaffirm support for your government's objectives of repatriation, reconciliation, reconstruction and justice.
- Only long-term solution for Rwanda is power-sharing in which all non-genocidist elements can participate. Rwandans must develop this system since no amount of outside assistance can replace consensus among the Rwandan people.

Refugees:

- Continued presence of 1.7 million Rwandan refugees in Zaire and Tanzania is destabilizing and untenable.
- Recognize the security problems camps pose and are preparing to lead an effort with the international community to stimulate voluntary repatriation and camp relocation. This will include moving humanitarian supplies to within Rwanda.
- Will require cooperation of GOR to receive large numbers of returnees. Hope your government will take all necessary steps to protect and welcome them home.
- Large numbers of prisoners in Rwanda, and their conditions, are being used by the extremist Hutus to make refugees fear for safety upon return. Understand your Parliament has yet to pass its draft genocide law. When do you expect this will happen?
- Share concern Tribunal has not moved as quickly as we would like. Hope GOR will cooperate to the fullest extent with the Tribunal, including providing access to witnesses and documents. It is in all our interest to see perpetrators brought to justice.

Burundi:

- Your visit follows Buyoya coup and Arusha II summit of regional leaders that called for extensive sanctions as a "shock therapy" for Bujumbura regime. As sanctions come into

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Declassify on: 8/7/06

Reason: 1.5(d)

force, we count on your government's key role in enforcing them. I am interested in your views about the situation.

- Hope you can use ties to Burundian authorities to press need for talks with Hutu insurgents.

If Asked:

- Military Equipment: We will consider requests for acquisition of non-lethal U.S. military equipment by Rwanda on a case-by-case basis. However, we note that our concern about prisons, especially on Capitol Hill, will limit our ability to act.
- IMET: Rwanda is eligible for expanded IMET, but not regular IMET. Serious concerns on Capitol Hill about human rights violations and prison overcrowding. Must pass genocide law.

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MEETING WITH RWANDAN VICE PRESIDENT PAUL KAGAME

CONTEXT OF MEETING

Vice President, Minister of Defense and pre-eminent Rwanda politician Paul Kagame, a Tutsi and member of the (mainly Tutsi) RPF has been in office since the then-guerrilla RPA took Kigali in July, 1994. Kagame is one of the "59ers" who grew up as a refugee in Uganda and served in Museveni's army. He led the RPA to victory, but ceded the top spot to President Pasteur Bizimungu, a moderate Hutu.

Kagame can be expected to seek further development aid and diplomatic/political support from the USG. He has indicated an interest in obtaining non-lethal military equipment from DOD stocks. Vice President Kagame will have met with Undersecretary of State Tim Wirth and Assistant Secretary of State George Moose on August 6, and Defense Secretary Perry on August 7.

The RPF-led coalition government has brought a large measure of stability to the country, while also encountering several formidable problems since taking power. The judicial system and administrative state were decimated in 1994. There are over 75,000 prisoners in Rwandan jails in horrific conditions, most arrested since Kagame took office. Members of Congress, NGOs and the international community are concerned about this problem, and the GOR's apparent lack of response to it. There are delays in putting a new law in place to handle this huge case load. There are 1.7 million Rwandan refugees, most of them in eastern Zaire and some of them armed. Most of the refugees receive international assistance and are under the control of the government and militia responsible for the genocide. Armed attacks back into Rwanda from this population have increased. Rwandan troops have committed atrocities since Kagame took office. There is a sense that guerrillas linked to the former genocidist regime now launch attacks in western Rwanda, as well as assassinations throughout the country, at will. This fuels the RPF's feeling of insecurity, which in turn makes it unwilling to release prisoners.

The USG has supported the current government. We have given over \$750 million in emergency and humanitarian aid to the sub-region (much more than development aid for Rwanda, a sore

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point with Kagame); AID has given substantial sums in development aid, DOD has provided humanitarian assistance and IMET training; various agencies have contributed money and personnel to efforts to ready the International Tribunal and Rwandan court system to try those suspected of crimes against humanity, including genocide. We have also supported the Rwandan government at the UN, including support for lifting the arms embargo against Rwanda. European governments believe that the USG is especially credible with the GOR.

OBJECTIVES

- o To assure Vice President Kagame that the USG supports the Government of Rwanda and its goals of repatriation, reconciliation, reconstruction and bringing those guilty of genocide to justice.
- o To reaffirm to the President that we are very interested in seeing a successful voluntary repatriation of Rwanda refugees, and note that a key step towards this goal would be reducing the prison population so that refugees feel less of a threat of arrest and imprisonment. The genocide bill currently before Rwanda's Parliament is a good first step.
- o To impress upon the Vice President the U.S. interest in working with Rwanda to end arms flows to Burundi and press, with the regional leadership, for talks between the Burundi government and Hutu insurgents.

TALKING POINTS

- o We wish to reaffirm our support for your government's objectives. The situation in Rwanda has not been easy. Despite the very difficult problems you have had to face, you have brought a measure of stability to your country, and we wish to continue to work with you.
- o We feel that the only long-term solution for Rwanda will be a power-sharing arrangement in which all non-genocidist elements of Rwanda can participate. It must be up to Rwandans to develop this arrangement, since no amount of outside assistance can replace consensus among the Rwandan people. This may be your government's biggest challenge.
- o The continued presence of 1.7 million Rwandan refugees in Zaire and Tanzania is destabilizing and untenable. It is in neither the Rwandan government's nor the international community's interest to continue with the status quo. It

is critical that there be an expeditious and successful voluntary repatriation of Rwandan refugees in Zaire. The USG is discussing with the international community relocation of camps away from the border and resulting closure of those that have been most problematic, and taking steps to encourage voluntary repatriation. Rwanda would have serious responsibilities if such a strategy is adopted, including being prepared to receive large numbers of returnees and moving the Petit Barriere camp deeper into Rwanda.

- o At the same time, we are deeply concerned by the actions taken several weeks ago by Burundi authorities in expelling thousands of Rwandans from refugee camps against their will. We were equally disturbed by reports that this action, which contravenes Burundi's obligations under the Refugee Convention and established international practice, may have enjoyed the support of your government.
- o In order to encourage voluntary repatriation, it is essential that conditions be created inside Rwanda which will encourage refugees to return. There has been progress, but it is particularly important that the prison population be reduced significantly, that there be security for those who repatriate to their homes, and that abuses at the hands of security forces be minimized. This is of grave concern to us all.
- o The large numbers of prisoners in Rwanda, and their conditions, are being used by the extremist Hutus to make refugees fear for their safety upon return. The same is true of reports of killings of military-age Hutu men and other civilians.
- o We share your concern that the Rwanda Tribunal has not moved as quickly as we all would like. We hope your government will cooperate to the fullest extent with the Tribunal, including by providing access to witnesses and documents. It is in all of our interest to see perpetrators brought to justice.
- o We were pleased that your government ceased its participation in the recent forced repatriation of Rwandan refugees from Burundi. Ignoring internationally accepted humanitarian principles not only leads to further regional instability, but also undermines the credibility of the GOR's policy of welcoming refugees home in safety and dignity.

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-4-

- o Your visit comes in the wake of the Buyoya coup and the Arusha II summit of regional leaders, including Rwanda, that called for extensive sanctions as a "shock therapy" for the Bujumbura regime. We would be very interested in your views. As sanctions come into force, we will count very much on your government's key role in enforcing them.

If Asked:

- o Military Equipment: We will consider requests for acquisition of non-lethal U.S. military equipment by Rwanda on a case-by-case basis. However, we note that our concern about prisons, especially on Capitol Hill, could limit our ability to act.

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

12-18-96

Declassified Under Authority of the
Interagency Security Declassification Appeals Panel,
E.O. 13526, Section 5.3(b)(3)

INFORMATION

ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 22

Declassification Date: March 18, 2014

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Eastern Zaire: Update and Next Steps

Situation on the Ground: More than 500,000 refugees have returned to Rwanda from North Kivu, Zaire since Friday. An estimated 30,000-80,000 more remain in that area -- many of whom are former soldiers and their families who will not return to Rwanda. The rest may wish to return but require assistance. Still unaccounted for are several hundred thousand refugees in South Kivu. Imagery reveals no large population masses. Hence, we speculate these refugees may have moved deeper into Zaire or north to join the flow back to Rwanda. Another possibility is that UNHCR's original estimate of 1.2 million refugees may be inflated.

Re-Defining the Mission: I had productive meetings today in Ottawa with senior Canadian defense and foreign affairs officials as well as with PM Chretien. We agreed the mass refugee return necessitated a different, more limited mission focused on assisting the Rwandan Government (GOR) to absorb and reintegrate returnees. If the GOR agrees, we propose to establish an air-bridge immediately through Entebbe, Uganda, to Kigali, Rwanda, to transport any needed relief assistance. JCS estimates the total international personnel required would be about 500 in Entebbe and 200 in Kigali (including the Canadian headquarters, U.S. air control element, civil affairs and psy-ops teams and a civil-military relations cell). This presence would also enable us to respond quickly, if necessary, to any humanitarian requirements in Eastern Zaire. We will continue to monitor population flows in South Kivu to try to determine if there are large numbers of people at risk. We believe no foreign military presence is necessary at this time in Goma.

Incidentally, we detected less enthusiasm among Canadian Government officials for a large mission to Rwanda/Zaire than PM

SECRET

Classified by: Susan E. Rice
Reason: x4
Declassify On: 11/18/21
Derived From: Multiple Sources

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING

Chretien has expressed. Undoubtedly, the PM has been personally inspired by Amb. Raymond Chretien's direct pleas for action. Next Steps: The U.S. pledged \$140 mill. today to assist international agencies and the GOR with refugee relief, reintegration and reconstruction. We have pre-positioned air assets in Europe to respond to any airlift requests, and U.S. personnel are en route to the region to prepare for air lift operations. Before deployment of any multinational force, we must obtain the consent of the GOR, which is likely to accept this limited mission provided there are no French troops in Rwanda. We must also work with Canada to ensure broad international agreement to the redefined mission. A Canadian-led multinational military planning session is still scheduled for Thursday in Stuttgart.

We have agreed with Canada on the designation of an African deputy commander who will be subordinate effectively, if not nominally, to the U.S. Deputy. We hope this position coupled with the inclusion of a significant African presence in the force will allay African concerns.

Finally, we are working to keep the press informed of the evolving mission requirements and the specific U.S. actions underway to address these new requirements. We will also consult with NGO leaders November 19 at the White House.

République du Zaïre

7743



*Le Président de la République
Mbaréchal du Zaïre*

Cape Martin, France, November 6th 1996.

To His Excellency
Mr. William Jefferson Clinton
President of the United States of America
The White House
1600, Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Dear Mr. President,

I would like to hasten and congratulate you for your recent reelection victory. I know you must be very happy about this new four years term that enables you to lead the United States of America. The american people are satisfied with your strong leadership. I share in your joy.

As you know it, the situation that prevails in the Great Lakes Region of Central Africa is worrisome.

Zaire is suffering on its eastern boundaries from a dramatic situation and once again, we are victims of our hospitality. Indeed, after we suddenly opened up in 1994 our borders to more than one million refugees for humanitarian reasons, we are actually facing an unfair warfare imposed to us by some neighboring states.

The current conflicts in several countries bordering Zaire are of ethnical intensity. They are at the same time complex; we ought to solve them through politically concerned means. That is why I strongly urge the United States to use his strong leadership to help reach the global, political and concerted solutions to the present conflicts in the Great Lakes Region.

.. / .

République du Zaïre



*Le Président de la République
Marechal du Zaïre*

- 2 -

Such a positive implication of the United States in this approach will of course help as it did in the former Yugoslavia case, and put an end to the ethnic and unjustified warfare that Zairean neighboring states have imposed upon him. Finally, I would like to seize this opportunity and let you know that the democratic process in my country is going on quite well. As it has been agreed on by all the Zairean political leaders and other international partners, the free, transparent and democratic elections will be held next year.

I thank you in advance for your benevolent attention to my request and for the reply you intend to give to it. My best wishes and highest regards.

MOBUTU SESE SEKO KUKU NGBENDU WA ZA BANGA

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

1-27-96

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 26, 1996

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE *AL*

SUBJECT: Eastern Zaire/Rwanda: Response to Canadian
Proposal for Deployment of Multinational Force to
Central Africa

Purpose

To decide whether or not to support the Canadian proposal for
deployment of a multinational force (MNF) to Central Africa.

Background

Following the Stuttgart planning session, the Government of
Canada (GOC) today presented a specific proposal for a
multinational humanitarian mission in Central Africa and
requested a formal response from potential troop contributors
within 36 hours.

The Canadian Proposal

Canada is proposing the immediate establishment of a
multinational force (MNF) with the mission of facilitating the
delivery of humanitarian assistance and facilitating voluntary
refugee repatriation. The MNF would perform the following tasks:

- Establish MNF Headquarters (HQ) in Entebbe, Uganda and Kigali,
Rwanda. There would be no HQ in Zaire. Any decision to
deploy the HQ to Zaire must be taken subsequently by consensus
of key troop contributors represented on the planned
multinational Steering Board.
- Place existing national forces in the theater (airlift control
elements, psyops, aerial reconnaissance etc.) under Canadian
operational control.

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Reason: 1.6, x4

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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- Deploy 350-person Canadian military Disaster Assistance team (DART) to Entebbe and possibly to Rwanda. The DART would not deploy to Zaire unless there is a subsequent consensus among key troop contributors to do so.
- Plan, prepare and execute air-drops of supplies in Zaire, if necessary, to assist populations in need. The airdrop operation would be conducted from Entebbe. While aware of the drawbacks of airdrops, Canada seeks our agreement now to give the Force Commander (FC) authority to decide whether to execute airdrops in Zaire. The GOC would like the U.S. and others to participate in the airdrop operation.

Unresolved Issues: Canada has not defined the force structure, although we estimate it would consist of 1000-2000 persons. Nor has it defined the role for African countries. We continue to stress the importance of significant African participation in the force. Canada has not yet secured the consent of the Governments of Rwanda and Uganda for this operation. Finally, Canada is soliciting at least 2,000 troops to participate in a potential convoy security operation in Eastern Zaire but does not have sufficient pledges to date. Canada agrees any decision to conduct convoy security operations in Zaire must be taken subsequently by consensus of key troop contributors.

Proposed U.S. Response

State, OSD, JCS, OVP and NSC recommend the U.S. convey to Canada our willingness to participate in the following MNF activities:

- Establish Multinational Headquarters.
- Place existing national forces in the theater under Canadian operational control.
- Plan for airdrops, issue alert order and take other necessary steps to enable execution within 48 hours. The decision to execute must be made subsequently by the Steering Board.
- Support deployment of the Canadian DART team to Entebbe or Rwanda, provided any decision to deploy to Zaire must be taken subsequently by the Steering Board.

U.S. agreement to and participation in the MNF should be predicated, however, on fulfillment of the following conditions;

- Establishment of a Steering Board -- the composition, mandate and voting procedures of which are acceptable to the USG.
- Formal agreement of the Governments of Rwanda and Uganda to the deployment, including status of forces agreements.

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- Significant African participation in the mission.
- Agreement on appropriate rules of engagement.
- Confirmation of the command and control arrangements agreed bilaterally with Canada.

OK
AID, OMB and USUN support the above proposal as well. However, AID is concerned that, by deferring any decision to deploy assets for airdrops at this time, we may look irresponsible if later we learn there is a dire need and our response is delayed 48 hours. OMB notes the U.S. costs of this operation are likely to be substantially below the estimates made for the original MNF proposal. U.S. forces currently on the ground (approximately 430) could cost \$25 mill. or less; potential U.S. participation in an expanded mission would increase this estimate. As planning proceeds, we would need to address those costs and review potential ways of offsetting them. USUN recommends the U.S. not object to other countries' pre-positioning assets in the region for airdrops; however, it thinks the U.S. should not do so and any decision to execute must be made by the Steering Board.

Other Countries' Perspectives

We anticipate that Canada will not be satisfied with the proposed U.S. response and will continue to insist on immediate authority to conduct airdrops. The GOC feels under substantial political pressure to 'do something' in Zaire. DOD thinks advance authorization of airdrops is imprudent and strongly recommends we not cede this point. We do not know whether Canada will accede to the U.S. position or decide to proceed without us. Several other countries have expressed in New York a preliminary readiness to support the Canadian proposal, including France, Belgium, Ireland, Uganda, Denmark, Senegal and Portugal. (They do not yet have final positions from capitals.) Key UN agencies also support the Canadian proposal as the best means of getting an operation launched. However, UNHCR and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations note that airdrops are potentially dangerous and the least desirable method of delivering assistance.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the proposed U.S. position outlined above for transmission to Canada as soon as possible.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

approved orally to sh
11/28/96

(Signature)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

Summary of Conclusions of
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: August 6, 1996
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 3:20-4:15 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of the Principals Committee
Meeting on Burundi and Rwandan Refugee Camps (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

The Vice President's Office
William Wise

State
Warren Christopher
Peter Tarnoff
Richard Bogosian

Defense
John White
Walter Slocombe

USUN
Madeleine Albright
Rick Inderfurth

Chief of Staff
Leon Panetta

OMB
Jack Lew
Gordon Adams

CIA
John Deutch
George Tenet
William Foltz

AID
Richard McCall
Nan Borton

JCS
John Shalikashvili
Michael Byron

White House
Anthony Lake
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
MacArthur DeShazer
Eric Schwartz
Mike Sheehan

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Interagency Security Declassification Appeals Panel,
E.O. 13526, Section 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 024
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

-- Neither an ultimatum nor deadlines will be set for Major Buyoya's regime. Sanctions implemented by regional states will be supported. (S)

-- EUCOM/JCS will provide a detailed contingency plan for a possible humanitarian operation in Burundi by Wednesday, August 7. (S)

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Classified by: Andrew D. Sens

Reason: 1.5(b)(d)

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-- As a matter of urgency, NSC will coordinate an interagency effort to formulate and implement a plan to recruit, support and train African and other forces to participate in a potential humanitarian intervention in Burundi. This plan will draw heavily on the concept of an African Crisis Response Force, which State and DOD will seek to implement as soon as possible. (S)

-- OMB will provide detailed options for funding the establishment of a Burundi contingency force, modeled on the concept of the African Crisis Response Force, as well as for funding the U.S. contribution to a Burundi intervention force established under UN auspices. (S)

-- The interagency proposal for closure of refugee camps near the Rwandan border is approved. The U.S. will seek to lead an international effort to stimulate voluntary return of Rwandan refugees and camp relocation, as necessary. The United States proposal entails phasing out international assistance to existing refugee camps over a 180 day period, beginning with those camps which pose the greatest immediate regional security threat. Those refugees who choose not to return to Rwanda would be relocated to camps away from the border. (S)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

August 5, 1996

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: MACARTHUR DESHAZER *Des/ro*

SUBJECT: Briefing Memo for Principals Committee Meeting on
Burundi and Rwanda, August 6, 2:30-3:15 p.m.

Burundi

1. **Situation Report:** Ask CIA to provide an update on recent developments and an assessment of the likelihood of a humanitarian crisis in the next six months.

For your information, there is [redacted (b)(1), E.O. 13526, 1.4(c)] reporting that Hutu rebels are planning insurgent operations before the end of August. One such report was made this weekend [redacted (b)(1), E.O. 13526, 1.4(c)].

[redacted (b)(1)] Similarly, Burundian Armed Forces are reported to have devised a preliminary strategy for renewed counterinsurgency efforts against Hutu rebels. It is also expected to begin before the end of August.

2. **Revised Options:** Following your instructions during the JCS briefing on Saturday, we have revised the options to include alternatives that do not involve the U.S. leading the intervention force. We have added two sub-options (2a&b) to Option 2. Essentially, Option 2a calls for the U.S. to provide requisite force cohesion and direction by underwriting the operation now in terms of support and organizational skill. We would pursue an intense diplomatic effort to identify a third world country to lead the force and mount an all-out effort to train, equip and support the selected country to lead the intervention force. Option 2b is a variation of direct U.S. participation outlined in the original paper.

You should discuss with General Shali how he wants to present to the Principals the JCS plan for a humanitarian contingency force. Ideally, he would give a short briefing on the safe area concept briefed to you on Saturday and likely force size and composition (by unit or function) required to perform the mission.

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Reason: 1.5 (a) (d)
Declassify On: 7/2/06
Derived From: Multiple Sources

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Interagency Security Declassification Appeals Panel,
E.O. 13526, Section 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 025
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014

3. Options for U.S. Participation

If we are to be in a position to react effectively to the impending crisis in Burundi, the only practical alternative to doing nothing or doing it all ourselves is to marry the most competent African forces with a competent lead nation and provide the Africans with substantial amounts of equipment, resources, logistics support and (time permitting) training. In any case, the U.S. should be prepared to play the role of lead nation if a crisis erupts before this plan can be implemented. You should try to gain agreement that the U.S. should:

-- Take immediate steps to identify a third world nation in order to obtain a commitment to lead a multinational intervention force for Burundi.

-- Agree to provide requisite force cohesion and direction to the selected third world country to lead a multinational intervention force by underwriting the operation now in terms of support and organizational skill.

-- Pledge to commence accelerated training and logistics support designed to prepare the force for mission requirements.

-- Actively recruit targeted African, western and other troop contributors to perform specific mission tasks along the lines of the proposed action plan at Tab B(1).

-- Gain agreement for direct U.S. participation (Option 2b) in the event a crisis erupts before an intervention force can be assembled and prepared. If a crisis occurs within the next few months, only the U.S. or France is capable of mounting a highly effective humanitarian intervention. France is unlikely to do so.

You should also task JCS and OSD to finalize the force template and identify capable countries to target for recruitment. In addition, you should task OMB with NSC to lead an interagency effort to estimate the total cost of creating and sustaining this force and the appropriate form and funding sources for the U.S. contribution (vice that of allies). We will have great difficulty finding the required funds and may even have to consider a supplemental.

4. African Crisis Response Force

You should gain agreement in principle that DOD's proposal to establish an African Crisis Response Force (ACRF) should be implemented by the U.S. Task NSC to coordinate implementation effort. Task State to craft a diplomatic strategy to sell the

proposal to selected African nations. **Task OMB** to work with State and DOD to **produce cost estimates and options for funding** to the proposal in FY 97 and FY 98.

Rwandan Refugee Camps

Eric Schwartz and I have led an interagency effort to formulate options for dealing with the security threat posed by the continued presence of refugee camps on Rwanda's borders. NSC produced a detailed options paper that was reviewed by all concerned agencies and bureaus at the Assistant Secretary level. While the details of implementation must still be finalized, there was consensus that the U.S. should urge other donors, UNHCR and countries in the region to agree to phase out assistance to Rwandan refugee camps over a period of 180 days, starting with those camps that pose the greatest immediate security threat. Those who choose not to return would be relocated inside Zaire and Tanzania.

While there is interagency consensus on the plan (which Dan Spiegel supports), agencies may argue that the plan is unworkable (and highly risky) without --

- a beefed up security presence in the camps, a determination to neutralize ex-FAR leaders in the camps and the cooperation of Mobutu (whose acquiescence we would need in any resettlement plan);
- a willingness on the part of the Rwandan government to improve the climate for return, by providing a semblance of due process for the 80,000 detainees in Rwanda, ending reprisal killings, etc.

You should indicate that you share these concerns, and that our efforts on the refugee issue need to be coordinated closely with what we are doing on the political/security side.

You should confirm that the Principals endorse this plan and ask State to work with NSC to consult with allies and UNHCR to implement the plan.

Concurrences by: *Copy Provided*
RSW
Richard Clarke, Eric Schwartz

Attachments

- Tab A Agenda
- Tab B Discussion Paper on Burundi
 - Tab 1 Proposed Action Plan for Implementation of Option 2
 - Tab 2 African Crisis Response Force
- Tab C Discussion Paper on Rwanda Refugee Camps

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Interagency Security Declassification Appeals Panel,
E.O. 13526, Section 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 58

Declassification Date: March 18, 2014

Burundi: Preparations for Possible Humanitarian Contingency Operation Principals Committee Discussion Paper

Purpose: To review the status of preparations for a possible humanitarian contingency operation in Burundi and consider whether additional steps by the USG are warranted. (S)

Recent Developments: The recent coup in Burundi, effective suspension of the Arusha I "security assistance" plan, continuing Hutu insurgency and the impending imposition of economic sanctions against Burundi by the countries in the region combine to increase the possibility that Burundi could become more unstable. In the worst case, communal violence could escalate and spread culminating in a genocide on the scale of October 1993 in Burundi or even Rwanda in 1994. (S)

Background: While the United States, countries in the region and the international community at large are alert to this possibility, few concrete steps have been taken to ready the international community for an effective response should a worst case scenario ensue. (S)

Chapter VII humanitarian contingency planning at the UN is in the early stages. UN DPKO envisions a force mandated to protect innocent civilians and provide support to humanitarian assistance efforts. (S)

Thus far, UN estimates of troop requirements for such a mission appear so ambitious as to be unrealistic. While a few less capable African countries have indicated a willingness in principle to participate in a humanitarian intervention (Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Malawi, Chad), none is capable of launching an effective mission without many months of intense training, substantial equipment, logistical and financial support. No western or other nation has agreed to provide ground forces for such a mission. Most critically lacking is any competent country willing to organize, command and control the force. (S)

In May, agencies participated in a political-military-humanitarian planning exercise in Carlisle, PA. That session produced a mission statement and concept for the establishment of safe areas to provide security to civilians at risk and for supporting delivery of humanitarian relief supplies. This concept remains the basis for U.S. planning to date. The Carlisle report has recently been shared with the UN and key allies. However, it does not (and was not intended to) provide a precise force template necessary to recruit specific troop contributions. (S)

EUCOM has been tasked to produce a detailed plan, which is due shortly and which will represent the next step in the planning process. From these

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Declassify on: 8/2/06

analyses, we hope to derive notional force structures for a basic plan and excursions (i.e., with reduced mission and attendant force reductions). Excursions might include one single or two safe areas. With notional force structures available, the USG would be able, if desired, to try to recruit capable troops from targeted African, western and other countries to perform specific functions. (S)

At this stage, we face the question of whether or not the United States should move beyond our planning to date and intensify our efforts to recruit and organize a humanitarian intervention force capable of responding swiftly to a near-term crisis in Burundi. (S)

Assumptions

- If a humanitarian disaster occurs, there will be substantial pressure for the international community to respond, particularly since there has been substantial media attention to the potential for crisis in Burundi. (S)
- If a crisis occurs within the next three months, only the United States or France is capable of mounting a *highly effective* humanitarian intervention. France is unlikely to do so. (S)
- If a crisis occurs in the next few months, the only practical alternative to doing nothing or doing it ourselves is to marry the most competent African and other foreign forces with a competent lead nation (or nations). This would entail providing the African countries with substantial amounts of equipment, logistics support, sustainment funds and (time-permitting) training. (S)
- No humanitarian intervention force can succeed without a "lead" nation providing, at a minimum, command, control and communications (C3). (S)
- The African countries most willing to participate in a Chapter VII force (e.g., Tanzania, Uganda) are least capable of performing effectively unless their troops have been fully trained and equipped, which will take at least six months. (S)
- The cost to the United States of helping equip, sustain and support African troops in a humanitarian mission in Burundi would be substantial. (S)

Options:

1) Current Approach

To date, the United States has done more diplomatically to avert a humanitarian crisis in Burundi and pledged more concrete military assistance to enable a swift international response than any other outside power. For more than a year, we

have urged the UN and others to prepare for a humanitarian crisis in Burundi. We have pledged and provided detailed planning assistance both to the UN and to the Arusha process in Dar es Salaam. Further, the United States has pledged strategic airlift and an air control element to assist others to deploy. We have also pledged in principle equipment and other forms of assistance to a Chapter VI consensual regional peacekeeping effort as contemplated at Arusha I. We have made very clear to other countries that the U.S. contribution would be limited to the above and not involve U.S. combat forces or other troops stationed in Burundi. (S)

However, another genocide remains all too possible. In the worst case, a wider regional war could also ensue. As media attention to the crisis builds, the United States and others would likely face considerable criticism in some circles for not doing more to try to stop the killing. (S)

In the event of a crisis, the United States can maintain with considerable credibility that we did our best -- within the limits of our prior commitments -- to avert genocide and enable an effective international response. Moreover, we would stress yet again that Burundians themselves are responsible for their own fate. Most importantly, our current course would enable us to avoid placing U.S. forces at risk and contributing scarce resources to support a humanitarian intervention. Ultimately, however, we would still incur major costs to provide assistance (food, shelter, water) to refugees and displaced persons. (S)

2) Enhanced International Donor Involvement

Alternatively, the United States could immediately take the lead in organizing one of two hybrid African/Western to respond quickly to a major crisis: (S)

2 a) Robust Arusha Model

The Concept: The robust Arusha model would require the U.S. Government, possibly in tandem with other key western donor nations, to commit to play a greater role than previously planned in the provision of incentives for participation. In sum, the United States would provide requisite force cohesion and direction by underwriting the operation now in terms of support and organizational skill. An intense diplomatic effort would focus on a short list of most-capable African nations in order to obtain a commitment by one to lead the force. The short list would, at best, include South Africa, Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. Once selected, an all-out effort would be made to train and support selected country to lead the intervention force. To leverage other participation, the United States would consider a full range of tools including economic offsets and military incentives. Similar but tailored approaches would be made to the most capable donor nations to flush out headquarters, combat support and brigade structures. The immediate recruiting goals would be, in priority, a force headquarters, support elements and sufficient troops to secure two safe areas

(approximately 13,000). Once commitment to participation is obtained, the United States (and hopefully other western nations) would commence accelerated training and logistics support designed to prepare the force for mission requirements. Once the operations commence, operational and sustainment support could be phased in through a combined U.S. and/or western and MNF support group located in an offset location(s) outside of Burundi. (S)

Pros:

- No U.S. troop involvement in Burundi beyond the modest support committed by the President;
- Limited direct U.S. military and political liabilities;
- Positive and proactive U.S. leadership and support for the force;
- Allows the United States to shape the force (and therefore the outcome);
- Builds for interagency regional peacekeeping;
- Positive sign (domestic/international) of U.S. interest and engagement. (S)

Cons:

- Gap between U.S. decision and operational readiness of force;
- High cost/limited resources (however, this must be weighed relative to the cost of doing nothing or committing U.S. forces);
- Will require a major interagency effort to orchestrate legislative, fiscal, and diplomatic activities. (S)

2 b) Direct U.S. Participation:

The Concept: This model would involve a substantial U.S. troop commitment in Burundi beyond that pledged by the President but would rely on African forces to actually conduct the majority of operations in the contested areas, thereby reducing the risk of U.S. casualties. Even with American military and political leadership, there is no guarantee other countries will join us, although experience has shown American leadership often spurs others to follow suit.-(S)

The United States would command the MNF in Burundi, provide logistics and specialized headquarters support, a capability for country-wide Quick Reaction Force operations, airport security, medical support, and aviation support. Other African donor nations would provide brigade headquarters and battalions "as is, where is" to support an MNF structure similar to the one currently envisioned. The United States would airlift these battalions into Burundi at which time they would come under U.S. command and control. Costs would remain high as the United States would still undertake to train and sustain African operational forces in addition to absorbing operational and maintenance costs related to U.S. forces. Costs related to headquarters and support training would be reduced, however. (S)

Pros:

- Tangible sign of U.S. commitment beyond logistics and training; could attract other donor nations;
- Enhanced efficiency in headquarters and C3I; could lower requirement for some specialized equipment. (S)

Cons:

- Raises a myriad of problems related to PDD-25, command of U.S. forces and force protection;
- Will raise war power issues;
- Increased likelihood of U.S. casualties, particularly if the United States provides rotary wing aviation support;
- Saddles United States with potential for major operational failure since combatant elements are not U.S.;
- Unknown level of opposition/resistance on the ground. (S)

NB: Training costs would initially be less than the option above because the United States would be drawing on existing battalions and would not be required to substantially increase the capabilities of the African donor battalions. On the other hand, training would take much longer since more units would have to be trained, and costs would skyrocket at execution due to the greatly increased U.S. involvement. (S)

3) U.S. Intervention.

This is the only option which will provide an effective, immediate response to a genocide in Burundi until some type of African force is trained. It is also the option with the greatest chance for success assuming success is stopping the genocide. Concomitantly, it is the option with the greatest likelihood of U.S. casualties. Such an intervention would have a major downside in terms of domestic reaction. The United States might be able to conduct this operation in tandem with other western partners to temper criticism. (S)

Pros:

- Provides the quickest response to a genocide in Burundi;
- Provides maximum operational efficiency (S)

Cons:

- Will trigger significant domestic reaction;
- War powers issues will surface;

- Great likelihood of U.S. casualties;
- Far beyond stated Presidential support;
- Unknown resistance on the ground;
- High potential for sustained U.S. commitment in Burundi. (S)

Duration/Exit Strategy: A time limit would be placed on any intervention. The duration of such a mission must still be determined. It could be set arbitrarily (e.g., three months) as the French did in Rwanda or it could be tied to a political outcome -- such as a negotiated power-sharing agreement. Should technical or operational support beyond the regional force's capability be required in country, it could be provided by contract personnel. The "adopt-a-battalion" concept tried in Rwanda could also provide a means to share the cost burden. In any case, after closure of the safe areas, a smaller UN or regional follow-on peacekeeping force is likely to be required to perform more traditional functions -- either to enhance security and deter further killings (as in UNAMIR II in Rwanda) or to implement a peace agreement (as in Angola or Mozambique). The duration of the follow-on force is also uncertain but should be tied to the effective re-establishment by the government of general security throughout the country. (S)

Political Oversight: A body and process to provide political oversight to the multinational force must be designated (UN, OAU, NATO?) or developed (Arusha heads of state?). Identification or development of this body is an absolutely critical first step to building, funding, supporting and ultimately commanding the force. Most western states appear to prefer that the UN Security Council sanction for a regional body (the Arusha heads of state), along the lines of ECOWAS in Liberia. Attention and effort will have to be devoted to resolving this issue early. (U)

U.S. Recruitment Effort: The United States would have to invest equipment, money and diplomatic capital to recruit and establish an effective force. We would have to approach capable African and other troop contributors at the highest levels and urge their participation in specific roles, primarily infantry but also certain combat support functions. Those African countries most capable of participating quickly and effectively in such a force include: Zimbabwe, South Africa, Ghana, Kenya, Botswana, Senegal and Ethiopia. We must also be prepared to welcome limited numbers of less capable but politically important African troops such as those from Tanzania and possibly Uganda. Other traditional troop contributors such as Pakistan and India should also be asked to participate. (S)

U.S. and western partners would have to pledge substantial assistance to equip, sustain, fund and train these troops. These non-western troops could be funded through the UN peacekeeping budget, provided the UNSC authorized the mission and maintained political oversight of the mission. While this arrangement would be unorthodox and costly (particularly given U.S. budgetary constraints), it may be preferable to ad hoc funding mechanisms, which we have great difficulty sustaining over time. (S)

Western Support: The United States would also have to work to attract competent logistics support elements (e.g., transportation, engineering, signals, POL, water, etc.), primarily from other capable western countries. Among those countries that have performed similar roles elsewhere in Africa are the UK in Rwanda and Angola, Germany in Somalia, and Belgium and Canada in Rwanda. NATO/WEU countries might also contribute joint logistics/support elements. While previous efforts to solicit allied participation have failed, an enhanced U.S. contribution may well suffice to persuade some western partners to play a greater role. France, for instance, has recently said it will do no more and no less than others. To obtain such support, we would need a sustained high-level approach to our allies. (S)

Garnering Public Support: It would be difficult but not impossible to persuade our public of the wisdom of an enhanced U.S. role in Burundi along the lines suggested above. To do so, we might stress that the U.S. contribution is relatively little but enables others to do a lot. This is U.S. leadership as well as burden-sharing at its best. Moreover, as a global leader, we are in some way diminished, if we do not act to help avert another genocide when we can do so at acceptable risk and cost. (S)

Action Plan: At Tab 1 is a proposed action plan for implementing Option 2 above.

Long-Term Alternatives

If we are fortunate to avoid a near-term crisis in Burundi, we can take steps now to enhance our readiness and flexibility to respond to future crises in Burundi or elsewhere in Africa with minimal U.S. involvement. DOD is refining a concept called the **African Crisis Response Force (ACRF)** -- (Summary at Tab 2). This concept calls for the United States and possibly others to identify, recruit, train and equip capable African troops for potential peacekeeping and humanitarian contingencies in Africa. If implemented, this proposal would enhance the quality of African troops available for peace operations and may eventually obviate the need for western "lead" country involvement. Over the long term, we might also be able to train and equip less capable African troops (i.e., Tanzania and Uganda) so they could augment a force led by more experienced African forces. (S)

Implementation would require sustained diplomatic efforts and resources -- such as FMF and/or voluntary peacekeeping funds. If this is deemed an initiative worth pursuing, we might launch the recruitment effort and incorporate the proposal into the Administration's FY 98 budget request. (S)

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ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 56
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014

Proposed Action Plan for Implementation of Option 2

- 1) Define Precise Mission and Force Requirements; Determine U.S. contribution.** (Action: JCS/EUCOM; Principals Recommendation/POTUS decision)
- 2) Identify Attractive Target Countries to Provide Specific Military Capabilities.** (Action: OSD/JCS)
- 3) Identify Resources/Method of Funding U.S. contribution of equipment, training, and financial support.** (Action: OMB with State, DOD and NSC)
- 4) Brief UN, allies, OAU, Arusha Participants on U.S. plan and proposed contribution; Request UN assistance in Recruitment.** (Action: State/USUN)
- 5) Launch recruitment effort in conjunction w/ UN. Determine Support Requirements for Participating Countries.** (Action: State with substantial support from OSD, JCS, NSC)

Phase I: Africa and Others

- POTUS letters
- Send joint USG team (State/JCS/OSD/NSC -- Assistant Secretary level) to key African and other nations to brief operational plan, force requirements, U.S. role and requested contribution.
- Follow-up calls from Principals to counterparts as needed.

Phase II: Western Partners (troops and resources)

- POTUS letters
- Send joint USG team (State/JCS/OSD/NSC -- Assistant Secretary level) to key Western nations to brief operational plan, force requirements, U.S. role and requested troop and financial contributions.
- Follow-up calls from Principals to counterparts as needed.

(With regard to both Phase I and II, JCS notes that the joint USG team **must** include USEUCOM military planners and the discussions should be about the operational concept not the operational plan. Once a firm donor commitment is made, USEUCOM planners would establish mil-to-mil contacts with all donor nations to coordinate the details of the plan as necessary. Security at this stage will be vital.)

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Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 8/2/06

6) Align Force Contributions to Mission requirements/Adjust Mission, if necessary. (Action: JCS/EUCOM with direction from Principals, if necessary)

7) Identify Tripwires/Obtain quiet commitment from UNSC Members to authorize mission, if circumstances warrant. (Action: State/USUN)

8) Provide equipment, training, funding as required. (Action: State and DOD)

9) Preposition equipment or troops as required. (Action: DOD)

10) Identify political structure under which the force will be built, funded and controlled. (Action: State)

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E.O. 13526, Section 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 026

Declassification Date: march 18, 2014

August 2, 1996

Rwandan Refugee Camps in Zaire

Purpose: To decide whether to pursue a strategy to obtain the closure of refugee camps near the Rwandan border.

Background: In July 1994, more than two million Rwandans fled ahead of the victorious Tutsi-dominated rebel army into eastern Zaire and northwestern Tanzania. The United States led *Operation Support Hope* in an effort to stabilize the humanitarian situation and, today, more than 1.7 million refugees remain in Zaire and Tanzania. The current cost of maintaining the camps is about one million dollars per day, of which the United States provides more than 30%.

Status quo: While at least 300,000 of those who fled have returned to Rwanda voluntarily, the remainder (about one million in Zaire and 700,000 in Tanzania) live largely under the authority of the former government, its military forces (the ex-FAR) and militia (Interahamwe). Many of those in the camps participated in the genocide and would likely never return to Rwanda voluntarily. Many others who might return are forced (by threat and intimidation) to remain in the camps by the leadership of the former government. We believe that many would go home if they could make that decision freely; conditions in Rwanda are far from ideal, but the situation has stabilized sufficiently to permit large scale voluntary return.

Problems with the status quo: The camps pose a security threat for the Government of Rwanda and for the countries in which they are located. Most of the camps in Zaire and Tanzania are near the border, and ex-FAR and Interahamwe use the camps in Zaire as bases of operation from which to launch attacks into western Rwanda. In fact, the political/military structures in the camps appear to be forming a nascent ethnic parastate, mobilizing the Rwandan Hutu population through an ethnic nationalist creed. The risks to U.S. objectives are many: increasing attacks into Rwanda from the camps as the ex-FAR strengthen their position, retaliation by the Government of Rwanda in the form of attacks on the camps, increasing collaboration between ex-FAR and Hutu extremists in Burundi, and neighboring states being drawn into increased conflict.

U.S. Proposal: As a result of these concerns, U.S. Rwanda/Burundi Special Coordinator Richard Bogosian broached the concept of selected camp closure during the June Rwanda

CONFIDENTIAL

Classified by: Eric Schwartz

Reason: 1.5(d)

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Operational Support Group Meeting in Geneva. Our allies are awaiting a formal proposal from us on this issue.

Interagency agreement on this issue: At an Assistant Secretary-level meeting held at the National Security Council last month, agencies reached a general consensus on the following points:

- The United States should seek to lead an international effort to stimulate voluntary return and relocation of remaining displaced persons;
- The plan should envision a phase out of assistance to the camps over a 180 day period, beginning with those camps which pose the greatest immediate regional security threat;
- That those individuals who choose not to return to Rwanda should be relocated in camps further from the border.

Factors to Consider: It is important to recognize that such a strategy will be difficult to implement -- if that were not the case, it would have already been effected. In particular, a detailed strategy and operations plan will have to take account of the following factors, all of which concern political and security issues:


Coordination with the EU and with UNHCR: while the U.S. is the largest donor, this is an international effort, and decision-making on camp strategy will have to be collective.

Security concerns in the camps: we can expect vigorous efforts by ex-FAR and Interahamwe to thwart any relocation/repatriation plan. If there is no effort to neutralize this threat, the plan will, at best, fail and, at worst, result in chaos and violence.

Actions by the Government of Rwanda: we will need to encourage actions by the GOR to improve the climate for return, by providing at least a semblance of due process for the 80,000 detainees in Rwanda, ending reprisal killings, etc.

August 2, 1996

NOTED



INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

FROM: SUSAN E. RICE

SUBJECT: Briefing Memo for Principals Committee Meeting on
Burundi and Rwanda, August 6, 2:30-3:15 pm.

Burundi

- 1. **Situation Report:** Ask CIA to provide an update on recent developments and an assessment of the likelihood of a humanitarian crisis in the next six months.
- 2. **JCS Briefing:** Following your briefing by JCS on Saturday, you should discuss with Shali how he wants to present to the Principals the JCS plan for a humanitarian contingency force. Ideally, he would give a short briefing on the safe area concept and likely force size and composition (by unit or function) required to perform the mission on different scales -- small (one safe area), medium (two areas) and large (three plus).

3. **Options for U.S. Participation**

You should try to gain agreement that the U.S. should:

- Take immediate steps to **serve as the Lead Nation** in organizing a multinational intervention force for Burundi.
- Privately pledge to contribute the headquarters unit and airport security battalion for a force.
- Actively recruit targeted African, western and other troop contributors to perform specific mission tasks along the lines of the proposed action plan at Tab B(1).

You should also task JCS and OSD to finalize the force template and identify capable countries to target for recruitment. In addition, you should task OMB with NSC to lead an interagency effort to estimate the total cost of creating and sustaining this force and the appropriate form and funding sources for the U.S.

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Derived From: Multiple Sources

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contribution (vice that of allies). We will have great difficulty finding the required funds and may even have to consider a supplemental.

4. African Crisis Response Force

You should gain agreement in principle that DOD's proposal to establish an African Crisis Response Force (ACRF) should be implemented by the U.S. Task NSC to coordinate implementation effort. Task State to craft a diplomatic strategy to sell the proposal to selected African nations. Task OMB to work with State and DOD to produce cost estimates and options for funding to the proposal in FY 97 and FY 98.

Rwandan Refugee Camps

Eric Schwartz and I have led an interagency effort to formulate options for dealing with the security threat posed by the continued presence of refugee camps on Rwanda's borders. NSC produced a detailed options paper that was reviewed by all concerned agencies and bureaus at the Assistant Secretary level. While the details of implementation must still be finalized, there was consensus that the U.S. should urge other donors, UNHCR and countries in the region to agree to phase out assistance to Rwandan refugee camps over a period of 180 days, starting with those camps that pose the greatest immediate security threat. Those who choose not to return would be relocated inside Zaire and Tanzania.

While there is interagency consensus on the plan (which Dan Spiegel supports), agencies may argue that the plan is unworkable (and highly risky) without --

- a beefed up security presence in the camps, a determination to neutralize ex-FAR leaders in the camps and the cooperation of Mobutu (whose acquiescence we would need in any resettlement plan);
- a willingness on the part of the Rwandan government to improve the climate for return, by providing a semblance of due process for the 80,000 detainees in Rwanda, ending reprisal killings, etc.

You should indicate that you share these concerns, and that our efforts on the refugee issue need to be coordinated closely with what we are doing on the political/security side.

You should confirm that the Principals endorse this plan and ask State to work with NSC to consult with allies and UNHCR to implement the plan.

Concurrences by: *not available* *See*
Richard Clarke, Eric Schwartz

Attachments

Tab A Agenda

Tab B Discussion Paper on Burundi

 Tab 1 Proposed Action Plan for Implementation of
 Option 2

 Tab 2 African Crisis Response Force

Tab C Discussion Paper on Rwanda Refugee Camps

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ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 57

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**Burundi: Preparations for Possible Humanitarian Contingency Operation
Principals Committee Discussion Paper**

Purpose: To review the status of preparations for a possible humanitarian contingency operation in Burundi and consider whether additional steps by the USG are warranted. (S)

Recent Developments: The recent coup in Burundi, effective suspension of the Arusha I "security assistance" plan, continuing Hutu insurgency and the impending imposition of economic sanctions against Burundi by the countries in the region combine to increase the possibility that Burundi could become more unstable. In the worst case, communal violence could escalate and spread culminating in a genocide on the scale of October 1993 in Burundi or even Rwanda in 1994. (S)

Background: While the United States, countries in the region and the international community at large are alert to this possibility, few concrete steps have been taken to ready the international community for an effective response should a worst case scenario ensue. (S)

Chapter VII humanitarian contingency planning at the UN is in the early stages. UN DPKO envisions a force mandated to protect innocent civilians and provide support to humanitarian assistance efforts. (S)

Thus far, UN estimates of troop requirements for such a mission appear so ambitious as to be unrealistic. While a few less capable African countries have indicated a willingness in principle to participate in a humanitarian intervention (Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Malawi, Chad), none is capable of launching an effective mission without many months of intense training, substantial equipment, logistical and financial support. No western or other nation has agreed to provide ground forces for such a mission. Most critically lacking is any competent country willing to organize, command and control the force. (S)

In May, agencies participated in a political-military-humanitarian planning exercise in Carlisle, PA. That session produced a mission statement and concept for the establishment of safe areas to provide security to civilians at risk and for supporting delivery of humanitarian relief supplies. This concept remains the basis for U.S. planning to date. The Carlisle report has recently been shared with the UN and key allies. However, it does not (and was not intended to) provide a precise force template necessary to recruit specific troop contributions. (S)

The Joint Staff has made some preliminary estimates of the requirements for a U.S.-led humanitarian mission. **EUCOM has been tasked to produce a**

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detailed plan, which is due shortly and which will represent the next step in the planning process. From these analyses, we hope to derive notional force structures for a basic plan and excursions (i.e., with reduced mission and attendant force reductions). Excursions might include one single or two safe areas. With notional force structures available, the USG would be able, if desired, to try to recruit capable troops from targeted African, western and other countries to perform specific functions. (S)

At this stage, we face the question of whether or not the United States should move beyond our planning to date and intensify our efforts to recruit and organize a humanitarian intervention force capable of responding swiftly to a near term crisis in Burundi. (S)

Assumptions

- If a humanitarian disaster occurs, there will be substantial pressure for the international community to respond, particularly since there has been substantial media attention to the potential for crisis in Burundi. (S)
- If a crisis occurs within the next three months, only the United States or France is capable of mounting a *highly effective* humanitarian intervention. France is unlikely to do so. (S)
- If a crisis occurs in the next few months, the only practical alternative to doing nothing or doing it ourselves is to marry the most competent African and other foreign forces with a competent lead nation (or nations). This would entail providing the African countries with substantial amounts of equipment, logistics support, sustainment funds and (time-permitting) training. (S)
- No humanitarian intervention force can succeed without a "lead" nation providing, at a minimum, command, control and communications (C3). (S)
- The African countries most willing to participate in a Chapter VII force (e.g., Tanzania, Uganda) are least capable of performing effectively unless their troops have been fully trained and equipped, which will take at least six months. (S)
- The cost to the United States of helping equip, sustain and support African troops in a humanitarian mission in Burundi would be substantial. (S)

Options:

1) Current Approach

To date, the United States has done more diplomatically to avert a humanitarian crisis in Burundi and pledged more concrete military assistance to enable a swift

international response than any other outside power. For more than a year, we have urged the UN and others to prepare for a humanitarian crisis in Burundi. We have pledged and provided detailed planning assistance both to the UN and to the Arusha process in Dar es Salaam. Further, the United States has pledged strategic airlift and an air control element to assist others to deploy. We have also pledged in principle equipment and other forms of assistance to a Chapter VI consensual regional peacekeeping effort as contemplated at Arusha I. We have made very clear to other countries that the U.S. contribution would be limited to the above and not involve U.S. combat forces or other troops stationed in Burundi. (S)

However, another genocide remains all too possible. In the worst case, a wider regional war could also ensue. As media attention to the crisis builds, the U.S. and others would likely face considerable criticism in some circles for not doing more to try to stop the killing. (S)

In the event of a crisis, the United States can maintain with considerable credibility that we did our best -- within the limits of our prior commitments -- to avert genocide and enable an effective international response. Moreover, we would stress yet again that Burundians themselves are responsible for their own fate. Most importantly, our current course would enable us to avoid placing U.S. forces at risk and contributing scarce resources to support a humanitarian intervention. Ultimately, however, we would still incur major costs to provide assistance (food, shelter, water) to refugees and displaced persons. (S)

2) Enhanced U.S. Role -- Lead Nation in Assembling Capable Multinational Force

Alternatively, the United States could immediately take the lead in organizing a hybrid African/Western force to establish one or more humanitarian safe areas in the event of a widespread crisis. (S)

The Concept: JCS estimates roughly 20,000 troops would be needed to man three safe areas (approximately 2,500 square kilometers ~ the size of the French zone in Operation Turquoise in Rwanda). With fewer troops, the notional mission would require modification to reflect limits in terms of capability and geographic area of responsibilities. The force would require peace enforcement capabilities and Chapter VII UNSC authority. (S)

While a hybrid force would not be as effective as a U.S.- or French-only operation, it could still save thousands of lives at least in a limited area. Such a force would take several months to recruit and equip. Moreover, unless forces and equipment are pre-positioned in advance, it would take several additional weeks before any large force could be fully deployed. (S)

Duration/Exit Strategy: The duration of such a mission must still be determined. It could be set arbitrarily (e.g., three months) as the French did in Rwanda or it could be tied to a political outcome -- such as a negotiated power-sharing agreement. In the latter case, the force might remain in Burundi for an extended period of time. In any case, after closure of the safe areas, a smaller UN or regional follow-on peacekeeping force is likely to be required to perform more traditional functions -- either to enhance security and deter further killings (as in UNAMIR II in Rwanda) or to implement a peace agreement (as in Angola or Mozambique). The duration of the follow-on force is also uncertain but should be tied to the effective re-establishment by the Government of general security throughout the country. (S)

There is considerable risk the establishment of safe areas could result in the quasi-permanent separation of Hutu and Tutsi populations either through refugee flows or the de facto partition of the country. Further consideration must be given to ways to dissolve safe areas in a manner that reduces the possibility of either partition or additional refugee flows.-(S)

Political Guidance: A body and process to provide political oversight to the multinational force must be designated (UN, OAU, NATO?) or developed (Arusha heads of state?). Identification or development of this body is an absolutely critical first step to building, funding, supporting and ultimately commanding the force. Most western states appear to prefer that the UN Security Council sanction for a regional body (the Arusha heads of state), along the lines of ECOWAS in Liberia. Attention and effort will have to be devoted to resolving this issue early. (U)

U.S. Military Role: Given the reluctance to date of other countries to participate in a multinational humanitarian intervention force, the U.S. would have to commit to play a greater military role than previously planned to attract other capable forces to join such a force. The U.S. role could be limited but must be meaningful and provide an important new degree of leadership and force cohesion that has been lacking. Even with American military and political leadership, there is no guarantee other countries will join us, although experience has shown American leadership often spurs others to follow suit.-(S)

The U.S. military role could be expanded to include one or more command or support capabilities, in addition to our previous pledge to provide airlift and an air control element. Such capabilities could include but are not limited to:

- Headquarters/C3 element. The headquarters could be based at Bujumbura airport where U.S. forces would be positioned to support airlift operations. U.S. personnel might include planners, logisticians, communicators, liaison personnel, administrative support, command elements, plus other support. They could be joined by African, NATO or other officers, if desired. The headquarters

function is essential to provide the command, control and communications (C3), necessary for any force to function. (S)

- Airport security battalion to provide security at Bujumbura airfield. (S)
- Aviation Battalion to provide air mobility to the force. (S)
- Surgical Hospital. (S)

Western donor nations could also provide some or all of these capabilities. (S)

U.S. Recruitment Effort: In addition to a greater military contribution, the United States would have to invest equipment, money and diplomatic capital to recruit and establish an effective force. We would have to approach capable African and other troop contributors at the highest levels and urge their participation in specific roles, primarily infantry but also certain combat support functions. Those African countries most capable of participating quickly and effectively in such a force include: Zimbabwe, South Africa, Ghana, Kenya, Botswana, Senegal and Ethiopia. We must also be prepared to welcome limited numbers of less capable but politically important African troops such as those from Tanzania and possibly Uganda. Other traditional troop contributors such as Pakistan and India should also be asked to participate. (S)

U.S. and western partners would have to pledge substantial assistance to equip, sustain, fund and train these troops. These non-western troops could be funded through the UN peacekeeping budget, provided the UNSC authorized the mission and maintained political oversight of the mission. While this arrangement would be unorthodox and costly (particularly given U.S. budgetary constraints), it may be preferable to ad hoc funding mechanisms, which we have great difficulty sustaining over time. (S)

Western Support: The United States would also have to work to attract competent logistics support elements (e.g. transportation, engineering, signals, POL, water, etc.), primarily from other capable western countries. Among those countries that have performed similar roles elsewhere in Africa are the UK in Rwanda and Angola, Germany in Somalia, and Belgium and Canada in Rwanda. NATO/WEU countries might also contribute joint logistics/support elements. While previous efforts to solicit allied participation have failed, an enhanced U.S. contribution may well suffice to persuade some western partners to play a greater role. France, for instance, has recently said it will do no more and no less than others. To obtain such support, we would need a sustained high-level approach to our allies. (S)

Garnering Public Support: It would be difficult but not impossible to persuade our public of the wisdom of an enhanced U.S. role in Burundi along the lines suggested above. To do so, we might stress that the U.S. contribution is relatively little but

enables others to do a lot. This is U.S. leadership as well as burden-sharing at its best. Moreover, as a global leader, we are in some way diminished, if we do not act to help avert another genocide when we can do so at acceptable risk and cost. (S)

Action Plan: At Tab 1 is a proposed action plan for implementing Option 2 above.

Long-Term Alternatives

If we are fortunate to avoid a near-term crisis in Burundi, we can take steps now to enhance our readiness and flexibility to respond to future crises in Burundi or elsewhere in Africa with minimal U.S. involvement. DOD is refining a concept called the **African Crisis Response Force (ACRF)** -- (Summary at Tab 2). This concept calls for the U.S. and possibly others to identify, recruit, train and equip capable African troops for potential peacekeeping and humanitarian contingencies in Africa. If implemented, this proposal would enhance the quality of African troops available for peace operations and may eventually obviate the need for western "lead" country involvement. Over the long term, we might also be able to train and equip less capable African troops (i.e. Tanzania and Uganda) so they could augment a force led by more experienced African forces. (S)

Implementation would require sustained diplomatic efforts and resources -- such as FMF and/or voluntary peacekeeping funds. If this is deemed an initiative worth pursuing, we might launch the recruitment effort and incorporate the proposal into the Administration's FY 98 budget request. (S)

July 26, 1996

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: SUSAN E. PRICE/ERIC SCHWARTZ
FROM: SHAWN H. MCCORMICK/RICHARD RAGAN
SUBJECT: Rwanda Refugee Strategy

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Nat'l Sec Advisor
has seen

During an A/S-level interagency meeting last Wednesday, it was agreed that the United States should become actively involved in resolving the Rwanda refugee crisis. The preferred course of action calls for gaining donor support to phase out assistance to all Rwandan refugee camps over 180-days, starting with those camps which pose the greatest immediate regional security threat and relocating those who choose not to return. This "push-pull option" is conditional on our allies agreeing to the same approach and African government agreeing to relocate those who choose not to return. UNHCR would be the lead agency interacting with African governments on this matter.

It was agreed that each A/S would gain support of their Deputy or Principal for this course of action and ascertain whether they thought a DC or PC is necessary. In the meantime, State is drafting an instruction cable to European and African capitals.

At Tab I is a copy of the paper being circulated for Deputies/Principals, along with CIA analysis, maps of the region and OMB memo on funding.

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ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 028
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014

Attachments

- Tab I Rwanda Refugee Paper
- Tab A OMB Memo on Funding
- Tab B CIA Analysis
- Tab C Maps

T -
Susan thinks realistic
+ more alternative is
better. Looks tough to
me but worth a shot
m

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ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 029

Declassification Date: March 18, 2014

Ad Hoc Interagency/Deputies Committee Meeting on Rwandan Refugee Camps

PURPOSE: To decide what steps, if any, the United States should take to resolve the Rwandan refugee crisis in an effort to achieve greater stability in the Great Lakes region.

Background

Mass Exodus: In July 1994, more than two million Rwandans heeded the call of the sitting Hutu-dominated government, which was responsible for the genocide of more than 500,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus, and fled ahead of the victorious Tutsi-dominated rebel army into eastern Zaire and northwestern Tanzania. This was the largest movement of people in the shortest period ever recorded and posed an overwhelming humanitarian dilemma. The United States led Operation Support Hope in an effort to stabilize the health/food/housing situation. Today, more than 1.7 million refugees remain in Zaire and Tanzania and enjoy the highest living standards and the highest birth rate on the continent, appreciably higher for than those living inside Rwanda.

Since 1994 the United States has spent approximately \$540 million on its initial operation and subsequent measures to sustain the camps. During that same period, we have only provided approximately \$110 million to assist with the situation inside Rwanda. The current cost to the international community to maintain the camps is approximately \$1 million per day, of which the U.S. provides more than 30-percent.

Current Situation: There are numerous problems with the status quo. While at least 300,000 of the 1994 refugees have returned to Rwanda of their own volition, the remainder (one million in Zaire, 700,000 in Tanzania) live largely under the authority of the former government, its military forces (the ex-FAR) and militia (Interahamwe). Estimates are that as many as 200,000 people in the camps may have been implicated in the genocide and therefore would likely never return to Rwanda peacefully. Many of those who might repatriate voluntarily stay because they are ordered to do so by the leadership of the former government which has reconstituted itself in the camps. This former leadership tells the displaced that they will be killed by the new Tutsi-dominated government if they return home. In an unprecedented move, ten international humanitarian organizations withdrew

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Reason: 1.5 (d)

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services in the camps last year due to the aggressive authority of the former government leaders over the refugees. Only one American NGO continues to operate in the eastern Zaire camps.

The fear of persecution or death for most potential repatriating refugees had initially been generally accepted as plausible but is increasingly specious as time passes. The Rwandan government does have 75,000 people suspected of genocide in make-shift jails in deplorable conditions; however, at least 300,000 Hutu returnees across the country have resumed normal lives without fear of persecution (one million Tutsi refugees who fled Rwanda in 1959 have also returned to Rwanda). In fact, the situation inside Rwanda is largely stable and non-threatening except for those directly implicated in the genocide. The international community maintains efforts to promote reforms by the new Rwandan government and has met with considerable success outside of the judicial sphere. Under pressure from families of survivors, the GOR finds it extremely difficult to move forward on judicial reform until some degree of justice is meted out to the leadership of the former government which is living in camps sustained by the international community just across its borders.

Security Threat: The refugee camps also pose a significant security threat not only for the GOR, but for the countries in which they are located. Most of the 55 camps in Zaire and Tanzania are within five miles of the border with Rwanda (none is more than 25 miles), with those in Zaire sitting on a strip of land 150-miles long. The ex-FAR and Interahamwe use the camps in Zaire as bases of operation from which they launch attacks into western Rwanda. The camps and their internal political/military structures appear increasingly to resemble a nascent ethnic parastate which mobilizes the Rwandan Hutu population through an ethnic nationalist creed. Inherently, the interests of this Hutu parastate are hostile to Zaire, Burundi and Rwanda.

Attacks by the ex-FAR into Rwanda have increased recently with dozens of genocide survivors (who represent potential witnesses in war crimes proceedings) being massacred on a regular basis before the fighters cross back to the safety of Zaire. The GOR has sent military reinforcements to its western border which heightens tensions, stunts the trickling level of voluntary repatriation and raises the specter of the GOR launching attacks across the border to pursue the invaders and risking a wider war with Zaire. The ex-FAR also attack Rwanda from staging points in northwestern Burundi. Credible reports indicate collaboration between the ex-FAR and extremist Burundian Hutu rebels which could explain the increased effectiveness of forces seeking to topple the fragile moderate coalition government in Bujumbura. There are significant fears that with the same ethnic composition

and explosive atmosphere, Burundi could replay events of Rwanda in 1994 if the situation further degenerates.

Eastern Zaire - A Tinder Box: The presence of one million Rwandans in eastern Zaire has also resulted in violence and tense relations with the local population they have displaced. Ethnic clashes caused by the influx of Rwandan refugees in the Masisi region of Zaire have caused 250,000 indigenous people to flee, in some cases, into Rwanda. The refugees have also caused a major ecological disaster destroying more than 20,000 acres of the now threatened Virunga National Forest. As the Zairian government moves toward national elections next year, the crisis caused by Rwandan refugees becomes an increasingly important issue.

International Efforts to Date: There have been numerous efforts since 1994 to end the refugee crisis. UNHCR has promoted cross border visits by refugee elders to assess the situation in Rwanda, and trips to the camps by GOR officials attempting to convince refugees they would be safe upon returning home. In addition, the UNHCR has operated a daily mass information campaign since March encouraging voluntary repatriation with virtually no impact. Former President Carter produced a videotape shown regularly in the camps of himself and various regional heads of state, including President Bizimungu of Rwanda and President Mobutu of Zaire, urging voluntary repatriation. The Government of Zaire attempted refoulement initiatives last year which were initially effective, but eventually stalled in the face of international opposition. Leaders of the former government in the camps quickly applied pressure to prevent mass repatriation by the refugees and a stalemate resumed.

Since Rwanda/Burundi Special Coordinator Ambassador Richard Bogosian first broached the concept of selected camp closure during the June Rwanda Operational Support Group Meeting in Geneva, our allies have been awaiting a formal proposal from us. Embassy Geneva is requesting policy-level approval and a strategy urgently to lead discussions toward developing a common approach to this issue. It is important that any refugee strategy be agreed upon by major donors, those international organizations involved with Rwandan refugees and regional governments.

Key Assumptions

- The camps pose a significant and growing threat to regional peace and security because they have displaced local populations, serve as a base for ex-FAR and Interahamwe collaboration with extremist Burundian Hutu rebels and attacks against Rwanda, and invite cross border retaliatory raids by the government of Rwanda.

- Many Rwandans (perhaps as many as 200,000) will never return to Rwanda because of their involvement in genocide, or to a lesser extent, their fears of being accused of such involvement.
- The remainder are unable to return primarily because extremist camp leaders do not permit them to do so.
- The situation in Rwanda can be improved still further with international help and could enhance the attractiveness of return to refugees. The GOR has the capacity to cope with refugees in a steady stream but not all en masse.
- The cost to the international community of maintaining the camps is unsustainable over the long term.
- Unless the international community takes direct and prompt action to deal with the refugee problem, the regional security situation will steadily worsen.

Issues for Decision

A) Should the United States try to lead an international effort to stimulate voluntary repatriation and relocate remaining displaced persons?

It is important that as many refugees as possible return to their homes in Rwanda and reintegrate into the society. Those remaining should be withdrawn from the border and away from bases operated by the ex-FAR and Interahamwe. This will be constructive for regional security, decrease prospects of retaliatory raids by the GOR into Zaire, calm tensions in Masisi and diminish ties between the ex-FAR and extremist Burundi Hutu rebels.

An internationally coordinated effort to stimulate repatriation and refugee relocation could include an agreement by all donor nations and the UNHCR that food, medical and other supplies to the existing camps near the border would end within a specific time period. Countries currently hosting the camps would also have to agree to relocation of a smaller number of camps several hundred kilometers away from the Rwandan border. Residents of the camps would be given the choice of repatriating or relocating. The international community would agree to a corresponding shift of resources to within Rwanda to assist in the resettlement of returnees.

Analysis: Maintaining current assistance levels of \$1 million per day to the camps upholds a two-year old approach coordinated with European and other donors. It also deflects potential criticisms from human rights groups, refugee advocates and others who may claim that terminating assistance violates international agreements on refugee treatment. Moving people risks the possibility of resistance or conflict from ex-FAR and Interahamwe elements in the camps who, some analysts believe, would use civilians as a human shield to occupy western Rwanda if forced to return. Any new strategy will be dependent on the Rwandan government's ability to honor their commitments to welcome these refugees home and the commitment of Great Lakes leaders to provide security and land to those who want to be relocated. Strictly voluntary, not stimulated repatriation remains the humanitarian/refugee community's preferred durable solution to the Rwandan refugee situation.

The alternative is to encourage refugees to return to Rwanda or move them to camps a significant distance from the border. Noting the control of former government officials, the ex-FAR and Interahamwe over the population and a standard of living higher than in Rwanda itself, there is virtually no likelihood that an end to the status quo will materialize unless provoked.

Continued international support to the refugee camps has diverted scarce resources from efforts to provide adequate levels of assistance inside Rwanda where it is most needed and has the greatest impact. It also raises the moral question of providing for the care and feeding of possibly 200,000 genocide perpetrators and other active combatants who have no intention of returning except through force. Those within the camps, with the exception of genocide perpetrators and their families, have little ground to suspect persecution if they return to Rwanda. Those who did participate in the murder of at least 500,000 people over a three month period in 1994 would in all likelihood be excluded from all protections contained in the Refugee Conventions. Our allies and UNHCR Mrs. Ogata share our concerns and have begun to question the rationale for continuing humanitarian assistance under existing terms and conditions.

The leadership of the former government, ex-FAR and Interahamwe will continue to act with impunity destabilizing the region. Attacks by these armed elements into Rwanda have steadily increased and will continue to do so, heightening fears of GOR retaliatory attacks into Zaire and raising concerns of a larger regional war. Conflicts between camp residents and the local Zairian population have also risen dramatically and are expected to increase. Voluntary repatriation has proved a failed endeavor

because it does not address the reality that camp residents have few incentives and many disincentives to return.

B) If the United States is to support programs aimed at stimulating voluntary repatriation and refugee relocation, in what fashion should these measures occur?

Rwandan refugee camps are located in three principal areas; Tanzania, and both North and South Kivu in eastern Zaire. To stimulate voluntary repatriation or camp relocation for those who will not return voluntarily, international assistance (food, medicine, supplies) could be phased out within specific timeframes. It is imperative, however, that while this international assistance is phased out in the camps, it be shifted for use within Rwanda by returnees. For those who choose to return home, the distance to the border in virtually all cases is less than five miles, permitting them to walk or await transportation by buses that can be provided by the international community. The refugees could be notified in advance they can either return to Rwanda or, if they fear persecution, relocate to UNHCR-run camps that would be smaller, less attractive and offer only the minimum internationally accepted levels of services several hundred kilometers away from the border.

Relocation costs per camp at their current size is estimated at \$1 million, however with some portion of the refugees returning the total amount would be less than \$55 million for relocating all camps. Relocation, and thus the following options, are dependent on Zaire and Tanzania agreeing to permit such camps to be established several hundred kilometers from the Rwandan border. If other donors agree to this approach, a concerted effort must be undertaken at senior levels to convince both Zaire and Tanzania of the need to undertake this step.

Tanzania appears willing to relocate refugees unwilling to return several hundred miles away near the Mozambican border. While Zaire has said it may be willing to consider a similar relocation scheme, there is the likelihood they may not. In such a case, the international community must encourage Tanzania to proceed and consider approaching other states (possibly Uganda, Central African Republic or Kenya) to accept the establishment of such camps on their territories. However, each of these examples pose tremendous logistical difficulties noting the very limited infrastructure in the region. Efforts to close the camps in Zaire could be slowed while international pressure is applied to the Zairian government urging officials to adopt a position similar to that of Tanzania. UNHCR must lead this and all other efforts to engage Zairian President Mobutu on measures related to this initiative.

In pursuit of stimulating refugee repatriation and relocation, additional security measures will be required. Initial reports indicate that Tanzania is prepared to use its military forces to provide needed security to cope with camps on its territory. In Zaire, however, the Zairian Camp Security Contingent organized and funded under UNHCR must be augmented to provide added protection for international relief workers, convoy movements and to prevent refugees moving from closed camps to ones at least temporarily remaining open. While details of such augmentation and its costs should be left to UNHCR, this must not include either a regional or international peacekeeping mission.

Concurrent with any option to stimulate voluntary repatriation and relocation must be an effort to gain the agreement of the Rwandan government to a series of measures aimed at building the confidence of returning refugees and promoting longterm stability. Among these the GOR parliament must pass its long awaited judicial reform bill, establish additional mechanisms to process potentially large numbers of returning refugees and guarantee basic safeties and freedoms from prosecution for returnees. It is important that the GOR also agree to a comprehensive plan of action in coordination with the UNHCR and other organizations to support returning refugees with increased international aid, reiterate its assurances on land tenure and cooperate in cross border visits to be arranged by UNHCR.

Another important issue is the risk of violence. Fomented by former government leaders, the ex-FAR or Interahamwe, any attempt by the international community to change the status quo could prompt a violent response directed at UNHCR officials in the camps, international relief workers, local populations and others. It is also possible that armed members of the former government could attempt to use refugees as a human shield to enter Rwanda en masse. In the face of such possibilities, it is imperative that the international community maintain its resoluteness of action once the announcement to move forward occurs.

There are several options for stimulating voluntary repatriation or relocation. (OMB paper on funding options forthcoming)

1. Gain donor agreement to stop all assistance to all camps simultaneously within 90-days and relocate those individuals who choose not to return. In coordination with donors, UNHCR would choose a specific date to end assistance to all existing refugee camps simultaneously, shifting those supplies to within Rwanda. This impending action would be conveyed to the refugees along with information regarding repatriation or the option for those who fear persecution to relocate to new, smaller and more sparse camps several hundred kilometers away from the Rwandan border.

The 90-day timeframe to end all assistance to all camps simultaneously and shift those supplies to within Rwanda would begin when refugees are first informed of the impending action.

A universal approach ending all assistance to all camps simultaneously would be the swiftest way to address the immediate regional security threat posed by the refugee camps. It would permit the international community swiftly to direct its resources to within Rwanda to entice returnees back and limit the ability of the leadership of the former government, the ex-FAR and Interahamwe to prepare strategies to oppose any alteration to the status quo. It would also have the most immediate positive impact on environmental conditions in areas around the camps.

However, such a measure might well prompt the ex-FAR to use large numbers of returning civilians as a human shield to return and attempt to occupy large portions of Rwanda. Additionally, such potentially significant numbers returnees in this brief timeframe could severely overwhelm the capacity of the Rwanda government to absorb them even with substantial international assistance.

2. Gain donor support to phase out assistance to camps gradually over 180-days, starting with those camps which pose the least immediate regional security threat, and relocate those individuals who choose not to return. In coordination with donors, UNHCR would choose a specific date to phase out all assistance over 180-days (shifting those supplies to within Rwanda), starting in the initial 90-days with those refugee camps that pose the least immediate regional security threat first. This impending action would be conveyed to the refugees along with information regarding the reality of repatriation and the option - - for those who fear persecution - - to relocate to new, smaller and more sparse camps several hundred kilometers away from the Rwandan border. Residents in the remaining camps would be informed at the same time that after this first phase was complete, all assistance to their camps would end over a subsequent 90-day period and they too would have the option of relocation. The initial 90-day timeframe would begin when refugees are first informed of the impending action. Action to end all assistance in the remaining camps would begin immediately after the first 90-day period expires.

An approach to ending assistance to those camps posing the least immediate regional security threat (over the first 90-days) could possibly bring the greatest initial success, thereby building momentum toward dealing with most contentious camps at a later stage (second 90-day phase). It is likely that under this option those refugees in the least problematic camps who are most likely to return home would do so without much convincing. A phased approach of this nature also permits UNHCR the opportunity to

learn from mistakes during the first phase which can be applied in the latter.

While this approach could bring initial success, it could create the opportunity for the leadership of the former government, ex-FAR and Interahamwe to implement well organized resistance to these efforts. These leaders could use refugees in the remaining camps as virtual hostages to prevent the ending of international assistance. Another possibility is that these forces could organize a well coordinated plan to use the refugees as a human shield to occupy portions of Rwanda. It also fails to address the pressing problems posed by those camps posing the greatest immediate regional security threat.

3. Gain donor support to phase out assistance over 180-days, starting with those camps which pose the greatest immediate regional security threat, and relocate those individuals who choose not to return. In coordination with donors, UNHCR would choose a specific date to phase out all assistance over 180-days (shifting those supplies to within Rwanda) starting in the first 90-days with those refugee camps that pose the greatest immediate regional security threat. This impending action would be conveyed to the refugees along with information regarding the reality of repatriation and the option - - for those who fear persecution - - to relocate to new, smaller and more sparse camps several hundred kilometers away from the Rwandan border. Residents in the remaining camps would be informed at the same time that after this first phase was complete, all assistance to their camps would end over a subsequent 90-day period and they too would have the option of relocation. The initial 90-day timeframe to end all assistance in those camps which pose the greatest immediate regional security threat would begin when refugees are first informed of the impending action. Action to end all assistance in the remaining camps would begin immediately after the first 90-day period expires.

By first closing the camps that pose the greatest immediate regional security threat, the resistance of camp leaders might be minimized because they would have little time to prepare. Those who remain behind would be more clearly identifiable as members of the former government, ex-FAR or Interahamwe and could be taken to camps several hundred kilometers away from the border with haste. This method would also provide the quickest solution to the immediate regional security threat posed by the presence of the camps. Success with these camps in the early stages could reflect relative ease in repatriating or relocating refugees from those camps that pose the least immediate regional security threat.

However, if camp leaders offer stiff resistance, the initial phase of stimulating voluntary repatriation could be stunted with unclear consequences for the second portion. As in option two, this approach might prompt the ex-FAR and Interahamwe to use large numbers of returning civilians as a human shield to return and attempt to occupy portions of Rwanda.

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Declassified Under Authority of the
Interagency Security Declassification Appeals Panel,
E.O. 13526, Section 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 030

Declassification Date: March 18, 2014

Prospective Diplomatic Strategy

A) What diplomatic strategy should we pursue to implement a policy of stimulating voluntary repatriation and camp relocation?

There are two groups that need to be convinced that this course of action is the most appropriate: other key donors (OECD countries, EU, UNHCR, NGOs) and states in the Great Lakes region.

1. Key Allies

Feedback from the June meeting of the Rwanda Operational Support Group (ROSG) in Geneva along with follow-up reporting indicates support for creative ideas to stimulate voluntary repatriation and camp relocation. It is critical to obtain the agreement of these actors to coordinate their contributions to achieve these objectives.

USG should take the following steps to build donor consensus:

A. Senior Administration official write a letter to OECD and EU counterparts to rethink and seek agreement to a plan to stimulate voluntary repatriation and camp relocation.

B. Senior Administration official meet with UNHCR Ogata to explain position and solicit support.

C. Dispatch Special Coordinator Bogosian to UNHCR headquarters and OECD and EU capitals to press points in senior Administration official letter.

2. Great Lakes States

Stimulating voluntary repatriation and camp relocation cannot occur without the cooperation and participation of affected governments in the region (Rwanda, Tanzania and Zaire). All have made commitments in international fora to promote regional security and refugee return, but have taken little action to follow through. We should inform these states of the strategic importance of promoting voluntary repatriation and camp relocation. The message must be clear, future contributions to UNHCR, IOs and NGOs will be linked to actions by effected governments toward the achievement of voluntary repatriation and camp relocation. Despite such a strong message, the African governments, Rwanda in particular, must be assured the U.S. and our partners will shift resources from the camps to provide the necessary support for an increased population.

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Classified by Shawn McCormick

Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify on: 1.6 X6

Steps USG might take include:

- A. Senior Administration official write a letter to African counterparts to seek agreement on plan to stimulate voluntary repatriation and camp relocation.
- B. Dispatch Special Coordinator Bogosian to African capitals to press points in Christopher letter.

B) If the United States is to support programs aimed at stimulating voluntary repatriation and refugee relocation, what measures should be taken to provide for adequate security?

UNHCR is currently funding a special contingent of 1,500 Zairian soldiers (Zairian Camp Security Contingent) to provide basic levels of security in several of the refugee camps. While the troops have curtailed crime, they have been unsuccessful in eliminating the influence of the extremists. UNHCR, however, considers them indispensable. If an effort were undertaken to stimulate voluntary repatriation and refugee relocation, some degree of additional security presence might be required to assist in Zaire. No security mechanisms should be required to assist with refugees returning from Tanzania.

1. In a demarche to allies, request they provide funds to support an additional contingent of Zairian forces to augment the current size of the ZCSC.
2. In a demarche to Mobutu, request that he detail those additional forces needed to the command of UNHCR to conduct required duties.

C) If the United States is to support programs aimed at stimulating voluntary repatriation and refugee relocation, what measures should be taken to lay the proper psychological groundwork among the refugees to ensure these efforts are successful?

To be successful, there must be a well coordinated public relations campaign from international media, states in the region and UNHCR.

1. Daily messages, statements and interviews by various officials from the United States, European countries and UNHCR must be broadcast via international radio to instill in the minds of the refugees that this effort at repatriation and refugee relocation will shortly begin and there is no alternative.

2. The Rwandan, Zairian and Tanzanian governments should make regular statements on the impending initiatives before they are undertaken and additional daily comments when they are underway to local and international radio.

3. UNHCR should begin rotating its expatriate directors from the camps and replace them with new staff whose mandate is to stimulate repatriation and refugee relocation. UNHCR should also initiate cross boarder visits with or without ministerial activity. The buses and logistics support required should also be staged and ready to provide transportation to those unable to walk the short distance back into Rwanda.

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Declassified Under Authority of the
Interagency Security Declassification Appeals Panel,
E.O. 13526, Section 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 031
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014

Ad Hoc Interagency Meeting on Eastern Zaire
Issues Paper
November 2, 1996

Purpose

- To decide what strategy for repatriation of Rwandan refugees the U.S. should urge UNHCR to pursue. (S)
 - To consider additional steps the USG might take to prepare to assist international aid agencies to respond to a potential wider humanitarian disaster in Eastern Zaire. (S)
 - To decide what further diplomatic steps the USG might take to achieve an immediate ceasefire and spur resolution of the crisis on the Zaire-Rwanda border. (S)
 - To decide whether to give consideration to a series of additional steps that might help stabilize the situation in Zaire/Rwanda over the longer term (b)(1) (S)
- (b)(1), E.O. 13526, 1.4(c); E.O. 13526, 1.4(d) (S)

Recent Developments/Potential Scenarios (See Tab 4)

POLICY GOALS

U.S. policy objectives in Central Africa remain regional stability, prevention of a wider humanitarian crisis, finding a negotiated solution to the conflict in Burundi, and the repatriation of Rwandan refugees whose presence on the border is a proximate cause of the current instability. (S)

To achieve these goals, over the past several months we have engaged in aggressive regional diplomacy, supported humanitarian aid efforts and pressed a strategy to encourage refugee repatriation. In the current context, however, further and perhaps more radical steps may be necessary to secure an end to the fighting, return refugees and respond to a wider humanitarian crisis. (S)

ISSUES FOR DECISION


1) Refugee Repatriation Strategy?

UNHCR agrees with U.S. officials that refugees should not return to reconstituted camps on the Rwandan border. Re-establishment of these camps would merely replicate the circumstances that sparked the latest round of violence -- at great expense to the international community. UNHCR also realizes that Zaire will oppose the establishment of new camps further inside the country. (S)

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Moreover, new camps further west in Zaire would be difficult, if not impossible, to provide with adequate food and water. Neither the dispersal of the refugees further west into Zaire nor the re-establishment of the refugee camps on the Rwandan border is desirable. Hence, UNHCR recognizes that repatriation is the only way to avert a larger humanitarian disaster and reduce instability in the region. (S)



To work through these issues with UNHCR and try to arrive at a viable, aggressive repatriation plan, it may be necessary to send a policy team to UNHCR Geneva and to consult in key European capitals. The U.S. team should be armed with an agreed U.S. strategy to promote repatriation in the current unsettled environment. That strategy might draw upon all or some of the "pull" and "push" elements outlined below: (S)

PULL ELEMENTS

- **Aggressive public information campaign in Mugunga camp to encourage repatriation.** Leaflet drops, air-borne loud-speaker messages, statements by the GOR and UNHCR, radio broadcasts, in-person testimonials by safely returned refugees and other means could be used to try to convince refugees it is safe to return to Rwanda, the old camps on the border will not re-open, and no relief supplies can be provided to those refugees that move west into Zaire. ~~(S)~~
- **Establishment by UNHCR of humanitarian corridors inside Zaire and Rwanda to protect returnees.** ZCSC and RPF forces would have to form this corridor from Goma to Gisenyi. To give refugees further confidence, there must be a substantial complement of international observers -- civilian or military, official or non-official. UNHCR has maintained that only international peacekeepers can perform this role adequately. However, such a force cannot be constituted quickly, if at all. The only practical, immediate alternative might be to ask all foreign embassies and NGOs in the region to dispatch all potentially available personnel to observe repatriation through the corridors. The U.S. might activate former Peace Corps volunteers with local language capability. The OAU should also be asked to provide observers (military or civilian) and the UN might supply UN volunteers or other officials on TDY basis. Ethiopia (which served admirably in Rwanda, has a capable military and indicated a potential willingness to respond to another Great Lakes crisis) might be asked to provide a battalion or two to assist the ZCSC with security. ~~(S)~~
- **Significantly increase UNHCR and other international resources and personnel inside Rwanda:** establishment of reception centers, resettlement packages, positioning of food, water, medicines and other supplies inside Rwanda, augmentation of human rights monitors group with other international observers, safe transit to home communes. ~~(S)~~
- **Urge the Rwandan Government to take further steps to encourage refugee return.** Such steps should include public announcements that the GOR will: start genocide trials immediately and issue a timetable for trials; ensure returning refugees are processed fairly and swiftly with international supervision and their cases monitored over the long-term at the communal level; prosecute in military court all military personnel accused of attacking civilians; establish a mechanism for adjudicating property disputes. ~~(S)~~

PUSH ELEMENTS

- **Urge the GOR to press Zairian Tutsi forces to deploy in a fashion that spurs repatriation.** Fear is what motivates the refugees. The refugees are almost certain not to return to Rwanda unless fear of staying in Zaire exceeds fear of return to Rwanda. Zairian Tutsi forces may be the only indigenous force

capable of spurring refugee movement back to Rwanda in the near term. The refugees have fled the Zairian Tutsi forces in fear in recent days and may move again in the opposite direction, if prompted. While, thus far, reports indicate the Zairian Tutsi forces have demonstrated discipline, tactical capability and have treated refugees with civility, their ability and will to spur repatriation without significant bloodshed operation is uncertain. Lives could be lost, particularly if Zairian Army and/or ex-FAR forces to resist this operation. If the mission is fails and is perceived as a U.S. idea, the political fall-out could be significant. However, the alternative to spurred refugee return -- the death of thousands of displaced in the interior of Zaire -- is an even worse scenario. (S)

- **Urge the Zairian Government to use its forces to spur repatriation.** Rather than using Tutsi rebels to spur repatriation, some consideration has been given to suggesting that Zairian forces do so. This approach would enable Zairian forces to preserve control over significant portions of its own territory and may be less politically problematic. However, given their incompetence, corruption and indiscipline, FAZ forces -- even elite forces, paid by the international community and deployed from Kinshasa to the region -- probably could not conduct this operation effectively in the near term, if at all. To date, FAZ forces have abandoned virtually all contested areas and resorted to looting rather than face the small, but well armed, trained and equipped Tutsi opposition. (S)

Alternatively, Ethiopia might be asked to assist the FAZ in this operation. While Ethiopia is unlikely to accept and Zaire may resist inviting in Ethiopian forces, this option may be both viable and more desirable than using FAZ alone or the Zairian Tutsi forces.

- **Employ sophisticated PsyOps campaign to convince refugees at Mugunga that Zairian Tutsi forces are approaching from the West.** UNHCR would have to lead the campaign, possibly with U.S. assistance. The threat alone of approaching Tutsi forces may be sufficient to cause mass movement east back in the direction of Rwanda. Many refugees left their camps in the last few weeks out of fear rather than under actual attack. (S)

2) USG preparations for wider humanitarian disaster

DOD has already issued a general planning order in anticipation of a worst case contingency and potential international organization requests. These requests might involve assistance with water delivery/supply, building pit latrines and sanitary systems, opening airheads to relief supplies, airlifting supplies, evacuating humanitarian workers. (S).

In order for the U.S. to be prepared to respond swiftly and effectively to potential requests to provide unique capabilities or other critical services, we could take any or all of the following steps: (S)

- **Dispatch technical team** (humanitarian experts plus military planners and logisticians) to Geneva for intensive consultations with UNHCR to identify likely gaps and facilitate USG planning.
- **Send CDC water expert to region; pre-position water bladders and other critical equipment in the region.**
- **Issue warning order/deploy evacuation team to Entebbe.**
- **Establish 24-hour interagency Task Force at State** to track U.S. citizens, monitor developments, liaise with NGO community, coordinate U.S. relief efforts.
- **Dispatch an experienced U.S. humanitarian coordinator** with strong diplomatic skills to work with a representative from a leading U.S. NGO, UNHCR and the GOR in Kigali to help coordinate the international response to the impending humanitarian crisis.
- **Urge Embassy Kinshasa to allow the DART team in Kigali access to Eastern Zaire through Rwanda.** AID has just decided that it needs to dispatch the DART team to Eastern Zaire. AID seeks clearance from Embassy Kinshasa to send this team over as needed and as security conditions permit. Once clearance is granted in principle, the DART team would notify Embassy Kinshasa prior to crossing the border from Rwanda to Zaire.

It is important to note that even in the best of circumstances -- large-scale refugee repatriation -- a substantial international humanitarian relief operation will be necessary. (S)

3) Diplomacy

The most urgent diplomatic objective is to achieve a ceasefire in eastern Zaire, which would facilitate the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies and diminish the potential for a wider conflict. This is the top priority of UN Special Representative Raymond Chretien, who will depart the U.S. Wednesday for consultations with Mobutu in Switzerland and then proceed to the region. The U.S. is lending full support to Chretien, including intelligence-sharing and expert briefings in Washington. *In addition, the U.S. could consider offering to second a senior diplomat and a representative from EUCOM to his staff to assist in any way he might find helpful.* (S)

Equally urgent is the need for the top political and military leaders of Rwanda and Zaire to agree on concrete steps aimed at defusing the crisis. These steps should include: (S)

-- immediate ceasefire.

- withdrawal of all foreign forces from Zaire and Rwanda.
- affirmation by the GOZ that all Banyamalenge and other Zairian Tutsis are Zairian citizens, need not leave the country and will not be persecuted or harassed by GOZ officials.
- public commitment by Rwanda (as well as by Uganda) not to provide further direct or indirect support to any elements in Eastern Zaire.
- reciprocal commitment by Zaire not to provide support or sanctuary to Ex-FAR and Rwandan Hutu militias in Zaire.
- joint GOZ-GOR border monitoring mechanism with UN assistance.
- refugee repatriation/camp closure plan.

Thus far, Zairian Prime Minister Kengo has refused such a meeting until all foreign forces are out of Zaire. VP Kagame of Rwanda has conditioned Rwandan participation on guarantees by Zaire that the Banyamalenge will be accorded the full rights and protections of Zairian citizens and that remaining camps will be moved away from the border. (S)

NEXT STEPS

a) Nairobi Summit

Kenyan President Moi has invited regional leaders to attend a summit in Nairobi on Tuesday, November 5 to discuss the situation in central Africa. OAU Secretary General Salim Salim and most key regional leaders (except Kengo) plan to attend. This summit affords a potentially important opportunity for regional leaders to discuss the regional crisis and for Zaire and Rwanda to reach agreement on the steps above. To facilitate a successful outcome at Nairobi, the USG could: (S)

-- *Join with European countries to take all possible steps to push key regional leaders to attend the Nairobi Summit, especially Kengo plus his top military aides and Kagame. (This should include demarches, phone calls by senior U.S. officials -- e.g. Moose, Tenet -- to appropriate leaders, as necessary.)*

-- *Dispatch senior U.S. official to Nairobi to work on the margins of the summit to gain agreement to the steps above.*

b) Threat to Zairian Tutsis

In addition, to try to prevent reprisals or possible genocide against Zairian Tutsis, the U.S. could use its influence to:-(S)

-- *persuade Zairian officials and military leaders to take all necessary action to prevent incendiary rhetoric and protect ethnic Tutsis.*

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-- stress publicly and privately we will not tolerate ethnic cleansing of Tutsis, hold the GOZ and its officials personally accountable, and sanction those guilty of such action.

-- urge European partners to reinforce this message.

c) Rwandan Government

The GOR could be pressed to allow humanitarian relief supplies to cross Rwanda into Zaire and to avoid attacks at or near Mugunga refugee camp, which would cause a humanitarian catastrophe. (S)


4) Additional Issues

There are five additional actions the USG might take aimed at promoting regional stability over the longer term and improving our intelligence collection capabilities. Each of these possible steps have significant policy and resource implications and require substantial further study before decisions can be taken. To facilitate further study of these issues, appropriate action agencies are suggested below. (S)

A) Provide financial incentives to separate intimidators. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) released a list of more than 400 individuals who were suspected leaders in the 1994 genocide. To date, fewer than 50 have been apprehended around the world. Most are suspected to reside among the refugee populations in Eastern Zaire and Tanzania. The governments of Zaire and Tanzania have been unwilling to arrest any of these suspects, even in cases when the ICTR has issued international arrest warrants. Offering a bounty for the arrest of each of these individuals could increase the likelihood they are apprehended. (Action agency: State/DRL) (S)

B) Increase USG funding for the ICTR. The international community has provided limited funding to the Tribunal which has been tasked with bringing to justice the leaders of the genocide. No investigations of genocide have been conducted in the entire eastern portion of the country due to lack of resources and personnel. The first trial has been delayed repeatedly in part due to insufficient detention facilities and limited prosecutorial staff. Additional U.S. financial support, technical assistance and leadership to secure additional funding is necessary, if the ICTR is to become an effective instrument in the struggle to bring lasting justice to Rwanda. At the same time, however, there are serious allegations of mismanagement at the ICTR under investigation by the UN inspector general. (Action agency: State/DRL and IO) (S)

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Recent Developments/Potential Scenarios

As of Friday, there were more than 100 international aid workers and ex-patriates, including seven Americans, trapped in Goma awaiting evacuation. Rwandan forces (RPF) took control of the main UNHCR headquarters, according to some sources "in the nick of time" as ex-FAR and interhamwe were approaching. All ex-pats were reported safe, and the RPF reportedly plans to escort them safely to Rwanda. (S)

Attacks by Banyamulenge and other forces threatened with expulsion or genocide in eastern Zaire have resulted in relatively few casualties but displaced more than 500,000 refugees and Zairois. Resistance from Zairian government forces and armed elements of the former Rwandan government has been minimal as the rebel troops, supported directly and indirectly by Rwanda and possibly by Uganda and Burundi, have captured Uvira, Bukavu and most areas north of Goma. Refugees are fleeing mainly West and South into surrounding areas where there is no international assistance or infrastructure to support them as well as to already crowded refugee camps. (S)

As many as 700,000 refugees may soon converge at Mugunga refugee camp west of Goma. Mugunga previously held only 200,000 and cannot possibly accommodate the more than 500,000 already there. Sanitation is a major problem. Lack of water is another potential problem that could result in cholera. Relief workers in the Goma area are hoping to be evacuated as soon as possible. Humanitarian re-supply efforts have been halted due to fighting around key airports and closure of remaining roads. As a result, food supplies will run out in the Goma area late next week due, although sufficient food stocks are available in the region. (S)

The whereabouts of several hundred thousand refugees that fled camps in South Kivu (Uvira and Bukavu) are unknown. Many of these refugees (Burundi outnumber Rwandans 2:1) have fled into the bush or are believed to be moving south towards Fizi, Zaire, an inaccessible town 75 miles south of Bujumbura. (S)

Refugee agencies agree conditions in Rwanda are suitable for repatriation. However, only approximately 700 Rwandan refugees have recently crossed into Rwanda along with 3,000-4,000 new Zairian refugees; several thousand Burundian Hutus have returned to Burundi. The movement westward of Rwandan refugees will result not only in a certain humanitarian crisis, since aid agencies will be unable to support them, but also risks further destabilizing Eastern Zaire where the local populations have previously attacked persons of Rwandan origin. (S)

There is also a significant risk that the demonstration effect of turmoil in Eastern Zaire, the ineffectual response of Zairian forces (FAZ) and Mobutu's incapacitation will encourage separatist and violent elements in other unstable parts of Zaire, including potentially Kasai, Katanga and even Kinshasa. The fragmentation of

Zaire, which borders nine other countries, would be catastrophic and destabilize much of the rest of Africa, including Angola and southern Africa. (S)

Graver still is the possibility that the current instability will lead to a wider regional war. Several NGOs reported to U.S. officials yesterday that Zairian authorities have drawn up mass lists of Tutsis resident in Zaire. This action was a precursor to the genocide in Rwanda. On October 31, the Zairian Transitional Parliament voted overwhelmingly to recommend that Zaire sever diplomatic relations with Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda and that Zairian Tutsis be removed from all government and quasi-government positions. On November 1, the Rwandan ambassador in Kinshasa was reportedly abducted. The act or even the threat of genocide against Tutsis in Zaire could spark a war pitting Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda against Zaire (supported by arms supplied by France and Libya). Sudan, already effectively at war with Uganda and funneling arms to Zaire, is likely to work in concert with Zaire. In this case, Ethiopia and Eritrea (already sympathetic to Rwanda and Burundi and allied with Uganda) may join the war against Sudan. Other regional actors hostile to the Tutsi governments in Rwanda and Burundi, such as Tanzania and Kenya, might also take sides by imposing an economic blockade against Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi or even by taking military action. (S)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

November 1, 1996

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: SUSAN E. RICE *SR*

FROM: SHAWN MCCORMICK *SM*

SUBJECT: Briefing Memo for Ad Hoc Interagency on Eastern
Zaire, Saturday, November 2, 1996, 9:30 a.m.

READING TIME

Since most people will only receive the meeting package Saturday morning, you may want to provide ten minutes at the start of the meeting for people to read the Issues Paper at Tab B.

SITREP

Ask CIA to provide assessment of the military/humanitarian situation in eastern Zaire, likely humanitarian requirements, status of Americans and other ex-patriots in Goma and Bukavu, and future prospects.

ISSUES FOR DECISION

1. Approval of Push-Pull Strategy

UNHCR now accepts that closed camps should not be reconstituted and a policy of aggressive repatriation must begin. Zaire refuses to allow new camps to be established further inland and conditions in Rwanda do permit the refugees to return home. Only repatriation can avert a larger humanitarian disaster and promote long-term stability.

Ogata is focusing on "pull" factors such as prepositioning food and supplies in Rwanda, utilizing testimonials, leaflet airdrops and other measures to convince refugees to repatriate. We have tried much of this for the last two years with virtually no success. Under her concept, the refugees would transit a humanitarian corridor manned by Zairian troops or 5,000 international troops that do not and will not exist. What is missing is an effective pull strategy, possibly including the use

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Classified by: McCormick, Shawn

Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify On: 1.6, X6

of armed elements, to encourage repatriation through this humanitarian corridor.

NSC staff unanimously support the "pull" elements, including an aggressive public information campaign in Mugunga camp to encourage repatriation, establishment by UNHCR of humanitarian corridors inside Zaire and Rwanda to protect refugees, significantly increasing UNHCR and other international resources and personnel inside Rwanda, and urging Rwanda to take its own steps to encourage repatriation.

On the "push" side, all concerned NSC staff agree on a psyops campaign, but we are split whether to use Zairian government troops, Zairian Tutsi forces or outside troops, perhaps from Ethiopia. Soderberg, Schwartz and McCormick favor, in the first instance, using Zairian forces to lead a "push" strategy. Rice favors using Zairian Tutsi forces, or as a fallback position also supported by Soderberg and McCormick outside forces, possibly from Ethiopia to effect the "push." Rice feels strongly that to use undisciplined and corrupt Zairian troops would certainly result in people being killed.

Schwartz is also concerned that, while we do not want to re-establish camps at the border, we will need an assistance strategy for Zaire - even if repatriation works. This is because repatriation is not likely to occur as quickly as we would like. We face the specter of tens of thousands of women and children suffering badly as they await fruition of our "strategy." Schwartz would avoid public statements of our bottom line until after we have consulted with UNHCR. Doing so would risk us assuming responsibilities (and blames for failures) that should be those of the international community. Finally, Schwartz urges dispatch of a team to Geneva this weekend and elements onward to Kigali.

Goal: Gain approval of the psyops campaign and "pull" elements as central tenets of a U.S. strategy to promote repatriation. Discuss "push" options of using Zairian government forces, Zairian Tutsis, or an outside force, possibly Ethiopia in a "push" strategy. Gain approval to dispatch Eric Schwartz and State official to Geneva this evening to work with UNHCR in Geneva and key European capitals beginning Monday to arrive at an aggressive repatriation plan.

2. Take Steps to Prepare for Humanitarian Crisis

With only 500,000 or so refugees in camps, more than 500,000 others are in transit to unknown destinations. Both groups will be in need of significant humanitarian assistance within a matter of days. Food and water needs are acute, and sanitation could

become an even more pressing problem as large numbers of refugees congregate at Mugunga camp west of Goma. International relief agencies can provide some of the needs, but the U.S. and others will likely be called upon to fill the gaps. Our problem is that neither we nor UNHCR know what those gaps are and no effective planning is taking place.

Goal: Gain agreement to dispatch a technical team this weekend (humanitarian experts, military planner/logistician) to Geneva to assess likely gaps in humanitarian crisis planning. Gain agreement to send a CDC water expert to the region, issue a warning order/consider deploying evacuation team to Entebbe, establish 24-hour interagency Task Force at State, dispatch an experienced US humanitarian coordinator to Kigali to work with UNHCR, and press State to allow the DART team now in Rwanda access to Eastern Zaire.

3. Approve Diplomatic Strategy

Regional leaders will hold their first summit since the latest crisis in Eastern Zaire next Tuesday in Nairobi. This is an important opportunity to press leaders toward a cease-fire and other necessary agreements. However, it is unclear if Zairian Prime Minister Kengo, his Defense Minister along with Rwanda VP/Defense Minister Kagame will attend. It is important the U.S. push for all of them to attend and to send a high-level official (Moose) to help broker an agreement. State opposes this and wants to send its Central Africa division director (too low level).

Efforts by Zairians to deny Zairian Tutsis their citizens, rights and property is an important reason for the current instability in Eastern Zaire. Affirmation of their rights and assurances of no persecution is critical if the conflict and Rwandan support to the Tutsis is to cease.

Adequate supplies of international humanitarian assistance are in the region, but it cannot be transshipped due to fighting which has closed road access from Uganda and the airports in Goma and Bukavu. The only available route is overland via Rwanda, but the Kigali government is not allowing supplies to pass.

Goal: Gain agreement to work with European allied to encourage Zairian Prime Minister Kengo, his Defense Minister and Rwandan Vice President/Defense Minister Kagame to attend regional summit in Nairobi on November 5. Gain agreement to dispatch A/S Moose from Paris to work the margins of the summit. Gain agreement to press Zairian officials to halt incendiary rhetoric against Tutsi and stress the need to protect them from reprisals across the

country. Stress publicly and privately we will not tolerate ethnic cleansing of Tutsi and will hold the GOZ accountable if it occurs (we must not consider specific sanctions before engaging the economic agencies). Lastly, gain agreement to press the Rwandan government to permit humanitarian relief supplies to cross its territory into Zaire, and to avoid attacks on the Mugunga camp.

4. Task Additional Issues

There are a set of additional steps which if implemented might assist in promoting long-term stability in the region and expand our intelligence base in Eastern Zaire. Various agencies should be tasked to analyze each of these five proposals.


Goal: Gain agreement to task out: 1) State/DRL prepare assessment of how offering bounties for those leaders implicated in the genocide could lessen their control over refugees and how such a program could be funded; 2) State/DRL and IO prepare analysis of how Rwandan War Crimes Tribunal could use additional resources and where they could come from, and; 3) CIA prepare assessment of the benefits and risks

(b)(1)

(b)(1), E.O. 13526, 1.4(c), E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)

ITEM NOT IN INTERAGENCY ISSUES PAPER

We omitted the following additional from the paper for further study due to its sensitivity. You can decide whether or not to raise.



Concurrences by: Eric Schwartz, Richard Clarke/Rand Beers
(info)

Attachments

- Tab A Agenda
- Tab B Issue Paper
- Tab C Recent Developments

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

20410

May 6, 1998

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES E. STEINBERG

THROUGH: JOSEPH C. WILSON *JC for*

FROM: JOHN P. PRENDERGAST *JP*

SUBJECT: Briefing Memo for Deputies Committee Meeting on
Countering Genocide in the Great Lakes, ^{N²}a.m. -
12:30 p.m., Thursday, May 7, 1998, Situation Room
28

Thousands of the soldiers and militia who carried out the 1994 genocide still destabilize Rwanda and the Great Lakes region, maintain their genocidal ideology, and seek to exterminate Tutsis and moderate Hutus. In recent months, the *genocidaires* have expanded their attacks against Tutsi and selected Hutu civilians beyond their northwest stronghold. They aim their attacks primarily at schools, hospitals, prisons and other undefended, "soft" targets. Well over 1,000 Tutsis and dozens of Hutu moderates have been killed in the last six months alone. The GOR's counter-insurgency campaign has contributed to hundreds of civilian deaths, and thus is taking steps to improve its inadequate and non-transparent military justice mechanisms.

These activities greatly undermine our efforts to promote a more secure future for the Great Lakes. POTUS pledged to do everything possible to prevent a recurrence of genocide or mass killing in the Great Lakes. To this end, we are significantly enhancing our diplomatic and development strategies (see Discussion Paper section on "U.S. Policy," p. 1). Deputies will consider whether we are prepared to deepen our security engagement as an element of a broader genocide prevention strategy. You should note that any enhancement in USG policy will necessitate two separate, further processes: 1) the development of a comprehensive public affairs and legislative strategy to explain our policy and actions; and 2) the identification of specific sources of funding required for expanded activities e.g., FMF, ESF, IMET, EDA and drawdown.

ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION

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Classified by: ~~John Prendergast~~

Reason: 1.5 (c) (d)

Declassify On: 5/2/08

Declassified Under Authority of the
Interagency Security Declassification Appeals Panel,
E.O. 13526, Section 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 034
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014

ISSUE ONE: What should be the policy objective and scope of additional USG military aid and training for Rwanda?

We have presented two options: A) to expand our current efforts to help professionalize the Rwandan military and make it a more stable institution; or B) to directly contribute to the GOR's efforts to militarily deter, contain or neutralize the *genocidaires*. A decision by Deputies would then provide the parameters for a DOD assessment team to determine the appropriate mix of activities, subject to requirements described below.

It is our judgment that the second option would produce the most appropriate parameters for the DOD assessment team to take to the region. The team could then recommend what specific military activities we might undertake to most effectively counter the *genocidaires*. The parameters should allow for lethal assistance and counter-insurgency training. This option would contribute to providing the GOR with adequate capacity to prevent or deter a resurgence of mass killing. Vital to countering genocidal activity is a more efficient, targeted, and professional GOR counter-insurgency operation. Demonstrating our direct support for an anti-genocide campaign could likely improve our leverage to increase GOR commitment to political liberalization and respect for human rights.

There are, however, serious concerns about abuses in the northwest (e.g., based on limited reporting due to limited access, Human Rights Watch believes that tens of thousands of civilians have been forcibly displaced, probably as a result of RPA counter-insurgency operations. Thus, we would have to condition Option B assistance on specific actions by the GOR, such as access to the northwest to observe human rights conditions, a code of conduct to ensure that aid and training are not used against innocent civilians, increased prosecution of human rights abusers and a system to monitor actions of troops that receive U.S. training. Moreover, we would seek to help the GOR meet these requirements as part of our Great Lakes Justice Initiative.

GOAL: Gain agreement that the objective of our security engagement with the Rwandan Government should be to directly contribute to efforts to deter, contain or neutralize the *genocidaires* and that the scope of our potential assistance should include lethal aid and training.

ISSUE TWO: Should we also pursue a regional strategy that might include military aid, training and contingency support to better prepare the region to counter future genocidal activity?

Given the limitations of ACRI (which is training for peacekeeping, not peace enforcement in the context of genocide or mass killing) and lack of desire for direct intervention, we need to begin a process for determining if and to what extent we are prepared to work with regional states to increase quickly their capacity to respond in the event of resurgent genocide or mass killing. Deputies will review whether the U.S. should create an IWG that would analyze contingencies and options regarding potential U.S. support for building regional capacity for peace enforcement. After doing the appropriate internal analysis, it is our view that the USG should embark on consultation and assessment processes with regional states and donor countries aimed at determining how we might contribute to building that capacity.

We also believe that we should explore how we might be prepared to offer airlift and logistical support to forces undertaking a peace enforcement operation or humanitarian intervention, such as the 1995 offer to provide airlift support in a Burundi intervention. We believe that the only willing volunteers to counter a rapidly unfolding resurgence in genocide or mass killing would be neighboring states. Therefore, we should consider how providing relevant training and equipment would enhance their ability to counter such activities. We need a reliable, rapid response system to address worst-case scenarios in one of the most crisis-prone regions of the world.

GOAL: Gain agreement to embark on an assessment process with regional actors about supporting appropriate regional intervention capacity, and seek agreement to pledge airlift and logistical support for an intervention in a strictly defined crisis.

ISSUE THREE: Should the U.S. equip and train the Rwandan army to locate and suppress hate radio broadcasts?

Given the potential hate radio broadcasts can have in feeding genocidal activity, it is our view that we should train and equip the Rwandan army to locate and suppress mobile radio transmitters. We also believe that DOD should develop on-the-shelf plans for a worst-case contingency which might require use of USG assets to jam genocidal hate radio broadcasts. Providing equipment and training to the GOR will certainly minimize the

necessity for using our own assets to suppress transmissions in a crisis situation. It will also provide those with the greatest incentive to halt such broadcasts with the means of doing so. Provision of training and/or equipment will be accompanied by guidelines to define the kind of "suppression" that is or is not appropriate - both in terms of the nature of the broadcasts that will be suppressed and the methods of suppression.

GOAL: Gain agreement to seek funding for the provision of training and equipment to enable the GOR to locate and suppress hate radio broadcasts. Gain agreement that DOD will develop on-the-shelf contingency plans for jamming broadcasts ourselves.

Concurrences by: Mary McCarthy, Richard Ragan, Leonard
Hawley, Gina Abracromie-Winstanley

J.P. for

DISCUSSION PAPER FOR
NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON
COUNTERING GENOCIDE IN THE GREAT LAKES (S)

BACKGROUND

The Threat of Resurgent Genocide Persists: Thousands of soldiers of the former Rwandan Army (ex-FAR) and their extremist *Interahamwe* militia allies who carried out the 1994 genocide continue to sow terror in the Great Lakes region. They retain their genocidal ideology and aim to exterminate Tutsis and target moderate Hutus. In recent months, the *genocidaires* have intensified their attacks against Tutsi and selected Hutu civilians and expanded their area of operation. Their destabilizing activities undermine reconstruction and reconciliation efforts. Since mid-1997, the *genocidaires* are conducting larger, better-coordinated operations aimed at schools, hospitals and other undefended targets. Over 1,000 Tutsis and dozens of Hutu moderates have been killed in the last six months alone. Analysts do not believe these forces represent a direct threat to the Rwandan Government (GOR). Despite efforts to mobilize along ethnic lines, the *genocidaires* have not been successful in generating mass popular support.

(S)

Rwandan Government Response: As the force which stopped the genocide, the GOR held the moral high ground upon taking power in 1994. But a number of its actions have eroded that position. Its counter-insurgency campaign has contributed to hundreds of civilian deaths, and there are continuing reports of collateral civilian damage. GOR leaders acknowledge human rights abuses and say they do not condone reprisal acts and are taking steps to improve less-than-effective and non-transparent military justice mechanisms. (S)

U.S. Policy: U.S. efforts to support reconstruction and democratic transitions in Rwanda and the wider Great Lakes region are threatened by the *genocidaires* and their cooperation with other armed insurgents in DROC, Uganda and Burundi, as well as with the regime in Sudan. In order to fulfill the President's commitment to do everything possible to prevent a recurrence of genocide or mass killing in the Great Lakes, we are pursuing several elements of an effective strategy, including: implementing the Great Lakes Justice Initiative to help break the cycle of impunity; dispatching two highly

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Classified by: Glyn Davies

Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify on: April 17, 2008

Declassified Under Authority of the
Interagency Security Declassification Appeals Panel,
E.O. 13526, Section 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 035
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014

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qualified American lawyers to help accelerate and bring due process to the genocide trials in Rwanda; supporting local elections in Rwanda scheduled for later this year, which will expand opportunities for participation for the Hutu majority; exploring possible avenues for expanding dialogue between the GOR and untainted elements of the former government and opposition that might credibly represent other constituencies within Rwanda; discussing with the GOR the establishment of regional development offices patterned after those in DROC; working to enhance reconciliation radio programming in Rwanda and the GOR's efforts to counter hate propaganda; consulting in the region about the possible establishment of an international Coalition Against Genocide; and revitalizing the UN Arms Flow Commission. This Deputies meeting will address military elements of an enhanced strategy. (S)

ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION

Deputies will consider whether we are prepared to deepen our security engagement as one element of a broader genocide prevention strategy. A separate discussion later will identify specific funding sources, if necessary. (S)

ISSUE ONE: What should be the policy objective and scope of additional U.S. military aid and training for Rwanda?

Given the expanded activity of the *genocidaires*, Deputies are asked to review whether the objective of our military assistance should be to expand our current efforts to help professionalize the Rwandan military and make it a more stable institution, or to directly contribute to the GOR's efforts to militarily deter, contain or neutralize the *genocidaires*. A decision is necessary to provide the parameters for a DOD assessment team to determine the appropriate mix of activities. We do not expect that either option would spark demands from other regional states for similar aid. On the contrary, more serious engagement would be positively received by most East and Central African states.

(S)

OPTION A: EXPAND EFFORTS TO PROFESSIONALIZE THE RWANDAN ARMY

This option would expand our current efforts to enable the Rwandan army to professionalize its senior and junior operational leadership, strengthen its military justice institutions and facilitate its transition to a national military, without introducing lethality into our assistance. The DOD assessment team would examine how to expand our efforts

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at leader development through command and staff training. Illustrative activities might include: training of officers and staff in planning, command and control, management systems and military justice; supporting an NCO and officer academy; expanding human rights training in the rules of war; developing the command and staff of their nascent air force; and providing further equipment such as uniforms, communication and load-bearing equipment. This could require additional IMET resources, dispatching U.S. personnel for enhanced training activities and making additional slots open to Rwandans for the Command General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth. (S)

PROS: This option would strengthen a critical GOR institution and assist in the long-term goal of facilitating a transition to a more professional military. Supporting the creation of and training trainers for a training academy would assist the GOR to lower costs, integrate disparate efforts and enhance sustainability of inputs. This option would increase our leverage to promote reforms of and the rule of law within the Rwandan military. The Ministry of Defense recently finished its own assessment of military justice and we could build on the window of opportunity to ensure greater internal accountability and protection of civilians. (S)

CONS: This option will not in the short run contribute greatly to the GOR's ability to deter or prevent a resurgence of mass killings or to defeat the *genocidaires* because it would not involve operational and tactical training. It only addresses long-term improvements in the Rwandan army's capabilities, not lethal aid to deal with the immediate threat. (S)

OPTION B: SUPPORT GOR EFFORTS TO CONTAIN THE GENOCIDAIRES

This option would establish our policy objective to more directly contribute to Rwanda's military efforts to deter, contain or neutralize the *genocidaires*. We would commit to enhancing the GOR's internal defensive or offensive capabilities through the provision of lethal and non-lethal training and equipment. The DOD assessment team would consider a scope of activities that would build on Option A but also include counterinsurgency training, intelligence sharing and logistical support to internal defense. (S)

PROS: This option would help enable the GOR to more effectively counter the activities of the *genocidaires* and provide it with adequate capacity to deter, prevent or neutralize a resurgence of mass killing. Critical to countering genocidal activity is a

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more efficient, targeted and professional GOR counter-insurgency operation. Demonstrating our direct support for an anti-genocide campaign would improve our leverage to increase GOR commitment to political liberalization and respect for human rights. Specific performance criteria resulting from consultations with human rights groups would be attached to this option, such as a code of conduct to ensure that aid and training are not used against innocent civilians. (S)

CONS: Because of publicized human rights abuses within the context of its counter-insurgency operation, providing lethal military aid to the RPA would be highly controversial with human rights groups and certain Members of Congress. This approach would require a change in policy to support lethality and would require a concerted public affairs campaign and consultation effort in Congress. It also requires additional resources. Opposition to lethal support for the Rwandan military might obstruct our efforts to make non-military policy enhancements. (S)

ISSUE TWO: Should we also consider a regional strategy that might include military aid, training and contingency support to better prepare the region to counter future genocidal activity?

The African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) in its current form is years away from creating a capacity for Africa to do peacekeeping operations by itself and does not address some of the particular requirements of peace enforcement operations. Regional states by themselves lack the current capacity to intervene successfully to stop a genocide or situation of mass killing. Some regional leaders have spoken about the possibility of intervening unilaterally or as a regional coalition against the *genocidaires* if the situation markedly deteriorates. We need to determine if and to what extent we are prepared to work with these states to increase quickly their capacity to respond to resurgent genocide. (S)

Deputies are asked to review whether the United States should task the IWG to analyze contingencies and options regarding potential U.S. support for building regional capacity for peace enforcement. The IWG would address the following questions: What do we need to do now to support regional capacities to undertake peace enforcement in strictly defined circumstances? What should we be prepared to do ourselves (unilaterally and to support an intervening force) in the event of an intervention to counter genocide? What should we do to develop an appropriate

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multilateral political framework for intervention contingencies?
(S)

The range of options could include the following:

- specialized training and/or equipment through additional JCETs, IMET, EDA, FMF or emergency drawdown to support regional logistical and peace enforcement capacities;
- modification of the Program of Instruction (POI) for some ACRI training and equipment transfers to address requirements unique to peace enforcement operations;
- modification of Frontline States equipment transfers;
- contingency planning for providing airlift and/or logistical support to intervening forces, such as the 1995 offer to provide airlift support for humanitarian operations in the event of an internationally sanctioned regional intervention in Burundi. (S)

PROS: It is possible that the only willing volunteers to counter a rapidly unfolding resurgence in genocide or mass killing would be neighboring states. Therefore, providing relevant training and equipment would enhance their ability to counter such activities. We don't want to find ourselves in a position of having to choose to either stand by and do nothing or intervene unilaterally in the face of another mass killing. We need a reliable alternative response system. This approach promotes regional solutions to regional problems. It may minimize Congressional concerns if presented as a way to both reduce future military or humanitarian commitments and promote regional solutions to regional problems. (S)

CONS: This option requires support for regional deterrent action and may be misinterpreted as endorsing regional intervention more broadly. Regional states deploying ACRI-trained units for a non-UN sanctioned operation would engender resistance from the Hill, UN and elsewhere. Assistance could be used for military purposes other than those we intend, given that regional states have been instrumental in revolutions in Zaire and Sudan. This option would require additional funding for participating countries. A commitment to provide airlift and logistical support might raise false expectations that the United States would back a regional intervention that would not be endorsed by the UNSC. We need to clarify the conditions under which we would be prepared to support such an intervention. (S)

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ISSUE THREE: Should the United States equip and train the Rwandan army to locate and suppress hate radio broadcasts?

The 1994 genocide demonstrated the potential hate radio broadcasts can have in feeding genocidal activity. Although most of the hate propaganda currently being disseminated is written, hate radio has the potential to reemerge as a tool of the *genocidaires*. **Deputies are asked to decide** what we are prepared to do to address the possibility of an intense hate propaganda campaign in a rapidly deteriorating crisis situation. We are already taking a number of steps to counter hate propaganda in the Great Lakes through the positive use of information. But countering a potential upsurge in inflammatory hate radio broadcasts would require training and equipping the Rwandan army to locate and suppress mobile radio transmitters. The GOR currently can monitor and sometimes jam broadcasts, but lacks the direction-finding capabilities which would be required to locate and suppress mobile transmitters. Providing this equipment and training to the GOR could be carried out either by U.S. military personnel or by contractors. **Deputies should also consider** whether to develop on-the-shelf plans for a worst-case contingency which might require use of USG assets to jam genocidal hate radio broadcasts. (S)

PROS: Providing equipment and training to the GOR will forestall future pressure on us to use our own assets to suppress such transmissions in a crisis situation. It will also provide those with the greatest incentive to halt such broadcasts with the means of doing so. (S)

CONS: On the other hand, once this equipment and training have been provided, it may be difficult for us to control how these capabilities might be used. Human rights groups and some Members of Congress may criticize any provision of this type of equipment to governments which themselves have imperfect human rights records. To counter such concerns, an agreement that provides for a monitoring regime on the use of the equipment should be negotiated as part of the package. (S)

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Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: May 28, 1998

LOCATION: Cordell Hull Conference Room

TIME: 2:00-3:30 P.M.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of NSC Deputies Committee
Meeting on Countering Genocide in the Great Lakes (U)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Jim Steinberg

Chief of Staff
John Podesta

OVP
Leon Fuerth
Jim Babbitt

CIA
Roderick Isler
 (b)(3)

State
Wendy Sherman
Susan Rice

AID
Richard McCall

Defense
Walter Slocombe
Vincent Kern

JCS
Joseph Ralston
George Casey

OMB
Phil DuSault

NSC
Joseph Wilson
John Prendergast
Richard Ragan
Len Hawley
Mary McCarthy

USUN
David Goldwyn

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- In light of the continuing attacks on civilians by the forces that perpetrated the Rwandan genocide, and in response to the President's pledges to do everything possible to prevent a recurrence of genocide or mass killing in the Great Lakes, Deputies agreed to deepen our security engagement with the Government of Rwanda as an element of a broader genocide prevention strategy. (S)

Declassified Under Authority of the
Interagency Security Declassification Appeals Panel,
E.O. 13526, Section 5.3(b)(3)

SECRET

Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 5/28/08

ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 36
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014

- A DOD assessment team with State Department participation will travel to Rwanda and complete within 90 days an assessment of the appropriate mix of additional military training activities and equipment aimed at contributing to Rwandan efforts to deter, contain or minimize the effect of the *genocidaires*. The DOD plan will also include specific cost estimates for proposed activities. (Action: DOD, State) (S)
- The parameters of the assessment will include lethal and non-lethal aid requirements. However, no commitment will be made to the GOR concerning lethal aid. State Department members of the team will seek agreement with the GOR on enhanced human rights safeguards necessary for the provision of lethal military assistance should Deputies authorize aid. Deputies will re-convene at the appropriate time to decide whether to provide lethal aid. (Action: State) (S)
- The issue of whether the United States should equip and train the Rwandan army to locate and suppress hate radio broadcasts will be integrated into the assessment team's mandate. If the assessment team recommends any lethal activity associated with countering hate radio, it will also be subject to Deputies decision. (S)
- DOD will produce within ninety days a plan to give neighboring countries the military capacity to respond to genocidal activity on a timeline much shorter than ACRI. DOD's plan will also address airlift and logistical gaps. (Action: DOD) (S)
- In tandem with the DOD planning process, NSC will convene an IWG to analyze contingencies and develop options for the provision of U.S. political support for building regional capacity to respond quickly to genocide or mass killing. The IWG should also develop a diplomatic strategy to maximize multilateral buy-in and African regional leadership to avoid a backlash from Africans and a perception that this might be a U.S.-led initiative. (Action: NSC) (S)
- The DOD plan and the results of the IWG process will be presented to Deputies for their consideration. (C)
- Any enhancement of our security relationship with the Government of Rwanda will require the development of a comprehensive public affairs and legislative strategy to explain our policy and actions. (C)

- Following the DOD assessment and cost estimates, OMB, State, and DOD will identify appropriate sources of funding required for any enhancement of our security assistance relationship.
(Action: OMB, State, DOD) (C)



Republic of Cameroon

*The President
of the Republic*

Yaounde, the 6th January 1997

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for Your kind letter delivered to Me in New York on October 24 by Ambassador Madeleine Albright with regard to the extradition of Rwandan Colonel Bagosora. I agree fully with You that it is in the interest of all of us that this individual, accused of genocide, be judged by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. There he can answer for his alleged crimes against humanity.

I am pleased to inform You, accordingly, that all legal impediments within the Republic of Cameroon to the extradition of Colonel Bagosora and three others have been cleared away and that I have today signed the extradition authorization. I hope that these cases can be handled expeditiously by the Tribunal in Arusha in order to demonstrate to the world that crimes of that nature will not be tolerated, regardless of where they may occur in the world.

I am looking forward to continued cooperation between our two Governments in the New Year. Please accept, Mr. President, the renewed assurances of My highest consideration. /-

The Honorable BILL CLINTON
President of the United States
WASHINGTON, D.C.



Paul BIYA

Declassified Under Authority of the
Interagency Security Declassification Appeals Panel,
E.O. 13526, Section 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 52
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 7, 1998

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

3-9-98

Copied
Berger
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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER *[Signature]*
SYLVIA MATHEWS *[Signature]*
STEPHANIE STREETT *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Possible Stop in Rwanda on Your Trip to Africa

Purpose

To decide whether you will make a tarmac stop in Rwanda.

Background

The Rwandan Government has invited you to stop in Rwanda for a brief event to underscore our condemnation of genocide no matter where it occurs. Given the centrality of this issue for Rwandans, President Bizimungu and Vice President Kagame believe that without an airport stop by you in Rwanda, it would be impossible for them to attend the regional meeting in Uganda.

Rwandan participation in the Kampala summit is clearly important to achieving our objectives for the meeting. But there are other compelling reasons for stopping in Rwanda, as well. Remembering the victims of genocide in the country where the atrocities occurred sends a powerful message that the United States and the international community are as concerned with genocide in Africa as we are with genocide in other parts of the world -- a message that would resonate both in Africa and in the United States. The stop would also more vividly highlight the importance of the regional discussions we will be having in Uganda on ending the cycle of impunity. Finally, we should be able to announce several additional elements of support for Rwanda (likely candidates include a contribution to the newly established genocide survivors fund, assistance in the area of democratization and hate radio).

We can accommodate this event by making a brief trip to the Kigali airport in lieu of the roundtable discussion with women emerging from conflict scheduled for the second day in Kampala.

CONFIDENTIAL

Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 3/3/08

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Declassified Under Authority of the
Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel
E. O. 13526, Section 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 037
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014

The new schedule - resulting in a long day - would be: depart Kampala for Kigali at approximately 8:00 a.m.; about one hour flight time; conduct the airport stop at Kigali; return early afternoon for the Regional Summit; and depart Kampala that evening, arriving at your hotel in Cape Town at approximately 2:00 a.m. You are down the following day until early afternoon.

The Secret Service believes that concerns about security associated with a visit to Rwanda while real can be managed so long as the activities in Kigali are limited to the airport, are small in scope, and are kept logistically simple. We are also working with the Secret Service and our military to heighten security for the advance team that will prepare the stop.

RECOMMENDATION

That you make a tarmac stop in Rwanda.

Approve

Disapprove

Attachment

Tab A Letter from President Bizimungu

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 038
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
STEPHANIE STREETT

SILVIA MATHEWS

SUBJECT: Possible Stop in Rwanda on Your Trip to Africa

Purpose

To decide whether you will make a tarmac stop in Rwanda.

Background

The Government of Rwanda has invited you to make a short tarmac stop at Kigali International Airport so that you might make an historic gesture -- condemnation of genocide wherever it occurs -- to Africa and to the world. After a week of careful deliberations, the Rwandan Government has decided that -- absent your visiting Rwanda itself -- attending the Kampala Summit and discussing the genocide there is politically and symbolically too problematic. The Rwandans feel it is essential that American condemnation of the Rwandan genocide be articulated on Rwandan soil. We have indications that other regional leaders share this perspective and view this as a critical signal of a new U.S. policy toward Africa, building on Madeleine's pledge that the United States would stand against the resurgence of genocide in Africa. In addition, a Kigali tarmac stop would ensure Rwandan Government participation in the Regional Summit.

*Embry, Christoph
If we go to
Rwanda, they
will come to
Summit*

There are important moral, symbolic and political reasons for you to consider making this stop. It would allow you to dramatically commemorate victims of genocide, as you have in Bosnia and Germany. You could highlight our recent efforts to help break the cycle of impunity and restore the rule of law to the region. More importantly, you could send a powerful message to the continent -- and the world -- that genocide in Africa is no different than genocide in Europe. You could also strengthen our message about the international community's responsibility in the 1994 genocide, stressing our commitment to work with other countries and alone if necessary to check genocide and address impending mass human rights abuses. This message would

*doesn't want
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empty
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some
letter
to summit*

*2 hrs
[scribble]*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 3/3/08

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

rebound throughout the continent, the world, and back to the United States, where key constituencies -- particularly African-American and human rights activists -- believe that African lives are not viewed as being as important to Americans or American policy-makers as those from other continents.

As you have pointed out, a stop in Rwanda would indeed raise the ghosts of our inaction in April-June 1994. Nevertheless, this perception might be better addressed by focusing on what we are now doing in the region and making the case for lessons learned from the 1994 experience. This approach received uniformly positive media coverage during Madeleine's visit. Additionally, relations with Rwanda have progressed far beyond recriminations over past mistakes. President Bizimungu made clear in his personal invitation to you that the people of Rwanda view continued U.S. engagement, as well as Madeleine's words, as important indications of America's strong resolve on the issue of genocide. All signs indicate that the Rwandans want to look towards the future while commemorating the past.

ISSUE FOR DECISION: SHOULD YOU MAKE A TARMAC STOP IN RWANDA?

~~The Secret Service sees no problem with a short stop on the tarmac in Rwanda. A ceremony or event involving genocide survivors and a short speech are all that would be required. The Rwandans have indicated a bilat in Rwanda would not be necessary, The impact of your stop would resonate throughout the continent and the world, and more than any other stop on the trip would truly underscore that we are committed to a new partnership with a new Africa.~~

To accommodate this stop in your schedule, we propose cancelling the roundtable discussion with women emerging from conflict, presently scheduled for the second day in Kampala. Instead, that ~~morning~~ you would travel to Rwanda, approximately one hour flight time, and return early that afternoon for the Summit.

RECOMMENDATION

That you make a tarmac stop in Rwanda.

Approve _____
Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab A Letter from President Bizimungu

Need U.S.S

with genocide survivors and m. followed

by a statement to one event

AIA would be a long day starting at approx 8:00 a.m.

we would still plan on flying on to C.T. arriving at jam hotel at approx 2:00 am.

REPUBLIC OF RWANDA**1st March, 1998****THE PRESIDENT**

Declassified Under Authority of the
Interagency Security Declassification Appeals Panel,
E.O. 13526, Section 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-040, document no. 53
Declassification Date: March 18, 2014

**Mr. William Jefferson Clinton,
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C**

Dear Mr. President,

I am writing to thank you for your invitation to attend a regional summit in Kampala on 24th and 25th, March 1998. I also wish to take this opportunity to welcome you to Africa and to the region. This will give you and African leaders an opportunity to work out principles that would guide the new partnership.

Mr. President, I am keenly aware of your strong sentiments against genocide as is evident from our frequent correspondence and messages from you through some of your most notable officials. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, former Secretary of Defense William Perry, Anthony Lake, Susan Rice have all conveyed your messages on several occasions. It is with this in mind that I expressed our strong wish that you include Rwanda on your forthcoming tour of Africa.

A stop-over in Rwanda, however brief, would give you a unique and historical opportunity to re-affirm your personal condemnation of genocide on one of the sites where it took place only recently. An opportunity to repeat the call to "NEVER AGAIN"; to denounce the heinous crimes; to show solidarity with the survivors, and to lead the international community in a rededication to deter genocide.

Unfortunately, your visit to Africa which does not include Rwanda will be judged, fairly or unfairly, as diminishing the tragic events that occurred in our country. Indeed, some countries and individuals have attempted to dismiss genocide in Rwanda as insignificant, thus complicating the management of its aftermath. Those who deny or minimize its significance give comfort to its perpetrators, hence the continuation of acts of genocide in Rwanda and in the region. To our people who suffered and still suffer the trauma of the genocide, and who so gallantly fought to stop it, GENOCIDE has a meaning.

Besides the fact that that would be in stark contrast to your usual position, both on domestic and international issues, this interpretation would be aggravated by my going to Kampala to discuss, among other things, the continuing acts of genocide. The confusion and embarrassment this would cause in Rwanda puts me in a rather difficult position with regard to attending the meeting, in the event that the stop-over does not occur.

The issue here is not a visit to Rwanda. It is the unique and historical opportunity for the US to re-affirm its moral leadership.

Mr. President, I still hope, against all odds, that you will make the stop-over.

In the event that this is not so, and because of the importance we attach to our relationship and our support for your vision of US-Africa partnership, I propose to meet you in Washington, DC after your African tour. This will enable me to discuss bilateral issues and to inform you on our shared efforts to reconstruct our country and to create an environment in which national reconciliation can be nurtured.

Sincerely,


Pasteur Bizimungu
Pasteur BIZIMUNGU
President of the Republic of Rwanda