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## **Clinton Presidential Records Mandatory Declassification Review**

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Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were released in full or released in part.

Those documents released with redactions have been restricted under Section 1.4 (d) of E.O. 13526.

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- Liechtenstein special prosecutor Spitzer ended his investigation on July 31, and presented his report on August 31. Swiss press reports indicate that Spitzer found indications of money laundering activities by prominent attorney Herbert Bätliner, including ties to a Latin American drug cartel (Joreg Reyes-Torres), Togo dictator Eyadema, and Swiss-based precious metal dealer Marc Rich (indicted in U.S. courts for racketeering, tax evasion and mail fraud).
- In his final report, Spitzer wrote; “In all I can say that white-collar crime in the principality of Liechtenstein is no different than in other European countries.”
- Spitzer’s investigation triggered a defensive reaction from Liechtenstein’s political and financial leadership--particularly within its close-knit community of asset managers. In June, Spitzer sent officers to seize documents from LGT Bank, owned by the royal family, and several prominent citizens, including a MP and the brother of the Deputy Prime Minister were arrested. The case sparked fears that major powers--including the U.S. and France--could impose sanctions and hamstringing the country’s role as a prime offshore financial center.
- Prince Hans-Adam II and the Liechtenstein parliamentary president sounded defensive notes in National Day speeches (Aug. 21) calling for increased national unity and patriotism in response to “foreign” criticism.
- When Spitzer was first appointed by Hans-Adam, the prince publicly announced that he would dismiss any government minister who interfered with the special prosecutor’s investigation. Spitzer’s complaints of stonewalling (by Liechtenstein law enforcement and banking institutions) were ignored, however, by the prince and government. Another Austrian, Robert Wollner, has been named to follow up on Spitzer’s findings.
- Peter Ritter, Liechtenstein’s Minister of Economics, is the brother of attorney and SPAG/Trenton executive Rudolf Ritter, who according to the BND is “an agent of the Colombian drug cartel and Russian organized crime.”

March 30, 1999

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PER E. O. 13526

2012-1021-M  
8/19/15 KBH

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: RICHARD A. CLARKE

FROM: WILLIAM F. WECHSLER

SUBJECT: EO 13526 1.4d -- A New Interagency Mechanism for  
Prioritizing International Crime Targets

At long last, the intelligence, law enforcement and national security communities have begun working together to establish integrated targeting priorities for international organized crime groups that threaten U.S. national security (other than those with a primary focus on drug trafficking). Once targeted, we will enhance intelligence collection and begin new operational initiatives to arrest the leaders and disrupt the activities of these crime groups. This new mechanism, a major goal of the President's International Crime Control Strategy, is [redacted] patterned after the successful Linear and Linkage mechanisms that currently focus on drug trafficking syndicates in Latin America and East Asia, respectively.

We were successful in our efforts to ensure that NSC is represented [redacted] the penultimate policymaking body on this subject. This will allow NSC to ensure that, where necessary, issues related to the work [redacted] [redacted] will be raised to the Deputies or Principals. NSC will not be represented on [redacted] working groups that will direct specific law enforcement operations.

**Possible Targets:** Agencies are in the process of nominating potential targets for consideration [redacted] Thus far five organizations have been proposed, each of which currently engages in criminal operations in the United States:

[Large redacted box]

EO 13526 1.4d

**Next Steps:** By the end of April, [redacted] complete the examination of nominated crime groups and determine which groups should be targets for operations and which should be targets for enhanced collection. At that point, we will inform you of those decisions and recommend if a Deputies or Principals Committee meeting will be necessary to review them.

**Concurrences by:** Carlos Pascual, Ken Lieberthal, Susan Braden, Erica Barks-Ruggles, Steve Ward, Mary DeRosa

Exchange Mail

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DATE-TIME 04/21/2000 11:23:35 AM  
FROM Brzezinski, Mark F. (RUE)  
CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)  
DATECLASSIFIEDON 04/21/2000  
DECLASSIFYON 04/22/2010  
SUBJECT RE: Berezovsky [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]  
TO Wolosky, Lee S. (TNT)

CARBON\_COPY  
TEXT\_BODY Extremely interesting - nothing like generating legitimacy through charitable donations. MB

-----Original Message-----

From: Wolosky,  
Lee S. (TNT)  
Sent: Friday, April 21, 2000 11:23 AM  
To: Brzezinski,  
Mark F. (RUE)  
Subject: Berezovsky [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

Further to  
our discussion yesterday, I learned this morning that Berezovsky  
approached Princeton in connection with a major gift. I am told  
that the size of the proposed gift was \$8 million, and that in exchange  
Princeton would agree to name a center for him. Princeton ultimately  
rejected the proposal.

He might also have approached Harvard.  
I am finding out more.

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8/19/15 KBH

## Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 07/14/2000 8:57:28 AM  
 FROM Kurtz, Paul B. (TNT)  
 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~  
 CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(c)(d)  
 DATECLASSIFIEDON 07/13/2000  
 DECLASSIFYON 07/14/2010  
 SUBJECT FW: POTUS-Putin memo ~~{SECRET}~~  
 TO Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE)

CARBON\_COPY  
 Chen, Darren T. (INTERN/TNT)  
 Clarke, Richard A. (TNT)  
 Cressey, Roger W. (TNT)  
 Gordon-Hagerty, Lisa E. (TNT)  
 Grandrimo, Nicole M. (TNT/INTERN)  
 Green, Charles A. (TNT)  
 Hanley, Timothy P. (INTERN/TNT)  
 Hunker, Jeffrey A. (TNT)  
 Kurtz, Paul B. (TNT)  
 Lieberman, Donna P. (TNT)  
 Montgomery, Mark C. (TNT)  
 Mulligan, George D. (TNT)  
 Owens, Bernard M. Jr. (TNT/INTERN)  
 Pierce, Eric A. (TNT)  
 Robinson, Jack A. (TNT)  
 Rosa, Frederick M. (TNT)  
 Roundtree, Beverly (TNT)  
 Telleen, Erik K. (TNT/INTERN)  
 Wolosky, Lee S. (TNT)

## TEXT\_BODY

Andrew suggest we add a point on terrorism. See language in text.  
 Not sure if I have the right name for the working group.

-----Original

Message-----

From: Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE)

Sent: Thursday, July

13, 2000 23:10 PM

To: @INTECON - Economic Affairs; @NONPRO - Export  
 Controls; Black, Steven K. (VP); Davidson, Leslie K. (VP); Hinckley,

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Steedman (VP); @SEE - Southeast European Affairs; @EUROPE - European Affairs; Camp, Donald A. (NESA); Kurtz, Paul B. (TNT); Wolosky, Lee S. (TNT); @MULTILAT - Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs  
Subject: POTUS-Putin  
memo [SECRET]

Would appreciate comments by 10 a.m. Friday. Thanks.

TRANSLATED\_ATTACHMENT Okinawa Bilat - Putin.doc  
MEETING WITH  
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN

#### KEY OBJECTIVES

- \* Review Putin's plans on economy, reengagement with IFIs, Soviet-era debt.  
Stress need for deeds over words. Highlight risk of losing momentum.
- \* Press Putin for progress on Iran nuclear and missile nonproliferation issues,  
highlighting corrosive effect on relationship. Emphasize need for decisive action.
- \* Highlight mounting questions about Putin's support for democratic principles,  
rule of law. Stress need for political solution in Chechnya, accountability for human rights abuses.

#### CONTEXT OF THE MEETING

Putin primarily wants to use Okinawa to demonstrate that he is fully accepted as an international statesman. He also intends to make a low-key pitch for support of his economic gameplan, to deflect criticism of Russian brutality in Chechnya, and, possibly, to rally international opposition to NMD. Putin will be very sensitive about whether being accorded the same reception as Yeltsin at previous summits and about Russia's desire for "full" membership in the G-8.

#### BACKGROUND

Long Hot Summer. Putin's arrival in Okinawa coincides roughly with the end of his honeymoon period. The political situation at home is far hotter than during your visit to Moscow, exacerbated by Putin's relentless travel schedule and government disarray and divisions. Putin is preoccupied by the end-game in his attempt to rein in Russia's governors. The bruising contest has revealed the limits of Putin's authority, alienated key constituencies, and sapped momentum from implementation of economic reforms and passage of legislation by the Duma.

Unlike Yeltsin, who tried to play a balancing role among Russia's fractious elites, Putin is fighting several other battles simultaneously. The recent crackdown on prominent oligarchs -- Gusinskiy/Media-MOST, Alekperov/LUKOil, Vyakhirev/Gazprom, Potanin/Oneksimbank -- has clear political overtones. While these figures are no angels, they also happen to own independent media outlets and relish their independence from the Kremlin. Other notorious power-brokers (Abramovich, Mamut) are escaping scrutiny from the tax police and procuracy; Putin's inner circle of security service veterans and the so-called Yeltsin "family" are reportedly pulling the strings.

The Putin administration is walking a very fine line between laying down new, more modern "rules of the game" and reverting to old methods of centralization, arbitrariness and intimidation -- thus chilling the investment climate and damaging Putin's reputation abroad. While criticism of Putin's tough-guy methods and highly elastic political value system is mounting in the liberal Russian press, his approval rating is still over 75%.

Sound Thinking on Economics. Putin continues to say all the right things on the economy, but he has trimmed his sails somewhat regarding international assistance. Putin's chances of success depend on taking advantage of

the current fragile economic upturn, galvanizing the rusted and suspicious bureaucratic apparatus behind his plan and selling the reforms politically. The boldness of his government's economic plan and the key economic themes of Putin's recent state of the nation address is unmistakable.

Implementation is everything. He recognizes that Russia must create a more inviting business climate that protects investor and property rights, collects reasonable taxes, enforces a predictable rule of law, and promotes competitiveness and growth. He also wants to rationalize public finance at all levels of government, to reduce opportunities for corruption and state interference in the economy, and to establish a sustainable social safety net.

The likely timing of a new IMF program is slipping to fall 2000. But Putin knows the importance of good relations with the IMF. He is likely to appeal for more flexibility from the Fund on structural reforms in recognition that Russia is setting its own economic priorities. In view of Russia's strong current financial position and strong resistance from key creditors, Putin is unlikely to make panhandling for debt relief (particularly reduction) a high priority at Okinawa. In his speech to parliament, Putin decried Russia's reliance on foreign handouts and beneficence.

Putin and PM Kasyanov have also recognized the tenuousness of the current economic "recovery," correctly chalking it up to external factors such as the high price of oil and other commodities. Because of current account inflows, the ruble is already under strong upward pressure undermining the domestic competitiveness, which has been such a boon to industry since late 1998. This in turn is creating new pressures on monetary policy, posing serious questions about the right exchange rate and inflation targets.

AGENDA

Economic Program, IFIs, and Debt. You should applaud announcement of a systematic program and ask about specific priorities and plans for implementation. You could explore what kind of political consensus or coalitions Putin expects to build in parliament, the regions, and the business community.

You should express support for Russia's reengagement with the IMF on a solid new program, which would send a positive signal to investors. An IMF deal would help set the stage for another possible round of interim debt rescheduling of Soviet-era obligations. We also expect that the World Bank can play a strong supporting role on key structural reforms (e.g., reducing barter, fiscal federalism, financial and social sector).

WTO. You should echo your big-picture message in Moscow about the wisdom of "going global" and accelerating efforts to join WTO. In the view of USTR, the key problem is the lack of high-level shepherds to coordinate the technical and legislative challenges. Putin's own buy-in for prioritizing WTO accession is fuzzy at best. He does not fully appreciate the benefits of using the accession process to leverage tough decisions on reforms.

Investment Climate. Most investors seem to be waiting for a track record from the new team. Bold, concrete moves would help, for example in the area of tax laws, corporate governance and shareholder rights, adoption of international accounting standards and enforcement of judgments. Our experts are working together on remaining issues in the Bilateral Investment Treaty. Passage of a solid money laundering law is a more distant prospect, but remains important both for international cooperation in the fight against cross-border financial crime and for improving Russia's business climate. We hope commercial missions - Bob Strauss, Commerce Secretary-designate Mineta - can be scheduled later in the

year. Finally, Jim Harmon is headed to Moscow at the end of July to seek progress on pending EXIM deals.

Bilateral Trade. If Putin raises the old hobby-horse of "market economy" status in anti-dumping cases, you should say that our experts have done a good job of clarifying the legal process and the pros and cons of switching status and that it's up to the GOR to decide whether to initiate a petition. The Bilateral Steel Dialogue, which was announced at the Moscow summit, will hold its first session in September and provides a good opportunity to study questions of structural impediments in key sectors.

Regional Issues. You should briefly review status on several fronts, beginning with the upcoming inaugural session of a working group on Afghanistan agreed at the Moscow summit. Tom Pickering and former SVR Director (and present Deputy Foreign Minister) Trubnikov will lead. On NATO-Russia, we want to send a signal that Putin's interest in closer cooperation has sparked brainstorming on our end.

On the Balkans you lay markers about Milosevic's destabilizing moves and our concerns about the situation in Montenegro. Putin will remain coy about the Milosevic problem, but you should call for creation of diplomatic working group modeled on the Afghan example. This group will help us attempt to bring our policies more in synch and deal with the problem of Russian credits and other support for the FRY regime. Finally, you should ask Putin for a readout on his trip to China and North Korea.

Arms Control. TO BE PROVIDED.

Nonproliferation. On the Iran nuclear issue, Putin is expecting a serious exchange, drawing upon your July 10 conversation and an extensive message from

the Vice President spelling out the details of Iran's program and its efforts to obtain sensitive technology from Russia. Russian-Iranian nuclear cooperation in areas proscribed by the 1995 Gore-Chernomyrdin commitments has intensified and now covers all areas of the nuclear fuel cycle.

You should emphasize that unless we make progress quickly, cooperative programs may be put at risk. You should highlight that the problem is causing serious damage to our relations and has far-reaching implications for international and regional security. To get around Atomic Energy Minister Adamov, a key source of the problem, you should suggest a special channel to discuss this issue. As a test case of Russian intentions, we have identified a Russian entity, the Efremov Institute, that is providing uranium enrichment technology. We have threatened to impose trade penalties unless the Russians take decisive action to shut down this activity. You should ask for an update on their investigation.

On the Iran missile problem, we have made some progress but have not achieved any breakthroughs, despite the efforts of our main interlocutors in the Russian space ministry. We need Putin to see the practical benefits of curtailing missile cooperation and implementing a work plan agreed on the margins of the Moscow summit. We have drawn a clear linkage between the work plan (Holum-Koptev) and allowing the commercial space launch quota to expire at the end of the year, which could be worth hundreds of millions to Russia. You should tell Putin that dramatic action to stop a habitual offender, Glavkosmos, could allow us to move forward on that decision, provided that it was matched by good faith efforts against the lesser offenders (MAI, MATI, et al).

Democracy, Chechnya. At the Moscow summit, you made clear to Putin that his support for democratic principles and freedoms was central to continued

international support for Russia and its international integration. You need to reinforce that message, while informing Putin that the credibility gap has widened in the aftermath of Gusinskiy's arrest and recent moves against oligarchs. Putin will offer self-serving justifications for his actions, but does not appreciate how damaging these problems can be for his international reputation. Likewise, Putin is still in denial about Chechnya. You should emphasize the need to get the political track moving, to support return of the OSCE Assistance Group to the region, and to ensure proper accountability for human rights abuses.

Terrorism. The first meeting of the US-Russian Counter Terrorism Working group is scheduled for late July. You should welcome this dialogue and request Putin's assistance in engaging other UNSC members on the need for additional sanctions against the Taliban, such as an arms embargo.

People-to-people. The Russians have proposed an early experts meeting to discuss their proposals on expanded cooperation on social and cultural issues -

exchanges, status of women, fighting drug abuse, cultural preservation. You should embrace their initiative and offer to send a high-level team to Moscow.

You could also note that Donna Shalala will be in Moscow July 20-21 to work on health issues under Binational Commission auspices.

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Reason: 1.5 (b)(d)

Declassify On: 07/05/10

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# Exchange Mail

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**DATE-TIME** 10/01/2000 10:49:17 AM  
**FROM** Wolosky, Lee S. (TNT)  
**CLASSIFICATION** ~~SECRET~~  
**CLASSIFICATIONREASON** 1.5(c)  
**DATECLASSIFIEDON** 10/01/2000  
**DECLASSIFYON** 10/02/2010  
**SUBJECT** EO 13526 1.4d ~~(SECRET)~~  
**TO** Clarke, Richard A. (TNT)  
**CARBON\_COPY** Rosa, Frederick M. (TNT)

**TEXT\_BODY** Berezovsky was in the US in late September, and was feted by US-Russia Business Council (Bob Strauss's group) and the Council on Foreign Relations. In New York, on the margins of UNGA, he met with U/S Pickering.

Later this week (5-7 OCT), Harvard's Kennedy School and the US-Russia Business Council host the 4th Annual US-Russian Investment Symposium. Expected attendees include Mikhail Khodorkovsky (keynote speaker), Pyotr Aven (CEO Alfa Bank, which owns Tyumen Oil), German Gref (SPAG advisor) and Vladimir Evtushenkov (Chairman of Sistema, Luzhkov's holding company).

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