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UNITED NATIONS MISSION TO HAITI: TRAINING OR OCCUPATION?

Issue For Decision: As a part of the recent policy review, we have pledged to reconfirm our willingness to participate in a UN military mission in Haiti, and noted that it might be necessary to have a "reconfigured" mission, and consequently a restated UNSC mandate. When he was asked to confirm that he would agree to a new UN military mission, President Aristide asked what its "reconfigured" mission would be.

To answer President Aristide's question, and to have clarity in our policy, a decision is needed to determine whether the mission we have in mind is similar to that provided for in the Governors Island Agreement, namely to train and professionalize the Haitian military, and perform limited "civic action" construction, or whether the UN military mission should also have an internal security role and other peace enforcement tasks.

Considerations Common To Both Options:

Under both approaches, an important issue is whether the UN military force would be sent in before President Aristide had returned to power in Haiti, or only after his successful return. Sending the force only after he had resumed the powers of the presidency would reduce the impression that the force was intended to assure his return, either by deterring non-cooperation by the Haitian military or by direct military action. Whether that is an advantage or a disadvantage depends on one's view of what the mission of the force should be. Sending the force before Aristide's return could help calm the situation and regime cooperation with it would be a manifestation of a real intent to cooperate in implementing GIA fully. If, however, the force is intended to have a limited mission, sending it before the most difficult part of GIA -- President Aristide's actual return to power in Haiti -- is accomplished, could imply a willingness to use US military force that we did not intend.

Deployment of either mission would follow only after the UN provided approval via a UN Security Council resolution. Consistent with the principle of making our action regarding Haiti multilateral, we would not unilaterally intervene. Whether the UNSC would authorize a mission of the second kind, which could reasonably be characterized as an intervention, is problematic. There is no possibility that the OAS would authorize such a mission.

Either approach would entail significant costs. For either the US would have to provide the overwhelming majority, if not all, the troops. For the training mission, the USG would seek to have the mission conducted as the basis of UN reimbursement by assessments under Chapter VI. For the internal security mission, we would seek reimbursement as a Chapter VII operation. Whether we would succeed in getting significant cost-sharing under any approach is dubious.

The Options

Option I: Military training for professionalization--The October 93 model updated, with no internal security functions.

Under this approach the military mission's main task would be to retrain the Haitian military into a non-political, professional force capable of carrying out the normal functions of military establishments in small, underdeveloped states with constitutional governments. Its premise is that the phase out of police functions from the army, along with concurrent redefinition of military roles, would gradually help Haiti develop a responsible military with a legitimate purpose in a democratic society. This would be a long-term effort, requiring substantial commitment of personnel and resources (from foreign aid, not DoD O& M, budgets) for a period of several years.

For this mission, revision of the present UN mandate would be required to permit shifting the focus of the mission from civic action construction projects to training, and to assure that the mission could be the size and composition needed to carry out the mission while providing for its own security. That option is temporarily provided by UNSCR 905, which will expire June 30.

Under this UNMIH configuration, internal security would remain the responsibility solely of Haitian security forces, throughout the time the unit was in Haiti.¹ Initially those forces would be responsive to the Haitian authorities awaiting Aristide's return; afterward they would be those on whom President Aristide chose to place the responsibility. The UNMIH forces would provide training, serve as role models and, in respect to police functions, monitor performance of the Haitian forces. The UN military mission would have neither the authority nor responsibility to monitor compliance with the key political terms of the GIA nor to intervene in local security matters or to insure compliance with the GIA. In the event of violence or non-compliance, UNMIH would take steps to assure its own safety, but would not engage in peace enforcement, or, indeed, in traditional peacekeeping.

The US element of the UN military training mission would not be deployed to Haiti until it would go as part of a viable political agreement having the support of all parties, and steps had been taken to begin putting the other elements of the settlement in place. In particular, it would be a precondition of deployment of the military mission that the police monitoring units were in place. In addition, the US would require that all parties formally confirm their agreement to the deployment and give strong assurances, backed by demonstrated changes in behavior, that the mission was coming as part of an accepted overall settlement and would receive the support and cooperation of the Haitian authorities, both military and civilian. In this connection, we would insist on their active help in carrying out its mission, as well as in being properly received and protected while in country. We would also insist on appropriate host nation support

¹ There would also be an international police assistance mission. However, its role would be monitoring the activities of the (reconstituted) Haitian police and certain forms of technical assistance, not itself policing the country.

arrangements, including a Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA), assured access to ports and airfields, and agreements on how the training mission would be conducted.

However, in configuring the force, we would not count on a permissive environment. The detailed force requirements for the force would be set by the relevant command. Illustratively, the US training team could consist of approximately 100 trainers and 200 support personnel.² It would carry such weapons, have such security personnel, and be governed by such ROE as the US deems appropriate to enable the force to provide for its own protection and to ensure that it could land and move safely to its facilities in the event Haitian authorities do not cooperate or they fail to provide security. We would not negotiate with either President Aristide or the Haitian military on these points, though we would inform them of our intentions.

The force would not be configured to keep order in Haiti, provide protection for Aristide and his government, or (if sent in before he returns) deal with military refusal to accept his return. In briefing Congress and the press, we would need to make clear the limited character of the mission, so it would be public knowledge that we did not intend to use force to install or protect Aristide or deal with violence in the country. Should the situation deteriorate to the point where it was unsafe or infeasible for the mission's training activity to continue, it would remain in a protective posture until the situation improved or it was withdrawn.

Option II: Internal security tasks included in mission

This approach would give the UNMIH the authority and responsibility to perform internal security functions, as well as training. Its tasks would include preventing and if necessary suppressing violence among Haitians, providing personal security to Aristide and his key government associates after his return, and disarming/disbanding armed civilian groups, such as the FRAPH. Its mission could also include using military force to protect him physically in the course of his return.

Adopting this approach would be based on the premise that the return of Aristide could precipitate violence on a massive scale between Aristide partisans seeking revenge on the army and army enlisted seeking to preempt such attacks through terror and intimidation of their own, and that Haitian security forces either could not or would not deal with the problems themselves. It assumes that, without a foreign (and in practice US) military force, Aristide cannot count on returning to power in Haiti and keeping control of the country and the security forces. It does not assume that reconciliation and fundamental political and social reform is impossible, only that it will take a long time to reform and rebuild institutions based on democratic principles and that, in the meantime, it is both necessary and in the US interest to provide the muscle to sustain President Aristide in office.

A force assigned this internal security mission would be configured quite differently from one assigned only a training and self-protection mission. The force would be significantly larger, and would operate essentially as an occupying army,

² To the extent it was part of the force's mission to conduct civic action construction projects, additional personnel would be needed.

pending the establishment of Aristide's full and effective authority in the country, including winning loyalty of the security forces, or inauguration of a new president in February 1996. Over time US casualties would be certain, as would be Haitian casualties caused by US actions. Under the War Powers Act, its introduction would appear to begin the timetable for congressional authorization, unless the Act is considered not to apply to operations of this character.

It would be necessary to resolve in advance the relationships between the US commander of the force and the Haitian government, as to the circumstances in which the force would intervene in internal conflicts in Haiti, and its ROE for doing so. Because such a force could be involved in conflict situations, it would require complete freedom of action, under U.S. command, in determining which measures were necessary for its own protection, and in determining how to carry out its broad mission. For obvious reasons, there would be a tension between the requirement of clear US command and control -- which is necessary for legal and practical political reasons -- and its function as the de facto internal security force of a foreign government.

It is not clear that President Aristide could give permission for a US force to operate in this way, given the traditional Haitian view of US military intervention. It is certain that the OAS would not mandate such a mission. Whether the UN would do so is problematic, though Russian support could almost certainly be achieved because of the desirable precedent it would set for Russian action in its own "near abroad."

Pros and Cons of the Two Options

Option I: Training Mission, No internal security functions

Pros:

- Keeps the onus on Haitian parties for maintaining security, and for avoiding provocative acts towards each other. A limited US role is consistent with the basic proposition that the future of Haiti is a Haitian issue, in which the US has only a very limited interest (however strong our sympathies and preferences) and requires that Haitians take responsibility for solution.
- Avoids drawing US and other foreign forces into internal conflicts, thus reducing security risks to our personnel and scale of US commitment
- Avoids placing US and other foreign personnel in the position of taking law enforcement measures against Haitian citizens and all the potential for legal and other difficulties such a mission would entail.
- Keeps the mission focus on professionalization, a task for which US military is experienced.
- Has been accepted by President Aristide, the Haitian military (at least formally), elements of the Parliament and by the UN and other troop contributors.

- Has a reasonable chance of winning UN and hemisphere approval. International support is essential for legitimacy and credibility (at home as well as abroad).
- Would not involve defacto US occupation. Avoids giving the US military a police function.
- Requires a modest investment of US forces and funds.

Cons:

- Does not provide deterrent or counter against Haitian military moving against President Aristide or his supporters, and vice versa.
- Presence of any US military capability in Haiti will to lead to calls for it to become involved if violence erupts.
- Should significant levels of violence occur, the UN and member states will almost certainly be criticized for failing to intervene.
- The Administration could be compelled to withdraw forces if conditions made its training mission unsafe or impractical.
- Without the active cooperation of the Haitian military, this mission will not succeed.
- Does not guarantee professionalization of the Haitian armed forces. This is a long-term process for which no funding, beyond the FY92 set-aside within the FAA, currently exists. Nor is any outyear funding planned which would allow the robust degree of FMF/IMET funded training necessary to accomplish a realistic professionalization mission.

Option II: Mandate to intervene militarily in Haiti if the internal security situation warrants.

- Would diminish probability of major hostilities between pro and anti- Aristide groups
- Would provide greater security for Aristide and his government.
- Assumes a military defeat or internal collapse of the Haitian security forces. (It is not conceivable that any Haitian military leadership would agree to the introduction of foreign forces to perform sovereign internal security functions.)
- Maximizes chances of President Aristide's successful return to power in Haiti by providing US military guarantee

Cons:

- Difficult to secure support from Congress, where enthusiasm for direct US military role in administration of Haiti is limited even among strong supporters of democratic reform.

- Ignores Haiti's sovereignty. Neither Aristide nor any other Haitian political figure has been willing to take responsibility for inviting foreign forces to intervene, citing both historical and constitutional reasons.
- Requires a major effort to obtain approval of such a mandate at the UN. Other countries are very unlikely to make meaningful troop contributions.
- Requires a substantial commitment of U.S. resources, including a significant combat military presence for an extended period.
- Places US and other foreign soldiers in the position of carrying out police functions (the UN has been unable to recruit sufficient police personnel for even a limited monitoring mission) in an unfamiliar environment in which they do not speak the language.
- Likely to result in guerrilla/terrorist activities by nationalist groups against the US mission.
- Potential for conflict with President Aristide and other authorities if we refuse to comply with their directives, and, conversely, places responsibility on the US for controversial reform and security policies if we do.