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WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

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POLICY

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Recommended Changes to the Presidential Decision Directive
on Peacekeeping (U)

Secretary Aspin and I have thoroughly reviewed the PDD on peacekeeping and are convinced that we are nearing the point where we should seek approval of the President. However, before we take this final step in the process, we should make some additional changes and reach agreement on legislative language to implement "shared responsibility."

We should also ensure that the document conveys our intention to closely scrutinize any new peacekeeping operation before agreeing to provide USG support--paying careful attention to stringent entry and exit criteria for each mission. We should therefore clearly specify that before we deploy US forces to any peace operation, the mission will be closely scrutinized by the CINCPAC, the JCS, senior interagency review groups, and the President. Finally, we must be unequivocal in our willingness to consult with Congress in a timely and complete manner before agreeing to deploy US forces as part of a multilateral peace operation.

In addition to these general concerns, I am convinced that several of the draft PDD's recommendations raise unnecessary questions about the direction of our policy and could adversely affect our ability to garner necessary Congressional support. This is particularly true in light of increasing Congressional scrutiny in past months and our recent experiences in UN peace operations. Therefore, I believe that the following changes to the text should be made:

1. Page 4, Paragraph 8B and Page 10, Paragraph 10D. Delete both paragraphs. There is no need to create a separate facility for the DPO if all we intend to do is to create a more effective planning and current operation center. This would be an expensive addition that would open the policy to increased opposition--both because of the additional cost, and as a result of the appearance that we are attempting to give the UN greater military capabilities than we have publicly stated.

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2. Page 5, Paragraph 8D, first tick. Delete the entire paragraph. There is no need to create a standing airlift capability for the UN. This concept is likely to be opposed by Congress as too expensive and will raise fears about our taking a first step toward creating a standing UN military.
3. Page 6, Paragraph 8E. Delete the recommendation to create a correspondence course on peacekeeping. This option is a less practical addition to an otherwise good section on peacekeeping training, and would not be viewed as a serious proposal by the Congress.
4. Page 9, Paragraph 9D. The current language on Command and Control of U.S. forces should be further strengthened. The last sentence in the lead paragraph states that "The greater the U.S. military role, the less likely it will be that the U.S. will allow a UN commander to exercise operational control over U.S. forces." We should go one step further by adding language that states what we all believe to be true: "Any substantial U.S. military participation in a major peace enforcement operation should be conducted under U.S. command and control through competent regional organizations or ad hoc coalitions."
5. Page 10, Paragraph 9E and Page 11, Paragraph 10H. Delete both recommendations. I do not believe it is necessary, or prudent, to even hint at a willingness to provide rapid reaction capabilities or enter into Article 43 agreements with the United Nations. The option of entering into Article 43 agreements with the United Nations was thoroughly examined during the review process--and rejected by most participants. While noting that the U.S. will not pursue Article 43 agreements at this time, the PDD subsequently tasks the Peacekeeping Core Group to review "rapid reaction capabilities and Article 43 arrangements" after U.S. recommendations have been implemented to the extent possible. While the USG may want to reconsider these options eventually, it is not something we should seriously consider for many, many years. Including this language in the PDD creates an unnecessary target for Congressional opposition.


I agree that it makes sense to begin consultations on the document because there is much misunderstanding on the Hill about our policy direction. Our funding requests and discussions about ongoing operations have suffered from a lack of knowledge about where we are going in our overall peacekeeping policy.

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However, before the PDD is signed, we also need to reach agreement on draft legislation to implement the shared responsibility model. As we've seen in the past, interagency agreement on specific legislative language--not just agreement in principle--is necessary if we are to present a coordinated Administration position to the Hill.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Frank G. Wisner". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal line extending to the right.

Frank G. Wisner

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Peacekeeping PDD

I have reviewed the final draft of the Peacekeeping PDD and while it is clear that we are now very close to final agreement, I still have substantive and procedural concerns that are sufficiently important that I need to ask for these changes.

Substantively, first I am concerned that the language on page 3 paragraph 2, and page 9, paragraph 9D, appears to create a legal requirement to consult with Congress before placing U.S. forces under the operational control of a UN commander. I urge that you delete the language. I believe that a general reference to working more cooperatively with the Congress on peacekeeping issues would be more appropriate.

Second, I am concerned about the new language on page 8 stressing the President's ability to designate either State or DoD as the lead agency for Chapter VI operations, irrespective of the presence of U.S. combat forces. While I, of course, do not question the President's prerogatives to ask either Agency to manage an operation and to finance it, I urge you to delete this sentence. Its inclusion will, in my judgment, vastly complicate the process of securing Congressional approval of the shared responsibility approach by reopening the issue of State's and DoD's respective responsibilities. The new language suggests that State could have the lead on an operation involving the deployment of U.S. combat troops, or that DoD could be financially responsible for operations not involving combat units. Moreover, the added language is a statement of the obvious (the President can always assign either Department as lead).

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Finally, I remain concerned that we are not prepared to go to Congress with a complete package. I continue to believe that we should not proceed without Congressional consultations or final approval of the PDD until we have final decision on a total package policy, funding and authorities. Without a comprehensive package agreed within the Executive Branch, we again risk adding oxygen to the Congressional fires already burning on the issue of peacekeeping.

I understand that these concerns were raised at an interagency meeting on peacekeeping funding and legislation on December 2nd, and that a process is well underway to develop and coordinate all the pieces of the package in advance of the President's Budget Submission to Congress. DoD is an eager and conscientious participant in this process.

I look forward to working with you to implement the PDD.

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DEMOCRACY
AND
PEACEKEEPING

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2300 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2300



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MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

FROM: DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR PEACEKEEPING AND PEACE
ENFORCEMENT POLICY

Prepared by: Mr. Joseph Berger, (PK/PE), x52310

SUBJECT: Peacekeeping PDD -- ACTION MEMORANDUM--

DISCUSSION: NSC is awaiting our response to the final version of the Peacekeeping PDD (Tab A). The final PDD contains some, but not all, of the DoD, State and Joint Staff proposed changes. Your recommendations on Article 43 and command and control are included ("Art 43"/"C3" tabs). A few remaining issues still cause concern among different components in DoD. A memorandum to Tony Lake addressing these issues is at Tab B.

Legislation

The final document does not reflect your recommendation that the interagency should have reached agreement on legislative language to implement shared responsibility. However, in the last ten days there have been a series of intense interagency meetings and we are moving toward agreement. We understand that Tony Lake intends to convene a Principals meeting shortly to resolve any remaining issues. The proposed memorandum from you to Lake reiterates your position that we should not consult on the Hill until we have a complete package.

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Consultations

The Joint Staff strongly objects to the language appearing to require consultations with Congress before placing U.S. forces under the operational control of a UN commander. The memorandum to Lake requests he remove the "consultation with Congress" language.

Shared Responsibility

The new draft adds language proposed by State (page 8 of the PDD) that states that the President may designate either State or DoD to be the lead agency for Chapter VI operations "irrespective of the presence of U.S. combat units".

We believe this language reopens the issue of defining State and DoD's respective responsibilities and creates unnecessary ambiguity which could complicate the budgeting process and create havoc on the Hill. This new language could result in having State with the lead on an operation involving the deployment of U.S. combat troops, or having DoD financially responsible for operations not involving combat units. Most importantly, the added language is a statement of the obvious (the President can always assign either Department as lead) which will unnecessarily open every Chapter VI decision to interagency argument and manipulation. Therefore, the new language on page 8 should be deleted.

Policy notes, however, that a rigid cost sharing formula may not fit every circumstance. There may be circumstances in which it would make sense for State to continue managing ~~and fund~~ funding some Chapter VI operations which include combat units and or some Chapter VII operations such as UNIKOM in which no USG combat units are involved.

The Attached memorandum conveys to Tony Lake the above concerns about a coherent legislative package, war powers issues, and the exceptions to shared responsibilities.

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the attached memorandum.

COORDINATION:

OGC _____ LA _____ Compt _____ RSA _____ JS _____