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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

November 4, 1993

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DECL: OADR

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Moving Forward with the Peacekeeping PDD

We have reviewed the draft PDD on peacekeeping in light of the events of recent weeks and have concluded that it remains a solid foundation upon which to base U.S. peacekeeping policy. We have also concluded, however, that in addition to the modifications State proposed on September 23, revised sections are required on: (1) sharing responsibility, (2) U.S. financing, and (3) command of U.S. forces.

(1) Shared responsibility:

Specifically, the Department continues to believe that there needs to be greater flexibility in the division of responsibility than is reflected in the document. The mere presence (or lack thereof) of U.S. combat forces in a Chapter VI peacekeeping operation may not be the most appropriate criterion for determining the lead agency. (For example, a U.S. infantry company may be only a small part of larger UN military presence whether under Chapter VI or VII. Alternatively, non-combat U.S. units such as engineers may form the bulk of a Chapter VI operation.) The President should have the ability to designate either State or DoD as the lead agency for a particular operation if the circumstances warrant. We suggest the insertion of a new third tick under paragraph 9.A. of the Policy Guidance.

"-- In appropriate circumstances, the President may designate either State or DoD as lead agency for Chapter VI operations, irrespective of the presence of U.S. combat units."

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In addition, in the first tick under Paragraph 9.A, replace the clause "in which U.S. combat units are not participating" with "unless a significant number of U.S. combat troops are participating." In the second tick, replace "U.S. combat units" at the end of the first sentence with "a significant number of U.S. combat troops."


(2) U.S. Funding:

Annex III should include a sentence reaffirming the President's statement that the U.S. assessment must be lowered. The document should also recall that the Congress has recently directed us to make clear to the UN that our assessment should be no more than 25 percent. Annex VI requires revision to reflect the Principals' Committee decision to share responsibility for oversight and funding of peacekeeping operations. Paragraph 2 on the long-term approach to reimbursement should reflect the decision to seek a separate DoD CIPA account to pay U.S. assessments for Chapter VII operations and those Chapter VI operations with significant U.S. military participation. A proposed redraft is at Tab A. Although this change is consistent with the shared responsibility model, we will need to discuss it further with DoD and the NSC.

(3) Command of U.S. Forces:

Paragraph 9.D. on page 9 should be strengthened by changing the first sentence to read: "The President retains and will not relinquish command authority over U.S. forces." JCS and OSD should agree with this change.

Thank you for your assistance in this matter.



Marc Grossman
Executive Secretary

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Reimbursement Policy for U.S. Contributions
to UN Peacekeeping Operations

There is interagency agreement that the U.S. should be reimbursed by the United Nations when DoD contributes troops, supplies or services to assessed UN peacekeeping operations. As a matter of policy until permanent change is achieved in the way that the USG funds UN peace operations, State and DoD have agreed to the following procedures, without prejudice to each agency's views of existing legal authorities:

1. SHORT-TERM: In the short-term, State and DoD will continue to consider each assessed UN peacekeeping operation on a case-by-case basis.

1a. DoD Troop Contributions: When DoD details forces to assessed UN peacekeeping operations under either Chapter VI (peacekeeping) or Chapter VII (peace enforcement) of the UN Charter, the U.S. shall seek the normal reimbursement to which all troop contributor nations are entitled (e.g., \$988/troop/month; or \$1279/troop/month for specialists).

Such reimbursement, in excess of DoD component incremental troop costs, could be used, to the extent provided under existing statutes, to offset the USG's peacekeeping assessment -- paid from the existing State CIPA account.

1b. DoD Goods and Services: When DoD provides goods or services (e.g., lift, logistics support, medical or technical services) to assessed UN peacekeeping operations, DoD shall seek direct reimbursement from the UN.

DoD and State will consult in exceptional situations which may require waiver of reimbursement. In such exceptional circumstances, when DoD and State agree, DoD would waive reimbursement. DoD believes that we should consider such a waiver only when the UN is not in a position to provide reimbursement. When the UN does not reimburse DoD, State believes that it may seek a credit against its peacekeeping assessment. State and Defense agree that we should continue to resolve these issues on a case-by-case basis.

2. LONG-TERM: Under the shared responsibility model, the Administration would seek new legislation to authorize the President to pay expenses for certain UN assessed peace operations from funds authorized to be appropriated to a new DoD account -- a DoD Contributions for International Peace Operations Activities (CIPA) Account.

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If such legislation is enacted, funds appropriated to this account would pay for the U.S. assessments for Chapter VII peace operations and those Chapter VI operations involving significant U.S. forces.

2a. DoD Troop Contributions: When DoD details forces to assessed UN Chapter VII operations, or significant forces to Chapter VI operations, the U.S. shall seek the normal UN reimbursement for troop contributor nations (e.g., the \$988 or \$1279).

Such reimbursement in excess of DoD's incremental troop costs could be used, to the extent provided by DoD authorities, to offset the USG assessment paid from the DoD CIPA.

2b. DoD Goods and Services: When DoD provides goods or services to assessed UN peacekeeping operations, the U.S. shall seek reimbursement for the costs of DoD contributions.

(1) DoD normally shall seek direct reimbursement from the UN for the incremental costs of goods and services provided. Such reimbursement will be credited to appropriate DoD components' appropriations.

(2) On a case-by-case basis, DoD and the Department of State jointly could waive some or all of this direct reimbursement based on considerations such as: assessment of the importance of the operation to U.S. political and security interests; the timeliness and availability of funds from the DoD appropriation for peacekeeping to reimburse DoD components, personnel and other resources; and the impact on the Military Departments.

If the U.S. waives direct reimbursement:

-- the U.S. may seek reimbursement through a UN credit to the U.S. peacekeeping assessment (State or DoD CIPA, as appropriate) for up to the full value (i.e., base and incremental costs) of DoD's contribution; and

-- DoD component incremental costs will be reimbursed from the DoD appropriation for peacekeeping.

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

December 30, 1993

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DECL: OADR

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Finalizing the Draft PDD on Peacekeeping Policy

At your lunch on December 29 with Acting Secretary Tarnoff you suggested that the only outstanding issue on the proposed peacekeeping policy related to the timing of seeking amendments to Section 7 of the UN Participation Act. The State Department is eager to finalize the peacekeeping PDD. However, without the benefit of seeing how our earlier comments were incorporated into the PDD, it would be difficult for State to agree that the PDD is indeed ready to present to the President and the Congress.

In our memorandum of December 6, we highlighted several outstanding issues, including: amending the UN Participation Act; shared responsibility; Annex VI on reimbursement policy; and Annex VII on terms and definitions.

Secretary Christopher believes that any reference to amending the UN Participation Act should be removed from the PDD at this time. Even with caveats, he is concerned that raising the issue in the current Congressional climate will foment a debate that could derail our efforts to improve UN peacekeeping. The question would be revisited later, once we had gained Congressional support for our overall policy.

The NSC forwarded this week a draft legislative proposal and accompanying executive order creating a DoD CIPA account. This proposal did not reflect the agreement between you and the Secretary at last week's lunch that DoD would have lead responsibility only for Chapter VII operations and those Chapter VI operations in which "significant" U.S. combat units are participating.

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
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JCS informally sent to State in mid-December proposed revisions to Annex VI (reimbursement policy) and Annex VII (terms and definitions). We will have State comments ready the first week of January.

The Department requests that a final version of the PDD be provided for the Secretary's approval. We will provide comments expeditiously, and suggest that a Principals Committee meeting be called in the near future to bring this document to closure.

Thank you very much for your assistance in this matter.


for Marc Grossman
Executive Secretary

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Washington, D.C. 20520

December 6, 1993

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DECL: OADR

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Moving Forward with the Peacekeeping PDD

We have reviewed the draft PDD on peacekeeping in light of the events of recent weeks and have concluded that it remains a solid foundation upon which to base U.S. peacekeeping policy. We have also concluded, however, that revised sections are required on: (1) sharing responsibility, (2) peacekeeping in the former Soviet Union, (3) the UN Field Operations Division, (4) Annex VII, (5) the section on amending the UN Participation Act, and (6) U.S. financing.

(1) Shared Responsibility:

The primary purpose of the shared responsibility model is to improve peacekeeping policy formulation and implementation and to ensure adequate financing by drawing on the strengths of both State and Defense. For this policy to work effectively, lead responsibility for individual operations must be assigned to the most appropriate agency. The interagency process has labored to find a bright line that would assign responsibility successfully. There appears to be no satisfactory bright line because peacekeeping operations are so diverse.

As currently drafted, the PDD assigns to DoD lead policy responsibility for all Chapter VII operations (regardless of the participation of U.S. forces) and those Chapter VI operations where U.S. combat units (i.e., infantry, armor, artillery) are participating. (Chapter VI operations do not allow for combat activity except in strict self-defense.)

Although the current draft PDD gives the President slight flexibility to designate a different lead agency for Chapter VI

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operations if "unusual" circumstances warrant (he would not have flexibility to assign Chapter VII operations to State), in practice it will be difficult to overcome the presumption that DoD should have the policy lead whenever U.S. combat troops are present, regardless of the actual risk of fighting or the size of the U.S. deployment.

The fundamental issue here is not agency prerogatives but how to assure clarity of authority and responsibility for success in matters that are almost always diplomatically complex and may have major military requirements.

Here are a few examples based on current UN operations of how the PDD would assign responsibility:

- Bosnia and Croatia, both Chapter VII operations, would be transferred to DoD even though no U.S. combat troops are deployed and the fundamental questions are political and diplomatic.
- Macedonia, a Chapter VI operation, would also be transferred to DoD since a U.S. infantry company makes up a small part of the larger UN deployment.
- UNIKOM, in Iraq and Kuwait, is another Chapter VII operation where no U.S. troops are deployed and our interests are overwhelmingly diplomatic, yet DoD would assume the lead in managing our peacekeeping policy.
- Even in Somalia, where there is a large American combat presence in a Chapter VII operation, no one is arguing that lead responsibility for our policy should be turned over to DoD. That would happen under the current draft of the PDD.
- The planned mission to Haiti, despite its large contingent of U.S. troops, would remain under State direction because the troops involved will be non-combat troops.

These anomalies are a real problem. They force DoD, especially, into areas where it claims no expertise. On Capitol Hill, we can expect questions that can jeopardize the entire shared responsibility approach.

If there is no satisfactory bright line, the only option seems to be presidential discretion. This too will have problems on the Hill, but at least it provides a rational response on the issue. We therefore propose that the President have discretion to assign both Chapter VI and Chapter VII operations as conditions warrant.

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To address this we propose to modify the first full tick on page 8 of the Policy Guidance to delete the word "all" before Chapter VII and "those" before Chapter VI and insert the word "significant" in front of the phrase U.S. combat units in the first sentence. We also propose changing the second full tick to read:

"The President may choose to designate either State or DOD as lead agency for Chapter VI or Chapter VII operations, irrespective of the presence of U.S. combat units."

Also, there is a need to ensure that responsibility for oversight of fulfillment of U.S. obligations to the UN is centralized in one place, even if, for example, the U.S. assessed contribution is paid from two accounts. Thus on page 3 of the PDD, in the penultimate paragraph, in the last sentence (and on page 7 of the Policy Guidance, in paragraph 9a, in the last sentence), we propose adding after "The conduct of diplomacy," the phrase, "oversight responsibility regarding the fulfillment of USG obligations to the UN,".

(2) Peacekeeping in the Former Soviet Union:

The Policy Guidance (page 3, section 7, first tick) addresses in one paragraph both our policy for traditional "blue-helmeted" peacekeeping in the former Soviet Union and our willingness to consider on a case-by-case basis a voluntary fund for peacekeeping operations by Russia and other regional states. These are, in fact, separate issues. All current, traditional "blue-helmeted" operations are funded by assessment. We find no support in the UNSC for changing that policy. Our talks with the Russians about voluntary funds have focused on a possible regional peacekeeping force (Russia and other former Soviet Union states) that might operate under a UN mandate, but would not be a "blue-helmeted" UN operation. We proposed amending the last sentence of this tick to delete the first word "instead" and to move the remainder of the sentence down to become the third tick of the section.

(3) Logistics Division:

On page five of the Policy Guidance (tick on Logistics Division) a minor fix is needed to reflect the fact that the transfer of Field Operations Division to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has already been accomplished. The second sentence of the tick should read "The U.S. enthusiastically supports the transfer of the Field Operations Division (FOD) from the Department of Administration ...".

(4) Annex VII - Legal Authority, Terms and Definitions:

There has been no inter-agency discussion and no inter-agency agreement of the terms defined in Annex VII. The Annex does not always accurately reflect current definitions in use, nor is it always legally correct. We also note that the footnote at the bottom of page 1 of the Policy Guidance points out that these terms are to guide military practitioners within the USG. Given that this section has limited application within the USG and does not have inter-agency agreement, we propose deleting the Annex. The footnote at the bottom of page one of the Policy Guidance should also be amended to reflect this change. A preferable option to including the Annex would be to charge the Peacekeeping Core Group with developing a set of definitions which would meet DOD's needs and have inter-agency acceptance.

(5) Amending the UN Participation Act:

The Policy Guidance (Page 8, paragraph 9C, first tick) continues to state that the Administration will seek an amendment to section 7 of the United Nations Participation Act that would remove limitations on use of personnel in Chapter VI operations and, "to the extent it is politically feasible," delete prohibitions against using section 7 as authority to support Chapter VII operations.

Amending the UNPA is probably politically infeasible for the foreseeable future. It is hard to imagine Congress removing legislative hurdles for the use of U.S. assets and personnel in peacekeeping operations. Rather than give the impression that this legislative fix is at the top of our agenda, it might be more advisable to remove it altogether from the PDD and reserve it for another day. In doing so, we might preempt what would otherwise be certain congressional opposition. (This is also without prejudice to the President's constitutional prerogatives as Commander-in-Chief.)

(6) U.S. Funding:

On page two of the PDD the first sentence in the third tick (the one which begins "Having considered the factors in Annex I...") should have the words "the U.S. and" inserted before the words "other nations" in the phrase that currently reads "when other nations are prepared to support the effort with forces and funds;".

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X Annex III should include a sentence reaffirming the President's statement that the U.S. assessment must be lowered. The document should also recall that the Congress has recently directed us to make clear to the UN that our assessment should be no more than 25 percent.

The third tick of Annex III should also note that the addition of Japan and Germany as permanent members of the Security Council, and an agreement by China to pay a larger share of peacekeeping assessments, are required to meet the 25 percent target.

Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

M. Robinson

for Marc Grossman
Executive Secretary

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Note to: TL

Re: The Status of PDD on Peacekeeping

Jim Reed asked that I give you a note on ^{the} ~~ten~~ status of the attached package. The status of the attached package is the same today as it was on 15 December. The attached text is agreed, with the exception that State does not want to mention seeking amendments to the UNPA, as noted. In your marginalia, you disagree with State. With that decision, the text is cleared.

State staff had promised comments on annexes VI and VII, but have not provided any despite our repeated attempts to get them to do so.

The Implementing legislation on Shared Responsibility is out for interagency coordination by next week. It looks like we have 98% agreement on a text.


Dick

Bottom line: We have a PDD text you could send to the President!

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: UN, AORC, PREL, MARR, ABUD

SUBJECT: DEMARCHE TO SECRETARY GENERAL ON U.S.
PEACEKEEPING ASSESSMENT RATE

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT IS REQUESTED TO SEEK AN APPOINTMENT WITH THE SYG ON AN URGENT BASIS TO EXPLAIN TO HIM U.S. PLANS FOR REDUCING THE U.S. PEACEKEEPING RATE OF ASSESSMENT AND TO SEEK HIS SUPPORT FOR THIS EFFORT. AS EXPLAINED BELOW: THESE PLANS INCLUDE ESTABLISHING OBJECTIVE CRITERIA FOR MEMBERSHIP IN THE DIFFERENT GROUPS OF THE PEACEKEEPING SCALE, ADDING JAPAN AND GERMANY AS PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AND PERSUADING CHINA VOLUNTARILY TO ACCEPT A GREATLY INCREASED PEACEKEEPING ASSESSMENT RATE. END SUMMARY.

CHANGES IN THE PEACEKEEPING SCALE OF ASSESSMENTS

3. IN ORDER TO MEET THE PRESIDENT'S OBJECTIVE OF REDUCING THE U.S. PEACEKEEPING RATE OF ASSESSMENT, THE SECRETARY HAS APPROVED SEEKING THE FOLLOWING CHANGES IN THE UN

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PEACEKEEPING SCALE OF ASSESSMENTS:

A. USE PLACEMENT ON THE LIST OF LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES APPROVED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AS THE CRITERION FOR MEMBERSHIP IN GROUP D. THIS WOULD PROVIDE AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD TO BE APPLIED AUTOMATICALLY OVER THE YEARS. UNDER THIS STANDARD NOW, FIVE COUNTRIES WOULD BE MOVED FROM GROUP C TO GROUP D AND FIFTEEN FROM GROUP D TO GROUP C. THE NET EFFECT ON THE U.S. RATE WOULD BE MINIMAL, REDUCING IT FROM 31.739 PERCENT TO 31.733 PERCENT, BUT ADVOCATING IT WOULD DEMONSTRATE A "CLEAN HANDS" APPROACH.

-- THE FIVE COUNTRIES TO MOVE FROM GROUP C TO GROUP D ARE: LIBERIA, ZAMBIA, MADAGASCAR, ZAIRE, AND CAMBODIA. THE FIFTEEN COUNTRIES TO MOVE FROM GROUP D TO GROUP C ARE: ANGOLA, ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA, BELIZE, DOMINICA, GAMBIA, GRENADA, NAMIBIA, PAPUA NEW GUINEA, ST. KITTS AND NEVIS, ST. LUCIA, ST. VINCENT AND GRENADINES, SENEGAL, SEYCHELLES, SURINAM, AND ZIMBABWE.

B. USE THE WORLD PER CAPITA INCOME AVERAGE AS THE CRITERION FOR GRADUATING MEMBERS FROM GROUP C TO GROUP B. THIS WOULD BE ANOTHER OBJECTIVE STANDARD THAT COULD BE APPLIED AUTOMATICALLY OVER THE YEARS. THE UN SECRETARIAT HAS INDICATED THAT THE WORLD PER CAPITA INCOME LEVEL AVERAGE FOR THE CURRENT SCALE'S BASE PERIOD OF 1980-89 IS DOLS. 2,600. APPLYING THE STANDARD NOW WOULD MOVE TWENTY-NINE COUNTRIES UP TO GROUP B. IN ADDITION TO THE CHANGE ABOVE, THIS WOULD REDUCE THE U.S. RATE TO 29.446 PERCENT.

-- THE TWENTY-NINE COUNTRIES (AND THEIR AVERAGE PER CAPITA INCOMES) TO MOVE FROM GROUP C TO GROUP B CURRENTLY ARE: QATAR (DOLS. 17,495), UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (DOLS. 17,470), KUWAIT (DOLS. 15,504), BRUNEI DARUSSALAM (DOLS. 13,146), SAUDI ARABIA (DOLS. 8,528), BAHAMAS (DOLS. 7,552), LIBYA (DOLS. 6,559), SINGAPORE (DOLS. 6,299), BAHRAIN (DOLS. 6,180), ISRAEL (DOLS. 6,079), SLOVENIA (DOLS. 4,955), OMAN (DOLS. 4,799), TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO (DOLS. 4,654), BARBADOS (DOLS. 4,366), LATVIA (DOLS. 4,152), MALTA (DOLS. 4,077), CYPRUS (DOLS. 3,914), KAZAKHSTAN (DOLS. 3,810), ESTONIA (DOLS. 3,810), GREECE (DOLS. 3,788), LITHUANIA (DOLS. 3,471), GEORGIA (DOLS. 3,156), CROATIA (DOLS. 3,153), VENEZUELA (DOLS. 3,082), ARMENIA (DOLS. 3,052), REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA (DOLS. 2,959), AZERBAIJAN (DOLS. 2,696), GABON (DOLS. 2,610), AND PORTUGAL (DOLS. 2,608). THE FSU STATES WOULD CHALLENGE THE STATISTICS PLACING THEM ON THIS LIST.

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C. ADD JAPAN AND GERMANY AS PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. FOLLOWING THE TWO CHANGES ABOVE, THIS WOULD REDUCE THE U.S. RATE TO 28.023 PERCENT.

D. PERSUADE CHINA TO ACCEPT VOLUNTARILY AN INCREASE IN ITS PEACEKEEPING ASSESSMENT RATE WITH THE BENEFIT TO BE SHARED PROPORTIONALLY AMONG OTHER PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. A MAJOR ANOMALY IN THE CURRENT SCALE IS THE LOW ASSESSMENT RATE OF CHINA: 0.77 PERCENT FOR THE REGULAR BUDGET AND 0.978 PERCENT FOR PEACEKEEPING. AN IMF STUDY THIS SUMMER, BASED ON PURCHASING POWER PARITIES, RANKED THE CHINESE ECONOMY AS THIRD LARGEST IN THE WORLD BEHIND THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN. EVEN BY UN STATISTICS {BASED ON NATIONAL INCOME LEVELS}, THE CHINESE ECONOMY IS THE EIGHTH LARGEST IN THE WORLD WITH AN AVERAGE NATIONAL INCOME OVER THE 1980-89 BASE PERIOD REPRESENTING 2.839 PERCENT OF THAT OF ALL UN MEMBERS. THE LOW CHINESE ASSESSMENT RATES REFLECT AN ALLOWANCE IN THE UN FORMULA FOR LOW PER CAPITA INCOME {DOLS. 333 FOR CHINA}. IN VIEW OF CHINA'S ROLE AS A MEMBER OF THE PERM FIVE, ITS INCREASING INTEREST IN UN PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES, AND ITS CURRENTLY BOOMING ECONOMY, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO PERSUADE CHINA TO ACCEPT VOLUNTARILY A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN ITS PEACEKEEPING RATE OF ASSESSMENT AND TRANSFER THE BENEFIT PROPORTIONATELY AMONG THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. WERE THIS TO BE DONE, FOR EXAMPLE, ON THE BASIS OF CHINA FOREGOING THE BENEFIT OF THE LOW PER CAPITA INCOME ALLOWANCE, CHINA'S PEACEKEEPING ASSESSMENT RATE WOULD INCREASE TO 3.184 PERCENT AND THE U.S. RATE WOULD DECREASE TO 27.118 PERCENT, ASSUMING THE CHANGES ABOVE ALSO ARE MADE.

-- THIS ACTION BY CHINA WOULD REQUIRE CAREFUL NEGOTIATIONS WITH CHINA AS A PART OF THE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS TO ACHIEVE THE OTHER CHANGES SOUGHT IN THE PEACEKEEPING SCALE. THE TIMING OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT WITH CHINA WOULD BE INDEPENDENT OF THE OTHER CHANGES IN THE SCALE. WERE SUCH AN AGREEMENT TO BE REACHED WITH CHINA BEFORE THE OTHER CHANGES ARE NEGOTIATED, THE U.S. RATE INITIALLY WOULD BE REDUCED TO 30.202 PERCENT AND CHINA'S NEW RATE INITIALLY WOULD INCREASE TO 3.606 PERCENT. ASSUMING THE ULTIMATE COMPLETION OF THE OTHER CHANGES, THE END RESULT WOULD BE THE SAME FOR CHINA AND THE U.S., I.E., 3.184 PERCENT FOR CHINA AND 27.118 PERCENT FOR THE U.S.

STRATEGY

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4. WHILE WE HAVE TO BE READY TO FORCE A VOTE ON THE MATTER, IT WOULD BE BEST TO ACHIEVE APPROVAL BY CONSENSUS FOR THE NECESSARY CHANGES IN THE PEACEKEEPING SCALE OF ASSESSMENTS. DOING SO WILL REQUIRE THE RIGHT COMBINATION OF DIPLOMATIC APPEAL TO THE INTERESTS OF THE AFFECTED MEMBERS AND A CLEAR DEMONSTRATION OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF U.S. INTENT. DEPARTMENT ENVISAGES THE FOLLOWING FOUR-PART STRATEGY:

A. AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT WOULD MEET WITH THE SYG TO EXPLAIN THE OVERALL CHANGES WE SEEK AND REQUEST HIS SUPPORT FOR THE EFFORT. THE SYG HAS INDICATED HIS INTENTION TO SEND AN EMISSARY TO SEEK AGREEMENT FROM THE TEN WEALTHIEST MEMBERS OF GROUP C TO JOIN GROUP B. THIS IS ACCEPTABLE AS A FIRST STEP, LEAVING OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF SUBSEQUENTLY SENDING THE SAME EMISSARY OR OTHERS TO EXTEND THIS LIST TO ALL OF THOSE TWENTY-NINE MEMBERS OF GROUP C WITH PER CAPITA INCOME LEVELS ABOVE THE WORLD AVERAGE OF DOLS. 2,600 THAT SHOULD BE ASKED TO JOIN GROUP B (RECOGNIZING THAT AT LEAST SOME FSU STATES WOULD CHALLENGE THEIR PER CAPITA INCOME LEVEL RANKING) AND TO INCLUDE ALSO THE FIFTEEN MEMBERS OF GROUP D THAT WOULD BE ASKED TO JOIN GROUP C.

B. SUBJECT TO WHAT CAN BE WORKED OUT WITH THE SYG, PARALLEL DEMARCHES WOULD BE SENT TO THE OTHER PERM FOUR, THE EC, AND THE OTHER AFFECTED COUNTRIES. THE DEMARCHE TO CHINA WOULD BUILD UPON THEIR INCREASED INTEREST IN UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS. THE DEMARCHES TO JAPAN AND GERMANY WOULD RELATE THIS EFFORT TO THEIR INTEREST IN BECOMING PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

C. BASED ON THE SUPPORT OF THE SYG AND THE RESULTS OF THE DEMARCHES INDICATED ABOVE, WE WOULD SEEK APPROVAL FOR THE CHANGES IN THE SCALE, EXCEPT FOR THOSE RELATED TO JAPAN AND GERMANY BECOMING PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AT AN EXPECTED RESUMED SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SCHEDULED NEXT SPRING TO ADDRESS THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND BUDGETARY ASPECTS OF THE FINANCING OF UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, INCLUDING THE ISSUE OF ANOMALIES IN THE PEACEKEEPING SCALE.

D. TAKING ADVANTAGE OF JAPAN AND GERMANY BECOMING PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD FOLLOW AS PART OF OUR STRATEGY FOR SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM.

TALKING POINTS FOR THE SYG

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5. INITIATING THE STRATEGY INDICATED ABOVE, THE FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS ARE SUGGESTED FOR THE MEETING OF AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY BENNET WITH THE SYG:

A. WE GREATLY APPRECIATE THAT, WHEN IN WASHINGTON FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, YOU INDICATED AN INTENTION TO SEND AN EMISSARY TO TEN OF THE WEALTHIEST COUNTRIES IN GROUP C OF THE PEACEKEEPING SCALE TO URGE THEIR AGREEMENT TO MOVING UP TO GROUP B.

-- THIS DEMONSTRATES YOUR UNDERSTANDING FOR PRESIDENT CLINTON'S CONCERN ABOUT THE NEED TO REDUCE THE U.S. RATE OF ASSESSMENT FOR UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.

B. THE PRESIDENT INDICATED IN HIS SEPTEMBER 27 SPEECH TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY THAT HE IS COMMITTED TO THE UNITED STATES BEING CURRENT IN ITS PEACEKEEPING ASSESSMENTS. HE IS WORKING WITH CONGRESS TOWARD THAT END.

C. HE ALSO MADE THE POINT IN HIS SPEECH THAT REDUCING THE U.S. PEACEKEEPING ASSESSMENT RATE TO REFLECT THE INCREASED CAPACITY TO PAY OF OTHER NATIONS WILL MAKE IT EASIER FOR HIM "TO MAKE SURE WE PAY IN A TIMELY AND FULL FASHION."

-- THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE IN VIEW OF THE VAST RANGE OF OTHER U.S. ACTIVITIES RELATED TO AND IN SUPPORT OF UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS FOR WHICH THERE IS NO ACCOUNTING IN UN BUDGETS.

D. THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RECOGNIZED IN 1972 THAT IT IS DAMAGING FOR THE REGULAR BUDGET EXPENSES OF THE ORGANIZATION TO BE OVERLY DEPENDENT ON CONTRIBUTIONS FROM ONE MEMBER STATE. THIS IS EVEN MORE TRUE FOR THE ORGANIZATION'S PEACEKEEPING EXPENSES.

E. WE HAVE DEVELOPED AN OVERALL PLAN FOR REDUCING THE U.S. RATE OF PEACEKEEPING ASSESSMENTS SIGNIFICANTLY TOWARD THE 25 PERCENT LEVEL. YOUR ASSISTANCE IN IMPLEMENTING THIS STRATEGY WOULD BE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO US. WE BELIEVE SUCCESS IN THIS EFFORT WOULD GREATLY STRENGTHEN THE UN'S CAPACITY TO FULFILL ITS EXPANDING PEACEKEEPING RESPONSIBILITIES.

-- BEFORE EXTENSIVELY DISCUSSING OUR PLANS WITH OTHERS, WE WANT TO GO OVER THEM IN DETAIL WITH YOU. YOUR VIEWS ABOUT OUR PLANS AND ACTIONS THAT YOU WOULD BE WILLING TO TAKE IN SUPPORT OF THEM WILL INFLUENCE HOW WE APPROACH OTHERS.

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F. THIS STRATEGY CALLS FOR ESTABLISHING OBJECTIVE CRITERIA TO DETERMINE THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE DIFFERENT GROUPS IN THE PEACEKEEPING SCALE OF ASSESSMENTS, FOR ADDING JAPAN AND GERMANY AS PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AND FOR REACHING AGREEMENT WITH CHINA VOLUNTARILY TO ACCEPT A MUCH GREATER PEACEKEEPING ASSESSMENT RATE IN KEEPING WITH ITS GROWING ROLE IN THE UN AND IN WORLD AFFAIRS.

G. WE SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING CRITERIA FOR THE DIFFERENT GROUPS IN THE PEACEKEEPING SCALE:

-- GROUP A: THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AS ALREADY DEFINED.

-- GROUP B: MEMBERS WITH PER CAPITA INCOMES ABOVE THE WORLD AVERAGE, WHICH CURRENTLY IS DOLS. 2,600.

-- GROUP C: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WITH PER CAPITA INCOMES BELOW DOLS. 2,600.

-- GROUP D: THOSE MEMBERS ON THE LIST OF LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AS APPROVED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

H. USING SUCH OBJECTIVE CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE DIFFERENT GROUPS WOULD ALLOW FOR AUTOMATIC ADJUSTMENTS AS THE ECONOMIC SITUATIONS OF MEMBERS CHANGE OVER TIME. THIS WOULD OVERCOME THE RECURRENT AND INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WHEN NEW PEACEKEEPING SCALES MUST BE APPROVED. THIS ALSO WOULD MAKE THE PEACEKEEPING SCALE MUCH MORE TRANSPARENT AND EASIER TO EXPLAIN TO DOMESTIC LEGISLATIVE BODIES THAT HAVE TO APPROPRIATE FUNDS FOR PEACEKEEPING ASSESSMENTS.

I. WE EXPECT THAT ADMINISTRATIVE AND BUDGETARY ASPECTS OF THE FINANCING OF UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, INCLUDING ANOMALIES IN THE PEACEKEEPING SCALE OF ASSESSMENTS, WILL BE ADDRESSED AT A RESUMED SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY NEXT SPRING. IT IS OUR HOPE THAT THIS SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WOULD TAKE ACTION ON ESTABLISHING OBJECTIVE CRITERIA FOR THE DIFFERENT GROUPS IN THE PEACEKEEPING SCALE. CLEARLY THIS WILL REQUIRE EXTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS WITH AFFECTED COUNTRIES IN ADVANCE.

-- YOUR ASSISTANCE TOWARD THIS END WOULD BE MOST IMPORTANT. WE NOTE THAT YOU HAVE INDICATED AN INTENTION

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TO SEND AN EMISSARY TO TEN COUNTRIES IN GROUP C TO URGE THEM TO MOVE UP TO GROUP B. HOPEFULLY THIS CAN BE UNDERTAKEN SOON SINCE THE U.S. CONGRESS WILL BE MEETING IN LATE JANUARY ON LEGISLATION THAT MAY CAP OUR PEACEKEEPING ASSESSMENT AT 25 PERCENT. IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO HAVE ACTIVE DIPLOMACY IN PLAY BEFORE THE MEETING OF THE CONGRESS. WE LEAVE OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF SUBSEQUENTLY SENDING THE SAME EMISSARY OR OTHERS TO ALL OF THOSE COUNTRIES IN GROUP C THAT SHOULD BE ASKED TO JOIN GROUP B AND ALSO TO THE FIFTEEN MEMBERS OF GROUP D THAT WE BELIEVE SHOULD BE ASKED TO JOIN GROUP C.

-- WE WOULD PLAN TO SEND PARALLEL DEMARCHES TO THE SAME COUNTRIES. FOR THIS PURPOSE, WE HOPE THAT WE CAN MAINTAIN CLOSE COMMUNICATION WITH YOU AS OUR JOINT EFFORTS PROGRESS.

J. IN REGARD TO AN INCREASED PEACEKEEPING ASSESSMENT RATE FOR CHINA, WE RECOGNIZE THAT WHAT WE HAVE IN MIND WILL REQUIRE A SIGNIFICANT COMMITMENT FROM THEM. HOWEVER, WE WOULD LIKE TO BE ABLE TO DRAW ON YOUR SUPPORT, AS APPROPRIATE, IN OUR EFFORTS.

K. IN REGARD TO ADDING JAPAN AND GERMANY AS PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THIS IS A MATTER THAT WILL PROCEED AT ITS OWN PACE RELATED TO THE ISSUE OF OVERALL REFORM OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

M. WE GREATLY APPRECIATE THAT YOU WELL UNDERSTAND HOW SIGNIFICANT THE ISSUE OF PEACEKEEPING ASSESSMENTS IS FOR THE UNITED STATES AND FOR THE UNITED NATIONS. WE LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING CLOSELY WITH YOU IN A COMMON EFFORT TO ADDRESS THIS CRITICAL ISSUE.

NEXT STEPS

6. INFO ADDRESSEES ARE REQUESTED TO AVOID RAISING THE ISSUE DIRECTLY WITH THEIR HOST GOVERNMENTS UNTIL INSTRUCTED. BEFORE TAKING FURTHER STEPS, THE DEPARTMENT WANTS TO HAVE A CHANCE TO ANALYZE THE RESULTS OF AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT'S MEETING WITH THE SYG. BACKGROUND COMMENTS OR INFORMATION ON HOST GOVERNMENT VIEWS REGARDING THIS ISSUE FROM INFO ADDRESSEES WOULD BE GREATLY APPRECIATED (PLEASE SLUG FOR IO/S). 44

United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

**ACTION MEMORANDUM**
S/S~~CONFIDENTIAL~~**DRAFT**

TO: The Secretary

THROUGH: P - Mr. Tarnoff

FROM: IO - Douglas J. Bennet

SUBJECT: Reducing the U.S. Rate of Assessment for UN
Peacekeeping Operations

This memorandum has been coordinated with USUN in New York. Ambassador Albright concurs.

ISSUES FOR DECISION:

- (1) Whether to approve a strategy to meet the President's objective of reducing the U.S. rate of assessment for UN peacekeeping operations to 25 percent; and
- (2) Whether to authorize an instruction cable to USUN to seek the support of the UN Secretary General.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS**Background**

The President and members of Congress have called for reducing the U.S. rate of assessment for UN peacekeeping from 31.739 percent to the 25 percent level we are assessed for the UN regular budget. Non-binding language in the Conference Report on the FY 1994 Commerce, Justice, and State appropriation bill calls for informing the UN that "the United States will not accept an assessment of more than 25 percent of peacekeeping costs...." The Senate may attach more binding legislation to the State Department Authorization Bill which it is considering in January.

The Secretary General is sympathetic to our desire to reduce our rate of assessment and has indicated he will send an emissary to urge certain member states with high per capita incomes to increase their assessment rates. Even with his help, reducing our rate to 25 percent will be difficult. In order to get some real savings now, we may have to settle for paying more than 25 percent, but still far less than our current 31.7 percent, and achieving the 25 percent level in the future.

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The UN peacekeeping scale of assessments is based on the scale for the UN regular budget, which reflects primarily capacity to pay as indicated by national income statistics. (It is important to this discussion to know that the U.S. assessment rate for the UN regular budget would be 27.5 percent based on national income statistics, but it is capped at 25 percent because of a ceiling established by the General Assembly in 1972.) The peacekeeping scale formula was developed in 1973 to ensure at least token contributions from developing countries in order to maintain the principle of collective financial responsibility for UN peacekeeping. UN members are divided into four groups:

- Group D: currently fifty-four very poor countries assessed for peacekeeping at ten percent of their regular budget rates of assessment. In total, Group D pays 0.054 percent of peacekeeping assessments, a discount of 0.489 percentage points.
- Group C: currently ninety-seven more advanced "developing countries" (including anomalies such as Greece, Portugal, Singapore, Israel, Brunei Darussalam, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar) assessed at twenty percent of their regular assessment rates. In total, Group C pays 2.752 percent, a discount of 11.010 percentage points.
- Group B: currently twenty-two developed countries assessed at their full regular assessment rates. In total, Group B pays 41.986 percent.
- Group A: the five Permanent Members of the Security Council. Reflecting their added responsibilities for peacekeeping, the Perm Five pay at their regular assessment rates and absorb proportionally the discounts granted to Groups C and D. In total, Group A pays 55.226 percent.

The numbers above will change marginally in 1994 as a result of adding to the scale the six new members (Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Eritrea, Monaco, and Andorra) that have joined the UN this year. Also, it should be noted that major changes are expected in the scale for 1995-97 because much lower, more accurate economic figures will be used for the FSU states and others in Eastern Europe. Nonetheless, the overall composition of the various peacekeeping scale groups still will not reflect global economic realities.

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A resumed session of the General Assembly in early 1994 is expected to address changes in membership of the different groups for the special peacekeeping scale of assessments. Ukraine, Belarus, the Czech Republic, and the Slovak Republic, in particular, sought reassignment from Group B to Group C at the just completed regular session of the General Assembly. Action on their requests was deferred for consideration in the context of an overall reworking of the Group memberships. In this regard, a Working Group previously established by the General Assembly to consider anomalies in the Group membership was continued. The Working Group, whose objective includes the establishment of standard criteria to ensure that placement in the various peacekeeping scale Groups is applied in a consistent manner, is expected to submit a report to the General Assembly in 1994. The resumed session of the General Assembly to address changes in the peacekeeping scale, combined with the continued mandate of the Working Group on anomalies in the scale, provides us with an opportunity to pursue the changes we seek in the peacekeeping scale.

Options for Changes in the Scale

Option A: The most simple and direct change would be to eliminate the special peacekeeping scale and base peacekeeping assessments on the regular budget scale. The greatest advantage of this approach is that it would meet directly and fully our stated goal of reducing our peacekeeping assessment to 25 percent. Gaining General Assembly approval of this option is extremely unlikely since it would require 151 members to pay multiples of five and ten of what they now pay for peacekeeping operations. We made an approach along these lines to the Perm Five in 1992 and received no support. We may wish to consider this option as a fall-back in case the incremental approach (Option C below), which could produce immediate, tangible gains fails.

Option B: An alternative to eliminating the special peacekeeping scale would be to require all members of Group C to join members of Group B in paying at their regular budget rates of assessment; existing discounts would be allowed only for members of Group D. This would reduce the U.S. peacekeeping rate of assessment to 25.411 percent. However, the fact that ninety-seven members, more than a majority in the General Assembly, would be forced to pay amounts five times greater than they currently do makes General Assembly approval (two-thirds required for approval of an "important question") of this change unlikely.

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Option C: Working within the parameters of the current peacekeeping scale, we would seek a series of ad-hoc adjustments. The U.S. assessment rate could be reduced to 27 percent by correcting anomalies in the scale, adding Japan and Germany as Permanent Members of the Security Council, and persuading China to accept an increased share of peacekeeping assessments on a voluntary basis.

1. Use placement on the list of least developed countries approved by the General Assembly as the criterion for membership in Group D. This would provide an objective standard to be applied automatically over the years. Under this standard now, five countries would be moved from Group C to Group D and fifteen from Group D to Group C (list at Tab 2). The net effect on the U.S. rate would be minimal, reducing it from 31.739 percent to 31.733 percent, but advocating it would demonstrate a "clean hands" approach.

2. Use the world per capita income average as the criterion for graduating members from Group C to B. This would be another objective standard that could be applied automatically over the years. For the current scale's base period of 1980-89, the UN Secretariat has indicated that \$2,600 approximates the world average per capita income level. Applying the standard now would move twenty-nine countries up to Group B (list at Tab 2 -- note that some of the FSU states listed insist they have lower per capita income levels). In addition to the change above, this would reduce the U.S. rate to 29.446 percent.

3. Add Japan and Germany as Permanent Members of the Security Council. Following the two changes above, this would reduce the U.S. rate to 28.023 percent.

4. Persuade China to accept voluntarily an increase in its peacekeeping assessment rate with the benefit shared proportionally among other permanent members of the Security Council. A major anomaly in the current scale is the low assessment rate of China: 0.77 percent for the regular budget and 0.978 percent for peacekeeping. An IMF study this summer, based on purchasing power parities, ranked the Chinese economy as third largest in the world behind the United States and Japan. Even by UN statistics (based on national income levels), the Chinese economy is the eighth largest in the world with an average national income over the 1980-89 base period representing 2.839 percent of that of all UN members. The low Chinese assessment rates reflect an allowance in the UN formula for low per capita income (\$333 for China). In view of China's role as a member of the Perm Five, its increasing interest

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in UN peacekeeping activities, and its currently booming economy, it might be possible to persuade China to accept voluntarily a significant increase in its peacekeeping rate of assessment with the benefit to be shared among the other permanent members of the Security Council. Were this to be done, for example by China foregoing the benefit of the low per capita income allowance, China's peacekeeping assessment rate would increase to 3.184 percent and the U.S. rate would decrease to 27.118 percent, assuming the changes above also are made. (Were China to accept such an increase before the other changes are negotiated, the U.S. rate would decrease initially to 30.202 percent and China's rate would increase initially to 3.606 percent.)

Political Estimate

o The UN Secretary General, having heard President Clinton's speech before the UN General Assembly, is well aware of our urgent concern to reduce our peacekeeping assessment rate. He has indicated that, in principle, he supports a reduction in our peacekeeping rate to 25 percent.

o Others would benefit in addition to the U.S. Eliminating the special peacekeeping scale or requiring all members of Group C to join Group B would benefit all other permanent members of the Security Council in the same proportion that the U.S. would benefit. Except for China, of course, the same would be true also for the multi-step Option C indicated above.

o In 1992 the U.S. consulted the other permanent members of the Security Council about the possibility of establishing a 25 percent ceiling on peacekeeping assessments. However, we found no support for this at that time. We should test this again, but, as before, we expect to receive a negative reaction because of the clear sense by others that the strategy is unlikely to work.

o In pursuing any action on the peacekeeping scale, we can expect to confront a growing sense in the General Assembly that the special responsibility and privileges of permanent members of the Security Council for peacekeeping issues means they should bear an even larger share of financial obligations than they do today. Thus, there is a danger that this issue could reignite past North-South divisions.

o Changing the peacekeeping scale relates to the issue of Security Council expansion. Attempting to eliminate the peacekeeping assessment differential could strengthen claims for a more representative Security Council.

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o This is an issue that should be raised initially in capitals. Delegates in New York will resist any plan that puts them in the position of arguing back home for higher assessments.

Strategy

Eliminating the special peacekeeping scale at this stage (Option A) would have no chance of success since it would require 151 members to pay multiples of five and ten of what they now pay for peacekeeping. Actively pursuing this option now could isolate the U.S. from other permanent members of the Security Council and would so polarize the issue that the success of other options would be seriously threatened. Seeking to require all of Group C to join Group B (Option B) would have much the same effect. The only realistic means for making significant progress on the issue at this stage is the multi-step approach in Option C above. Option C would result in our paying for peacekeeping approximately what we would pay for the UN regular budget were our assessment for the latter not artificially capped at 25 percent. The 27 percent level might be viewed by other countries as appropriate in light of our veto power in the Security Council.

While we have to be ready to force a vote on the matter, it would be best to achieve approval by consensus for the necessary changes in the scale of peacekeeping assessments. Doing so will require the right combination of diplomatic appeal to the interests of the affected members and a clear demonstration of the seriousness of the U.S. intent. A four-step strategy toward achieving the necessary changes in the peacekeeping scale is suggested:

1. Ambassador Albright would approach the Secretary General to explain the overall changes we seek and request his support. He has indicated his intention to send an emissary to seek agreement to join Group B from the ten members of Group C with the highest per capita income levels. We should accept that as a first step, leaving open the possibility of subsequently sending the same emissary or others to all of those members in Group C with per capita income levels above the world average of \$2,600 that should be asked to join Group B (possibly excluding some FSU states that can claim lower per capita income levels) as well as the fifteen members of Group D that should be asked to join Group C.
2. Subject to what can be worked out with the Secretary General, we would send parallel demarches to the other Perm 4, the EC, and the other affected countries. The demarche

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to China would seek to build upon their increasing interest in UN peacekeeping operations. The demarches to Japan and Germany would relate this effort to their interest in becoming Permanent Members of the Security Council.

3. Based on the support of the Secretary General and the results of the demarches indicated above, we would seek approval for the changes in the scale, except for those related to Japan and Germany becoming Permanent Members of the Security Council, at the expected resumed session of the General Assembly scheduled this spring (assuming acquiescence in capitals, there should be no objections).

4. Taking advantage of Japan and Germany becoming Permanent Members of the Security Council would follow as part of our strategy for Security Council reform.

5. Begin briefings on Capitol Hill to show that we have a strategy in process and develop realistic expectations as to what can be achieved.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That you approve the strategy suggested above.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

2. That you authorize the attached telegram (Tab 1) to USUN instructing Ambassador Albright to join me in seeking the support of the Secretary General for the changes in the scale of assessments for UN peacekeeping operations.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab 1 - Draft telegram to USUN.

Tab 2 - Countries moving between Groups C and D.

Tab 3 - Group C countries to graduate to Group B.

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