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## **Clinton Presidential Records Mandatory Declassification Review**

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29 Jun 95

Talking points on Serb Radar Net

-- One of the basic premises of the partial sanctions suspension is that Belgrade will not provide military support to Pale.

-- We have reason to believe that, in fact, the Belgrade Serb radar system is used to provide air surveillance information to the Bosnian Serb military, which information is then available for their use for air defense purposes against aircraft carrying out UN-authorized missions over Bosnia.

-- (If asked for evidence: Specifically, voice transmissions on a high frequency (HF) radio wave system are used to pass information of this character.)

---- Thus, Belgrade, through the passage of air surveillance information, is providing to Pale military support of the most fundamental kind -- current operational intelligence.

-- This is particularly serious as it threatens aircraft and their crews engaged in enforcing UN mandates, notably the NFZ, and standing ready to provide CAS to UN peacekeeping forces.

-- The US therefore believes that it is an essential condition of extension of the ~~current~~ sanctions relief that Belgrade agree to take effective action during the next extension period to cease providing air surveillance information to the Bosnian Serbs and confirm to the UN that such information is not being provided ~~by any means~~.

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GRADUATED RESPONSE FOR THE USE OF AIR POWER

Aim - To restore the viability of UNPROFOR in the face of Bosnian Serb attacks on UN safe areas.

- To achieve more effective and timely use of air power within terms of UNSCRs, particularly 836, and related NAC decisions in respect of both Close Air Support and Air Strikes for the defence of Gorazde [and other Safe Areas in Bosnia].

Key Approach

- Considerable authority exists already under SCRs and NAC decisions for use of airpower in support of UNPROFOR. UN and NATO commanders will use that authority to protect Gorazde and UNPROFOR [designated Safe Areas] threatened by military force.

- Airpower has to facilitate task of Commanders on the ground and support the political process if it is to be effective in helping to defend Gorazde.

- Considerable scope exists for more effective and timely use of airpower to deter Bosnian Serb aggression and to counter military action on the ground which conflict with the terms of the UNSCRs.

- Such use of airpower is potentially escalatory. But if

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viewed as a series of graduate steps appropriate use of air power under effective command and control arrangements, could deliver a clear and painful politico-military deterrent to the Bosnian Serbs.

- A phased, militarily effective, response affords a means of controlling the overall situation and of ensuring that political approval is given before resort to an expanded air campaign throughout B-H. Such an expanded campaign could be perceived by the Bosnian Serbs as a declaration of war against them and therefore the end of UNPROFOR's current mandate and mission.

#### Requirements

~~The construct of the air campaign would involve:~~

- Firm and unequivocal warning to the Bosnian Serbs that attacks on Safe Areas would result in effective, sustained and timely use of airpower.
- Acceptance by the international community that such a warning once issued must be followed through and that any reluctance to demonstrate the necessary political will would leave UNPROFOR and NATO worse off in terms of credibility.
- A related preparedness to accept the risk of, and

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consequences, for hostages of such use of force; the taking of all practicable steps before the issue of the warning to reduce the degree of risk (accepting that it cannot be removed entirely); and acceptance of the risk of Bosnian Serb retaliation and military action against other enclaves including interruption of resupply.

Way Ahead

- Revise command and control arrangements so that the political control for use of airpower in respect of Safe Area and Exclusion Zone around Gorazde is exercised, by UN and NATO Commanders, in accordance with provision of UNSCRs and existing NAC decisions.

- The expectation would be that the Force Commander UNPF would delegate the tactical decision on the use of airpower to Force Commander UNPROFOR, on the advice of the subordinate commander.

- Require UN and NATO Commanders to develop urgently Operating Procedures and Concept of Operations for an [phased] air campaign on the lines of matrix at Annex for engaging forces involved in direct attack on Safe Area exclusion zones.

- Proceed to the NAC at the earliest possible date to seek

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authorization for conducting the air campaign. In going to the NAC consideration should be given to any proposal by the Force Commander UNPROFOR to replace the exclusion zone with a Zone of Action, should he consider that necessary.

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GRADUATED AIR CAMPAIGN

SER	EVENT	TARGETS	B-H AUTHORISATION	REMARKS
1	BSA concentrating forces and or heavy weapons, and conducting other military preparations which, in the common judgement of the UN and NATO Military Commanders, presents a direct threat to Gorazda.	Targets would include, but not be limited to, BSA forces and heavy weapons (arty, mortars etc) and their direct and essential support (such as C2, munitions and fuel sites) within the Zone on Action, in order to deny manoeuvre capability and concentration of troops. SEAD as required.	1. CAS requested by on-scene ground Commander, authorised by FC UNPROFOR. 2. Campaign plan for fixed targets pre-coordinated between UN and NATO Military Commanders, once initiated will be carried out by CINCSOUTH in support of FC UNPROFOR. 3. UN and NATO Commanders will continue to coordinate to ensure the effectiveness of attacks against mobile targets in the Zone of Action.	1. Enforcement of 20 KM EZ as established under UNSCR 836 and NAC decision of 22 Apr 94. 2. Heavy weapons may be attacked if outside EZ, if firing in. 3. Consideration of NAC authority to : a. Replace 20 KM EZ by Zone of Action to be defined by FC UNPROFOR. b. Include concentration of troops as targets to be attacked.
2	Direct BSA attack on Gorazde, other than local skirmish.	1. CAS. Targets are forces directly attacking, including heavy weapons, in order to defend enclave. 2. Heavy weapons and direct and essential support facilities in order to destroy heavy weapons and deny Serb forces logistical support. 3. Attack follow-on forces, as required. 4. SEAD as required.	See above.	See above.
3	BSA continue offensive.	1. Continue attacks on heavy weapons and support facilities. 2. Continue CAS. 3. SEAD as required. 4. Attack targets Bosnia-wide, as authorised.	See above.	Carries wider strategic implications. Need new NAC authorisation for Option 3 targets, in accordance with provisions of UNSCR 836 and the addition of infrastructure targets that support the BSA military.

Note: Battlefield conditions may well dictate that Serials 1 and 2 occur simultaneously.

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