See also 2013-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title: DC0011 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, February 26, 1993
Staff Office-Individual: Records Management
Original OA/ID Number: 3994

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
43	4	5	1	V

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. list	Attendees to the Deputies Committee Meeting, Friday, February, 26, 1993 [CIA Act] [partial] (1 page)	ca. 02/26/1993	P3/b(3)
001b. cover sheet	National Security Council to U.S. United Nations, New York re: Notice of Meeting, Summary of Conclusions [partial] (1 page)	03/01/1993	b(2)
~~001c. memo~~	~~William Itoh to Leon Fuerth et al. re: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, February 26, 1993 (2 pages)~~	~~03/01/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 09/30/2014
~~001d. memo~~	~~William Itoh to Leon Fuerth et al. re: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, February 26, 1993, Draft (2 pages)~~	~~ca. 03/01/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
002a. cover sheet	National Security Council to U.S. United Nations, New York re: Notice of Meeting [partial] (1 page)	02/27/1993	b(2)
~~002b. memo~~	~~Samuel Berger to Leon Fuerth et al. re: Ex-Yugoslavia Work Program (1 page)~~	~~02/27/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 09/30/2014
003a. cover sheet	National Security Council to U.S. United Nations, New York re: Notice of Meeting on 26 Feb at 5 pm [partial] (1 page)	ca. 02/1993	b(2)
~~003b. agenda~~	~~Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)~~	~~02/26/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3994

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0011 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, February 26, 1993

2010-0533-M
kh529

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9320182
RECEIVED: 26 FEB 93 20

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 01 MAR 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
DC
YUGOSLAVIA
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 26 FEB DC MTG ON BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

ACTION: ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 02 MAR 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL LOGREF: 9320171 9320181

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0011 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		HOLL
		NSC CHRON
		WALKER

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB CLOSED BY: NSKDB DOC 2 OF 2

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By KBM NARA, Date 5/21/2010
2010-0533-M

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10/13/93
OCR
JWD

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	93022621	FOR DECISION
001		X	93030119	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
001	ITOH	Z	93030119	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	93030120	ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	930301	FUERTH, L	
002	930301	OLIVER, J	
002	930301	GROSSMAN, M	
002	930301	SHEFFIELD, H	
002	930301	SHERFIELD, M	
002	930301	INDERFURTH, K	

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. list	Attendees to the Deputies Committee Meeting, Friday, February, 26, 1993 [CIA Act] [partial] (1 page)	ca. 02/26/1993	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3994

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0011 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, February 26, 1993

2010-0533-M
kh529

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING
FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 1993
5:00 P.M. - 6:00 P.M.
SVTS ROOM

WHITE HOUSE
Samuel R. Berger

OVP
Leon Fuerth

STATE
Peter Tarnoff
Steve Oxman

DOD
Frank Wisner
Walter Slocombe

JCS
David Jeremiah
James Hill

CIA
William Studeman
(b)(3) [001a]

USUN
Rick Inderfurth

SPECIAL ENVOY
Reginald Bartholomew

NSC
Jenonne Walker
Jane Holl

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2/27 1025 rec'd TL LLS copy

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 20182

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG ✓ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	1	✓	
ExecSec	3		Sign Sec I
Staff Director			Please
D/APNSA	2	✓	
APNSA			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	✓ 3/1	D
NSC Secretariat			

(A = Action) I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

26 FEB 95 21:4[illegible]

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Ex Sec has discretion.

Jane —
Few changes.
2 don't need to see again.
S Done

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National Security Council
The White House

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PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 20182

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (AL) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	1	Mark	
ExecSec	3		Sign Sandy I
Staff Director			Please
D/APNSA	2	✓	
APNSA			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	AL 3/1	D
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty

Should be s

Jane -
Few changes.
2 don't need
to see again.
S
Done

COMMENTS:

26 FEB 93 8:4

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Ex Sec Res

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9320182
DATE 01 MAR 93

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR DC MTG ON 26 FEB RE BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	_____	_____	_____ COPY: 1
MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	_____	_____	_____ COPY: 1

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E.O. 12958, As Amended,
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By KBH NARA, Date 3/25/ 2010
2010 - 0533 - M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC, ROOM 379 OEOB

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

Rreleaser: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. _____ **CLASSIFICATION** ~~SECRET~~ **PAGES** 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH for
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS NSC LOG# 20182

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

FOR IMMEDIATE TRANSMITTAL

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E.O. 12958, As Amended,
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By KBH NARA, Date 3/25/2010
2010-0533-M

~~SECRET~~
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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. cover sheet	National Security Council to U.S. United Nations, New York re: Notice of Meeting, Summary of Conclusions [partial] (1 page)	03/01/1993	b(2)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3994

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0011 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, February 26, 1993

2010-0533-M
kh529

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

012150L

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE
- ☐ FLASH
- ☐ IMMEDIATE
- ☐ PRIORITY
- ☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: O. Miller

DATE/TIME: 012135L MAR 93

MESSAGE #: 0019

NSC LOG # 20182

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS PAGES: 2

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	(b)(2)

[0016

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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E.O. 12958, As Amended,
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By KBH NARA, Date 3/25/2010
2010-0533-M

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 1, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JAMES R. OLIVER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

CAPTAIN H.L. SHEFFIELD
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the United States to the United Nations

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, February 26, 1993 (S)

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

-- State will draft a message to Ankara and Islamabad to address Turkish and Pakistani offers to participate in the airlift. We will welcome their offer in principle and accept what supplies they can provide. We will also offer to accept air crews of their nationals. We will defer any decision on their offers of aircraft, however, until others join, i.e. Russians, Germans, etc. (S)

-- State will draft a message to UNHCR and the UN urging that ground deliveries not be halted during the airlift. (S)

-- We will confirm with the Germans that any offer they chose to make would be accepted, including use of C-160 aircraft. (S)

-- EUCOM will provide daily press briefings on the air drop operation. A back-up will be maintained by the Pentagon in Washington in the event a crisis develops. (S)

-- On the issue of Russian participation in the air drop operation, State will track Kozyrev's expected reply to the Secretary next week. (S)

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PER E.O. 13526
NLC 9/30/14
1010-0533-M (1.86)

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-- Deputies agreed that the essence of a successful outcome of the U.S. initiative in Bosnia is an agreement that is equitable and workable. With this in mind, NSC will circulate under separate cover the work program to develop our views of the Vance/Owen plan and to support Bartholomew in his discussions. (S)

-- USIA will join the Working Group Meetings and work with State on implementing a program of coverage to ensure that desired messages are reaching the intended audiences. (S)

-- Bartholomew will explore the issue of enforcement of the No-Fly Zone in the context of his discussion in New York. (S)

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20182

February 26, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER

FROM: JANE E. HOLL

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, February 26, 1993

Attached at Tab I is the Summary of Conclusions from the Deputies Committee Meeting, February 26, 1993.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Memo to the Agencies

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E.O. 12958, As Amended,
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By KBH NARA, Date 3/25/2010
2010-0533-M

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~~SECRET~~ 20182

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JAMES R. OLIVER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

CAPTAIN H.L. SHEFFIELD
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the United States to the United Nations

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on ~~the~~ Bosnia, February 26, 1993 ~~(S)~~

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

-- State will draft a message to Ankara and Islamabad to address Turkish and Pakistani offers to participate in the airlift. We will welcome their offer in principle and accept what supplies they can provide. We will also offer to accept air crews of their nationals. We will defer ~~action on accepting~~ their offers of aircraft, however, until others join, ~~in as well,~~ i.e. Russians, Germans, etc. ~~(S)~~

-- State will draft a message to UNHCR and the UN urging that ground deliveries not be halted during the airlift. ~~(S)~~

-- We will confirm with the Germans ~~that any offer they chose~~ (including use of C-160 aircraft) to make would be accepted. ~~(S)~~

-- EUCOM will provide daily press briefings on the air drop operation. A back-up will be maintained by the Pentagon in Washington in the event a crisis develops. ~~(S)~~

-- On the issue of Russian participation in the air drop operation, State will track Kozyrev's expected reply to the Secretary next week. ~~(S)~~

-- Deputies agreed that the essence of a successful outcome of the U.S. initiative in Bosnia is an agreement that is equitable and workable. With this in mind, NSC will

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED PER E.O. 13526
NL 2/5/2020 (1.02)
2013-0682-M

circulate under separate cover the work program to develop our views of the Vance/Owen plan and to support Bartholomew in his discussions. ~~(S)~~

-- USIA will join the Working Group Meetings and work with State on implementing a program of coverage to ensure that desired messages are reaching the intended audiences. ~~(S)~~

-- Bartholomew will explore the issue of enforcement of the No-Fly Zone in the context of his discussion in New York. ~~(S)~~

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9320181
RECEIVED: 26 FEB 93 19

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 27 FEB 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: YUGOSLAVIA
BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
IWG
NATO
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FOLLOW UP WORK PROGRAM TO 26 FEB DC MTG ON FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

ACTION: BERGER SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 02 MAR 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF: 9320171 9320182

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0011 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		NSC CHRON
		WALKER

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: NSWEA DOC 2 OF 2

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By KBH NARA, Date 3/25/2010
2010-0533-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	93022621	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	93022711	BERGER SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	930227	FUERTH, L	
002	930227	GROSSMAN, M	
002	930227	SHERFIELD, M	
002	930227	OLIVER, J	
002	930227	SHEFFIELD, H	
002	930227	INDERFURTH, K	

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2/27 1025am Rec'd

National Security Council
The White House

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (MA) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	1		
ExecSec	X		
Staff Director			
D/APNSA	2		
APNSA			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	2/27	D
NSC Secretariat			

(A = Action) I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

26 FEB 93 01:14

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

TIME OF TRANSMISSION
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
1993 FEB 27 AM 11:14

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

B

TIME OF RECEIPT
'93 FEB 27 P12:11

B

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: B Ryan

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 0301 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 1

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH WHI
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION WORK PROGRAM

Log # 20181

B
D
A
D

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

URGENT

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E.O. 12958, As Amended,
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By KBH NARA, Date 3/25/2010
2010-0533-M

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WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
1993 FEB 27 AM 11:14

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF RECEIPT
Site D / NMCC / CWC
27/1123 Feb 93

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE (PRIORITY) ROUTINE

RELEASER: B Gibson

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 0301 **CLASSIFICATION** ~~SECRET~~ **PAGES** 1

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH WHI
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION WORK PROGRAM

Log # 20181

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		

BDAD

REMARKS:

URGENT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended,
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By KBH NARA, Date 3/25/2010
2010 - 0533-M

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
1993 FEB 27 AM 11: 14

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF RECEIPT

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE (PRIORITY) ROUTINE

FEB 27 11:20 AM '93

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO. 0301 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 1

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH WHI (NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION WORK PROGRAM

Log # 20181

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		

B
D
A
D

REMARKS:

URGENT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended,
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By KBM NARA, Date 3/25/2010
2010-0533-M

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

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002a. cover sheet	National Security Council to U.S. United Nations, New York re: Notice of Meeting [partial] (1 page)	02/27/1993	b(2)

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NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3994

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0011 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, February 26, 1993

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P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

1205L

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE
- ☐ FLASH
- ☐ IMMEDIATE
- ☒ PRIORITY
- ☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: [signature]

DATE/TIME: 271145L Feb 93

MESSAGE #: 0018

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting Ex-Yugoslavia Work Program PAGES: 1

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

Log #20181

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	(b)(2)

[002a]

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

URGENT

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended,
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By KBY NARA, Date 3/25/2010
2010-0533-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9320181
DATE 27 FEB 93

SUBJECT: EX YUGOSLAVIA WORK PROGRAM
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	_____	_____	_____ COPY: 1
MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	_____	_____	_____ COPY: 1

DECLASSIFIED
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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By KBM NARA, Date 3/25/2010
2010-0533-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC, ROOM 379 OEOB

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ 20181

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 27, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JAMES R. OLIVER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

CAPTAIN H.L. SHEFFIELD
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the United States to the United Nations

SUBJECT: Ex-Yugoslavia Work Program (S)

The following work program was agreed at the February 26 1993 Deputies Committee meeting on the former Yugoslavia:

1. Enforcement provisions in a settlement and what it would take to implement them. OSD will circulate terms of reference Monday March 1, for discussion in the Working Group telecon at 10:00 a.m. Tuesday March 2. (S)

2. NATO preparations for implementation of a settlement. During the week of March 1, State will provide a draft gameplan for getting the necessary work done in NATO and inclusion of the Russians and possibly others. This work will result in guidance to USNATO. (S)

3. Analysis of the Vance/Owen map and Bosnian and Serb counter proposals. The Intelligence Community will provide during the week of March 1. (S)

4. Interim Arrangements. State will provide draft proposals for US views on the Vance/Owen proposals and other possibilities by the middle of the week of March 1. (S)

5. Compliance with the London Accords. OSD was previously tasked to draft proposals for lifting the siege of Sarajavo, to be distributed the week of March 1. OSD will include the possibility of moving the talks to Sarajevo. The Working Group will agree on tasking of other aspects of the London accords at its March 1 meeting. (S)

Samuel R. Berger
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

~~SECRET~~
Declassify On: OADR

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~~SECRET~~

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PER E.O. 13526
RDS 9/30/14
2010-0533-M (1.87)

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20181

February 26, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

FROM: JENONNE WALKER

SUBJECT: Ex-Yugoslavia Work Program

The memo to agencies outlining the work program agreed at the February 26 Deputies Teleconference is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to agencies attached at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to Agencies

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E.O. 12958, As Amended,
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By KBH NARA, Date 3/25/2010
2010-0533-M

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: ADR

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~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9320171
RECEIVED: 25 FEB 93 13

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 25 FEB 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
DC
YUGOSLAVIA
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 26 FEB DC MTG ON BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

ACTION: ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 01 MAR 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL LOGREF: 9320181 9320182

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0011 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		HOLL
		NSC CHRON
		WALKER
		WRIGHT

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E.O. 12958, As Amended,
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By KBH NARA, Date 3/25/2010
2010-0533-M

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: NSWEA DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	93022519	FOR DECISION
001		X	93022608	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
002		X	93022608	ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	930225	FUERTH, L	
002	930225	GROSSMAN, M	
002	930225	SHERFIELD, M	
002	930225	OLIVER, J	
002	930225	SHEFFIELD, H	
002	930225	INDERFURTH, K	

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

2/25 10:00 pm

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: LWA LOG # 20171

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG LWA A/O _____

W

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	1		A
ExecSec	2	VS	
Staff Director			
D/APNSA	3	—	
APNSA			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	JDA 2/26	D
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS: Pls Dispatch ASAP - mtg 2/26
25 FEB 93 21:13 is at 5:00 Tonight.

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Ex Sec's Office has diskette

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

TIME OF TRANSMISSION
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
1993 FEB 26 AM 8:35

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF RECEIPT

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
(PRIORITY)
ROUTINE

RELEASER: O'Leary

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 0292 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH for DOA (NAME) 456-6536 (PHONE NUMBER) _____ (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION DC MTG ON 26 FEB AT 5 PM

Log #20171

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		

B D A D

REMARKS:

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended,
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By KBH NARA, Date 3/25/2010
2010-0533-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

TIME OF TRANSMISSION
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
1993 FEB 26 AM 8:35

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
FEB 26 8 49 AM '93

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE (PRIORITY) ROUTINE

RELEASER: O'Leary

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 0292 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH for DOA 456-6536
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION DC MTG ON 26 FEB AT 5 PM

Log #20171

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		

BDAD

REMARKS:

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By KBINARA, Date 3/25/2010
2010-0533-M

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
1993 FEB 26 AM 8:35

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF RECEIPT

Delta 260938L FEB 93

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE (PRIORITY) ROUTINE

RELEASER: O'Leary

DTG: _____

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE NO. 0292 CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH for DA | 456-6536 | _____
(NAME) | (PHONE NUMBER) | (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION DC MTG ON 26 FEB AT 5 PM

Log #20171

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		

BDAD

REMARKS:

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By KBH NARA, Date 3/25/2010
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9320171
DATE 25 FEB 93

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 26 FEB MTG
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	_____	_____	_____ COPY: 1
MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	_____	_____	_____ COPY: 1

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By KBH NARA, Date 3/25/2010
2010-0533-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC, ROOM 379 OEOB

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. cover sheet	National Security Council to U.S. United Nations, New York re: Notice of Meeting on 26 Feb at 5 pm [partial] (1 page)	ca. 02/1993	b(2)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3994

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0011 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, February 26, 1993

2010-0533-M
kh529

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE
- ☐ FLASH
- ☐ IMMEDIATE
- ☒ PRIORITY
- ☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting on 26 Feb at 5 PM PAGES: 2

PLEASE DELIVER TO: Log #20171

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	(b)(2)

[003a

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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E.O. 12958, As Amended,
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By KBNARA, Date 3/25/2010
2010-0533-M

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~ SECRET 20171

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 26, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JAMES R. OLIVER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

CAPTAIN H.L. SHEFFIELD
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the United States to the United Nations

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

There will be a Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, February 26, 1993, at 5:00pm in the White House Situation Room. Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the subject meeting. (S)

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended,
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By KBM NARA, Date 3/25/2010
2010 - 0533 - M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

SECRET

DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA
DATE: February 26, 1993
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 5:00p.m.

AGENDA

I. Opening Remarks.....NSC

II. Policy Discussion.....All Participants

a. Air Drops and Related Issues.....OSD/JCS

b. Guidance for Bartholomew.....State

c. Gore's Meeting with Izetbegovic.....NSC

d. Status Report on Ongoing Issues.....NSC

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
NLZ 2/5/2020 (1.03)
2013-0682-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20171

February 25, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SANDY BERGER

THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER

FROM: JANE E. HOLL

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, Friday, February 26, 1993, 5:00p.m.

Attached at Tab I is the memorandum to agencies for the subject meeting.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to Agencies
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended,
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By KBM NARA, Date 3/25/2010
2010-0533-M

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See also 2013-0687-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title: DC0012 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, March 4, 1993				
Staff Office-Individual: Records Management				
Original OA/ID Number: 3994				
Row: 43	Section: 4	Shelf: 5	Position: 1	Stack: V

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. report~~	~~Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Teleconference on Bosnia, March 4, 1993 (2 pages)~~	~~03/04/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 9/30/2014
~~001b. report~~	~~Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Teleconference on Bosnia, March 4, 1993, Draft (2 pages)~~	~~03/04/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 9/30/2014

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3994

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0012 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, March 4, 1993

2010-0533-M
kh530

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9320209
RECEIVED: 04 MAR 93 19

TO: ITOH

FROM: HOLL
WALKER

DOC DATE: 10 MAR 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
DC
YUGOSLAVIA
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 4 MAR DC MTG ON BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

ACTION: KENNEY APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 08 MAR 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL LOGREF:

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0012 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		HOLL
		NSC CHRON
		WALKER

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E.O. 12958, As Amended,
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By KBH NARA, Date 3/25/2010
2010-0533-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB CLOSED BY: NSWEA DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

OA/ID 10/13/95

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	93030519	FOR DECISION
001	HOLL	Z	93030812	FOR REDO
002	ITOH	Z	93031013	FOR DECISION
002		X	93031117	KENNEY APPROVED RECOM

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 20209 REDO

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	6		A
ExecSec			
Staff Director			
D/APNSA			
APNSA			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	7	CWA 3/11	N
NSC Secretariat	8		N

(A = Action) I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

10 MAR 93 11 27

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

3/5 10 PM

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: ASK LOG # 20209

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	1		
ExecSec	3		
Staff Director		Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
D/APNSA	2		
APNSA			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	3/8	N
NSC Secretariat	4		
~~VP~~	~~6~~		
Watchman/Hall	5		FYI

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

5 MAR 93 21 3

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: ASK LOG # 20209

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	1		
ExecSec	3		
Staff Director		Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
D/APNSA	2		
APNSA			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3		N
NSC Secretariat	4		
[illegible]	[illegible]		
Warren/Hall	5		FI

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

MAR 93 7:3[illegible]

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 20209 REDO

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	6		A
ExecSec			
Staff Director			
D/APNSA			
APNSA			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	7	CWA 3/11	N
NSC Secretariat	8		N

(A = Action) I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

0 MAR 93 1 : 2

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20209
Redo

March 10, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER

FROM: JANE E. HOLL

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee Teleconference on Bosnia, March 4, 1993

Attached at Tab I is the Summary of Conclusions from the Deputies Committee Teleconference March 4, 1993.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Summary of Conclusions be filed for the record.

Approve ✓ Kate

Attachment
Tab I Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended,
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By KBH NARA, Date 3/25/2010
2010-0533-M

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions of
Deputies Committee Teleconference
DATE: March 4, 1993
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 6:00-7:00pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Teleconference on Bosnia, March 4, 1993 (S)

PARTICIPANTS

The Vice President's Office:
Leon Fuerth

State:
Peter Tarnoff
Steve Oxman
Reginald Bartholomew

DOD:
Frank Wisner
Walter Slocombe

CIA:
William Studeman
Daniel Wagner

JCS:
Barry McCaffrey
James Hill

NSC:
Jenonne Walker
Jane Holl

Summary of Conclusions

-- Deputies agreed that because the fast-paced nature of events in New York could present us with a fait accompli before our thinking on the various issues is fully developed, tasks would be undertaken on an urgent basis and Deputies would reconvene either late Friday or Saturday to review current status. (S)

-- Working Group members will evaluate the OSD paper on implementing the Vance/Owen plan, convey reactions to OSD this evening, if possible. The working group would then consider the paper and next steps at its meeting tomorrow morning. (S)

-- CIA will forward its analysis of the Vance/Owen map upon receipt of the Bosnia proposal which State will help secure. (S)

-- OSD will collate agency reactions to its Siege of Sarajevo paper and also incorporate an analysis of the "Lantos" option, i.e. moving the negotiations to Sarajevo. (S)

-- State will draft a cable to capitals, following up to the UN Security Council statement of March 3. The cable will

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RDS 9/30/14
2010-0533-M
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outline our proposals for tightening sanctions as a means of putting 'teeth' into the UN Security Council statement. (S)

-- Leon Fuerth and the Sanctions group will work up a new proposal for sanctions tightening for Deputies consideration for presentation to Principals. (S)

-- Deputies will sound Principals out on their preliminary thinking regarding whether we should begin to consider tougher steps -- involving U.S. air power or ground forces -- to take to respond to the mounting violence in Eastern Bosnia. (S)

-- OSD/JCS will prepare an options paper for dealing with a potential mounting refugee problem in Tuzla. (S)

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~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20209

March 4, 1993

→ Will - I think we should not send this out, in view of subsequent events. JC

→ Chris - I need one copy for my files on DC meetings. S.

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER

FROM: JANE E. HOLL

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee Teleconference on Bosnia, March 4, 1993

Attached at Tab I is the Summary of Conclusions from the Deputies Committee Teleconference March 4, 1993.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove ✓

Attachment
Tab I Memo to the Agencies

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E.O. 12958, As Amended,
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By KBH NARA, Date 3/25/2010
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JAMES R. OLIVER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

CAPTAIN H.L. SHEFFIELD
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the United States to the United Nations

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Teleconference on the Bosnia, March 4, 1993 (S)

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

-- Deputies agreed that because the fast-paced nature of events in New York could present us with a fait accompli before our thinking on the various issues is fully developed, tasks would be undertaken on an urgent basis and Deputies would reconvene either late Friday or Saturday to review current status. (S)

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2010-0533-M
RS 9/30/14

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-- OSD/JCS will prepare an options paper for dealing with a potential mounting refugee problem in Tuzla. (S)

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

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See also 2013-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

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Folder Title: DC0013 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, March 9, 1993				
Staff Office-Individual: Records Management				
Original OA/ID Number: 3994				
Row: 43	Section: 4	Shelf: 5	Position: 1	Stack: V

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Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. memo~~	~~William Itoh to Leon Fuerth et al. re: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, March 9, 1993 (2 pages)~~	~~03/15/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RDS 9/30/2014
001b. list	Deputy Committee Attendance. [partial] [CIA Act] (1 page)	03/09/1993	P3/b(3)
001c. cover sheet	National Security Council to U.S. United Nations, New York re: Notice of Meeting [partial] (1 page)	03/15/1993	b(2)
~~001d. memo~~	~~William Itoh to Leon Fuerth et al. re: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, March 9, 1993, incomplete draft (1 page)~~	~~ca. 03/15/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RDS 9/30/2014

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3994

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0013 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, March 9,1993

2010-0533-M
kh531

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9320227
RECEIVED: 10 MAR 93 13

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 12 MAR 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
DC
YUGOSLAVIA
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 9 MAR DC MTG ON BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

ACTION: ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 13 MAR 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF:

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0013 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		HOLL
		NSC CHRON
		WALKER
		WRIGHT

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By KBM NARA, Date 3/25/2010
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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	93031217	FOR DECISION
001		X	93031218	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
001	ITOH	Z	93031218	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	93031519	ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	930312	FUERTH, L	
002	930312	OLIVER, J	
002	930312	GROSSMAN, M	
002	930312	SHERFIELD, M	
002	930312	SHEFFIELD, H	
002	930312	INDERFURTH, K	

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. list	Deputy Committee Attendance. [partial] [CIA Act] (1 page)	03/09/1993	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:
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NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
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FOLDER TITLE:
DC0013 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, March 9,1993

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RESTRICTION CODES

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DC 13

DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING
TUESDAY, MARCH 9, 1993
4:00 P.M. - 5:00 P.M.
SVTS ROOM

WHITE HOUSE
Samuel R. Berger

OVP
Leon Fuerth

STATE
Peter Tarnoff
Steve Oxman

DOD
Frank Wisner
Walter Slocombe

JCS
David Jeremiah
Michael Ryan

CIA
William Studeman
(b)(3) [001b]

USUN
Rick Inderfurth (via STU III)

SPECIAL ENVOY
Reginald Bartholomew

NSC
Jenonne Walker

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9320227
RECEIVED: 10 MAR 93 13

TO: BERGER

FROM: WALKER

DOC DATE: 10 MAR 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA YUGOSLAVIA
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DECISIONS OF DC MTG ON 9 MAR RE BOSNIA

ACTION: FOR DECISION DUE DATE: 13 MAR 93 STATUS: X

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF:

FILES: IFM NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
BERGER		

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By KBH NARA, Date 3/25/2010
2010-0533-M

COMMENTS: _____

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Rec'd 3/15 4:00pm ~~3/16 11pm~~

National Security Council
The White House

3/13 0930
3/15 1620

PROOFED BY: WA LOG # 20227

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (KA) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
W DepExecSec	1		
ExecSec	3/5/6	✓ 3/15	
Staff Director			
D/APNSA	2/4	Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
APNSA			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	7	(KA) 3/15	D
NSC Secretariat			

(A = Action) I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

12 MAR 93 5:31

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

E4 Sec's Office has desk

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NSC-HTS Hoppe ~~2nd Floor~~

National Security Council
The White House

cere 3/13 0930 3/15 1620

PROOFED BY: WA LOG # 20227

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (AA) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
W DepExecSec	1		
ExecSec	3/5/6	VE/VE	
Staff Director			
D/APNSA	2/4	Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
APNSA			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	7	(AA) 3/15	D
NSC Secretariat			

(A = Action) I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

12 MAR 93 5:33

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Ex Sec's Office has deadline

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 10, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: JENONNE WALKER

SUBJECT: Decisions of March 9 Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia

Attached at Tab I is the memorandum to agencies for the subject meeting.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove ____

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to Agencies

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E.O. 12958, As Amended,
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By KBM NARA, Date 3/25/2010
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 15, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JAMES R. OLIVER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

CAPTAIN H. L. SHERFIELD
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the United States to the United Nations

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, March 9, 1993, 4:00pm (S)

1. State will prepare a message from Secretary Christopher to French Foreign Minister Dumas, urging that Serbian President Milosevic be pressed to reach an agreement during his March 11 visit to Paris and stressing the serious consequences for Serbia if the Bosnian government signs and Serb forces continue attacking. (S)

2. State will prepare a similar cable to Embassy Moscow, urging that Russia use its influence with Milosevic. (S)

3. The U.S. will not propose a new Security Council resolution on sanctions during the meeting of the Russian Congress of People's Deputies. The Sanctions Working Group will, however, continue refining our substantive position in order to be prepared when/if the time is right. The Deputies will revisit the issue at the end of this week in light, inter alia, of developments at the Russian Congress and of whether our willingness to introduce such a resolution might help get Bosnian President Izetbegovic to return to the talks. (S)

4. State will prepare a concept paper for a possible trip by Special Envoy Bartholomew to the former Yugoslavia and possibly other capitals as well. (State subsequently agreed to distribute this draft no later than Thursday, March 11.) That concept paper will help Deputies/Principals decide whether Ambassador Bartholomew should travel at this time. (S)

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2010-0533-M (1.8)

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5. OSD will circulates on March 10 the conclusions of the interagency team that has been assessing the humanitarian situation in Bosnia. (S)

6. The Principals Committee may meet Saturday, to look at possible new initiatives relating, for instance, to Sarajevo or Tzula. (S)

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9320227
DATE 12 MAR 93

SUBJECT: DECISIONS OF DC MTG ON 9 MAR RE BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
3/15	2122	

MR. LEON FUERTH
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
VIA LARRY BRANSCUM
ROOM 292, OEOB
WASHINGTON, DC 20506

COPY: 1

DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
3-15-93	1938	

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

COPY: 1

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By KBH NARA, Date 3/25/2010
2010-0533-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC, ROOM 379 OEOB

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001c. cover sheet	National Security Council to U.S. United Nations, New York re: Notice of Meeting [partial] (1 page)	03/15/1993	b(2)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3994

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0013 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, March 9,1993

2010-0533-M
kh531

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE
- ☐ FLASH
- ☐ IMMEDIATE
- ☐ PRIORITY
- ☒ ROUTINE

RELEASER: [signature]

DATE/TIME: 152137L MAR 93

MESSAGE #: 0029

NSC LOG # 20227

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting PAGES: 2

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	(b)(2)

[001C]

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By KBH NARA, Date 3/25/2010
2010-0533-M

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SITUATION ROOM
1993 MAR 15 PM 7:24

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF RECEIPT

-D-
Washfax
15 2000

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
(ROUTINE)

RELEASER: [signature]

DTG: _____

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE NO. 0418 CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (WHI) _____ _____
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION DECISIONS OF 9 MARCH MEETING

NSC LOG # 20227

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

A
B
D
D

REMARKS:

IMMEDIATE TRANSMITTAL

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E.O. 12958, As Amended,
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By KBH NARA, Date 3/25/2010
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TIME OF TRANSMISSION
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
1993 MAR 15 PM 7:24

~~SECRET~~

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
(ROUTINE)

RELEASER: ZNP

DTG:

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE NO. 0418 CLASSIFICATION PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NH)
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION DECISIONS OF 9 MARCH MEETING

NSC LOG # 20227

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

A
B
D
D

REMARKS:

IMMEDIATE TRANSMITTAL

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended,
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By KBM NARA, Date 3/25/2010
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TIME OF TRANSMISSION
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
1993 MAR 15 PM 7:24

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF RECEIPT

A

MAR 15 7 38 PM '93

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
(ROUTINE)

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 0418 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (WHI) _____ _____
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION DECISIONS OF 9 MARCH MEETING

NSC LOG # 20227

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
A CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D JCS	SECRETARY		
D DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

IMMEDIATE TRANSMITTAL

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By KBM NARA, Date 3/25/2010
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JAMES R. OLIVER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

CAPTAIN H. L. SHERFIELD
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the United States to the United Nations

SUBJECT: (Summary of Conclusions) ~~Decisions~~ of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, March 9, 1993, 4:00pm (S)

(reach agreement)

1. State will prepare a message from Secretary Christopher to French Foreign Minister Dumas, urging that Serbian President Milosevic be pressed to ~~sign the modified Vance/Owen plan~~ during his March 11 visit to Paris and stressing the serious consequences for Serbia if the Bosnian government signs and Serb forces continue attacking. (S)

2. State will prepare a similar cable to Embassy Moscow, urging that Russia use its influence with Milosevic. (S)

3. The U.S. will not propose a new Security Council resolution on sanctions during the meeting of the Russian Congress of People's Deputies. The Sanctions Working Group will, however, continue refining our substantive position in order to be prepared when/if the time is right. The Deputies will revisit the issue at the end of this week in light, inter alia, of developments at the Russian Congress and of whether our willingness to introduce such a resolution might help get Bosnian President Izetbegovic to return to the talks. (S)

4. State will prepare a concept paper for a possible trip by Special Envoy Bartholomew to the former Yugoslavia and possibly other capitals as well. (State subsequently agreed to distribute this draft no later than Thursday, March 11.) That concept paper will help Deputies/Principals decide whether Ambassador Bartholomew should travel at this time. (S)

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2010-0533-M
BY NARA DATE 7/30/14

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See DLS 2013-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

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Folder Title: DC0065 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina Humanitarian Assistance, October 28, 1993				
Staff Office-Individual: Records Management				
Original OA/ID Number: 3996				
Row: 43	Section: 4	Shelf: 5	Position: 3	Stack: V

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. form~~	~~National Security Council Log #21141 (1 page)~~	~~10/30/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 04/05/2010
~~001b. form~~	~~National Security Council Log #21141 (1 page)~~	~~10/30/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 04/05/2010
001c. cover sheet	National Security Council to U.S. United Nations, New York re: Summary of Conclusions [partial] (1 page)	ca. 11/01/1993	b(2)
~~001d. memo~~	~~Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee on Humanitarian Assistance to Bosnia (2 pages)~~	~~10/28/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RDS 09/30/2014
~~001e. memo~~	~~Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee on Humanitarian Assistance to Bosnia, draft (2 pages)~~	~~10/28/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RDS 09/30/2014
002a. cover sheet	National Security Council to U.S. United Nations, New York re: Notice of Meeting [partial] (1 page)	ca. 10/26/1993	b(2)
~~002b. memo~~	~~William Itoh to Leon Fuerth et al. re: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)~~	~~10/26/1993~~	~~P1/b(1), P5~~ VZ 02/06/2020
002c. agenda	Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)	10/27/1993	P1/b(1)
002d. paper	Re: Bosnian Humanitarian Situation (3 pages)	10/05/1993	P1/b(1), ~~P5~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002e. paper~~	~~Re: Humanitarian Aid Options (9 pages)~~	~~ca. 10/26/1993~~	~~P1/b(1), P5~~ KBH 08/03/2015
002f. paper	After the Policy Decision [partial] (2 pages)	ca. 10/26/1993	P1/b(1), ~~P5~~ VZ 6/11/2020

COLLECTION:
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([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3996

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0065 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina Humanitarian Assistance, October 28, 1993

2010-0533-M
kh538

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002g. paper	Agreements on Access (1 page)	ca. 10/26/1993	P1/b(1)
002h. paper	UNPROFOR: Rules of Engagement (1 page)	ca. 10/26/1993	P1/b(1)
002i. paper	Relief Items in Bosnia (2 pages)	ca. 10/26/1993	P1/b(1)
002j. paper	Tuzla Airport (2 pages)	ca. 10/26/1993	P1/b(1), ~~P5~~
002k. paper	U.S. Role in Humanitarian Assistance to the Former Yugoslavia (1 page)	ca. 10/26/1993	P1/b(1), ~~P5~~
002l. paper	Ex-Yugoslav Settlement (5 pages)	ca. 10/26/1993	P1/b(1), ~~P5~~
~~002m. memo~~	~~Jane Holl and Eric Schwartz to Samuel Berger re: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, Wednesday, October 27 (1 page)~~	~~10/22/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 02/06/2020
~~003a. paper~~	~~Summary/Introduction (1 page)~~	~~ca. 10/27/1993~~	~~P1/b(1), P5~~ VZ 02/06/2020
003b. paper	Agreements on Access for Humanitarian Convoys (2 pages)	ca. 10/27/1993	P1/b(1), ~~P5~~
003c. paper	Negotiators Owen and Stoltenberg (1 page)	ca. 10/27/1993	P1/b(1), ~~P5~~
003d. paper	Tuzla Airport (2 pages)	ca. 10/27/1993	P1/b(1), ~~P5~~

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
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FOLDER TITLE:
DC0065 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina Humanitarian Assistance, October 28, 1993

2010-0533-M
kh538

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003e. paper	UNPROFOR: Rules of Engagement (1 page)	ca. 10/27/1993	P1/b(1), ~~P5~~
003f. paper	U.S. Role in Humanitarian Assistance to the Former Yugoslavia (1 page)	ca. 10/27/1993	P1/b(1), ~~P5~~
003g. paper	Relief Items in Bosnia (2 pages)	ca. 10/27/1993	P1/b(1)
003h. paper	Expanded Needs (1 page)	ca. 10/27/1993	P1/b(1), ~~P5~~
004. memo	Eric Schwartz and Jane Holl to Samuel Berger re: Bosnia, Deputies Committee Meeting, Thursday, October 28, 1993 (2 pages)	10/28/1993	P1/b(1), ~~P5~~

COLLECTION:
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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9321141
RECEIVED: 29 OCT 93 11

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 01 NOV 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
DC
YUGOSLAVIA
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 28 OCT DC MTG ON BOSNIA - HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

ACTION: ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 02 NOV 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCHWARTZ LOGREF: 9321183 9321211

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0065 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		CLARKE
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		SCHWARTZ
		SODERBERG
		WALKER
		WRIGHT

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By KBH NARA, Date 4/5/2010
2010-0533-M

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSJDA CLOSED BY: NSMEM DOC 2 OF 2

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OCR'd 11/10/03 JD

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	93102920	FOR DECISION
001		X	93110110	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
002		X	93110110	ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	931101	FUERTH, L	
002	931101	GROSSMAN, M	
002	931101	MCALEER, R	
002	931101	INDERFURTH, K	
002	931101	LAUDER, J	
002	931101	PATRICK, T	
002	931101	WILLIAMS, A	

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TL -
There was very strong resistance to most of this from JCS. Please review before I send it out and press them to fulfill the undertakings.
SRT

recd 10-30 1:30 PM JWR

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: VA LOG # 21141 10/30

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (MH) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	1	VA	
ExecSec			
Staff Director	2	VA	
D/APNSA	3	~~Updated~~	mh
APNSA	4	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
~~Situation Room~~ Kenney	5	VA	Tab I
West Wing Desk	6		D per phone
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS: Soderberg Wright

99 OCT 30 PM 4:48

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

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National Security Council
The White House

1:30 PM JWR 10/30

PROOFED BY: WA LOG # 21141

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (MH) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	1	[illegible]	
ExecSec			
Staff Director	2	[illegible]	
D/APNSA	3	[illegible]	[illegible]
APNSA	4	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
~~Situation Room~~ Kenney	5	[illegible]	Tab I
West Wing Desk	6		D please
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty

Should be seen b

COMMENTS: Soderberg Wright

PL -
There was very strong resistance to most of this from JCS. Please review before I send it out and press them to fulfill the undertakings

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

ExecSec has diskette

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001c. cover sheet	National Security Council to U.S. United Nations, New York re: Summary of Conclusions [partial] (1 page)	ca. 11/01/1993	b(2)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3996

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0065 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina Humanitarian Assistance, October 28, 1993

2010-0533-M
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RESTRICTION CODES

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- ☐ IMMEDIATE
- ☐ PRIORITY
- ☑ ROUTINE

RELEASER: [signature]

DATE/TIME:

MESSAGE #: 196

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: ~~Notice of Meeting~~ SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS PAGES: 3

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	(b)(2)

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeleine Albright. If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 199
By KSI NARA, Date 4/5/20
2010-0533-M

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 1, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

COLONEL ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. AARON WILLIAMS
Executive Secretary
Agency for International Development

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Permanent Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance to Bosnia (C)

Attached at Tab A is the Summary of Conclusions of the Deputies Committee Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance on Thursday, October 28, 1993. (S)

for Kristie A. Kenney
William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended,
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By KBH NARA, Date 4/5/2010
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions of
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee
DATE: October 28, 1993
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 11:00 am - 12:30 pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee on Humanitarian Assistance to Bosnia (C)

PARTICIPANTS:

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Rick Saunders

State:
Peter Tarnoff
Charles Redman
Warren Zimmermann
Alexander Vershbow

DOD:
Walter Slocombe
Joe Krugel

USUN:
David Scheffer
Laura Bowman

CIA:
Douglas MacEachin
Gene Wicklund

JCS:
David Jeremiah
Barry McCaffrey

AID:
Carol Lancaster
Doug Stafford

White House:
Samuel Berger

NSC:
Jenonne Walker
Jane Holl
Eric Schwartz

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

-- although finding adequate humanitarian aid resources will continue to be a significant challenge, there is no imminent supply crisis. State will report to the Deputies in early December on whether a U.S. appeal to the EC (or other action to encourage donor support) is necessary. (C)

-- AID, with the assistance of the CIA and USUN, will examine provision of medical supplies and adequacy of medical facilities in Bosnia, with a view toward improving U.S. and international efforts to deliver medical assistance. AID will also evaluate the possibility of improving delivery through airdrops. (C)

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NSC 3/30/14 (1.90)
2010-0533-M

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-- OSD/JCS will report on the military requirements for providing air support for UNPROFOR pursuant to an EC decision to open a humanitarian corridor from Croatia through Central Bosnia to Sarajevo. The OSD/JCS paper should discuss an air support mission for the Metkovic-Sarajevo road, as well as other corridors through Central Bosnia that may be discussed at the EC summit on October 29. The paper should discuss different rules-of-engagement options for the air support mission and how these options differ from current USG policy on support of UNPROFOR. Finally, Deputies should discuss with Principals whether any consideration should be given to undertaking the opening of such a humanitarian corridor as a NATO operation. (S)

-- OSD/JCS, with the assistance of CIA and AID, will assess the current level of airdrops. What is the basis for the current level? Due to lack of access, are there critical and unmet humanitarian needs that could be addressed through increased levels of airdrops? Does the impending winter dictate that we, along with the international community, develop a contingent ability to increase airdrop levels at short notice? (C)

-- OVP will attempt to develop an immediate plan to ensure against exhaustion of potable water in Sarajevo, which appears to be an imminent possibility. In particular, OVP will examine how we might ensure delivery of fuel necessary to operate generators that pump water. (C)

-- OVP will inquire again with Bosnian officials in New York on their position regarding efforts to urge the Hungarians to cut the fuel pipeline to Belgrade. (S)

-- NSC staff, State and OVP will identify carrots and sticks we could use to persuade all parties to cooperate on humanitarian access and, in particular, to respect a new humanitarian corridor if the EC decides to open and operate one. Redman will pursue in discussions with Owen/Stoltenberg and the parties. (C)

-- OSD/JCS will examine the possibility and implications of authorizing the USG MASH unit in Zagreb to provide short-term care for small numbers of Bosnians prior to their being moved on to hospitals in Europe and the United States. OSD/JCS should include an implementation plan to permit such care, which should discuss means to limit excessive demands on the facility (such as by imposing numerical limitations, a requirement for rapid "through-put" and appropriate treatment criteria). (C)

Following the meeting, Berger requested additional action on one agenda item that was not discussed, the opening of Tuzla airport. It is requested that OSD/JCS, with the assistance of State, report on the feasibility and advisability of opening the airport in Tuzla, including options that do and do not include the involvement of USG in the opening or operating of the airport. (C)

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~~SECRET~~ 21141

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 29, 1993

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: RICHARD A. CLARKE
JENONNE R. WALKER

FROM: ERIC P. SCHWARTZ

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of the Deputies Committee Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance to Bosnia

Attached at Tab A is the Summary of Conclusions of the Deputies Committee Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance to Bosnia, held on Thursday, October 28, 1993, at 11:00 a.m.

Concurrence by: Jane Holl

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize William Itoh to forward the transmittal memo to his counterparts at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to Counterparts
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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E.O. 12958, As Amended,
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By KBH NARA, Date 4/5/2010

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions of
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee
DATE: October 28, 1993
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 11:00 am - 12:30 pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee on Humanitarian Assistance to Bosnia ~~(C)~~

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OVP:
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Rick Saunders

State:
Peter Tarnoff
Charles Redman
Warren Zimmermann
Alexander Vershbow

DOD:
Walter Slocombe
Joe Krugel

USUN:
David Scheffer
Laura Bowman

CIA:
Douglas MacEachin
Gene Wicklund

JCS:
David Jeremiah
Barry McCaffrey

AID:
Carol Lancaster
Doug Stafford

White House:
Samuel Berger

NSC:
Jenonne Walker
Jane Holl
Eric Schwartz

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BDS 9/3/2014 (1.11)
2013-0682-M

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-- OSD/JCS, with the assistance of CIA and ~~AID~~, will assess the current level of airdrops. What is the ~~justification~~ basis for the current level? Due to lack of access, are there critical and unmet humanitarian needs that could be addressed through increased levels of airdrops? Does the impending winter dictate that we, along with the international community, develop a contingent ability to ~~dramatically~~ increase airdrop levels at short notice? ~~(C)~~

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-- OVP will inquire again with Bosnian officials in New York on their position regarding efforts to urge the Hungarians to cut the fuel pipeline to Belgrade. ~~(S)~~

-- NSC staff, State and OVP will identify carrots and sticks we could use to persuade all parties to cooperate on humanitarian access and, in particular, to respect a new humanitarian corridor if the EC decides to open and operate one. ~~(C)~~

-- OSD/JCS will examine the possibility and implications of authorizing the USG MASH unit in Zagreb to provide short-term care for small numbers of Bosnians prior to their being moved on to hospitals in Europe and the United States. OSD/JCS should include an implementation plan to permit such care, which should discuss means to limit excessive demands on the facility (such as by imposing numerical limitations, a requirement for rapid "through-put" and appropriate treatment criteria). ~~(C)~~

Following the meeting, ~~Samuel~~ Berger requested additional action on one agenda item that was not discussed, the opening of Tuzla airport. It is requested that OSD/JCS, with the assistance of State, report on the feasibility and advisability of opening the airport in Tuzla. ~~The paper should examine~~ options that do and do not include the involvement of USG in the opening or operating of the airport. ~~(C)~~

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9321183
RECEIVED: 22 OCT 93 12

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 26 OCT 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA DC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA OF 28 OCT DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 26 OCT 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL LOGREF: 9321211 9321213

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0065 CODES:

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FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	93102521	FOR DECISION
001		X	93102612	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
002		X	93102612	KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	931026	FUERTH, L	
002	931026	GROSSMAN, M	
002	931026	MCALEER, R	
002	931026	LAUDER, J	
002	931026	PATRICK, T	
002	931026	INDERFURTH, K	

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Staff Director			
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APNSA			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	~~1~~ 4	JDA 10/26	D
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MESSAGE NO. 2110 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 29

FROM WILLIAM H ITOH (NAME) 456-6534 (PHONE NUMBER) _____ (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION DC MTG ON 27 OCT

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TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	MARC GROSSMAN		
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. cover sheet	National Security Council to U.S. United Nations, New York re: Notice of Meeting [partial] (1 page)	ca. 10/26/1993	b(2)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3996

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0065 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina Humanitarian Assistance, October 28, 1993

2010-0533-M
kh538

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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MESSAGE #: 189

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting PAGES: 29

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By KBM NARA, Date 4/5/2010
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 26, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COLONEL ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

CAPTAIN T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

There will be a Deputies Committee Meting on Bosnia, October 27, 1993, at 11:00am in the White House Situation Room. Supporting materials for the meeting are attached as indicated. Deputies should review the attached papers in order to determine next steps in three areas: supply, access, and security (while access and security are obviously related, reaching areas of Bosnia could be an issue of more trucks as well as safer routes). (S)

Access will be the critical issue; therefore, Deputies should think about how to push the envelope, e.g. by getting UNPROFOR countries to make full use of their mandate; whether to open Tuzla airport; how and where to increase airdrops, etc. Moreover, since Croat-Bosnian fighting in Central Bosnia has intensified, we should explore which of our ideas for promoting Muslim-Croat rapprochement (Tab I) would help most rapidly to improve security conditions there. (S)

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 2/6/2020
2013-0682-M (1.14)

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While access may be the critical issue, we should not assume that resources will be adequate absent a big diplomatic push from us; donor fatigue will be a problem. If UNHCR projections fall short, we may want to consider whether to assume a more active role in soliciting humanitarian help from others. ~~(S)~~

for Kristie A. Kenney
William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab A	Agenda
Tab B	Prospects for the Winter
Tab C	Access: Humanitarian Aid Options
Tab D	Agreement for Access
Tab E	UNPROFOR: ROE
Tab F	Prepositioning Relief
Tab G	Opening Tuzla Airport
Tab H	The U.S. Role
Tab I	Promoting Muslim-Croat Rapprochement

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A.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002c. agenda	Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)	10/27/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3996

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0065 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina Humanitarian Assistance, October 28, 1993

2010-0533-M
kh538

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002d. paper	Re: Bosnian Humanitarian Situation (3 pages)	10/05/1993	P1/b(1), P5

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3996

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0065 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina Humanitarian Assistance, October 28, 1993

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ISSUE PAPER

HUMANITARIAN AID OPTIONS

When the Bosnian Parliament voted to accept the Geneva Peace Plan but placed conditions which in effect rejected the plan, hopes dimmed for a peaceful settlement in Bosnia prior to the winter and last winter's concerns over a humanitarian have been resurrected. Last year mild weather and unidentified reserves of food helped to avert disaster, but we cannot hope for a repeat of the mild weather this year. And with the reserves of food and body fat depleted before the winter begins, the requirements are even greater this year. UNHCR has identified a shortfall of US$ 172 million for Oct-Dec 1993 and a requirement for US$ 566 million for Jan-Jun 1994, but their donor appeal will go out next week and the US and the international community will doubtless respond.

The real key to averting humanitarian disaster this winter is the thorny issue of access. Once the international community responds to UNHCR's appeal, how do the resources get to the target populations in the face of inclement weather and sporadic or continuous hostilities? UNHCR has been so concerned with the dangers that aid delivery poses to their workers, that they have been negotiating with UNPROFOR to turn over aid delivery to the UN peacekeepers. Some of the key questions concerning access are addressed below, followed by a more in-depth description of the security situation and numerous "solutions" to help alleviate the access problem.

Key Questions:

Can anyone guarantee access?

The short answer is no. Aside from the decreased access expected due to winter weather, the constant threat of hostilities has turned access into a cat and mouse game. Access is dependent not only on the political parties' current support for access, but also on each local war lord.

What can be done to increase the likelihood that aid reaches the target population?

Access can be increased by using force, or bribery, but it cannot be guaranteed. The likelihood of UNPROFOR using force to deliver aid is nonexistent, and short of a US decision to unilaterally ensure the delivery of aid, force will probably not be a viable option. Bribery, providing carrots to the warring parties, in exchange for their guarantee of access may have a slightly higher chance for success.

What would be the effect of lifting/suspending sanctions?

The Serbian economy is in dire straights and Milosevic's willingness to pressure the Bosnian Serbs in the most recent round of peace talks was more than likely fueled by his hope that sanctions would be lifted. Even a partial lifting of sanctions, to include such commodities as heating oil, might prove to be a powerful carrot for Milosevic. The

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8/3/15 KBH (1.16)

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question is how much leverage he ultimately has not only over Karadzic, but over the various Bosnian Serb warlords.

What leverage is there over the Bosnian Croats?

There may be several avenues to encourage Croatia to pressure the Bosnian Croats to allow free access for humanitarian aid. Some of these include the threat of sanctions and the offer of economic assistance. Once again, the question is how much leverage Croatia has over the Bosnian Croat warlords. The threat of airstrikes against all three parties is more direct, but failure to carry out this threat in the past has weakened its effectiveness.

What leverage is there over the Bosnian Serbs?

While Serbia is concerned with the lifting of sanctions, the Bosnian Serbs have not felt the same hurt, particularly as they have been able to siphon off significant humanitarian assistance to keep their people and their armies feed and fueled. More likely leverage would exist if there is some way to make the Bosnian Serbs actually feel the pinch of the Serbian sanctions. The threat of airstrikes remains as a paper tiger.

What leverage is there to prevent Muslim instigated clashes?

Perhaps the greatest leverage would be the threat to cut off all humanitarian assistance to Bosnia. However, this is an option which makes us out to be the bad guys. The international community, and the US in particular, can reiterate that no western power will use military force to settle the war, and at the same time reiterate the threat of airstrikes against any party which prevents the delivery of humanitarian aid.

If security of LOCs is not likely, what can be done to increase airlift/airdrop effectiveness?

Unfortunately the coming winter means a decrease rather than an increase in the effectiveness of airlift and airdrop as a means to deliver humanitarian aid. In November, December, and January 30% of the flying days will be lost to inclement weather. In February and March the number declines to a loss of 20% of the flying days.

What are the limitations of airlift/airdrop?

All of the airfields are limited to daylight hours of operation. To increase the airflow into Sarajevo would require increased personnel for ground operations. If Tuzla is opened, the airport is limited to one C-141 or three C-130s on the ground at any one time. Airdrop of anything other than food or medicine is a difficult operation and presents numerous challenges and risks. For both airland and airdrop operations, increases would entail significant resource commitments.

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The Issue--Access and Security, not Resources:

The Security Situation:

The Bosnian people needing humanitarian assistance are located in isolated pockets dispersed to numerous parts of the land-locked country. The UNHCR's major distribution centers for humanitarian assistance are in Serbia (Belgrade) and Croatia (Metkovic on the Dalmatian coast and Zagreb). Land convoys from these centers are necessary in order for the resources to reach the target population in any volume. These convoys can be and are augmented by airland into Sarajevo and airdrop into some of the enclaves. However, land access is mandatory for the volume of aid required, especially with the requirement for winterization materials.

The roads linking the enclaves with each other and the distribution centers have been under attack for 18 months. Bridges are out, roads have been mined, repair work is at a virtual standstill. In addition to the physical problems, convoys are turning back to avoid fighting, and being denied access by the different factions. The onset of inclement weather will make convoy passage of these roads even more difficult.

The program director of Britain's aid effort in the former Yugoslavia reported on the serious shortage of diesel fuel facing all of Bosnia, and highlighted the threat to Tuzla because it has one of the largest resident and refugee populations and is at the far end of one of the most tortuous and vulnerable supply routes. His report predicted winter weather conditions and continued fighting would threaten to close all road access to Tuzla. In assessing the needs of Tuzla, the British director believed that Tuzla would need relief flights even if some road access is kept.

If access is denied for any significant period of time, it will have a devastating impact on the population and will probably lead to a humanitarian disaster. The magnitude of the disaster will depend on how completely access is denied, how long it is denied, and which population centers are denied. In Srebrenica, for example, most of the enclave families have sufficient food stocks to last them for about 2 or 3 days.

The Bosnian Serbs: In the past few weeks, the Bosnian Serbs have allowed relatively free access to UNHCR convoys transiting to Sarajevo and the eastern Muslim enclaves. It is generally agreed that this loosening of the noose around these cities is due in part to the threat of NATO airstrikes, but perhaps even more directly to the recent hopes of a peace settlement. The Bosnian Serbs have acquired the territory they set out to control, and it was in their and Serbia's best interest to appear as ready and willing participants in the peace process and as aiding in humanitarian efforts, in the anticipation of the lifting of sanctions and acceptance into the greater world community. Even at the height of cooperation, fuel convoys did not move, because UNHCR feared that the Serbs, short of fuel due to sanctions, would siphon off an unacceptable percentage as a "tax". Since the rejection of the peace plan by the Bosnian Parliament, the shelling and gunfire

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around Sarajevo have definitely increased, and there is the expectation that Serbian cooperation in the humanitarian arena will probably quickly diminish.

The Bosnian Croats: Since the middle of August, few convoys have departed Metkovic (UNHCR's central distribution center on the Dalmatian coast) and reached their destination. The siege of Mostar is a prime example of how continued hostilities in the central and southern region have prevented convoys from reaching the target populations. Airdrops were used as a last ditch effort to prevent starvation in the Muslim sector, and when a land convoy was finally allowed through after extensive negotiations, a large portion of the food and supplies had to be delivered to the Croat western sector of Mostar, even though the situation there was infinitely better than that in the Muslim sector. Last week Sarajevo received its first convoy from Metkovic since the middle of August. The convoy used a circuitous route that would probably be impassable in winter. Despite a new cease-fire in Mostar, there is no reason to believe that hostilities will decrease to the extent required to allow free access for humanitarian convoys.

The Muslims: Despite the fact that it is the Muslim population that is in most dire need of humanitarian assistance, the very hostilities which prevent the delivery of this assistance are often sparked by Muslim offensives against the Bosnian Croat forces. The Muslims are equally responsible for the breaking of numerous cease-fires and have reportedly detained and delayed convoys for extensive searches.

Inclement Weather: The deteriorating roads into Sarajevo and the Muslim enclaves are made even more hazardous by sporadic or continual fighting, and mining of the roads. This winter, mud, snow, and ice will cause road conditions to deteriorate seriously. Damage to bridges around the major transportation centers will force UN convoys to use secondary roads through the mountains, where travel will be very slow and difficult. In addition, the airland and airdrop operations will become more difficult as the pilots must not only worry about potential evasive action against enemy fire, but also must deal with the cloudy, stormy weather rife with wind shears, poor visibility and other hazards which will cause the cancellation of many missions, and make those that aren't more treacherous.

Scope of Requirements:

The UN estimates that up to 3.4 million people throughout the former Yugoslavia will require assistance. The up to 2.5 million people requiring assistance in Bosnia will need 45.000 metric tons of food and 11,000 metric tons of nonfood assistance (medicines, fuel, shelters, and heaters) each month. Over the course of the winter, this could amount to nearly 300,000 metric tons.

The World Food Program (WFP) has adequate supplies of most commodities for Bosnia through the end of the year. Because of earmarking, some areas, particularly Serbia and Montenegro are experiencing shortages of many commodities, but these issues can be worked. UNHCR has announced a $172 million shortfall for Oct-Dec 1993 and

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requirement for $577 million for Jan-Jun 1994, but the real issue is not one of adequate resources, but one of access. The critical shortage of fuel, which will have repercussions on everything from distribution of resources, to heating and providing medical care, is again a problem of access, not resource availability. While we cannot ignore the upcoming donor's call, and must participate along with other countries and the EC in responding to it, the majority of our efforts should be focused on how we can increase the likelihood of successful access to the target population.

Possible "Solutions" to alleviate the problem of access:

All of the proffered solutions fall into one of three categories. The first category involves increasing the likelihood of access by opening up more routes, adding methods of delivery, or adding resources. The second category uses force to increase the likelihood of access. In either case, however, there is no guarantee of access to all areas at all times. The third category uses bribery or diplomacy to get concessions from the parties to allow free access. Because the three political leaders do not have control over all of the forces, agreement by these parties will need to be augmented with their escorts to ensure the aid gets through. Whatever action is taken, the weather and the support of the three warring parties will greatly influence the success of the operation. Several actions may increase the likelihood of success.

Increasing Resources:

1. Preposition at least a month's supply of aid:

One hedge against inclement weather is to preposition at least a month's supply to carry populations through the times when storms and road conditions prevent convoys and aircraft delivery. UNHCR is already attempting to do this, but have been unable to make much headway. There may be two weeks of supplies in Sarajevo and three weeks in Tuzla, but most enclaves are consuming supplies as rapidly as they are receiving them. Even now, with relatively good access from Belgrade, next week's food supplies are competing for convoy space with winter parkas and other winterization supplies.

2. Increase Airlift into Sarajevo:

The United Nations currently averages 20 airland missions per day into Sarajevo. The delivery of food and medicines is the top priority. The US has provided approximately 35 percent of the total airland mission sorties. All 15 US C-130s operating into Bosnia are equipped with defensive systems to counter ground-to-air threats. These are the only Air Force airlift C-130s with counter measure equipment.

Increasing daily US operations tempo will be very difficult. Of the 15 C-130s operating out of Rhein-Main, 12 are generally operational day-to-day. Six are dedicated to airdrop operations. Increasing the airland flow at Sarajevo will require an increase in manpower on the ground to turn the aircraft and remove the cargo. The US has steadfastly refused to increase forces on the ground at Sarajevo or in Bosnia. If the decision is made to increase airlift operations into Sarajevo, it should be a NATO

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operation, with USNATO putting forward the request for additional assets. Presuming the US does not want to put US personnel on the ground, we would have to convince allies to contribute ground personnel to augment the airfield ground operations.

Inclement weather between October and March will also have an affect on the ability to deliver via airland and airdrop. During November, December, and January, we can expect to lose 30% of the flying days due to weather. In February and March this will probably drop to 20% of the flying days lost due to weather.

3. Increase Airdop:

Currently six US C-130s and 2 C-160s (1 German and 1 French) participate in airdrop operations. The US has provided approximately 80% of the airdrop sorties. Eight sorties are considered a maximum generation effort based on current ground support at Rhein-Main and the complexity of night operations to three separate drop zones in Bosnia.

Almost any commodity can be airdropped if it is packaged correctly. However, this is an extremely expensive option for delivery of supplies. Deliveries of food, MREs and Humanitarian Daily Rations (HDRs),and medicine using the TRIAD method of delivery have been extremely successful. However, the dropping of other than food and medicine items present potential challenges and risks. Fuel bladders are a scarce commodity, and coal would present significant processing and loading problems. Heavy equipment and large bundle airdrops require drop zones clear of populated areas for safety, and then the goods are difficult or unsafe to retrieve. The only exception to this is the TRIAD delivery of food, limited to MREs and Humanitarian Daily Rations (HDRs).

4. Open Tuzla Airport:

Since Tuzla is a center of distribution for humanitarian aid, opening the airport would increase access to a large area in central Bosnia. However, there are several drawbacks and limiting factors to this option. The airport is small with the capability to handle only one C-141/ or three C-130 on the ground at a time.

Despite the small capacity which will not offer a significant increase to deliveries, it will take additional personnel on the ground to secure and operate the airport and the ground operation. The Nordic Battalion stationed at Tuzla is now able to provide limited security for the airfield. The battalion commander has stated they intend to secure and control the Tuzla airport, but currently the Bosnia Muslims (BIH) are unwilling to leave. Unless they leave, the Serbs will continue to have an excuse to attack it and the commander will not take control.

The remaining problem is to provide engineering support for the maintenance of the field and navigational aids for inclement weather. These personnel would need to be provided by UNPROFOR. Again, if the US does not want to put US personnel on the ground in Bosnia, we will have to convince another country to provide those people. One of the other limitations that Tuzla is currently experiencing in aid distribution is their

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shortage of fuel. In addition to the fact that there would not be fuel on the ground for any aircraft, fuel would have to be brought in, either by land or air, for use by the convoys in distributing their humanitarian aid to the outlying areas.

5. Use Helicopters:

The use of helicopters to airlift supplies into enclaves could possibly augment ground convoys. However, the helicopters are limited by weather, range, and altitude restrictions, and would require extensive logistical and personnel support at either a land base in Croatia or Serbia or aboard naval shipping in the Adriatic. In any helicopter operation, deployment schedules, contingency commitments, and security requirements must be analyzed before the decision to deploy is made.

6. Send In a Civil Affairs Assessment Team:

Send a Civil Affairs survey team to Bosnia to make an assessment of the needs for survival through the winter. Identify required items other than food (for example, batteries.) Then have the team regroup in Zagreb or Belgrade to develop a distribution plan. (Ask OFDA if the DART has already done or if they see a need for this.) If they don't already have a good tracking system to record final end user distribution, set up the system used for Provide HOPE.

7. Provide Additional Equipment to Open Routes:

Last year the US provided excess equipment, including snow removal equipment for Sarajevo. Additional road graders and snow plows would help to keep roads open during inclement weather, or reopen them shortly thereafter. We could also lobby for increased UNPROFOR engineer support to assist in keeping the roads passable, assuming we don't want to provide US engineering support.

8. Increase Engineer Support:

On option is to lobby with our allies to provide additional engineering personnel to UNPROFOR to assist in keeping the roads passable. Another option would be to provide US engineering support on a temporary basis to repair roads before the onset of winter.

Use of Force:

9. Deliver Humanitarian Aid Using Force:

Another option is to apply pressure to UNPROFOR to use all means available, including force, to deliver humanitarian aid. This would not require any additional UN action, nor any US troops in Bosnia, if current UNPROFOR forces are used to implement this option. To maximize resources, two key routes could be identified, probably one from Belgrade and one from Metkovic, and forces used to provide security for convoys using these routes. One option already under discussion would be for UNHCR to hand over the delivery of aid to UNPROFOR.

The most difficult part from the US perspective is convincing the countries with troops on the ground to take this action, while not providing any US forces in Bosnia.

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Key NATO allies have indicated they have not changed their position on the use of force to deliver aid. Currently our allies see the availability of resources as the most critical problem, and have not focused on how the collapse of the Geneva talks would affect humanitarian assistance.

Use of Diplomacy/"Bribery":

10. Negotiating a Humanitarian Agreement:

With the prospects dimming for an overall peace agreement before winter, negotiators could expend their energies on a regional conference on humanitarian assistance. Attention would focus on the issue of how we can lay a political framework for humanitarian relief operations. Before initiating relief operations, we should explore the feasibility of preserving the termination of hostilities between Serbs and Bosnians as well as achieving a cease-fire between Bosnians and Croats, without trying to settle the issue of final land distribution. Terminating hostilities throughout Bosnia will not be easy. Whether the warring parties will display the flexibility will depend on two factors: domestic political constraints, and the degree to which diplomatic pressure can be brought to bear outside the region to overcome those domestic constraints. The weight of the international community, including such key players as Russia and Greece for Serbia; Germany for Croatia; and the US for Bosnia, must be brought to bear at the negotiating table. The London Conference on Yugoslavia outlined last August several specific steps to enhance delivery of humanitarian assistance.

It may be possible to achieve agreement on free access if humanitarian aid is freely offered to all parties. Some sort of a delivery formula could be developed that allowed one Serbian or Croatian convoy for every three Muslim convoys. Agreement on such a scheme by all three political parties will not guarantee free access of humanitarian aid deliveries, however, because these parties do not have control over the various warlords fighting the individual battles. To ensure access through these areas, the three belligerents may well have to provide escort through their territories.

Potential Leverage Dealing with the Bosnian Serbs:

1. Temporarily suspend sanctions on humanitarian goods, such as heating oil and coal, through the winter, on the condition of free access to the Bosnian target population.
2. Increase humanitarian aid to the refugee population in Serbia and Montenegro.
3. Use Russia to influence Serbian assistance.
4. Reiterate the threat of airstrikes.
5. Look for ways to make sanctions felt by Bosnian Serbs.
6. Make humanitarian aid to Serbia contingent upon free access to the Muslim areas.

Potential Leverage Dealing with the Bosnian Croats:

1. Reiterate the threat of sanctions.
2. Reiterate the threat of airstrikes.

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3. Convince Croatia to pressure the Bosnian Croats by offering Croatia specific economic assistance conditioned on humanitarian aid access to Bosnia.

4. Support the Vance Plan for the UNPAs.

Potential Leverage Dealing with the Muslims:

1. Reiterate that no western power, including the US will use military force to settle the war in Bosnia.

2. State that no humanitarian aid will flow to central Bosnia when hostilities are underway. Place the blame on the Muslims when they are the instigators.

Attachments:

A. After the Policy Decision: Getting the Word Out (PSYOPs and Public Affairs)
B. Winter Assessment (DIA)
C. NATO Perspectives on Humanitarian Assistance (NATO Policy)
D. Bosnian Winter Climatology Report (USAF/XOOOW)
E. Message ICFY Humanitarian Issues

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002f. paper	After the Policy Decision [partial] (1 page)	ca. 10/26/1993	P1/b(1)

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Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
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OA/Box Number: 3996

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0065 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina Humanitarian Assistance, October 28, 1993

2010-0533-M
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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After the Policy Decision, Getting the Word Out:

For All Three Warring Factions:

1. In coordination with the UN and NATO, undertake a major public diplomacy initiative using all available means to gain international support for necessary UN and NATO actions to ensure the provision of humanitarian assistance to needy recipients throughout the FRY. Concurrently, begin 1.4(a) campaign to promote the concept that humanitarian aid is dependent upon all parties ceasing combat operations. Reiterate our position that interference with our air operations and/or UNPROFOR may result in retaliatory air strikes. This policy should be made known by public statements and by leaflet drops on drop zones and along the resupply corridors. 1.4(a) EO 13526 1.4a 1.4(a)

2. UNHCR and UNPROFOR have demonstrated no ability to mount an effective public information campaign to communicate their mission persuasively to local citizens and others, so as to enlist their support. US military EO 13526 1.4a could provide EO 13526 1.4a to assist UNPROFOR in developing such a campaign, to include providing public service announcements for local radio and television, prerecorded messages for UNPROFOR loudspeakers, informational materials to be handed out at food distribution points, etc. The number of individuals required to design and put in place such a campaign need not be large, nor would they necessarily have to operate on the ground in Bosnia - Zagreb might in fact be preferable, in terms of access to commercial print facilities and recording studios. The key, however, would be recognition on the part of UNPROFOR that they needed such help and a strong commitment to implement the campaign once it was developed.

For the US Public and Allies:

Public interest and corresponding news media coverage of the humanitarian aid situation in the former Yugoslavia will be directly related to the degree of United States policy change and level of U.S. commitment to a new or expanded course of action.

Policy announcements from the United Nations, White House, Defense or State Departments regarding the former Yugoslavia will receive automatic national and international coverage by the respective press corps which cover these institutions. Current events in Somalia will obviously color how the media and public perceive actions with respect to the former Yugoslavia. Any action which places additional numbers of people and/or lift resources in the former Yugoslavia will generate a brief, but intense level

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of news media interest, both at air/sea ports and within Bosnia, Croatia or Serbia. The story line will evolve from donor nations' decisions to increase aid, the challenges in delivering it to target populations, and whether the aid was received and the impact on the survival of the target population. Once the humanitarian system reaches the stage of routine operations, the media located outside the former Yugoslavia will lose interest. A certain level of media interest is guaranteed by those based in Belgrade, Zagreb or Sarajevo.

Interagency Public Affairs planning should focus on the following stages:

- Washington announcement of humanitarian aid "campaign" for FRY during winter of 1993.
- Background briefings at DoD and State on procurement of food, medicine and supplies, operational concept for delivery and number of military/civilians involved.
- Develop policy for news media coverage of operations and establish on-scene press operation at affect air bases/ports to facilitate coverage.
- Liaison with UNHCR, UNPROFOR, and NGOs/PVOs to ensure consistency of press guidance.
- Update operation status through daily Washington press briefings and in-theater briefings as required.

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002g. paper	Agreements on Access (1 page)	ca. 10/26/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3996

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0065 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina Humanitarian Assistance, October 28, 1993

2010-0533-M
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002h. paper	UNPROFOR: Rules of Engagement (1 page)	ca. 10/26/1993	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002i. paper	Relief Items in Bosnia (2 pages)	ca. 10/26/1993	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002j. paper	Tuzla Airport (2 pages)	ca. 10/26/1993	P1/b(1), P5

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002k. paper	U.S. Role in Humanitarian Assistance to the Former Yugoslavia (1 page)	ca. 10/26/1993	P1/b(1), P5

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OA/Box Number: 3996

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
0021. paper	Ex-Yugoslav Settlement (5 pages)	ca. 10/26/1993	P1/b(1), P5

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21183

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 22, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: JANE E. HOLL/ERIC SCHWARTZ

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, Wednesday, October 27, 11:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m., White House Situation Room

Attached at Tab I is the memorandum to agencies for the subject meeting.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve ____ Disapprove ____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to Agencies
Tab A Agenda
Tab B Prospects for the Winter
Tab C Access: Humanitarian Aid Options
Tab D Agreement for Access
Tab E UNPROFOR: ROE
Tab F Prepositioning Relief
Tab G Opening Tuzla Airport
Tab H The U.S. Role
Tab I Promoting Muslim-Croat Rapprochement

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By ____ NARA, Date 2/6/2020
2013-0682-M

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9321211
RECEIVED: 28 OCT 93 07

TO: ITOH

FROM: GROSSMAN, M

DOC DATE: 27 OCT 93
SOURCE REF: 9324761

KEYWORDS: YUGOSLAVIA
HUMAN RIGHTS
BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DISCUSSION PAPERS FOR 28 OCT DC MTGON ON FORMER YUGOSLAVIA HUMANITARIAN ISSUES

ACTION: SEE 9321213 FOR FINAL ACTION DUE DATE: 01 NOV 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL LOGREF: 9321183 9321213

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0065 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		CLARKE
		HOLL
		NSC CHRON
		SCHWARTZ

COMMENTS: _____

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E.O. 12958, As Amended,
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By KBH NARA, Date 4/5/2010
2010-0533-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	HOLL	Z	93102807	PREPARE MEMO FOR ITOH
001		X	93102917	SEE 9321213 FOR FINAL ACTION

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RECORD ID: 9321211
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DOC DATE: 27 OCT 93
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KEYWORDS: YUGOSLAVIA
HUMAN RIGHTS
BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DISCUSSION PAPERS - HUMANITARIAN ISSUES IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR ITOH DUE DATE: 01 NOV 93 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL LOGREF:

FILES: IFM NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
HOLL	CLARKE	GROSS
	SCHWARTZ	KRECZKO
		MERCHANT
		ROSNER
		WALKER

COMMENTS: Integrated into PR 21213

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OPENED BY: NSJDA CLOSED BY: DOC 1 OF 1

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2010-0533-M

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9324761 2/211

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 27, 1993

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DECL: OADR

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Discussion Papers -- Humanitarian Issues in the former Yugoslavia

Forwarded herewith are Discussion Papers prepared by the Humanitarian Working Group on Assistance to the Former Yugoslavia. Pursuant to the daily teleconference on the former Yugoslavia, we received this tasking from the NSC by telephone for use in a Deputies' Committee meeting to be held October 28, 1993. These papers have been cleared with other agencies, as appropriate.

Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

for Marc Grossman
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended,
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By KBH NARA, Date 4/5/2010
2010-0533-M

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SUMMARY/INTRODUCTION

The enclosed discussion papers, relevant to the 1993-94 winter humanitarian crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina (B-H), provide background and address steps and decisions that could be taken to facilitate the relief effort. They reflect the input of those USG offices and agencies engaged in B-H humanitarian programs, taking account of the latest findings by State Department Assistant Secretary Zimmermann after his travel to Geneva and Zagreb only ten days ago.

Security and Access

A. Agreements on Access for Humanitarian Convoys among Factions in the Former Yugoslavia

Strategies to Overcome Obstacles to Relief Delivery

B. Press Negotiators Owen and Stoltenberg to Give Humanitarian Access and Relief Top Priority

C. Augmentation of Delivery Options: Opening Tuzla Airport

D. UNPROFOR: Rules of Engagement

Relief Supplies/Roles/Funding

E. U.S. Role in Humanitarian Assistance to the former Yugoslavia

F. Prepositioning Relief Items in Bosnia

G. Sources of Additional Funding: No Good Options

Tabs: as indicated above

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 2/6/2020

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. paper	Agreements on Access for Humanitarian Convoys (2 pages)	ca. 10/27/1993	P1/b(1), P5

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3996

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0065 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina Humanitarian Assistance, October 28, 1993

2010-0533-M
kh538

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003c. paper	Negotiators Owen and Stoltenberg (1 page)	ca. 10/27/1993	P1/b(1), P5

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3996

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0065 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina Humanitarian Assistance, October 28, 1993

2010-0533-M
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003d. paper	Tuzla Airport (2 pages)	ca. 10/27/1993	P1/b(1), P5

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3996

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0065 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina Humanitarian Assistance, October 28, 1993

2010-0533-M
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003e. paper	UNPROFOR: Rules of Engagement (1 page)	ca. 10/27/1993	P1/b(1), P5

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3996

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0065 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina Humanitarian Assistance, October 28, 1993

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003f. paper	U.S. Role in Humanitarian Assistance to the Former Yugoslavia (1 page)	ca. 10/27/1993	P1/b(1), P5

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3996

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0065 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina Humanitarian Assistance, October 28, 1993

2010-0533-M
kh538

RESTRICTION CODES

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003g. paper	Relief Items in Bosnia (2 pages)	ca. 10/27/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3996

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0065 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina Humanitarian Assistance, October 28, 1993

2010-0533-M
kh538

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003h. paper	Expanded Needs (1 page)	ca. 10/27/1993	P1/b(1), P5

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3996

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0065 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina Humanitarian Assistance, October 28, 1993

2010-0533-M
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RECEIVED: 28 OCT 93 08

TO: BERGER

FROM: HOLL
SCHWARTZ

DOC DATE: 26 OCT 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
HUMAN RIGHTS

DC
YUGOSLAVIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MTG DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 28 OCT DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER DUE DATE: 01 NOV 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL LOGREF: 9321183 9321211

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0065 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		CLARKE
		HOLL
		NSC CHRON
		SCHWARTZ
		WALKER

COMMENTS: _____

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E.O. 12958, As Amended,
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By KBH NARA, Date 4/5/2010
2010-0533-M

~~SECRET~~ RECORD ID: 9321213

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	93102815	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	93102815	NOTED BY BERGER

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National Security Council
The White House

JAR 10/28

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ExecSec			
Staff Director			
D/APNSA	2	**Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen**	
APNSA			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	AOK 10/28	R
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

cc: NS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. memo	Eric Schwartz and Jane Holl to Samuel Berger re: Bosnia, Deputies Committee Meeting, Thursday, October 28, 1993 (2 pages)	10/28/1993	P1/b(1), P5

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3996

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0065 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina Humanitarian Assistance, October 28, 1993

2010-0533-M
kh538

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See also 2013-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title: DC0070 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina Humanitarian Assistance, November 16, 1993				
Staff Office-Individual: Records Management				
Original OA/ID Number: 3996				
Row: 43	Section: 4	Shelf: 5	Position: 3	Stack: V

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)~~	~~11/16/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RDS 09/03/2014
002. report	re: Zagreb U.S. Military Hospital Treatment Criteria (1 page)	11/22/1993	P1/b(1)
~~003a. report~~	~~re: Airdrops in Bosnia-Hercegovina (3 pages)~~	~~11/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003b. list~~	~~re: DART/Zagreb's Airdrop Locations (2 pages)~~	~~11/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~004. memo~~	~~[Duplicate of 001] [incomplete copy] (1 page)~~	~~11/16/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
005. memo	Jenonne Walker to Samuel Berger re: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (5 pages)	11/12/1993	P1/b(1)
006a. paper	re: Issues for Decision (2 pages)	11/1993	P1/b(1)
006b. paper	re: EC Proposal for Securing Bosnia Aid Corridors (2 pages)	11/1993	P1/b(1)
006c. paper	re: Humanitarian Relief Access (5 pages)	11/1993	P1/b(1)
~~006d. memo~~	~~re: Air Support Requirements to Support (2 pages)~~	~~11/08/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 08/03/2015
~~006e. paper~~	~~re: Air Support Requirements for French-Sponsored (3 pages)~~	~~11/03/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 08/03/2015
~~006f. paper~~	~~re: Increasing Humanitarian Aid Airdrops (3 pages)~~	~~11/09/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 08/03/2015

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3996

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0070 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina Humanitarian Assistance, November 16, 1993

2010-0533-M
rs661

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006g. paper	re: Opening Tuzla Airport (2 pages)	11/09/1993	P1/b(1)
006h. paper	re: Proposed Airlift to Tuzla Airfield (2 pages)	11/08/1993	P1/b(1)
006i. memo	Leon Fuerth to Samuel Berger re: Sanctions and the Humanitarian Situation in Serbia (2 pages)	11/08/1993	P1/b(1)
006j. paper	re: Humanitarian Assistance for Serbia and Montenegro (2 pages)	11/09/1993	P1/b(1)
006k. paper	re: Winter Medical Needs in Bosnia and Hercegovina (3 pages)	11/03/1993	P1/b(1)
~~006l. paper~~	~~re: Expansion of Mission-US Hospital Zagreb (2 pages)~~	~~10/29/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 08/03/2015
~~006m. memo~~	~~Yugoslav Task Force to Under Secretary of Defense for Policy re: Medical Options for Croatia (2 pages)~~	~~11/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 08/03/2015
~~006n. letter~~	~~Klaus Kinkel and Alan Juppe to Willy Claes (4 pages)~~	~~11/07/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
006o. paper	re: Proposed Presidential Appeal for "A Winter Humanitarian Truce" (1 page)	11/08/1993	P1/b(1)
~~006p. cable~~	~~re: Goulding Conveys Request for "Humanitarian Truce" in B-H (3 pages)~~	~~11/04/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
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FOLDER TITLE:
DC0070 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina Humanitarian Assistance, November 16, 1993

2010-0533-M
rs661

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
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b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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RECORD ID: 9321303
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TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 22 NOV 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA DC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 16 NOV DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 20 NOV 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF: 9321265 9321282

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0070 CODES:

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FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		CICIO
		DARBY
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
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		WALKER
		WRIGHT

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By KC NARA, Date 9/24/2019
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DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	93111810	FOR DECISION
001		X	93112216	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
001	ITOH	Z	93112216	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	93112218	KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	931122	FUERTH, L	
002	931122	GROSSMAN, M	
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002	931122	LAUDER, J	
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FROM: WALKER

DOC DATE: 17 NOV 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA DC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 16 NOV DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: FOR DECISION DUE DATE: 20 NOV 93 STATUS: X

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF:

FILES: IFM NSCP: CODES: BOS

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	(Anne) 1		A
ExecSec			
Staff Director	2		
D/APNSA		Deputy Nat'l Sec Advisor has seen	
APNSA			
~~Situation Room~~ Kenney	3		Tab I
West Wing Desk	4	(MH) 11/22	D
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS: cc: NS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

ExecSec has DISC.

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The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
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ExecSec			
Staff Director	Cyp 2		
D/APNSA		Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
APNSA			
Kenney/ ~~Situation Room~~	3		Tab I
West Wing Desk	4	(AH) 11/22	D
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

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93 12:47

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LOG 9321303
DATE 22 NOV 93

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 16 NOV DC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA JIM CARMEN ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506			COPY: 1
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AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: KATHY KLINE ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW			COPY: VIA FAX

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 22, 1993

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COLONEL ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

CAPTAIN T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, November 16, 1993 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

for William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By KL NARA, Date 9/24/2019
2013-0682-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of NSC Deputies Committee
DATE: November 16, 1993
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 4:00pm - 5:00pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

The Vice President's Office:
Leon Fuerth

State:
Peter Tarnoff
Stephen Oxman
Warren Zimmerman

DOD
Frank Wisner
Darrell Johnson

CIA
Douglas MacEachin
Oliver Wicklund

JCS
Barry McCaffrey
James Hill

USUN
David Scheffer
Laura Bowman

SPECIAL ENVOY
Charles Redman

AID
Frank Almaguer
Douglas Stafford

White House
Samuel R. Berger

NSC
Jenonne Walker

Summary of Conclusions

A. Humanitarian Issues

Deputies will recommend to Principals that we should:

1. Reiterate our existing commitment for Close Air Support to UNPROFOR. Specifically, we should tell the French that so far as we are concerned our existing commitment would apply to UNPROFOR escorts of humanitarian convoys along agreed routes. (S)

2. Tell Zagreb that if Bosnian Croat forces interfere with the humanitarian effort during the winter we will support sanctions on Croatia's civil air and maritime sectors and denial of its access to IFI resources. We also would warn that if Zagreb retaliates by reducing its current level of refugee/relief support we would support full-scale sanctions comparable to those imposed on Serbia. Ambassador Redman should make recommendations

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about other possible leverage on all the parties to cooperate with the humanitarian effort after his discussions in Europe later this week. (S)

3. With regard to humanitarian relief for Serbia, we should in principle be open to:

--The use of some USG funds for UNHCR purchase of food and medicine;

--20K of fuel for refugee centers;

--7K of fuel for specified institutions

--Expanded natural gas deliveries to Serbia and Bosnia in reasonable amounts;

--Further consideration of energy-for-energy swaps.

Ambassador Redman will make recommendations on how best to use these possible sanctions-exemptions, especially with a view to getting better access for winterization materials to Bosnian-held communities. (S)

5. Be willing to participate in an airlift to Tuzla airport if UNPROFOR opens it and the airlift coalition (including the U.S.) judges it safe. Look at the provision of equipment or the possibility of providing U.S. contractor personnel if opening the airport becomes a real possibility. (S)

* * * * *

Deputies also agreed that more work was needed on two agenda items and tasked the following two papers, both due by Friday November 19:

1. Estimate of possible need for increased air drops (State and AID). (S)

2. Criteria and procedures for possible acceptance of civilians at MAASH Zagreb. (S)

B. EC Negotiating Initiative

1. State will circulate for clearances a letter to EC Foreign Ministers conveying U.S. views.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 17, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

FROM: JENONNE WALKER

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies Committee Meeting, November 16, 1993, 4:00pm - 5:00pm, Situation Room

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from Will Itoh to his counterparts asking that the Summary of Conclusions (Tab A) be passed to the Deputies.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memorandum to the agencies transmitting the Summary of Conclusions.

Approve sr/v Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Will Itoh's Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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By VC NARA, Date 1/24/2019
2013-0682-M

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RECORD ID: 9321349
RECEIVED: 26 NOV 93 16

TO: ITOH

FROM: GROSSMAN, M

DOC DATE: 22 NOV 93
SOURCE REF: 9327032

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA CROATIA
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: STATE FOLLOW UP PAPER FOR 16 NOV DC MTG ON BOSNIA HUMANITARIAN

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE DATE: 30 NOV 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE LOGREF: 9321265 9321282

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0070 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
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		DARBY
		GROSS
		HOLL
		MERCHANT
		NSC CHRON
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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

November 22, 1993

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[redacted]

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Criteria for Treatment of Civilians at the U.S. Military Hospital Deployed to Zagreb, Croatia

The State Department was tasked by the Deputies Committee on November 16 to prepare the attached criteria for treatment of young victims of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia at the U.S. military hospital in Zagreb as part of U.S. Government efforts to provide humanitarian assistance for Bosnia.

Thank you for your assistance.

Marc Grossman
Executive Secretary

DOS: —

MEMO MAKES REFERRENCE TO AN ATTACHMENT - BUT NONE WAS PROVIDED.

NSC
Attachment enclosed
S. McElhaney
11/26/93

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Department of State Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KC NARA, Date 9/24/2019
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. report	re: Zagreb U.S. Military Hospital Treatment Criteria (1 page)	11/22/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3996

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0070 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina Humanitarian Assistance, November 16, 1993

2010-0533-M
rs661

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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TO: ITOH

FROM: WILLIAMS, A

DOC DATE: 19 NOV 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FOLLOW UP PAPER FOR 16 NOV DC MTG RE AIRDROPS IN BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE DATE: 24 NOV 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE LOGREF: 9321265 9321282

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0070 CODES:

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DEVELOPMENT

Office of
the Executive
Secretariat

November 19, 1993

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MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH
Executive Secretary
National Security Council
The White House

SUBJECT: Airdrops in Bosnia-Herzegovina

REF: Deputies Committee Meeting on November 16

At referenced meeting A.I.D. was asked to prepare a paper on the above subject. Attached is the requested response.

Aaron S. Williams
Executive Secretary

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Initials: KL Date: 9/24/2019
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AIRDROPS IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

On February 26, 1993, airdrops were initiated by an NSC Direction Order to provide a temporary measure for delivering humanitarian relief supplies. On February 27, the U.S. conducted a series of leaflet drops, and on February 28, the airdrop missions officially began. Since then, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has directed the Joint Task Force Provide Promise (JTF-PP) to airdrop critically needed food, medical supplies, seeds, clothing, blankets, shelter items, and other emergency relief items on selected targets in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Through November 16, 1993, a total of 1,453 missions have been flown, dropping 9,270 metric tons of cargo on 14 towns. Six U.S. C-130s, one German C-160, and one French C-160 have been flying almost daily. The U.S. has flown approximately 80% of the missions costing the U.S. approximately $14 million to date.

Tasking of an Airdrop

• UNHCR/Zagreb determines airdrop priority based upon the degree to which a lack of security or other factors prevent access by road over an extended time period. The degree of need, percentage of shortfall, and number of victims are also taken into consideration.

• Information on the above is gathered from a variety of sources: 1) reports from on-site U.N. Military Observers; 2) on-site UNHCR representatives; 3) UNPROFOR reports; 4) local Bosnian authorities; 5) OFDA's Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART); 6) PVOs in the field; 7) ham radio operator reports; 8) major feeding centers; and others.

• Based on the raw data, the JTF Target Selection Board (Naples) verifies, prioritizes, and nominates potential drop zones on a daily basis to the Joint Forces Air Component Commander/USAFE Deputy Commander for Contingency Operations (Vincenza), who analyzes factors such as drop zone size and the potential for collateral damage to dwellings.

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• The list of priority targets is determined by a US EUCOM representative at UNHCR/Zagreb who delegates daily operational decisions and target selections to JTF-PP. The Commander approves the final target list for each night's missions.

• As of November 1993, UNHCR/Zagreb lists airdrop priorities as follows: 1) Maglaj; 2) Tesanj; 3) Konjic/Tarcin; 4) Mostar (east bank); 5) Srebrenica; 6) Gorazde; and 7) Zepa.

• On November 18, Francesco Strippoli, World Food Program (WFP) Unit Head for Eastern Europe Operations, reported to the Department of Defense (DOD) that the airdrops have been well over 90% effective in reaching the intended recipients.

• On average each U.S. sortie costs $12,500 (flight only), with a daily cost for 6 U.S. C-130s averaging $75,000 per day. Since airdrops began, the operation has cost approximately $14 million.

Resources for Airdrop

• The WFP donates 80% of the food for both air-land and airdrop missions. The U.S. is the principal donor, with an average of 50 percent of the total donation to WFP.

• On November 18, WFP reported to DOD that if airdrop operations had to be doubled, WFP would make available enough food stocks to cover the increase. The only limiting factor would be one month's advance notice of the requirement.

• In FY 1993, the U.S. government provided over 10.3 million MREs, valued at $47 million, for airdrop operations in the former Yugoslavia. There are currently 1.94 million Humanitarian Daily Rations and 500,000 additional MREs in European storage sites that can be used in future airdrop missions.

Prognosis for Winter

The UNHCR is meeting with the warring parties in mid-November to discuss emergency actions necessary to avert a humanitarian disaster in Bosnia this winter. Even with a negotiated settlement, there is no guarantee that such a settlement would be honored in the field. Due to the lack of stockpiles in central and eastern Bosnia, and no apparent

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solution to the problem of access, the airdrop operations will take on a greater importance. The need for a means to airdrop fuel has already been identified as a critical medical priority for the operation of small generators at field hospitals.

Presently, airdrop operations are considered a necessary supplement, not a substitute, to the land convoy system. If access and security guarantees are not obtained so that land convoys can move freely and safely through Bosnia-Herzegovina, UNHCR will request additional airdrops and airlifts. As noted above, WFP has reported that sufficient food stocks would be made available to cover the increase, and that additional warehouse space in Germany could be contracted.

Should an offer of additional aircraft for the airdrop operations be made, UNHCR would most certainly revise its priority list by adding more locations where shortfalls exist but are not acute enough to make the present list. OFDA's DART in Zagreb has identified Zenica, Jablanica, and Tuzla as potential winter airdrop locations based upon current shortages, lack of access, and other criteria. The opening of Tuzla airport would preclude the necessity to airdrop to additional locations in that particular area.

Attachment: DART's information on airdrop locations

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DART/ZAGREB'S AIRDROP LOCATIONS INCLUDING NUMBER OF BENEFICIARIES, DAILY FOOD REQUIREMENT, AND RELIEF HISTORIES

1. **ZEPA** (Muslim)
   Beneficiaries: 10,000
   Daily Food Requirement: 5.4 MT
   Relief History Since Nov. 1, 1992: 27 convoys - 1,752.3 MT; 40 airdrops - 939.9 MT

2 **SREBRENICA** (Muslim)
   Beneficiaries: 44,140
   Daily Food Requirement: 23.9 MT
   Relief History Since Nov. 1, 1992: 86 convoys - 6284.3 MT; 71 airdrops - 2,004.5 MT

3 **GORAZDE** (Muslim)
   Beneficiaries: 66,000
   Daily Food Requirement: 35.7 MT
   Relief History Since Nov. 1, 1992: 52 convoys - 5,294 MT; 92 airdrops - 3,208 MT

4. **KONJIC/TARCIN** (Muslim)
   Beneficiaries: 85,030
   Daily Food Requirement: 46.8
   Relief History Since Nov. 1, 1992: 1 convoy - 91 MT; 5 airdrops - 161.7 MT

5. **JABLANICA**
   Beneficiaries: 24,000
   Daily Food Requirement: no daily figure
   Relief History: convoy information unavailable; no airdrops

6. **MOSTAR** (Muslim)
   Beneficiaries: 60,000
   Daily Food Requirement: 32.4
   Relief History Since Aug. 1, 1992: 20 convoys - 1,485 MT; 16 airdrops - 485.9 MT

7. **TUZLA** (Muslim)
   Beneficiaries: 446,500
   Daily Food Requirement: 241.5 MT
   Relief History Since Apr. 12, 1993: 223 convoys - 12,628 MT 4 airdrops - 88.5 MT

8. **ZENICA**
   Beneficiaries: 554,065
   Daily Food Requirement: no daily figure
   Relief History: convoy information unavailable; no airdrops

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PER E.O. 13526
2/4/2020 (1.3A)
2013-0682-M

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9. **MAGLAJ** (Muslim)
Beneficiaries: 13,582
Daily Food Requirement: 7.3 MT
Relief History Since Aug. 1, 1993: 1 convoy - 75 MT; 47 airdrops - 1,132.1 MT

10. **TESANJ** (Muslim)
Beneficiaries: 16,953
Daily Food Requirement: 9.2 MT
Relief History Since Nov. 1, 1992: 1 convoy - 84 MT; 41 airdrops - 980.2 MT

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DC 70

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21303

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of NSC Deputies Committee
DATE: November 16, 1993
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 4:00pm - 5:00pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

The Vice President's Office:
Leon Fuerth

State:
Peter Tarnoff
Stephen Oxman
Warren Zimmerman

DOD
Frank Wisner
Darrell Johnson

CIA
Douglas MacEachin
Oliver Wicklund

JCS
Barry McCaffrey
James Hill

USUN
David Scheffer
Laura Bowman

SPECIAL ENVOY
Charles Redman

AID
Frank Almaguer
Douglas Stafford

White House
Samuel R. Berger

NSC
Jenonne Walker

Summary of Conclusions

A. Humanitarian Issues

Deputies will recommend to Principals that we should:

1. Reiterate our existing commitment for Close Air Support to UNPROFOR. Specifically, we should tell the French that so far as we are concerned our existing commitment would apply to UNPROFOR escorts of humanitarian convoys along agreed routes. (S)

2. Tell Zagreb that if Bosnian Croat forces interfere with the humanitarian effort during the winter we will support sanctions on Croatia's civil air and maritime sectors and denial of its access to IFI resources. We also would warn that if Zagreb retaliates by reducing its current level of refugee/relief support we would support full-scale sanctions comparable to those imposed on Serbia. Ambassador Redman should make recommendations

Declassify on: OADR
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PER E.O. 13526
KC 2/6/2020 (141)
2013-0682-M

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9321282
RECEIVED: 11 NOV 93 11

TO: ITOH

FROM: GROSSMAN, M

DOC DATE: 10 NOV 93
SOURCE REF: 9325828

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA HUMAN RIGHTS
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 16 NOV DC MTG ON HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO BOSNIA

ACTION: SEE 9321265 FOR FINAL ACTION DUE DATE: 15 NOV 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL LOGREF: 9321265 9321288

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0070 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By KL NARA, Date 9/24/2019
2013-0682-M

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

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~~SECRET~~ RECORD ID: 9321282

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	HOLL	Z	93111111	APPROPRIATE ACTION
001		X	93111515	SEE 9321265 FOR FINAL ACTION

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9321282
RECEIVED: 11 NOV 93 11

TO: ITOH

FROM: GROSSMAN, M

DOC DATE: 10 NOV 93
SOURCE REF: 9325828

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA HUMAN RIGHTS
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DISCUSSION PAPERS ON HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOR BOSNIA

ACTION: APPROPRIATE ACTION DUE DATE: 15 NOV 93 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL LOGREF:

FILES: IFM NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
HOLL	CLARKE	GROSS
	SCHWARTZ	KRECZKO
		ROSNER
		WALKER

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By YG NARA, Date 9/29/2015
2013-0682-M

COMMENTS: Incoprated into Package 21265 N

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJEB CLOSED BY: DOC 1 OF 1

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9325828

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET~~

November 10, 1993 21282

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Discussion Papers on Humanitarian Assistance for Bosnia

The NSC has asked the State Department to prepare the attached discussion papers for the next Deputies/Principals meeting on humanitarian assistance for Bosnia. These papers cover the following subjects:

1. Humanitarian Relief Access: Carrots and Sticks

2. EC Proposal for Securing Bosnia Aid Corridors

3 Opening Tuzla Airport: Pros and Cons

4. Humanitarian Assistance for Serbia and Montenegro

Marc Grossman
Executive Secretary

Attachments:
As stated.

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E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KC, NARA, Date 9/24/2019
F2013-00682-M

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9321288
RECEIVED: 12 NOV 93 17

TO: BERGER

FROM: WALKER

DOC DATE: 12 NOV 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA YUGOSLAVIA
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 16 NOV DC MTG ON BOSNIA HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER DUE DATE: 16 NOV 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF: 9321265 9321282

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0070 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		CICIO
		DARBY
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		WALKER
		WRIGHT

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VC NARA, Date 5/24/2019
2013-0682-M

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSKDB CLOSED BY: NSKDB DOC 1 OF 1

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	93111219	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	93111620	NOTED BY BERGER

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Rec'd 11/13 9:40am

National Security Council
The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec			
ExecSec	1		
Staff Director	cop		
D/APNSA	2		Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen
APNSA			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	11/16	N
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action (I = Information) D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

cc: ~s

12 NOV 93 [illegible] 49

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Exec Sec has distrib

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. memo	Jenonne Walker to Samuel Berger re: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (5 pages)	11/12/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3996

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0070 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina Humanitarian Assistance, November 16, 1993

2010-0533-M
rs661

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9321265
RECEIVED: 09 NOV 93 16

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 15 NOV 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
AGENDA
HUMAN RIGHTS
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION W/ AGENDA & DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 16 NOV DC MTG ON HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO BOSNIA

ACTION: ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 12 NOV 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF: 9321282

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0070 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		HOLL
		NSC CHRON
		WALKER
		WRIGHT

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By KC NARA, Date 9/24/2019
2013-0682-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	93111211	FOR SIGNATURE AND DECISION
001		X	93111513	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
002		X	93111513	ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	931115	GROSSMAN, M	
002	931115	LAUDER, J	
002	931115	MCALEER, R	
002	931115	PATRICK, T	
002	931115	INDERFURTH, K	
002	931115	FUERTH, L	

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

11-12-93

Sandy —

I'd recommend the agenda at TAB A reflect which agency is responsible for particular topics.

— JwR

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Rec'd 11/12 1:35pm

National Security Council
The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	1/3	mm	
ExecSec			
Staff Director			
D/APNSA	2		
APNSA			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4		
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS: cc: NS

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9321265
DATE 15 NOV 93

SUBJECT: DC MTG HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO BOSNIA 16 NOV
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	_____	_____	_____ COPY: 1
MR. JOHN A. LAUDER CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ COPY: VIA FAX
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ COPY: VIA FAX
COL. T. R. PATRICK JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001	_____	_____	_____ COPY: VIA FAX
MR. RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W -- ROOM 6333 DEPT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ COPY: VIA FAX
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	_____	_____	_____ COPY: 1

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2013-0682-M

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PRECEDENCE
- ☐ FLASH
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- ☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: EES

DATE/TIME: 1519007 NOV 93

MESSAGE #: 13

FROM: **National Security Council** PHONE: **202-456-2291** ROOM: **WHSR**

SUBJECT: **Notice of Meeting** DC MTG ON BOSNIA PAGES: 44

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

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~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE NO. 2259 CLASSIFICATION PAGES 44

FROM WILLIAM H ITOH (NAME) 456-6534 (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION DC MTG ON BOSNIA 16 NOV

NSC LOG # 21265

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	COL. PATRICK		

BADD

REMARKS:

EYES ONLY

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Initials: VC Date: 9/24/2019
2015-0082-M

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PRECEDENCE: (IMMEDIATE) PRIORITY ROUTINE

RELEASER: [illegible]

DTG: _____

~~EYES ONLY~~ ~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE NO. 2259 CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES 44

FROM WILLIAM H ITOH (NAME) 456-6534 (PHONE NUMBER) _____ (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION DC MTG ON BOSNIA 16 NOV

NSC LOG # 21265

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	COL. PATRICK		

B
ADD

REMARKS:

EYES ONLY

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Initials: KL Date: 9/24/2019
2013-0681-M

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(MO) 11. 15. '93 14:01 NO. 1460024908 PAGE 1

TIME OF RECEIPT

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D

15 1435 NOV 93

PRECEDENCE: (IMMEDIATE) PRIORITY ROUTINE

RELEASER: KLO

DTG: _____

~~EYES ONLY~~ ~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE NO. 2259 CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES 44

FROM WILLIAM H ITOH (NAME) 456-6534 (PHONE NUMBER) _____ (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION DC MTG ON BOSNIA 16 NOV

NSC LOG # 21265

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	COL. PATRICK		

BADD

REMARKS:

EYES ONLY

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Initials: KC Date: 9/24/2019
2015-0682-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 15, 1993

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COLONEL ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

CAPTAIN T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations

MR. AARON WILLIAMS
Executive Secretary
Agency for International Development

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance to Bosnia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, November 16, 1993, at 4:00 - 5:00pm in the White House Situation Room. Materials for this meeting are attached as indicated. Deputies should note that some tabs contain relevant papers by more than one agency. Additionally, a paper framing issues for decision is attached at Tab B. ~~(S)~~

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachments
Tab A Agenda
Tab B Issues for Decision
Tab C Support for Humanitarian Aid Corridors
Tab D Airdrops
Tab E Opening Tuzla Airport
Tab F Humanitarian Assistance for the "FRY"
Tab G Winter Medical Needs
Tab H Civilian Care in MASH Zagreb
Tab I New EC Negotiating Initiative
Tab J Presidential Endorsement of "Winter Humanitarian Truce"

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By KL NARA, Date 9/24/2019
2013-0682-M

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DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA
DATE: November 16, 1993
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 4:00pm - 5:00pm

AGENDA

I. Support for Designated Humanitarian Aid Corridors

II. Airdrops

III. Opening Tuzla Airport

IV. Humanitarian Assistance to the "FRY"

V. Meeting Winter Medical Needs

VI. Civilian Care by MASH Zagreb

VII. U.S. Support for Possible New EC Negotiating Initiative

VIII. Presidential Endorsement of "Winter Humanitarian Truce"

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By KC NARA, Date 9/24/2019
2013-0682-M

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006a. paper	re: Issues for Decision (2 pages)	11/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3996

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0070 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina Humanitarian Assistance, November 16, 1993

2010-0533-M
rs661

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006b. paper	re: EC Proposal for Securing Bosnia Aid Corridors (2 pages)	11/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3996

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0070 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina Humanitarian Assistance, November 16, 1993

2010-0533-M
rs661

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006c. paper	re: Humanitarian Relief Access (5 pages)	11/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3996

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0070 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina Humanitarian Assistance, November 16, 1993

2010-0533-M
rs661

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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THE JOINT STAFF
WASHINGTON, DC

Reply ZIP Code:
20318-0300

DJSM-1196-93
8 November 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(REGIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)

Subject: Air Support Requirements to Support French-Sponsored Humanitarian Relief Operations (U)

1. (U) As requested,* the Joint Staff has reviewed the French proposal for delivering humanitarian relief supplies in Bosnia-Herzegovina (B-H) via convoy.

2. (S) Close air support (CAS) in support of convoy operations could be conducted using the forces engaged in NATO Operation DENY FLIGHT if the four AC-130 gunships deployed to Somalia are returned to Operation DENY FLIGHT or replaced. However, we recommend against providing CAS for the following reasons:

a. UNHCR aid convoys are not being stopped by organized military but by local bandits and groups of women and children. CAS is not useful in these situations.

b. Forcing delivery of humanitarian aid signals escalation of military involvement and would require principals' approval.

c. Serbs have just offered guaranteed access from Bar to Sarajevo. Permissive delivery of aid is preferable to convoying through potentially hostile areas.

3. (S) We have determined that battlefield air interdiction operations are not desirable or feasible given the current situation in B-H, rules of engagement, and difficulties with

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2013-0682-M
8/3/15 KBH (1.4)

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NOV 09 '93 15:29 R 2110M T1

target identification and linkage to enemy forces interfering with convoy operations. The enclosed information paper provides more details on the CAS for the French-sponsored humanitarian relief operations.

R. C. MACKE
Vice Admiral, USN
Director, Joint Staff

Enclosure

Reference:
* ASD(RSA) memorandum, I93/50258, 29 October 1993, "Air Support Requirements To Support French Sponsored Humanitarian Relief Operations"

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NOV 09 '93 15:30 R 2110M T1
P.3

~~SECRET~~

3 November 1993

ENCLOSURE

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Air Support Requirements for French-Sponsored Humanitarian Relief Operations (U)

1. (U) Purpose. To provide information on close air support (CAS) for French-sponsored humanitarian relief operations.

2. (U) Key Points

- (S) The French propose that military escorted convoys be used to deliver approximately 1,000 tons per day of relief supplies to Sarajevo and environs this winter.

- (S) The French estimate that one convoy per day of 50 trucks (20 ton capacity) will transport the relief supplies to Sarajevo and that each convoy will take 3 days to travel to Sarajevo, unload supplies, and return to point of origin.

- (S) The three courses of action (COA) consider using two route clusters for convoy operations.

  - COA 1 - Escorting convoys on varied routes.

  - COA 2 - Escorting convoys on a single route.

  - COA 3 - Controlling a single route.

- (S) French operation will require air support from Operation DENY FLIGHT.

- (S) The French feel that the current ROE is adequate for the conduct of CAS.

- (S) The current Operation DENY FLIGHT force levels are in place and adequate to meet the CAS mission for the French proposal. J-3 estimates that the return of or deployment of 4 X AC-130 aircraft is required. NATO would have to approve this use.

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- (S) NATO Operation DENY FLIGHT conducts 70 fighter CAS missions a week, maintains a 24-hour alert aircraft, and conducts 7 ABCCC missions per week. CINCSOUTH has scheduled 7 AC-130 gunship missions per week when assets return from Somalia.

- (S) Current in-place CSAR assets are adequate for aircrew recovery only.

- (S) ABCCC mission rate may increase.

- (S) UNPROFOR commands the CAS ground components and would have to provide the AOCC at Kiseljak and FACPs on each convoy.

- (S) UNHCR aid convoys are not being stopped by organized military but by local bandits and groups of women and children. CAS is not useful in these situations.

- (S) Forcing the delivery of humanitarian aid signals unwanted escalation of military involvement and would require Principals' approval.

- (S) Serbs have just offered guaranteed access from Bat to Sarajevo. Permissive delivery of aid is preferable to convoying through potentially hostile areas.

- (S) The conduct of battlefield air interdiction (BAI) to support convoys is not envisioned.

- (U) BAI is air operations conducted to destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy's military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces at such distances from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of the friendly forces is not required.

- (S) The current situation in B-H does not lend itself to the conduct of BAI.

  - Concentrations of enemy forces are not present. Interference with convoys has been by small bands, unidentified indirect fire, civilian mobs, and groups of women and children.

  - Identification of forces interfering with convoy operations and targeting their higher echelons would be difficult to impossible.

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P.5

NOV 09 '93 15:32 R 2110M T1

•• Current Operation DENY FLIGHT ROE do not authorize BAI operations.

•• Collateral damage will be a major concern.

Prepared by: LTC Bill FitzGerald, USA
J-3/JOD, 52541
EUCOM2//378//

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NOV 09 '93 15:33 R 2110M T1 P.6

~~SECRET~~ 9 November 1993

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Increasing Humanitarian Aid - Airdrops (U)

1. (U) Purpose. To provide information on improving the delivery of humanitarian aid by increasing airdrop operations.

2. (U) Background. The ongoing airdrop operation began in February 93 as a temporary measure aimed at supplementing ground convoys. Despite the recent success of the ground routes, continued intransigence and deteriorating conditions due to winter weather make examination of alternative delivery methods necessary.

3. (U) Key Points

a. (S) ASSUMPTIONS

- Enhanced operations are requested/supported by UNHCR.
- Increased airdrops are temporary in nature, aimed at those in need who cannot be reached by ground convoys due to fighting or winter conditions.
- Additional supplies are available for increased airdrops.
- Belligerents sanction operation.

b. (S) CONCEPT OF OPERATION

- Airdrops continue at night due to threat.
- Surge capability above current six flights per night using dedicated fleet impractical. Aircraft operating at near maximum utilization rates due to flight duration, crew availability and periodic maintenance requirements. For an immediate surge, USEUCOM would be required to reprioritize theater air missions in order to support. Sustained surge would require additional aircraft, aircrews, and riggers. Thirty day supply of aid items available in Germany.
- For the long term, additional defensive system equipped C-130s/crews are made available to USEUCOM. This will probably require additional National Guard/Reserve participation depending on increased level of effort. Additional sorties require increase in riggers (8 per sortie - if airdrops doubled would require additional rigging company).
- Sufficient ramp space is available at Rhein Mein.

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- Additional sorties will require increased reliance on GPS directed drops, due to limited number of A/C equipped with AWADS (Radar for precision airdrops) and defensive systems.

- If possible, new air items should be procured in an international orange color. This would make them easy to spot by those in need, easier to recover, and less valuable to combatants. USG should seek UN funding to cover contract costs.

b. (~~S~~) DISCUSSION

- This option presents minimal risk to US A/C, crews.

- Airdrop operations are less weather dependent than helicopter deliveries.

- Accuracy of current delivery means is good. Increasing airdrop operations, however, does not ensure that food is delivered to those in need; ground distribution systems are uncertain and beyond our control.

- Airdrops are not capable of delivering required fuel/water needed in some locations. This requires ground convoys, which are the most efficient means of delivering aid.

- Airdrops do not address pressing issue of delivery of winterization supplies. Belligerents have classified these items as non-humanitarian aid due to potential for military application. Airdropping winterization supplies likely perceived as belligerent act.

- Belligerents could use these operations as a reason to deny access to isolated areas by ground personnel. This would not only undercut the UN efforts to expand ground convoys, but could also prevent observers from getting in to obtain accurate assessments.

- Incremental cost of each C-130 flight is approximately $12,500, not including costs of relief supplies.

c. (U) POLITICO-MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS

PROS
- Safest method of US participation.
- Very visible, high profile demonstration of US concern/ activism.
- Does not put forces on the ground.
- Overcomes access problems to isolated areas.

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CONS

- Does not address cause of problem; subsidizes continued fighting.
- Extremely costly effort producing minimal results.
- No control of ground distribution; unable to ensure delivery to those in need.
- Decreases need for cooperation/negotiations by belligerents.
- Enhanced effort may arouse congressional scrutiny.

4. (S) Bottom Line. While effective in accuracy, the airdrop operation is not effective for the large volume of sustained supply for a civilian population. Operation is inviting due to the low-risk and high visibility. Joint Staff would strongly recommend airdrops over helicopter or ground operations for emergency resupply of limited quantities of relief supplies to a needy population.

Prepared by: J-3/4/5, POC CDR Mark A Stearns, USN, X49435
BLKNWP 1980

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006g. paper	re: Opening Tuzla Airport (2 pages)	11/09/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3996

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0070 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina Humanitarian Assistance, November 16, 1993

2010-0533-M
rs661

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006h. paper	re: Proposed Airlift to Tuzla Airfield (2 pages)	11/08/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3996

FOLDER TITLE:
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006i. memo	Leon Fuerth to Samuel Berger re: Sanctions and the Humanitarian Situation in Serbia (2 pages)	11/08/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3996

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0070 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina Humanitarian Assistance, November 16, 1993

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006j. paper	re: Humanitarian Assistance for Serbia and Montenegro (2 pages)	11/09/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3996

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0070 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina Humanitarian Assistance, November 16, 1993

2010-0533-M
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006k. paper	re: Winter Medical Needs in Bosnia and Hercegovina (3 pages)	11/03/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3996

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0070 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina Humanitarian Assistance, November 16, 1993

2010-0533-M
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RESTRICTION CODES

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29 October 1993

14

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Expansion of Mission - US Hospital Zagreb (U)

1. (U) Purpose. Provide analysis of expanding US hospital (Zagreb) medical mission to treat pediatric patients.

2. (U) Background. Request for expansion of mission result of 28 Oct DC meeting. Ambassador Galbraith previously requested US hospital involvement in the care of five to ten child victims of the conflict. General Cot, UNPROFOR commander, agreed with concept of using spare capacity at UN field hospitals to treat war trauma victims. State currently reviewing request.

3. (S) Discussion. 48th Air Transportable Hospital is third US hospital in rotation. Hospital OPCON to UNPROFOR as a UN "blue hatted" unit. Mission to provide medical support to UNPROFOR. Hospital staff reported to be operating below capacity and would be able to accept up to 10 pediatric patients. Treating civilians requires UN approved change in mission.

PROS

- High visibility US humanitarian assistance contribution without commitment of additional ground troops
- Appeals to American sentiment.
- Reduces suffering.
- Taps under-used resource, provides varied medical training opportunities.

CONS

- Impartiality and treatment of only non-belligerents must be maintained or safety of existing mission at risk - both hospital personnel and aircrews. Hard to differentiate between juvenile combatants and non-combatants (Somalia).
- May detract from priority mission. To do job right will require changes in equipment, personnel, supplies (pediatric sized supplies, pediatrician, pediatric nurse, pediatric pharmaceuticals).
- Criteria not in place to determine what classification of patient hospital will accept, length of stay, disposition of family members, and procedures for transfer should space be required for UNPROFOR patient.

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8/3/15 KBH (SS)

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- Non-US personnel making triage decisions. Over stressed system with history of screening problems.

- May expand into "magnet" hospital. Ignores potential flood of patients from refugee community in Zagreb.

- Creates untenable problem of turning away patients.

- Civilian hospitals available in Zagreb with pediatric capability.

- Patients likely to require long-term care. US hospital not a long term care facility. May create permanent refugee status for children and strain the already over-burdened Croatian government.

- Politically difficult to terminate once started. Sets precedent for future involvement.

4. (S) Bottom Line. Seemingly attractive option - seen as doing something. However, must be cautious of diverting US military medical support from the UNPROFOR mission. Should not proceed until specific criteria and procedures established and agreed to for accepting, evacuating, treating, and returning patients to families in country of origin. Parties to agreement must include affected agencies, governments and warring factions - a significant diplomatic challenge. If USG undertakes mission without agreement, belligerents likely to manipulate program as an issue of taking sides - immediately jeopardizing the mission. As an alternative to expanding US mission, recommend USG explore consortium program with local hospitals under UNHCR/WHO auspices.

Prepared by: LTC Kevin Campbell, USA and CPT Butch Botters, USA
J-5, European Division, X49435
BLKNWP 1977

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MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

FROM: YUGOSLAV TASK FORCE
Prepared by Col J.P. Kiley/EurPol/x40661

SUBJECT: Medical Options for Croatia

Tab A tasked a requirement to review medical capabilities in order to provide additional relief for refugee assistance in Croatia. Currently, the 48th Air Transportable Hospital is deployed in Zagreb in support of UNPROFOR. This unit is tasked and designed to give trauma and stabilization care to combat casualties. It can provide for 60 bed ridden patients. Ambassador Galbraith has requested that surplus capacity be provided for the care of civilian patients, particularly children. The JCS paper describing the additional requirements necessary to accommodate this request is at Tab B.

Other options exist to provide additional medical capability to administer to the requirements of the refugee population in Croatia. These options all require additional medical personnel and equipment to be deployed in a potential combat area. A decision will be required for deployment and expenditure of the necessary funds.

Options:

- Medical Civil Action Programs: augment the military hospital in Zagreb with additional personnel in order to provide rotational medical service to the refugee camps. Active/reserve forces from all services could be used to augment the hospital. This might benefit active duty training for reserve personnel. It might be possible to request civilian health care professionals to augment the hospital and provide the additional staffing from these volunteers.

- Environmental Health Assistance: civil action programs consisting of environmental health specialists to advise the refugee population could augment the hospital in Zagreb. While providing no direct health care, they could assist by providing a forward deployed diagnostic laboratory to conduct surveillance on the health status of the refugee camps by monitoring the sanitation, food preparation, water systems, and entomological sources of communicable diseases.

- Naval Assets:

- Assault Landing Ship (LHA) - an option exists to use helicopters to provide resupply to the refugee population in Bosnia for the winter. The LHA contains a 48 bed hospital with a full operating suite for combat casualties. It could, if fully manned, provide humanitarian care for patients prior to movement to a civilian facility. The resupply helicopters could provide the lift

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from shore to ship as scheduled by UN organizations. Medical civil action programs from the ship could also be conducted in conjunction with the U.S. hospital in Zagreb and coordinated with the UN.

- Hospital Ship (TAH) - two are currently in the inventory under the control of the Military Sealift Command (MSC). One is assigned to the Atlantic Fleet. It has a complement of 1200 personnel; has 1,000 hospital beds; 12 operating suites; and is manned by active duty and civilian personnel. The ship would require support to move patients to/from the vessel; escort ships; and a defined UN procedure for returning patients to civilian hospitals would have to be established. The ship is in Baltimore Harbor in reduced operating status (5 days). If ordered to sea and medical personnel assigned, it could be at sea in 5 days. Activation costs will be $40-60K. Operating costs range from $51K/day at sea to $41K/day in port or at anchor. Activation costs are absorbed in these per diem costs. It is primarily a surgical facility but can be equipped and staffed for humanitarian operations. A 30 day block of surgical supplies is valued at $12M. Supplies for humanitarian assistance would be additive to this. Medical civil action could also be conducted from this platform through coordination with the hospital in Zagreb. While current plans call for the ship to be staffed with U.S. Navy personnel, joint staffing from USN, USA, and USAF medical personnel might be possible, if this option is considered, to lessen the affect on residual medical care for all services.

All options require a threat assessment, personnel, fiscal, and logistical estimate.

Recommendation: none. For information only.

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Translation

The Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs
Klaus Kinkel

The Minister for Foreign Affairs
Alain Juppé

Bonn and Paris, 7. November 1993

Dear Willy,

In a letter dated 27 October 1993 from the Federal Chancellor and the President of the Republic in agreement with the Prime Minister to Prime Minister J.-L. Dehaene on the subject of the realization of a Common Foreign and Security Policy, Germany and France proposed that we speedily develop a coherent common position within the Union with a view to bringing about a lasting ceasefire and a peace settlement in the former Yugoslavia. We should like to share a few thoughts in confidence with our partners:

1) We noted with great interest Lord Owen's statement at the General Affairs Council meeting on 26 October on the state of the peace negotiations. We support the efforts of the co-chairmen. Their "globalization concept" is to be welcomed. It is in keeping with the approach adopted at the London conference. Only a comprehensive resolution of all the problems in the former Yugoslavia will make possible a durable peace settlement in this sorely tested region.

However, the co-chairmen's most recent soundings have confirmed that preparations for the planned "globalization conference" will take some considerable time. The UN Secretary-General, too, assumes that the earliest it could take place is the spring of next year. In the meantime Bosnia and Herzegovina faces the threat of catastrophe this winter, and in the areas of Croatia under UNPROFOR mandate the risk of war is increasing.

We cannot turn a blind eye to these developments. A twin-track approach is therefore necessary - a view shared by the co-chairmen. As well as the necessary careful preparations for the global conference, which can only take place if there is a real chance of its success, particular emphasis must now be placed on tackling the following priorities:

- securing humanitarian assistance for Bosnia,
- arriving at a solution for Bosnia based on the Geneva package, and
- establishing a modus vivendi for the areas of Croatia under UNPROFOR mandate in order, as an interim step, to prevent the danger of war there.

2) We are aware of the immense problems involved. Nonetheless, the Twelve must, as a result of their responsibility for this part of Europe, continue to do their utmost to achieve these urgent objectives as quickly as possible and must also try to win the support and participation of the United States of America and Russia for these goals. Germany and France therefore propose the following procedure to their partners:

Mr Willy Claes,
President of the Council of European Union,
Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the Kingdom of Belgium,
Brussels

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(a) Humanitarian assistance (Joint Action)

The financial resources available for humanitarian assistance should be increased and third parties, in particular Islamic states, encouraged to participate. Specially protected humanitarian corridors should be established between the Dalmatian coast and Sarajevo in particular and Tuzla airport should be reopened. All parties to the conflict must agree that these routes and Tuzla airport are inviolable and give credible, firm guarantees to this effect. The airlift should be extended to Tuzla. The practice of demanding "transit fees" must be ended. It must be ensured through checks on transport and final distribution that the humanitarian assistance does in fact reach the needy, not the military. The legal prerequisites for this are in place (UN Security Council resolutions, rules of engagement). We welcome the readiness of European Community member states and other troop contributors to help protect the humanitarian corridors and to provide logistical support within the limits of their respective possibilities.

These measures should be elaborated immediately in conformity with the European Council declaration of 29 October, then submitted to the UN Secretary-General and implemented in close coordination with the United Nations.

(b) Solution in Bosnia

The war in Bosnia must be brought to an end. The Bosnian people do not want a second winter of war. They want peace.

The acquis reached in the negotiations on board "Invincible" on 20 September must be secured. If the draft constitution allows one or two constituent republics of the "Union of Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina" to secede from it, such an outcome should not be encouraged. Peace has already been within reach, and we must try everything to obtain a result without altering Bosnia and Herzegovina's external borders. Consideration should be given to a new approach to the parties to the conflict in order to conclude peace.

The Bosnian Muslims are demanding that their territory be enlarged. Milosevic appears to be willing to negotiate. In addition, a wide-ranging offer relating to reconstruction and economic cooperation would be particularly important to the Muslims. Finally, they must be given confidence that a package accepted by all parties, including its provisions on human rights and minorities, would in fact be rapidly implemented. This will only be possible with a strong implementation element. The United States recently reaffirmed its willingness in principle to participate in this. Unless the international community showed itself willing to defend a package of solutions, accepted by the parties to the conflict with international endorsement, with an international presence on the spot, thus demonstrating that it supported its realization, the solution would merely remain on paper. This is why the Twelve have already declared their readiness to participate in implementation. In order to make it easier for the Muslims to give their agreement, consideration should be given to linking the elements of reconstruction and implementation by the international community with the peace package itself so that the Muslims would not have to fear giving up their old positions without the certainty that the package would truly be implemented.

If the Muslims' current territorial demands, namely an extra 3-4% of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, are met and they still remain unwilling to sign the peace package, it will have to be made clear to the leaders in Sarajevo that military options do not have the slightest chance of success and that they would thereby risk losing the support of the international community.

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As things stand, the Serbian side will be persuaded to show the necessary territorial flexibility only if it can be sure that the UN sanctions will be lifted step by step corresponding to stages of implementation. The Serbian side should be given an assurance that the UN sanctions will be lifted if it implements an agreed package on Bosnia and a modus vivendi in the occupied areas of Croatia (see below). As Italy has suggested, this could happen step by step: the sooner the Serbian side meets its obligations under the agreements to be concluded, the quicker things will move. This would also have the advantage of providing urgently needed relief for the neighbouring states of Serbia and Montenegro.

(c) Areas of Croatia under UNPROFOR mandate

There is an increasing risk of war in the Krajina. Since it is at present unlikely that a solution for this region will be found quickly, we should concentrate initially on achieving a ceasefire and on confidence-building measures pursuant to Security Council Resolution 847, in other words a modus vivendi preventing the danger of war, which at the same time would be an interim step towards a definitive solution.

Germany and France confirm their readiness to help actively in establishing such a modus vivendi soon if the outcome of the conference's current endeavours make it appropriate and if the co-chairmen so wish.

3) Should a solution for Bosnia and a modus vivendi in the Krajina be achieved, consideration would have to be given to holding a conference in Geneva along the lines of the London one ("London II"). Its tasks would be, on the one hand, to endorse what had been achieved, to give a powerful impetus to implementation and to ensure the financing of the reconstruction of the destroyed areas, in which the Islamic states should be brought to play a significant part. On the other hand, the conference should provide a mandate for the solution of the remaining problems in the former Yugoslavia (definitive solution in Carniola, rights of ethnic groups and national minorities).

The degree of autonomy of the areas currently covered by the UNPROFOR mandate must be determined in the light of the relative proportion of the population of the Serbian community before the outbreak of war in 1991. The Carrington proposal remains of great relevance for determining this status in each case. It cannot be for the Twelve to encourage border changes.

Widespread autonomy must be reestablished in Kosovo, too, as the Serbs cannot refuse the Kosovo Albanians what they are demanding for the Serbian ethnic group in the Krajina. Finally, in Sandjak and in the Vojvodina specific rights as envisaged by the co-chairmen must be guaranteed. Hungary must not feel itself left alone with the problem of the Hungarian minority in the Vojvodina. In all three regions an international presence to monitor the observance of the rights of ethnic groups and minorities is a matter of urgency.

The actual global conference on all issues can only take place at a final stage when the negotiations on the remaining problems in the former Yugoslavia have been successfully concluded. This "London III" could endorse the relevant agreements, which should also contain a disarmament element. The implementation of these agreements would open the way for Serbia and Montenegro's full incorporation into the international community.

4

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4) These considerations are not exhaustive and will have to be adapted in the light of further developments. We regard them as a basis for internal discussion among the Twelve as to the further joint approach, with the additional aim being to give encouragement to Lord Owen.

We should like to suggest to you that, as an initial step, our experts quickly elaborate a common position which will be presented for approval to the General Affairs Council via the Political Committee. The result could then serve the EC representative as a guideline, while maintaining the flexibility he needs.

The prime imperative, however, is that we now give a powerful new political impulse for the peace endeavours in the priority areas and for securing the provision of humanitarian supplies to the suffering people. We will not be able to evade responsibility for these our fellow Europeans, nor can we shrug off the expectations placed in the Twelve's Common Foreign and Security Policy by the people in our countries. Despite all the difficulties, therefore, we must make every endeavour to avoid the impending disaster this winter.

We would be grateful to you if you could also send this letter to the other Council members and to Lord Owen.

Yours sincerely,

(sgd) Klaus Kinkel (sgd) Alain Juppé

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006o. paper	re: Proposed Presidential Appeal for "A Winter Humanitarian Truce" (1 page)	11/08/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3996

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0070 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina Humanitarian Assistance, November 16, 1993

2010-0533-M
rs661

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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Draft

44270 1

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USUN 11/04/93
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ECON TJR

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INFO USMISSION GENEVA, PRIORITY KR
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE, PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ZAGREB, PRIORITY

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREF, EAID, BK, SR
SUBJECT: GOULDING CONVEYS REQUEST FOR "HUMANITARIAN - TRUCE" IN B-H

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SEE ACTION REQUEST, PARA 10.

3. SUMMARY: U/SYG MARRACK GOULDING, IN A MEETING WITH THE AMBASSADORS OF THE U.S., RUSSIA AND BELGIUM (IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE PRESIDENT OF THE EC), PASSED ON A STOLTENBERG REQUEST FOR THE PRESIDENTS OF THE U.S., RUSSIA AND THE EC, ALONG WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL, TO MAKE AN APPEAL FOR "A WINTER HUMANITARIAN TRUCE" IN BOSNIA TO PERMIT ACCESS TO DELIVER HUMANITARIAN SUPPLIES. GOULDING DESCRIBED THE CRITICAL NATURE OF THE SITUATION WITH THE ONCOMING OF WINTER AND INFORMED THE ASSEMBLED GROUP THAT STOLTENBERG THOUGHT THAT ONLY A PERSONAL APPEAL BY WORLD LEADERS OF THE STATURE OF PRESIDENTS CLINTON AND YELTSIN, JOINED BY THE EC PRESIDENT AND THE UN SYG, COULD POSSIBLY HAVE A CHANCE TO BRING A TRUCE. UNHCR HEAD OGATA CONCURRED AND EMPHASIZED THAT ACCESS WAS THE KEY OBJECTIVE OF THE APPEAL. NOT EVEN MONEY WAS AS ESSENTIAL. THE AMBASSADORS RAISED THE QUESTION THAT OTHERS MIGHT TRY TO BROADEN THE APPEAL AND MIGHT AGAIN ACCUSE THE SYG AND THE EC COUNTRIES OF ONLY BEING CONCERNED ABOUT EUROPEANS. AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT, WHILE CONFESSING THAT THE IDEA WAS ATTRACTIVE, CALLED FOR FOCUSSING ON THE CONS, NOT THE OBVIOUS PROS. LATER, THE RUSSIAN PERMREP TOLD ALBRIGHT THAT THE IDEA WOULD NOT BE SUCCESSFUL AND THE "PRESTIGE OF OUR TWO PRESIDENTS" SHOULD NOT BE PUT AT RISK. END SUMMARY.

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PER E.O. 13526
VR 2/6/2020 (1.5c)
2013-0682-M

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4. CREATING A BIT OF SUSPENSE AND LOW-KEY DRAMA, UN UNDER SECRETARY GENERAL FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS MARRACK GOULDING, WITH ONLY A HINT OF THE SUBJECT MATTER, CONVENED A MEETING OF THE AMBASSADORS FROM THE U.S., RUSSIA AND THE EC PRESIDENCY THE EVENING OF NOVEMBER 3 TO REQUEST THAT THE LEADERS OF THE UNITED STATES, RUSSIA AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY JOIN WITH THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL TO ISSUE AN APPEAL FOR "A WINTER HUMANITARIAN TRUCE IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA." (NOTE: THE WRITTEN PROPOSAL HAS BEEN FAXED TO IO/PHO.) GOULDING, WHO WAS JOINED BY UNHCR SADAKA OGATA AND UN DEPARTMENT OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS CHIEF JAN ELIASSON, INFORMED THE AMBASSADORS THAT THE IDEA OF THE APPEAL ORIGINATED WITH UN SPECIAL ENVOY THORVALD STOLTENBERG AND HAD THE STRONG SUPPORT OF MRS. OGATA.

5. ACCORDING TO GOULDING, STOLTENBERG THOUGHT A DRAMATIC PERSONAL APPEAL ISSUED BY PRESIDENT CLINTON, PRESIDENT YELTSIN, THE PRESIDENT OF THE EC AND THE SYG REPRESENTED THE ONLY HOPE FOR ADDRESSING WHAT WAS RAPIDLY BECOMING AN HUMANITARIAN CATASTROPHE. THE U/SYG SUGGESTED THAT THE APPEAL STATE IN "STARK TERMS" THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND. HE READILY ADMITTED THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF A POSITIVE RESPONSE WAS "SLENDER." BUT, ARGUED GOULDING, "WE MUST THROUGH THE APPEAL SEEK TO SENSITIZE WORLD OPINION, INCREASE THE FLOW OF FUNDS AND SHOW WHERE THE BLAME LIES IN CASE OF FAILURE." HE CONCLUDED HIS OPENING REMARKS BY SAYING THAT THE SYG WANTED TO INFORMALLY SOUND OUT THE PARTIES BEFORE MAKING A MORE FORMAL REQUEST.

6. OGATA SECONDED THE REMARKS OF GOULDING AND IDENTIFIED THE KEY FACTOR BETWEEN DELIVERING AID OR NOT AS THAT OF ACCESS. EVEN IF FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE, STATED OGATA, "ACCESS IS THE REAL OBJECTIVE" OF THE APPEAL. IT WAS HER VIEW AND THAT OF STOLTENBERG THAT AN APPEAL THAT HAD "THE POLITICAL SUPPORT FROM THE HIGHEST LEVELS" WOULD BE THE ONLY WAY TO ACHIEVE A TRUCE. LIKE GOULDING, OGATA CONCEDED THAT THERE WOULD BE VIOLATIONS IF A TRUCE WERE ACHIEVED. BUT THE EFFORT WOULD BE WORTH IT.

7. THE BELGIAN PERMREP, PAUL NOTERDAEME, SPEAKING FOR THE EC, RAISED THE QUESTION OF DOUBLE STANDARDS THAT SOME WOULD SURELY CAST AT THIS APPEAL IF A SIMILAR EFFORT WERE NOT MADE ON BEHALF OF OTHER TRAGIC HUMANITARIAN SITUATIONS. "WHAT ABOUT APPROACHING THE

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OAU?", ASKED AMBASSADOR NOTERDAEME. OGATA RESPONDED BY POINTING OUT THE UNIQUE NATURE OF WINTER IN A PLACE LIKE BOSNIA AND EXPLAINED THAT SHE WOULD HAVE NO TROUBLE DEALING WITH SUCH A CRITICISM. RUSSIAN PERMREP YULI VORONTSOV SUGGESTED AN EVEN BROADER APPEAL, ON BEHALF OF "ALL OF THE UNITED NATIONS." GOULDING AND OTHERS THOUGHT SUCH AN APPEAL WOULD BE SO BROAD AS TO "DILUTE" ITS EFFECT AND, IN ANY CASE, WOULD NOT HAVE THE IMPACT OF A PERSONAL, DRAMATIC REQUEST BY THE LEADERS OF THE WORLD POWERS WITH THE GREATEST PUBLIC APPEAL.

8. AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT, NOTING THAT HER COMMENTS WERE PRELIMINARY, WAS NON-COMMITTAL BUT CONFESSED THAT (GIVEN THE CRITICAL SITUATION ON THE GROUND) THE IDEA WAS ATTRACTIVE. HOWEVER, CAUTIONED ALBRIGHT, WHILE THE PROS WERE OBVIOUS, "WE SHOULD CAREFULLY EVALUATE THE CONS." SHE TOO WAS CONCERNED THAT OTHERS (E.G., THE OIC) MIGHT WANT TO JOIN IN BY CALLING FOR AN APPEAL IN THE CASE OF OTHER REGIONAL CONFLICTS. A CRITICAL ISSUE IN EVALUATING THE PROPOSAL, ASSERTED AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT, WAS WHETHER STOLTENBERG OBJECTIVELY BELIEVED THAT SUCH AN APPEAL WOULD IN FACT LEAD TO A REAL TRUCE.

9. COMMENT: AFTER THE MEETING, VORONTSOV TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT HE THOUGHT THE IDEA, WHILE LAUDABLE, PROBABLY HAD LITTLE CHANCE OF SUCCESS ON THE GROUND. "IT WOULD BE LIKE ANY OTHER TRUCE," STRESSED VORONTSOV, "KARADZIC WOULDN'T BE ABLE TO CONTROL SOME MILITARY GUY OUT IN THE FIELD WHO WOULD START SHOOTING RIGHT AFTER THE SIGNING CEREMONY." VORONTSOV ARGUED THAT "WE (THE U.S. AND RUSSIA) SHOULD NOT PUT THE PRESTIGE OF OUR TWO PRESIDENTS ON THE LINE" FOR A TRUCE THAT IS BOUND TO FAIL. WE TEND TO AGREE.

10. ACTION REQUEST: DEPARTMENT PLEASE ADVISE. THE EC COUNTRIES PLAN TO CONSIDER THE PROPOSAL ON NOVEMBER 4. GOULDING SAID THE TIMING FOR A RESPONSE TO STOLTENBERG WAS "AS SOON AS POSSIBLE." WE ANTICIPATE BEING CONVOKED FOR ANOTHER MEETING WITH GOULDING NO LATER THAN FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 5.

ALBRIGHT##

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Appeal for a winter humanitarian truce in BiH

Today, temperatures are already sub-zero in parts of BiH, a country devastated by war. Many people are facing the winter without electricity in accommodation that cannot be heated. Water and sanitation services have collapsed or are about to break down. The health services cannot meet even basic needs.

A humanitarian catastrophe is now inevitable if the conflict in BiH continues this winter. It has not been possible for the parties to reach political agreement on a peace plan. If disaster is to be averted, they must, at least, agree on a winter humanitarian truce, while political negotiations continue. An immediate suspension of hostilities must be accompanied by unconditional access for humanitarian assistance and complete and secure freedom of movement for humanitarian aid workers.

Humanitarian principles are being flouted. Personnel of the UN, governmental and non-governmental organizations who are risking and losing their lives to help others are being deliberately targeted by all sides. Their efforts are being obstructed for military advantage.

Without the immediate action that will be made possible by a winter truce, many persons are likely to die of cold. Support for the coal mines, electricity generating capacity, and repair of transmission lines is vital. Not only will lives otherwise be lost, but irreparable damage will be done to the infrastructure that serves all communities and on which economic recovery will depend.

The parties must allow humanitarian assistance to reach those who need it most, and stop diverting it to the military. The cessation of attacks on UNPROFOR and humanitarian aid workers of UNHCR and other agencies will allow all resources to be concentrated on overcoming the practical difficulties. The most effective land routes must be opened as soon as the physical obstacles are removed. The main road from the coast to Sarajevo and the large population centres in central Bosnia are the highest priority. At the same time, the airlift to Sarajevo remains vital and must continue throughout winter without military disruption. Tuzla airport must be opened under UN authority to allow a second airbridge.

Many civilians are still unlawfully detained under appalling conditions. They may not survive the winter. They must be released in accordance with the principles of, and arrangements made by, the ICRC.

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The leaders alone can create the conditions that will allow the international community to help their people. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees will meet with the three parties in BiH to formalize the winter truce and obtain clear guarantees for the unconditional access of humanitarian assistance. If the parties to the conflict fulfil their obligations, and with the full support of the international community, the worst can be prevented. The parties to the conflict already bear a heavy responsibility for a massive human tragedy. If they fail their communities and humanity now, and do not act on this appeal, an even greater disaster will occur. Their responsibility is inescapable.

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~~SECRET~~ SECRET 21265

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 9, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER

FROM: JANE E. HOLL

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance to Bosnia, November 16, 4:00 - 5:00pm, White House Situation Room

The papers and agenda for the subject meeting are attached as indicated. In certain cases, multiple papers have been prepared on a topic and have been grouped together. Additionally, to focus Deputies towards taking decisions in several areas, we have attached an issues paper at Tab B.

Concurrences: Eric Schwartz

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve srb Disapprove _____

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RS NARA, Date 9/24/2019
2010-0533-M

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to Agencies
Tab A Agenda
Tab B Issues for Decision
Tab C Support for Humanitarian Aid Corridors
Tab D Airdrops
Tab E Opening Tuzla Airport
Tab F Humanitarian Assistance for the "FRY"
Tab G Winter Medical Needs
Tab H Civilian Care in MASH Zagreb
Tab I New EC Negotiating Initiative
Tab J Presidential Endorsement of "Winter Humanitarian Truce"

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See also 2013-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title: DC0156 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, December 19, 1994				
Staff Office-Individual: Records Management				
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Row: 43	Section: 4	Shelf: 6	Position: 3	Stack: V

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (3 pages)~~	~~12/19/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RDS 4/17/2015
002a. memo	Don Kerrick to Samuel Berger re: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (6 pages)	12/17/1994	P1/b(1)
002b. memo	Berger to Strobe Talbott et al. re: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)	12/14/1994	P1/b(1)
~~002c. agenda~~	~~Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia (1 page)~~	~~12/19/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002d. paper~~	~~re: Reinvigorated UNPROFOR Proposlas (revised) (2 pages)~~	~~12/16/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 9/21/2015
002e. paper	re: US Proposals for Stregthening UNPROFOR [NATO] (3 pages)	12/1994	P1/b(1)
002f. paper	re: Mission: Secure Sarajevo Airport [NATO] (3 pages)	12/16/1994	P1/b(1)
~~002g. paper~~	~~re: Build Down (2 pages)~~	~~12/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 9/21/2015
~~002h. paper~~	~~re: Talking Points: Unilateral Lift Implications (3 pages)~~	~~12/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
003. memo	[Duplicate of 002b] (1 page)	12/14/1994	P1/b(1)
~~004. agenda~~	~~[Duplicate of 002c] (1 page)~~	~~12/19/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020

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([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3999

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0156 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, December 19, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs662

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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RECORD ID: 9421486
RECEIVED: 19 DEC 94 15

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 20 DEC 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA SOC
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 19 DEC DC MTG RE BOSNIA

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 22 DEC 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9421473 9421481

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0156 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
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		BERGER
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		KERRICK
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By SB NARA. Date 9/25/2019
2013-0682-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	94122019	FOR DECISION
001		X	94122019	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
002		X	94122019	SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	941220	FUERTH, L	
002	941220	PANETTA, L	
002	941220	BRILL, K	
002	941220	MCALEER, R	
002	941220	INDERFURTH, K	
002	941220	GARTHOFF, D	
002	941220	PATRICK, T	

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Situation Room			
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Reed			
Sens	1/3	NS/AP	A
Itoh			
Soderberg			
Berger	2	Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	MBN 12/20	D
NSC Secretariat			N

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

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COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

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DATE 20 DEC 94

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 19 DEC DC MTG RE BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 20, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN

MR. LEON E. PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the
President

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia December 19, 1994 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By SB NARA, Date 9/25/2019
2013-0682-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions
Meeting of NSC Deputies Committee
DATE: December 19, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 11:10 - 1:15pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Samuel Berger

OVP
Leon Fuerth

State
Strobe Talbott
Peter Tarnoff
Richard Holbrooke

DOD
John Deutch
Walter Slocombe

CIA
Douglas MacEachin
Norman Schindler

JCS
ADM. William Owens
LTG Daniel Christman
BG John Walsh

UN
Rick Inderfurth
James O'Brien

NSC
Alexander Vershbow
Donald Kerrick
Bill Danvers

Summary of Conclusions

Administration of Deputies Meetings

1. The Deputies convened in accordance with the direction of the December 12, 1994 Principals' Committee Meeting which asked the Deputies to meet regularly on Bosnia. The Deputies agreed to meet at least weekly with a goal of imposing discipline on the Interagency Bosnia policy-making process.

Negotiating Track

2. The Deputies discussed the progress of ongoing efforts to restart the negotiations under the auspices of the Contact Group and how the former President Carter initiative would affect those

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2010-0533-M (1.94)

negotiations. The Deputies agreed that a common Administration position should be developed and followed by all agencies. Action: NSC draft talking points for use with press and Congressional consultations.

Retaining and Strengthening UNPROFOR

3. The Deputies discussed the efforts underway at the meeting of the Chiefs of Defense at The Hague designed to strengthen and retain UNPROFOR in Bosnia. Noting the lack of enthusiasm on the part of most Allies for robust options, the Deputies agreed that we should continue our efforts to identify steps that will make UNPROFOR more viable in the performance of its existing mandate.

Build-Down Concept

4. The Deputies discussed the concept of build-down and recognized that, despite the difficulties of implementation, build-down was now a political reality and, therefore, required clear definition and integration into our strategy both pre- and post-UNPROFOR withdrawal. Action: OSD flesh out the build-down concept and identify where and how it fits into our near- and long-term strategy.

Sanctions

5. The Deputies discussed steps that have been taken in the run-up to the January 13, 1995 decision point on extending sanctions relief for the Serbian border closure. The Deputies agreed that the yet-to-be announced cut-off of the Krajina Serbs by Milosevic could be a positive step and could affect our action on January 13. The Deputies also agreed that steps must be taken within the interagency community to replace the U.S. border monitors now participating in the ICFY border monitoring mission. Action: OVP.

6. Leon Fuerth circulated a paper outlining a process to guide actions in the run-up to the January 13 decisions and reached an informal agreement that the Deputies Committee was the appropriate level for decisions regarding policy decisions on compliance. The Deputies agreed to consult further on this issue before reaching a decision. Action: OVP.

Congressional and Public Affairs Strategy

7. The Deputies ongoing efforts to raise the awareness in Congress and in the public about the implications of a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo. The Deputies directed that an interagency group be immediately established to oversee the development and implementation of a Congressional and public

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affairs strategy. The group will meet daily and will be under the co-chairmanship of Bill Danvers, NSC Legislative Affairs, and a State Department Public Affairs representative. The group will develop a detailed Congressional and public affairs strategy including an interagency-agreed script and timetable. Action: NSC and State.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 19, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

FROM: DON KERRICK (K)

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, December 19, 1994

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia held December 19, 1994.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve [signature] Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By SB NARA Date 9/25/2019
2017-0682-M

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TO: BERGER

FROM: KERRICK

DOC DATE: 16 DEC 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPERS FOR 19 DEC DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER DUE DATE: 20 DEC 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9421473 9421486

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0156 CODES:

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The White House

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	Don Kerrick to Samuel Berger re: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (6 pages)	12/17/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3999

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0156 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, December 19, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs662

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. memo	Berger to Strobe Talbott et al. re: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)	12/14/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3999

FOLDER TITLE:
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2010-0533-M
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: December 19, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: ~~3:00 - 4:30~~PM
11 - 12:30

AGENDA

I. Bosnia Policy Review/Next Steps

A. Strategy to Deflect Unilateral Lift

(1) Negotiating Track/Prospects/Next Steps.....State

(2) Retaining and Strengthening UNPROFOR: Options/Strategy.....OSD*

(3) Build-Down Concept/Implementation.....OSD*

(4) Congressional/Public Strategy.....State

B. Sanctions - Preparing for January 13th Decision

(1) U.S. Policy Objectives.....State/OVP

(2) Gameplan in Run-Up to Decision.....State/OVP*

C. Gaining Congressional support for U.S. participation in NATO operations to withdraw UNPROFOR.....State/OSD

D. Strategy Post-Withdrawal

(1) Next Steps in Consultations with Allies/Russians.....State*

(2) Relationship Between Build-Down and Lift and Strike.....OSD

(3) Status of Military Planning.....JCS

* Papers requested

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By CF NARA, Date 2/6/20
2013-0682-M

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REINVIGORATED UNPROFOR PROPOSALS
(revised)

FRENCH PROPOSALS.

- Secure the Sarajevo Airport. This idea is consistent with the current humanitarian mission. However, when considered previously, the idea was rejected because of the number of troops required to secure the Serb controlled approaches to the airport on a full-time basis. The French may have in mind something less ambitious than this.
- Secure a land route to Sarajevo. Consistent with current UNPROFOR mandate; most of the route is in Muslim/Croat control, but Serbs control the immediate access to Sarajevo and will oppose UN convoys and target the route; weather also an issue in some areas; and the troop requirement is unclear.
- Consolidate UNPROFOR in the central area. Provides economy of force and efficiency; if it means pulling out of the enclaves, creates the image of withdrawal and abandonment of the eastern enclaves; French seem to have in mind a less complete pull back, e.g., closing down the isolated weapons storage sites around Sarajevo, pulling back UNMO's.

OTHER OPTIONS (within existing mandate)

- Tougher convoy ROE. A variant of the "blue route" concept. Would force through Serb roadblocks, instead of negotiating. Problems are Serb counter-escalating, use of civilians to block convoys.
- Safe Area/EZ focus. Clearly define safe areas, create small exclusion zones and expand them. Deploy UNPROFOR more heavily in safe areas/EZs. Use military force to defend people in safe areas and the movement of humanitarian supplies to them. Option is impartial and within current mandate. Links easily to build-down. Difficult to coordinate, support and control dispersed units; requires a tactical reorientation and probably more troops.
- Central Based Rapid Reaction Force. Concentrate UNPROFOR in Sarajevo with a small presence in limited, designated safe areas. Create a viable mechanized and armor (consider attack helicopters) reaction force (Bn or Bde) configured for combat and located in Sarajevo to respond with ground combat power and air support to UN missions as required. UNPROFOR more defensible; restores UN initiative and gives combat capability to UN but requires new organizational structure, C3I, combat equipment and log support. May increase fighting.

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- Secure Tuzla airport. Easier to secure than Sarajevo airport because it is deeper inside government area. However, it creates new opportunity for fighting, and Tuzla is remote from other areas requiring humanitarian support. Would also require redeployment of many UNPROFOR forces.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002e. paper	re: US Proposals for Stregthening UNPROFOR [NATO] (3 pages)	12/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3999

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0156 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, December 19, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs662

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002f. paper	re: Mission: Secure Sarajevo Airport [NATO] (3 pages)	12/16/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3999

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0156 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, December 19, 1994

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DRAFT

Build Down

Background: On September 30, 1994, Senators Nunn and Lugar sent Dr. Perry a letter outlining key components of a build down strategy. Dr. Perry endorsed the concept as worthy of serious consideration in his October 7, 1994, response. Nunn followed up with a second letter on December 1, 1994, endorsing build down as an alternative to either unilateral or multilateral lifting of the arms embargo as a means to establish rough military parity and hence create one of the essential conditions for a negotiated settlement.

Issue: obtain Deputies agreement on a definition of build down, how it fits into our near and long-term strategy, and how it should be presented to our Allies.

Discussion:

The Concept: an alternative to lifting the embargo. The idea is to reduce weapons rather than increase those of the Bosnian Govt. Build down is designed to equalize the forces by eliminating all or most of the heavy weapons on both sides by either destroying them or removing them from B-H. It is intended to establish rough military equivalence by eliminating the current Bosnian Serb advantage in heavy weapons, thereby allowing the Bosnians to defend themselves and accelerating a negotiated end to the Bosnian conflict.

Build down should be a step-by-step process of demilitarization, beginning as an amplification of our current policy. Since force asymmetries exist, trades-off could include the dismantling of BSA heavy weapons in return for the demobilization of Bosnian Govt troops. Possible key provisions which can be inserted at any point in the negotiating process include:

- Demilitarized zones (DMZ) around Sarajevo and elsewhere;
- Demilitarized roads for humanitarian deliveries ("blue routes");
- More vigorous enforcement and/or extension of EZs;
- Cease-fire areas beyond the EZs with gradual extension into nation-wide DMZ.

Implementation: (Assumption--former President Carter has some success in getting the Bosnian Serbs to resume negotiations for a settlement to the conflict in good faith) Present build down to the UN, NATO, and the Contact Group (CG) for their endorsements. Have the CG present the idea to the Bosnian Serbs as an alternative to lift and strike. Also present to the UN and NATO the idea of partial multilateral lifting of the

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DRAFT

arms embargo by providing the Bosnian Govt forces with a carefully selected package of defensive arms in areas where air attacks have proved ineffective. This idea would be pushed if the build down was not accepted by the warring parties.

Potential Problems: The UN and our NATO allies may have difficulty with more rigorous enforcement of the EZs so long as UNPROFOR is deployed throughout B-H. Re-deployment of those forces to more defensible and less exposed positions could be married to the more vigorous use of NATO air and partial lift. Expanding EZs may require more forces. Bosnian Govt is likely to resist build down. Advocates of lift (with or without strike) may label build down naive.

Recommendation: adopt build down as a component of the diplomatic strategy. Present it as an alternative to lift. If it is not readily accepted, use that as an additional argument if favor of lift, particularly the partial multilateral lift to provide defensive weapons to the Bosnian Govt in areas where NATO air power has been ineffective.

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Bosnia Hill Strategy

Issue

We have to make certain that a very vocal group in the House and the Senate in favor of a lift and strike strategy for Bosnia are not able to pass legislation that would force unilateral lift on the Administration.

Despite all of our past briefings and outreach efforts, this group believes that our policy of seeking a diplomatic solution and multilateral lift does not work. For the past year they have been progressively introducing more and more restrictive legislation trying to force a unilateral lift. Thus far, we have been able to fight back their efforts, although the Nunn-Mitchell amendment, part of the FY 95 DoD authorization bill, forced us not to enforce the embargo and to prepare plans for a unilateral lift and arming the Bosnians.

Another problem we may have to confront at some point in the future is whether or not we should support or even seek an authorization for our participation in an NATO-led operation to get UNPROFOR troops out of Bosnia. While this will not become an issue until NATO makes a decision, we may want to do some initial soundings on the Hill during upcoming Bosnia briefings.

Hill Strategy

We need to get the story out as to why a unilateral lift is not a good idea. In addition, we must also explain, clearly, what our alternative strategy is.

We should use the next couple of weeks before Congress comes back into session to refine the arguments we want to make against unilateral lift and in support of our policy. We will, however, have an opportunity to brief members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Bosnia in a closed briefing on Friday, December 16. Peter Tarnoff will take the lead. He will be accompanied by representatives from DoD and JCS.

During the first week of January, we will begin a round of intense briefings on Bosnia. Three important issues we have to raise are: the problems of a unilateral lift, our alternative to lift and strike and our participation in a NATO-led operation to get UNPROFOR troops out of Bosnia.

The briefings should be closely coordinated with the new leadership, as well as the new committee chairmen and ranking

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members. We will be more effective if we go committee by committee-- i.e. Armed Services, International Relations, Intelligence-- as opposed to offering one big briefing for the House and Senate. We should also make an effort to target every new Senator and the freshman members of the House Armed Services and International Relations Committees.

Between now and the beginning of January, we should form a State/DoD/JCS briefing team to present our case. It is crucial that DoD and JCS take the lead when discussing the problems of unilateral lift. We should also prepare a set of common talking points that lay out simply and clearly our policy and the case against unilateral lift. If at all possible we should have a dry run of the presentation we will make to the Hill during the next few weeks.

Once the initial round of briefings are held in January, we should have principals make calls to key members on Bosnia to gauge where they are. We should also consider bringing back to Washington Admiral Crowe, Peter Galbraith and other Ambassadors to meet with a select group of members in January.

It is particularly important that we remain in close touch with Senators Dole, Lieberman Levin, Cohen, McCain, Nunn, Lugar, McConnell, Leahy, Biden and Kassebaum. In the House we should keep in contact with Representatives Gingrich, Gephardt, Bonior, Gilman, Hamilton, Murtha, Obey, and Livingston. They are key to any legislative action on unilateral lift. We should be under no illusions that we can defeat a resolution on a unilateral lift or that its proponents won't find a way to make it very difficult to veto a bill containing such language.

While a veto should always be an option, it should be used strategically, so that members do not feel they are getting a free ride in supporting a resolution calling for a unilateral lift because they know the legislation will be vetoed.

Public Affairs

There should be a coordinated Hill/public affairs campaign that helps us make the case on the perils of unilateral lift and explains why our policy is the right one. Articles, public statements, calls and meetings from individuals outside the government, like Colin Powell, in support of our policy would be of help with the general public and the Hill.

Between now and when Congress convenes in January, we should reach out to editorial boards across the nation on the problems

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of unilateral lift. The public affairs people from DoD, State and the White House should coordinate this effort.

We recommend that the White House working with the NSC form an interagency public affairs/legislative strategy group to help shape our Bosnia strategy over the coming weeks. A similar group on Haiti group worked quite well.

Summary

Sen. Dole and others will likely force the issue of a unilateral lift on us sometime in January. We need to use the time between now and when Congress comes into session to mount a public affairs strategy on the perils of a unilateral lift.

When Congress convenes, we will begin an aggressive Hill briefing strategy to clearly state our policy and why we are against a unilateral lift. We will work through the leadership and key committees and will follow up with calls from principals. During this process we will take discreet soundings of how the Hill views our participation in a NATO-led operation to get UNPROFOR troops out of Bosnia, which will help us decide whether to support or possibly seek an authorization for our participation.

Obviously the outcome of the Carter mission could affect our approach to the Hill.

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Talking Points: Unilateral Lift Implications

I. Unilateral lift of the arms embargo would have a number of severe and negative consequences for the United States and the region. Unilateral lift would ultimately lead to:

--increased pressure to deploy more than 100,000 US ground troops in Bosnia and U.S. responsibility for the conflict;

--a possible widening of war to engulf the entire Balkans, including two NATO allies (Greece and Turkey);

--a significant increase in violence. And a dramatic deterioration in the humanitarian crisis with millions more refugees;

--a serious rift between the US and our Western allies, endangering NATO;

--a direct confrontation with Russia;

--an undermining of the authority of all UN Security Resolutions, including sanctions on Iraq, Libya, etc.

1. If the US lifts unilaterally, most UNPROFOR countries are likely to withdraw immediately, leaving at best a handful of Moslem peacekeepers. The Bosnian Serbs will launch all out pre-emptive attacks, before the Bosnian government can be supplied and trained. Even if the US launched massive airstrikes, the US would not have the support of NATO (because lift was unilateral) and so would have to act alone. Airstrikes alone would not halt the Serb ground attack, particularly in view of the mountainous terrain and generally poor visibility, and, in response to airstrikes, Serbia itself would come to the aid of the Bosnian Serbs, raising the possibility of a U.S. war with Serbia. In the face of the Bosnian government's certain defeat at the hands of the combined Serb forces, the United States prestige would be on the line, and we would have a moral responsbility to send sufficient US ground troops (more than 100,000) to rescue the Bosnian state.

2. The escalation of fighting would draw in the Serbs from the Krajina, thus spreading the war to Croatia. With the all out military confrontation between the US and Serbia, Serbia would no longer have any reason to exercise restraint in Kosovo, thus risking the spread to Macedonia, which in turn would bring in Greece and Turkey.

3. Given France and Britain's opposition to unilateral lift, they likely would refuse consent to allow NATO facilities to be used for the US air and ground operations.

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The resulting rift would undermine the consensus behind NATO's unified military command, and deeply harm the political underpinings of NATO.

4. Russia would not only oppose unilateral lift, but in response would unilaterally lift sanctions against Serbia, and arm Serbia and perhaps the Bosnian Serbs, This would put the US and Russia on a direct military collision course, with the prospect of US troops being killed by Russian supplied weapons.

5. If the United States asserted the right to abrogate unilaterally the UNSC embargo resolutions, others would claim similar rights for other other UNSC Resolutions (e.g. France and Russia on Iraq sanctions).

II. Multilateral lift would not pose the same risks

Multilateral lift assumes the concurrence of France, Britain and Russia, all members of the Security Council. Thus the dangers to the Western alliance and the US-Russian relationship could be avoided, the United States would not assume sole responsbility for the defense of the Bosnian government, and the unity among the Contact Group members/Perm 5 would provide a powerful incentive for the Serbs to negotiate rather than attack in response to multilateral lift.

For these reasons, the Administration continues to believe that multilateral lift remains an option. For the present, the Bosnian government does not seek lifting of the arms embargo.

III. Complete disengagement would not serve US interests

Although unilateral lift is not in our interest, neither is complete disengagment. We have a strong interest in preventing the war from spreading, in meeting humanitarian needs, in supporting (though not with ground troops) the efforts of our allies and friends in UNPROFOR) and seeking (though not with ground troops) a negotiated agreement on the basis of the Contact Group plan that preserves Bosnia's territorial integrity.

IV. Reinvigorating diplomatic efforts, as launched by the Contact Group December 2 mininsterial, is the best course.

--neither side is capable of winning the war militarily

--only a negotiated solution has any chance of lasting

--the international community continues to apply pressure through sanctions -- Milosevic's cut-off of

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the Bosnian Serbs demonstrates that sanctions can have an impact.

--a unified Contact Group position on maintaining sanctions and insisting on the Contact Group plan, combined with the border closures, is increasing pressure on Karadzic, improving the chances for a negotiated solution.

--although there is no guarantee that this renewed effort will produce immediate success, it is the only realistic approach to a durable solution.

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RECORD ID: 9421473
RECEIVED: 14 DEC 94 13

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 14 DEC 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA DC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 19 DEC DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: BERGER SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 17 DEC 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9421481 9421486

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0156 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BAKER JANE
		BERGER
		CICIO
		DARBY
		KERRICK
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW
		WOLIN

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By: [illegible] NARA Date 9/25/2019
2013-0662-M

COMMENTS: _____

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001	BERGER	Z	94121511	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	94121511	BERGER SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	941214	TALBOTT, S	
002	941214	DEUTCH, J	
002	941214	FUERTH, L	
002	941214	OWENS, W	
002	941214	STUDEMAN, W	
002	941214	INDERFURTH, K	

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Andrew — 12/14

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Fawcett.

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National Security Council
The White House

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Sens			
Itoh	1	WZ	
Soderberg			
Berger	2	MR	
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	DR 12/14	D
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS:

→ Format of outgoing memo, per Mr. Berger's instruction, 12/14 DB

14 DEC 94 [illegible] 17

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LOG 9421473
DATE 14 DEC 94

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION OF DC MTG ON BOSNIA 19 DEC
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. STROBE TALBOTT DEPARTMENT OF STATE VIA EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7220, MAIN STATE	12/15/94	14:41	Adelia Thomas PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. JOHN M. DEUTCH DEPT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E944 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
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VICE ADMIRAL WILLIAM O. STUDEMAN CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY VIA EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: FAX

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(PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: DC Meeting on Bosnia 19 Dec

NSC LOG # 21473.

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
State	Executive Secretary	S. Talbott	
DoD	Executive Secretary	J. Deutch	
JCS	Secretary	Adm. Owens	
CIA	Executive Secretary	Adm. Studeman	
USUN/State	Office of the Ambassador	Amb. Inderfurth	

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NSC LOG # 21473

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting PAGES: 2

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. memo	[Duplicate of 002b] (1 page)	12/14/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3999

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0156 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, December 19, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs662

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: December 19, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 3:00 - 4:30PM

AGENDA

I. Bosnia Policy Review/Next Steps

A. Strategy to Deflect Unilateral Lift

(1) Negotiating Track/Prospects/Next Steps.....State

(2) Retaining and Strengthening UNPROFOR: Options/Strategy.....OSD*

(3) Build-Down Concept/Implementation.....OSD*

(4) Congressional/Public Strategy.....State

B. Sanctions - Preparing for January 13th Decision

(1) U.S. Policy Objectives.....State/OVP

(2) Gameplan in Run-Up to Decision.....State/OVP*

C. Gaining Congressional support for U.S. participation in NATO operations to withdraw UNPROFOR.....State/OSD

D. Strategy Post-Withdrawal

(1) Next Steps in Consultations with Allies/Russians.....State*

(2) Relationship Between Build-Down and Lift and Strike.....OSD

(3) Status of Military Planning.....JCS

* Papers requested

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 2/6/2020
NSC-06-82-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 14, 1994



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: DON KERRICK

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum and agenda for the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia to be held on December 19, 1994, 3:00-4:30pm.

Concurrences by: Bill Danvers and Bill Wise N/A In Moscow: Copy provided

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to your agency counterparts.

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to counterparts
Tab A Agenda

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RS NARA, Date 9/25/2019
2010-0533-M

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See also 2013-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)~~	~~01/06/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RDS 04/17/2015
002a. memo	Don Kerrick to Samuel Berger re: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (3 pages)	01/05/1994	P1/b(1)
002b. paper	re: Extension of FRY Sanctions Relief (4 pages)	01/1995	P1/b(1)
~~002c. memo~~	~~Richard Holbrooke to the Secretary; re: Bosnia (4 pages)~~	~~01/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020

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([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3999

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DC0160 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, January 6, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs663

RESTRICTION CODES

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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RECORD ID: 9520025
RECEIVED: 09 JAN 95 09

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 11 JAN 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA DC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 6 JAN DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 12 JAN 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520005 9520011

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0160 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BAKER JANE
		DARBY
		KERRICK
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

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001	BERGER	Z	95011108	FOR DECISION
002		X	95011108	ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950111	FUERTH, L	
002	950111	BRILL, K	
002	950111	MCALEER, R	
002	950111	INDERFURTH, K	
002	950111	PANETTA, L	
002	950111	GARTHOFF, D	
002	950111	PATRICK, T	

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Situation Room			Faxed
West Wing Desk	6	MBN 1/10	D
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Itoh			
Soderberg	2	MS	
Berger	3 #		
Lake		Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			Faxed
West Wing Desk	6	MBN 1/10	D
NSC Secretariat			

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1/10 cc to TL per JRB request

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WASHINGTON, DC 20506

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET , N.W.
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 10, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR.KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of
the U.S. to the United Nations

MR. LEON E. PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President
of the United States

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia
January 6, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By SD NARA, Date 9/25/2019
2013-0682-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions
Meeting of NSC Deputies Committee
DATE: January 6, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 3:10 - 4:15pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Samuel Berger

OVP
Leon Fuerth
Richard Saunders

State
Peter Tarnoff
Robert Frasure

DOD
Walter Slocombe
Joseph Kruzel

WHITE HOUSE
Nancy Soderberg

CIA
Douglas MacEachin
Norman Schindler

JCS
LTG Wes Clark
BG John Walsh

UN
David Scheffer
James O'Brien

NSC
Alexander Vershbow
Donald Kerrick
Bill Danvers

Summary of Conclusions

Sanctions

1. The Deputies reviewed the Interagency Working Group's analysis, conclusions, and recommendations on the inter-Serbian border closure and approved the IWG recommendation to extend sanctions relief for another 100 days, with a positive vote needed to extend and a clause to terminate sanctions relief should Serbian performance deteriorate. The Deputies authorized the IWG to develop a list of minimum essential requirements and supporting objectives for inclusion in a guidance cable for USUN use in developing a new UNSCR. Action: OVP/NSC and State.

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NLCD-2013-0533-M
KS 9/30/14 (1.95)

2. The Deputies discussed the options for consulting with Congress on the sanctions relief extension decision and agreed that calls to key members should be made Monday, January 9, before the afternoon meeting at the UN. The Deputies directed that talking points be prepared. Action: NSC

Diplomatic Strategy

3. The Deputies discussed the progress of ongoing Contact Group efforts to restart the negotiations. The Deputies requested that a list of options be developed for influencing the negotiations toward a positive outcome. This should be part of a diplomatic roadmap from now until April 30. The paper should be circulated by COB January 10 for comment prior to another Deputies meeting later in the week. Action: State.

Congressional and Public Affairs Strategy

4. The Deputies discussed next steps in dealing with Congress on Bosnia and agreed that a single comprehensive briefing on Bosnia should be prepared for use during the sessions next week. Action: State, in coordination with OSD, JCS and NSC.

5. The Deputies discussed timing for publication of the Secretary Perry/General Shalikashvili op-ed, deferring decision until a later date. The Deputies also agreed to develop a list of witnesses outside the Administration to speak on behalf of Administration Bosnia policy. Action: NSC

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 9, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

FROM: DON KERRICK (DK)

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, January 6, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of Conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia held January 6, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve SNV Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By SB NARA, Date 9/25/2019
2013-0682-M

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RECEIVED: 05 JAN 95 13

TO: BERGER

FROM: KERRICK
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 05 JAN 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPERS FOR 6 JAN DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER DUE DATE: 09 JAN 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520005 9520025

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0160 CODES:

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FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
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		DARBY
		KERRICK
		NSC CHRON
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The White House

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	Don Kerrick to Samuel Berger re: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (3 pages)	01/05/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3999

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0160 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, January 6, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs663

RESTRICTION CODES

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P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
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DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: January 6, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 3:00pm - 4:00pm

Agenda

I. Inter-Serbian Sanctions.....OVP/NSC

-- IWG recommendations on extension of 100-day sanctions suspension period

II. Diplomatic Strategy .....State

-- Status of negotiations post-cessation of hostilities

III. Congressional and Public Affairs Strategy.....All

-- Gameplan for January

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RS NARA, Date 5/25/2019
2010-0533-M

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. paper	re: Extension of FRY Sanctions Relief (4 pages)	01/1995	P1/b(1)

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NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3999

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0160 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, January 6, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs663

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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NZ 2/6/2020 (1.72)
2013-0682-M

TO: The Secretary

THROUGH: P - Mr. Tarnoff

FROM: EUR - Richard C. Holbrooke

SUBJECT: Bosnia: A Road Map for January

- Our goal is to bring to an end the war in Bosnia in 1995 in a manner consistent with the Contact Group plan. Over the last month, starting with the December 2 CG Ministerial in Brussels, we developed a three-stage, sequenced approach to reach this goal: ceasefire, formal cessation of hostilities, and a political negotiation centered on the CG plan.

- With the first two stages now accomplished, our current task is to succeed in the third phase -- the difficult negotiation to find a political settlement. Three aspects are crucial:

  -- The process for renewing peace negotiations;

  -- The substance of the peace process;

  -- Congressional strategy -- that is, creating enough breathing space on the Hill to allow us to use the four months productively.

THE PROCESS

- The four-month cessation of hostilities is going to be fragile and frequently violated, but we believe it does create a new political environment more conducive to peace negotiations.

- The first question now is how to reactivate the peace process. We must reengage quickly -- within the next ten days -- to seize the momentum created by the cessation agreement. We must avoid a vacuum that others would seek to fill, as Boutros tried to do over the weekend.

- Indications from Bonn are that their current problem over contacts with Pale will be resolved this week -- prior to or during Ambassador Thomas' scheduled CG meeting in Bonn, January 5. Your message has been delivered and we believe is already having some positive effect. To meet German concerns, the CG will

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agree to approach Karadzic, but only to get Pale's "acceptance" of the plan. No other topics will be raised in the first CG contact with Pale. Based on conversations with our embassies yesterday, we believe the British, French and the Russians will buy into this approach. The CG team will proceed to Sarajevo, Pale, Belgrade, and Zagreb late this week on this basis.

- o I will go into Sarajevo on January 9 or 10 to meet with Izetbegovic and his colleagues on next steps, and will then meet with CG political directors (probably in Paris). By this time the CG will have completed its tour of the region and I will link up with Thomas.

- o Our aim will be the establishment of a clear diplomatic process by mid-January under CG auspices, although the precise form is yet to be decided. Three formats are possible:

  -- A Geneva type conference;

  -- "Proximity talks" somewhere in Europe;

  -- Shuttle diplomacy between the two sides, i.e. back and forth between Sarajevo, Zagreb, Belgrade and Pale.

- o We believe shuttle diplomacy gives us the best chance of progress; it worked well over the last two weeks for both Carter and the UN. We should avoid a Geneva extravaganza which would allow Karadzic -- and others -- to posture before the world's press and maximize chances for a stalemate. "Proximity talks" are not likely to have as representatives the decision-making levels needed for progress. Shuttle diplomacy works best, in our view, because it allows the CG to put direct pressure on the decision makers, and is less susceptable to media manipulation than a conference or proximity talks.

- o We will, per your Sunday conversation with Boutros, work for closer UN-CG coordination in the next phase, but we should avoid allowing the UN to subvert or downgrade the CG -- an action that would damage our relations with Russia, would create serious problems with Sarajevo, and increase our difficulties with Congress.

- o We will need to keep the Carter operation on the sidelines but it may be needed again if and when we have crunch points with the Pale Serbs where a Carter phone call to Karadzic could be the only remedy. Thus we need to keep the Carter camp informed; calls to Carter and Barnes, a Frasure trip to Atlanta periodically. (It is clear Carter plans to stay involved -- see his letter to Milosevic, tab 4.)

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US POLICY AND A NEGOTIATION

- We all recognize that any negotiation will be very difficult. Given the divisions within the CG, the USG must make it very clear that we are sticking to the 51/49 although "land swaps" can be arranged with the consent of both parties.

- We will also need to show full support to the Bosnian Government in their efforts to maintain their state as an international entity within its present boundaries. Our program for non-military assistance for the GOBH (headed by Dan Serwer and including the "Friends of the Federation" which will be announced this month in Bonn) must be vigorously continued. This will be particularly useful with the Hill.

- Throughout this process we will need to pay special attention to Zagreb. If Tudjman comes to believe that we are heading toward a Bosnia-only solution -- with the Krajina problem pushed aside, Cyprus-style -- Zagreb will abort a deal, possibly by disrupting the Federation, and will threaten to end the UN presence which is up for renewal at the end of January.

CONGRESSIONAL STRATEGY

- If the cessation agreement holds and a diplomatic process is underway, our ability to fend off Congressional pressure in January will be greatly enhanced. We believe a vigorous offensive should be launched with the Hill, rather than wait to react to Dole and others.

- Our first test on the Hill will be over a decision on whether or not to renew sanctions relief for Milosevic. A decision must be made by the UNSC by January 13. We control this process, since we can block or limit any extension of the suspension of the sanctions. Congress will certainly express negative views, and will cite anecdotal evidence of border leakage. In recent weeks, however, monitoring of the border has improved, and strengthens the case that Belgrade is making a serious effort.

  -- But, in the end, our decision will be political. Assuming the diplomatic process is underway, we will probably recommend to you and to the Principals Committee a limited term extension of phase one sanctions. This will be criticized by some on the Hill as going too far and by the British and Russians for not going far enough; but it will probably be a sustainable policy and can be used, we hope, to encourage negotiations.

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- Our biggest test on the Hill will be the Dole-Lieberman resolution on lift (attached tab 3). We have received conflicting information as to timing and format of this resolution. Lugar told me December 28 that he was confident that, given the Republican domestic agenda, it would not be acted on before May or June; other sources have suggested that Dole will try to get an early vote. We believe that in a condition of cessation of hostilities and visible activity by the CG, our ability to resist Dole is substantially improved.

  -- However, a certain amount of pressure from the Hill on lift, paradoxically, helps us in London and Paris, and Sarajevo and Pale.

  -- It is also worthwhile, as President Izetbegovic mentioned in his letter to you, that we mention now and again our desire to have our UN resolution on multilateral lift passed.

- In addition to our ability to show Congress that we have a process underway, we must also show members that we are not engaging in a strategy of "peace at any price."

  -- Our continued close consultation with the Bosnians, including our efforts to support and invigorate the the Bosnian-Croat Federation, will be understood as a positive sign that we are not cutting or running. The Bosnians are well plugged in on the Hill, and while not decisive, have considerable influence.

Attachments:

Tab 1: December 31 Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities
Tab 2: December 30 letter from President Izetbegovic
Tab 3: Dole-Lieberman draft bill on lift
Tab 4: Carter letter to Milosevic

Drafted: EUR:RFrasure/CRHill
1/2/95 Bosnia Strategy seeeyyug 10109

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CONGRESSIONAL CALENDAR ON BOSNIA
JANUARY

Jan. 4	Senators Dole/Lieberman & 15 introduce unilateral lift resolution. Referred to committee (SFRC).
Jan. 4-6	Ambassador Galbraith briefs SFRC/HIRC staffs, Senators Moynihan, Lieberman and Levin.
Jan. 6	DC meeting on suspension of sanctions.
Jan. 6/9	Calls on members/staffs to brief on USG decision regarding sanctions extension, decision to offer equipment to UNPROFOR.
Jan. 11-12	State, JCS, OSD briefings of SASC, SFRC, HIRC, and CONS (Members) on overall Bosnia policy.
Jan. 16-17	British Foreign Secretary Hurd in Washington, meetings with key Members.
Jan. 24-Feb. 2	Adm. Crowe meetings with key members
Jan. 26-27	French FM Juppé in Washington, meetings with key members
January-February	Meetings by Ambassadors Albright, Harriman, Bartholomew, and Hunter with key Members, others as needed.
January-February	Continue to set up targeted Perry-Shali meetings with Dole, Lieberman, Gingrich, Cohen, Levin, Hyde, Berman, McCain, Gilman.
January-February	National security briefings in House/Senate for new Members.

(Contact Group meetings continue throughout this period. To the extent any significant developments, staff/Member calls will be made. State/NSC/OSD leg will have daily press guidance to brief individual staffers in response to any inquiries.)

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UNILATERAL LIFTING OF THE ARMS EMBARGO ON BOSNIA: THE PATH TO AN AMERICANIZED FOURTH BALKAN WAR

When the history of the tragic conflict in the former Yugoslavia is written, it will be clear that the arms embargo on Bosnia -- imposed in 1991 -- was a mistake. It has been discriminatory in depriving B-H of the means of self-defense against the Bosnian Serbs' superiority in tanks and artillery drawn from Tito's old arsenals and from some fresh supplies from outside, notably supporters in Serbia itself. An international agreement to lift the arms embargo multilaterally and deal collectively with the consequences would be both wise and just -- and has been supported by the Administration.

Some Americans, however, reacting with understandable frustration, are demanding the U.S. ignore UN resolutions and act unilaterally to lift the arms embargo. They claim unilateral lift would ensure that Bosnian government forces receive the arms and training they need to "level the field" and defend themselves. And they claim such a step would do this without drawing the U.S. into the Balkan fighting.

But a realistic look at the facts on the ground and the likely consequences of unilateral U.S. action demonstrate that taking such a seemingly fair, direct, and simple action would be a grave mistake, for both U.S. interests and the people of Bosnia. Among the consequences -- ignored or denied by proponents of unilateral lift -- would be these:

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- Unilateral lift would undermine the most successful diplomatic initiative in many months -- the Cessation of Hostilities agreement, negotiated with the help of former President Carter -- which was just signed by all the warring parties, and is now coming into effect. An American decision now to end the arms embargo would end that Cessation of Hostilities agreement -- and end also the hope of renewed negotiations toward a permanent peace settlement that would preserve Bosnia-Herzegovina as a single state, consistent with the Contact Group proposal.

- The Bosnian Serbs would have every incentive launch pre-emptive attacks, designed to exploit their advantages before the American arms supplies reached Bosnia. While the Serbs probably could not totally defeat government forces, it is virtually certain they would occupy the eastern enclaves and renew military pressure on Sarajevo and elsewhere, especially on relief supply routes.

- Current UNPROFOR operations would end as European and many other contributing countries withdraw from Bosnia, seizing on U.S. action as an excuse to end a commitment that has been costly for them in lives, treasure, and involvement.

- UN and most other outside relief efforts would stop, at the very time humanitarian requirements would increase dramatically, both because of the increased fighting and the withdrawal of Serb cooperation. Most Americans are unaware that a high percentage of the food reaching the enclaves comes through Belgrade and Bosnian-Serb controlled territory. All airfields and most land routes are within range of Bosnian Serb artillery. Whatever else

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they did, the Serbs could easily cut off these relief supplies.

The cumulative effect of these consequences would be strong pressure for direct American combat involvement -- something President Clinton, like President Bush before him has consistently ruled out. The U.S. would have precipitated the increased fighting and the end of international relief and peacekeeping efforts. Moral responsibility for the resulting military and humanitarian situation in Bosnia would shift the U.S.

In short, unilaterally ending the arms embargo is not an alternative to U.S. military intervention. It is a way of accomplishing such intervention.

The implications of taking on this responsibility are many and grave. To begin with, the U.S. would have to take over relief efforts, or accept responsibility for the large-scale starvation and refugee flows that would result from the lack of food.

Similarly, unless we were prepared to watch as pre-emptive Serb attacks further battered Bosnian cities and defensive positions, U.S. airstrikes would be required to defend government forces. However the necessary European bases and other NATO support on which our current, much smaller air efforts depend, might not be available in the aftermath of a major break with our allies. In any case, airstrikes alone, even with the added planes needed, would probably not halt Serb ground attacks, given the difficult weather and terrain conditions.

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Furthermore, contrary to the claims of unilateral lift backers, the "playing field" in Bosnia is not self-leveling. Simply authorizing U.S. manufacturers to sell arms to Bosnia would not get any arms to Bosnia. For lifting the embargo to have its intended effect of allowing the Bosnians to defend themselves, the U.S. would have to undertake a major military assistance program to provide arms -- without the cooperation of our major allies and, potentially, in the face of their active opposition.

The financial costs, though substantial, would be the least of the problems in carrying out such an effort. Upgrading Bosnia's light infantry to confront Bosnian Serb heavy weapons successfully is not a simple task -- as earlier U.S. efforts to equip local forces in other countries from Vietnam to El Salvador have shown. Most important, sophisticated arms -- which the Bosnians would need to overcome Bosnian Serb advantages in heavy weapons -- are ineffective without trained soldiers to use them and a continuing stream of support. U.S. trainers, advisers and logistics support personnel on the ground would be necessary to assist the Bosnian Government in using the arms effectively.

A U.S. decision to lift the arms embargo unilaterally would undermine the most important U.S. national security objectives for the region. The primary U.S. objective has been to avoid a wider war in the Balkans. Among the most serious potential consequences of unilateral U.S. action would, however, be strong pressures to widen the conflict beyond Bosnia. There are painfully many scenarios for such wider fighting:

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- Escalation of fighting would likely draw in the Serbs from Krajina (as it did in Bihac), thus extending the actual fighting to Croatia.

- The Belgrade Serbs, though very sympathetic to the Bosnian Serbs, are now under strong international pressure, cutting off supplies to the Bosnian Serbs and pressing them to settle on terms the government of Bosnia Herzegovina has accepted. With the U.S. acting unilaterally, over the objections of our allies and the Russians, it would be difficult if not impossible to convince the Belgrade Serbs to hold back from intervening in support of their Bosnian Serb compatriots -- unless we were prepared to threaten Belgrade militarily.

- U.S. military confrontation with Serbia could precipitate a sharp crackdown by Belgrade in Serbia's principal Muslim province, Kosovo, a development which would have the potential to destabilize the entire southern Balkan region, and which the U.S. has pledged to meet with force.

- Broader conflict could draw Albania, Macedonia, Greece, and Turkey into the conflict.

Multilateral lift would not pose the same risks. Our Contact Group partners have agreed that lifting the arms embargo multilaterally could become unavoidable as a last resort if negotiations collapse and UNPROFOR must be withdrawn. If the arms embargo were lifted multilaterally by the UN the dangers to the Western alliance and the U.S.-Russian relationship would be avoided, the United States would not assume sole responsibility for the defense of the Bosnian government, and the unity among the Contact Group members and permanent members

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of the UN Security Council would provide a powerful incentive for the Serbs to negotiate rather than attack in response to multilateral lift.

With NATO's cooperation, airstrikes would be more effective; the allies might assist in arming the Bosnian government; and with Russia's help or acquiescence, Serbia may be kept out of the war -- a critical factor in whether a lift and strike strategy would succeed. For these reasons, the Administration continues to believe that multilateral lift remains an option, although one not without risks and adverse consequences.

Neither our horror at the destruction brought by this long and brutal war and at the atrocities of Serbian ethnic cleansing nor our frustration with the irrationality of Balkan rivalries and the difficulty of international peacekeeping should be allowed to cause us to forget that much has been accomplished by international action even as the war has continued. The European role, and our cooperation with Europe, has been central to what has been achieved to moderate the suffering in Bosnia and prevent a wider war. The UN for all its limitations, has saved thousands of lives by its military and civilian efforts. UNPROFOR, for all its problems, has been the necessary element for the large scale delivery of food, and for support of the Sarajevo and Gorazde exclusion zones. NATO cooperation has been essential for enforcement of the "No Fly Zone," the heavy weapons exclusion zones, and the economic sanctions against Serbia. The Contact Group, which includes Russia, as well as key European allies, has been the principal instrument for seeking a negotiated solution.

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Maintaining that cooperation and avoiding a fundamental break with our NATO allies over the Bosnian issue is, of course, also essential to our broader national interests in European and international security. Virtually every European nation opposes lifting the arms embargo at this time. Thus U.S. unilateral action would be undertaken in the face of vehement opposition of most NATO allies. The resulting rift would undermine consensus underlying NATO's unified military command and deeply damage the alliance and the U.S. ability to lead it.

Additionally, hopes of a cooperative relationship with Russia on European security would be seriously jeopardized by actions that Russians of all political stripes would see as U.S. intervention not just against the Bosnian Serbs, but against the Belgrade Serbs as well. Russia would likely counter U.S. action by arming the Serbs, thereby raising the ante and reviving U.S.-Russian confrontation.

Finally, while it is fashionable in some circles these days to ridicule the UN and all its works, the U.S. has an important interest in nations not taking unilateral action in contravention of UN resolutions. Such actions not only undermines both international law and internationally sanctioned peacekeeping operations. It also undercuts the U.S. interest in international sanctions being observed. One of the main pressures on the Serbs is the UN embargo on their trade. If the U.S. unilaterally dropped the part of the UN sanctions it finds objectionable, the front line states -- Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs which they claim has cost them billions of dollars already.

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Nor would the effects on sanctions regimes we support be confined to the Balkans. If the U.S. acted alone in this matter, other nations would claim the right to ignore UN embargo resolutions that we strongly favor such as those that pertain to Iraq and other pariah states.

In sum, Congressional action mandating unilateral U.S. action to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia would be a tragic and short-sighted mistake. It would mean the Americanization of the war, for unilateral action entails unilateral responsibility for the consequences of that action. We should be under no illusion that the U.S. could responsibly simply lift the arms embargo and walk away. Nor should we do the only thing that would really produce the Bosnian victory many lift proponents understandably think the only just and fair outcome -- commit U.S. ground forces to solve the problems of Bosnia.

What we must do instead, therefore, is continue to work within the international community to limit the scale of fighting, provide humanitarian relief, prevent a wider war, and seek to achieve an early agreed settlement to this tragic war. That settlement will not be ideal. But it will be far better than the consequences of expanded war, division from our allies, and likely U.S. combat involvement that unilateral lifting of the arms embargo would bring.

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RECORD ID: 9520005
RECEIVED: 04 JAN 95 08

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 05 JAN 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA AGENDA
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 6 JAN DC MTG RE BOSNIA

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 07 JAN 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520011 9520025

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0160 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BAKER JANE
		DARBY
		KERRICK
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

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DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	95010508	FOR DECISION
001		X	95010508	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
002		X	95010508	SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950105	FUERTH, L	
002	950105	BRILL, K	
002	950105	MCALEER, R	
002	950105	GARTHOFF, D	
002	950105	PATRICK, T	
002	950105	INDERFURTH, K	

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National Security Council
The White House

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Sens	1	NDS	
Itoh			
Soderberg			
HW Berger	2	mr	
~~Lake~~ Sens	3	NDS	Tab I
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4		
NSC Secretariat			

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cc: Baker

COMMENTS: NOM - DC Mtg
1/6

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ROOM 290, OEOB
WASHINGTON, DC 20506

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COPY: 1

1/5	3:44p	S. McElhany

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TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PRIORITY
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DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: _____ **CLASSIFICATION:** ~~SECRET~~ **TOTAL:** 3 **(PAGES INCLUDING COVER)**

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: DC MTG ON BOSNIA ON 6 JAN

NSC LOG # 20005.

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

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2.13-0682-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 5, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the UN

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia on Friday, January 6, 1995, 3:00-4:00 p.m., in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be principals plus one. The agenda is attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By SB NARA, Date 9/25/2019
2013-0682-M

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DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: January 6, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 3:00 - 4:00 p.m.

Agenda

I. Inter-Serbian Sanctions.....OVP/NSC

-- IWG recommendations on extension of 100-day sanctions suspension period

II. Diplomatic Strategy .....State

-- Status of negotiations post-cessation of hostilities

III. Congressional and Public Affairs Strategy.....All

-- Gameplan for January

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 4, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: DON KERRICK

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum and agenda for the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia to be held on January 6, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you ~~sign~~ approve with Itoh's initials the memorandum to ~~your~~ agency counterparts at tab I.

OK

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to counterparts
Tab A Agenda

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By SB NARA, Date 9/25/2019
2,13-0687-M

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See 0150 2013-0682

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 3999				
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (3 pages)~~	~~01/11/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RDS 10/01/2013
002a. memo	Alexander Vershbow to Samuel Berger re: Today's Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (4 pages)	01/11/1995	P1/b(1)
002b. cable	re: Presidential Letter to Tudjman (2 pages)	01/08/1995	P1/b(1)
002c. cable	re: Tudjman Responds to President's Letter (3 pages)	01/10/1995	P1/b(1)

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NSC Records Management
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2010-0533-M
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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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RECORD ID: 9520060
RECEIVED: 13 JAN 95 11

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 17 JAN 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
DC
CROATIA
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION FOR 11 JAN DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 17 JAN 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9520044

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0163 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

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		DARBY
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
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001	BERGER	Z	95011709	FOR DECISION
001		X	95011709	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
002		X	95011709	SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950117	FUERTH, L	
002	950117	BRILL, K	
002	950117	PANETTA, L	
002	950117	MCALEER, R	
002	950117	INDERFURTH, K	
002	950117	GARTHOFF, D	
002	950117	PATRICK, T	

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cc: TL

National Security Council
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Sens	4	AS	
Itoh			
Soderberg	2	copy	
Berger	3	ajb	
Lake	~~5~~		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4		D
NSC Secretariat			

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cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS:

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National Security Council
The White House

10AM

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Itoh			
Soderberg	2	copy	
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Lake	#		
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LOG 9520060
DATE 17 JAN 95

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION FOR DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA ON 11 JAN
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET , N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1

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FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (aaa) (NAME) | (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) | WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC for DC Mtg on Bosnia & Croatia

NSC LOG # 20600

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
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JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 17, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR.KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of
the U.S. to the United Nations

MR. LEON E. PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President
of the United States

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, January 11, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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E.O. 13526,
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By. SB ARA, Date 9/25/2019
2013-0682-M

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee
DATE: January 11, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 4:30-5:55 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
Samuel R. Berger

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Richard Saunders

State:
Richard Holbrooke
Robert Frasure
Amb. Peter Galbraith

DOD:
Walter Slocombe
Joseph Kruzel

CIA:
Douglas MacEachin
Ray Converse

JCS:
Adm. William Owens
LTG Wesley Clark

UN:
David Scheffer
James O'Brien

NSC:
Alexander Vershbow

Summary of Conclusions

Bosnia: Contact Group Strategy

1. Deputies reviewed the results of the January 10 Contact Group meeting in Paris and prospects for renewed negotiations on a political settlement. They agreed that Deputies should review the territorial and constitutional issues that will come up in those negotiations, while recognizing the political sensitivity

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2010-0533-M
KC 9/30/14 (1.96)

of the U.S. going beyond the role of facilitator and adopting a formal position on specific issues. (S)

2. Deputies requested two papers for a follow-on meeting during the week of January 16 (papers should be completed by COB January 17):

A) Review and analysis of the sides' positions on the key negotiating issues **(Action: CIA)**.

B) Diplomatic strategy for the period from now until April 30, including possible options for promoting a positive outcome to the negotiations, as well as a recommended strategy in the event negotiations break down **(Action: State)**. (S)

Croatia: Tudjman's decision to terminate UNPROFOR's mandate

3. Deputies considered options for responding to President Tudjman's decision to terminate UNPROFOR's mandate in Croatia when it expires on March 31, and the position that should be conveyed to the Croatian envoys following the meeting. They agreed that we should seek to reverse the Croatian decision, stress our concern about the risks of a new war in the Krajina and the dangers the decision posed for the safety of UNPROFOR troops, and make clear to Tudjman he will be on his own if he chooses the military option. (S)

4. Deputies agreed that, as an initial response, we would we would urge the Croatians to delay a public announcement of their decision (scheduled for the following day) pending further consultations. If this were not accepted by the Croatians, Deputies agreed that we would urge them to leave the door open to a less-than-complete UNPROFOR withdrawal, and to work with us on a new UNPROFOR mandate that would retain at least those elements that were performing important functions: (S)

-- monitoring the March 29, 1994 ceasefire and separation of forces agreement;

-- headquarters operations for continuing UNPROFOR missions in Croatia, Bosnia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia;

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-- implementation of the Zagreb-4 economic confidence-building measures, including the opening of the Zagreb-Belgrade highway;

-- humanitarian convoys to Bihac and Banja Luka; and

-- maintaining a liaison office in Knin to facilitate negotiations.

5. As part of this proposal, Deputies agreed that we would offer to launch a reinvigorated diplomatic effort aimed at the political reintegration of the UN Protected Areas based on the revised Zagreb-4 plan, and to undertake a special diplomatic mission to key Western capitals to develop a coordinated Croatia strategy. (S)

6. Deputies decided that we should not threaten to withdraw the President's commitment to link Serbian sanctions relief to progress toward a Krajina settlement, or threaten other punitive steps, at this time. (S)

7. Deputies agreed to review the situation at their next meeting, including the Congressional dimension, in light of the Croatian response to the U.S. position set forth above. A paper laying out a diplomatic strategy, including an inventory of possible punitive steps in the U.S. bilateral relationship with Croatia, was subsequently tasked by the Interagency Working Group and should be completed by COB January 17 **(Action: State)**. In addition, the Joint Staff should review the operational implications of a continued UNPROFOR presence in Croatia in support of Bosnia operations in the context of renewed fighting in the Krajina **(Action: JCS)**. (S)

UNPROFOR Strengthening and UNPROFOR Funding

8. Deputies noted the tension between ongoing efforts to strengthen/expand UNPROFOR and the need to reduce our aggregate UN peacekeeping costs. They agreed to address this issue at their next meeting. In the meantime, diplomatic efforts on UNPROFOR strengthening should continue. (S)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20060

January 13, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, January 11, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of Conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia held January 11, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve mlc Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By: SB NARA, Date: 9/25/2019
2013-0682-M

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520044
RECEIVED: 11 JAN 95 09

TO: BERGER

FROM: VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 11 JAN 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA CROATIA
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPERS FOR 11 JAN DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER DUE DATE: 14 JAN 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9520060

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0163 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BAKER JANE
		DARBY
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By SY NARA, Date 9/25/2019
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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	95011208	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	95011208	NOTED BY BERGER

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recd 1/11 2:12p

National Security Council
The White House

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG [illegible] A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Sens	1	DDS	
Itoh			
Soderberg			Copy
Berger	2		
Lake		Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3		N
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette N

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	Alexander Vershbow to Samuel Berger re: Today's Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (4 pages)	01/11/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3999

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0163 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, January 11, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs664

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. cable	re: Presidential Letter to Tudjman (2 pages)	01/08/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3999

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0163 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, January 11, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs664

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002c. cable	re: Tudjman Responds to President's Letter (3 pages).	01/10/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3999

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0163 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, January 11, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs664

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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See also 2013-0682-

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

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Folder Title: DC0165 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, January 25, 1995				
Staff Office-Individual: Records Management				
Original OA/ID Number: 3999				
Row: 43	Section: 4	Shelf: 6	Position: 3	Stack: V

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia [partial] (3 pages)	01/25/1995	P1/b(1) RDS 10/01/2013
~~002a. paper~~	~~re: Options for UNPROFOR Withdrawal from Croatia (6 pages)~~	~~01/31/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
002b. paper	re: The Case for Prepositioning [partial] (1 page)	01/26/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 6/11/2020
~~002c. paper~~	~~re: Reinforcing UNPROFOR (2 pages)~~	~~01/25/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003a. memo~~	~~To: Samuel Berger; From: Don Kerrick; Re: Initial Contact Group SITREP (1 page)~~	~~01/27/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 02/06/2020
~~003b. paper~~	~~re: Bosnia-The Contact Group Leaves Sarajevo Empty-Handed (1 page)~~	~~01/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003c. paper~~	~~re: London Language (1 page)~~	~~01/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
004a. memo	Don Kerrick to Samuel Berger re: January 25 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia [partial] (5 pages)	01/24/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 6/11/2020
004b. agenda	Deputies Committe Meeting on Bosnia [partial] (1 page)	01/25/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 6/11/2020
004c. paper	re: Likely Sticking Points in Bosnian Peace Talks (3 pages)	01/24/1995	P1/b(1)
~~004d. paper~~	~~re: Bosnia-If We Move Into a Negotiation (6 pages)~~	~~01/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~004e. letter~~	~~Alija Izetbegovic to Secretary of State (1 page)~~	~~01/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
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([PC and Bosnia...])
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FOLDER TITLE:
DC0165 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, January 25, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs665

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004f. paper	re: UNPROFOR Augmentation Issues Paper (3 pages)	01/24/1995	P1/b(1)
004g. list	re: Troops Offered to UNPROFOR (1 page)	01/23/1995	P1/b(1)
~~004h. paper~~	~~Croatia Strategy (4 pages)~~	~~01/00/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 09/08/2017
~~004i. paper~~	~~re: Political and Military Options for Supporting an UNPROFOR Withdrawal from Croatia (3 pages)~~	~~01/24/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 09/08/2017
~~004j. report~~	~~re: Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic Visit to Washington (4 pages)~~	~~01/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
005. agenda	[Duplicate of 004b] [partial] (1 page)	01/25/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 6/11/2020
006. agenda	[Duplicate of 004b] [partial] (1 page)	01/25/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 6/11/2020

COLLECTION:
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([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3999

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2010-0533-M
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520104
RECEIVED: 25 JAN 95 18

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 27 JAN 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
SOC

CROATIA
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 25 JAN DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: REED SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 28 JAN 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520085 9520090

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0165 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BAKER JANE
		DARBY
		KERRICK
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		RICE
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By SB NARA, Date 9/25/2019
2013-0682-M

COMMENTS:

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	95012614	FOR DECISION
001		X	95012715	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
001	ITOH	Z	95012715	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	95012716	REED SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950127	FUERTH, L	
002	950127	BRILL, K	
002	950127	MCALEER, R	
002	950127	ADAMS, G	
002	950127	INDERFURTH, K	
002	950127	GARTHOFF, D	
002	950127	PATRICK, T	

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RECORD ID: 9520104
RECEIVED: 25 JAN 95 18

TO: BERGER

FROM: KERRICK
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 26 JAN 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA DC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 25 JAN DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: FOR DECISION DUE DATE: 28 JAN 95 STATUS: X

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520090

FILES: IFM NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
BERGER		

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By. SB NARA, Date 9/25/2019
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URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG JSK A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
KB Reed	1	JSR	
Sens			
Itoh			
Soderberg	2	M	
Berger	3	MW	w/ changes cc: TL
Lake Reed			
~~Situation Room~~	4	JSR	Tab I
West Wing Desk	5	MH 1/27	D
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS: ok Jake

Signed but need to make fix at Tab A. JSR

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

rec'd 1/26 4:25pm

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: TBK LOG # 20104

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TBK A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed	1	JWR	
Sens			
Itoh			
Soderberg	2		
Berger	3	MW	w/changes cc: TLB for Tab I D
Lake			
~~Situation Room~~ Reed	4	JWR	
West Wing Desk	5	1/27	
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS: ok Jall

Signed but need to make fix at Tab A. JWR

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9520104
DATE 27 JAN 95

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 25 JAN DC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	30 Jan	0705	L Branscum PRINT LAST NAME: BRANSCUM COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	1-28-95	3:08pm	Ruby Thomas PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	1-30-95	8:55	J. Lyons PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: SB Date: 9/13/2019
NLC-13-60-2-6
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SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 25 JAN DC MTG ON BOSNIA
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EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
COL. T. R. PATRICK JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	30 Jan	0705	L. Branscum PRINT LAST NAME: BRANSCUM COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: 1
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: [illegible] Date: 9/23/2013
2013-0682-M

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DATE 27 JAN 95

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 25 JAN DC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	1/30/95	10:25AM	PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
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AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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DATE 27 JAN 95

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 25 JAN DC MTG ON BOSNIA
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FROM : NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 25 JAN DC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 20104

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

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NSC LOG # 20104

FROM: National Security Council (WH) PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS PAGES: 6

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 27, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, January 25, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

James W. Rubin
for William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By SB NARA, Date 9/25/2019
2013-0682-M

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Tab A

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia [partial] (3 pages)	01/25/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3999

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0165 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, January 25, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs665

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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20104

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee
DATE: January 25, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 12:30-1:35 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
Samuel R. Berger

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Richard Saunders

State:
Peter Tarnoff
Robert Frasure

DOD:
Joseph Nye
John Klekas

OMB:
Gordon Adams
John Burnim

UN:
David Scheffer
James O'Brien

CIA:
Douglas MacEachin
Norman Schindler

JCS:
LTG Wesley Clark
BG John Walsh

White House:
Nancy Soderberg

NSC:
Alexander Vershbow
Donald L. Kerrick
Susan Rice

Summary of Conclusions

Bosnia: Contact Group Strategy

1. Deputies reviewed the results of the ongoing Contact Group efforts in Bosnia and prospects for renewed negotiations on a political settlement. They agreed to defer discussion of the territorial and constitutional issues that will come up in those negotiations until next week. Deputies requested that, when the Contact Group is engaged, a daily one-page SITREP on Contact Group activities [redacted] E.O.13526 3.5(c) and reports from Ambassador Thomas be circulated for Deputies. **(Action: State/CIA)**

Declassified in Part
CIA Historical Records
Division AR 70-14
10/01/2013
2010-0533-M (1.97)

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UNPROFOR Augmentation

2. Deputies considered options for moving forward with augmenting UNPROFOR and agreed to:

A) Continue efforts to strengthen UNPROFOR in Bosnia, including support for the additional 6500 troops requested by the UN.

B) Urge the United Nations to conduct a serious review of UNPROFOR operations aimed at economizing wherever possible.

C) Press for a redefinition of the UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia, along the lines proposed by the U.S., which could produce eventual offsets to planned plus-ups in Bosnia. **(Action: USUN should begin to encourage the UN Secretariat to focus on a modified mandate)**

3. Deputies briefly discussed UNPROFOR funding, noting that the Peacekeeping Deputies would meet on that subject and requested that a plan be prepared for dealing with Congress on funding UNPROFOR. **(Action: State)** Deputies also requested the preparation of talking points highlighting the value of UNPROFOR in Bosnia and the logic of strengthening it. **(Action: JCS)**

Croatia: Tudjman's decision to terminate UNPROFOR's mandate

4. Deputies discussed a strategy to respond to President Tudjman's decision to terminate UNPROFOR's mandate in Croatia when it expires on March 31. They endorsed the three-pronged approach outlined in the State Croatia strategy paper: seek to maintain the essential functions of UNPROFOR in Croatia; launch a negotiating process between Serbs and Croats on a political settlement; and prepare to respond to the worst-case scenario of renewed hostilities. State will flesh out its paper with results of next week's Zagreb-4 diplomatic efforts and a concept for securing Croatian agreement to a redefined UNPROFOR mandate. **(Action: State)**

Pol/Mil Aspects of Supporting UNPROFOR Withdrawal from Croatia

5. Deputies reviewed the ongoing planning at the UN and NATO regarding UNPROFOR withdrawal from Croatia. Deputies requested the following work for a follow-up meeting during the week of January 30:

A) An independent intelligence assessment of the threat to UNPROFOR forces withdrawing from Croatia. **(Action: JCS/CIA)** (Due within 48 hours)

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B) An options paper, built on the threat assessment, that includes options ranging from full NATO involvement similar to what is envisaged in Bosnia to more limited options involving air and logistical support. The paper should include the pros/cons of extending to Croatia the President's decision-in-principle to provide U.S. ground forces and an in-depth review of associated prepositioning issues. **(Action: JCS, with input from State)** (Due Monday, January 30).

Congressional and Public Affairs Strategy

6. Deputies discussed the upcoming Silajdzic visit, endorsed the approach outlined in the State paper and agreed to ensure he departs with a better understanding of the tepid support for unilateral lift, together with renewed assurances of our support so that Bosnia can confidently engage in negotiations.

7. Deputies decided to defer publishing Secretary Perry's op-ed until after the Silajdzic visit.

8. Deputies agreed to provide the unclassified version of LTG Clark's Congressional remarks on lift to Congress before the Silajdzic visit.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 26, 1995

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen
NOTED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

FROM: DON KERRICK (K)

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, January 25, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of Conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia held January 25, 1995.

Concurrence by: Susan Rice (K)

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve SNB w changes Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By SB NARA, Date 9/25/2019
2013-0682-M

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520127
RECEIVED: 31 JAN 95 11

TO: BERGER

FROM: KERRICK
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 31 JAN 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
UN
CROATIA
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FOLLOW UP PAPER TO 25 JAN DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA - TASKING PAPER

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER DUE DATE: 03 FEB 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520085 9520090

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0165 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 31, 1995



INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: DON KERRICK

SUBJECT: Papers Tasked by Deputies on Bosnia

Have attached three papers tasked at last week's Deputies meeting on Bosnia:

Tab A: JCS, draft, *Options for UNPROFOR Withdrawal from Croatia.* To be discussed at February 2 DC.

Tab B: JCS, *The Case for Prepositioning.* JCS will raise at DC. SACEUR pushing for OK to preposition. Needs 60 days "notice" to prepare for withdrawal of UNPROFOR Bosnia.

Tab C: JCS, *Reinforcing UNPROFOR.* Talking points to make case for strengthening UNPROFOR in Bosnia.

Attachments
Tab A *Options for UNPROFOR Withdrawal from Croatia*
Tab B *The Case for Prepositioning*
Tab C *Reinforcing UNPROFOR*

cc: Leon Fuerth/Rick Saunders
Susan Rice
Bill Danvers
Alan Kreczko

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~~SECRET/NOFORN~~ DRAFT 31 January 1995

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Options for UNPROFOR Withdrawal from Croatia (U)

1. (U) Purpose. To provide Joint Staff analysis of USG options in response to an UNPROFOR withdrawal from Croatia.

2. (U) Background

a. ~~(S)~~ GOC announced on 12 January that it will terminate the UNPROFOR mandate effective 31 March. However, Croatia has indicated that UNPROFOR has up to 90 days (after March 1st) to complete the withdrawal. The UN is preparing plans for a phased withdrawal under permissive conditions.

b. ~~(S)~~ NATO plans do not currently address, in any detail, a withdrawal operation from Croatia. SACEUR has directed his staff to commence planning for a sequential or simultaneous withdrawal operation from Croatia and Bosnia.

3. (U) Situation

a. ~~(S/NF)~~ **Likely Threat.** DIA assesses most likely threat to be indirect, limited and local actions by the Krajina Serbs designed to harass or prevent UNPROFOR egress.

b. ~~(S/NF)~~ US Intelligence Community analysis indicates that RSK forces pose the chief threat to UN personnel attempting to withdraw from Croatia. RSK troops and/or civilians would likely attempt to impede a UN pullout in order to use UNPROFOR as a deterrent against a HV attack. HV troops do not pose a direct threat to UNPROFOR; however, UN personnel could be caught between HV and RSK fighting as the two sides try to seize key positions being vacated by UNPROFOR. UNPROFOR commander General DeLaPresle views threat in same light as US intelligence community assessments.

c. ~~(S/NF)~~ Resistance is expected to have a local focus, but a wider campaign organized by the Knin authorities remains a possibility. RSK resistance may take the form of hostage taking, administrative restrictions to movement, crossing point closure, theft of UN property, and civilian demonstrations to include route blockages by women and children. More violent actions could include; harassing fires, destruction of bridges, blockades of UN facilities, mining, small unit attacks, shelling and sniping. However, direct attacks on UNPROFOR are improbable.

d. ~~(S/NF)~~ The Intelligence Community further assesses that UN troops in Croatia are not well-prepared to conduct a complex withdrawal operation in a hostile environment. UNPROFOR Croatia

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is made up of lightly equipped contingents from 18 different nations. The bulk of the troops are neither organized, trained nor equipped for the rigors of a potential withdrawal under pressure from hostile forces.

e. ~~(S)~~ **Physical conditions.** Rugged terrain and narrow winding roads combined with a dispersed, lightly armed UNPROFOR, make safe egress a difficult task.

f. ~~(S)~~ Many questions surrounding the expected "battlefield" require special attention to identify primary and alternate egress routes. A detailed analysis of the specific conditions a withdrawal force may face takes greater than a week to prepare. These details are now necessary to begin identifying the scope of support required to successfully extract UNPROFOR from Croatia.

4. ~~(S)~~ Withdrawal Options

Assumptions:

(1) UNPROFOR units will not attempt to fight their way out if directly confronted by Serb forces.

(2) Localized fighting between HV and RSK forces will occur regardless of UNPROFOR presence.

(3) Croatia will allow a withdrawal force access to ports/facilities.

(4) UN will request NATO assistance.

(5) Each UNPA will require different considerations for withdrawal operations.

Considerations:

(1) Decision on the mandate will not be finalized until late March. Any UNPROFOR movement (consolidation) up until the decision point could trigger a Krajina Serb response.

(2) The decision will likely determine the degree of resistance UNPROFOR will encounter.

(3) If opposition is encountered, given the significant Western European presence in Croatia, NATO will likely be asked to assist in a withdrawal. Delaying a decision until late March on Alliance participation precludes NATO's response in a timely and effective manner.

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Issue: Should the withdrawal operation be a UN only operation or supported by NATO? In the best case (permissive environment), a UN run operation is preferred and possible. However, given the uncertainty surrounding a revised mandate, NATO must be prepared to react to a non-permissive situation.

Decision: NATO should plan and prepare to assist UNPROFOR's withdrawal from Croatia.

Issue: Should the US participate (ground troops) in a NATO withdrawal operation?

(1) The US is morally obligated to support and participate in this Alliance action. The US supported the UN resolutions that placed troops into Croatia. Many of the troops are from NATO nations, including several hundred US soldiers.

(2) Should the US stand aside, we may marginalize our influence and abdicate our leadership role within NATO. France may dictate that any assistance for UNPROFOR's withdrawal be carried out under WEU auspices. This calls into question the relevancy of NATO in a post Cold War world.

(3) Militarily, the US brings many unique capabilities to an operation that provide a distinct advantage over the adversary. A US presence increases the likelihood of operational success.

Decision: The US should commit to provide a full spectrum of support for a NATO operation, including ground troops.

Timing: Given the uncertainty surrounding a decision on a new mandate, UNPROFOR may require assistance as early as 1 April. If a decision is not made on the mandate by 31 March, the likelihood of an immediate Krajina Serb reaction to hold UNPROFOR in place increases.

(1) US needs to agree in NAC now that NATO/lead nation begin negotiations on the use of Croatian infrastructure for NATO operations.

(2) By mid-February, we must be willing to commit US support for a NATO operation. Concurrently, the NAC must approve the concept under which NATO would support an UNPROFOR withdrawal.

(3) NATO will require approximately six weeks to identify, assemble, train, rehearse, and deploy a force.

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I. Full NATO Support, including ground troops.

PROs:

- Provides credible and capable combined arms combat force.
- RSK unlikely to directly challenge NATO force.
- Provides sufficient forces and mature command structure to control operations over wide area.
- Positions force for follow-on withdrawal from Bosnia if required.

CONs:

- Could place NATO in a combatant role.
- High cost option, funding responsibilities unclear.
- May cause reaction against UNPROFOR troops in B-H by the Bosnian Serbs to demonstrate Serb solidarity.
- Because of regional instability and mutually exclusive objectives of the warring parties, public appeals likely for NATO to remain in theater to resolve conflict.
- Cumbersome NAC process may not support timely decisions needed to effectively execute UNPROFOR withdrawal operation.
- Could be criticized as "overkill" based on assumed low threat and may increase tensions and the threat to UNPROFOR.

II. NATO Off-Shore Reaction Force/Air Support. NATO could offer to provide close air support (CAS), a ready reaction force positioned either off-shore (MEU/MEB) or in a neighboring country (outside FY) (mechanized brigade w/combat aviation), and fixed amounts of communications, logistics, and transport.

PROs:

- Reduces NATO commitment and cost.
- NATO ground troops not interpositioned or maneuvering between combatants.
- Lower profile force could elicit less friction in the UNPAs.
- Provides effective combined arms concentrated response to meet localized limited threats.

CONs:

- Commits force incrementally.
- Does not commit sufficient force to ensure success.
- Higher UNPROFOR casualties possible.
- Without dominant NATO force presence, command and control arrangements with UN uncertain.
- Responses to likely threats require sequential reaction.

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III. **UNPROFOR Autonomous.** The UN would run its own withdrawal, contracting for required ground, air, and sea transport. UN negotiates withdrawal on case by case basis. This option would be more credible if taken in conjunction with implementation of a revised UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia. This option can then be viewed as "tailoring" UNPROFOR to the new mandate.

PROs:

- Relies on negotiations that decrease tensions vice use of force that increases tensions.
- Reduces cost/risks to US/NATO.
- Possible continued UN presence as a result of blockage. If peaceful, could delay fighting and increase opportunities for a negotiated settlement.

CONs:

- If threat is misjudged, as other than benign environment, UNPROFOR will not have capability to egress from the UNPAs and could result in significant casualties.
- If threat increases, NATO likely to be called for immediate assistance. Quick NATO reaction may rely heavily on US forces.
- UN is slow to sign contracts.
- Could encourage disruptive unilateral national support not coordinated with UNPROFOR withdrawal plan.

5. ~~(S)~~ **Prepositioning.** Due to the volatility of the situation, predicting how much reaction time will be available to assemble and deploy a force is difficult. Prepositioning gives the force a hedge against this uncertainty. Additionally, prepositioning signals our intent to oversee a safe withdrawal and may deter preemptive actions designed to hamper UNPROFOR's withdrawal. Because the likely threat in Croatia can be met with a tailored rapid reaction force, a decision for prepositioning should be made far enough in advance to ensure force readiness by 31 March.

6. ~~(S)~~ **Revamped Mandate.** If USG diplomatic efforts to persuade Croatia to accept a modified mandate are successful, this may reduce tensions along the lines of confrontation. If tensions are reduced on both sides, force requirements may be similarly reduced to meet the likely threat.

7. ~~(S)~~ **Recommended Course of Action.** There are a number of integrated steps that should be taken in preparation for a withdrawal from Croatia. First, work for a new UN mandate in Croatia designed to ease tension over drawdown of UN forces. To allay Krajina Serb concerns, a UN presence must be maintained at key positions throughout the UNPAs. Second, because a withdrawal (partial or complete) can be expected, we must decide now to

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provide and identify forces based on a detailed threat analysis (the NAC must also decide on level of NATO participation). Based on the current threat assessments, option II presents the best point of departure for meeting expected mission requirements. Planning should still continue for wider operations as envisioned under OPLAN 40104. Third, go forward with prepositioning support requirements for this specific mission. Fourth, position the reaction force so that military action can commence by late March. This force can also serve as a theater reserve should a full NATO package be required.

Prepared by Balkans Working Group
J-5, EURDIV, 614-9435
n/eur/eurcenea/unprofor/unwd3

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002b. paper	re: The Case for Prepositioning [partial] (1 page)	01/26/1995	P1/b(1)

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DC0165 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, January 25, 1995

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P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 26 January, 1995

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: The Case for Prepositioning (U)

1. (U) Purpose. To explain the importance of prepositioning in support of either UNPROFOR withdrawal or peace plan implementation.

2. (U) Background.

a. ~~(C)~~ There is general consensus in the intelligence community, in theater (EUCOM, AFSOUTH), and with recent visitors to the former Yugoslavia (DUSD(P) Slocombe and party) that negotiations have stalled and renewed warfare in Bosnia (and Croatia) this Spring is very likely. This is not to detract from the importance of continuing to pursue negotiations as the only means of preventing a resumption of fighting, but reflects the realities of the situation. Since the same prepositioning is required for either peace plan implementation or withdrawal support, NATO military authorities desire to take prudent military measures to support either eventuality.

b. ~~(C)~~ The following confluence of factors supports the need to be ready to conduct an UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia in April 1995: the expiration of the UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia (31 March), the expiration of the four month cessation of hostilities agreement (30 April), the Bosnian government push to give the Bosnian Serbs a 2 month deadline to start negotiations or return to open warfare, the next sanctions renewal review (late April), and the return of good weather when Spring arrives

c. ~~(C)~~ SACEUR has established the following timeline to support an UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia:

4 weeks to assemble, deploy, and make the C3 package operational

2 weeks to deploy and establish logistics/movement control groups. (Reserve force deployed at the same time.)

2-4 weeks to deploy the main force

Thus the minimum time required to be ready to start the actual UNPROFOR withdrawal operation is 8 weeks,. This means if we want NATO to be ready to commence supporting an UNPROFOR withdrawal on 1 April, the decision to

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Declassify on OADR

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commence deployment of the C3 package needs to be made by 1 February. In addition, the SACEUR timeline assumes that decisions on national force contributions are made at the same time as authorization to commence deployment of the C3 package. This allows the logistics and movement teams and reserve force to assemble and prepare for deployment while the C3 package is being deployed. The main force will be prepared, assembled, and trained during this same period.

4. (U) Details.

a. (~~C~~) The C3 package, consisting of about 500 personnel and equipment (including about 250 soldiers from the US Seventh Signal Brigade in Germany, with UK and NATO support) provides a full, secure military communications system with ties to theater tactical systems, NATO systems, national military systems, commercial phone systems, and the UNPROFOR system. Personnel would deploy to Mons, Belgium, 3 sites in Germany, 3 sites in Italy, and 2 sites in Croatia (Zagreb and Split). No personnel would be deployed to Bosnia or the Krajina as part of the initial C3 package. The exact number of C3 nodes to be activated during prepositioning, the number of soldiers, and their nationalities are still being refined.

b. (~~C~~) Included in the four week period to establish the C3 package is the time to prepare personnel and equipment for movement, time to negotiate appropriate contracts for the use of civilian communications lines and satellite frequencies and to purchase off-the-shelf communications equipment in addition to the military system. EO 13526 1.4a EO 13526 1.4a 1.4(a) A decision not to preposition the C3 package would delay the start of the operation from 2 to 4 weeks.

c. (~~C~~) The initial cost of deploying this C3 package is $2.2 million. Once deployed and operational, the manpower can be reduced by about half, and it will cost $500,000 per month to maintain operational. There is currently $14 million in the NATO peacekeeping fund. Although funding decisions have still not been agreed at NATO or between NATO and the UN, it is anticipated no additional funding would be required at this time.

d. (~~C~~) The CINCSOUTH OPLAN 40104 C3 package supplements and interfaces with that already established for DENY FLIGHT and SHARP GUARD, and provides the dedicated communications circuits necessary to support an UNPROFOR withdrawal from both Bosnia and Croatia. The existing communications systems are not adequate for a significant ground operation.

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5. (~~C~~) Discussion. The issues for consideration are: (a) the probability of UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia this Spring, and (b) the balance between the political signals this deployment sends and the military preparations needed to carry out a successful operation.

a. (~~C~~) There is a pessimistic consensus that the cessation of hostilities is likely to collapse and war will return to Bosnia this Spring.

b. (~~C~~) Tudjman is serious about not renewing the UNPROFOR mandate. UNPROFOR withdrawal from Croatia will probably lead to Croat-Krajina Serb fighting, which is likely to spill over into Bosnia.

c. (~~C~~) Prepositioning the C3 package is a prudent military action to prepare for a timely UNPROFOR withdrawal operation. Should a peace agreement be reached, NATO is better prepared for peace plan implementation. If the status quo continues, the C3 package is small enough that it can be repositioned and the experience factored into future planning. There is some military concern about the commitment of manpower and equipment to an operation that does not have a planned start date (D-Day), but the high probability that this operation will occur and the need to be ready outweighs this concern.

d. (~~C~~) Prepositioning will send several signals: NATO is serious about taking meaningful action, NATO supports UNPROFOR, and that UNPROFOR is serious about leaving if war breaks out. Careful control of these signals is required to ensure the proper message is sent. These signals could prompt the warring parties to get serious about coming to a negotiated settlement, or precipitate action by one or both sides.

6. (~~C~~) Recommendation. Approve the concept of prepositioning so that SACEUR is assured of the political support of the US government before he pushes the issue at NATO.

n: eurcenea/nato/prepodc.doc

Prepared by: [redacted] Captain, USN
EURDIV, J-5 PMA, Ext 49435

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25 January, 1995

TALKING PAPER

Subject: Reinforcing UNPROFOR

1. Purpose. To provide talking points on the need to reinforce UNPROFOR.

2. Talking Points

- UNPROFOR continues to perform a valuable mission in Bosnia, including facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid and establishing the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis.

- UNPROFOR has requested 6,500 additional troops and equipment to support the current cessation of hostilities agreement, to improve its capability to protect itself,and to respond to acts by the warring parties against UNPROFOR. These additional troops and equipment would provide operational flexibility, better ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid, and allow the use of more robust measures to keep ground and air aid corridors open.

- On several occasions, most recently in Bihac, UNPROFOR could have done a better job if it had more manpower and equipment resources, including helicopters, at its disposal.

- The NATO Chiefs of Defense met with UN, Russia, and other interested nations at The Hague, Netherlands, in December to consider how UNPROFOR could be made more effective. Two initiatives resulted from this meeting:

-the formulation of concepts for maintaining open the air and land routes into Sarajevo and the enclaves, and

-the decision to offer UNPROFOR additional manpower and equipment to better accomplish its mission.

- As a result of this initiative fourteen countries have offered almost 6,000 troops and significant additional equipment.

- We consider it essential to support this effort and have offered to the UN helicopters, armored personnel carriers, radars, radios, night vision goggles, and assorted engineer vehicles on a lease or sale basis.

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- The success of the cessation of hostilities agreement would be a significant achievement on the road to a peaceful settlement in the former Yugoslavia. The UN deserves the help of the entire international community to take advantage of this cessation of hostilities to better prepare for whatever comes next.

- The UN is still evaluating all the offers it has received. We expect the UN to inform us shortly of their desires. At that time we will negotiate financial arrangements for sale or lease of the equipment offered by the U.S. government.

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520119
RECEIVED: 27 JAN 95 15

TO: BERGER

FROM: KERRICK
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 27 JAN 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
UN
CROATIA
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FOLLOW UP PAPER TO 25 JAN DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA - INITIAL CONTACT GRP SITREP

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER DUE DATE: 31 JAN 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520085 9520090

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0165 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

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FOR INFO
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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By SB NARA, Date 9/25/2019
2013-0682-M

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001	BERGER	Z	95012718	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	95012812	NOTED BY BERGER

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DOC DATE: 27 JAN 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: INITIAL CONTACT GRP SITREP - TASKED FM 25 JAN DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION DUE DATE: 31 JAN 95 STATUS: IX

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF:

FILES: IFG NSCP: CODES:

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BERGER		

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Berger	2	cc	
Lake	3	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	1/28	N
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 27, 1995

INFORMATION

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW FOR NOTED

FROM: DON KERRICK

SUBJECT: Initial Contact Group SITREP

First edition of Deputies' tasked Contact Group SITREP attached FYI. No deal struck. Tensions increasing within Contact Group. Contact Group returning to capitals today.

Attachment
Tab A State Contact Group SITREP

cc: LEON FUERTH
RICK SAUNDERS
BILL DANVERS
SUSAN RICE
SITUATION ROOM

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 2/6/2020
2015-0062-M

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BOSNIA - THE CONTACT GROUP LEAVES SARAJEVO EMPTY-HANDED

Charlie Thomas told us this morning that the CG reps who were still in Sarajevo--the Brit, the French and himself--spoke with Karadzic by phone from UNPROFOR headquarters. Karadzic said that he had our London "acceptance" formulation (attached) passed to them by the Carter Center. Karadzic said there is no possibility that the Serbs will accept it. He countered with a weaker formulation or, alternatively, with an offer of ten days of silence plus a secret memorandum with the CG. Thomas declined, and the group left Sarajevo late today.

Over the last forty-eight hours, the tensions inside the CG have become more severe. Despite the Serb ceasefire violation and the lack of response on the London "acceptance" formulation, the British and the French instructed their reps to go up to Pale nonetheless. We told Thomas not to go with them. London and Paris subsequently backed off.

German Contact Group rep Michael Steiner, who left Sarajevo on Wednesday, told us that FM Kinkel strongly objected to the compromise language worked out in London on January 25 at the Quad Political Directors and had laid down the law that under no circumstances should Germany participate in presenting it to Sarajevo. Steiner said he had to dissuade his minister from calling Secretary Christopher, arguing that the language would never reach Sarajevo anyway because the Serbs would reject it.

Steiner told us that the efforts in the last 48 hours to compromise with Pale have caused "great damage" to the Contact Group process both tactically and strategically by signaling to Karadzic its "desperation." Steiner believes a renewed effort should be made with Belgrade to seek its recognition of Bosnia combined with a cut-off of telecommunications in Serb controlled Bosnia in return for further sanctions relief to Milosevic. Steiner said he had talked with Siladzic about this approach, and that the Bosnian PM was amenable to the idea of sanctions relief for Belgrade. Steiner also said that Kozyrev in his meeting with Kinkel was also interested in a renewed push with Milosevic for cross recognition. (Izetbegovic raised the idea with Thomas.)

The embassy reports that the firing in Sarajevo was more extensive than reported by UNPROFOR. According to the Charge and Thomas, there were three separate episodes, each of which began with RPGs fired from Bosnian Serb territory into downtown Sarajevo. In the third incident, Bosnian forces returned fire. UNPROFOR reports twelve RPG explosions. Thomas lost count after fourteen in the second round. The DS detachment believes there was also some mortar fire. Welcome to Sarajevo, General Smith. (EUR:RFrasure)

EUR:RFrasure x71126
SEEURRCF 109

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2/6/2020 (1.82)
2013-0682-M

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LONDON LANGUAGE

"The Contact Group has presented to the RS its proposal on the continuation of the peace process. We have explained fully to the Contact Group our views on this subject. Having done so, we are now ready to proceed as proposed by the Contact Group."

This statement would have been made by Karadzic in response to a CG announcement that negotiations would begin in early February and "will be on the basis of acceptance of the peace plan of the Contact Group as a starting point."

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520090
RECEIVED: 24 JAN 95 16

TO: BERGER

FROM: KERRICK
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 24 JAN 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA CROATIA
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 25 JAN DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER DUE DATE: 27 JAN 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520085 9520104

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0165 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BAKER JANE
		DANVERS
		DARBY
		KERRICK
		NSC CHRON
		RICE
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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By SB NARA, Date 9/25/2019
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~~SECRET~~ RECORD ID: 9520090

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DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
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001		X	95012517	NOTED BY BERGER

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Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	(M) 1/25	N
NSC Secretariat			

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COMMENTS:

Bosnia DC
1/25

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004a. memo	Don Kerrick to Samuel Berger re: January 25 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia [partial] (5 pages)	01/24/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3999

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0165 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, January 25, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs665

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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20090

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 24, 1995



INFORMATION

Natl Sec Advisor has seen
NOTED

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

FROM: DON KERRICK (K)

SUBJECT: January 25 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia.

Agenda

Lengthy agenda for the one hour allotted. Suggest you try to allot 15 minutes per major topic. Agenda at Tab A. Talbott, Deutch and Owens are out of town. Expect to see Tarnoff, Nye and Clark stand-in.

I. Diplomatic Strategy

State should provide the current state of play on Contact Group efforts to get agreement on a formulation regarding acceptance. Charlie Thomas has been shuttling between Sarajevo and Pale for the past several days attempting to get agreement on language. Bosnian Serbs want to respond in writing to Contact Group-proposed language in a manner that the Bosnian Government says refutes acceptance. State is seeking Deputies' blessing to allow the process to continue. EO 13526 1.4c EO 13526 1.4c The State mid-term strategy paper is at Tab C, and focuses on strategy in the event we succeed in restarting negotiations (State is reluctant to put "worst-case" strategies on paper at this stage). The Izetbegovic reply to Secretary Christopher is at Tab D. For discussion:

-- What is the likelihood that the parties will agree to a formula for starting negotiations?

-- What is our strategy for getting an agreement to restart?

-- If we get negotiations restarted, what is our strategy for achieving early progress?

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Per E.O. 13526
VZ 2/6/2020 (1.84)
2013-0682-M

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-- If we are unable to get negotiations restarted, what should be our strategy in the run-up to April 30?

-- At what point do we break away from this track, prepare for UNPROFOR withdrawal, and pursue passage of multilateral lift?

II. UNPROFOR Augmentation

Ask JCS to provide a brief recap on the state of play. An NSC drafted background paper that includes interagency comments was circulated and is attached at Tab E. Following discussion, the IWG seeks Deputies' agreement to the following:

-- USG continued commitment to beefing up UNPROFOR.

-- Support UN request for additional 6500 troops in Bosnia.

-- Do not link efforts to strengthen UNPROFOR in Bosnia to drawdown of UNPROFOR in Croatia. Maintain support for limited mandate in Croatia for UNPROFOR. Ask the UN to review force disposition of UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia to ensure optimal employment and capture any savings. (Funding issue to be discussed at Thursday DC on Peacekeeping.)

-- How do we proceed on the Hill?

III. Croatia Strategy

Status of Zagreb-4 Diplomacy: State is seeking Deputies' agreement to proceed along the lines outlined in their paper at Tab F. Ask State to briefly recap the strategy and prospects. Peter Galbraith previewed the Z-4 plan with the Knin Serbs, and found them less rejectionist than in the past (suggesting real apprehension over UNPROFOR's departure). The Croatian Government continues to argue that the plan gives the Serbs much more autonomy than they deserve, but are not likely to reject the plan out of hand. For discussion:

-- Any progress on getting Tudjman to reconsider his decision on UNPROFOR since the Slocombe meeting with Tudjman?

-- Will the Z-4 plan still be presented next week as planned?

-- What is the strategy for next 30 days to ensure the start of political talks and tangible progress?

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Political/Military Aspects of Supporting UNPROFOR Withdrawal from Croatia: Deputies need to have a focused discussion and agree on concrete steps for dealing with withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Croatia. The JCS/State paper is at Tab G. Ask State and JCS to lead a discussion on the political and military aspects of supporting withdrawal.

UNPROFOR has a basic plan for permissive withdrawal. Krajina Serbs have indicated there could be resistance to UNPROFOR withdrawal as it could leave the Krajina naked to attack from the Croatians. Informal CIA estimates say there is a 60-75% chance that there will be localized resistance.

During January 20 UN/NATO meeting in New York, the UN asked NATO to plan to assist in Croatia. NATO planning has focused on withdrawal from Bosnia. January 25 NAC likely to ask military authorities to plan for Croatia and to revisit decision not to preposition equipment in Croatia.

Circumstances in Croatia are similar, but different, to those in Bosnia. Seven NATO countries have forces on the ground, including the U.S. MASH unit in Zagreb, but only those in the Krajina should be subject to resistance (Belgium, Denmark and Canada have forces there). Informal reports from NATO indicate Secretary General Claes favors prepositioning of NATO forces, particularly communicators, in Croatia now to facilitate withdrawal from Bosnia or Croatia. He may push that idea in near term. Prepositioning now would be expensive and could signal that withdrawal is inevitable. The IWG recommends slowing such efforts at NATO, although JCS will endorse prepositioning on grounds of military need. There appears to be interagency agreement building around following points:

- NATO will likely be pressed to assume responsibility for assisting withdrawal from Croatia. (UN may be hoping NATO will do it and pay for it.)

- Degree of NATO support required dependent on threat. Most likely resistance will be localized hostage scenarios.

- USG should support NATO contingency planning for supporting UNPROFOR withdrawal from Croatia. Emphasis should be on air and logistics support unless and until threat demonstrates need for NATO ground forces.

- USG should encourage the UN to withdraw itself from Croatia as it has from many other places, i.e. Cambodia, without NATO assistance unless the threat is agreed to be substantial.

(1) UN [now] plan to withdraw w/o NATO preclear

(2) NATO plan on scenarios w/o committing

(3) ~~SECRET~~ full release on ground forces

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- o Extension to Croatia of President's decision in principle for ground forces in Bosnia should be held in abeyance pending review of planning.

- o Efforts to preposition equipment should be slowed to allow negotiations to progress, avoid creating impression we regard withdrawal as inevitable.

IV. Congressional and Public Affairs Strategy

Deputies need to discuss steps on Hill in view of next week's Silajdzic visit. State strategy paper is at Tab H, suggests our goal should be to show him support for lift is declining and to win his renewed cooperation with Contact Group efforts. The IWG recommends that the Deputies agree to continue our approach of targeting key members on unilateral lift (Admiral Crowe will meet with these members next week) and to take a measured approach to the Silajdzic visit so that it does not appear the Administration is running scared. Appropriate messages will be delivered to Silajdzic in meetings at State and at the NSC. We will continue with swat team briefings after the Silajdzic visit.

The Principals deferred a decision on publishing the Bill Perry op-ed until this week. The IWG (minus OSD) recommends publishing after the Silajdzic visit. Deputies should discuss and make appropriate decision. For discussion:

-- What is your sense of how we stand on the Hill regarding Bosnia?

-- How aggressive do we want to be before the Silajdzic visit?

-- What should be our message to Silajdzic?

-- Do we publish the Bill Perry op-ed before the visit, or should we wait until after we can better gauge Hill response?

-- Where do we stand on declassifying Wes Clark's Hill statement? (Wes promised a draft by Wednesday morning.)

Concurrences by: Susan Rice SR/nv and Bill Danvers BD/nv

Attachments
Tab A Agenda
Tab B [redacted] E.O. 13526, 1.4c
Tab C State Paper on Mid-Term Strategy

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Tab D Izetbegovic Letter to Christopher
Tab E NSC Paper on UNPROFOR Augmentation
Tab F State Croatia Strategy Paper
Tab G JCS Paper on Pol/Mil Aspects of Withdrawal
Tab H State Paper on Silajdzic Visit

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TAB A

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004b. agenda	Deputies Committe Meeting on Bosnia [partial] (1 page)	01/25/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3999

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0165 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, January 25, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs665

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA
DATE: January 25, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 1:00pm - 2:00pm

Agenda

I. Diplomatic Strategy .....State

-- [redacted] E.O. 13526, 1.4(c) [0146]

-- Mid-Term Diplomatic Strategy (State Should Circulate Tasked Paper NLT Jan 23)

II. UNPROFOR Augmentation.....All

-- Status of Efforts to Strengthen UNPROFOR.....JCS

-- UNPROFOR Strengthening vs UNPROFOR Funding (NSC Paper to be Circulated NLT January 24)

III. Croatia Strategy.....State

-- Status of Zagreb-4 Diplomacy.....State

-- Diplomatic Strategy to Respond to Tudjman's UNPROFOR Decision (State Should Circulate Paper NLT January 24.....State

-- Political Aspects of Supporting UNPROFOR Withdrawal from Croatia (State Should Circulate Paper NLT January January 24).....State

-- Military Aspects of Supporting UNPROFOR Withdrawal from Croatia (JCS Should Circulate Paper NLT January 24).....JCS

IV. Congressional and Public Affairs Strategy.....All

-- Strategy to Defeat Unilateral Lift Vote.....State

-- Silajdzic Visit Strategy (State Should Circulate Paper NLT January 24).....State

-- Timing of Bill Perry Op-Ed.....OSD

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 02/06/2020
2013-0682-M

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TAB B

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004c. paper	re: Likely Sticking Points in Bosnian Peace Talks (3 pages)	01/24/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3999

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0165 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, January 25, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs665

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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TAB C

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Bosnia - If We Move Into a Negotiation

With an unstable winter cessation of hostilities more or less in place, we are at a fundamental crossroads on Bosnia. One path leads to a very difficult negotiation under Contact Group auspices that hopefully will result in a hopefully sustainable conclusion to the war. The second path leads--perhaps through a failed negotiation--through unravelling of the ceasefire with a military explosion in late spring, possibly accompanied by renewed warfare in Croatia. This paper examines the first possibility and provides a catalog of some of the issues that must be dealt with.

The Contact Group Plan

The Contact Group peace plan provides the basis for a viable, reasonable and realistic solution. But it will be a very difficult negotiation. Four elements of the Plan must be borne in mind:

(1) The territorial proposal of the Group, with its 51/49 parameter, while being open to adjustment by mutual agreement between the parties, is the central feature in the plan.

(3) Regarding constitutional arrangements, balanced treatment of the Bosniac-Croat and Bosnian Serb entities will be essential, including the establishment of parallel special relationships with neighboring countries, provided this is consistent with the integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the maintenance of Bosnia as a single state within its internationally recognized borders.

(3) Following agreement on constitutional arrangements and possible territorial adjustments, there will be withdrawal of forces and governmental authorities to the lines agreed. The Contact Group would look to the United Nations to make arrangements to ensure the separation of forces and to provide effective monitoring of these lines.

(4) The settlement should provide for refugees and displaced persons to have the possibility to return freely to their homes of origin.

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The Problem of the Map

The map calls for a 51/49 division of Bosnia. The Serbs now hold about 72 percent of the land. Mladic says that they should keep at least 62-64 percent. The Carter people believe that Karadzic would settle for something approaching 51/49 if the quality of what they get is substantially improved, i.e. more towns and industry, fewer mountains, more defensible boundaries. In that regard, Karadzic hinted at "50/50" when he saw Redman. The Bosnians of course insist on 51/49 with small land swaps that don't modify that overall ratio, although privately Bosnian President Izetbegovic believes that the Muslim-Croat federation should control at least 58 percent of Bosnia, according to various sources.

Four Territorial Issues

Bargaining is likely to center on the following aspects:

The Posavina Corridor. The Contact Group map establishes a corridor that largely consists of the road that the Serbs are now using to transport supplies between eastern and western Bosnia plus a small area on either side of it. The corridor is at its narrowest at the town of Brcko and is modeled there after a Serb proposal offered during last year's negotiations on the British war ship Invincible. According to the Contact Group plan, the UN is to ensure both the Serbs' right to use the corridor and the Federation's right to cross over it into Brcko.

-- The Bosnian Serbs want a wider, more defensible corridor and do not want the UN's help in ensuring their control of it. They view the corridor as vital to their ability to become a coherent state, and Serbia considers it essential for the formation of a greater Serbia. Their vision of a wider corridor would include allowing Brcko--a traditionally Muslim-majority city--to remain in Serb hands. Earlier Serb proposals for a Posavina corridor have also included land swaps involving Croatian territory near Brcko--specifically, a swath north of Brcko and the Sava River. The Serbs proposed this--in exchange for granting territory to Croatia east of Dubrovnik--in late 1993/early 1994. Zagreb rejected giving up any of its territory.

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-- The Bosnian Government retains hope that Bosnia can remain a united republic and does not want to do anything to foster the Serbs' ability to become self-sufficient. A narrow corridor has a technical quality to it. Moreover, the corridor can be widened only by giving the Serbs control of traditionally ethnic Croat and Muslim land.

The Enclaves. This issue is perhaps the most sensitive one for the Muslims, since it deals directly with the war's most odious aspect--ethnic cleansing.

-- The Bosnian Serbs ethnically cleansed large traditionally Muslim sections of eastern Bosnia and are anxious to complete the job by taking control of the remaining Muslim enclaves of Zepa, Srebrenica, and Gorazde. Moreover, the Contact Group plan, which gives the Muslims substantially more territory around the enclaves and connects them to the main body of Muslim territory, effectively splits Serb holdings in eastern Bosnia into two parts. According to various sources, the Serbs want the Muslims to give them the enclaves in exchange for territory in the Sarajevo District. According to recent clandestine reporting, Krajisnik also wants Serb control of the Bihac enclave. But Bihac has a large Muslim population that a Serb entity may not want. At the very least, the Serbs insist on retaining territory they now control south and west of the Una River, contrary to the Contact Group map which awards the Bosnian Government considerable territory in western Bosnia.

-- Retaining the enclaves and restoring government control of significant areas of ethnically cleansed land in eastern and western Bosnia is a primary goal of the Bosnian Government. Most earlier Bosnian Government proposals envisioned bulking up their territory around the enclaves, to include territory around the city of Visegrad. Bosnian President Izetbegovic continues to reject Serb offers to swap an area around Sarajevo for the enclaves and has said that, at most, he would exchange two or three isolated villages under Muslim control for villages held by the Serbs.

Sarajevo District. The Contact Group decided that the Federation should receive two-thirds of Sarajevo District and the Serbs one-third, but it gave the warring parties two years to negotiate the specific division of the district, during which time the UN would administer the territory.

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-- The Bosnian Serbs want a settlement on Sarajevo District to be included in the first round of talks and are willing to trade some territory northwest of the city that they currently control for the Muslims' eastern enclaves, according to press reports. Earlier this month, however, Karadzic reiterated the Serbs' demand to hold on to parts of the city itself. There are substantial differences within the Serb side in that Western Bosnian Serbs have little interest in Sarajevo while some key leaders have land holdings or interests in the suburbs.

-- The Bosnian Government is willing to postpone talks on the precise division of Sarajevo District, hoping to develop de facto control of the area during the two-year period of UN control. The Government reportedly is uninterested in trading the enclaves for control of the city because it believes it can break the Serbs' siege of Sarajevo within four months. But in a genuine negotiation, the Muslims are likely to consider uncontested control of Sarajevo in a defensible geographical context as their top priority.

Access to the Sea. Under the Contact Group plan, the Federation receives control of Bosnia's small coastline. The issue of access to the sea for the Serbs is left to a future round of negotiations, presumably between the Bosnian Serbs and Croatia.

-- The Bosnian Serbs believe that access to the sea is necessary to ensure the future independence of their territory both from the rest of Bosnia and probably from Belgrade, as well. The Serbs assume that they would have to negotiate with Zagreb on this issue and may try to arrange a deal that would include a return to Croatia of a small portion of land currently held by the Krajina Serbs.

-- Zagreb would give the Bosnian Serbs access to the sea through Croatia if the price were right. Zagreb has expressed willingness in the past to consider giving the Serbs access at the Prevlaka Peninsula. Croatia almost certainly would ask to be given control of a swath of Bosnia behind Dubrovnik that the Contact Group plan gives to the Bosnian Serbs. This would help get Dubrovnik out of artillery range.

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Constitutional Issues

One can envisage a number of political outcomes to the Bosnian drama, some of which are not consistent with the CG plan.

A fully centralized state with minor local functions assigned to a number of communes whose boundaries would be determined on other than ethnic lines. This would be the Muslim preference.

A loose union between the Bosniac-Croat Federation and the so-called Republika Srpska. It would continue the international legal personality of Bosnia and Herzegovina, i.e., as a member of the UN and other international organizations. All other governmental functions would be exercised by the Federation and the Republika Srpska. (A variation could be the Taiwan model in which only the Bosnia state in Sarajevo is fully recognized by the international community.)

A loose union is the solution proposed by the Contact Group. The Serbs insist on the right to establish a confederation with Serbia under these arrangements, while the Bosniacs foresee the possibility of allowing "natural links" to Serbia but short of confederation. The EU would support a confederation but has agreed with the US to the following compromise language: "Balanced treatment of the Federation and Republika Srpska will be essential, including the establishment of parallel special relationships with neighboring countries provided this is consistent with the integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina."

Another contentious issue is whether the Serbs would have the right to merge with Serbia or the Krajina. Early drafts of possible constitutional arrangements have allowed this right, possibly through a referendum after two or three years--but only with the agreement of the GOBH.

The Serbs argue for a totally sovereign Serbian state with the right to a flag at the United Nations and the right to Anschluss. They know they won't get this and also understand that there is virtually no international support for this position. Karadzic may be less interested in a Greater Serbia at the moment, given his problems with Milosevic.

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A loose Federation of Three ethnically determined states with significant or possibly even total independence in foreign relations and defense fields and basically merely cooperative arrangements in most economic areas.

Lurking in the background is the threat that the Croats and Serbs would get together to agree on a rump Muslim state and the right of the Croats to join Croatia, with the Serbs becoming an integral or federal part of Yugoslavia. This is obviously the least satisfactory outcome from our standpoint and is a formula for future conflict.

HANDLING THE ISSUES

The manner is which these issues is dealt with could be crucial.

One can argue that it is better to talk about the map first. This could evolve into a complicated real estate discussion. Doing the map first assumes that geographic clarity makes it easier to approach the tough constitutional point.

An alternative strategy would be to turn at once to the constitutional issue. In this approach, we might assume that the Milosevic/Karadzic split is genuine and Karadzic has no interest in near term confederation with a Greater Serbia ruled by his bitter enemy. If so, it's just possible that would preserve a Bosnia state as an international entity, a key Sarajevo goal. Agreement in this area could then make a subsequent negotiation on land swaps go perhaps more easily.

Some would argue that we should get both sides to the table and then let them work it out. That of course will not succeed. We will need a strong broadly-based team to support and guide these talks.

All of this assumes that the talks will be under Contact Group auspices, i.e. other putative mediators will remain on the sidelines. We would expect that the process would begin with low key shuttling by the Contact Group reps and could lead to a more formal conference in due course.

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Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
PRESIDENT OF THE PRESIDENCY

H.E. Mr. Warren Christopher
U.S. Secretary of State
Washington D.C.

Dear Mr. Secretary of State,

Thank You for Your letter of 21st January 1995.

We retain our concerns that the continuation of negotiations, before the acceptance of the Plan, could be understood by the Serbs side as the sign of Your readiness for new concessions. If that would be the case; the negotiations would really be counterproductive.

Since Your assessment is obviously different, we do not oppose the continuation of the efforts in order to seek the political solution to the conflict, if the conditions You have stated were fully respected.

We understood from Your letter that those conditions are as follows:

1. That the Serbs fully abide by the agreement on cessation of hostilities (withdrawal over the border in the Bihać region, medical evacuation of the wounded - MEDIVAC and opening of the "blue routes"),

2. That the starting point for the talks would be the acceptance of the Contact Group Plan, including the map on the internal delineation,

3. That the assumption of the future constitutional arrangements is the preserving of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina within its internationally recognized borders.

Since the Serbs side is holding two thirds of the territories under its occupation and has the interest for postponing the solution, we think this exploratory job should be completed within 60 days and that Serbs should be notified of this.

If this term expires without producing results, the international community should implement measures from the Contact Group Communiqué of 30th July 1994.

I agree that the Prime Minister Silajdžić's visit is a good opportunity to discuss in details both these issues, as well as the issues of the implementation of the Federation.

Please, Mr. Secretary of State, accept the expressions of my highests respects.

Cairo, January 22, 1995

Alija Izetbegović

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, Tel: +71 440-332, 444-454; 664-961; Fax: +71 472-491; SATCOM 0871 144 62 55

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TAB E

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004f. paper	re: UNPROFOR Augmentation Issues Paper (3 pages)	01/24/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3999

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0165 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, January 25, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs665

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004g. list	re: Troops Offered to UNPROFOR (1 page)	01/23/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3999

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0165 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, January 25, 1995

2010-0533-M
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TAB F

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CROATIA STRATEGY

The brinksmanship of Zagreb's announcement ending UNPROFOR's mission could break the logjam that has kept a Serbo-Croat settlement out of reach, but it could also trigger hostilities with human and diplomatic casualties. The U.S. approach to Croatia must be three-pronged: maintain the essential functions of UNPROFOR in Croatia; launch a negotiating process between Serbs and Croats on a political settlement; and prepare to respond to renewed hostilities. In public, we should not undercut Croatia. But as we receive strategic warning of renewed hostilities, we must make clear to Tudjman that key elements of our bilateral relationship will be at risk.

U.S. must show support for Croatian goals . . .

In the ten weeks before UNPROFOR's current mandate expires, the U.S. will have to strike a balance, supporting Zagreb's ends while opposing its most dangerous means. There can be no question that we endorse restoration of Croatian sovereignty over the Serb-held areas, or that we recognize Croatia's role as a bulwark against Serb aggression. The U.S. has a strategic interest in backing Croatia as long as Zagreb continues to support the Federation, i.e. to keep the Bosnian Croats from cutting a deal with the Serbs to carve up Bosnia. In addition, strong bilateral cooperation will help keep Zagreb on the path of Western political and economic reform.

. . . while minimizing risks of war

We must nevertheless minimize the dangers in Tudjman's high-risk strategy for pressuring the Serbs. His approach makes a renewed conflaguration more likely, particularly if UNPROFOR's withdrawal leaves the separation zone between the Croat and Serb armies unsupervised. While Tudjman's intention to avoid war seems genuine, he seems more prepared to contemplate it than ever before. If fighting breaks out, he claims that: (1) Croatia can make significant military gains against the Krajina Serbs; (2) Serbia proper will stay out (at least if Croatia spares Sector East). Both propositions are doubtful, and they cancel each other out: the more territory Croatia regains, the less likely Serbia is to sit idly by.

Whether started deliberately or accidentally, renewed Serbo-Croat warfare would have many casualties. First, the Bosnia cease-fire would unravel. Bosnian Serbs would probably attack Croatian Army forces in Bosnia (who are prepositioned to attack the Krajina Serb capital from the east). In addition,

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GOBH forces would be tempted to strike when Krajina Serbs are tied down in Croatia and unable to assist their Bosnian brethern as they did in Bihac. Second, an attack on Serbs in Croatia would rally Serb nationalists, pressuring Milosevic to re-open the border with Bosnia to resupply the Krajina Serbs. Third, substantial human casualties would result, particularly among civilians in Croatian towns, which have usually been subject to Krajina Serb shelling when hostilities erupt. Fourth, the conflict would undermine Bosnian relief efforts, which are staged from Croatia to a large extent.

UNPROFOR Negotiations

In stressing that his decision to expel UNPROFOR is irrevocable, Tudjman has made it almost inevitalbe that UNPROFOR as we know it has no future after March. But he has left the door open to preserving the elements that the U.S. has defined as essential. These are: cease-fire monitoring in Croatia; liaison with Knin; confidence-building measures implementation; support for Bosnia operations; force headquarters. They do not require the substantial troop presence throughout the UNPAs that UNPROFOR now maintains.

Zagreb has indicated it would accept continued UNPROFOR operations on Croatia soil in support of Bosnia, as well as an international presence to pursue the Croatia-related tasks. These tasks could be fulfilled by a UN mission with a different name. It would report to the UNSYG through Akashi in order to remain integrated with UNPROFOR, similar to the organization of the various UN peacekeeping operations in the Middle East.

The mission's top priority would be monitoring the separation zones established by the March '94 cease-fire. Otherwise, the vacuum left by UNPROFOR's withdrawal would draw Serb and Croat forces into clashes. This return to the pre-cease-fire situation is more dangerous now because both sides are spoiling for a fight; isoloated incidents would quickly escalate into full-scale confrontation. International monitors could act as a brake by providing an early-warning system. Since they would not be deployed to deter a military offensive -- neither is UNPROFOR at present -- they could be unarmed. Similarly, liaison with Knin and implementation of confidence-building measures, except for de-mining, are not tasks requiring military skills.

UNSC negotiations on a new mandate are unlikely to begin until the March 31 expiration approaches. In developing a new mandate for the UN presence in Croatia, Zagreb will wait to

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show flexibility in order to maintain maximum pressure on the Serbs. At the appropriate time, the U.S. should mediate between the Croats on the one hand and the UNSYG's representatives and key UNSC members on the other. No other country is positioned to do so. To prepare, we should use the intervening weeks to explore the nuts and bolts of desired UN activity in Croatia with the responsible UN officials, especially incoming force commander Smith.

Update on Launching Negotiations via the Z-4

The Z-4 Mediators (the Zagreb Ambassadors of the U.S., Russia, EU, and UN) have now finalized all provisions of their constitutional plan and map for a Croatia settlement. Their proposal to grant autonomy to ethnic Serb areas while restoring Croatian sovereignty throughout its territory is a framework for accomplishing the urgent task of bringing the parties to the negotiating table. The Z-4 are scheduled to present the plan in Zagreb and Knin on January 30 and in Belgrade on January 31. They will meet subsequently with the parties to explain the provisions and present the map, and then to organize negotiations.

We should emphasize that negotiations on a settlement must start soon and that we expect the parties to consider the Z-4 Plan seriously, since it represents what the international community is prepared to support. With the backing of all the major powers, we would expect a final settlement to look very much like this proposal, but it is not a take-it-or-leave-it proposition.

While Bosnia negotiations have gone on in one form or another for several years, a political settlement in Croatia has never been the subject of serious talks among the parties. Little has occured in recent years to induce them to negotiate. It may be months or years until they are ready to settle, and additional fighting may occur. It is doubtful, moreover, that the fractured Krajina Serb leadership will pursue talks with Zagreb unless Belgrade dispels the dream of Greater Serbia, e.g. with recognition of Croatia and its international borders.

Despite the odds, however, every attempt must be made to launch negotiations. The bargaining would take place between representatives of Zagreb and Knin. Belgrade need not be represented if it endorses the basic plan and makes the Krajina Serbs attend. We can be flexible on modalities and venues, with the organizing principle being to support whatever works. At some point, we will have to consider possible incentives and

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disincentives to keep the negotiations going, but doing so now would be premature. The bottom line is that unless we find a way to get the parties to confront each other at the negotiating table, they will move closer to a face-off on the battlefield.

Preparing for the worst

While making every effort to preserve an UNPROFOR presence that can deter renewed conflict and to invigorate the diplomatic track, the U.S. must also consider what to do in the event that hostilities erupt as a result of apparent Croatian recklessness. Senior U.S. officials (Albright, Tarnoff, Slocombe, Holbrooke, Galbraith) have already delivered the two-part message to the Croats: we will work with you to restore Croatian sovereignty, but we will not understand or help if you provoke a war. We have to keep reinforcing this message.

For now, it makes sense to hold off on intensifying military cooperation until the UNPROFOR mandate question is satisfactorily resolved, as U/S Slocombe discussed with President Tudjman on Monday. If a satisfactory new mandate proves impossible or Croatia otherwise demonstrates belligerent intentions, we would scale back the bilateral relationship. These decision would have to be carefully calibrated to respond to the specific circumstances. It nevertheless makes sense to warn the Croats ahead of time that we cannot continue close cooperation if they pursue military confrontation, at least until the possibilities for settlement talks have been exhausted.

We should also work with the UN, NATO, and NGOs to allow essential relief operations in Bosnia to continue with minimal disruption in the event that Croatia becomes unavailable as a staging ground.

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TAB G

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 24 January 1995

Information Paper

Subj: Political and Military Options for Supporting an UNPROFOR Withdrawal From Croatia (U)

1. (U) Purpose. To analyze the political and military aspects of supporting an UNPROFOR withdrawal from Croatia.

2. (U) Background. Croatia has stated it will not renew the UNPROFOR mandate that expires on 31 March and wants all UNPROFOR troops out of the UNPAs by 30 June. Croatia will allow UNPROFOR and UNHCR headquarters to remain in Zagreb if the UN desires; however, the UN has indicated it will relocate the headquarters if UNPROFOR withdrawal becomes a reality. The UN told NATO informally on 23 January it hoped NATO would undertake contingency planning for assistance with a pullout from Croatia. At the 25 January NAC NATO SecGen Claes will seek approval to expand Bosnia withdrawal planning to include Croatia. This will probably result in a specific tasking to the MC to expedite plans to support an UNPROFOR withdrawal from Croatia.

3. (U) Current Planning Status.

a. (C) **UNPROFOR planning:** UNPROFOR has a basic plan for withdrawal from Croatia under unopposed conditions.

b. (C) **NATO planning:** NATO planning priorities have been on withdrawal from Bosnia, with withdrawal from Croatia and Macedonia seen as less likely cases. NATO planners have commenced looking at what changes are required to OPLAN 40104 (NATO support to UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia) if withdrawal from Croatia occurs before or in parallel with withdrawal from Bosnia. A parallel withdrawal effort would significantly complicate the operation and increase troop requirements.

4. (U) Withdrawal Support Options.

a. (C) **UNPROFOR runs own withdrawal.** The UN would run its own withdrawal, contracting for required ground, air, and sea transport. This would be difficult to achieve on short notice due to contracting delays, but could be successful in an unopposed scenario given the available lead-time. However, the UN informal approach to NATO on 23 January suggests the UN may not want to pursue this option.

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b. (C) **NATO provides limited support.** NATO could offer to provide close air support (CAS), if required, and fixed amounts of communications, logistics, and transport support. This would minimizes NATO commitment and cost, and might be relatively easy for the NAC to reach consensus. This could lead to criticism if this option results in UNPROFOR troops suffering significant casualties. NATO and the UN need to define the extent to which UNPROFOR in Croatia is exposed and vulnerable. Decisions on the extent of required support can only be made closer to the time of an actual withdrawal, based on the degree of threat to UNPROFOR posed by the Krajina-Serbs, in particular, and whether the proposed support is sufficient to counter it.

c. (C) **Full NATO support similar to Bosnian withdrawal, including NATO ground troops.** This would utilizes the full extend of NATO assets, but increases NATO liability and commitment. It builds on existing command arrangements, forces in theater, and infrastructure. It is the most likely option to succeed, but will require resolution of issues NATO and the UN have avoided coming to closure on: C2 above theater level, role of Akashi, and financing. (These same issues will need to be resolved to support UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia.) With 7 NATO members with troops in Croatia (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Netherlands, Norway, and the US) and only three deployed to the UNPAs (Belgium, Canada, Denmark) some NATO member countries may be reluctant to support a full-scale NATO withdrawal effort. Our Congress will pose the same objection to US ground troop involvement that it would in a Bosnia contingency. A direct request for withdrawal assistance from Canada or another NATO member would help in the NAC and with Congress.

d. (C) **US or other nation unilateral support.** The US is the only country that possesses the lift and mobility assets to conduct an operation of this size. A unilateral US operation would be extremely difficult to justify to Congress.

5. (U) Discussion.

a. (C) A full NATO support operation (Option c) is what the UN expects and is the one most likely to succeed in

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the face of expected opposition. It would be hard for NATO to maintain credibility if it decided to support an UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia but not Croatia. It would also seriously damage US credibility among the non-NATO troop contributing nations with forces in Croatia who may be looking to the US and NATO to help evacuate their forces. New Security Council resolutions and NAC decisions will be necessary for a full scale support operation, and might be necessary even to accomplish the limited option.

b. (C) For the present, the UN, NATO, and member states need to emphasize that UNPROFOR has a vital role to play in Croatia, in particular in implementing agreements between Zagreb and the Krajina Serbs. A reduced UNPROFOR presence is preferable to a complete pull-out. When working with the Croatians on the subject of withdrawal planing and support requirements, we must bear in mind that the extensive work required to make an operation successful will have the unintentional side effect of sending a signal that the international community is losing interest in the problems of the region. At this delicate stage in negotiations between Zagreb and Knin, such a signal might be particularly damaging.

c. (C) New Security Council resolutions and NAC decisions, for example to extend CAS to all of the UNPAs, would be necessary were NATO to involve itself in assistance to an UNPROFOR withdrawal from Croatia. The NAC will address these issues on 25 January.

d. (C) In order to be prepared for withdrawal from Bosnia or Croatia, or possible peace plan implementation, SACEUR is proposing the prepositioning of command and control equipment and personnel in Croatia, Germany, and Italy. The Deputies may be requested to discuss this issue in the next several days.

Prepared by: J-5 Balkans working group/STATE EUR/RPM
n:eurcenea/croatia/pmimp.

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TAB H

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DRAFT

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Subject: Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic Visit to Washington January 30 - February 2.

THE SETTING

- Prime Minister Silajdzic's main goal in Washington will be to take the political water temperature on the Dole bill. Our goal is to keep the fragile peace process started by Charlie Thomas on track.

- Recent discussions with Silajdzic in Sarajevo suggest that he is emerging as the Bosnian government's chief hardliners on the peace process. Silajdzic's shift may be tactical -- he may be repositioning himself in Bosnia's internal political process. But in any event, we must be prepared for a Washington visitor who is showing a growing impatience for the negotiating process and who remains a firm believer in lifiting the arms embargo.

- Silajdzic -- more than VP Ganic and President Izetbegovic -- has been skeptical of approaches to Pale which he regards as the Contact Group's shift away from its plan toward more concessions to the Serbs. He has insisted in his recent meetings with Charlie Thomas that any renewal of negotiation with Pale be on the basis of the CG plan with a clear time limit for the negotiations.

- Much of Silajdzic's stridency is directed at the Administration which he accuses of retreating from lift to a position in line with the Europeans. Silajdzic shows little appreciation for the nuances between multilateral and unilateral lift, viewing the issue against the broader backdrop of US moral leadership. He has honed a vigorous and passionate argument for lift, a performance we can expect to hear next week on talk shows and on the Hill.

THE SCHEDULE

- Silajdzic will meet with Secretary Christopher on Monday. We believe that a meeting with the Vice President should also be arranged as a strong signal of our continued support to Bosnia. A meeting with the Vice President would also offer the opportunity to make the same private assurances that we remain firm on the Contact Group plan and map.

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- We have encouraged the Bosnian Embassy to arrange meetings with a broad range of Congressional leadership. So far the Bosnian Embassy is pursuing meetings with Nunn, Lugar, Warner, in addition to Dole, Helms, Biden, and Liberman.

- Silajdzic will also have extensive interviews with the press which the Bosnian Embassy is also organizing. So far the Bosnian Embassy is considering offers from Nightline, McNeil-Lehrer, CNN, CBS, and NBC.

OUR OBJECTIVES

- Our overall objective for the visit is to

  -- Make Silajdzic understand that support for lift and strike is tepid at best, while we

  -- Demonstrate strong support to the Bosnian government and to the future of Bosnia as a single state within internationally recognized borders.

Lift:

- We are making sure that Silajdzic sees people on the Hill who do not share his views about lift and strike.

- Members such as Lugar, Warner, Nunn and others can make clear that support for Dole's lift and strike scenario in Congress is not as strong as Silajdzic himself would like to believe.

- At the same time, we wish to avoid the perception that we are engaged in a "full-court press" in the run-up to Silajdzic's visit which could result in a perception of US reorientation away from the Bosnians, possibly complicating the delicate road to peace that Charlie Thomas has begun to build in his meetings in Sarajevo and Pale.

- For this reason it would be worthwhile for us to hold off on our briefings by Wes Clark, Walt Slocombe and myself of the intell and appropriations committees until after the Silajdzic visit has passed. ✓

- For the same reason, we think we should hold off on the Shali/Perry op ed until after he leaves. ✓

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- With the press, we should plan on having a senior official hold a backgrounder on Bosnia to ensure that the media are fully conversant with all the arguments on lift.

Peace Process

- We need to convince the reluctant Bosnians -- especially the doubting Silajdzic -- to move ahead. To do this we need to reassure them that we can and well be supportive of them in that negotiation. But we cannot let things drift much longer.

- Secretary Christopher's letter to Izetbegovic with its assurances on our support for the 51/49 map and Bosnia's territorial unity was the first step. But we need to follow up.

  We think the best format for this message would be a thirty-minute one-on-one meeting with Secretary Christopher, followed by a small lunch.

- The message to Silajdzic should straight forward and track with the letter to Izetbegovic:

  -- We understand Bosnian reluctance to enter into a negotiation in the absence of a clear, comprehensive endorsement by the Serbs of the Contact Group plan, but we believe the conditions of the cessation offer a chance for successful negotiations.

  -- The Bosnians have concentrated on the "starting point" for negotiations, more attention should be paid to the end point.

  -- We continue to support the contact group, specifically the 51/49 map and the unity of the Bosnian state.

  -- We would not pressure the Bosnians to take less.

Public support to the Federation

- We can also use Silajdzic's visit to inject new life into the Bosnian-Croat Federation which continues to be fragile.

  -- We may use the occasion of Secretary Christopher's meeting with Silajdzic to announce the "Friends of the Federation," a group of 10-15 countries engaged in funding multiethnic development and war reconstruction projects.

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-- We can also announce the selection of General Franks as an advisor to the Federation joint command, as well as our intention to sign a 505 agreement with Bosnia that will permit IMET and other defense cooperation activities that do not violate the UN arms embargo.

o These projects follow up on the Washington accords and provide Silajdzic and the Bosnians with tangible proof of our commitment to their future.

o We can also use Silajdzic's visit to inject new life into the Bosnian-Croat Federation which continues to be fragile.

o These projects follow up on the Washington accords and provide Silajdzic and the Bosnians with tangible proof of our commitment to their future.

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FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 23 JAN 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
AGENDA
CROATIA
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 25 JAN DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 24 JAN 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520090 9520104

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 23, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. LEON E. PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President of the United States

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T.R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the UN

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia on Thursday, January 26, 1995, 12:00-1:00pm, in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be principals plus one. Taskers for papers and agenda are attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

for William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RS NARA, Date 9/25/2019
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P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: January 25, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 1:00pm - 2:00pm

Agenda

I. Diplomatic Strategy .....State

-- [redacted] EO 13526 1.4c [005]

-- Mid-Term Diplomatic Strategy (State Should Circulate Tasked Paper NLT Jan 23)

II. UNPROFOR Augmentation.....All

-- Status of Efforts to Strengthen UNPROFOR.....JCS

-- UNPROFOR Strengthening vs UNPROFOR Funding (NSC Paper to be Circulated NLT January 24)

III. Croatia Strategy.....State

-- Status of Zagreb-4 Diplomacy.....State

-- Diplomatic Strategy to Respond to Tudjman's UNPROFOR Decision (State Should Circulate Paper NLT January 24.....State

-- Political Aspects of Supporting UNPROFOR Withdrawal from Croatia (State Should Circulate Paper NLT January January 24).....State

-- Military Aspects of Supporting UNPROFOR Withdrawal from Croatia (JCS Should Circulate Paper NLT January 24).....JCS

IV. Congressional and Public Affairs Strategy.....All

-- Strategy to Defeat Unilateral Lift Vote.....State

-- Silajdzic Visit Strategy (State Should Circulate Paper NLT January 24).....State

-- Timing of Bill Perry Op-Ed.....OSD

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 23, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. LEON E. PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President of the United States

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T.R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the UN

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia on Thursday, January 26, 1995, 12:00-1:00pm, in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be principals plus one. Taskers for papers and agenda are attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

for William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RS NARA, Date 9/25/2019
2010-0533-M

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006. agenda	[Duplicate of 004b] [partial] (1 page)	01/25/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3999

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0165 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, January 25, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs665

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: January 25, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 1:00pm - 2:00pm

Agenda

I. Diplomatic Strategy .....State

-- E.O.13526 1.4c [006]

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IV. Congressional and Public Affairs Strategy.....All

-- Strategy to Defeat Unilateral Lift Vote.....State

-- Silajdzic Visit Strategy (State Should Circulate Paper NLT January 24).....State

-- Timing of Bill Perry Op-Ed.....OSD

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 23, 1995

Sandy:
Agencies have been notified about taskings on UNPROFOR/Croatia withdrawal planning listed in the agenda.
Sandy V.

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW/W

FROM: DON KERRICK

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum and agenda for the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia to be held on January 26, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to initial the memorandum to agency counterparts at Tab I.

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to counterparts
Tab A Agenda

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See also 2015-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

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~~001. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (2 pages)~~	~~02/02/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RDS 10/01/2013
002. memo	To: Samuel Berger; From: Don Kerrick; Re: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, February 2, 1995 (1 page)	02/02/1995	P1/b(1)
003a. memo	Don Kerrick to Samuel Berger re: February 2 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia (6 pages)	02/01/1995	P1/b(1)
003b. list	re: Sanctions and the Bold Approach (3 pages)	02/1995	P1/b(1)
003c. agenda	Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)	02/02/1995	P1/b(1)
003d. report	re: Status of Cessation of Hostilities (1 page)	02/01/1995	P1/b(1)
~~003e. paper~~	~~re: Bosnia Policy Options in the Short Term (3 pages)~~	~~02/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
003f. memo	Alexander Vershbow to Anthony Lake re: Silajdzic Plan-Initial Thoughts (2 pages)	02/01/1995	P1/b(1)
~~003g. paper~~	~~re: Implementing a Croatia Strategy (1 page)~~	~~02/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003h. paper~~	~~re: Implementing a Croatia Strategy (4 pages)~~	~~02/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
003i. paper	re: Threat to UNPROFOR Withdrawal from Croatia (3 pages)	01/26/1995	P1/b(1)

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FOLDER TITLE:
DC0168 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, February 2, 1995

2010-0533-M
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003j. paper	re: Options for UNPROFOR Withdrawal from Croatia [partial] (2 pages)	02/02/1995	P1/b(1), b(7)(C), b(7)(E) VZ 6/11/2020
~~003k. paper~~	~~re: Pre-positioning for Bosnia Contingencies (4 pages)~~	~~02/01/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003l. paper~~	~~Status - UNPROFOR (4 pages)~~	~~02/01/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
004. agenda	[Duplicate of 003c] (1 page)	02/02/1995	P1/b(1)

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TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 04 FEB 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
DC
CROATIA
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 2 FEB DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: REED SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 06 FEB 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF:

FILES: IFM NSCP: DC 0168 CODES:

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FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
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		DARBY
		KERRICK
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

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001		X	95020415	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
002		X	95020415	REED SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

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DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
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002	950204	BRILL, K	
002	950204	MCALEER, R	
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DC

PERSONS:

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ACTION: BERGER APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 06 FEB 95 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF:

FILES: IFM NSCP: CODES:

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Sens	1	DS	
Itoh			
Soderberg			
Berger	2		
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	2/4	D
NSC Secretariat	5		N

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Reed	3		A
Sens	1	DS	
Itoh			
Soderberg			
Berger	2		
Lake			
Situation Room		Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
West Wing Desk	4	3/4	D
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FROM : NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SoC & DC Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia 2 Feb. NSC LOG # Z0143

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RS Date: 9/25/2019
2010-0533-M

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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NSC LOG # 20143

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: ~~Notice of Meeting~~ Summary of Conclusions PAGES: 3

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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Initials: RS Date: 9/25/2019
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 4, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

AMBASSADOR RICK INDEFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T.R. PATRICK
Executive Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, February 2, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

for William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RS NARA, Date 9/25/2019
2010-0553-M

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Declassify on: OADR

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee
DATE: February 2, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:10 - 3:30pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
Samuel R. Berger

OVP:
Leon Fuerth

State:
Peter Tarnoff
Richard Holbrooke
Robert Frasure
Charles Thomas

DOD:
John Deutch
Walter Slocombe
Michael Hagee

OMB:
Gordon Adams
John Burnim

USUN:
David Scheffer
James O'Brien

CIA:
Douglas MacEachin
Norman Schindler

JCS:
LTG Daniel Christman
LTG Wesley Clark

NSC:
Alexander Vershbow
BG Donald L. Kerrick
Susan Rice

Summary of Conclusions

1. Deputies reviewed the results of recent Contact Group efforts in Bosnia, diplomatic options for renewing negotiations for a political settlement, and prospects for achieving mutual recognition of all former Yugoslav Republics as a means of further isolating Karadzic. They agreed to discuss with Allies a renewed effort with Milosevic aimed at achieving mutual recognition. Deputies agreed that cross-recognition must be broadened beyond a possible bilateral deal between Serbia and Croatia to include Bosnia as well, plus Slovenia and FYROM. They

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0533-M
RVS 9/30/14 (2.00)

requested a strategy paper be prepared for next week's Principals meeting. The strategy should address steps to achieve cross-recognition, including how to approach Milosevic and Tudjman, timing, the relationship between recognition and UNPROFOR retention in Croatia, and the U.S. response should Milosevic move only on recognition of Croatia. (S) **(Action: State)**

2. Recognizing that sanctions relief will be our main leverage for securing cross-recognition, Deputies requested that the OVP lead an Interagency effort to configure a Milosevic sanctions relief package that looks at the pros and cons of accepting the European Union's position. (S) **(Action: OVP)**

3. Deputies discussed the results of recent diplomatic efforts in Croatia. Noting the dynamic situation in Croatia, they requested an integrated, political and military strategy for Croatia. The strategy should address how to maximize opportunities for UNPROFOR retention, how to approach Tudjman in the run-up to the March 31 UNPROFOR mandate expiration, a description of the redefined UNPROFOR mandate we hope to achieve, measures to minimize risk to UNPROFOR, and military planning decision points for UNPROFOR's complete or partial withdrawal. (S) **(Action: State/JCS)**

4. Deputies reviewed the state of military planning to support UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia and Croatia. They agreed to support NATO discussions with Croatia concerning prepositioning of C3I systems and host nation support for UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia. They further agreed to present to Principals a recommendation that the U.S. agree in principle to participate in a NATO operation to support UNPROFOR withdrawal from Croatia and to approve completion of required contingency planning. (S) **(Action: JCS)**

5. Deputies reviewed the status of efforts at the United Nations to strengthen UNPROFOR. Reiterating their support for strengthening measures, the Deputies requested more information to clarify UN intentions, objectives, rationale, and operational impact. (S) **(Action: JCS)**

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. memo	To: Samuel Berger; From: Don Kerrick; Re: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, February 2, 1995 (1 page)	02/02/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3999

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0168 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, February 2, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs666

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520136
RECEIVED: 01 FEB 95 14

TO: BERGER

FROM: KERRICK
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 01 FEB 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA CROATIA
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPERS FOR 2 FEB DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER DUE DATE: 04 FEB 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520124 9520143

FILES: IFM O NSCR: DC0168 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		KERRICK
		NSC CHRON
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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RS NARA, Date 9/25/2019
2010-0533-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	95020115	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	95020415	NOTED BY BERGER

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Rec'd 2/2
8:29am

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: MBN LOG # 20136

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Reed			
Sens	1	POS	
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Soderberg			
Berger	2		
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	2/4	N
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS: Mtg Paper for Bosnia DC Feb 2

Exec Sec Office has diskette WP

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. memo	Don Kerrick to Samuel Berger re: February 2 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia (6 pages)	02/01/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3999

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0168 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, February 2, 1995

2010-0533-M
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RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. list	re: Sanctions and the Bold Approach (3 pages)	02/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3999

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0168 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, February 2, 1995

2010-0533-M
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RESTRICTION CODES

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TAB A

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003c. agenda	Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)	02/02/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3999

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0168 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, February 2, 1995

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TAB B

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003d. report	re: Status of Cessation of Hostilities (1 page)	02/01/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3999

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0168 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, February 2, 1995

2010-0533-M
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TAB C

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DRAFT

C.

BOSNIA POLICY OPTIONS IN THE SHORT TERM:
PRESSURE ON PALE; FEDERATION SUPPORT

The effort to bring the Pale Serbs to the table failed because, despite [redacted] Carter, Karadzic is not under sufficient pressure to negotiate on any terms except his own. With the four-month cessation agreement in its second month and barely holding, we need to work fast to build the pressure necessary to begin real negotiations.

The clock is also ticking on the Federation. If we do not take action to shore it up, by spring we could be confronting a three way war which will feed into the dangerous military situation developing in Croatia.

Meanwhile, our CG partners are going back to the drawing board for ideas. The result -- as evidenced by Juppe's interview in Le Monde -- may be an excess of free thinking which could complicate the diplomatic road ahead.

We thus need to move quickly on three tracks: (1) build pressure on Pale to negotiate; (2) shore up the Federation; and (3) avoid a diplomatic vacuum that could result in disarray at a time when diplomatic cohesion is most essential.

Pushing Milosevic Toward Recognition

Mutual recognition of all former Yugoslav republics, especially Serb recognition of the GOBH, would help further isolate Pale and nudge Karadzic toward the negotiating table. Milosevic may be willing to trade recognition for sanctions relief.

Izetbegovic told Charlie Thomas last week that Milosevic had invited him to Belgrade several times and that he would gladly accept if he could be guaranteed in advance some positive result. Izetbegovic also made it clear that he would support some sanctions relief for Belgrade in exchange for recognition by Milosevic. Silajdzic also indicated that, contrary to past Bosnian government positions, he too believes some sanctions relief would be appropriate, but he took a tougher line.

Now is the time for a full court press on Milosevic, even if the odds are still against success. The Secretary's commitment to Silajdzic to approach Kozyrev was a good first step in this process. A joint approach to Milosevic, preferably at the Ministerial level, may prove successful. A joint visit to Belgrade by other Contact Group foreign ministers, or a succession of individual visits, might put the needed pressure on Milosevic.

~~SECRET~~

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PER E.O. 13526
VR 2/6/2020 (2.00)

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On sanctions, we would be proposing a partial lifting or suspension. We would need need to take a close look at what package could be offered which would not undercut the remaining sanctions regime. /*

UN Membership for Milosevic

One potentially tasty carrot which we may want to offer Milosevic to entice him toward recognizing his neighbors -- not involving sanctions relief -- is United Nations membership for the "FRY." At present, Belgrade's representatives in New York are squatting at the desk of the former Yugoslavia, a situation which might be in the power of influential members of the Security Council to discontinue. In the context of gaining title to the seat, Milosevic might be persuaded to recognize formally his neighbors. We need to explore the full range of ramifications of such an offer.

UNPROFOR Withdrawal - Redux

During December, the Bosnian Serbs became alarmed at reports that UNPROFOR might have to be withdrawn, and that the withdrawal would require the help of NATO troops. The threat of withdrawal was probably the single greatest factor in their desire to achieve a cessation agreement. NATO action is a nightmare for the Bosnian Serbs who do not believe that NATO -- after its first ground operation ever -- would leave and allow a massacre to ensue. If peace negotiations are not restarted in the next few weeks, talk of UNPROFOR withdrawal might resurface, again causing the Bosnian Serbs to reconsider their position.

We should make sure that the current prepositioning issue in NATO and with the Croatian government is understood by the Bosnian Serbs as another sign that the withdrawal of UNPROFOR is being planned. General Rose carried a dire warning to Pale in December; Rupert Smith should do the same now. We will discuss this with London.

Summit: Maybe Not A Bad Idea

We reacted guarded[redacted] to the French proposal of a summit, insisting that there be content and a guaranteed result. We should consider, however, that a meeting of Milosevic, Tudjman, Izetbegovic, and perhaps the CG ministers would send a powerful signal to the Pale Serbs that their aspirations for international recognition -- as anything more than war criminals -- is unlikely.

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Lift -- the Last Resort

Finally, we should look for an early opportunity with our CG partners to restate the July 30 communique language on lift as a last resort.

Support for the Federation

Recent events in Bosnia have shown that domestic support for the Federation remains shaky. At the top, relations between senior government officials are correct and sometimes even cordial, but disturbing trends continue at the local and regional level. Tensions remain high in Mostar and other areas where the two communities live side-by-side. Military coordination has been and hoc at best. Karadzic & Co. are banking on these intercommunal tensions eventually to split the Federation.

We must support a stronger Federation now and undercut Karadzic's hopes for his policy of "divide and conquer." Every step we take to build up the Federation will show Pale that it faces a unified adversary, not a doomed coalition. how?

Last week, Izetbegovic and Tudjman met with Federation President Zubak to review Federation implementation. They agreed to form a committee to identify problems and suggest solutions, to be headed by Zubak and VP Ganic. In this vein, both the Croats and the Muslims have sought outside assistance in resolving the impasse. As the engine behind the Washington Accords, the U.S. has a special role to play.

At the Wehrkunde conference in Munich this week Dick Holbrooke will press both the Croats (FM Granic) and the Bosnians (Silajdzic and Zubak) to revitalize the Federation by taking concrete steps toward implementation. He will also solicit support for our "Friends of the Federation" initiative.

We will use the Friends of the Federation to target funds on specific projects designed to reduce mistrust on both sides. Of particular importance are projects like formation of a single administration in Mostar (including Police) and a single border authority. Our plans to integrate the Federation armed forces have been slowed by the decision of General Franks to withdraw from consideration as our military advisor to the Federation. We are now looking for a new candidate.

The "inner circle" of Friends, comprised of the American, German, Turkish, and Austrian Ambassadors in Sarajevo, will offer day-to-day guidance to the Federation in overcoming the difficulties of implementation. This inner circle does not intend, however, to get involved in arbitrating or mediating disputes. The parties themselves must solve their differences.

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TAB D

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003f. memo	Alexander Vershbow to Anthony Lake re: Silajdzic Plan-Initial Thoughts (2 pages)	02/01/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3999

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0168 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, February 2, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs666

RESTRICTION CODES

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TAB E

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

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E

25 January, 1995

TALKING PAPER

Subject: Reinforcing UNPROFOR

1. Purpose. To provide talking points on the need to reinforce UNPROFOR.

2. Talking Points

- UNPROFOR continues to perform a valuable mission in Bosnia, including facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid and establishing the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis.

- UNPROFOR has requested 6,500 additional troops and equipment to support the current cessation of hostilities agreement, to improve its capability to protect itself,and to respond to acts by the warring parties against UNPROFOR. These additional troops and equipment would provide operational flexibility, better ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid, and allow the use of more robust measures to keep ground and air aid corridors open.

- On several occasions, most recently in Bihac, UNPROFOR could have done a better job if it had more manpower and equipment resources, including helicopters, at its disposal.

- The NATO Chiefs of Defense met with UN, Russia, and other interested nations at The Hague, Netherlands, in December to consider how UNPROFOR could be made more effective. Two initiatives resulted from this meeting:

-the formulation of concepts for maintaining open the air and land routes into Sarajevo and the enclaves, and

-the decision to offer UNPROFOR additional manpower and equipment to better accomplish its mission.

- As a result of this initiative fourteen countries have offered almost 6,000 troops and significant additional equipment.

- We consider it essential to support this effort and have offered to the UN helicopters, armored personnel carriers, radars, radios, night vision goggles, and assorted engineer vehicles on a lease or sale basis.

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- The success of the cessation of hostilities agreement would be a significant achievement on the road to a peaceful settlement in the former Yugoslavia. The UN deserves the help of the entire international community to take advantage of this cessation of hostilities to better prepare for whatever comes next.

- The UN is still evaluating all the offers it has received. We expect the UN to inform us shortly of their desires. At that time we will negotiate financial arrangements for sale or lease of the equipment offered by the U.S. government.

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TAB F

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F

FUNDING UNPROFOR

Congressional Strategy

UNPROFOR, the largest UN peacekeeping force, with a U.S. assessment of $506 million for FY 95, is unfunded for this fiscal year. The Administration will submit a peacekeeping supplemental request for FY 95 which totals $672 million, of which the lion's share will be for UNPROFOR. Absent a radical solution, UNPROFOR's solvency will depend in large measure on whether we obtain this supplemental. In addition, the FY 96 budget submitted to Congress would fully fund UNPROFOR at current levels of spending for only six months.

In preparing the FY 95 budget, the Administration proposed "Shared Responsibility," by which DOD would pay the U.S. assessments of Chapter VII peacekeeping operations and those Chapter VI operations in which U.S. combat units are participating, while the Department of State would pay for Chapter VI operations. UNPROFOR, under Chapter VII, would have been funded by DOD. However, Congress chose not to authorize "Shared Responsibility," and UNPROFOR was left unfunded for FY 95, dictating the need for a supplemental appropriation request. In the FY 96 budget a modified version of "Shared Responsibility" (DOD pays assessments for operations in which U.S. combat units participate) was included. The FY 96 UNPROFOR request covered only six months of operation because of the uncertainties surrounding UNPROFOR's future.

Adding to the growing expense for UNPROFOR is the UN's call for an additional 6500 troops to help enforce the cessation of hostilities and to move the warring parties to a political solution by separating them. These 6500 troops will cost approximately $150 million for the first year, with the U.S. assessment approximately $46 million. The U.S. earlier voted for UNPROFOR's mandate which included the additional 6500 troops.

Uncertainties. Given the political/military realities in Bosnia and Croatia at this time, it is difficult to predict UNPROFOR's future even six months ahead. The Croatian Government has requested the end of UNPROFOR's mandate on March 31, with the removal of all units (except for headquarters and logistics in Zagreb) within a few months' time after that. Possibly UNPROFOR will stay, but with a much changed mandate and changed troop configuration. In Bosnia the cessation of hostilities agreement ends April 30. If not renewed, or if a political settlement is not reached, then active warfare might break out, making UNPROFOR's position untenable. Plans are underway to have NATO help UNPROFOR's withdrawal if necessary. It is very possible that UNPROFOR will cease to exist in six months' time. On the other hand, if UNPROFOR is successful and a settlement is reached, then certainly troop numbers will have to be augmented to keep the peace. This uncertainty makes budgeting a nightmare, and explains why supplementals must be used.

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Congress. Many factors militate against Congress's passing the supplemental legislation necessary for UNPROFOR's survival. Congress is in a budget cutting, deficit slashing mode. UN programs are an easy target. And the Bosnian situation itself raises hackles. Many, Senator Dole included, who believe that UNPROFOR has been a failure, favor lifting the arms embargo and allowing the warring contestants to fight it out, with the U.S. aiding the Bosnian Government. But other members of Congress still strongly support UN peacekeeping and see an arms lift as a recipe for disaster, with the U.S. being pulled in militarily.

What must be done. Yesterday's Deputies Committee on Peacekeeping looked at methods of "Enhanced Consultations with Congress on UN Peacekeeping and Related Issues." (Tab A) Those recommendations are necessary to create an atmosphere more accepting of the need for UN peacekeeping. Also discussed at that meeting were "Cost Savings Options," (Tab B), many of them directed at UNPROFOR. But specifically on Bosnia and UNPROFOR, much needs to be done.

A leaner, more effective UNPROFOR. Congress is no longer willing to fund peacekeeping missions without making the most strenuous efforts to hold down the cost. Before approaching Congress on UNPROFOR, we should demarche the UN about our funding concerns, making the point that we want UNPROFOR to be as cost effective as possible. We could offer planners to help in assessing needs. Given that UNPROFOR is by far the largest UN peacekeeping operation, we should insist on a "bottom up" review, to be completed before the mandate expires.

Croatian UNPROFOR mandate. We need to meet with allies to determine what a reconfigured UNPROFOR in Croatia might look like, assuming the Croatian Government allows the mandate to be continued. Certain baseline activities must be performed (separation of contestants, convoying humanitarian supplies), but perhaps these can be done with a much reduced UNPROFOR. To keep from sending wrong signals to the Croatians, however, this review must begin with the assumption that UNPROFOR in some form will be remaining in Croatia.

Hill briefings. More than ever before, the reasons for our support of UNPROFOR must be transparent to Congress. Relevant committees must see:

-- the necessity of UNPROFOR and the terrible costs if it is not funded;

-- what we are doing to minimize the cost of UNPROFOR;

-- if U.S. military readiness is affected by support for UNPROFOR.

Briefings clearly must include senior U.S. administration officials from State and DOD. It will be a difficult sell.

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To be done before Hill briefings:

-- Approach UN concerning "bottom up" review of UNPROFOR (State).

-- Work with allies to reconfigure UNPROFOR/Croatia (State)

-- Determine effects of UNPROFOR enhanced support on U.S. military readiness (JCS)

-- Prepare "doomsday" scenario for termination of UNPROFOR, including (JCS):

U.S. ground troops needed to extricate UNPROFOR
Cost of extricating UNPROFOR
Cost to U.S. to enhance GOBH military
Certainty of war in Bosnia and Croatia
Strong possibility of spillover to Serbia and Macedonia

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TAB G

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

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IMPLEMENTING A CROATIA STRATEGY

Croatia and the Serbs continued a slide toward war this past week. The UN has made noises about an early pullout from Croatia and Bosnia; the Serbs rebuffed international mediators; the Croats indicated they would take wide-scale military action. Ideally, the glare of publicity about these developments would illuminate a key fact for the parties: more fighting is a negative-sum game. Instead, it is heating up Balkan belligerence, fueling a feeling that fighting is inevitable. The U.S. should try to head off a new regional war.

Deputies have discussed a three-pronged U.S. approach: maintain the essential functions of UNPROFOR in Croatia; launch a negotiattions between Serbs and Croats on a political settlement; and prepare for the worst case of renewed hostilities. In public, we should not undercut Croatia to keep maximum pressure on the Serbs to negotiate. Only progress toward a settlement will convince Tudjman to keep UNPROFOR in Croatia. In private, we can be tougher with Zagreb.

Main action items of this strategy include:

-- Consult early with the Secretariat and key UNSC members on maintaining UNPROFOR's essential elements.

-- Stomp on loose talk of UNPROFOR pulling out early or moving its headquarters.

-- Give Croatia time to come up with the "right answer" on UNPROFOR.

-- Warn the Serbs against taking UNPROFOR personnel hostage.

-- Insist that Knin accept Croatian sovereignty before seating it at any Balkan conference.

-- Refuse to take "no" for an answer on the Z-4 Plan, making the parties come up with any new proposals and take responsibility for their fate.

-- Prepare to walk away from the issue and sanction any recalcitrant party, including Belgrade if its mutual recognition proves hollow.

-- Lay down a marker about protecting UN peacekeepers.

-- Plan ahead for NATO support of UNPROFOR withdrawal without asking Croatia for assistance at this time.

-- Give Zagreb notice of the bilateral risks and warn Serbia that sanctions relief is unthinkable if it intervenes.

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IMPLEMENTING A CROATIA STRATEGY

Croatia and the Serbs have continued sliding back toward war in the past week. The UN has made noises about an early pullout from Croatia and Bosnia; the Serbs rebuffed international mediators; the Croats gave signs of readiness to take wide-scale military action; and Bosnian peace efforts ran into a dead end. Ideally, the glare of publicity about these developments would illuminate a key fact for the parties: more fighting is a negative-sum game. Instead, it is heating up belligerence, fueling the feeling that fighting is inevitable. The U.S. should make every effort to avoid a new Balkan war.

Deputies have discussed a three-pronged U.S. approach to this situation: seek to maintain the essential functions of UNPROFOR in Croatia; launch a negotiating process between Serbs and Croats on a political settlement; and prepare to respond to the worst-case scenario of renewed hostilities. In doing so, we should avoid undercutting Croatia in public and keep maximum pressure on the Serbs to negotiate. Tudjman has made clear that only progress toward a settlement will enable him to keep UNPROFOR in Croatia. In private, however, we must tell Zagreb that key elements of the bilateral relationship are at risk if Croatia initiates hostilities or prevents the UN from maintaining essential operations there.

Maintaining the essential functions of UNPROFOR

Consulting with the Secretariat and key UNSC members: We need to get them on board with keeping UNPROFOR in place to the maximum possible extent. Following up the Albright-Boutros Ghali and Galbraith-Akashi conversations, we would make a strong demarche emphasizing UNPROFOR's importance and asking for an end to unhelpful talk of early withdrawal or a move out of Zagreb.

Points to make: We would describe the essential elements to be preserved if UNPROFOR cannot remain as currently constituted -- monitoring the cease-fire and separation zone in Croatia; maintaining liaison with Knin; helping to implement agreed confidence-building measures; supporting operations in Bosnia and Macedonia, including relief convoys to Bihac and Banja Luka; operating force headquarters. Noting that these functions do not require the same troop presence in the UNPAs and that Zagreb is willing to preserve UNPROFOR support for Bosnia and Macedonia, we would ask UN planners to estimate what "UNPROFOR lite" would entail.

Waiting for the right moment: It is premature for the UN or any other party to engage the Croats in a discussion of a scaled-down UNPROFOR presence or to speculate publicly about it. When negotiations on a new mandate occur in the UNSC (probably in March), we will need to assess the current situation and fill in the specifics of our UNPROFOR strategy

US planning needs

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then. Now, however, Zagreb would read a rush to consult as eagerness compromise, while the Serbs would interpret it as pressure on Tudjman to back down. We should instead keep the international focus on launching political negotiations between the Croats and Serbs, which offer the main hope for Tudjman to reconsider his decision to expel UNPROFOR.

Dealing with the Croats: We must continue telling Zagreb that we view UNPROFOR withdrawal as leading to renewed war in Croatia and Bosnia, with casualties for all sides and destruction of current diplomatic efforts. We therefore hope Croatia will reconsider, as President Clinton urged in his letter to President Tudjman, and will act to demonstrate the peaceful intentions that Zagreb professes. We expect the U.S. to be a key negotiator with Croatia in the endgame on a new UNPROFOR mandate. But at this stage we should maintain a certain distance, giving the Croats time to come up with the "right answer" on UNPROFOR. Instructions to Zagreb and other European diplomatic posts would be sent along these lines.

Talking with the Serbs: The Krajina Serbs have threatened to take UN peacekeepers hostage to prevent their withdrawal. We need to make clear that such action undermines the Serb case and invites Croatian military action to "rescue" the UN. We should emphasize that the best way for Knin to help keep UNPROFOR in place is to allow it to do its job, including letting convoys into Bihac. We would want to double-track these points in Belgrade, if only to demonstrate that we see Milosevic as the strongman in Krajina. Instructions to Zagreb, Belgrade, Moscow, and other European diplomatic posts would be sent along these lines.

Launching negotiations on a political settlement

General diplomacy: In responding to the French call for a new Balkan conference, the U.S. should note that the Krajina Serbs will seek a seat, which the international community should not grant without Knin's commitment to negotiate in good faith. We have few pressure points on the Serbs and should exploit this one, while insisting that no conference occur without real results. Croatia will object to perceived "equal treatment" between Zagreb and Knin.

Not taking "no" for an answer: Regardless of the Z-4 Plan's merits, it represents a U.S.-European-Russian effort and a balance among big power interests. The parties will try to back us away from it. We should avoid the trap of re-jiggering our proposal every time one side objects to a provision, which increases the outsiders' responsibility for resolving the conflict. Instead, we would emphasize that we have done our part and now the parties must start talking directly. To change what is on the table, they must sit down at it.

Thinking about walking away: Despite our hopes for

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obtaining a good negotiated outcome in Croatia, we must recognize that current efforts are aimed at testing the parties' willingness to choose negotiations over war. If Zagreb's deeds become as belligerent as its recent words or the Serb side continues to refuse serious talks, we should draw the necessary conclusions about whom we can work with, disengage for the time being, and limit the damage. That could mean cutting back on our bilateral relations with Croatia and/or maintaining sanctions on Serbia indefinitely.

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Watching out for the mutual recognition shell game: Real accommodation between Belgrade and Zagreb would be welcome; it would dispel the Great Serbia dream of the Krajina population. There is no sign, however, that Milosevic has any such arrangement in mind. Unless Serbia irrevocably acknowledges Zagreb's sovereignty over the Serb-held areas, mutual recognition is an empty shell undeserving of sanctions relief. We would inform our Contact Group partners of these considerations as we consider Plan B and other formulations. //*

Being flexible on modalities and venues: We should pursue "whatever works" on procedural questions. Regarding direct participation by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the important thing is to make sure that Belgrade endorses the basic plan and makes the Krajina Serbs attend.

Preparing for renewed hostilities

Laying down a marker about protecting the peacekeepers: We must recognize the potential for the situation to worsen and renewed hostilities to occur along the entire Serbo-Croat confrontation line with direct FRY involvement. While any international reaction would respond to the specifics of the situation and could not be pre-determined, we should warn all parties against action that would harm UN peacekeepers. We would also ask key UNSC members to reinforce this message.

Advance planning for possible NATO support of UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia and/or Croatia: We need to make sure that UN and NATO planning is up-to-date, realistic, and coordinated. (See attached State commentary on JCS analysis.) We should not approach Croatia now about UNPROFOR withdrawal, since doing so would send the wrong message. Rather, plans based on the likelihood of Croatian support should be developed, along with a contingency response if Zagreb's cooperation is not forthcoming. Instructions to USUN and USNATO would be sent along these lines. ⊛

Giving Zagreb fair notice: We should continue stressing that the U.S. will be unable to assist Croatia if it provokes renewed hostilities. While keeping existing programs in place, we would point out that Zagreb's belligerence puts key elements of our bilateral relationship at risk. Without a satisfactory resolution of the UNPROFOR mandate issue, we would not expand our military cooperation, as U/S Slocombe discussed with President Tudjman.

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Trying to keep Serbia out: Renewed Serbo-Croat warfare would invite FRY "volunteers" to reinforce Serb fighters in Krajina and Bosnia, with transfer of military equipment and deployment of JNA units a real possibility. This would refute Milosevic's contention that the Krajina problem is strictly between Knin and Zagreb. We would make absolutely clear to our Contact Group partners and to Belgrade that further sanctions relief would be unthinkable under these circumstances.

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Why to avoid war

The parties seem increasingly interested in renewing hostilities and getting them over with quickly, while analysts note that warfare could be a clarifying event that eventually rejuvenates efforts to get a negotiated settlement. Despite its superficial attraction, however, a new round of fighting would probably drag on and be brutal. In the last Serbo-Croat conflict, which lasted only four months from July to November 1991, an estimated 10,000 people lost their lives and tens of thousands were injured or forced to flee.

Beyond the human tragedy, the timing is wrong. The parties are only now being given a framework for starting political negotiations. So Croatia would lose support by resorting to force prematurely. If war must come, next winter would be more opportune, since the Croats (and Bosnians) will have become better equipped and trained, and the Serbs will have been weakened by another year of sanctions.

This logic is not lost on President Tudjman. He has repeatedly rejected the military option pressed by his advisers, most recently during the Bihac crisis. While he believes Croatia is ready to fight if necessary, he still prefers not to fight if possible.

In the longer term, a Croatian-Bosnian military response may prove the only check to Serb aggression and ethnic cleansing. As Tudjman prepares to lead his party in national elections in 1996, he may have to bow to popular sentiment and give his military a green light. At this point, however, it makes sense for the U.S. to try to prevent a new Balkan war.

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TAB H

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003i. paper	re: Threat to UNPROFOR Withdrawal from Croatia (3 pages)	01/26/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3999

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0168 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, February 2, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs666

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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TAB I

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003j. paper	re: Options for UNPROFOR Withdrawal from Croatia [partial] (2 pages)	02/02/1995	P1/b(1), b(7)(C), b(7)(E)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 3999

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0168 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, February 2, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs666

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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2 February 1995

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Options for UNPROFOR Withdrawal from Croatia (U)

1. (U) Background

a. ~~(S)~~ GOC announced on 12 January that it will terminate the UNPROFOR mandate effective 31 March. However, Croatia has indicated that UNPROFOR has up to 90 days (after March 31st) to complete the withdrawal. The UN is preparing plans for a phased withdrawal under permissive conditions.

b. ~~(S)~~ NATO plans do not currently address, in any detail, a withdrawal operation from Croatia. SACEUR has directed his staff to commence planning for a sequential or simultaneous withdrawal operation from Croatia and Bosnia.

2. (U) Situation

a. ~~(S/NF)~~ **Likely Threat.** E.O. 13526 3.3(b)(1) most likely threat to be indirect, limited and local actions by Krajina Serb civilians designed to harass or prevent UNPROFOR egress. See threat assessment at Appendix A.

b. ~~(S)~~ **Physical conditions.** Rugged terrain and narrow winding roads combined with a dispersed, lightly armed UNPROFOR, make safe egress a difficult task.

3. ~~(S)~~ **Assumptions**

(1) UNPROFOR units will not attempt to fight their way out if directly confronted by Serb forces.

(2) Localized fighting between HV and RSK forces will occur regardless of UNPROFOR presence.

(3) Croatia will allow a withdrawal force access to ports/facilities.

(4) UN will request NATO assistance.

(5) Each UNPA will require different considerations for withdrawal operations.

4. ~~(S)~~ **Considerations**

(1) Decision on the mandate will not be finalized until late March. Any UNPROFOR movement (consolidation) up until the decision point could trigger a Krajina Serb response.

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(2) The decision will likely determine the degree of resistance UNPROFOR will encounter. A total withdrawal is likely to be met with greater resistance. A revised mandate with some form of UN presence may reduce Krajina Serb concerns and their resistance to a partial withdrawal.

(3) If opposition is encountered, given the significant Western European presence in Croatia, NATO will likely be asked to assist in a withdrawal. Delaying a decision until late March on Alliance participation precludes NATO's response in a timely and effective manner. Therefore, 31 March would appear to be the best target date for having a combat force in position to assist with UNPROFOR's withdrawal. (Note: Determining exactly when forces must be ready is problematic. The 31 March date in and of itself is soft. The Croatian requirement is that UN forces be withdrawn by 30 June. The approach of 31 March could bring an increase in tensions in the UNPAs and threaten the safety of UNPROFOR soldiers).

5. ~~(S)~~ **Withdrawal Options**

Option I. Full NATO Support, including ground troops.

PROs:

- Provides credible and capable combined arms combat force.
- RSK unlikely to directly challenge NATO force.
- Provides sufficient forces and mature command structure to control operations over wide area.
- Positions force for follow-on withdrawal from Bosnia if required.
- Commits NATO up front; fewer political decisions by NATO required after beginning operation.

CONs:

- Could place NATO in a combatant role.
- High cost option, funding responsibilities unclear.
- May cause reaction against UNPROFOR troops in B-H by the Bosnian Serbs to demonstrate Serb solidarity.
- Because of regional instability and mutually exclusive objectives of the warring parties, public appeals likely for NATO to remain in theater to resolve conflict.
- Cumbersome NAC process may not support timely decisions needed to effectively execute UNPROFOR withdrawal operation.
- Could be criticized as "overkill" based on assumed low threat and may increase tensions and the threat to UNPROFOR.

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Option II. NATO Reaction Force/Air Support. NATO could offer to provide close air support (CAS), a ready reaction force, and fixed amounts of communications, logistics, and transport.

PROs:

- Reduces NATO commitment and cost.
- NATO ground troops not interpositioned or maneuvering between combatants.
- Lower profile force could elicit less friction in the UNPAs.
- Provides effective combined arms concentrated response to meet localized limited threats.

CONs:

- Commits force incrementally.
- Does not commit sufficient force to ensure success.
- Exacerbates NAC involvement, and potential delays, as NATO incrementally commits forces.
- Higher UNPROFOR casualties possible.
- Without dominant NATO force presence, command and control arrangements become even more uncertain.
- Responses to likely threats require sequential reaction.

Option III. UNPROFOR Autonomous. The UN would run its own withdrawal, contracting for required ground, air, and sea transport. UN negotiates withdrawal on case by case basis. This option would be more credible if taken in conjunction with implementation of a revised UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia. This option can then be viewed as "tailoring" UNPROFOR to the new mandate.

PROs:

- Relies on negotiations that decrease tensions vice use of force that increases tensions.
- Reduces cost/risks to US/NATO.
- Possible continued UN presence as a result of blockage. If peaceful, could delay fighting and increase opportunities for a negotiated settlement.

CONs:

- If threat is misjudged, as other than benign environment, UNPROFOR will not have capability to egress from the UNPAs and could result in significant casualties.
- If threat increases, NATO likely to be called for immediate assistance. Quick NATO reaction may rely heavily on US forces.
- UN is slow to sign contracts.

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- Could encourage disruptive unilateral national support not coordinated with UNPROFOR withdrawal plan.

6. ~~(S)~~ Recommended Course of Action. There are a number of integrated steps that should be taken in preparation for a withdrawal from Croatia. First, work for a new UN mandate in Croatia designed to ease tension over drawdown of UN forces. To allay Krajina Serb concerns, a UN presence must be maintained at key positions throughout the UNPAs. Second, the US should request that NATO accelerate planning for a Croatian withdrawal. NATO planning will be necessarily compressed, though some of the planning it has already completed for a Bosnia withdrawal will be applicable, and the US must be ready to inform NATO what forces the US would contribute. Based on the current threat assessments, option II (NATO Reaction Force/Air Support) appears the best point of departure for meeting the expected threat and mission requirements

7. ~~(S)~~ Issues for Decision

Issue #1: Should the withdrawal operation be supported by NATO? In the best case (permissive environment), a UN operation is preferred and possible. However, given the uncertainty surrounding a revised mandate, NATO must be prepared to react to a non-permissive situation. Many of the troops are from NATO nations, including several hundred US personnel in Zagreb.

Decision: NATO should plan and prepare to assist UNPROFOR's withdrawal from Croatia.

Issue #2: Should the US participate (ground troops) in a NATO withdrawal operation?

(1) The US is obligated to support and participate in this Alliance action. The US supported the UN resolutions that placed troops into Croatia, and has publicly announced it would participate in an UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia. The US could hardly act unilaterally to withdraw its troops from Croatia without significant ramifications.

(2) Should the US stand aside, we may marginalize our influence and abdicate our leadership role within NATO. France may dictate that any assistance for UNPROFOR's withdrawal be carried out under WEU auspices. This calls into question the relevancy of NATO in a post Cold War world.

(3) Militarily, the US brings many unique capabilities to an operation that provide a distinct advantage over the adversary. A US presence increases the likelihood of operational success.

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Decision: The US should commit to provide substantial support for a NATO operation, including ground troops.

Issue #3: Should the USG support the recommended course of action (NATO Reaction Force/Air Support)?

(1) Course of action reaffirms NATO relevancy, demonstrates US leadership and commitment in the Alliance.

(2) Provides force package capable of meeting expected threat.

(3) Does not over-commit NATO or US forces.

Decision: If USG supports a NATO operation with US forces, US should adopt recommended course of action.

Timing: Given the uncertainty surrounding a decision on a new mandate, UNPROFOR may require assistance as early as 1 April. If a decision is not made on the mandate by 31 March, the likelihood of an immediate Krajina Serb reaction to hold UNPROFOR in place increases.

(1) US needs to agree now that if a Croatian withdrawal operation under NATO leadership is required, the US is willing to commit substantial support to such an operation. Further, the USG should support a NAC decision to allow NATO/lead nation to begin negotiations on the use of Croatian infrastructure.

(2) By mid-February, the NAC must approve the concept under which NATO would support an UNPROFOR withdrawal. The USG must be prepared to transfer operational control of forces required to support the NATO operation.

(3) NATO will require approximately six weeks to assemble, train, rehearse, and deploy a force.



Prepared by Balkans Working Group, J-5, EURDIV, (b)(7)c (b)(7)e

10/10

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TAB J

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1 February 1995

DECISION PAPER

How does CROATIA affect?

Subject: Pre-positioning for Bosnia Contingencies (U)

1. ~~(C)~~ Purpose. To provide information for Interagency decision on the early commitment of US communications personnel and assets when SACEUR requests, and the NAC approves, the early deployment of the initial C3 package and other Phase 1 actions prior to NAC approval of OPLAN 40104 and a NAC decision to execute the remaining phases of the withdrawal operation.

2. (U) Background.

a. ~~(C)~~ There is general consensus that negotiations have stalled and renewed warfare in Bosnia (and Croatia) this Spring is likely. This is not to detract from the importance of continuing to pursue negotiations as the only means of preventing a resumption of fighting, but reflects the realities of the situation. Since the same pre-positioning is required for either peace plan implementation or withdrawal support, NATO military authorities desire to take prudent military measures to support either eventuality.

b. ~~(C)~~ The following confluence of factors supports the need to be ready to conduct an UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia in April/May 1995: the expiration of the UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia (31 March), the expiration of the four month cessation of hostilities agreement (30 April), the Bosnian government push to give the Bosnian Serbs a 2 month deadline to start negotiations or return to open warfare, the next sanctions renewal review (late April), and the return of good weather when Spring arrives.

c. ~~(C)~~ Final MC and NAC approval of OPLAN 40104 could take several weeks. If approval is unduly delayed SACEUR may request the NAC to authorize the deployment of the C3 package and other Phase 1 actions in advance of OPLAN approval and a decision to actually commence the withdrawal operation.

d. ~~(C)~~ SACEUR has established the following planning timelines for an UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia: (derived from a combination of OPLAN 40104 and information provided by SACEUR)

PHASE 1 (PREPARATION) (Duration: 4 weeks, commencing 6-8 weeks prior to a NAC decision to execute the withdrawal)

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Declassify on OADR

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- SACEUR would request NAC approval of the OPLAN or a separate NAC decision to implement Phase 1.

- Logistic/Movement Control actions must be initiated. Deployment of pre-positioned assets provided by the US required, date uncertain. WHERE?

- Installation of C3 architecture commences. Includes deployment of pre-positioned assets provided by the US.

PHASE 2 (DEPLOYMENT OF MAIN BODY OF TROOPS BEFORE ACTUAL WITHDRAWAL OPERATIONS BEGIN) (Duration 2-4 weeks)

- The NAC decision to execute the withdrawal starts Phase 2.

- Two to four weeks are required before the initial 3 NATO brigades (2-US, 1-UK) begin operations in Bosnia.

The OPLAN estimates a decision not to deploy prepositioned C3 assets would delay the operation by about 10 days. SACEUR is reexamining this timeline and attempting to implement actions which shorten the time required for Phase 1. ||*

3. (U) Pre-positioned C3 Package Details.

a. ~~(C)~~ The C3 package, consisting of about 800 personnel and equipment (including 400 UK, 260 US, 25 French, 15 Canadians, and 20 civilian contractors), provides a full, secure military communications system with ties to theater tactical systems, NATO systems, national military systems, commercial phone systems, and the UNPROFOR system. Personnel would deploy to Mons, Belgium, 3 sites in Germany, 5 sites in Italy, and 3 sites in Croatia (Zagreb/Pleso, Split, Ploce). No personnel would be deployed to Bosnia or the Krajina as part of the initial C3 package. The number of C3 nodes to be activated during pre-positioning, the number of soldiers, and their nationalities are still being refined, as is the number of support and security troops.

b. ~~(C)~~ Included in the four week Phase 1 preparation period is the time to finalize national contributions, prepare personnel and equipment for movement, negotiate appropriate contracts for the use of civilian communications lines and satellite frequencies, and purchase off-the-shelf communications equipment to supplement the military system. It actually takes 10 days for the Seventh Signal Brigade to deploy and make the US portion of the C3 package fully operational. A decision not to pre-position the C3 package could delay the start of the operation from 10 days to 4 weeks.

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c. ~~(C)~~ The initial cost of deploying this C3 package is under $2 million. Once deployed and operational, the manpower can be reduced by about half, and it will cost about $500,000 per month to maintain operational. There is currently $14 million in the NATO peacekeeping fund. Although funding decisions have not been agreed at NATO or between NATO and the UN, it is anticipated no additional funding would be required at this time.

d. ~~(C)~~ The CINCSOUTH OPLAN 40104 C3 package supplements and interfaces with that already established for DENY FLIGHT and SHARP GUARD, and provides the dedicated communications circuits necessary to support an UNPROFOR withdrawal from both Bosnia and Croatia. The existing communications systems are not adequate for a significant ground operation.

4. ~~(C)~~ Discussion. The issues for consideration are: (a) the probability of UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia this Spring, (b) the balance between the political signals this deployment sends and the military preparations needed to carry out a successful operation, and (c) the US leadership role in NATO.

a. ~~(C)~~ There is a pessimistic consensus that the cessation of hostilities is likely to collapse and war will return to Bosnia this Spring.

b. ~~(C)~~ Tudjman is serious about not renewing the UNPROFOR mandate. UNPROFOR withdrawal from Croatia will probably lead to Croat-Krajina Serb fighting, which could spill over into Bosnia.

c. ~~(C)~~ Pre-positioning the C3 package is a prudent military action to prepare for a timely UNPROFOR withdrawal operation. Should a peace agreement be reached, NATO is better prepared for peace plan implementation. If the status quo continues, the C3 package is small enough that it can be repositioned and the experience factored into future planning.

d. ~~(C)~~ A significant military concern is the deployment of US signal, logistic, transport, and engineering assets for a NATO operation prior to NAC approval of the OPLAN and determination of D-Day. These assets would be unavailable for other contingencies while committed to NATO. The effect on readiness must be weighed against the risks involved in lengthening the OPLAN's deployment schedule. The requirement to pre-position logistical, transportation, movement control, and engineer assets during Phase 1 has not been determined.

e. ~~(C)~~ Pre-positioning will send several signals: NATO is serious about taking meaningful action, NATO supports UNPROFOR, and that UNPROFOR is serious about leaving if war breaks out. Careful control of these signals is

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required to ensure the proper message is sent. These signals could prompt the warring parties to get serious about coming to a negotiated settlement, or precipitate action by one or both sides.

f. ~~(C)~~ Other options short of pre-positioning to speed implementation after a NAC decision to execute include:

- **Pre-stage** required assets for prepositioning at home bases.
- **Pre-position** assets required in Belgium, Germany, and Italy and **pre-stage** those assets required for pre-positioning in Croatia.

g. ~~(C)~~ Since the President has already committed to US participation in an UNPROFOR withdrawal, including the use of ground troops, the deployment of several hundred communications personnel outside the high threat area is a low profile, low risk, high gain decision. It would show US leadership in the Alliance and send a signal that NATO is serious about supporting UNPROFOR.

5. (U) Recommendations.

a. ~~(C)~~ Inform SACEUR that the US government will approve the concept of pre-positioning the initial C3 package, including US personnel, and other Phase 1 actions prior to final NAC decisions on OPLAN 40104 approval and execution of the remaining phases of the withdrawal operation when the issue is formally raised and approved at the NAC.

b. ~~(C)~~ Provide guidance to the US Mission to NATO to support discussions on prepositioning with Croatian authorities to ensure NATO access to required facilities.

n: eurcenea/nato/prepodc.doc

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STATUS OF HAGUE INITIATED OFFERS TO STRENGTHEN UNPROFOR 1 FEB 95

(Changes highlighted in BOLD)

GEN DE LA PRESLE'S PRIORITIZED LIST	EQUIPMENT OFFERED	SOURCE	COMMENT
9 LYNX AND GAZELLE TYPE HELOS	6 LYNX & 6 GAZELLE **4 PUMA & 6 GAZELLE**	UK **FRANCE**	
5 MECH INFANTRY BNS (EGYPT OFFERED 1 LINE INF BN)	4 MECH BNS	BANGLADESH MALAYSIA PAKISTAN ARGENTINA	LIMITED FULLY EQUIP. FULLY EQUIP. CROATIA REDEPLOY
24 MED.LIFT HELOS	3 CHINOOKS	UK	3 MORE ON STANDBY
1 COMBAT ENG BN	1 ENG BN **300 COMBAT ENGINEERS**	INDONESIA **FRANCE**	TENTATIVE
100 UNMOS	128	20 DUTCH 4-6 ITALY 20 INDONESIA 20 PAKISTAN 30 BANGLADESH 19 UK 5 NORWAY 8 TURKEY	
1 ENG BN (HVY)			
200 CIVPOL	50	JORDAN	

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8 MORTAR LOC RADAR		DUTCH TURKEY NETHERLANDS	NUMBER TBD NUMBER TBD NUMBER TBD
8 TACPS	2 OFFERED	1 TURKEY 1 UK	 TENTATIVE
LINE TRANSPORT BN			
SIGNAL REGIMENT			
THEATRE COMM NETWORK			
12 HVY LIFT HELOS			
ARMED HELO UNIT	14 AH-1S	US	8 FROM UNOSOM CREWS NOT IDed ARGEN POSSIBLE
1 SQND FW TRANSPORTS C-130 TYPE	4 F-27S	NETHERLANDS	
1 FIELD HOSPITAL	1 CONSIDERED	ITALY	
3 AIRFIELD SNOWBLOWERS			

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1123 GENERATORS			
NIGHT VISION GOGGLES	150 PVS-5	US	
62 OVERSNOW VEH	58 OVERSNOW VEHICLES	SWEDEN	
30 SNOWMOBILES			
GPS TO PLT LEVEL			
TBD # OF MINE PROTECTED VEHICLES			
BATTLEFIELD SURVEILLANCE RADARS	25	US	10 PPS-5 15 PPS-15

ADDITIONAL OFFERS:

APCS	50	ITALY	
	50	USA	
	100	GERMANY	
HVY ENG EQUIPMENT	20 BULLDOZERS	US	DEPOT MAINT
	10 ROAD SCRAPERS	US	REQUIRED PRIOR
	50 DUMP TRUCKS	US	TO DEPLOYMENT

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HELOS		4	NETHERLANDS	TYPE TBD
REINFORCE LOG BN	TBD		NORWAY	
REINFORCE PRESENT BN	TBD		UKRAINE	
INCREASE CONTINGENT BY ONE COMPANY	TBD		SPAIN	

NOTE: The US has approached Ireland, India, South Korea, Australia, and Ukraine on a bilateral basis to encourage them to offer more resources to strengthen UNPROFOR.

STATUS:
Australia has confirmed that it will not contribute to UNPROFOR. (Canberra 240505Z Jan)

Ireland has told the AMEMBASSY they may be able to contribute one transport company, if asked by the UN. (Dublin 241532Z Jan)

Ukraine has told the AMEMBASSY they are preparing a proposal to the UN offering mine clearing units,a signal unit, and observers. (Kiev 191403Z Jan)

India has said they are considering the request, but have not received a similar approach from the UN. (New Dehli 181136Z Jan)

South Korea has expressed interest and the Korean Assistant DATT visited J-5, EURDIV on 31 Feb to help the Koreans frame the requirement. The ROKs view peacekeeping as a "growth industry" and it has popular support. (Seoul 182317Z Jan)

Prepared by: J-5,UNDIV,7-5738

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520124
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FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 31 JAN 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
AGENDA
CROATIA
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 2 FEB DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: REED SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 02 FEB 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520136 9520143

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0168 CODES:

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		DARBY
		KERRICK
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

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001		X	95013118	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
002		X	95013118	REED SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950131	FUERTH, L	
002	950131	BRILL, K	
002	950131	MCALEER, R	
002	950131	GARTHOFF, D	
002	950131	PATRICK, T	
002	950131	INDERFURTH, K	
002	950131	ADAMS, G	

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Soderberg	2	copy	
~~Berger~~	3	~~Deputy Natl Sec Advisor~~ has seen	
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~~Situation Room~~	4	JWR	Tab I
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 31, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T.R. PATRICK
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the UN

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia on Thursday, February 2, 1995, 2:00-3:30pm, in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be principals plus one. Taskers for papers and agenda are attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

James W. Rud
for William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RS NARA, Date 9/25/2019
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P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 30, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER FOR (K)

FROM: DON KERRICK (D)

SUBJECT: Deputies Meeting on Bosnia, February 2, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Deputies Meeting on Bosnia to be held February 2, 1995. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve OK Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
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~~001. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (3 pages)~~	~~02/22/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RDS 10/01/2013
002a. memo	BG Don Kerrick to Samuel Berger re: February 22 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (6 pages)	02/21/1995	P1/b(1)
002b. agenda	[Duplicate of 003] (1 page)	02/22/1995	P1/b(1)
~~002c. memo~~	~~Leon Fuerth to Tony Lake re: Controlling Release of FRY Frozen Assets under Plan B (2 pages)~~	~~02/17/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002d. memo~~	~~re: Controlling Release of FRY Frozen Assets under Plan B (2 pages)~~	~~02/20/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
002e. email	Kerrick to Neal Wolin re: About to Fall Off the Cliff (1 page)	02/16/1995	P1/b(1)
002f. paper	re: Issue Paper (2 pages)	02/21/1995	P1/b(1)
~~002g. paper~~	~~re: Funding UNPROFOR Withdrawal: Choices and Dynamics (3 pages)~~	~~02/17/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 08/03/2015
002h. letter	Sven Alkalaj to President Clinton (1 page)	01/17/1994	P1/b(1)
~~002i. paper~~	~~re: Support for the Federation 505 Agreement (3 pages)~~	~~02/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
003. agenda	Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (1 page)	02/22/1995	P1/b(1)

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FOLDER TITLE:
DC0176 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, February 22, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs667

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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DOC DATE: 25 FEB 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
SOC
CROATIA
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 22 FEB DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 27 FEB 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520214 9520218

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0176 CODES:

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FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
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By RS NARA, Date 9/26/2019
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002	950225	BRILL, K	
002	950225	MCALEER, R	
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

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FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOG OF DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA - 22 FEB NSC LOG # 20095

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STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
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RELEASER: S.G.

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 0405 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 5 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

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JCS 1	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

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REMARKS:

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~~PRIORITY~~
ROUTINE

RELEASER: S.G.

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 0405 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 5 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC OF DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA 22 FEB NSC LOG # 20095

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USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS 1	SECRETARY		
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FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting SOC DC ON BOSNIA 22 FEB PAGES: 4

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DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

AMBASSADOR RICK INDEFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T.R. PATRICK
Executive Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, February 22, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

for
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RS NARA, Date 9/26/2019
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee
DATE: February 22, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:15 - 3:30pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
Samuel R. Berger

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Rick Saunders

State:
Peter Tarnoff
Robert Frasure

DOD:
John Deutch
Walter Slocombe

OMB:
Gordon Adams
Kevin Beckell

USUN:
David Scheffer
James O'Brien

CIA:
Douglas MacEachin
Ray Converse

JCS:
LTG Daniel Christman
COL. Tom Bowden

NSC:
Alexander Vershbow
BG Donald L. Kerrick
Susan Rice

Summary of Conclusions

1. Deputies met to review efforts to obtain Serbian recognition of Bosnia, Croatia and other former Yugoslav republics within their existing borders in exchange for sanctions relief (Plan B) and to review military planning for UNPROFOR withdrawal and Croatia. (S)

2. Deputies reviewed the results of last week's Contact Group efforts on mutual recognition and reaffirmed Principals' decision that we should not agree to any further sanctions relief or other measures that would "sweeten" the offer now under consideration. They agreed it would be helpful to create uncertainty in

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RS 9/30/14 (2.02)

Milosevic's and Allies' minds about how long U.S. support for broad sanctions relief could be sustained. Deputies directed Ambassador Frasure to inform our European Contact Group partners before their meeting with Milosevic on February 23 that the U.S. had gone as far as it could in offering sanctions relief and that it was unclear how long our support for Plan B would remain in effect. **(Action: State)** (S)

3. Deputies agreed that prospects for success were low for achieving mutual recognition in exchange for sanctions relief. However, in the event Milosevic attempted to enter new negotiations aimed at modifying the Plan B proposal, serious sanctions-related issues remained and further Deputies' or Principals' review would be required. They decided that no further negotiations beyond the proposal now on the table could begin without further review by the Deputies. Deputies deferred decision on how long to leave Plan B on the table until a review of overall policy is completed next week. (S)

4. Deputies discussed the results of recent diplomatic efforts in Croatia aimed at retaining UNPROFOR or a remodeled UNPROFOR as a deterrent to renewed fighting. They agreed that the approaching UNPROFOR mandate expiration on March 31, and the possibility of renewed hostilities thereafter in the Krajina, could be the catalyst for new fighting elsewhere in the region. Deputies directed that a strategy be promptly developed that outlines how to deal with Tudjman in the run-up to the March 31 UNPROFOR mandate expiration and steps that can be taken to retain an international force of some type as a deterrent to renewed fighting. **(Action: State)** (S)

5. Deputies discussed how to fulfill Principals' request for a review of potential scenarios to frame policy choices likely to be faced in the next 2-3 months should diplomatic efforts fail to achieve a negotiated settlement. They directed the Interagency Working Group to complete the review by February 27 for subsequent Deputies' and Principals' consideration. The review should include estimated time-lines for events on the ground in Bosnia, Croatia and neighboring areas; an analysis of U.S. interests, objectives and priorities; allied and Congressional attitudes; and U.S. policy options. A process for completion of the study should be presented to Deputies on February 27. **(Action: NSC/Interagency Working Group)** (S)

6. Deputies reviewed the status of efforts at the United Nations to strengthen UNPROFOR. They agreed to support the current UN request for logistics and engineering equipment as outlined in the JCS paper. Noting the uncertainty of UNPROFOR's future, Deputies deferred decision on more robust options until the policy options review is completed. **(Action: JCS)** (S)

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7. Deputies reviewed the state of military planning to support UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia and Croatia. They agreed to defer decisions on Step Two prepositioning until DoD completes an internal review of the overall military operational plan and presents a recommendation to Principals. Deputies also deferred discussion of funding options pending completion of the DoD review of the operational plan. **(Action: DoD)** (S)

8. Deputies deferred discussion and decision on providing training for the Bosnian forces until the policy options review is completed. (S)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 23, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

FROM: DON KERRICK DK

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, February 22, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of Conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia held February 22, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RS NARA, Date 9/26/2019
2010-0533-M

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520225
RECEIVED: 21 FEB 95 14

TO: BERGER

FROM: KERRICK

DOC DATE: 21 FEB 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA CROATIA
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPERS FOR 22 FEB DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER DUE DATE: 24 FEB 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520095 9520214

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0176 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BAKER JANE
		KERRICK
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	95022308	FOR DECISION
001		X	95022308	NOTED BY BERGER

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Recd 2/22 6:45a

National Security Council
The White House

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Dohse	1	D	
Sens			
Soderberg	2	Copy	
Berger	3		
Lake		Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk		2/23	A N
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS:

Berger Mtg Package for Bosnia Croatia OC 2/22 2:00pm

Exec Sec Office has diskette WP

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	BG Don Kerrick to Samuel Berger re: February 22 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (6 pages)	02/21/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4000

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0176 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, February 22, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs667

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. agenda	[Duplicate of 003] (1 page)	02/22/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4000

FOLDER TITLE:
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cc: Sandy Vershbow

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

February 17, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR TONY LAKE

FROM: LEON FUERTH

SUBJECT: Controlling Release of FRY Frozen Assets under Plan B

One of the most important implementation issues underlying the Contact Group's Plan B offer to Milosevic is how to manage release of frozen assets. If the international community fails to handle this issue properly, Milosevic could get a massive infusion of cash that he can use to rectify his economy's most pressing problems or -- if the worst happens in Croatia or Bosnia -- finance a Serbian spring offensive. In the longer term, a maladroit release of assets will also give Milosevic significant advantage over the other Yugoslav successor states by helping him increase his creditworthiness while saddling others with a disproportionate share of outstanding Yugoslav debt.

Blocked assets include bank deposits, credits, debts, real estate and tangible property. We have a good idea of what is frozen in the U.S., but it is less clear how much is held by other governments as many were not as rigorous as we were in seizing assets in the first place and some have since allowed the Serbs to draw on frozen accounts to buy humanitarian goods.

Issues to address in releasing blocked assets include

- determining ownership (successor state issues are not yet settled)

- paying depositors, creditors, and other claimants (the Yugoslav institutions and firms whose assets were frozen owed a lot of money to a lot of people -- including numerous U.S. citizens and firms; those creditors have valid claims for payment if assets are unfrozen)

- payment of war reparations and other penalties

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Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526
NLC 2013-0682-M 9/10/2020 (2.12)

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The U.S. Government should seek a thorough international inventory of frozen assets as a first step to their orderly distribution. Then, there should be a meeting of financial and banking experts to discuss how to unblock assets with due provision for the rights of successor states and creditors. We should continue to insist on resolution language mandating that assets not be released until ownership is resolved and legal rights of successor states, creditors, and other claimants are protected.

Remember that Milosevic is a banker. He will find it hard to object to such a process, while he certainly will be quick to take advantage of any openings we give him. So long as our approach requires that claims of others be adjudicated, the time frame for releasing frozen assets is relatively long, which tends to deny Milosevic short-term access for purposes we might find objectionable and preserves some leverage for settling other issues.

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~~SECRET~~

February 20, 1995

SUBJECT: Controlling Release of FRY Frozen Assets under Plan B

One of the most important implementation issues underlying the Contact Group's Plan B offer to Milosevic is how to manage release of frozen assets. If the international community fails to handle this issue properly, Milosevic could get a massive infusion of cash that he can use to rectify his economy's most pressing problems or -- if the worst happens in Croatia or Bosnia -- finance a Serbian spring offensive. In the longer term, a maladroit release of assets will also give Milosevic significant advantage over the other Yugoslav successor states by helping him increase his creditworthiness while saddling others with a disproportionate share of outstanding Yugoslav debt.

Blocked assets include bank deposits, credits, debts, real estate and tangible property. We have a good idea of what is frozen in the U.S., but it is less clear how much is held by other governments. Issues to address in releasing blocked assets include determining ownership (successor state issues are not yet settled; paying depositors, creditors, and other claimants (there are numerous clains against blocked Yugoslav assets -- including by U.S. citizens and firms); and payment of war reparations and other penalties.

The U.S. Government should continue to insist that any UN resolution that unblocks assets mandate that these assets not be released until ownership is resolved and legal rights of successor states, creditors, and other claimants are protected. The U.S. should seek a thorough international inventory of frozen assets as a first step to their orderly distribution. Then, financial and banking experts should discuss how to unblock assets with due provision for the rights of successor states and creditors.

Remember that Milosevic is a banker. He will find it hard to object to such a process, while he certainly will be quick to take advantage of any openings we give him. So long as we require that claims be adjudicated, the time frame for releasing frozen assets is relatively long, which limits Milosevic's short-term access for purposes we might find objectionable and preserves some leverage for settling other issues.

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Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526
7/6/2020 (2.13)
2013-0682-M

Implementing Plan B

Conditions for sanctions relief	Requirements to enforce conditions
Addressed in 2/15 CG Proposal	
FRY recognition... must be genuine and unequivocal	• Clear definition of "genuine and unequivocal" recognition • Link definition to SC procedures for suspending and reimposing sanctions
Sanctions suspension for 2 month periods, positive SC vote needed for renewal each time	Unambiguous language in SC resolution suspending sanctions
Sanctions enforcement regime against FRY(S&M) must remain in place to allow quick reimposition of full sanctions	• SAMs structure remains in place • Front-line states retain enforcement mechanisms
Restrictions beyond UNSC resolutions to remain in force (no IFI assistance, no UN seat, no readmission to OSCE)	Agreement among CG that these items should be held back as long-term leverage against settlement of region's underlying security problems (e.g.: Kosovo, War Crimes Tribunal)
Significant toughening of monitoring regime on FRY borders with Bosnia and Croatia (more monitors and more equipment)	European agreement to deploy additional monitors and equipment
Sanctions relief to go into effect only after border is more tightly closed and Europeans have deployed additional monitors	Agreed definition of "acceptable" level of closure and monitoring
FRY continues to support CG plan for Bosnia	Links to reimposition and extension language in resolution
FRY endorses principles of Z-4 plan	Links to reimposition and extension language in resolution
NOT Addressed 2/15 CG Proposal	
Mechanism for immediate revocation of sanctions relief if FRY reneges	Unambiguous language in SC resolution stipulating conditions under which sanctions relief would be revoked
Closing the "Back Door:" Goods reaching Pale via Croatian and GOBH territory threaten to make FRY border closure irrelevant	• GOC and GOBH commitment to control trade with Pale Serbs; plus CG/international agreement to control trade on Croatia/Bosnia border (or to cut off both Pale and Knin Serbs) • Support (monitors, technical assistance) for GOC and GOBH • Clarify UNPROFOR role
Protecting interests of successor states and other claimants as financial sanctions are suspended	Agreement that assets will not be released until successor state, creditor, and other claimants concerns have been addressed
Prohibiting trade facilitation agreements with the FRY	Trade preferences and other agreements should be included in the list of non-UNSC sanctions cited above

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21 FEB 95

INFORMATION PAPER

1. Purpose. To provide information on the status of United Nation's efforts to strengthen UNPROFOR and a recommendation on the way ahead.

2. Key Points.

- The Deputies Committee has reiterated its support for strengthening UNPROFOR but requested more information on UN intentions, objectives, rationale, and operational impact.

- The UN's **objective** is to implement the Cessation of Hostilities (COH). The **rationale** is that the COH is the best mechanism for achieving a negotiated political settlement in Bosnia. If the COH fails, UNPROFOR withdrawal may follow. The **operational impact** of this **uncertainty** between strengthening and withdrawal is that the UN is accepting some offers made pursuant to the Hague initiative, but holding on others. Therefore, the UN **intends** to wait on the outcome of Cessation of Hostilities implementation (agreed zones of separation and heavy weapons exclusion zones) before committing to strengthening UNPROFOR with more robust capabilities. **The UN does not support using more robust means to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid.**

- The UN has accepted offers of transport helicopters for the mobility they have long desired. Transport helos have been offered by UK (6 LYNX, 6 GAZELLE, and 3 CHINOOK), and France (4 PUMA and 6 GAZELLE). Netherlands transport helos are not required by the UN at this time according to UNDPKO.

- The UN has also accepted all offers of UNMOs (100 requested, 128 offered).

- The US offer of night vision devices has been formally accepted (USUN 040129Z Jan 95).

- The UN has agreed to accept the 58 oversnow vehicles offered by Sweden.

- The UN is requesting more information from nations which offered engineering equipment. France offered 300 combat engineers and Indonesia has offered an engineering battalion. The UN has formally requested more information from the USG on the 20 bulldozers, 10 roadgraders, and 50 dump trucks we offered, specifically with regard to spares (data provided to UN on 17 Feb 95). The UN probably assumes they will need all

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NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER (TU) 02.21. '95 13:48 NO. 1490011/825 PAGE 2

items mentioned above whether the strengthening or withdrawal scenario occurs.

• Regarding infantry, mech infantry, and APC offers, the UN has put a "hold" on accepting offers until a clearer picture emerges on COH implementation. **"Hold" means the UN is planning to accept the offers if the COH or similar peace plan is implemented. They are gathering information, but not committing to accept the offers until they know if UNPROFOR will withdraw or remain.**

- The UN Department of Peace Operations has informed the USUN that the UN is "unable to accept our offer" of 14 AH-1s and 5 OH-58s, per UN FAX dated 16 Feb 95.

• The spread sheet attached displays all offers made by UNPROFOR troop contributors since the CHODs met at the Hague in December 94.

• The status of the UN requests for US offered equipment follows, cost are per DSAA, based on 10 month lease costs:

--**NVGs**-UN officially requested price and availability - estimated costs for 130 PVS-5B and 20 PVS-5C:
-sale=$645,000 CSP=$11,947
-lease=$35,850 CSP-$11,947
-CSP = Concurrent Spare Parts

--**APCs**-officially turned down- USUN 090003Z Jan 95

--**Heavy engineer equipment**-UN officially requested price and availability:

-- 20 **D-7 dozers**-sale=$289,300,CSP=$19,380
-lease=$80,400,CSP=$19,380
-- Available from POMCUS in Europe
-- Condition Code A (serviceable)

-- 50 **Dump trucks**-sale=$505,000,CSP=$167,500
-lease= **0, beyond 75% of service life**
-- Available from POMCUS in Europe
-- 43 are in Europe
- 31 Code B (unserviceable/mixed condition)
- 12 Code F (requires repair/overhaul)
-- 7 remaining available from excess at Ft Devens.
-- No repair facility available in Europe
-- Cost to repair in CONUS = $2M
-- Army looking for a less costly repair plan

-- 10 **Scrapers**-sale=$476,720,CSP=$31,940
-lease=$$6,300,CSP=$31,940
-- Available from POMCUS in Europe

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-- Condition Code A

-- Mobile Training Team cost = $300,000
-- 10 soldiers for 65 days in-country

--**AH-1s**- UN turned down USG offer on 16 Feb 95

--**AN/PPS-5s and PPS-15s**-officially requested data on training / maintenance package and costs. DSAA gathering data.

3. Recommendation. **Provide costing data and equipment which the UN has requested. Encourage UN to develop priorities and plan to reinforce UNPROFOR, if the COH or similar peace plan is implemented.**

Prepared by:LtCol Jim Thigpen
UN Division, J-5, Ext 7-5738

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STATUS OF HAGUE INITIATED OFFERS TO STRENGTHEN UNPROFOR

GEN DE LA PRESLE'S PRIORITIZED LIST	EQUIPMENT OFFERED	SOURCE	COMMENT
9 LYNX AND GAZELLE TYPE HELOS	6 LYNX & 6 GAZELLE	UK	UN ACCEPTED
	4 PUMA & 6 GAZELLE	FRANCE	UN ACCEPTED
5 MECH INFANTRY BNS	4 MECH BNS	BANGLADESH	UN HOLD
		MALAYSIA	UN HOLD
(EGYPT OFFERED 1 LINE INF BN)		PAKISTAN	UN HOLD
		ARGENTINA	UN HOLD
24 MED.LIFT HELOS	3 CHINOOKS	UK	UN CONSIDERING
1 COMBAT ENG BN	1 ENG BN	INDONESIA	UN CONSIDERING
	300 COMBAT ENGINEERS	FRANCE	UN CONSIDERING
100 UNMOS	128	20 DUTCH	UN ACCEPTED
		4-6 ITALY	ALL UNMOs
		20 INDONESIA	
		20 PAKISTAN	
		30 BANGLADESH	
		19 UK	
		5 NORWAY	
		8 TURKEY	
1 ENG BN (HVY)			
200 CIVPOL	50	JORDAN	150 NEEDED

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8 MORTAR LOC RADAR		DUTCH TURKEY NETHERLANDS	NUMBER TBD NUMBER TBD NUMBER TBD
8 TACPS	2 OFFERED	1 TURKEY 1 UK	UN CONSIDERING UN CONSIDERING
LINE TRANSPORT BN			
SIGNAL REGIMENT			
THEATRE COMM NETWORK			
12 HVY LIFT HELOS			
ARMED HELO UNIT	14 AH-1S	US	OFFICIALLY TURNED DOWN BY UN
1 SQND FW TRANSPORTS C-130 TYPE	4 F-27S	NETHERLANDS	UN CONSIDERING
1 FIELD HOSPITAL	1 CONSIDERED	ITALY	
3 AIRFIELD SNOWBLOWERS			

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1123 GENERATORS			
NIGHT VISION GOGGLES	150 PVS-5	US	UN ACCEPTED
62 OVERSNOW VEH	58 OVERSNOW VEHICLES	SWEDEN	UN ACCEPTED
30 SNOWMOBILES			
GPS TO PLT LEVEL			
TBD # OF MINE PROTECTED VEHICLES			
BATTLEFIELD SURVEILLANCE RADARS	25	US	10 PPS-5 15 PPS-15 UN REQUESTED DATA ON TRAINING SPARES
ADDITIONAL OFFERS:			
APCS	50	ITALY	
	50	USA	UN TURNED DOWN
	100	GERMANY	
HVY ENG EQUIPMENT	20 BULLDOZERS	US	UN REQUESTED MORE DATA ON SPARES AND CONDITION OF EQUIPMENT
	10 ROAD SCRAPERS	US	
	50 DUMP TRUCKS	US	

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HELOS	4	NETHERLANDS	TYPE TBD
REINFORCE LOG BN	TBD	NORWAY	
REINFORCE PRESENT BN	TBD	UKRAINE	
INCREASE CONTINGENT BY ONE COMPANY	TBD	SPAIN	

NOTE: The US has approached Ireland, India, South Korea, Australia, and Ukraine on a bilateral basis to encourage them to offer more resources to strengthen UNPROFOR. This effort is on hold pending UN decisions.

STATUS:

Australia has confirmed that it will not contribute to UNPROFOR. (Canberra 240505Z Jan)

Ireland has told the AMEMBASSY they may be able to contribute one transport company, if asked by the UN. (Dublin 241532Z Jan)

Ukraine has told the AMEMBASSY they are preparing a proposal to the UN offering mine clearing units,a signal unit, and observers. (Kiev 191403Z Jan)

India has said they are considering the request, but have not received a similar approach from the UN. (New Dehli 181136Z Jan)

South Korea has expressed interest and the Korean Assistant DATT visited J-5, EURDIV on 31 Feb to help the Koreans frame the requirement. ROK wants a formal UN request.

Prepared by: J-5,UNDIV,7-5738

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002e. email	Kerrick to Neal Wolin re: About to Fall Off the Cliff (1 page)	02/16/1995	P1/b(1)

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002f. paper	re: Issue Paper (2 pages)	02/21/1995	P1/b(1)

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FUNDING UNPROFOR WITHDRAWAL: CHOICES AND DYNAMICS

SHAPE has prepared a document, NATO Withdrawal Budget Estimates (1995), dated 31 January 1995, that provides preliminary cost estimates for the implementation of SHAPE/AFSOUTH OPLAN 40104, *DETERMINED EFFORT*, a NATO-conducted withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina. The OPLAN does not consider evacuation of assets currently stationed in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

According to the SHAPE estimate, OPLAN 40104 will take six months to execute, involve a multi-national force of approximately 70,000 ground, air and naval personnel, and cost approximately $1.9B at minimum. This cost estimate breaks down as follows: about $515M for NATO common costs (i.e., common procurement and O&M costs); $1.4B in national costs (personnel, equipment and sustainment costs for all troop-contributing nations); and $37.2M for the evacuation of 31,000 UNPROFOR personnel, 9,400 vehicles and related equipment.

Organizations involved in military operations in and around the former Republic of Yugoslavia have not developed a single, common, standardized funding mechanism for defraying costs because of the current division of operational control. Funding arrangements have been primarily threefold: (1) "blue helmet" operational costs paid through the UN's assessment system; (2) NATO members "paying their own way" for costs associated with their forces supporting the UN Security Council mandate (e.g., SHARP GUARD and DENY FLIGHT); and (3) NATO using its Military Budget to pay NATO common costs.

A detailed funding mechanism for UNPROFOR withdrawal, that can be agreed to by the various organizations involved, will have to be devised to ensure the success of the operation. There are four possible options (all costs use OPLAN estimates as a base).

UN Funding Option: This option would entail the UN paying for all costs associated with the operation to include military and civilian elements engaged in planning, execution or support. It uses the standard UN peacekeeping assessment process which assesses member states for a percentage share of the total operational costs. U.S. share would be 30.4%, or approximately $590M plus the incremental costs for forces and other support paid up front, less any reimbursements. Each country contributing to the operation would be required to pay incremental costs up front and be reimbursed by the UN for personnel and other support later.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2013-0682-M
8/3/15 KBM (2.16)

Classified by: Multiple Sources
Declassify on: OADR
Prepared jointly by OUSD(P)ISA and S&R, 17 Feb 95 13:41 PM

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FEB 21 '95 13:53 R 2110M T1

"Pay-Your-Own Way" Option: This option entails each participating nation, organization, and non-governmental organization, paying its own evacuation costs without the expectation of reimbursement from another organization. The cost to the U.S. would be contingent upon the level of support the U.S. furnished (number of personnel, airlift, CAS, etc.). UN members, including the U.S. may also be assessed for the cost of evacuating the non-NATO troops UNPROFOR troops if this costs was borne by the UN. The estimated cost to the U.S. using this approach is $600M to $1B for incremental costs associated with operational support..

NATO Funding Option: NATO members would be obligated to pay the entire cost of the operation. It currently pays for only common costs in FRY through its Military Budget. NATO accounts have never been used before to carry the full cost of a military operation. One approach to funding the operation would be to use the NATO national cost share formula to set the assessment rate for each NATO member (U.S. share 25% or approximately $490M plus the incremental costs for operational support minus any reimbursements). This approach assumes also that non-NATO UNPROFOR nations would not be assessed by NATO for the accrued costs. Each NATO nation contributing forces and support would pay its own incremental costs up front. Later reimbursement by NATO is problematic.

"Hybrid Option": This option uses two approaches. Non-NATO UN member states pay for a portion of the total cost of the operation at their regular UN peacekeeping rate (non-NATO UN member assessments total 32% of the UN peacekeeping budget). These costs would be paid into a UN fund that would be used to fund the cost of non-NATO forces in the operation and UN administrative and support costs. NATO nations would pay the other portion and not be assessed by the UN, but pay under the NATO national cost share formula described above. The cost to the U.S. under this approach would be approximately $330M plus incremental operational support costs less reimbursements. If the operational cost was allocated based on the proportion on NATO and non-NATO troop strength, the U.S. cost may be reduced to $225M (plus incremental support costs less reimbursements) since 54% of the UNPROFOR troops are non-NATO.

NATO and the UN have been discussing cost sharing arrangements for funding a potential withdrawal operation for several months, with no tangible results. Indeed, in recent correspondence to NATO SYG Claes, UN SYG Boutros-Ghali stated his assumption that, in the case of an UNPROFOR withdrawal, NATO would bear the costs. NATO Permanent Representatives were sharply critical of this position, and agreed that SYG Claes would tell Boutros-Ghali that funding arrangements for such an operation were to be the subject of future negotiations between the two organizations.

Classified by: Multiple Sources
Declassify on: OADR
Prepared jointly by OUSD(P)/ISA and PM/PR, 17 Feb 95 (4:00 PM)

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While NATO has set no specific timetable for entering into these negotiations, military planning factors and operational timing requirements may play a significant role in determining the final funding scheme. They therefore merit serious consideration in the overall context of this evolving situation.

SACEUR indicates that he must have a pre-positioned command and control/logistics infrastructure in place to execute the OPLAN. His preference is that this operating base be established prior to execution of any withdrawal operation, and in light of agreed ministerial political, military and financial guidance (i.e., formal funding arrangements). SHAPE planners estimate that it will take about three to four weeks to establish the pre-positioned support structure after a political decision to execute has been rendered by NATO Ministers.

However, if SACEUR must establish his operating base on a contingency basis (i.e., as outlined in OPLAN 40104, but without final agreement between NATO and the UN on some issues, like funding arrangements), the US government (as a NATO and UN member) may have no alternative but to accept a *de facto* funding arrangement (*a la* "Pay-Your-Own-Way"), which would leave us little hope or expectation of being reimbursed for accrued costs.

Since the Croatian government has declared 31 March the expiration date of the UN mandate there, planning, negotiations and decision making on formal funding arrangements between NATO and the UN must begin soon, lest events foreclose available options.

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COLLECTION:
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FOLDER TITLE:
DC0176 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, February 22, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs667

RESTRICTION CODES

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P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
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Congress of the United States

Washington, DC 20515

February 17, 1995

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing to urge immediate action by you on the war in Bosnia. While diplomats talk in the wake of former President Carter's visit to the region, there is strong reason to believe that the Bosnian Serbs will continue to reject peace. If the war in Bosnia resumes full scale, we do not believe the situation will continue as it has for the last three years. UNPROFOR's already weakened position will become even more untenable, and pressure for its withdrawal will increase.

In the event of either significant Serbian escalation or of UNPROFOR withdrawal, the case for ending the international arms embargo of Bosnia becomes even more compelling. We trust that, in such circumstances, your Administration would move expeditiously to end the United Nations embargo. Should that not be possible, however, we would expect the Congress to vote to unilaterally end participation by the United States in the embargo.

In any event, the United States has an obligation to prepare for the most likely scenarios in Bosnia. If the embargo is to be ended, either multilaterally or unilaterally, we will want to see direct U.S. involvement in the conflict held to a minimum. The surest way to minimize direct U.S. involvement after the embargo is ended is to act now to train the pro-government forces in strategy and tactics and the use of some of the weapons they are likely to obtain.

Such training would reduce the risk to the pro-government forces of any preemptive Serbian offensive, and would be an alternative to sending U.S. forces into Bosnia to provide training after the embargo is ended. Such training should be provided outside of Bosnia in order to avoid any risk to U.S. trainers. We understand that such training can be provided at a small fraction of the cost we currently are paying for the U.N. peacekeeping operation in Bosnia, and that it could be completed in less than six months. We also understand that the government of Bosnia and Hercegovina would welcome such training, and indeed already has submitted a formal request to you in this regard.

There can be no question about your authority to direct the provision of such training. Section 1404 of the 1995 Defense Department Authorization Act (the so-called Nunn-Mitchell provision) required the Administration to present options to the Congress for training the pro-government forces in Bosnia. Other provisions of law, including section 503 of the National Security Act of 1947, give you authority to deliver such training. Further, the provision of such training by the United States would not violate existing Security Council resolutions or relevant principles of international law.

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We believe you should take this step in order to be better prepared for the likely next phase of the war in Bosnia and in order to reduce the likelihood that U.S. forces will become directly involved in that war. It is important to note, however, that a program of training the pro-government forces in Bosnia would give the United States additional leverage in the ongoing negotiations with the Bosnian Serbs. Beginning a training program now would make clear to the Bosnian Serbs our determination to bring about a just and sustainable peace, and would underscore to them the probable cost of prolonging the conflict.

In other words, in the hands of able diplomats, a policy of training the pro-government forces for war could prove to be a powerful instrument for bringing about peace.

For all these reasons, we urge you to initiate promptly a program of military training for the pro-government forces in Bosnia and Hercegovina.

Sincerely,

BOB DOLE

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN

JOSEPH LIEBERMAN

HENRY J. HYDE

SUSAN MOLINARI

MICHAEL R. MCNULTY

JIM MORAN

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DECL:OADR

SUPPORT FOR THE FEDERATION - 505 AGREEMENT

I. PURPOSES FOR DEPUTIES COMMITTEE

- Decide if the Government of Bosnia Herzegovina (GoBH) can sign the broad 505 agreement they now have so that international military and educational training (IMET) to support the Federation may begin.

- Approve the strategy to win support for this decision from our NATO and Contact Group allies.

II. OPTIONS

Option 1 (Recommended): Ask Prime Minister Siladjic to confirm the GoBH notification to our embassy that the Bosnians are ready to sign the broad draft 505 given them so that already-approved IMET training can commence.

PRO: A broad 505 agreement would give the EUR military consultant (replacing General Galvin as Special Representative to the Bosnian Federation armed forces) a tool he can use in negotiations trying to bring two mutually suspicious armed forces closer together. His capacity to get anything done will depend on being able to draw on a full range of DoD programs, consistent with the clear understanding that, after a Presidential determination is signed, we will not transfer anything that violates the embargo.

Signing a broad agreement would signal our support without committing us to furnish excess defense articles (EDA) at this time; a Presidential determination is required to make a country eligible for transfers of defense articles (enforced by policy precedent) and the UN arms embargo limits EDA. (We are awaiting a GoBH short list of items they need in order to obtain an interagency legal opinion on which items could be furnished under the arms embargo.)

Asking the GoBH to limit the 505 agreement to IMET only after they have been given a broad draft could be perceived as a diminuation of USG support for the Federation, our current policy and could anger Congress which sees support for the Federation as vital to Balkan peace efforts.

CON: NATO and Contact Group allies may perceive signing this broad 505 agreement as a USG move toward unilaterally lifting the arms embargo, particularly if the singular nature of the agreement is publicized. We would need to carefully explain our position to counter this perception.

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2013-0682-M

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Option 2: Ask Prime Minister Siladjic to sign a revised 505 agreement limited to IMET only, explaining the draft which he was shown was in error and we intended to be consistent with agreements presented to Slovenia, FYROM, and Croatia.

PRO: Broad 505 agreements are, in general, not concluded until such time as we have identified specific defence articles we want to transfer to a given country.

Allies are worried, with Congressional legislation still to preclude most types of military assistance, arms to the GoBH, and singling out the GoBH to sign an agreement including all military equipment sales, lease or draw-down which was refused to other Eastern European countries could be misinterpreted.

Providing IMET signals support for the Federation; we should be honest and tell the GoBH we mistakenly gave the wrong legal document needed to make this training happen.

CON: We cannot risk signalling any withdrawal of support for the Federation at this crucial time in negotiations. It is both easier and less risky to quietly allow the GoBH to sign the agreement they have already been given, and explain, if Allies ask, that nothing more than IMET can be given without further steps such as a Presidential determination which we do not intend to take at this time.

III. BACKGROUND

Before any military assistance (defense articles or related training or other defense services) may be furnished to a foreign country, Section 505 of the Foreign Assistance Act requires that certain assurances from the recipient country be obtained concerning use, retransfer and security of any articles, training, or services provided. These assurances are contained in an exchange of diplomatic notes which constitute an international agreement between the U.S. and the "potential recipient country." These assurances normally cover the full range of military assistance. However, throughout Central Europe and the FSU, we have initiated IMET programs before progressing to other levels of military assistance. In such cases, we have limited our 505 agreement with a given country to cover only IMET. Broader 505 agreements are, in general, not concluded until such time as we have identified specific defence articles we want to transfer to a given country. It is important to note that a 505 agreement does not commit the U.S. to providing military assistance either in general or in a specific form. Rather, it is only done in order to meet a statutory precondition to providing such assistance.

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For Bosnia, we need a 505 agreement before we can begin the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program approved as one of a number of things that can be done within current U.S. law and policy (in particular compliance with the UN arms embargo) to be supportive of the development of the armed forces of the Bosnian Federation. A Presidential determination that furnishing military assistance to a particular country will strengthen the security of the U.S. and promote worldwide peace is an additional statutory precondition to providing most types of military assistance.

While for legal reasons this 505 agreement would be signed by the Government of Bosnia Herzegovina (GoBH) as well as by the Federation, the cooperation would be intended for the Federation armed forces. (Note: The 505 agreement itself has no means to enforce this intention to provide support to the Federation but agreements to transfer specific equipment can be written to limit the use of the goods or services to the Federation armed forces rather than the GoBH national army.)

Broad 505 Agreement Given to GoBH

Limited 505 agreements for IMET only have been signed with Slovenia and Macedonia, and is pending with Croatia (as well as initially with all other CE states). We have also signed a broad non-binding defense cooperation agreement with Croatia (as well as several other CE states). A broad draft 505 agreement (sufficient for provision of IMET, lethal, and *non-lethal EDA) was given to the GoBH; it was made clear that* transfers under the agreement would be limited by the UN arms embargo.

IV. CONSULTATIONS WITH ALLIES

We must consult closely with allies to explain that signing a broad 505 agreement, while needed for any EDA transfers or military sales, does not change our opposition to unilateral lift. We will undertake nothing beyond the provision of IMET without obtaining a Presidential determination requiring Congressional notification for Bosnia. We do not plan to ask *for this determination at this time.*

We should portray the agreement as a necessary but not sufficient bureaucratic hurdle. While it momentarily singles out the Federation from among former Yugoslav countries (and even some Eastern European ones) as being more "worthy" of U.S. support, we would not object should others demand the same agreement with the same limitations.

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520214
RECEIVED: 17 FEB 95 18

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 21 FEB 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA CROATIA
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 22 FEB DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 21 FEB 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520095 9520225

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0176 CODES:

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		KERRICK
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001		X	95022114	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
002		X	95022114	DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950221	FUERTH, L	
002	950221	BRILL, K	
002	950221	MCALEER, R	
002	950221	PATRICK, T	
002	950221	ADAMS, G	
002	950221	INDERFURTH, K	
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The White House

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: DC meeting on Bosnia & Croatia 22 Feb

NSC LOG #: 20214

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 21, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the UN

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia on Wednesday, February 22, 1995, 2:00-3:30pm, in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be principals plus one. The agenda is attached at Tab A.

The following papers should be circulated by 12:00pm, February 21: Diplomatic Strategy (State); Status of UNPROFOR Strengthening Efforts at the UN (JCS); U.S. Force Commitments to NATO for UNPROFOR Withdrawal Operations (JCS); Prepositioning - Step Two (NSC/JCS); Funding UNPROFOR Withdrawal (OSD); 505 Agreement for Bosnia (State). ~~(S)~~

for
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 17, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

FROM: DON KERRICK

SUBJECT: Deputies Meeting on Bosnia, February 22, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Deputies Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia to be held February 22, 1995. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. agenda	Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (1 page)	02/22/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4000

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0176 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, February 22, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs667

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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See also 2013-0652-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (2 pages)~~	~~02/28/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RDS 10/01/2013
002a. memo	Don Kerrick to Samuel Berger re: February 28 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (4 pages)	02/27/1995	P1/b(1)
~~002b. agenda~~	~~Deputies Committee Meeting on Croatia and Bosnia (1 page)~~	~~02/28/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002c. paper~~	~~re: Croatia Strategy (3 pages)~~	~~02/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002d. talking points~~	~~re: Points for Zagreb (1 page)~~	~~02/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002e. talking points~~	~~re: Points for Belgrade and Knin (1 page)~~	~~02/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002f. paper~~	~~re: Croatian Proposals in Regard to the Termination of UNPROFOR Mandate (6 pages)~~	~~02/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002g. cable~~	~~re: GOC Proposals for a "Post-UNPROFOR" Regime (4 pages)~~	~~02/27/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
002h. paper	re: Issue Paper (2 pages)	02/27/1995	P1/b(1)
~~002i. paper~~	~~re: Former Yugoslavia Policy Review (11 pages)~~	~~02/27/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RDS 10/01/2013
002j. report	re: The Balkans: The Next Three Months [partial] (8 pages)	02/24/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 6/11/2020
~~002k. chart~~	~~re: [Bosnia Timeline] (1 page)~~	~~02/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 08/13/2015

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RESTRICTION CODES

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~~003. agenda~~	~~[Duplicate of 002b] (1 page)~~	~~02/28/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020

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RESTRICTION CODES

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FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 01 MAR 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
DC
CROATIA
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 28 FEB DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: REED SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 04 MAR 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520250 9520253

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0178 CODES:

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FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
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		KERRICK
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
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001		X	95030117	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
001	SENS	Z	95030117	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	95030118	REED SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

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DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950301	FUERTH, L	
002	950301	BRILL, K	
002	950301	MCALEER, R	
002	950301	ADAMS, G	
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KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
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SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 28 FEB DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE DUE DATE: 04 MAR 95 STATUS: X

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~~Situation Room~~	3		Tab I
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COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	Agenda not attached 3/2/95	9:29	J. Graves PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
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NSC LOG # 20255

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B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
	USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		
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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 28 FEB DC MTG ON BOSNIA

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	USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

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	USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
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D	JCS	SECRETARY		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 28 FEB DC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 20255

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
	USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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Initials: RDS Date: 9/26/2019
2010-0533-M

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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NSC LOG # 20255

FROM: National Security Council (AJ) PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting SOC OF 28 FEB DC MTG PAGES: 4

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 1, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T.R. PATRICK
Executive Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, February 28, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

James W. Rudd
for Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 5/26/2019
2019-0533-M

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

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TAB

A.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee
DATE: February 28, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 4:45 - 6:00pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
Samuel R. Berger

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Rick Saunders

State:
Peter Tarnoff
Richard Holbrooke
Robert Frasure

DOD:
John Deutch
Walter Slocombe

OMB:
Gordon Adams
Kevin Beckell

USUN:
James O'Brien

CIA:
Douglas MacEachin
Ray Converse

JCS:
LTG Wesley Clark
MG Jared Bates

NSC:
Alexander Vershbow
BG Donald L. Kerrick

Summary of Conclusions

1. Deputies met to discuss our strategy for dealing with Croatia in the run-up to the March 31 UNPROFOR mandate expiration date. They requested that the State strategy paper be expanded to include a list of incentives and disincentives designed to obtain a positive decision from President Tudjman on retaining UNPROFOR or a similar force. The paper should include options and recommended alternatives to UNPROFOR that we would subsequently propose to Tudjman, in addition to the five-point mandate presented to the Croatians in January. Additionally, Deputies asked that the disincentives include specific areas of U.S. and European assistance that we might threaten to suspend if

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2010-0533-M
NSC 9/30/14 (2.04)

Tudjman refuses to retain UNPROFOR in the separation zone, as well as possible carrots to induce his cooperation. The paper should be circulated NLT OOB Thursday, March 2, for consideration by the Deputies that afternoon. **(Action: State with JCS input)** (S)

2. Deputies discussed the issue of prepositioning NATO communications assets to support a NATO-led operation to withdraw UNPROFOR from Bosnia and/or Croatia. Deputies agreed that the issue should be presented to the Principals this week with two options. Option One would authorize U.S. support for prepositioning now as a precautionary move without prejudice to possible future decisions regarding UNPROFOR withdrawal, U.S. participation, and the funding for such actions. Option Two would defer a decision on prepositioning until the military operational plan is reviewed and Congressional authorization and funding have been obtained. Deputies directed that an options paper be circulated NLT OOB Thursday, March 2, for Deputies' review that afternoon and Principals' review Friday, March 3. **(Action: JCS/NSC)** (S)

3. Deputies deferred discussion on the NSC-staff paper "Former Yugoslavia Policy Review" until their next meeting on March 2. For those discussions, they requested a supporting paper outlining options for beefing-up Macedonia should UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia or renewed fighting threaten to expand the conflict. The paper, to include alternative agency views, should be circulated NLT OOB Thursday, March 2. **(Action: OSD)** (S)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 1, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

FROM: BG DON KERRICK DK

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions ~~for~~ from the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, February 28, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of Conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia held February 28, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve AV Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By BDS NARA, Date 9/26/2019
2010-0533-M

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RECORD ID: 9520253
RECEIVED: 27 FEB 95 17

TO: BERGER

FROM: KERRICK

DOC DATE: 27 FEB 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA CROATIA
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 28 FEB DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER DUE DATE: 02 MAR 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520250 9520255

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0178 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BAKER JANE
		KERRICK
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/26/2019
2010-0533-M

COMMENTS: _____

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001		X	95032208	NOTED BY BERGER

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National Security Council
The White House

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COMMENTS:

Berger Mtg package
for Bosnia/Croatia
Dc 2/27

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	Don Kerrick to Samuel Berger re: February 28 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (4 pages)	02/27/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
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FOLDER TITLE:
DC0178 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, February 28, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs668

RESTRICTION CODES

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P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA AND CROATIA

DATE: February 28, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 4:30pm - 6:00pm

Agenda

I. Near-Term Croatia Strategy.....State

II. NATO Prepositioning - Step Two.....JCS

III. Former Yugoslavia Policy Review.....NSC/All

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By lr NARA, Date 2/6/2020
2013-0682-M

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DRAFT

CROATIA STRATEGY

Tudjman's gambit is not working. The Krajina Serbs are not blinking, and if Milosevic is scared, he is not showing it. Tudjman is keeping his own counsel, but appears to be blundering into a war that could bring Serb troops back into Croatia, destroy the Bosnia cease-fire, and involve U.S. troops on the ground in a volatile operation to rescue UNPROFOR.

War need not be inevitable in Croatia, particularly if we make sure that fighting remains a bad option for every side. What is inevitable after Tudjman's decision is an end to today's UNPROFOR and a transition to some successor force. Our goal is to keep the lid on Croatia by slowing and stabilizing this transition. That means when we ask Tudjman to keep key elements of UNPROFOR in place -- i.e. the interpositional force -- we cannot afford to take no for an answer.

Our strategy would consist of three segments:

(1) a full-court press to get Zagreb to be flexible;

(2) pre-positioning of NATO forces when needed;

(3) establishment of UNPROFOR Lite when there is time to do it right, including obtaining necessary Serb consent.

(Technically, the UNSC could use Chapter VII authority to keep UNPROFOR without all parties' consent. That, however, would depart from the Vance Plan, agreed to by the Serbs and Croats.)

Approaching Tudjman

We need to coordinate our approach with Germany -- the other country to which Tudjman pays attention. We should make this approach quickly -- within the next week -- to give Tudjman time to dodge the cannonball he has launched at himself. A U.S.-German effort is also a powerful message to the Croatian public that Tudjman backed down under duress.

Our focus with Tudjman must be to demand that the interpositional force in the separation zone remain in place. Without it, the cease-fire could quickly break down. With agreement on this point, the other UNPROFOR elements we have identified as essential should not prove difficult to preserve (perhaps re-packaged to help Tudjman politically). While we must deal with Croatian concerns about becoming another Cyprus, we must make clear that Zagreb has no choice but to accede to American/German pressure this time.

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Key arguments for Zagreb would include the following (draft talking points at Tab A). An end to separation zone monitoring makes war virtually inevitable. Continued Croatian refusal to allow peacekeepers to patrol the DMZ would be a reckless act, ending our year-long policy of cooperation with Croatia. Zagreb must choose between sticking patiently with the West or impatiently confronting the Serbs alone. We cannot help Zagreb without more time to work with. Tudjman will chafe at the message, but it will help him face down his military advisers and domestic critics.

In demanding an extension of the interpositional force, we should work with Tudjman on his political needs, e.g. give UNPROFOR another name or pursue a token international force to patrol Croatia's external borders, symbolizing for the Croatian public that the international community will not tolerate a Western Serb Republic. (The Serbs may permit a token force as the price for keeping UNPROFOR between them and the HV.)

The Croats may refuse to accept Akashi as the man in charge of the UN force, or of those forces involved with Croatia per se. If so, we should seek his replacement before bringing in another organization to do a trial run at peacekeeping.

Contingency preparations

Given the overwhelming domestic sentiment in Croatia to "kick out" UNPROFOR, a major redeployment out of the UNPAs is unavoidable at some point. Serb statements on whether they would allow this are ambiguous, so a NATO rescue mission could be needed even if all of UNPROFOR does not pull out. NATO requires several weeks to pre-position forces offshore (with a few communicators on the ground) in order to mount an extraction in Croatia.

Pre-positioning should not begin until after our full-court press with Zagreb is underway. Otherwise, we risk undermining the message to Tudjman (and the rest of the world) that we are trying to keep UNPROFOR in place. Also, our next approaches to Zagreb may buy UNPROFOR several months additional time.

If Zagreb's response to our warning demarche merits it, we would give the go-ahead for pre-positioning. This would be prudent to avoid the human and diplomatic casualties of a NATO scramble to help allied troops in trouble. It could also have a sobering effect on the parties, sending the message that we think a new Serbo-Croat conflict is brewing and they should reconsider their positions before it is too late.

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Pre-positioning would help the Serbs realize that they can no longer count on the West to get Tudjman to back down, and they would not want NATO forces deployed against them. Zagreb could use the resulting renewed attention on Croatia as a fig leaf for compromise on UNPROFOR renewal. We should also warn Zagreb that its relations with the West will be strained if its actions force NATO to land ground troops in Croatia.

What does that mean?

Negotiations on a successor UNPROFOR

Coming up with the right recipe for UNPROFOR Lite will be complicated, involving negotiation among the parties, UN Secretariat, and key UNSC members. We will have to seek additional time to work out details of a successor force and manage the transition on the ground. Croatia has already given UNPROFOR through June 30 to effect withdrawal. Exploiting this opening to seek further extension will help the Croats keep their cool even as the snow and cease-fire melt in Bosnia.

We should also work on creating a serious negotiating track to restore Croatian sovereignty in return for autonomy in the areas where the Serbs comprise a majority. Failure to do so has been a major source of Zagreb's frustration. One reason Tudjman withdrew consent for UNPROFOR was concern that the international community was not paying attention. Once we have succeeded in keeping the interpositional force in place, our message to Belgrade and Knin must be swift: negotiate on the basis of the twin principles of Croatian sovereignty and Serb autonomy or do not expect us to help you.

What is our leverage?

Messages to Knin and Belgrade would focus on the following (draft talking points at Tab B). Zagreb's consent is required to keep UNPROFOR in place, and Serb stonewalling makes that consent almost impossible to obtain. (If appropriate) We succeeded in preserving UNPROFOR as the Krajina Serbs asked, now it is time to live up to their promise to start political talks. If Knin refuses to start political talks, outsiders can do little to uphold Serb rights. We would warn them not to harm UN peacekeepers or NATO troops being pre-positioned to assist them if necessary.

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POINTS FOR ZAGREB

-- We support re-integration of the UNPAs into Croatia, but events are making that goal more distant.

-- The Serbs have reacted to your threats against Krajina by moving away from recognition and settlement talks and reinforcing Knin's ties with Belgrade and with Pale.

-- Your decision to expel UNPROFOR without a clear strategy of how to replace it or avoid war has damaged your cause.

-- To remove UNPROFOR from the separation zone would abrogate the March '94 cease-fire and spark clashes in all sectors.

-- In the resulting war, your forces would not gain a decisive victory and deter Serbia from intervening directly. ?

-- An international presence to monitor the separation zone is essential and we insist on it as a price of continued cooperation.

-- We cannot understand your recent refusal to consent to such monitoring, which Croatia has been proposing since January in the form of WEU, OSCE, or ECMM observers.

-- We are also distressed that you have not agreed to maintain other essential elements of UNPROFOR like CBM implementation and liaison with Knin.

-- In short, your actions speak louder than your words and indicate that you seek war.

-- In these circumstances we would be unable to help Croatia, although we agree that the Serbs are the main aggressors.

-- Of course we are pressuring the Serbs to negotiate, and we have avoided public criticism of Croatia as you requested.

-- The Serbs have said they would enter into political dialogue if UNPROFOR remained, and we need your cooperation to test whether they really mean this.

-- In the past year, we have enjoyed good bilateral cooperation; we would like to continue it and actively support Croatia's integration into the West.

-- But it is now up to you to demonstrate that Croatia is interested in these goals, even if they require more patience than you would like.

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2013-0082-M

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POINTS FOR BELGRADE AND KNIN

-- Croatia is recognized as the host country for UNPROFOR, so Zagreb's consent is required to keep it in place.

-- (if appropriate) We have succeeded in preserving UNPROFOR, and now it is time to move forward on talks with Zagreb as promised.

-- We agree with your statements that the UN presence creates stability, that more economic confidence-building is necessary, that Vance Plan provisions must be respected.

-- But it is hard to reconcile these statements with your interference with UNPROFOR, suspension of economic talks, and continued refusal to implement the Vance Plan.

-- We see little chance of getting Zagreb's continued cooperation without a positive signal from the Serb side, e.g. acceptance of international patrol of the Croatian border.

-- Given the possibility of an UNPROFOR withdrawal, we will pre-position NATO elements to assist, and we want to warn you against interfering with these forces or UNPROFOR units.

-- We are committed to human and ethnic community rights for Serbs, despite our disagreement with some policies of the Serb leadership.

-- We have advocated an ambitious plan for Krajina autonomy, but your recent actions almost guarantee UNPROFOR's withdrawal and renewed hostilities.

-- We urge you to resume your talks with Zagreb.

-- It is unrealistic to expect the international community to help people who are unwilling to help themselves reach a negotiated settlement.

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VR 2/6/2020 (2.24)
2013-0682-M

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5

C

Position paper

CROATIAN PROPOSALS IN REGARD TO THE TERMINATION OF UNPROFOR MANDATE

After three years of UNPROFOR passivity in the area, Croatian occupied territories have yet to be re-integrated in Croatia, as called for in the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and several peace plans; Bosnia-Herzegovina is still at war, and Serbia/Montenegro is still under sanctions. Along with recent forming of the 'joint commands' between illegal Serb entities in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as repeated and resolute Belgrade's refusal to grant recognition to other successor states, this means that only a radically different approach could bring peace, stability and security to the area of South-eastern Europe.

1. In his letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations, dated January 12, 1995, the President of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tudman, has declared the mandate of UNPROFOR to be terminated effective March 31, 1995 at midnight, withdrawing Croatia's consent to the stationing of UNPROFOR on Croatian territory. The President's decision, later reconfirmed by both Houses of the Croatian Parliament, allows for an additional period of three months for completion of the withdrawal of UNPROFOR units from the territory of the Republic of Croatia.

Further, the President's letter strongly reconfirmed Croatia's willingness and determination to seek, first and foremost, a peaceful re-integration of all temporarily occupied Croatian territories (UNPAs), as well as a peaceful resolution of the crisis in the entire area, in full conformity with the UN Security Council resolutions and Contact Group peace proposals.

Such a long standing policy of the Republic of Croatia clearly implies that, in search for the solution, Croatia is willing and fully prepared to cooperate in good faith with the international community and is ready to consider the future role of different international fora and institutions in the re-integration of the occupied territories. ?

2. Following its decision to terminate the UNPROFOR mandate, and fully determined to continue to strive for peace, Croatia is willing to continue and press forward both the negotiations with Croatian Serbs and with the

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government in Belgrade. In this regard Croatia seeks full support of the international community.

In this process, Croatia's essential aims are : a) peaceful re-integration of the occupied territories; b) adequate normalisation of relations among all the successor states, and in particular Croatia's relations with Serbia/Montenegro as a most important requirement for the lasting peace in the region; and c) full cooperation and support of Contact Group peace endeavours in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

3. If proper conditions are created and the right signals sent to the authorities in Belgrade and to Croatian Serbs, the active participation of the international community could lead to a peaceful resolution of the problems. For such a development the following necessary preconditions are : unconditional recognition of Croatia by Serbia/Montenegro as a clear proof that Serbia and Montenegro are giving up the occupation of Croatian territories; full respect of the internationally recognized borders; observance of international law governing relations among states; acceptance of the existing Contact Group peace proposal for Bosnia/Herzegovina; and the elaborated system of mutually dependent sanctions and incentives for the sides concerned.

Such a new stage in re-integration would then open the way to full normalisation of Croato-Serbian relations, and enable Croatia to play even more constructive role in bringing forth the lasting peace to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

4. Croatia has signed the cease fire agreement and a number of other, so called economic, agreements with Croatian Serbs. Croatia is willing to proceed with the normalisation of relations with Serbia/Montenegro in accordance with the Joint Declarations of September 30 and October 20, 1992 and Geneva Declaration of January 19, 1994 under the auspices of Co-chairmen of the ICFY. A part of that process is the planned, but yet to be scheduled visit of the Croatian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Belgrade.

5. The President of the Republic of Croatia has publicly agreed to attend the Summit proposed by France, under the auspices of the Contact Group, provided that the summit is properly prepared and desired results (especially as elaborated by the United States) are assured in advance.

6. The President of the Republic of Croatia stated that the basic principles of the so-called Z-4 Plan (i.e. territorial integrity of Croatia within its internationally recognized borders; full respect of civil and ethnic minority rights; and, the local autonomy in the region where Croatian Serbs constituted

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majority population according to 1991 census), are acceptable. They are already incorporated in Croatian Constitution and the Constitutional Law on Human Rights and Freedoms and the Rights of National and Ethnic Communities or Minorities in the Republic of Croatia. These constitutional provisions, which are on the highest level of international conventions, should be a framework for negotiations relative to the implementation of human and ethnic rights of Croatian Serbs and their local autonomy in certain regions of Croatia. It should be specially emphasized here that these constitutional provisions have been enacted on recommendation and upon approval of the Arbitration Commission of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia (presided by Mr. Robert Badinter, president of the French Cour de Cassation). Croatia, however, could not accept some proposals in the Z-4, Plan which have no precedent in any system of protection of minority rights. Croatia will, within a short time, present a detailed counter-proposal on resolution of the raised issues, in full conformity with the highest standards of international conventions relating to local and cultural autonomies, as well as human rights and rights of the ethnic communities.

7. Croatia proposes that in the next several months the international community adopts and follows a more determined two-track policy.

i) Through a negotiating process such as the proposed Paris summit, and/or other proper mediation, based on an elaborate system of sanctions and incentives, the international community should strive for and ensure : (a) mutual recognition of Croatia and Serbia/Montenegro and mutual recognition among other successor states, including declaration of full respect for the international borders and specific consent to station international monitors at points where borders are being or could be violated; (b) obligation of all successor states not to resort to force or interfere into internal affairs of others, with international guarantees in this respect; (c) acceptance of the highest standards of international conventions for minority rights; (d) acceptance of the peace settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina; (e) speeding-up of the process of succession to the SFR Yugoslavia; (f) maintaining the strategic core of the sanctions regime with the clear understanding that sanction would be suspended or eased only following full implementation of the agreements reached, but not only upon the declaration of intent to do so being issued.

ii) In regard to Croatia specifically, the international community should : (a) help to establish full control and inviolability of the Croatia's international borders; (b) fully contribute to creation of the necessary conditions and overall atmosphere conducive to implementation of the re-integration of the occupied territories, including needed forms of monitoring, of implementation of agreements and of local mediation when necessary; and (c) help further

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integration of Croatia into Europe (PHARE, Trade and Cooperation Agreement), as well as stabilization of Croatian economy in order to enable it to begin with the reconstruction, particularly of the war-devastated areas.

8. Fully aware of the concerns existing in different circles in regard to the possible new eruption of violence following the withdrawal of UNPROFOR, and in order to contribute to creating desired conditions as elaborated in Para. 7., Croatia further proposes that :

i) During UNPROFOR's withdrawal, NATO should by its presence ensure and guarantee not only the safety of the withdrawing UN troops, but also contribute to general stability in the occupied Croatian territories. Although no incidents are likely to occur which could lead to serious escalation of hostilities, NATO's presence would definitely discourage such events and would be a stabilizing factor in the period before the deployment of monitors and other International Task Forces which would for the time being control Croatian borders. That would also serve to alleviate the fears of international circles which are afraid of the renewal of hostilities.

ii) In the period of 6 months, NATO (or International Task Force - ITF) should be entrusted with establishing appropriate control of the Croatian internationally recognized borders in presently occupied parts of Croatia, and with opening of the major international traffic routes, on land as well as on the Danube and Sava rivers. Croatia, on its part, is willing to use that period to finalize the negotiations with Croatian Serbs regarding their cultural and ethnic autonomy and local autonomy in already mentioned regions.

ITF - consisting of personnel from (primarily) the Contact Group countries, or evolving from the initial NATO presence in Croatia - should be established and specifically mandated for duty in the Republic of Croatia by a special UN Security Council resolution for a period of six months;

iii) The Security Council resolution that shall extend the UNPROFOR mandate in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the FRY of Macedonia, must contain operative paragraph that will explicitly state that UNPROFOR mandate in the Republic of Croatia has been terminated and is not being extended after March 31, 1995.

On March 31, 1995 the Security Council should adopt further resolution that will establish the conditions for the future international monitoring and mediation presence in the Republic of Croatia. This resolution must be in accordance with the existing Security Council resolutions confirming Croatia's territorial integrity, and be consistent with General Assembly resolution 49/43 (Situation in the Occupied Territories of Croatia). Croatia and the relevant international bodies (UN or others) shall regulate and formally establish the presence of new International Mediating and Monitoring Task Force in Croatia

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simultaneously with the process of UNPROFOR withdrawal, that is no later than June 30, 1995.

iv) UNPROFOR will continue to enjoy Croatia's full cooperation and support in its activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this respect, Croatia is prepared to extend its full hospitality to the UNPROFOR Headquarters in Zagreb, MASH near Pleso, the logistic base in Divulje, Adriatic ports facilities and other facilities used presently by UNPROFOR. Croatia is also willing to consider the appropriate role of UNPROFOR in ensuring the normal and unimpeded land traffic needed for UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

9. Croatia is determined to continue the existing negotiations with Croatian Serbs regarding the full re-integration of the occupied parts of Croatia provided that there is a clear and demonstrated understanding on the other side that talks on issues related to political re-integration have to be conducted in good faith. In order to (a) facilitate implementation of the already existing agreements and (b) set the stage for meaningful negotiations related to predominantly political issues of re-integration, Croatia is ready to consider the role of the international community in monitoring and further promotion of these agreements.

Croatia proposes to work out and define a proper arrangement with the European Union and the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) related to a possible role of the enlarged European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in monitoring the implementation of all agreements.

Croatia also welcomes possible missions of long or short duration, clearly mandated by the appropriate international institution, e.g. the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), to help at the local level in promotion and observance of minority rights and intra-communal relations in areal to be given special status according to the Croatia's Constitution and the Constitutional Law on Human Rights and Freedoms and the Rights of National and Ethnic Communities or Minorities in the Republic of Croatia.

Appropriate international institutions, best suited for specific tasks, could in that way cooperate with the Government of Croatia and Croatian Serbs in preventing conflicts and creating conditions necessary for peaceful re-integration.

Croatia is prepared to further elaborate such an arrangement and enter in arrangements with appropriate institutions.

10. In order to safeguard its rights and interests, as well as the rights and interests of other successor States, Croatia draws the attention of the relevant international factors to the particular peril connected with the easing or

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suspension of sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. If these sanctions are eased or suspended, the nominal holders of title (i.e. Serbia and Montenegro - or under the name of FR of Yugoslavia) on funds, assets, interests and movable and immovable property, which are object of the succession of the former SFR of Yugoslavia, may try to unilaterally dispose of them. This is especially apparent in the case of the deposits in foreign banks which were deposited by the former National Bank of Yugoslavia as the part of federal foreign currency reserves (cca 2 billions of USD), and which are at present blocked in those foreign banks. Therefore any suspension or easing of sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro should not affect the funds, assets, interests, movable and immovable property which are objects to the succession procedure.

11. Croatia wishes first and foremost to speed-up the process of negotiations with Belgrade and with Croatian Serbs and give new and strong impetus and dynamics to the overall peace process, in particular the process of re-integration of the occupied Croatia territories.

Croatia firmly believes that its proposals constitute a peaceful way towards the resolution of the present problems, a way to the lasting peace and to the establishment of the new international order in this region.

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EXDIS

VIENNA ALSO FOR BOSNIA

E.O. 12356: DECL OADR
TAGS: PREL, HR, UN, US
SUBJECT: GOC PROPOSALS FOR A "POST-UNPROFOR" REGIME
MISS THE BOAT

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE - SEE PARA 8.

3. SUMMARY: THE CROATIAN POSITION PAPER ON TERMINATION OF THE UNPROFOR MANDATE IS AN UNHELPFUL AND UNREALISTIC CONSTRUCT OF DUBIOUS VALUE TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S EFFORTS TO KEEP THE LID ON THE SITUATION IN CROATIA. IT ASSUMES THAT NATO OR ANOTHER INTERNATIONAL FORCE WILL BE PREPARED IN EFFECT TO POLICE CROATIA'S INTERNATIONAL BORDERS BY FORCE IF NECESSARY, AND IT OMITS SPECIFIC MENTION OF ANY SIGNIFICANT CONTINUED INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION OF THE SEPARATION ZONE BETWEEN THE GOC AND REBEL SERB FORCES. THE GOC HAS ASKED FOR A CONSIDERED U.S. REACTION BEFORE IT SHOWS THE PAPER TO FRANCE (EU PRESIDENCY ON MARCH 1; ABSENT DEPARTMENT OBJECTION, WE INTEND TO GIVE THE GOC FEBRUARY 28 A FIRM RESPONSE THAT MAKES CLEAR OUR VIEW THE PAPER HAS NOTHING TO OFFER. END SUMMARY.

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4. ON FEBRUARY 25, FM GRANIC SUMMONED CHARGE TO RECEIVE A CROATIAN POSITION PAPER ENTITLED "CROATIAN PROPOSALS IN REGARD TO THE TERMINATION OF UNPROFOR MANDATE," WHICH HE AND TUDJMAN HAD PROMISED EARLIER. IN PRESENTING THE PAPER, GRANIC SAID THE GOC HOPED TO RECEIVE OUR COMMENTS BY FEBRUARY 27. HE NOTED THAT THE PAPER WOULD BE GIVEN TO THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT, AS EU PRESIDENCY, ON MARCH 1.

THE GOC PROPOSALS IN BRIEF

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5. AS WE UNDERSTAND THE DEPARTMENT HAS RECEIVED THE SAME PAPER FROM THE CROATIAN EMBASSY, WE ARE NOT REPRODUCING ITS TEXT HERE. ITS OPERATIVE FEATURES INCLUDE:

-- A NATO PRESENCE TO ENSURE THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNPROFOR TROOPS AND STABILIZE THE AREA UNTIL

-- NATO OR ANOTHER "INTERNATIONAL TASK FORCE" (COMPRISED MAINLY OF TROOPS PROVIDED BY CONTACT GROUP COUNTRIES) WOULD BE POSITIONED TO "ESTABLISH APPROPRIATE CONTROL OF THE CROATIAN INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED BORDERS IN PRESENTLY OCCUPIED PARTS OF CROATIA,"

-- INSTITUTION, UNDER A NEW UNSC RESOLUTION, OF AN "INTERNATIONAL MEDIATING AND MONITORING TASK FORCE" IN CROATIA BY JUNE 30, 1995; AND

-- CROATIA WOULD "CONSIDER" THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (OSCE, EU, ICFY, AND ECMM ARE VARIOUSLY MENTIONED) IN MONITORING AND PROMOTING EXISTING AGREEMENTS AND IN SETTING THE STAGE FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON XOLITICAL ISSUES OF REINTEGRATION.

BADLY FLAWED

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6. THE PROVERBIAL MAN FROM ANOTHER PLANET MIGHT SEE THESE PROPOSALS AS AN EARNEST ATTEMPT TO PRESERVE KEY UNPROFOR FUNCTIONS WITHOUT UNPROFOR, BUT IN OUR VIEW, TAKEN IN CONTEXT, THEY ARE FATALLY FLAWED ON AT LEAST TWO POINTS:

-- THE ROLE OF NATO: THE GOC ASSUMES, AGAINST ALL REASON AND OUR SPECIFIC ASSERTIONS TO THE CONTRARY, THAT NATO OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL FORCES WILL BE PREPARED TO TAKE CONTROL OF CROATIA'S BORDERS AND THAT IT COULD DO SO WITHOUT USE OF FORCE. WE CONSIDER THE

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FORMER ASSUMPTION HIGHLY IMPROBABLE AND THE LATTER IMPOSSIBLE.

-- LACK OF AN EFFECTIVE SEPARATION ZONE: IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION WITH DCM FEBRUARY 26, FM GRANIC CONFIRMED THAT THE GOC IS NOT/NOT WILLING TO PERMIT CEASEFIRE MONITORS EITHER TO BE ARMED OR TO BE "PERMANENTLY" POSITIONED ON THE LINE BETWEEN THE OPPOSING FORCES (SEPTEL). THUS THE GOC PAPER AT BEST LEAVES ROOM ONLY FOR UNARMED "MONITORS," TO MAKE PERIODIC TRIPS INTO THE ZONE OF SEPARATION. SUCH MONITORS WOULD BE INEFFECTIVE IN PRESERVING THE PEACE, NOR IS IT REALISTIC TO ASSUME THAT "MONITOR"-PROVIDING COUNTRIES WOULD BE WILLING TO RISK THEIR PEOPLE UNARMED. FURTHER, TUDJMAN HAS BLUNTLY SAID THERE WILL BE NO ZONE OF SEPARATION.

COMMENT
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7. THE POLICY PAPER APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED IN A VACUUM, PERHAPS TO INDICATE GOC "REASONABLENESS" WITHOUT SIGNIFICANTLY ALTERING TUDJMAN'S DECISION ON UNPROFOR AND ALL THAT IT PORTENDS. ALTHOUGH GRANIC, ZUZUL, AND OTHERS HAD GIVEN SOME HOPE EARLIER THAT WE COULD REACH AGREEMENT ON A NON-UNPROFOR UNPROFOR, THE PAPER SEEMS TO REFLECT INSTEAD PRESIDENT TUDJMAN'S CATEGORICAL INSISTENCE THAT THERE BE ENFORCED CONTROL OF CROATIA'S INTERNATIONAL BORDERS, AND NO SEPARATION ZONE. THE CALL FOR NATO DEPLOYMENT TO CONTROL THE INTERNATIONAL BORDERS OF CROATIA AS WELL AS MUCH ELSE IN THE PAPER, SUGGESTS THAT THE GOC POSITION IS NOT GROUNDED IN REALITY. WE BELIEVE THE GOC NEEDS TO BE BROUGHT TO EARTH QUICKLY.

ACTION REQUEST
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8. WE WILL BE OFFERING SOME LONGER TERM POLICY SUGGESTIONS SEPTEL. IN THE MEANTIME, UNLESS THE DEPARTMENT INSTRUCTS US OTHERWISE BY COB FEBRUARY 27, WE PLAN TO GIVE THE CROATS A RESPONSE ON FEBRUARY 28 ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:

-- THE CROATIAN PAPER IS NOT LIKELY TO ATTRACT MUCH INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT. CERTAINLY WE DO NOT FIND IT COMPELLING.

-- WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE GOC SCENARIO IS OVERLY OPTIMISTIC WITH RESPECT TO THE PROSPECTS FOR CONTINUED PEACE, BELGRADE'S NONINTERVENTION, PROGRESS ON ECONOMIC AND OTHER AGREEMENTS, AND THE MILITARY SUCCESS OF CROATIAN FORCES (SHOULD RENEWED HOSTILITIES

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OCCUR).

-- FURTHER, THE PAPER IS COMPLETELY UNREALISTIC IN ITS ASSESSMENT OF POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL ACTION.

-- NATO, IF IT WERE DEPLOYED AT ALL, AND IF IT HAD TO ENTER THE UNPAS, WOULD NOT BE DOING SO TO SECURE CROATIA'S BORDERS, LET ALONE BY FORCE.

-- ANY NATO OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO WITHDRAW UNPROFOR WOULD BE OF EXTREMELY SHORT DURATION AND HAVE A TIGHTLY FOCUSED MISSION.

-

-- AS WE HAVE EXPLAINED BEFORE, THE CONTINUED MONITORING OF THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT (AND HENCE THE SEPARATION ZONE) THROUGH AN ARMED, FIXED PRESENCE IS A SINE QUA NON FOR AVOIDING WAR. YOU MAY DIFFER WITH THIS ASSESSMENT, BUT OUR WILLINGNESS TO OFFER SUPPORT MUST BE BASED ON OUR ASSESSMENT.

-- WE URGE YOU AGAIN TO CONSIDER THE FIVE POINT PLAN THAT WE PRESENTED EARLIER, CONCERNING THE ESSENTIAL TASKS OF UNPROFOR THAT MUST CONTINUE TO BE PERFORMED.

GALBRAITH

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FORMER YUGOSLAVIA POLICY REVIEW

Introduction

As we approach a potentially critical period in the Balkans over the next three months, now is the time to review the fundamental principles guiding our policy. U.S. policy has, in fact, had some success over the past two years in containing the spread of the war, reducing the level of violence, keeping relief supplies flowing to most areas, and maintaining cohesion with Allies and Russia. What we have been unable to produce is a political settlement in Bosnia or Croatia that rolls back Serb gains sufficiently to be acceptable to the Bosnians and Croats, and to be perceived as "fair" (much less "just") in moral terms.

The fundamental problem has been a lack of leverage: sanctions and political pressure have been insufficient to sway the Serbs, and our efforts to bring NATO air power to bear have come to naught. In Bosnia, after almost a year of effort, the Contact Group is becoming a spent force, with its unity increasingly strained. In Croatia, the Z-4 plan for a political solution is, for all intents and purposes, stillborn, and Tudjman's decision to eject UNPROFOR threatens to destroy even the limited economic confidence-building measures developed over the past year.

As the CIA paper makes clear, there is no "peace faction" among any of the parties, and Milosevic's willingness to pressure his Serb cousins is limited. If we stay on our present course, the prospects are for an escalation of the war in Bosnia and a new war in Croatia, with the potential unraveling of our limited achievements to date, and increased pressures for U.S. involvement. The differences between the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios are largely ones of timing and degree. And as the risk of war increases in Bosnia and Croatia, the dangers of spillover to other areas grow as well.

If the war escalates, the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Croatia, Bosnia or both will become increasingly likely -- creating the prospect of U.S. troops on the ground in former Yugoslavia in a hostile environment, the outcome we have most sought to avoid. As international efforts founder, the Bosnians will be able to make an increasingly convincing case for lifting the arms embargo; yet the odds of bringing our Allies and, especially, the Russians along will remain low. Moreover, lifting the arms embargo, to be effective, entails the United States taking other actions that increase our involvement and responsibility.

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Interests and Objectives

Throughout the conflict, we have sought to protect several core U.S. interests: maintaining our strategic relationship with key Allies and protecting the credibility of NATO; avoiding a conflict with Russia that could undermine our efforts to promote reform and international cooperation; preventing the spread of the Bosnian conflict into a wider Balkan war that could destabilize southeastern Europe and draw in U.S. allies; and ensuring that the use of force to change borders and acts of genocide do not become legitimate forms of behavior in post-Cold War Europe.

Along with these core interests, we have pursued a range of more specific objectives, but have never set clear priorities among them:

- To stop or limit the fighting.
- To maintain relief supplies and reduce human suffering.
- To prevent the establishment by force of a Greater Serbia.
- To achieve a negotiated settlement acceptable to all parties that reverses at least some Serb territorial conquests and preserves the territorial integrity and international identity of Bosnia, Croatia and other ex-Yugoslav states.
- To prevent the spread of conflict to Kosovo, Macedonia, Albania and beyond.
- To keep U.S. ground forces out except in the context of implementing a political settlement.

The tools we have applied have varied over time in response to events, and as our priorities have shifted: Until the end of 1994, we sought to use NATO military power to enforce UNSC resolutions and to put pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to settle on terms that provided a better deal for the Bosnian Government ("air power in the service of diplomacy"). After Bihac, however, we consciously shifted the emphasis to maintaining NATO cohesion, recognizing that this would erode U.S. and Alliance credibility and reduce further our negotiating leverage. Yet we did not scale back our political objectives to match our reduced leverage -- leading to the present diplomatic impasse.

The result has been charges of fecklessness and an erosion of confidence in U.S. leadership on other issues. Therefore, we now need to step back and confront these inherent contradictions:

- On the one hand, our own principles, as well as public and Congressional pressures, make it difficult to disengage and effectively abandon the Bosnians.

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- On the other hand, we do not presently have the means to attain the political goal we have set -- negotiated settlements that deprive the Serbs of some of their ill-gotten gains -- and we have not been prepared to commit those means. Moreover, there is limited public support in the U.S. or in Europe for doing so.

Basic Strategic Choices

Many of our decisions over the next 2-3 months will be driven by events on the ground. But some of our choices will depend on where we want to go in the longer term. Therefore, before considering specific options, Principals need to decide our overall strategic direction and whether the course chosen is politically sustainable. This, in turn, requires deciding what are our priority interests and sticking with that decision in terms of committing the resources needed to attain our goals. The following, in broad terms, are basic approaches to be considered:

1. Continue our present policy: muddle through while supporting the Bosnians: Maintain the Contact Group and continue to seek a political solution that provides a better deal for the Bosnians, but not commit to increased military pressure on their behalf; rely for leverage on sanctions and efforts to isolate the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs (recognizing that these will be inadequate to the task). Seek to contain the fighting and humanitarian suffering to the extent possible, while maintaining Alliance cohesion. Keep UNPROFOR in place in essentially its present form (improve its effectiveness, but don't press it to take a more confrontational stance against the Serbs). Seek to postpone any lifting of the arms embargo and don't push for use of NATO air power, since this would precipitate UNPROFOR's withdrawal. Continue to sustain the Federation. Take additional measures in the front-line states to contain spillover of the conflict, such as beefing up UNPROFOR/Macedonia.

   - This would maintain European and Russian support, reduce the risks of deeper U.S. military involvement, and recognize that, absent such involvement, political settlements are not achievable in the foreseeable future.

   - The gap between our goal of a "fair" settlement and our unwillingness to provide the means to that end, however, would leave us vulnerable to charges of diplomatic fecklessness. It would be difficult to persuade the public and pro-Bosnian elements in the Congress that, over time, the maintenance of sanctions, a continued stalemate on the ground, and the solidity of the Federation will bring the Bosnian Serbs to accept a settlement along the lines of the

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Contact Group plan, and the Krajina Serbs to accept autonomy within Croatia.

- The main weakness of this approach, however, is that the Bosnians and the Croatians are not prepared to play along: Both are ready to pursue the military option with renewed vigor over the coming months, putting UNPROFOR's presence in doubt. And the Bosnians will campaign for lift when the ceasefire ends. Our continued rhetorical support for their cause would make it difficult for us to oppose.

2. Adopt a policy of neutrality toward the terms of a settlement and focus on active containment of the conflict: Openly acknowledge that achieving a better solution for the Bosnians is not possible without U.S. actions that it is not in our interest to take. Apart from this shift in approach to the diplomatic track, take essentially the same actions as under the previous approach. Make clear we do not believe multilateral lift is politically attainable and strongly oppose Congressional pressures to lift unilaterally. Abandon Contact Group or suspend its activities, making clear that it is up to the parties, not the international community, to find a mutually acceptable solution. Promote periodic ceasefire agreements. Advise the Bosnians of the need to be realistic about the facts on the ground and agree to terms that acknowledge Serb preeminence (accept territorial outcomes short of 51:49, Serb Confederation with Belgrade; seek protection through links to Croatia, etc.).

   - This course would also maintain good relations with the Europeans, avoid a confrontation with Russia, and reduce the potential for U.S. military involvement. We would concentrate our efforts in areas where we have been able to achieve some success: reducing the violence, delivering humanitarian relief, maintaining the Muslim-Croat ceasefire and the Federation, and preventing the spread of the conflict outside of Bosnia and possibly Croatia. By distancing ourselves from the Bosnians' political agenda, we might have greater success in keeping UNPROFOR in place.

   - We would suffer harsh criticism from some quarters in the Congress and the public for abandoning the Bosnians and performing another flip-flop. We would need to make the case that it is not in U.S. interests to intervene unilaterally to ensure Bosnian victory, that we cannot gain European or Russian support for firmer measures to help the Bosnians, and that lift alone would probably make things worse for them in any case. We would want to appeal to the significant number of Congressmen whose support for lift is soft, and who are not keen on the deeper military involvement that a credible lift-and-strike policy would require.

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- Assuming we can ride out the initial storm, this approach would lower expectations and adjust public opinion to the reality of a continued conflict for which there may be no immediate solution. It would put the onus on the parties to negotiate directly with one another, rather than forcing us to explain repeated failed diplomatic initiatives backed by empty threats. It would force the Bosnians to accept the reality of defeat and the fact that they are destined to live surrounded by Serbs. It might even lead to a de facto indefinite cessation of serious hostilities, reducing both human suffering and public pressures for action.

- The problem with this approach, like the first, is that we may not be able to ride out the storm: the Bosnians may succeed in getting Congress to lift unilaterally, possibly with sufficient votes to override a Presidential veto. Moreover, we would, effectively, be acquiescing in Serb aggression, setting a dangerous precedent for the future.

3. Containment of Conflict and Long-Term Quarantine of Greater Serbia: Abandon efforts to negotiate a political settlement and reimpose full sanctions against Serbia for the long haul. Make clear we will refuse to recognize Serb conquests in Bosnia and Croatia and we will continue to treat Serbia as a pariah state until Serbs accept settlements that restore territorial integrity of Bosnia and Croatia. Refrain from military intervention, take laissez-faire approach to continued fighting among the parties. Concentrate on humanitarian aid, bolstering the Federation politically and economically, and containing spillover to other parts of the region. If UNPROFOR were to withdraw, this could be combined with a lift-and-leave strategy.

- This approach would be analogous to our approach to Soviet domination of Central and Eastern Europe during the Cold War, in which we were prepared to wait for decades for a just outcome -- isolating one party while promoting free-market development in the other. It would be based, again, on a recognition that there is no available political solution, and avoid perpetuating false expectations that the international community can impose a settlement. But in contrast to the previous approach, it would be based as well on a judgment that Milosevic remains the problem rather than the solution, despite his recent attempts to play the peacemaker -- distinguishing the victim from the victimizer.

- It is doubtful Russia would agree if we reimposed the sanctions noose around Serbia, however. We might agree with the Russians to disagree about Serbia, perhaps lifting or suspending some or all multilateral sanctions against the FRY -- but maintaining U.S. sanctions -- in exchange for agreement on continued, tightened sanctions against the Pale

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and Knin Serbs (but recognizing that Milosevic will try to undermine these to the extent he can get away with it).

- The front-line states' enforcement of sanctions would be difficult to sustain absent substantial financial compensation. Without such compensation, long-term continuation of the sanctions could actually have a destabilizing effect on the region overall. Moreover, this long-term approach could result in further Serb territorial expansion and prolong the humanitarian and refugee crisis for years to come.

- As with approaches 1 and 2, it is not clear we could sustain this course in the face of pressure from the Congress and the Bosnians.

4. Increased U.S. commitment in support of Bosnians, apply military pressure to compel Serb acceptance of a settlement: In theory, this could involve either: (a) returning to our 1994 approach: press for a more robust UNPROFOR that is prepared to use force against Serbs and make active use of NATO close air support; resume NATO enforcement of exclusion zones, and possibly establish additional exclusion zones; if these measures prove insufficient, withdraw UNPROFOR and implement a multilateral lift-and-strike strategy; or (b) proceeding directly to lift and strike, after helping UNPROFOR to withdraw. In practice, only (b) is feasible, since Allies will not agree to robust military actions while their vulnerable UNPROFOR forces remain in place.

   - This would align our policy with Congressional rhetoric and provide the means to back up our declared goals of helping the Bosnians and thwarting Serb ambitions. It would lead to increased fighting, at least in the short term, but might in time give the Bosnians the capability to recover territory and, by altering the situation on the battlefield, convince the Serbs to agree to an equitable political settlement.

   - It would, however, create significant strains in our relations with our Allies and the Russians. Our readiness to participate in NATO extraction of UNPROFOR could provide the leverage to win Allied support in the UNSC for multilateral lift. But preventing a Russian veto would be more difficult. It would, at a minimum, require lifting sanctions against Serbia at the same time (although this may be necessary in any event to encourage Milosevic not to resume military support to his Serb cousins).

   - Moreover, withdrawing UNPROFOR and explicitly committing to produce a Bosnian success would hasten the onset of the situation we have sought most to avoid, the deployment of U.S. ground forces, leaving us with the responsibility for organizing relief supplies and protecting the enclaves. And

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lift - whether unilateral or multilateral -- would commit us to arming and training the Bosnians for an indefinite period, as well as providing air cover, even if we tried to set a time limit on our support. In short, it could Americanize the war, with little likelihood of hastening a political settlement.

Near-Term Decisions

The foregoing choices pertain mainly to the decisions we will need to take in the coming months on Bosnia. In Croatia, the situation may be more urgent, and our goal more straightforward: to prevent a new war over the Krajina. To this end, we need to be clear at the outset that we do not support Croatian military action to reassert control over the Krajina Serbs, and increase pressure on Tudjman to retain at least some portion of UNPROFOR interposed between the warring parties in the separation zone. We cannot go too far in imposing punitive measures on Tudjman, however, given the importance of Tudjman's support for the Federation and our need to use Croatian territory to support any UN/NATO/U.S. operation in Bosnia. We must above all avoid driving Tudjman into an unholy alliance with Milosevic to carve up Bosnia.

Finally, to the extent that we decide to focus more on containment of spillover, beefing up or replacing UNPROFOR in Macedonia would take on greater urgency alongside the decisions that we will need to make with respect to Bosnia and Croatia.

With these considerations in mind, the following is a sketch of the options on which decisions will be needed over the next three months.

Options: Croatia

Near Term:

- Make renewed push (in tandem with Germans and other Allies) within next 10 days to convince Tudjman to extend UNPROFOR with reduced mandate (UNPROFOR Lite).
- Fallback: Press for one-time extension of March 31/June 30 deadlines to allow more time for negotiations.

  Issue: Whether to threaten limited punitive actions at this stage? Or should we offer Tudjman a carrot?

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If these initial efforts fail:

- Begin Step Two prepositioning for UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia or Croatia no later than March 8 (will require Congressional consultations and decisions on funding).
- Offer new, high-level international negotiator to negotiate Croatian settlement, in tandem with final push for acceptance of UNPROFOR Lite.
- Agree in principle to Croatian proposal for international task force (ITF) to replace UNPROFOR that would monitor Croatian-Bosnian border *on condition that* Tudjman agrees to extend ceasefire, agrees the force will also police the separation zone, and agrees to negotiate with Krajina Serbs on basis of principles in Z-4 plan.

  Issues: Is ITF feasible? (Border force would be highly vulnerable to attack or hostage-taking by Bosnian and Krajina Serb forces, who have traditionally viewed such a force as threat to their survival, and whose acceptance would be a *sine qua non*. Allies would look to U.S. to join the force. But some token presence on the border may be the fig leaf Tudjman needs to back down on ejection of UNPROFOR; Krajina Serbs may accept if it is only way to keep international forces in separation zone.)

  Who would comprise the force? (Unarmed civilian monitors? Joint international-Croatian-Krajina Serb police force? NATO? WEU, backed by U.S. air support -- but recognizing that effectiveness would be limited without TACPs?)

Medium Term:

- Withdraw UNPROFOR from Croatia

  Issues: Nature of U.S. participation?

  How to discourage Tudjman from using NATO forces as cover for early offensive (sanctions or other punitive steps? carrots?).

  How to deter Krajina Serbs from seizing vacated UNPROFOR positions or threatening NATO forces (air strike threat?)

- Introduce civilian monitors to replace UNPROFOR (e.g. OSCE)

Long Term (post-UNPROFOR withdrawal):

- Contain fighting: Establish no-fly zone in Croatia? Other measures?

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- Decide whether to let Tudjman fend for himself (allowing possible Serb victory) or to provide limited support, despite our warnings that he will be on his own.

Options: Bosnia

Near Term:

- Keep Plan B on the table.

  Issues: If so, for how long? Possible modifications/ extensions that aren't sweeteners -- e.g., put forward detailed proposal on constitutional arrangements for future Bosnian Union?)

- Consider staged or scaled-back Plan B -- i.e., ask Milosevic to identify the steps he would take in "partial recognition" of Bosnia and Croatia, determine whether they could be linked to limited sanctions relief.

  Issues: What could Milosevic do beyond tightening border closure to justify sanctions relief? (We could not justify additional relief for tightening a border that should be sealed already. *Possibilities*: close the "back door" to Croatia; cooperate with the War Crimes Tribunal; recognize Bosnia's border and territorial integrity but not the Sarajevo Government.)

  Should we take parallel steps in support of Bosnians to reduce Bosnian/Congressional criticism -- e.g. IMET, other training for Bosnians?

- Continue efforts to isolate Pale irrespective of Plan B: increase border monitors; close Krajina back door.

- Consider whether to reduce or end the activity of the Contact Group as such, in order to emphasize the need for the parties themselves to undertake territorial and constitutional discussions. (This would permit private or individual mediators to operate.) Or agree to French international conference without prior agreement on mutual recognition?

- Explore efforts to increase international support for the Federation: material assistance and political support (envoys to and from, participation in international conferences, agreements such as our proposed 505 agreement, etc.)

- Approach the UN to reconsider its decision not to expand UNPROFOR with the troops already offered (i.e. urge UN to increase UNPROFOR numerically to enable it to deliver humanitarian assistance more effectively, especially along the Blue Route, as opposed to changing its ROE).

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Medium Term:

Decision depends on the choice of overall strategic approach as described above:

- Muddle through, continue to support Bosnians rhetorically, continue diplomatic efforts, but focus on containment.
- Shift to policy of neutrality toward terms of settlement and active containment of conflict; end or suspend Contact Group activities, acknowledge we cannot produce better deal for Bosnians.
- Containment of conflict and long-term quarantine of Greater Serbia.
- Renewed push for military measures in support of Bosnians: withdraw UNPROFOR, multilateral lift and strike.

Long Term:

- Maintain support for Federation to forestall Muslim-Croat splits. Intensify isolation of Pale and Knin Serbs.
- Maintain support for War Crimes Tribunal.
- Withdraw UNPROFOR, lift the arms embargo, with lift possibly implemented in stages (beginning with defensive weapons) and tied to "final offer" to accept Contact Group plan.

  Issue: Are we prepared to lift unilaterally if Allies support us in UNSC but Russians veto? Alternatives to lift?

- Abandon support for lift, take tough line with Congress and Bosnians, stick with one of the containment options.

Options: Containing Spillover

- Beef up or replace UNPROFOR/Macedonia

  Issues: When and how? (Enlarge existing force under UN command? Replace with NATO division?)

- Continue efforts to defuse Greece/FYROM dispute.
- Shore up outer wall of sanctions against Serbia.
- Expand bilateral aid/infrastructure programs in south Balkans.
- Expand bilateral military cooperation and economic cooperation with Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia.
- High-level visits to front-line states.

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Decision Timeline

See chart

Attachments:

CIA paper - The Balkans: The Next Three Months
Decision Timeline

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Intelligence Report

DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force *24 February 1995*

The Balkans: The Next Three Months (U)

Fighting is likely to resume this spring because Croatia and Bosnia do not accept the status quo, believe that they can gain political and territorial concessions from Serbs only through military force, and are highly skeptical of the international community's efforts to forge an equitable peace. Fighting is more likely to break out first in Bosnia in March with the collapse of the cessation of hostilities agreement. The scope and intensity of this could influence President Tudjman's calculations on regaining the Krajina by force, but Tudjman's decision on the renewal of conflict there will be taken independently of fighting in Bosnia. Clashes are likely by April or May in conjunction with the UNPROFOR pullout. In a second, less likely scenario, a combination of factors could postpone the fighting until later this year but not alter the deep clashes of interest. In a third scenario, all the warring factions would have to make fundamental changes to their political positions--even less likely in the near to mid term--in order for there to be real movement toward a stable peace in the region. 3.5c

Current Balkans leaders are pursuing irreconcilable demands that make even the beginning of a meaningful peace process in the next three months unlikely. At most, one or more of the key actors in the two major zones of conflict might be convinced to postpone military action. Postponement, however, is not necessarily a way station on the road to peace. Only a reordering of demands or a significant shift in the military situation on the ground would set the stage for a renewed effort to forge a lasting peace in the region. 3.5c

The Key Actors: What Drives Them?

Croatia: Guided by a vision of his personal historical role, mounting nationalist/political pressures which he has helped generate, and frustration with the international community, President Tudjman is now prepared to initiate large-scale military action to reintegrate the Krajina into Croatia. He is encouraged by claims of military superiority from his generals and his own belief that Serbian President Milosevic will not intervene. We do not have evidence Tudjman is working with a specific time schedule; however, having taken the bit in his teeth, it is unlikely he will stall for long or accept merely paper changes in UNPROFOR's mandate. There is no significant peace faction in the Croatian leadership. 3.5c

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Krajina Serbs: Despite fractious personal differences, the Krajina Serb leadership adamantly refuses any form of reintegration, including the limited "autonomy" Zagreb is willing to offer. They will fight fiercely to protect their homeland and could escalate localized Croatian attacks by shelling major Croatian cities. If attacked, they expect help from the Bosnian Serbs and, in extremis, from Belgrade. There is no significant peace faction in Knin. 3.5c

Bosnian Government: Bosnian leaders firmly believe that they can regain territory from the Bosnian Serbs and preserve the concept of a unified Bosnia within its internationally recognized boundaries only by military pressure. They are increasingly confident of their own military capabilities and see the tide swinging in their favor as they look out several years. There is no significant politically organized opposition within the Muslim community to this vision. The Bosnian Croats are largely satisfied with the territory they now control and take their guidance from Zagreb, not Sarajevo. The Herzegovinian hardliners leading the Bosnian Croats ultimately hope to be integrated into a Greater Croatia, a vision that Tudjman does not discourage. 3.5c

Bosnian Serbs: Bosnian Serb leaders will accept nothing less than an independent state as an interim measure toward the creation of an ill-defined "Greater Serbia." They are willing to give up some of the territory they now control to reach an agreement, but until then will fight to keep what they have. They are committed to helping the Krajina Serbs. If pressed by Bosnian Government forces, they might also consider a major military campaign aimed at dealing the Bosnian Government a severe defeat. Although some divisions among leaders are now being publicized, even those advocating acceptance of the Contact Group plan agree with Karadzic on driving a hard bargain on territory and independence for a Bosnian Serb state. Army Commander Mladic despises Karadzic but also shares his goal for an independent Serbian Bosnia with ties to Serbia. 3.5c

Serbia: President Milosevic continues to be a cornerstone to a settlement but at the same time is only a secondary player with limited influence on those he helped into power in Pale and Knin. Milosevic is driven by a strong personal desire to remain in power. He seeks to end sanctions but not at the cost of important political values. He continues to support--for political if not necessarily personal reasons--the concept of a "Greater Serbia," which makes it unlikely he could recognize Croatia and Bosnia or refuse help to the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs if they appeared to be on the verge of serious setbacks. In the short run, he is unable, not just unwilling, to compel either the Krajina Serb or Bosnian Serb leaders to make compromises that they believe are not in their interest. There is no significant peace party in Serbia. 3.5c

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This memorandum was prepared by EO 13526 3.5(c)
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Russia: Moscow's overall objectives will be to maintain an influential role in the international decision-making process on the Balkans as the Contact Group process wanes, while trying to keep the conflict contained and minimizing NATO's role. Tactically, Russian leaders will want to increase Russian leverage and head off all domestic criticism by pressing for full sanctions relief for Serbia. Moscow has limited influence with Belgrade--and even less with Pale--but the Russians have the capacity to play a spoiler role. They may pose obstacles to any international actions if they believe that the West is not accounting for Russian interests. 3.5c

EU Contact Group Members: Fearing renewed violence and a broader Balkan conflict, the European Union members of the Contact Group are desperate to keep the negotiating process alive but are increasingly frustrated with the intransigence of the feuding parties. Germany, Britain, and France--which holds the EU presidency and has the largest troop contingent in the former Yugoslavia--will focus on offering incentives for peace, wooing Zagreb with the prospect of EU aid and Belgrade with the promise of lifting sanctions. The EU members so far do not have a unified strategy for dealing with the renewal of full-scale war in Bosnia, according to various sources. Despite differing views, European Contact Group members agree on the need for Contact Group unity and are likely to maintain a coordinated position among themselves under French leadership. 3.5c

Three Scenarios

Renewed Fighting

It is likely that fighting will resume in Bosnia in the next two months, and clashes could then follow quickly in Croatia.

- The Bosnian Government has clearly focused on resupplying, reequipping and reorganizing its forces during the four-month cessation of hostilities (COH) in preparation for launching additional attacks to retake territory in central Bosnia. The Bosnian Serbs also believe that fighting will resume and are taking steps to increase military pressure on the Bihac enclave.

- The Bihac enclave will be the likely focal point of fighting for most of March as the Government V Corps clashes with Krajina Serb and rebel Muslim forces--which did not sign the COH agreement--supported by the Bosnian Serbs. Major gains by either faction around Bihac would probably cause the fighting to spread elsewhere in Bosnia, as the losing faction would attempt to pressure the other by attacking at other points.

- Fighting will probably increase in the rest of Bosnia by late March or early April as the weather improves--temperatures rise into the mid-50s--and the warring factions begin to jockey for military advantage prior to the end of the COH on 30 April. In 1994, fighting picked up substantially in April as

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[redacted]

the government launched a series of attacks in central Bosnia and the Serbs responded by assaulting Gorazde.

- The Bosnian Serbs will probably make a push for new talks in late April and call for an extension of the COH agreement in an attempt to preempt a government attack. The Bosnian Government may accept additional talks under international pressure but will probably reject any extension of the COH agreement.

- The return of warmer, drier weather by May will probably lead to general fighting throughout Bosnia. Government forces will probably launch a series of local attacks--following their strategy of last year--especially in central and northern Bosnia. Government forces will probably make some territorial gains, as the Bosnian Serbs are stretched thin and essentially remain cut off from Serbia. Serb strategy has been to respond to any government attack with an overwhelming offensive--preferably against an isolated or poorly defended enclave--to press the government to abandon its offensive. The Bosnian Serbs, however, will be reluctant to commit their forces fully to a Bosnian offensive, because some may be needed to reinforce the Krajina Serbs in Croatia.

- The resumption of fighting will spark renewed discussion of the need to remove UNPROFOR from Bosnia. Heavy fighting in Bosnia at the same time as an UNPROFOR pullout from Croatia in May and June will spark calls in Paris and London to move toward a withdrawal before winter.

- A major resumption of hostilities in Bosnia, which included an all-out Bosnian Serb effort to take the eastern enclaves, could put at risk nearly 120,000 Muslims who would try to flee to the nearest Muslim-controlled territory. [redacted]

The fighting in Bosnia could influence the prospects for renewed clashes in Croatia, but Tudjman's decision on a renewal of the conflict there will be taken independently of the fighting in Bosnia.

- President Tudjman has ordered the UN to begin withdrawing from Croatia after 31 March and complete withdrawal by 30 June. The Croatians expect to come under increasingly heavy international pressure in the coming month to extend the UN mandate. They appear prepared to stand firm and exact a high price: an international monitoring force--possibly including forces from NATO or Contact Group states--on the Croatian border with Bosnia and Serbia, recognition of Croatia's international border by Belgrade, and demonstrable progress on reintegration of Serb-held territory. In late March or early April, Tudjman may make a push for new talks with the Krajina Serbs, in hopes that the UN pullout will pressure the Serbs to make additional concessions.

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- While the Krajina Serbs may be willing to undertake new negotiations after the deadline is passed, they will not make the concessions necessary to preempt military action by the Croatian armed forces.

- Clashes are likely in late April and early May as the UN begins its withdrawal. A key factor will be the UN pull-out from the Zone of Separation between the warring factions in late April. Krajina Serb and Croat military forces probably will both move to seize key positions along the confrontation line currently occupied by the UN.

- Zagreb will probably attempt to exploit any clashes to place the onus for renewed fighting on the Krajina Serbs. As the clashes escalate, the Krajina Serbs will take steps to impede the withdrawal of UNPROFOR, including taking isolated units as hostages. At this point, the UN may call for NATO to take steps to facilitate the withdrawal of the trapped peacekeepers.

- The Croats will probably try to avoid launching a major offensive until UNPROFOR has withdrawn--slated to be completed by 30 June--but could speed up this timetable if the Krajina Serbs take steps to formally unite with the Bosnian Serbs or they take direct military action against Croatian cities.

- Tudjman may be influenced by events in Bosnia in establishing the timetable for any military operation. Heavy fighting in Bosnia could provide Zagreb with an opportunity to exploit the Krajina Serb weakness in manpower because fewer Bosnian Serbs would be available to reinforce the Krajina. If a settlement appears likely in Bosnia, the Croats may opt for military measures before the International Community eliminates sanctions on Serbia.

- It is very difficult to estimate the number of refugees that would result from major conflict in part because estimates of the current population in the Serb-controlled territories of Croatia vary from about 200,000 to 450,000. Refugees would most likely move into territory controlled by the Bosnian Serbs. 3.5c

Milosevic's recognition of Croatia and Bosnia--although unlikely--would probably accelerate and increase the fighting in both Bosnia and Croatia.

- Serbia's recognition of Croatia's borders would cause the Krajina Serbs to announce formal unification with the Bosnian Serbs. This would almost certainly lead to an immediate military assault by the Croats.

- The Bosnian Government forces would be bolstered by recognition but would almost certainly redouble their military efforts against the Bosnian Serbs, who would now be completely cut off from resupply. 3.5c

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Postponed Fighting

While the differences between the warring factions in Croatia and Bosnia make another round of fighting likely in the next three months, a combination of factors could postpone the fighting until later this year.

- Introduction of a follow-on peacekeeping force could delay renewed fighting in Croatia. Zagreb will only accept a new force that will take control of Croatia's border with Serbia and Bosnia. The Krajina Serbs are unlikely to accept such a force unless it also is charged with patrolling the current cease-fire line. If both factions compromised on this issue and some minimal international force--probably from the WEU or NATO--were in place in April before UNPROFOR begins withdrawing, fighting could be forestalled while a new round of negotiations took place.

- Zagreb will be reluctant to launch a major attack while substantial UN forces are still in Serb-held territories. If the UN withdrawal in April and May is particularly slow and a large number of peacekeepers remain in the region, Croatia may opt to postpone major military action until the fall, after the tourist season.

- If Croatia is seriously threatened with major economic sanctions in response to military attacks on the Krajina Serbs, Zagreb may delay military action until the international community's focus wanes or until Croatia can point to a serious Serb "provocation" to justify further military operations. 3.5c

Heavy fighting would be postponed in Bosnia if the Bosnian Government decided to delay its likely spring offensives.

- Heavy spring rains could impede resupply and movement of government forces, and they may wait until the drier months of June or July before launching major attacks.

- Government forces may wish to take advantage of the impact on the Serbs of renewed fighting in Croatia. Under such a scenario, they might postpone their attacks until the Bosnian Serbs are heavily engaged in the fighting in the Krajina, probably in June or later.

- The government could rethink its plans for military operations if serious negotiations were about to take place. These would require true concessions from the Bosnian Serbs prior to the start of talks, including removal of forces from key areas such as Sarajevo, and some form of acceptance of the original contact group plan. 3.5c

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Movement Towards Peace

Despite five years of effort, the international community has not been able to affect the fundamental clashes of interests in the region. Unless the UN, NATO or some other outside actor is prepared for a massive long-term infusion of economic and military resources into the region, such changes are not likely in the near term. If all the warring factions made fundamental changes to their political positions, we would expect to see some of the following signs of movement towards agreement during the next three months.

- Croatia would have to accept the extension of the UNPROFOR mandate or the deployment of a new force that monitored the current cease-fire line by April in order to prevent renewed clashes--especially in the zone of separation this spring.

- By late spring, a new round of negotiations would have to begin, with both sides making major concessions. Croatia and the Krajina Serbs would have to be prepared to redraw existing international borders allowing the Serbs to live outside Croatian control. Alternatively, the complete Krajina Serb leadership would have to be replaced, and probably a substantial portion of the local Serb population removed to Bosnia or Serbia, leaving the Krajina inside Croatia.

- Negotiations could be based on a slightly less extreme scenario if Zagreb accepted significantly more "autonomy" for the Krajina Serbs than is contained in the Z-4 plan and the Krajina Serbs gave up the idea of any "special links" with Belgrade. [redacted]

Movement towards a solution in Bosnia would almost certainly be tied to developments in Croatia, but any movement towards peace there would also rely on a number of unprecedented developments.

- Initially, the Bosnian Government and Bosnian Serbs would have to accept an extension of the current cessation of hostilities accord after 30 April and begin implementing all of its measures, including the separation of forces and the deployment of peacekeepers between the warring factions.

- To support the talks, the Bosnian Government would have to abandon its goal of maintaining a unified Bosnia. The Serbs would have to back down from their plans for association with Serbia.

- Effective enforcement of the arms embargo, especially the cut-off of Iranian arms deliveries, could make Sarajevo more receptive to a diplomatic settlement.

- As stated earlier, Belgrade's recognition of Croatia and Bosnia is likely to lead to an increase in fighting in the short term. If the Krajina Serbs and

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[redacted]

Bosnia Serbs are truly and completely cut off from Serbia, however, the weight of forces for the Croatians and Bosnia Government would lead to the eventual military defeat of both Serb groups--but not within the next three months. [redacted]

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

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AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	28 Feb	1504	[signature] 1/16/1995 PRINT LAST NAME: [illegible] COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
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DATE/TIME: 28/1425Z Feb 95

MESSAGE #: 202

NSC LOG # 9520250

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting Agenda for 28 Feb DC PAGES: 3

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

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SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 27, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the UN

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia on Tuesday, February 28, 1995, 4:30-6:00pm, in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be principals plus one. The agenda is attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

for
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/26/2019
2010-0533-M

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DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA AND CROATIA

DATE: February 28, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 4:30pm - 6:00pm

Agenda

I. Near-Term Croatia Strategy.....State

II. NATO Prepositioning - Step Two.....JCS

III. Former Yugoslavia Policy Review.....NSC/All

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 2/6/2020

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 27, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: DON KERRICK

SUBJECT: Deputies Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, February 28, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Deputies Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia to be held February 28, 1995. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

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Case Number: 2010-0533-M

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~~001a. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (2 pages)~~	~~03/02/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RDS 10/01/2013
~~001b. memo~~	~~[Duplicate of 001a] (2 pages)~~	~~03/02/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RDS 10/01/2013
002a. memo	BG Don Kerrick to Samuel Berger re: March 2 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (4 pages)	03/01/1995	P1/b(1)
~~002b. agenda~~	~~[Duplicate of 003] (1 page)~~	~~03/02/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 02/06/2020
~~002c. paper~~	~~re: Draft Discussion Paper (5 pages)~~	~~03/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002d. paper~~	~~re: Croatia Discussion Paper: Possible Incentives and Disincentives (3 pages)~~	~~03/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
002e. paper	re: Decision Paper (2 pages)	03/01/1995	P1/b(1)
~~002f. paper~~	~~re: Former Yugoslavia Policy Review (11 pages)~~	~~02/27/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RDS 10/01/2013
002g. report	re: The Balkans: The Next Three Months [partial] (6 pages)	02/24/1995	P1/b(1) RDS 10/01/2013
~~002h. chart~~	~~re: [Bosnia Timeline] (1 page)~~	~~02/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 08/03/2015
002i. list	re: Balkans Policy Review Issues/Decisions (2 pages)	02/1995	P1/b(1)
~~002j. paper~~	~~re: The International Military Presence in Macedonia: Regional Stability and Containment (3 pages)~~	~~03/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 08/03/2015

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2010-0533-M
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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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2010-0533-M
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RESTRICTION CODES

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P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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DOC DATE: 03 MAR 95
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KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
DC
CROATIA
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 2 MAR DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: REED SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 07 MAR 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520256 9520260

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0179 CODES:

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FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BAKER JANE
		KERRICK
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

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001		X	95030619	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
001	SENS	Z	95030619	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	95030620	REED SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

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002	950303	FUERTH, L	
002	950303	BRILL, K	
002	950303	MCALEER, R	
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KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
DC
CROATIA
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 2 MAR DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: DUE DATE: 07 MAR 95 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF:

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FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
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Dohse	7	D	
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger	2		
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	'3/6	8
NSC Secretariat			

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Dohse	1	D	
Sens			
Soderberg	BA		
Berger	2	DLR	
Lake			
Situation Room			
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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	3/6	11:35 p.m.	Charles V. Alexander PRINT LAST NAME: ALEXANDER COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
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MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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Initials: RDS Date: 9/26/2019
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9520278
DATE 03 MAR 95

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 2 MAR DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
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MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 5/26/2019
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 6, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Executive Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, March 2, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

James W. Rund
for Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/26/2019
2010-0533-M

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A.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee
DATE: March 2, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 6:00 - 7:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
Samuel R. Berger

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Rick Saunders

State:
Strobe Talbott
Peter Tarnoff
Richard Holbrooke

DOD:
John Deutch
Walter Slocombe

OMB:
Gordon Adams
Keith Beckell

USUN:
David Scheffer
James O'Brien

CIA:
Douglas MacEachin
Ray Converse

JCS:
LTG Wesley Clark
COL. Walter Buchanan

NSC:
Alexander Vershbow
BG Donald L. Kerrick

Summary of Conclusions

1. Deputies met to discuss the strategy for Ambassador Holbrooke to pursue in a final push with President Tudjman aimed at reversing his decision to terminate the UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia on March 31. They agreed that retention of interpositional forces along the confrontation line is vital to prevent renewed fighting between the Croatian and Krajina Serb forces. The price for retention of the interpositional force for Tudjman may be agreeing to demand for forces along Croatia's border with Bosnia, but it is not clear we can support a border force and American participation would be very difficult. If Tudjman is willing to agree to the interpositional force,

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2010-0533-M
RS 9/30/14 (2.06)

Deputies agreed that Ambassador Holbrooke should only offer to discuss a possible border force with Allies. Deputies asked State to prepare a paper for Principals' consideration on Friday, March 3, illustrating the approach Ambassador Holbrooke will use in his meeting with President Tudjman next week. **(Action: State)** (S)

2. Deputies discussed the issue of Step Two prepositioning of NATO communications assets to support a NATO-led operation to withdraw UNPROFOR from Bosnia and/or Croatia. They agreed that the issue should be presented to the Principals Friday for decision. They requested that the decision paper be modified to reflect the Deputies' discussion. **(Action: NSC)** (S)

3. Deputies agreed to meet in informal session Saturday, March 4, to discuss the NSC-staff paper "Former Yugoslavia Policy Review." (S)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 3, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

FROM: BG DON KERRICK (DK)

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, March 2, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of Conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia held March 2, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve (AV) Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 5/26/2019
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20278

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee
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TIME: 6:00 - 7:00 p.m.

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RS 9/30/14 (2.38)
2013-0682-M

border force with Allies. Deputies asked State to prepare a paper for Principals' consideration on Friday, March 3, illustrating the approach Ambassador Holbrooke will use in his meeting with President Tudjman next week. **(Action: State)** (S)

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RECORD ID: 9520260
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TO: BERGER

FROM: KERRICK
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 01 MAR 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA CROATIA
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 2 MAR DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER DUE DATE: 04 MAR 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520256 9520278

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0179 CODES:

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FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BAKER JANE
		KERRICK
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

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Soderberg	2	Copy	
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Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	(MH) 3/3	N
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cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS:

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	BG Don Kerrick to Samuel Berger re: March 2 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (4 pages)	03/01/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4000

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0179 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, March 2, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs669

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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TAB A

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DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA AND CROATIA

DATE: March 2, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: TBD

Agenda

I. Near-Term Croatia Strategy.....State

II. NATO Prepositioning - Step Two.....JCS

III. Former Yugoslavia Policy Review.....NSC/All

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 2/6/2020
2013-0682-M

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TAB 3

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(1)

DRAFT DISCUSSION PAPER

UNPROFOR/Croatia's current 15,000 troops come from Canada, Poland, Jordan, Ukraine, Denmark, Kenya, the Czech Republic, Russia, Lithuania and Belgium. UNPROFOR has been deployed in Croatia since early 1992 to demilitarize the UN Protected Areas (UNPAs), facilitate refugee return, monitor the Croatia/Bosnia border, and facilitate economic confidence-building measures (CBMs).

In the face of Krajina Serb opposition and the absence of Security Council approval of a more robust application of its mandate, UNPROFOR has generally operated with the agreement of the parties. Its inability to demilitarize the UNPAs or to monitor the border is at the core of the Croatian Government's contention that UNPROFOR has de facto partitioned Croatia. More recently, UNPROFOR/Croatia has successfully monitored the ceasefire agreed in March 1994 and assisted implementation of the CBMs agreed in recent months. Ultimately, however, the departure of UNPROFOR means war: our objective must be to maintain an international presence along the lines of confrontation. If Croatia refuses to extend UNPROFOR's mandate, we need to consider alternatives:

Option I - UNPROFOR Reconfigured and Re-named: "UNPROFOR Lite"

Would involve essential elements of UNPROFOR Lite proposal and address some of Tudjman's other concerns. Some or all of the elements of the mission proposed below could be adopted.

Mission Elements:

-- Could have a new Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG). Akashi would retain responsibility only for Bosnia and Macedonia.

-- Reduced troop presence of about 5,000 - 7,000 would continue to monitor the force separation line.

whether

-- Small (less than 200) observer force would symbolically monitor the international border (more robust mandate would only set up mission for failure). This aspect of mission could be non-UN.

-- CIVPOL or civilian component might be retained to help implement economic confidence building measures (ECBM's), help protect minorities in the UNPA's and facilitate transitional arrangements in UNPA West.

PRO:

o Perhaps the only possible realistic alternative.

o British support concept.

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2017-0682-M

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- o Continued UN involvement would facilitate broader international support.

- o Continuity and cost limitation by using existing forces and logistic infrastructure.

- o Gives Tudjman symbolic recognition of his borders and the start of an effort toward transition in UNPA West. Akashi is replaced in Croatia. Knin gets a force on the separation line in return for border monitoring force.

- o Better able to coordinate its actions with UNPROFOR than a non-UN force.

- o Less costly than current operation. Funding mechanism exists.

CON:

- o Unity of command lost with two SRSG's.

- o UN is still suspect, if not discredited.

- o Knin, the Bosnian Serbs, and the Bosniacs could all veto the border monitors.

- o Border monitors and effort to begin transition in UNPA West might prove ineffective. Having to pull border monitors out under pressure could have serious political costs.

Option II - Retaining UNPROFOR "As Is"; "UNPROFOR Stout"

UNPROFOR would continue roughly at current manpower levels, with a presence in the UNPAs and along the ceasefire lines, and an added presence along the international border. It would pursue its mandate in theory but not necessarily with the agreement of the parties, but with the warning that interference by the parties would invite a response.

PRO:

- o Continuity

- o Proven effectiveness

- o Maximize coordination of overall ex-Yugo policy

- o Likely to have broad international support, particularly from Russia

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(3)

CON:

- o UNPROFOR (esp. Akashi) has no credibility with GOC
- o Requires Tudjman to back all the way down
- o Without Croatian agreement, would be in difficult political position

Option III - WEU Force

There has been discussion in European governments of the WEU providing the interpositional force. They might also be able to provide just border monitors, or other elements of the mandates sketched out above.

PRO:

- o "NATO Standard" troops could operate under more robust ROE if the political will was present.
- o Would hand lead for solving the problem in Croatia back to the Europeans.
- o Might involve very little cost to the U.S.

CON:

- o Has been tried. No precedent for success. Could be totally ineffective and lead to greater conflict.
- o In practice unlikely to be much more assertive than UNPROFOR has been, which could erode both WEU and NATO credibility.
- o Ironically, might also enhance WEU's credibility at the expense of NATO and the U.S.
- o Discontinuity with current UN operations.
- o Russia and Islamic countries might feel marginalized.
- o Europeans would expect cash contributions from the U.S. We have no effective way to contribute the large sums that would be expected.

Option IV - OSCE Force

The OSCE has no experience with peacekeeping and is enmeshed in plans for an operation in Nagorno Karabakh. Doesn't have the infrastructure necessary to run a large operation. They could not do both Croatia and NK at the same time. Might be better suited to perform just the border monitoring mission.

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(4)

PRO:

- Would involve a credible, broad-based regional organization to which the U.S. belongs. Russia is also a member.
- Unless the U.S. were to contribute large numbers of troops or logistical support our costs might be very low. (8.3% of common costs)
- We would remain important players at a political level.
- Planning done for deployment to NK give the organization some experience in planning a large scale operation.

CON:

- Not clear who would contribute troops. Might result in offers primarily from Eastern European countries. Might not get enough troops.
- OSCE is a consensus organization. Anyone can veto.
- Unity of command in ex-Yugo would be compromised.
- OSCE has even more restrictive ROE than the UN.
- OSCE lacks peace-keeping experience and is tied up with Nagorno-Karabakh.
- No money budgeted for this. Cost sharing mechanism unclear and untested.

Option V - Multinational Force

A multinational coalition would probably act under authority of a UN mandate. Any combination of participants would require strong leadership. The U.S. is the only country that has effectively led a multinational military effort. England and France might be capable, but would probably have to rely heavily on our diplomatic capital.

PRO:

- Has potential to be the most robust option, by far.
- Although many countries may contribute token forces, the leaders of the coalition usually retain much tighter political control over the force.

CON:

- Most likely to require some U.S. troop presence on the ground.

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(5)

- Increased risk of embroiling troop contributing nations directly in the conflict. Attacks on troops acting in national capacity may require retaliation.

- Not budgetted and no mechanism to share costs. US could be stuck with the bill.

- Unless the MNF troops were prepared to intervene militarily to stop aggression it could undermine credibility of the troop contributing nations.

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CROATIA DISCUSSION PAPER:

POSSIBLE INCENTIVES & DISINCENTIVES

Zagreb has failed to grasp that preservation of the "essential" international peacekeeping elements we identified in January is non-negotiable. In making this unmistakably clear -- essentially by insisting on international monitoring of the separation zone -- we need a menu of carrots and sticks to bring Tudjman around.

We should also pursue a third country track, including:

- o Instructions to Amb Flynn to propose Papal involvement.
- o Further contacts with Germans to coordinate approaches.
- o Consultations with Croatian neighbors -- i.e. Hungary, Slovenia, Austria to make own demaraches.

The following ideas would be staffed out once Deputies provide the necessary guidance on the general approach to take with Zagreb.

Punitive Bilateral Steps

Consulates
-- revoke permission to open new consulates in Los Angeles, Pittsburgh, and/or Cleveland
-- no GOC plans to open these immediately
-- close recently-opened consulate in New York

illustrative put at peril

Cultural/Educational Exchanges
-- range of options from revoking visas for current visitors to suspending applications for future exchanges

Science & Technology
-- suspend cooperation, freezing projects from joint fund
-- requires advance notice to renounce agreement

Democracy and Rule of Law Programs
-- range of options from shutting down ongoing projects to refusing to fund new ones
-- probably counter-productive to stop these SEED programs

Downgrade relations
-- withdraw Ambassadors

Development Assistance
-- suspend work on banking sector
-- most AID funds go to Bosnian refugees and Croatian displaced
-- ask European to double-track to maximize impact

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PL 480
-- already approved $5 million for commodity purchase
-- difficult to stop at this stage

Halt Defense Cooperation
-- have already suspended programs that would expand bilateral defense cooperation, e.g. IMET, Marshall Center
-- U.S. benefits much more from exchange of Defense Attaches with Croatia than does Zagreb
-- Suspending "Memorandum of Cooperation on Defense Relations" would be significant symbol, with limited practical result

Commercial Treaties
-- cut off/hold up negotiations on Bilateral Investment, Intellectual Property Rights, Double Taxation Treaties

Punitive Multilateral Steps

UN arms embargo
-- enforce vigorously
-- tricky not to disadvantage Bosnia supply
-- but not impossible, e.g. challenge Zagreb's heavy equipment acquisition

International Financial Institutions
-- freeze Croatia programs in EBRD, IBRD
-- IMF cut-off inadvisable given Zagreb's excellent macroeconomic record

Economic Sanctions on Croatia

Positive Bilateral Steps

Presidential Meeting
-- offer Tudjman meeting with POTUS during Federation commemoration or other suitable occasion

if what?

Serbian Sanctions Linkage
-- reaffirm U.S. commitment to keep significant sanctions on Belgrade until there is real progress toward reintegrating the Serb-held areas
-- if not public and high-level it's nothing new

Croatian Economic Sanctions Veto
-- Pledge to oppose sanctions on Zagreb if Croatia acts pesponsibly, e.g. peacekeeping essentials, no hostile acts

Anti-Missile Defense
-- offer to deploy Patriot-type batteries to protect Croatian cities, e.g. Zagreb, Dubrovnik
-- explore no-fly/no-radar/no-missile zone over Krajina

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Looser Interpretation of Arms Embargo
-- sell some items
-- lift restrictions on non-weapon military goods, e.g. parachutes, trucks

Positive Multilateral Steps

WTO Accession
-- support Croatian accession to the World Trade Organization

Highway/Pipeline Security
-- "UNPROFOR Heavy" or NATO deployment to secure highway and oil pipeline
-- both sides have already agreed on desirability of re-opening pipeline and highway

International Border Control
-- organize force (largely symbolic) along lines Zagreb proposes
-- requires Serb consent
-- could build up from existing mandates in Vance Plan (JNA withdrawal monitoring), ICFY Mission (Krajina transshipments), and/or UNPROFOR (Highway checkpoints)
-- helping separate Krajina and Serbia accelerates Krajina reintegration

Air strikes
-- UN/NATO attacks on RSK positions in event of provocations

Caveats

-- Some change in UNPROFOR needed to satisfy Croatian public.
-- Many bilateral programs result from Washington Accords.
-- Risk of Zagreb abandoning Federation to assauge nationalists.
-- Publicly pushing Zagreb supports Knin, undermines U.S. goals.

Reasons to Be Tough

-- Zagreb says they do not seek war, so we are trying to help them out.
-- Tudjman's domestic position is strong enough to sell a turnaround, although he'll have to show results by 1996.
-- When U.S. says "essential," we mean it; we defined the minimum in January with the five elements; the question for Zagreb is not whether they will be preserved, but how.

Tactical Considerations

-- Therefore, push Tudjman hard but not too far.
-- First need him to accept separation zone monitoring.
-- Must enlist German/European support in threatening an end to cooperation if this is refused.
-- Once Zagreb shows some flexibility, we can pursue alternatives to UNPROFOR with key allies.
-- Akashi exploration of border monitoring possibilities with Krajina Serbs is useful and should be allowed to continue.

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TAB C

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002e. paper	re: Decision Paper (2 pages)	03/01/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4000

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0179 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, March 2, 1995

2010-0533-M
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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TAB D

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~~SECRET~~ February 27, 1995

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA POLICY REVIEW

Introduction

As we approach a potentially critical period in the Balkans over the next three months, now is the time to review the fundamental principles guiding our policy. U.S. policy has, in fact, had some success over the past two years in containing the spread of the war, reducing the level of violence, keeping relief supplies flowing to most areas, and maintaining cohesion with Allies and Russia. What we have been unable to produce is a political settlement in Bosnia or Croatia that rolls back Serb gains sufficiently to be acceptable to the Bosnians and Croats, and to be perceived as "fair" (much less "just") in moral terms.

The fundamental problem has been a lack of leverage: sanctions and political pressure have been insufficient to sway the Serbs, and our efforts to bring NATO air power to bear have come to naught. In Bosnia, after almost a year of effort, the Contact Group is becoming a spent force, with its unity increasingly strained. In Croatia, the Z-4 plan for a political solution is, for all intents and purposes, stillborn, and Tudjman's decision to eject UNPROFOR threatens to destroy even the limited economic confidence-building measures developed over the past year.

As the CIA paper makes clear, there is no "peace faction" among any of the parties, and Milosević's willingness to pressure his Serb cousins is limited. If we stay on our present course, the prospects are for an escalation of the war in Bosnia and a new war in Croatia, with the potential unraveling of our limited achievements to date, and increased pressures for U.S. involvement. The differences between the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios are largely ones of timing and degree. And as the risk of war increases in Bosnia and Croatia, the dangers of spillover to other areas grow as well.

If the war escalates, the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Croatia, Bosnia or both will become increasingly likely -- creating the prospect of U.S. troops on the ground in former Yugoslavia in a hostile environment, the outcome we have most sought to avoid. As international efforts founder, the Bosnians will be able to make an increasingly convincing case for lifting the arms embargo; yet the odds of bringing our Allies and, especially, the Russians along will remain low. Moreover, lifting the arms embargo, to be effective, entails the United States taking other actions that increase our involvement and responsibility.

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Interests and Objectives

Throughout the conflict, we have sought to protect several core U.S. interests: maintaining our strategic relationship with key Allies and protecting the credibility of NATO; avoiding a conflict with Russia that could undermine our efforts to promote reform and international cooperation; preventing the spread of the Bosnian conflict into a wider Balkan war that could destabilize southeastern Europe and draw in U.S. allies; and ensuring that the use of force to change borders and acts of genocide do not become legitimate forms of behavior in post-Cold War Europe.

Along with these core interests, we have pursued a range of more specific objectives, but have never set clear priorities among them:

- To stop or limit the fighting.
- To maintain relief supplies and reduce human suffering.
- To prevent the establishment by force of a Greater Serbia.
- To achieve a negotiated settlement acceptable to all parties that reverses at least some Serb territorial conquests and preserves the territorial integrity and international identity of Bosnia, Croatia and other ex-Yugoslav states.
- To prevent the spread of conflict to Kosovo, Macedonia, Albania and beyond.
- To keep U.S. ground forces out except in the context of implementing a political settlement.

The tools we have applied have varied over time in response to events, and as our priorities have shifted: Until the end of 1994, we sought to use NATO military power to enforce UNSC resolutions and to put pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to settle on terms that provided a better deal for the Bosnian Government ("air power in the service of diplomacy"). After Bihac, however, we consciously shifted the emphasis to maintaining NATO cohesion, recognizing that this would erode U.S. and Alliance credibility and reduce further our negotiating leverage. Yet we did not scale back our political objectives to match our reduced leverage -- leading to the present diplomatic impasse.

The result has been charges of fecklessness and an erosion of confidence in U.S. leadership on other issues. Therefore, we now need to step back and confront these inherent contradictions:

- On the one hand, our own principles, as well as public and Congressional pressures, make it difficult to disengage and effectively abandon the Bosnians.

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- On the other hand, we do not presently have the means to attain the political goal we have set -- negotiated settlements that deprive the Serbs of some of their ill-gotten gains -- and we have not been prepared to commit those means. Moreover, there is limited public support in the U.S. or in Europe for doing so.

Basic Strategic Choices

Many of our decisions over the next 2-3 months will be driven by events on the ground. But some of our choices will depend on where we want to go in the longer term. Therefore, before considering specific options, Principals need to decide our overall strategic direction and whether the course chosen is politically sustainable. This, in turn, requires deciding what are our priority interests and sticking with that decision in terms of committing the resources needed to attain our goals. The following, in broad terms, are basic approaches to be considered:

1. Continue our present policy: muddle through while supporting the Bosnians: Maintain the Contact Group and continue to seek a political solution that provides a better deal for the Bosnians, but not commit to increased military pressure on their behalf; rely for leverage on sanctions and efforts to isolate the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs (recognizing that these will be inadequate to the task). Seek to contain the fighting and humanitarian suffering to the extent possible, while maintaining Alliance cohesion. Keep UNPROFOR in place in essentially its present form (improve its effectiveness, but don't press it to take a more confrontational stance against the Serbs). Seek to postpone any lifting of the arms embargo and don't push for use of NATO air power, since this would precipitate UNPROFOR's withdrawal. Continue to sustain the Federation. Take additional measures in the front-line states to contain spillover of the conflict, such as beefing up UNPROFOR/Macedonia.

   - This would maintain European and Russian support, reduce the risks of deeper U.S. military involvement, and recognize that, absent such involvement, political settlements are not achievable in the foreseeable future.

   - The gap between our goal of a "fair" settlement and our unwillingness to provide the means to that end, however, would leave us vulnerable to charges of diplomatic fecklessness. It would be difficult to persuade the public and pro-Bosnian elements in the Congress that, over time, the maintenance of sanctions, a continued stalemate on the ground, and the solidity of the Federation will bring the Bosnian Serbs to accept a settlement along the lines of the

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Contact Group plan, and the Krajina Serbs to accept autonomy within Croatia.

- The main weakness of this approach, however, is that the Bosnians and the Croatians are not prepared to play along: Both are ready to pursue the military option with renewed vigor over the coming months, putting UNPROFOR's presence in doubt. And the Bosnians will campaign for lift when the ceasefire ends. Our continued rhetorical support for their cause would make it difficult for us to oppose.

2. Adopt a policy of neutrality toward the terms of a settlement and focus on active containment of the conflict: Openly acknowledge that achieving a better solution for the Bosnians is not possible without U.S. actions that it is not in our interest to take. Apart from this shift in approach to the diplomatic track, take essentially the same actions as under the previous approach. Make clear we do not believe multilateral lift is politically attainable and strongly oppose Congressional pressures to lift unilaterally. Abandon Contact Group or suspend its activities, making clear that it is up to the parties, not the international community, to find a mutually acceptable solution. Promote periodic ceasefire agreements. Advise the Bosnians of the need to be realistic about the facts on the ground and agree to terms that acknowledge Serb preeminence (accept territorial outcomes short of 51:49, Serb Confederation with Belgrade; seek protection through links to Croatia, etc.).

   - This course would also maintain good relations with the Europeans, avoid a confrontation with Russia, and reduce the potential for U.S. military involvement. We would concentrate our efforts in areas where we have been able to achieve some success: reducing the violence, delivering humanitarian relief, maintaining the Muslim-Croat ceasefire and the Federation, and preventing the spread of the conflict outside of Bosnia and possibly Croatia. By distancing ourselves from the Bosnians' political agenda, we might have greater success in keeping UNPROFOR in place.

   - We would suffer harsh criticism from some quarters in the Congress and the public for abandoning the Bosnians and performing another flip-flop. We would need to make the case that it is not in U.S. interests to intervene unilaterally to ensure Bosnian victory, that we cannot gain European or Russian support for firmer measures to help the Bosnians, and that lift alone would probably make things worse for them in any case. We would want to appeal to the significant number of Congressmen whose support for lift is soft, and who are not keen on the deeper military involvement that a credible lift-and-strike policy would require.

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- Assuming we can ride out the initial storm, this approach would lower expectations and adjust public opinion to the reality of a continued conflict for which there may be no immediate solution. It would put the onus on the parties to negotiate directly with one another, rather than forcing us to explain repeated failed diplomatic initiatives backed by empty threats. It would force the Bosnians to accept the reality of defeat and the fact that they are destined to live surrounded by Serbs. It might even lead to a de facto indefinite cessation of serious hostilities, reducing both human suffering and public pressures for action.

- The problem with this approach, like the first, is that we may not be able to ride out the storm: the Bosnians may succeed in getting Congress to lift unilaterally, possibly with sufficient votes to override a Presidential veto. Moreover, we would, effectively, be acquiescing in Serb aggression, setting a dangerous precedent for the future.

3. Containment of Conflict and Long-Term Quarantine of Greater Serbia: Abandon efforts to negotiate a political settlement and reimpose full sanctions against Serbia for the long haul. Make clear we will refuse to recognize Serb conquests in Bosnia and Croatia and we will continue to treat Serbia as a pariah state until Serbs accept settlements that restore territorial integrity of Bosnia and Croatia. Refrain from military intervention, take laissez-faire approach to continued fighting among the parties. Concentrate on humanitarian aid, bolstering the Federation politically and economically, and containing spillover to other parts of the region. If UNPROFOR were to withdraw, this could be combined with a lift-and-leave strategy.

- This approach would be analogous to our approach to Soviet domination of Central and Eastern Europe during the Cold War, in which we were prepared to wait for decades for a just outcome -- isolating one party while promoting free-market development in the other. It would be based, again, on a recognition that there is no available political solution, and avoid perpetuating false expectations that the international community can impose a settlement. But in contrast to the previous approach, it would be based as well on a judgment that Milosevic remains the problem rather than the solution, despite his recent attempts to play the peacemaker -- distinguishing the victim from the victimizer.

- It is doubtful Russia would agree if we reimposed the sanctions noose around Serbia, however. We might agree with the Russians to disagree about Serbia, perhaps lifting or suspending some or all multilateral sanctions against the FRY -- but maintaining U.S. sanctions -- in exchange for agreement on continued, tightened sanctions against the Pale

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and Knin Serbs (but recognizing that Milosevic will try to undermine these to the extent he can get away with it).

- The front-line states' enforcement of sanctions would be difficult to sustain absent substantial financial compensation. Without such compensation, long-term continuation of the sanctions could actually have a destabilizing effect on the region overall. Moreover, this long-term approach could result in further Serb territorial expansion and prolong the humanitarian and refugee crisis for years to come.

- As with approaches 1 and 2, it is not clear we could sustain this course in the face of pressure from the Congress and the Bosnians.

4. Increased U.S. commitment in support of Bosnians, apply military pressure to compel Serb acceptance of a settlement: In theory, this could involve either: (a) returning to our 1994 approach: press for a more robust UNPROFOR that is prepared to use force against Serbs and make active use of NATO close air support; resume NATO enforcement of exclusion zones, and possibly establish additional exclusion zones; if these measures prove insufficient, withdraw UNPROFOR and implement a multilateral lift-and-strike strategy; or (b) proceeding directly to lift and strike, after helping UNPROFOR to withdraw. In practice, only (b) is feasible, since Allies will not agree to robust military actions while their vulnerable UNPROFOR forces remain in place.

- This would align our policy with Congressional rhetoric and provide the means to back up our declared goals of helping the Bosnians and thwarting Serb ambitions. It would lead to increased fighting, at least in the short term, but might in time give the Bosnians the capability to recover territory and, by altering the situation on the battlefield, convince the Serbs to agree to an equitable political settlement.

- It would, however, create significant strains in our relations with our Allies and the Russians. Our readiness to participate in NATO extraction of UNPROFOR could provide the leverage to win Allied support in the UNSC for multilateral lift. But preventing a Russian veto would be more difficult. It would, at a minimum, require lifting sanctions against Serbia at the same time (although this may be necessary in any event to encourage Milosevic not to resume military support to his Serb cousins).

- Moreover, withdrawing UNPROFOR and explicitly committing to produce a Bosnian success would hasten the onset of the situation we have sought most to avoid, the deployment of U.S. ground forces, leaving us with the responsibility for organizing relief supplies and protecting the enclaves. And

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lift - whether unilateral or multilateral -- would commit us to arming and training the Bosnians for an indefinite period, as well as providing air cover, even if we tried to set a time limit on our support. In short, it could Americanize the war, with little likelihood of hastening a political settlement.

Near-Term Decisions

The foregoing choices pertain mainly to the decisions we will need to take in the coming months on Bosnia. In Croatia, the situation may be more urgent, and our goal more straightforward: to prevent a new war over the Krajina. To this end, we need to be clear at the outset that we do not support Croatian military action to reassert control over the Krajina Serbs, and increase pressure on Tudjman to retain at least some portion of UNPROFOR interposed between the warring parties in the separation zone. We cannot go too far in imposing punitive measures on Tudjman, however, given the importance of Tudjman's support for the Federation and our need to use Croatian territory to support any UN/NATO/U.S. operation in Bosnia. We must above all avoid driving Tudjman into an unholy alliance with Milosevic to carve up Bosnia.

Finally, to the extent that we decide to focus more on containment of spillover, beefing up or replacing UNPROFOR in Macedonia would take on greater urgency alongside the decisions that we will need to make with respect to Bosnia and Croatia.

With these considerations in mind, the following is a sketch of the options on which decisions will be needed over the next three months.

Options: Croatia

Near Term:

- Make renewed push (in tandem with Germans and other Allies) within next 10 days to convince Tudjman to extend UNPROFOR with reduced mandate (UNPROFOR Lite).
- Fallback: Press for one-time extension of March 31/June 30 deadlines to allow more time for negotiations.

  Issue: Whether to threaten limited punitive actions at this stage? Or should we offer Tudjman a carrot?

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If these initial efforts fail:

- Begin Step Two prepositioning for UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia or Croatia no later than March 8 (will require Congressional consultations and decisions on funding).
- Offer new, high-level international negotiator to negotiate Croatian settlement, in tandem with final push for acceptance of UNPROFOR Lite.
- Agree in principle to Croatian proposal for international task force (ITF) to replace UNPROFOR that would monitor Croatian-Bosnian border *on condition that* Tudjman agrees to extend ceasefire, agrees the force will also police the separation zone, and agrees to negotiate with Krajina Serbs on basis of principles in Z-4 plan.

  Issues: Is ITF feasible? (Border force would be highly vulnerable to attack or hostage-taking by Bosnian and Krajina Serb forces, who have traditionally viewed such a force as threat to their survival, and whose acceptance would be a *sine qua non*. Allies would look to U.S. to join the force. But some token presence on the border may be the fig leaf Tudjman needs to back down on ejection of UNPROFOR; Krajina Serbs may accept if it is only way to keep international forces in separation zone.)

  Who would comprise the force? (Unarmed civilian monitors? Joint international-Croatian-Krajina Serb police force? NATO? WEU, backed by U.S. air support -- but recognizing that effectiveness would be limited without TACPs?)

Medium Term:

- Withdraw UNPROFOR from Croatia

  Issues: Nature of U.S. participation?

  How to discourage Tudjman from using NATO forces as cover for early offensive (sanctions or other punitive steps? carrots?).

  How to deter Krajina Serbs from seizing vacated UNPROFOR positions or threatening NATO forces (air strike threat?)

- Introduce civilian monitors to replace UNPROFOR (e.g. OSCE)

Long Term (post-UNPROFOR withdrawal):

- Contain fighting: Establish no-fly zone in Croatia? Other measures?

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- Decide whether to let Tudjman fend for himself (allowing possible Serb victory) or to provide limited support, despite our warnings that he will be on his own.

Options: Bosnia

Near Term:

- Keep Plan B on the table.

  Issues: If so, for how long? Possible modifications/ extensions that aren't sweeteners -- e.g. put forward detailed proposal on constitutional arrangements for future Bosnian Union?)

- Consider staged or scaled-back Plan B -- i.e. ask Milosevic to identify the steps he would take in "partial recognition" of Bosnia and Croatia, determine whether they could be linked to limited sanctions relief.

  Issues: What could Milosevic do beyond tightening border closure to justify sanctions relief? (We could not justify additional relief for tightening a border that should be sealed already. *Possibilities*: close the "back door" to Croatia; cooperate with the War Crimes Tribunal; recognize Bosnia's border and territorial integrity but not the Sarajevo Government.)

  Should we take parallel steps in support of Bosnians to reduce Bosnian/Congressional criticism -- e.g. IMET, other training for Bosnians?

- Continue efforts to isolate Pale irrespective of Plan B: increase border monitors; close Krajina back door.

- Consider whether to reduce or end the activity of the Contact Group as such, in order to emphasize the need for the parties themselves to undertake territorial and constitutional discussions. (This would permit private or individual mediators to operate.) Or agree to French international conference without prior agreement on mutual recognition?

- Explore efforts to increase international support for the Federation: material assistance and political support (envoys to and from, participation in international conferences, agreements such as our proposed 505 agreement, etc.)

- Approach the UN to reconsider its decision not to expand UNPROFOR with the troops already offered (i.e. urge UN to increase UNPROFOR numerically to enable it to deliver humanitarian assistance more effectively, especially along the Blue Route, as opposed to changing its ROE).

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Medium Term:

Decision depends on the choice of overall strategic approach as described above:

- Muddle through, continue to support Bosnians rhetorically, continue diplomatic efforts, but focus on containment.
- Shift to policy of neutrality toward terms of settlement and active containment of conflict; end or suspend Contact Group activities, acknowledge we cannot produce better deal for Bosnians.
- Containment of conflict and long-term quarantine of Greater Serbia.
- Renewed push for military measures in support of Bosnians: withdraw UNPROFOR, multilateral lift and strike

Long Term:

- Maintain support for Federation to forestall Muslim-Croat splits. Intensify isolation of Pale and Knin Serbs.
- Maintain support for War Crimes Tribunal.
- Withdraw UNPROFOR, lift the arms embargo, with lift possibly implemented in stages (beginning with defensive weapons) and tied to "final offer" to accept Contact Group plan.

  Issue: Are we prepared to lift unilaterally if Allies support us in UNSC but Russians veto? Alternatives to lift?

- Abandon support for lift, take tough line with Congress and Bosnians, stick with one of the containment options.

Options: Containing Spillover

- Beef up or replace UNPROFOR/Macedonia

  Issues: When and how? (Enlarge existing force under UN command? Replace with NATO division?)

- Continue efforts to defuse Greece/FYROM dispute.
- Shore up outer wall of sanctions against Serbia.
- Expand bilateral aid/infrastructure programs in south Balkans.
- Expand bilateral military cooperation and economic cooperation with Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia.
- High-level visits to front-line states.

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Decision Timeline

See chart

Attachments:

CIA paper - The Balkans: The Next Three Months
Decision Timeline

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Intelligence Report

DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force *24 February 1995*

The Balkans: The Next Three Months (U)

Fighting is likely to resume this spring because Croatia and Bosnia do not accept the status quo, believe that they can gain political and territorial concessions from Serbs only through military force, and are highly skeptical of the international community's efforts to forge an equitable peace. Fighting is more likely to break out first in Bosnia in March with the collapse of the cessation of hostilities agreement. The scope and intensity of this could influence President Tudjman's calculations on regaining the Krajina by force, but Tudjman's decision on the renewal of conflict there will be taken independently of fighting in Bosnia. Clashes are likely by April or May in conjunction with the UNPROFOR pullout. In a second, less likely scenario, a combination of factors could postpone the fighting until later this year but not alter the deep clashes of interest. In a third scenario, all the warring factions would have to make fundamental changes to their political positions--even less likely in the near to mid term--in order for there to be real movement toward a stable peace in the region. 3.5c

Current Balkans leaders are pursuing irreconcilable demands that make even the beginning of a meaningful peace process in the next three months unlikely. At most, one or more of the key actors in the two major zones of conflict might be convinced to postpone military action. Postponement, however, is not necessarily a way station on the road to peace. Only a reordering of demands or a significant shift in the military situation on the ground would set the stage for a renewed effort to forge a lasting peace in the region. 3.5c

The Key Actors: What Drives Them?

Croatia: Guided by a vision of his personal historical role, mounting nationalist/political pressures which he has helped generate, and frustration with the international community, President Tudjman is now prepared to initiate large-scale military action to reintegrate the Krajina into Croatia. He is encouraged by claims of military superiority from his generals and his own belief that Serbian President Milosevic will not intervene. We do not have evidence Tudjman is working with a specific time schedule; however, having taken the bit in his teeth, it is unlikely he will stall for long or accept merely paper changes in UNPROFOR's mandate. There is no significant peace faction in the Croatian leadership. 3.5c

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Krajina Serbs: Despite fractious personal differences, the Krajina Serb leadership adamantly refuses any form of reintegration, including the limited "autonomy" Zagreb is willing to offer. They will fight fiercely to protect their homeland and could escalate localized Croatian attacks by shelling major Croatian cities. If attacked, they expect help from the Bosnian Serbs and, in extremis, from Belgrade. There is no significant peace faction in Knin. 3.5c

Bosnian Government: Bosnian leaders firmly believe that they can regain territory from the Bosnian Serbs and preserve the concept of a unified Bosnia within its internationally recognized boundaries only by military pressure. They are increasingly confident of their own military capabilities and see the tide swinging in their favor as they look out several years. There is no significant politically organized opposition within the Muslim community to this vision. The Bosnian Croats are largely satisfied with the territory they now control and take their guidance from Zagreb, not Sarajevo. The Herzegovinian hardliners leading the Bosnian Croats ultimately hope to be integrated into a Greater Croatia, a vision that Tudjman does not discourage. 3.5c

Bosnian Serbs: Bosnian Serb leaders will accept nothing less than an independent state as an interim measure toward the creation of an ill-defined "Greater Serbia." They are willing to give up some of the territory they now control to reach an agreement, but until then will fight to keep what they have. They are committed to helping the Krajina Serbs. If pressed by Bosnian Government forces, they might also consider a major military campaign aimed at dealing the Bosnian Government a severe defeat. Although some divisions among leaders are now being publicized, even those advocating acceptance of the Contact Group plan agree with Karadzic on driving a hard bargain on territory and independence for a Bosnian Serb state. Army Commander Mladic despises Karadzic but also shares his goal for an independent Serbian Bosnia with ties to Serbia. 3.5c

Serbia: President Milosevic continues to be a cornerstone to a settlement but at the same time is only a secondary player with limited influence on those he helped into power in Pale and Knin. Milosevic is driven by a strong personal desire to remain in power. He seeks to end sanctions but not at the cost of important political values. He continues to support--for political if not necessarily personal reasons--the concept of a "Greater Serbia," which makes it unlikely he could recognize Croatia and Bosnia or refuse help to the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs if they appeared to be on the verge of serious setbacks. In the short run, he is unable, not just unwilling, to compel either the Krajina Serb or Bosnian Serb leaders to make compromises that they believe are not in their interest. There is no significant peace party in Serbia. 3.5c

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This memorandum was prepared by EO13526 3.5(c)
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Russia: Moscow's overall objectives will be to maintain an influential role in the international decision-making process on the Balkans as the Contact Group process wanes, while trying to keep the conflict contained and minimizing NATO's role. Tactically, Russian leaders will want to increase Russian leverage and head off all domestic criticism by pressing for full sanctions relief for Serbia. Moscow has limited influence with Belgrade--and even less with Pale--but the Russians have the capacity to play a spoiler role. They may pose obstacles to any international actions if they believe that the West is not accounting for Russian interests. 3.5c

EU Contact Group Members: Fearing renewed violence and a broader Balkan conflict, the European Union members of the Contact Group are desperate to keep the negotiating process alive but are increasingly frustrated with the intransigence of the feuding parties. Germany, Britain, and France--which holds the EU presidency and has the largest troop contingent in the former Yugoslavia--will focus on offering incentives for peace, wooing Zagreb with the prospect of EU aid and Belgrade with the promise of lifting sanctions. The EU members so far do not have a unified strategy for dealing with the renewal of full-scale war in Bosnia, according to various sources. Despite differing views, European Contact Group members agree on the need for Contact Group unity and are likely to maintain a coordinated position among themselves under French leadership. 3.5c

Three Scenarios

Renewed Fighting

It is likely that fighting will resume in Bosnia in the next two months, and clashes could then follow quickly in Croatia.

- The Bosnian Government has clearly focused on resupplying, reequipping and reorganizing its forces during the four-month cessation of hostilities (COH) in preparation for launching additional attacks to retake territory in central Bosnia. The Bosnian Serbs also believe that fighting will resume and are taking steps to increase military pressure on the Bihac enclave.

- The Bihac enclave will be the likely focal point of fighting for most of March as the Government V Corps clashes with Krajina Serb and rebel Muslim forces--which did not sign the COH agreement--supported by the Bosnian Serbs. Major gains by either faction around Bihac would probably cause the fighting to spread elsewhere in Bosnia, as the losing faction would attempt to pressure the other by attacking at other points.

- Fighting will probably increase in the rest of Bosnia by late March or early April as the weather improves--temperatures rise into the mid-50s--and the warring factions begin to jockey for military advantage prior to the end of the COH on 30 April. In 1994, fighting picked up substantially in April as

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the government launched a series of attacks in central Bosnia and the Serbs responded by assaulting Gorazde.

- The Bosnian Serbs will probably make a push for new talks in late April and call for an extension of the COH agreement in an attempt to preempt a government attack. The Bosnian Government may accept additional talks under international pressure but will probably reject any extension of the COH agreement.

- The return of warmer, drier weather by May will probably lead to general fighting throughout Bosnia. Government forces will probably launch a series of local attacks--following their strategy of last year--especially in central and northern Bosnia. Government forces will probably make some territorial gains, as the Bosnian Serbs are stretched thin and essentially remain cut off from Serbia. Serb strategy has been to respond to any government attack with an overwhelming offensive--preferably against an isolated or poorly defended enclave--to press the government to abandon its offensive. The Bosnian Serbs, however, will be reluctant to commit their forces fully to a Bosnian offensive, because some may be needed to reinforce the Krajina Serbs in Croatia.

- The resumption of fighting will spark renewed discussion of the need to remove UNPROFOR from Bosnia. Heavy fighting in Bosnia at the same time as an UNPROFOR pullout from Croatia in May and June will spark calls in Paris and London to move toward a withdrawal before winter.

- A major resumption of hostilities in Bosnia, which included an all-out Bosnian Serb effort to take the eastern enclaves, could put at risk nearly 120,000 Muslims who would try to flee to the nearest Muslim-controlled territory. 3.5c

The fighting in Bosnia could influence the prospects for renewed clashes in Croatia, but Tudjman's decision on a renewal of the conflict there will be taken independently of the fighting in Bosnia.

- President Tudjman has ordered the UN to begin withdrawing from Croatia after 31 March and complete withdrawal by 30 June. The Croatians expect to come under increasingly heavy international pressure in the coming month to extend the UN mandate. They appear prepared to stand firm and exact a high price: an international monitoring force--possibly including forces from NATO or Contact Group states--on the Croatian border with Bosnia and Serbia, recognition of Croatia's international border by Belgrade, and demonstrable progress on reintegration of Serb-held territory. In late March or early April, Tudjman may make a push for new talks with the Krajina Serbs, in hopes that the UN pullout will pressure the Serbs to make additional concessions.

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- While the Krajina Serbs may be willing to undertake new negotiations after the deadline is passed, they will not make the concessions necessary to preempt military action by the Croatian armed forces.

- Clashes are likely in late April and early May as the UN begins its withdrawal. A key factor will be the UN pull-out from the Zone of Separation between the warring factions in late April. Krajina Serb and Croat military forces probably will both move to seize key positions along the confrontation line currently occupied by the UN.

- Zagreb will probably attempt to exploit any clashes to place the onus for renewed fighting on the Krajina Serbs. As the clashes escalate, the Krajina Serbs will take steps to impede the withdrawal of UNPROFOR, including taking isolated units as hostages. At this point, the UN may call for NATO to take steps to facilitate the withdrawal of the trapped peacekeepers.

- The Croats will probably try to avoid launching a major offensive until UNPROFOR has withdrawn--slated to be completed by 30 June--but could speed up this timetable if the Krajina Serbs take steps to formally unite with the Bosnian Serbs or they take direct military action against Croatian cities.

- Tudjman may be influenced by events in Bosnia in establishing the timetable for any military operation. Heavy fighting in Bosnia could provide Zagreb with an opportunity to exploit the Krajina Serb weakness in manpower because fewer Bosnian Serbs would be available to reinforce the Krajina. If a settlement appears likely in Bosnia, the Croats may opt for military measures before the International Community eliminates sanctions on Serbia.

- It is very difficult to estimate the number of refugees that would result from major conflict in part because estimates of the current population in the Serb-controlled territories of Croatia vary from about 200,000 to 450,000. Refugees would most likely move into territory controlled by the Bosnian Serbs. 3.5c

Milosevic's recognition of Croatia and Bosnia--although unlikely--would probably accelerate and increase the fighting in both Bosnia and Croatia.

- Serbia's recognition of Croatia's borders would cause the Krajina Serbs to announce formal unification with the Bosnian Serbs. This would almost certainly lead to an immediate military assault by the Croats.

- The Bosnian Government forces would be bolstered by recognition but would almost certainly redouble their military efforts against the Bosnian Serbs, who would now be completely cut off from resupply. 3.5c

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Postponed Fighting

While the differences between the warring factions in Croatia and Bosnia make another round of fighting likely in the next three months, a combination of factors could postpone the fighting until later this year.

- Introduction of a follow-on peacekeeping force could delay renewed fighting in Croatia. Zagreb will only accept a new force that will take control of Croatia's border with Serbia and Bosnia. The Krajina Serbs are unlikely to accept such a force unless it also is charged with patrolling the current cease-fire line. If both factions compromised on this issue and some minimal international force--probably from the WEU or NATO--were in place in April before UNPROFOR begins withdrawing, fighting could be forestalled while a new round of negotiations took place.

- Zagreb will be reluctant to launch a major attack while substantial UN forces are still in Serb-held territories. If the UN withdrawal in April and May is particularly slow and a large number of peacekeepers remain in the region, Croatia may opt to postpone major military action until the fall, after the tourist season.

- If Croatia is seriously threatened with major economic sanctions in response to military attacks on the Krajina Serbs, Zagreb may delay military action until the international community's focus wanes or until Croatia can point to a serious Serb "provocation" to justify further military operations. 3.5c

Heavy fighting would be postponed in Bosnia if the Bosnian Government decided to delay its likely spring offensives.

- Heavy spring rains could impede resupply and movement of government forces, and they may wait until the drier months of June or July before launching major attacks.

- Government forces may wish to take advantage of the impact on the Serbs of renewed fighting in Croatia. Under such a scenario, they might postpone their attacks until the Bosnian Serbs are heavily engaged in the fighting in the Krajina, probably in June or later.

- The government could rethink its plans for military operations if serious negotiations were about to take place. These would require true concessions from the Bosnian Serbs prior to the start of talks, including removal of forces from key areas such as Sarajevo, and some form of acceptance of the original contact group plan. 3.5c

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

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TAB E

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COLLECTION:
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NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4000

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0179 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, March 2, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs669

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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TAB F

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The International Military Presence in Macedonia: Regional Stability and Containment

Purpose

This paper provides a strategy to retain international military forces in Macedonia and surrounding countries to contain the further spread of war in the Balkans should UNPROFOR withdraw from Croatia and Bosnia and fighting increase there. This military strategy is designed to support the long-term stabilization of Macedonia as an area critical to spread of war further into the southern tier of Europe.

Background

The Principals' Committee meeting on February 7, 1995, directed more comprehensive planning on options to contain the conflict in Bosnia and Croatia. Pressure is growing for the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from the former Yugoslavia, and the prospects for renewed fighting in both Croatia and Bosnia are high in the Spring. Given Macedonia's importance to stability in Southern Europe, the Principals directed that special attention be given to strengthening forces in Macedonia to provide stability through deterrence of military threats to Macedonia.

National Interests

Preventing the spread of war in the Balkans is a vital national security interest of the United States, and Macedonia is the center of gravity to containing conflict in Southern Europe. Regional war would threaten the overall stability of Europe and could trigger a conflict between Greece and Turkey, thereby further straining NATO in an increasingly volatile area. The US commitment to stability in Macedonia is well-established. This Administration has reaffirmed the Bush Administration's announcement in December 1992 that the US would employ military force against the Serbians in Kosovo and Serbia proper in the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action. While the threat of Serbian caused violence is low, the consequence of a large refugee flow into Macedonia is grave for the entire region.

The Threat: Why Focus on Macedonia?

The sizable ethnic Albania minority in Macedonia makes it likely that should Macedonia be destabilized, the Albanians will move to merge those ethnically Albanian dominated areas within Macedonia with Albania. An upheaval in Kosovo, which is 90% ethnic Albanian, would result in massive refugee flows that would present Macedonia with insupportable economic, political, and security problems. This is the greatest threat to the region in general for it is the most likely condition to destabilize Macedonia and lead to a land grab of at least parts of Macedonia with the potential to draw in NATO allies Greece and Turkey onopposite sides, Russia, Serbia, and Bulgaria.

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The greatest threat to Macedonian stability is its internal condition undermined by external factors. The combined effects of enforcing the UN-mandated economic sanctions on Macedonia's major trading partner, Serbia, and the closure of the border with Greece, have led to deteriorating and grave economic difficulties--30% unemployment, per capita income at 1964 levels, and industrial output operating at 40% efficiency. These problems only exacerbate ethnic tensions. At the same time, Macedonian nationalists have become more militant. It is conceivable that the fragile democracy that Gligorov has built cannot survive these pressures.

In sum, Macedonia is the most politically, economically, and militarily vulnerable of the states in the region, and its political and military collapse would trigger a preventable wider Balkan war.

Options.

Four options are available to support an international military presence in Macedonia. These include:

1. A NATO deployment;
2. A U.S. led, multinational deployment,
3. A U.S. unilateral deployment,
4. Retain UNPROFOR.

The disadvantages and dangers inherent in any unilateral U.S. action would likely aggravate regional tensions. Such action would risk NATO, PFP, and our emerging partnership with Russia. Moreover, the American people would likely be particularly hesitant to support any U.S. involvement of ground combat forces without a similar commitment from our NATO allies. Finally, it would be logistically difficult if not impossible to get so involved without the direct support of our NATO allies.

A U.S.-led multinational (but not NATO) suffers from many of the disadvantages of a unilateral U.S. action, and does not enjoy the existing infrastructure advantages of a NATO-run operation.

A NATO-run containment strategy has intrinsic merit. Containment of the conflict is a European problem first and foremost, and NATO has the existing political and military infrastructure to support such activities. An exclusively NATO-led operation would not be plagued by the dual-key, chain-of-command difficulties that have characterized UN-NATO command relationships in Bosnia to date. Even so, such an enhanced NATO-controlled operation also risks heightening regional tensions. Without the economic assistance and political stabilization package, such a strategy would not address internally-based stability concerns.

The status quo option is based on the premise that the current UNPROFOR mission and force structure not only is adequate to respond to the current threat environment, but also that any increase in the in the size of the forces would be counterproductive in the long-term--that it would be destabilizing by provoking internal unrest.

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Proposed Concept

Given the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from the former Yugoslavia and the potential for conflict among Serbia, Croatia, and the warring parties in Bosnia, the deployment of a more capable NATO force to Macedonia and associated sites in the southern Balkans is designed to deter a wider Balkan war. It should be equipped and have the ROE to carry out its assigned mission. This deployment is expected to be of indefinite duration. It should be under NATO command and control (C2), operating under a UN mandate. It is intended to send a strong international and internal signal regarding its commitment to preserve internal and regional stability in Southern Europe, thereby containing the present conflict to the former Yugoslavia.

Mandate

The principal focus of this strategy is not the areas of conflict themselves but rather the areas of potential conflict in the countries surrounding Bosnia. Authority for the operations will emanate from a UN mandate, but under NATO C2.

General Mission

An appropriately sized NATO ground force, with significant U.S. participation and with appropriate air and naval support in the region, will deploy to Macedonia. This force will deter threats to Macedonia and preserve the inviolability of Macedonia's internationally recognized borders, thereby enhancing internal and regional stability and prevent the spread of war throughout the Balkans.

Forces and Operations

- Deploy an appropriately sized NATO force to Macedonia;
- NATO force is under exclusive NATO command and control;
- Consider increasing NATO naval presence in the Adriatic;
- Consider increasing NATO air forces deployed to the region; consider basing in Albania.

Assumptions

- NATO will concentrate on containment of the conflict vice active ground involvement in the former Yugoslavia.
- Macedonia will accept the NATO deployment and permit the full use of its military infrastructure.
- UN sanctions against Serbia will not be part of the NATO mission.
- Russia, Turkey, and Greece cannot prevent this deployment.
- UNPROFOR has withdrawn from Bosnia and Croatia.
- Deployment will be under permissive conditions--logistics hubs, overflight and transit rights, and SOFAs will be available.
- Funding arrangements will be acceptable to the U.S.

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STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520260 9520278

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM RECEIVED 95 MAR 15 P3:00

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: (IMMEDIATE) PRIORITY ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 0444 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (202) 456-9425 WH SITROOM
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTICE OF 2 MAR DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

NSC LOG # 20256

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
	USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 9/26/2019
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER

WASHFAX

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

-1 MAR 95 20 17

NMCC/JCS

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: (IMMEDIATE) PRIORITY ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 0444 CLASSIFICATION: SECRET TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (202) 456-9425 WH SITROOM
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTICE OF 2 MAR DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

NSC LOG #: 20256

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
	USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: (IMMEDIATE) PRIORITY ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 0444 CLASSIFICATION: SECRET TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTICE OF 2 MAR DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

NSC LOG # 20256

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
	USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 9/26/2019
2010-0533-M

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~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE
- ☐ FLASH
- ☐ IMMEDIATE
- ☐ PRIORITY
- ☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC LOG # 20256

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting NOTICE OF 2 MAR DC MTG PAGES: 3

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 9/26/2019
2010-0533-M

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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~~SECRET~~

20256

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 1, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National
Security & International
Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia on March 2, 1995, 6:00-7:00pm, in the White House Situation Room to continue discussion from their February 28 meeting. Attendance will be principals plus one. The agenda is attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

for
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/26/2019
2010-0533-M

Declassify on: ~~OADR~~

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DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA AND CROATIA

DATE: March 2, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 6:00-7:00pm

Agenda

I. Near-Term Croatia Strategy.....State

II. NATO Prepositioning - Step Two.....JCS

III. Former Yugoslavia Policy Review.....NSC/All

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By NARA, Date 2/6/2010

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~~SECRET~~ 20256

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 1, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: DON KERRICK

SUBJECT: Deputies Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, March 2, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Deputies Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia to be held March 2, 1995. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove ____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/26/2019
2010-0533-M

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See also 2013-0652-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title: DC0181 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, March 9, 1995				
Staff Office-Individual: Records Management				
Original OA/ID Number: 4000				
Row: 43	Section: 4	Shelf: 7	Position: 1	Stack: V

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (2 pages)~~	~~03/09/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RDS 10/01/2013
002a. memo	Don Kerrick to Samuel Berger re: March 9 Deputies Meeting on Croatia and Bosnia (7 pages)	03/08/1995	P1/b(1)
~~002b. agenda~~	~~[Duplicate of 004] (1 page)~~	~~03/09/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 02/06/2020
~~002c. paper~~	~~re: Side Paper (2 pages)~~	~~03/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002d. paper~~	~~re: Near-Term Croatia Strategy (3 pages)~~	~~03/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002e. paper~~	~~re: Response to Milosevic's Proposal (1 page)~~	~~03/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002f. talking points~~	~~re: Talking Points for Secretary's Telcon with President Tudjman (3 pages)~~	~~03/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002g. talking points~~	~~re: Talking Points for Calls to Members of Congress (2 pages)~~	~~03/07/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 8/3/2015
002h. chart	re: NATO Prepositioning Step 2 [NATO] (2 pages)	03/1995	P1/b(1)
002i. letter	Sven Alkalaj to President Clinton (1 page)	01/17/1994	P1/b(1)
~~002j. paper~~	~~re: Issue Paper: Training the Pro-Government Forces in Bosnia (2 pages)~~	~~03/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 8/3/2015
~~002k. paper~~	~~re: Support for the Federation-505 Agreement (3 pages)~~	~~03/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
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FOLDER TITLE:
DC0181 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, March 9, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs670

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002l. email	Alan Kreczko to Donald Kerrick re: Bosnia DC Briefer II (1 page)	02/21/1995	P1/b(1)
~~003. paper~~	~~re: Easing U.S. Sanctions on Serbia-Montenegro (2 pages)~~	~~03/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~004. agenda~~	~~Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (1 page)~~	~~03/09/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 02/06/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4000

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0181 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, March 9, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs670

RESTRICTION CODES

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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520318
RECEIVED: 11 MAR 95 12

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 15 MAR 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
SOC
CROATIA
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 9 MAR DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: REED SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 15 MAR 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520295 9520302

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0181 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BAKER JANE
		BERGER
		KERRICK
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
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COMMENTS: _____

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	95031507	FOR DECISION
001		X	95031507	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
002		X	95031507	REED SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950315	FUERTH, L	
002	950315	BRILL, K	
002	950315	ADAMS, G	
002	950315	MCALEER, R	
002	950315	INDERFURTH, K	
002	950315	GARTHOFF, D	
002	950315	PATRICK, T	

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recd 3/14 8am

National Security Council
The White House

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ W/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Dohse	1	D	
Sens			
Soderberg	copy		
Berger	2	AV	
Lake			
~~Situation Room~~ Reed	3	JR	Tab I
West Wing Desk	4		
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

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National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 20318

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ H/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Dohse	1	D	
Sens			
Soderberg	cop y		
Berger	2	AW	
Lake			
Situation Room	3	JWR	Tab I
West Wing Desk	4		
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

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LOG 9520318
DATE 15 MAR 95

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 9 MAR DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	15 Mar	0950	L A Branscum
	PRINT LAST NAME: BRANSCUM		
	COPY: 1		
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	3/15/95	9:30 AM	Cathy Tull
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: 1		
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	3/15/95	11:30	J. Graves
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: 1		

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 9/26/2019
2010-0533-M

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DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9520318
DATE 15 MAR 95

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 9 MAR DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	15 Mar	1555	L H Branscum PRINT LAST NAME: BRANSCUM COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: 1
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: 1

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 9/26/2019
2010-0533-M

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DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9520318
DATE 15 MAR 95

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 9 MAR DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	3/15	12/58	S. McE/Lbranscum
	PRINT LAST NAME:		McE/Lbranscum
	COPY:	1	
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY:	1	
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY:	1	

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 9/26/2019
2010-0533-M

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

A

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 0355 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 4
(PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK gwn (202) 456-9425 WH SITROOM
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusion of 9 MAR DL MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA NSC LOG # 20318

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B	USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 9/26/2019
2010-0533-M

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
~~PRIORITY~~
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 0355 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 4
(PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusion of 9 MAR DL MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA NSC LOG # 20318

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 9/26/2019
2010-0533-M

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WASHFAX

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

15 MAR 95 08 29 TIME OF RECEIPT

NMCC/JCS

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 0355 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 4
(PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusion of 9 MAR DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA NSC LOG # 20318

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 9/26/2019
2010-0533-M

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

N 56
0900

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 0355 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 4
(PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusion of 9 MAR DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA NSC LOG # 20318

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

~~UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL~~
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 9/26/2019
2010-0533-M

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~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ 20318

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 15, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

AMBASSADOR RICK INDEFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T.R. PATRICK
Executive Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, March 9, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

for James W. Reed
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By BDS NARA, Date 9/26/2019
2010-0533-M

~~SECRET~~
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee
DATE: March 9, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 4:30pm - 5:30pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
Samuel R. Berger

OVP:
Leon Fuerth

State:
Peter Tarnoff
Richard Holbrooke
Robert Frasure

DOD:
John Deutch
Walter Slocombe

USUN:
Madeleine Albright

CIA:
Douglas MacEachin

JCS:
Admiral William Owens

NSC:
Alexander Vershbow

Summary of Conclusions

1. Deputies met to review the agreement on a new international presence in Croatia worked out on March 6 in Zagreb between Ambassador Holbrooke and President Tudjman. In welcoming the agreement, Deputies noted the discrepancy between Tudjman's expectations of the force controlling Croatia's international borders and what Allies will likely support. In view of this discrepancy, Deputies agreed that the CJCS would place low-key calls to CHODs of principal Allies and UNPROFOR/Croatia troop contributors to describe the meaning of "control" of the border as understood in the agreement. **(Action: JCS)** (S)
(S)

2. Deputies agreed to proceed with planning for the Vice President to meet with Tudjman in Copenhagen on March 12, where the agreement would be finalized and announced by Tudjman, and to prepare for a possible meeting between the President and

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Presidents Izetbegovic and Tudjman during the ceremony honoring the one-year anniversary of Federation on March 16. They confirmed that the agreement with Tudjman needed to be finalized and announced before we invited Tudjman to Washington. **(Action: State)** (S)

3. Deputies agreed that Ambassador Albright should wait until after the agreement has been announced before circulating a draft UN Security Council resolution that would establish the mandate for the new UN force. They agreed, however, that she should preview the main elements to Contact Group counterparts. **(Action: USUN)** (S)

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20318

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 10, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: DON KERRICK

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, March 9, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of Conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia held March 9, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/26/2019
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FROM: KERRICK

DOC DATE: 08 MAR 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA CROATIA
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BRIEFING MEMO FOR 9 MAR DC MTG RE BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER DUE DATE: 11 MAR 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520295 9520318

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0181 DC181 CODES:

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Mar 9

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002a. memo	Don Kerrick to Samuel Berger re: March 9 Deputies Meeting on Croatia and Bosnia (7 pages)	03/08/1995	P1/b(1)

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DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA AND CROATIA

DATE: March 9, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 3:00-4:00pm

Agenda

I. Diplomatic Strategy

A. Near-Term Croatia Strategy (Next Steps).....State

B. Response to the Milosevic Proposal.....State

II. OPLAN 40104 Approval Process

A. Next Steps on Implementing Principals' Decision on NATO Prepositioning - Step Two. .....OSD/JCS

(1) Talking Points for Congressional Calls

(2) Notifying NATO

B. NATO/U.S. Decision Timeline for OPLAN 40104.....OSD/JCS

III. Responding to Dole/Bosnian Government Requests for Military Training (Implementing 505 Agreement).....OSD/JCS

IV. Former Yugoslavia Policy Review.....NSC/All

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By [illegible] NARA, Date 2/6/2020
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SIDE PAPER

This paper describes the understandings reached between Croatia and the U.S. regarding the statement for a new international presence in Croatia.

1. The international force is envisioned to consists of approximately 5,000 troops,

2.. Troops may carry weapons for self-defense and may have other protective equipment (such as armored vehicles),

3. The limited period of time is understood to extend at least until June 30, 1995,

4. The United States will support a separate Croatia-only UNSC resolution providing for a separate Croatia-only mandate for the new international force,

5. The name of the new international force shall make no reference to UNPROFOR,

6. To the extent possible, troops should come from countries mutually agreed between Croatia and the Security Council,

7. It is expected that the international force will control 25 to 30 main crossing points between FRY and Croatia, and between B-H and Croatia,

8. The international force shall prohibit the crossing of the international border by military personnel, or of military equipment, supplies, and weapons,

[9. To the extent possible, the commander of the international force shall be from a country agreed between Croatia and the UN Security Council.]

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As of April 1, 1995, the Mandate of UNPROFOR in Croatia will have expired. Working with the Security Council and its partners in the international community, Croatia will seek to negotiate a new UN Security Council Mandate for an international presence in Croatia that will ---

1. Control the international borders between the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia - Montenegro), and between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, at such places where principal crossing points are not now controlled by the authorities of the Republic of Croatia;

2. Control access and communications for UNPROFOR and other international humanitarian operations to Bosnia-Herzegovina through territory not currently under the control of the authorities of the Republic of Croatia; and

3. Facilitate the continued implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement of March 29, 1994, and the Economic Agreement of December 2, 1994, and facilitate implementation of future agreements aimed at the reintegration of Croatia, and facilitate implementation of relevant UNSCRs

Pending the successful negotiation of a mandate for a new international presence along the lines described above and for a limited period of time, the Government of Croatia agrees that the current international presence may continue to perform functions related to its mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina and functions essential to the continued implementation of the above mentioned agreements of March 29, 1994 and December 2, 1994.

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MARCH 16

FEDERATION ANNIVERSARY EVENT

POLICY OBJECTIVES

BUILD ON FEDERATION'S POSITIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS:

ENDED FIGHTING IN CENTRAL BOSNIA
FACILITATED HUMANITARIAN AID DELIVERY
MODEL FOR LONG-TERM REGIONAL SETTLEMENT
RULE OF LAW/CIVIL SOCIETY

CEREMONY DETAILS

--ONE HOUR FORMAL COMMEMORATION OF THE WASHINGTON ACCORDS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FEDERATION

--REMARKS BY THE FOUR GUESTS OF HONOR--IZETBEGOVIC, TUDJMAN, ZUBAK, GANIC

--REMARKS BY THE EU REP POSSIBLY JUPPE, AND KINKEL

--ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE FRIENDS OF THE FEDERATION--CO-SPONSORED BY EU--

--SIGNING OF A "DECLARATION OF SUPPORT" BY THE FRIENDS

--ANNOUNCEMENT OF A PACKAGE OF ASSISTANCE FOR THE FEDERATION

WHO WILL ATTEND?

-ZUBAK, GANIC, IZETBEGOVIC, TUDJMAN
-HIGH LEVEL REP EU PRESIDENCY, OTHER FM"S
-REPS FROM FRIENDS OF THE FEDERATION
-CONGRESSMEN/SENATORS
-ACADEMIC AND THINK TANKS

PRESS

OPEN COVERAGE. AGRESSIVELY PROMOTE THIS AMERICAN INITIATIVE THAT WE WILL PURSUE AS A LONGER TERM SOLUTION TO THE INSTABILITY IN THE REGION.

ALSO - PRESIDENTIAL MEETINGS WITH THE TUDJ + IZZY ON March 16 or 17

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NEAR-TERM CROATIA STRATEGY

Zagreb Meetings

In his meetings with A/S Holbrooke on March 6, President Tudjman insisted that the current mandate of UNPROFOR cannot be renewed, but agreed to permit the continuation of an international force in Croatia. Tudjman will seek from the UN a new mandate for an international force which will:

1. control the international borders between Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro, and between Croatia and Bosnia;

2. maintain UNPROFOR's logisitical role and humanitarian operations in Bosnia; and

3. implement the Ceasefire Agreement of March 29, 1994, and the Economic Agreement of December 2, 1994.

(See attached statement agreed by Croatia.)

Although point 1 introduces a new and possibly problematic responsibility for the international force, point 3 provides for the essential task of continued monitoring of the disengagement of forces. Tudjman insisted on avoiding reference to the zone of separation, but accepted explicit mention of the March agreement, which defines the lines.

He also agreed to permit UNPROFOR to continue its current operations in Croatia for a period of at least three months during which a new mandate for a new international force will be developed. The new force would have roughly half the number of personnel that UNPROFOR currently devotes to the UNPAs and would be concentrated on their perimeter, rather than be deployed throughout Serb-held territory.

Following subsequent discussions with Contact Group governments and UN Secretariat officials, it appears that sufficient support can be obtained for a UN presence that meets the key requirements of the USG, Croatia, and the "RSK." Important details remain to be worked out before circulating a draft UNSC resolution, however. Ambassador Galbraith is traveling to Knin Thursday to try to bring the Krajina Serbs on board.

Tudjman's concession resulted in part from understandings with the U.S. on the reconstituted UN presence. A text describing these points was worked out in Zagreb. (See attached side paper.)

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Next steps -

In the next week we would propose to undertake the following:

1. Soundings with key allies, Moscow, Secretariat (begun).

2. Galbraith meetings in Knin.

3. Christopher-Tudjman phone call to nail down Zagreb's agreement.

4. Gore-Tudjman meeting followed by Croatian announcement, which Croats circulate as UNSC document.

5. USG statement (at State noon briefing) to welcome.

6. High-level USG communications to Moscow, Belgrade, and Knin, urging cooperation in avoiding war in Croatia.

7. Washington briefings for Contact Group members, UNPROFOR troops contributors, others.

Subsequently, we would begin preparatory work on draft UNSC resolution language while the Federation Anniversary get the Balkan headlines. Although a possible March 16 Tudjman-Clinton meeting could help advance the UNPROFOR issue, its substantive focus should be on the Federation and it should only be offered if Zagreb's compromise has already been locked in. We should also explore a Z-4 approach to Knin proposing negotiations with Zagreb on the principles of Croatian sovereignty and Krajina autonomy. Realistically, progress toward negotiations is unlikely before April.

The focus of attention on the UN presence would then move primarily to consultations in New York, first among the Contact Group Ambassadors, later within the full Security Council. How the end-game should be played depends largely on reactions received from the governments most directly concerned in the next two weeks.

Tactics

For domestic political reasons, Tudjman wants the issuance of the Croatian statement on continuation of a UN presence to be seen as a result of our strong pressure. Vice President Gore's imminent visit to Copenhagen and a possible bilat with Tudjman present an excellent target of opportunity. That would get Croatia on record before the domestic reaction to any leak of the compromise gives

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Tudjman second thoughts. It would also let the international community start serious work on making the most of this opportunity.

Russia and Serbia will require careful handling, but first we need to firm up the public perception that continuation of UNPROFOR in its present form in Croatia is not in the cards. It must be clear that the choice is between a full UNPROFOR pullout with attendant risks of conflict and possible NATO involvement or the Zagreb compromise. This means keeping news of Tudjman's concession quiet until Croatia is ready to make its announcement.

Subsequently we must work closely with Moscow to ensure that it plays a helpful role vis-a-vis Belgrade. In approaching the Russians, we will want to emphasize the gravity of the situation, explaining that the new mandate is essential to avoiding a war in the Krajina.

At the same time, we will work to re-invigorate the negotiating track between Knin and Zagreb. We will follow up Krajina hints of political talks once a continued UN presence is assured, seeking to keep SRSG Akashi engaged, since he has a certain credibility with the Serbs. The ongoing power struggle in Knin makes dealing there [illegible] stake in avoiding war than does Serbia, so we should seek to have Knin rather than Belgrade be the main address for dealing with the Serbs on a new UN mandate in Croatia.

UN forces in Croatia will need some kind of mandate as of April 1 to avoid being left in legal limbo. We can use this deadline to generate pressure for UNSC members to get behind the deal. In any case, the UN will need time to draw down UNPROFOR, re-deploy, and establish border monitoring operations. We should therefore think in terms of a bridging resolution that nails down the key elements of the successor force (much as the UNSC endorsed the Vance Plan concept prior to establishing UNPROFOR), while authorizing UNPROFOR to continue monitoring the cease-fire and implementing the economic agreement until the new presence is established.

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RESPONSE TO MILOSEVIC'S PROPOSAL

- Milosevic's proposal is weak and tenuous, particularly in its avoidance of any time frame for steps forward.

  -- The Europeans have already told him that his first step, the unconditional lifting of sanctions, is unacceptable.

  -- Milosevic has postponed recognition of Bosnia until there is a final peace settlement, referring only to a union of the Federation and the "Republika Srpska" rather than the existing and internationally recognized Republic.

  -- He has omitted any mention of recognition of Croatia, only a "normalization of relations".

  -- On the military front, Milosevic asks that UNPROFOR continue its current activities in Serb-held areas of Croatia and that the Bosnian cessation of hostilities agreement remain in force.

- Milosevic also introduced elements of the Contact Group territorial proposal which create a loophole for the Bosnian Serbs.

  -- Both constitutional and territorial arrangements would be discussed by the parties without any prior requirement for Pale to accept the plan.

- To maintain a degree of momentum towards resolution of this conflict, it is appropriate to work with Milosevic to adjust his proposal.

  -- Allowing the European members of the Contact Group to continue the dialogue without us offers insulation from Congressional criticism. However, our participation would ensure that the Europeans do not produce a "solution" which we cannot accept.

  -- The Europeans have done an admirable job of explaining our political parameters to Milosevic, but were unable to make corrections or adjustments to his proposal.

  -- Our participation in future Contact Group meetings with Milosevic will make it easier to determine, early in the process, if this dialogue has any merit.

- Time is the only factor which will moderate Milosevic's position. He holds the keys to resolving this conflict, and as long as we can protect our equities, we should let this dialogue take its course.

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Talking Points for Secretary's Telcon with President Tudjman

- Pleased to hear the report of your meetings with A/S Holbrooke in Zagreb. Your decision to announce that while the current UN mandate would still end on March 31, you agree that the present UN forces can remain while we seek a new UNSCR mandate reflecting your goals as described in the "side paper" is very positive.

- This new mandate will be one of our top priorities in New York. I have asked Amb. Albright to begin work immediately on the new UNSCR. We will work especially closely to achieve a UNSCR that reflects the goals outlined in the private "side paper" you and A/S Holbrooke agreed on.

- I have suggested that Vice President Gore meet you in Copenhagen on Sunday. I have asked Dick Holbrooke to accompany the Vice President and represent the State Department when you make the announcement that you and he agreed on.

- A/S Holbrooke met with the Germans, French, and British in Frankfurt yesterday (Tuesday) to convey the substance of your meetings in Zagreb. They were generally supportive of this overall approach.

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- Separately, our Ambassador in Moscow has consulted with the Russians and we have briefed them in Washington as well. Their initial reaction has been positive.

- Regarding press and public announcements:

  -- We need to coordinate with the press on any public announcements.

  -- The press seems not to have the story up to now. Our discussions have not become public. But we cannot be certain that will hold until Sunday.

  -- I know you have asked that an American be with you when you make the announcement. That could be done in Copenhagen. If that must happen before Sunday, because details have become public beforehand, it may be that you and I could make coordinated statements,

  -- I am pleased to learn that you and Ambassador Galbraith and Assistant Secretary Holbrooke have worked out the public statement, but you would be making that. Immediately after your statement, either I or another ranking American official would make a statement welcoming your decision and confirming that you will be coming to Washington for the March 16 events in connection with the announcement of the establishment of the Friends of the Federation. I look forward to seeing you then.

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- Mr. President, I am well aware of the great difficulty you have faced in meeting your people's strong desire to have Croatian sovereignty restored to all parts of your country. Together with our international partners, the U.S. will remain actively engaged in finding a peaceful solution.

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TALKING POINTS FOR CALLS TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Support for Step Two of NATO Prepositioning for UNPROFOR Withdrawal

- As you know, in early December the President informed our Allies that the U.S. would be prepared, in principle, to commit U.S. ground forces to a NATO operation to help UNPROFOR withdraw from *Bosnia*.

- Assisting UN forces in Bosnia, in particular those of our closest Allies, would be an essential demonstration of Alliance solidarity. Failure to offer such support would risk grave damage to NATO.

- We do not want UNPROFOR to depart; it performs a critical function in Bosnia. Our decision to assist an UNPROFOR withdrawal was a decision in principle.

- The Administration has no intention of keeping U.S. ground forces in Bosnia or Croatia following a withdrawal operation. The sole purpose of deploying troops would be to participate as a NATO-member nation in support of UNPROFOR withdrawal.

- I hasten to note that the UN has not made a formal decision to withdraw UNPROFOR from either Bosnia or Croatia. Fighting, however, could resume in Bosnia this spring. Heavy fighting could well prompt a UN decision to withdraw.

- Since it would take 8-12 weeks after a UN request for help and a NATO decision to implement the OP Plan before preparations are complete and forces in place to commence a withdrawal of UNPROFOR, our senior military commanders recommend that we act now to ensure that the essential first prepositioning steps are taken to ensure the communications network is ready to support a likely major military operation.

- **Accordingly, I am asking for your support for a Presidential decision in principle to preposition approximately 450 U.S. DOD personnel to the area -- over 300 in Croatia -- to execute the preliminary communications steps associated with NATO's operational plan for extraction of UNPROFOR from Bosnia.**

- In the interim, NATO's Operational Plan is being updated continuously; there has been no final determination on the numbers of troops that would be provided from among the various NATO allies, how the overall operation would be funded, nor when precisely the *actual* prepositioning of communications personnel would begin. Prior to implementation of the complete plan, we will consult with you again.

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IF ASKED

- Funding for the prepositioning steps would come from existing NATO funds (about $11 million).

- As for Croatia, we believe that UNPROFOR has a critical role to play in that nation as well. We are currently urging President Tudjman to reverse his decision not to extend UNPROFOR's mandate beyond March 31.

- Due to ongoing negotiations with Croatian President Tudjman on a future role for UNPROFOR, President Clinton has not yet made a formal determination on whether the U.S. would agree to participate in a NATO operation to extract UNPROFOR forces presently deployed in *Croatia.* At this point, therefore, NATO prepositioning in Croatia would be done to assist in an UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia.

- Congressional approval?
- how much?
- how many?

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002h. chart	re: NATO Prepositioning Step 2 [NATO] (2 pages)	03/1995	P1/b(1)

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Congress of the United States

Washington, DC 20515

February 17, 1995

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing to urge immediate action by you on the war in Bosnia. While diplomats talk in the wake of former President Carter's visit to the region, there is strong reason to believe that the Bosnian Serbs will continue to reject peace. If the war in Bosnia resumes full scale, we do not believe the situation will continue as it has for the last three years. UNPROFOR's already weakened position will become even more untenable, and pressure for its withdrawal will increase.

In the event of either significant Serbian escalation or of UNPROFOR withdrawal, the case for ending the international arms embargo of Bosnia becomes even more compelling. We trust that, in such circumstances, your Administration would move expeditiously to end the United Nations embargo. Should that not be possible, however, we would expect the Congress to vote to unilaterally end participation by the United States in the embargo.

In any event, the United States has an obligation to prepare for the most likely scenarios in Bosnia. If the embargo is to be ended, either multilaterally or unilaterally, we will want to see direct U.S. involvement in the conflict held to a minimum. The surest way to minimize direct U.S. involvement after the embargo is ended is to act now to train the pro-government forces in strategy and tactics and the use of some of the weapons they are likely to obtain.

Such training would reduce the risk to the pro-government forces of any preemptive Serbian offensive, and would be an alternative to sending U.S. forces into Bosnia to provide training after the embargo is ended. Such training should be provided outside of Bosnia in order to avoid any risk to U.S. trainers. We understand that such training can be provided at a small fraction of the cost we currently are paying for the U.N. peacekeeping operation in Bosnia, and that it could be completed in less than six months. We also understand that the government of Bosnia and Hercegovina would welcome such training, and indeed already has submitted a formal request to you in this regard.

There can be no question about your authority to direct the provision of such training. Section 1404 of the 1995 Defense Department Authorization Act (the so-called Nunn-Mitchell provision) required the Administration to present options to the Congress for training the pro-government forces in Bosnia. Other provisions of law, including section 503 of the National Security Act of 1947, give you authority to deliver such training. Further, the provision of such training by the United States would not violate existing Security Council resolutions or relevant principles of international law.

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We believe you should take this step in order to be better prepared for the likely next phase of the war in Bosnia and in order to reduce the likelihood that U.S. forces will become directly involved in that war. It is important to note, however, that a program of training the pro-government forces in Bosnia would give the United States additional leverage in the ongoing negotiations with the Bosnian Serbs. Beginning a training program now would make clear to the Bosnian Serbs our determination to bring about a just and sustainable peace, and would underscore to them the probable cost of prolonging the conflict.

In other words, in the hands of able diplomats, a policy of training the pro-government forces for war could prove to be a powerful instrument for bringing about peace.

For all these reasons, we urge you to initiate promptly a program of military training for the pro-government forces in Bosnia and Hercegovina.

Sincerely,

BOB DOLE

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN

JOSEPH LIEBERMAN

HENRY J. HYDE

SUSAN MOLINARI

MICHAEL R. MCNULTY

JIM MORAN

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002i. letter	Sven Alkalaj to President Clinton (1 page)	01/17/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4000

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0181 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, March 2, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs670

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ISSUE PAPER:
TRAINING THE PRO-GOVERNMENT FORCES IN BOSNIA

Background: Senator Dole, Rep. Gilman, and others wrote the President on February 17, 1995, to urge him to "act now to train the pro-government forces in strategy and tactics and the use of some of the weapons they are likely to obtain." The Members argued that the surest way to minimize direct U.S. involvement is to train the pro-government forces now so as to reduce their risk from any preemptive Serbian offensive.

Ambassador Alkalaj of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (B-H) also wrote President Clinton on January 17, 1995, to request that the U.S. review the means by which training for the B-H Army personnel could begin outside of the borders of B-H. He argued that such training "can be most decisive in preparing B-H for continuing its defense against aggression, or, in the event of a negotiated settlement, for an effective deterrent and source of stability as peace is secured...."

An interagency General Counsels' (OGC) group in February recommended that only a "narrow" IMET be concluded for reasons of neutrality and force protection. OGC posited the negative consequences associated with violating the spirit and intent of UNSCRs and losing the protections afforded by "experts on mission" status. They believe, however, that adequate domestic legal authority exists to provide the training contemplated by Senator Dole.

Issue: The type of training, if any, that the USG should provide to the pro-government forces in B-H; where that training should be provided; and when such training should begin.

Options:

1. *Limit training at this time to that outlined in a narrow Section 505 of the Foreign Assistance Act agreement*--The U.S. has $70,000 available for IMET should such an agreement be signed. However, moving forward with the narrow agreement would require finessing the issue of the broader draft 505 agreement which was provided to the government of B-H earlier. Such training would not violate the spirit and intent of UNSCRs regarding the arms embargo. It would be limited to IMET training for only a few senior Federation officers at our senior professional military schools and some English language training. The training would not affect USG neutrality regarding this conflict. Providing this limited training would avoid the appearance of totally abandoning B-H but would have negligible affect on the battlefield.
2. *Expand IMET training beyond the few senior Federation officers attending war colleges or receiving English language training.* Courses would be "non-lethal" technical training courses and could include courses in computer programming, finance, and health care. Training would be at the individual level. This would have little practical effect on the battlefield but might placate some who felt the USG had a moral obligation to do something.

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2013-0682-M
8/3/15 KBM

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3. *Provide some limited individual tactical and operational training for weapons likely to be used.* Individual training would be conducted at U.S. facilities and schools. Such training could also include enrollment of junior and mid-level officers in professional development and leadership courses. This would prolong the conflict by encouraging B-H to fight on but would likely have minimal effect on the battlefield. It is unclear how unit commanders could be rotated through this training without a detrimental effect on the battlefield for B-H. It would, however, partially meet the demands of those who posit that the USG has a moral responsibility to assist B-H in its self-defense.
4. *Train the pro-government forces in accordance with the plan outlined by Senator Dole.* This would be unit level training and would need to be accomplished in a neighboring country, most likely Croatia. Such training would respond fully to the moral arguments that demand the USG assist B-H. It would also relieve some pressure from Congress. However, it directly contradicts the spirit and intent of UNSCRs and would clearly remove our forces from the protections of their current "experts on mission" status and make the U.S. a co-belligerent in the conflict.

Discussion: The effects of training the pro-government forces of B-H are problematic. However, there are other more likely and less favorable results from the training than those outlined by Ambassador Alkalaj and Senator Dole.

- Training is virtually synonymous with arming. Once the U.S. begins a significant training effort, the U.S. becomes an ally of B-H and, by extension, Croatia. The U.S. would become a co-belligerent.
- Once a decision to train is made, but before the training is complete, defines a period of enhanced vulnerability for B-H. Many will interpret such a decision to train as a harbinger of lifting the arms embargo. That, in turn may trigger UNPROFOR's withdrawal.
- UNPROFOR"s imminent withdrawal means that UN related humanitarian assistance programs will terminate. The humanitarian crisis will worsen.
- Training is a signal to all the Federation (including the HVO) that the U.S. is preparing the pro-government forces for a return to war.
- The Bosnian Serbs are likely to react to the above with preemptive action against B-H. Probable targets are the isolated enclaves. Almost all analysts project they would fall quickly.
- Others might feel compelled to take similar action on the side of the Serbs.
- The negative consequences outlined by the OGC are compelling--training as contemplated by Senator Dole puts USG neutrality in question and would destroy the fabric of even-handedness upon which UNPROFOR and NATO operations in support thereof are based.
- The March 4, 1995, Deputies' discussion focused on the reality of accepting a minimalist outcome for B-H and that its longer-term prospect was absorption by Croatia and Serbia.

Recommendation: Approve Option 1--narrow 505 agreement--as the basis of the President's response to Senator Dole.

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SUPPORT FOR THE FEDERATION - 505 AGREEMENT

I. PURPOSES FOR DEPUTIES COMMITTEE

- Decide if the Government of Bosnia Herzegovina (GoBH) can sign the broad 505 agreement they now have so that international military and educational training (IMET) to support the Federation may begin.

- Approve the strategy to win support for this decision from our NATO and Contact Group allies.

II. OPTIONS

Option 1 (Recommended): Ask Prime Minister Siladjic to confirm the GoBH notification to our embassy that the Bosnians are ready to sign the broad draft 505 given them so that already-approved IMET training can commence.

PRO: A broad 505 agreement would give the EUR military consultant (replacing General Galvin as Special Representative to the Bosnian Federation armed forces) a tool he can use in negotiations trying to bring two mutually suspicious armed forces closer together. His capacity to get anything done will depend on being able to draw on a full range of DoD programs, consistent with the clear understanding that, after a Presidential determination is signed, we will not transfer anything that violates the embargo.

Signing a broad agreement would signal our support without committing us to furnish excess defense articles (EDA) at this time; a Presidential determination is required to make a country eligible for transfers of defense articles (enforced by policy precedent) and the UN arms embargo limits EDA. (We are awaiting a GoBH short list of items they need in order to obtain an interagency legal opinion on which items could be furnished under the arms embargo.)

Asking the GoBH to limit the 505 agreement to IMET only after they have been given a broad draft could be perceived as a diminuation of USG support for the Federation, our current policy and could anger Congress which sees support for the Federation as vital to Balkan peace efforts.

CON: NATO and Contact Group allies may perceive signing this broad 505 agreement as a USG move toward unilaterally lifting the arms embargo, particularly if the singular nature of the agreement is publicized. We would need to carefully explain our position to counter this perception.

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Option 2: Ask Prime Minister Siladjic to sign a revised 505 agreement limited to IMET only, explaining the draft which he was shown was in error and we intended to be consistent with agreements presented to Slovenia, FYROM, and Croatia.

PRO: Broad 505 agreements are, in general, not concluded until such time as we have identified specific defence articles we want to transfer to a given country.

Allies are worried, with Congressional legislation still to providing most types of military assistance arms to the GoBH, and singling out the GoBH to sign an agreement including all military equipment sales, lease or draw-down which was refused to other Eastern European countries could be misinterpreted.

Providing IMET signals support for the Federation; we should be honest and tell the GoBH we mistakenly gave the wrong legal document needed to make this training happen.

CON: We cannot risk signalling any withdrawal of support for the Federation at this crucial time in negotiations. It is both easier and less risky to quietly allow the GoBH to sign the agreement they have already been given, and explain, if Allies ask, that nothing more than IMET can be given without further steps such as a Presidential determination which we do not intend to take at this time.

III. BACKGROUND

Before any military assistance (defense articles or related training or other defense services) may be furnished to a foreign country, Section 505 of the Foreign Assistance Act requires that certain assurances from the recipient country be obtained concerning use, retransfer and security of any articles, training, or services provided. These assurances are contained in an exchange of diplomatic notes which constitute an international agreement between the U.S. and the "potential recipient country." These assurances normally cover the full range of military assistance. However, throughout Central Europe and the FSU, we have initiated IMET programs before progressing to other levels of military assistance. In such cases, we have limited our 505 agreement with a given country to cover only IMET. Broader 505 agreements are, in general, not concluded until such time as we have identified specific defence articles we want to transfer to a given country. It is important to note that a 505 agreement does not commit the U.S. to providing military assistance either in general or in a specific form. Rather, it is only done in order to meet a statutory precondition to providing such assistance.

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For Bosnia, we need a 505 agreement before we can begin the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program approved as one of a number of things that can be done within current U.S. law and policy (in particular compliance with the UN arms embargo) to be supportive of the development of the armed forces of the Bosnian Federation. A Presidential determination that furnishing military assistance to a particular country will strengthen the security of the U.S. and promote worldwide peace is an additional statutory precondition to providing most types of military assistance.

While for legal reasons this 505 agreement would be signed by the Government of Bosnia Herzegovina (GoBH) as well as by the Federation, the cooperation would be intended for the Federation armed forces. (Note: The 505 agreement itself has no means to enforce this intention to provide support to the Federation but agreements to transfer specific equipment can be written to limit the use of the goods or services to the Federation armed forces rather than the GoBH national army.)

Broad 505 Agreement Given to GoBH

Limited 505 agreements for IMET only have been signed with Slovenia and Macedonia, and is pending with Croatia (as well as initially with all other CE states). We have also signed a broad non-binding defense cooperation agreement with Croatia (as well as several other CE states). A broad draft 505 agreement (sufficient for provision of IMET, lethal, and *non-lethal EDA) was given* to the GoBH; it was made clear that transfers under the agreement would be limited by the UN arms embargo.

IV. CONSULTATIONS WITH ALLIES

We must consult closely with allies to explain that signing a broad 505 agreement, while needed for any EDA transfers or military sales, does not change our opposition to unilateral lift. We will undertake nothing beyond the provision of IMET without obtaining a Presidential determination requiring Congressional notification for Bosnia. We do not plan to ask *for this determination at this time.*

We should portray the agreement as a necessary but not sufficient bureaucratic hurdle. While it momentarily singles out the Federation from among former Yugoslav countries (and even some Eastern European ones) as being more "worthy" of U.S. support, we would not object should others demand the same agreement with the same limitations.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002l. email	Alan Kreczko to Donald Kerrick re: Bosnia DC Briefer II (1 page)	02/21/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4000

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0181 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, March 2, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs670

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520307
RECEIVED: 10 MAR 95 16

TO: SENS

FROM: BRILL, K

DOC DATE: 09 MAR 95
SOURCE REF: 9504144

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA CROATIA
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: STATE DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 9 MAR DC MTG ON BOSNIA RE EASING OF US SANCTIONS

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE DATE: 14 MAR 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE LOGREF: 9520295 9520302

FILES: IFM C NSCP: DC0181 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BAKER JANE
		KERRICK
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/26/2019
2010-0533-M

COMMENTS: _____

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001		X	95040319	FOR RECORD PURPOSES

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S/S # 9504144

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 9, 1995

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DECL:OADR

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW D. SENS
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Subject: Paper on Easing U.S. Sanctions for Bosnia DC

Please circulate the attached paper, "Easing ~~U.S.~~ Sanctions on ~~Serbia~~ Montenegro," for consideration at the March 9, 1995 Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia.

Kenneth C. Brill
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated.

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E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By RDS NARA, Date 9/26/2019
2010-0533-M

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Easing U.S. Sanctions on Serbia-Montenegro

UN Security Council Resolutions 943 and 970 suspended certain sanctions on the FRY. The UN now permits international passenger flights to and from Belgrade airport, ferry service between Bar (Montenegro) and Bari (Italy), and provision of parts and maintenance to allow those services to operate. The suspension also removes restrictions on cultural exchanges and "FRY" participation in international sporting events. The U.S. is not obliged to suspend sanctions. However, U.S. refusal to allow spare parts and servicing for U.S. manufactured aircraft is a danger to air safety and has a negative impact on the competitiveness of our aerospace industry. Russia and European members of the Contact Group indicate they view continuation of U.S. sanctions as deviating from Contact Group unity.

Recommendations

The Department of State recommends that we implement the sanctions suspension in a limited way; such an approach was approved by the Secretary on January 16. It recommends the USG authorize, on a case-by-case basis, transactions for aviation safety, and not-for-profit cultural and sports exchanges, as well as generally authorize commercial transactions related to non-U.S. passenger air service to Belgrade, except on FRY carriers. By approving cultural and sports exchanges individually, we can prevent events that might seem unwarranted or poorly timed, but we would have taken a step to bring ourselves into conformity with the Contact Group.

Congressional Considerations

Under section 1511 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1994 ("the Levin Amendment") these modifications to U.S. sanctions would require Presidential certification to Congress that the modification is necessary to achieve "a negotiated settlement of the Bosnia conflict that is acceptable to the parties." Although we will need to refine our justification, such a modification of the U.S. sanctions regime could be justified on the basis that UNSC Resolutions 943 and 970 are an element of the Contact Group strategy to achieve Bosnian Serb acceptance of the proposed territorial settlement. Any easing of Serbian sanctions will be controversial. Congressional consultations with Senator Levin and the relevant committees will be carried out prior to transmission of the certification documents.

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2013-0668-M

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Suggested Talking Points on
Easing U.S. Sanctions on Serbia-Montenegro:

- We need to consider whether to ease some U.S. sanctions on Serbia in ways permitted by the UN resolutions suspending certain sanctions. State's recommendations are summarized in the paper distributed to all of you.

- We'll need to make calls to Congress, and the "Levin Amendment" requires Presidential certification that these steps are necessary to achieve a Bosnia settlement. Despite pressure from Contact Group partners, we'd be reluctant to take yet another controversial issue to the Hill.

- However, there is an air safety concern that requires urgent attention. Yugoslav airlines (JAT) aircraft -- most of them American-made -- are now permitted to fly to and from Belgrade, but U.S. sanctions are preventing them from getting necessary spare parts. Embassy Belgrade has pointed out the air safety problem, and we've heard frequently from Boeing as well as other aircraft manufacturers.

- Once we move forward on that issue, we should approve the recommended package.

- I understand there may be some concern that allowing sports and cultural events may be going too far. But our proposal would allow only case-by-case approvals of sports and cultural exchanges which do not provide economic benefit to Serbia. This control would give us some flexibility and ensure that high-profile activities and participation of "FRY" national teams in events other than the Olympics would not be permitted without careful consideration.

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RECORD ID: 9520295
RECEIVED: 07 MAR 95 14

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 08 MAR 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
DC
CROATIA
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 9 MAR DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 10 MAR 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520302 9520307

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0181 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BAKER JANE
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		KERRICK
		KRECZKO
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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/26/2019
2010-0533-M

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DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	95030811	FOR DECISION
002		X	95030811	DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950308	FUERTH, L	
002	950308	BRILL, K	
002	950308	MCALEER, R	
002	950308	ADAMS, G	
002	950308	INDERFURTH, K	
002	950308	GARTHOFF, D	
002	950308	PATRICK, T	

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National Security Council
The White House

rec'd 3/7 8:10 pm

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SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION OF 9 MARCH DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA
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EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	ABA	SITROOM	BOX 13128 8 MARCH PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	3/10/95	8:00 AM	(1) package of WMD PRINT LAST NAME: George COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	3/10/95	8:45	J. Graves PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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2010-0533-M

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COL. T. R. PATRICK JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	8 Mar	2:50 pm	L Fuerth PRINT LAST NAME: BRANSCUM COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: 1
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MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX

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DATE 08 MAR 95

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION OF 9 MARCH DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
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MESSAGE NO.: 0508 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 13
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FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

NSC LOG # 20295

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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MESSAGE NO.: 0508 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 3
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FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

NSC LOG # 20295

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
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MESSAGE NO.: 0508 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

NSC LOG # 20295

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
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CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

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DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
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REMARKS:

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BROADCAST REPORT

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 8, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National
Security Director for National
Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia on March 9, 1995, 3:00-4:00 p.m., in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be principals plus one. The agenda is attached at Tab A. Papers should be circulated by the lead agency NLT COB March 8. ~~(S)~~

for
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/26/2019
2010-0533-M

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DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA AND CROATIA

DATE: March 9, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 3:00-4:00pm

Agenda

I. Diplomatic Strategy

A. Near-Term Croatia Strategy (Next Steps).....State

B. Response to the Milosevic Proposal.....State

II. OPLAN 40104 Approval Process

A. Next Steps on Implementing Principals' Decision on NATO Prepositioning - Step Two. .....OSD/JCS

(1) Talking Points for Congressional Calls

(2) Notifying NATO

B. NATO/U.S. Decision Timeline for OPLAN 40104.....OSD/JCS

III. Responding to Dole/Bosnian Government Requests for Military Training (Implementing 505 Agreement).....OSD/JCS

IV. Former Yugoslavia Policy Review.....NSC/All

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 2/6/2020
2013-0682-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 7, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: DON KERRICK

SUBJECT: Deputies Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, March 9, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Deputies Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia to be held March 9, 1995. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the meeting and authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve AW Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
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See also 2013-0662-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)~~	~~04/27/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
~~001b. paper~~	~~Sanctions Relief (1 page)~~	~~00/00/0000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
002a. memo	Don Kerrick to Samuel Berger re: April 27 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia (4 pages)	04/26/1995	P1/b(1)
~~002b. agenda~~	~~[Duplicate of 003] (1 page)~~	~~04/27/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 02/06/2020
002c. cable	re: Milosevic's Response to Contact Group Paper on Recognition (4 pages)	04/17/1995	P1/b(1)
002d. paper	The UK-FR "Proposal" (1 page)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)
~~002e. paper~~	~~[Duplicate of 001b] (1 page)~~	~~00/00/0000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
002f. paper	re: Unanswered Policy Questions on NATO Support for UNPROFOR Withdrawal (4 pages)	04/1995	P1/b(1)
~~003. agenda~~	~~Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (1 page)~~	~~04/27/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 02/06/2020

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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DATE 02 MAY 95

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR BOSNIA DC MTG ON 27 APR
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA DC
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PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 27 APR DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 02 MAY 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520530 9520537

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0196 CODES:

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FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BASS
		BERGER
		KERRICK
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
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001		X	95050212	SODERBERG APPROVED RECOM
002		X	95050212	DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
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002	950502	BRILL, K	
002	950502	ADAMS, G	
002	950502	NYE, J	
002	950502	MCALEER, R	
002	950502	INDERFURTH, K	
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002	950502	PATRICK, T	

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Dohse	1 | 3	5/5	Sign TBT
Sens			
Soderberg	copy 2		
Berger		RW	
Lake			
Situation Room	4	JHL 5/2	D
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DATE 02 MAY 95

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR BOSNIA DC MTG ON 27 APR
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1

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MESSAGE NO.: 929 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 5 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions for DC MTG on Bosnia on 27 April NSC LOG # 20554

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B	USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
U	Treasury	Executive Secretary		

REMARKS:

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MESSAGE NO.: 929 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 5 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

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D	JCS	SECRETARY		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
U	Treasury	Executive Secretary		

REMARKS:

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DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 929 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 5 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

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REMARKS:

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WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF TRANSMISSION
1995 MAY -2 PM 1:07

TIME OF RECEIPT

K-1
5-2
1310

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE / PRIORITY / ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 929 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 5 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions for DC MTG on Bosnia on 27 April NSC LOG # 20554

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B	USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
H	Treasury	Executive Secretary		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 9/27/2019
2010-0533-M

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WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF TRANSMISSION
1995 MAY -2 PM 1:07

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TIME OF RECEIPT

NMCC/JCS

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: BJZ

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 929 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 5
(PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

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REMARKS:

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 9/27/2019
2010-0533-M

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TIME OF RECEIPT

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RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: SoC ~~Notes~~ of Meeting on April 27 Bosnia DCMB PAGES: 5

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 9/27/2019
2016-0533-M

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

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DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: _____ CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 5 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

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USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
Treasury	Executive Secretary		

REMARKS:

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~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ 20554

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 2, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, April 27, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

for
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/27/2019
2010-0533-M

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee
DATE: April 27, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 3:30 - 4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
Samuel R. Berger

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Rick Saunders

State:
Peter Tarnoff
Richard Holbrooke
Robert Frasure

Treasury:
J. Benjamin Nye

DOD:
Walter Slocombe
Joseph Kruzel

OMB:
Gordon Adams
Keith Beckell

USUN:
David Scheffer
James O'Brien

CIA:
Douglas MacEachin
Ray Converse

JCS:
LTG Wesley Clark
RADM Charles Moore

NSC:
Alexander Vershbow
BG Donald L. Kerrick

Summary of Conclusions

1. Deputies met to discuss next steps in the Contact Group, including what sanctions relief package we would be willing to offer Milosevic in return for genuine recognition of Bosnia, and the accompanying strategy for Ambassador Frasure to pursue in the next Contact Group meeting and in a follow-on private meeting with Milosevic. Deputies agreed that we should continue to pursue a strategy to isolate Karadzic and the Pale Serbs by further tightening the inter-Serb border and by moving to close the "back door" so that prohibited goods do not reach the Bosnian Serbs through Croatia. (S)

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0533-M
NSC 9/30/14 (2.09)

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2. Deputies agreed that any further suspension of sanctions will require genuine recognition by Milosevic of Bosnia's internationally-recognized borders and a real sealing of the Bosnian Serbs' border. Deputies agreed that no lifting of any sanctions would be appropriate at this time and that suspension of certain sanctions for finite periods of time was the most we could accept. They authorized Ambassador Frasure to propose option "a" from the OVP's sanctions relief chart (Tab A). Noting that other Contact Group partners would likely seek broader sanctions relief, Deputies agreed that Ambassador Frasure could inform Contact Group partners that he would need to seek Washington's approval to move even part of the way toward option "b" from the OVP sanctions chart. **(Action: State)** (S)

3. Deputies approved measures to close the "back door" as outlined in the OVP memorandum previously circulated to Deputies. They directed OVP and Treasury to work together to resolve the issue concerning the use of U.S. Customs Agents as sanctions monitors. **(Action: OVP)** (S)

4. Deputies discussed the situation in Sarajevo, where the Bosnian Serbs have reneged on the 1992 agreement regarding the unrestricted use of Sarajevo airport. They agreed that we should continue efforts to strengthen UNPROFOR to make it more effective when dealing with the Bosnian Serbs. Deputies asked that the Bosnian Government be contacted to learn more about their proposal to create a demilitarized zone in and around Sarajevo which would be one means of restoring full UN control over the airport. **(Action: State)** Deputies deferred further discussion on measures to strengthen UNPROFOR pending a report from the CJCS on his meetings with counterparts in Brussels. **(Action: JCS)** (S)

5. Deputies discussed the status of efforts to develop answers to the policy questions concerning OPLAN 40104 for a NATO-led withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Bosnia. They agreed to defer further discussion until the Principals receive the JCS briefing on the OPLAN on April 28. At that time, the NSC will determine the process that will be used to finalize answers to the questions as a basis for review by Deputies and Principals. **(Action: NSC)** (S)

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Sanctions Relief in Return for Tighter Border Closure and Bosnian Recognition



[1] All suspensions are for successive, limited periods. UNSC action required to extend suspensions. Continuation of suspensions to depend on continued progress toward negotiated settlement of the conflicts.

[2] Strategic goods include crude oil, petroleum products, coal, energy-related equipment, iron, steel, other metals, chemicals, rubber, tires, vehicles, aircraft, and motors of all types.

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20554

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 1, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: BG DON KERRICK

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, April 27, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of Conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia held April 27, 1995.

Concurrence by: Rick Saunders

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions w/attachment

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS, NARA, Date 9/27/2019
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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LOG 9520554
DATE 02 MAY 95

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR BOSNIA DC MTG ON 27 APR
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	2 May	1450	[signature]
	PRINT LAST NAME: BRANSCUM		
	COPY: 1		
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	5/2/95	2:30 PM	[signature]
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: 1		
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	5/2/95	5:45	[signature]
	PRINT LAST NAME: GRAVES		
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DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	5/2/94	1515	Wms, MC PRINT LAST NAME: Williams COPY: 1
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520537
RECEIVED: 26 APR 95 15

TO: BERGER

FROM: KERRICK

DOC DATE: 26 APR 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER ON 27 APR DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER DUE DATE: 29 APR 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520530 9520554

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0196 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BAKER JANE
		CLARKE
		HAWKINS
		KERRICK
		NSC CHRON
		SESTAK
		SODERBERG
		STEPHENS
		VERSHBOW

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/27/2019
2010-0533-M

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DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
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001		X	95042818	NOTED BY BERGER

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National Security Council
The White House

Exec Sec Office has diskette YES LOG # 20537 A/O

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL /DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1		
Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg		Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Berger	2		
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	MGC 4/28	A
NSC/Rm			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Special Dispatch Instructions:

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	Don Kerrick to Samuel Berger re: April 27 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia (4 pages)	04/26/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4000

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0196 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, April 27, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs671

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA AND CROATIA

DATE: April 27, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 3:00-4:00pm

Agenda

I. Near-Term Diplomatic Strategy

A. Contact Group Prospects/Response to the Milosevic Proposal.....State**

B. Sanctions Options for Recognition.....OVP**

II. OPLAN 40104: Unanswered Policy Questions (Time Permitting)

A. Dealing with Civilians.....State**

B. Delivery of Humanitarian Aid.....State**

C. Dealing with Warring Parties.....JCS**

D. Violations of Safe Areas and Exclusion Zones....State**

E. Resolving Territorial and Equipment Disputes.....JCS**

F. Command and Control.....JCS**

G. Mission of the NATO Force.....JCS**

** - Paper Due COB April 26.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 2/6/2020

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002c. cable	re: Milosevic's Response to Contact Group Paper on Recognition (4 pages)	04/17/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4000

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0196 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, April 27, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs671

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002d. paper	The UK-FR "Proposal" (1 page)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4000

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0196 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, April 27, 1995

2010-0533-M
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Sanctions Relief in Return for Tighter Border Closure and Bosnian Recognition

Desired FRY Actions	Sanctions Levers
Continued support for Contact Group plan	Extend Phase 1 sanctions suspension
Support complete isolation of Pale: • Tighten closure of "Inter-Serb" border • Cut military links (including C&C, training and personnel) • Sever telecommunications links • Full enforcement of all UN resolutions with respect to Pale (targeted sanctions, end financial support, end FRY-sponsored "humanitarian" shipments, etc.) • Close border with Sector East • Discontinue support for Knin so long as Knin and Pale are cooperating politically and militarily	Suspend[1] sanctions against scientific and technical cooperation
	Suspend sanctions against trade and transshipment of non-strategic goods and commodities[2]
	Release FRY vessels and conveyances
FRY recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina **in manner acceptable to GOBH and CG**	**Suspend sanctions against financial transactions and services**
Continued support for the principles of the Z-4 plan	**Release all blocked financial and real assets**
Recognition of the Republic of Croatia	**Suspend sanctions against trade and transshipment of strategic goods**
FRY recognition of Slovenia and FYROM	**Lift all UNSCR sanctions; disband enforcement structures**
Full implementation of a Bosnia settlement	Lift objections to IFI loans, full participation in international organizations, trade preferences, etc.
Full implementation of a Krajina settlement	
Progress towards settlement of other regional security issues, including Kosovo, cooperation with War Crimes Tribunal, regional arms control, etc.	

Alternatives

a

b

[1] All suspensions are for successive, limited periods. UNSC action required to extend suspensions. Continuation of suspensions to depend on continued progress toward negotiated settlement of the conflicts.

[2] Strategic goods include crude oil, petroleum products, coal, energy-related equipment, iron, steel, other metals, chemicals, rubber, tires, vehicles, aircraft, and motors of all types.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002f. paper	re: Unanswered Policy Questions on NATO Support for UNPROFOR Withdrawal (4 pages)	04/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4000

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0196 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, April 27, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs671

RESTRICTION CODES

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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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RECORD ID: 9520530
RECEIVED: 25 APR 95 16

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 26 APR 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
DC
CROATIA
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 27 APR DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 28 APR 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520537 9520554

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0196 CODES:

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FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BAKER JANE
		BERGER
		KERRICK
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
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2010-0533-M

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001	BERGER	Z	95042519	FOR DECISION
002		X	95042613	DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950426	FUERTH, L	
002	950426	BRILL, K	
002	950426	MCALEER, R	
002	950426	PATRICK, T	
002	950426	INDERFURTH, K	
002	950426	GARTHOFF, D	

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MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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PRIORITY
ROUTINE

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DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: _____ CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

NSC LOG # 20530

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting DC BOSNIA PAGES: 2

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

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USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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Berger	2	on	
Lake		Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	AK 9/26	D N
NSC/Rm			

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20530

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 26, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia on April 27, 1995, 3:00-4:00pm, in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be principals plus one. The agenda is attached at Tab A. Papers should be circulated by the designated Agency by close of business April 26. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/27/2019
2010-0533-M

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DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA AND CROATIA

DATE: April 27, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 3:00-4:00pm

Agenda

I. Near-Term Diplomatic Strategy

A. Contact Group Prospects/Response to the Milosevic Proposal.....State**

B. Sanctions Options for Recognition.....OVP**

II. OPLAN 40104: Unanswered Policy Questions (Time Permitting)

A. Dealing with Civilians.....State**

B. Delivery of Humanitarian Aid.....State**

C. Dealing with Warring Parties.....JCS**

D. Violations of Safe Areas and Exclusion Zones....State**

E. Resolving Territorial and Equipment Disputes.....JCS**

F. Command and Control.....JCS**

G. Mission of the NATO Force.....JCS**

** - Paper Due COB April 26.

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By VL NARA, Date 2/6/2020
2013-0682-m

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 25, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: DON KERRICK

SUBJECT: Deputies Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, April 27, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Deputies Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia to be held April 27, 1995. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve OK Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

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COL. T. R. PATRICK JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520			
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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	4/26/95	17:00	Wm. MC PRINT LAST NAME: Williams COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
COL. T. R. PATRICK JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
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~~001. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (2 pages)~~	~~05/04/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
~~002. agenda~~	~~Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (1 page)~~	~~05/04/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
003a. memo	Don Kerrick to Samuel Berger re: May 4 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (4 pages)	05/03/1995	P1/b(1)
~~003b. agenda~~	~~[Duplicate of 002] (1 page)~~	~~05/04/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 02/06/2020
~~003c. cable~~	~~re: May 3 Contact Group Meeting (4 pages)~~	~~05/03/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
003d. paper	Sanctions Relief (1 page)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)
003e. paper	re: Croatian Crisis: Diplomatic Strategy (2 pages)	05/02/1995	P1/b(1)

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P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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DOC DATE: 08 MAY 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
SOC
CROATIA
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 4 MAY DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 09 MAY 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520574 9520576

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002	950508	BRILL, K	
002	950508	MCALEER, R	
002	950508	INDERFURTH, K	
002	950508	ADAMS, G	
002	950508	GARTHOFF, D	
002	950508	PATRICK, T	

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Situation Room			
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COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
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DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	5/9/95	3:35	J. Graves PRINT LAST NAME: GRAVES COPY: 1
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ROOM 2E865
PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001

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2010-0533-M

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LOG 9520588
DATE 08 MAY 95

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	5/9	1100	S McE PRINT LAST NAME: McElhaney COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	5/12/95	_____	J. Graves PRINT LAST NAME: GRAVES COPY: 1
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 8, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the UN

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, May 4, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

for
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions w/Attachment

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/27/2019
2016-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee
DATE: May 4, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 1:30 - 2:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
Samuel R. Berger

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Rick Saunders

State:
Peter Tarnoff
Richard Holbrooke
Robert Frasure

DOD:
Walter Slocombe
Joseph Kruzel

USUN:
David Scheffer
James O'Brien

OMB:
John Burnim

CIA:
Douglas MacEachin
Norm Schindler

JCS:
LTG Wesley Clark
BG John Walsh

NSC:
Alexander Vershbow
BG Don Kerrick

Summary of Conclusions

1. Deputies met to discuss a strategy for dealing with the Contact Group deadlock on what degree of sanctions relief to offer Milosevic in return for genuine recognition of Bosnia, and the accompanying strategy for Ambassador Frasure to pursue in the next Contact Group meeting and in a follow-on private meeting with Milosevic. Deputies agreed that we should continue to pursue a strategy, in close coordination with the Bosnian Government, that supports the Bosnian Government's goal of gaining genuine recognition by Milosevic of Bosnia-Herzegovina within its internationally recognized borders in return for limited sanctions relief and a closure of the border with Bosnian Serb territory. (S)

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2010-0533-F
BY 9/30/14 (2.10)

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2. Deputies agreed that Ambassador Frasure should continue to stand on the existing USG position in upcoming Contact Group discussions. In the follow-on meeting with Milosevic, Ambassador Frasure should emphasize that the U.S. will not support any efforts to lift sanctions until the Contact Group plan is accepted by the Pale Serbs, and that while we might consider a longer sanctions suspension period (e.g., 180 days), any extension of suspended sanctions would require a positive UNSC vote. He should also inform Milosevic that the U.S. is not prepared to support release of frozen financial assets. Deputies agreed that, if it becomes clear in the meeting with Milosevic that an element of lift is necessary to complete an otherwise acceptable deal, the U.S. should consider (but not offer at that meeting) lifting sanctions against certain media and information-related activities. Deputies asked that Leon Fuerth and Ambassador Frasure confer on the appropriate financial sanctions language for presentation to the Contact Group. **(Action: OVP/State)** (S)

3. Deputies discussed the renewed fighting in Croatia and a strategy to prevent escalation. They agreed that the U.S. should press President Tudjman and the Krajina Serbs to halt military operations and exercise restraint. They agreed to press the Croatians at all levels to adopt an accommodating position that could include the demilitarization of the recaptured areas, the return of Serb civilians to their homes and the reestablishment of UNCRO authority in Sector West and other areas of conflict. If Croatia is willing to take these steps, the U.S. would support the presence of Croatian civilian police in Sector West and the removal of all RSK military forces. **(Action: State)** (S)

4. Deputies discussed the steps to be taken to ensure the Croatians are aware of the U.S. view of their military actions. They agreed to support a UNSC resolution condemning incursions by all sides in Sectors South and East and calling for the restoration of UNCRO authority in all areas. Deputies directed that the Croatians be immediately informed of our deep concerns and endorsed a Vice Presidential meeting with President Tudjman in London as a useful forum for registering U.S. concerns about Tudjman's military actions. **(Action: State/OVP)** (S)

5. Deputies also discussed the importance of warning the Krajina Serbs of the consequences of attacks on U.S. personnel in Zagreb. They agreed that we should be prepared to bypass the dual-key system if a NATO response were not approved by the UN. They directed military options be developed for retaliatory action, both unilateral and through NATO. **(Action: JCS)** (S)

6. Deputies discussed briefing the Congress on OPLAN 40104 and directed that the talking points be cleared before the briefings are scheduled. **(Action: JCS draft talking points; NSC/State schedule briefings)** (S)

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20588

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 5, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

FROM: BG DON KERRICK (K)

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, May 4, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of Conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia held May 4, 1995.

Concurrence by: Rick Saunders FOR (K)

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve ok Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/27/2019
2010-0533-M

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RECORD ID: 9520577
RECEIVED: 03 MAY 95 15

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 03 MAY 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
DC
CROATIA
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 4 MAY DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 06 MAY 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520579 9520588

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0198 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

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2010-0533-M

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002		X	95050319	SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950503	FUERTH, L	
002	950503	BRILL, K	
002	950503	MCALEER, R	
002	950503	INDERFURTH, R	
002	950503	GARTHOFF, D	
002	950503	PATRICK, T	

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National Security Council
The White House

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Soderberg	copy 2		
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Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	MEC 5/3	D
NSC/Rm			

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	5/4/95	6:05 AM	Unitty Tony PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: 1
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MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
COL. T. R. PATRICK JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
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COL. T. R. PATRICK JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	5/4/95	7:30AM	L. Smith PRINT LAST NAME: Smith COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
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MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: DC MEETING ON BOSNIA AND CROATIA

NSC LOG # 9520577

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B	USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		
4	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

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MESSAGE NO.: 0946 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 3
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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: DC MEETING ON BOSNIA AND CROATIA

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O	JCS	SECRETARY		
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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: DC MEETING ON BOSNIA AND CROATIA

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PRIORITY
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RELEASER: S. C.

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D	JCS	SECRETARY		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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20577

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 3, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia on May 4, 1995, 1:30-2:30 p.m., in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be principals plus one. The agenda is attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/27/2019
2010-0533-M

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DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA AND CROATIA

DATE: May 4, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 1:30-2:30 p.m.

Agenda

I. Sanctions

Strategy for Dealing with the Contact Group Deadlock on Degree of Sanctions Relief to Offer Milosevic for Recognition of Bosnia.....OVP

II. Croatia Crisis

Strategy for Preventing Escalation.....State

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By: VL NARA, Date 2/6/2020
2018-0082-M

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Deputy Nat'l Sec Advisor has seen

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
May 3, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

FROM: DON KERRICK

SUBJECT: Deputies Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, May 4, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Deputies Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia to be held May 4, 1995. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve DVT Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
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By RDS NARA, Date 9/27/2019
2010-0533-M

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FROM: KERRICK
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 03 MAY 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA CROATIA
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 4 MAY DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER DUE DATE: 06 MAY 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520574 9520576

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0198 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		KERRICK
		NSC CHRON
		VERSHBOW

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/27/2019
2010-0533-M

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

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~~SECRET~~ RECORD ID: 9520579

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	95050319	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	95050415	NOTED BY BERGER

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rec'd 5/4 6:45am

National Security Council
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Exec Sec Office has diskette wp LOG # 20579 A/O ____

DOCLOG MEC SYSTEM: PRS (NSC) INT

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL /DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1	D	
Sens			
Soderberg	copy 2		
Berger		ON	
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	MEC 5/4	A
NSC/Rm			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: Berger hits package for Bosnia/Croatia DC 5/4

Special Dispatch Instructions:

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. memo	Don Kerrick to Samuel Berger re: May 4 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (4 pages)	05/03/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4000

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0198 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, May 4, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs672

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA AND CROATIA

DATE: May 4, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 1:30-2:30pm

Agenda

I. Sanctions

Strategy for Dealing with the Contact Group Deadlock on Degree of Sanctions Relief to Offer Milosevic for Recognition of Bosnia.....OVP

II. Croatia Crisis

Strategy for Preventing Escalation.....State

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By NARA, Date 2/6/2012
2013-0682-M

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: FUERTH, SIT, CLARKER, CRESSEY, KERRICK, NSC, SAUNDERS, STEPHENS, SUM, SUM2, VERSHBOW

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~SECRET~~ DTG:031755Z MAY 95

FM: AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO:RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8271

RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1709
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RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0666
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 8738
RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 6804

~~S E C R E T~~ LONDON 006422

EXDIS

FROM CHRIS HILL; VIENNA FOR BOSNIA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, ETTC, ETRD, EFIN, BK, SR, MW
SUBJECT: MAY 3 CONTACT GROUP MEETING

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. THE CONTACT GROUP, REINFORCED BY FINANCE AND SANCTIONS EXPERTS, MET AT THE FCO TO REVIEW THE SANCTIONS/BORDER CLOSING/RECOGNITION PACKAGE TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS ON MAY 5. THE MEETING REVEALED MAJOR DIFFERENCES ON THE PROPOSED SANCTIONS RELIEF PACKAGE FOR FRY RECOGNITION OF BOSNIA. FRENCH AND BRITISH REPS INSISTED ON A LIFT ELEMENT TO THE PACKAGE AND MADE CLEAR THAT ALL OTHER SANCTIONS SHOULD BE SUSPENED EXCEPT FOR A NARROW DEFINITION OF STRATEGIC TRADE. THEY ALSO ADVOCATED RELIEF OF SOME FROZEN ASSETS WHICH THEY FELT WAS NECESSARY "TO JUMP START THE SERB ECONOMY."

3. CG REPS WERE ALSO DIVIDED ON PROPOSALS TO RENAME AND REVISE THE REPORTING CHANNELS FOR THE ICY MONITORING MISSION, ALTHOUGH THERE WAS AGREEMENT TO INCRESE THE SIZE OF THE MISSION. THE CG MEMBERS REVIEWED THE RECOGNITION TEXT AND AGREED TO INCORPORATE SEVERAL MINOR CHANGES SUGGESTED BY THE GOBH. THE RUSSIANS WERE REPRESENTED BY A MEMBER OF THEIR LONDON EMBASSY STAFF WHO TOOK NO ACTIVE PART IN THE FIVE HOUR DISCUSSION.

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VR 2/6/2020 (2.63)

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END SUMMARY.

SANCTIONS RELIEF PACKAGE

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2. FRENCH AND BRITISH REPS URGED THAT THE RELIEF PROPOSAL INCLUDE A LIFTING OF ONE ELEMENT OF THE SANCTIONS PACKAGE, PROPOSING ALL STAGE ONE SANCTIONS (FLIGHTS AND CULTURAL EVENTS) BE CONSIDERED. GERMAN AND US REPS INSISTED THAT THE PACKAGE SHOULD NOT INCLUDE A LIFT ELEMENT UNLESS THERE IS A CHANGE IN THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND IN BOSNIA. THE FRENCH AND THE BRITISH INSISTED THAT LIFT WOULD BE A NECESSARY "PSCHOLOGICAL" INDUCEMENT TO MILOSEVIC REGARDLESS OF DEVELOPMENTS IN BOSNIA.

3. THE GERMAN REP JOINED WITH THE FRENCH AND BRITISH IN SUPPORTING A NARROWER DEFINITION OF STRATEGIC TRADE, ARGUING THAT TO INSIST ON THE BROADER CONCEPT AS CONTAINED IN UNSCR 787 WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO MONITOR AND WOULD LEAVE MOST FRY TRADE STILL UNDER THE SANCTIONS REGIME. THE US REP POINTED OUT THAT THE EU DEFINITION WOULD FREE UP VIRTUALLY ALL OF FRY'S TRADE.

4. ON FINANCIAL SANCTIONS, THE US PRESENTED A PROPOSAL TO LIMIT TRANSACTIONS TO THOSE NECESSARY FOR THE TRADE OF NONSTRATEGIC GOODS. THE FRENCH, BRITISH AND GERMANS, HOWEVER, MADE CLEAR THAT THEY SUPPORT SUSPENSION OF ALL SANCTIONS ON FINANCIAL TRANMSACTIONS, ARGUING THAT ATTEMPTING TO KEEP SOME IN PLACE WOULD MAKE VERIFICATION AND MONITORING PROBLEMATIC, ESPECIALLY IN LESS SOPHISTICATED BANKING SYSTEMS. THE FRENCH REP SAID THAT FULL SANCTIONS RELIEF ON FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS IS NECESSARY TO "GIVE MILOSEVIC THE MEANS TO RESTART THE ECONOMY." THE GERMAN REP COUNTERED THAT SANCTIONS RELIEF SHOULD ENTAIL TAKING AWAY RESTRICTIONS, NOT HELPING SERBIA TO RESTART COMMERCE; HE NOTED THAT THIS PROPOSAL WAS CLOSE TO THE "RED LINE" AGAINST ASSISTANCE TO THE FRY DRAWN BY CHANCELLOR KOHL.

5. ON FROZEN ASSETS CG POSITIONS WERE ALSO DIVERGENT: THE U.S. ADVOCATED THAT NO FROZEN ASSETS BE RELEASED, WITH NEW ACCOUNTS ESTABLISHED TO ACCOMMODATE PERMITTED TRADE; GERMANY AGREED THAT FROZEN ASSETS SHOULD REMAIN SO, BUT FAVORED MORE LIBERAL USE OF NEW ACCOUNTS; THE UK, SUPPORTED BY FRANCE, ADVOCATED RELEASING SOME FROZEN ASSETS TO HELP RESTART THE FRY ECONOMY. THE BRITISH ALSO MAINTAINED THAT UNLESS SOME PERCENTAGE OF THE FROZEN ASSETS WERE RELEASED, SOME COUNTRIES WOULD GO AHEAD AND DO SO ON THEIR OWN, LEAVING BRITISH COMPANIES HAMPERED IN THEIR ABILITY TO ATTRACT SERB SALES. DISAGREEMENT ALSO REMAINS ON THE TECHNICAL LEVEL OF THE ENFORCEABILITY OF A PARALLEL REGIME OF BLOCKED ASSETS EXISTING ALONGSIDE OF "FREE" ACCOUNTS.

6. FINALLY, THE FRENCH AND BRITISH ARGUED THAT SUSPENDED SANCTIONS MEASURES SHOULD BE SUSPENDED "SINE DIE" TO AVOID THE

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"AGONY" OF UNSC REVIEW EVERY 75 OR 100 DAYS. SANCTIONS WOULD REMAIN SUSPENDED UNLESS THE UNSC RECEIVES A NEGATIVE REPORT ON BORDER CLOSURE WHICH WOULD TRIGGER AUTOMATIC REIMPOSITION IN FIVE DAYS ABSENT COUNCIL ACTION (PART OF THE CURRENT SUSPENSION MECHANISM). THIS WOULD BE COMPLEMENTED BY A POLITICAL UNDERSTANDING THAT LIFTED SANCTIONS WOULD ALSO BE REIMPOSED ON THE BASIS OF SUCH A NEGATIVE REPORT. SINCE THIS WOULD REQUIRE POSITIVE ACTION IN THE UNSC, THE UK AND FRANCE ARE WORKING WITH RUSSIA TO DEVELOP A POLITICAL AGREEMENT THAT RUSSIA WOULD NOT VETO A SANCTIONS REIMPOSITION RESOLUTION UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. THE GERMAN REP ARGUED AGAINST LIFT WITH A POLITICAL UNDERSTANDING TO REIMPOSE, ARGUING THAT AN AGREEMENT ON A FUTURE SECURITY COUNCIL VOTE WAS NOT DESIRABLE AND PROBABLY COULD NOT BE LEGALLY BINDING.

BORDER CLOSURE REGIME

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7. DISCUSSION OF STRENGTHENING THE REGIME FOR MONITORING THE FRY/BOSNIA BORDER BEGAN WITH DETAILED RECOMMENDATIONS FROM FORMER ICFY MISSION HEAD BO PELLNAES. HE RECOMMENDED INCREASING ICFY MISSION STAFFING TO 400; FIELDING OBSERVERS AT RADAR SITES, HELICOPTER BASES AND OTHER MILITARY BASES; IMPROVING COOPERATION WITH UNPROFOR, PARTICULARLY TO RECEIVE INFORMATION FROM THE BOSNIAN SIDE OF THE BORDER; FUNDING THE MISSION ADEQUATELY AND PROVIDING A RELIABLE COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK AND 60 FOUR-WHEEL-DRIVE VEHICLES; SECURE COMMUNICATIONS FOR THE HEAD OF MISSION, POSSIBLY THROUGH AN EMBASSY; USE OF HELICOPTERS AND MORE ROVING PATROLS TO COUNTER VJ AND "SERB SECRET POLICE" WARNING TO SMUGGLING OPERATIONS; AND INCREASED USE OF OVERHEAD, INCLUDING THERMAL PHOTOGRAPHY AT NIGHT FROM HELICOPTERS, TO DETECT SMUGGLING OPERATIONS. PELLNAES ALSO STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF ADDRESSING FLOWS OF FUEL FROM CROATIA THROUGH "HERCEG-BOSNA" TO THE PALE SERBS; HE RECOMMENDED THAT UNPROFOR MILITARY OBSERVERS BE TASKED WITH CONTROLLING ROADS INTO BOSNIAN SERB-HELD TERRITORY.

8. THE ICFY REPRESENTATIVE PRESENTED A NOTE FROM THE CO-CHAIRMEN (FAXED TO TFSR01) STRESSING THAT THE ICFY MISSION WOULD NEED TO CLOSE DOWN IF IT DID NOT RECEIVE FUNDS BY MONDAY, MAY 8. WE STRESSED OUR EFFORTS TO TRANSFER FUNDS TO ICFY QUICKLY. THE GERMAN REP NOTED THAT U.S. AND JAPANESE INSISTENCE THAT ICFY CANNOT ISSUE OBLIGATORY ASSESSMENTS IS COMPLICATING EU COUNTRIES' ABILITY TO PAY THEIR SHARE. OF ICFY'S OVERLAPPING BUDGETS ALSO POSE A PROBLEM.

9. THE CONTACT GROUP AGREED THAT THE ICFY MISSION STRENGTH SHOULD BE INCREASED TO A TARGET OF 400 MONITORS. (IF UNPROFOR WOULD BUILD ON ITS PRESENT ROLE BY TAKING RESPONSIBILITY FOR IMPROVED MONITORING OF THE AIR BORDER, AS WE URGED AND OTHERS AGREED, THIS NUMBER COULD BE REDUCED.) THE UK URGED THAT EACH CONTACT GROUP COUNTRY FOLLOW THE U.S. LEAD AND AGREE TO PROVIDE 50 MONITORS. (NOTE: GERMAN REP STEINER TOLD US SEPARATELY THAT THE FRY DOES NOT/NOT HAVE A PROBLEM WITH GERMAN PARTICIPATION; RATHER, GERMANY HAS FIELDED ONLY ONE MONITOR

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BECAUSE THE FINANCE MINISTRY HAS NOT SUPPORTED THE EFFORT. STEINER (PROTECT) SUGGESTED THAT A CALL TO KINKEL MIGHT BREAK THE LOGJAM AND ALLOW GERMANY TO FIELD 50 MONITORS.) THE FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE EXPRESSED HOPE, BUT SOME DOUBT, THAT FRANCE WOULD BE ABLE TO COMMIT TO THIS LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION. THE RUSSIAN REPRESENTATIVE HAD NO COMMENT WHEN QUESTIONED.

10. THE MOST CONTENTIOUS DISCUSSION ON BORDER MONITORING CENTERED ON U.S. AND GERMAN PROPOSALS AT THE PREVIOUS CONTACT GROUP MEETING TO RENAME THE ICFY MISSION AND HAVE THE HEAD OF MISSION REPORT DIRECTLY TO THE UN SYG. WE PRESSED THE POINT THAT THIS WAS SCALED-BACK FROM THE BOSNIAN REQUEST FOR A LARGE UNPROFOR PRESENCE ON THE FRY/BOSNIA BORDER, AND THAT IT IS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF A MUTUAL RECOGNITION PACKAGE ACCEPTABLE TO THE GOBH. THE UK AND FRANCE STAUNCHLY OPPOSED ANY CHANGE, AND THE UK REP POINTEDLY REMINDED THE ICFY REPRESENTATIVE TO REPORT CG MEMBERS' POSITIONS TO THE CO-CHAIRMEN. THE GERMAN REP SUPPORTED THE CHANGE, NOTING THAT THE CO-CHAIRMEN HAD FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE AGREEMENT WHEN THE MISSION WAS ESTABLISHED THAT CONTACT GROUP COUNTRIES WOULD SEE REPORTS BEFORE THEY WERE FORWARDED TO NEW YORK AND THAT THE CO-CHAIRMEN WOULD NOT REVISE THE TEXT OF REPORTS FROM THE ICFY MISSION.

PROGRESS ON RECONGITION DOCUMENT

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11. TOWARD THE END OF THE MEETING, THE CG REPS REVIEWED THE STATUS OF THE RECOGNITION PACKAGE AND AGREED THAT IT IS READY TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS ON FRIDAY. THE GERMAN AND US REPS, WHO HAD MET SEPARATELY WITH BOSNIAN UN AMBASSADOR SACIRBEY EARLIER, NOTED THAT THE TERM "SPRPKA REPUBLIKA" WAS DIFFICULT FOR THE BOSNIANS TO ACCEPT, AND PROPOSED THAT IT BE PUT IT IN QUOTATION MARKS ALONG WITH THE REFERENCE TO THE FEDERATION, A COMPROMISE THE OTHER REPS ACCEPTED.

COMMENT

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12. THE RUSSIANS WERE REPRESENTED BY AN OFFICIAL FROM THE LONDON EMBASSY. HE TOOK NO PART IN THE CONVERSATION EXCEPT TO EXPLAIN THAT HE WAS ATTENDING WITHOUT ANY INSTRUCTIONS ON HIS GOVERNMENT'S POSITIONS.

CROWE
BT
#6422

NNNN
<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003d. paper	Sanctions Relief (1 page)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4000

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0198 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, May 4, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs672

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003e. paper	re: Croatian Crisis: Diplomatic Strategy (2 pages)	05/02/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4000

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0198 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, May 4, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs672

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See also 2013-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (3 pages)~~	~~05/09/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RDS 04/17/2015
002a. memo	Don Kerrick to Samuel Berger re: May 9 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (5 pages)	05/08/1995	P1/b(1)
~~002b. agenda~~	~~[Duplicate of 003a] (1 page)~~	~~05/09/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 02/06/2020
~~002c. cable~~	~~re: Meeting with Milosevic Still Demands Sanctions Lift (5 pages)~~	~~05/07/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002d. cable~~	~~re: Holbrooke Meeting with President Tudjman: May 7 London (4 pages)~~	~~05/07/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002e. paper~~	~~re: Bosnia Diplomatic Strategy: Sarajevo Airport (2 pages)~~	~~05/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002f. paper~~	~~re: Military Options for Reopening Sarajevo Airport (7 pages)~~	~~05/01/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002g. cable~~	~~re: Sarajevo Airport (2 pages)~~	~~05/04/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002h. paper~~	~~re: Unanswered Policy Questions Relating to OPLAN 40104 (12 pages)~~	~~05/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
002i. talking points	re: Talking Points for Congressional OPLAN 40104 (4 pages)	05/1995	P1/b(1)
~~003a. agenda~~	~~NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (1 page)~~	~~05/09/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 02/06/2020
~~003b. agenda~~	~~[Draft version of 003a] (1 page)~~	~~05/09/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 02/06/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4000

FOLDER TITLE:
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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520602
RECEIVED: 10 MAY 95 09

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 10 MAY 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
DC
CROATIA
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 9 MAY DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 13 MAY 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520596 9520597

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0199 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BAKER JANE
		BASS
		BERGER
		KERRICK
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		SIMON
		VERSHBOW

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 5/27/2019
2010-0533-M

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSASK CLOSED BY: NSDRS DOC 2 OF 2

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	95051011	FOR DECISION
001		X	95051017	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
002		X	95051017	DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950510	FUERTH, L	
002	950510	BRILL, K	
002	950510	MCALEER, R	
002	950510	INDERFURTH, K	
002	950510	ADAMS, G	
002	950510	GARTHOFF, D	
002	950510	PATRICK, T	

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Rec'd 5/10 2:45pm

National Security Council
The White House

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes LOG # 20602 A/O

DOCLOG ASH SYSTEM: PRS NSC INT

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL /DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1		
Sens			
Soderberg	copy 2		
Berger			X
Lake		Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
~~Situation Room~~ Dohse	3		Tab I plse.
West Wing Desk	4		
NSC/Rm	5	DHS 5/10	

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

X fax FYI to TL Done 5/10 DHS

Special Dispatch Instructions:

WHO - Please fax to Veit/Emery for LAKE cc: Darby/SENS and do a normal dispatch

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National Security Council
The White House

2:15 pm

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes LOG # 20602 A/O

DOCLOG 1SM SYSTEM: PRS NSC INT

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL /DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1	D	
Sens			
Soderberg	copy		
Berger	2		X
Lake		Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
~~Situation Room~~ Dohse	3		Tab I please
West Wing Desk	4		D
NSC/Rm	5	DKS 5/10	D

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

X fax FYI to TL

Done 5/10 DKS

Special Dispatch Instructions:

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cc: Darby/SENS
and do a normal dispatch

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9520602
DATE 10 MAY 95

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 9 MAY DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	11 May	0700	L Branscum PRINT LAST NAME: BRANSCUM COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	5/11/95	6:00 AM	Anthony Taylor PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX+1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	5/12/95	8:15	J. Graves PRINT LAST NAME: GRAVES COPY: 1
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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Initials: RDS Date: 9/27/2019
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SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 9 MAY DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA
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EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
COL. T. R. PATRICK JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 9 MAY DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	11 May	0730	L. Branscum PRINT LAST NAME: BRANSCUM COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX+1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: 1
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX

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SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 9 MAY DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA
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EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	5/11/95	1151	Wms. MC PRINT LAST NAME: Williams COPY: VIA FAX+1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 9/27/2019
2010-0535-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

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LOG 9520602
DATE 10 MAY 95

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 9 MAY DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX+1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	5/23/95		J. Graves PRINT LAST NAME: GRAVES COPY: 1
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 9/27/2019
2010-0533-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

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1995 MAY 10 PM 6:43

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

MAY 10 6:59 PM '95

TIME OF RECEIPT

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
~~PRIORITY~~
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 1007 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 5
(PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC of 9 May DC Meeting on Bosnia & Croatia NSC LOG #: Z0602

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
State	Executive Secretary		
DOD	Executive Secretary		
USUN	Ofc. of the Rep of the U.S.		
CIA	Executive Secretary		
JCS	Secretary, Joint Staff		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 9/27/2019
2010-0533-M

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION
SITUATION ROOM
1995 MAY 10 PM 6:43

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF RECEIPT

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 1007 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 5 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC of 9 May DC Meeting on Bosnia & Croatia NSC LOG #: 20602

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	State	Executive Secretary		
N	DOD	Executive Secretary		
B	USUN	Ofc. of the Rep of the U.S.		
A	CIA	Executive Secretary		
D	JCS	Secretary, Joint Staff		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 9/27/2019
2010-0533-M

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WASHFAX

TIME OF TRANSMISSION
SITUATION ROOM
1995 MAY 10 PM 6:43

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF RECEIPT
10 MAY 95 18 56
NMCC/JCS

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 1007 CLASSIFICATION: SECRET TOTAL: 5
(PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC of 9 May DC Meeting on Bosnia & Croatia NSC LOG # 20602

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
3	State	Executive Secretary		
1	DOD	Executive Secretary		
3	USUN	Ofc. of the Rep of the U.S.		
	CIA	Executive Secretary		
1	JCS	Secretary, Joint Staff		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 9/27/2019
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SITUATION ROOM
1995 MAY 10 PM 6:43

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF RECEIPT
1908

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 1007 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 5
(PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC of 9 May DC Meeting on Bosnia & Croatia

NSC LOG # 20602

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	State	Executive Secretary		
U	DOD	Executive Secretary		
B	USUN	Ofc. of the Rep of the U.S.		
4	CIA	Executive Secretary		
D	JCS	Secretary, Joint Staff		

REMARKS:

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 9/27/2019
2010-0533-M

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TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: (IMMEDIATE) PRIORITY ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: _____ CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 5 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions for 9 May DC Mtg. on Bosnia & Croatia NSC LOG # 2602

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
Trip Site	Kathy Veit for TL		
	Mary Emery for TL		
	Brooke Darby		
	Andrew Sens		

REMARKS:

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Initials: RDS Date: 9/27/2019
2010-0533-M

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE
- ☐ FLASH
- ☐ IMMEDIATE
- ☑ PRIORITY
- ☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: ~~Notice~~ SOC of Meeting 9 May DC on Bosnia PAGES: 4 + Cover

PLEASE DELIVER TO: NSC # 20602

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20602

May 10, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National
Security & International
Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, May 9, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

for

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/27/2019
2010-0533-M

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee
DATE: May 9, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 1:15 p.m. - 3:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
Samuel R. Berger

OVP:
William Wise

State:
Peter Tarnoff
Robert Frasure
Chris Hill

DOD:
Walter Slocombe
James Pardew

OMB:
Gordon Adams
John Burnim

USUN:
Madeleine Albright
Rick Inderfurth
David Scheffer

CIA:
Douglas MacEachin
Norm Schindler

JCS:
ADM William Owens
LTG Wesley Clark

NSC:
Alexander Vershbow
BG Don Kerrick
Steven Simon

Summary of Conclusions

1. Deputies met to discuss next steps in dealing with the Contact Group on what degree of sanctions relief to offer Milosevic in return for genuine recognition of Bosnia. Following Ambassador Frasure's report on his two meetings with Milosevic, Deputies discussed a State proposal for a new, two-pronged approach that incorporates sanctions relief and new OSCE involvement. Deputies directed that a paper outlining the new proposal be circulated to the Deputies by May 10 for subsequent Principals consideration. **(Action: State)** Deputies reemphasized the need to work in close coordination with the Bosnian Government on any proposal regarding its goal of gaining

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2010-0533-M
RS 9/30/14 (2.65)

genuine recognition by Milosevic of Bosnia-Herzegovina within its internationally recognized borders in return for limited sanctions relief and a closure of the border with Bosnian Serb territory. (S)

2. Deputies reviewed the situation in Croatia and progress on preventing escalation following the Vice President's meeting with President Tudjman in London over the weekend. Deputies agreed that the situation remained very volatile and that the U.S. should continue to press President Tudjman to exercise restraint. They agreed that Ambassador Holbrooke should follow-up with Tudjman on his agreement with the Vice President to accept some UNCRO presence in Sector West and to refrain from military action in other areas of conflict. Deputies further directed that Ambassador Albright and Ambassador Galbraith continue efforts with appropriate Croatian authorities to develop positions that will further defuse the situation. **(Action: State/USUN)** (S)

4. Deputies discussed options for dealing with the situation in Sarajevo where increased violations of the exclusion zone and the Bosnian Serb closure of the Sarajevo airport continue to erode UN authority and NATO credibility. Deputies agreed that the untenable situation, and lack of UN will to fully execute its mandate, places the continuation of UNPROFOR in Bosnia at serious risk. Noting that with the change in Government, the French will undertake a review of their participation in UNPROFOR, Deputies directed that a strategy be developed for gaining French support for tougher UN action in Sarajevo. **(Action: State)** Deputies further directed that the JCS Sarajevo military options paper be circulated to Principals. **(Action: JCS)** (S)

5. Deputies briefly discussed the IWG efforts in developing a post-UNPROFOR withdrawal strategy and in drafting answers to the unanswered policy questions regarding OPLAN 40104. Noting that more time was needed to review the work, Deputies asked that Agency comments be promptly provided (NLT COB May 11) directly to State (EUR). State will incorporate comments and circulate another version for Deputies final review on Friday, May 12. **(Action: State)** A subsequent version which incorporates any additional Deputies' comments will circulated to Principals. (S)

6. Deputies discussed the SACEUR's request for authority to issue an ACTREQ for the enabling and main forces in OPLAN 40104 that may be forwarded to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) next week. Deputies agreed that this request goes beyond existing Principals' authorization and directed that the following actions be taken to frame the issue for Principals' decision:

- Present Principals with proposed answers to OPLAN 40104 unanswered policy questions NLT Monday, May 15. **(Action: State)** (S)

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- Clarify the significance of the ACTREQ as it relates to the overall OPLAN 40104 approval process. **(Action: OSD/JCS)** (S)

- Gauge likely NATO response to the request and develop appropriate guidance to U.S. representatives at NATO. **(Action: State/DoD)** (S)

- Prepare ACTREQ options/decision paper for Principals' consideration NLT Monday, May 15. **(Action: DoD with State input)** (S)

- Defer Congressional briefings until questions concerning new authorities requested by the SACEUR are clarified. **(Action: NSC/IWG)** (S)

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20602

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 10, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW FOR

FROM: BG DON KERRICK

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, May 9, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of Conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia held May 9, 1995.

Concurrence by: Steve Simon FOR

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve MV Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/27/2019
2010-0533-M

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520597
RECEIVED: 08 MAY 95 15

TO: BERGER

FROM: KERRICK
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 08 MAY 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA CROATIA
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 9 MAY DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER DUE DATE: 11 MAY 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520596 9520602

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0199 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		KERRICK
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		VERSHBOW

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/27/2019
2010-0533-M

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DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	95051812	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	95051812	NOTED BY BERGER

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National Security Council
The White House

Rec'd 5/9 7:00am

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Harmon			
Dohse	1	D	
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger	2	Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3		N
NSC/Rm			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Berger Mtg package
Bosnia Croatia
DC mtg May 9

Special Dispatch Instructions:

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	Don Kerrick to Samuel Berger re: May 9 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (5 pages)	05/08/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4000

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0199 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, May 9, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs673

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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TAB

A.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA AND CROATIA

DATE: May 9, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 1:00-2:30pm

Agenda

I. Near-Term Diplomatic Strategy

A. Contact Group Prospects/Next Steps.....State

B. Croatia: Situation Review/Next Steps.....State

II. Strategy for Dealing with the Situation in Sarajevo

A. Intelligence Assessment.....CIA

B. Diplomatic Strategy.....State

C. Existing Mandates.....State

D. Military Options.....JCS

III. OPLAN 40104: Unanswered Policy Questions

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 2/6/2020
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B.

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FROM AMB FRASURE FOR THE SECRETARY

E.O. 12356: DECL
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, SR
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH MILOSEVIC--STILL DEMANDS SANCTIONS LIFT, GRIM MOOD ON CROATIA

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE CHARGE AND I SPENT SIX HOURS YESTERDAY WITH MILOSEVIC AT THE HUNTING LODGE AT KARADJORJEVO NORTH OF BELGRADE -- AND JUST A FEW MILES FROM SECTOR EAST. OVER DINNER AND IN A LONG WALK AROUND THE LAKES WITH THEIR ASSORTED WATERFOWL (WHILE SERBIAN MOSQUITOES DEVOURED US), TWO THEMES CLEARLY EMERGED:

-- ON THE BOSNIA RECOGNITION/BORDER/SANCTIONS PACKAGE, MILOSEVIC IS SIMPLY NOT INTERESTED IN SUBSTANTIAL SUSPENSION OF SANCTIONS. HE WANTS LIFT. HOWEVER, HE UNDERSTANDS OUR FIRM POSITION THAT LIFT CANNOT BEGIN UNTIL COMPETENT AUTHORITIES IN PALE ACCEPT THE CONTACT GROUP PLAN. AS HE SUMMED IT UP: "OK, I WILL HAVE TO ARRANGE PHASE TWO NOW. BUT IT WILL BE HARDER AND IT WILL TAKE LONGER. YOU WANT ME TO GO OVER THE MOUNTAIN INSTEAD OF THROUGH THE TUNNEL."

-- THERE IS A VERY SUBSTANTIAL NEGATIVE OVERHANG HERE FROM RECENT EVENTS IN CROATIA WHERE MILOSEVIC, I BELIEVE, FEELS BADLY WRONG FOOTED. (MILOSEVIC DOES NOT ENJOY BEING OUT-MANEUVERED BY TUDJMAN TO PUT IT BLUNTLY.) HE EXPECTS TO BE IN TOUCH AGAIN WITH ZAGREB AFTER SOME INTERVAL BUT FEARS HE MAY LOSE CONTROL IN KNIN AS HE DID IN PALE. HIS PARTING WORDS TO ME WERE: "PLEASE, MR. FRASURE, DO SOMETHING ABOUT CROATIA."

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3. MILOSEVIC SEEMED SUBDUED, INDEED BLEAK, ALTHOUGH HIS MOOD PICKED UP SOMEWHAT IN THE COURSE OF THE EVENING. CONNECTING THE TWO MAIN THEMES OF THE EVENING--THE NEED FOR ACTION IN PALE AND THE CRISIS IN CROATIA--MILOSEVIC GLUMLY REMARKED THAT RECENT EVENTS WILL MAKE IT EVEN MORE DIFFICULT TO HAVE MLADIC DISPLACE KARADZIC. THIS CONVERSATION MAY BE SOMETHING OF A WATERSHED IN THAT WE NOW CLEARLY UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER'S POSITIONS AND THE DIFFERENCES THAT DIVIDE US. END SUMMARY.

WHERE WE ARE ON SANCTIONS --LIFT/SUSPENSION

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4. I LED OFF THE DISCUSSION BY TELLING MILOSEVIC THAT WE ARE AT A CRUCIAL STAGE IN THE BOSNIA GAME AND WE NEED TO HAVE FUNDAMENTAL CLARITY AND AGREEMENT ON WHERE IT IS GOING. PERHAPS WE CAN DEVELOP AN INFORMAL FRAMEWORK OF UNDERSTANDINGS ON HOW EVENTS SHOULD UNFOLD OVER THE NEXT SIX MONTHS. BUT WE MUST HAVE NO MISUNDERSTANDING ON SANCTIONS -- OUR FIRM POSITION, DESPITE SOME PRESSURE IN THE CONTACT GROUP, IS THAT WE WILL NOT AGREE TO ACTUAL LIFT UNTIL COMPETENT AUTHORITIES IN PALE ACCEPT THE CG PLAN. (AND I REMARKED PERSONALLY THAT I DON'T PUT KARADZIC IN THE COMPETENT CATEGORY.)

5. MILOSEVIC RESPONDED THAT THE SANCTIONS ISSUE IS SOMETHING OF "A CHICKEN AND EGG DISCUSSION." HIS VIEW REMAINED THAT ONLY A RADICAL CHANGE BRINGS ABOUT "AN IRREVERSIBLE PROCESS FOR PEACE." WITH MOCK INCREDULITY, HE REMARKED: "YOU CANNOT TREAT ME HALF AS AN ENEMY HALF AS A CO-WORKER. YOU DON'T SUPPOSE THAT I WANT TO TRICK YOU?" I REPLIED THAT WITH RUSSIA ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS IS ITSELF AN IRREVERSIBLE PROCESS. WE NEED AN INSURANCE POLICY; THAT IS WHY WE ARE ONLY PREPARED TO SUSPEND SANCTIONS AT THIS STAGE. AND THAT WILL NOT CHANGE. MILOSEVIC RETORTED: "YOU ARE LIKE A CAR DEALER WHO WON'T LET ME DRIVE THE CAR OUT OF THE LOT. DO YOU THINK I WANT TO DRIVE IT TO VENEZUELA. YOUR INSURANCE IS OUR VITAL INTEREST."

6. MUCH LATER IN THE EVENING WE RETURNED TO THE ISSUE AND MILOSEVIC REMARKED WITH MUCH RESIGNATION: "OK I UNDERSTAND YOUR POSITION. I WILL HAVE TO DEAL WITH THE SITUATION IN PALE. I WILL HAVE.TO ARRANGE PHASE TWO NOW. I HAVE NO CHOICE." MILOSEVIC MUTTERED ABOUT HAVING A "PLAN" BUT DID NOT GET INTO SPECIFICS. "I UNDERSTAND I MUST REMOVE KARADZIC--WITH OR WITHOUT SANCTIONS."

LIMITING THE WAR IN THE MEANTIME

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7. I TOLD MILOSEVIC THAT WITH THE END OF THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES WE ARE NONETHELESS URGING THE BOSNIANS TO SHOW RESTRAINT AND WE BELIEVE THEY WILL. HE SAID HE IS PUTTING SIMILAR PRESSURE ON MLADIC AND BELIEVES THE SITUATION WILL NOT GET OUT OF HAND. "THE MUSLIMS DON'T REALLY WANT TO FIGHT."

CROATIA ON HIS MIND

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8. MILOSEVIC WAS PASSIONATE ABOUT LAST WEEK'S EVENTS: "TUDJMAN'S SPECIALS WERE MASSACRING CIVILIANS. YOU ARE NOT AWARE OF HOW LARGE IT WAS. WHAT WILL HAPPEN WHEN THOSE REFUGEES WITH THEIR STORIES GET TO BANJA LUKA? MORE THAN ONE THOUSAND CIVILIANS WERE KILLED. IT WAS THE USTASHE MODEL FROM WORLD WAR TWO." I TOLD MILOSEVIC THAT WE HAVE MADE OUR UNHAPPINESS KNOWN IN ZAGREB. WE FEEL THAT TUDJMAN HAS VIOLATED OUR ACCORD FROM COPENHAGEN. WE ARE NOT AWARE OF WIDESPREAD ATROCITIES BUT ARE WATCHING THE SITUATION CLOSELY. WE WANT A UN PRESENCE RESTORED IN SECTOR WEST. WE ARE TELLING TUDJMAN THAT HIS TREATMENT OF SERBS IN WESTERN SLAVONIA COULD DETERMINE WHETHER PEACE IS POSSIBLE.

9. CLEARLY UNHAPPY THAT HE HAD BEEN WRONG FOOTED BY TUDJMAN, MILOSEVIC FULMINATED IN DETAIL: "SARANIC WAS LYING TO ME. I WON'T TALK TO HIM AGAIN. I PASSED THROUGH HELL HERE TO CALM THE SITUATION. TUDJMAN IS A CRAZY MAN; THE CROATS ARE KILLERS." MILOSEVIC ASSERTED THAT THE GERMANS HAD APPROVED THE OPERATION IN ADVANCE AND PROMISED TO PREVENT ANY ACTION AT THE UN. MILOSEVIC INSISTS THAT THE STATUS QUO ANTE BE RESTORED BY THE UN IN SECTOR WEST.

10. I TOLD MILOSEVIC THAT ZUZUL HAD ASKED ME TO PASS ALONG ASSURANCES THAT ZAGREB WANTS TO CALM THE SITUATION AND THERE WILL BE NO MORE MILITARY OPERATIONS IF THERE ARE NO MORE ATTACKS ON ZAGREB. MILOSEVIC BRUSHED ALL OF THAT ASIDE AND ASSERTED THAT THE CROATIANS ARE PROBING INTO THE OTHER SECTORS. "SECTOR WEST WAS A SOFT TARGET; TUE OTHERS ARE NOT." TO MY COMMENT THAT TUDJMAN MAY FEEL HE HAS PULLED A RABBIT OUT OF THE HAT, MILOSEVIC RETORTED GLUMLY, "YES, AND HE IS CALLING IT AN ELEPHANT." HE CONFIRMED THAT HE HAS SENT ARMORED UNITS TO THE SECTOR EAST BORDER BUT DOWNPLAYED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MOVE.

11. MILOSEVIC SAID THAT THE PEACE PROCESS HAD BEEN DAMAGED AND IT WOULD BE HARD TO GET IT BACK ON TRACK. "I TOLD MIKELIC HE SHOULD GO TO GENEVA TO

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LORD OWEN'S MEETING. HE REPLIED, "ARE YOU CRAZY? IF I TALK TO CROATS NOW, PEOPLE IN KNIN WILL KILL ME; IT IS A HOT SITUATION NOW." (MILOSEVIC WAS GENERALLY DISMISSIVE OF OWEN AND STOLTENBERG. "OWEN IS TOTALLY IRRELEVANT NOW. BUT I SEE HIM AS A COURTESY WHEN HE COMES TO TOWN.") MILOSEVIC SAID HE WOULD BE MEETING WITH MIKELIC AND BABIC ON MONDAY AND THE KNIN ASSEMBLY WOULD HAVE A SESSION ON WEDNESDAY.

12. ON KARADZIC'S ROLE, MILOSEVIC SNEERED: "HIS OFFER TO HELP FELLOW SERBS? HE HAD TROOPS ONLY TWO HUNDRED METERS AWAY BUT HE DID NOTHING. HE WANTS KRAJINA TO BE WEAK SO THEY WILL BE DEPENDENT ON HIM." HE BLAMED MARTIC FOR THE ROCKET ATTACKS AND CLAIMED HE HAD TOLD THE KRAJINA LEADERS THAT "YOU CANNOT PROTECT THE CHILDREN IN WESTERN SLAVONIA BY KILLING OF CHILDREN IN ZAGREB."

THE BALKAN GODFATHER -- A MAN ALONE, SOMEWHAT DIMINISHED

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13. I WAS ESPECIALLY STRUCK THIS TIME BY HOW ISOLATED AND CUT OFF MILOSEVIC IS. HERE HE WAS, OUT AT KARADJORJEVO FOR THE WEEKEND WITH HIS BODYGUARDS, SERVANTS, A FLUNKY OR TWO AND A LOT OF DUCKS. (MILOSEVIC SAID HE GOES DUCK HUNTING FROM TIME TO TIME BUT HAS NO INTEREST IN THE REST OF TITO'S WILD MENAGERIE.) HIS FAITHFUL PRIVATE SECRETARY, GORAN MILINOVIC, WHO WRITES DOWN EVERYTHING AND NEVER SAYS A WORD, SEEMS REMARKABLY LIKE STALIN'S UBIQUITOUS GNOME ALEXANDER POSKREBESHEV. THERE APPEARS TO BE NOTHING SIMILAR TO TUDJMAN'S COLLECTION OF COLORFUL AND STRONG-WILLED ADVISERS.

14. NOT SURPRISINGLY, MILOSEVIC IS PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE TO PARANOID BALKAN "INTELLIGENCE." THIS TIME HE TOLD ME THAT THE CIA IS FLOODING THE COUNTRY WITH COUNTERFEIT MONEY. I SAID THAT WAS RIDICULOUS. LAST TIME HE ASSURED ME HE HAD PICTORIAL EVIDENCE THAT WARREN ZIMMERMANN HAD ORGANIZED A PLOT TO KILL HIM. OF THE OUTSIDE WORLD HE KNOWS VERY LITTLE, DESPITE HIS PREFERRED PERSONA AS A SOPHISTICATED BELGRADE BANKER, AT HOME IN NEW YORK, WHO GOT INTO POLITICS BY ACCIDENT. OVER DINNER WE TALKED A LITTLE BIT ABOUT THE UPCOMING MOSCOW SUMMIT AND NATO EXPANSION -- I DID NOT OFFER MEMBERSHIP TO SERBIA -- AND HIS COMMENTS WERE BANAL AT BEST.

15. PERHAPS AS A RESULT OF THE CROATIA FIASCO THIS

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WEEK, MILOSEVIC SEEMED MUCH LESS CONFIDENT, LESS IN CONTROL, INDEED LESS FORMIDABLE THAN WAS THE CASE IN OUR PREVIOUS MEETINGS. HIS PARTING REQUEST THAT WE DO SOMETHING ABOUT CROATIA ALMOST SOUNDED LIKE PLEADING. PERINA

FROM:
SITREPRT

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TAB C.

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EXDIS

FROM A/S HOLBROOKE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, HR
SUBJECT: EUR A/S HOLBROOKE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT TUDJMAN: MAY 7, LONDON

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ACCOMPANIED BY EMBASSY POLITICAL COUNSELOR MIKE HABIB, I MET MAY 7 WITH CROATIAN PRESIDENT TUDJMAN IN THE LATTER'S HOTEL SUITE, PREPARATORY TO TUDJMAN'S MEETING WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT LATER TODAY.

3. IN A HIGHLY CONFIDENT MOOD, TUDJMAN OPENED WITH A DEFENSE OF THE CROATIAN MILITARY ACTION IN SECTOR WEST. CROATIA HAD RESPONDED TO SERBIAN ATTACKS ON CROATIAN CIVILIANS USING THE ZAGREB-BELGRADE HIGHWAY. A FACTOR LEADING TO THE SERB VIOLENCE WAS THE FACT THAT MARTIC HAD ESCAPED FROM MILOSEVIC'S CONTROL THOUGH THE SERBIAN LEADER WAS NOW TRYING TO REIN HIM IN. THE MILITARY ACTION HAD BEEN PROFESSIONAL AND GREAT CARE HAD BEEN TAKEN TO PREVENT EXCESSES AGAINST THE CIVILIAN POPULATION. ONLY 33 CROATS HAD BEEN KILLED IN THE OPERATION.

4. ALLEGATIONS THAT CROATIAN FORCES HAD FIRED ON CIVILIANS WERE FALSE. THE ARMY HAD ONLY BEEN ATTEMPTING TO PREVENT THE MOVEMENT OF BOSNIAN SERB REINFORCEMENTS

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INTO SECTOR WEST. THE AREA WAS NOW ENTIRELY UNDER CROATIAN CONTROL. MILOSEVIC, OWEN AND OTHERS, HE CONTINUED, WERE NOW TALKING ABOUT PROCLAIMING A "FREE ZONE" AND MAINTAINING UNCRO IN THE AREA. THIS WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO CROATIA, THOUGH UN AND/OR EU MONITORS COULD REMAIN.

5. TUDJMAN CLAIMED THAT CROATIA WOULD UNDERTAKE NO FURTHER MILITARY ACTIONS IN THE UNPA'S. HE SAID HE HAD ALREADY ISSUED ORDERS TO THIS EFFECT AND ANNOUNCED THIS PUBLICLY. CROATIAN TROOP MOVEMENTS IN AND NEAR OTHER UNPA'S WERE CONFINED TO IMPROVEMENTS IN LOCAL DEFENSIVE POSITIONS. EVEN HERE, TUDJMAN HAD ORDERED SOME OF THESE TROOPS TO PULL BACK.

6. TUDJMAN, ON BALANCE, DID NOT EXPECT A SERBIAN MILITARY RESPONSE. MILOSEVIC AND MIKELIC WERE CLEARLY IN FAVOR OF A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. MILOSEVIC WAS CONTINUING TO WORK TOWARDS MARTIC'S REMOVAL BY THE CROATIAN SERB PARLIAMENT; THIS MIGHT OCCUR NEXT WEEK. THE U.S. WARNING TO THE SERBS ABOUT ENDANGERING U.S. PERSONNEL IN ZAGREB HAD BEEN VERY HELPFUL IN DISSUADING THEM FROM TAKING MILITaRY ACTION.

7. I SAID I WANTED TO DISCUSS FOUR ASPECTS OF THE SITUATION IN PREPARATION FOR THIS EVENING'S MEETING WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT: (1) THE TREATMENT OF THE SERB POPULATION IN SECTOR WEST; (2) THE FUTURE OF UNCRO; (3) THE OTHER UNPA'S; AND (4) SEVERAL LARGER ISSUES.

8. I FIRST STRESSED THE IMPERATIVE OF PROPER TREATMENT OF ALL CIVILIANS. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO PREVENT REVENGE ATTACKS. THE MANNER IN WHICH CROATIA DEALT WITH THE POPULATION THERE WOULD BE A MAJOR FACTOR IN INFLUENCING INTERNATIONAL OPINION AS WELL AS THAT OF CROATIAN SERBS IN THE OTHER UNPA'S. EMBASSY ZAGREB HAD THUS FAR REPORTED FAVORABLY ON WHAT IT HAD SEEN REGARDING TREATMENT OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION IN THE AREA. (FYI: GALBRAITH IS VISITING THE AREA TOMORROW. END FYI.)

9. SECOND, IT WAS VITAL THAT CROATIA NOT MOVE MILITARILY ELSEWHERE. TUDJMAN INTERJECTED THAT ZAGREB WOULD NOT DO SO DESPITE STRONG PUBLIC PRESSURES IN THIS DIRECTION. IT WAS IMPORTANT, I CONTINUED, TO DAMPEN DOWN THE MOOD OF EUPHORIA IN CROATIA. TUDJMAN SAID HE AGREED; CROATIA HAD LOST ONLY 33 SOLDIERS IN SECTOR WEST BUT HE RECOGNIZED THAT MILITARY ACTIONS AGAINST SECTOR NORTH AND SOUTH WOULD LIKELY RESULT IN 2-5,000 CROATIAN DEAD.

10. TURNING TO THE ISSUE OF THE FUTURE UN PRESENCE IN SECTOR WEST, I NOTED THAT A DIFFERENCE OF OPINION EXISTED. WE HAD ADVISED AGAINST THE MILITARY ACTION. WHEN THE VICE PRESIDENT AND TUDJMAN HAD MET IN

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COPENHAGEN, THE U.S. MND CROATIA HAD AGREED ON A FUTURE STRUCTURE FOR THE UN PRESENCE IN THE UNPA'S. WE HAD HELD TO OUR COMMITMENT: THE UN OPERATION HAD BEEN RE-DESIGNATED AS UNCRO, GIVEN A NEW MANDATE AND REDEPLOYED. WHILE THE CROATIAN ACTION MAY HAVE BEEN PROVOKED BY THE SERBS, IT HAD NONETHELESS CAUSED IMMENSE PROBLEMS.

11. WE BELIEVED CROATIA MUST PERMIT UNCRO TO REMAIN AND THE UNPA STATUS TO CONTINUE. IN PRACTICE, THIS WOULD MEAN THAT WHILE THE UN STATUS WOULD REMAIN UNCHANGED THE AREA WOULD, IN FACT, BE UNDER CROATIAN RATHER THAN SERB CONTROL. SUCH AN APPROACH WAS IN CROATIA'S OWN INTEREST AS A CONTINUING UN PRESENCE WAS NEEDED TO REDUCE TENSIONS THROUGHOUT THE KRAJINA.

13. I ADDED THAT MILOSEVIC HAD TOLD FRASURE LAST NIGHT THAT THE CROATIAN MOVE INTO SECTOR WEST HAD SERIOUSLY DAMAGED HIS ABILITY TO MOVE TOWARD ANY FORM OF RECOGNITION OF CROATIA AND BOSNIA. IT HAD ALSO SET BACK HIS EFFORTS TO REMOVE KARADZIC AND MARTIC AND REDUCED HIS INFLUENCE ON MLADIC. MILOSEVIC HAD BEEN VERY UPSET BY THE CROATIAN MOVE, I SAID. TUDJMAN MADE A SMALL SMILE.

13. TUDJMAN REITERATED THAT UN MONITORS COULD REMAIN IN WESTERN SLAVONIA, PERHAPS BEING CONCENTRATED IN AREAS SUCH AS THE BRIDGE OVER THE SAVA RIVER, WHERE SERB PROVOCATIONS WERE MOST LIKELY. HOWEVER, THE CROATIAN LEADER DEMURRED WHEN I ASKED AGAIN IF THE AREA COULD CONTINUE AS A UNPA. THIS WOULD BE TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE CROATIAN PEOPLE.

14. I WARNED THAT EXPELLING UNCRO COULD REINFORCE INCREASING THINKING IN SOME CAPITALS (PARIS AND LONDON) IN FAVOR OF A UN WITHDRAWAL FROM CROATIA AND BOSNIA. TUDJMAN AGREED THAT A CONTINUING UNPROFOR PRESENCE IN BOSNIA WOULD BE HELPFUL BUT HE SEEMED UNCONCERNED ABOUT A KRAJINA SERB MILITARY MOVE. THEY NO LONGER HAD THE MILITARY CAPABILITY TO UNDERTAKE LARGE-SCALE ACTION AND WERE DEMORALIZED. IF IT WANTED TO, CROATIA COULD TAKE SECTOR NORTH AND SOUTH IN EIGHT DAYS WITH NO MORE THAN 3-5,000 DEAD, A PRICE HE SAID (SEEMINGLY CONTRADICTING HIS EARLIER STATEMENT IN PARAGRAPH 9) "WE ARE WILLING TO PAY IF NECESSARY." SECTOR EAST WOULD BE MORE OF A PROBLEM, HE ADDED.

15. I AGAIN REPEATED THE U.S. VIEW THAT UNCRO SHOULD REMAIN IN PLACE AND THE AREA SHOULD CONTINUE AS A UNPA. TUDJMAN AGAIN SAID THE AREA WOULD BE REINTEGRATED INTO CROATIA. UN MONITORS COULD REMAIN, E.G. ON THE BOSNIAN BORDER. THE UN SHOULD ALSO CONTROL THE UDBINA AIRFIELD AND LAUNCHING SITES FOR MISSILES AIMED AT CROATIAN CITIES. TUDJMAN ADDED THAT HE WAS STRONGLY OPPOSED TO UN PLANS TO REDEPLOY RUSSIAN TROOPS FROM SECTOR EAST TO

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16. I CLOSED THE MEETING BY EMPHASIZING THAT I BELIEVED OUR DIFFERENCES OVER THE UN PRESENCE WERE SOLUBLE, AND STRESSED THAT THE VICE PRESIDENT WOULD PURSUE THIS ISSUE WITH TUDJMAN AT THEIR MEETING LATER IN THE DAY. (AFTER THE MEETING I BRIEFED PAULINE NEVILLE-JONES AND, BY SECURE PHONE, AMBASSADORS FRASURE AND GALBRAITH.)

17. COMMENT: I DIDN'T DENT TUDJMAN; PERHAPS THE VICE PRESIDENT WILL BE ABLE TO. HIS ASSURANCES THAT HE WON'T MOVE ON SECTORS NORTH AND SOUTH, WHILE PROBABLY SINCERE TODAY, ARE WORTH ABOUT AS MUCH AS WERE HIS SIMILAR STATEMENTS AT COPENHAGEN. COUPLED WITH FRASURE'S BLEAK FIRST MEETING WITH MILOSEVIC, THIS REPRESENTS ANOTHER SETBACK FOR PEACE, EVEN THOUGH THE TAKING OF SECTOR WEST HAS SOME OBVIOUS SHORT-TERM BENEFITS IN TERMS OF THE SANCTIONS REGIME AND REDUCING THE AREA IN DISPUTE IN CROATIA.
CROWE

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DECL: OADR

Bosnia Diplomatic Strategy: Sarajevo Airport

The Problem

After their successful challenge to the French at the illegal Sierra-4 checkpoint and their even more humiliating treatment of Contact Group representatives at Sarajevo airport, the Bosnian Serbs know they can keep bullying the United Nations and get whatever they want. The UN has no fall-back position for its talks with Karadzic; it long-ago ruled out the option of enforcing its control of the airport and the environs of Sarajevo. In his initial report on the situation, the Secretary General made it clear that the airport could be kept open only with the parties' agreement.

Referring to nonexistent precedents and claiming that the airport is Serb territory merely managed by the UN, Karadzic and his minions have threatened to fire on UN aircraft carrying anything but UNPROFOR military personnel. On April 27, the Serb commander overseeing the airport turned back a plane with civilians aboard and Karadzic announced that he will never allow foreign diplomats to land at Sarajevo, "especially diplomats from hostile nations, like Iran and the United States."

Prognosis: Humiliation and Strangulation

In the end, the UN may be able to maintain the airport as a logistical base for its own severely limited activities, but unless the UN can persuade the Bosnian Serbs otherwise, Sarajevo will lose its air link to the outside world. The GOBH will be isolated and the city will be strangled by closure of land routes.

And the Serbs may go further. In recent weeks, the Bosnian Serb Army has made obvious preparations for a massive attack on Sarajevo -- digging tank emplacements, replacing wooden and sandbag revetments encircling the city with reinforced concrete, etc. General Smith has said he expects the Serbs to "pick off the enclaves one-by-one" and then go for "the real prize enclave -- Sarajevo itself."

In response to these moves, the GOBH is certain to take into its own hands the future of its capital city. The B-H Army has already engaged in probing actions north and south of the city -- possibly setting the stage for an all-out offensive to punch one or two corridors into Sarajevo from nearby government-controlled territory. As Bosnian Vice President Ganic has stated, "We want UNPROFOR to stay in Bosnia and do its job while the Serbs want UNPROFOR to stay in Bosnia and not do its job." In the case of Sarajevo, the Bosnians will not long accept an UNPROFOR that is powerless to counter the Serbs.

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Our Limited Options

The key to keeping UNPROFOR on the ground and to avoiding the deployment of U.S. ground troops in Bosnia is to take aggressive and decisive measures to keep Sarajevo Airport open for all traffic. The legal authority exists to do so and military options are being prepared.* But if we are truly serious, we must begin immediately to build a consensus among our allies and at the UN, threatening realistic consequences for inaction.

Among our options are the following:

-- Using existing authority to permit NATO air activity of the following sorts:

1) Close air support in defense of UNPROFOR troops at the airport, who have in recent days been shelled by the Bosnian Serbs;

2) Air strikes based on the fact that Sarajevo is being strangled;

3) Air strikes based on the fact that the exclusion zone is being violated.

Diplomatically, we could begin with the following steps:

-- Consulting immediately with allies bilaterally, at NATO and at the UN on Serb non-compliance with relevant UNSC resolutions, which call for unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance including "safe and secure access" to Sarajevo Airport, and provide for the use of force to protect the Sarajevo safe area. The UN Security Council is to act Wednesday to issue a Presidential Statement on the airport that will call for its re-opening in accordance with the 1992 Airport Agreement.

-- Convening a meeting of the NAC to discuss military measures to ensure compliance with relevant UNSC resolutions.

-- Arranging calls by the Secretary to Hurd, Juppe and Kozyrev, letting them know that a failure to open the airport on acceptable terms will make a Ministerial impossible.

-- Raising the issue at the May 5 Contact Group meeting in Paris.

*See accompanying papers

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EXISTING AUTHORITY FOR NATO AIR ACTIVITY AROUND SARAJEVO AIRPORT

Within limitations, the UN and NATO have the authority to use air power in response to restrictions placed on the use of Sarajevo Airport, based on the following:

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (CAS)

NATO Authority: Based on paragraph 1.1 of the Athens Ministerial Decision Sheet (June 10, 1993), which reads in part:

> "Ministers decided ... to offer NATO's protective air power in case of attack against UNPROFOR"

NATO may respond to a UN request for NATO air power, without further action, to support UNPROFOR.

UN Authority: UNSC 836 Res. (June 4, 1993), reaffirmed by UNSC Res. 844 (June 18, 1993) provides that:

> "... member states, acting ... through regional organizations, ... may take all necessary measures, through the use of air power, ... in and around safe areas, ... to support UNPROFOR in the performance of [certain aspects of] its mandate ..."

That mandate includes deterring attacks on the safe areas, and replying to obstruction of movement of UNPROFOR or humanitarian convoys throughout Bosnia. In addition, under UNSC Res. 770, the UN may request NATO to use force to facilitate delivery of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo. These resolutions require that actions by member states and regional organizations be taken in "close cooperation" or in "coordination" with the UN, respectively.

AIR STRIKES IN RESPONSE TO STRANGULATION

NATO Authority: Based on NAC decisions of August 2 and 9, 1993, which read in part:

> "...that the Alliance will make immediate preparations for undertaking, in the event of strangulation of Sarajevo and other areas ..., measures including air strikes ..."

NATO may conduct air strikes in response to the "strangulation" of safe areas.

The NAC decision also makes clear that "the first use of air power shall be authorized by the UN Secretary General." This has been termed the "dual key" arrangement.

UN Authority: As with CAS, implementing UN resolutions are 770, 836 and 844.

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AIR STRIKES IN RESPONSE TO VIOLATIONS OF THE SARAJEVO EXCLUSION ZONE

NATO Authority: Based on the NAC decision of February 9, 1994, which reads in part that NATO:

"... accepts ... the request of the UN Secretary General to launch air strikes, ... at the request of the United Nations, against artillery or mortar positions in or around Sarajevo ... which are determined by UNPROFOR to be responsible for attacks against civilians, ... and ... in response to artillery or mortar attacks on Sarajevo, ... and ... in response to the identification of any heavy weapons [inside] the exclusion zone [and not under UNPROFOR control] ..."

NATO may conduct air strikes, at the UN's request, if the Sarajevo exclusion zone is violated.

UN Authority: As with CAS, implementing UN resolutions are 770, 836 and 844.

In addition to the UN/NATO authorities, collective self-defense would authorize states to use air power at the request of the Bosnian Government. Such use of air power could be restricted by UN Security Council resolutions -- e.g., by the establishment of the no-fly zone over Bosnia.

NOTE: UN and NATO authority to use air power, as noted above, does NOT apply to restrictions on the use of Sarajevo Airport by diplomats or official delegations.

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TAB G

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INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Military Options for Reopening Sarajevo Airport (U)

1. (U) Purpose. To provide options to reopen Sarajevo airport for the delivery of humanitarian aid.

2. (U) Background. Sarajevo air operations have been periodically interrupted by the Bosnian Serbs since the beginning of the conflict. Bosnian Serb forces control the area surrounding the airport and the major land routes into Sarajevo. The Bosnian Serbs have the capability to attack aircraft in flight and while unloading on the airfield. Aircraft are threatened by both antiaircraft weapons and conventional direct and indirect ground systems. The Bosnian Muslims also have the capability, though to a lesser extent, to interdict air operations. UNPROFOR has documented numerous occasions of BiH fire.

3. ~~(S)~~ Discussion. The following options are available for consideration for the delivery of humanitarian aid into Sarajevo:

Assumptions:

- New UNSCR(s) required to implement a military option will be adopted by the Security Council.
- A parallel diplomatic effort to secure the opening of Sarajevo will be undertaken.

OPTION 1: Secure Sarajevo Airport - forcibly secure and maintain a DMZ around Sarajevo. Create a demilitarized zone (8-10km) around Sarajevo airfield which denies the Bosnian Serbs from employing weapons against aircraft that are in flight or on the ground. This option could require up to a division sized force to secure the airfield and remove the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim presence from the immediate area.

UNPROFOR Action:

- UNPROFOR seize (if necessary) and establish administrative control over the Sarajevo airport
- Secure airfield perimeter and approaches using a combination of troops equipped with means of acquisition for various types of attack. May include night vision devices, GPS, artillery acquisition battery.
- Take direct action to secure high terrain and buildings from belligerents. Move civilians outside of airport safe zone (2-3km). Combatants excluded inside 8-10km zone.

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2013-0662-M (2 pp)

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- Roving security patrols along approaches to the airport. Requires mounted and dismounted patrols monitoring out to 10 km from the airport.
- NATO Airborne AC-130 and helicopter response capability to attack sniper/mortar/artillery positions. Consider use of a ground quick reaction force.

Belligerent Reaction:

- "Administrative" harassment by Serbian officials at the airport.
- Threats from Bosnian Serb government in Pale, e.g., refusing to guarantee the safety of UN flights.
- Employ random sniping incidents due to the particular vulnerability of aircraft
- Small arms fire directed either at aircraft or ground personnel. Will be disruptive even if not directed at airport operations per se.
- Random or continuous mortar and artillery attacks designed to damage the airfield, aircraft or simply to disrupt operations.
- Employment of man portable IR surface to air missiles/AAA designed to directly attack aircraft.
- Employment of longer range systems (heavy artillery, SA-2s from ranges of 30-50kms).
- Horizontal escalation elsewhere in B-H; hostage taking, attacks on ground convoys, attacks on UN personnel, disruption of utilities into Sarajevo and other enclaves.
- BiH may target UNPROFOR attempting to blame the BSA in order to encourage a NATO response against the BSA.

Counteraction:

- Difficult if not impossible to counteract Bosnian Serb horizontal escalation/asymmetric responses.

Recommended Force Enhancements:

- Counterbattery radar, NODs, GPS, and other long range acquisition devices linked to means of reaction.
- Up to a brigade dedicated to airport security with heavy quick reaction force, up to a brigade sized force to remove combatants from the Sarajevo airport area.
- AC-130, CAS, and helicopter support
- Air assault capability (company sized)

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Pol-Mil Considerations:

- UNPROFOR/Allies unlikely to support "offensive" operation to open airport.
- Additional troop contributions to support new mission unlikely.
- Allies could call for large US troop and equipment contribution.
- Bosnian Serbs could advertise DMZ as form of ethnic cleansing.

Risk Assessment:

- Irrespective of any of the military measures taken, the absolute safety of transport/civilian aircraft cannot be guaranteed given the threat environment.
- Difficulty maintaining sophisticated equipment with limited logistics base.
- Cannot guarantee the survivability of aircraft (especially helicopters, transport, and AC-130s) in a semi-integrated air defense network.
- UNPROFOR would be required to redeploy forces to support this option which could create increased risk in other areas. Only French, UK, Dutch, Canadian forces capable of accomplishing tasks associated with this option.
- **Without significant force enhancements, UNPROFOR forces outmatched by Bosnian Serb forces.**
- Increased probability of UNPROFOR ground force casualties.
- Airport sits astride confrontation line; will be difficult to establish which party is responsible for firing.

OPTION 2: Use CAS and air strike packages to support delivery of humanitarian aid flights. Marshall significant NATO air package to surpress immediate threats around Sarajevo airport as aid is flown into and unloaded at the airfield. Package could include integration of target acquisition systems to assist in locating indirect firing systems. Given the nature of the threat surrounding the airfield, target acquisition (rifleman, AA gun, mortar) would be extremely difficult. As a consequence, the ability to deliver effective suppressive fire against these type targets would be extremely difficult.

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UNPROFOR Action:

- Deploy target acquisition system to Sarajevo airfield. Deploy TACPs to Sarajevo area.
- Package aid deliveries so that CAS/air strike packages support specified high density delivery periods.
- Clearly state intent to use NATO air support for protecting aid deliveries into Sarajevo.
- Specify target categories (high value, artillery pieces, headquarters in Sarajevo vicinity) that NATO may strike in response to Serb attack on humanitarian aid flights.

Belligerent Reaction:

- Continued "administrative" harassment by Serbian officials at the airport. Blocking aid outside airport.
- Threats from Bosnian Serb government refusing safety of flights.
- Hostage taking - placing hostages at weapons sites.
- Direct attack against humanitarian flights.
- BiH may manipulate NATO's intent to use air power to their advantage.

Counteraction:

- Direct attack against targets engaging aircraft.
- Direct attack against Bosnian Serb high value targets.

Recommended Force Enhancements:

- AC-130 aircraft.
- EW CAP (EA-6B, EF-111s).

Pol-Mil Considerations:

- Troop contributing nations unlikely to support air option due to concern for safety of deployed troops.
- "Dual key" arrangement remains key factor in control of air strikes.
- Could require significant US contribution in terms of air assets.
- Bosnian Serbs likely to use collateral damage as media weapon against US/NATO. Given this scenario, attempts to suppress sniper/mortar fires in an urban environment have a high potential for collateral damage.

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Risk Assessment:

- Air power alone insufficient to protect humanitarian aid flights and keep airfield open. Threat/target difficult to identify and acquire (snipers, mortars, urban environment, mountainous topography).
- Support aircraft (AC-130) at high risk in semi-integrated air defense network.
- Bosnian Serbs can react in ways (hostage taking, utility shut-down) which limit the effectiveness of air power options.
- High probability of collateral damage and fratricide.

OPTION 3: Open and maintain a road corridor from the Adriatic coast to Sarajevo (15km through Bosnian Serb held territory).

UNPROFOR Action:

- Enhance convoy ability to protect themselves by employing a graduated range of security responses from self protection through heavy force (armor/Infantry Fighting Vehicle) security escorts.
- UNPROFOR can create and employ a "Quick Reaction Force" consisting of heavy ground maneuver units, assault forces, and possibly helicopters.
- To counter interdiction efforts UNPROFOR can obtain and employ combat engineer units/assets moving with convoys or reacting to specific points.
- Provide each convoy with TACPs and continuous overhead air escort (helo/fixed wing).

Belligerent Reaction:

- Incidents of civil disobedience on the part of the population, e.g. crowds blocking roads.
- Halt and delay convoys with intent to delay aid delivery or steal ("tax") contents of the convoys.
- Sniping or other acts of random violence to intimidate and disrupt or stop convoys.
- Attacks on convoys to prevent delivery of aid or as a punitive measure in response to UNPROFOR (or opposing) belligerent actions.
- Belligerents may stop/delay aid by interdicting LOC.
  Barricade roadway — Mine road segments
  Destroy bridges — Block tunnels

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Counteraction:

- Difficult to counteract Bosnian Serb indirect responses - mining roads, destroying bridges (72 choke points on the Ploce - Sarajevo route).

Recommended Force Enhancements.

- Up to a brigade for route security (approx 15 km).
- Quick Reaction Force (mech and air assault).
- 1-2 engineer battalions.
- AC-130, CAS, and helicopter support.
- MP units.

Pol-Mil Considerations:

- Additional troop contributions to support new mission unlikely.
- UNPROFOR/NATO allies could call for significant US contribution.
- UNPROFOR unlikely to accept full enforcement of mandate.

Risk Assessment:

- Bosnian Serb indirect/asymmetrical responses can halt aid delivery.
- Current UNPROFOR forces not capable of providing robust ground escort package. Without enhancements, UNPROFOR forces would be outmatched by Bosnian Serb forces.
- Difficulty maintaining sophisticated equipment with limited logistics base.
- Cannot guarantee the survivability of aircraft (especially helicopters, AC-130s) in a semi-integrated air defense network.
- Increased probability of UNPROFOR ground force casualties.
- Routes parallel numerous hot spots near the active confrontation line. Convoys may encounter indirect fire from the fighting.

NOTE: These options were developed based on the assigned mission - reopen Sarajevo airport. The options are intentionally robust based on the threat capabilities and areas required to be secured. An air strike only package directed against high value targets throughout Bosnia was not considered. This approach could be perceived as purely offensive and unrelated to the

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direct opening of the airport at Sarajevo. The danger to relief operations and UNPROFOR troops could rise dramatically given this approach to reopening Sarajevo.

5. ~~(S)~~ Recommendation. The military options are high risk, high cost operations. Unless the US is willing to employ ground forces to support the securing of Sarajevo airfield and/or the coastal route to Sarajevo, it is unlikely that UNPROFOR or NATO will support a military option. At this time, the Joint Staff recommends against executing a military option.

Prepared by Balkans Working Group, J-5, EURDIV
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H.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: SIT, CLARKER, CRESSEY, KERRICK, NSC, SAUNDERS, STEPHENS, SUM, SUM2, VERSHBOW

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG:040734Z MAY 95

FM: AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO

TO:
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0114
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0161

RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0002

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SARAJEVO 000128

DEPT FOR EUR RFRASURE, EUR/SCE CHILL, JZETKULIC, PGOLDBERG
DEPT ALSO FOR IO/UNP AND DS/OP/EUR
VIENNA FOR BOSNIA

E.O. 12356: DECLAS: OADR
TAGS: PREL, AMGT, BK

SUBJECT: SARAJEVO AIRPORT

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: SARAJEVO AIRPORT REMAINS CLOSED FOR ALL USES OTHER THAN UNPROFOR RESUPPLY AND FOR UNIFORMED UNPROFOR PERSONNEL. IN EFFECT, THE AIRPORT HAS DEVOLVED INTO AN UNPROFOR LOGISTICS BASE. THERE ARE NO GROUNDS FOR OPTIMISM THAT IT WILL OPEN, SINCE THE SERBS HAVE HARDENED THEIR POSITION. END SUMMARY.

3. ON APRIL 3 WE MET WITH THE UN CIVIL AFFAIRS CHIEF NEGOTIATOR FOR THE AIRPORT. THE AIRPORT TALKS HAD TAKEN PLACE THAT DAY AND HAD NOT GONE WELL. THE SERBS HAVE HARDENED THEIR POSITION IN SEVERAL RESPECTS:

(A) THEY DEMAND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT THEY OWN THE AIRPORT,
(B) THEY DEMAND RENT, AND
(C) THEY DEMAND PLEDGES THAT THE AIRPORT WILL BE RETURNED TO THEIR CONTROL WHEN UNPROFOR LEAVES.

4. IN ADDITION, THE SERBS INSIST ON EXERCISING RIGHTS TO CLEAR, APPROVE, AND CONTROL ALL CARGO AND PASSENGERS. THIS MEANS THAT THEY WANT ADVANCE NOTICE WITH THE RIGHT TO DETERMINE WHO AND WHAT IS ACCEPTABLE, AND THAT THEY WILL HAVE THE RIGHT TO TURN BACK PEOPLE OR CARGO AT THE AIRPORT

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IF IT DOESN'T MEET WITH THEIR APPROVAL FOR ANY REASON.

5. THE UN IS PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF REOPENING THE AIRPORT FOR ANYTHING BY UNIFORMED UNPROFOR PURPOSES IN AT THE LEAST THE MID-TERM.

6. COMMENT: THE SERB DEMANDS ARE OUTRAGEOUS AND UNACCEPTABLE TO THE UN. HOWEVER, GIVEN THE INADEQUACIES OF FOOD DELIVERIES OVER LAND, IT IS LIKELY THAT FULL DISTRIBUTIONS OF FOOD WILL CONTINUE ONLY THROUGH MID-MAY. AT THE POINT WHERE SUPPLY CANNOT KEEP PACE WITH DEMAND, THE PRESSURE WILL BUILD ON THE UN TO CUT SOME DEAL--ANY DEA--TO OPEN UP THE HUMANITARIAN AIR BRIDGE. THE SERBS ARE CLEARLY AWARE OF THIS AND ARE BIDING THEIR TIME.

7. ACCORDING TO UN SOURCES, THE SERBS ARE VERY CONFIDENT THAT UNPROFOR AND NATO WILL DO NOTHING IN RESPONSE TO THE CLOSURE OF THE AIRPORT. FURTHER, UNPROFOR READS THE HARDENED POSITION NOT AS A NEGOTIATING PLOY, BUT AS PART OF A LARGER STRATEGY TO CLAMP DOWN ON THE AIRPORT AND CUT OFF BOSNIAN ACCESS TO THE OUTSIDE.

8. THERE IS A CLEAR DANGER THAT AS THE CITY'S SUPPLIES ARE DRAWN DOWN, PRESSURE WILL INCREASE ON UNPROFOR TO GIVE AWAY THE STORE TO RESTORE THE MINIMAL FLOW. ONE SENIOR UNHCR OFFICIAL HAS ALREADY EXPRESSED TO US A WILLINGNESS TO SEVERELY LIMIT TRAVEL OF PERSONNEL ON UNHCR FLIGHTS IN EXCHANGE FOR RESTARTING THE AIR BRIDGE.

9. THE GREATER DANGER IS THAT THE BOSNIANS WILL FEEL COMPELLED TO ATTEMPT TO LIBERATE SARAJEVO AND WILL LAUNCH A MILITARY CAMPAIGN TO THIS END. MOST SOURCES HERE BELIEVE THEY CANNOT SUCCEED AT THIS TIME.

10. THE UN IS NOT COMPLACENT ABOUT THIS ISSUE: THEY SIMPLY HAVE NO GOOD CARDS LEFT TO PLAY.

11. THE EMBASSY WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR U.S. OFFICIAL TRAVEL INTO AND OUT OF THE CITY VIA THE IGMAN ROAD, THE ONLY LINK TO THE OUTSIDE. WE WILL KEEP DEPARTMENT APPRISED OF FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS. END COMMENT MENZIES
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Unanswered Policy Questions Relating to OPLAN 40104

Attached as requested are options for examining the policy questions raised in developing OPLAN 40104. To place them in context, we have included sections on "Assumptions" and "General Policy and Principles" which we believe should guide consideration of these issues, and of the OPLAN itself.

The nature of NATO's commitment to withdrawal, and thus of the U.S., is a key issue which requires priority attention by Deputies and Principals. It is addressed under the "Command and Control" set of Policy Questions.

It is our understanding that OPLAN 40104 calls for transfer of theater command to NATO under any UNPROFOR withdrawal scenario, even under a permissive environment or under limited extraction scenarios. This means that NATO and the U.S. will be engaged from the outset, even if UNPROFOR could handle such a scenario on its own, or with limited NATO support, for example from the air. Such an arrangement will virtually guarantee the engagement of NATO (and U.S.) forces on the ground in Bosnia.

We believe OPLAN 40104 should give NATO the flexibility to tailor its support to the level UNPROFOR requests and requires, so that, if possible, UNPROFOR can make its own way out. NATO must define when a withdrawal must become a NATO operation. The point of transition from UNPROFOR to NATO control should be linked to employment of NATO forces on the ground, or to UNPROFOR's inability to manage a full or limited withdrawal on its own.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE (MO) 05.08. '95 18:59 NO. 4601208S5 PAGE 8

POLICY QUESTIONS/ANSWERS ON NATO SUPPORT FOR UNPROFOR WITHDRAWAL

Assumptions:

- A continued UN presence in the region would tend to attenuate the fighting and alleviate human suffering.
- The United Nations has decided to withdraw UNPROFOR from Bosnia, and has requested NATO's assistance.
- The situation will permit UN forces to remain in Croatia and Macedonia.
- NATO has decided to assist a withdrawal from Bosnia and fully executes OPLAN 40104.
- NATO (and the U.S.) will conduct a limited-duration withdrawal operation, then depart.
- The UN and/or local governments will have responsibility for humanitarian assistance after UN forces have been withdrawn.
- NATO (and the U.S.) will oppose any action/activity during the withdrawal operation, to include lifting the arms embargo, that would tend to result in an escalation of fighting in the region.
- U.S. interests/objectives are to:
  - •• Improve regional peace and stability; contain the conflict.
  - •• Help ensure Bosnia's survival as a state.
  - •• Honor U.S. bilateral and NATO commitments to assist in a NATO-led withdrawal should one become necessary.
- Post UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia, the U.S. policy is "lift and strike," which does not include the employment of U.S. ground troops.

•• minimize risk to U.S./NATO forces in extraction

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

POLICY QUESTIONS/ANSWERS ON NATO SUPPORT FOR UNPROFOR WITHDRAWAL

PROPOSED U.S. General Policy and Principles:

- The United States is willing to commit its forces, including U.S. ground troops, as part of a NATO-led operation to withdraw UN forces and American citizens from the former Yugoslavia.

- Apart from the withdrawal operation, the United States will continue to meet its NATO (DENY FLIGHT and SHARP GUARD) and national obligations in support of UN mandates for humanitarian assistance to the extent the situation permits.

- The United States is willing to commit its forces, except for the deployment of U.S. ground troops into the theater, to help ensure the survival of Bosnia.

- During the withdrawal operation the forces of the United States, its Allies, and the UN will be expected to conduct themselves with impartiality and neutrality to the maximum extent practical.

- NATO forces will take appropriate self-defense measures to protect themselves and those being withdrawn. Lethal force would only be used against civilians as a last resort for self-defense purposes.

- The withdrawal priority will be for NATO forces to remove designated personnel first, then weapons, and finally, equipment.

  - NATO forces will, to the best of their ability, withdraw all personnel who are supposed to be withdrawn.

  - If, in the judgment of the on-scene commander, removing weapons or equipment poses unacceptable risks, NATO forces will leave such weapons/equipment behind, possibly destroying or disabling it, as the situation dictates.

  - If civilians request relocation assistance, and in the judgment of the on-scene commander this assistance would not jeopardize the withdrawal effort, then such assistance should be provided.

refugees

- Any force, regardless of warring-party faction and of location within the theater of operations, that is determined to be a threat to the withdrawal operation, is subject to NATO attacks.

- Any force, regardless of warring-party faction and of location within the theater of operations, that is detected attacking civilians, is subject to NATO attacks.

- NATO forces are authorized to take the necessary self-defense measures against any attacker, regardless of location.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE (MO) 05.08. 95 18:59 NO. 14601208S5 PAGE 10

Question: <u>What is the NATO policy for dealing with civilians during and after withdrawal?</u>

- o What if civilians not related to UNPROFOR such as embassy personnel, NGOs, PVOs, etc., request to be evacuated with UNPROFOR?
- o What action will NATO take if civilians riot against NATO/UNPROFOR or hinder and block withdrawal? Does NATO use deadly force against civilians?
- o What action will NATO take if civilians attempt to use NATO forces for protection?
- o If the Bosnian Serbs attack the Eastern Enclaves and put thousands of new refugees on the road, what will NATO do? (Ganic says NATO and U.S. will be morally and physically trapped.)
- o What action will NATO take if UN humanitarian operations (medical care, feeding, displaced persons, etc.) prove inadequate to meet demands?
- o What action will NATO take if civilians come under attack or are shelled outside safe areas or exclusion zones or outside areas where withdrawal is occurring?
- o What action will NATO take if any side commits ethnic cleansing? If NATO evacuates civilians will it be contributing to ethnic cleansing?

Policy Options:

- Evacuation of civilians:
  - •• Remove all who request withdrawal, even if not authorized by OPLAN 40104.
  - •• Remove some who request withdrawal, including NATO/UN national citizens, to the extent doing so will not jeopardize withdrawing those authorized by OPLAN 40104. The on-scene commander would determine which additional personnel, if any, could be withdrawn.
  - •• Remove only those authorized by OPLAN 40104 and UN/NATO national citizens.
  - •• Remove only those authorized by OPLAN 40104.
- Use of force against civilians:
  - •• No use of force against civilians would be authorized.
  - •• Non-lethal force could be used.
  - •• Lethal force could be used for self-defense purposes as a last resort.
- Protection of civilians:
  - •• NATO forces would be expected to respond to any action against civilians.
  - •• Respond to attacks against civilians in safe areas, and anywhere against anyone conducting ethnic cleansing.
  - •• If detected by NATO forces, respond to attacks against civilians in any area where withdrawal operations are being conducted.
  - •• Respond to attacks against civilians only to the extent necessary to facilitate the withdrawal operation.

incident to withdrawal

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Proposed Policy:

NATO's mission and priority for commitment of forces is to conduct the withdrawal of UN forces. NATO will assist civilians not designated for evacuation to the extent doing so will not adversely impact on the withdrawal operation. NATO will withdraw those personnel designated for withdrawal (UN identification-card holders) under OPLAN 40104, and assist UN/NATO nations' citizen evacuation efforts. Lethal force would only be used against civilians as a last resort for self-defense purposes. If detected by NATO forces, NATO will respond to attacks against civilians in any area where withdrawal operations are being conducted.

After withdrawal, NATO should offer support along the lines of that provided before withdrawal; e.g., use of NATO airpower, if requested, for protection of UN personnel and in response to safe area violations, and its air/maritime power for continuance of DENY FLIGHT and SHARP GUARD operations.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE (MO) 05.08. '95 18:59 NO. 14601208S5 PAGE 12

Question: <u>What is the NATO policy governing the delivery of humanitarian aid during and after withdrawal?</u>

- o Will NATO take over protection of relief convoys passing through the former UNPAs? If not, and aid is blocked, what will we do about a potential humanitarian disaster in Bihac?
- o What action will NATO take if humanitarian supplies run short or major delivery ports such as the Sarajevo airport are closed by one of the parties?
- o What action will NATO take if electricity, water, or gas supplies are disrupted to major population centers?
- o What action would NATO take if after withdrawal is completed there is no international organization willing to assume responsibility for guaranteeing humanitarian relief?

Policy Options:

- Assistance to civilians during withdrawal:
  - •• Provide refugee relocation and aid delivery when requested.
  - •• Provide refugee relocation and aid delivery moving in the direction of the withdrawal operation.
  - •• Provide assistance to the extent doing so does not place the withdrawal operation at further risk.
- Assistance to civilians after withdrawal:
  - •• Retain NATO forces, including ground, in the region to conduct refugee relocation and aid delivery operations.
  - •• Provide non-ground-force support to UN/national assistance efforts.
  - •• Provide no post-withdrawal assistance; NATO's mission is complete after UN forces are withdrawn.

Proposed Policy:

During withdrawal, NATO will provide humanitarian assistance to the extent doing so will not place the withdrawal operation at further risk. After withdrawal, NATO should offer its support, excluding the use of ground forces, to facilitate UN/national assistance efforts.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE (MO) 05.08. '95 18:59 NO. 14601208S5 PAGE 13

Question: <u>What is the guiding NATO policy for dealing with the warring parties during and after withdrawal?</u>

- What action will NATO take if it is unable to deter hostage taking and hostages are held at unknown locations by the Bosnian Serbs? Bosnian Government?
- What action will NATO take if its is not attacked, but exposed UNPROFOR, UNHCR, or NGO/PVO hostages are taken instead?
- If NATO is unable to deter attacks on UNPROFOR, or if small groups of UNPROFOR are detained, held hostage or blocked, what action will NATO take?
- What will NATO do if Tudjman or Izetbegovic takes military action against the Serbs while NATO is on the ground?
- What will NATO do if the Bosnian Government launches a new offensive in Bihac, drawing in RSK forces? Is there a danger of NATO forces coming into conflict with the RSK/BSA?
- Would NATO respond the same way to Bosnian Serb and Bosnian government violation?
- What will NATO do if Islamic UNPROFOR units begin to fight on the Bosnian Government's side during withdrawal operations? If Russian or others begin to fight on the Bosnian Serb side?
- What will NATO do if Milosevic openly supports or enters the war on the Bosnian Serb side?
- What will NATO do if Bosnian Government forces are being overrun and call for assistance?
- What action will NATO take if it is forced to take prisoners?
- What action will NATO take if it encounters prison camps with unacceptable conditions?
- What action will NATO take if it receives information that war atrocities are occurring?
- What action will NATO take if it needs Serbian support to defuse tension? Will it negotiate safe passage for withdrawing UNPROFOR elements through Serbia?

Policy Options during Withdrawal:

- Attacks on or hostage taking of NATO forces or UN evacuees:
  - •• Use of lethal force is authorized for self-defense purposes, but not for securing the return of hostages.
  - •• Use of lethal force is authorized to deal with attacks on NATO forces/UN evacuees, and for securing the return of hostages. Every effort will be made to ensure that all NATO forces and UN personnel are safely withdrawn from the region.
- Warring-party inter-fighting (atrocities, territory overrun):
  - •• Take action to attenuate/halt any fighting.
  - •• Take action against the Serbs only.
  - •• Take action to attenuate/halt fighting to the extent it does not place the withdrawal operation at further risk.
  - •• Take action only if necessary to facilitate the withdrawal.

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- Outside lethal support (from Croatia, Serbia, or from intervening UN nations such as Russia or a Muslim state), including fighting for and the turnover of weapons to, a warring faction:
  - •• Respond impartially against all efforts to provide outside lethal support.
  - •• Respond against any outside lethal support for Serb forces.
  - •• Respond impartially against any outside lethal support that could adversely impact the withdrawal operation.

Proposed Policy during Withdrawal:

NATO is authorized to use lethal force, as necessary, to protect its forces and UN evacuees, and to secure the return of NATO/UN hostages. Every effort will be made to ensure that all NATO forces and UN evacuees are safely withdrawn from the region. NATO will take action to attenuate/halt fighting between the warring parties as necessary to facilitate the withdrawal. NATO will respond impartially against any outside lethal support effort that could adversely impact the withdrawal operation.

Policy Options after Withdrawal:

- Seek to implement "lift and strike":
  - •• Convince the UN to multilaterally lift the arms embargo.
  - •• Convince NATO to terminate DENY FLIGHT and SHARP GUARD to facilitate the flow of weapons into the region.
  - •• Convince Serb-friendly nations not to arm/train the Serbs, and Bosnian/Croatian-friendly nations to arm/train the Bosnian and Croatian governments.
  - •• Convince NATO to conduct an air campaign against the Bosnian Serbs.
  - •• Convince the warring parties to stop fighting once Bosnia's survival is ensured.
- Seek to implement "lift only":
  - •• Continue to support the arms embargo and SHARP GUARD.
  - •• Convince NATO to conduct an air campaign against the Serbs.
  - •• Convince Serb-friendly nations not to enter the fight on the side of the Serbs.
  - •• Convince the warring parties to stop fighting once Bosnia's survival is ensured.
- Seek to contain the conflict:
  - •• Continue to support the arms embargo, SHARP GUARD, and DENY FLIGHT, and use of NATO airpower, if requested, for protection of UN personnel and in response to safe area violations.
  - •• Obtain international community support for, and NATO agreement to conduct, an air campaign against Serb forces should it become necessary to help ensure Bosnia's survival as a state.

Proposed Policy: See strategy paper.

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Question: <u>What is NATO's responsibility in dealing with violations of safe areas and exclusion zones?</u>

- o What will NATO do if safe areas are shelled?
- o What will NATO do if heavy weapons violations occur?
- o What will NATO do if the Bosnian Serbs lay siege to or attack the eastern enclaves? If they fall?
- o What will NATO do if sniping incidents occur?
- o What will NATO do if during the course of the withdrawal either Sarajevo or Zagreb come under attack by Serb forces?

Policy Options:

- Respond to all safe area and exclusion zone violations.
- Respond to violations to the extent practical without adversely impacting on withdrawal operations.
- Respond only as necessary to ensure a successful withdrawal.

Proposed Policy:

NATO's mission and priority for commitment of forces, including airpower, would be to conduct the withdrawal of UN forces. Its mission would not be to defend the Bosnian population, nor to support Bosnian Government forces. NATO would be expected to respond to safe area and exclusion zone violations to the extent practical without adversely impacting on withdrawal operations. In those areas where UN forces are being withdrawn, NATO's response to safe area and exclusion zone violations would be as required to facilitate the withdrawal operation.

NATO forces would take appropriate self-defense measures to protect themselves and those being withdrawn. If a concentration or movement of heavy weapons in any area, even an area not designated as a safe area or exclusion zone, were determined to be capable of threatening the withdrawal operation, such weapons would be subject to NATO attacks. Similarly, NATO forces would have authority to destroy/neutralize weapons in collection sites that could be reasonably expected to fall into the hands of those who would attempt to use them against the withdrawal effort. In these situations, NATO-UN dual-key procedures would not apply.

Apart from the withdrawal operation, NATO would continue to meet its obligations in support of UN elements outside the NATO Commander's area of control as the situation might permit and according to existing arrangements. In areas (safe areas, exclusion zones, or otherwise) where no withdrawal operations are being conducted, NATO could respond to heavy weapons violations if doing so, in the NATO Commander's judgment, would not adversely impact on the withdrawal operation. In these areas, which would be outside the NATO Commander's area of control, the dual-key arrangement would remain in effect. Responses in areas not previously addressed (i.e., those outside the safe areas and exclusion zones) would require further NAC approval.

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9/12

DEPARTMENT OF STATE (MO) 05.08. '95 18:59 NO. 4601208855 PAGE 16

Question: <u>What is the NATO governing policy in resolving territorial and equipment disputes?</u>

- o What will NATO do if disputes erupt between parties over territory that NATO occupies or is withdrawing from? Does NATO return it to the internationally recognized country or to the party who had prior control?
- o What will NATO do with equipment if parties will not allow equipment to be peacefully withdrawn?
- o Will NATO deal only with the recognized Government of Bosnia in resolving disputes or will it also deal with the Pale Serbs? The Herceg-Bosnia authorities?

Policy Options:

- Ensure territory/equipment is returned to the party that had control prior to UN intervention.
- Attempt to leave as much territory/equipment in the hands of the Bosnian Government as feasible.
- Leave dispensation of territory/equipment to the warring parties.
- NATO on-scene commanders will allocate territory/equipment in the way that best supports the withdrawal operation.

Proposed Policy:

NATO on-scene commanders will allocate territory/equipment in the way that, in their judgment, best supports the withdrawal operation. As a general rule, consistent with mission safety, equipment should be destroyed, and territory should be returned to the Bosnian Government.

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10/12

DEPARTMENT OF STATE (MO) 05.08. 95 18:59 NO. 14601208855 PAGE 17

Question: Command and Control.

- o What is the acceptable model for "coordination" between the UN SRSG and the NATO Commander?
- o What if the UN mandate requests withdrawal only from certain areas? Will NATO have total control/NATO ROE/no dual-key?
- o What command-and-control arrangements will NATO make to accommodate those UNPROFOR units which refuse to come under NATO OPCON?
- o What will the U.S. do if the UN demands TACON of NATO forces during the 14-day period after the NATO main body begins deployment, but before the conditions are met for Transfer of Authority (TOA) from UNPROFOR to NATO?

Policy Options:

- Establish a command-and-control arrangement whereby the UN and NATO mutually agree on all withdrawal decisions.
- Establish a flexible OPLAN 40104 arrangement whereby, inter alia, the following could be accommodated:
  - •• If it chooses to depart without NATO assistance, UNPROFOR could depart in whole or in part under its own control.
  - •• UNPROFOR could conduct a withdrawal involving limited NATO support along the lines of current arrangements.
  - •• If direct NATO involvement is required, then NATO would control the withdrawal operation.
- Establish an arrangment whereby any NATO involvement in a UN withdrawal automatically activates theater-wide NATO command and control, commitment of NATO (and U.S.) forces, implementation of NATO ROE, and elimination of dual key.

Proposed Policy:

NATO will develop OPLAN 40104 that gives NATO the flexibility to fully support a UN withdrawal if it must, and that allows the flexibility to tailor the level of Alliance support (as laid out in the second option above) required, if any. [As currently laid out, NATO is engaged from the outset under any withdrawal situation.]

11/12

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE (MO) 05.08. '95 19:00 NO. 14601208S5 PAGE 18

Question: What is the mission of the NATO force? Will it be clear to the soldier, Congress, news media, and public what we are doing and why? What is success?

Policy Options:

- NATO's mission is to withdraw UNPROFOR and others requesting evacuation; and after withdrawal, to take up UNPROFOR's humanitarian assistance mission and, if necessary to ensure Bosnia survives, to join Bosnian Government forces in their fight against the Serbs. Success is when all NATO and UNPROFOR troops are withdrawn from the area, fighting has stopped, and Bosnia's survival is guaranteed.
- NATO's mission is to withdraw UNPROFOR and to the extent it can, to continue to meet its NATO and UN obligations in support of the UN's humanitarian assistance efforts. Success is when all NATO and UNPROFOR troops are withdrawn from the area, and humanitarian assistance is still being provided to the extent the fighting permits.
- NATO's mission is to withdraw UNPROFOR. Success is when all NATO and UNPROFOR troops are withdrawn.

Proposed Policy:

NATO's mission is to withdraw UNPROFOR and to the extent it can, to continue to meet its NATO and UN obligations in support of the UN's humanitarian assistance efforts.

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12/12

DEPARTMENT OF STATE (MO) 05.08. '95 19:00 NO. 14601208S5 PAGE 19

TAB K

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002i. talking points	re: Talking Points for Congressional OPLAN 40104 (4 pages)	05/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4000

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0199 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, May 9, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs673

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520596
RECEIVED: 08 MAY 95 08

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 08 MAY 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
DC
CROATIA
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 9 MAY DC MTG RE BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 11 MAY 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520597 9520602

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0199 CODES:

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		KERRICK
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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
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002		X	95050816	SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950508	BRILL, K	
002	950508	FUERTH, L	
002	950508	ADAMS, G	
002	950508	MCALEER, R	
002	950508	GARTHOFF, D	
002	950508	PATRICK, T	
002	950508	INDERFURTH, K	

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National Security Council
The White House

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~~Dohse~~ Situation Room	3		Tab I Please
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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: DC Mtg R. Bosnic & Crosta

NSC LOG # 9520596

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STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: DC Mtg re Bosnia & Croatia

NSC LOG # 9520596

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JCS	SECRETARY		
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FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting DC Mtg Re Bosnia PAGES: 3

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USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

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If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20596

May 8, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National
Security and International
Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia on May 9, 1995, 1:00-2:30 p.m., in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be principals plus one. The agenda is attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/27/2019
2010-0533-M

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NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA AND CROATIA

DATE: May 9, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 1:00-2:30 p.m.

Agenda

I. Near-Term Diplomatic Strategy

A. Contact Group Prospects/Next Steps.....State

B. Croatia: Situation Review/Next Steps.....State

II. Strategy for Dealing with the Situation in Sarajevo

A. Intelligence Assessment.....CIA

B. Diplomatic Strategy.....State

C. Existing Mandates.....State

D. Military Options.....JCS

III. OPLAN 40104: Unanswered Policy Questions

A. Post-UNPROFOR Withdrawal Strategy.....State

B. Unanswered Policy Questions: Dealing with Civilians; Delivery of Humanitarian Aid; Dealing with Warring Parties; Violations of Safe Areas and Exclusion Zones; Resolving Territorial and Equipment Disputes; Command and Control; Mission of the NATO Force.....State

IV. OPLAN 40104 Congressional Briefings.....JCS

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By dz NARA, Date 2/6/2020
2013-0682-M

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20596

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
May 8, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: DON KERRICK

SUBJECT: Deputies Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, May 9, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Deputies Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia to be held May 9, 1995. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

w/ changes

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/27/2019
2010-0533-M

~~SECRET~~
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NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA AND CROATIA

DATE: May 9, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 1:00-2:30 p.m.

Agenda

I. Near-Term Diplomatic Strategy

A. Contact Group Prospects/Next Steps.....State

B. Croatia: Situation Review/Next Steps.....State

II. Strategy for Dealing with the Situation in Sarajevo

A. Intelligence Assessment.....CIA

B. Diplomatic Strategy.....State

C. Existing Mandates.....State

D. Military Options.....JCS

III. OPLAN 40104: Unanswered Policy Questions

A. Post-UNPROFOR Withdrawal Strategy.....State

B. Unanswered Policy Questions: Dealing with Civilians; Delivery of Humanitarian Aid; Dealing with Warring Parties; Violations of Safe Areas and Exclusion Zones; Resolving Territorial and Equipment Disputes; Command and Control; Mission of the NATO Force.....State

IV. OPLAN 40104 ~~Approval Process~~

~~A.~~ Congressional Briefings.....JCS

~~B. Funding Options Progress Report.....OMB~~

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 2/6/2020
2013-0687-M

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Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

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Folder Title: DC0202 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, 1995				
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Nelson Drew to Sandy Berger re: June 13 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia (5 pages)	06/13/1995	P1/b(1)
~~001b. cable~~	~~re: June 12: Resolution on Proposed Rapid Reaction Force Moves~~ Ahead (7 pages)	~~06/13/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VL 6/11/2020
~~002. agenda~~	~~NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)~~	~~06/13/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VL 6/11/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
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([PC and Bosnia...])
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FOLDER TITLE:
DC0202 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, June 1995

2010-0533-M
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520755
RECEIVED: 13 JUN 95 11

TO: BERGER

FROM: DREW
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 16 JUN 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 13 JUN SVTS DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER DUE DATE: 16 JUN 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DREW LOGREF: 9520753

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0202 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		DREW
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		PAB
		SODERBERG
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2010-0533-M

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	95061508	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	95061508	NOTED BY BERGER

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National Security Council
The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
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Berger	2		
Lake			
Situation Room		Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
West Wing Desk	3		R
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Nelson Drew to Sandy Berger re: June 13 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia (5 pages)	06/13/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
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DC0202 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, June 1995

2010-0533-M
rs1014

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REVISED FRENCH/BRITISH DRAFT

(B)

(to be updated)

UNPROFOR

1200 9 June 1995

The Security Council,

A: Recalling all its earlier relevant resolutions,

B: Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 30 May 1995 (S/1995/444),

C: Having considered also the letter of the Secretary-General of ...June (S/.../1995),

D: Deeply concerned by the continuing armed hostilities in the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

former F; reworded

E: Underlining once again the urgent need for a resolution of the conflict through the political agreement of the parties, and for acceptance by the Bosnian Serb party of the Contact Group peace plan as a starting point,

NEW

F: Gravely concerned that the regular obstruction of deliveries of humanitarian assistance, and the denial of freedom of movement and of the use of Sarajevo airport, by the Bosnian Serb side threaten the ability of the United Nations in Bosnia-Herzegovina to carry out its mandate,

reworded ref. to Bosnian Serbs

former E; reworded

G: Condemning in the strongest possible terms all attacks on UNPROFOR personnel,

H: Condemning the increasing attacks on the civilian population by Bosnian Serb forces,

I: Determined to enhance the protection of UNPROFOR and to enable it to carry out its mandate,

J: Determining that the situation in the former Yugoslavia continues to be a threat to international peace and security,

K: Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Demands that the Bosnian Serb forces release immediately all remaining detained UNPROFOR personnel, and fully respect the safety of UNPROFOR personnel and others engaged in the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the complete freedom of movement of these personnel;

0609rus5

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was #6: no other change

2. Emphasises that there can be no military solution to the conflict, stresses the importance it attaches to vigorous pursuit of a political settlement, and reiterates its demand that the Bosnian Serb party accept the Contact Group peace plan as a starting point;

was #5; no change

3. Calls upon the parties to agree without further delay to a ceasefire and a complete cessation of hostilities in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina;

new

4. Demands that all parties fully respect the safety of UNPROFOR personnel and others engaged in the delivery of humanitarian assistance and allow their unimpeded access to humanitarian assistance to all parts of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina;

Sharkend

5. Demands further that the Bosnian Serb forces comply immediately with the Agreement of 8 June 1992 (S/24075, Annex) and ensure unimpeded access by land to Sarajevo;

was #4; no change

6. Demands that the parties respect fully the status of the safe areas and ensure UNPROFOR's unimpeded access to the safe areas, and in particular that they cease attacks on the safe areas and refrain from launching military attacks therefrom;

stronger - demilitarization

7. Underlines the need for demilitarisation of the safe areas and encourages the Secretary-General to further intensify efforts aimed at reaching agreement with the parties on modalities for such demilitarisation;

was #7;

8. Welcomes the letter of the Secretary-General of June 1995 (S/.../1995) on the reinforcement of UNPROFOR and the establishment of a rapid reaction capacity to enable UNPF/UNPROFOR to carry out its mission;

was #8; slightly changed

9. Decides accordingly to authorise an increase in UNPROFOR personnel, acting under the present mandate and on the terms set out in the above-mentioned letter, by up to ... additional troops;

10. Authorises the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements for implementing the measures referred to in paragraph 7 above;

11. Requests the Secretary-General, in taking any decisions with respect to the deployment of UNPROFOR personnel, to take full account of the need to enhance their security and minimise the dangers to which they might be exposed;

12. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

0609ms6

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 12, 1995

MEMORANDUM TO: THE DEPUTIES COMMITTEE

FROM: The Peacekeeping Core Group

SUBJECT: Paying for Expanded UN Operations in Bosnia

The PCG proposes the following policy on the issue of the funding the expansion of UN operations in Bosnia:

1. The US will support the expansion of UN forces in and around Bosnia by approximately 10,000 forces, which will be under UN command and for which costs will be assessed as a UN operation.

2. Toward that end, the US will support a Security Council resolution to increase the ceiling of the peacekeeping force as necessary (the ceiling needs to be increased by 6000 to permit an adddition to the force of 10,000).

3. The US will assist the expanded force by providing lift, equipment and support for that equipment, on a reimbursable basis with the UN. The US will also provide intelligence and close air support on a non-reimbursable basis.

4. The assessed cost to the US of the expanded UN force will be assumed by the State Department (150 account CIPA funds). Although the cost for the expanded UN force is not certain yet, it may exceed $150 million per year above the cost of the previously existing force. There are currently no funds in FY95 of FY96 to cover this expense. State will, however, consult with Congress about ways in which to appropriate such funds.

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PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG:130124Z JUN 95

FM: USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5621

RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB IMMEDIATE 1327
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO IMMEDIATE 0018
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 2557
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEADWW/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUFQAAA/USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2616
RUFNBUT/HQ JTF PP NAPLES IT//POLAD//
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 2771
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 3443
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 1316
RUCBSAA/USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USVIENNA 3728
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 8488
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 1666
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2551
RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 0679
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 1077

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 002358

JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, CHAIRMAN,
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINCLANT FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR
POLAD MINISTER PENNER, VIENNA FOR BOSNIA

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UNSC, NATO, BK, HR, SR,
SUBJECT: JUNE 12: RESOLUTION ON PROPOSED RAPID REACTION
-- FORCE MOVES AHEAD

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND CONTACT GROUP PLUS ITALY DISCUSSED THE BRITISH/FRENCH RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING DEPLOYMENT OF A RAPID REACTION FORCE FOR

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PER E.O. 13526
2/6/2020 (2.75)
2013-0682-M

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UNPROFOR ON JUNE 12. THE BRITISH AND FRENCH HAVE PRODUCED A NEW TEXT AND THEY PUT IT IN BLUE. THEIR INTENTION IS TO REQUEST A VOTE ON JUNE 14. AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT URGED THE UK AND FRENCH PERMREPS TO DELAY PUTTING THE DRAFT IN BLUE AND TO HOLD OFF ON A VOTE UNTIL NEXT WEEK. TY RESPONDED THAT THEY HAD RECEIVED FIRM INSTRUCTIONS TO MOVE AHEAD QUICKLY. DISCUSSION OF DELAY WOULD HAVE TO OCCUR IN CAPITALS. THE CO-SPONSORS ACCEPTED A NUMBER OF AMENDMENTS PROPOSED BY THE NON-ALIGNED CAUCUS OR THE BOSNIAN DELEGATION, BUT NOT THE TWO AMENDMENTS THAT BOSNIAN FOREIGN MINISTER SACIRBEY SAID WERE MOST IMPORTANT. DURING THE COUNCIL'S DISCUSSION CHINESE PERMREP QIN SAID THAT THE PROPOSED RAPID REACTION FORCE VIOLATED STANDARD PEACE KEEPING PRINCIPLES AND THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY SUPPORTING IT. UNDERSECRETARY GENERAL ANNAN ANSWERED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE PROPOSED FORCE FROM THE RUSSIANS AND OTHER TROOP CONTRIBUTORS. END SUMMARY.

MEETINGS OF THE CONTACT GROUP PLUS ITALY

---

3. THE BRITISH AND FRENCH CONVENED MORNING AND AFTERNOON MEETINGS OF THE CONTACT GROUP PLUS ITALY TO DISCUSS THE TEXT. UK PERMREP HANNAY AND FRENCH PERMREP MERIMEE EMPHASIZED THAT THEY HAD INSTRUCTIONS TO "GO BLUE" EVENING OF JUNE 12 AND TO PRESS THE RESOLUTION TO A VOTE ON JUNE 14. RUSSIAN PERMREP LAVROV ARGUED THAT THE CONTACT GROUP HAD TO KEEP IN MIND THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE TEXT. IT THEREFORE NEEDED TO "BE BALANCED," AND SHOULD NOT GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE FORCE WAS BEING DEPLOYED TO WAGE WAR ON THE SERBS. LAVROV CIRCULATED A NUMBER OF AMENDMENTS THAT CONDEMNED BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT MILITARY OFFENSIVES, UNDERLINED THE NEED FOR STRICT ENFORCEMENT OF THE ARMS EMBARGO, AND CLARIFIED THAT THE FORCE WOULD COMPLY WITH UNPROFOR'S EXISTING MANDATE, RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, AND COMMAND STRUCTURE. THE UK AND FRANCE TRIED TO MEET THE RUSSIAN CONCERNS IN PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS. (AS OF 2100 JUNE 12 WE HAD NOT RECEIVED THE UPDATED TEXT.)

4. THE CONTACT GROUP PLUS ITALY LATER MET WITH BOSNIAN PERMREP SACIRBEY. SACIRBEY PROPOSED A NUMBER OF AMENDMENTS OF HIS OWN, THE MOST IMPORTANT OF WHICH, HE SAID, WAS LANGUAGE RECOGNIZING BOSNIA'S RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE AND SPECIFYING THAT SERB-CONTROLLED TERRITORY AROUND THE SAFE AREAS WILL HAVE TO BE DEMILITARIZED ALONG WITH THE SAFE AREAS THEMSELVES. THE UK AND FRANCE AGREED TO A NUMBER OF SACIRBEY'S AMENDMENTS, BUT NOT THOSE TWO POINTS. SACIRBEY EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF USING THE RAPID REACTION FORCE TO OPEN THE MOUNT IGMAN ROAD INTO SARAJEVO. SACIRBEY ADDED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD OPPOSE ANY EFFORT TO ESTABLISH A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR THE PEACE

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PROCESS THAT DOWN-GRADED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CONTACT GROUP.

5. IN A THIRD CONTACT GROUP SESSION, AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT SAID THAT THE U.S. WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE WAY THE TEXT ADDRESSED SAFE AREAS. SHE EMPHASIZED THAT WE HAD QUESTIONS ABOUT THE WAY IN WHICH THE NEW FORCE WOULD BE USED, THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT UNDER WHICH IT WOULD OPERATE, WHETHER OR NOT ITS OPERATIONS WOULD BE ~~C O N F I D E N T I A~~L SECTION 02 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 002358

JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, CHAIRMAN,
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINCLANT FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR POLAD MINISTER PENNER, VIENNA FOR BOSNIA

E.0.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UNSC, NATO, BK, HR, SR,
SUBJECT: JUNE 12: RESOLUTION ON PROPOSED RAPID REACTION
-- FORCE MOVES AHEAD

BASED ON THE NEED TO OBTAIN THE CONSENT OF THE TWO PARTIES, AND ITS COST. THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO SUPPORT A RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING DEPLOYMENT OF THE FORCE UNTIL THESE QUESTIONS WERE ANSWERED. SHE NOTED THAT THE CONCEPT CONTAINED IN THE SYG'S JUNE 9 LETTER SEEMED TO BE AT ODDS FROM THAT OF THE PARIS MEETING OF DEFENSE MINISTERS. THUS, THE IDEA BEHIND THE FORCE SEEMED TO BE SHIFTING, AND THERE WAS SERIOUS CONCERN IN WASHINGTON THAT THE CO-SPONSORS WERE TRYING TO MOVE TOWARDS A VOTE TOO QUICKLY. MERIMEE AND HANNAY DENIED THAT THE CONCEPT UNDER WHICH THE FORCE WOULD OPERATE HAD EVOLVED SINCE PARIS. THE ONLY THING HOLDING UP DEPLOYMENT WAS THE COUNCIL'S DECISION.

6. AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT URGED HANNAY AND MERIMEE TO DELAY GOING BLUE. EACH SAID THEY HAD FIRM INSTRUCTIONS TO PRESS AHEAD RAPIDLY. HANNAY SAID THAT THEY WOULD PUT THE RESOLUTION TO A VOTE AND "OTHER DELEGATIONS WOULD HAVE TAKE THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES." IF THE RESOLUTION WAS NOT ADOPTED HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS FROM UNPROFOR. DURING PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS WITH AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT, HANNAY AND MERIMEE EMPHASIZED THAT THE RAPID REACTION FORCE WAS NOT THE BEGINNING OF A WITHDRAWAL FROM BOSNIA OR AN ATTEMPT TO MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO. RATHER, MERIMEE SAID THAT IN HIS OPINION IT WAS THE "BEGINNING OF AN ESCALATION." WHILE UNPROFOR'S RULES OF ENGAGEMENT WOULD NOT CHANGE, THE FORCE WOULD EFFECT HOW THOSE RULES WERE IMPLEMENTED. IT WOULD BE EASIER FOR UNPROFOR TO ACT ROBUSTLY IF ITS TROOPS WERE BACKED BY TANKS AND HEAVY ARTILLERY THAN IF THEY WERE NOT. SIMILARLY, HANNAY AND MERIMEE DOWNPLAYED THE ROLE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AKASHI WILL PLAY IN DETERMINING HOW THE FORCE WILL BE USED. THEY ARGUED THAT, WHILE

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AKASHI HAS PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE IN DECIDING FOR OR AGAINST THE USE OF AIR POWER, HE HAD PLAYED A MINOR ROLE IN DECISIONS REGARDING DAY-TO-DAY MILITARY OPERATIONS.

DISCUSSION DURING SECURITY COUNCIL'S INFORMAL MEETING

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7. IN AN INFORMAL UNSC SESSION JUNE 12, MEMBERS DISCUSSED THE DRAFT TEXT. USYG ANNAN RESPONDED TO QUESTIONS POSED BY RUSSIAN PERMREP LAVROV. LAVROV EXPRESSED CONCERNS IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS: (1) USE OF THE RAPID REACTION FORCE OUTSIDE OF BOSNIA; (2) THE PROPOSED COMPOSITION OF THE RAPID REACTION FORCE; (3) A BREAKDOWN OF THE PRECISE NUMBERS OF UNPROFOR FORCES AND PERSONNEL; (4) THE TIMING OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE RAPID REACTION FORCE AND ITS RELATION TO THE CONCLUSION OF AGREEMENTS; (5) THE FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE FORCE; AND (6) THE CHAIN OF COMMAND AND DECISION-MAKING CHAIN THAT WOULD APPLY TO THE FORCE.

8. ANNAN STATED THAT THE UN CHAIN OF COMMAND WILL APPLY TO THE FORCE AND THAT UN COMMANDERS ON THE GROUND WILL HAVE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE FORCE. THE FORCE WILL CONSIST OF MEMBERS FROM THE UK, CANADA, SPAIN, NEW ZEALAND, AND SLOVAKIA. ANNAN STRESSED THAT THE FORCE WILL OPERATE ON THE PRINCIPLE OF THE STRATEGIC CONSENT OF THE PARTIES INVOLVED AND WILL SEEK THE COOPERATION OF THE PARTIES. THE PURPOSE OF THE RAPID REACTION FORCE WOULD BE ENHANCED PROTECTION OF PEACEKEEPING FORCES, AND THE FORCE COMMANDER WOULD HAVE FLEXIBILITY IN DETERMINING HOW TO BEST ACHIEVE THIS. WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT THE SUBJECT OF FINANCING THE FORCES WAS A DIFFICULT ONE, ANNAN DECLINED TO DISCUSS FIGURES,

JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, CHAIRMAN,
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINCLANT FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR POLAD MINISTER PENNER, VIENNA FOR BOSNIA

E.0.12356: DECL: OADR
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SAYING THAT THIS MUST BE WORKED OUT WITH THE DONOR COUNTRIES. IN RESPONSE TO BRITISH, AS WELL AS RUSSIAN CONCERNS, ANNAN SAID THAT THE FORCE COULD EVENTUALLY BE USED IN CROATIA BUT THAT THIS WOULD ENTAIL FURTHER DISCUSSION. THE UK ALSO REQUESTED CLARIFICATION OF THE CEILING ON THE NUMBER OF NEW FORCES, WHICH ANNAN STATED AS 15,000, A FIGURE WHICH ENCOMPASSES POTENTIAL REINFORCEMENTS FROM INDIVIDUAL CONTINGENTS.

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9. THE NON-ALIGNED CAUCUS PROPOSED A SERIES OF AMENDMENTS TO THE DRAFT RESOLUTION. THE UK AND FRANCE, STRESSING THE URGENCY OF TIMING, AGREED TO MEET WITH THE NAM CAUCUS LATER IN THE DAY.

10. THE CHINESE OBJECTED STRONGLY TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A RAPID REACTION FORCE ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT CONSTITUTED ENFORCEMENT RATHER THAN PEACEKEEPING AND, AS SUCH, FUNDAMENTALLY ALTERED THE NATURE OF UNPROFOR. CHINA STATED THAT, WHILE THE FOCUS OF UNPROFOR SHOULD BE ON CONFIDENCE BUILDING AND ON ACHIEVING A CEASEFIRE, THE CREATION OF A RAPID REACTION FORCE WOULD MERELY MAKE UNPROFOR A PARTY TO THE CONFLICT.

DISCUSSION AT TROOP CONTRIBUTOR'S MEETING

---

11. AT AN UNPROFOR TROOP CONTRIBUTOR'S MEETING ON JUNE 12, USYG ANNAN DISCUSSED THE IMPLICATION OF THE OFFER OF THE FRENCH, BRITISH, AND DUTCH TO CREATE A RAPID RESPONSE FORCE. HE ALSO ADDRESSED THE CONCERN OF MANY UNPROFOR CONTRIBUTORS THAT THEY BE PERMITTED TO PROVIDE WEAPON REINFORCEMENTS, ASSURING THEM THAT THIS WOULD BE POSSIBLE AND DIRECTING THEM TO CONTACT THE MILITARY ADVISOR'S OFFICE FOR BILATERAL TALKS TO ARRANGE THE DETAILS.

12. ANNAN RESPONDED TO QUESTIONS FROM CONTRIBUTOR COUNTRIES, MANY OF WHOM CALLED FOR RENEWED EFFORTS TO RESTART THE PEACE PROCESS AND EXPRESSED INTEREST IN THE SYG'S MENTION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A "NEW POLITICAL INITIATIVE." USYG GHAREKHAN SAID THAT POLITICAL INITIATIVES SHOULD OCCUR SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE REINFORCEMENT OF UNPROFOR AND STRESSED THAT THIS WAS THE DOMAIN OF THE CONTACT GROUP.

13. MUSLIM BLOC COUNTRIES EXPRESSED CONCERN FOR THE PROTECTION OF SAFE AREAS AND QUESTIONED WHETHER THE RAPID REACTION FORCE WOULD TAKE ON THIS ROLE. ANNAN STATED THAT, WHILE IT WAS HOPED THAT THE PRESENCE OF THE FORCE WOULD DETER AGGRESSION, THE FORCE DID NOT HAVE A MANDATE TO PROTECT CIVILIANS. MANY COUNTRIES QUESTIONED THE COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE (FRENCH, BRITISH, DUTCH) AND CALLED FOR BROADER PARTICIPATION. ANNAN STATED THAT THE NEED FOR COHESIVE, SELF-SUFFICIENT FORCES, WHICH HAD TRAINED TOGETHER AND POSSESSED INTER-OPERABLE EQUIPMENT, HAD DICTATED THE FORCE COMPOSITION.

14. OTHER QUESTIONS CONCERNED WHY THE NEW FORCE WOULD NOT WEAR BLUE HELMETS AND DRIVE WHITE VEHICLES. ANNAN RESPONDED THAT GREEN VEHICLES WOULD OPERATE MORE EFFECTIVELY AT NIGHT (HE CITED SOMALIA AS A PRECEDENT) AND THAT THE DISTINCT APPEARANCE OF THE NEW FORCE WOULD

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HAVE A POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT. ON THE ISSUE OF HOSTAGES, ANNAN STATED THAT EFFORTS WERE UNDERWAY TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF THE REMAINING HOSTAGES, BUT THAT THE CREATION OF THE RAPID REACTION FORCE HAD NO BEARING ON THIS PROCESS.
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 002358

JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, CHAIRMAN,
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINCLANT FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR POLAD MINISTER PENNER, VIENNA FOR BOSNIA

E.0.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UNSC, NATO, BK, HR, SR,
SUBJECT: JUNE 12: RESOLUTION ON PROPOSED RAPID REACTION
-- FORCE MOVES AHEAD

15. COMMENT: WE HAVE NO REASON TO DOUBT THAT THE BRITISH AND FRENCH DELEGATIONS HAVE RECEIVED FIRM INSTRUCTIONS TO PRESS FOR A VOTE BY JUNE 14. IF WE WANT A DELAY WE WILL HAVE TO PRESS HARD IN CAPITALS. MEANWHILE, WE WILL HAVE TO DECIDE WHETHER WE CAN ACCEPT THE CURRENT TEXT, AND IF NOT, WHAT SPECIFIC CHANGES WE WILL WANT TO PROPOSE. END COMMENT.

16. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

ALBRIGHT
BT
#2358

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<^SSN>2358
<^TOR>950612215808 M1713347
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<^SECT>SECTION: 04 OF 04
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E

U.S. Suggested Changes to UK/French Draft Resolution

Redraft Operative paragraphs 6 and 7 as follows:

6. Demands that the parties respect fully the status of the safe areas and ensure UNPROFOR's unimpeded access to the safe areas, and in particular that they cease attacks on the safe areas and refrain from initiating military attacks therefrom;

7. Underlines the benefit of demilitarization of the safe areas and encourages the Secretary General to further intensify efforts aimed at reaching agreement with the parties on modalities and the territorial extent of such demilitarization;

U.S. Views on the changes proposed by the Russian Federation is as follows:

preambular e: we can accept everything up to "23 December 1994 (S/1995/8). We can not accept the last phrase.

preambular i and j: We can not accept either.

operative 1: We can accept the compromise suggested by Ambassador Hannay. The paragraph should make clear that the Bosnian Serbs are responsible for blockading or detaining UNPROFOR personnel.

operative 6: Might be able to accept mentioning both the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian government.

operative 7 bis: We can not accept.

operative 7 terr: We do not want to go beyond "notes the SYG's report".

operative 8 bis: We believe this paragraph is not necessary.

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(F)

REPORT TO CONGRESS OF POSSIBLE PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN SUPPORT OF A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION

Pursuant to section 407(a)(5) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1994-1995, P.L. 103-236, this report provides notification of the possibility that the United States may provide assistance to the United Nations in support of its peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia.

As was briefed to certain members and staff on March 20 and April 21, the Administration has authorized the prepositioning in Croatia of 20 U.S. military communicators as part of a NATO group of 80 persons. Our senior military commanders recommended this action as an essential step to ensure that a communications network is in place to support NATO should a decision be made to assist in the withdrawal of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) from Bosnia. The Department of Defense has informed us that the cost of sustaining these 20 communicators and associated equipment in Croatia for a period of six months will not exceed one million dollars. The cost of this prepositioning did not, therefore, pass the formal notification threshold. The U.S. expense for this deployment will be borne by the Department of Defense.

NATO planning also calls for a follow-on precautionary prepositioning in Croatia of about 1,500 communicators and support staff, of which it is anticipated the U.S. would provide approximately 460 persons. The purpose of this step is to complete the preparations for the communications network begun by the earlier group of 80 persons, to be ready to be used should the decision be made for NATO assistance in the withdrawal of UNPROFOR. We are discussing with our NATO allies how the full cost of the predeployment is to be shared. We are not seeking U.N. reimbursement. We anticipate that the costs to the U.S. government will exceed the notification threshold of $3 million.

The decision to deploy the 1500-person group has not yet been taken.

These precautionary steps do not represent any change in the U.S. position that UNPROFOR should remain in Bosnia. Prudent planning to ensure the efficient and safe withdrawal of UNPROFOR, if necessary, can help convince troop contributors to maintain their commitment to UNPROFOR. NATO's military authorities advise that this prepositioning is essential to maintain NATO command and control over a withdrawal operation.

I shall provide notification in a subsequent message of other possible U.S. steps to provide assistance to UN peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia, in light of recent developments.

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REPORT TO CONGRESS OF POSSIBLE PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN SUPPORT OF A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION

Pursuant to section 407 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1994-1995, P.L. 103-236, this report provides notification of the possibility that the United States may provide assistance to the United Nations to support peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia. This could include assistance in connection with either a withdrawal of UN related personnel from Bosnia, or an emergency extraction of UNPROFOR units from positions which have become untenable to positions elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia which are safe, or the establishment of a rapid reaction force.

The Administration has previously discussed possible assistance to UNPROFOR with certain members and staff of the designated Congressional committees in phone calls on March 20, April 21, and May 29. Staff were also briefed on March 31 and Members on May 19 and May 26. ~~On June 9~~, we are submitting a separate notification with respect to prepositioning of communicators and support staff in Croatia as a precautionary step in case withdrawal became necessary.

NATO planning for a possible withdrawal of UNPROFOR calls in addition for early action involving training and exercises, preparations for a possible deployment of NATO forces, and acquisition of communications equipment that would be NATO owned, but which could be used in a possible evacuation of UN forces. We are discussing with our NATO allies how the full cost of the predeployment is to be shared. We are not seeking reimbursement. We anticipate that the costs to the U.S. government will exceed the notification threshold of $3 million.

As was made clear in the briefings on May 19 and 26, and in the statement released after the May 29 meeting of the Contact Group, the Administration strongly supports UNPROFOR's continued operation in Bosnia. No final decision has been made on U.S. participation in a withdrawal, beyond the initial deployment of 20 personnel. The President informed our Allies last December, however, that the U.S. is prepared, in principle, to commit U.S. ground forces to a NATO operation to assist UN Peace Forces to withdraw from the former Yugoslavia if the UN decides that it can no longer perform its mission and requests NATO's help in withdrawing, and if the North Atlantic Council approves acting on the UN request. This action would also extend to helping in an emergency extraction of UN Peace Forces from positions which have become untenable to positions of safety within the former Yugoslavia.

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Should an UNPROFOR withdrawal or partial withdrawal be necessary, a deployment in which the U.S. would provide a substantial number of troops and other assistance could be authorized. We are discussing with our NATO allies how this cost would be shared. We are also discussing within the Administration how the U.S. will fund its share of the operation.

We have also joined the Contact Group call for a reinforced UNPROFOR. While we do not contemplate any new U.S. role in UNPROFOR, we might join and assist in a NATO effort, if requested, to make UNPROFOR more robust and more defensible.

Our allies in NATO, and in particular France and Britain, which already have troops on the ground in Bosnia and some of whose peacekeeping forces have been taken hostage by the Bosnian Serbs, have proposed the creation of a rapid reaction force that would protect and support the peacekeepers. At this time, it is contemplated that the force would be authorized as part of UNPROFOR by the Security Council in a resolution. The U.S. is prepared to provide appropriate assistance and support, short of ground forces, for such a force. This could logically include, for example, close air support to assist in the defense of the force; transfer or loan of equipment, including attack helicopters, radars, communications gear and night vision equipment; airlift support to move forces and equipment to the theater of operation; and provision of intelligence to local commanders. The modalities for creating and deploying such a force are at a formative stage, and we are now discussing this matter within NATO and bilaterally. At this time, until we have determined the precise elements of the support and the terms on which it would be provided, a reliable estimate of its cost is not available.

The Administration intends to continue to consult with the Congress on assistance to UN peacekeeping efforts in the former Yugoslavia. As the situation develops, we will provide the Congress with more detailed information about U.S. assistance and support through consultations and the monthly reports submitted under section 407.

George F. Ward, Jr.
Acting Assistant Secretary
International Organization Affairs

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KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA DC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 13 JUN SVTS DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 15 JUN 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DREW LOGREF: 9520755

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0202 CODES:

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		BERGER
		DREW
		KRECZKO
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		SODERBERG
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By RDS NARA, Date 9/27/2019
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001		X	95061219	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
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002		X	95061220	DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

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002	950612	MCALEER, R	
002	950612	INDERFURTH, R	
002	950612	ADAMS, G	
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DOC DATE: 12 JUN 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
DC
CROATIA
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 13 JUN DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: FOR DECISION DUE DATE: 15 JUN 95 STATUS: X

STAFF OFFICER: DREW LOGREF:

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B	USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		212-415-4177
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
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RELEASER: _____

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NSC LOG # 20753

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting & Agenda for 13 Jun DC Mtg PAGES: 3

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 9/27/2019
2010-0533-M

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20753

June 12, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National
Security and International
Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia on June 13, 1995, 4:45 p.m. - 5:45 p.m., conducted by way of the Secure Video Teleconference System (SVTS). Attendance will be principals plus one. The agenda is attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

for
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/27/2019
2016-0533-M

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

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NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA
DATE: June 13, 1995
LOCATION: Secure Video TeleConference System (SVTS)
TIME: 4:45 - 5:45 p.m.

Agenda

I. UN Security Council Resolution on RRF.....USUN

A. Funding.....OMB/State

B. Demilitarization of Safe Areas.....State/OSD/USUN

II. Next Steps on Diplomatic Track

A. Negotiations with Milosevic.....State

B. Desired Role for Carl Bildt as EU co-chairman of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia.....State

III. Approach to Bosnia at Halifax.....State

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR, NARA, Date 2/6/2020
0517-0687-m

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20753

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
June 12, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

FROM: NELSON DREW ND

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, June 13, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Deputies meeting on Bosnia to be held June 13, 1995. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the meeting and authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve AV Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/27/2019
2010-0533-M

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See also 2013-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia Funding (1 page)~~	~~06/19/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
~~001b. memo~~	~~[Duplicate of 001a] (1 page)~~	~~06/19/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
~~001c. memo~~	~~[Duplicate of 001a] (1 page)~~	~~06/19/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
002a. memo	Michael Sheehan to Samuel Berger re: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia Funding (3 pages)	06/16/1995	P1/b(1)
~~002b. agenda~~	~~[Duplicate of 003a] (1 page)~~	~~06/19/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 02/06/2020
002c. paper	re: Deputies Committee Discussion Paper Bosnia: Seeking a More Equitable Payment Formula (5 pages)	06/19/1995	P1/b(1)
~~003a. agenda~~	~~Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia Funding (1 page)~~	~~06/19/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 02/06/2020
003b. paper	[Duplicate of 002c] (5 pages)	06/19/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
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NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4000

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0203 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, June 19, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs674

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 20 JUN 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
CROATIA
DC
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 19 JUN DC MTG ON BOSNIA FUNDING

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 22 JUN 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SHEEHAN LOGREF: 9520764 9520765

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0203 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
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		BASS
		BERGER
		CLARKE
		DANVERS
		DREW
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		SHEEHAN

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/27/2016
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DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
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002	950620	MCALEER, R	
002	950620	INDERFURTH, R	
002	950620	ADAMS, G	
002	950620	GARTHOFF, D	
002	950620	WILSON, F	

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Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	6/20	
Records Mgt.	5		

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Harmon			
Dohse	1 3	D/D	
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger	2		
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	6/20	DJ
Records Mgt.	5		

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

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MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	6/21	730 am	FBK Sitroom Box PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	6/21/95	AM 8:45	Anthony Tafft PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX+1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	6/21/95	12:10	J. Graves PRINT LAST NAME: GRAVES COPY: 1
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 19 JUN DC MTG ON BOSNIA FUNDING
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COL. F. C. WILSON
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ROOM 2E865
PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX+1
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SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 19 JUN DC MTG ON BOSNIA FUNDING
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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	6/21	1120A	S. McEl
			PRINT LAST NAME: McElhaney
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COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			
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AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			
			PRINT LAST NAME:
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DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503			
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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX+1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
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DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	6/21/95	_____	J. Graves PRINT LAST NAME: GRAVES COPY: 1
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 9/27/2019
2010-0533-M

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(PRIORITY)
ROUTINE

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FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions for 19 June DC Mtg. on Bosnia Funding NSC LOG # 20770

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
State	Executive Secretary		
DoD	Executive Secretary		
USUN	Ofc. of the Rep. of the U.S.		
CIA	Executive Secretary		
JCS	Secretary, Joint Staff		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 9/27/2019
2010-0533-M

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- ☑ PRIORITY
- ☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: ~~Notice~~ Summary of Meeting : 19 Jun DC on Bosnia PAGES: Cover + 2

PLEASE DELIVER TO: NSC # 20770

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 9/27/2019
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 20, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. DOUGLAS GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia Funding (U)

Attached at Tab A is the Summary of Conclusions of the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia Funding held Monday, June 19, 1995, 3:00 p.m. - 4:00 p.m., in the White House Situation Room. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/27/2019
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20770

Summary of Conclusions of
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee
DATE: June 19, 1995
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 3:00 p.m. - 4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia Funding (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR
Sandy Berger

STATE
Strobe Talbott
Richard Holbrooke
George Ward
Wendy Sherman
Robert Frasure

OMB
Phil DuSault
Phebe Vickers

CIA
Admiral Dennis Blair
Norman Schindler

DOD
Jan Lodal
Ted Warner
Joseph Kruzel

JCS
Wesley Clark
John Walsh

USUN
Amb. Madeleine Albright (via SVTS)
David Scheffer
James O'Brien

NSC
Richard Clarke
Michael Sheehan
Sandy Vershbow
Nelson Drew

Summary of Conclusions

- JCS (Clark) and State (Holbrooke) will conduct military and diplomatic consultations respectively with French and British counterparts to better define the nature of the RRF; its size, mandate, budget, command and control, etc. (S)

- A Working Group chaired by NSC will prepare a paper outlining options to deal with funding the RRF. (S)

- The paper will examine a strategy involving a Voluntary Fund, a redistribution of Allied costs, new U.S. money, and Congressional dimension. (S)

- A memorandum will be forwarded to the President by Wednesday this week. (S)

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0533-M
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20770

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 19, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: RICHARD A. CLARKE

FROM: MICHAEL A. SHEEHAN

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia Funding

Attached at Tab A is the Summary of Conclusions of the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia Funding held Monday, June 19, 1995, 3:00 p.m. - 4:00 p.m. in the White House Situation Room.

Concurrence by: Bill Danvers, Nelson Drew

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the Summary of Conclusions at Tab A and authorize Andy Sens to forward the transmittal memo to his counterparts at Tab I.

Approve AWL Disapprove ____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to Counterparts
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/27/2019
2010-0533-M

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20770

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions of
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee
DATE: June 19, 1995
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 3:00 p.m. - 4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia Funding (S)

PARTICIPANTS:
Chair Sandy Berger

STATE
Strobe Talbott
Richard Holbrooke
George Ward
Wendy Sherman
Robert Frasure

OMB
Phil DuSault
Phebe Vickers

CIA
Admiral Dennis Blair
Norman Schindler

DOD
Jan Lodal
Ted Warner
Joseph Kruzel

JCS
Wesley Clark
John Walsh

USUN
Amb. Madeleine Albright (via SVTS)
David Scheffer
James O'Brien

NSC
Richard Clarke
Michael Sheehan
Sandy Vershbow
Nelson Drew

Summary of Conclusions

- JCS (Clark) and State (Holbrooke) will conduct military and diplomatic consultations respectively with French and British counterparts to better define the nature of the RRF; its size, mandate, budget, command and control, etc. (S)

- A Working Group chaired by NSC will prepare a paper outlining options to deal with funding the RRF. (S)

- The paper will examine a strategy involving a Voluntary Fund, a redistribution of Allied costs, new U.S. money, and Congressional dimension. (S)

- A memorandum will be forwarded to the President by Wednesday this week. (S)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20770

Summary of Conclusions of
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee
DATE: June 19, 1995
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 3:00 p.m. - 4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia Funding (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

STATE
Strobe Talbott
Richard Holbrooke
George Ward
Wendy Sherman
Robert Frasure

OMB
Phil DuSault
Phebe Vickers

CIA
Admiral Dennis Blair
Norman Schindler

DOD
Jan Lodal
Ted Warner
Joseph Kruzel

JCS
Wesley Clark
John Walsh

USUN
Amb. Madeleine Albright (via SVTS)
David Scheffer
James O'Brien

wt
NSC
wt

Summary of Conclusions

- JCS (Clark) and State (Holbrooke) will conduct military and diplomatic consultations respectively with French and British counterparts to better define the nature of the RRF; its size, mandate, budget, command and control, etc. (S)

- A Working Group chaired by NSC will prepare a paper outlining options to deal with funding the RRF. (S) and Congressional dimension.

- The paper will examine a strategy involving a Voluntary Fund, a redistribution of Allied costs, and new U.S. money. (S)

- A memorandum will be forwarded to the President by Wednesday this week. (S)

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520765
RECEIVED: 16 JUN 95 14

TO: BERGER

FROM: SHEEHAN
CLARKE

DOC DATE: 16 JUN 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
DC
CROATIA
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 19 JUN DC MTG ON BOSNIA FUNDING

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER DUE DATE: 20 JUN 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CLARKE LOGREF: 9520764 9520770

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0203 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BAKER JANE
		CLARKE
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		SHEEHAN
		SODERBERG

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/27/2019
2010-0533-M

COMMENTS: _____

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	95061712	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	95071007	NOTED BY BERGER

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National Security Council
The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1		
Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger	2		fax to Halifax
Lake			
Situation Room	3	Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
West Wing Desk			
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette ___NO___

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	Michael Sheehan to Samuel Berger re: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia Funding (3 pages)	06/16/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4000

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0203 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, June 19, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs674

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA FUNDING

DATE: Monday, June 19, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 3:00 - 4:00 p.m.

AGENDA

I. Introduction.....NSC

II. Describing the Funding Crisis.....State/OSD

III. Options (NSC Paper)..... ALL

-- Voluntary Fund
-- Waiving Repayments
-- Non-assessed RRF
-- Close Air Support Operations Assessed
-- Agreed National Contribution
-- New Money

IV. Next Steps.....ALL

V. Summary and Conclusions.....NSC

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By N NARA, Date 2/6/2020
2013-0687-M

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002c. paper	re: Deputies Committee Discussion Paper Bosnia: Seeking a More Equitable Payment Formula (5 pages)	06/19/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4000

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0203 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, June 19, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs674

RESTRICTION CODES

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Executive Summary
OpPlan 40104 Withdrawal Financing Options

- NATO OpPlan 40104 costs in total about $2 billion for all participants. DOD's role constitutes about 50% of the operation (or $1 billion). With NATO/U.N. assessments, U.S. upfront costs could go as high as $1.4 billion.

- Of the four financing options outlined, the three U.S.-crafted options all have some form of cost sharing - either through a combination of NATO and UN assessments or by calling on Allies to pay our U.N. assessment for UNPROFOR. **Allies and others in UN unlikely to be sympathetic to U.S. options to assess others (NATO/UN) to pay for U.S. participation.** Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) funding outcome is a new factor; impact of RRF on options needs to be assessed.

- If a funding request to Congress is made, **Congress likely will demand that offsets be presented.** (Oklahoma City requests are offset). There are no known offsets at this time.

- U.S. costs are largely Defense O&M expenditures. Costs are estimated to occur both in FY 95 and FY 96; as time passes, more costs will shift to FY 96. Funding can be obtained:

  - for FY 95, by requesting an offset supplemental appropriations or by absorbing within existing resources (both very difficult in last quarter of FY 95);
  - for FY 96, through adjustments within FY 96 appropriations bills now pending in Congress. A Presidential decision to shift funds (offsets) would be required.

- **Option I (HYBRID)** is most financially advantageous to U.S. It shares costs between NATO Allies (including U.S.), which bear 2/3rds of costs, and other U.N. members, which bear 1/3rd of costs. The NATO costs are funded by levying NATO infrastructure/admin cost sharing on its members (heretofore never done for operations). U.S. and others reimbursed largely by other NATO allies. The net U.S. cost after reimbursements is $330 million.

- **Option II (NATO minus UNPROFOR)** is the next most financially advantageous to U.S. It splits costs between those units originally in UNPROFOR (U.N. pays these) and those NATO forces involved in withdrawal (NATO pays through its infrastructure/admin cost sharing formula). U.S. and others reimbursed for participating through NATO assessments. Net U.S. cost is $430 million.

- **Option III (Allies Preferred Option)** costs U.S. the most and NATO Allies pay significantly less than under other options. Most of withdrawal costs are funded either by U.N. assessments or by NATO participating countries with the U.S. paying most of its own way. Utilizes existing structures (U.N. assessments and NATO infrastructure/admin cost sharing). U.S. is reimbursed very little (only $160 million out of $1 billion). Net U.S. cost is $1,020 million .

- **Option IV (Pay Your Own Way/Voluntary Fund)** would require all participating nations to pay their own national costs (U.S. = $1 billion). There would be an agreement that others (NATO/other U.N.) would pay U.S. assessments to the UN for the cost of UNPROFOR including arrears. Net U.S. cost is $1,010 million.

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FINANCING WITHDRAWAL ONLY IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

June 16, 1995

Background

The United States has agreed in principle to participate in a NATO-led withdrawal from Bosnia should that be necessary. The cost of a withdrawal operation would be approximately $1.95 billion, with DOD paying roughly $1.0 billion (51%) in FY 1995 dollars for its prominent role in the operation. There has been considerable discussion both within the Administration and with NATO allies on financing arrangements for such an operation. Due to required planning, forward movement of the operation, and the long lead times to gain approval in NATO and the U.N. for a funding mechanism and budget authorization, timely action is required to ensure an approved funding mechanism that benefits the United States is in place. This paper discusses options for funding these costs, with varying results for *net* U.S. costs, once the U.S. has been reimbursed. The effect of the new Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) on these options, including costs and viability of options, has not been assessed pending resolution of the funding/operational questions of RRF.

Cost Options

The financing options are described on the following pages in terms of both gross U.S. costs (paid up front), net U.S. costs (after reimbursements from either NATO or U.N.), and the estimated supplemental request to Congress that would be needed. (See Table 1 attached for a detailed break-out of the costs for each of the options.) A total of nine options (including five analyzed by NATO) for paying FY 1995 Bosnia costs were considered. However, only four options, representative of major funding approaches and resulting in lower net U.S. costs, are evaluated in this paper. The four options considered are:

- **Hybrid (NATO/non-NATO U.N. Cost Sharing).** This is a U.S. originated option which would have to be introduced at NATO and the UN. The option shares costs between the U.S., NATO allies, and other U.N. member states and would have the least net cost to the United States.

- **NATO minus UNPROFOR.** This option is a U.S. government proposed variant of one originated by NATO. It would fund UNPROFOR through the U.N. budget during withdrawal, with NATO paying for all remaining costs, including transportation, of the additional forces required for withdrawal.

- **Allies Preferred Option (Enhanced UNPROFOR & U.N. Share).** This is the option preferred by our 15 NATO allies. NATO would only fund common costs of HQ and some commo/engineering. The U.N. would pay most of the in-theater costs, which would be funded through U.N. assessments. Participating troop countries would pay the majority of their own costs.

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- **Pay-Your-Own-Way/Voluntary Contribution Fund**. DOD would pay its $1.0 billion estimated share of the withdrawal operation without any reimbursements. State Department FY 1995 assessed U.N. peacekeeping costs for Bosnia (approximately $500 million) would be paid by other nations to a U.N. voluntary contribution fund.

Financing Budget Costs

Regardless of which option is chosen, the Administration will be required to present a request to Congress that identifies how the withdrawal plan will be paid for while remaining within budget ceilings. At present, Defense Comptroller has estimated DOD costs by fiscal year, assuming a six month operation starting July 1. FY 1995 costs are estimated at $530 million and FY 1996 costs are estimated at $470 million. This does not include any possible NATO assessment (which could add up to an additional $420 million).

There are no known offsets to cover these costs in FY 95 or in FY 96. A Presidential decision would be required to identify the necessary offsets. Offsets required for FY 1995 would be exceedingly difficult as we are entering the fourth quarter and most FY 1995 appropriations have already been spent. Final resolution of the FY 1995 supplemental/rescission bill, which the President vetoed, is also a factor.

For any proposal presented to the Hill, Congress likely will also want to know the nature of the reimbursement arrangements (from either NATO or the UN) to insure that if it credits reimbursements against the budgetary costs, there is a reasonable chance that these reimbursements will be made as projected. Given past experience, should there be any costs incurred in FY 95, reimbursements would only be made after FY 95 has ended.

I. Hybrid (NATO/non-NATO U.N. Cost Sharing) Option

U.S. Gross Cost: $1,330 m. Net Cost: $330 m. Supplemental Request: $1,330 m.

Description: A contract would be negotiated between NATO and the U.N. whereby NATO, in charge of all forces, provides all withdrawal services and initially pays for them. In return, the U.N. would assess other non-NATO nations to help pay for NATO withdrawal costs.

Financing Mechanism: The U.N. would establish a separate fund to receive contributions; this fund would help pay for withdrawal. The U.N. would then assess all its non-NATO member states for their normal share (approx. 32%, or $620 million) of the $1.95 billion withdrawal operation. These assessments would be used by the U.N. to fund the costs of withdrawing non-NATO UNPROFOR forces to their home countries as well as U.N. administrative and support costs estimated at $200 million. Any remaining funds (approx. $420 million) would be given to NATO

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to reimburse NATO members' costs. NATO would pay the remaining 68% of the $1.95 billion withdrawal cost (i.e. roughly $1,330 million) by assessing each of its members for their share based on NATO administrative cost assessed rates.

U.S. Gross Costs: DOD would incur up front roughly $1.0 billion in costs for withdrawal. It would also pay up front approximately $320 million in new NATO assessments (i.e. 24% of $1,330 million). The State Department would incur a nominal, new U.N. assessment of roughly $10 million to cover UNPROFOR soldier and equipment deployment flights to Germany.

Reimbursements: The U.N. would reimburse NATO with the resources remaining in the contribution fund. In turn, NATO would have to reimburse its member states out of the U.N. reimbursement as well as out of its own assessments. However, NATO does not currently have any reimbursement mechanism, and some argue the likelihood of NATO reimbursement is uncertain. DOD would expect to be reimbursed its entire initial cost of operations (i.e. deployment and logistics costs of $1.0 billion incurred before the U.N. or NATO has raised funds from its assessments) from these resources.

Supplemental Request: The new supplemental request to Congress would be $1,330 million. DOD's share would be $1,320 million ($1,000 million withdrawal + $320 million NATO Assessment). State Department's share would be $10 million. The supplemental request would in principle be offset by later reimbursements (approximately $1.0 billion). Any reimbursements would be deposited with Treasury. If offset by reimbursements, the net supplemental request would equal $330 million.

Advantages

- Lowest net U.S. cost; U.S. taxpayer pays less than in other options;
  -- Congress likely to be more receptive to lower costs.
- Requires fewer offsets for supplemental request.
- Spreads some burden of withdrawal costs to non-NATO U.N. members providing greater equity between U.S., other NATO, and other U.N. members.

Disadvantages

- Might be difficult to gain agreement from the U.N. and NATO to implement for several reasons:
  1. U.N. asked to pay for part of NATO's costs but has no command over forces since this is a NATO "rescue" of U.N. peacekeepers.
  2. Dual funding mechanisms between U.N. and NATO have never been used before. Would require a level of cooperation and coordination between U.N. and NATO that has never been attempted. Process to reach agreement likely to be time consuming and difficult with certain NATO allies.
  3. NATO allies costs greater than in other options (increases NATO assessment).
  4. Russians and others may balk at underwriting NATO through U.N. assessments.
- Significant senior White House and policy official involvement would likely be required to secure NATO allies and U.N. agreement.
- Reimbursements from NATO may be very slow or may not be made.

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II. NATO Minus UNPROFOR Option

U.S Gross Cost: $1,430 m. Net Cost: $430 m. Supplemental Request: $1,430 m.

Description: NATO would provide and pay all costs for the new troops and equipment needed for withdrawal. The U.N. would retain budgetary control over all UNPROFOR forces, including those of NATO member states, for the six month period they are being drawn down.

Financing Mechanism: The U.N. would fund all costs (approximately $210 million) incurred by UNPROFOR forces (e.g. logistics) during withdrawal. It would do so partially out of its current UNPROFOR budget. For the remainder, the U.N. would assess its member states to redeploy UNPROFOR troops and equipment back to their home countries. NATO would fund the costs (e.g. deployment/ redeployment, basic logistics) of all forces used for withdrawal that were not originally in UNPROFOR. It would do so by assessing NATO member states for their share of the operation, which is anticipated to total approximately $1,740 million.

U.S. Gross Costs: DOD would pay up front roughly $1.0 billion for withdrawal. It would also pay up front approximately $420 million in new NATO assessments (i.e. 24% of $1,740 million) as part of its share to cover all NATO costs. The State Department would incur a nominal, new U.N. assessment of roughly $10 million to cover UNPROFOR soldier and equipment deployment flights to Germany.

Reimbursements: There would be no reimbursements from the U.N. NATO would reimburse its member states out of its own assessments. However, NATO does not currently have any reimbursement mechanism and some argue the likelihood of NATO reimbursement is uncertain. Nonetheless, DOD would expect to be reimbursed its entire initial cost of operations (approx. $1.0 billion).

Supplemental Request: The new supplemental request to Congress would be $1,430 million. DOD's share would be $1,420 million ($1,000 million withdrawal + $420 million NATO Assessment). State's share would be $10 million. The supplemental request might be offset by reimbursements (approx. $1.0 billion). Any reimbursements would be deposited with Treasury. If fully offset by reimbursements, the net supplemental request would equal $430 million.

Advantages

- Fairly simple division of responsibility between U.N. and NATO.
- A lower net cost for the U.S. (though higher than the Hybrid Option).
- NATO allies might accept this option as a fallback from its preferred option.
  -- However, NATO allies might not agree to NATO paying transportation costs, preferring instead that nations pay their own transport costs.

Disadvantages

- Higher net U.S. costs than Hybrid option.

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- U.S. share of NATO assessment would increase if any NATO nation makes a political decision to opt out of participating in withdrawal, since assessment shares are based upon the number of nations participating in operations.
- Reimbursements from NATO would require new financial procedures to be created and may be very slow or may not be made.

III. Allies Preferred Option (Enhanced UNPROFOR & U.N. Share)

U.S. Gross Cost: $1,180 m. Net Cost: $1,020 m. Supplemental Request: $1,180 m.

Description: This is the preferred option of our 15 NATO allies because it places as much of the withdrawal costs as possible on the U.N. and U.S. (as opposed to NATO) budgets. The U.N. would fund some of the withdrawal costs of NATO. Specifically, it would maintain control of ***all*** UNPROFOR forces (as in NATO minus U.N. Option above) ***and*** it would fund the basic logistics costs of all troops (NATO and UNPROFOR) on the ground in Bosnia. Nations sending troops for the withdrawal operation would pay the majority of costs (e.g. deployment / redeployment, logistics outside of Bosnia, et al.). NATO would fund only the common costs of headquarters and communications / engineering requirements.

Financing Mechanism: The U.N. would increase the size of the UNPROFOR budget by the equivalent of 6,000 additional troops that had been authorized in the original mandate (although no troops would actually be added to UNPROFOR). The U.N. would use the increased funds to pay partially the costs incurred by UNPROFOR forces during withdrawal (as in NATO Minus U.N. Option above). It would also assess its member states for the costs of providing logistics to the withdrawal force in Bosnia. The participating nations would pay those costs not covered by the U.N. or NATO (for common costs of approx. $110 million) out of their own treasuries. NATO would assess its member states to cover its common costs.

U.S. Gross Costs: DOD would pay up front roughly $1.0 billion for withdrawal. It would also pay up front approximately $30 million in new NATO assessments for common costs. The State Department would incur a new U.N. assessment of approximately $150 million. These costs total $1,180 million.

Reimbursements: Both the U.N. and NATO would owe DOD reimbursements totaling approximately $160 million.

Supplemental Request: The new supplemental request to Congress would be $1,180 million. DOD's share would be $1,030 million ($1,000 million withdrawal + $30 NATO Assessments). State Department's share would be $150. The supplemental request might be offset by reimbursements (approx. $160 million). Any reimbursements would be deposited with Treasury. If offset by reimbursements, the net supplemental request would equal $1,020 million.

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Advantages

- NATO allies strongly support: they pay much lower U.N. assessments than NATO assessments -- e.g. for U.K., U.N. assessment is 3 times lower than for NATO).
- Obviates the need for agreement on a NATO assessments and reimbursement mechanism.

Disadvantages

- Highest net U.S. costs (more than double the other options) of almost all options.
- U.S. pays disproportionately vis-a-vis other NATO allies because of the sizeable U.S. role in the withdrawal.
- Congress likely to balk at this arrangement.
- Requires large offsets (around $1 billion) in agency budgets, displacing other high priority programs.
    -- Offsets may not be available this late in the fiscal year.

IV. Pay-Your-Own-Way/Voluntary Contribution Fund Option

U.S. Gross Cost: $1,010 m. Net Cost $1,010 m. Supplemental Request: $1,010 m.

Description: Each nation would pay its own costs in executing the withdrawal operation. NATO member troops currently in UNPROFOR would revert back to their respective nations' militaries. Non-NATO members of UNPROFOR would remain under UNPROFOR while being drawn down.

Financing Mechanism: Each nation would pay its own costs from its own treasury. The U.N. would cover the costs of extracting non-NATO UNPROFOR troops from within the existing UNPROFOR budget. Because the U.S. would be paying the majority of withdrawal costs (i.e. $1.0 of $1.95 billion) while representing just over one third of all forces in theater (including UNPROFOR troops being withdrawn), our NATO allies and others (Japan, Saudi Arabia, et al.) would agree to pay $500 million (or more depending upon Rapid Reaction Force funding outcome) to a special U.N. voluntary fund. This fund would be used to pay the FY 1995 State Department U.N. assessment arrearages for UNPROFOR. As a practical matter, this option shifts the burden of U.S. international peacekeeping obligations in Bosnia from the State Department budget to the Defense budget. This occurs because DOD bears costs, that otherwise would be reimbursed, to permit the U.S. to solicit funds to cover the existing UNPROFOR assessment.

U.S. Gross Costs: DOD would pay up front roughly $1.0 billion for withdrawal. State would have a small $10 million cost for UN assessments.

Reimbursements: There would be none.

Supplemental Request: The new supplemental request to Congress for DOD's costs would be $1 billion (gross and net). State would have a small $10 million cost for UN assessments. There would be no offseting reimbursements.

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Advantages

- Would eliminate U.S. UNPROFOR arrears.
- Helps maintain U.N. solvency.

Disadvantages

- Would have significantly higher U.S. net costs because there would be no reimbursements to the U.S.
- Would be difficult to sell to the Congress, since U.S. covers the majority of the costs of the withdrawal effort.
- The other countries would have to commit in advance to paying certain amounts to the U.N. fund to insure that commitments exist to cover the $500+ million. This would require active solicitation of funds along the Desert Storm model. Most other countries are not likely to make contributions.
- Would be strongly resisted by DoD and most likely Congress as an attempt, albeit indirect, to cover U.N. assessments in the DoD budget by precluding a supplemental request for State to pay its U.N. assessment arrearages.
- Some believe this raises questions of H.R. 7 'crediting' for U.N. assessments that the Administration opposed.

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16-Jun-95

Table 1: Financing Options for WITHDRAWAL Only from Bosnia

($ in Millions: Assumes Full Reimbursement from NATO and/or U.N.)

	Option 1 Hybrid	Option 2 NATO-UN	Option 3 Allies Prefer	Option 4 Pay Own Way
Total Withdrawal Costs (For 6 Months of Operations)	**1,950**	**1,950**	**1,950**	**1,950**
Financed By: NATO	1,330	1,740	110	
Financed By: National Costs			1,310	1,910
Financed By: United Nations	620	210	530	40
Gross US Costs re Withdrawal Op'n	**1,330**	**1,430**	**1,180**	**1,010**
State	10	10	150	10
New Withdrawal Assessment	10	10	40	10
FY 1995 UN Assessment	na	na	110	0
DOD	1,320	1,420	1,030	1,000
Withdrawal Cost	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
New NATO Assessment	320	420	30	0
Withdrawal Cost Reimbursements	**1,000**	**1,000**	**160**	**0**
DOD	1,000	1,000	160	0
Net US Costs re Bosnia For FY95	**330**	**430**	**1,020**	**1,010**
State	10	10	150	10
New Withdrawal Assessment	10	10	40	10
FY 1995 UN Assessment	na	na	110	0
DOD	320	420	870	1,000
Withdrawal Cost	0	0	840	1,000
New NATO Assessment	320	420	30	0

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Table 2: Total FY 1995 Potential Supplemental Requests to Congress

($ in Millions)

	Option 1 Hybrid	Option 2 NATO-UN	Option 3 Allies Prefer Pay	Option 4 Own Way
New Request to Congress	**1,330**	**1,430**	**1,180**	**1,010**
State	10	10	150	10
New	10	10	150	10
DOD	1,320	1,420	1,030	1,000
Withdrawal Costs	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
NATO Assessment	320	420	30	0
Reimbursments to the Treasury	**1,000**	**1,000**	**160**	**0**
DOD	1,000	1,000	160	0
Net U.S. Supplemental	**330**	**430**	**1,020**	**1,010**
State	10	10	150	10
DOD	320	420	870	1,000

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DOD/OSD

ISSUE PAPER

Issue: This paper provides a rough order of magnitude assessment of the current USG support provided to the UN in support of UNSCRs in the Former-Yugoslavia. In addition, we provide a brief assessment of the potential impact of USG support for the Rapid Reaction Force authorized by the UN Security Council on 16 June.

DOD OUTLAYS (Reimbursed & Non-reimbursed)

This section outlines the cost of USG contributions to the operation of UNPROFOR and associated UN Security Council Resolutions governing the operations in and around the former-Yugoslavia. In general, the US pays approximately $300 million* per year in support of the operations ($297 million in FY 94, $317 million in FY 95 based on FY 94 level of operations, and $363 million in FY 96 based upon current FY 95 outlays). Reimbursement for these costs is negligible, $1.0 million in FY 94. The cost of the USG's 30.4% peacekeeping assessment for support of UNPROFOR must be added to this figure for a comprehensive cost accounting. Cost of UNPROFOR in FY 94 was $1.6 billion resulting in a US assessment of approximately $530 million. Total cost is therefore estimated to be $847 million for FY 95. others?

* This figure of $300 million for USG support includes our participation in DENY FLIGHT, SHARP GUARD, humanitarian airlift, ABLE SENTRY and PROVIDE PROMISE FORWARD. ?

DOD IMPACT

For FY 95 any significant increase in the costs of US operations in the former-Yugoslavia as a result of our support for the RRF would require either a supplemental or reprogramming. In the current political atmosphere, it is highly unlikely we could obtain any supplemental that would not require offsets. Limited assistance to the RRF in FY 95 could probably be absorbed in current O&M levels. DOD

There are no funds in the FY 96 budget for UNPROFOR operations. SECDEF has stated that any additional O&M funds provided by Congress would be used to pay for contingency operations. Baseline contingency operation costs for FY 96 are $1.2 billion. Any significant additional costs for the RRF or 40104 would require a supplemental or reprogramming. Again it is highly unlikely we could obtain any supplemental funding that did not require offsets.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ALLIED NON-ASSESSED COSTS FOR UNPROFOR

1994 Unreimbursed Expenditures for Peacekeeping-related Activities in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. Data were provided by contributing nations and may not reflect the same assumptions or accounting methods.

The Netherlands

Operation Sharp Guard:	$14.6 million
TOTAL:	$14.6 million

France

U.S. — $300 million

UNPROFOR:	$430 million
UAV* overflights:	$79.3 million
UAV from Istrana	$20.8 million
ECMM	$1.4 million
TOTAL:	$531.5 million**

Britain

UNPROFOR	$203.8 million
Operation Deny Flight	$41.2 million
Operation Sharp Guard	$3.1 million
Carrier Group	$31 million
ECMM	$5 million
ICFY Border Mission	$.62 million
Sanctions Assistance Mission	$.5 million
TOTAL:	$285.22 million

**Total reported contributions during 1994 were $843.5 million, less $96 million in reimbursements from the UN; reimbursement figures were not broken out by operation.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Estimates of UNPROFOR Reimbursements Earned
(Dollars in Millions)

Period 10/1/94 - 3/31/95	UN Total	European Share	UK/French Share
Military Personnel and Contingent Owned Eqpmt	454.8	259.2	95.5

Basis for calculations: European forces amount to 57 percent of UNPROFOR total and UK/French forces amount to 21 percent.

Source: "Financing of United Nations Protection Force," A/49/540 Add. 2 (3 May 1995).

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Amount U.S. Owes and Will Owe for UNPROFOR
(Dollars in Millions)

FY 1995 (at 30.4 percent rate)

Current Bills Outstanding (Covers up to June 30, 1995)	$396
Expected Additional Bill before Expansion for July 1 to September 30, 1995	$123
Total Owed before Expansion	$519

Amount We Can Pay After October 1, 1995 (at 25 percent rate)

Total from FY 1995 at 25 percent rate	$427

Expansion of UNPROFOR - Six Months Costs

At 30.4 percent rate $414 million x 30.4%	$126
At 25 percent rate $414 million x 25 %	$103

NOTE: Although the United States pays at a rate of 30.4 percent and will unilaterally reduce the payment to a 25 percent rate as of October 1, 1995, the UN will continue to bill the U.S. at a 31.2 percent rate and will consider the difference an arrearage.

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Department of State

Impact of Funding Crisis on UN Ability to Operate

-- The Rapid Reaction Force has brought to a head the peacekeeping funding problem. Even without this additional strain on UN budgets, we were concerned about the potential for UN insolvency by next summer. Adding more than $800 million to the UN tab would make a financial crisis more likely.

-- The danger will be most acute next summer, but there is some chance of a financial crisis in October when the UN regular budget will be $170 million overdrawn. An overdraft of about $50 million in October is normal, and usually covered by borrowing from peacekeeping until we pay our assessment. This year our non-payment of peacekeeping assessments may leave the PK account too poor to cover the UN's cash flow needs.

-- If the RRF is deployed as a UN funded operation, with the UN providing the lift and accommodations, but not reimbursing troop contributors or governments, we would estimate a UN out of pocket cost of about $180 million for the first six months without the standby French force and about $230 million if it deploys. While this cash flow requirement would greatly increase the risk of an early insolvency, our best guess is that UN peacekeeping would still be able to operate into 1996. This does not take into account the unknown cost of other ongoing deployments undertaken by the UN to bring UNPROFOR up to its authorized troop strength.

-- The UN owes commercial creditors and governments about $1 billion for services and supplies and governments about $700 million for troop reimbursements and equipment depreciation. When 1995 equipment depreciation costs are added in early 1996 the total owed for peacekeeping will jump to about $2.5 billion.

-- The UN stays afloat by paying its most urgent bills first, and letting governments wait for reimbursement. In the past most UN peacekeeping debts were to member states. An increased reliance on more cost-effective commercial contractors and a debt overhang that will exceed $2.5 billion dollars in early 1996 has left the UN vulnerable to a "run on the bank scenario" if cash flows dries up. If that happens, all operations, including those in the Middle East and Cyprus, could be affected. Some troops could be stranded in the field.

-- Last fall we received $1.2 billion in supplemental and FY-95 money for peacekeeping. Our remittances to the UN were used to make long-overdue payments to troop contributing countries. Prior to our payment several countries had threatened to withdraw their troops from existing operations. This problem will likely resurface in the fall.

-- Although it is not an imminent problem, we could loose our vote in the General Assembly if our arrears reach the amount of our assessments for the preceding two years.

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

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Peacekeeping Funding Crisis - Congressional Strategy

-- By the end of FY-95 we will owe the UN $670 million for peacekeeping; more if the RRF is an assessed operation.

-- State has requested $445 million for peacekeeping in FY-96. This included only $211 million for UNPROFOR; enough for six months. DoD requested $65 million to pay for UNMIH (Haiti) and UNPREDEP (Macedonia); they will not get this money. We have no money budgeted for MINURSO (Western Sahara), which was to have ended in FY-95. By the end of FY-96 we may owe the UN more than $1 billion for peacekeeping.

-- There is bipartisan concern, approaching outrage, on the Hill about our willingness to incur large obligations for peacekeeping without adequate consultation. The Gilman, Livingston, Rogers letter, the notification provisions of the FY 94-95 State authorization bill, and the peacekeeping provisions of HR 7, S 5 and this years funding legislation for State clearly demonstrate Congress's ire.

-- Our request this year for a $672 million emergency supplemental for peacekeeping was rejected. At typical 150 account foreign aid outlay rates it would require several billion dollars in program cuts to offset this request.

-- We tried last year to establish a contingency fund for peacekeeping to get around problems created by not knowing when the budgets are submitted what crises will occur. Congress was not receptive.

-- Recently, however, Rogers, Domenici, Kassebaum, Hamilton and a few others have signaled that they might be open to discussing the funding problem. Any solution would require closer consultations with Congress on peacekeeping.

-- Monthly briefings have informed staff, but there is a need for face to face exchanges between senior Administration officials and key Members of Congress.

-- The Peacekeeping Core Group has endorsed a State proposal to offer Congress regular consultations between senior Administration officials and key Congressional leaders in exchange for the creation of an ERMA like contingency fund for peacekeeping.

-- Our first opportunity for such consultation may come next week. Unfortunately, it will involve MINURSO (Western Sahara), an operation viewed by many on the Hill as fundamentally flawed and by some as a prime example of UN mismanagement. Congress even passed a recision of MINURSO's remaining FY-95 funds, but the President vetoed the bill. Since it was due to close in 1995 we have no money budget for FY-96. If we extend MINURSO without adequate consultation with Congress and a plan for how we will pay, we can expect a Congressional reaction similar to that we saw last week.

-- We will also need to explain our decision on funding the RRF.

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ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
AGENDA
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION / AGENDA & DISCUSSION PAPERS FOR 19 JUN DC MTG ON BOSNIA FUNDING

ACTION: HARMON SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 20 JUN 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CLARKE LOGREF: 9520765 9520770

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0203 CODES:

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002	950617	FUERTH, L	
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002	950617	INDERFURTH, R	
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STAFF OFFICER: CLARKE LOGREF: 9520765

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WWD — —

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Pls. log

Thx

Brooke

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The White House

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	6/19/95	6:00 AM	[signature]
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NSC LOG # 20764

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	AMB INDERFURTH		

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B STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
N DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
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A CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
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JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTIFICATION OF 19 JUNE DC MEETING ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 20764

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FROM: National Security Council (LP) PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting 19 JUNE DC MTG ON BOSNIA PAGES: 2

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20764

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 17, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. DOUGLAS GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Notification of Deputies Committee on Bosnia Funding ~~(S)~~

Attached at Tab A is the Agenda for the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia funding, scheduled for Monday, June 19, 1995 at 3:00 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. Attached at Tab B is the discussion paper for this meeting. Attendance is limited to principals plus one. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachments
Tab A Agenda
Tab B Discussion Paper
Tab C OMB Paper
Tab D State/DOD Fact Sheets
Tab E Congressional Strategy

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/27/2019
2010-0533-M

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

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TAB A

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA FUNDING

DATE: Monday, June 19, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 3:00 - 4:00 p.m.

AGENDA

I. Introduction.....NSC

II. Describing the Funding Crisis.....State/OSD

III. Options (NSC Paper)..... ALL

- -- Voluntary Fund
- -- Waiving Repayments
- -- Non-assessed RRF
- -- Close Air Support Operations Assessed
- -- Agreed National Contribution
- -- New Money

IV. Next Steps.....ALL

V. Summary and Conclusions.....NSC

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VE NARA, Date 2/6/2020
2013-0682-m

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TAB B

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. paper	[Duplicate of 002c] (5 pages)	06/19/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4000

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0203 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, June 19, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs674

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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TAB C

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Executive Summary
OpPlan 40104 Withdrawal Financing Options

- NATO OpPlan 40104 costs in total about $2 billion for all participants. DOD's role constitutes about 50% of the operation (or $1 billion). With NATO/U.N. assessments, U.S. upfront costs could go as high as $1.4 billion.

- Of the four financing options outlined, the three U.S.-crafted options all have some form of cost sharing - either through a combination of NATO and UN assessments or by calling on Allies to pay our U.N. assessment for UNPROFOR. **Allies and others in UN unlikely to be sympathetic to U.S. options to assess others (NATO/UN) to pay for U.S. participation.** Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) funding outcome is a new factor; impact of RRF on options needs to be assessed.

- If a funding request to Congress is made, **Congress likely will demand that offsets be presented.** (Oklahoma City requests are offset). There are no known offsets at this time.

- U.S. costs are largely Defense O&M expenditures. Costs are estimated to occur both in FY 95 and FY 96; as time passes, more costs will shift to FY 96. Funding can be obtained:

  - for FY 95, by requesting an offset supplemental appropriations or by absorbing within existing resources (both very difficult in last quarter of FY 95);
  - for FY 96, through adjustments within FY 96 appropriations bills now pending in Congress. A Presidential decision to shift funds (offsets) would be required.

- **Option I (HYBRID)** is most financially advantageous to U.S. It shares costs between NATO Allies (including U.S.), which bear 2/3rds of costs, and other U.N. members, which bear 1/3rd of costs. The NATO costs are funded by levying NATO infrastructure/admin cost sharing on its members (heretofore never done for operations). U.S. and others reimbursed largely by other NATO allies. The net U.S. cost after reimbursements is $330 million.

- **Option II (NATO minus UNPROFOR)** is the next most financially advantageous to U.S. It splits costs between those units originally in UNPROFOR (U.N. pays these) and those NATO forces involved in withdrawal (NATO pays through its infrastructure/admin cost sharing formula). U.S. and others reimbursed for participating through NATO assessments. Net U.S. cost is $430 million.

- **Option III (Allies Preferred Option)** costs U.S. the most and NATO Allies pay significantly less than under other options. Most of withdrawal costs are funded either by U.N. assessments or by NATO participating countries with the U.S. paying most of its own way. Utilizes existing structures (U.N. assessments and NATO infrastructure/admin cost sharing). U.S. is reimbursed very little (only $160 million out of $1 billion). Net U.S. cost is $1,020 million .

- **Option IV (Pay Your Own Way/Voluntary Fund)** would require all participating nations to pay their own national costs (U.S. = $1 billion). There would be an agreement that others (NATO/other U.N.) would pay U.S. assessments to the UN for the cost of UNPROFOR including arrears. Net U.S. cost is $1,010 million.

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FINANCING WITHDRAWAL ONLY IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

June 16, 1995

Background

The United States has agreed in principle to participate in a NATO-led withdrawal from Bosnia should that be necessary. The cost of a withdrawal operation would be approximately $1.95 billion, with DOD paying roughly $1.0 billion (51%) in FY 1995 dollars for its prominent role in the operation. There has been considerable discussion both within the Administration and with NATO allies on financing arrangements for such an operation. Due to required planning, forward movement of the operation, and the long lead times to gain approval in NATO and the U.N. for a funding mechanism and budget authorization, timely action is required to ensure an approved funding mechanism that benefits the United States is in place. This paper discusses options for funding these costs, with varying results for *net* U.S. costs, once the U.S. has been reimbursed. The effect of the new Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) on these options, including costs and viability of options, has not been assessed pending resolution of the funding/operational questions of RRF.

Cost Options

The financing options are described on the following pages in terms of both gross U.S. costs (paid up front), net U.S. costs (after reimbursements from either NATO or U.N.), and the estimated supplemental request to Congress that would be needed. (See Table 1 attached for a detailed break-out of the costs for each of the options.) A total of nine options (including five analyzed by NATO) for paying FY 1995 Bosnia costs were considered. However, only four options, representative of major funding approaches and resulting in lower net U.S. costs, are evaluated in this paper. The four options considered are:

- **Hybrid (NATO/non-NATO U.N. Cost Sharing).** This is a U.S. originated option which would have to be introduced at NATO and the UN. The option shares costs between the U.S., NATO allies, and other U.N. member states and would have the least net cost to the United States.

- **NATO minus UNPROFOR.** This option is a U.S. government proposed variant of one originated by NATO. It would fund UNPROFOR through the U.N. budget during withdrawal, with NATO paying for all remaining costs, including transportation, of the additional forces required for withdrawal.

- **Allies Preferred Option (Enhanced UNPROFOR & U.N. Share).** This is the option preferred by our 15 NATO allies. NATO would only fund common costs of HQ and some commo/engineering. The U.N. would pay most of the in-theater costs, which would be funded through U.N. assessments. Participating troop countries would pay the majority of their own costs.

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- **Pay-Your-Own-Way/Voluntary Contribution Fund**. DOD would pay its $1.0 billion estimated share of the withdrawal operation without any reimbursements. State Department FY 1995 assessed U.N. peacekeeping costs for Bosnia (approximately $500 million) would be paid by other nations to a U.N. voluntary contribution fund.

Financing Budget Costs

Regardless of which option is chosen, the Administration will be required to present a request to Congress that identifies how the withdrawal plan will be paid for while remaining within budget ceilings. At present, Defense Comptroller has estimated DOD costs by fiscal year, assuming a six month operation starting July 1. FY 1995 costs are estimated at $530 million and FY 1996 costs are estimated at $470 million. This does not include any possible NATO assessment (which could add up to an additional $420 million).

There are no known offsets to cover these costs in FY 95 or in FY 96. A Presidential decision would be required to identify the necessary offsets. Offsets required for FY 1995 would be exceedingly difficult as we are entering the fourth quarter and most FY 1995 appropriations have already been spent. Final resolution of the FY 1995 supplemental/rescission bill, which the President vetoed, is also a factor.

For any proposal presented to the Hill, Congress likely will also want to know the nature of the reimbursement arrangements (from either NATO or the UN) to insure that if it credits reimbursements against the budgetary costs, there is a reasonable chance that these reimbursements will be made as projected. Given past experience, should there be any costs incurred in FY 95, reimbursements would only be made after FY 95 has ended.

I. Hybrid (NATO/non-NATO U.N. Cost Sharing) Option

U.S. Gross Cost: $1,330 m. Net Cost: $330 m. Supplemental Request: $1,330 m.

Description: A contract would be negotiated between NATO and the U.N. whereby NATO, in charge of all forces, provides all withdrawal services and initially pays for them. In return, the U.N. would assess other non-NATO nations to help pay for NATO withdrawal costs.

Financing Mechanism: The U.N. would establish a separate fund to receive contributions; this fund would help pay for withdrawal. The U.N. would then assess all its non-NATO member states for their normal share (approx. 32%, or $620 million) of the $1.95 billion withdrawal operation. These assessments would be used by the U.N. to fund the costs of withdrawing non-NATO UNPROFOR forces to their home countries as well as U.N. administrative and support costs estimated at $200 million. Any remaining funds (approx. $420 million) would be given to NATO

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

to reimburse NATO members' costs. NATO would pay the remaining 68% of the $1.95 billion withdrawal cost (i.e. roughly $1,330 million) by assessing each of its members for their share based on NATO administrative cost assessed rates.

U.S. Gross Costs: DOD would incur up front roughly $1.0 billion in costs for withdrawal. It would also pay up front approximately $320 million in new NATO assessments (i.e. 24% of $1,330 million). The State Department would incur a nominal, new U.N. assessment of roughly $10 million to cover UNPROFOR soldier and equipment deployment flights to Germany.

Reimbursements: The U.N. would reimburse NATO with the resources remaining in the contribution fund. In turn, NATO would have to reimburse its member states out of the U.N. reimbursement as well as out of its own assessments. However, NATO does not currently have any reimbursement mechanism, and some argue the likelihood of NATO reimbursement is uncertain. DOD would expect to be reimbursed its entire initial cost of operations (i.e. deployment and logistics costs of $1.0 billion incurred before the U.N. or NATO has raised funds from its assessments) from these resources.

Supplemental Request: The new supplemental request to Congress would be $1,330 million. DOD's share would be $1,320 million ($1,000 million withdrawal + $320 million NATO Assessment). State Department's share would be $10 million. The supplemental request would in principle be offset by later reimbursements (approximately $1.0 billion). Any reimbursements would be deposited with Treasury. If offset by reimbursements, the net supplemental request would equal $330 million.

Advantages

- Lowest net U.S. cost; U.S. taxpayer pays less than in other options;
  -- Congress likely to be more receptive to lower costs.
- Requires fewer offsets for supplemental request.
- Spreads some burden of withdrawal costs to non-NATO U.N. members providing greater equity between U.S., other NATO, and other U.N. members.

Disadvantages

- Might be difficult to gain agreement from the U.N. and NATO to implement for several reasons:
  1. U.N. asked to pay for part of NATO's costs but has no command over forces since this is a NATO "rescue" of U.N. peacekeepers.
  2. Dual funding mechanisms between U.N. and NATO have never been used before. Would require a level of cooperation and coordination between U.N. and NATO that has never been attempted. Process to reach agreement likely to be time consuming and difficult with certain NATO allies.
  3. NATO allies costs greater than in other options (increases NATO assessment).
  4. Russians and others may balk at underwriting NATO through U.N. assessments.
- Significant senior White House and policy official involvement would likely be required to secure NATO allies and U.N. agreement.
- Reimbursements from NATO may be very slow or may not be made.

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II. NATO Minus UNPROFOR Option

U.S Gross Cost: $1,430 m. Net Cost: $430 m. Supplemental Request: $1,430 m.

Description: NATO would provide and pay all costs for the new troops and equipment needed for withdrawal. The U.N. would retain budgetary control over all UNPROFOR forces, including those of NATO member states, for the six month period they are being drawn down.

Financing Mechanism: The U.N. would fund all costs (approximately $210 million) incurred by UNPROFOR forces (e.g. logistics) during withdrawal. It would do so partially out of its current UNPROFOR budget. For the remainder, the U.N. would assess its member states to redeploy UNPROFOR troops and equipment back to their home countries. NATO would fund the costs (e.g. deployment/ redeployment, basic logistics) of all forces used for withdrawal that were not originally in UNPROFOR. It would do so by assessing NATO member states for their share of the operation, which is anticipated to total approximately $1,740 million.

U.S. Gross Costs: DOD would pay up front roughly $1.0 billion for withdrawal. It would also pay up front approximately $420 million in new NATO assessments (i.e. 24% of $1,740 million) as part of its share to cover all NATO costs. The State Department would incur a nominal, new U.N. assessment of roughly $10 million to cover UNPROFOR soldier and equipment deployment flights to Germany.

Reimbursements: There would be no reimbursements from the U.N. NATO would reimburse its member states out of its own assessments. However, NATO does not currently have any reimbursement mechanism and some argue the likelihood of NATO reimbursement is uncertain. Nonetheless, DOD would expect to be reimbursed its entire initial cost of operations (approx. $1.0 billion).

Supplemental Request: The new supplemental request to Congress would be $1,430 million. DOD's share would be $1,420 million ($1,000 million withdrawal + $420 million NATO Assessment). State's share would be $10 million. The supplemental request might be offset by reimbursements (approx. $1.0 billion). Any reimbursements would be deposited with Treasury. If fully offset by reimbursements, the net supplemental request would equal $430 million.

Advantages

- Fairly simple division of responsibility between U.N. and NATO.
- A lower net cost for the U.S. (though higher than the Hybrid Option).
- NATO allies might accept this option as a fallback from its preferred option.
  -- However, NATO allies might not agree to NATO paying transportation costs, preferring instead that nations pay their own transport costs.

Disadvantages

- Higher net U.S. costs than Hybrid option.

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Advantages

- NATO allies strongly support: they pay much lower U.N. assessments than NATO assessments -- e.g. for U.K., U.N. assessment is 3 times lower than for NATO).
- Obviates the need for agreement on a NATO assessments and reimbursement mechanism.

Disadvantages

- Highest net U.S. costs (more than double the other options) of almost all options.
- U.S. pays disproportionately vis-a-vis other NATO allies because of the sizeable U.S. role in the withdrawal.
- Congress likely to balk at this arrangement.
- Requires large offsets (around $1 billion) in agency budgets, displacing other high priority programs.
    -- Offsets may not be available this late in the fiscal year.

IV. Pay-Your-Own-Way/Voluntary Contribution Fund Option

U.S. Gross Cost: $1,010 m. Net Cost $1,010 m. Supplemental Request: $1,010 m.

Description: Each nation would pay its own costs in executing the withdrawal operation. NATO member troops currently in UNPROFOR would revert back to their respective nations' militaries. Non-NATO members of UNPROFOR would remain under UNPROFOR while being drawn down.

Financing Mechanism: Each nation would pay its own costs from its own treasury. The U.N. would cover the costs of extracting non-NATO UNPROFOR troops from within the existing UNPROFOR budget. Because the U.S. would be paying the majority of withdrawal costs (i.e. $1.0 of $1.95 billion) while representing just over one third of all forces in theater (including UNPROFOR troops being withdrawn), our NATO allies and others (Japan, Saudi Arabia, et al.) would agree to pay $500 million (or more depending upon Rapid Reaction Force funding outcome) to a special U.N. voluntary fund. This fund would be used to pay the FY 1995 State Department U.N. assessment arrearages for UNPROFOR. As a practical matter, this option shifts the burden of U.S. international peacekeeping obligations in Bosnia from the State Department budget to the Defense budget. This occurs because DOD bears costs, that otherwise would be reimbursed, to permit the U.S. to solicit funds to cover the existing UNPROFOR assessment.

U.S. Gross Costs: DOD would pay up front roughly $1.0 billion for withdrawal. State would have a small $10 million cost for UN assessments.

Reimbursements: There would be none.

Supplemental Request: The new supplemental request to Congress for DOD's costs would be $1 billion (gross and net). State would have a small $10 million cost for UN assessments. There would be no offseting reimbursements.

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Advantages

- Would eliminate U.S. UNPROFOR arrears.
- Helps maintain U.N. solvency.

Disadvantages

- Would have significantly higher U.S. net costs because there would be no reimbursements to the U.S.
- Would be difficult to sell to the Congress, since U.S. covers the majority of the costs of the withdrawal effort.
- The other countries would have to commit in advance to paying certain amounts to the U.N. fund to insure that commitments exist to cover the $500+ million. This would require active solicitation of funds along the Desert Storm model. Most other countries are not likely to make contributions.
- Would be strongly resisted by DoD and most likely Congress as an attempt, albeit indirect, to cover U.N. assessments in the DoD budget by precluding a supplemental request for State to pay its U.N. assessment arrearages.
- Some believe this raises questions of H.R. 7 'crediting' for U.N. assessments that the Administration opposed.

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16-Jun-95

Table 1: Financing Options for WITHDRAWAL Only from Bosnia

($ in Millions: Assumes Full Reimbursement from NATO and/or U.N.)

	Option 1 Hybrid	Option 2 NATO-UN	Option 3 Allies Prefer	Option 4 Pay Own Way
Total Withdrawal Costs (For 6 Months of Operations)	**1,950**	**1,950**	**1,950**	**1,950**
Financed By: NATO	1,330	1,740	110	
Financed By: National Costs			1,310	1,910
Financed By: United Nations	620	210	530	40
Gross US Costs re Withdrawal Op'n	**1,330**	**1,430**	**1,180**	**1,010**
State	10	10	150	10
New Withdrawal Assessment	10	10	40	10
FY 1995 UN Assessment	na	na	110	0
DOD	1,320	1,420	1,030	1,000
Withdrawal Cost	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
New NATO Assessment	320	420	30	0
Withdrawal Cost Reimbursements	**1,000**	**1,000**	**160**	**0**
DOD	1,000	1,000	160	0
Net US Costs re Bosnia For FY95	**330**	**430**	**1,020**	**1,010**
State	10	10	150	10
New Withdrawal Assessment	10	10	40	10
FY 1995 UN Assessment	na	na	110	0
DOD	320	420	870	1,000
Withdrawal Cost	0	0	840	1,000
New NATO Assessment	320	420	30	0

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Table 2: Total FY 1995 Potential Supplemental Requests to Congress

($ in Millions)

	Option 1 Hybrid	Option 2 NATO-UN	Option 3 Allies Prefer	Option 4 Pay Own Way
New Request to Congress	**1,330**	**1,430**	**1,180**	**1,010**
State	10	10	150	10
New	10	10	150	10
DOD	1,320	1,420	1,030	1,000
Withdrawal Costs	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
NATO Assessment	320	420	30	0
Reimbursments to the Treasury	**1,000**	**1,000**	**160**	**0**
DOD	1,000	1,000	160	0
Net U.S. Supplemental	**330**	**430**	**1,020**	**1,010**
State	10	10	150	10
DOD	320	420	870	1,000

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TAB D

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DOD/OSD

ISSUE PAPER

Issue: This paper provides a rough order of magnitude assessment of the current USG support provided to the UN in support of UNSCRs in the Former-Yugoslavia. In addition, we provide a brief assessment of the potential impact of USG support for the Rapid Reaction Force authorized by the UN Security Council on 16 June.

DOD OUTLAYS (Reimbursed & Non-reimbursed)

This section outlines the cost of USG contributions to the operation of UNPROFOR and associated UN Security Council Resolutions governing the operations in and around the former-Yugoslavia. In general, the US pays approximately $300 million* per year in support of the operations ($297 million in FY 94, $317 million in FY 95 based on FY 94 level of operations, and $363 million in FY 96 based upon current FY 95 outlays). Reimbursement for these costs is negligible, $1.0 million in FY 94. The cost of the USG's 30.4% peacekeeping assessment for support of UNPROFOR must be added to this figure for a comprehensive cost accounting. Cost of UNPROFOR in FY 94 was $1.6 billion resulting in a US assessment of approximately $530 million. Total cost is therefore estimated to be $847 million for FY 95.

* This figure of $300 million for USG support includes our participation in DENY FLIGHT, SHARP GUARD, humanitarian airlift, ABLE SENTRY and PROVIDE PROMISE FORWARD.

DOD IMPACT

For FY 95 any significant increase in the costs of US operations in the former-Yugoslavia as a result of our support for the RRF would require either a supplemental or reprogramming. In the current political atmosphere, it is highly unlikely we could obtain any supplemental that would not require offsets. Limited assistance to the RRF in FY 95 could probably be absorbed in current O&M levels.

There are no funds in the FY 96 budget for UNPROFOR operations. SECDEF has stated that any additional O&M funds provided by Congress would be used to pay for contingency operations. Baseline contingency operation costs for FY 96 are $1.2 billion. Any significant additional costs for the RRF or 40104 would require a supplemental or reprogramming. Again it is highly unlikely we could obtain any supplemental funding that did not require offsets.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ALLIED NON-ASSESSED COSTS FOR UNPROFOR

1994 Unreimbursed Expenditures for Peacekeeping-related Activities in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. Data were provided by contributing nations and may not reflect the same assumptions or accounting methods.

The Netherlands

Operation Sharp Guard:	$14.6 million
TOTAL:	$14.6 million

France

UNPROFOR:	$430 million
UAV* overflights:	$79.3 million
UAV from Istrana	$20.8 million
ECMM	$1.4 million
TOTAL:	$531.5 million**

Britain

UNPROFOR	$203.8 million
Operation Deny Flight	$41.2 million
Operation Sharp Guard	$3.1 million
Carrier Group	$31 million
ECMM	$5 million
ICFY Border Mission	$.62 million
Sanctions Assistance Mission	$.5 million
TOTAL:	$285.22 million

**Total reported contributions during 1994 were $843.5 million, less $96 million in reimbursements from the UN; reimbursement figures were not broken out by operation.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Estimates of UNPROFOR Reimbursements Earned
(Dollars in Millions)

Period 10/1/94 - 3/31/95	UN Total	European Share	UK/French Share
Military Personnel and Contingent Owned Eqpmt	454.8	259.2	95.5

Basis for calculations: European forces amount to 57 percent of UNPROFOR total and UK/French forces amount to 21 percent.

Source: "Financing of United Nations Protection Force," A/49/540 Add. 2 (3 May 1995).

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Amount U.S. Owes and Will Owe for UNPROFOR
(Dollars in Millions)

FY 1995 (at 30.4 percent rate)

Current Bills Outstanding (Covers up to June 30, 1995)	$396
Expected Additional Bill before Expansion for July 1 to September 30, 1995	$123
Total Owed before Expansion	$519

Amount We Can Pay After October 1, 1995 (at 25 percent rate)

Total from FY 1995 at 25 percent rate	$427

Expansion of UNPROFOR - Six Months Costs

At 30.4 percent rate $414 million x 30.4%	$126
At 25 percent rate $414 million x 25 %	$103

NOTE: Although the United States pays at a rate of 30.4 percent and will unilaterally reduce the payment to a 25 percent rate as of October 1, 1995, the UN will continue to bill the U.S. at a 31.2 percent rate and will consider the difference an arrearage.

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Department of State

Impact of Funding Crisis on UN Ability to Operate

-- The Rapid Reaction Force has brought to a head the peacekeeping funding problem. Even without this additional strain on UN budgets, we were concerned about the potential for UN insolvency by next summer. Adding more than $800 million to the UN tab would make a financial crisis more likely.

-- The danger will be most acute next summer, but there is some chance of a financial crisis in October when the UN regular budget will be $170 million overdrawn. An overdraft of about $50 million in October is normal, and usually covered by borrowing from peacekeeping until we pay our assessment. This year our non-payment of peacekeeping assessments may leave the PK account too poor to cover the UN's cash flow needs.

-- If the RRF is deployed as a UN funded operation, with the UN providing the lift and accommodations, but not reimbursing troop contributors or governments, we would estimate a UN out of pocket cost of about $180 million for the first six months without the standby French force and about $230 million if it deploys. While this cash flow requirement would greatly increase the risk of an early insolvency, our best guess is that UN peacekeeping would still be able to operate into 1996. This does not take into account the unknown cost of other ongoing deployments undertaken by the UN to bring UNPROFOR up to its authorized troop strength.

-- The UN owes commercial creditors and governments about $1 billion for services and supplies and governments about $700 million for troop reimbursements and equipment depreciation. When 1995 equipment depreciation costs are added in early 1996 the total owed for peacekeeping will jump to about $2.5 billion.

-- The UN stays afloat by paying its most urgent bills first, and letting governments wait for reimbursement. In the past most UN peacekeeping debts were to member states. An increased reliance on more cost-effective commercial contractors and a debt overhang that will exceed $2.5 billion dollars in early 1996 has left the UN vulnerable to a "run on the bank scenario" if cash flows dries up. If that happens, all operations, including those in the Middle East and Cyprus, could be affected. Some troops could be stranded in the field.

-- Last fall we received $1.2 billion in supplemental and FY-95 money for peacekeeping. Our remittances to the UN were used to make long-overdue payments to troop contributing countries. Prior to our payment several countries had threatened to withdraw their troops from existing operations. This problem will likely resurface in the fall.

-- Although it is not an imminent problem, we could loose our vote in the General Assembly if our arrears reach the amount of our assessments for the preceding two years.

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TAB E

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Peacekeeping Funding Crisis - Congressional Strategy

-- By the end of FY-95 we will owe the UN $670 million for peacekeeping; more if the RRF is an assessed operation.

-- State has requested $445 million for peacekeeping in FY-96. This included only $211 million for UNPROFOR; enough for six months. DoD requested $65 million to pay for UNMIH (Haiti) and UNPREDEP (Macedonia); they will not get this money. We have no money budgeted for MINURSO (Western Sahara), which was to have ended in FY-95. By the end of FY-96 we may owe the UN more than $1 billion for peacekeeping.

-- There is bipartisan concern, approaching outrage, on the Hill about our willingness to incur large obligations for peacekeeping without adequate consultation. The Gilman, Livingston, Rogers letter, the notification provisions of the FY 94-95 State authorization bill, and the peacekeeping provisions of HR 7, S 5 and this years funding legislation for State clearly demonstrate Congress's ire.

-- Our request this year for a $672 million emergency supplemental for peacekeeping was rejected. At typical 150 account foreign aid outlay rates it would require several billion dollars in program cuts to offset this request.

-- We tried last year to establish a contingency fund for peacekeeping to get around problems created by not knowing when the budgets are submitted what crises will occur. Congress was not receptive.

-- Recently, however, Rogers, Domenici, Kassebaum, Hamilton and a few others have signaled that they might be open to discussing the funding problem. Any solution would require closer consultations with Congress on peacekeeping.

-- Monthly briefings have informed staff, but there is a need for face to face exchanges between senior Administration officials and key Members of Congress.

-- The Peacekeeping Core Group has endorsed a State proposal to offer Congress regular consultations between senior Administration officials and key Congressional leaders in exchange for the creation of an ERMA like contingency fund for peacekeeping.

-- Our first opportunity for such consultation may come next week. Unfortunately, it will involve MINURSO (Western Sahara), an operation viewed by many on the Hill as fundamentally flawed and by some as a prime example of UN mismanagement. Congress even passed a recision of MINURSO's remaining FY-95 funds, but the President vetoed the bill. Since it was due to close in 1995 we have no money budget for FY-96. If we extend MINURSO without adequate consultation with Congress and a plan for how we will pay, we can expect a Congressional reaction similar to that we saw last week.

-- We will also need to explain our decision on funding the RRF.

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20764

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 16, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: RICHARD A. CLARKE

FROM: MICHAEL A. SHEEHAN

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia Funding

Attached at Tab I is the counterparts memo announcing the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia funding, to be held on Monday, June 19, 1995 at 3:00 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. The discussion paper is attached a Tab B.

Concurrence by: Nelson Drew, Bill Danvers

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the attached agenda and paper for transmittal to agency counterparts.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to Counterparts
Tab A Agenda
Tab B Discussion Paper
Tab C OMB Paper
Tab D State/DOD Fact Sheets
Tab E Congressional Strategy

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/27/2019
2010-0533-M

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See DSS 2013-0661-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

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~~001. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meetings on Bosnia (3 pages)~~	~~07/11-12/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
002a. memo	Anthony Lake to the President re: Response to the Fall of Srebrencia (2 pages)	07/13/1995	P1/b(1)
002b. memo	[Draft version of 002a] (2 pages)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)
002c. memo	[Draft version of 002a] (2 pages)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)
~~003. agenda~~	~~NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)~~	~~07/11/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 02/06/2020

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P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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DC UN

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 11 - 12 JUL DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 28 JUL 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DREW LOGREF: 9520833 9520838

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, July 11-12, 1995 NSC LOG # 20872

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
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Defense	Executive Secretary		
USUN/State	Rick Indefurth		
CIA	Executive Secretary		
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SUBJECT: ~~Notice of Meeting~~ Summary of Conclustion, Bosnia PAGES: 5

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20872

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 27, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

AMBASSADOR RICK INDEFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. F.C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, July 11-12, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 5/23/2019
2010-0533-M

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20872

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee
DATE: July 11-12, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room/SVTS
TIME: 11:00 - 11:30 a.m.
12:30 - 1:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meetings on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR
Sandy Berger

OVP
Leon Fuerth
Rick Saunders (7/12 only)

STATE
Peter Tarnoff
John Kornblum
Christopher Hill (7/11 only)

DEFENSE
John White (7/11 only)
Walter Slocombe
Joe Kruzel (7/12 only)

USUN
Ambassador Madeleine Albright
(7/11 only -- via secure video)

Rick Inderfurth (7/12 only)
David Scheffer

OMB
Gordon Adams (7/12 only)
Keith Bickel (7/12 only)

CIA
George Tenet (7/12 only)
Dennis Blair (7/11 only)
Norman Schindler

JCS
William Owens
Wesley Clark
Howell Estes (7/11 only)

NSC
Alexander Vershbow
Nelson Drew

Summary of Conclusions

1. Deputies met on July 11 and 12 to consider appropriate responses to the Bosnian Serb assault and occupation of the UN Safe Area at Srebrenica. (U)

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2010-0533-M
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2. Deputies agreed on the need to reassert UNPROFOR's ability to carry out its humanitarian and protection missions in Bosnia, and to halt the pattern of successful Bosnian Serb military aggressiveness that has marked the past month. They also agreed that failure to reverse this pattern will result in attacks on the other enclaves and renewed strangulation of Sarajevo, precipitating the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission and initiation of a withdrawal under circumstances that will be perceived as defeat for the UN, NATO and our allies. They also expressed concern that it would accelerate passage of unilateral lift legislation by the Congress in a manner that would damage relations with our allies. (S)

3. Deputies agreed on the following immediate actions (U):

- To support the UNSCR introduced by the French calling for the use of all available resources to restore the Srebrenica Safe Area, although acknowledging privately that UNPROFOR does not now possess the military capability to reverse the Bosnian Serb occupation of Srebrenica (nor, in all likelihood, to prevent the fall of Zepa). **(Action: State/USUN)** (S)

- To weigh in with Milosevic (and, through the UN, with Karadzic and Mladic) to obtain support for UNHCR efforts to assist in the movement, care and supply of the refugees and the Dutch UNPROFOR troops in Srebrenica; at the same time, to work with the Bosnian government to obtain their consent for the evacuation of the refugees to Tuzla rather than forcing them to remain unsupported behind Serb lines. **(Action: State)** (S)

- To use public statements and consultations with allies to send a clear signal of continuing U.S. resolve to support the retention of UNPROFOR as the best available option for resolving the crisis short of a major Balkan war. **(Action: All)** (S)

- To review the viability of U.S. and NATO quick/emergency withdrawal options as a matter of highest priority in light of the speed with which Srebrenica was overrun. **(Action: OSD/JCS)** (S)

4. Beyond these immediate actions, Deputies also agreed on the need to work with allies on the development of a follow-on strategy to deter further Serb provocations and prevent the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission **(Action: NSC/State/OSD):** (S)

- At a minimum, this strategy must preserve Bosnian government presence in and access to Sarajevo, and it must sustain

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UNPROFOR deployments in Federation territory so as to continue maintaining peace where it exists. (S)

- To this end, we will support robust use of the existing elements of the RRF to secure overland access to Sarajevo using the Mt. Igman route and possibly to restore control over Sarajevo airport. (S)
- Given the political imperative not to be seen as abandoning all of the eastern enclaves and the fact that NATO credibility (through commitment to enforcing the weapons exclusion zone) is engaged in Gorazde, the strategy should include a commitment to protect this safe area, even if protection of Zepa proves unfeasible. (S)

5. Finally, Deputies agreed that efforts to stabilize the situation will be critical to our efforts to avoid Congressional action on unilateral lift. (C)

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~~SECRET~~ 20872

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 25, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

FROM: NELSON DREW ND

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, July 11-12, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of Conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia held July 11-12, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve AVS Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/27/2019
2010-0533-M

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

DC 0206

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9520872
DATE 27 JUL 95

SUBJECT: SOC FOR DC MTG ON 11 - 12 JUL ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA NOELLE JENSEN ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX+1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	8/3/95	_____	S Graves PRINT LAST NAME: GRAVES COPY: 1
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 9/27/2019
2010-0533-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520838
RECEIVED: 12 JUL 95 17

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 13 JUL 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FOLLOW UP PAPER TO PRES FM 11 - 12 DC MTG ON BOSNIA - RESPONSE TO FALL OF SREBRENICA

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT DUE DATE: 15 JUL 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DREW LOGREF: 9520833 9520872

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0206 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		DREW
		NSC CHRON
		VERSHBOW

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/27/2019
2010-0533-M

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS CLOSED BY: NSASK DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~ RECORD ID: 9520838

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95071219	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
002	PRESIDENT	Z	95071708	FOR INFORMATION
002		X	95071708	NOTED BY PRESIDENT

~~SECRET~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Rec'd 7/13 8a

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 20838

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1		
Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger	2		
Lake		Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	7/17	D
Records Mgt.			N

(A = Action) I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	Anthony Lake to the President re: Response to the Fall of Srebrencia (2 pages)	07/13/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4000

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0206 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, July 11-12, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs675

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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~~SECRET~~

20838

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 12, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW/N

FROM: NELSON DREW ND

SUBJECT: Response to the Fall of Srebrenica

The attached memorandum to the President outlines the policy recommendations that have emerged from discussions in the last two days among Deputies and, informally, Principles concerning the appropriate U.S. response to the fall of the Safe Area at Srebrenica.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to the President

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/27/2019
2010-0533-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. memo	[Draft version of 002a] (2 pages)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4000

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0206 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, July 11-12, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs675

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002c. memo	[Draft version of 002a] (2 pages)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4000

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0206 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, July 11-12, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs675

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520833
RECEIVED: 11 JUL 95 10

TO: BERGER

FROM: DREW

DOC DATE: 11 JUL 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA DC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 11 JUL DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: OBE PER EXECSEC DUE DATE: 14 JUL 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DREW LOGREF: 9520838 9520872

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0206 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
DREW
NSC CHRON
VERSHBOW

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/27/2019
2010-0533-M

COMMENTS: OBE - NOTICE & AGENDA WAS NOT SENT TO AGENCIES.

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA CLOSED BY: NSJDA DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	95071113	FOR DECISION
001		X	95071113	OBE PER EXECSEC

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National Security Council
The White House

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URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ *SYSTEM* / *PRS* *NSC* *INT*

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ *DOCLOG* _____ *A/O* _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1		
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger	2		
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3		OBE-NOT SENT
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~

20833

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 11, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: NELSON DREW

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, July 11, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Deputies meeting on Bosnia to be held July 11, 1995. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the meeting and authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/27/2019
2010-0533-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20833

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia on July 11, 1995, 12:30 pm to 1:30 p.m., in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Deputies plus one. The agenda is attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/27/2019
2010-0533-M

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

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NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA
DATE: July 11, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Center
TIME: 12:30 - 1:30 p.m.

Agenda

I. Immediate Operational Issues of Dutch Evacuation/Rescue:

A. Military Options.....JCS/OSD

B. Diplomatic Options.....State/USUN

C. Humanitarian Implications.....CIA/State/USUN

D. Implications for Other Safe Areas.....CIA

II. Longer Term Implications of Srebrenica Developments:

A. Impact on UNPROFOR and RRF deployment.....OSD/State

B. Options for post-evacuation strategy.....All

-- Dealing with the Serbs

-- Future of UN and NATO mandates

-- Impact on 40104 planning and implementation

C. Congressional Issues and Strategy.....State

-- Funding

-- Arms Embargo Lift

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By NL NARA, Date 2/6/2020
2013-0687-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

See also 2013-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title: DC0207 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, 1995
Staff Office-Individual: Records Management
Original OA/ID Number: 4001

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
43	4	7	2	V

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. note	re: [Berger Handwritten Note] (1 page)	07/1995	P1/b(1)
001b. memo	Alexander Vershbow to Samuel Berger re: Outline for Today's Deputies Meeting on Bosnia (3 pages)	07/22/1995	P1/b(1)
001c. paper	re: Bosnia Endgame Strategy [partial] (2 pages)	07/17/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 6/11/2020
~~001d. memo~~	~~To: Sandy Vershbow; From: Chris Hill; Re: Bildt/Milosevic (5 pages)~~	~~07/19/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4001

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0207 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, July 1995

2010-0533-M
rs1015

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520869
RECEIVED: 22 JUL 95 12

TO: BERGER

FROM: VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 22 JUL 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 22 JUL DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER DUE DATE: 26 JUL 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF:

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0207 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BAKER
		BERGER
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By KDS NARA, Date 7/30/2019
2010-0533-M

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS CLOSED BY: NSASK DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~ RECORD ID: 9520869

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	95072211	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	95073111	NOTED BY BERGER

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. note	re: [Berger Handwritten Note] (1 page)	07/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4001

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0207 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, July 1995

2010-0533-M
rs1015

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. memo	Alexander Vershbow to Samuel Berger re: Outline for Today's Deputies Meeting on Bosnia (3 pages)	07/22/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4001

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0207 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, July 1995

2010-0533-M
rs1015

RESTRICTION CODES

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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July 20, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR MADELEINE ALBRIGHT
STROBE TALBOTT
JOHN WHITE
ADM WILLIAM OWENS
LEON FUERTH
GEORGE TENET

FROM: SANDY BERGER

SUBJECT: Bosnia Strategy

At their informal meeting on Wednesday, Principals asked the Deputies to review our medium- and long-term strategy for Bosnia on the basis of the attached NSC paper, with a view toward formulating recommendations or options for the President. The paper is extremely sensitive and should be held closely.

I have scheduled a Deputies' meeting for Saturday, July 22 at 3:00-4:00. Attendance will be Principals plus one.

Attachment
Tab A July 17 NSC paper: Bosnia Endgame Strategy

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By ZDS NARA, Date 9/30/2019
2010-0533-M

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BOSNIA ENDGAME STRATEGY

Summary: With the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa, we need to make an all-out effort in the coming weeks to restabilize the situation on the ground, restore UNPROFOR's credibility in Sarajevo, Central Bosnia and Gorazde (see separate paper), and press for a realistic diplomatic settlement this year. If this effort fails, we should let UNPROFOR collapse this year and help the Bosnians obtain the military capabilities needed to level the playing field. This would be underpinned during a one-year transition period by air strikes to protect Sarajevo and the other safe areas, reinforced if possible by an UNPROFOR successor force based on a coalition of the willing. Following the transition, the Bosnians would be on their own.

Restabilization post-Srebrenica and Zepa: We have little time to devise and implement steps to strengthen UNPROFOR and halt the pattern of increasingly aggressive Serb behavior. If we do not change the status quo, the Serbs will move on Gorazde and renew the strangulation of Sarajevo, and the French will likely decide to withdraw -- leading to UNPROFOR's collapse and a protracted NATO withdrawal operation in circumstances that will represent a defeat for the UN and the Alliance. It will also guarantee passage of unilateral lift by the Congress in a manner that will damage relations with our allies and make it impossible to sustain a Presidential veto.

Our priority is to shore up UNPROFOR in Sarajevo and Central Bosnia by reducing its vulnerability, using the RRF to open secure routes to Sarajevo, and making more aggressive use of NATO air power (under a single key) to halt Serb artillery attacks on the exclusion zones. We should also support efforts to deter a Serb attack on Gorazde, recognizing that a U.S. contribution to this effort may be needed to prevent a French decision to pull out. In order for this strategy to succeed, we need to persuade the Bosnian Government that it is in its interest to keep UNPROFOR even if this means writing off Srebrenica and Zepa and concentrating UNPROFOR's efforts in Sarajevo and Central Bosnia. We would also need to be sure, before embarking on steps to protect Gorazde, that Bosnian forces will defend the enclave, since even a reinforced UNPROFOR presence is not capable of doing this on its own.

Pressing for a political settlement this year: The best way of avoiding an UNPROFOR withdrawal and the new challenges of a post-withdrawal strategy would be to make an all-out effort at obtaining a political settlement this year. The strengthened UNPROFOR and more aggressive use of NATO air power described above will restore some of the leverage we have lost over the past year vis-à-vis the Bosnian Serbs. But we will also need to offer some new inducements to break the logjam surrounding "acceptance" of the Contact Group plan. The loss of Srebrenica and Zepa may open the way to more realistic territorial solutions, and we will need to have a heart-to-heart discussion with the Bosnians aimed at eliciting greater flexibility on the map, constitutional arrangements, and possibly the Bosnian Serbs' right to secede from the Union after an initial period. We will also need to sweeten our offers to Milosevic in order to encourage him to put real pressure on the Bosnian Serbs. At Annex I is a more detailed gameplan for an early diplomatic breakthrough.

Supporting Bosnia's Survival post-UNPROFOR: If the last-ditch effort to obtain a settlement fails and/or we fail to restabilize the situation on the ground, we will need to face up to the issue of UNPROFOR withdrawal (including how to mitigate the risks of OPLAN 40104 and secure Congressional support) and implementing a post-withdrawal strategy. Indeed, it would be preferable to face these issues this year rather than having to implement a messy and protracted NATO withdrawal operation in the middle of the election campaign, when the parties will have an

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even greater incentive to embarrass us or try to draw us into the conflict. **We should begin consulting with our key Allies *now* on our post-withdrawal strategy** in order to bolster their resolve to strengthen UNPROFOR in the short term, and to force them to face up to their responsibility to help support Bosnia's survival if withdrawal must occur.

Leveling the playing field: Our post-withdrawal strategy should have as its goal providing the Bosnians with sufficient military capability to survive the immediate Serb onslaught, consolidate their authority over Sarajevo and Central Bosnia and, within a short period of time, to begin to regain territory allotted to them under the Contact Group proposal. This would make the ultimate resolution of the conflict the result of a balance of power on the ground rather than dependent on the actions of the international community.

- **Our preferred approach would be to lift the arms embargo multilaterally through passage of a UNSC resolution**, perhaps part of the same resolution terminating UNPROFOR's mandate and authorizing withdrawal. Our allies have indicated they will go along with lift after UNPROFOR withdrawal. To secure a Russian abstention, we would, at a minimum, need to make the lift applicable to all republics of the former Yugoslavia (including Serbia-Montenegro), and we might also need to accept substantial sanctions relief for Belgrade as well.
- [redacted] EO 13526 1.4c

Additional Support during the Transition: Although the Bosnians are stronger now than when we first pushed lift-and-strike in 1993, until they acquire and assimilate new arms, they will still need additional support to survive the Serbs' preemptive offensives. At a minimum, we will need to help the Bosnians ensure the survival of Sarajevo as the linchpin of a future Bosnian state. Therefore, for a one-year transition period, we would:

- Press our NATO Allies to **continue enforcing the no-fly zone**, to deprive the Serbs of air superiority (this would, of course, require preemptive SEAD); as a fallback, we would enforce the NFZ through a coalition of the willing.
- **Conduct aggressive air strikes against a broad range of Bosnian Serb military targets to protect Sarajevo (and possibly the other remaining safe areas) against Serb artillery attacks.** This would preferably be done through NATO or, if our allies refused to renew the NATO mandate post-UNPROFOR, through a U.S.-led coalition of the willing. The air strikes would be based on new UNSC authority (since existing authority under 836 and 844 is tied to UNPROFOR) or, as a fallback, on a Bosnian Government request for collective self-defense. Forward air controllers would be provided by members of the UNPROFOR successor force, if available (see below), since we would want to avoid assigning this function to the Bosnian Government. We would limit the commitment to Sarajevo and possibly the other safe areas to avoid becoming full-scale combatants; in any case, Bosnian ground forces, with HVO cooperation, can hold their own in Central Bosnia.

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- **Support the deployment of a successor force to UNPROFOR** to reinforce the Bosnians' hold on Sarajevo and the other safe areas, and to continue to promote stability in Federation-controlled areas of Central Bosnia. Such a force would be a coalition of the willing composed of those UNPROFOR contributors willing to remain plus new forces from Islamic countries (except states like Iran -- the Bosnians would have to agree to rule that out). If possible, the force would be deployed under a Chapter VII UN mandate with the explicit mission of supporting Bosnia against Serb aggression. Otherwise, the force would deploy at the request of the Bosnian Government, invoking Article 51 of the UN Charter. (The humiliating prospect of Islamic countries taking the place of European countries in solving a European problem could prompt some of our Allies to stay and participate in the successor force.)

We would set a time limit of one year (end of 1996) on the NFZ and air strike commitments, making clear to the Bosnians that once the playing field is leveled, they are on their own. The mandate of the successor force could extend beyond a year if the coalition members were willing. In addition to providing arms and training to reinforce the Bosnians' ground force capabilities, we would ensure they obtained effective air defenses to counter Serb air capabilities when the NFZ lapsed. EO 13526 1.4c

EO 13526 1.4c

Keeping Belgrade Out. Leveling the playing field becomes a much more formidable challenge if Belgrade intervenes on a large scale in support the Bosnian Serbs. We would offer **substantial sanctions relief to induce Milosevic to stay out, fully seal the border, and accept a much larger international monitoring force.** We could also encourage Milosevic by brokering a mutually favorable deal with Tudjman over the Krajina and Sector East (see below). We would at the same time **warn Milosevic that, if we detect Serbian military support, we will use air power** against Serbian forces operating inside Bosnia and against the Drina bridges and other supply routes, and that we do **not rule out strikes against military targets inside Serbia.**

Regional containment strategy: As we moved to arm the Bosnians, we would need to take a range of steps to prevent a widening of the conflict to other parts of the region, to include:

- Reinforcing UNPREDEP in Macedonia to deter Serbian border encroachments and a new crackdown in Kosovo, together with a reaffirmation of our warnings to Milosevic regarding air strikes against Serbia in the event he provokes armed conflict in Kosovo;
- Strengthening UNCRO and providing increased economic assistance to Croatia to discourage Tudjman from launching a full-scale war in Krajina in the near term (while at the same time encouraging continued low-level attrition operations that could help limit Krajina Serb support to the Bosnian Serbs);
- Possibly going even further to broker a Belgrade-Zagreb deal whereby Milosevic would abandon the Krajina (Sectors North and South) to Tudjman in return for a piece of Sector East and assurances regarding Bosnian Serb confederation with the FRY following a settlement; and
- Possibly deploying preventive peacekeeping forces along Hungary's and Albania's borders with the FRY.

We would, at the same time, intensify our efforts to **sustain the Federation and Bosnian-Croat military cooperation.** And we would make clear that we stand ready to **broker a political settlement and assist in its implementation,** although at this stage we would jettison the Contact Group approach and devise a new basis for the negotiations.

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Annex I: Gameplan for a Diplomatic Breakthrough in 1995

To achieve an agreement this year that reflects the changing strategic realities, we will need to adapt elements of the Contact Group plan while preserving its essential core as the starting point.

- We would begin with a **heart-to-heart talk with the Bosnians**, stressing that, in light of the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa and renewed Western readiness for tougher action, they must think more realistically about the shape of a settlement (map, constitutional arrangements, even 51:49). They also need to bend in their demand that the Serbs "accept" the CG plan as the "starting point" and agree to at least exploratory CG contacts or proximity talks with Pale.
- In talks with Pale, we would float **possible modifications to the Contact Group map.** At the outset, these would preserve the 51:49 ratio, but provide for a more compact and cohesive territory for the Federation (e.g. trading Srebrenica, Zepa -- and possibly Gorazde -- plus a widening of the Posavina corridor for full Federation control over Sarajevo and additional territory in central Bosnia). Consistent with a recent Silajdzic proposal to Juppé, we could state that up to 10 percent of the Contact Group map was subject to renegotiation.
- Ultimately, **we should be prepared to press the Bosnians to accept less than 51%** if they can obtain higher-quality territory and more defensible Federation frontiers in Central Bosnia.
- We would, similarly, **develop the Contact Group's proposed constitutional principles** to show the Serbs the amount of autonomy their republic would have within the Union and the scope of the "parallel special relationship" with Serbia.
- If necessary, we would press the Bosnians to agree that the Serbs can conduct a **referendum on secession after 2-3 years**, as had been agreed in the 1993 *Invincible* package. We would argue that, if the Bosnians cannot persuade the Serb population that their best future lies in reintegration, there is no point in blocking the *peaceful* separation of the Union along the lines of the Czechoslovak model.
- We would propose to the Allies and Russians mutual participation in funding a **post-settlement "mini-Marshall Plan" for the Balkans, including the prospect of EU association agreements,** designed to foster regional economic recovery and integration and thereby give all parties a stake in peace.

In tandem with these steps, we and our Contact Group partners should tell Milosevic the time has come for him to put up or shut up, i.e. that:

- We will terminate the current sanctions relief in September if he has not recognized Bosnia and taken visible action to terminate military support for Pale (and Knin);
- Moreover, if sanctions relief is terminated and the ICFY mission departs, any resumption of large-scale support for Pale will be met not only by a tightening of economic sanctions against the FRY, but by U.S. or NATO air strikes against the Drina bridges and key supply routes.
- At the same time, in conjunction with the threat of terminating sanctions relief for non-compliance, we would **increase the rewards offered to Milosevic for initial positive steps**, such as suspending all non-strategic trade sanctions if he recognizes Bosnia and/or really seals the border, and perhaps lifting vice suspending a few of the phase-one sanctions.

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To Sandy Vershbow

F: Chris Hill

SUBJECT: BILDT/MILOSEVIC

1. Below is a message from Carl Bildt to the Foreign Ministers of the Contact Group countries and Spain.

BEGINS

2. I have now concluded a final round of talks with President Milosevic on the recognition/sanctions relief package in parallel and in contact with the talks on the situation on the ground between Generals Mladic and Rupert Smith in accordance with the procedures that were agreed upon last weekend.

3. This double-track approach has, in my opinion, taken us a considerable way forward during the day. Detailed reporting on the Mladic/Smith meeting will be available through UNPROFOR channels, but in the "generals' talks" it was possible to agree some of the issues left unresolved in the preliminary talks on these issues last weekend, and in my talks with Milosevic we virtually completed the package.

4. We can thus achieve both a significant easing of the problems we have had on the ground during the past few months - in particular Gorazde and Sarajevo - and at the same time move into a new phase in the overall political effort.

5. When I was asked to continue these talks, the key issue that had not been resolved was the sanctions reimposition mechanism. During the course of the talks, I believe we have managed to find a formula that meets our basic objectives and which Milosevic can accept. The main hurdle to an agreement has thus been overcome, and we have to make up our minds on whether we want it or not given the circumstances and given our wider political strategy in the conflict.

6. The mechanism that Milosevic and I have agreed upon means that we will now use the autumn and winter to try to achieve a political settlement in Bosnia with his active support, but that we can

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reconsider our policy and - if he has given anything other than humanitarian assistance to the Bosnian Serbs in the meantime - reimpose sanctions during next spring. The decision to go back to sanctions will be taken by a panel of five countries (permanent members of the Security Council) by simple majority. It will be based on the reporting of the ICFY Mission through the Secretary General, or through evidence provided by panel member countries.

7. When discussing this mechanism, I believe we have to do it from the broader political perspective. With Belgrade recognising Bosnia and Hercegovina within its internationally recognised borders, and with the FRY agreeing to a set of principles for the constitutional and territorial settlement of the dispute, we are very effectively limiting the future options available to the Bosnian Serbs.

8. If Milosevic gets the support he needs for this package in the weeks ahead, it will be most difficult for Pale to continue dreaming about the things they are still dreaming about. At the same time, it will be clearly demonstrated that the outside world is not pursuing a policy that is anti-Serb in general, but one that isolates destructive policies. I believe most observers will say that this will radically increase the pressure on the Bosnian Serb leadership. Pale's nationalist rhetoric will sound increasingly hollow if it finds that the vast majority of Serbs are turning their backs on it.

9. We can have no guarantees that this package will solve the problems of Bosnia quickly and smoothly. This will not happen. There are limits to what Milosevic can do to influence events, and there are at times limits to what he is prepared to do. But I cannot see an alternative policy that has a better chance of bringing about the political changes imperative to a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

10. We will naturally have to continue to monitor Milosevic's behaviour extremely carefully. That applies in particular to the closing of the border. We agreed that the ICFY Mission will be reinforced. Indeed the problems I am having in this respect are mainly due to lack of funding and lack of personnel from ICFY contributing countries, rather than reluctance on Milosevic's part. There has also been a noticeable lack of input to the ICFY Mission from countries that often report that they have information indicating that the border is not as closed as it should be. We must improve our joint performance in the areas of both money and personnel, with an ICFY Mission substantially augmented and with substantially better information from other means of monitoring the border.

11. There is nothing in the agreement - which is important - to prevent the ICFY Mission from reporting violations throughout the nine month grace period. This has obvious effects both on political relations and on the economic possibilities of using the nine month period effectively since there will be a great reluctance on the part of the outside world to go into long-term

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arrangements with Serbian enterprises if they see the risk of sanctions returning next spring. Milosevic is aware of this.

12. On the other issues in the package, there have been substantial negotiations back and forth going on for months. Milosevic has tried to bring up the state succession issue time after time, but this has been refuted. He has urged us to be more flexible on defining strategic sanctions, and here we have reason to be more forthcoming in order to give him his necessary "critical mass". But the essence of the package remains the recognition of Bosnia and Hercegovina, the suspension of sanctions and the possibility of returning to them next spring if there is clear evidence that he has gone back on his support for the Contact Group plan or he has given more than humanitarian support to the Bosnian Serbs.

13. Today Milosevic employed his by now familiar tactic of raising a number of old issues again to see if there was after all some flexibility on our side, as well as some final arguing over the unresolved issues.

14. His number one remaining concern is over the freezing of financial assets. Most of the day - in addition to discussions on the general situation and prospects ahead - was spent on this issue. As an old banker he argues with force and conviction, and tried as hard as he could to secure progress. At the end of the meeting - because I decided from the beginning that it would be unproductive to continue into the night - he dropped demands for the unfreezing of Central Bank assets, but continued to argue for the unfreezing of the assets of commercial banks and private enterprises. I argued that it was sometimes difficult to draw the dividing line between governmental and private assets that some sanctions have to remain in order to provide incentives for the future and that I "so oder so" did not judge that I had any margin for manoeuvre on this issue.

15. On other issues, we made progress. Milosevic accepted my wording on paragraph four of the framework document ("As the basis for the realisation of the Contact Group plan , it is agreed that") thus dropping his long-fought for demand ("It is agreed that"). I accepted the EU list of strategic sanctions with the addition of a final sentence "Provisions should be agreed for normal steel production". The figures for this should be sorted out by experts within a month.

16. We wrestled over the outstanding issues and ended by my saying that I could present his argument on the unfreezing of commercial assets to the Contact Group. But there was a 95 per cent chance that it would be refused, but that I would be prepared to argue forcefully for suspended sports sanctions to be lifted (with 60 per cent chance of success) and that an oil figure of 400,000 metric tonnes per months would make sense politically, although I could have squeezed him down to 375,000 metric tonnes.

17. The package as it now stands will thus have to be agreed or rejected by us on Friday. I have promised him a letter from the

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Contact Group, in the name of the foreign ministers, on Saturday offering him an agreement and asked that he reply during the weekend. Although he made angry noises about his "critical mass" being crippled and us being unfair, I am fairly convinced that he will buy the package without the unfreezing of commercial assets but with sports and oil there. I naturally said that there was the possibility of the Foreign Ministers throwing it all - me included - out of the window.

18. If we endorse and he agrees on the package, Milosevic will make it public with a major speech to the nation, thus launching his political offensive during the next few days. We should make it public at the same time.

19. In the aftermath of Srebrenica, it will not be easy to present to public opinion in our respective countries the fact that we are entering into an agreement with Milosevic. I have noted that the Prime Minister Siladjic in one of his frequent CNN interviews has said that responsibility for "genocide" in Bosnia lies with the "Fascist-Stalinist monster" in Belgrade. Although this is extreme even by his standards, similar sentiments have been echoed elsewhere.

20. But policy has to be long-term. We have been pursuing the search for this agreement for a long time, and any cool analysis of our policy options for the months ahead should make us more rather than less interested in it now. Abandoning it now by rejecting an agreement that is within our grasp would force us to devise another policy, and would make Milosevic revise his approach.

21. Milosevic's possibilities for influencing Bosnian Serb military activities are certainly not non-existent but are not unlimited. Mladic is pursuing his own war in the interests of what he considers his people, and although he listens to political advice and political orders coming from either Pale or - sometimes - Milosevic, it is my impression that he makes the actual decisions on his own. We can at times use Milosevic to moderate and influence him, but there are distinct limits to what can be achieved as long as we cannot get the Bosnian government to agree to some form of military restraint, at best in the form of a cessation of hostilities.

22. We are thus, when it comes to the situation on the ground, in the difficult position that there are limits to what we can achieve with Mladic as long as we cannot get Sarajevo to stop fighting, and there are distinct limits to the pressure we can apply to the Bosnian Government as long as we cannot show real improvements on the ground in terms of Sarajevo access and other key issues.

23. I do not believe that we can extract ourselves from this situation by some kind of show of force unless we are prepared to escalate as far as it takes. Mladic has seen our policy spasms in the past, and he is likely to test them early and decisively in order to see how much cold steel we are ready to take and use.

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24. If we are talking in terms of military options, I would advise you very strongly to be ready for a ride that might well be very rough. Bosnian Serbs are ready to wage war against UNPROFOR in the - so far correct - belief that there are distinct limits to how far we are prepared to escalate. It is my opinion that any serious intent on our side to escalate must be preceded by a considerable change in the deployment and operation of UNPROFOR including the option for troop contributing nations to get out if they so wish. You cannot ask nations to provide troops for peace-keeping and then drag them into war without consulting them or giving them the option of leaving

25. The double-track negotiating approach which I have set up has now produced effects both in terms of the possibility of us entering into a new political phase and in terms of a substantial easing of the acute situation on the ground both for our forces and for the humanitarian effort.

26. To have the aid and food convoys rolling into Sarajevo again is important from the humanitarian as well as political point of view. To be able to resupply and rotate in Gorazde is important for other - but equally obvious - reasons.

27. I am continuing to Split this evening. I will proceed on Thursday morning to Kiseljak for a meeting with General Rupert Smith and from there along the road that we will now again have access to into Sarajevo where I intend to brief President Izetbegovic on the broad outlines of what has been discussed. I will also bring up with him the possibility of a meeting between himself and President Milosevic, as well as ask him for clarification of some of the statements made recently by a number of his ministers concerning the future of the UN effort in Bosnia. I will then return to Split in order to fly to London, arriving late on Thursday evening.

ENDS

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FINAL 19/7

FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT

BETWEEN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE COUNTRIES OF THE CONTACT GROUP

1. The Contact Group countries have stated, that a key to the future stability of the region of former Yugoslavia is the early and mutual recognition between all its states within their internationally recognized borders as this provides the basis for the negotiations that are essential in order to promote the political settlements of the disputes of the region, and paves the way for the peaceful cooperation between all the peoples and states of the region.

2. In the context of mutual recognition between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and provided that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia respectively supports or implements the other provisions below, the Contact Group governments are prepared to recommend to the UN Security Council the sanctions relief as envisaged in the annex, to take effect simultaneously with recognition.

3. In an act of recognition between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Hercegovina, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will recognize Bosnia and Herzegovina within its internationally recognized borders.

4. As the basis for the realization of the Contact Group plan, it is agreed that:

A. Bosnia and Herzegovina should be a union of two entities, the "Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina" and the "Republika Srpska."

B. There should be balanced and equal treatment of the "Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina" and the "Republika Srpska."

C. Both the entities should have the right to establish parallel special relationships with neighbouring countries, consistent with the integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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D. Any future political rearrangements brought about by any community within either entity will not change the status of the other entity within the union, as described in subparagraphs A, B and C above.

E. The 51:49 parameter of the territorial proposal of the Contact Group would remain the basis for a settlement. This territorial proposal would be open for adjustment by mutual agreement.

F. There would be provision in the settlement for refugees and displaced persons to be able to return to their homes of origin.

5. Redeployment to the lines agreed would take place as soon as there was agreement between the two sides on any territorial adjustments and on constitutional arrangements.

6. A cessation of hostilities agreement should be concluded to enable the opening and completion of the negotiations. Such an agreement should include all the elements of the cessation of hostilities agreement of 31 December 1994.

7. As regards Croatia, following the passage of Security Council resolution 981, there should now immediately be further normalization of economic relations and the start of negotiations on a final political settlement between Zagreb and Knin.

8. The Contact Group underlines the need for maintenance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the border closure except for humanitarian assistance. The UNPF Mission will be reinforced.

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FINAL 19/7

SANCTIONS RELIEF ANNEX

1. All UN mandated trade, financial and economic sanctions against the FRY as well as the sanctions suspended by SCR 943 (1994), except those on trade in strategic goods* (aside from oil and petroleum products which will be subject to a special regime) and except the frozen [illegible] existing accounts will be suspended sine die.

2. New accounts will be able to operate freely, and cash brought from the FRY can be deposited in them.

3. The FRY will be able to import each month seasonally adjusted amounts of oil and petroleum products in a quantity not to exceed normal monthly usage. The FRY will assure that none of these supplies will be reexported or allowed to leave the country. The FRY agrees that oil and petroleum products will be imported through the port of Bar and via the Danube.

4. Sanctions that have been suspended would be reimposed by decision of a panel consisting of the five permanent members of the Security Council if, after a report by the Secretary General on the basis of the ICFY Mission, or a report by a permanent member of the Security Council, it is concluded that the FRY is not implementing its decision to close the border with Bosnia except for humanitarian assistance or is no longer supporting the Contact Group plan. Such a decision can be taken no earlier than after reviewing nine months after sanctions have been suspended in accordance with this agreement. The decision of the panel is taken by a simple majority (three out of five).

5. After Bosnian Serb authorities accept the Contact Group plan as a starting point for negotiations, the lifting of sanctions against the FRY will begin, commencing with the phase one sanctions now suspended. Simultaneously, the FRY will restore conditions for normal trade and contacts with Bosnia and Hercegovina.

6. When a cessation of hostilities is in place and negotiations by the Bosnian parties have begun on the implementation of the Contact Group plan, suspended sanctions will be lifted. Strategic sanctions will be suspended and the oil regime will remain in effect.

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7. When the Contact Group plan is implemented on the ground and the respective forces have withdrawn to the agreed territorial delimitations, the remaining sanctions will be lifted, aside from those frozen assets associated with state succession questions.

* Strategic items to be crude oil, petroleum products, coal, iron, steel, other metals, petrochemicals (other than for agricultural use, textiles and normal plastics) and energy related equipment for new production. Provisions should be agreed for normal steel production.

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O:\RYN\RYN95.840 S.L.C.

Pending

Latest Dole 18 July

AMENDMENT NO. ____ Calendar No. ____

Purpose: To substitute language for the text of the bill.

IN TH st Sess.

AMENDMENT № 1801

By DOLE — OTHERS

To To S. 21 able

(6 Pages)

Refer GPO : 1994 84-478 (mac) ____

Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE intended to be proposed by Mr. DOLE (for himself, Mr. LIEBERMAN Helms, Thurmond, Biden, D'Amato, McCain, Fe Warner, Hatch, Kyl, Moynihan, Stevens, Cochran, Hutch Viz: Mack, Coverdell, Packwood, Murkowski, Specter,

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Bosnia and Herzegovina Self-Defense Act of 1995".

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

The Congress makes the following findings:

(1) For the reasons stated in section 520 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103–236), the Congress

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has found that continued application of an international arms embargo to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina contravenes that Government's inherent right of individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 of the United National Charter and therefore is inconsistent with international law.

(2) The United States has not formally sought multilateral support for terminating the arms embargo against Bosnia and Herzegovina through a vote on a United Nations Security Council resolution since the enactment of section 1404 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103–337).

(3) The United Nations Security Council has not taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security in Bosnia and Herzegovina since the aggression against that country began in April 1992.

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF SUPPORT.

The Congress supports the efforts of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina—

(1) to defend its people and the territory of the Republic;

(2) to preserve the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of the Republic; and

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(3) to bring about a peaceful, just, fair, viable, and sustainable settlement of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

SEC. 4. TERMINATION OF ARMS EMBARGO.

(a) TERMINATION.—The President shall terminate the United States arms embargo of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as provided in subsection (b), following—

(1) receipt by the United States Government of a request from the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina for termination of the United States arms embargo and submission by the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in exercise of its sovereign rights as a nation, of a request to the United Nations Security Council for the departure of UNPROFOR from Bosnia and Herzegovina; or

(2) a decision by the United Nations Security Council, or decisions by countries contributing forces to UNPROFOR, to withdraw UNPROFOR from Bosnia and Herzegovina.

(b) IMPLEMENTATION OF TERMINATION.—The President may implement termination of the United States arms embargo of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina pursuant to subsection (a) prior to the date of completion of the withdrawal of UNPROFOR personnel

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from Bosnia and Herzegovina, but shall, subject to subsection (c), implement termination of the embargo pursuant to that subsection no later than the earlier of—

(1) the date of completion of the withdrawal of UNPROFOR personnel from Bosnia and Herzegovina; or

(2) the date which is 12 weeks after the date of submission by the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina of a request to the United Nations Security Council for the departure of UNPROFOR from Bosnia and Herzegovina.

(c) PRESIDENTIAL WAIVER AUTHORITY.—If the President determines and reports in advance to Congress that the safety, security, and successful completion of the withdrawal of UNPROFOR personnel from Bosnia and Herzegovina in accordance with subsection (b)(2) requires more time than the period provided for in that subsection, the President may extend the time period available under subsection (b)(2) for implementing termination of the United States arms embargo of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina for a period of up to 30 days. The authority in this subsection may be exercised to extend the time period available under subsection (b)(2) for more than one 30-day period.

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(d) PRESIDENTIAL REPORTS.—Within 7 days of the commencement of the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and every 14 days thereafter, the President shall report in writing to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives on the status and estimated date of completion of the withdrawal operation. If any such report includes an estimated date of completion of the withdrawal which is later than 12 weeks after commencement of the withdrawal operation, the report shall include the operational reasons which prevent the completion of the withdrawal within 12 weeks of commencement.

(e) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as authorization for deployment of United States forces in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina for any purpose, including training, support, or delivery of military equipment.

(f) DEFINITIONS.—As used in this section—

(1) the term "United States arms embargo of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina" means the application to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina of—

(A) the policy adopted July 10, 1991, and published in the Federal Register of July 19, 1991 (58 FR 33322) under the heading "Sus-

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pension of Munitions Export Licenses to Yugoslavia"; and

(B) any similar policy being applied by the United States Government as of the date of completion of withdrawal of UNPROFOR personnel from Bosnia and Herzegovina, pursuant to which approval is denied for transfers of defense articles and defense services to the former Yugoslavia; and

(2) the term "completion of the withdrawal of UNPROFOR personnel from Bosnia and Herzegovina" means the departure from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina of substantially all personnel participating in UNPROFOR and substantially all other personnel assisting in their withdrawal, within a reasonable period of time, without regard to whether the withdrawal was initiated pursuant to a request by the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a decision by the United Nations Security Council, or decisions by countries contributing forces to UNPROFOR, but the term does not include such personnel as may remain in Bosnia and Herzegovina pursuant to an agreement between the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the government of any country providing such personnel.

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Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title: DC0208 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, July 24, 1995				
Staff Office-Individual: Records Management				
Original OA/ID Number: 4001				
Row: 43	Section: 4	Shelf: 7	Position: 2	Stack: V

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (3 pages)~~	~~07/24/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
002. memo	Alexander Vershbow to Samuel Berger re: Outline for Today's Deputies Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)	07/24/1995	P1/b(1)
~~003. agenda~~	~~NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)~~	~~07/24/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 02/06/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4000

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0208 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, July 24, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs676

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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RECORD ID: 9520874
RECEIVED: 25 JUL 95 08

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 27 JUL 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA SOC
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 24 JUL DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 28 JUL 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DREW LOGREF: 9520870 9520890

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0208 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
DREW
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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/30/2019
2016-0533-M

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001	SENS	Z	95072720	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	95072720	DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950727	FUERTH, L	
002	950727	BRILL, K	
002	950727	MCALEER, R	
002	950727	ADAMS, G	
002	950727	INDERFURTH, R	
002	950727	GARTHOFF, D	
002	950727	WILSON, F	

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Soderberg			
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Lake	~~3~~		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	MC 7/27	D
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Sens			
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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	7/28/95	AM 5:45	A Taylor Anthony Taylor PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX+1
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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	7/28/95	7:30A.M.	R. Smith PRINT LAST NAME: R. Smith COPY: VIA FAX+1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
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MESSAGE NO.: 1556 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 5
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FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, July 24, 1995 NSC LOG # 20874

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
State	Executive Secretary		
Defense	Executive Secretary		
USUN/State	Rick Inderfurth		
CIA	Executive Secretary		
JCS	Secretary		

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, July 24, 1995 NSC LOG # 20874

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
State	Executive Secretary		
Defense	Executive Secretary		
USUN/State	Rick Inderfurth		
CIA	Executive Secretary		
JCS	Secretary		

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FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, July 24, 1995 NSC LOG # 20874

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
State	Executive Secretary		
Defense	Executive Secretary		
USUN/State	Rick Inderfurth		
CIA	Executive Secretary		
JCS	Secretary		

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PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
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RELEASER: Z Ingrell

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 1556 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 5 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, July 24, 1995 NSC LOG # 20874

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
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Defense	Executive Secretary		
USUN/State	Rick Inderfurth		
CIA	Executive Secretary		
JCS	Secretary		

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FROM: **National Security Council** PHONE: **202-456-2291** ROOM: **WHSR**

SUBJECT: **Notice of Meeting** Summary of Conclusions on Bosnia PAGES: 5

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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20874

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 27, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. F.C. WILSON
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, July 24, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/30/2019
2010-0533-M

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee
DATE: July 24, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room/SVTS
TIME: 2:00 - 3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR
Sandy Berger

OVP
Leon Fuerth
Rick Saunders

STATE
Strobe Talbott
Peter Tarnoff
Jim Steinberg

DEFENSE
John White
Walter Slocombe

USUN
Madeleine Albright
David Scheffer

CIA
George Tenet
Dennis Blair

JCS
William Owens
Wesley Clark

SPECIAL ENVOY
Robert Frasure

NSC
Alexander Vershbow
Nelson Drew

Summary of Conclusions

1. Deputies agreed to begin meeting on the Bosnia crisis via SVTS on a daily basis until further notice. (C)

2. USUN reported on Boutros-Ghali's refusal to meet with U.S., UK and French Ambassadors to discuss implementation of the London Conference decisions until he was presented with a "non-paper" on the concept being considered by NATO. A joint UK/French/USUN draft was discussed, and Deputies tasked a working group chaired by OSD to revise the non-paper and provide a cleared version for use in New York that evening, drawing on the President's phone

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call with French President Chirac (who wanted to ensure a role for General Janvier, UNPF Theater Commander, and the UN SYG in the decision cycle for initiating any Bosnia-wide phase in an air campaign) and conversations between the CJCS and the National Security Advisor on the best way to respond to the French concerns. The revision was completed and cleared for use in New York. ~~(S)~~

3. Deputies discussed briefly the problems of expanding the London Conference decisions to include Safe Areas beyond Gorazde. They agreed that USNATO should seek NAC language setting the stage for a transition from a strictly Gorazde-centered policy to one that applied to other Safe Areas but that it would not be practical to insist on expanding the London ultimatum of extensive air strikes to additional Safe Areas in the July 25 NAC decision. **(Action: State)** ~~(S)~~

4. Deputies noted that the Croatian government had notified Ambassador Galbraith of its intention to launch an attack into the Bihac sector during the early morning of July 25. They agreed that, given the deteriorating military situation in Bihac and the inability immediately to apply the London agreement to Bihac, it would be inappropriate to attempt to dissuade the Croatians from their plans. However, it also was agreed that the Croats should be warned against taking this opportunity to launch an attack against Knin, with the accompanying risk of a multi-front campaign and possibly drawing Serbian Government forces into the conflict. **(Action: State)** ~~(S)~~

5. Following a read-out on the President's call to Chirac, Deputies noted that several key elements of what had apparently been agreed in London now seemed to be coming undone. They agreed that a major effort involving multiple phone calls by Principals to their UK and French counterparts should be undertaken to restore the London consensus. This effort would key off the work being done to reach U.S./UK/French agreement on the non-paper for Boutros-Ghali. **(Action: All)** ~~(S)~~

6. Deputies reviewed the results of the interagency working group tasked on July 22 to develop alternatives to the Dole resolution calling for unilateral lift of the arms embargo on Bosnia and a legislative strategy to preclude the President having to cast an unsustainable veto of the Dole legislation. They endorsed the conclusion of the group that a series of amendments should be sought that would: (1) change the triggering mechanism to ensure that the Bosnian government could not unilaterally start the clock on a requirement for the U.S. to lift the embargo; (2) endorse the efforts to strengthen UNPROFOR through the RRF and the London Conference; and (3) change the requirement from unilateral lift to multilateral lift. They

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agreed that a Presidential veto should be recommended if the requirement for unilateral lift remained. They agreed that key Principals would brief a bipartisan Congressional group on July 25 regarding the desired amendments and the implications of the London Conference. **(Action: NSC/All)** (S)

7. Deputies reviewed progress toward satisfying tasking from the July 22 DC regarding the need for new diplomatic initiatives and critical decisions associated with possible transition to a post-UNPROFOR environment in Bosnia. They considered the need to look at multiple diplomatic options and tracks given the fluid nature of the current environment and the need to move thinking beyond the current "Milosevic track." OVP agreed to work with State in producing a new drafts for further consideration by Deputies and Principals. **(Action: OVP/State).** (S)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 25, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: NELSON DREW

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, July 24, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of Conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia held July 24, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/30/2019
2010-0533-M1

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DC 0208

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9520874
DATE 27 JUL 95

SUBJECT: SOC FOR DC MTG ON 24 JUL ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	8/3/95	_____	S. Graves PRINT LAST NAME: GRAVES COPY: 1
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
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RECORD ID: 9520890
RECEIVED: 31 JUL 95 11

TO: BERGER

FROM: VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 24 JUL 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 24 JUL DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER DUE DATE: 03 AUG 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9520870 9520874

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0208 CODES:

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FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
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		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		VERSHBOW

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001		X	95073111	NOTED BY BERGER

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. memo	Alexander Vershbow to Samuel Berger re: Outline for Today's Deputies Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)	07/24/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4000

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0208 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, July 24, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs676

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 24 JUL 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA DC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 24 JUL DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 27 JUL 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9520874 9520890

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0208 CODES:

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FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
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NSC CHRON
SODERBERG
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By RDS NARA, Date 9/30/2019
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001	BERGER	Z	95072411	FOR DECISION
001		X	95072413	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
002		X	95072413	DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

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DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950724	FUERTH, L	
002	950724	BRILL, K	
002	950724	MCALEER, R	
002	950724	INDERFURTH, R	
002	950724	GARTHOFF, D	
002	950724	WILSON, F	

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DOC DATE: 24 JUL 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: AGENDA FOR 24 JUL DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: FOR DECISION DUE DATE: 27 JUL 95 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF:

FILES: IFM NSCP: CODES:

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FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
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The White House

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Soderberg			
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Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	PRS 7/24	D N
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

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7/24

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SUBJECT: AGENDA FOR 24 JUL DC MTG ON BOSNIA
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MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
COL. F. C. WILSON JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: DC MTG ON BOSNIA

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REMARKS:

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RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting DC ON BOSNIA TODAY PAGES: 2

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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20870

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 24, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia on July 24, 1995, 2:00 - 3:00 p.m., conducted by way of the Secure Video Teleconference System (SVTS). Attendance will be principals plus one. The agenda is attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/30/2019
2010-0533-M

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NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA
DATE: July 24, 1995
LOCATION: Via Secure Videoconference
TIME: 2:00 - 3:00 p.m.

Agenda

I. Implementation of London Decisions on Use of Air Power

A. Status of NATO Military Committee and NAC Decisions.....JCS/State

B. Status of Consultations with UN.....USUN

C. Whether to extend decision to Bihac.....All

II. Diplomatic Issues

A. Response to Bildt/Milosevic Package.....State/OVP

B. How to restart talks among Bosnian Parties.....State

III. Strategy toward unilateral lift legislation.....NSC

Declassify on: OADR

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VIA NARA, Date 2/6/2020
2013-0682-M

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~~SECRET~~ 20870

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 24, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, July 24, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Deputies meeting on Bosnia to be held July 24, 1995. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the meeting and authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve ___ Disapprove ___

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/30/2019
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~~001. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)~~	~~07/25/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4001

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DC0209 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, July 25, 1995

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rs677

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P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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RECORD ID: 9520879
RECEIVED: 26 JUL 95 13

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 31 JUL 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA SOC
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 25 JUL DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: HARMON SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 29 JUL 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF:

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0209 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
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VERSHBOW

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/30/2019
2010-0533-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

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001		X	95073120	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
001	SENS	Z	95073120	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	95073120	HARMON SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950731	FUERTH, L	
002	950731	BRILL, K	
002	950731	MCALEER, R	
002	950731	INDERFURTH, R	
002	950731	ADAMS, G	
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Dohse			
Sens	1	DS	
Soderberg			
Berger	✓		
~~Lake~~ Harmon	3		Tab I please
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	MC 7/31	D
Records Mgt.			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

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Exec Sec Office has diskette typo

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
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Dohse			
Sens	I	NDS	
Soderberg			
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Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	MC 7/31	D
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	8-1-95	1 M 6:00	A TAYLOR Arthur Taylor PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX+1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
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DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	8/1/95	8:45	C PRINT LAST NAME: George COPY: 1
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX

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DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET
ROOM 238
OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG
WASHINGTON, DC 20503

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MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
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AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
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MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX

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RELEASER: ~~BRG~~

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 1592 CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOTAL: 4 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, July 25, 1995 NSC LOG # 20879

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
State	Executive Secretary		
Defense	Executive Secretary		
USUN/State	Rick Inderfurth		
CIA	Executive Secretary		
JCS	Secretary		
			VTDP

BNBAD

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Initials: RDS Date: 9/30/2019
2010-0533-M

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM 1995 JUL 31 PM 3

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

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TIME OF RECEIPT

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE / PRIORITY / ROUTINE

RELEASER: BKG

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 1592 CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOTAL: 4 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, July 25, 1995 NSC LOG # 20879

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
State	Executive Secretary		
Defense	Executive Secretary		
USUN/State	Rick Inderfurth		
CIA	Executive Secretary		
JCS	Secretary		

SNBAD

REMARKS:

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Initials: RDS Date: 9/30/2019
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TIME OF TRANSMISSION
1995 JUL 31 P8:30

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RELEASER: BNC

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FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, July 25, 1995 NSC LOG # 20879

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
State	Executive Secretary		
Defense	Executive Secretary		
USUN/State	Rick Inderfurth		
CIA	Executive Secretary		
JCS	Secretary		

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REMARKS:

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Initials: RDS Date: 9/30/2019
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31 JUL 95 20 45

NMCC/JCS

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: BKG

DTG: _____

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FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, July 25, 1995 NSC LOG # 20879

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
State	Executive Secretary		
Defense	Executive Secretary		
USUN/State	Rick Inderfurth		
CIA	Executive Secretary		
JCS	Secretary		

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FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, July 25, 1995 NSC LOG # 20879

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USUN/State	Rick Inderfurth		
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- ☒ ROUTINE

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DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting SOC DC Mtg on Bosnia 25 July PAGES: 4

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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20879

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 31, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. DOUGLAS GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, July 25, 1995 ~~(C)~~

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(C)~~

Joyce A. Stern for
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/30/2019
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee
DATE: July 25, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room/SVTS
TIME: 11:00 a.m. - 12:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR
Sandy Berger

OVP
Leon Fuerth
Rick Saunders

STATE
Strobe Talbott
Peter Tarnoff
Jim Steinberg

DEFENSE
John White
Walter Slocombe

USUN
Madeleine Albright
David Scheffer

OMB
Gordon Adams

CIA
George Tenet
Dennis Blair

JCS
RADM William Owens
LTG Wesley Clark

SPECIAL ENVOY
Robert Frasure

NSC
Alexander Vershbow

Summary of Conclusions

Implementation of London Decisions

1. Deputies reviewed the issues that had arisen in that day's ongoing discussions in the North Atlantic Council regarding implementation of the London decision on Gorazde. They agreed that we could agree to the French proposal that UN authority for Option 1 and 2 air strikes be delegated to the UNPF theater commander, General Janvier, with the expectation that he would delegate authority for close air support to the local commander.

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CIA Historical Collections Division
2018-0533-M (2.16)

They agreed that, in light of French opposition to delegating authority for Option 3 air strikes to Janvier, we would agree to defer a NAC decision on the modalities for UN-NATO coordination until the time Option 3 authority was sought. This would be without prejudice to the U.S. position that a decision by UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali was not required. (C)

2. Deputies also agreed that the U.S. should oppose UK efforts to require a new NAC decision before attacks could take place against troop concentrations within the Gorazde zone of action (ZOA) under Option 2, as well as UK efforts to limit the size of the ZOA. (C)

Contact Group Discussion of Bildt Negotiations

3. Deputies discussed the approach that Ambassador Frasure should take in the July 26 Contact Group meeting to discuss the package negotiated by EU negotiator Bildt with Serbian President Milosevic. They agreed that we should not endorse or provisionally accept the Bildt-Milosevic package but that we needed to take a sufficiently positive stance to encourage continued UK/French support for serious NATO military action. (C)

4. Deputies agreed that Ambassador Frasure should inform Contact Group counterparts that we support continued efforts by Bildt, that we believe it essential that Bildt consult further with the Bosnian Government to address their concerns and that we see a need for improvements to the package in the following areas:

-- sanctions reimposition mechanism (the U.S. remains opposed a de facto lifting of sanctions in the guise of suspension; we are prepared to continue to work on the idea of a five-nation review panel, but cannot commit to the idea until other aspects of the Bildt-Milosevic package are resolved);

-- length of the grace period before reimposition could occur (nine months is clearly too long); and

-- the strength of Milosevic's commitments on closure of the Serbian-Bosnian border and acceptance of increased numbers of international monitors.

They agreed that Ambassador Frasure should also underscore that, given the situation on the ground, the negotiations must proceed in tandem with genuine restabilization and de-escalation by the Bosnian Serbs; otherwise it would politically untenable for us to move ahead with a deal with Milosevic. (C)

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20879

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 31, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, July 25, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of Conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia held July 25, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve AR Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/30/2019
2010-0533-M

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See also 2013-0652-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

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Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
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2010-0533-M
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TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 14 AUG 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA DC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 11 AUG DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 15 AUG 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BREMNER LOGREF:

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0212 CODES:

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FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
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002	950814	BRILL, K	
002	950814	MCALEER, R	
002	950814	INDERFURTH, R	
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Harmon	1		
Dohse			
Sens	3		Sign Tab I
Soderberg			
Berger	2		
Lake			
Situation Room		Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
West Wing Desk	3 4		D
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

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Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
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Dohse			
Sens	3	ADT	Sign. Tab I
Soderberg			
Berger	2		
Lake			
Situation Room		Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
West Wing Desk	3 4		D
Records Mgt.			
		copy	

A = Action I = Information D = Further Action

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COMMENTS:

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SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS OFAUG 11 DC MTG ON BOSNIA
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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	8-14-95	2:30 PM	Arthur Taft PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
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~~PRIORITY~~
~~ROUTINE~~

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MESSAGE NO.: 1702 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 4 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC FOR DC ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 20940

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B	USUN	OFFICE OF AMB. (STATE)		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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2010-0533-M

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
~~ROUTINE~~

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 1702 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 4 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC FOR DC ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 20940

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B	USUN	OFFICE OF AMB. (STATE)		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
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~~ROUTINE~~

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 1702 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 4 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC FOR DC ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 20940

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B	USUN	OFFICE OF AMB. (STATE)		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
~~ROUTINE~~

RELEASER: [signature]

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 1702 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 4 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC FOR DC ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 20940

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
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N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B	USUN	OFFICE OF AMB. (STATE)		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

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TIME OF RECEIPT

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PRECEDENCE
- ☐ FLASH
- ☐ IMMEDIATE
- ☑ PRIORITY
- ☐ ROUTINE

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DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC LOG # 20940

FROM: National Security Council (ASK) PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting SCC FOR DC ON BOSNIA PAGES: 3 + COVER

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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Bakke, Kyle D.

From: Baker, Jane E.
To: @EUROPE - European Affairs
Cc: /N, NonRecord at A1; /R, Record at A1; Bakke, Kyle D.; Gerstner, Christina L.; Sanborn, Daniel R. K.; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary; @LEGAL - Legal Advisor; @LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs; @PRESS - Public Affairs; @UP - APNSA Special Assistants
Subject: DC Time Change 8/11 ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~
Date: Wednesday, August 09, 1995 5:45PM

The Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia scheduled for Friday, August 11, has a time and venue change. It will now be held from 10:00 - 11:00 a.m. in the SITROOM, NOT via SVTS. All agencies have been notified.

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/30/2019
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20940

MEMORANDUM FOR August 14, 1995

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. DOUGLAS GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F.C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, August 11, 1995 ~~(C)~~

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(C)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/30/2019
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee SVTS
DATE: August 11, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room/SVTS

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meetings on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR
Sandy Berger

OVP
Leon Fuerth
Richard Wurtz

STATE
Strobe Talbott
James Steinberg

DEFENSE
Jan Lodal
James Pardue

USUN
James O'Brien

OMB
Gordon Adams

CIA
Dennis Blair
Ray Converse

JCS
John Walsh
Thomas Bowden

NSC
Nelson Drew
Sue Bremner
Eric Schwartz
Mike Sheehan

Summary of Conclusions

1. Deputies met August 11 to discuss a) the itinerary of the team that will go to the region to consult with parties to the conflict; b) the situation on the ground, including Croatian military intentions; c) planning for humanitarian assistance to Krajina Serb refugees in Bosnia and Serbia; d) UN planning for UNCRO drawdown; e) NATO inability to enforce the No Fly Zone over Banja Luka; and f) Serb threats to move refugees to Vojvodina and Kosovo. (S)

2. Deputies agreed:

- The Lake/Tarnoff team would meet with Holbrooke and Drew in London Sunday afternoon before the latter proceeded to ex-Yugoslavia. **(Action: All)** (S)

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2010-0533-M
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- Secretary Perry would call Defmin Susak August 11 to warn him of the dangers of military movements at this time, whether in Sector East, inland toward Montenegro from Dubrovnik, or around Banja Luka. In the course of the demarche Perry would reiterate our insistence on civil treatment of refugees. If Susak's reaction was not reassuring, the Vice President would follow up on the Perry call with a call to Tudjman. **(Action: OSD/OVP)** (S)

- State and USUN would work with UN and UNHCR officials to help the latter develop a comprehensive plan of regional refugee assistance. The plan would take into account the needs of all displaced persons, including Krajina Serbs, and would call for unimpeded access to Sarajevo and Gorazde, as well as to Banja Luka. Once the plan were developed, the U.S. would consider how best to contribute to it and to refugee relief efforts already under way on the part of ICRC and other organizations. **(Action: State/USUN)** (S)

- USUN would work with UN officials to prevent precipitous action on the part of Boutros-Ghali and Akashi with regard to UNCRO drawdown, particularly considering the volatile situation in Sector East. At the same time, the Peacekeeping Core Group and others would continue to look at ways to rationalize UNCRO and consider changes to its mandate, composition and location commensurate with the changed circumstances on the ground. USUN would not attempt to slow down UN discussions, but would aim to slow down action. **(Action: USUN/PCG)** (S)

- On the No Fly Zone enforcement issue, State would send a cable to USNATO instructing Ambassador Hunter to make the point that now was not the time to raise the issue of attempting SEAD, considering the diplomatic initiatives under way and the presence of large numbers of refugees in the vicinity of Banja Luka. **(Action: State)** (S)

- CIA would continue monitoring Serb threats to move refugees from the Krajina to Vojvodina and Kosovo, and compare threats with actions. Should forced movements to Kosovo appear imminent, agencies would consider the utility of reissuing the 1992 Kosovo warning. State would review the language of the 1992 warning to determine if it remains appropriate. **(Action: CIA/State)** (S)

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20940

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 11, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: SUSAN BREMNER SB

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, August 11, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of Conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia held August 11, 1995.

Concurrence by: Nelson Drew ND

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve AL Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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See also 2013-0682-M

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~~001. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meetings on Bosnia (2 pages)~~	~~08/14/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2025
002. agenda	NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)	08/14/1995	P1/b(1)

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NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
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P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
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FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 14 AUG 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA DC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 14 AUG DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 17 AUG 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BREMNER LOGREF: 9520946

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0214 CODES:

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FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
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		BREMNER
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

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001	SENS	Z	95081417	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	95081419	SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950814	FUERTH, L	
002	950814	BRILL, K	
002	950814	MCALEER, R	
002	950814	INDERFURTH, R	
002	950814	ADAMS, G	
002	950814	GARTHOFF, D	
002	950814	WILLIAMS, A	
002	950814	WILSON, F	

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1	D	
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger	2	CNN	
~~Lake~~ Sens	3	NDS	Tab I
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	MB 8/14	
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

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LOG 9520950
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SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 14 AUG DC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 14 AUG DC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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LOG 9520950
DATE 14 AUG 95

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COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	8/16/95	2:10	S. Graves PRINT LAST NAME: GRAVES COPY: 1
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ROUTINE

RELEASER: M&M

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 1714 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 4 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (202) 456-9425 WH SITROOM
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 14 AUG DC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 20950

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
	USUN	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		
B	AID	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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PRIORITY
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RELEASER: M&M

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 1714 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 4 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 14 AUG DC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 20950

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
AID	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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Initials: RDS Date: 9/30/2019
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PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
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RELEASER: M&M

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 1714 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 4 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (AH) (202) 456-9425 WH SITROOM
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 14 AUG DC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 20950

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
	USUN	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		
B	AID	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: M&M

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 1714 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 4 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 14 AUG DC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 20950

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
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	USUN	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		
B	AID	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

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NSC LOG # 20950

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting SOC FOR 14 AUG DC MTG: Bosnia PAGES: 4

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

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If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20950

August 14, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. AARON S. WILLIAMS
Executive Secretary
Agency for International Development

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

Attached is a Summary of Conclusions, including taskings, from the Deputies Committe SVTS on August 14, 1995 from 11:30 a.m. - 12:00 noon. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/30/2019
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee SVTS
DATE: August 14, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room/SVTS

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meetings on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR
Sandy Berger

OVP
Bill Wise
Richard Wurtz

STATE
Strobe Talbott
James Steinberg

DEFENSE
Ted Warner
James Pardue

USUN
James O'Brien

OMB
John Burnim

CIA
Dennis Blair
Ray Converse

JCS
William Owens
John Walsh

NSC
Sue Bremner
Eric Schwartz

AID
Barbara Turner
Dalena Wright

Summary of Conclusions

1. Deputies met August 14 to discuss a) the situation on the ground, including the Serb build-up near Sector East and the GoBH/HV offensives in west-central Bosnia; b) the Vice President's calls to Izetbegovic and Tudjman; c) planning for settlement implementation; d) UNCRO drawdown and the posibility of UNCRO's managing pro-Abdic refugee problems in Sector North; e) Serb refugee resettlements, including transfers to Kosovo and harrasment of non-Serbs in Sandjak and Vojvodina.

2. Deputies agreed:

- a Principals meeting would be held Tuesday, August 15, to review progress made by the Lake/Tarnoff team, to discuss Kosovo, and to formulate a plan for dealing with Bildt and for

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responding to diplomatic initiatives like the French offer of a three-way Summit. **(Action: NSC/State)**

- State would finalize its cable on UNCRO drawdown, reiterating the need for a measured approach especially in Sector East and asking for UN views on whether UNCRO could be of assistance in managing current refugee problems in Sector North. **(Action: State)**

- State would prepare talking points for consideration by principles on Serb resettlement of Krajina refugees into Kosovo. When approved, the points would likely be used by A/S Holbrooke in Belgrade, with a follow-up demarche by Rudy Perina. **(Action: State)**

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20950

August 14, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: SUE BREMNER

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting, August 14, 1995

Attached at Tab A is a summary of conclusions, including taskings, from today's Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the summary of conclusions and authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memorandum to agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/30/2019
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RECEIVED: 14 AUG 95 10

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 14 AUG 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA DC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION W/ AGENDA FOR AUG 14 DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 17 AUG 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9520950

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0214 CODES:

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FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BAKER JANE
		BERGER
		BREMNER
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/30/2019
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002		X	95081411	DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950814	FUERTH, L	
002	950814	BRILL, K	
002	950814	MCALEER, R	
002	950814	INDERFURTH, R	
002	950814	ADAMS, G	
002	950814	GARTHOFF, D	
002	950814	WILLIAMS, A	
002	950814	WILSON, F	

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The White House

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Dohse	1/3	D	
Sens	R		
Soderberg			
Berger	2	Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Lake			
Situation Room			
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COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20946

August 14, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. AARON S. WILLIAMS
Executive Secretary
Agency for International Development

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia today, August 14, via SVTS from 11:30 a.m. - 12:00 noon. Attendance is principals plus one. An agenda for the meeting is attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 5/30/2019
2010-0533-M

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P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20946

August 14, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER R. VERSHBOW SRV for

FROM: SUE BREMNER SB

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting, August 14, 1995

Attached is an agenda (Tab A) for today's Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the agenda and authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to Agencies
Tab A Agenda

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/30/2019
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~~001b. memo~~	~~[Draft Version of 001a] (4 pages)~~	~~08/18/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
002a. memo	Ivo Daalder and Sue Bremner to Samuel Berger re: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (4 pages)	08/17/1995	P1/b(1)
~~002b. agenda~~	~~[Duplicate of 003a] (1 page)~~	~~08/18/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 02/06/2020
~~002c. paper~~	~~re: Deputies Committee Discussion Paper Humanitarian Assistance and Refugees (1 page)~~	~~08/17/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003a. agenda~~	~~NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)~~	~~08/18/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 02/06//2020
~~003b. paper~~	~~[Duplicate of 002c] (1 page)~~	~~08/17/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003c. paper~~	~~re: Implementing a Balkan Peace Settlement (4 pages)~~	~~08/17/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003d. paper~~	~~re: Multilateral Equipping and Training of the Bosnian Federation (3 pages)~~	~~08/17/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~004. paper~~	~~[Duplicate of 002c] (1 page)~~	~~08/17/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020

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2010-0533-M
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RECORD ID: 9520984
RECEIVED: 21 AUG 95 09

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 22 AUG 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA DC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS OF 18 AUG DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 24 AUG 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9520972 9520978

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0216 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BAKER JANE
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By RDS NARA, Date 9/30/2019
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002		X	95082307	SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950822	FUERTH, L	
002	950822	BRILL, K	
002	950822	MCALEER, R	
002	950822	INDERFURTH, R	
002	950822	ADAMS, G	
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~~5021~~

ZELIKOW

ZELIKOW, JACK
EUR/SCE Rm 5221
~~5509 4208~~

DONE

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Jack Zetkulic
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~~5221~~

ZETKULIC, JACK
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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LOG 9520984
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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	8-23-95	PM 3:00	Anthony Tyler PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
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AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	8/24/95	10:15	D. Graves PRINT LAST NAME: GRAVES COPY: 1
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FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions for DC Meeting on Bosnia

NSC LOG # 9520984

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	State	Executive Secretary		
N	Defense	Executive Secretary		
B	USUN/State	Rick Inderfurth		
A	CIA	Executive Secretary		
B	State/AID	Executive Secretary		
D	JCS	Secretary		

REMARKS:

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MESSAGE NO.: 1768 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 6 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions for DC Meeting on Bosnia

NSC LOG # 9520984

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	State	Executive Secretary		
N	Defense	Executive Secretary		
B	USUN/State	Rick Inderfurth		
A	CIA	Executive Secretary		
B	State/AID	Executive Secretary		
D	JCS	Secretary		

REMARKS:

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Initials: RDS Date: 9/30/2019
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NMCC/JCS

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DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 1768 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 6 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions for DC Meeting on Bosnia

NSC LOG # 9520984

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B	State	Executive Secretary		
N	Defense	Executive Secretary		
B	USUN/State	Rick Inderfurth		
A	CIA	Executive Secretary		
B	State/AID	Executive Secretary		
D	JCS	Secretary		

REMARKS:

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Initials: RDS Date: 9/30/2019
2010-0533-M

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions for DC Meeting on Bosnia

NSC LOG # 9520984

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	State	Executive Secretary		
N	Defense	Executive Secretary		
B	USUN/State	Rick Inderfurth		
A	CIA	Executive Secretary		
B	State/AID	Executive Secretary		
D	JCS	Secretary		

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions for DC Meeting on Bosnia

NSC LOG # 9520984

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
State	Executive Secretary		
Defense	Executive Secretary		
USUN/State	Rick Inderfurth		
CIA	Executive Secretary		
State/AID	Executive Secretary		
JCS	Secretary		

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DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting SOC for DC Mtg on Bosnia PAGES: 5

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DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20984

August 22, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. DOUGLAS GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. AARON S. WILLIAMS
Executive Secretary
Agency for International Development

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, August 18, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/30/2019
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee
DATE: August 18, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 4:30 - 6:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR
Sandy Berger

OVP
Bill Wise
Rick Saunders

STATE
Strobe Talbott
John Kornblum

DEFENSE
Jan Lodal
Ted Warner
James Pardew

USUN
Dave Scheffer
James O'Brien

OMB
Phebe Vickers
Rodney Bent

CIA
George Tenet
Dennis Blair

AID
Thomas Dine
Michael Mahdesian

JCS
BG John Walsh
Douglas Lute

WHITE HOUSE
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
BG Donald Kerrick
Richard Clarke
Sue Bremner

Summary of Conclusions

1. Deputies met August 18 to review the status of DoD's post-settlement implementation planning effort and discuss arming and training the Federation forces. They agreed to reconvene on Tuesday, August 22 to accomplish two tasks:

- review more detailed discussion paper on peace settlement implementation based on Deputies discussion, to be prepared by

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10/1/2013

OSD with input from JCS and others as appropriate, that would be forwarded to Principals later in the week;

- review a paper on arm and train, in which JCS would attempt to frame questions and lay out a mechanism for decisionmaking. This paper would also be presented to Principals later in the week. (S)

IMPLEMENTATION

2. Deputies accepted as a working assumption (although this was disputed by some) that the force would largely be **deployed to Federation territory.** (S)

3. Deputies were in agreement that the **mandate** of the NATO-led Peace Implementation Force (PIF) should include all necessary use of force in **self-defense**, whether through air power or other means. (S)

4. With regard to the mandate of the force vis-a-vis **protecting Federation territory from Serb attack**, some participants advocated security guarantees akin to NATO Chapter V protection; anything short of this was described as making the PIF ineffectual. Other participants called for lesser guarantees in the form of air power alone, under the arrangements envisioned at the July 1995 London Conference but country-wide. Participants agreed the subject required further consideration. (S)

5. Deputies agreed that **if the Bosnian government or Federation violated** the terms of settlement by launching major offensives to gain strategic advantage, the PIF would leave. (S)

6. **If the Serbs violated** the terms of the agreement by launching major campaigns to gain strategic advantage, the PIF would undertake actions that moved up a pre-established ladder of escalation. (S)

7. All agreed that the PIF would take an even-handed approach, using force as necessary, to counter **renegade or isolated military activities** on the part of either side, so long as they did not constitute major offensives. (S)

8. With regard to the **mission** of the force, Deputies discussed four elements:

- Separation of forces: Separation of forces would be done voluntarily by the parties to the agreement, but the PIF would be authorized to effect the movement of forces that had not done so voluntarily. (S)

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- Disarmament: Some Deputies noted that this task would be subordinate to separation of forces, as troops would not have to be disarmed inside areas they were given at settlement. Other Deputies noted that we would need to guard against appearing to sanction an arms race in territory under the control of the parties. (S)

- Heavy weapons: Deputies noted that build-down was an option that needed to be explored further. The task of controlling heavy weapons was also discussed in relation to separation of forces and demilitarization. (S)

- Demilitarization: The Deputies agreed that there should be narrow DMZs along the borders. They agreed to examine analyses of weapons limitation zones to supplement the DMZs. Deputies further discussed zones of separation, including notions of two-tiered zones with inner zones of separation and outer buffer exclusion zones. (S)

9. Deputies agreed that the PIF should be under NATO command and control, **with arrangements for non-NATO troops.** Deputies noted that dissuading the Russians and Islamic-country forces from participating in post-settlement implementation might be politically difficult. (S)

10. Deputies agreed peacekeeping forces would continue to operate in Macedonia and Croatia under UN auspices and would not be incorporated into the PIF. The UN would also continue to operate civilian functions such as UNCIVPOL and UNHCR in the PIF area of responsibility. (S)

11. On the subject of **phasing,** Deputies agreed that initial deployment should occur quickly, once the UN made a request, through means of a NATO command and control headquarters being set up on the ground and the resubordination of the RRF. A Joint Commission would be established to coordinate political and military issues with local officials. NATO OPLAN 40104, containing planning for UNPROFOR withdrawal, might be used as a basis for planning out initial deployments, which would have to occur in conjunction with the removal of UNPROFOR units not a part of NATO and not willing to remain. (S)

12. As for the **exit strategy,** Deputies discussed DoD's estimate that the force would remain in place for nine months. Some participants considered nine months sufficient for arm and train to be effective; others felt the establishment of buffers and CBMs, separation of forces, and other aspects of the mission would take more time. DoD noted that using OPLAN 40104 as the

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basis for planning would facilitate drawdown of the PIF itself, when the time came. (S)

13. Deputies agreed that **next steps** for the USG, once Principals endorsed the DoD paper, would include a possible key allies meeting to refine plans and make arrangements for a NAC to bless an updated version of OPLAN 40104 encompassing settlement implementation as well as withdrawal. (S)

ARM AND TRAIN

14. Deputies agreed arming and training was a function parallel to implementation planning. Basic assumptions included:

- that we would **equip the Federation** (as opposed to other entities);
- that the U.S. would attempt to lead a **multilateral effort;**
- that our goal would be to build up the **core defensive capabilities** of the Bosnian army;
- that we would attempt to **counterbalance** the strengths of the BSA. (S)

15. Deputies noted that even if there were no peace plan implementation, there might still be a requirement to arm and train, so planning needed to get under way. (S)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20984

August 21, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: BG DONALD KERRICK, ACTING

FROM: SUE BREMNER

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, August 18, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of Conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia held August 18, 1995.

Concurrence by: Richard Clarke

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/30/2019
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20904

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee
DATE: August 18, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 4:30 - 6:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR
Sandy Berger

OVP
Bill Wise
Rick Saunders

STATE
Strobe Talbott
John Kornblum

DEFENSE
Jan Lodal
Ted Warner
James Pardew

USUN
Dave Scheffer
James O'Brien

OMB
Phebe Vickers
Rodney Bent

CIA
George Tenet
Dennis Blair

AID
Thomas Dine
Michael Mahdesian

JCS
BG John Walsh
Douglas Lute

WHITE HOUSE
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
BG Donald Kerrick
Richard Clarke
Sue Bremner

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CIA Historical Collections Division
NR 70-14 (6/1/2012

Summary of Conclusions

discuss

1. Deputies met August 18 to review the status of DoD's post-settlement implementation planning effort and ~~share thoughts~~ discuss on arming and training the Federation forces. They agreed to reconvene on Tuesday, August 22 to accomplish two tasks:

- review more detailed discussion paper on peace settlement implementation, to be prepared by OSD with input from JCS and based on Deputies discussion,

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others as appropriate, that would be forwarded to Principals later in the week;

- review a paper on arm and train, in which JCS would attempt to frame questions and lay out a mechanism for decisionmaking. This paper would also be presented to Principals later in the week. (S)

IMPLEMENTATION

2. Deputies accepted as a working assumption (although this was disputed by some) that the force would largely be **deployed to Federation territory.** (S)

3. Deputies were in agreement that the **mandate** of the NATO-led Peace Implementation Force (PIF) should include all necessary use of force in **self-defense**, whether through air power or other means. (S)

4. With regard to the mandate of the force vis-a-vis **protecting Federation territory from Serb attack**, some participants advocated security guarantees akin to NATO Chapter V protection; anything short of this was described as making the PIF ineffectual. Other participants called for lesser guarantees in the form of air power alone, under the arrangements envisioned at the July 1995 London Conference. ~~A third suggestion was for a mandate that would make the force responsible for protecting a peace "arrangement" rather than the Federation itself.~~ Participants agreed the subject required further consideration. (S)

5. Deputies agreed that **if the Bosnian government or Federation violated** the terms of settlement by launching major offensives to gain strategic advantage, the PIF would leave. (S)

6. **If the Serbs violated** the terms of the agreement by launching major campaigns to gain strategic advantage, the PIF would undertake actions that moved up a pre-established ladder of escalation. (S)

7. All agreed that the PIF would take an even-handed approach, using force as necessary, to counter **renegade military activities** on the part of either side, so long as they did not constitute major offensives. (S)

8. With regard to the **mission** of the force, Deputies discussed four elements:

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- Separation of forces: Separation of forces would be done voluntarily by the parties to the agreement, but the PIF would be authorized to effect the movement of forces that had not done so voluntarily. ~~(S)~~

- Disarmament: Some Deputies noted that this task would be subordinate to separation of forces, as troops would not have to be disarmed inside areas they were given at settlement. Other Deputies noted that we would need to guard against appearing to sanction an arms race in territory under the control of the parties. ~~(S)~~

- Heavy weapons: Deputies noted that build-down was an option that needed to be explored further. The task of controlling heavy weapons was also discussed in relation to separation of forces and demilitarization. ~~(S)~~

- Demilitarization: The Deputies agreed that there should be narrow DMZs along the borders. They agreed to examine analyses of weapons limitation zones to supplement the DMZs. Deputies further discussed zones of separation, including notions of two-tiered zones with inner zones of separation and outer buffer exclusion zones. ~~(S)~~

9. Deputies agreed that the PIF should be under NATO command and control, **with arrangements for non-NATO troops**. Deputies noted that dissuading the Russians and Islamic-country forces from participating in post-settlement implementation might be politically difficult. ~~(S)~~

10. Deputies agreed peacekeeping forces would continue to operate in Macedonia and Croatia under UN auspices and would not be incorporated into the PIF. The UN would also continue to operate civilian functions such as UNCIVPOL and UNHCR in the PIF area of responsibility. ~~(S)~~

11. On the subject of **phasing**, Deputies agreed that initial deployment should occur quickly, once the UN made a request, through means of a NATO command and control headquarters being set up on the ground and the resubordination of the RRF. A Joint Commission would be established to coordinate political and military issues with local officials. NATO OPLAN 40104, containing planning for UNPROFOR withdrawal, might be used as a basis for planning out initial deployments, which would have to occur in conjunction with the removal of UNPROFOR units not a part of NATO and not willing to remain. ~~(S)~~

12. As for the **exit strategy**, Deputies discussed DoD's estimate that the force would remain in place for nine months. Some

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participants considered nine months sufficient for arm and train to be effective; others felt the establishment of buffers and CBMs, separation of forces, and other aspects of the mission would take more time. DoD noted that using OPLAN 40104 as the basis for planning would facilitate drawdown of the PIF itself, when the time came. ~~(S)~~

13. Deputies agreed that **next steps** for the USG, once Principals endorsed the DoD paper, would include a possible key allies meeting to refine plans and make arrangements for a NAC to bless an updated version of OPLAN 40104 encompassing settlement implementation as well as withdrawal. ~~(S)~~

ARM AND TRAIN

14. Deputies agreed arming and training was a function parallel to implementation planning, ~~and would be expensive and prove controversial with Congress~~. Basic assumptions included:

- that we would **equip the Federation** (as opposed to other entities);
- that the U.S. would attempt to lead a **multilateral effort;**
- that our goal would be to build up the **core defensive capabilities** of the Bosnian army;
- that we would attempt to **counterbalance** the strengths of the BSA. ~~(S)~~

15. Deputies noted that even if there were no peace plan implementation, there might still be a requirement to arm and train, so planning needed to get under way. ~~(S)~~

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RECORD ID: 9520978
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TO: BERGER

FROM: DAALDER
BREMNER
CLARKE

DOC DATE: 17 AUG 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 18 AUG DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER DUE DATE: 21 AUG 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DAALDER LOGREF: 9520972 9520980

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0216 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
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		BREMNER
		CLARKE
		DAALDER
		KERRICK
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG

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By RDS NARA; Date 9/30/2019
2010-0533-M

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001		X	95090513	NOTED BY BERGER

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Dohse			
Sens			
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Berger	2	Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	8/6 9/5	A
Records Mgt.			N

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cc:

COMMENTS: Berger Mtg package for Bosnia DC 8/18

17 AUG 95 23 P

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	Ivo Daalder and Sue Bremner to Samuel Berger re: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (4 pages)	08/17/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4001

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0216 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, August 18, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs680

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA
DATE: August 18, 1995
LOCATION: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
TIME: 4:30 - 6:30 p.m.

Agenda

I. Policy Issues Relating to Military Implementation of a Peace Plan.....OSD/JCS

II. Policy Issues Relating to Arming and Training Bosnian Government Forces.....OSD/JCS

III. Policy Issues Relating to Humanitarian and Refugee Assistance Deliveries to Serbia..... State/NSC

IV. Status Report on Holbrooke Mission.....State

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By MD NARA, Date 2/6/2020
2013-0682-M

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August 17, 1995

Bosnia

Deputies Committee Discussion Paper
Humanitarian Assistance and Refugees

1. **Access for humanitarian deliveries throughout FRY:** Little has come of this effort. UNHCR is supportive; Belgrade said it has little control over the actions of the Bosnian Serbs.

Possible initiatives: Amb. Spiegal could raise with Mrs. Ogata and urge public statement from UNHCR; 2) we could demarche European capitals and urge public statements from them; 3) we could seek formal action at UN; 4) we could ask that this issue be raised by U.S. negotiators in the region.

2. **Humanitarian assistance to Belgrade:** Currently, State/PRM aid to UNHCR can go to Bosnian Serbs in Bosnia, but not to activities in the FRY. Likewise, State/PRM aid to ICRC is earmarked for use "particularly" in Bosnia and Croatia. State's political statement has not, up to now, had a large impact on the amount of humanitarian aid reaching priority beneficiary populations in the FRY. Based on recent increase in humanitarian needs and subject to a needs assessment, State and AID would now like to consider relief support to UNHCR, ICRC and other international and non-governmental organizations for projects in the FRY.

3. **Money for Humanitarian Assistance:** We have substantial monies remaining in humanitarian assistance accounts at State for the end of FY 95 (more than $80 million in unspent MRA and ERMA). Some of this will need to go to Rwanda and other areas of dire need, but much might go to Bosnian relief.

Possible initiative: Should we come forward with more aid and, if so, can and should we use it as a means to encourage greater access to all areas of need?

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RECEIVED: 16 AUG 95 17

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 18 AUG 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA DC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION / AGENDA & DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 18 AUG DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 19 AUG 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BREMNER LOGREF: 9520980

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0216 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

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		BERGER
		KERRICK
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG

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001		X	95081811	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
002		X	95081811	DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

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002	950818	BRILL, K	
002	950818	MCALEER, R	
002	950818	INDERFURTH, R	
002	950818	ADAMS, G	
002	950818	GARTHOFF, D	
002	950818	WILLIAMS, A	
002	950818	WILSON, F	

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Dohse	1 3	D/D	A
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Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	8/18	D
Records Mgt.			

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Dc 8/18

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MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA NOELLE JENSEN ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	8/18	4:24p	S. McCall PRINT LAST NAME: McElhaney COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
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ROUTINE

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DTG:

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NSC LOG # 20172

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
3	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
✓	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
4	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
2	JCS	SECRETARY		
1	AID	DIR. EXEC. SEC.		
	USUN (STATE)	OFFICE OF AMB		

REMARKS:

MTG TODAY!!

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PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 1741 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 11 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTIFICATION OF DC ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 20972

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
AID	DR. EXEC. SEC.		
USUN(STATE)	OFFICE OF AMB		

REMARKS:

MTG TODAY!!

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PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 1741 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 11 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTIFICATION OF DC ON BOSNIA

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	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		
B	AID	DR. EXEC. SEC.		
	USUN(STATE)	OFFICE OF AMB		

REMARKS:

MTG TODAY!!

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Initials: RDS Date: 9/30/2019
2010-0533-M

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PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTIFICATION OF DC ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 20972

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N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		
B	AID	DIR. EXEC. SEC.		
	USUN(STATE)	OFFICE OF AMB		

REMARKS:

MTG TODAY!!

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Initials: RDS Date: 9/30/2019
2010-0533-M

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NSC# 20972

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting DC ON BOSNIA PAGES: 10 + COVER

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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20972

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 18, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. DOUGLAS GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. AARON S. WILLIAMS
Executive Secretary
Agency for International Development

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia, Friday, August 18, 1995, from 4:30 - 6:30 p.m. Attendance is principals plus one. An agenda for the meeting is attached at Tab A. At Tabs B and C are discussion papers that will be reviewed during the meeting. ~~(S)~~

for
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachments
Tab A Agenda
Tab B Discussion Paper on Humanitarian Assistance and Refugees
Tab C Discussion Paper on Implementating a Balkan Peace Settlement

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/30/2019
2010-0533-M

NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA
DATE: August 18, 1995
LOCATION: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
TIME: 4:30 - 6:30 p.m.

Agenda

I. Policy Issues Relating to Military Implementation of a Peace Plan.....OSD/JCS

II. Policy Issues Relating to Arming and Training Bosnian Government Forces.....OSD/JCS

III. Policy Issues Relating to Humanitarian and Refugee Assistance Deliveries to Serbia..... State/NSC

IV. Status Report on Holbrooke Mission.....State

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 2/6/2007

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August 17, 1995

Bosnia

Deputies Committee Discussion Paper
Humanitarian Assistance and Refugees

1. **Access for humanitarian deliveries throughout FRY:** Little has come of this effort. UNHCR is supportive; Belgrade said it has little control over the actions of the Bosnian Serbs.

Possible initiatives: Amb. Spiegal could raise with Mrs. Ogata and urge public statement from UNHCR; 2) we could demarche European capitals and urge public statements from them; 3) we could seek formal action at UN; 4) we could ask that this issue be raised by U.S. negotiators in the region.

2. **Humanitarian assistance to Belgrade:** Currently, State/PRM aid to UNHCR can go to Bosnian Serbs in Bosnia, but not to activities in the FRY. Likewise, State/PRM aid to ICRC is earmarked for use "particularly" in Bosnia and Croatia. State's political statement has not, up to now, had a large impact on the amount of humanitarian aid reaching priority beneficiary populations in the FRY. Based on recent increase in humanitarian needs and subject to a needs assessment, State and AID would now like to consider relief support to UNHCR, ICRC and other international and non-governmental organizations for projects in the FRY.

3. **Money for Humanitarian Assistance:** We have substantial monies remaining in humanitarian assistance accounts at State for the end of FY 95 (more than $80 million in unspent MRA and ERMA). Some of this will need to go to Rwanda and other areas of dire need, but much might go to Bosnian relief.

Possible initiative: Should we come forward with more aid and, if so, can and should we use it as a means to encourage greater access to all areas of need?

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Implementing a Balkan Peace Settlement (U)

Scenario: ~~(S)~~ A peace plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina is accepted by all warring parties and includes a cessation of hostilities. There is international commitment to implement the provisions of the plan, including economic, diplomatic and military components. The principal military requirement is to create a stable environment during a limited period wherein the Bosnian Muslim-Croat Federation (the "Federation") is able to develop an effective self-defense relative to the Bosnian Serbs. To meet this requirement, two parallel programs are conducted: Multilateral security assistance to provide equipment and training to the Federation forces; a NATO force to implement the peace plan.

Assumptions: ~~(S)~~

- Public and Congressional support for the plan has been achieved.
- All parties to the conflict agree to the settlement and the peace plan; both NATO and the UN Security Council endorse it by resolution as a NATO-led, non-blue helmeted, operation.
- At the appropriate time, as specified in the peace agreeement, forces of all sides move to designated areas, except in isolated instances.
- The arms embargo is lifted for all of the former Yugoslavia.
- Croatia continues its support for and cooperation with the Federation.
- Border monitors on the Bosnia-Serbia border are withdrawn.
- There will be no UN involvement in military decision making for the operation.
- UNPROFOR mission completed, withdrawal authorized.
- UNCRO/UNPREDEP operations continue under UN control.
- Humanitarian assistance operations now underway continue and are adequate.
- US ground forces will be committed to the peace implementation force.
- Federation forces, once armed and trained, have to defend their country.

Mission: ~~(S)~~ On order, CINCSOUTH assumes operational control of designated NATO and non-NATO forces and conducts operations to enforce the terms of the peace agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Specified Tasks: ~~(S)~~ The Peace Implementation Force ("PIF") will:

- Deter violations of the cease-fire,
- Monitor and enforce compliance by all parties with the peace agreement,
- Ensure self defense and freedom of movement of the peace force,
- Facilitate the provision of humanitarian aid in Bosnia-Herzegovina and be prepared to secure convoys, and
- Employ NATO air power in support of peace enforcement operations and in defense of peace implementation forces.

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2013-0682-m (3.01)

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Parallel functions: ~~(S)~~ The following functions will be performed by entities other than the PIF:

- Security Assistance (Arm/Train): Multilateral security assistance forces will provide equipment and related training to Federation forces to improve their ability to defend against outside aggression. This function could be conducted principally outside B-H and would be accomplished as rapidly as possible to permit early withdrawal of the PIF.
- Air Support: Deny Flight operations will continue throughout the PIF's mission in Bosnia. These forces will provide no-fly zone enforcement, close air support, suppression of enemy air defenses, and possibly strike operations to support the PIF (along the lines agreed in London in July).
- UNPROFOR Withdrawal: The UN will organize and conduct the withdrawal of those UNPROFOR forces not transitioning to the PIF.
- Other Support: Humanitarian assistance, human rights monitoring, and economic reconstruction efforts will proceed in parallel with the implementation of the plan.

Desired End State: ~~(S)~~ The mission of the PIF will be complete when the terms of the peace plan have been implemented by all parties and the Federation has enhanced its self-defense capability relative to the Bosnian Serbs.

Issues: ~~(S)~~ The following issues should be discussed in the interagency before proceeding with further planning for execution of the peace plan:

(1) Mission/Force Calculus: SACEUR, who will execute the mission, will refine the forces he will need to do the job, seeking to develop a force sufficient to do the tasks assigned based on mission analysis. He has been requested by CJCS to provide an estimate of the forces required and a timeline for the operation as soon as possible.

(2) Initiation: Deployment of the PIF should be ordered as promptly as feasible upon all parties' acceptance of the peace plan and issuance of the necessary mandates.

(3) Timing: Building the existing FR/UK/NL RRF onto the PIF will significantly reduce the time needed to assemble the force. The time needed to fully deploy the PIF will depend on its size and sourcing.

(4) UNPROFOR Withdrawal: The UN-organized withdrawal of those elements of UNPROFOR which will not transition to the PIF while the other elements of the PIF are deploying into the region will represent a considerable logistic effort and will tax the logistic infrastructure in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.

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(5) **Transition Period:** The most vulnerable period with the greatest potential for a breakdown of the cease-fire will be during the simultaneous movement of NATO, UN and warring parties to transition to the peace agreement. Quick transition to the PIF will minimize the risk of early violation of the peace plan. Issues include enhanced authority for the UNPROFOR commander's use of airpower in advance of turnover, prompt withdrawal of those elements of UNPROFOR least capable of self-defense, rapid and clear transfer of authority to the PIF commander, explicit definition of PIF tasks and those assigned to UNPF during the transition, and rapid deployment of the US element of the PIF.

(6) **Continuation of Air Support:** An additional period of NATO Deny Flight support to the Federation after departure of the PIF could be needed to provide additional support to the Federation while its self-defense capabilities are being upgraded.

(7) **Force Recruitment:** Forces beyond those currently in the RRF and other NATO elements of UNPROFOR and those contributed by the US may be needed for the operation. A diplomatic effort to solicit additional forces may be needed.

(8) **Force Composition:** US/NATO policy must be formulated with respect to (a) Russian participation in the PIF, (b) Islamic nation participation in the PIF, and (c) Radical Islamic entities' involvement in arming/financing Federation forces.

(9) **Mandate:** For the PIF to work, both UNSC and NAC must support the mission with the appropriate mandate(s) (including Chapter VII ROE) and provide authority to the PIF as necessary for it to carry out its mission as a NATO-led (vice UN) operation with rules of engagement appropriate to its mission.

(10) **Status of Forces:** Given recent experiences in deploying the RRF, early attention should be given to completing comprehensive status of forces agreements for the PIF.

(11) **Financing:** Mission cost and financing arrangements must be determined. As this will be a NATO rather than a UN operation, the same questions will arise as have arisen during the staffing of OPLAN 40104. Within the US, a decision will be needed to seek new appropriations from the Congress. A timeline for financial decisions will be needed.

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(12) **Sequencing:** The sequence of events within the USG, within the Contact Group, at NATO, at the UN and within the US, NATO, and UN military chains of command required to execute the plan remains to be developed.

(13) **Congressional Consultation:** A legislative plan must be developed for the Congressional consultations/approvals and/or legal processes that will be necessary and the steps which should be taken to avoid having Congressional and legal processes inordinately delay necessary military steps.

(14) **Participation Criteria:** The USG should set the same criteria for participation in this mission as were set for OPLANs 40103 and 40104. (Exclusively NATO C3, demonstrated peace in place, robust ROE, etc.)

(15) **Follow-on Activities:** Consideration should be given now to developing the concept for a much smaller UN or regionally-organized peacekeeping force that would monitor continuing compliance with the peace agreement following withdrawal of the PIF.

Deputies' Committee Action: ~~(S)~~ Recommend that the Deputies' Committee:

- Confirm the principles contained in this paper.
- Recommend Principals approve the above mission statement.
- Conduct preliminary discussion of and assign staffing responsibility for the issues identified.
- Direct State/OSD/JCS to initiate US planning and push for prompt initiation of NATO planning for the mission.

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08/17/95 7:35 PM

Multilateral Equipping and Training of the Bosnian Federation (U)

Scenario: ~~(S)~~ A peace plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina is accepted by all warring parties and includes a cessation of hostilities. There is international commitment to implement the provisions of the plan, including economic, diplomatic and military components. The principal military requirement is to create a stable environment during a limited period wherein the Bosnian Muslim-Croat Federation (the "Federation") is able to develop an effective self-defense relative to the Bosnian Serbs. To meet this requirement, two parallel programs are conducted: multilateral equipping and training of the Federation forces; a NATO force to implement the peace plan.

Assumptions: ~~(S)~~

- Public and Congressional support for the plan has been achieved.
- The arms embargo is lifted for all of the former Yugoslavia.
- Legal requirements for provision of equipment have been met.
- Overt operation.
- Bosnian Federation requests assistance.
- Croatia continues its support for and cooperation with the Federation.
- Croatia will grant access through its territory to Bosnia.
- "No-Fly" Zone will continue to be enforced.
- BSA will retain its offensive capability.
- Bosnian Federation Army can disengage to re-equip, re-organize, and train.
- Adequate training facilities and logistics are available.

Mission: ~~(S)~~ On order, USCINCEUR assumes operational control of a multi-national force from designated NATO and Non-NATO nations and conducts operations to equip and train selected elements of the Bosnian Federation Army to enhance its capability to defend the territorial integrity of the Bosnian Federation.

Intent: ~~(S)~~

- Multi-national effort, US led.
- Enhance Federation Army existing core capabilities and units.
- Develop Federation Army capability to sustain training program.
- Counter-balance Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) strengths.
- Focus on defensive tasks at the company and battalion levels and on brigade and higher staff operations.

Specified Tasks: ~~(S)~~

- USCINCEUR assume operational control of a multi-national force for the mission.
- Assess Federation Army capabilities and needs

DRAFT

~~SECRET~~

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PER E.O. 13526
CIA Historical Collections Division
NAR Date 10-14-2015
2013-0682-M (3.02)

Classified By: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: OADR

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- In coordination with the Federation Army, plan their reorganizing, reequiping, and training.
- Form a multi-national training and equipping team to execute the mission
- Facilitate the provision of equipment to the Federation Army by donor nations.
- Assist the Federation Army to execute the plan
- Ensure the self-defense and freedom of movement of the training and equipping team.

Framework: ~~(S)~~
- Equip/train would not be conducted by NATO Peace Implementation Force.
- Multilateral equip/train effort would be under US leadership.
- Training conducted primarily outside the Bosnian Federation. Other alternatives include Croatia, other European locations, or US.
- Equipment would be US, Former Warsaw Pact, or a mix.

Concept of Operations: ~~(S)~~ This would be a five-phase operation with phases overlapping:
- Phase I -- Assessment. Assess the doctrine, organization, equipment and training status. Determine equipment and training required; assess availability of equipment and training. Prepare legal basis for provision of equipment.
- Phase II -- Establish the support structure. Position equipment, organize training teams, and establish training facilities.
- Phase III -- Equip.
- Phase IV -- Train. Integrate leaders and equipment into units, complete individual training, and conduct unit training.
- Phase V -- Sustainment. Exercise units and transition units to training base facilities.

Desired End State: ~~(S)~~ Bosnian Federation Army has the capability of defending the territorial integrity of the Bosnian Federation against aggressors without external combat support (less "No Fly" Zone enforcement) within six months of mission start.

Issues: ~~(S)~~ The following issues should be discussed in the interagency before proceeding with further planning for execution of multilateral security assistance:

1. Initiation: Should begin as promptly as feasible upon all parties' acceptance of the peace plan and issuance of the necessary mandates.

2. Timing: The most vulnerable period with the greatest potential for a breakdown of the cease-fire is the transition period between the present situation with UNPROFOR in place and implementation of the peace plan with NATO in place. Needs to move on same timeline as peace implementation plan.

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3. Continuation of Air Support: Sustainment of "No-Fly" Zone operations and future Bosnian Federation air defense and air forces.

4. Methods/Financing: Costs, authorities, and financing arrangements (drawdown, security assistance, international contributions) must be determined. Within the US, a decision will be needed to seek new appropriations from the Congress. A timeline for financial decisions will be needed.

5. Sequencing: The sequence of events within the USG, within the Contact Group, at NATO, at the UN and within the US, NATO, and UN military chains of command are required to execute a multilateral equip/train program.

6. Congressional Consultation: A legislative plan must be developed for the Congressional consultations/approvals and/or legal processes that will be necessary and the steps which should be taken to avoid having Congressional and legal processes inordinately delay the necessary steps.

7. Legal: SOFAs, status of trainers/training area under the Law of Armed Conflict. Transfer of classified equipment and information.

8. Command and Control: US leadership of multinational effort. Missions tasked to CINCEUR, and most likely delegated to USAREUR for detailed planning, coordination and execution. Integrating the activities of the other donor nations.

9. Risk of enduring commitment: Tying US to Bosnian Federation Army failure.

10. Availability of Equipment. Availability of Former Warsaw Pact equipment, spare parts, and consumables.

Deputies' Committee Action: ~~(S)~~ Recommend the Deputies' Committee:

- Confirm the assumptions, mission, and specified tasks to meet the arming and training requirements while the two parallel programs (Arm & Train and implementation of the peace plan) are conducted.
- Recommend Principals approve the above mission statement.
- Conduct preliminary discussion of and assign staffing responsibility for these issues, and possibly others which are identified.
- Direct State/OSD/JCS to initiate US planning and push for prompt initiation of multilateral involvement.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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

August 146 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: BG DONALD KERRICK, ACTING (K)

FROM: SUE BREMNER for (S)

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting, August 18, 1995

Attached is an agenda (Tab A) for the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia for Friday, August 18, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the agenda and authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve AN Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to Agencies
Tab A Agenda
Tab B Discussion Paper on Humanitarian Assistance and Refugees
Tab C Discussion Paper on Implementing a Balkan Peace Settlement

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 5/30/2019
2010-0533-M

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RECORD ID: 9520980
RECEIVED: 17 AUG 95 17

TO: BERGER

FROM: SCHWARTZ
CLARKE

DOC DATE: 17 AUG 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
DC
REFUGEES

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 18 AUG DC MTG ON BOSNIA - AGENCY DISCUSSION ON HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE & REFUGEES

ACTION: SEE 9420972 FOR FINAL ACTION DUE DATE: 21 AUG 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCHWARTZ LOGREF: 9520972

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0216 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDSNARA, Date 5/30/2019
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COMMENTS: _____

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	95081719	FOR DECISION
001		X	95081811	SEE 9420972 FOR FINAL ACTION

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Sandy — 8/18

Paper to agencies
for this afternoon's DC

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National Security Council
The White House

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Berger	2		
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Records Mgt.			This was incorporated into 20970 (Tab A)

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: Bosnia DC Paper
Humanitarian Assist + Refugees

17 AUG 93 7:31

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 17, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: RICHARD A. CLARKE

FROM: ERIC SCHWARTZ

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Discussion Paper on Humanitarian Assistance and Refugees

Attached at Tab I is the counterparts memo forwarding a short discussion paper on Humanitarian Assistance and Refugees for the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia scheduled for tomorrow, August 18, 1995.

Concurrence by: Don Kerrick

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to forward the attached paper to agency counterparts.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to Counterparts
Tab A Discussion Paper

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/30/2019
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20980

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the U.N.

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for
National Security &
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. AARON WILLIAMS
Executive Secretary
Agency for International
Development

SUBJECT: Discussion Paper on Humanitarian Assistance and Refugees ~~(C)~~

Attached at Tab A is a short Discussion Paper on Humanitarian Assistance and Refugees for the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia scheduled for August 18, 1995. ~~(C)~~

Andrew Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Discussion Paper

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/30/2019
3410-0533-M

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August 17, 1995

Bosnia

Deputies Committee Discussion Paper
Humanitarian Assistance and Refugees

1. Access for humanitarian deliveries throughout FRY: Little has come of this effort. UNHCR is supportive; Belgrade said it has little control over the actions of the Bosnian Serbs.

Possible initiatives: Amb. Spiegal could raise with Mrs. Ogata and urge public statement from UNHCR; 2) we could demarche European capitals and urge public statements from them; 3) we could seek formal action at UN; 4) we could ask that this issue be raised by U.S. negotiators in the region.

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3. Money for Humanitarian Assistance: We have substantial monies remaining in humanitarian assistance accounts at State for the end of FY 95 (more than $80 million in unspent MRA and ERMA). Some of this will need to go to Rwanda and other areas of dire need, but much might go to Bosnian relief.

Possible initiative: Should we come forward with more aid and, if so, can and should we use it as a means to encourage greater access to all areas of need?

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2013-0612-M (3.03)

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See also 2013-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (5 pages)~~	~~08/23/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
002a. memo	Sue Bremner et al to Samuel Berger re: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (3 pages)	08/23/1995	P1/b(1)
~~002b. paper~~	~~re: Implementing a Balkan Peace Settlement (6 pages)~~	~~08/22/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
002c. paper	re: General Concept: Is the Objective of the PIF (1 page)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)
002d. paper	re: Arms Limitations and Constraints (2 pages)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)
002e. paper	re: Exit Strategy, Duration (2 pages)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)
002f. paper	re: NATO Control and National Participation (1 page)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)
002g. paper	re: Transition from UNPROFOR to NATO (1 page)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)
002h. paper	re: Joint Commission and Civilian Leadership (2 pages)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)
002i. paper	re: Population Movements (1 page)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)
~~002j. paper~~	~~re: Multilateral Equipping and Training of the Bosnian Federation (5 pages)~~	~~08/22/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KDE 05/26/2016
002k. memo	Memorandum for BG Don Kerrick re: Multilateral Equipping and Training the Bosnian Federation (1 page)	08/1995	P1/b(1)

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Clinton Presidential Records
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003. memo	re: Bosnia Peace Implementation Force Examining the Top Twenty Issues (4 pages)	08/1995	P1/b(1)
~~004a. agenda~~	~~NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)~~	~~08/23/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 02/06/2020
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ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 26 AUG 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BREMNER LOGREF: 9520985 9520996

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia August 23, 1995 NSC LOG # 9521002

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
State	Executive Secretary		
Defense	Executive Secretary		
USUN/State	Rick Inderfurth		
CIA	Executive Secretary		
AID/State	Executive Secretary		
JCS	Secretary		

REMARKS:

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FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting SOC of DC Mtg on Bosnia PAGES: 7

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 24, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. DOUGLAS GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. AARON S. WILLIAMS
Executive Secretary
Agency for International Development

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, August 23, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/30/2019
2010-0533-M

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21002

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee
DATE: August 23, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 3:35 p.m. - 6:25 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (~~S~~)

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR
Sandy Berger

OVP
Leon Fuerth
Richard Saunders

STATE
Strobe Talbott
James Steinberg
John Kornblum
Ralph Johnson

DEFENSE
John White
Walter Slocombe
Jan Lodal

USUN
David Scheffer
(via secure video)
James O'Brien

OMB
Phebe Vickers
Rodney Bent

CIA
Dennis Blair
Norman Schindler

AID
Thomas Dine
Dalena Wright

JCS
Wesley Clark
John Walsh

NSC
Sandy Vershbow
Richard Clarke
Donald Kerrick
Stephen Flanagan

Summary of Conclusions

Implementation of a Bosnia Peace Settlement

1. Deputies met to finalize development of an integrated political/military plan for implementation of a Bosnian peace settlement. They reached agreement on several elements and tasked papers on several issues that require further analysis. These papers and a further and more detailed iteration of the OSD paper on the Peace Implementation Force (PIF) will be reviewed at another Deputies Meeting on Monday, August 28 (Action: OSD). (~~S~~)

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Deputies will also review a paper for Principals summarizing key recommendations and issues for decision (Action: NSC). (S)

2. **Overall Concept**: Deputies agreed that our goal in implementing a settlement is to preserve Bosnia-Herzegovina as a single state comprised of two highly autonomous units. Our priority is to ensure the survival of the Bosniac-Croat Federation; this should be accomplished in the context of unity with the Bosnian Serb entity along with rights of association with Croatia and Serbia. (S)

Deputies agreed that the Peace Implementation Force (PIF) should be deployed primarily (but not exclusively) in Federation territory. The operational commander should have broad authority for self-protection of the force and to enforce the cease-fire and separation of forces against incidents initiated by any party, using overwhelming force if necessary. At the same time, Deputies agreed the PIF should have defined limits on the scope of its responsibilities and operational conduct. The Deputies agreed that the response to massive violations of the agreement would be "evenhanded but asymmetrical." In the event of Bosnian Serb violation of the agreement, the PIF should be authorized to respond using air and ground forces, but this response should follow a ladder of escalation. In the event of serious Bosnian Government violation of the agreement, the PIF would withdraw. Deputies further agreed the PIF should not disarm the parties and that some tasks, such as demarcation of borders and resettlement of civilians, could be accomplished by civilian officials or agencies. (S)

Taskings: State to draft brief overall mission statement for the PIF reflecting the limited tasks above. NSC to write a short paper identifying possible additional tasks for the PIF that may prove necessary, for example, if the settlement establishes a stronger central government or Bosnia-wide institutions. CIA to do an assessment of the Bosnian government's conception of a settlement and how this may alter the PIF's mission. OSD to do detailed mission statement as part of OSD paper. (S)

3. **Gorazde**: Deputies noted that Principals, in light of Bosnian Government resistance to trading Gorazde for other territories, had requested an examination of the requirements for ensuring the viability of Gorazde if it remains part of the Federation under the terms of a settlement. (S)

Taskings: DOD and CIA to assess implications for the PIF and the longer-term defense requirements for Gorazde following the departure of the PIF, using the Contact Group map as the baseline, but considering territorial improvements (e.g., larger corridor) as well. (S)

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4. **Arms Limitations**: Deputies agreed that our goal of establishing a stable military balance could best be achieved by a hybrid approach that would support enhancement of the self-defense capabilities of Federation armed forces (ABH and HVO) in tandem with efforts to reach agreement among all the parties to certain arms limitations or reductions. They agreed to separation zones (DMZs) and to examine inventory limits on CFE treaty limited equipment. They agreed that an arms control regime should have a regional context. (S)

Taskings: State, in coordination with OSD, to develop detailed options for narrow DMZs, separation of heavy weapons and/or exclusion zones, overall limits on heavy weapons and confidence-building measures that could be included as part of the settlement and/or pursued following implementation of a settlement. (S)

5. **Exit Strategy**: Deputies agreed that we need to establish a date certain for completion of the PIF mission. There was a consensus that the PIF should be terminated by the end of 1996. At the same time, we should identify mission-essential tasks that we would seek to complete prior to that date, although the PIF would withdraw whether or not all those tasks had been accomplished. (S)

Taskings: State to draft an initial timeline paper defining political, economic and military benchmarks for accomplishment of critical tasks. CIA to do an assessment of how the parties would react to knowing there was a date certain. (S)

6. **National Participation/Funding**: Deputies agreed that the PIF would be a NATO operation with limited non-NATO involvement. While there would be a UNSC resolution authorizing NATO to conduct the mission, there would be no dual key or other limitations on NATO command and control. Deputies agreed that no Ally should be excluded, but that the need for NAC consensus would force us to deal with Greek approval of Turkish participation. Deputies acknowledged that operational efficiency might be compromised by involvement of non-NATO forces but recognized that non-NATO participation will be politically necessary and, in some respects, desirable (e.g., as a proving ground for Partnership for Peace countries to operate with NATO forces). Non-NATO forces would be under NATO operational control similar to a CJTF. (S)

On funding, Deputies agreed that we would seek to follow the normal NATO approach, i.e., NATO and other contributors would pay their own way, with common costs assessed according to a variant of the NATO infrastructure formula. Funding arrangements more

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advantageous to the U.S. would be difficult to negotiate with our Allies, but will be explored. (S)

Taskings: JCS/OSD to examine the political/military requirements and constraints of making the PIF a NATO-plus force, involving PFP partners and other non-NATO militaries. This should draw on previous NATO planning for implementation of the Vance-Owen plan (40103) and UNPROFOR extraction (40104). OSD/JCS to complete a cost estimate for the probable U.S. contribution to the PIF. The Peacekeeping Funding Group to reexamine alternative cost-sharing arrangements among the participants. (S)

7. **Joint Commission:** Deputies agreed that a Joint Commission with local subsidiaries should be established (comprising NATO, the Federation and the Bosnian Serbs) to resolve problems in implementing the military aspects of a settlement. This might have national and regional components. Deputies also agreed that there would be other aspects of settlement implementation (political, economic, humanitarian) that could be beyond the purview of the Joint Commission, and that we needed to develop a concept for how these would be handled and whether there would be a senior Secretary General's Representative for NATO, the UN or, perhaps, the OSCE. They agreed that any arrangement should exclude interference with the operation of the PIF (i.e., no dual keys). (S)

Tasking: State to draft a paper on the political analogue to the Joint Commission for implementing the non-military aspects of a settlement. (S)

8. **Population Movements:** Deputies agreed that the parties should have primary responsibility for population movements, with international relief agencies (UNHCR) providing secondary support. The PIF should generally avoid involvement in population movements, but it should be prepared to protect UNHCR personnel, aid convoys, and refugees in transit as necessary. Deputies also agreed that restitution and other forms of compensation were alternatives to resettlement that we should encourage the parties to explore. (S)

Tasking: State and USUN will do a paper on policy toward population movements, forced departures and associated enforcement mechanisms. (S)

Post-War Reconstruction Assistance

9. Deputies agreed that we urgently need a conceptual framework and initial plan for post-war regional reconstruction, as well as rough estimates of the overall cost, and the preferred cost-sharing among the U.S., EU, Japan and Islamic countries. They

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also expressed concerns about the difficulties of offsetting the U.S. contribution to the program on the basis of reductions in other programs. Deputies agreed that we would actively pursue the EU's offer to take the lead and press the EU, Japan and the Islamic states to clarify their contributions to the package. Deputies agreed that, in order to encourage Bosnian Government flexibility in the negotiations, Ambassador Holbrooke should be in a position by Monday to suggest the size of the U.S. contribution that the President will seek from the Congress in the event of a settlement (between $500 million and $1 billion over 3-5 years). They also agreed that we needed to inform the Congress immediately of our thinking on post-war reconstruction in the context of consultations on the progress of the U.S. diplomatic initiative. (S)

Taskings: State to develop a post-war reconstruction program for the region, in coordination with NSC, OMB, AID and other agencies. State to draft talking points for a call by National Security Advisor Lake to Spanish Foreign Minister Solana to reconfirm the EU's willingness to take the lead on reconstruction and to offer the parties such carrots as EU association and enhanced market access. State and NSC to draft talking points for Holbrooke's use with the Bosnians on August 28. State and NSC to draft a gameplan and talking points for Congressional consultations August 26-28; these points should be in the context of an overall review of the status of the peace initiative and should also reference our commitment to participate in an implementation force if there is an agreement they will explain our goals and why solid U.S. financial backing is essential. (S)

Sanctions

10. Deputies affirmed agreement on the main elements of our approach to sanctions relief for the FRY in the context of the U.S. diplomatic initiative: all UNSC sanctions, except those governing frozen assets subject to claims, would be suspended once there is a signed agreement; there would be a complete lifting of sanctions once implementation of the plan is completed; and Belgrade would receive less sweeping suspension of sanctions if it failed to agree to a solution for Eastern Slavonia at the time of signature. It was agreed that Deputies would need to decide at their next meeting how long we should hold Belgrade accountable for the actions of the Pale Serbs, and what would be the precise conditions for sanctions lifting. (S)

Tasking: OVP to circulate a paper on a proposed sanctions strategy, highlighting the 4 or 5 fundamental issues needing Deputies' attention, including the sanctions reimposition mechanism and linkages to a Croatia settlement and war crimes, in preparation for the Deputies' meeting on August 28. (S)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

21002

August 24, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW/RICHARD CLARKE

FROM: STEPHEN FLANAGAN

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, August 23, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of Conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia held August 23, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to the agencies

Approve Done per phone call w/ Vershbow. Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/30/2019
2010-0533-M

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520996
RECEIVED: 23 AUG 95 08

TO: BERGER

FROM: BREMNER

DOC DATE: 23 AUG 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
SERBIA
CROATIA
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 23 AUG DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER DUE DATE: 26 AUG 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BREMNER LOGREF: 9520985 9520998

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0217 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BREMNER
		CLARKE
		DAALDER
		FLANAGAN
		NSC CHRON
		SCHWARTZ
		SIMON
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSASK CLOSED BY: NSJDA DOC 1 OF 1

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By RDC NARA, Date 9/30/2019
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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	95082308	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	95091111	NOTED BY BERGER

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National Security Council
The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger	1		
Lake		Deputy Nat'l Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2		N
Records Mgt.			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	Sue Bremner et al to Samuel Berger re: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (3 pages)	08/23/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4001

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0217 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, August 23, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs681

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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"Implementing a Balkan Peace Settlement (U)"

22 August 1995

~~(S)~~ KEY CHANGES TO OSD PAPER SINCE LAST DC (17 August):

- Assumptions concerning nature of peace plan itself added.
- Under "Specified Tasks", following items added:
  --Importance of rapid deployment
  –Enforce movement of units to designated areas.
- "Issues" added as follows:
  --"Pattern of Deployment"
  --"Federation Support"
  --"Zones of Separation"
  --"Armaments/Builddown"
  --"Contingent Responses"
  --"Mission Duration".

~~(S)~~ RECOMMENDED FOCUS FOR 23 AUGUST DC:

- To do its job, should the force be based and/or operate within Federation territory only or throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina? (Issue #1)

- What size force will be needed to implement the peace and how can the size be limited without endangering the ability to do the mission? (Issue #2)

- How will we reconcile US participation in both the impartial "peace implementation" mission and the inherently partial "equip and train" mission? Can our commitment to "Federation Support" if the peace fails be reconciled with the "peace implementation" mission? (Issue #5)

- What will happen if the peace breaks down? (Issue #18)

- The parallel "equip and train" mission will apparently be the controlling factor in mission duration. How long will it take and what are the military, diplomatic and domestic political consequences of mission duration? (Issue #19)

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PER E.O. 13526
NL 2/6/2020 (3.06)
2013-0682-M

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Implementing a Balkan Peace Settlement (U)
(Changes to paper since 17 August shown in ***bold italics***)

Scenario: ~~(S)~~ A peace plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina is accepted by all warring parties and includes a cessation of hostilities. There is international commitment to implement the provisions of the plan, including economic, diplomatic and military components. The principal military requirement is to create a stable environment during a limited period wherein the Bosnian Muslim-Croat Federation (the "Federation") is able to develop an effective self-defense relative to the Bosnian Serbs. To meet this requirement, two parallel programs are conducted ***concurrently***: Multilateral ***efforts*** to provide equipment and training to the Federation forces; a NATO-***led*** force to implement the plan.

Assumptions: ~~(S)~~

- ***The peace plan includes the following provisions:***
  - ***A cessation of hostilities.***
  - ***Mutually recognized borders between the warring parties.***
  - ***A joint commission to facilitate implementing and maintaining the provisions of the agreement.***
  - ***At the appropriate time, forces of all sides move to designated areas.***
  - ***The arms embargo is lifted for all of the former Yugoslavia and no disarmament by the warring parties is required.***
  - ***The parties will not interfere with the activities of the PIF or the activities of humanitarian assistance organizations.***
- Public and Congressional support for the plan has been achieved.
- All parties to the conflict agree to the settlement and the peace plan; both NATO and the UN Security Council endorse it by resolution as a NATO-led, non-blue helmeted, operation.
- Croatia continues its support for and cooperation with the Federation.
- Border monitors on the Bosnia-Serbia border are withdrawn.
- There will be no UN involvement in military decision making for the operation.
- UNPROFOR's mission is completed ***and its*** withdrawal ***is*** authorized.
- ***UK, FR and perhaps other elements of UNPROFOR transition to the NATO-led peace implementation force.***
- UNCRO ***(reduced)*** & UNPREDEP operations continue under UN control.
- Humanitarian assistance operations underway continue and are adequate.
- US ground forces will be committed to the peace implementation force.
- Federation forces, once armed and trained, have to defend their country.

Mission: ~~(S)~~ On order, CINCSOUTH assumes operational control of designated NATO and non-NATO forces and conducts operations to enforce the terms of the peace agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

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Specified Tasks: ~~(S)~~ *As long as the peace plan is substantially observed and only isolated violations occur,* the Peace Implementation Force ("PIF") will:

- *Deploy into the area as rapidly as possible to stabilize the situation, using existing FR/UK/NL RRF capabilities already in place to reduce the time needed to generate a credible military capability,*
- Deter *and respond to* violations of the cease-fire,
- Monitor and enforce compliance by all parties with the peace agreement,
- *Enforce movement of recalcitrant units to agreed positions, if necessary,*
- Interact with the commission established in the peace plan,
- Ensure *its own* self defense and freedom of movement,
- Facilitate the provision of humanitarian aid in Bosnia-Herzegovina and be prepared to secure convoys, and
- Employ NATO air power in support of peace enforcement operations and in defense of peace implementation forces.

Parallel Functions: ~~(S)~~ The following functions will be performed by entities other than the PIF:

- *Equipping & Training*: Multilateral forces will provide equipment and related training to Federation forces to improve their ability to defend against outside aggression. This function could be conducted principally outside Bosnia-Herzegovina, would be accomplished as rapidly as possible to permit early withdrawal of the PIF, *and may be in the context of efforts to limit growth of the external threat to the Federation.*
- Air Support: Deny Flight operations will continue throughout the PIF's mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. These forces will provide no-fly zone enforcement, close air support, suppression of enemy air defenses, and possibly strike operations to support the PIF (along the lines agreed in London in July).
- UNPROFOR Withdrawal: The UN will organize and conduct the withdrawal of those UNPROFOR forces not transitioning to the PIF.
- Other Support: Humanitarian assistance, human rights monitoring, and economic reconstruction efforts will proceed in parallel with the implementation of the plan.

Desired End State: ~~(S)~~ The mission of the PIF will be complete when the terms of the peace plan have been implemented by all parties and the Federation has enhanced its self-defense capability relative to the Bosnian Serbs.

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Issues: ~~(S)~~ The following issues should be *resolved* in the interagency *as development of the peace plan and planning for its execution continue*:

(1) *Pattern of Deployment: Discussions during development of the PIF concept have posited that the PIF might be stationed only on Federation territory as opposed to stationing throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. Such stationing could detract from the perception of impartiality needed to carry out the PIF mission. Further, PIF deployment should initially focus on those areas most likely to be contentious during plan implementation.*

(2) Mission/Force Calculus: SACEUR, who will execute the mission, is refining the forces he will need to do the job, seeking to develop a force sufficient to do the tasks assigned based on mission analysis. *The expected degree of cooperation by the warring parties will be important in determining force requirements.*

(3) Initiation: Deployment of the PIF should be ordered as promptly as feasible upon all parties' acceptance of the peace plan and issuance of the necessary mandates.

(4) UNPROFOR Withdrawal: The UN-organized withdrawal of those elements of UNPROFOR which will not transition to the PIF while the other elements of the PIF are deploying into the region will represent a considerable logistic effort and will tax the logistic infrastructure in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia.

(5) *Federation Support: The degree to which NATO will protect the Federation from Bosnian Serb aggression and the PIF's role in that mission requires resolution, as does NATO's response in the event that Croatian support for the plan and/or the Federation is withdrawn.*

(6) Transition Period: The most vulnerable period with the greatest potential for a breakdown of the cease-fire will be during the simultaneous movement of NATO, UN and warring parties to transition to the peace agreement. Quick transition to the PIF will minimize the risk of early violation of the peace plan. Issues include enhanced authority for the UNPROFOR commander's use of airpower in advance of turnover, prompt withdrawal of those elements of UNPROFOR least capable of self-defense, rapid and clear transfer of authority to the PIF commander, explicit definition of PIF tasks and those assigned to UNPF during the transition, C2 relationships between the PIF and UNCRO/UNPREDEP, and rapid deployment of the US element of the PIF.

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(7) *Zones of Separation: Implementation of the peace plan could involve the establishment of demilitarized zones (DMZs) along the border between the Federation and the Bosnian Serbs and/or the establishment of heavy weapons exclusion zones to reduce the likelihood of cross-border attacks. The size and location of these zones and the PIF responsibilities for them must be determined.*

how much more ?

(8) *Armaments/Builddown: Federation self-defense capabilities vis-a-vis the Bosnian Serbs could be more quickly enhanced if the flow of arms to the Bosnian Serbs were constrained either as part of or an adjunct to the agreement. During the course of the negotiations, concepts which can help limit Bosnian Serb offensive capabilities should be pursued.*

(9) Continuation of Air Support: An additional period of NATO Deny Flight support to the Federation after departure of the PIF could be needed to provide additional support to the Federation while its self-defense capabilities are being upgraded.

(10) Force Recruitment: Forces beyond those currently in the RRF and other NATO elements of UNPROFOR and those contributed by the US may be needed for the operation. A diplomatic effort to solicit additional forces may be needed.

(11) Force Composition: US/NATO policy must be formulated with respect to (a) *which UNPROFOR forces should transition to the PIF,* (b) Russian participation in the PIF, (c) Islamic nation participation in the PIF, and (d) Radical Islamic entities' support to Federation forces.

IRAN none

(12) Mandate: For the PIF to work, both UNSC and NAC must support the mission with the appropriate mandate(s) (including Chapter VII ROE) and provide authority to the PIF as necessary for it to carry out its mission as a NATO-led (vice UN) operation with rules of engagement appropriate to its mission.

(13) Status of Forces: Given recent experiences in deploying the RRF, early attention should be given to completing comprehensive Status of Forces Agreements for the PIF.

(14) Financing: Mission cost and financing arrangements must be determined. As this will be a NATO rather than a UN operation, the same questions will arise as have arisen during the staffing of OPLAN 40104. Within the US, a decision will be needed to seek new appropriations from the Congress. A timeline for financial decisions will be needed.

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(15) **Sequencing:** The sequence of events within the USG, within the Contact Group, at NATO, at the UN and within the US, NATO, and UN military chains of command required to execute the plan remains to be developed.

(16) **Congressional Consultation:** A legislative plan must be developed for Congressional consultations/approvals and/or legal processes that will be needed and the steps which should be taken to avoid having these processes inordinately delay necessary military steps.

(17) **Participation Criteria:** The USG should set the same criteria for participation in this mission as were set for OPLANs 40103 and 40104. (Exclusively NATO C3, demonstrated peace in place, robust ROE, etc.)

(18) Contingent Responses: In the event of a systematic breakdown of the peace and the return of wide-scale war, the PIF will:

- *If the breakdown is precipitated by Federation forces' aggression, the PIF will defend itself and withdraw from Bosnia-Herzegovina. Deny Flight air support and equipping and training the Federation forces will cease.*
- *If the breakdown is precipitated by Bosnian Serb forces' aggression, the PIF will assist the Federation in its defense, with support from Deny Flight air assets. NATO air will also be prepared to conduct wider attacks consistent with the London agreement. Equipping and training Federation forces will continue.*
- *If the breakdown is due to the actions of both parties or the situation is ambiguous, further policy direction will be provided.*

(19) Mission Duration: The duration of the PIF mission will be determined by both the time needed for it to perform its peace implementation tasks and the time it takes other forces to accomplish the equipping and training functions described above. The "equip and train" function will probably be the controlling factor for PIF withdrawal. Withdrawal itself could take several months.

(20) **Follow-on Activities:** Consideration should be given now to developing the concept for a much smaller UN or regionally-organized peacekeeping force that would monitor continuing compliance with the peace agreement following withdrawal of the PIF.

Principals' Committee Action: ~~(S)~~ Recommend that the *Principals'* Committee:

- Confirm the principles contained in this paper.
- Approve the above mission statement.
- *Confirm the list of* issues.
- *Confirm initiation of* US planning and *support* prompt initiation of NATO planning for the mission.

Rev *18 (Ital)*, 22 Aug 95

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002c. paper	re: General Concept: Is the Objective of the PIF (1 page)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4001

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0217 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, August 23, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs681

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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002d. paper	re: Arms Limitations and Constraints (2 pages)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)

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NSC Records Management
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FOLDER TITLE:
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002e. paper	re: Exit Strategy, Duration (2 pages)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
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OA/Box Number: 4001

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002f. paper	re: NATO Control and National Participation (1 page)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)

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NSC Records Management
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DC0217 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, August 23, 1995

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002g. paper	re: Transition from UNPROFOR to NATO (1 page)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4001

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0217 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, August 23, 1995

2010-0533-M
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002h. paper	re: Joint Commission and Civilian Leadership (2 pages)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)

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([PC and Bosnia...])
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FOLDER TITLE:
DC0217 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, August 23, 1995

2010-0533-M
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~~SECRET~~ DRAFT

08/22/95 8:40 AM

Multilateral Equipping and Training of the Bosnian Federation (U)

Scenario: (S) A peace plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina is accepted by all warring parties and includes a cessation of hostilities. There is international commitment to implement the provisions of the plan, including economic, diplomatic and military components. The principal military requirement is to create a stable environment during a limited period wherein the Bosnian Muslim-Croat Federation (the "Federation") is able to develop an effective self-defense relative to the Bosnian Serbs. To meet this requirement, two parallel programs are conducted concurrently: multilateral effort to provide equipment and training to the Federation forces; a NATO-led force to implement the peace plan.

Assumptions: (S)

- Public and Congressional support for the plan has been achieved.
- The arms embargo is lifted for all of the former Yugoslavia.
- Legal requirements for provision of equipment have been met.
- Overt operation.
- Bosnian Federation requests assistance.
- Croatia continues its support for and cooperation with the Federation.
- Croatia will grant access through its territory to Bosnia.
- "No-Fly" Zone will continue to be enforced.
- BSA will retain its offensive capability.
- Bosnian Federation Army can disengage to equip and train.
- Adequate training facilities and logistics are available.

Mission: (S) On order, USCINCEUR assumes operational control of a multi-national force from designated NATO and non-NATO nations and conducts operations to equip and train selected elements of the Bosnian Federation Army to enhance its capability to defend the territorial integrity of the Bosnian Federation.

Intent: (S)

- Multi-national effort, US led.
- Enhance Federation Army existing core capabilities and units.
- Develop Federation Army capability to sustain training program.
- Counter-balance Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) strengths.
- Focus on defensive tasks at the company and battalion levels and on brigade and higher staff operations.
- Begin as promptly as feasible upon all parties' acceptance of the peace plan and issuance of the necessary mandates.
- Move concurrently on same timeline as peace implementation plan.

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Specified Tasks: ~~(S)~~

- USCINCEUR assume operational control of a multi-national force for the mission.
- Assess Federation Army capabilities and needs.
- In coordination with the Federation Army, plan their equipping and training.
- Form a multi-national training and equipping team to execute the mission.
- Facilitate the provision of equipment to the Federation Army by donor nations.
- Assist the Federation Army to execute the plan.
- Ensure the self-defense and freedom of movement of the training and equipping team.

Framework: ~~(S)~~

- Equip/train would not be conducted by NATO Peace Implementation Force.
- Multilateral equip/train effort would be under US leadership.
- Training conducted primarily outside the Bosnian Federation. Other alternatives include Croatia, other European locations, or US.
- Equipment would be US, former Warsaw Pact, or a mix.

Concept of Operations: ~~(S)~~ This would be a five-phase operation with phases overlapping:

- Phase I -- Assessment. Assess the doctrine, organization, equipment and training status. Determine equipment and training required; assess availability of equipment and training. Prepare legal basis for provision of equipment.
- Phase II -- Establish the support structure. Position equipment, organize training teams, and establish training facilities.
- Phase III -- Equip.
- Phase IV -- Train. Integrate leaders and equipment into units, complete individual training, and conduct unit training.
- Phase V -- Sustainment. Exercise units and transition units to training base facilities.

Desired End State: ~~(S)~~ Bosnian Federation Army has the capability of defending the territorial integrity of the Bosnian Federation against aggressors without external combat support within nine months of mission start.

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Issues: (S) The following issues should be discussed in the interagency before proceeding with further planning for execution of multilateral security assistance:

(1) **Legal.** There are significant domestic and international legal issues that must be resolved by interagency coordination. The primary domestic legal consideration is determining legal authority for providing US assistance. A legislative strategy must be developed for Congressional consultations. International legal concerns include SOFAs, for both the training site country and B-H, and the status of trainers and training sites under the Law of Armed Conflict.

What limitations is Congress likely to place on US participation in this effort? How much time will be required to establish a comprehensive SOFA for training in Croatia, a NATO member country, possible Middle East nations?

(2) **Funding.**

Funding requirement. Assessment of equipment and training requirements must establish overall funding requirement. At a minimum, funding must include equipment, spares, consumables, maintenance, sustainment. Funding must also be found for building a Federation air defense capability and for any No-Fly Zone operations past initial equip and train timeline.

Funding sources. Funding sources must be identified to include US, regional organizations, and bilateral. Within USG, must consider all existing legal authorities: security assistance, supplemental appropriation, and drawdown. If drawdown, what is the potential impact on readiness? If new appropriations are necessary, how long will Congressional approval take? Will Congress be willing to apply the $100 million proposed in the Senate bill? Will they establish a formal Security Assistance funding level? Internationally, can a "Gulf" account be established? What is the best means to acquire third country contributions/ procurements/grants? Can solicitation of international funding begin now as a signal of US commitment?

(3) **Equipment availability.**

Availability. Equipment necessary to establish balance of power must be available, sustainable, maintainable. Equipment must be available for transport into region within timeline established. Issues requiring further definition during assessment phase:

What type of equipment: former Warsaw Pact, NATO, US, mixed? Current estimate indicates former Warsaw Pact equipment is the best option because of relative cost and availability, and it presently forms the basis of Federation equipment inventory. Would departing UNPF units be willing to leave some

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equipment behind? Are spare parts and consumables available? Is stock (US and other contributing nations) sufficient to meet requirement and timeline? Can equipment be maintained and sustained by Bosnian Federation forces? What international linkages and leverages are involved with sustaining particular types of equipment? What is effect of linkages on long-term stability?

(4) **Command and Control.**

Establishing US command authority for equip and train operations for Bosnian Federation. US leadership must be established to ensure multinational efforts are coordinated to achieve the desired end state. Mission will be tasked to CINCEUR, and most likely delegated to USAREUR for detailed planning, coordination, and execution. Efforts by the international community to equip and train warring factions could easily result in small "arms race" establishing an imbalance of power thereby destabilizing the region. How will other nations be integrated into effort? Will others accept US leadership? Can the US prevent/limit participation by potentially disruptive nations (e.g. Iran)? How will unity of effort be achieved to avoid multiple, uncoordinated equip/train efforts? Can UN/EU/NATO/CSCE establish international authority for unity of effort?

(5) **Operational.**

Multinational air support. There are two scenarios to consider. If there is a peace agreement, then what air support should be provided the Federation during the equip/train program? Should the air support be extended beyond the program for some limited period? If there is no agreement, then what air support should be provided and for how long? Under both conditions, where are NFZ operations continued: over Federation, over Federation and SRBH, or over all of Former Yugoslavia? Should NFZ include fixed wing, helicopters, active SAM sites?

Federation air defense. Should we assist the Bosnian Federation in establishing air defense to counterbalance Bosnian Serbs? Is air defense capability provided the Federation from the outset of the equip/train program? How should establishment of Federation air defense be coordinated so as to minimize potential threat to Deny Flight? What capability should the Federation possess: guns, missiles, a mix?

Defensive force. The arms embargo will be lifted for all of the former Yugoslavia. Establishment of numerical limits and zonal sub-limits (DMZs, areas of restricted maneuvering/operations) may be required for all warring parties to achieve and maintain a balance of power. Such limits could include heavy equipment (tanks, APCs, aircraft, naval vessels), and force structure (active and reserve). Decisions required: What are the limits necessary for

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Federation self-defense? At what point does a strong defensive force become a possible offensive threat to regional stability? How many tanks, mortars, aircraft, ships? Who determines limits: warring parties via peace plan, EU, CSCE, NATO, or US? Who develops initial stabilization measures (measures of transparency, constraint, reinforce confidence, monitoring compliance/evaluation)? Who maintains measures: EU, CSCE, NATO?

(6) **Risk of enduring US commitment.** Direct US ties to the Bosnian Federation Army may result in long term commitment. Failure of Bosnian Army may be US failure. Must establish exit strategy which disengages US from maintaining the Bosnian Federation. What is the exit strategy? Is it based on time, capability of Bosnian Federation forces to counter threat?

Deputies' Committee Action: (S) Recommend the Deputies' Committee:

- Confirm the assumptions, mission, and specified tasks to meet the arming and training requirements while the two parallel programs (Arm & Train and implementation of the peace plan) are conducted.
- Recommend Principals approve the above mission statement.
- Conduct preliminary discussion of and assign staffing responsibility for these issues, and possibly others which are identified.
- Direct State/OSD/JCS to initiate US planning and push for prompt initiation of multilateral involvement, to include hosting an international conference in Washington to solicit multi-national support.

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Former Yugoslavia Post-Settlement Assistance

- $1 billion is our estimate of USG assistance funding (not including peacekeeping) required if peace breaks out.
  - -- Reconstruction would focus on Bosnia and the UNPA's in Croatia--that is where the war damage has occurred.
  - -- Humanitarian aid would be distributed more broadly, assuming the ban on U.S. aid in Serbia is lifted.
  - -- Payment of arrears is critical to Bosnia joining the IMF and World Bank and should be regarded as an essential aspect of the post-settlement assistance.
- Likely international affairs (function 150) budget levels for FYs 1996-97 include funding for only a fraction of the reconstruction requirements identified.
  - -- Humanitarian assistance should be adequate to meet projected needs, but nothing is budgeted to help clear former Yugoslavia arrears to IFIs.
- Were the Administration to seek additional funding for the former Yugoslavia from Congress as part of the normal appropriations process, appropriators may well insist on offsetting cuts from other programs.
  - -- The most likely source of offsets would be SEED and NIS funds.
  - -- SEED has only $30 million for Bosnia in FY 96 (out of anticipated $324 million); an additional contribution of $100 million would greatly diminish our ability to foster irreversible democratic and market transitions in Central Europe and seriously endanger the success so far achieved.
  - -- Alternatively, appropriators might agree to provide additional funding in the FY 96 Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill, so long as overall budget allocations are not exceeded. We have argued to have additional funding provided for the MDBs, Economic Support Funds, NIS account and other priorities.
- Our best shot would be to get a Bosnia/Croatia FY 95 supplemental or FY 96 budget amendment through Congress before the end of the fiscal year (September 30).
- Such a supplemental would include:
  - -- reimbursements for DOD costs;
  - -- about $600 million to pay UNPROFOR arrears;
  - -- reconstruction costs.

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- Wendy Sherman, who will discuss this with you directly, has declined to clear this material, believing the EU should be heard from first and that USG funding would necessarily have to come out of existing 150 appropriations.

- EUR believes EU willingness to be forthcoming in the event of a peace settlement is unquestionable.

- EB has also objected on grounds that the U.S. share should be less and that Bosnian arrears are so large as to warrant further discussion of how the issue should be resolved.

Talking points

--The USG would need a $1 billion assistance package over three years to do its part in supporting a peace agreement, in addition to the funding required for peacekeeping.

--We would look to Western Europe, Japan and the Muslim countries to cover the additional $3 billion required.

--In State's view, the best way to fund this assistance package would be an end-of-year supplemental that also includes the peacekeeping requirements.

(if needed)

--No reconstruction funding should be requested for Serbia, which has suffered no war damage. The USG bar on humanitarian assistance there should be lifted. Once FRY arrears are paid (we do not propose USG funding for this purpose), Serbia would have access to IFI funding.

drafted:EUR:DSerwer DS
cleared:S/RRP:CJohnstone/ARichard
EUR:JKornblum
EUR/EEA:SMcGinnis
PRM:DShemanski

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Former Yugoslavia Comprehensive Post Settlement Assistance Package

Millions of dollars

	Current U.S. Spending	U.S. Share of Projected Needs			Global Projected Needs			Current Global Spending
	FY 95	CY96	CY97	CY98	CY96	CY97	CY98	
Humanitarian	300	300	200	100	1000	600	300	1000
Re-Construction								
Bosnia	25.2	100	150	100	300	500	500	220
Croatia	14.5	30	30	25	100	100	100	
Arrears Payment	0	125	0	0	500	0	0	
Total	**340**	**455**	**380**	**225**	**1900**	**1200**	**900**	**1200**

The Bottom Line

$1B U.S. Share

$4B Total Required

Concept Paper

Comprehensive Post-settlement Assistance Package

for Ex-Yugoslavia

1. Principles

a. Humanitarian assistance should be driven by needs, with equal treatment across ethnic groups and a clear phasedown strategy.

b. Reconstruction assistance should reinforce political and economic objectives:

--preservation of territorial integrity of sovereign states (in particular Bosnia-Herzegovina)

--multiethnic democracy

--return of refugees

--development of private enterprise and a market economy

c. Limited military cooperation should

--contribute to stability

--limit the potential for future conflict

--encourage observance of international norms

--exclude indicted war criminals.

2. Mechanisms

a. Humanitarian assistance should continue to be delivered by U.N. organizations, PVOs and national governments.

b. Reconstruction assistance should be implemented in coordination with national governments (ie, Zagreb and Sarajevo) and NGO's; donor coordination should be through the IBRD.

c. Military assistance should also be coordinated through national governments.

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3. Country-specific considerations

a. Croatia:

--Humanitarian: needs should decline as displaced persons and refugees return to their homes.

--Reconstruction/development: aid should be focussed on the former UNPA's, where it should be used to encourage return of Serb as well as Croat refugees.

--Military: PMRI and IMET to continue.

b. Bosnia:

--Humanitarian: obstacles to return of Croat, Muslim and Serb DP's and refugees should be removed, but realistically many may choose not to do so; continuing but declining need for humanitarian assistance.

--Reconstruction/development: aid should be conditional on reestablishment of multiethnic society, which would mean no assistance to areas that will not permit return of DP's and refugees or refuse to build up democratic institutions open on an equal basis to all.

--Military: likewise, assistance should be directed to and through multiethnic institutions (Federation Army) and not permitted to ethnically pure ones (HVO, Bosnian Serb Army).

c. FRY:

--Humanitarian: Croatian Serb refugees should be encouraged to return by establishment of conditions of safety and decency in Croatia, but realistically speaking many may choose not to do so; there will be a continuing need for humanitarian assistance.

--Economic and democratic development: Serbia proper has suffered no war destruction; assistance should be through normal IFI mechanisms; USG would not help clear arrears.

--Military: limited IMET program for the FRY military, conditional on no crackdown in Kosovo.

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4. Resources required and available

a. Croatia:

--Humanitarian: current $200 million?

--Reconstruction/development:

- Current: FY95 $14.5 million; FY96 $9.6 million
- Needed: $100 million/year for reestablishment of multiethnic society in former UNPA's.

--Military: IMET FY95 $65,000; MPRI is paid by the GoC.

b. Bosnia

--Humanitarian: current: about $800 million

--Reconstruction/Development:

- Current: FY95 $25.2 million
- Needed in the event of a settlement: $300 million in the first year, rising to $500 million in each of the next two years

--Military:

- Current: FY95 $70,000, FY 96 $200,000
- Needed in the event of a settlement: DoD "arm and train" plus $10 million for "military in a democracy" focussed on the Federation Army

c. FRY

--Humanitarian: current: nil

--Economic and democratic development

- Current: nil
- Needed in the event of a settlement: nil

--Military: begin small IMET program

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5. Current international context: spending is at about $1.2 billion/year

a. Humanitarian assistance: current expenditure (FY 95) about $1 billion, not counting UNPROFOR; this should decline with a settlement

b. Reconstruction/development: current expenditure is almost entirely in Bosnia, at perhaps $220 million per year ($170 million from Western Europe)

c. Military: minimal, except for unknown amount of Islamic country military assistance to the GoBH

6. Comprehensive international aid package for the future: $4.0 billion over three years

a. Requirement: $1.9 billion in the first year

--Humanitarian assistance: $1000 million

--Reconstruction/development: $400 million

--Payment of arrears: $500 million (one-time)

$1.2 billion in the second year, $900 million in the third, with humanitarian assistance declining, reconstruction/development increasing (see charts)

b. U.S. share

--One-quarter of total ($500 million in the first year, $1 billion total)

c. Burdensharing

--One-quarter from Europe

--One-quarter from Islamic moderates

--One-quarter from the Japanese

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FORMER YUGOSLAVIA ASSISTANCE BUDGET : Reconstruction

In millions of dollars

	U.S. Committment FY 95	Three Year Gross Budget Projection CY 96	CY 97	CY 98	U.S. Share CY 96	CY 97	CY 98
Bosnia *	25.2	300	500	500	100	150	100
Croatia **	14.5	100	100	100	30	30	25
Totals	39.7	400	600	600	130	180	125

* Includes all territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina as defined in 1992. ** focuses on economic development and reconstruction activities in conflicted areas only.

ASSUMPTIONS:

Peace will be achieved by the end of the calendar year.

Assistance program will only cover territory within internationally recognized borders.

Program aim is to quickly and effectively provide assistance, demonstrating U.S. committment to countries who have signed the peace agreement. This budget assumes bi-lateral programs undertaking both short-term and longer-term economic, democratic and social development. These assistance efforts are expected to encourage other bi-lateral as well as multi-lateral assistance.

The U.S. assistance program is to renovate, rehabilitate and strengthen key assistance sectors. Major infrastructure rehabilitation will require multi-national (IFIs) participation. The 3 year intervention is to be complementary to the full fledged involvement of the IFIs. Our timeline assumes the IFIs will increasing undertake the infrastructure renovation.

U.S. Assistance by Sector:

Infrastructure Rehabilitation - 45%

Water and sanitation
Utilities

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Transportation (rail/tram/road/bridge repair)
Telecommunication (repair)

Economic Restructuring - 25%

Mico-enterprise development
Enterprise restructuring
Agribusiness/agriculture/forestry

Democratic Initiatives - 15%

Governance
Legal reform
Media

Quality of Life - 15%

Housing (repair)
Health care (facility renovation/equipment repair/medical supplies and delivery system)
Education (building renovation/supplies)

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0021. paper	re: Approaching Former-Yugoslav Post-War Reconstruction (3 pages)	08/08/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4001

FOLDER TITLE:
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COLLECTION:
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Milosevic's "Framework Agreement"



Frozen assets: Not mentioned, but probably released in first step.

Reimposition mechanism: None.

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Proposed Sanctions Strategy - 8/21/95



Reimposition mechanisms:

- Automatic if settlement not implemented by date specified in the settlement.
- Automatic upon report by implementation force commander that Pale and/or Belgrade is impeding implementation or otherwise failing to fulfill obligations
- UNSC must vote to extend sanctions suspensions every 60 days during the implementation period.

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Proposed Sanctions Strategy - 8/21/95

Suspension

- If the parties reach a settlement by October 31, the Contact Group will recommend that the UNSC suspend all sanctions against Belgrade (except the freeze on assets). Settlement must include, inter alia:
    - Country-wide cease-fire.
    - Full access for relief supplies.
    - FRY commitment to maintain border closure.

- Sanctions against Pale -- including the FRY's closure of its border with Bosnia -- will remain in place until at least 60 days after the settlement is signed and until the implementation force commander reports that sufficient forces have deployed for the force to begin its implementation mission.

Reimposition

- The settlement should define what constitutes full implementation and establish a date certain to accomplish those goals. Sanctions against Belgrade and Pale will be automatically reimposed if the agreement was not implemented by that date -- unless the UNSC votes to extend sanctions relief on the grounds that Belgrade and Pale has made good-faith efforts to fulfill the settlement and delays are the result of GOBH actions.

- Sanctions against Belgrade and Pale will be automatically reimposed if at any time during the implementation period ICFY reports that Belgrade is no longer enforcing the border closure and/or the Commander of the Peace Implementation Force reports that the Bosnian Serbs have

    - impeded deployment of the PIF or otherwise prevented it from accomplishing its mission,

    - stalled implementation through refusal to re-deploy forces or failure to abide by the final map,

    - violated the country-wide cessation of hostilities, and/or

    - interfered with humanitarian deliveries.

- During the implementation period, the UNSC must vote every 60 days to extend sanctions relief based on Pale's efforts to implement the peace settlement as outlined in the preceding paragraph and Belgrade's continued closure of the border and support for the peace process.

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Lift

- Upon full implementation of the peace settlement and FRY recognition of Croatia, the Contact Group will recommend that all sanctions against Belgrade be lifted (including frozen assets except for those subject to claims).

- Six months after full implementation, the UNSC will vote to lift all sanctions against Pale, provided the Bosnian Serbs continue to live up to the terms of the settlement.

Flexibility

- If there is no settlement by October 31, the Contact Group retains the option of recommending more limited sanctions relief (e.g.: oil import quota, non-strategic trade, etc.), subject to periodic renewal by the UNSC, if Belgrade has

  - recognized Croatia and Bosnia,

  - tightened its border closure with Bosnia, and

  - induced Pale to enter into a country-wide cease-fire and allow free passage of humanitarian supplies.

(This approach is similar to the Bildt approach, as modified and limited in the USG's August 2 internal paper.)

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SUBJECT: Addendum to Proposed Sanctions Relief Package

It is important to visualize what happens during the implementation phase of the settlement to understand how the proposed reimposition measures hold Belgrade and Pale accountable for their actions. The following time-line illustrates automatic reimposition arrangements and how primary accountability shifts from Belgrade to Pale once the PIF deploys and begins its implementation mission.



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Automatic reimposition occurs when the PIF commander declares that actions by the Bosnian Serbs are preventing his force from deploying or otherwise accomplishing its mission. This is a highly credible trigger because it depends on the commander's assessment of threats to his force's safety and its ability to carry out specific tasks. The proposed sanctions relief strategy supplements these automatic reimposition procedures with a requirement that the Security Council vote every 60 days to extend sanctions relief. Any permanent member of the Council can veto the extension, thus causing reimposition of sanctions.

Belgrade and other Contact Group members may find the 60-day review too restrictive. Because of the credibility of the automatic reimposition provisions, we may be able to accept an arrangement under which any permanent Security Council member can challenge the sanctions suspensions at any time on grounds that Belgrade and/or Pale have reneged on obligations. Sanctions would then be reimposed if three of the five permanent members votes to end sanctions relief.

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520998
RECEIVED: 23 AUG 95 11

TO: BERGER

FROM: CLARKE
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 23 AUG 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPERS FOR 23 AUG DC MTG RE BOSNIA

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER DUE DATE: 26 AUG 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CLARKE LOGREF: 9520985 9520996

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0217 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		CLARKE
		NSC CHRON
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS:

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By KDS NARA, Date 9/30/2019
2010-0533-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	95082315	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	95082320	NOTED BY BERGER

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National Security Council
The White House

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG MC A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1		
Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger	2		
Lake			
Situation Room		Dr. Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
West Wing Desk	3	MC 8/25	
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: Today Bosnia DC

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

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~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20998



August 23, 1995

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

FROM: RICHARD CLARKE/ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

SUBJECT: Today's Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia

Enclosed is a paper comparing DOD's twenty issues to our seven key issues.

Attachment
Tab A Examining the Top Twenty Issues regarding the PIF

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/30/2019
2010-0533-M

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Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. memo	re: Bosnia Peace Implementation Force Examining the Top Twenty Issues (4 pages)	08/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4001

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0217 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, August 23, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs681

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520985
RECEIVED: 21 AUG 95 09

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 22 AUG 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA DC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 23 AUG DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 24 AUG 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF:

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0217 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BAKER JANE
		BERGER
		BREMNER
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

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By KDS NARA, Date 9/30/2019
2010-0533-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	95082116	FOR DECISION
002		X	95082212	DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

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002	950822	BRILL, K	
002	950822	MCALEER, R	
002	950822	INDERFURTH, R	
002	950822	ADAMS, G	
002	950822	GARTHOFF, D	
002	950822	WILLIAMS, A	
002	950822	WILSON, F	

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (NSC) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1		
Dohse	3		Sign Tab I
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger	2		
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen 8/22	
Records Mgt.			

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cc:

revise

COMMENTS:

NOM + Agenda Bosnia
8/22

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MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA NOELLE JENSEN ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	8/22	140	[signature]
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: 1		
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	8-22	PM 2:30	[signature]
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: 1		
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: VIA FAX		
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: VIA FAX		
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	8/23/95	3:00	[signature]
	PRINT LAST NAME:		GRAVES
	COPY: 1		
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: VIA FAX		

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 9/30/2019
2010-0533-M

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EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. AARON WILLIAMS AGENCY FOR INTL DEVELOPMENT ROOM 5945, NEW STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20523	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
COL. F. C. WILSON JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	8/22	~~16~~ 1620	AJ Daniel PRINT LAST NAME: DANIEL COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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A

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: (IMMEDIATE) PRIORITY ROUTINE

RELEASER: Kevin Wooten

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 1762 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: DC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # [redacted]20985

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
	USUN (STATE)	OFFICE OF AMB		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B	AID	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 9/30/2019
2010-0533-M

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

95 AUG 22 P2:38

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: Kevin Wooten

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 1762 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: DC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # [redacted]20985

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
	USUN (STATE)	OFFICE OF AMB		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B	AID	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 9/30/2019
2010-0533-M

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TIME OF RECEIPT

22 AUG 95 16 13

NMCC/JCS

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PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: Kevin Wroten

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 1762 CLASSIFICATION: SECRET TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: DC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # [redacted] 20985

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
V	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
	USUN (STATE)	OFFICE OF AMB		
4	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
3	AID	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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TIME OF RECEIPT 14:33

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: (IMMEDIATE) PRIORITY ROUTINE

RELEASER: Kevin Wroten

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 1762 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: DC MTG ON BOSNIA

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B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
V	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
	USUN (STATE)	OFFICE OF AMS		
4	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
3	AID	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

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TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE
- ☐ FLASH
- ☑ IMMEDIATE
- ☐ PRIORITY
- ☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting DC MTG ON BOSNIA PAGES: 2 + COVER

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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20985

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 22, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. DOUGLAS GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. AARON WILLIAMS
Executive Secretary
Agency for International Development

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia August 23, 1995, from 3:00 p.m. - 4:30 p.m. Attendance is principals plus one. An agenda for the meeting is attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

for Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/30/2019
2010-0533-M

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NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA
DATE: August 23, 1995
LOCATION: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
TIME: 3:00 - 4:30 p.m.

Agenda

I. Policy Issues Relating to Military Implementation of a Peace Plan .....OSD/JCS

II. Policy Issues Relating to Arming and Training Bosnian Government Forces .....OSD/JCS

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 2/6/2020
2013-0682-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20985

August 21, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: BG DONALD KERRICK

FROM: SUE BREMNER

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, August ~~22,~~ 23 1995

Attached at Tab A is the ~~a~~genda for the Deputies meeting on Bosnia to be held August ~~22~~ 23, 1995. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the meeting and authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve MW Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/30/2019
2010-0533-M

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

NSC

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. DOUGLAS GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia August ~~22~~ 23, 1995 from ~~5:00 p.m. - 6:30 p.m.~~ 3-4:30 p.m. Attendence is prencipals plus one, an agenda for the meeting is attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/30/2019
2010-0533-M

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NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA
DATE: August 22, 1995
LOCATION: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
TIME: 5:00 - 6:30 p.m.

Agenda

I. Policy Issues Relating to Military Implementation of a Peace Plan .....OSD/JCS

II. Policy Issues Relating to Arming and Training Bosnian Government Forces .....OSD/JCS

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 2/6/2020
2013-0687-M

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Case Number: 2010-0533-M

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (3 pages)~~	~~08/28/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
002a. memo	Sue Bremner to Samuel Berger re: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (6 pages)	08/28/1995	P1/b(1)
002b. paper	re: Achieving a Bosnian Peace Settlement: Draft Memorandum for Principals (5 pages)	08/27/1995	P1/b(1)
~~002c. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Meeting on Bosnia (5 pages)~~	~~08/23/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002d. paper~~	~~re: Implementing a Balkan Peace Settlement (4 pages)~~	~~08/25/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
002e. paper	re: Bosnia: Additional Tasks for the PIF (2 pages)	08/26/1995	P1/b(1)
~~002f. paper~~	~~re: Balkan Settlement Force Mission Statement (1 page)~~	~~08/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002g. paper~~	~~re: Multilateral Equipping and Training of the Bosnian Federation (5 pages)~~	~~08/22/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KDE 05/26/2016
002h. memo	Memorandum for BG Don Kerrick re: Multilateral Equipping and Training the Bosnian Federation (1 page)	08/1995	P1/b(1)
~~002i. memo~~	~~David Scheffer and Jim O'Brien to Sandy Vershbow and Leon Fuerth re: Proposed Sanctions Relief Package (4 pages)~~	~~08/24/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002j. paper~~	~~re: U.N. Actions for Implementation of U.S. Peace Plan (8 pages)~~	~~08/26/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
002k. paper	re: Sarajevo's Stance on Bosnia as a Unitary State (2 pages)	08/25/1995	P1/b(1)

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2010-0533-M
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RESTRICTION CODES

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P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
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002m. paper	re: Aid Convoys and the Peace Plan (1 page)	08/25/1995	P1/b(1)
002n. paper	re: Possible Refugee Movements Associated with the Peace Plan (4 pages)	08/25/1994	P1/b(1)
~~003. agenda~~	~~NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)~~	~~08/28/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 02/06/2020

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FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 31 AUG 95
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KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA DC
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PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 28 AUG DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: HARMON SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 01 SEP 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9521007 9521013

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001		X	95083120	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
002		X	95083120	HARMON SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950831	FUERTH, L	
002	950831	BRILL, K	
002	950831	NYE, J	
002	950831	MCALEER, R	
002	950831	INDERFURTH, R	
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Treasury	Executive Secretary		
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CIA	Executive Secretary		
AID	Executive Secretary		
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

21017

August 31, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. BENJAMIN NYE
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

DR. GORDON ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. DOUGLAS GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. AARON S. WILLIAMS
Executive Secretary
Agency for International Development

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, August 28, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Joyce A. Henry for
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/30/2019
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee
DATE: August 28, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:00 p.m. - 4:10 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR
Sandy Berger

OVP
Leon Fuerth
Richard Saunders

STATE
Strobe Talbott
John Kornblum
Ralph Johnson

TREASURY
Jeffrey Shafer
Stephen Altheim

DEFENSE
John White
Walter Slocombe
Ted Warner

USUN
David Scheffer
James O'Brien

OMB
Gordon Adams
Mark Sandy

CIA
Dennis Blair
Norman Schindler

AID
Thomas Dine
Dalena Wright

JCS
Michael Byrum
John Walsh

NSC
Alexander Vershbow
Steven Simon
Sue Bremner
Stephen Flanagan

Summary of Conclusions

Implementation of a Bosnia Peace Settlement

1. Deputies met to advance the integrated political/military plan for implementation of a Bosnian peace settlement. They agreed to finalize a draft memo to Principals by Wednesday, August 30, summarizing their main conclusions and recommendations

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10/1/2013

on: (A) issues affecting the ongoing negotiations, and (B) issues relating to implementation of a Bosnian peace settlement (Action: NSC). (S)

2. **Peace Implementation Force**: Deputies expressed satisfaction with the latest draft of the DoD concept paper on "Implementing a Peace Settlement." In reviewing the NSC paper on "Additional Tasks for the PIF," they agreed that the PIF should only play a limited role, as essential to the conduct of its core mission, in such areas as civil works, population movements, and relief support. They also agreed that some of the possible additional functions, such as border demarcation/monitoring and arms control implementation, should be conducted by civilian authorities. State offered to address the integration of requisite political and military functions in its paper on the political counterpart to the PIF Joint Commission. They also agreed that the IWG should review the DoD paper on Gorazde at the August 29 SVTS (Action: State/NSC). (S)

3. **DENY FLIGHT, Air Cover, and the PIF**: Deputies discussed the problems of creating a stable military balance during and after the implementation of the settlement given the fact that the Bosnian Government has no aircraft or air defenses to counter the Bosnian Serb's Air Force and links to the integrated air defense network of the former Yugoslavia. JCS and OSD noted that giving the Bosnian government aircraft or even a limited air defense capability would be very costly. State argued that if NATO air strikes were the equalizer in the pre-PIF era, they should remain so during implementation of a settlement and, if necessary, for a period of time after the PIF's departure. Deputies agreed these issues should be highlighted in the memorandum to Principals and that they would discuss this issue further in the context of their review of a State paper on timelines for implementation of a settlement. As a first step, JCS will draft a paper on continuation of air support beyond the PIF (Action: JCS). (S)

4. **Economic Reconstruction Plan:** Deputies agreed that discussion with the parties, other donors, or the Congress of specific dollar figures for the reconstruction plan at this point is both premature and possibly counterproductive. They agreed that Principals should endorse a general statement on the scope of the plan and a range of U.S. contributions to it. They agreed the plan should include: a humanitarian element, which would decline over a two-year period; provisions for reconstruction of infrastructure, with a major role for the IFIs; and support for market reforms and restructuring to ensure that the old socialist economic legacy is overcome. They also agreed that the U.S. should serve as a catalyst in this effort, with the EU taking the lead and with major contributions from Japan and the Islamic states -- including those in Southeast Asia. They agreed that the State paper on reconstruction should be refined to clarify

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the scope of the plan. State was also tasked with a gameplan for consultations with the EU, Japan, Islamic states, and the IFIs to be presented to Principals. Treasury agreed to do a paper examining various debt issues, including arrearages (Action: State/Treasury). (S)

5. **Sanctions Relief**: Deputies reviewed the OVP papers on sanctions relief under the U.S. diplomatic initiative. They agreed to defer the question of whether the offer of suspension is open-ended or time-limited. They also discussed the mechanism for reimposition and the linkage to Croatia, noting the time-sequencing problem if achievement of a settlement on Eastern Slavonia takes longer than the 10-12 months envisioned for sanctions suspension. They agreed that the issues of sanctions relief for Pale and how long to hold Milosevic accountable for the Pale Serb actions should be open to review as the negotiations evolve (No new action). (S)

6. **Arm and Train**: Deputies discussed the DoD paper briefly and agreed that training could be conducted in Bosnia by non-PIF personnel. They also agreed that the IWG should review the following questions during its August 29 SVTS: provision of close air support/no-fly enforcement during the implementation period; how to exclude participation by Iran in the coalition; legal matters; funding; involvement of allies/others; whether/how this program could be conducted in the absence of a UN Security Council resolution to lift the arms embargo; and Croatia's involvement (Action: IWG). (S)

7. **Outstanding Papers**: Deputies agreed to review at a later date State papers on arms control, implementation timelines, and a political analogue to the Joint Commission; DoD papers on cost estimates for the U.S. contribution to the PIF and how to make the PIF work as a NATO force; and OMB's paper on financing options for the PIF. (S)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

21017

August 29, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: STEPHEN FLANAGAN

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, August 28, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of Conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia held August 28, 1995.

Concurrence by: Steve Simon

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to the agencies

Approve ok Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/30/2019
2010-0533-M

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9521013
RECEIVED: 28 AUG 95 09

TO: BERGER

FROM: BREMNER
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 28 AUG 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 28 AUG DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER DUE DATE: 31 AUG 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BREMNER LOGREF: 9521007 9521017

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0218 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BREMNER
		NSC CHRON
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
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National Security Council
The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1	D	
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger	2		
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3		
Records Mgt.			

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	Sue Bremner to Samuel Berger re: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (6 pages)	08/28/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4001

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0218 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, August 28, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs682

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. paper	re: Achieving a Bosnian Peace Settlement: Draft Memorandum for Principals (5 pages)	08/27/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4001

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0218 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, August 28, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs682

RESTRICTION CODES

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21002

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 24, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. DOUGLAS GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. AARON S. WILLIAMS
Executive Secretary
Agency for International Development

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, August 23, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By KDS NARA, Date 9/30/2019
2010-0533-M

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21002

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee
DATE: August 23, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 3:35 p.m. - 6:25 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR
Sandy Berger

OVP
Leon Fuerth
Richard Saunders

STATE
Strobe Talbott
James Steinberg
John Kornblum
Ralph Johnson

DEFENSE
John White
Walter Slocombe
Jan Lodal

USUN
David Scheffer
(via secure video)
James O'Brien

OMB
Phebe Vickers
Rodney Bent

CIA
Dennis Blair
Norman Schindler

AID
Thomas Dine
Dalena Wright

JCS
Wesley Clark
John Walsh

NSC
Sandy Vershbow
Richard Clarke
Donald Kerrick
Stephen Flanagan

Summary of Conclusions

Implementation of a Bosnia Peace Settlement

1. Deputies met to finalize development of an integrated political/military plan for implementation of a Bosnian peace settlement. They reached agreement on several elements and tasked papers on several issues that require further analysis. These papers and a further and more detailed iteration of the OSD paper on the Peace Implementation Force (PIF) will be reviewed at another Deputies Meeting on Monday, August 28 (Action: OSD). ~~(S)~~

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2013-0682-M (3.22)

Deputies will also review a paper for Principals summarizing key recommendations and issues for decision (Action: NSC). ~~(S)~~

2. **Overall Concept**: Deputies agreed that our goal in implementing a settlement is to preserve Bosnia-Herzegovina as a single state comprised of two highly autonomous units. Our priority is to ensure the survival of the Bosniac-Croat Federation; this should be accomplished in the context of unity with the Bosnian Serb entity along with rights of association with Croatia and Serbia. ~~(S)~~

Deputies agreed that the Peace Implementation Force (PIF) should be deployed primarily (but not exclusively) in Federation territory. The operational commander should have broad authority for self-protection of the force and to enforce the cease-fire and separation of forces against incidents initiated by any party, using overwhelming force if necessary. At the same time, Deputies agreed the PIF should have defined limits on the scope of its responsibilities and operational conduct. The Deputies agreed that the response to massive violations of the agreement would be "evenhanded but asymmetrical." In the event of Bosnian Serb violation of the agreement, the PIF should be authorized to respond using air and ground forces, but this response should follow a ladder of escalation. In the event of serious Bosnian Government violation of the agreement, the PIF would withdraw. Deputies further agreed the PIF should not disarm the parties and that some tasks, such as demarcation of borders and resettlement of civilians, could be accomplished by civilian officials or agencies. ~~(S)~~

Taskings: State to draft brief overall mission statement for the PIF reflecting the limited tasks above. NSC to write a short paper identifying possible additional tasks for the PIF that may prove necessary, for example, if the settlement establishes a stronger central government or Bosnia-wide institutions. CIA to do an assessment of the Bosnian government's conception of a settlement and how this may alter the PIF's mission. OSD to do detailed mission statement as part of OSD paper. ~~(S)~~

3. **Gorazde**: Deputies noted that Principals, in light of Bosnian Government resistance to trading Gorazde for other territories, had requested an examination of the requirements for ensuring the viability of Gorazde if it remains part of the Federation under the terms of a settlement. ~~(S)~~

Taskings: DOD and CIA to assess implications for the PIF and the longer-term defense requirements for Gorazde following the departure of the PIF, using the Contact Group map as the baseline, but considering territorial improvements (e.g., larger corridor) as well. ~~(S)~~

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4. **Arms Limitations**: Deputies agreed that our goal of establishing a stable military balance could best be achieved by a hybrid approach that would support enhancement of the self-defense capabilities of Federation armed forces (ABH and HVO) in tandem with efforts to reach agreement among all the parties to certain arms limitations or reductions. They agreed to separation zones (DMZs) and to examine inventory limits on CFE treaty limited equipment. They agreed that an arms control regime should have a regional context. ~~(S)~~

Taskings: State, in coordination with OSD, to develop detailed options for narrow DMZs, separation of heavy weapons and/or exclusion zones, overall limits on heavy weapons and confidence-building measures that could be included as part of the settlement and/or pursued following implementation of a settlement. ~~(S)~~

5. **Exit Strategy**: Deputies agreed that we need to establish a date certain for completion of the PIF mission. There was a consensus that the PIF should be terminated by the end of 1996. At the same time, we should identify mission-essential tasks that we would seek to complete prior to that date, although the PIF would withdraw whether or not all those tasks had been accomplished. ~~(S)~~

Taskings: State to draft an initial timeline paper defining political, economic and military benchmarks for accomplishment of critical tasks. CIA to do an assessment of how the parties would react to knowing there was a date certain. ~~(S)~~

6. **National Participation/Funding**: Deputies agreed that the PIF would be a NATO operation with limited non-NATO involvement. While there would be a UNSC resolution authorizing NATO to conduct the mission, there would be no dual key or other limitations on NATO command and control. Deputies agreed that no Ally should be excluded, but that the need for NAC consensus would force us to deal with Greek approval of Turkish participation. Deputies acknowledged that operational efficiency might be compromised by involvement of non-NATO forces but recognized that non-NATO participation will be politically necessary and, in some respects, desirable (e.g., as a proving ground for Partnership for Peace countries to operate with NATO forces). Non-NATO forces would be under NATO operational control similar to a CJTF. ~~(S)~~

On funding, Deputies agreed that we would seek to follow the normal NATO approach, i.e., NATO and other contributors would pay their own way, with common costs assessed according to a variant of the NATO infrastructure formula. Funding arrangements more

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advantageous to the U.S. would be difficult to negotiate with our Allies, but will be explored. ~~(S)~~

Taskings: JCS/OSD to examine the political/military requirements and constraints of making the PIF a NATO-plus force, involving PFP partners and other non-NATO militaries. This should draw on previous NATO planning for implementation of the Vance-Owen plan (40103) and UNPROFOR extraction (40104). OSD/JCS to complete a cost estimate for the probable U.S. contribution to the PIF. The Peacekeeping Funding Group to reexamine alternative cost-sharing arrangements among the participants. ~~(S)~~

7. **Joint Commission:** Deputies agreed that a Joint Commission with local subsidiaries should be established (comprising NATO, the Federation and the Bosnian Serbs) to resolve problems in implementing the military aspects of a settlement. This might have national and regional components. Deputies also agreed that there would be other aspects of settlement implementation (political, economic, humanitarian) that could be beyond the purview of the Joint Commission, and that we needed to develop a concept for how these would be handled and whether there would be a senior Secretary General's Representative for NATO, the UN or, perhaps, the OSCE. They agreed that any arrangement should exclude interference with the operation of the PIF (i.e., no dual keys). ~~(S)~~

Tasking: State to draft a paper on the political analogue to the Joint Commission for implementing the non-military aspects of a settlement. ~~(S)~~

8. **Population Movements:** Deputies agreed that the parties should have primary responsibility for population movements, with international relief agencies (UNHCR) providing secondary support. The PIF should generally avoid involvement in population movements, but it should be prepared to protect UNHCR personnel, aid convoys, and refugees in transit as necessary. Deputies also agreed that restitution and other forms of compensation were alternatives to resettlement that we should encourage the parties to explore. ~~(S)~~

Tasking: State and USUN will do a paper on policy toward population movements, forced departures and associated enforcement mechanisms. ~~(S)~~

Post-War Reconstruction Assistance

9. Deputies agreed that we urgently need a conceptual framework and initial plan for post-war regional reconstruction, as well as rough estimates of the overall cost, and the preferred cost-sharing among the U.S., EU, Japan and Islamic countries. They

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also expressed concerns about the difficulties of offsetting the U.S. contribution to the program on the basis of reductions in other programs. Deputies agreed that we would actively pursue the EU's offer to take the lead and press the EU, Japan and the Islamic states to clarify their contributions to the package. Deputies agreed that, in order to encourage Bosnian Government flexibility in the negotiations, Ambassador Holbrooke should be in a position by Monday to suggest the size of the U.S. contribution that the President will seek from the Congress in the event of a settlement (between $500 million and $1 billion over 3-5 years). They also agreed that we needed to inform the Congress immediately of our thinking on post-war reconstruction in the context of consultations on the progress of the U.S. diplomatic initiative. ~~(S)~~

Taskings: State to develop a post-war reconstruction program for the region, in coordination with NSC, OMB, AID and other agencies. State to draft talking points for a call by National Security Advisor Lake to Spanish Foreign Minister Solana to reconfirm the EU's willingness to take the lead on reconstruction and to offer the parties such carrots as EU association and enhanced market access. State and NSC to draft talking points for Holbrooke's use with the Bosnians on August 28. State and NSC to draft a gameplan and talking points for Congressional consultations August 26-28; these points should be in the context of an overall review of the status of the peace initiative and should also reference our commitment to participate in an implementation force if there is an agreement they will explain our goals and why solid U.S. financial backing is essential. ~~(S)~~

Sanctions

10. Deputies affirmed agreement on the main elements of our approach to sanctions relief for the FRY in the context of the U.S. diplomatic initiative: all UNSC sanctions, except those governing frozen assets subject to claims, would be suspended once there is a signed agreement; there would be a complete lifting of sanctions once implementation of the plan is completed; and Belgrade would receive less sweeping suspension of sanctions if it failed to agree to a solution for Eastern Slavonia at the time of signature. It was agreed that Deputies would need to decide at their next meeting how long we should hold Belgrade accountable for the actions of the Pale Serbs, and what would be the precise conditions for sanctions lifting. ~~(S)~~

Tasking: OVP to circulate a paper on a proposed sanctions strategy, highlighting the 4 or 5 fundamental issues needing Deputies' attention, including the sanctions reimposition mechanism and linkages to a Croatia settlement and war crimes, in preparation for the Deputies' meeting on August 28. ~~(S)~~

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8/25/95

Implementing a Balkan Peace Settlement (U)

Scenario: ~~(S)~~

A peace plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina is accepted by all warring parties and includes a cessation of hostilities. There is international commitment to implement the provisions of the plan, including economic, diplomatic and military components. The principal military requirement is to create a stable environment during a limited period wherein the Bosnian Muslim-Croat Federation (the "Federation") is able to develop an enhanced self-defense relative to the Bosnian Serbs. To meet this requirement, two parallel programs are conducted concurrently: Multilateral efforts to provide equipment and training to the Federation forces and a NATO-led Peace Implementation Force ("PIF") to implement the plan. This paper addresses the latter.

Situation and Assumptions: ~~(S)~~

The Peace Plan

- The peace plan includes the following provisions:
  - A cessation of hostilities and an agreed cease-fire throughout the peace implementation period.
  - Mutually recognized borders between the warring parties.
  - A joint (PIF/Federation/Bosnian Serb) commission to facilitate implementing the provisions of the agreement and to resolve disputes through negotiation and mediation.
  - When the agreement is signed, all forces move to their respective territories, completing their movement within a few weeks.
  - The parties will not interfere with the activities of the PIF or activities of humanitarian assistance organizations.
  - The arms embargo is lifted for all of the former Yugoslavia.
- Public and Congressional support for the plan has been achieved.
- NATO and the UN Security Council endorse the plan by resolution.

The Participants in the Agreement

- The Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, continuing to cooperate closely in the Federation, as well as the Bosnian Serbs, all agree to the peace plan.
- All parties to the agreement substantially observe its provisions with no more than isolated violations.
- The Federation remains viable and acts as a single governmental entity.
- Croatia continues its support for and cooperation with the Federation.
- Serbia continues its support for and cooperation with the Bosnian Serbs.

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VL 2/6/2020 (3.27)
2013-0082-M

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The Peace Implementation Force

- The UN sanctions and NATO charters a NATO-led, non-UN, peace enforcement (Chapter VII) operation to implement the plan.
- The operation will be conducted under exclusively NATO command and control, no UN involvement in military decision making.
- Robust rules of engagement are authorized for the operation
- Status of Forces Agreements covering PIF deployments are concluded with the Federation, the Bosnian Serbs, and other countries as necessary.
- The PIF will deploy immediately upon all parties' acceptance of the peace plan and issuance of the UN and NATO mandates.
- NATO Deny Flight forces become the air component of the PIF.
- UK/FR/NL (and perhaps other) UNPROFOR forces transition to the PIF.
- US ground forces will be committed to the PIF.
- Forces beyond US/UK/FR/NL needed for the operation will be solicited primarily from other NATO nations and Russia. Radical nations and those incapable of operating to NATO standards will not be included.

Related Activities

- UNPROFOR's mission is completed and its withdrawal is authorized.
- UNCRO (reduced) & UNPREDEP operations continue under UN control.
- Humanitarian assistance operations underway continue and are adequate.

Mission: ~~(S)~~ On order, CINCSOUTH assumes operational control of designated NATO and non-NATO forces and conducts operations to enforce the terms of the peace agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Specified Tasks: ~~(S)~~ Tasks continue to be identified as the planning process matures; the list below will be refined. CINCSOUTH will:

- Establish the Peace Implementation Force (PIF) rapidly, building on FR/UK/NL RRF capabilities plus those of UNPROFOR nations forces joining the PIF; quickly deploy additional NATO forces required; operate principally from Federation territory,
- Establish liaison in the joint commission with Federation and Bosnian Serb army to facilitate implementation of the peace plan,
- Be prepared, as necessary, to mark boundaries set out by the peace plan in critical areas of separation between the warring parties,
- As necessary, enforce withdrawal of forces to conform to new boundaries,
- Enforce compliance by all parties with the provisions of the peace plan (e.g., enforcing the cease-fire and compliance by all parties with the buffer zone along the frontier between Federation and Bosnian Serb territory),
- Ensure self defense and freedom of movement of the PIF,
- Observe and prevent interference with any population movements that accompany the withdrawal of forces under the peace plan,

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- Employ NATO air in support of PIF operations, and
- Be prepared to facilitate movement of UNHCR and other international organizations in the accomplishment of their humanitarian missions.

Parallel Functions: ~~(S)~~ The following functions will be performed by entities other than the PIF:

- Equipping & Training: Multilateral forces will provide equipment and related training to Federation forces to improve their self-defense capability. This function will be conducted both within and outside Federation territory, will be accomplished as rapidly as possible to permit timely withdrawal of the PIF, and may be undertaken in the context of some form of ceiling on Federation and Bosnian Serb defense capabilities.

- UNPROFOR Withdrawal: The UN will organize and conduct the withdrawal of those UNPROFOR forces not transitioning to the PIF.

- Other Support: Humanitarian assistance, human rights monitoring, and economic reconstruction efforts will proceed in parallel with implementation of the plan.

Mission Completion: ~~(S)~~ The mission of the PIF will be complete when the terms of the peace plan have been implemented by all parties and the Federation has enhanced its self-defense capability relative to the Bosnian Serbs. Withdrawal of the PIF ground forces by the end of 1996 is envisioned. NATO air assets may continue to be available to support the peace process for some period after PIF ground forces are withdrawn.

Post-PIF Activities: ~~(S)~~ It has been suggested that, following withdrawal of the PIF, a much smaller UN or regionally-organized force might monitor continuing compliance with the peace agreement. Interagency staffing is underway (State lead) to develop concepts for such a follow-on force.

Peace Deterioration: ~~(S)~~ In the event of a seriously deteriorating security environment (short of a complete breakdown of the peace), the PIF will be prepared to react immediately to stabilize the situation with assigned forces, calling in additional forces if necessary, preparing to implement more aggressive actions against violators, expanding air activity, and supporting diplomatic and informational activities.

In the event of a complete breakdown of the peace and the return of wide-scale war, the PIF will defend itself and:

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- If the breakdown is precipitated by Federation forces and other non-military means of resolution are exhausted, withdraw from Bosnia-Herzegovina. Military support to the Federation will cease.

- If the breakdown is precipitated by Bosnian Serb forces, enforce the terms of the peace settlement with all force at its disposal. NATO air will be prepared to conduct wider attacks consistent with the London agreement. Military support to the Federation will continue.

- If the breakdown is due to the actions of both parties or the situation is ambiguous, further policy direction will be provided.

Issues: ~~(S)~~ The following items, among others, are being staffed in the interagency as development of the peace plan and planning for its execution continue:

- **Possible Gorazde Enclave:** The inclusion of the Muslim enclave in Gorazde as a part of the Federation under the peace agreement would have major implications for the tasks the PIF would be required to perform. An interagency working group (JCS lead) is examining these implications.

- **Arms Controls:** The peace plan could be accompanied by limitations on the types, amounts and locations of armaments the formerly warring parties will be permitted. Interagency work (State lead) is underway to explore various arms control initiatives (weapons exclusion zones, a regional "build down", confidence building measures, etc.) that might be pursued.

- **Financing:** Mission cost and international financing arrangements must be determined. As this will be a NATO rather than a UN operation, the same questions will arise as have arisen during the staffing of OPLAN 40104. The interagency Peacekeeping Funding Group (OMB lead) is working these questions.

Principals' Committee Action: ~~(S)~~ Recommend that the Principals' Committee:

- Confirm the principles contained in this paper.
- Approve the above mission statement.
- Confirm urgent planning for the mission.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002e. paper	re: Bosnia: Additional Tasks for the PIF (2 pages)	08/26/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4001

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0218 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, August 28, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs682

RESTRICTION CODES

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Balkan Settlement Force
Mission Statement

Upon UNSCR approval, the Balkan Settlement Force is to deploy quickly and establish a dominance unquestioned by the disengaging parties. It is to create a secure environment within which the political undertakings of a settlement can go forward. The goal is to ensure both the survival of the Bosniac-Croat Federation and the preservation of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a single state (one comprised of two highly autonomous units with rights of association with Croatia and Serbia). Settlement force objectives toward achieving this goal include

-- initial efforts toward separation of forces and a diminished level of violence along lines of confrontation

-- pursuit of a broader reduction in the level of conflict, including enforcement activities - using overwhelming force as necessary - if required.

The overall effort is designed to allow the Federation to develop (with assistance by the Equip and Train Force) an indigenous and effective self-defense force viz. the BSA. The Force will facilitate the activities of UN and civilian agencies engaged in humanitarian and reconstruction tasks. While not charged with the disarming of local parties, its determined response to any threats against its own security or massive violations of the cease-fire will be "even-handed but asymmetrical".

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Multilateral Equipping and Training of the Bosnian Federation (U)

Scenario: (S) A peace plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina is accepted by all warring parties and includes a cessation of hostilities. There is international commitment to implement the provisions of the plan, including economic, diplomatic and military components. The principal military requirement is to create a stable environment during a limited period wherein the Bosnian Muslim-Croat Federation (the "Federation") is able to develop an effective self-defense relative to the Bosnian Serbs. To meet this requirement, two parallel programs are conducted concurrently: multilateral effort to provide equipment and training to the Federation forces; a NATO-led force to implement the peace plan.

Assumptions: (S)
- Public and Congressional support for the plan has been achieved.
- The arms embargo is lifted for all of the former Yugoslavia.
- Legal requirements for provision of equipment have been met.
- Overt operation.
- Bosnian Federation requests assistance.
- Croatia continues its support for and cooperation with the Federation.
- Croatia will grant access through its territory to Bosnia.
- "No-Fly" Zone will continue to be enforced.
- BSA will retain its offensive capability.
- Bosnian Federation Army can disengage to equip and train.
- Adequate training facilities and logistics are available.

Mission: (S) On order, USCINCEUR assumes operational control of a multi-national force from designated NATO and non-NATO nations and conducts operations to equip and train selected elements of the Bosnian Federation Army to enhance its capability to defend the territorial integrity of the Bosnian Federation.

Intent: (S)
- Multi-national effort, US led.
- Enhance Federation Army existing core capabilities and units.
- Develop Federation Army capability to sustain training program.
- Counter-balance Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) strengths.
- Focus on defensive tasks at the company and battalion levels and on brigade and higher staff operations.
- Begin as promptly as feasible upon all parties' acceptance of the peace plan and issuance of the necessary mandates.
- Move concurrently on same timeline as peace implementation plan.

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Specified Tasks: (S)

- USCINCEUR assume operational control of a multi-national force for the mission.
- Assess Federation Army capabilities and needs.
- In coordination with the Federation Army, plan their equipping and training.
- Form a multi-national training and equipping team to execute the mission.
- Facilitate the provision of equipment to the Federation Army by donor nations.
- Assist the Federation Army to execute the plan.
- Ensure the self-defense and freedom of movement of the training and equipping team.

Framework: (S)

- Equip/train would not be conducted by NATO Peace Implementation Force.
- Multilateral equip/train effort would be under US leadership.
- Training conducted primarily outside the Bosnian Federation. Other alternatives include Croatia, other European locations, or US.
- Equipment would be US, former Warsaw Pact, or a mix.

Concept of Operations: (S) This would be a five-phase operation with phases overlapping:

- Phase I -- Assessment. Assess the doctrine, organization, equipment and training status. Determine equipment and training required; assess availability of equipment and training. Prepare legal basis for provision of equipment.
- Phase II -- Establish the support structure. Position equipment, organize training teams, and establish training facilities.
- Phase III -- Equip.
- Phase IV -- Train. Integrate leaders and equipment into units, complete individual training, and conduct unit training.
- Phase V -- Sustainment. Exercise units and transition units to training base facilities.

Desired End State: (S) Bosnian Federation Army has the capability of defending the territorial integrity of the Bosnian Federation against aggressors without external combat support within nine months of mission start.

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Issues: (S) The following issues should be discussed in the interagency before proceeding with further planning for execution of multilateral security assistance:

(1) **Legal**. There are significant domestic and international legal issues that must be resolved by interagency coordination. The primary domestic legal consideration is determining legal authority for providing US assistance. A legislative strategy must be developed for Congressional consultations. International legal concerns include SOFAs, for both the training site country and B-H, and the status of trainers and training sites under the Law of Armed Conflict.

What limitations is Congress likely to place on US participation in this effort? How much time will be required to establish a comprehensive SOFA for training in Croatia, a NATO member country, possible Middle East nations?

(2) **Funding**.

Funding requirement. Assessment of equipment and training requirements must establish overall funding requirement. At a minimum, funding must include equipment, spares, consumables, maintenance, sustainment. Funding must also be found for building a Federation air defense capability and for any No-Fly Zone operations past initial equip and train timeline.

Funding sources. Funding sources must be identified to include US, regional organizations, and bilateral. Within USG, must consider all existing legal authorities: security assistance, supplemental appropriation, and drawdown. If drawdown, what is the potential impact on readiness? If new appropriations are necessary, how long will Congressional approval take? Will Congress be willing to apply the $100 million proposed in the Senate bill? Will they establish a formal Security Assistance funding level? Internationally, can a "Gulf" account be established? What is the best means to acquire third country contributions/ procurements/grants? Can solicitation of international funding begin now as a signal of US commitment?

(3) **Equipment availability**.

Availability. Equipment necessary to establish balance of power must be available, sustainable, maintainable. Equipment must be available for transport into region within timeline established. Issues requiring further definition during assessment phase:

What type of equipment: former Warsaw Pact, NATO, US, mixed? Current estimate indicates former Warsaw Pact equipment is the best option because of relative cost and availability, and it presently forms the basis of Federation equipment inventory. Would departing UNPF units be willing to leave some

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equipment behind? Are spare parts and consumables available? Is stock (US and other contributing nations) sufficient to meet requirement and timeline? Can equipment be maintained and sustained by Bosnian Federation forces? What international linkages and leverages are involved with sustaining particular types of equipment? What is effect of linkages on long-term stability?

(4) **Command and Control.**

Establishing US command authority for equip and train operations for Bosnian Federation. US leadership must be established to ensure multinational efforts are coordinated to achieve the desired end state. Mission will be tasked to CINCEUR, and most likely delegated to USAREUR for detailed planning, coordination, and execution. Efforts by the international community to equip and train warring factions could easily result in small "arms race" establishing an imbalance of power thereby destabilizing the region. How will other nations be integrated into effort? Will others accept US leadership? Can the US prevent/limit participation by potentially disruptive nations (e.g. Iran)? How will unity of effort be achieved to avoid multiple, uncoordinated equip/train efforts? Can UN/EU/NATO/CSCE establish international authority for unity of effort?

(5) **Operational.**

Multinational air support. There are two scenarios to consider. If there is a peace agreement, then what air support should be provided the Federation during the equip/train program? Should the air support be extended beyond the program for some limited period? If there is no agreement, then what air support should be provided and for how long? Under both conditions, where are NFZ operations continued: over Federation, over Federation and SRBH, or over all of Former Yugoslavia? Should NFZ include fixed wing, helicopters, active SAM sites?

Federation air defense. Should we assist the Bosnian Federation in establishing air defense to counterbalance Bosnian Serbs? Is air defense capability provided the Federation from the outset of the equip/train program? How should establishment of Federation air defense be coordinated so as to minimize potential threat to Deny Flight? What capability should the Federation possess: guns, missiles, a mix?

Defensive force. The arms embargo will be lifted for all of the former Yugoslavia. Establishment of numerical limits and zonal sub-limits (DMZs, areas of restricted maneuvering/operations) may be required for all warring parties to achieve and maintain a balance of power. Such limits could include heavy equipment (tanks, APCs, aircraft, naval vessels), and force structure (active and reserve). Decisions required: What are the limits necessary for

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Federation self-defense? At what point does a strong defensive force become a possible offensive threat to regional stability? How many tanks, mortars, aircraft, ships? Who determines limits: warring parties via peace plan, EU, CSCE, NATO, or US? Who develops initial stabilization measures (measures of transparency, constraint, reinforce confidence, monitoring compliance/evaluation)? Who maintains measures: EU, CSCE, NATO?

(6) **Risk of enduring US commitment.** Direct US ties to the Bosnian Federation Army may result in long term commitment. Failure of Bosnian Army may be US failure. Must establish exit strategy which disengages US from maintaining the Bosnian Federation. What is the exit strategy? Is it based on time, capability of Bosnian Federation forces to counter threat?

Deputies' Committee Action: ~~(S)~~ Recommend the Deputies' Committee:

- Confirm the assumptions, mission, and specified tasks to meet the arming and training requirements while the two parallel programs (Arm & Train and implementation of the peace plan) are conducted.
- Recommend Principals approve the above mission statement.
- Conduct preliminary discussion of and assign staffing responsibility for these issues, and possibly others which are identified.
- Direct State/OSD/JCS to initiate US planning and push for prompt initiation of multilateral involvement, to include hosting an international conference in Washington to solicit multi-national support.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002h. memo	Memorandum for BG Don Kerrick re: Multilateral Equipping and Training the Bosnian Federation (1 page)	08/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4001

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0218 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, August 28, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs682

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Confidence-Building/Arms Control Measures To Accompany Political Settlement

Assumption: It will be important that the U.S. offer the perspective of "arms build-down" in connection with any settlement package -- both to help build political support among allies and partners for the overall U.S. initiative and to assist in creating an environment within which the Federation-Bosnian Serb military balance can more easily be stabilized. Any set of proposals to that effect, however, would have to be phased and flexible, readily adapting to changing circumstances on the ground and open to expansion over time in both scope and application.

Step-by-Step Approach: In the first instance, we should concentrate on political/military confidence-building measures geared to specific areas and tactical situations along lines of confrontation within Bosnia itself. Their immediate objective would be to supplement and help stabilize the ceasefire contained in the settlement; accordingly, they would focus on disengagement of the parties, preliminary forms of weapons control, and transparency.

More specifically, this might include (perhaps within the text of any ceasefire component of a settlement):

-- Separation of forces and weapons along designated confrontation lines (e.g., 2 km for infantry, 10 km for mortars, 20 km for heavy weapons).

-- Ban of certain military activities, including aircraft activities, in selected areas.

-- Establishment of heavy weapons collection/deactivation sites.

-- Establishment of joint liaison/communication links among opposing local commanders under the active oversight of the Implementation Force.

-- Establishment of procedures for extensive monitoring all of the above measures by designated elements of the Implementation Force.

As progress is made with each of these measures, we would seek to expand them in scope and effect. As some would presumably be intended for a long duration, we would wish to build in the possibility that, as the NATO-led military implementation force draws down with the accomplishment of its basic mission, monitoring/verification duties might be eventually passed to another body -- perhaps some configuration of UN/OSCE observers.

Long-Term Perspective: Even as our immediate focus should be on local stabilizing measures within Bosnia proper to support the ceasefire and settlement, the U.S. should be prepared to offer -- at an appropriate political moment -- a long-term

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with an emphasis on a conmprehensive approach to the problems of the former Yugoslavia.

The stated objective of such a U.S. initiative for confidence-building/arms control measures for would be strengthening stability and security throughout the region, with the specific aim of eliminating disparities and capabilities for launching surprise attack and for initiating, at a regional level, large-scale offensive action. Reductions, limitations and the realization of a more defensive set of force postures might be examined as contributions to a more stable military balance.

Any initial deliberations among parties as to participation and modalities could take place in an informal setting, although the intention should always be to transfer any such the negotiations back into a more formal OSCE framework at an appropriate time. Recognizing the many inherent difficulties involved in any move towards a more ambitious arms control regime for the region, the U.S. objective would, in the first instance, be as much to set in place an ongoing process as the expectation of any early progress towards a CFE-like regime.

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8/25/95

(STATE)

Concept Paper

Post-settlement Assistance Package

for Bosnia and Croatia

Summary

- $1 billion is estimated USG assistance required over three years if peace breaks out (out of a total $4 billion, at least $3 billion from the EU, Japan and Muslim countries).
  - -- Reconstruction ($435 million) would focus on Bosnia and Croatian UNPA's--where war damage has occurred.
  - -- Humanitarian aid ($450 million paid out of existing budgets) would be distributed more broadly, assuming the ban on U.S. aid in Serbia is lifted.
  - -- Payment of arrears to IFI's (U.S. share as much as $125 million) is critical to Bosnia joining the IMF and IBRD; it is essential post-settlement assistance.
- The USG would look to the European Union to provide the largest portion of the assistance package and to coordinate the process, with major contributions also from Japan and Muslim countries. We have not yet discussed the global needs or burdensharing with other countries.

Principles

- Humanitarian assistance should be driven by needs

  --equal treatment across ethnic groups

  --strong focus on repatriation of DP's and refugees, and on demining

  --delivery continues through U.N. organizations, PVOs and national governments

  --clear phasedown strategy required

- Reconstruction assistance should reinforce political and economic objectives

  --preservation of territorial integrity of sovereign states (in particular Bosnia-Herzegovina)

  --multiethnic democracy

  --return of refugees

  --development of private enterprise and a market economy

  --regional integration and integration with Western Europe

  --implementation coordinated with Zagreb, Sarajevo and NGO's, donor coordination through the IBRD

What does this mean??

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Country-specific considerations

o Croatia

--Humanitarian: needs should decline as displaced persons and refugees return to their homes

--Reconstruction/development: aid should be focussed on the former UNPA's, where it should be used to encourage return of Serb as well as Croat refugees

o Bosnia

--Humanitarian: obstacles to return of Croat, Muslim and Serb DP's and refugees should be removed, but realistically many may choose not to do so; continuing but declining need for humanitarian assistance

--Reconstruction/development: aid should aim at reestablishment of multiethnic society, which would mean limited assistance to areas that will not permit return of DP's and refugees or refuse to build up democratic institutions open on an equal basis to all

what kind of projects purpose? PROCESS FOR DEFINANCE

o FRY:

--Humanitarian: Croatian Serb refugees should be encouraged to return by establishment of conditions of safety and decency in Croatia, but realistically speaking many may choose not to do so; there will be a continuing need for humanitarian assistance

--Reconstruction/development: Serbia proper has suffered no war destruction; assistance should be through normal IFI and bilateral mechanisms, including USG support for democratic institutions; USG would not help clear arrears (but not object to others doing so)

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International context

- Current spending is at about $1.2 billion/year

  --Humanitarian assistance: current expenditure (FY 95) about $1 billion, not counting UNPROFOR; this should decline with a settlement

  --Reconstruction/development: current expenditure is almost entirely in Bosnia, at perhaps $220 million per year ($170 million from Western Europe)

- International aid package in the event of a settlement: $4.0 billion over three years

  --$1.9 billion in the first year

  Humanitarian assistance: $1000 million

  Reconstruction/development: $400 million

  Payment of arrears: $500 million (one-time)

  --$1.2 billion in the second year, $900 million in the third, with humanitarian assistance declining, reconstruction/development increasing (see charts)

- U.S. share

  --Less than one-quarter of total ($500 million in the first year, $1 billion total)

  Reconcile w/ Perlin et al?

  --Burdensharing

  --More than one-quarter from Europe

  --One-quarter from Islamic moderates

  --One-quarter from the Japanese (with emphasis on humanitarian assistance)

  --Neither burdensharing nor global needs have yet been discussed with other countries.

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Former Yugoslavia Comprehensive Post Settlement Assistance Package

Millions of dollars

	Current U.S. Spending	U.S. Share of Projected Needs			Global Projected Needs			Current Global Spending
	FY 95	CY96	CY97	CY98	CY96	CY97	CY98	
Humanitarian	200	200	150	100	1000	600	300	1000
Re-Construction								
Bosnia	25.2	100	150	100	300	500	500	220
Croatia	14.5	30	30	25	100	100	100	
Arrears Payment	0	125	0	0	500	0	0	
Total	**340**	**455**	**330**	**225**	**1900**	**1200**	**900**	**1200**

The Bottom Line $1B $4B

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(TREASURY)

BOSNIA -- SUPPORTING RECONSTRUCTION

Introduction

The prospects for peace in Former Yugoslavia, especially Bosnia-Hertzegovina (B-H), could be enhanced by western efforts to put forth a vision of reconstruction and external financing for this process.

But at the same time, the international financial community faces a shortage of resources. Financing Bosnia's reconstruction will necessarily need to be pieced together through a concerted effort of the international community -- by bilateral donors, by the international financial institutions, and hopefully by the private sector. In this regard, the Europeans have told us, in the context of assembling other country financing packages, that they would have adequate resources to help Bosnia at the appropriate time. It will thus be critical to engage them to step forward, while we do enough for our part so that we can exercise leadership. Also, under existing guidelines, the IMF and World Bank together could be expected to provide $500 million in loans for this purpose in the first year or two, some possibly on concessional terms.

Financing Plan -- Terms and Conditions

Reconstruction finance for Bosnia should entail several stages.

1. **Needs Assessment:** The IMF, World Bank and EBRD should quickly assemble a task force for a quick needs assessment study. The task force could be joined by experts, designated by capitals. It would prepare a paper for the international financial community, outlining: the macroeconomic stabilization, structural reform, and infrastructure requirements in B-H; a timetable for their implementation; their costs; and potential associated external financing.

The Netherlands has already started backing a Trust Fund at the World Bank to which the United States is now in the process of making a contribution. This Fund was created to allow the World Bank to defray the costs of conceptualizing a plan for reconstruction and its financing before B-H joined the IFIs. Financing from other donors would be welcomed and helpful for timely completion of the assessment.

2. **Coordinating Mechanism:** A coordinating mechanism should be quickly established to bring together IFIs and donors. The coordinating body will need to develop a financing package on the basis of the needs assessment task force report. The World Bank would be a logical choice to head the coordinating body. It has played such a role elsewhere in the world and also has established such expertise through its longstanding leadership of the consultative group process. If we are not resolute in supporting the Bank, the EU may volunteer itself for a coordinating role.

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3. **Financing:** Reconstruction will require an extraordinary effort by bilateral donors, complementing the efforts of the IFIs. Additionally, B-H must still become of a member of the Fund and Bank. It has arrears, however, of $409 million to the World Bank and $36 million to the IMF -- inherited from Yugoslavia -- that must be cleared prior to commencement of IFI activities.

Bilateral Donors' Role:

Bilateral donors will need to play a financing role in three respects.

First, they will need to support arrears clearance to allow B-H to normalize relations with the IFIs. Arrears-clearance exercises have typically been conducted by "support groups." Under a support group, a country takes the lead in assembling donor financing that can be lent to the arrears country once it has agreed to an IFI-supported reform package and covered by IFI disbursements. Germany (or the EU) might be a logical candidate to head the support group.

Second, they will need to provide new money for reconstruction. While it is not feasible to approximate these costs absent a needs assessment, the fact is that reconstruction costs for B-H will be large due to the ravages of war. Thus, substantial bilateral resources will be required. The donor community may wish to consider co-financing such lending with the IFIs, to leverage bilateral resources and to leverage sound reform.

Apart from small amounts of World Bank net income, the IFIs cannot provide grants. They do have the possibility of providing concessional support, though these amounts are limited. This reality underscores the imperative of active bilateral donor support.

For the United States, this means that we need to consider whether we can meet our responsibilities from the SEED budget or whether new appropriations will be required. We may be hard pressed to make an extraordinary bilateral commitment in the current budget environment as a supplemental appropriation is unlikely. In these circumstances, recourse to SEED funding may be inevitable.

Third, Treasury has agreed with B-H on and established a Fiscal Technical Assistance project. This project could be quickly activated to support reconstruction.

Additionally, there remains the thorny question of allocating the assets of the Former Yugoslav states. Bilateral donors may need to play a role in helping address this issue, perhaps either through the ICFY (International Conference on Former Yugoslavia) or some other mechanism.

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IMF

The IMF would take the lead in providing general balance of payments support for macroeconomic stabilization.

- Under normal IMF loan terms, Bosnia could have access up to $200-300 million over two years at market terms, with repayments completed in five years. This financing would be strictly conditioned.

- It might be possible subsequently to roll such a loan into an IMF loan on concessional terms, assuming B-H fell under the per capital income threshold for such lending. With very generous treatment, B-H might receive $350 to 475 million from the IMF's concessional arm over a three year period. Such financing would also require strenuous adjustment measures.

- Sale of IMF gold to support B-H would be exceedingly difficult. It would require Congressional authorization and an 85% IMF super-majority vote. Such sales could probably only be used to finance interest rate subsidies on loans.

World Bank

The World Bank would take the lead on structural reform and reconstruction.

- Rehabilitation (critical import) lending, requiring an appropriate macroeconomic framework, might quickly infuse B-H with $100-200 million of disbursements in the first year following membership.

- Structural adjustment lending could quickly follow on, continuing the infusion of fast-disbursing balance of payments support.

- Project loans would be disbursed much more slowly and over a longer period, in support of infrastructural needs.

EBRD

The EBRD also can provide invaluable support for infrastructure projects, especially in the area of transport and telecommunications. The Bank has established expertise in helping privatize firms and developing financial sectors. It has a demonstrated track record in catalyzing private sector resources for its operations.

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SUBJECT: Addendum to Proposed Sanctions Relief Package

It is important to visualize what happens during the implementation phase of the settlement to understand how the proposed reimposition measures hold Belgrade and Pale accountable for their actions. The following time-line illustrates automatic reimposition arrangements and how primary accountability shifts from Belgrade to Pale once the PIF deploys and begins its implementation mission.



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Automatic reimposition occurs when the PIF commander declares that actions by the Bosnian Serbs are preventing his force from deploying or otherwise accomplishing its mission. This is a highly credible trigger because it depends on the commander's assessment of threats to his force's safety and its ability to carry out specific tasks. The proposed sanctions relief strategy supplements these automatic reimposition procedures with a requirement that the Security Council vote every 60 days to extend sanctions relief. Any permanent member of the Council can veto the extension, thus causing reimposition of sanctions.

Belgrade and other Contact Group members may find the 60-day review too restrictive. Because of the credibility of the automatic reimposition provisions, we may be able to accept an arrangement under which any permanent Security Council member can challenge the sanctions suspensions at any time on grounds that Belgrade and/or Pale have reneged on obligations. Sanctions would then be reimposed if three of the five permanent members votes to end sanctions relief.

August 24, 1995

~~SECRET~~
MEMORANDUM

To: NSC - Sandy Vershbow
OVP - Leon Fuerth

From: USUN/W - David Scheffer JSB
- Jim O'Brien

Subject: Proposed Sanctions Relief Package

We want to bring to your attention a few key issues with respect to the proposed sanctions relief package described in the August 21 memorandum and the addendum showing the time-line.

1. Outer Wall.

The outer wall is missing in both the memorandum and the time-line. Both documents should describe and affirm the long-held U.S. position on the outer wall: we will not agree to the FRY's joining the international community (including by receiving IFI funds, receiving membership in international organizations and institutions, and starting diplomatic relations) until it meets conditions including cooperation with the Tribunal, progress in Kosovo, and perhaps some link to Croatia.

The President reaffirmed the outer wall this March, noting that Serbian cooperation with the Tribunal is a condition of its rejoining the international community. (His letter to Representative Hoyer is attached.) We should not walk back from that commitment.

In addition to the political significance of the President's statement, there are strong merits to keeping the outer wall. It has one thing Milosevic ultimately wants: international legitimacy. It will remain relevant for years after economic sanctions are suspended or lifted, as IFI funds are allocated and disbursed or as the FRY seeks to join new international bodies. It will be diverse (many IFI projects, many organizations), allowing us to tailor punishments to whatever Milosevic has done

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wrong. And we will have unilateral control over many parts of it (for example, on membership in some international institutions or anything requiring Security Council approval).

Finally, keeping the outer wall permits more flexibility in the inner wall, as reflected in your latest iteration. If we exclude the outer wall, we undermine our case for the up-front sanctions relief outlined in the new inner wall proposal. We should not make explaining this to Congress and the public more difficult than we need to.

2. Cooperation with the War Crimes Tribunal.

On the second page of the August 21 memorandum, you set forth the issue of cooperation with the War Crimes Tribunal. We appreciate your raising this issue and recommend the following points be shared with the Deputies and the Holbrooke team.

We believe that economic sanctions relief for the FRY, in addition to the outer wall, should be conditioned on its cooperation with the Tribunal.

a. Cooperation with the Tribunal is a responsible condition. It reflects the FRY's international legal obligations as set forth by the Security Council, endorsed by the U.S. Government, and enshrined in basic tenets of international law.

b. Threatening sanctions for non-cooperation is working. Over the last several months, the Tribunal has told us (please protect) that it is starting to receive tentative, back-channel information from the FRY; intelligence reports in late August confirm this. (Milosevic is instructing FRY diplomats to inform on the notorious paramilitary Arkan, just as Milosevic has previously distanced himself from other suspected war criminals).

His tentative cooperation comes against a backdrop of several years' consistent statements by Ambassador Albright and the Secretary that we will consider cooperation with the Tribunal in decisions on economic and other sanctions relief; these have been reinforced by other officials (notably John Shattuck) in parallel to the spring and summer negotiations with Milosevic. It is of course difficult to parse how much Milosevic's cooperation is due to the prospect of economic sanctions rather than to the outer wall sanctions. It is certain, however, that it is premature to give up any part of our sanctions leverage just as we are getting the result we want.

c. Our new plan requires new thinking. As Bob Frasure noted during our discussions on this issue, if we move away from Contact Group and Bildt plans we should not consider ourselves constrained by our CG partners' old objection to conditioning economic sanctions relief on cooperation with the Tribunal.

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d. We are giving something to get this new condition. Our new proposal provides more immediate, liberal, and sweeping sanctions relief than the CG or Bildt proposal. Our agreement to do that (even in response for more immediate action by Milosevic) is a concession, and it is reasonable for us to add reasonable conditions to that sanctions relief.

e. The condition can be implemented flexibly. A key question is telling Milosevic what he has to do with the Tribunal to satisfy us. The standard is almost self-defining: cooperate with its requests, which themselves set a clear record of what he should do; furthermore, he should not obstruct its work or harbor those fleeing from it.

We could accept a procedure that would prevent us from invoking this condition unilaterally or arbitrarily. For example, we could require a report from Justice Goldstone, the Prosecutor, confirming that Belgrade is "manifestly obstructing the work of the Tribunal or manifestly not complying with requests from the Tribunal, in a manner and to a degree that severely undermines the ability of the Tribunal to investigate and prosecute those accused." Minor acts of non-cooperation, or the failure to surrender one or two indicted individuals, may not meet a standard of "manifestly obstructing" or "manifestly not complying" with the Tribunal. We can further set forth in some detail what constitutes non-cooperation or obstruction.

f. Politically, manifest Serbian failure to cooperate with the Tribunal will make it very difficult for the United States to support continued sanctions relief for Serbia. We would look foolish and appear weak, Congress would skewer us, and the victims of Serb atrocities would condemn us in perpetuity. Senator Dole in the middle of the Presidential campaign would make hay of our decision to lift sanctions when it becomes known -- as could happen -- that Belgrade were harboring indicted war criminals and obstructing the Tribunal's work. All of the leadership and investment we have committed to the Tribunal will be overtaken by that single act.

This last point might be made using the approach Mr. Tarnoff took to a Bosnian cease-fire in his August 3 letter to Carl Bildt: cooperation may not technically be a prerequisite to continued sanctions relief, but political realities make it nearly that way.

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3. **Additional Notes on the Outer Wall.**

We recognize that the outer wall faces two significant potential difficulties even if it is agreed in the package. First, economic reconstruction in the FRY may require release of IFI funds, removing part of the outer wall. Second, agreement among the states of the former Yugoslavia on succession issues (perhaps in the context of agreement on debts and liabilities) may determine the FRY's access to international bodies. (If the other successor states accept the FRY's assertion that it is the continuity of the SFRY, the FRY could claim automatic membership in many international organizations, including the United Nations, and the outer wall would erode further.)

We believe that ways can be found to reconcile these needs with the importance of keeping the outer wall, especially given the diversity of the outer wall. The pressures we can expect on these issues reinforce the significance of the outer wall to Milosevic and thus the importance of retaining it: just as we will face pressures to let it go, he must be concerned that he will lose the benefits it holds.

cc: Ambassador Albright, Assistant Secretary Shattuck

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U.N. Actions for Implementation of U.S. Peace Plan

The implementation of the U.S. peace plan currently under negotiation will entail action on several fronts and for a sustained period of time at the United Nations. Failure or non-implementation of the peace plan also would involve U.N. actions. Many of the critical assumptions in the peace plan are based upon Security Council action that remains of an unpredictable character. Many of the steps in the peace plan likewise will be dependent on successful Council action. We cannot predict with certainty the full range of actions that would unfold at the United Nations, or the views other delegations on the Security Council will hold as the peace plan advances or falters. The peace plan--even if it is proceeding smoothly in capitals and on the ground--can be derailed or fatally delayed because of set-backs in the Security Council or non-cooperation by U.N. authorities.

Nonetheless, the following description of various U.N. actions relating to the peace plan offers an initial roadmap of U.N. actions that should be factored into the planning and implementation of the peace plan. As more details of the peace plan are worked out, and the views of relevant governments better known, U.N. actions can be gauged more accurately. The one certainty is that many of the actions described below will require heavy-lifting, both in New York and capitals.

This treatment of the subject is based on the August 22 draft of the documents entitled, "Implementing a Balkan Peace Settlement," and "Multilateral Equipping and Training of the Bosnian Federation," the August 21 draft of "Sanctions Issues for 8/22 Principals Committee Meeting" and its "Addendum to Proposed Sanctions Relief Package", and the Principals and Deputies meetings that discussed them.

I. Lift of the U.N. Arms Embargo

One of the assumptions in the plan is that, "The arms embargo is lifted for all of the former Yugoslavia and no disarmament by the warring parties is required." If the intention is to achieve multilateral as opposed to unilateral lift, that will require Security Council action.

U.N. Action: A new UNSC resolution that terminates UNSC Resolution 713 (1991) (and thus parts of subsequent resolutions that reaffirm UNSC Res. 713). This multilateral lift will require the affirmative vote or abstention of each P-5 Member (U.S., France, Russia, United Kingdom, China), and a total affirmative vote of at least nine UNSC members.

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Timing: The plan appears to contemplate immediate action on multilateral lift. Complicating factors include:

(1) Other Council or non-Council members with troops in UNPROFOR may insist that multilateral lift not be initiated until after UNPROFOR has withdrawn--a position consistent with their current thinking.

(2) Russia in particular might hold the multilateral lift vote hostage indefinitely to its long-stated right and intention to arm the Bosnian Serbs. If Russia votes for multilateral lift and then arms the Serbs, that might upset any arms build-down strategy built into the peace plan and probably would increase the level of arms that we would feel compelled to provide the Federation in order to achieve parity.

Conditionality:

(1) There may be considerable pressure within the Council to place some conditions on the multilateral lift (e.g., quantitative limitations on weapons exported to individual governments, types of weapons that can be imported, for use only in self-defense, no transfer outside the state's territory, labeling). Such conditionality could have a serious impact on our plan to multilaterally equip and train the Federation.

Specifically, some delegations may seek to require in the resolution that arms be delivered in-theater only at specified locations, which they would ask be monitored by the U.N.

(2) There may also be pressure to approve a suspension of the arms embargo rather than a lift. The suspension could be for one year and an automatic permanent lift thereafter unless the Council decides otherwise. Or a Council vote might be required to permanently lift after a period of suspension. The recent Security Council action to suspend the Rwanda arms embargo with conditions for one year, followed by lift unless the Council decided otherwise, may serve as a model for some delegations.

(3) Depending on the status of Sector East in Croatia, Zagreb may weigh in to condition any multilateral lift in order to impede FRY's ability to bolster its armaments in support of Serb control of Sector East. Furthermore, if UNCRO continues to have a presence in Sector East--a position we are encouraging--then troop contributors to UNCRO and the U.N. Secretariat may see a lift of the arms embargo as a potential threat to UNCRO personnel.

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II. PIF Deployment

Another assumption of the peace plan is that the Security Council will endorse the Peace Implementation Force by resolution as a NATO-led, non-blue helmeted operation.

U.N. action: PIF deployment would require a UNSC authorizing resolution for several reasons: 1) to provide clear uncontested legal authority for PIF to operate and use military force on Bosnian territory (one might construct a legal basis for PIF deployment without UNSC action, but it would be highly controversial, particularly with Council members); 2) to coordinate PIF deployment with UNPROFOR withdrawal; 3) other troop contributors to PIF would demand Council authorization; and 4) to confirm NATO command and PIF's responsibilities for parallel activities in which the U.N. remains involved (e.g., UNHCR, War Crimes Tribunal investigations and arrests, humanitarian aid).

Timing: A UNSC resolution should be adopted prior to October 31, and presumably with enough lead-time so that signing parties to the peace settlement are assured of PIF deployment immediately after October 31.

Conditionality: Numerous conditions might be proposed by Council members for authorization of PIF deployment. These conditions might include:

1) Coordination between the NATO-led operation and U.N. entities, including any remaining UNPROFOR contingents, UNHCR, UNCRO, and UNPREDEP. This would not necessarily be an attempt to create any new "dual keys," but rather to ensure that PIF operates under some agreed guidelines with respect to U.N. entities in the field.

2) The mandate and thus objectives of PIF would be addressed in the resolution--an exercise that will entail many of the issues about PIF's mandate that are being examined for the peace plan. This could include scope of authority, access to Bosnian Serb territory, host state consent and self-defense, and other use of force issues.

3) The resolution may need to revise existing UNSC authority to enforce the no-fly zone so that it is compatible with PIF. The current authority addresses the NATO-UNPROFOR relationship.

III. Withdrawal of UNPROFOR

A third critical assumption of the peace plan is that "UNPROFOR's mission is completed and its withdrawal is authorized." Details have not yet been worked out on the exact

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timing or modalities of an UNPROFOR withdrawal and how it is coordinated with PIF deployment. What constitutes completion of UNPROFOR's mission, particularly with respect to an anticipated PIF deployment, is ambiguous.

Timing and UNSC Action: The mandate for UNPROFOR expires on November 30, 1995. That would be the easiest date on which to adopt a radical change in the future of UNPROFOR. Prior to that date, UNPROFOR troops can be moved and the Secretary-General has inherent authority in some circumstances (such as intolerable risk or a request by the host country or troop contributors) to withdraw UNPROFOR troops from the theater. The withdrawal of British and Ukranian troops from Gorazde may serve as an example of what can be done without explicit UNSC direction prior to a vote to extend or terminate UNPROFOR's mandate.

Nonetheless, if there is a UNSC resolution authorizing PIF deployment adopted prior to October 31, it may be desirable to adopt a parallel resolution (one that, in the alternative, might be folded into the PIF resolution) that directs the withdrawal of UNPROFOR as PIF deploys. Otherwise, the Council would be seized with the issue soon thereafter, in November, when it determines the future of UNPROFOR on the roll-over date.

Conditionality: The complexity of an UNPROFOR withdrawal teamed with a PIF deployment (which necessarily would be engaged in covering an UNPROFOR withdrawal) would trigger discussion in the Council about various conditions.

1) The command and control of UNPROFOR in relation to PIF during the withdrawal would need to be addressed in the resolution.

2) The responsibilities of UNPROFOR during the withdrawal may need clarification. Is it tasked solely to withdraw, or also to continue to fulfill some of its existing responsibilities, particularly in assisting provision of humanitarian aid, during withdrawal?

3) The mandate of the Rapid Reaction Force during the withdrawal would be addressed. Elements of the RRF presumably will be folded into PIF. The UNSC resolution may seek to confirm that the RRF remains responsible for the protection of UNPROFOR throughout the withdrawal, and that while UNPROFOR remains in Bosnia the command of the RRF remains with the United Nations. How this squares with command arrangements for PIF and force build-up for PIF needs to be clarified.

4) The resolution probably would address UNPROFOR's responsibility for its own arms and equipment. Would it be required to withdraw all of its arms and equipment; would it be authorized to leave some behind for the PIF or old RRF that has joined PIF; would it be explicitly authorized to dump arms or equipment if necessary for its own safety during withdrawal (i.e., if sudden airlift of troops is required)?

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5) The resolution may also address the funding implications of UNPROFOR withdrawal. Presumably a withdrawal would be assessed as a regular UNPROFOR expense, but there may be characteristics of it that we prefer to see paid for through alternative mechanisms (particularly in relation to simultaneous PIF deployment). Although the Council has no authority to determine assessments, the subject would be raised in the context of the resolution (as we experienced with the RRF resolution).

IV. Future of UNCRO and UNPREDEP

Decision made with respect to UNPROFOR and the peace settlement as a whole will influence Council decisions on the future mandate and deployment of UNCRO in Croatia and UNPREDEP in Macedonia. Depending on the cooperation of all parties concerned, decisions will need to be reached on force levels and locations for both peacekeeping operations (particularly UNCRO in Sector East and the American force level in UNPREDEP).

Timing: Like UNPROFOR, the mandates of UNCRO and UNPREDEP expire on November 30, 1995. That date will force the Council to reconsider the mandates and deployments of each operation. But the Council may see reason to address either one prior to the scheduled expiration date.

V. Sanctions Suspension/Lift/Enforcement

The proposed sanctions relief package for the peace plan will require a series of UNSC resolutions:

1) An initial resolution suspending sanctions against the FRY, with conditions and modalities for automatic reimposition. This resolution would need to be adopted before October 31 as part of the over-all plan, which includes signing of the peace settlement and PIF deployment.

2) Upon full deployment of the PIF and commencement of the implementation phase of the settlement, a resolution would be required to suspend sanctions on the Pale Serbs and suspend the border closure, as well as the conditions and modalities for automatic reimposition. This resolution logically would be required either immediately prior to or simultaneously with the start of the implementation phase of the settlement. One key issue would be what to do with the ICFY monitoring team on the border--should they "stand by" or "stand down"?

3) A resolution lifting all sanctions (except frozen assets subject to claims) on the FRY. This would be required upon full implementation of the peace settlement and FRY recognition of Croatia. The timing presumably would be immediately prior

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to or simultaneously with the determination by the Council that there has been full implementation and satisfactory FRY recognition of Croatia.

4) Six months after full implementation of the peace settlement, the UNSC would vote to lift all sanctions against Pale, provided the Bosnian Serbs continue to live up to the terms of the settlement.

5) Prior to full lift of sanctions, the Council can vote to override an automatic reimposition of sanctions on the grounds of good faith efforts by the parties.

6) Extension of suspension of FRY sanctions every 60 days would require a Council vote. Any permanent member of the Council could veto the extension, thus causing reimposition of sanctions. Thus every 60 days an extension vote would arise in the Council, prompting the need for a report on compliance to be delivered to the Council prior to the vote. How Council members approach each 60-day vote will be influenced by the conditions on the ground and the political dynamics in the peace settlement.

In the alternative to a 60-day cycle, there is discussion of a requirement to reimpose sanctions if three of the five permanent members vote to end sanctions relief--a condition that would have to be set forth in any suspension resolution. We must bear in mind that this alternative proposal has grave political and legal difficulties. It would be unprecedented in U.N. history and Council practice and raise questions under the U.N. Charter. Non-permanent members in particular would object.

Automatic reimposition: The proposal to give the PIF commander the power to reimpose automatically sanctions based upon his assessment of threats to his force's safety and its ability to carry its mission doubtless will stimulate much debate in the Council, and be very difficult to achieve. A set of conditions for such assessment and modalities for implementing a reimposition of sanctions would almost certainly have to be worked out in some detail in the suspension resolution.

VI. Movement of People and Work of UNHCR

Depending on how PIF deployment and UNPROFOR withdrawal are planned and implemented, UNHCR will determine whether or not it can remain on the ground in Bosnia. This decision will have a significant impact on how movements of people are handled as well as the delivery of humanitarian aid. A UNHCR withdrawal from Bosnia could trigger large movements of people, cripple efforts to deliver humanitarian aid, and thus seriously effect the mission of the PIF. Troop deployments and redeployments also could affect the safety of UNHCR personnel.

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As the peace plan takes further shape, we will need to determine the likely conditions UNHCR will expect in the field in order to continue its work in Bosnia. Close coordination with Mrs. Ogata in Geneva will be essential. In particular, coordination between the PIF and UNHCR on the delivery of humanitarian aid--both in Federation territory and Bosnian Serb territory--will need to be coordinated. PIF will need to know what UNHCR expects of it in terms of convoy escort and protection, and UNHCR will need to know the limits of PIF capabilities.

VII. Economic Reconstruction

Implementing an economic reconstruction plan (particularly if it extends outside the Federation territory) will intersect with sanctions relief and the outer wall (access to IFI money, legitimacy in terms of membership in international institutions such as the United Nations). Therefore, certain U.N. actions will be required. These include:

1) UNSC resolutions on sanctions relief (described above).

2) Admission of the FRY into the United Nations. The FRY's presence at the United Nations and associated international organizations has been crippled by Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, all of which require the FRY to seek admission to the United Nations as a new member. We have staunchly refused to grant the FRY successor status to the former Yugoslavia. Therefore, many of the governments and international institutions engaged in funding a multilateral economic reconstruction plan may require as a precondition FRY legitimacy, namely admission to the United Nations. (U.N. admission is not the only way to gain legitimacy or obtain funding, of course, but in this case it may well prove to be a necessary benchmark.) The timing of any such vote in the Security Council and General Assembly will be influenced by full implementation of the peace settlement, Pale's performance, war crimes indictments, and Belgrade's position on claims on Yugoslavia's frozen assets. Belgrade's full recognition of all former republics of Yugoslavia may also be a condition to getting the necessary votes for admission to the United Nations.

VIII. War Crimes Tribunal

The War Crimes Tribunal will continue to investigate, indict, and issue arrest warrants, as well as request cooperation from relevant government authorities in the region. Such actions may influence the implementation of the peace settlement and the sanctions relief program, depending on the gravity of non-cooperation by Belgrade or Pale. Serb authorities in either city may react unpredictably to Tribunal activity, and in ways that have a direct impact on their compliance with the peace settlement and interaction with the PIF.

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IX. Role of the Secretary-General

It will be necessary to maintain close consultation with the U.N. Secretary-General throughout the negotiation and implementation of the peace settlement. His cooperation will be essential with respect to the withdrawal of UNPROFOR, the authority under which PIF will operate, and the execution of the sanctions relief package. One reason is that the Council will call upon the Secretary-General to issue reports prior to critical Council decisions on these matters. Those reports carry considerable weight with Council members. We also need his cooperation in bringing other governments along, particularly troop contributors to UNPROFOR.

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FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 25 AUG 95
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PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 28 AUG DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 29 AUG 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9521013 9521017

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001		X	95082515	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
001	SENS	Z	95082515	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	95082515	DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950825	FUERTH, L	
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002	950825	MCALEER, R	
002	950825	INDERFURTH, R	
002	950825	ADAMS, G	
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002	950825	WILLIAMS, A	
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~~Doris~~ /Pete: Please discuss this w/ Sandy when the opportunity allows so I can get memo out to agencies by weekend. Rich

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DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	8/25	5:35	Lara Hobbs PRINT LAST NAME: POTTER COPY: 1
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DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: 1
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	8/28	7:01	CAholmes PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX+1
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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

PRINT LAST NAME: _____
COPY: VIA FAX+1

COL ROBERT P. MCALEER
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ROOM 3E880
PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

PRINT LAST NAME: _____
COPY: VIA FAX

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER
ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
2201 C STREET NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319

PRINT LAST NAME: _____
COPY: VIA FAX

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET
ROOM 238
OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG
WASHINGTON, DC 20503

9/27/95 _____ G Graves
PRINT LAST NAME: GRAVES
COPY: 1

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS
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TIME OF RECEIPT

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RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 1790 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia

NSC LOG # 9521007

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
State B	Executive Secretary		
Defense N	Executive Secretary		
USUN/State B	Rick Inderfurth		
CIA A	Executive Secretary		
AID/STATE B	Executive SEcretary		
JCS D	Secretary		

REMARKS:

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Initials: RDS Date: 9/30/2019
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TIME OF RECEIPT

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MESSAGE NO.: 1790 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia

NSC LOG # 9521007

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
State B	Executive Secretary		
Defense N	Executive Secretary		
USUN/State B	Rick Inderfurth		
CIA A	Executive Secretary		
AID/STATE B	Executive SEcretary		
JCS D	Secretary		

REMARKS:

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~~PRIORITY~~
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 1790 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia

NSC LOG # 9521007

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
State B	Executive Secretary		
Defense N	Executive Secretary		
USUN/State B	Rick Inderfurth		
CIA A	Executive Secretary		
AID/STATE B	Executive SEcretary		
JCS D	Secretary		

REMARKS:

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Initials: RDS Date: 9/30/2019
2010-0533-M

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WHITE HOUSE
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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

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25 AUG 95 15
AFIC/JCS 44

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
~~PRIORITY~~
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 1790 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 3
(PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia

NSC LOG # 9521007

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
State B	Executive Secretary		
Defense N	Executive Secretary		
USUN/State B	Rick Inderfurth		
CIA A	Executive Secretary		
AID/STATE B	Executive SEcretary		
JCS D	Secretary		

REMARKS:

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Initials: RDS Date: 9/30/2019
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- ☐ IMMEDIATE
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DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting DC Mtg on Bosnia PAGES: 3

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

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If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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21007

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 25, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. DOUGLAS GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. AARON S. WILLIAMS
Executive Secretary
Agency for International Development

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia, Monday, August 28, 1995 from 2:00 p.m. - 3:30 p.m. Attendance is principals plus one. An agenda for the meeting is attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/30/2019
2010-0533-M

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NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA
DATE: August 28, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:00 - 3:30 p.m.

Agenda

I. Economic Reconstruction Planning.....State

II. Peace Settlement Implementation Planning .....OSD/JCS

III. Arm and Train.....OSD/JCS

IV. Sanctions Relief Strategy.....OVP

V. Status of Other Work.....NSC

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 2/6/2020
2013-0682-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

21007

August 25, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ~~ANTHONY LAKE~~ Berger

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: SUE BREMNER

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting, August 28, 1995

Attached is an agenda (Tab A) for the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia for Monday, August 28, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the agenda and authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to Agencies
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 9/30/2019
2010-0533-M

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See also 2013-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (3 pages)~~	~~09/08/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
~~001b. memo~~	~~[Duplicate of 001a] [incomplete copy] (2 pages)~~	~~09/08/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
002a. memo	Sue Bremner to Samuel Berger re: Deputies Committee Meeting (4 pages)	09/07/1995	P1/b(1)
~~002b. agenda~~	~~[Duplicate of 003] (1 page)~~	~~09/08/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002c. paper~~	~~re: Issues for Discussion (1 page)~~	~~09/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002d. paper~~	~~re: Implementation Structure (2 pages)~~	~~09/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002e. paper~~	~~re: Political Implementation Structures in a Bosnian Settlement (4 pages)~~	~~09/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
002f. paper	re: Russian and other Non-NATO Participation in NATO Implementation Force in Bosnia [partial] (3 pages)	09/06/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 6/11/2020
002g. paper	re: Equipping and Training the Bosnian Federation [partial] (1 page)	09/01/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 6/11/2020
~~002h. paper~~	~~re: Equip and Train: Diplomatic Considerations (3 pages)~~	~~09/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002i. paper~~	~~re: Confidence-Building/Arms Control Measures to Accompany Political Settlement (3 pages)~~	~~09/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
002j. paper	re: Continuation of Air Support Beyond the Peace Implementation Force [partial] (1 page)	08/31/1995	~~P1/b(1)~~, b(6) KBH 2/27/2017

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2010-0533-M
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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2010-0533-M
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 09 SEP 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA SOC
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 8 SEP DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: HARMON SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 12 SEP 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9521035 9521044

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0221 CODES:

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FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
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		BERGER
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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

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002		X	95091107	HARMON SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950909	FUERTH, L	
002	950909	BRILL, K	
002	950909	ADAMS, G	
002	950909	NYE, J	
002	950909	MCALEER, R	
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002	950909	YANNUZZI, R	
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Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger	2		REDelivered
Lake			
Situation Room		Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	via fax
West Wing Desk	4	9/7	
Records Mgt.	5	9/11	D orig.

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Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger	2		
Lake		Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			via fax
West Wing Desk	4	9/7	
Records Mgt.	5	9/11	Doria

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

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SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION OF 8 SEP DC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
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DATE: 12 Sept TIME: 1050 SIGNATURE: Nikki Bujold
PRINT LAST NAME: Bujold Jensen
COPY: 1

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

DATE: 9-10-95 TIME: 2 PM 10 SIGNATURE: Christina Tyler
PRINT LAST NAME:
COPY: 1

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET
ROOM 238
OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG
WASHINGTON, DC 20503

DATE: 9-12-95 TIME: 12:15 SIGNATURE: Graves
PRINT LAST NAME: GRAVES
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DATE 09 SEP 95

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION OF 8 SEP DC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	9/14	3:10P	S. McElh PRINT LAST NAME: McELHANEY COPY: 1
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
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MESSAGE NO.: 1905 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 5 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions for 8 Sept. D.C. meeting on Bosnia NSC LOG # 21047

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
State B	Executive Secretary		
Treasury K/	Executive Secretary		
DoD N	Executive Secretary		
USUN B	Ofc. of Rep. of the US		
CIA A	Executive Secretary		
AID B	Executive Secretary		
JCS D	Secretary, Joint Staff		

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Initials: RDS Date: 10/1/2019
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DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 1905 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 5 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions for 8 Sept. D.C. meeting on Bosnia NSC LOG # 21047

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
State B	Executive Secretary		
Treasury KI	Executive Secretary		
DOD N	Executive Secretary		
USUN B	Ofc. of Rep. of the US		
CIA A	Executive Secretary		
AID B	Executive Secretary		
JCS D	Secretary, Joint Staff		

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Initials: RDS Date: 10/1/2019
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(PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (202) 456-9425 WH SITROOM
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions for 8 Sept. D.C. meeting on Bosnia NSC LOG # 21047

TO (AGENCY)		DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
State	B	Executive Secretary		
Treasury	KI	Executive Secretary		
DoD	N	Executive Secretary		
USUN	B	Ofc. of Rep. of the US		
CIA	A	Executive Secretary		
AID	B	Executive Secretary		
JCS	D	Secretary, Joint Staff		

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RELEASER: A. Bunz

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FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions for 8 Sept. D.C. Meeting on Bosnia NSC LOG # 21047

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
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DOD N	Executive Secretary		
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FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions for 8 Sept. D.C. meeting on Bosnia NSC LOG # 21047

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
State B	Executive Secretary		
Treasury K/	Executive Secretary		
DOD N	Executive Secretary		
USUN B	Ofc. of Rep. of the US		
CIA A	Executive Secretary		
AID B	Executive Secretary		
JCS D	Secretary, Joint Staff		

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DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: ~~[redacted]~~ Summary of Meeting : 8 Sept. DC on Bosnia PAGES: Cover + 4

PLEASE DELIVER TO: NSC # 21047

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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21047

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 9, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the UN

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. AARON S. WILLIAMS
Executive Secretary
Agency for International Development

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, September 8, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Joyce A. Stern for
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

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21047

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee
DATE: September 8, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 11:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR
Sandy Berger

OVP
Leon Fuerth
Rick Saunders

STATE
Strobe Talbott
John Kornblum
James Steinberg

TREASURY
David Lipton
Stephen Altheim

DEFENSE
Jan Lodal
Robert Osterthaler

USUN
Rick Inderfurth
David Scheffer
Jim O'Brien

OMB
Gordon Adams
Keith Bickel

CIA
George Tenet
John Gannon

AID
Thomas Dine
M. Douglas Stafford

JCS
Michael Byron
Douglas Lute

NSC
Alexander Vershbow
Sue Bremner

Summary of Conclusions

1. Deputies discussed four topics: 1) the shape and mandate of the political implementation mechanism that would coordinate among the actors in-country during the settlement implementation period; 2) equipping and training the Bosnian Federation; and 3) funding strategies for various aspects of post-settlement policy. They agreed to defer discussion of reconstruction assistance until the return of Ralph Johnson from consultations with the EU. (C)

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2009-0533-M
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2. On the issue of the **political implementation mechanism,** Deputies agreed to the following:

- The mission of the political implementation mechanism will chiefly be to coordinate among, rather than to control, the organizations that will play a role in the region after settlement: the NATO implementation force (IFOR), EU, ICFY, OSCE, IFIs, UN, UNHCR, ICRC and other NGOs, bilateral players, etc. Depending on the terms of the settlement, however, some international elements might report directly to the mechanism, or it could be itself directly responsible for implementing certain tasks.
- The political implementation mechanism will serve as a bridge between the various international actors and local officials.
- There should be a strong leader of political stature as the head of the political implementation mechanism.
- The political implementation mechanism should be established as part of the settlement documents and thus have essentially free-standing authority, although we would hope it would be "blessed" by the Security Council.
- Its role will likely extend beyond the termination of the mandate of the peace implementation force. ~~(S)~~

3. State agreed to revise and combine its papers on the political implementation mechanism into a final draft for Deputies' consideration the week of September 11. The new draft should include:

- a clear mandate and delineation of tasks for the political implementation mechanism, with initial recommendations on degree of authority desirable on a function-by-function basis;
- pros and cons and recommendations on the desirability of an American head;
- possible transitional arrangements for the period prior to the constitution of the new implementation mechanism. **(Action: State)** ~~(S)~~

4. In light of the September 5 Principals' discussions of **equip and train,** Deputies reaffirmed that an interagency Task Force, chaired by State and including OSD, JCS, OMB, and others as necessary, would be formed to reexamine and redefine the U.S. role while adhering to our goal of establishing a Federation self-defense capability. Specifically, the Task Force was asked to look at the following questions and prepare a paper for Deputies' consideration the week of September 11:

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- What degree of U.S. leadership, and what size U.S. contribution to the equip/train effort, will be required to keep negotiations going and further the peace implementation process?
- What type of U.S. involvement will be necessary to give us sufficient leverage to prevent pariah states from undertaking military assistance to the Federation?
- Would lifting the arms embargo be enough, in and of itself, to keep the peace implementation process going?
- What provisions and strategy should we pursue to ensure that feasible arms control/limitation mechanisms are included in the settlement agreement?
- When should we begin consultations with the Bosnians on their military needs and wishes?
- If a needs assessment is not possible, how can we best make decisions on the size of our contribution?
- What is the legal framework for equip and train?
- How will we finance our contribution? **(Action: State/Task Force)** ~~(S)~~

5. On the issue of **funding** for the range of post-settlement efforts, Deputies agreed that OMB would produce a paper laying out strategies to obtain sufficient resources to meet our policy goals. **(Action: OMB)** ~~(C)~~

6. Deputies briefly discussed the **Croatian offensive** inland from the Dalmatian coast toward Jajce and agreed that demarches should be made to Croatian leaders to urge restraint, especially as there were signs that the Serbs perceived the Croatian offensive as occurring in concert with the ongoing NATO strikes. **(Action: State/NSC)** ~~(S)~~

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21047

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 8, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: SUE BREMNER

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, September 8, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of Conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia held September 8, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve OK Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

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2. On the issue of the **political implementation mechanism,** Deputies agreed to the following:

- The mission of the political implementation mechanism will chiefly be to coordinate among, rather than to control, the organizations that will play a role in the region after settlement: the NATO implementation force (IFOR), EU, ICFY, OSCE, IFIs, UN, UNHCR, ICRC and other NGOs, bilateral players, etc. Depending on the terms of the settlement, some international elements might report directly to the mechanism, or it could be itself directly responsible for implementing certain tasks.
- The political implementation mechanism will serve as a bridge between the various international actors and local officials.
- There should be a strong leader of political stature as the head of the political implementation mechanism.
- The political implementation mechanism ~~will~~ be established as part of the settlement documents and thus have essentially free-standing authority, although we would hope it would be "blessed" by the Security Council.
- Its role will likely extend beyond the termination of the mandate of the peace implementation force. ~~(S)~~

3. State agreed to revise and combine its papers on the political implementation mechanism into a final draft for Deputies' consideration the week of September 11. The new draft should include:

- a clear mandate and delineation of tasks for the political implementation mechanism;
- ~~further examination of~~ and recommendations on the desirability of an American head;
- exploration of ~~whether the organization was best connected with an~~ existing entities (the UN, OSCE, ICFY, P-5, G-7, etc.), or whether it would work better sui generis;
- possible transitional arrangements for the period prior to the constitution of the new implementation mechanism. **(Action: State)** ~~(S)~~

4. In light of the September 5 Principals' discussions of **equip and train,** Deputies reaffirmed that an interagency Task Force, chaired by State and including OSD, JCS, OMB, and others as necessary, would be formed to reexamine and redefine the U.S. role while adhering to our goal of establishing a Federation

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2013-0682-M (3.35)

self-defense capability. Specifically, the Task Force was asked to look at the following questions and prepare a paper for Deputies' consideration the week of September 11:

- What degree of U.S. leadership, and what size U.S. contribution to the equip/train effort, will be required to keep negotiations going and further the peace implementation process?
- What type of U.S. involvement will be necessary to ~~prevent~~ give us sufficient leverage to prevent pariah states from undertaking military assistance to the Federation?
- Would lifting the arms embargo be enough, in and of itself, to keep the peace implementation process going?
- ~~How do we avoid inadvertently contributing to an arms race?~~ What provisions and strategy should be pursue
- ~~What can we do~~ to ensure that feasible arms control/limitation mechanisms are included in the settlement agreement?
- When should we begin consultations with the Bosnians on their military needs and wishes?
- If a needs assessment is not possible, how can we best make decisions on the size of our contribution?
- What is the legal framework for equip and train?
- How will we finance our contribution? **(Action: State/Task Force)** ~~(S)~~

5. On the issue of **funding** for the range of post-settlement efforts, Deputies agreed that OMB would produce a paper laying out strategies to obtain sufficient resources to meet our policy goals. **(Action: OMB)** ~~(C)~~

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TO: BERGER

FROM: VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 07 SEP 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
UN
NATO
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 8 SEP DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER DUE DATE: 11 SEP 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9521035 9521047

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0221 CODES:

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FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BREMNER
		NSC CHRON
		VERSHBOW

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COMMENTS: Bosnia DC Mtg Package
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	Sue Bremner to Samuel Berger re: Deputies Committee Meeting (4 pages)	09/07/1995	P1/b(1)

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2010-0533-M
rs683

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P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
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b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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(I)

NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA
DATE: September 8, 1995
LOCATION: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
TIME: 11:00 - 12:00 a.m.

AGENDA

I. Peace Plan Implementation

A. Political Implementation Structure.....State*

B. Modalities of a NATO-plus Peace Implementation Force (IFOR).....OSD/JCS*

C. Engaging the Russians on IFOR issues.....State

D. Update on IFOR consultations with Allies.....OSD/JCS

II. Equipping and Training for Federation forces

A. U.S. strategy and role (in light of September 5 Principals' discussion).....NSC

B. Mandate of State-led interagency task force.....All

C. Gameplan for consulting Allies/others.....State/OSD

D. Arms Control and CBM Options.....State*

E. NATO air support beyond end of equip/train effort...JCS*

III. Post-war Economic Reconstruction: Report on Consultations with EU and Next Steps.....State

IV. Funding Issues: Next Steps.....NSC/OMB

* Paper should be circulated by the lead agency no later than 5:00 p.m. September 7

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By K NARA, Date 2/6/2020

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new
tab II
(3 pieces)

Issues for Discussion

Legal status of the implementation authority

Whatever the structure of the civilian and military implementation authority, its legal personality and status must be determined well in advance the settlement, preferably early in the negotiating process. Options include:

- o A UN body (note: virtually any international civilian authority will require a UNSC mandate, as will IFOR);
- o An entity affiliated with some other international organization, such as the EU or OSCE;
- → • A free-standing international control authority (or control commission) established by the peace agreement;
- o An entity combining complementary elements of the above options.

Previous practice and UN precedents in Haiti, Southern Africa, and Cambodia show that a shape-to-fit legal status can be arranged that can meet our political requirements.

Bureaucratic superstructure / Lines of Authority

Options for the implementation authority's leadership and administration include:

- o A Senior Implementation Coordinator (SIC) or Representative (SIR), preferably an American of significant stature, with consultative authority and/or a coordinating role vis. all international entities in Bosnia (UN agencies, OSCE, etc.); (See the attached paper on Implementation Superstructure);
- o A consultative commission, preferably chaired by a senior American, to perform this role;

The best option would be as light and flexible a bureaucratic superstructure as possible. The exact nature of bureaucratic support will be determined largely by the control/supervision over other international entities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially the military (including the joint commission), international organizations with expertise to offer on the ground, and local authorities, including intercommunal confidence-building entities. With appropriate revisions to reflect past mistakes, the existing UN model may be carried over; IFOR will take over from UNPROFOR and the implementation authority may assume the role now played by Akashi & Co.

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IMPLEMENTATION STRUCTURE

Implementing the settlement in all its political, economic, humanitarian, military and other aspects will require a coordinating superstructure with a clear mandate to make the settlement work, as well as mobilization of a variety of organizations, most already active in the Balkans. This operation would require authorization from some combination of the UN Security Council, the warring parties (via the settlement agreement), and NATO.

The operation would be headed by a respected senior statesman, a strong personality and preferably an American to signify U.S. commitment and leadership role in brokering the settlement. This Senior Implementation Coordinator (SIC) would have a small secretariat, presumably located in Sarajevo. He would have overall responsibility for settlement implementation by working with local authorities and by overseeing international efforts. He would coordinate the work of independent agencies with specific functions, e.g. UNHCR, ECMM, and supervise staff for other tasks, e.g. conduct of elections.

A NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) would have responsibility for enforcing the peace agreement as required. Its commander would be the final authority on military and security matters. Ideally, IFOR would be incorporated into the overall structure as an independent agency. Alternatively, it could be set up separately from the general civilian implementation operation. The commander, or at least his chief of staff, should also be American.

The various agencies should be located in close proximity to the Senior Implementation Coordinator, with small liaison staffs in the same building. The SIC would not have formal line authority over the implementation agencies, but would work to ensure that various players do not duplicate tasks, do not undermine the work of other agencies, and do not contravene the general principles of the settlement.

The SIC would chair consultative meetings of the resident representatives of the main organizations active on the ground in Bosnia. Those agencies would include but not be restricted to IFOR, UN, UNHCR, EU/ECMM, OSCE, and IBRD. Other possibilities include ICFY, UNCRO, any UNPROFOR remnant, an international reconstruction mission, UN human rights monitors, Office of the UNSYG, Office of the NATO SYG, and possibly an arms-parity control organization. Major aid donors and/or other governments playing a key bilateral role in the settlement should also be included in the consultative meetings in an appropriate way.

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Meetings would review progress, exchanging information and coordinating efforts as directed by the SIC (although in some cases they would not be decision-making events, e.g. regarding IFOR or UNHCR operations). The SIC would exercise direction by virtue of his authority (presumably reinforced by a mandate to provide regular reports to the UNSC as with the ICFY co-chairs) and through his staff. As the senior international figure in Bosnia, he would be the locus for contact with the Federation and Serb Republic Governments and would maintain liaison offices in Belgrade, Zagreb, and possibly Skopje and elsewhere.

VV
What is his authority

Committees of the consultative meeting would meet as needed in the following, and perhaps other, fields:

-- Military Security

-- Human Rights

-- Resettlement

-- Reconstruction

-- Arms Control (and/or military assistance)

-- Confidence-Building

-- War Crimes

-- Democratic Elections and Institutions

-- Border Control

-- Legal/Dispute Settlement Issues

lots of structure

The SIC would designate a chairman for each of these committees, who could be either the local head of a relevant international agency or a deputy of the SIC. For example, the IFOR commander could chair the military committee, while the OSCE mission head chaired the arms control committee, and the SIC's top political adviser chaired the human rights/democracy-building committee. The guiding principle in organizing this structure should be pragmatism. To the extent possible, however, the structure should pave the way for Bosnian governmental institutions called for in the settlement, e.g. reconstruction commission, arbitration panel, and should provide important jobs to offer to nationals of various governments to help secure their support.

NO

The question of bringing Russia on board is discussed separately. It is worth noting here, however, that Russian participation in the IFOR and the arms control entity could help greatly in this effort.

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POLITICAL IMPLEMENTATION STRUCTURES IN A BOSNIAN SETTLEMENT

The Task

We need to begin now to prepare for the establishment -- in the context of a Bosnian settlement -- of an on-the-ground political framework structure to integrate, coordinate and, to a lesser degree, oversee progress on the various political undertakings of a settlement package and the activities of international organizations and activities involved in different aspects of implementation.

"Peace implementation" will require not only a military component -- through the NATO-led PIF to ensure a secure environment within which implementation can go forward -- but also a means of ensuring there is continued facilitation of political negotiations among the parties, promotion of local conflict resolution and monitoring of human rights, coordination of economic reconstruction, delivery of humanitarian assistance, monitoring of various confidence-building/arms control measures of increasing scope. Both an overall political framework and a central coordinating mechanism will be required.

There are various models of previous international interventions -- such as Haiti, Cambodia -- on which we can draw in terms of structures, functions and experience. Bosnia, however, will be sui generis -- not least because of the difficulty in meshing the roles of key international organizations. We will, for example, want a political implementation structure that is seen as distinctively different from past UN operations in the regions and minimizes any future role of the UN secretariat. At the same time, NATO will be called upon to play an unprecedented role in leading the PIF whose freedom of action we will wish to protect. We will wish to draw upon resources of the EU and OIC, even while maximizing our own national influence.

How the United States seeks to define the role, mandate, structure and senior leadership of such an international on-the-ground political component of settlement implementation will directly affect:

-- the credibility of the package that our current negotiating efforts are promoting with the parties in the region;

-- our ability to generate sufficient diplomatic support for a NATO-led military implementation force along the lines we desire;

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-- our ability to encourage and ensure continued progress in the various political undertakings of a settlement once launched; and,

-- the credibility of our exit strategy for the PIF and the withdrawal of its major U.S. elements by a date certain in late '96.

This latter point will be especially critical. While the NATO-led PIF is clearly intended to be of specific and limited duration, a political implementation structure would have the opportunity (indeed requirement) to run longer. (Just as an ongoing international presence to support and oversee democratic development within Haiti provided the context within which timely withdrawal of initial intervention forces was politically possible, so too will our announcement of an exit date and strategy for the PIF need to be accompanied by the sense that political mechanism for dealing with longer-term problems is in place in Bosnia.)

Defining the Framework Structure

From the U.S. perspective, any such on-the-ground political implementation structure (however labelled) should meet the following requirements:

-- It should have a clear political mandate and authority, not least to set it apart from the various international bodies and personalities that over time have come to claim a generalized or specific role in the former Yugoslavia (e.g., ICFY, ECMM, UN agencies, etc.). Its mandate/authority should flow directly and explicitly from the terms of the settlement among the parties themselves. As necessary, it should be blessed -- not necessarily created -- by a UNSC Resolution.

-- As the senior international authority for overall implementation in the region, it should be built around a few key leadership positions and a relatively light bureaucratic superstructure. It should not seek to create an entirely new on-the-ground presence to handle specialized tasks but rather have the task of integration and oversight of the "sub-contract work" of other agencies and efforts.

-- The head of this political framework structure (however labelled) should have a close and integral relationship with the NATO-led PIF but with no authority to control or inhibit PIF operations. (Put another way, this definitely would not be a recreation of Akashi's past role vis-a-vis UNPROFOR). The PIF should be seen as a consistent part of the overall implementation structure but clearly separate and distinct in its lines of command and control.

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-- The head of this political framework structure should also have -- again flowing from the terms of the settlement itself -- an established central role vis-a-vis the parties in the political processes set in motion by the settlement package. This will be particularly important in the context of facilitating post-settlement negotiations regarding practical details of the Bosnian Serbs' constitutional role within a unitary Bosnia.

-- Leadership staffing of this structure should maximize U.S. influence and direction. In particular, an American should occupy the position of senior international representative on the ground (however this is labelled - whether as High Commissioner or Personal Representative or the like). At the same time, it might prove politically important to carve out visible positions (in the appropriate areas of competency) for senior EU and Russian representatives.

Challenges in Defining Relationships with Other Institutions

Ideally, the United States would wish to see such a political implementation structure as separate and distinct from the UN as possible. As noted above, a prerequisite of this new operation would be a clear political break with UNPROFOR's past history. A complete break, however, would seem most unlikely to achieve.

-- The other members of the UNSC P-5 -- as well as the UN SYG -- will strongly insist, most likely as a price to a UNSC mandate to NATO for organization and command of the PIF, on some form of visible and meaningful UN role in political implementation.

-- At the same time, we will want to make full use of the resources and expertise of a host of UN and other specialized agencies.

-- Moreover, establishment of such a political operation would tax the current abilities of other organizations that might possibly assume such an institutional role -- OSCE or NATO itself. While casting this political framework structure in the context of either NATO or OSCE would not be impossible, it would require a major political effort on our part to realize.

-- Therefore, it is quite possible that we would face major pressures to at least designate the senior international representative with a label that ties the position to the UN SYG, even while designing the role and relationship in different terms from the past.

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-- Finally, it is also not yet clear the extent to which the Bosnian Government will be prepared to accept an international political presence that, at least according to our initial expectations, might be both long-term and intrusive.

Next Steps

As initial next steps, we would need to do the following:

-- Begin to stress, in our internal planning as well as in presentation to the parties, allies and others, "peace implementation" as a fundamentally political, as well as military, effort, thus requiring an on-the-ground political umbrella for the NATO-led PIF.

-- Refine precisely what tasks might be the priority for such a political implementation structure and how it might be organized to perform its integration, coordination and oversight roles.

-- Begin to develop specific options for how such an operation might be related to other bodies, not least being the UN SYG, in such a way as to meet our own bottom line.

-- Begin to identify possible U.S. personnel for key leadership positions.

SERPM2-12
9/5/95, 1300hrs

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002f. paper	re: Russian and other Non-NATO Participation in NATO Implementation Force in Bosnia [partial] (3 pages)	09/06/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4001

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0221 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, September 8, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs683

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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TAB III

(first draft)

WORKING DRAFT

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6 September 1995

POSITION PAPER

Subject: Russian and other Non-NATO Participation in NATO Implementation Force in Bosnia

1. (~~S~~) Purpose. To establish a Joint Staff/OSD position regarding Russian and other non-NATO participation in a NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia, in response to a tasking in the NSC Principals Committee meeting, 5 Sep 95.

2. (~~S~~) Background Points.

- In its memo to the Principals for the 5 Sep meeting, Deputies Committee agreed that:
  - ◊ The IFOR will be a NATO operation with limited non-NATO participation.
  - ◊ While operational efficiency of the IFOR will be reduced by involvement of non-NATO forces, non-NATO participation -- especially by Russia -- will be politically necessary and in some respects, desirable (e.g., as an opportunity for Partnership for Peace countries to operate with NATO forces).
  - ◊ Non-NATO forces must be militarily capable, interoperable with NATO, and fully equipped; EO 13526 1.4d EO 13526 1.4d
- Due to its strong geo-political interests in the Balkans and ethnic ties to the Serbs, the Russians in particular will want to participate in IFOR. Further, Russia has been engaged in the Bosnia crisis both diplomatically as a member of the Contact Group and militarily as a troop contributor to UNPF. There are 825 Russian soldiers in UNCRO's Sector East, 430 in Sarajevo, and 31 UNMO's in dispersed locations.
- The IFOR will set precedents for future NATO CJTFs in out-of-area operations.

3. (~~S~~) Discussion.

Non-NATO troop contributing countries, including Russia, are kept apprised of NATO planning by way of the Ad Hoc Planning and Coordination Group (AHPCG). This forum is appropriate for informing them of NATO's plans for

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Declassify on OADR

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WORKING DRAFT

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2013-0682-M

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IFOR and their proposed participation.

If the NATO plan for IFOR draws on past experience with OPLAN 40103 or OPLAN 40104, it will be a phased operation. Phase I will be the preparatory phase in which forces are trained, exercised and prepared for movement into the theater of operations. Training of non-NATO participants, to include basic familiarization with NATO procedures and operational concepts, could be accomplished in this phase. Forces currently assigned to UNPROFOR and deemed not interoperable with NATO forces [redacted] EO 13526 1.4d would not be invited to participate.

Agreement would have to be reached with the UN and with non-NATO participants for transfer of authority (TOA) to NATO. A Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) would also be needed for all participants in the implementation operation.

Agreement on TOA may hinge on the presence of a UN representative in theater and/or a non-NATO military official in a key position. A UN civilian official could serve at Theater Command level for consultation on political issues. It is not clear at this point that this would be acceptable to NATO allies and non-NATO contributors alike. This issue requires planning to avoid undercutting our CJTF position at NATO.

Advantages of Russian and other non-NATO participation:

- Assists NATO's generation of overall force strength required for peace enforcement mission.
- Enhances prospects of long-term regional stability by taking advantage of Russian leverage with Serbs.
- Enhances relations with Russia and other non-NATO countries by acknowledging their interests in the region.
- Enhances Russian and other non-NATO countries' confidence in NATO.
- Enhances impartiality of IFOR by including Russia, a pro-Serbian participant.
- Takes advantage of opportunity to enhance PFP relationship with Russia and others.

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- Russia is capable of being self-sufficient and funding its participation, so NATO does not accept additional financial burden. Others should also pay their share.
- Increases likelihood of Russian support in UN Security Council.

Disadvantages of Russian and non-NATO participation:

- Detracts from IFOR effectiveness due lack of interoperability with non-NATO forces.
- Complicates command and control: EO 13526 1.4d
- EO 13526 1.4d
- Opens the door for non-NATO participation beyond desirable level and desirable participants.

4. (~~S~~) Recommendation. NATO IFOR should only include Russian and non-NATO contingents under the following conditions:

- specify that Russia's participation is a special case.
- specify requirement for NATO operational control of Russian and other non-NATO forces.
- EO 13526 1.4d
- encourage Russian and other non-NATO countries contribution consisting of combat support and combat service support forces, such as engineers, military police, logistics and transportation units.
- EO 13526 1.4d
- specify that the Ad Hoc Planning and Coordination Group is the appropriate body for bringing non-NATO troop contributors into the IFOR planning process.
- give further consideration to command and oversight issues, and their relationship to the US CJTF position at NATO.

Prepared by: Balkans Working Group
Eur Div, J5, Ext. 614-9431/2

~~SECRET~~

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002g. paper	re: Equipping and Training the Bosnian Federation [partial] (1 page)	09/01/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
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([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4001

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IV

Equipping and Training the Bosnian Federation (U)

Scenario: (S) The developing situation in the Balkans will result in the near future in one of the following scenarios on the ground in Bosnia in which military assistance to the Bosnian Federation would take place:

- No peace settlement:
  - UNPROFOR remains and continues the mission.
  - UNPROFOR withdrawal.

- Peace settlement:
  - With large-scale NATO Peace Implementation Force (PIF).
  - With a token or no PIF.

This paper focuses on the peace settlement scenario with a PIF deployed upon the acceptance of a peace plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina by all warring parties. There is international commitment to implement the provisions of the plan, including economic, diplomatic and military components. While the peace settlement will preserve Bosnia as a single state in juridical terms, the two parts of the union will retain separate armed forces. Therefore, establishing a balance of power and preventing renewed conflict will require assisting the Federation to develop an effective self-defense capability relative to the BSA by the end of the period of peace plan implementation. To meet this requirement, two parallel programs are conducted concurrently: a US-led, multinational effort to provide equipment and training to the Federation forces; a NATO-led force to implement the peace plan.

Assumptions: (S)

- Public and Congressional support for the plan has been achieved.
- NATO consensus for effort exists.
- The arms embargo is lifted for all of the former Yugoslavia.
- Legal requirements for provision of equipment have been met.
- This will be an overt operation.
- Bosnian Federation remains a viable entity and requests assistance.
- Bosnian Federation Army can disengage to equip and train.
- Croatia continues its support for and cooperation with the Federation.
- Croatia will grant access through its territory to Bosnia.
- [redacted] EO 13526 1.4a
- Adequate equipment, training facilities, and logistics are available.

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Per E.O. 13526
VZ 02/06/2020 (3.42)
2013-0682-M

Classified By: Multiple Sources
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Mission: ~~(S)~~ On order, USCINCEUR assumes operational control of a multinational force from designated NATO and non-NATO nations and conducts operations to equip and train selected elements of the Bosnian Federation Army to enhance its capability to defend the territorial integrity of the Bosnian Federation.

Intent: ~~(S)~~

- Form a multinational coalition led by the US to equip and train the Federation Army.
- Enhance Federation Army's existing core capabilities and units.
- Strengthen military cohesion between the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat armed forces.
- Develop Federation Army's capability to sustain its own training program.
- Counter-balance BSA strengths.
- Focus on defensive tasks at the company and battalion levels and on brigade and higher staff operations.
- Begin as promptly as feasible.
- Training will not be conducted by the PIF.
- Support the mission logistically.

Desired End State: ~~(S)~~ Bosnian Federation Army has enhanced capability to defend the territorial integrity of the Bosnian Federation against Bosnian Serb aggression without external combat support within the time required; anticipated deadline is December 96.

Specified Tasks: ~~(S)~~

- USCINCEUR assumes operational control of a multinational force for the mission.
- Assess Federation Army capabilities and needs.
- In coordination with the Federation Army, plan their equipping and training.
- Establish the Multinational Training Team (MNTT).
- Facilitate the provision of equipment to the Federation Army by donor nations.

Concept of Operations: ~~(S)~~ Equipping and training the Federation will be a comprehensive operation beginning with an initial assessment of existing doctrine, organization, equipment, and training status. International conferences with contributing nations will be held to build consensus, obtain funding, and plan the integration of participating nations. Training sites and support structures will be established. Training location(s) has not been determined. Logistical support will be provided during the entire operation and lay the groundwork for a Federation logistical support system.

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Issues: ~~(S)~~ The following issues should be discussed in the interagency before proceeding with further planning for execution of multilateral equipping and training.

(1) **Legal.** There are significant domestic and international legal issues that must be resolved by interagency coordination. The primary domestic legal consideration is to determine the legal status of the Bosnian Federation and the legal authority for providing US assistance. Legal authority is tied to recognized governments; the Federation is not a legal entity. Further, before defense articles can be provided, bilateral agreements must be signed governing end-use and legislation permitting the grant transfer of lethal excess defense articles (EDA) must be obtained. International legal concerns include SOFAs, for both the training site country and B-H, and the status of trainers and training sites under the Law of War.

What limitations is Congress likely to place on US participation in this effort? How much time will be required to establish a comprehensive SOFA for training site country(s)? What if the UNSC refuses to lift the arms embargo during the period of peace plan implementation?

(2) **Funding.**

Funding requirement. Competition for sources of funds will occur between equip and train, PIF, and economic reconstruction requirements. The equip and train funding requirement will be driven by the ultimate capability we want the Federation to possess, based on assessment of Federation forces requirements and constrained by realistic assumptions about FY 96 funds available. At a minimum, the package must include equipment, training, transportation of trainers and equipment, site preparation, spares, consumables, maintenance and sustainment. In addition, funding must support building a Federation air defense capability.

Funding sources. Foreign contributions will form an essential source of funding for the equip and train package. Some form of voluntary fund may be warranted.

There are several potential sources for the US contribution in FY 96. The authority for drawing upon most of these sources is dependent on a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo and a Presidential Determination making the Federation eligible for assistance. Most of the FY 96 military assistance funds are already programmed for ongoing programs; diversion of such funds to the Bosnian Federation will be at their expense. The state of the FY 96 appropriation bill and veto debates may be problematic.

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The potential sources of such US funding for FY 96 are:

- *Excess Defense Articles (EDA):* There may be limited resources available depending upon what type of equipment is to be transferred to the Federation. Consideration would have to be given to funds for refurbishment, training, transportation, and support of much of this equipment.

- *DoD Title 10 Funds.* Funds in the amount of $40 million are being requested in FY 96 for joint exercises and training under the Partnership for Peace separate from FMF program funding. DoD has also requested funding for "Traditional CINC Programs."

- *Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) Drawdown Authority 506(a)(1):* We expect $75 million in FY 96 drawdown authority (for all countries); readiness impact on US forces must be considered.

- *Special Legislative Authority:*

    - Special Bosnia Drawdown Authority. FY 95 Foreign Operations Appropriation Act includes a $50 million drawdown authority for the Government of Bosnia. Current authority expires 30 September 95, but renewal is included in the Senate's FY 96 legislation.

    - B-H Self Defense Fund. Bill pending that would authorize $50 million US contribution to international fund for the purpose of equipping and training the Bosnian Army.

- *US-held Warsaw Pact Equipment Stocks.* US currently has a limited inventory.

The allocation of the following programs for FY 96 has been determined and announced. The Administration might try to request a supplemental authorization to replenish some of these sources.

- *Foreign Military Financing (FMF):* Funding levels have not been passed by the Senate. Based on House levels ($3.211 billion), traditional earmarks and Presidential commitments will leave only $27 million available to meet worldwide commitments. DoD has already proposed allocating $20 million of this amount to Jordan and State has historically supported $5 million for worldwide demining activities.

- *International Military Education & Training (IMET):* $39 million may be appropriated in FY 96 for 135 eligible countries. Tentative allocations have $200,000 identified for the Bosnian Federation and $200,000 for Croatia.

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(3) **Equipment availability**. Equipment necessary to establish balance of power must be identified, available, sustainable, and maintainable. Equipment must be available for transport into region within timeline established.

During the assessment phase, other issues must be resolved. It is recommended that a mix of equipment (former Warsaw Pact or NATO) be provided to the Federation. Current estimate is that the majority of items provided should be former Warsaw Pact equipment because of relative cost and availability. Further, this type of equipment presently forms the basis of Federation inventory. Alternatively, US equipment could fill existing voids in the Federation inventory (e.g., air defense, armored personnel carriers). There are indications that certain departing UNPF units may be willing to leave some equipment behind (e.g., APCs from Malaysia). Are spare parts and consumables available? Is stock (US and other contributing nations) sufficient to meet requirement and timeline? Can equipment be maintained and sustained by Bosnian Federation forces? What international linkages and leverages are involved with sustaining particular types of equipment? What is effect of linkages on long-term stability of Federation?

(4) **Command and Control**. US leadership must be established to ensure multinational efforts are coordinated to achieve the desired end state and to ensure that US maintains control over this program. Mission will be tasked to CINCEUR, and most likely delegated to USAREUR for detailed planning, coordination, and execution. A multinational conference will be necessary to plan the integration of other contributors and assert US leadership. This will also avoid multiple, uncoordinated equip and train efforts. US leadership will limit or prevent participation by potentially disruptive nations (e.g., Iran). US assistance should be conditional on the exclusion of radical Islamic states like Iran. After the equip and train period, US leverage on the Federation will likely diminish, so long-term regional arms control should be considered.

(5) **Regional Arms Control**. Efforts by the international community after the lifting of the arms embargo to equip and train warring factions could easily result in an arms race, resulting in an imbalance of power and thereby destabilizing the region. The establishment of inventory limits on CFE treaty limited equipment and zonal sub-limits (DMZs, areas of restricted maneuvering/operations) may be required for all warring parties in order to achieve and maintain a balance of power in the long-term. Such limits could include heavy equipment (tanks, APCs, aircraft, naval vessels) and force structure (active and reserve). What are the limits necessary for Federation self-defense? At what point does a strong defensive force become a possible offensive threat to regional stability? How many tanks, mortars, aircraft, ships? Who determines limits: warring parties via peace plan, EU, OSCE, NATO, or US? Who develops initial stabilization measures (measures of transparency, constraint, reinforce confidence, monitoring

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compliance/evaluation)? Who maintains measures: EU, OSCE, NATO? An arms control regime, to be effective, should have a regional context.

(6) **Operational.**

Multinational air support. If there is a peace agreement, air support will continue during the peace implementation effort. No Fly Zone (NFZ) operations will continue in the airspace of B-H, and authorized areas of Croatia, to maintain a ban on military flights. Close Air Support (CAS) in support of the PIF and air strikes to enforce the peace agreement will also be continued. The issue of extending NATO air support after PIF withdrawal to continue enforcement of the peace agreement requires further study. Only NFZ operations will be considered because CAS and air strikes will not be militarily required once the Federation has established an effective self-defense capability on the ground.

Federation air defense. The Federation does not possess an air force and it is recommended as part of a peace settlement that they will not be equipped with that capability. An air force is extremely expensive, very difficult to sustain and maintain, and constitutes an offensive threat. To compensate for this lack of an air capability, we should assist the Federation in establishing an appropriate air defense while ensuring the BSA air capability is subject to the proposed regional arms control regime. It is recommended that the Federation possess a mix of ADA assets; the exact mix and quantity have to be determined. The equipping phase should be timed so that armed weapons systems are not fielded prior to the termination of NATO air support. The Federation can be equipped and trained during the initial training period but weapons systems will not be armed with munitions until NATO air support is lifted.

(7) **Risk of enduring US commitment.** Direct US ties to the Bosnian Federation Army may result in long term commitment. Failure of Bosnian Army may be perceived as US failure. An exit strategy which disengages US from maintaining the Bosnian Federation must be established and linked to US security assistance to Bosnia.

Principals Committee Action: ~~(S)~~ Recommend the Principals Committee:

- Confirm the assumptions, mission, intent, desired end state, and specified tasks for the equipping and training operation.
- Conduct preliminary discussion of the issues.
- Direct State/OSD/JCS to initiate planning.
- Direct State/OSD to prepare a Congressional consultation plan.
- Authorize Joint Staff to coordinate an in-country assessment of Federation capabilities and needs.

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New State Paper (not tasked) (Tab 4½)

Equip and Train: Diplomatic Considerations

Goals

Building diplomatic support for an equip and train endeavor may be a significant challenge, given the reluctance of some countries to support build-up, the absence of much leverage over the "FRY" and Croatia, and the inevitable linkage to arms control efforts. Nonetheless, our initial efforts should work toward

-- establishing the settlement agreement as a codification of the peaceful intent of the parties. The agreement should embody clear commitments on no-first-use of force. It might also include some kind of renunciation of seeking boundary changes by force. We need to emphasize the importance of a managed regional balance of power as a key to regional military instability.

-- building international acceptance of the rights of states in the region to have capabilities to defend themselves. Political acceptance of this is fundamental to acceptance of an equip and train mission, and might also be built into constitutional or settlement provisions.

-- establishing this effort as a controlled response to simple multilateral lift, which itself might be expected to prompt an uncontrolled regional arms race.

-- developing an arms control concept-regime that would integrate the notions of building down while building up. This regime might encompass a variety of measures under the aegis of different entities, including separation of forces, constraining and mediating disputes, establishment of confidence-building measures, and establishment of a broader arms control structure, possibly based on the 1993 crisis stabilizing measures developed by the OSCE for the Balkans.

Establishing Needs

Once the political foundation is set, we can move towards a field anaylsis or assessment of the kinds of needs that might be met through an equip and train mission. What kinds of equipment and/or weapons might be helpful? What kind of training in what environment is required? Can defensive capabilities be emphasized?

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Diplomatic Consultations

This assessment might then be followed by presentations first to key allies at NATO. Achievement of a consensus on actual needs to be filled and notional means to do so should precede any presentation to other NATO allies.

Initial consultations must clearly distinguish between the equip and train force (ETF) and the IFOR, and establish that the ETF is a U.S.-led effort designed to meet specific needs within the context of the goals outlined above.

Consideration might then turn to identifying those countries best positioned to assist with filling those needs. For example

-- specific NATO (or even NACC) countries might be solicited by the U.S. to contribute expert trainers to programs.

-- other NATO (or NACC) countries might be approached to provide sites and support facilities for the out-of-Bosnia training. These countries might include Turkey, Hungary, Spain, etc.

-- finally, a select set of other countries from the OIC arena might be able to provide financial or equipment assistance in the effort. Specifically, Egypt might be well-positioned to provide Warsaw Pact equipment, or the OIC might be in a position to organize from members a financial/equipment contribution.

The bottom line should be that participating countries will be invited to assist based on their specific abilities to contribute in a controlled manner to the effort. This would all be done at U.S. suggestion/invitation, though close coordination at NATO, or at least with key allies, will remain important for maintaining political acceptance. Clear lines of consultation with arms control efforts (OSCE?) would be required from the time the assessment of needs was made to gauge the proper direction of build-up.

The extent of our own contribution may be critical to our asserting the lead role. In addition, we will face some tough decisions on solicitation of contributions. We will have to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable (to the U.S.) contributions.

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For example, is France an acceptable training locale given its allergy to US forces? While Iranian trainers are not acceptable, is Iranian funding or equipment? Matching offers of training and equipment to specific requirements may help limit the involvement of radical states, but probably not preclude it entirely.

The introduction of equipment (and trained personnel) back into the Federation should be carefully timed to coincide with the 1996 envisioned withdrawal of the IFOR and the status of CBM development within the region.

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new
tab V

Confidence-Building/Arms Control Measures
To Accompany Political Settlement

Assumption: It will be important that the United States offer the perspective of "arms build-down" in connection with any settlement package -- both to help build political support among allies and partners for the overall U.S. initiative and to assist in creating an environment within which the Federation-Bosnian Serb military balance can more easily be stabilized. Any set of proposals to that effect, however, would have to be phased and flexible, readily adapting to changing circumstances on the ground and open to expansion over time in both scope and application.

Step-by-Step Approach: In the first instance, we should concentrate on political/military confidence-building measures geared to specific areas and tactical situations along lines of confrontation within Bosnia itself. Their immediate objective would be to supplement and help stabilize the ceasefire contained in the settlement; accordingly, they would focus on disengagement of the parties, preliminary forms of weapons control, and transparency. CBM's

More specifically, this might include (perhaps within the text of any ceasefire component of a settlement):

-- Separation of forces and weapons along designated confrontation lines (e.g., 2 km for infantry, 10 km for mortars, 20 km for heavy weapons).

-- Ban of certain military activities, including aircraft activities, in selected areas.

-- Establishment of heavy weapons collection/ deactivation sites.

-- Establishment of joint liaison/communication links among opposing local commanders under the active oversight of the Implementation Force.

-- Establishment of procedures for extensive monitoring all of the above measures by designated elements of the Implementation Force.

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As progress is made with each of these measures, we would seek to expand them in scope and effect. As some would presumably be intended for a long duration, we would wish to build in the possibility that, as the NATO-led military implementation force draws down with the accomplishment of its basic mission, monitoring/verification duties might be eventually passed to another body -- perhaps some configuration of UN/OSCE observers.

Long-Term Perspective: Even as our immediate focus should be on local stabilizing measures within Bosnia proper to support the ceasefire and settlement, the United States should be prepared to offer -- at an appropriate political moment -- a long-term perspective for the region as whole. This would be consistent with an emphasis on a comprehensive approach to the problems of the former Yugoslavia.

The stated objective of such a U.S. initiative for confidence-building/arms control measures for would be strengthening stability and security throughout the region, with the specific aim of eliminating disparities and capabilities for launching surprise attack and for initiating, at a regional level, large-scale offensive action. Reductions, limitations and the realization of a more defensive set of force postures might be examined as contributions to a more stable military balance.

Any initial deliberations among parties as to participation and modalities could take place in an informal setting, although the intention should always be to transfer any such negotiations back into a more formal OSCE framework at an appropriate time. Recognizing the many inherent difficulties involved in any move towards a more ambitious arms control regime for the region, the U.S. objective would, in the first instance, be as much to set in place an ongoing process as the expectation of any early progress towards a CFE-like regime.

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8/28, 0900

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PHASE 2

Area of application: The territory of the successor States.

Start of application: As soon as possible after successful initiation of Phase I.

Objective: Creation of a balance of forces between the parties; removal of offensive capability by adoption of a defensive restructuring of force postures.

Content:
- detailed exchange of information;
- reductions;
- establishment of limitations;
- verification, as in Phase I.

Remarks: It will be important to develop incentives to gain their acceptance for the proposed measures. The mandate could be adopted in conjunction with the peace settlement, if possible setting targets and criteria for success.

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SCB - new draft SV

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Continuation of Air Support Beyond the Peace Implementation Force (PIF)

Scenario: (S) A peace plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina is accepted by all warring parties. A NATO-led Peace Implementation Force conducts operations to enforce the terms of the peace agreement in B-H. NATO air will continue No Fly Zone (NFZ) operations in the airspace of B-H, and authorized areas of Croatia, to maintain a ban on military flights as an essential element for the safety of the delivery of humanitarian assistance and a decisive step to maintain a cessation of hostilities, and will conduct Close Air Support (CAS) and air strike operations as required, to support the PIF. Operations could include associated support missions such as Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD).

Assumptions: (S) The assumptions in the DoD papers "Implementing a Balkan Settlement" and "Multilateral Equipping and Training of the Bosnian Federation" apply.

Issue: (S) Should NATO continue air operations in the air space of B-H, after departure of the PIF?

Situation: (S) PIF forces have withdrawn from B-H. Multinational forces have completed efforts to equip and train selected elements of the Bosnian Federation Army and have enhanced its capability to defend the territorial integrity of the Bosnian Federation.

There are two alternatives for multinational forces efforts to equip and train the Bosnian Federation Armed Forces with an air defense capability to counter the potential air threat from the Bosnian Serbs: (1) To complete establishing an air defense capability in parallel with the equip and train efforts for ground forces with the delivery of actual weapons just prior to PIF withdrawal or; (2) To delay establishing an air defense capability until after PIF withdraws. The intent in establishing an air defense capability after the PIF withdraws is to not increase risk to NATO air operations while the PIF is in place. Continued NATO air operations would also require UNSC and NAC mandates beyond the PIF mission. ✓

Assessment: (S)

Close Air Support after the PIF withdraws: Equip and train efforts have provided Bosnian Federation with a self-defense capability including artillery

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and other heavy weapons. Considerations to continue CAS operations beyond the PIF include:

Pros:
- Augments Bosnian Federation capability to conduct defensive operations.

Cons:
- Commits NATO to the defense of the Bosnian Federation with no clear end state.
- Requires trained TACPs on the ground to be effective.
- Requires continued NATO air operations which include impacts on funding, manpower, readiness.
- Requires continued authority for pre-emptive SEAD throughout B-H -- potentially escalatory in nature. Enforcement puts NATO in a perceived position of a belligerent.
- Could result in captured US aircrew without US/NATO ground troops engaged.

Air Strike Operations after PIF withdraws: Equip and train efforts have provided Bosnian Federation with a self-defense capability including artillery and other heavy weapons. Considerations to continue air strike operations beyond the PIF include:

Pros:
- Provides Federation deep strike capability against the Bosnian Serbs.

Cons:

- Commits NATO to the defense of the Bosnian Federation with no clear end state.
- Requires continued NATO intelligence effort to maintain target lists.
- Requires continued NATO air operations which include impacts on funding, manpower, readiness.
- Requires continued authority for pre-emptive SEAD throughout B-H -- potentially escalatory in nature; places NATO in a perceived role of a belligerent.
- Could result in captured US aircrew without US/NATO ground troops engaged.

"No-Fly" Operations after PIF withdraws:

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002j. paper	re: Continuation of Air Support Beyond the Peace Implementation Force [partial] (1 page)	08/31/1995	b(6)

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Pros:

- Under the case of delaying the equipping of an air defense capability, NFZ would maintain a balance of power in B-H until Bosnian Federation establishes air defense capability.

Cons:

- Requires continued NATO air operations which include impacts on funding, manpower, readiness.
- Requires continued authority for pre-emptive SEAD throughout B-H -- potentially escalatory in nature. Enforcement puts NATO in a perceived position of a belligerent.
- Could result in captured US aircrew without US/NATO ground troops engaged.

Conclusion: (S) CAS and air strikes are not militarily required once the Bosnian Federation has established an effective self defense capability on the ground. Once the Bosnian Federation air defense capability is established, there is no military requirement for NATO NFZ operations to maintain a balance of power in B-H.

To ensure NATO is not committed to defending the Bosnian Federation beyond the PIF, establishing the Bosnian Federation air defense capability should occur concurrently with other equip and train efforts and should be completed before the PIF withdraws. This end state can be achieved while minimizing the time period in which NATO air operations are at greater risk.

To minimize this period of vulnerability, the multinational equip and train forces could conduct the assessment of the Bosnian Federation air defense requirements, conduct training of operators outside of B-H, and identify and stockpile air defense equipment concurrently with other equip and train efforts with the ground forces. The final phase of actually equipping the Bosnian Federation air defense could commence just prior to the PIF withdrawal.

If as part of the peace negotiations, it is necessary to offer the Bosnian Federation an additional short term insurance policy after PIF withdrawal, only NFZ operations should continue and only then for a defined limited period of time. Actually equipping the Bosnian Federation air defense would be delayed until NFZ operations cease.

Prepared by: (b)(6) LCDR, USN
EUR, J5, Ext (b)(6)
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NSC # 21035

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting DC BOSNIA 8 SEP PAGES: 2 + COVER

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DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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21035

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 7, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. DOUGLAS GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. AARON S. WILLIAMS
Executive Secretary
Agency for International Development

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia on Friday, September 8, 1995, from 11:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m. Attendance is principals plus one. An agenda for the meeting is attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

for Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

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NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: September 8, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 11:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.

AGENDA

I. Peace Plan Implementation

A. Political Implementation Structure.....State*

B. Modalities of a NATO-plus Peace Implementation Force (IFOR).....OSD/JCS*

C. Engaging the Russians on IFOR issues.....State

D. Update on IFOR consultations with Allies.....OSD/JCS

II. Equipping and Training for Federation Forces

A. U.S. strategy and role (in light of September 5 Principals' discussion).....NSC

B. Mandate of State-led interagency task force.....All

C. Gameplan for consulting Allies/others.....State/OSD

D. Arms Control and CBM Options.....State*

E. NATO air support beyond end of equip/train effort..JCS*

III. Post-war Economic Reconstruction: Report on Consultations with EU and Next Steps.....State

IV. Funding Issues: Next Steps.....NSC/OMB

* Paper should be circulated by the lead agency no later than 5:00 p.m., September 7

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21035

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 6, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting, September 8, 1995

Attached is an agenda (Tab A) for the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia. I have included Treasury and AID on the distribution list; please delete them if you don't want to include them in this meeting.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the agenda and authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to Agencies
Tab A Agenda

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~~001. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)~~	~~09/15/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
002. memo	Ivo Daalder to Samuel Berger re: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (3 pages)	09/15/1995	P1/b(1)
003a. memo	Sue Bremner to Berger re: Briefing Materials for DC on Post-Settlement Political Implementation Structure (3 pages)	09/15/1995	P1/b(1)
003b. paper	re: Translation [of French Plan] (2 pages)	09/1995	P1/b(1)
003c. paper	re: NSC Analysis U.S. and French Positions on Peace Plan Implementation (2 pages)	09/15/1995	P1/b(1)
~~003d. paper~~	~~re: French Proposals on IFOR (3 pages)~~	~~09/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003e. paper~~	~~re: Implementation Structure in a Bosnian Settlement (7 pages)~~	~~09/14/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003f. paper~~	~~re: Confidence-Building/Arms Control Measures to Accompany Political Settlement (2 pages)~~	~~08/28/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
003g. paper	re: Non-NATO Participation in NATO Implementation Force in Bosnia [partial] (3 pages)	09/13/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 6/11/2020
~~003h. paper~~	~~re: Engaging the Russians on Bosnia Settlement Implementation (3 pages)~~	~~09/13/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020

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PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 15 SEP DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 19 SEP 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9521076 9521078

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, September 15, 1995 NSC LOG # 9521083

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
State	Executive Secretary		
Defense	Executive Secretary		
USUN/State	Rick Inderfurth		
CIA	Executive Secretary		
JCS	Secretary		

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MESSAGE #: _____

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting Summary of Conclusions DC MTG Bosnia PAGES: 4

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USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

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If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

21083

September 16, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the
United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for
National Security &
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, September 15, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
SVTS Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee
DATE: September 15, 1995
LOCATION: Secure Video Teleconference System

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR
Sandy Berger

OVP
Leon Fuerth
Rick Saunders

STATE
Peter Tarnoff
John Kornblum

DEFENSE
John White
Walt Slocombe

USUN
Dave Scheffer
James O'Brien

CIA
John Gannon
Norm Schindler

JCS
William Owens
John Walsh

NSC
Sandy Vershbow
Sue Bremner

Summary of Conclusions

1. Deputies met September 15 to plan for September 18 meetings with the French on post-settlement implementation issues. They reached the following conclusions about potential areas of agreement with the French on the shape and mandate for the political implementation structure:

- settlement documents should establish the political implementation structure and its mandate;
- the UN should give approval for the structure through a Security Council resolution;
- there should be a senior civilian head;
- the head should be charged with coordinating among the various actors responsible for post-settlement programs;
- the head should serve as an interface with the parties;
- the NAC would oversee military implementation by the IFOR;

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NLWHSC-03363-M
DOR: 9/30/14 (2.24)

- the Commander of the IFOR, CINCSOUTH, would maintain liaison with the head of the political implementation structure and with the UN. (S)

2. As for areas of disagreement, Deputies identified the following key requirements for the U.S. on which we could not compromise:

- the IFOR and its force commander would not take political guidance or be required to coordinate with the UN or any entity, other than the NAC, through SACEUR;
- we cannot agree to the French suggestion that disputes in the NAC would be referred to the UN Security Council;
- the UN would not be permitted to select the head of the political implementation structure, although we would want the UN to approve the choice made by the Contact Group;
- while we can agree that a French officer (the present UN Force Commander) could become the Deputy Force Commander of the IFOR and retain operational control over residual UN forces in Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, we cannot agree that the Deputy Force Commander should also be the Land Force Commander as the French propose. We continue to favor making the Ace Rapid Reaction Force (ARRC) Commander the Land Force Commander for the IFOR. (S)

3. Deputies noted their previous decision that the head of the political implementation structure might have direct authority over some entities in country and decided that questions on the scope of the head's authority should be deferred until the terms of the settlement were better understood. (S)

4. On the issue of whether the head of the political implementation structure should be an EU national (as proposed by the French) or an American, Deputies decided we could ultimately accept a European but that we should seek to obtain European concessions on other implementation issues before agreeing. (S)

5. Deputies noted their previous decision that non-NATO troops interested in participating would need to be integrated into IFOR under NATO operational control but deferred discussion of how that would be done. They agreed that JCS and OSD should revise the existing paper on non-NATO involvement to include specific options for integrating Russia and other non-NATO countries while preserving a unified NATO chain of command **(Action: JCS/OSD)**. (S)

6. Deputies asked State to revise its paper on the political implementation structure and circulate it by COB Monday for submission to Principals **(Action: State)** (S).

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21083

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 15, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: SUE BREMNER

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, September 15, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of Conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia held September 15, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

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RECORD ID: 9521078
RECEIVED: 15 SEP 95 14

TO: BERGER

FROM: DAALDER

DOC DATE: 15 SEP 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
CROATIA
UN
SERBIA
FRANCE
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 15 SEP DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER DUE DATE: 19 SEP 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DAALDER LOGREF: 9521076 9521083

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0224 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
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COMMENTS: _____

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	95091514	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	95091516	NOTED BY BERGER

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National Security Council
The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse			
Sens	1	ADS	
Soderberg			
Berger	2		
Lake		Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3		N
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

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15 SEP 95 23 30

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. memo	Ivo Daalder to Samuel Berger re: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (3 pages)	09/15/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4001

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0224 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, September 15, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs684

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOC DATE: 15 SEP 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
FRANCE
UN
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 15 SEP DC MTG ON BOSNIA - POST-SETTLEMENT POLITICAL IMPLEMENTAITON STRUCTURE

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER W/ COMMENTS DUE DATE: 19 SEP 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BREMNER LOGREF: 9521078 9521083

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0224 CODES:

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FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
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		NSC CHRON
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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
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001		X	95091615	NOTED BY BERGER W/ COMMENTS

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. memo	Sue Bremner to Berger re: Briefing Materials for DC on Post-Settlement Political Implementation Structure (3 pages)	09/15/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4001

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. paper	re: Translation [of French Plan] (2 pages)	09/1995	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003c. paper	re: NSC Analysis U.S. and French Positions on Peace Plan Implementation (2 pages)	09/15/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
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FRENCH PROPOSALS ON IFOR

The following discussion provides a summary of French positions on the IFOR and comparison and analysis with developing U.S. positions.

NOTE: THE FRENCH POSITION IS DERIVED FROM AN UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF A PAPER CIRCULATED AT NATO ON 11 SEP, AND THE U.S. POSITION IS BASED ON WORKING DOCUMENTS, NOT COORDINATED POSITIONS.

POLITICAL STRUCTURE:

FR: The position and functions must be set out in the peace plan.

Establish a senior representative charged with oversight of overall plan as well as the missions and phases of a largely allied force.

US: **Structure would flow directly from the terms of the settlement.**

Must have a clear political mandate (blessed by UNSCR).

Will coordinate with the IFOR but will have no authority to control the NATO force. ⊛

UNSC ROLE:

FR: UNSC will approve the peace plan and confirm the senior political representative nominated by the U.N. Sec. Gen.

Authorize a multinational force under unified command and control to carry out Chapter VII operations.

US: **UNSC blesses the peace plan and provisions for a political structure but does not necessarily have any role in selecting a senior representative much less controlling IFOR operations.** who selects?

SENIOR REPRESENTATIVE:

FR: An official proposed by the UNSYG and confirmed by the UNSC to oversee all aspects of the peace plan.

Will establish a dialogue with political authorities of all parties to the peace plan.

Will be briefed by the IFOR commander on military operations; will be appraised of difficulties as they arise and will report to the NAC and UNSC on progress of the plan.

US: **Preferably an American with internationally recognized credentials.**

Operates with a small staff to coordinate activities of the independent agencies designated to carry out the elements of the peace plan, economic reconstruction, etc.

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North Atlantic Council:

FR: The NAC will approve military planning for the IFOR.

Will authorize the NATO SYG to coordinate closely with UN SYG and the Senior Representative on implementation.

Will be briefed by the military CINC before proceeding with each phase of the operation and on any difficulties that may arise.

Will be briefed by Senior Representative as required.

If there is a disagreement within the NAC the NATO SYG will refer the problem to the UN SYG.

US: **The NAC will charter the IFOR and provide guidance for military planning.**

Will coordinate with the UN and the Senior Representative.

ROLE OF SACEUR:

FR: SACEUR will provide interface between the CINC and the NAC and provide necessary support to the operation.

US: **SACEUR would fulfill his normal role in the NATO integrated military structure for NATO operations.**

Will report to the NAC on activities of the theater CINC.

CINC of IFOR:

FR: Responsible for carrying out military operations.

Will report to the NAC via SACEUR; will inform Senior Rep. of military operations and any difficulties that arise.

Will have the UNPROFOR commander as his deputy in charge of residual UN forces and all land operations.
→ Macedonia/Croatia

US: **Commands all IFOR forces and UN forces that remain in the theater of operations.**

Reports via NATO military channels on operations.

Coordinates with Senior Rep and other agencies through consultation and regular meetings.

Employs existing NATO command structure and procedures.

Develops procedures to integrate non-NATO countries under NATO command.

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COMMENT

The French proposals cover a lot of common ground with our initial planning for peace implementation. However, several of their specific points stand out:

-- The role of the political superstructure and the senior representative is a point of divergence. The French seem to give this entity some direct authority over NATO military operations, whereas we envision his function as purely one of coordination.

-- The French emphasize an expanded UN role. We envision a UN blessed peace plan but with no direct UN role in selecting key officials, or overseeing implementation. In no case can we accept the French idea of letting the UN be a tie-breaker for disagreements in the NAC.

-- Though they talk around the subject, the French effor seems to dilute the NATO military command structure as much as possible. The proposal to position Janvier as overall Deputy CINC with control of all ground operations (including US forces) and all previous UN forces will be very controversial. This would effectively provide a French "dual key" for the all-important NATO ground operation.

But this was agreed for Vance-Owen - makes sense in larger political terms

SV

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IMPLEMENTATION STRUCTURE IN A BOSNIAN SETTLEMENT

The Task

Implementing a settlement in all its political, economic, humanitarian, military and other aspects will require a coordinating superstructure with a clear mandate to make the settlement work, as well as mobilization of a variety of organizations, most already active in the Balkans. The task would be to integrate, coordinate and, to a lesser degree, oversee progress on the various political undertakings of a settlement package and the activities of international organizations and activities involved in different aspects of implementation.

"Peace implementation" will require not only a military component -- through the IFOR to ensure a secure environment within which implementation can go forward -- but also a means of ensuring continued facilitation of political negotiations among the parties, promotion of local conflict resolution and monitoring of human rights, coordination of economic reconstruction, delivery of humanitarian assistance, and monitoring of various confidence-building/arms control measures of increasing scope.

An important aspect, yet to be determined, is the extent of direct involvement of the implementation structure in the internal affairs of the Bosnian state. The Bosnian parties will wish to have the least direct involvement by the implementation structure. The international community will expect the structure to bring about full implementation. The tension between these parties will have a bearing on the final settlement.

Mandate

The legal mandate for the implementation structure should derive from the settlement documents -- including the approval of all parties of the settlement. The structure would be a free-standing authority. We should seek UNSC blessing (but not creation of) the structure through appropriate language in a Security Council Resolution acknowledging the actual settlement. However, the structure should not be a UN-mandated entity.

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Mission

The mission of the structure will be to coordinate among, rather than to control, the organizations that will play a role in the region after settlement: the NATO-led implementation force (IFOR), EU, ICFY, OSCE, IFIs, UN, UNHCR, ICRC and possibly other NGOs, bilateral players, etc. Some elements might report directly to the Senior Implementation Coordinator depending on the terms of the settlement. The implementation structure will serve as a bridge between the international actors and local officials, as appropriate.

Termination

The structure should specifically be maintained as long as required in the view of the Senior Implementation Committee (see below), but in no case less than one year beyond the date of final withdrawal of the IFOR and for period not to exceed three years.

Funding

The administrative costs (including salaries) of the structure might be funded by the parties to the settlement according to a set proportional formula still to be determined. (note: USG funding is subject to Congressional authorization/appropriations.) The entity would establish an annual budget for presentation to contributors with requests for future contributions. The salary of the Senior Implementation Coordinator should be established at the time of the settlement.

U.S. Leadership

How the United States seeks to define the role, mandate, structure and senior leadership of such an international on-the-ground political component of settlement implementation will directly affect:

-- the credibility of the package that our current negotiating efforts are promoting with the parties in the region;

-- our ability to generate sufficient diplomatic support for a NATO-led military implementation force along the lines we desire;

-- our ability to encourage and ensure continued progress in the various political undertakings of a settlement once launched; and,

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE (FR) 09.15.95 11:55 NO. 1460120961 PAGE 3

-- the credibility of our exit strategy for the IFOR and the withdrawal of its major U.S. elements by a date certain in late 1996.

This latter point will be especially critical. While the NATO-led IFOR is intended to be of specific and limited duration, a broader implementation structure will have the opportunity (indeed requirement) to run longer. (Just as an ongoing international presence to support and oversee democratic development within Haiti provided the context within which timely withdrawal of initial intervention forces was politically possible, so too will our announcement of an exit date and strategy for the IFOR need to be accompanied by the sense that an implementation structure for dealing with longer-term problems is in place in Bosnia.)

Senior Implementation Coordinator

? The implementation structure would be headed by a respected senior statesman, a strong personality and preferably an American to symbolize U.S. commitment and leadership in brokering the settlement.

Discussion: An American would establish the U.S. commitment to successful conclusion of the effort. He would likely enjoy greater effectiveness and command access to a broader array of resources. He would be more amenable to working toward U.S. goals (e.g., avoiding getting trapped into long-term commitments). With clear U.S. claim to the role, he would pre-empt a political competition for the position. A non-American might enjoy the support of a wider group of countries, although he might have less clout in practice and be less inclined to support U.S. objectives. However, if the implementation breaks down, the U.S. might be further removed from responsibility for breakdown. Opening the door to a non-American would likely produce Carl Bildt as the person to beat.

? The Senior Implementation Coordinator might be nominated by any settlement group participant and agreed on by consensus. He might have three or four deputies from different countries, such as Russia. He would have no formal line authority over the implementation agencies, but would work to

-- ensure that various players do not duplicate tasks, undermine the "sub-contract" work of other agencies, or contravene the general principles of the settlement.

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-- establish general parameters for the overall mission by acting as interpreter of the terms of the settlement, and encouraging (but not necessarily dictating) international agencies to adhere to those parameters.

Senior Implementation Committee

This would be the major authority. The Senior Implementation Coordinator would chair consultative meetings of the senior resident representatives of the main organizations active on the ground in Bosnia. Those agencies would likely include but not be restricted to IFOR, UN, UNHCR, EU/ECMM, OSCE, and IBRD. Other possibilities include ICFY, UNCRO, any UNPROFOR remnant, an international reconstruction mission, UN human rights monitors, Office of the UNSYG, Office of the NATO SYG, and possibly an arms-parity control organization. The SIC would have no line authority over any of these agencies, unless an agency delegated specific decision-making authority to him.

Major aid donors and/or other governments playing a key bilateral role in the settlement may be included in the Senior Implementation Committee (or other committees, see below) in an appropriate way, if they provide a liaison staff to the SIC headquarters.

NGOs would not be represented in the Senior Committee. However, an NGO advisory board could be established of representatives of organizations willing to provide liaison officials and attend relevant meetings as determined by the SIC.

Functions

The SIC would exercise direction by virtue of his free-standing authority and through his staff. As the senior international figure in Bosnia, he would be the locus for contact with the Federation and Serb Republic Governments and would maintain liaison offices in Belgrade, Zagreb, and possibly Skopje and elsewhere.

? Functions under specific committees would be the following, and perhaps other fields, under the overall coordination of the Senior Coordination Committee:

-- Military Security

The SIC would have no line authority, but may be able to assist the commander with liaison with local political authorities. He would work to ensure that non-IFOR activities do not inadvertently find themselves in conflict zones, and try to coordinate the transfer of early IFOR tasks (such as boundary demarcation) to other authorities as necessary.

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-- Human Rights

SIC authority would rest with his ability to select a committee chairman (probably OSCE) and coordinate overall efforts in a direction most supportive of the settlement.

-- Resettlement

UNHCR is the most readily-apparent entity with a claim to leading this effort. The SIC would be able to provide liaison support to UNHCR, if needed, and deal with the UNSYG via the UNSYG liaison office.

-- Reconstruction

If the EU leads the reconstruction effort, the SIC might be able to ensure that EU efforts are consonant with local and other international (and bilateral) reconstruction efforts.

-- Security Stabilization

A comprehensive package of arms control and CBM measures should be included with the settlement agreement and provide for implementation by the OSCE. A background paper on this is attached. The Germans have put ideas forward on this, and we may wish to encourage them to work with OSCE to develop their ideas for a package here. The SIC might become operationally involved in coordination of any subsequent negotiation-verification efforts on arms control, though he would have no line authority over this function beyond encouraging efforts within the parameters of the settlement.

-- War Crimes

The UN war crimes tribunal may be the most readily-apparent entity with a claim to chairing this committee. The SIC would be able to provide liaison and even political support in dealings with local officials, as appropriate, and with the UNSYG via the UNSYG liaison office.

-- Democratic Elections and Institutions

Perhaps best situated to chair this committee would be the chief of an OSCE democracy-building entity that would have to be created at OSCE just prior to settlement. OSCE is best situated to integrate NGO concerns and recruit monitors for elections. The SIC would again wield most authority in supporting efforts with local officials.

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-- Border Control

Though the IFOR may have some initial responsibilities, these should be transferred to a combination of local authorities and international monitors at an appropriate time. EUMM may be the best candidate to develop a mandate in this area and chair the committee. The SIC would again serve a partial liaison role with local officials, and work to ensure good cooperation with IFOR.

-- Legal/Dispute Settlement

The SIC would have under his direct authority a Legal Office for whatever legal issues he determined needed attention. He could use that expertise to promote the resolution of any disputes with the consent of the parties affected. The legal office could provide non-binding advice on legal interpretations of the settlement terms, and provide advice as requested by various committees.

The SIC would designate a chairman for each of the above committees who could be either the local head of a relevant international agency or a deputy of the SIC. The guiding principle in organizing this structure should be pragmatism. A significant portion of the SIC's authority will derive from his ability to select committee chairmen. To the extent possible, however, the structure should pave the way for Bosnian governmental institutions called for in the settlement, e.g. reconstruction commission, arbitration panel, and might provide a few important jobs to offer to nationals of various governments to help secure their support.

Secretariat

The Senior Implementation Coordinator (SIC) would have a small secretariat located in or near Sarajevo. The various international agencies should be located in close proximity to the Office of the Senior Implementation Coordinator, with small, full-time liaison staffs (paid by parent agencies) in the same building.

Political Liaison Group

This group would be appended to the SIC's office. It would include representatives of the settlement group, as well as the representatives of the UNSYG's office, the NATO SYG's office, and the EU President's office -- all located in the SIC's headquarters. The group would be formally headed by the SIC, but serve as a general advisory/liaison group for the SIC. It

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would have no direct authority over the SIC, but be available to provide insights on possible differences among the parties. The Russians would be included if they are part of the final settlement group.

Russia

The question of bringing Russia on board is discussed separately. It is worth noting that in addition to the Political Liaison Group, that Russian participation in the implementation structure (not necessarily including the IFOR), and especially the arms control entity, might be possible.

Transition

The announcement of the SIC should be made on the day of actual settlement. Most agencies will already be present in Bosnia with senior representatives on the scene. The SIC will simply need to travel to Sarajevo, take occupancy of a (larger) building provided by the Bosnians, begin building his secretariat, and inviting the various international agencies to establish liaison offices under his roof. The transition should not be exceedingly disruptive given that only a small staff is required and most of the contributors to SIC activities will already be physically present in Sarajevo.

SERPM30
Rev. 3 9/14/95, 12:00

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Confidence-Building/Arms Control Measures
To Accompany Political Settlement

Assumption: At the onset, it will be important that the United States include elements of weapons control in connection with any settlement package in order to support the cease-fire and to build political support among allies and partners for the overall U.S. initiative. The second step would be to establish a regime to create something approaching a Federation-Bosnian Serb military balance. Such a military balance can only be created by taking into account Serb and Croation forces in the longer term. Any set of proposals to that effect, however, would have to be phased and flexible, readily adapting to changing circumstances on the ground and open to expansion over time in both scope and application.

Step 1: Conditions Imposed at Settlement: In the first instance, we should concentrate on political/military confidence-building measures geared to specific areas and tactical situations along lines of confrontation within Bosnia itself. Their immediate objective would be to supplement and help stabilize the cease-fire contained in the settlement; accordingly, they would focus on disengagement of the parties, preliminary forms of weapons control, and transparency.

More specifically, this might include (perhaps within the text of any cease-fire component of a settlement):

-- Separation of forces and weapons along designated confrontation lines (e.g., 2 km for infantry, 10 km for mortars, 20 km for heavy weapons).

-- Ban on certain (possibly all) military activities in selected areas or region-wide. Total ban on aircraft activities.

-- Establishment of protected heavy weapons collection/deactivation sites. (?)

-- Tighten Sharp Guard and/or other measures to prevent weapons flows into the region until specifically delineated implementation goals have been met. (?)

-- Establishment of joint liaison/communication links among opposing local commanders under the active oversight of the Implementation Force.

-- Establishment of procedures for extensive monitoring all of the above measures by designated elements of the Implementation Force.

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Step 2: The Military Balance: As progress is made with each of these measures, we would seek to expand them in scope and effect. As some would presumably be intended for a long duration, we would wish to build in the possibility that, as the NATO-led military implementation force draws down with the accomplishment of its basic mission, monitoring/verification duties might be eventually passed to another body -- perhaps some configuration of UN/OSCE observers. It would be necessary at this point to bring in Serbia and Croatia.

Step 3: Long-Term Perspective: Even as our immediate focus should be on local stabilizing measures within Bosnia proper to support the cease-fire and settlement, the United States should be prepared to offer -- at an appropriate political moment -- a long-term perspective for the region as whole. This would be consistent with an emphasis on a comprehensive approach to the problems of the former Yugoslavia.

The stated objective of such a U.S. initiative for confidence-building/arms control measures would be strengthening stability and security throughout the region, with the specific aim of eliminating disparities and capabilities for launching surprise attack and for initiating, at a regional level, large-scale offensive action. Reductions, limitations and the realization of a more defensive set of force postures might be examined as contributions to a more stable military balance.

Any initial deliberations among parties as to participation and modalities could take place in an informal setting, although the intention should always be to transfer any such negotiations back into a more formal OSCE framework at an appropriate time. Recognizing the many inherent difficulties involved in any move towards a more ambitious arms control regime for the region, the U.S. objective would, in the first instance, be as much to set in place an ongoing process as the expectation of any early progress towards a CFE-like regime.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003g. paper	re: Non-NATO Participation in NATO Implementation Force in Bosnia [partial] (3 pages)	09/13/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4001

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0224 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, September 15, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs684

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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POSITION PAPER

Subject: [redacted] Non-NATO Participation in NATO Implementation Force in Bosnia

1. (S) Purpose. To establish a Joint Staff/OSD position regarding [redacted] non-NATO participation in a NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia, in response to a tasking in the NSC Principals Committee meeting, 5 Sep 95.

2. (S) Background Points.

- In its memo to the Principals for the 5 Sep meeting, Deputies Committee agreed that:
  - ◊ The IFOR will be a NATO operation with limited non-NATO participation.
  - ◊ While operational efficiency of the IFOR will be reduced by involvement of non-NATO forces, non-NATO participation -- [redacted] -- will be politically necessary and in some respects, desirable (e.g., as an opportunity for Partnership for Peace countries to operate with NATO forces).
  - ◊ Non-NATO forces must be militarily capable, interoperable with NATO, and fully equipped; they must accept NATO operational control (OPCON) similar to a CJTF.
- [redacted]
- The IFOR will set precedents for future NATO CJTFs in out-of-area operations.

3. (S) Discussion.
Non-NATO troop contributing countries, including [redacted] are kept apprised of NATO planning by way of the Ad Hoc Planning and Coordination Group (AHPCG). This forum is appropriate for informing them of NATO's plans for IFOR and their proposed participation.

If the NATO plan for IFOR draws on past experience with OPLAN 40104, it will be a phased operation. Phase I will be the preparatory phase in which forces

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are trained, exercised and prepared for movement into the theater of operations. Training of non-NATO participants, to include basic familiarization with NATO procedures and operational concepts, could be accomplished in this phase. Since the intent is to deploy IFOR rapidly, however, the preparatory phase may be abbreviated, meaning that non-NATO forces might not be available from the outset of the operation. Forces currently assigned to UNPROFOR and deemed not interoperable with NATO forces (e.g., EO 13526 1.4d would not be invited to participate.

Agreement would have to be reached with the UN and with non-NATO participants for transfer of authority (TOA)/transfer of OPCON to NATO. A Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) would also be needed for all participants in the implementation operation.

Agreement on TOA/transfer of OPCON may hinge on the presence of a UN representative in theater and/or a non-NATO military official in a key position. A UN civilian official could serve at Theater Command level for consultation on political issues. It is not clear at this point that this would be acceptable to NATO allies and non-NATO contributors alike. This issue requires planning to avoid undercutting our CJTF position at NATO.

Advantages of EO 13526 1.4d non-NATO participation:

- Assists NATO's generation of overall force strength required for peace enforcement mission.
- Enhances prospects of long-term regional stability EO 13526 1.4d EO 13526 1.4d
- Enhances relations with 1.4(d) non-NATO countries by acknowledging their interests in the region.
- Enhances 1.4(d) non-NATO countries' confidence in NATO.
- Enhances impartiality of IFOR by including EO 13526 1.4d 1.4(d)
- Takes advantage of opportunity to enhance PFP relationship with 1.4(d) and others.
- EO 13526 1.4d NATO does not accept additional financial burden. Others should also pay their share.
- Increases likelihood of 1.4(d) in UN Security Council.

Disadvantages of 1.4(d) non-NATO participation:

- Detracts from IFOR effectiveness due lack of interoperability with non-NATO forces.

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- Complicates command and control. EO 13526 1.4d non-NATO countries may insist on command structure that is not strictly under NATO's OPCON.
- EO 13526 1.4d 1.4(d)
- Opens the door for non-NATO participation beyond desirable level and desirable participants.
- EO 13526 1.4d

4. ~~(S)~~ Recommendation. NATO IFOR should only include 1.4(d) non-NATO contingents under the following conditions:

- NATO specifies that 1.4(d) participation is a special case.
- NATO specifies requirement for NATO OPCON of EO 13526 1.4d non-NATO forces, based on written terms of reference defining "operational control."
- Non-NATO participants attain NATO standards (including training, physical fitness, medical status, equipment, logistics, sustainability). The theater commander would have a right of inspection prior to deployment of any contingent and could recommend acceptance/rejection. (EUCOM notes that this condition would exclude most non-NATO states.)
- NATO limits participation of EO 13526 1.4d non-NATO combat forces to avoid most serious consequences of lack of interoperability with other IFOR elements.
- NATO encourages EO 13526 1.4d non-NATO countries contribution consisting of combat support and combat service support forces, such as engineers, military police, logistics and transportation units.
- EO 13526 1.4d
- NATO specifies that the Ad Hoc Planning and Coordination Group is the appropriate body for bringing non-NATO troop contributors into the IFOR planning process.
- NATO gives further consideration to command and oversight issues, and their relationship to the US CJTF position at NATO.

Prepared by: Balkans Working Group
Eur Div, J5, Ext. 614-9431/2

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Engaging the Russians on Bosnia Settlement Implementation

Overview.

Your trip to Moscow will be our first opportunity to sound out Russian views on their participation in implementation of a Balkans settlement. While Russian thinking on implementation is not very far along, it is clear they are discomfited by the prospect of being left out of a U.S.- or NATO-led Peace Implementation Force (IFOR). As we think about how we might bring Russia into the IFOR, we must face up to four fundamental issues:

- Regardless of the ultimate mandate or political chapeau created for the IFOR, its commander will almost certainly be an American general. As a first step, we need to establish whether there are circumstances where the Russian leadership would be willing to participate in a peace enforcement operation under U.S. command.

- If the answer is yes, we will need to explore arrangements based on NATO's Combined Joint Task Force concept which would provide us with the certainty we need on political control issues but would give the Russians an arrangement they can live with (i.e., avoid the appearance of Russian subordination to NATO).

- If the answer is no, we will need to work with the Russians to identify so-called parallel tasks which fall outside IFOR's core peace enforcement mission but could be assigned to Russian military or civilian personnel.

- Clearly, creating workable arrangements for any Russian role should not be allowed to compromise IFOR's effectiveness and should meet the requirements laid down in PDD-25.

Political Oversight Issues.

You should be prepared for the Russians to insist on a role in political oversight/control of the IFOR, perhaps via the Security Council or as one of the great power guarantors of any overall peace settlement. While we plan to push for a UN

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mandate for the IFOR (which will require Russian help or acquiescence), the Russians will need to understand that the only political oversight we can live with would be via the North Atlantic Council. Still, it is conceivable we could create a Russian consultative arrangement with the NAC on a 16+1 basis which might assuage some of their concerns.

Structuring the Russian Contribution:

We have developed several models for Russian engagement in overall settlement implementation which, if properly fleshed out, could create a significant Russian role in the operation. We will need to have realistic expectations about what may be achievable, given Russia's chronic allergy to NATO.

Russians in the Chain

Model One: NATO Command under CJTF-type Label

If the Russians want a direct role in the IFOR and can accept U.S., but not NATO command, a CJTF-type command structure might be more palatable. The CJTF commander, in this case Adm. Smith, would be given opcon of the Russian units assigned to the IFOR. The Russians presumably would want to make it clear that their troops were subordinated to Smith in his capacity as Commander, Multi-National Force Bosnia, rather than in his NATO role (i.e., AFSOUTH). Political oversight of the CJTF would still come from the NAC, which could establish a special consultative arrangement with the Russians in Brussels. The Russian political role probably would need to be circumscribed to minimize possible interference in operational decisionmaking. The CJTF commander could readily draw on NATO support structures. It would be a NATO operation except in name. The Russians could have a senior military representative as a sub-commander in the CJTF structure, ideally charged with a non-combat function.

Model Two: A Coalition of the Willing

This would be modeled on DESERT STORM, where the U.S. assembled and commanded forces contributed by NATO and other countries on an ad hoc basis. The Russians would place their forces under the operational control of the U.S. commander. This structure would have many of the advantages of a NATO operation, but would not technically meet the tentative Principals decision that IFOR must be "NATO-led." The principal difficulty is the question of who exercises political oversight. In Desert Storm, the U.S. had the ultimate say although we consulted with key Allies. In this case, a Coalition Troop Contributors Council could be created and attached to the NAC via a consultative arrangement. The council would also have representation at the military command

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headquarters. Russian civilian and military officials would be given prominent roles in the council. (As a separate matter, we would also need to secure access to NATO support assets.)

Indirect Russian Involvement

Model Three: "Cut-Out" Role For the Russians, Emphasis on Parallel Tasks (Arms Control, Aid Distribution, etc.).

Moscow might be willing up front to focus its contribution on some of the so-called parallel tasks (e.g., arms control verification, distribution of humanitarian aid, resettlement, reconstruction, legal/dispute settlement issues, etc.) which we do not expect to assign to the IFOR. Drawing on our experience during the Gulf War with Polish and Czech units, we could develop a mechanism for associating the Russian troops and civilians assigned to these non-military tasks with the IFOR in a way that is politically palatable to Moscow but preserves NATO unity of command. Smaller NATO or neutral countries such as Finland and Ukraine might be tapped to augment the Russian role and to give it a multinational character. The Russian sector commanders would send liaison representatives to the IFOR HQ and the political superstructure which we expect will loosely coordinate non-IFOR activities. (As a separate issue, we need to look at ensuring a high-profile Russian role in this parallel structure.)

Model Four: OSCE Takes the Lead For Arms Control and Border Monitoring.

A variant of Model Three would be to set up a separate arms control/border monitoring function under OSCE. An OSCE body would be given loosely-defined oversight over this operation and would coordinate its activity with IFOR and the parallel political structure. Russians and others in the field would need to develop coordinating links with regional IFOR commanders and the parallel political structure. Russians could play a number of non-combat, leadership roles in such an effort, but the political leadership in Moscow might be resistant to being relegated to a secondary task along with smaller European states while NATO runs the peace enforcement mission.

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SEE ALSO 2015-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

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~~001. agenda~~	~~NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)~~	~~09/29/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 02/06/2020
002. memo	John Feeley to Samuel Berger re: September 29 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia (6 pages)	09/29/1995	P1/b(1)
~~003a. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)~~	~~09/29/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RDS 04/17/2015
~~003b. memo~~	~~[Duplicate of 002] [incomplete copy, page 2 only] (1 page)~~	~~00/00/0000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020

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DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA OF 29 SEP DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 30 SEP 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FEELEY LOGREF: 9521128 9521141

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0226 CODES:

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NSC LOG # 21122

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	State	EXECSEC		
	US/UN	Amb. Indefurth	Secure fax	736-7699
K	Treasury	EXECSEC		
N	DOD	EXECSEC		
B	AID	EXECSEC		
A	CIA	EXECSEC		
D	JCS	Col. Wilson		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

-2026466190- CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY -2026834413- Y95-08-28-12:57/001-001

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

1995 SEP 20 PM 12: 53

TIME OF RECEIPT

13:14

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: ~~IMMEDIATE~~
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 2041 CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: DC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21122

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	State	EXECSEC		
	US/UN	Amb. Indefurth	Secure fax	736-7699
K	Treasury	EXECSEC		
N	DOD	EXECSEC		
B	AID	EXECSEC		
A	CIA	EXECSEC		
D	JCS	Col. Wilson		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

1995 SEP 20 PM 12:53

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

K-1

PRECEDENCE: ~~IMMEDIATE~~
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 2041 CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: DC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21122

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	State	EXECSEC		
	US/UN	Amb. Indefurth	Secure fax	736-7699
K	Treasury	EXECSEC		
N	DOD	EXECSEC		
B	AID	EXECSEC		
A	CIA	EXECSEC		
D	JCS	Col. Wilson		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

1995 SEP 28 PM 12:53

TIME OF RECEIPT

SEP 28 1 02 PM '95

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: ~~IMMEDIATE~~
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: J. Berger

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 2041 CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: DC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21122

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	State	EXECSEC		
	US/UN	Amb. Indefurth	Secure fax	736-7699
K	Treasury	EXECSEC		
N	DOD	EXECSEC		
B	AID	EXECSEC		
A	CIA	EXECSEC		
D	JCS	Col. Wilson		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

21122

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 28, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. AARON S. WILLIAMS
Executive Secretary
Agency for International Development

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(C)~~

There will be a Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia September 29, 1995, from 5:00 - 6:00 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Principals plus one. The agenda is attached at Tab A. ~~(C)~~

Joyce A. Sens
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify On: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: September 29, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 5:00 - 6:00 p.m.

AGENDA

I. Non-allied Participation in IFOR.....JCS*

II. Political Implementation Structure.....State

III. Stability Package (Arms Control/Equip and Train).....State

IV. Economic Package.....State*/Treasury

V. USG Pol/Mil Plan for Implementation.....NSC

*Revised paper should be circulated by COB September 28th.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 2/6/2020
2013-0682-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

21122

September 27, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: JOHN F. FEELEY, JR.

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, September 29, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Deputies meeting on Bosnia to be held September 29, 1995. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve AW Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/1/2019

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~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9521128
RECEIVED: 28 SEP 95 15

TO: BERGER

FROM: FEELEY
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 28 SEP 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA DC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 29 SEP DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER DUE DATE: 02 OCT 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FEELEY LOGREF: 9521122 9521141

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0226 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		DAALDER
		FEELEY
		NSC CHRON
		PIFER
		VERSHBOW

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

COMMENTS: ATTACHMENTS NOT RETURNED

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS CLOSED BY: DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~ RECORD ID: 9521128

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	95092915	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	95092915	NOTED BY BERGER

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. memo	John Feeley to Samuel Berger re: September 29 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia (6 pages)	09/29/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4002

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0226 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, September 29, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs685

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9521141
RECEIVED: 02 OCT 95 14

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 04 OCT 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA DC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 29 SEP DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 05 OCT 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9521122 9521128

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0226 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BAKER JANE
		FEELEY
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB CLOSED BY: NSKDB DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	95100317	FOR DECISION
001		X	95100413	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
001	SENS	Z	95100413	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	95100414	SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	951004	FUERTH, L	
002	951004	BRILL, K	
002	951004	NYE, J	
002	951004	MCALEER, R	
002	951004	INDERFURTH, R	
002	951004	ADAMS, G	
002	951004	WILLIAMS, A	
002	951004	YANNUZZI, R	
002	951004	WILSON, F	

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Recd 10/4 7:45a

National Security Council
The White House

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URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (MP) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1		
Dohse			
Sens	3	ADS	Sign. Tab I
Soderberg			
Berger	2	ON	REDO ASAP
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	MP 10/4	D
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 21141

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (KB) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1		
Dohse			
Sens	3	AS	Sign Tab I
Soderberg			
Berger	2	CN	RETD
Lake			asap
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	(KB) 10/4	D
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9521141
DATE 04 OCT 95

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 29 SEP DC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA NOELLE JENSEN ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	10/5	SITROOM BOX	[signature]
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: ~~1~~		TAYLOR
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	10-5-95 AM	6:00	[signature]
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: VIA FAX +1		
MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY ROOM 3408, MAIN TREASURY BLDG 1500 PENNSYLVANIA AVE, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20220			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: VIA FAX		
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: VIA FAX		
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: VIA FAX		
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	10/6/95	8:55	[signature]
	PRINT LAST NAME:		GRAVES
	COPY: 1		

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9521141
DATE 04 OCT 95

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 29 SEP DC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. AARON WILLIAMS AGENCY FOR INTL DEVELOPMENT ROOM 5945, NEW STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20523	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
COL. F. C. WILSON JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9521141
DATE 04 OCT 95

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 29 SEP DC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA NOELLE JENSEN ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	5Oct95	0918	Noël Bujold PRINT LAST NAME: Bujold-Jensen COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX +1
MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY ROOM 3408, MAIN TREASURY BLDG 1500 PENNSYLVANIA AVE, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20220			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: 1

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9521141
DATE 04 OCT 95

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 29 SEP DC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA NOELLE JENSEN ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	10/5	640	Holmes PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX +1
MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY ROOM 3408, MAIN TREASURY BLDG 1500 PENNSYLVANIA AVE, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20220	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

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OCT -4 P 3:38

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF RECEIPT

Oct 4 3:45 PM '95

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 2096 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 4 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (AR) (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 29 SEP DC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21141

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
K	TREASURY	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
	USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF AMBASSADOR		736-7699
B	AID	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
~~ROUTINE~~

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 2096 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 4 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 29 SEP DC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21141

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
TREASURY	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF AMBASSADOR		736-7699
AID	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

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WHITE HOUSE COPY

TIME OF TRANSMISSION 1995 OCT -4 P 2:38

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF RECEIPT Oct 4 3:46 PM '95

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
~~ROUTINE~~

RELEASER: J. Kamp

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 2096 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 4 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (KPA) (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 29 SEP DC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21141

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
K	TREASURY	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
	USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF AMBASSADOR		736-7699
B	AID	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHITE HOUSE

TIME OF RECEIPT

NSC 08 WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

NSPR 21:58 4/OCT 95

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
~~ROUTINE~~

RELEASER: H. Kamp

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 2096 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 4 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (KP) (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 29 SEP DC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21141

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
K	TREASURY	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
	USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF AMBASSADOR		736-7699
B	AID	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

21141

October 4, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. AARON S. WILLIAMS
Executive Secretary
Agency for International Development

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, September 29, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

21141

Summary of Conclusions for
SVTS Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee
DATE: September 29, 1995
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 5:00 p.m. - 6:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR
Sandy Berger

OVP
Leon Fuerth
Rick Saunders

STATE
Strobe Talbott
Peter Tarnoff
Ralph Johnson

DEFENSE
John White
Walt Slocombe

TREASURY
David Lipton

USUN
David Scheffer
James O'Brien

OMB
Gordon Adams
Mark Sandy

CIA
John Gannon
Norm Schindler

JCS
Michael Byron
Doug Lute

AID
Carol Lancaster
Tom Dine

NSC
Sandy Vershbow
John Feeley

Summary of Conclusions

1. Deputies met September 29 to discuss post-settlement implementation. They agreed to defer discussion of economic reconstruction.

2. On American participation in IFOR, Deputies reaffirmed that our first priority is to ensure the integrity of military operations, i.e. NATO-led operation, unity of command, no dual key. Deputies agreed, however, that Russian participation in the IFOR was desirable. Deputies agreed that:

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RS 9/30/14 (2.31)
RS 4/17/2015

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- we would prefer that Russian forces be under NATO operational control as part of one or more Allies' Area of Responsibility (AOR), rather than in a separate Russian AOR;
- we would prefer that, within the Allied AOR(s), Russian forces be given specific functional responsibilities.

3. Deputies agreed in principle to a fallback position of allowing the Russians to report to Deputy IFOR Commander Janvier in his dual-hatted capacity as Deputy UN Force Commander, upon assurances that Janvier does not have an independent reporting line to the UN regarding military matters. However, before broaching this with the Russians, we need to study further what was needed to ensure unity of command and no "dual key" under the Janvier option **(Action: OSD/JCS)**. Based on that study, we would sound out the UN about the viability of this option **(Action: USUN/State)**. Deputies agreed to postpone military talks between the JCS (Clark) and his Russian military counterpart, in light of the proposed Perry-Grachev meeting.

4. In view of Allied preferences for a stronger UN role in the implementation of the civilian aspects of the peace settlement, Deputies agreed we should define what constraints would be needed to define a narrow scope of responsibility and avoid organizational inefficiency in the event we agreed that the UN SYG could appoint the Senior Coordinator **(Action: State/USUN)**.

5. With regard to the stabilization package, Deputies accepted a two-stage approach to arms control, i.e., the peace agreement would contain limited arms control measures (separation zones, continued no-fly zone) and a commitment by the parties to follow-on negotiations to establish equal ceilings on CFE categories of equipment. Deputies also recommended that the Principals look again at the equip and train decision. They agreed to prepare two options addressing a modest and a robust degree of U.S. engagement in equipping and training the Federation, in the context of a clearly defined end-state for the equip and train effort **(Action: State)**. Based on the assumptions in the JCS paper on equipping and training the Federation, the deputies asked JCS to prepare a paper regarding how to implement an equip and train program **(Action: JCS)**. The deputies also decided to defer sending an assessment team to the Federation at this time.

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21141

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 2, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: JOHN FEELEY

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, September 29, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of Conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia held September 29, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve AVR Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/1/2019
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See DLSD 2013-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (3 pages)~~	~~10/06/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
002a. memo	John Feeley to Samuel Berger re: October 6 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia [redo] (5 pages)	10/06/1995	P1/b(1)
002b. memo	John Feeley to Samuel Berger re: October 6 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia (5 pages)	10/06/1995	P1/b(1)
~~002c. agenda~~	~~[Duplicate of 003] (1 page)~~	~~10/06/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 02/06/2020
002d. paper	re: Participation in IFOR [partial] (6 pages)	10/05/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 6/11/2020
002e. paper	re: Russian Participation in the Bosnia IFOR [partial] (3 pages)	10/05/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 6/11/2020
002f. paper	re: Election Security-Implications to the NATO Implementation Force (3 pages)	10/05/1995	P1/b(1)
~~002g. paper~~	~~re: Senior Implementation Coordinator: Scope of Responsibilities if Appointed by UN SYG (2 pages)~~	~~10/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002h. paper~~	~~re: Senior Implementation Coordinator: Alternatives for Appointment (6 pages)~~	~~10/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002i. paper~~	~~re: Political Implementation Structure Model for the Senior Implementation Coordinator (3 pages)~~	~~10/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002j. paper~~	~~re: Stabilization Package in a Bosnian Settlement: CBMS/ARMS Control (3 pages)~~	~~10/06/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020

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2010-0533-M
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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~~002k. paper~~	~~re: Sustaining a Peace Agreement in Bosnia (4 pages)~~	~~10/05/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 08/03/2015
~~003. agenda~~	~~NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)~~	~~10/06/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 02/06/2020

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FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 12 OCT 95
SOURCE REF:

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DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 6 OCT DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 13 OCT 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FEELEY LOGREF: 9521159 9521168

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0229 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		FEELEY
		NSC CHRON
		VERSHBOW

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001	SENS	Z	95101214	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	95101214	DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	951012	FUERTH, L	
002	951012	BRILL, K	
002	951012	MCALEER, R	
002	951012	INDERFURTH, R	
002	951012	ADAMS, G	
002	951012	YANNUZZI, R	
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Sens			
Soderberg	copy 2		
Berger			
Lake			
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West Wing Desk	4	MC 10/12	D
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Dohse			
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	COPY: 1		
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	10-12-95	6:00 AM	[signature]
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: VIA FAX+1		
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			
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AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			
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JANET 16:53 DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	10/12/95	17:00	[signature]
	PRINT LAST NAME: ASHFORD		
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MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			
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COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	10/13/95	_____	S. Graves PRINT LAST NAME: GRAVES COPY: 1
MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions Deputy Committee Meeting on Bosnia NSC LOG # 21176

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	State	Executive Secretary		
N	Defense	Executive Secretary		
B	USUN	Rick Inderfurth		735-7699
A	CIA	Executive Secretary		
D	JCS	Secretary		

REMARKS:

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N	Defense	Executive Secretary		
B	USUN	Rick Inderfurth		735-7699
A	CIA	Executive Secretary		
D	JCS	Secretary		

REMARKS:

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RELEASER: ~~BG~~

DTG:

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions Deputy Committee Meeting on Bosnia NSC LOG # 21176

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	State	Executive Secretary		
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B	USUN	Rick Inderfurth		735-7699
A	CIA	Executive Secretary		
D	JCS	Secretary		

REMARKS:

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RELEASER: ~~BG~~

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 2136 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 5 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions Deputy Committee Meeting on Bosnia NSC LOG # 21176

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
State	Executive Secretary		
Defense	Executive Secretary		
USUN	Rick Inderfurth		735-7699
CIA	Executive Secretary		
JCS	Secretary		

REMARKS:

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- ☐ PRIORITY
- ☐ ROUTINE

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DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting Summary of Conclusions DC Bosnia 6 October PAGES: 5

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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Initials: RDS Date: 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21176

October 12, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, October 6, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

for
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

21176

October 11, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: JOHN FEELEY

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, October 6, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of Conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia held October 6, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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By RDS NARA, Date 10/1/2019
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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9521168
RECEIVED: 06 OCT 95 10

TO: BERGER

FROM: FEELEY
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 06 OCT 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 6 OCT DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER DUE DATE: 10 OCT 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FEELEY LOGREF: 9521159 9521176

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0229 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BAKER JANE
		DAALDER
		FEELEY
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		PIFER
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS:

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	95100610	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	95100619	NOTED BY BERGER

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The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1	[illegible]	
Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg	Copy		
Berger	2	Deputy Nat'l Sec Advisor has seen	
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	RB 10/6	N
Records Mgt.			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

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21176

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee
DATE: October 6, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 4:00 p.m. - 5:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR
Sandy Berger

OVP
Leon Fuerth
Rick Saunders

STATE
Strobe Talbott
John Kornblum

DEFENSE
John White
Walter Slocombe

USUN
Rick Inderfurth
David Scheffer

OMB
Gordon Adams
Keith Bickel

CIA
John Gannon
Norman Schindler

JCS
Daniel Christman
Douglas Lute

NSC
Alexander Vershbow
John Feeley

Summary of Conclusions

Russian Participation in IFOR

1. Deputies discussed options for Russian involvement in the peace implementation force (IFOR), in preparation for Secretary of Defense Perry's October 8 meeting with Russian Minister of Defense Grachev in Geneva. They reaffirmed that our first priority is to ensure the integrity of military operations, i.e., NATO-led operation, unity of command and no dual key. The Deputies agreed upon the following principles:

- Participation in IFOR means acceptance of NATO operational control (OPCON) or tactical control (TACON);

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(233)
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- All other options regarding relations with IFOR will be characterized as "cooperation with" IFOR;
- Under all options, Russia should not have a separate zone in the Theater of Operations, e.g., we should oppose Russian deployments exclusively in Bosnian Serb areas;
- The option of Russian units operating in support of IFOR under Russian national command is only acceptable if Russian forces are limited to non-core functional tasks;
- The option of Russian units in support of IFOR under a UN chain of command and reporting to the UN Senior Implementation Coordinator is acceptable if Russian forces are limited to non-core functional tasks and if safeguards exist against any backdoor UN interference in IFOR military decisions (no dual key);
- Only the NAC makes decisions for and provides political guidance to the IFOR;
- The Ad Hoc Planning Coordination Group or any other NATO fora established to include non-allied participants will only consult, advise and/or inform the NAC but not make decisions with or for the NAC;
- NATO meetings at 16-plus-Russia are desirable as an additional confidence-building measure but only to consult, advise and/or inform the NAC; and
- Russia will not have any veto over relations with or participation in IFOR by other non-Allies. ~~(S)~~

2. The Deputies agreed in principle that other non-allied participants could cooperate with IFOR under the above principles, but caution should be exercised. ~~(S)~~

IFOR Role During Elections

3. Deputies were skeptical that IFOR should assume direct responsibility for providing security during elections in Bosnia. They expressed general agreement with the conclusion in the JCS paper that IFOR would help create secure conditions for elections by completing its primary tasks: deploying forces to establish presence and separation between warring factions; enforcing the zones of separation and negotiated boundaries; and enforcing the withdrawal of forces to their respective territories within an agreed period. They deferred a formal decision, however, pending discussions with the U.S. negotiating team. ~~(S)~~

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UN Role in Civilian Aspects of Implementation

4. On the appointment of a senior official to coordinate the civilian aspects of peace implementation, the Deputies agreed that we continue to prefer that the Senior Implementation Coordinator (SICOR) be appointed as part of the peace settlement, with enhanced international authority conferred by the UN Security Council. Deputies agreed that we may ultimately need to accommodate the position of our Allies and the Russians that the SICOR be appointed by the UNSC or the UN Secretary General but deferred a decision on this question. ~~(S)~~

Military Stabilization Plan

5. Following up on the October 4 Principals Committee meeting, Deputies endorsed both the State-developed arms control package and the OSD military assistance package. Deputies reaffirmed that the military assistance package would be subject to modification following a visit by an assessment team. They agreed that JCS should draft a charter for the assessment team immediately and be prepared to send the team in the next two weeks, assuming that the cease-fire has taken effect **(Action: JCS)**. Deputies also agreed to the JCS suggestion that, in order to improve the effectiveness of the assistance package, we consider increasing efforts to strengthen the Federation's joint command. **(Action: State/JCS)** ~~(S)~~

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	John Feeley to Samuel Berger re: October 6 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia [redo] (5 pages)	10/06/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4002

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0229 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, October 6, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs686

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. memo	John Feeley to Samuel Berger re: October 6 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia (5 pages)	10/06/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4002

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0229 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, October 6, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs686

RESTRICTION CODES

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

21159

October 5, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(C)~~

There will be a Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia October 6, 1995 from 4:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Principals plus one. The agenda is attached at Tab A. ~~(C)~~

for
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

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NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: October 6, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 4:00 - 5:00 p.m.

AGENDA

I. Russian Participation in IFOR/Options for Perry-Grachev..OSD*

II. Role of IFOR during Elections.....JCS*

III. UN Role in Civilian Aspects of Implementation.....US/UN

IV. Military Stabilization Plan: Follow-up to PC.....State/OSD*

* Revised papers should be circulated by COB October 5.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 2/6/2020
2017-0682-M

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002d. paper	re: Participation in IFOR [partial] (6 pages)	10/05/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
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OA/Box Number: 4002

FOLDER TITLE:
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under E.O. 13526 1.4(b) & 1.4(d)

5 Oct 95

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(d) **Participation in IFOR** (or in cooperation with)

Note: Under all options, peace agreement would establish basic structure of military and civilian implementation, UN would endorse agreement and authorize NATO, UN agencies, and other international institutions to implement it. [redacted] would participate in "Consultative Group" (including CG, other nations with major participation, OIC, EU, OSCE, NATO, other institutions engaged in implementation.

Option I: [redacted] unit under NATO Tacon but National Command [redacted]

-- [redacted] units would be under the operational or tactical control of one of the divisions of IFOR, for instance, the French division. The IFOR division commander could assign tasks and provide direction to the [redacted] units, as spelled out in definitions of operational and tactical control. NEED SIMPLE SUMMARY STATEMENTS OF WHAT THESE TERMS MEAN TO NATO.

-- [redacted] retains national command authority over its units; can refuse to execute orders if that is national decision.

-- [redacted] unit performs either combat or support function.

-- [redacted] has liaison officers at every level of NATO command, beginning with a 3-star at SACEUR HQ, with additional liaison officers at level of IFOR Cdr (AFSOUTH), Land component cdr (ARRC), and Div commander.

-- [redacted] included in "Bosnia Military Implementation Committee" (along with representatives of other significant troop contributing countries) and at NATO HQ in Brussels in periodic [redacted] meetings to advise NAC on progress and problems of military implementation.

-- [redacted] pays costs of its units.

Option II: [redacted] units operate in support of IFOR but under full national command, with only liaison links to NATO-led IFOR

EO 13526 1.4b

-- [redacted] unit under full national command and control.

-- [redacted] unit performs support function only -- "functions that are important to overall effort, such as strategic lift or engineer tasks, but not so linked to operations of IFOR as to require unity of command." 1.4(b), 1.4(d) [redacted] ?

-- Liaison at all levels of NATO command chain, but no [redacted] participation in IFOR military command structure.

-- [redacted] unit liaises and coordinates with IFOR to avoid conflict/overlap, but no NATO officer has directive authority over [redacted] forces.

[redacted]

[redacted]

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under E.O. 13526 1.4(b) & 1.4(d)

-- [redacted] participates in overall political consultative committee, but not in Brussels-based Bosnia Military Implementation Committee.
-- [redacted] pays own costs.

Option III: [redacted] units operate in support of IFOR, but under a UN chain of command.

[redacted]

Note: CJCS would not include this option as a possibility.

-- Identical to Option II, except:
-- [redacted] unit reports to a UN military commander or to a UN civilian official, presumably the Special Coordinator.

[redacted]

Option IV: [redacted] carries out civilian implementation tasks, but does not participate with military units.

[redacted]

-- No [redacted] military role in implementation.
-- [redacted] active in civilian-side implementation, in Consultative Committee

[redacted]

Comments

Option I

-- Preserves NATO Unity of command
-- May be hard to get GOBH to agree to a [redacted] geographical AOR
-- [redacted] all contributors) retains ultimate power to refuse to accept NATO orders.
-- [redacted] has political advisory voice alongside the NAC in Brussels through the Bosnia Military Implementation Committee and periodic 16 + 1 consultations. It also has a place in the broader Consultative Group. To the degree this political voice is sufficiently meaningful to meet [redacted] concerns, it risks diluting NAC authority.
-- No UN military command element.

Option II

-- [redacted] not subordinate to NATO, but also no UN command.
-- Because of lack of unity of command, [redacted] functional military activities must be sufficiently separable that they can be carried out without unity of command.

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-- Must rely on [redacted] cooperation and liaison to avoid conflicts, no control authority over [redacted] units.

-- Even if its units are not under NATO command, [redacted] may insist on inclusion in arrangements for political consultation with troop contributors.

Option III

-- As Option II, except:
-- Distinctively UN operational authority over [redacted] forces.
-- Existence of a UN military element risk de facto dual key.

Option IV

-- Reflects judgment that the "circle cannot be squared," i.e., there is no role for [redacted] military that both preserves NATO unity of command over critical military task and [redacted] interest minimizing NATO control of [redacted] forces.

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E.O. 13526 1.4(b)
and 1.4(d)

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Option I. 1.4(b) Unit Under NATO TACON but National Command



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Option II. 1.4(b) Units in Support of IFOR but Under National Command Only



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10/5/95

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Option III. 1.4(b) Units in Support of IFOR but Under UN Chain of Command



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10/5/95

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002e. paper	re: Russian Participation in the Bosnia IFOR [partial] (3 pages)	10/05/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4002

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0229 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, October 6, 1995

2010-0533-M
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RESTRICTION CODES

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[redacted] PARTICIPATION IN THE BOSNIA IFOR

STRATEGY FOR [redacted] MEETING, 8 OCT. 1995

I. GENERAL STRATEGY

- **Our key objectives are to:**
  - -- Prevent a [redacted] veto of the UNSCR needed to authorize a NATO IFOR.
  - -- Reach agreement on cooperative [redacted] participation in the NATO-led IFOR on terms preferred by, or acceptable to, the U.S. and NATO.

- Our **strategy is primarily offensive**, not defensive, and is designed **to hold the U.S.-NATO line on:** (1) A UN-authorized IFOR under NATO command and control; (2) No dual key; (3) Conventional OPCON/TACON relationships to NATO; (4) NATO ROE; (5) IFOR contributors pay their own way; and (6) Military effectiveness, force balance and sustainability as key requirements for non-NATO contributions.

- Our fall back position (s) will only be offered if [redacted] refuses to allow a [redacted] contingent to serve under NATO.

- If [redacted] has not issued final guidance for [redacted] participation in IFOR by Sunday, [redacted] may only be authorized to listen and not close a deal. In this case, the Geneva meeting will be our best opportunity to try and shape [redacted] decision.

- Although [redacted] real -- as opposed to rhetorical -- bottom line on IFOR is still unknown, its mightiest lever is its UNSC veto.

- But [redacted] also has weaknesses that suggest [redacted] concessions might be possible. We will try to trade subordination of a [redacted] contingent to NATO command for the **appearance of [redacted] inclusion as an equal partner in the Bosnian IFOR political and military decision-making process.**

- [redacted] will never be comfortable with and may not accept the subordination of its forces to NATO. Nevertheless, a good cosmetics job -- stopping well short of making [redacted] an honorary member of NATO for the duration of an IFOR in Bosnia or giving [redacted] more than an advisory political voice -- could tip the balance.

- Given domestic pressures and the [redacted] Administration's need for a visible and major role in Bosnia, the key is to find the right combination of [redacted] involvement in political-military decision making bodies for IFOR as an artful cover for NATO control of [redacted] forces.

- On the political front, we should emphasize that [redacted]:
  - -- Already has a seat on the UNSC which will provide the mandate for implementing the peace settlement in Bosnia.

Classified by: Multiple Sources; Declassify on OADR

All closures made under E.O. 13526 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

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Per E.O. 13526
VZ 02/06/2020 (3.67)
2013-0682-M

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-- Would have a seat on the Consultative Group which will include the Contact Group, other major participating nations, and institutions engaged in implementation, such as OIC, EU, OSCE and NATO.

-- Would have a seat on the Bosnia Military Implementation Committee alongside the NAC in Brussels, and

-- Would have periodic consultations at 16+1 with the NAC.

• On the **military front**, emphasis should be placed on:

-- [redacted] retention of national command authority over its units and right to withdraw or refuse to execute orders.

-- [redacted] liaison officers at every level of NATO command, including SACEUR HQ (a 3 star), IFOR Commander (AFSOUTH), Land Component Commander (ARRC) and Division Commander.

-- The need for a senior [redacted] officer be sent to Mons as soon as possible for discussions with SACEUR on command arrangements, mission allocation, force deployments, areas of responsibility, and financial obligations.

• Fiscal constraints could curb [redacted] appetite for a prominent [redacted] role and/or strengthen his insistence on a UN IFOR. It remains to be seen how large a contingent [redacted] can afford and is prepared to field to secure the major role it wants in IFOR. The [redacted] has informally hinted the [redacted] contribution will be smaller than the U.S. but [redacted] has said it could be a Division or less.

• On the other hand, if NATO could contract out functions such as helicopter resupply, mine clearing, road transportation etc., [redacted] might find it an attractive solution to the problem of financing its contingent of combat troops.

II. WHAT TO EXPECT FROM [redacted]

• Repetition of long-standing complaints that [redacted] is excluded from the process of Western decision making on security issues.

• Strong opposition to the fundamental concept of an IFOR under exclusive NATO command and control, tempered by [redacted] desire to be a major player in any Balkan settlement.

• Preference for a separate AOR placing [redacted] on an equal footing with the U.S., UK and France. [redacted] recent suggestion that a [redacted] division might be tendered to IFOR and [redacted] proposal for a joint NATO-[redacted] IFOR under alternating command also hint at a separate AOR. As the '94 Totskoye exercise demonstrated, [redacted] peacekeeping doctrine calls for national AORs.

• Little enthusiasm for a secondary role confined to combat support or combat service support operations -- whether in or outside IFOR.

• Insistence that the [redacted] military be treated as an equal partner and integral player in the process of designing IFOR command structures, allocation of missions, and national areas of responsibility.

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III. THE APPROACH TO [redacted]

• The [redacted] NATO dialogue on IFOR must begin soon and be carefully shaped. While U.S. leadership in this dialogue is vital, we must avoid reinforcing [redacted] perceptions that the U.S. dominates NATO decision making.

• SecDef's meeting with [redacted] will be most effective if clearly presented as the beginning of [redacted] involvement in the IFOR process and leading to direct negotiations between the [redacted] and NATO.

• Begin by outlining diplomatic progress toward a peace settlement and the various elements of the peace implementation plan. Particular care should be taken with two concepts the [redacted] will find particularly objectionable: the "even-handed but asymmetric approach" to possible serious violations of the peace settlement, and equipping and training the Bosnian Federation.

• [redacted] will more readily understand the IFOR structures for political guidance, national command and operational control if guided from the top down with a chart showing parallel and identical U.S. and [redacted] command chains on either side of the NATO OPCON chain, and political bodies in which [redacted] will have a seat.

• Following this presentation of general principles, [redacted] should be asked for his comments and views.

• SecDef should then outline the preferred U.S. position of full [redacted] integration within the NATO chain of command.

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SENIOR IMPLEMENTATION COORDINATOR: SCOPE OF RESPONSIBILITIES IF APPOINTED BY U.N. SYG

This paper discusses what constraints would be needed to define a narrow scope of responsibility and avoid organizational inefficiency in the event the USG agreed that the U.N. Secretary-General could appoint the Senior Implementation Coordinator ("SICOR"). The attached paper ("Senior Implementation Coordinator: Alternatives for Appointment") describes the range of alternatives for appointment of the SICOR, including our preferred one (Option (2)) that would avoid having to build in the constraints described below, as well as Option (5) which lists some of the constraints in the event the U.N. SYG appoints the SICOR.

An important caveat is the fact that constraining the SICOR in some of the ways discussed below would be unprecedented in U.N. practice and probably a non-starter with our allies and the Russians on the Security Council and with the Secretary-General, who would want his "representative" to exercise certain authority on his behalf. Our allies and the Russians are proposing a U.N. appointment in order to grant the SICOR a substantial oversight role with U.N. authority. Trying to cripple that authority with constraints of the following character may be a futile exercise.

Possible Constraints on the SICOR:

- Require reports to the U.N. SYG either at the discretion of the SICOR or at lengthy intervals (e.g., semi-annually or annually).

- Define the SICOR's responsibilities as limited to coordinating only the work of U.N. agencies in the field. (This would open the possibility for a second coordinator appointed outside the U.N. system to work with the larger number of non-U.N. agencies, regional organizations, and NGO's in the field. However, there would have to be some coordination between the coordinators.)

- Explicitly prohibit the SICOR from taking any action relating to the IFOR. Nonetheless, it may be desirable for the SICOR to consult with the IFOR Commander with respect to non-military matters that intersect with the operation of the IFOR, but without any authority to impede IFOR operations. (The Europeans and Russians press this pragmatic point, not as a dual key proposal, but rather for efficient coordination of non-military affairs.)

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• Require the SICOR to consult closely and regularly with the Contact Group or settlement (CG+) group and either to follow guidance from such group or take its recommendations into account in his work.

• Dilute the SICOR's direct authority by enhancing the overall authority of the proposed "Senior Coordination Committee," which might report to the Contact Group or settlement group rather than to the U.N. The numerous functions envisaged for the various committees described in the "Implementation Structure" paper could be undertaken by the Senior Coordination Committee, with only a limited role to be played by the SICOR.

• Limit the SICOR's staff (secretariat) drastically, thus impeding his ability to act effectively. (The non-U.N. appointed de facto coordinator could be given adequate staff to operate effectively.) Further, or alternatively, ensure that the individual selected is of weak character. The objective would be to create a shell SICOR, and build up the capabilities of a non-U.N. appointed coordinator. (The model might be the peace negotiations themselves, in which the U.N.-appointed SICOR is like another Bildt or Stoltenberg, and the non-U.N. appointed coordinator is like Holbrooke.)

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SENIOR IMPLEMENTATION COORDINATOR: ALTERNATIVES FOR APPOINTMENT

The options below are in order of increasing international involvement, especially by the United Nations. Although the following refers to the appointment of the Senior Implementation Coordinator (SICOR), other governments have spoken of a "Special Representative" or "High Representative" of the U.N. Secretary-General or simply of the United Nations. The use of "SICOR" thus reflects our own preference rather than a term accepted by other governments.

Any of the following options could provide for consultations with the states pursuing a settlement and with the parties. In no option is it contemplated that the SICOR would have any explicit oversight, shared authority, or control over the military Implementation Force (IFOR). Nonetheless, the greater the U.N. role in selecting and employing the SICOR, the more likely situations will arise that encourage U.N. interference in IFOR-related activities through the work of the SICOR.

(1) Peace Settlement.

In the peace settlement, the parties would appoint the SICOR by name or would establish a process for appointing the SICOR, for example, by designating an institution or group of states to name the SICOR. The preferred group of states would be the Contact Group or the Contact Group plus additional interested states comprising a "Settlement Group."

This is the minimum necessary. This process ensures that the SICOR enjoys the trust of the parties and of states most involved in the negotiation and implementation of a settlement. The authority and profile of the SICOR would be limited, however, to that conferred by the parties themselves (or the appointer); the SICOR might lack influence with international bodies implementing the settlement, but he would not be imposed by an outside entity.

(2) Peace Settlement, Approved by U.N. Security Council.

The SICOR could be appointed as in Option (1), with enhanced international authority conferred by the Security Council. The Council might direct other states and organizations (especially UN organizations) to cooperate with the SICOR or it might more generally bless the arrangements reached by the parties.

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This has been our preferred approach in discussions with NATO allies and the Russians. Even a minimal Security Council imprimatur could increase the SICOR's profile and persuasive powers. The Council might, however, insist on some ongoing involvement with the SICOR (that he/she report regularly, that the Council exercise authority to instruct the SICOR) as a price for its approval.

After lengthy and contentious discussion at the September 29 NAC meeting (USNATO 3822), a compromise was reached describing the SICOR in a manner that largely conforms to our preferred approach:

> (15) Agreed that, in planning for the operation of an IFOR, NATO authorities should assume that a peace agreement will be the subject of a resolution of the United Nations Security Council, which could grant authority for civilian implementing tasks to a High Representative in theatre whose responsibility would be, without in any way interfering in the conduct of military operations or the chain of command, to monitor the overall implementation of the peace plan.

A more detailed discussion of our preferred approach is attached as Annex I.

(3) Security Council Blessing, with intermediary.

In option (2), the SICOR has a direct line to the Council. In order to reduce the likelihood of Security Council involvement in the SICOR's work, it may be desirable to place an intermediary organization between the SICOR and the Council, whether the Council directly appoints the SICOR or the SICOR is appointed by such intermediary or solely in the peace agreement (option (1)). The intermediary could provide political guidance in much the same way as we now envisage the Ad Hoc Planning Group in Brussels providing advice to NATO relating to the IFOR.

Options for the intermediary include:

- An ad hoc settlement group (e.g., Contact Group plus). This offers the most control for the states involved and would include the states most concerned about maintaining political involvement. It may be difficult to persuade the Security Council, however, to cede appointment authority entirely to such a group even if most members are themselves Council members.

- The OSCE. The OSCE's appointment process may be slow and difficult to control, particularly for an institution

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of such large membership operating on consensus. The OSCE itself is one of the organizations with which the SICOR will coordinate, and the SICOR's authority may be diminished by suspicions of other such organizations.

• The International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY). The ICFY is already established, well-known, and has a tradition of involvement in the former Yugoslavia, including appointments of personnel for monitoring and periodic reports to the U.N. SYG. In this case, the SICOR could report annually or perhaps semi-annually through the ICFY co-chairmen to the United Nations and the European Union. This would blunt the direct reporting requirement to the Council and thus diminish direct Council involvement.

--The SICOR could be appointed in any one of several methods. (1) The ICFY co-chairmen could appoint the SICOR following consultations with interested parties and in accordance with the peace agreement. (2) The settlement group could appoint following consultations with the UN and NATO SYG's and with blessing from the Security Council. (3) The U.N. SYG could appoint based upon the recommendation of the NATO SYG and perhaps the settlement group; but the responsibilities of the SICOR then would be delegated to ICFY to oversee. (This would have the added advantage of appointment by essentially the two SYG's, granting automatic status with international agencies.)

--Funding for the work of the the SICOR could be the same as for ICFY funding.

(4) Security Council Appointment.

In consultations and NAC debates, the French, British, and Russians have referred to appointment "by the Security Council" or "the United Nations." The Germans, Italians, and Spanish also have voiced strong support for a direct U.N. appointment of the SICOR. The parties could invite the Council to appoint the SICOR, presumably after consultations.

However, direct appointment by the Security Council of a U.N. "High Representative" (or "Special Representative") would be unorthodox. The traditional method is appointment by the U.N. Secretary-General followed by endorsement from the Security Council (see Option (5) below). We do not believe the Europeans are stuck on an initial Council appointment; they surely would settle for appointment by the SYG and endorsement by the Council. Only the French appear to be explicitly speaking of a direct Council appointment and presumably would settle for a direct SYG appointment.

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The difficulty with any direct SYG or Council appointment is the likelihood of, at a minimum, a reporting requirement (probably periodic and perhaps frequent) to the SYG or Council. (If the SICOR reports to the SYG, the latter transmits the report to the Council for its attention.) Since the SICOR would be the representative of the United Nations, he necessarily would be expected to report to the body he represents. He also would be expected to follow guidance from the United Nations.

In practice, the reporting requirements of a Special Representative of the SYG (namely, SICOR) automatically will seize the Council with whatever is contained in the reports, thus triggering Council action. Such action could include a Presidential Statement noting the delivery of the report and its contents or a Council resolution mandating some action in response to the report. This will offer Russia and others ample opportunity to intervene regularly in the affairs of the SICOR and attempt to do so with IFOR. Our goal has been to minimize Council involvement.

(5) Appointment by the Secretary General and Endorsement by the Security Council.

This is the customary means of appointment, and the one clearly preferred by the Europeans and Russia.

It may be of some significance that the U.N. Secretary-General did not suggest in his letter of September 18 to the Security Council that he had any interest in appointing the SICOR. Rather, he wrote of the Council authorizing an "ad hoc coalition of Member States, acting as appropriate with regional organizations or arrangements, to support all aspects of implementation of the agreement, with the exception of those relating to the relief and return of refugees and displaced persons which should continue to be entrusted to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees." The SYG's insistence on reducing U.N. expenses suggests that he may not be interested in an extensive U.N. role.

The SYG's formulation implicitly grants considerable flexibility to an arrangement for the SICOR, provided the UNHCR and other U.N. specialized agencies is "entrusted" to discharge its responsibilities. However, we learned in our discussions in Europe recently that some of our NATO allies and Russia do not accord much weight to the SYG's views on this matter.

Appointment of the SICOR by the Secretary-General and endorsement by the Security Council invites the Secretary-General and the Security Council to have ongoing involvement with the SICOR and key aspects of the peace implementation plan, particularly as a consequence of the

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reporting requirement that would be mandated. They would be tempted to express views about or even object to IFOR military activities. We could reduce the risks associated with this by:

- requiring reports either at the discretion of the SICOR or at lengthy intervals;

- explicitly limiting SICOR's mandate in such a way that the role of the United Nations is minimized;

- including in the Council resolution urging or endorsing appointment of the SICOR a request that interested states remain involved in the implementation of a peace settlement; and/or

- urging the SICOR to work in consultation with (or in coordination with) such interested states.

The final two conditions were used in the appointment of the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Liberia.

(6) The Uniting for Peace Model Using the General Assembly

The peace agreement could point to the General Assembly, rather than the Security Council, as the "authorizing" U.N. body. The General Assembly either could establish a semi-independent operation or designate the ICFY or institutionalized settlement group as the body through which the SICOR would operate and from which he/she would receive guidance. Appointment of the SICOR could be on nomination of the U.N. Secretary-General with approval of the Contact Group or settlement group. As with the UN command in Korea, the SICOR could report annually (or perhaps semi-annually) through the U.N. Secretary-General to the General Assembly. Funding for the work of the SICOR could be either through the United Nations or by voluntary contributions. Because the SICOR would be appointed by the U.N. SYG, he/she would have automatic status with international agencies.

One key advantage to this option is that it bypasses the enforcement authority of the Security Council. Reports would be delivered to the General Assembly, which could not adopt binding resolutions pertaining to the work of the SICOR. It also continues to engage the U.N. SYG and vest U.N. authority in the SICOR.

The downside is that it ties the SICOR to both the U.N. SYG and the General Assembly, thus leaving a heavy U.N. imprint on the SICOR and inviting intrusive U.N. behavior. The General Assembly can prove obstructionist in the debates and resolutions that often seize the body in connection with controversial matters. It also has been reluctant recently to

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endorse initiatives seen as Security Council (and this would still include Council involvement) calls on U.N. resources. In the long term, this arrangement could cause the General Assembly to get involved in security issues across-the-board that we would rather reserve to the Security Council.

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POLITICAL IMPLEMENTATION STRUCTURE

MODEL FOR THE SENIOR IMPLEMENTATION COORDINATOR

SOURCE OF AUTHORITY

* The peace settlement would establish the position of Senior Implementation Coordinator ("SICOR"), with authority to coordinate the implementation of political aspects of the settlement.

  - Parties to the settlement would include the Bosnian sides (Federation, Republic, and Serb entity or its representatives). The mandate should also be endorsed by the Governments of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia/Montenegro.

* The usual U.N. models for appointing U.N. representatives (whether called special representatives, envoys, coordinators, or by other titles) do no apply.

  - The mandate to be implemented in Bosnia would be set by the parties and the Contact (or settlement) Group, not a U.N. body. The SICOR's authority should be derived from the mandate that matters, i.e., the peace settlement, preferably amplified by endorsement of the Security Council.

  - U.N. representatives generally carry out discretionary functions entrusted to the Secretary-General by the Security Council or the General Assembly. (The majority of high level representatives are appointed to carry out the Secretary-General's functions in Council-authorized peacekeeping operations. Other representatives help the Secretary-General in the exercise of his good offices or related functions. The rest assist the Secretary-General in the discharge of his responsibilities.)

  - In the Bosnian settlement, the Secretary-General will not be directed to undertake functions requiring the assistance of a U.N. representative.

  - In the past, U.N. representatives have been appointed in cases where either (1) the U.N. is engaging in a conflict with a heavy hand by establishing a peacekeeping operation or exercising enforcement powers; or (2) the SYG needs to dispatch

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his own envoy into an emerging conflict to practice preventive diplomacy. Neither of those cases applies in the Bosnian settlement. The U.N. is disengaging, primarily through the withdrawal of UNPROFOR, and authorizing a regional process supported by regional military power (NATO with some non-NATO) and a large array of regional and international organizations (some U.N., many non-U.N.).

* The SICOR would not have any authority over the military Implementation Force (IFOR).

- U.N. representatives appointed to carry out peacekeeping operations typically oversee the police and military aspects of the peacekeeping operation as well as undertake a variety of political functions. In light of the military role played by Special Representative for former Yugoslavia, it wold be difficult for the SYG to create a successor position that holds no such authority.

- Military authority would no be relevant to the mandate of the SICOR. Also, the Bosnian settlement will not be a U.N. peacekeeping operation.

APPOINTMENT

* The SICOR should have the full confidence of the parties and the Contact (or Settlement) Group.

- He will be charged with a mandate they establish, in coordination with bodies they comprise or designate.

* Appointment by the Contact (or Settlement) Group (or perhaps by the ICFY acting upon the nomination of the Contact (or Settlement) Group), in consultation with the parties, therefore may be the most appropriate vehicle.

- We believe that the parties will permit the Contact (or Settlement) Group to select from candidates acceptable to them.

- The U.N. and NATO Secretary-Generals should be consulted prior to the appointment. We would expect that the candidate should be acceptable to both Secretary-Generals in order to enhance his international legitimacy and to be able to effectively discharge his duties.

* The Security Council could approve the Contact (or Settlement) Group's recommendation for the SICOR.

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- Such Council approval or endorsement would attach greater international legitimacy on the SICOR.

- This would augment the SICOR's influence with U.N. agencies operating in Bosnia.

- The Council has approved the use of regional mediators or negotiators in other circumstances.

REPORTING

* The SICOR should not be required to report to the Secretary-General or the Security Council except at his or her discretion.

* Regular, periodic reports are often required of U.N. representatives. They are, however, tied to the responsibilities of the Secretary-General or the Security Council.

- For example, reports are required to inform the Council before peacekeeping mandates expire.

- In the Bosnian settlement, the SICOR should report to the Contact (or Settlement) Group which could provide each such report to the Security Council for its information.

- But there should be no procedure established with compels either the Secretary-General or the Security Council to receive reports and then comment or act upon them in a supervisory capacity. Any such procedure would contradict the devolution of authority represented by the Council's authorization of IFOR and endorsement of the SICOR.

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STABILIZATION PACKAGE IN A BOSNIAN SETTLEMENT: CBMS/ARMS CONTROL

Our CBM/Arms Control package would consist of four basic elements which could be captured, in varying degrees of specificity, in the settlement agreement itself.

I. Basic Commitments to Principles and Processes

Our first objective is to establish within the settlement agreement itself a codification of commitments by the parties that would establish certain basic goals, principles, processes and timelines for a multi-stage confidence-building/arms control process, one that would lead from initial steps to increasingly ambitious measures. To that end, the settlement agreement would include language not simply on future non-use of force but on long-term goals of military reductions and elimination of destabilizing asymmetries of military forces.

II. Cessation of Hostilities Agreement - Immediate Measures

Our second stage objectives would deal with issues immediately related to separation of forces and stabilization that must be addressed as soon as the agreement is concluded. It might include the following components (with corresponding language) in the Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities Agreements:

-- Exchange of prisoners provisions.

-- Compliance by all parties with the zones of separation and boundary lines between the opposing Parties (e.g., 1 km).

-- Ban on Bosnian Serb and Federation combat aircraft activity for at least one year.

-- Establishment of a Joint Military Commission and joint liaison/communication links at multiple levels between the IFOR and the Federation and Bosnian Serb Armies.

-- Declarations of kinds of military equipment and arms.

On deployment, IFOR will come face to face with the realities of the parties' degree of adherence to these measures. However, at a certain point (depending on safety constraints and at its discretion), IFOR might wish to transfer some of the basic interpositional and monitoring responsibilities to the OSCE and EUMM missions or some combination.

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III. Expanding More Ambitious OSCE Confidence-Building Measures

In the third stage, the parties will be committed by the settlement agreement to work -- under the aegis and with the assistance of the OSCE -- toward a more ambitious CSBM's package. They would be committed to commence such negotiation within fifteen days of the settlement agreement with a goal of conclusion of an initial set of measures by forty-five/sixty days of settlement. The first focus should be on information exchange and contacts. The much tougher issues of data exchange on troop strength or movements would come later. These might include, for example:

-- Restrictions on deployments and exercises in certain sensitive areas, particularly within defined border regions;

-- Annual limits on the number of exercises above a fairly low threshold;

-- Annual limits on call-ups of reservists;

-- Limits on the number, size, and equipment of special operations and/or paramilitary units;

-- Reduction of arms stockpiles;

-- Ban on certain military activities-exercises in selected areas or region-wide, or, a notification regime of such planned activities exceeding a certain threshold.

The OSCE role will be that of framework and facilitator for such negotiations among the parties; its full membership would not be directly involved beyond lending generalized political support to this process. A specific individual -- either a senior personal representative of the Chairman-in-Office, the OSCE Secretary General or the head of its Conflict Prevention Center -- might be designated to organize, lead and broker such negotiations.

The OSCE has already begun preparing for such CSBM's in Bosnia and is planning for an active OSCE role within days of settlement. State will be working closely with OSCE through our delegation to ensure this process continues in a direction that supports the settlement.

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IV. Moving to CFE-type Arms Control Limits

Our fourth stage would be an effort to eliminate destabilizing assymetries in major CFE equipment categories. The parties would agree at settlement to begin within three months negotiations within the framework of OSCE leading to a CFE-like agreement. In the first instance, this would involve the parties within Bosnia itself. But it should also open the possibility for a follow-on stage of negotiations on a more regional basis to include the "FRY" and Croatia. The objectives of this fourth stage would be establishment of region-wide CSBMs and, if possible, simple CFE-type caps on certain categories of equipment.

In the event the settlement negotiations offer an opportunity to negotiate more specific language on a caps regime, it should include an element of build-down. For example, in might include a commitment by the parties to accept the following caps at settlement (all numbers illustrative) for each side in Bosnia alone on the following categories of equipment as defined in the CFE agreement would include build-down:

(1)	Battle Tanks	250
(2)	Armored Combat Vehicles	250
(3)	Artillery	1,700
(4)	Combat Aircraft	25
(5)	Combat Helicopters	10

Another component of build-down, however, might include a suppliers agreement in the context of the equip and train effort. Potential suppliers might agree to a consortium (like the Australia Group) to restrict arms sales of offensive-use only kinds of weaponry to the Bosnian sides. It might also insist that recipients of their equipment destroy old/current equipment in amounts equal or greater to new equipment received; this might go in the direction of some build down proposals.

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Sustaining a Peace Agreement in Bosnia

Military Stabilization Measures (U)

Background (S): International efforts to negotiate peace in the former Yugoslavia are more likely to result in an enduring peace if (1) the Bosnian Muslim - Bosnian Croat Federation (the "Federation") has a military capability to defend itself against the Bosnian Serbs, (2) no party to the conflict significantly increases its offensive capabilities, and (3) measures are developed to reassure the parties as to each others' military actions and intentions. An approach is needed to balance militarily capabilities, limit the incentives and ability of all the parties to obtain offensive weapons, and institute confidence-building measures (CBMs). The USG will lead an international effort to provide military assistance to the elements of the Federation so they can develop a more viable defense vis-a-vis the Bosnian Serbs while also supporting basic measures designed to avoid an arms race and reduce tensions. The effort will also be designed to strengthen the internal cohesion of the Federation and avoid features which could detract from cooperation within the Federation.

Arms Embargo (S): A premise of this paper is that the arms embargo and economic sanctions currently in place for the former Yugoslavia will be lifted by UN Security Council action in connection with the peace agreement. This will enable efforts to improve the Federation's self-defense capabilities, but also opens the door for additional arms flows to the Bosnian Serbs and could permit an unconstrained arms race in the region.

Military Balance (S): While the military balance in Bosnia and the Federation's specific needs will require a detailed assessment, including an in-country evaluation of Federation capabilities, enough information is now available to estimate the general needs and scale of effort required to enable a viable Federation defense:

- The Bosnian Serbs have an equipment advantage (~4:1 in tanks, ~10:1 in APCs, ~2:1 in artillery), whereas the Federation has a manpower advantage (2:1). Current equipment levels are at Tab A.
- Qualitatively, the Federation has an effective light infantry force able to defend against most Bosnian Serb attacks, but its military effectiveness is limited by equipment shortages, poor tactical and operational leadership skills, and by a lack of operational coordination between Muslims and Croats.
- The Bosnian Serbs have shown better organizational skills, but are constrained by manpower shortages and low morale.

Both sides have good skills in conducting defensive operations from prepared positions. The resulting stalemates in many parts of the country and, more recently, dynamic results on the battlefield attest to a modest imbalance in aggregate military

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2013-0682-M
8/3/15 KBH (3.73)

capability between Federation and Bosnian Serb forces, with the Bosnian Serbs holding a particular advantage in mechanized capabilities. Recent Federation successes against the Bosnian Serb Army do not change this fundamental judgment, because they have been so dependent on Croatian efforts and support.

Security Assistance Program (S): Efforts to enhance Federation self defense capabilities will be limited to the minimum necessary to create a balance without stimulating an arms race. The approach will be to improve the elements of the Federation's defensive capabilities by enhancing one brigade within each corps (equivalent) of the Federation -- a total of ten (3-4 Bosnian Croat and 6-7 Bosnian Muslim) brigades. These ten enhanced brigades will provide each corps (equivalent) a mobile reserve. By dispersing the enhancements across the ten corps (equivalents) and limiting training to the lowest (unit) level, increases in Federation offensive capability will be minimized. All support will be provided directly to the elements of the Federation (Bosnian Croat, Bosnian Muslim) rather than to the Federation itself and will be provided in proportion to their parts of the Federation forces. Further, the effort will lay the groundwork for continuing mil-to-mil contacts with US and other moderate nations, contributing to stability. The estimates below will be revised if necessary, once a comprehensive in-country assessment is conducted.

- **Training**. Training will be focused on defensive tactics, techniques and procedures to attain proficiency at the platoon level. Additionally, leader training in defensive planning and execution will be provided at company, battalion and brigade levels. The effort will require about 1,500 trainers and about seven months to accomplish. The in-country trainers will be principally USG contractor personnel and military personnel from nations not involved in IFOR operations.
- **Equipment**. Each of the ten mobile brigades will receive 10 APCs, 20 tanks, 18 howitzers, 15 mortars, a mix of air defense missiles and guns, antitank weapons, and small arms. For ease of integration, principally former WP equipment will be provided. The total major equipment to be provided to the Federation will be:

Equipment	Type(s)	Quantity
Tanks	T-72	200
APCs	BTR-60	100
Howitzers	122mm	180
Mortars	82/120 mm	270 (150/120)
MANPAD missiles	SA-7/16	50
Light AD guns	ZSU-23	60
Antitank Weapons	T-12 100mm	60
Rocket Launcher	128mm	60
Recoilless Rifle	82mm	60
Small Arms	AK-47	10,000

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- **Cost.** Preliminary estimates indicate a likely cost of $385M: $353M for equipment, $12M for training, $14M for operations, and $6M for transportation.

Arms Control Measures (S): The goal of arms control is to prevent an arms race in the wake of the removal of the arms embargo. Simple caps on the inventory of major weapons with offensive potential, limiting the Federation and the Bosnian Serbs each to the inventory level of the higher of the two parties in each category of weapons at the time of settlement, are likely to be all that we can achieve in the context of the peace agreement. More complex arrangements can then be pursued as the peace matures.

Confidence Building Measures (S): The peace agreement will contain provisions to enable both political and military dialogue between the parties to permit the resolution of differences before they escalate, including the establishment of a Joint Military Commission. Further, the agreement could contain provisions for the exchange of advance information concerning military exercises and force movements. Specific information to be exchanged could be agreed between the military leaders of the parties after the peace agreement has been signed.

Action (S): The USG will undertake the following actions to achieve stabilization of the peace agreement (lead agency as indicated):

- Subject to the negotiators' sense of acceptability to the parties, strive to include in the agreement the following stabilization features (State):
  --Caps on the numbers of selected categories of major weapon systems (e.g., Ground Attack aircraft, tanks, surface-surface missiles, artillery)
  --Parties agree not to accept security assistance from radical/pariah parties.
  --Establishment of a joint military commission to resolve disputes.
  --Parties to exchange information concerning major military movements and exercises.
- Obtain unconditional multilateral removal of the arms embargo and lifting of economic sanctions agains the Former Yugoslavia. (State)
- Seek agreement and support from key allies for the US approach. (State)
- Organize a coalition of willing nations to provide security assistance (equipment and training) to the Federation. Contributions of funding, equipment, and trainers will be needed. (State)
- Obtain Croatian agreement to permit unobstructed passage and not to interfere with the US-led effort. (State)
- Upon cessation of hostilities, conduct an in-country assessment to confirm the Federation's security needs. (JCS)
- Using intermediaries if necessary, seek at least tacit agreement from Serbia and Croatia to limit their support to their clients in Bosnia to items which will not adversely affect the balance or undermine the US effort. (State)

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- Seek Congressional support and funding for the effort. (State)
- Conduct the security assistance program commencing on signature of the peace agreement and completing within twelve months thereafter. (JCS/DSAA)

Prepared by CAPT W. L. Boyd, USN, OASD (S&R), 614-2759
Rev 4, 05 Oct 95

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9521159
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TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 05 OCT 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA DC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 6 OCT DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 07 OCT 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FEELEY LOGREF: 9521168 9521176

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0229 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BAKER JANE
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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	95100510	FOR DECISION
001		X	95100513	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
001	SENS	Z	95100513	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	95100515	DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	951005	FUERTH, L	
002	951005	BRILL, K	
002	951005	MCALEER, R	
002	951005	INDERFURTH, R	
002	951005	YANNUZZI, R	
002	951005	WILSON, F	

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TO: BERGER

FROM: FEELEY
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DOC DATE: 05 OCT 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA DC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 6 OCT DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: FOR DECISION DUE DATE: 07 OCT 95 STATUS: X

STAFF OFFICER: FEELEY LOGREF:

FILES: IFM NSCP: CODES:

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National Security Council
The White House

rec'd 10/5
1:30pm

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
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Dohse	3	[illegible]	A-Tab I
Sens			
Soderberg	Copy		
Berger	2	Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	[illegible] 10/4	[illegible]
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: Berger

COMMENTS: NOM + Agenda Cf bkgd
Bosnia DC
10/6
JRB

Exec Sec Office has diskette YES

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	10-5-95	4:20 PM	Anthony Taylor PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX +1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
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10/5 5:00pm Harlee Wood

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

PRINT LAST NAME: Wood

COPY: VIA FAX +1

COL ROBERT P. MCALEER
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ROOM 3E880
PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

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2201 C STREET NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
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WASHINGTON, DC 20505

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ROUTINE

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MESSAGE NO.: 2101 CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTIFICATIO/AGENDA FOR 6 OCT DC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21159

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF AMBASSADOR		736-7699
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		

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MESSAGE NO.: 2101 CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTIFICATIO/AGENDA FOR 6 OCT DC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21159

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF AMBASSADOR		736-7699
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		

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JCS	SECRETARY		

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FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting PAGES: 3

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

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USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

21159

October 5, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(C)~~

There will be a Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia October 6, 1995 from 4:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Principals plus one. The agenda is attached at Tab A. ~~(C)~~

for
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

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NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: October 6, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 4:00 - 5:00 p.m.

AGENDA

I. Russian Participation in IFOR/Options for Perry-Grachev..OSD*

II. Role of IFOR during Elections.....JCS*

III. UN Role in Civilian Aspects of Implementation.....US/UN

IV. Military Stabilization Plan: Follow-up to PC.....State/OSD*

* Revised papers should be circulated by COB October 5.

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By NARA, Date 2/6/2020

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

21159

October 5, 1995

ACTION



MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: JOHN FEELEY

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, October 6, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Deputies meeting on Bosnia to be held October 6, 1995. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/1/2019
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See also 2013-0661-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

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~~001. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)~~	~~10/16/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
002a. memo	John Feeley to Samuel Berger re: October 16 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia (5 pages)	10/14/1995	P1/b(1)
~~002b. agenda~~	~~[Duplicate of 003] (1 page)~~	~~10/16/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 02/06/2020
~~002c. memo~~	~~John Kornblum to Deputy Secretary re: A Multilateral Framework for Bosnian Peace Implementation (4 pages)~~	~~10/12/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002d. list~~	~~re: Bosnia Wishlist for Hyde Park (1 page)~~	~~10/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002e. list~~	~~re: Options for Russian Relationship with IFOR (3 pages)~~	~~10/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002f. list~~	~~re: Possible Sequence of International Conferences on Bosnia (1 page)~~	~~10/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
002g. letter	President Boris Yetlsin to President Clinton re: [Peace Conference] (2 pages)	10/12/1995	P1/b(1)
~~003. agenda~~	~~NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)~~	~~10/16/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 02/06/2020

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P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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DATE 19 OCT 95

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DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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DOC DATE: 19 OCT 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA DC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 16 OCT DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 19 OCT 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FEELEY LOGREF: 9521183 9521195

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0232 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BAKER JANE
		FEELEY
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	95101710	FOR DECISION
001		X	95101912	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
002		X	95101912	SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	951019	FUERTH, L	
002	951019	BRILL, K	
002	951019	MCALEER, R	
002	951019	INDERFURTH, R	
002	951019	ADAMS, G	
002	951019	YANNUZZI, R	
002	951019	WILSON, F	

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Harmon	1/3	D/D	
Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger	2	drb	Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen 10/16 a1ap
Lake			
Situation Room	4	MC 10/18	D
West Wing Desk			
Records Mgt.			

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COMMENTS:

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1/3	D/D	
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger	2	DSB Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	D 10/6 asap
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	MC 10/7/8	D
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COMMENTS:

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LOG 9521204
DATE 19 OCT 95

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS OF 16 OCT DC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA NOELLE JENSEN ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	10/19/95	4:22p	Lori A Moore PRINT LAST NAME: Lori A Moore COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	10/20/95	0800	Wm. MC PRINT LAST NAME: Williams COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	10/19/95	4:20	J. Graves PRINT LAST NAME: GRAVES COPY: 1
MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	10/20/95	0800	Mrs. M C PRINT LAST NAME: Williams COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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TIME OF RECEIPT

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PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: [signature]

DTG: _____

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(PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC DC MTG BOSNIA

16 OCT NSC LOG # 21204

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
V	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B	USUN (STATE)	OFFICE OF AMB	STU III →	736-7699
7	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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Initials: RDS Date: 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHITE HOUSE
95 OCT 19 PM 3:59

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM 19 OCT 95 16 08

NMCC/JCS

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PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
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DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 2200 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 4
(PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (202) 456-9425 WH SITROOM
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC DC MTG BOSNIA

16 OCT NSC LOG # 21204

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B	USUN (STATE)	OFFICE OF AMB	STU III →	736-7699
7	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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MESSAGE NO.: 2200 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 4
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FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (202) 456-9425 WH SITROOM
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC DC MTO BOSNIA

16 OCT NSC LOG # 21204

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
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DTG:

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC DC MTG BOSNIA

16 OCT NSC LOG # 21204

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
3 STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
1 DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
3 USUN (STATE)	OFFICE OF AMB	STU III →	736-7699
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
) JCS	SECRETARY		

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FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting SCC DC ON BOSNIA PAGES: _____

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21204

October 19, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, October 16, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~
Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5(b) (g)
Declassify on: 1.5 X5

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee
DATE: October 16, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 11 00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR
Sandy Berger

OVP
Leon Fuerth
Rick Saunders

STATE
Strobe Talbott
Peter Tarnoff
John Kornblum
Jim Steinberg

DEFENSE
John White
Ted Warner

UN
David Scheffer

OMB
Keith Bickel

CIA
Norman Schindler

JCS
Admiral Owens
MG Byron

NSC
Alexander Vershbow
John Feeley

Summary of Conclusions

Russian Relationship with IFOR

1. Deputies discussed options for Russian involvement within a multilateral, political framework for Bosnian peace implementation, in preparation for meetings in Moscow. Drawing on a State memorandum, Deputies agreed to study further the following option:

- A coalition of forces on the Desert Storm model. A UN resolution would request "interested states and appropriate regional organizations" to undertake implementation. The coalition could be limited to the military implementation (which NATO would run) or could include civilian aspects as well.

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Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5(b) (d)
Declassify on: 1.6, x5

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The above option would build on NATO and PFP structures to form a practical strategic partnership (a coalition) for implementation of the peace agreement. It would not alter our basic position that IFOR be under clear NATO command and control with exclusive political guidance from the NAC.

2. Deputies agreed that State should revise the discussion memo, as an internal U.S. government position, making the relationship to NATO decision-making bodies more clear and emphasizing NATO's final decision-making authority. In addition, Deputies agreed to include in the new State paper a set of "red lines" for use in negotiations in Moscow and to drop any reference to common funding **(Action: State)**. ~~(S)~~

Strategy for London and Moscow Conferences on Implementation

3. Deputies reaffirmed that the President has not agreed to a signing of a peace agreement in Paris and that the location for signing a peace agreement was unresolved. The Deputies agreed that State would draft a "notional" sequencing and agenda for upcoming conferences that would include Paris, London, Moscow and a fourth signing event **(Action: State)**. ~~(S)~~

Sanctions

4. Deputies reaffirmed that the negotiating team had no authority to offer interim sanctions relief to the FRY prior to signature of a peace agreement but that the option would be reviewed if requested by the negotiating team. ~~(S)~~

Classified by: Andrew Sens
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21204

October 16, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW for JF

FROM: JOHN FEELEY JF

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, October 16, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of Conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia held October 16, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve AS Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5(b) (g)
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RECORD ID: 9521195
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TO: BERGER

FROM: FEELEY
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 14 OCT 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA DC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 16 OCT DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER DUE DATE: 18 OCT 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9521183 9521204

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0232 CODES:

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FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
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		JOSHI
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
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001		X	95102309	NOTED BY BERGER

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National Security Council
The White House

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Dohse			
Sens	1	AOS	
Soderberg			
Berger	2		
Lake		Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3		N/R
Records Mgt.			

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002a. memo	John Feeley to Samuel Berger re: October 16 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia (5 pages)	10/14/1995	P1/b(1)

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Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4002

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0232 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, October 16, 1995

2010-0533-M
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
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NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: October 16, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 11:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.

AGENDA

I. Russia Relationship with IFOR.....State/OSD

II. Strategy for London and Moscow Conferences on Implementation.....State

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL, NARA, Date 2/6/2070
2013-0687-M

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

OCT 12 1995

9519204

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM 95 OCT 12 P2:4
S/S

~~SECRET~~
DECL:OADR

TO: The Deputy Secretary

FROM: EUR - John C. Kornblum, Acting JCK

SUBJECT: A Multilateral Framework for Bosnian Peace Implementation

Many countries and agencies must be integrated into a structure for implementation of Bosnian peace accords. This includes complex civilian and military structures.

A number of models are imaginable. US interests include the following requirements:

-- Complete autonomy for NATO as the organizer of the IFOR.

-- An indirect link to the United Nations, without requirements for UN oversight of either the military or civilian components.

-- A means of integrating non-NATO participants, especially Russia, into the IFOR, on the basis of NATO command and control.

-- A credible central civilian implementation structure which does not become embroiled in the politics of the UN, the EU or other organization.

A UNIFYING STRUCTURE

There is a strong desire both among NATO allies and other possible participants in implementation, especially the Russians, to devise a unifying structure to manage the implementation. Three possibilities can be imagined:

-- Direct UN authorization and management, including a UN civilian administrator and a UN military commander.

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NND 95-14 10/1/2013
0682-m (3.76)

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-- A totally self-supporting structure which emerges from the peace agreement. The parties would agree to the structure and would agree on its international management. A variant would be to have the Contact Group serve in a sponsorship role.

-- A coalition of forces on the Desert Storm model. A UN resolution would request "interested member states and appropriate regional organizations" to undertake implementation. A multilateral coalition could be formed, perhaps at the meeting in London. The coalition could be limited to the military implementation or could cover civilian aspects as well.

ANALYZING THE OPTIONS

The first option is unacceptable to the United States and to most NATO allies. The UN seems uninterested in assuming this burden.

The second option would be most practical and efficient from an American point of view. The disadvantage would be that the framework would not be broad enough to provide a sense of participation for all countries and agencies who believe they have a legitimate role in Bosnia. There would be resentment by some countries at a special role for the Contact Group.

The third option offers a chance to establish a credible international structure which is separate from the United Nations, but still manageable by the US. It could be especially useful in meeting the needs of Russia and others for a role in IFOR.

A MULTILATERAL COALITION FOR IFOR

An example of a useful international coalition is the IFOR and the role of non-NATO participants. The structure could be designed as follows:

by name?

-- The Bosnian Peace Agreement establishes an implementation structure which includes an implementation force mounted by NATO and a civilian coordinator. An annex establishing this force as an integral part of implementation is attached to the peace agreement.

-- The UNSC issues a short resolution which approves the peace agreement and grants authority to "interested member states, acting with appropriate regional organizations or arrangements," to support all aspects of implementation. NATO is not mentioned in the resolution, but a UNSYG report states that NATO has agreed to take on the IFOR task.

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-- NATO would take the lead in organizing the IFOR coalition. It would conclude individual MOU's with interested states which would discuss mission, command and control and consultations. These MOU's would provide a process for determining each individual state's contributions. Details would be worked out with SHAPE.

-- The individual MOU's would include identical provisions for political and military coordination. These could include:

- Agreement that each participant would be able to approve the operational plan as a condition for contributions of forces to IFOR. NATO would promise to take account of views, but final judgment would be reserved to the NAC.

- Establishment of a Multilateral (or International) Coordinating Council: This would be a political body composed of NATO and senior officials from contributing countries. The NATO Secretary General would chair. This body would discuss overall policy and command and control issues arising from IFOR's operation.

- A Senior Military Council: This would be chaired by SACEUR and be composed of senior military representatives from NATO and contributing countries. It would be charged with reviewing military operations and consulting with contributing countries on issues which arise in the operation of IFOR. It would assume the duties of the current Ad Hoc Group.

- Command Liaison Arrangements: NATO would provide liaison arrangements with contributing countries at various staff levels. Details would be tailored to individual countries.

- Provision for a common funding mechanism could be added if desired.

ADDING A CIVILIAN ELEMENT

This structure could be expanded to cover the civilian implementation structure and the role of the Senior Implementation Coordinator (SICOR). Providing a "coalition" structure could help deal with the debate with the French and others over the need for a supervising structure for the SICOR.

Rather than being appointed by the UNSYG as the French wish, the SICOR could operate within the framework of the multilateral coalition. A coalition of countries could include OIC countries etc. who would sign a single MOU on overall implementation. THE SICOR's authority could come from the coalition agreement.

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Existence of this "coalition" would also provide a framework for non-combat Russian military operations, if the Russians chose this course. Their forces could attached directly to a "security division" of the SICOR.

MEETING RUSSIAN NEEDS

Such a structure would help meet Russian needs in a number of ways:

-- It would include express UN authorization.

-- It would set up an intermediary structure between Russian and NATO which Russia could claim was the "real" IFOR authorizing body.

-- It would provide for an individual Russian agreement with NATO, preserving Russia's desire to be an "equal" partner with NATO in the IFOR.

-- It would provide for a direct role for SACEUR in the Senior Military Council, thus preserving for Russia the sense that they were dealing with SACEUR as a coalition commander rather than a NATO commander. (?)

-- It would provide both civilian and military consultative bodies to give Russia a chance to express its opinions on policy issues.

-- It would provide liaison opportunities in the NATO command structure.

-- If so desired, it could provide a common funding arrangement to help pay for the Russian contribution. (?)

-- If so desired, it could have a direct link to the civilian structure to allow Russia to relate its civilian and military roles. Russia could for example be given a senior post (deputy SICOR?) in the civilian structure to balance NATO's role in IFOR. Or, if Russia chose option II, its non-combat forces would still be part of the same coalition as the IFOR.

-- As a final point for Russia, we could agree informally that major policy issues would continue to be consulted with Contact Group partners in an informal CG forum established either at NATO or meeting regularly in capitals.

Attachments:
1. Timeline thru Hyde Park
2. Hyde Park Wish List
3. IFOR Options (Perry-Grachev)
4. International Conferences

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BOSNIA CALENDAR PRIOR TO HYDE PARK

Sunday, October 15

evening — Holbrooke Team departs U.S. for Paris.

Monday, October 16

am — Holbrooke Team meets with Quad Political Directors in Paris, departing for Moscow late afternoon.

DC Meeting on Bosnia

pm — Holbrooke Team arrives in Moscow for Contact Group working dinner.

Tuesday, October 17

am — Contact Group session continues.

afternoon — Talbott/Slocombe team arrives Moscow for bilateral discussions on Russian participation in IFOR.

afternoon — Holbrooke team departs for Belgrade and working dinner with Milosevic.

U.S. site selected for proximity talks.

Wednesday, October 18

am — Holbrooke team met in Belgrade by Russian Deputy Minister Ivanov and Carl Bildt, meet with Milosevic.

am — Talbott/Slocombe team continues bilateral discussions in Moscow

afternoon — Talbott/Slocombe team departs for Paris

pm — Talbott/Slocombe team bilateral consultations in Paris

Thursday, October 19

am — Holbrooke/Ivanov/Bildt depart for joint trip to Sarajevo.

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am	Talbott/Slocombe team travels to Brussels
am	Talbott/Slocombe team consults at NATO on Russia
afternoon	NATO-Russia meeting on IFOR
afternoon	Holbrooke team departs Sarajevo for Zagreb meeting with Tudjman. Holbrooke team returns to U.S.
afternoon	Talbott/Slocombe team returns to to U.S.

Friday, October 20

Final position/briefing on the issues for Hyde Park

Sunday, October 22

Possible Clinton-Izetbegovic-Tudjman trilateral in New York.

Monday, October 23

Hyde Park meeting. Issuance of statement/points on Russian participation.

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BOSNIA WISHLIST FOR HYDE PARK

WISH #1: Announce agreement on Russian participation in IFOR.

FALLBACK: Announce support for NATO-led IFOR and our joint commitment to Russian participation in some form.

WISH #2: Specify and announce Moscow conference on implementation issues.

FALLBACK: Announce that an implementation conference of some kind will be held in Moscow.

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OPTIONS FOR RUSSIAN RELATIONSHIP WITH IFOR

Principles which apply to options I and II only:

Peace agreement would establish basic structure of military and civilian implementation.

UNSC would endorse agreement and grant authority to NATO, UN agencies and other international institutions to implement it.

Units will be deployed and redeployed within theater based upon tasks which are assigned to them and not on the basis of permanently assigned zones of operation.

A senior implementation coordinator, with UN authorization, would coordinate implementation on the civilian side.

OPTION I: RUSSIAN UNITS UNDER NATIONAL COMMAND WITH OPERATIONAL CONTROL ("OPCON") OR TACTICAL CONTROL ("TACON") DELEGATED TO IFOR.

Russia retains national command authority over its units. Units may not be reorganized, resubordinated or disciplined without national concurrence.

Russian units under OPCON or TACON of one of the units of IFOR, for instance, the French division. The IFOR division commander could assign tasks and provide direction to the Russian units, as spelled out in agreed definitions of operational and tactical control.

Russian unit performs either combat or support function, depending on the types of forces assigned.

Russia has liaison officers at every level of NATO command, beginning with a 3-star at SACEUR HQ, with additional liaison officers at level of IFOR Cdr (AFSOUTH), Land component Cdr (ARRC), and Division commander.

Russia included in Bosnia Military Coordination Cell in Brussels (along with representatives of other significant troop contributing countries) to advise/consult/inform on deliberations of NAC, MC and other NATO bodies.

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Russia also included in consultations at NATO HQ via periodic 16+1 meetings, but would have no veto over NAC decisions.

Russia pays costs of its units.

Terms of Reference to be developed between NATO and Russia will spell out additional details of the relationship.

OPTION II: RUSSIAN UNITS PERFORM FUNCTIONALLY SEPARATE NON-COMBAT TASKS UNDER FULL NATIONAL COMMAND, WITH ONLY LIAISON LINKS TO NATO-LED IFOR.

Russian units under full national command and control.

Russian units perform functions that are important to overall effort, such as strategic lift or engineer tasks, but not so linked to operations of IFOR as to require unity of command.

Russian units could coordinate with but would not be subordinate to NATO.

Liaison at all levels of NATO chain of command.

Russian units liaise and coordinate with IFOR to avoid conflict/overlap, but no NATO officer has directive authority over Russian forces.

Russia participates in Brussels-based Bosnia Military Coordination Cell as well as 16+1 consultations.

Russia pays own costs.

OPTION III: PROCEEDING WITHOUT RUSSIA

Russia does not participate in military implementation at all, in neither a combat nor support role.

If neither Option 1 or 2 is agreed to, we face a good chance for Russian obstructionism in the UNSC re a resolution granting authority for peace implementation and IFOR.

IFOR proceeds with a NATO-only mandate, possibly agreed to by the parties in the terms of settlement.

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Allies modulate their IFOR participation (i.e., restrained use of force) according to the noise coming out of Moscow.

Other Russian actions are possible, but perhaps less likely:

Russians openly take sides with the "FRY" and Bosnian Serbs and offer weapons and economic assistance, in violation of embargo/sanctions.

Russian cooperation with the United States and with the Europeans deteriorates.

Russians decline to participate in non-IFOR implementation.

Obstructionism at OSCE encroaches effort to devise CBM regime.

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POSSIBLE SEQUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES ON BOSNIA

U.S.: Proximity talks to begin on October 31, lasting for approximately two weeks. To be attended by representatives of Contact Group countries, Carl Bildt and three Presidents Milosevic, Tudjman and Izetbegovic as heads of respective delegations. Goal: Reach and initial peace deal on constitutional and territorial issues.

Paris: International conference to be held late November/early ~~December, to be attended~~ by Foreign Ministers. Goal: Sign peace agreements.

London: International conference on implementation issues to be held early December, probably to be attented at Political Director level. Goal: Reach and announce agreements on the range of implementation issues, particularly reconstruction and humanitarian issues.

Moscow: Yet to be defined meeting on implementation issues. The British have suggested inclusion of arms control issues.

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002g. letter	President Boris Yetlsin to President Clinton re: [Peace Conference] (2 pages)	10/12/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4002

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0232 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, October 16, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs687

RESTRICTION CODES

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

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FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 13 OCT 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA DC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION W/ AGENDA FOR 16 OCT DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 14 OCT 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FEELEY LOGREF: 9521195 9521204

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0232 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

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002		X	95101313	DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	951013	FUERTH, L	
002	951013	BRILL, K	
002	951013	MCALEER, R	
002	951013	INDERFURTH, R	
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002	951013	YANNUZZI, R	
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National Security Council
The White House

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COMMENTS: Nom + Agenda for DC Mtg on Bosnia 10/16

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	10-12-95	4:10 PM	Christina Taylor PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX+1
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MESSAGE NO.: 2148 CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia

NSC LOG # 21183

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	State	Ececutive Secretary		
N	Defense	Executive Secretary		
	USUN/State	Rick INderfurth		736-7699
A	CIA	Executive Secretary		
D	JCS	Secretary		

REMARKS:

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D	JCS	Secretary		

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A	CIA	Executive Secretary		
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FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting DC Meeting on Bosnia PAGES: 3

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

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USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

21183

October 13, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the
United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for
National Security &
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(C)~~

There will be a Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia on Monday, October 16, 1995, from 11:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. via SVTS. Attendance will be principals plus one. The agenda is attached at Tab A. ~~(C)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDSNARA, Date 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

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NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: October 16, 1995
LOCATION: SVTS
TIME: 11:30 a.m. - 12:30 p.m.

AGENDA

I. Russia Relationship with IFOR.....State/OSD

II. Strategy for London and Moscow Conferences on Implementation.....State

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 2/6/2020
2013-0682-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21183

October 12, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: JOHN F. FEELEY, JR.

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, October 16, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Deputies meeting on Bosnia to be held October 16, 1995. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDSNARA, Date 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify On: ~~OADR~~

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See also 2013-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title: DC0235 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, October 18, 1995				
Staff Office-Individual: Records Management				
Original OA/ID Number: 4002				
Row: 43	Section: 4	Shelf: 7	Position: 3	Stack: V

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)~~	~~10/18/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
002a. memo	John Feeley to Samuel Berger re: October 18 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia (3 pages)	10/18/1995	P1/b(1)
~~002b. agenda~~	~~[Duplicate of 004] (1 page)~~	~~10/18/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 02/06/2020
~~002c. cable~~	~~re: Building Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2 pages)~~	~~09/28/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
003. list	Deputies Committee Meeting [partial] (1 page)	10/18/1995	P3/b(3)
~~004. agenda~~	~~NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)~~	~~10/18/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 02/06/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4002

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0235 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, October 18, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs688

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DC 0235

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9521217
DATE 26 OCT 95

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 18 OCT DC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA NOELLE JENSEN ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX +1
MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY ROOM 3408, MAIN TREASURY BLDG 1500 PENNSYLVANIA AVE, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20220	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	J. Graves PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	10/30/95	_____	J. Graves PRINT LAST NAME: GRAVES COPY: 1

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Initials: RDS Date: 10/1/2019
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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9521217
RECEIVED: 18 OCT 95 17

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 26 OCT 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
CROATIA
SOC
SERBIA
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 18 OCT DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 21 OCT 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FEELEY LOGREF: 9521205 9521209

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0235 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BAKER JANE
		FEELEY
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

COMMENTS: _____

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	95102416	FOR DECISION
001		X	95102615	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
001	SENS	Z	95102615	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	95102617	SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	951026	FUERTH, L	
002	951026	BRILL, K	
002	951026	NYE, J	
002	951026	MCALEER, R	
002	951026	INDERFURTH, R	
002	951026	ADAMS, G	
002	951026	YANNUZZI, R	
002	951026	WILLIAMS, A	
002	951026	WILSON, F	

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National Security Council
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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1		
Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg	copy		
Berger	2		
~~Labp~~ Sens	3		Talk to Sens
Situation Room		Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
West Wing Desk	4	KLP 10/24	D
Records Mgt.			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

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COMMENTS:

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National Security Council
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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1		
Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg	copy		
Berger	2		
~~Talbott~~ Sens	3		Talk to Pfaff
Situation Room		Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen 10/24	
West Wing Desk	4		D
Records Mgt.			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

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COMMENTS:

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9521217
DATE 26 OCT 95

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 18 OCT DC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA NOELLE JENSEN ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	10/27/95	0730 AM	Keith Bijold PRINT LAST NAME: Bijold COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	10-27-95	6:00	Anthony Taylor PRINT LAST NAME: A Taylor COPY: VIA FAX +1
MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY ROOM 3408, MAIN TREASURY BLDG 1500 PENNSYLVANIA AVE, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20220			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
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AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	10/27/95	1:15	J Graves PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: 1

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Initials: RDS Date: 10/1/2019
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SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 18 OCT DC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
MR. AARON WILLIAMS AGENCY FOR INTL DEVELOPMENT ROOM 5945, NEW STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20523	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
COL. F. C. WILSON JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: _____ CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 4 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 18 OCT DC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21217

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
TREASURY	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
AID	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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Initials: RDS Date: 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

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~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21217

October 26, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE
Executive Secretary
Department of Treasury

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. AARON S. WILLIAMS
Executive Secretary
Agency for International Development

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, October 18, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~
Classify by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5 (g)
Declassify on: 10/16/15

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By DDS NARA, Date 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

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~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: October 18, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 11:30 a.m. - 1:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR
Sandy Berger

OVP
Leon Fuerth
Rick Saunders

STATE
Peter Tarnoff
John Kornblum
James Steinberg
James Holmes

TREASURY
David Lipton
Mark Sobel

DEFENSE
Jan Lodal
James Keagle
Edward Warner

USUN
David Scheffer
James O'Brien

OMB
Gordon Adams
Mark Sandy

CIA
John Gannon
Raymond Converse

AID
Lawrence Byrne
Douglas Stafford

JCS
Michael Byron
John Walsh
John Roberti

NSC
John Feeley
Dan Fried

Summary of Conclusions

Economic Reconstruction

1. Using State's paper as a road map, Deputies agreed that we needed to develop a more specific set of assistance projects and

~~SECRET~~
Classify by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5 (G)
Declassify On: 10/16/05

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NSC 0533-M
RS 4/30/14 (2.36)
CIA Historical Collections Division ARC 10-14
10/1/2013

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priorities, with a particular focus on items that will need to be factored into the terms of the peace agreement itself. Treasury reported on a three-part strategy to ease Bosnia's arrears problem: 1) develop a financial blueprint; 2) after agreement on a financial blueprint, have the World Bank coordinate pledging; and 3) implement support on the ground. (S)

2. Deputies agreed to establish an interagency working group to be chaired by State and co-chaired by AID and Treasury, to develop in one week, for Principals, an integrated, comprehensive strategy paper that outlines timelines, priorities, issues for upcoming negotiations and issues for immediate decision by Principals **(Action: State/Treasury/AID)**. Deputies also agreed that the IWG would become a working subgroup of the soon to be established Balkan ExComm. (S)

IFOR/Unresolved Issues

3. Based on a review and discussion of a list of questions regarding IFOR's mission, deployment, area of operations and operational timing, Deputies identified several unresolved issues regarding mission creep, use of force, zones of separation, end states, required Presidential decisions, and the coordination of U.S. policy, negotiations, NATO decisions and military planning. Deputies agreed that JCS, State and NSC should revise the list and provide answers to the questions in order to identify critical unresolved issues regarding implementation of the peace plan before the end of the week for immediate Deputies' consideration **(Action: JCS/State/NSC)**. (S)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21217

October 23, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: JOHN FEELEY

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, October 18, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia held October 18, 1995.

Concurrence by: Daniel Fried

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to the agencies

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~
Classified by: John Feeley
Reason: 1.5 (g)
Declassify On: 1.6 (x5

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDSNARA, Date 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9521209
RECEIVED: 17 OCT 95 17

TO: BERGER

FROM: FEELEY

DOC DATE: 17 OCT 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
CROATIA
SERBIA
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 18 OCT DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER DUE DATE: 20 OCT 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FEELEY LOGREF: 9521205 9521217

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0235 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		FEELEY
		NSC CHRON

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEC CLOSED BY: NSMEC DOC 1 OF 1

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DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	95101815	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	95101815	NOTED BY BERGER

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National Security Council
The White House

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 1811 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1	D	
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger	2	AV	
Lake			
Situation Room		Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
West Wing Desk	3	MC 10/18	A
Records Mgt.			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

DC Mtg on Bosnia

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

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Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	John Feeley to Samuel Berger re: October 18 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia (3 pages)	10/18/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4002

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0235 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, October 18, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs688

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: October 18, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 11:30 a.m. - 1:00 p.m.

AGENDA

I. Economic Reconstruction.....State/AID/Treasury

II. IFOR/Unresolved Issues.....NSC

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 2/6/2020
2013-0682-M

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: SIT, BELL, CLARKER, CULLIN, DAALDER, FEELEY, FETIG, JOHNSON, NSC, PETERS, SAUNDERS, SCHUKER, SCHWARTZ, SESTAK, SUM, SUM2, VERSHBOW

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG:281805Z SEP 95

FM: AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO

TO:
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0663

////

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SARAJEVO 000623

DEPT. FOR EUR JKORNBLUM, EJONES, EUR/SCE CHILL, EUR/EEA JHOLMES, MHURLEY

E.O. 12356: DECLAS: OADR
TAGS: EAID, PREL, BK
SUBJECT: BUILDING DEMOCRACY IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: PRIME MINISTER HARIS SILAJDZIC IS EXECUTING A MARGIN CALL. THE EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT THE SEED PROGRAM SHOULD BEGIN IMMEDIATELY TO INITIATE A DEMOCRACY BUILDING PROGRAM OF ASSISTANCE IN BOTH ENTITIES OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA. END SUMMARY.

3. DURING A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE SARAJEVO CITY COUNCIL ON SEPTEMBER 28, PRIME MINISTER SILAJDZIC GAVE A POSITIVE REPORT ON THE NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO THE NEW YORK DOCUMENT ON FURTHER AGREED PRINCIPLES. SPEAKING IN FRONT OF LOCAL MEDIA, THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THE PRIMARY RESULT OF NEW YORK WAS TO DELINEATE THE CORE INSTITUTIONS OF THE STATE. THE MAIN BONE OF CONTENTION WAS THE CONDUCT OF ELECTIONS. THE ISSUE IS IMPORTANT, ACCORDING TO SILAJDZIC, BECAUSE THE WAR STARTED BECAUSE DEMOCRACY WAS FOREIGN TO THE BOSNIAN SERBS.

4. SILAJDZIC SAID THE U.S. HAD PROMISED TO GUARANTEE FREE AND DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS--A PROMISE CRUCIAL TO THE GOBH DECISION TO ACCEPT THE NEW YORK TEXT. PURTHER, HE WAS HEARTENED BY PRESIDENT CLINTON'S STRONG STATEMENT OPPOSING ANY SECESSION. SILAJDZIC WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE FATE OF DEMOCRACY IN AREAS WITHOUT A TRADITION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, BUT SAID HE WAS RELYING ON THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO MONITOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION THERE.

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2013-0682-M

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5. SILAJDZIC'S COMMENTS ARE BASED IN PART ON EMBASSY ARGUMENTS MADE TO BOTH SILAJDZIC AND IZETBEGOVIC THAT THE PRINCIPLES ESPOUSED IN 5.3 OF THE DOCUMENT PROVIDED AMPLE ROOM TO DEFEAT TOTALITARIANISM. WE REFERRED TO WORK DONE IN THE EARLY DAYS OF THE SEED PROGRAM IN BULGARIA AND, PARTICULARLY, IN ALBANIA TO PROMOTE DEMOCRATIC PLURALISM, FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS, AND THE TRIUMPH OF DEMOCRACY. WE URGED PRESIDENT IZETBEGOVIC TO CALL THE RESPECTIVE PRESIDENTS TO CONFIRM OUR CLAIM FOR THE EFFICACY OF THE PROGRAM.

6. SILAJDZIC IS EXECUTING A MARGIN CALL. THE EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT THE SEED PROGRAM SHOULD BEGIN IMMEDIATELY TO INITIATE A DEMOCRACY BUILDING PROGRAM OF ASSISTANCE IN BOTH ENTITIES OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA.

7. THE PROGRAM SHOULD INCLUDE AN INITIAL ASSESSMENT MISSION (U.S. ORGANIZED, BUT NOT NECESSARILY U.S. LED). THE MISSION SHOULD VISIT THE FEDERATION FIRST AND, WHEN APPROPRIATE, THE SERB-HELD LANDS.

8. CENTRAL COMPONENTS OF A FOLLOW-UP PROGRAM SHOULD BE:
--PARTY ORGANIZATION, DEVELOPMENT, PROMOTION, AND TRAINING,
--ELECTION MONITORING,
--HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING, AND
--DEVELOPMENT OF INDEPENDENT MEDIA, PRTICULARLY IN SERB AREAS.
9. THOUGH THE SEED PROGRAM HAS GENERALLY MOVED BEYOND THESE ACTIVITIES AS FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS HAVE BEEN HELD, BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA SHOULD BE VIEWED AS A SPECIAL CASE. THE PROGRAM SHOULD RETURN TO ITS INITIAL APPROACH OF ASSISTING BROADLY-BASED DEMOCRATIC COALITIONS DEVELOP THE ABILITY TO PARTICIPATE IN ELECTIONS.

10. THE INSTRUMENTS TO PROVIDE SUCH ASSISTANCE ARE STILL IN PLACE--THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE, THE INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE, THE FREE TRADE UNION INSTITUTE, AND OTHERS.

11. BASED ON OUR EXPERIENCE IN THE AREA OF DEMOCRACY-BUILDING, WE ESTIMATE THE COST OF AN EFFECTIVE PROGRAM AT ROUGHLY TWO MILLION DOLLARS, FUNDED INCREMENTALLY. THE PROGRAM SHOULD BE MANAGED LOCALLY. WE BELIEVE THAT A DEMOCRACY-BUILDING PROGRAM FOR BOSNIA WILL HAVE AN ENORMOUS IMPACT ON THE OUTCOME OF ELECTIONS AND WILL ENSURE THAT THEY ARE DEMOCRATIC, AND HELP US REDEEM THE AMERICAN PROMISORY NOTE. MENZIES
BT
#0623

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. list	Deputies Committee Meeting [partial] (1 page)	10/18/1995	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4002

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0235 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, October 18, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs688

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING
October 18, 1995
Situation Room
11:30 a.m. - 1:00 p.m.

CHAIR
Sandy Berger

OVP
Leon Fuerth
Rick Saunders

STATE
Peter Tarnoff
John Kornblum
James Steinberg

TREASURY
David Lipton
Mark Sobel

DEFENSE
Jan Lodal
James Keagle

USUN
David Scheffer
James O'Brien

OMB
Phil DuSault
Mark Sandy

(b)(3)

003

AID
Lawrence Byrne
Douglas Stafford

JCS
Michael Byron
John Walsh

NSC
John Feeley

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~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9521205
RECEIVED: 17 OCT 95 13

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 17 OCT 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
CROATIA
DC
SERBIA
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 18 OCT DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 20 OCT 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FEELEY LOGREF: 9521209 9521217

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0235 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BAKER JANE
		BERGER
		FEELEY
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB CLOSED BY: NSMEC DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By EDS NARA, Date 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	95101717	FOR DECISION
001		X	95101717	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
001	SENS	Z	95101717	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	95101717	DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	951017	FUERTH, L	
002	951017	BRILL, K	
002	951017	NYE, J	
002	951017	MCALEER, R	
002	951017	INDERFURTH, R	
002	951017	ADAMS, G	
002	951017	YANNUZZI, R	
002	951017	WILSON, F	
002	951017	WILLIAMS, A	

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National Security Council
The White House

Rec'd 10/17
4:10 PM

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 21205

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG MC A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1 | 3	D | W	A-Tab I
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger	2		
Lake			
Situation Room	4	MC 10/17	N
West Wing Desk			
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: NOM + Agenda Oct 18 Bosnia DC

Exec Sec Office has diskette

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9521205
DATE 17 OCT 95

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 18 OCT DC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA NOELLE JENSEN ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	10-17-95	6:30 PM	
	PRINT LAST NAME: BEARDSLEY		
	COPY: 1		
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	10/18	8:00A	S. McElhaney
	PRINT LAST NAME: McELHANEY		
	COPY: VIA FAX+1		
MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY ROOM 3408, MAIN TREASURY BLDG 1500 PENNSYLVANIA AVE, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20220			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: VIA FAX		
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: VIA FAX		
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: VIA FAX		
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	10/17/95	6:30	J. Graves
	PRINT LAST NAME: GRAVES		
	COPY: 1		

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9521205
DATE 17 OCT 95

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 18 OCT DC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
COL. F. C. WILSON JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
MR. AARON WILLIAMS AGENCY FOR INTL DEVELOPMENT ROOM 5945, NEW STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20523	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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LOG 9521205
DATE 17 OCT 95

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 18 OCT DC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA NOELLE JENSEN ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX+1
MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY ROOM 3408, MAIN TREASURY BLDG 1500 PENNSYLVANIA AVE, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20220	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9521205
DATE 17 OCT 95

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 18 OCT DC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA NOELLE JENSEN ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX+1
MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY ROOM 3408, MAIN TREASURY BLDG 1500 PENNSYLVANIA AVE, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20220	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	10/17/95	_____	J. Graves PRINT LAST NAME: GRAVES COPY: 1

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
1995 OCT 17 PM 5:22

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT 17:54

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
(PRIORITY)
ROUTINE

RELEASER: J.J. Marini

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 2175 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 3
(PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia

NSC LOG # 21205

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	State	Executive Secretary		
K	Treasury	Executive Secretary		
N	Defense	Executive Secretary		
B	USUN/STATE	Rick Inderfurth		736-7699
A	CIA	Executive Secretary		
D	JCS	Secretary		
B	AID	Executive Secretary		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
1995 OCT 17 PM 5:22

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

K-1

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: J.J. Marn

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 2175 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia

NSC LOG # 21205

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	State	Executive Secretary		
K	Treasury	Executive Secretary		
N	Defense	Executive Secretary		
B	USUN/STATE	Rick Inderfurth		736-7699
A	CIA	Executive Secretary		
D	JCS	Secretary		
B	AID	Executive Secretary		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

CC: MLR
BN
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
TIME OF TRANSMISSION
95 OCT 17 PM 5:22

WASHFAX
TIME OF RECEIPT
17 OCT 95 17 32
NMCC/JCS

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE (PRIORITY) ROUTINE

RELEASER: M. Marin

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 2175 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia

NSC LOG # 21205

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	State	Executive Secretary		
K	Treasury	Executive Secretary		
N	Defense	Executive Secretary		
B	USUN/STATE	Rick Inderfurth		736-7699
A	CIA	Executive Secretary		
D	JCS	Secretary		
B	AID	Executive Secretary		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
1995 OCT 17 PM 5:22

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE / PRIORITY / ROUTINE

RELEASER: M. Marin

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 2175 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia

NSC LOG # 21205

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	State	Executive Secretary		
K	Treasury	Executive Secretary		
N	Defense	Executive Secretary		
B	USUN/STATE	Rick Inderfurth		736-7699
A	CIA	Executive Secretary		
D	JCS	Secretary		
B	AID	Executive Secretary		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

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1995 OCT 17 PM 5:22

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: A. Marine

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 2175 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia

NSC LOG # 21205

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	State	Executive Secretary		
K	Treasury	Executive Secretary		
N	Defense	Executive Secretary		
B	USUN/STATE	Rick Inderfurth		736-7699
A	CIA	Executive Secretary		
D	JCS	Secretary		
B	AID	Executive Secretary		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE
- ☐ FLASH
- ☐ IMMEDIATE
- ☐ PRIORITY
- ☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting DC Meeting on Bosnia PAGES: 3

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

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~~SECRET~~

21205

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 17, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

DR. GORDON ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. AARON S. WILLIAMS
Executive Secretary
Agency for International Development

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(C)~~

There will be a Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia October 18, 1995, from 11:30 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Principals plus one. The agenda is attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

for Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

~~SECRET~~
Declassify On: OADR

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NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: October 18, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 11:30 a.m. - 1:00 p.m.

AGENDA

I. Economic Reconstruction.....State/AID/Treasury

II. IFOR/Unresolved Issues.....NSC

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 2/6/2020
2013-0682-M

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21205

October 5, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: JOHN FEELEY

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, October 18, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Deputies meeting on Bosnia to be held October 18, 1995. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify On: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

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See also 2013-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title: DC0236 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, October 20, 1995				
Staff Office-Individual: Records Management				
Original OA/ID Number: 4002				
Row: 43	Section: 4	Shelf: 7	Position: 3	Stack: V

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (4 pages)~~	~~10/20/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
002a. memo	John Feeley to Samuel Berger re: October 20 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia (3 pages)	10/20/1995	P1/b(1)
~~002b. agenda~~	~~[Duplicate of 003] (1 page)~~	~~10/20/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 02/06/2020
~~003. agenda~~	~~NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)~~	~~10/20/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 02/06/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4002

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0236 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, October 20, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs689

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DC 0236

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9521255
DATE 02 NOV 95

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS OF 20 OCT DC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	11/7/95	_____	J. Graves PRINT LAST NAME: GRAVES COPY: 1
MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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RECORD ID: 9521255
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TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 02 NOV 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
CROATIA
SOC
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DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 20 OCT DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 31 OCT 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FEELEY LOGREF: 9521216 9521226

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0236 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BAKER JANE
		FEELEY
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
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		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	95103015	FOR DECISION
002		X	95110211	DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	951102	FUERTH, L	
002	951102	BRILL, K	
002	951102	MCALEER, R	
002	951102	INDERFURTH, R	
002	951102	ADAMS, G	
002	951102	YANNUZZI, R	
002	951102	WILSON, F	

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
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Dohse	3		A - Tab I
Sens			
Soderberg	Copy 2		
Berger			
Lake		Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	11/2	
Records Mgt.			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

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COMMENTS:

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	3		A-Tab I
Sens			
Soderberg	Copy		
Berger	2		
Lake		**~~Deputy Natl Sec Advisor~~ has seen**	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	11/2	
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

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LOG 9521261/21255
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SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS OF 24 OCT DC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	11-2-95	PM 410	[signature] PRINT LAST NAME: A TAYLOR COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	11/2	4:20	[signature] PRINT LAST NAME: HABER COPY: 1
MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS OF 20 OCT DC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX + 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
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DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX + 1
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DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: 1
MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	11/2/95	4:30pm	Charlie Wood PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX + 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
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MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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33 OCT 95 12 29

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE ~~PRIORITY~~ ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 2319 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 6 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC OF DC MTG ON BOSNIA 20 OCT NSC LOG # 21255

TO (AGENCY)		DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	B	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	N	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
3 USUN (STATE)		OFFICE OF AMB.		
CIA	A	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	D	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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Initials: RDS Date: 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

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RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 2319 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 6 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC OF DC MTG ON BOSNIA 20 OCT

NSC LOG # 21255

TO (AGENCY)		DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	B	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	N	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B USUN (STATE)		OFFICE OF AMB.		
CIA	A	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	D	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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Initials: RDS Date: 10/1/2019
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TIME OF TRANSMISSION:

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

12:34 P

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
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ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 2319 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 6 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC OF DC MTG ON BOSNIA 20 OCT NSC LOG # 21255

TO (AGENCY)		DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	B	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	N	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN (STATE)	B	OFFICE OF AMB.		
CIA	A	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	D	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
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ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 2319 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 6 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC OF DC MTG ON BOSNIA

20 OCT NSC LOG # 21255

TO (AGENCY)		DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	B	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	N	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
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CIA	A	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	D	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

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Initials: RDS Date: 10/1/2019
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PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE ~~PRIORITY~~ ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 2319 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 6 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC OF DC MTG ON BOSNIA 20 OCT NSC LOG # 21255

TO (AGENCY)		DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	B	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	N	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN (STATE)	B	OFFICE OF AMB.		
CIA	A	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	D	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

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2010-0533-M

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
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ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 2319 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 6 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC OF DC MTG ON BOSNIA 20 OCT

NSC LOG # 21255

TO (AGENCY)		DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	B	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	N	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN (STATE)		OFFICE OF AMB.		
CIA	A	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	D	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

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REMARKS:

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
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MESSAGE NO.: 2319 CLASSIFICATION: SECRET TOTAL: 6 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC OF DC MTG ON BOSNIA 20 OCT NSC LOG # 21255

TO (AGENCY)		DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	B	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	N	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
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CIA	A	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	D	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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- ☐ FLASH
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- ☐ PRIORITY
- ☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC# 21255

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting SOC of DC on Bosnia 20 OCT PAGES: _____

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

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If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21255

November 2, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, October 20, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~
Classify by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5 (g)
Declassify on: 11/2/05

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21255

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: October 20, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 4:00 - 5:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR
Sandy Berger

OVP
Leon Fuerth
Rick Saunders

STATE
Strobe Talbott
Peter Tarnoff
John Kornblum
James Steinberg

DEFENSE
John White
Walt Slocombe

USUN
David Scheffer
Jim O'Brien

JCS
Wesley Clark
John Walsh
John Roberti

NSC
John Feeley
Alexander Vershbow
Donald Kerrick

OMB
Gordon Adams

CIA
George Tenet
Dennis Blair

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Declassify On: 10/20/05

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Summary of Conclusions

IFOR/Unresolved Issues

1. Deputies reviewed and discussed a list of questions and answers (prepared by JCS in coordination with State, OSD and NSC) that addressed nine areas of concern regarding the implementation force (IFOR): mission, non-compliance, election security, deployment, area of operations, timing, exit, Congressional strategy, and public outreach. Deputies agreed that:

- JCS/NSC should develop a notional timeline reflecting a sequence of actions and decisions to be taken by the NAC, UNSC and other organizations, and the time of Presidential or lower level decisions prior to deployment of the IFOR **(Action: JCS/NSC);**

- Deputies reaffirmed that IFOR will not provide for civil order, and State should prepare a paper addressing the outstanding issues of establishing a police force and the implications for a peace settlement if no viable police force exists **(Action: State);**

- State should prepare a paper on a possible IFOR role in implementing a settlement in Eastern Slavonia, including any limitations we want to seek to place on the mission **(Action: State);**

- Russian forces should not have a separate zone; this and other aspects of Russian participation will be addressed separately.

- The IFOR will create secure conditions for elections by completing its primary tasks; the OSCE should be solicited as the lead organization in the electoral component of the overall implementation effort, including the responsibility for an election security plan (Action: State);

- There should be indicators of seriousness in the framework agreement that the parties should commit to fulfill between initialing and signature of the peace agreement, but their fulfillment would not be a precondition for rapid deployment of IFOR;

- Until we have a final peace agreement and final implementation plan, we will preserve our flexibility on the exact duration

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of the IFOR's mission while continuing to use 12 months as the planning figure;

- Entities firing from one territory to another across the zone of separation is a violation of the peace agreement and the IFOR commander will judge when and what force will be used to enforce the settlement;

- IFOR forces should be authorized to stop deliberate violence to life and person against international civilian personnel and indigent population, and to act against gross humanitarian violations where NATO forces are present or have the means and opportunity to act;

- IFOR will not be responsible for investigating past incidents of attacks, atrocities, or human rights violations;

- IFOR will not provide protection for relief convoys and civilian movements;

- IFOR will not evict civilians from newly found homes nor bring prior residents back;

- Although IFOR will recognize the right of displaced civilians to return to their homes, it will not become involved and has no role in movement of refugee population;

- In the event of a major breakdown in compliance, and because this is a NATO-led operation, the NAC will ultimately define "total breakdown" based on the situation and the advice of military commanders;

- The IFOR commander will coordinate his actions with the Senior Implementation Coordinator (SICOR) and can talk to the civilian heads of each entity concerning military matters.

2. Deputies agreed that the following unresolved issues required immediate resolution by Principals:

- Under what circumstances will the IFOR use force against the Federation, in keeping with the principle of impartiality adopted by NATO?

- Will IFOR pull out if the Serbs unilaterally withdraw "strategic consent?" Will IFOR use force to enforce Serb acceptance before pulling out as the option of last resort?

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

- What does IFOR do about reported "over the horizon" violations of the peace agreement or gross violations of human rights?

- Should there be an IFOR symbolic presence on the external borders, particularly the inter-Serb border?

- Do we want a 20 km heavy-weapons-free zone and/or a 2 or 4 km all-weapons-free zone along the zone of separation?

- What is the nature of IFOR presence in Serb territory besides free access?

- What is an acceptable end state for the U.S. when IFOR leaves?

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~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21255

October 27, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: JOHN FEELEY

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, October 20, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of Conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia held October 20, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~
Classified by: Alexander Vershbow
Reason: 1.5 (g)
Declassify On: 10/27/05

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9521226
RECEIVED: 20 OCT 95 14

TO: BERGER

FROM: FEELEY
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 20 OCT 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
CROATIA
SERBIA
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 20 OCT DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER DUE DATE: 24 OCT 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FEELEY LOGREF: 9521216 9521255

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0236 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BAKER JANE
		FEELEY
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEC CLOSED BY: NSASK DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	95102310	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	95103010	NOTED BY BERGER

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National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 21226

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS ~~NSC~~ INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG me A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1		
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger	2	Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk		Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Records Mgt.	3	10/30	N

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: Bosnia mtg package

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	John Feeley to Samuel Berger re: October 20 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia (3 pages)	10/20/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4002

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0236 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, October 20, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs689

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA
DATE: October 20, 1995
LOCATION: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
TIME: 4:00 p.m. - 5:00 p.m.

AGENDA

I. IFOR/Unresolved Issues.....JCS/State/NSC*

* Paper to be provided by OOB October 20

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 2/6/2020
2013-0682-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5 (G)
Declassify on: 10/6/95

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9521216
RECEIVED: 18 OCT 95 17

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 19 OCT 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
CROATIA
AGENDA
SERBIA
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 20 OCT DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 21 OCT 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FEELEY LOGREF: 9521226 9521255

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0236 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BAKER JANE
		BASS
		BERGER
		FEELEY
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEC CLOSED BY: NSMEC DOC 2 OF 2

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By JDS NARA, Date 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	95101920	FOR DECISION
001		X	95101920	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
001	SENS	Z	95101920	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	95101920	SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	951019	FUERTH, L	
002	951019	BRILL, K	
002	951019	NYE, J	
002	951019	MCALEER, R	
002	951019	INDERFURTH, R	
002	951019	YANNUZZI, R	
002	951019	WILSON, F	

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National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 21216

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1	D	
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger	2		
Lake		Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
~~Situation Room~~	3	AC 1/19	
West Wing Desk	4		D
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9521216
DATE 19 OCT 95

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 20 OCT DC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA NOELLE JENSEN ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	700AM	10/20	JBN SITROOM PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	10/20/95	0800	Wms., MC PRINT LAST NAME: Williams COPY: VIA FAX+1
MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY ROOM 3408, MAIN TREASURY BLDG 1500 PENNSYLVANIA AVE, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20220	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9521216
DATE 19 OCT 95

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 20 OCT DC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

COL. F. C. WILSON
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ROOM 2E865
PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001

DATE _____ TIME _____ SIGNATURE _____

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: VIA FAX

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9521216
DATE 19 OCT 95

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 20 OCT DC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA NOELLE JENSEN ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE, ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX+1
MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY ROOM 3408, MAIN TREASURY BLDG 1500 PENNSYLVANIA AVE, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20220	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGMT, ROOM 379 OEOB

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9521216
DATE 19 OCT 95

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 20 OCT DC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA NOELLE JENSEN ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	10/20/95	0800	Wms., MC PRINT LAST NAME: Williams COPY: VIA FAX+1
MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY ROOM 3408, MAIN TREASURY BLDG 1500 PENNSYLVANIA AVE, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20220	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/1/2019
2010-~~0510~~-F1
0533

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

TIME OF TRANSMISSION WHITE HOUSE

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Oct 13 1:39 PM '95

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 2206 CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia

NSC LOG # 21216

TO (AGENCY)		DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
State	B	Executive Secretary		
Treasury	K1	Executive Secretary		
Defense	N	Executive Secretary		
USUN/STATE	B	Executive Secretary		736-7699
CIA	A	Executive Secretary		
JCS	D	Secretary		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

K-1

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MESSAGE NO.: 2206 CLASSIFICATION: TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia

NSC LOG # 21216

TO (AGENCY)		DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
State	B	Executive Secretary		
Treasury	K1	Executive Secretary		
Defense	N	Executive Secretary		
USUN/STATE	B	Executive Secretary		736-7699
CIA	A	Executive Secretary		
JCS	D	Secretary		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

WASHFAX

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

19 OCT 9521 06
NMCC/JCS

PRECEDENCE: ~~IMMEDIATE~~
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 2206 CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia

NSC LOG # 21216

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
State B	Executive Secretary		
Treasury K1	Executive Secretary		
Defense N	Executive Secretary		
USUN/STATE B	Executive Secretary		736-7699
CIA A	Executive Secretary		
JCS D	Secretary		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/1/2019
2010-0510-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 2206 CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia

NSC LOG # 21216

TO (AGENCY)		DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
State	B	Executive Secretary		
Treasury	KI	Executive Secretary		
Defense	N	Executive Secretary		
USUN/STATE	B	Executive Secretary		736-7699
CIA	A	Executive Secretary		
JCS	D	Secretary		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 2206 CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia

NSC LOG # 21216

TO (AGENCY)		DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
State	B	Executive Secretary		
Treasury	K1	Executive Secretary		
Defense	N	Executive Secretary		
USUN/STATE	B	Executive Secretary		736-7699
CIA	A	Executive Secretary		
JCS	D	Secretary		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE
- ☐ ~~FLASH~~
- ☐ ~~IMMEDIATE~~
- ☐ PRIORITY
- ☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting DC MTG ON BOSNIA PAGES: 3

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/1/2019

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

2010-0533-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

21216

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
October 19, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE
Executive Secretary
Department of Treasury

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia October 20, 1995, from 4:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be principals plus one. The agenda is attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5 (g)
Declassify on: 10/19/95

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By JDC NARA, Date 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: October 20, 1995
LOCATION: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
TIME: 4:00 p.m. - 5:00 p.m.

AGENDA

I. IFOR/Unresolved Issues.....JCS/State/NSC*

* Paper to be provided by OOB October 20

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5 (G)
Declassify On: N/6/95

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By YL NARA, Date 2/6/2020
2a3-0682-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21216

October 19, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: JOHN FEELEY

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, October 20, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Deputies meeting on Bosnia to be held October 20, 1995. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve AV Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5 (g)
Declassify On: 1.6, x5

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDSNARA, Date 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

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See also 2013-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title: DC0237 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, October 24, 1995				
Staff Office-Individual: Records Management				
Original OA/ID Number: 4002				
Row: 43	Section: 4	Shelf: 7	Position: 3	Stack: V

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (6 pages)	10/24/1995	P1/b(1)
002a. memo	John Feeley to Samuel Berger re: October 24 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)	10/24/1995	P1/b(1)
002b. agenda	NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)	10/24/1995	P1/b(1)
002c. paper	re: IFOR Issues (7 pages)	10/1995	P1/b(1)
002d. paper	[Duplicate of 002c] (7 pages)	10/1995	P1/b(1)
002e. paper	re: Information Paper (16 pages)	10/23/1995	P1/b(1)
003. agenda	[Duplicate of 002b] (1 page)	10/24/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4002

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0237 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, October 24, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs690

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

DC 0237

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9521261
DATE 02 NOV 95

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS OF 24 OCT DC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA NOELLE JENSEN ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	11/7/95	_____	D. Graves PRINT LAST NAME: GRAVES COPY: 1
MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9521261
RECEIVED: 30 OCT 95 08

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 02 NOV 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA DC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 24 OCT DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 02 NOV 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FEELEY LOGREF: 9521231 9521236

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0237 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BAKER JANE
		FEELEY
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSASK CLOSED BY: NSASK DOC 2 OF 2

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By KBG NARA, Date 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

~~SECRET~~ RECORD ID: 9521261

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	95103117	FOR DECISION
002		X	95110211	DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	951102	FUERTH, L	
002	951102	BRILL, K	
002	951102	MCALEER, R	
002	951102	INDERFURTH, R	
002	951102	ADAMS, G	
002	951102	YANNUZZI, R	
002	951102	WILSON, F	

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National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 21261

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS ~~NSC~~ INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1		
Dohse	#3		A-Tab I
Sens			
Soderberg	Copy.		
Berger	2		
Lake		Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	10/2	
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

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National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 21261

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1		
Dohse	#3		A-Tab I
Sens			
Soderberg	Copy		
Berger	2		
Lake		Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	10/2	
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9521261 / 21255
DATE 02 NOV 95

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS OF 24 OCT DC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA NOELLE JENSEN ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	11/2	15:15	SITROOM BOX PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	11-2-95	PM 410	Anthony Taylor PRINT LAST NAME: A TAYLOR COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	11/2	4:20	SA PRINT LAST NAME: HABER COPY: 1
MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9521261
DATE 02 NOV 95

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS OF 24 OCT DC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

COL. F. C. WILSON
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ROOM 2E865
PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001

DATE _____ TIME _____ SIGNATURE _____

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: VIA FAX

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9521261
DATE 02 NOV 95

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS OF 24 OCT DC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA NOELLE JENSEN ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	11/3/95	0750	Neil Bujold PRINT LAST NAME: Bujold COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: 1
MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KDS Date: 10/17/2019
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9521261
DATE 02 NOV 95

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS OF 24 OCT DC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA NOELLE JENSEN ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	11/2/95	4:30pm	Charlie Work PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/1/2015
2010-0533-M

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

12:46

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
(PRIORITY)
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 2320 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 8 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC OF DC MTG ON BOSNIA

24 OCT NSC LOG # 21261

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE B	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD N	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN B	OFFICE OF AMB.		
CIA A	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS D	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 2320 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 8 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC OF DC MTG ON BOSNIA

24 OCT NSC LOG # 21261

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE B	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD N	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN B	OFFICE OF AMB.		
CIA A	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS D	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
(PRIORITY)
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 2320 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 8 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC OF DC MTG ON BOSNIA 24 OCT

NSC LOG # 21261

TO (AGENCY)		DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	B	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	N	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN	B	OFFICE OF AMB.		
CIA	A	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	D	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

WHITE HOUSE

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WASHFAX

TIME OF RECEIP

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

03 OCT 95 12 29

NMCC/JCS

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 2320 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 8
(PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (202) 456-9425 WH SITROOM
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC OF DC MTG ON BOSNIA

24 OCT NSC LOG # 21261

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE B	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD N	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN B	OFFICE OF AMB.		
CIA A	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS D	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

[illegible] UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/1/2019
2015-0533-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 2320

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

TOTAL: 8
(PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

18K

BROADCAST REPORT

(THU) 11.02. '95 12:44

WHSR#1

DOCUMENT #	TIME STORED	PAGE	NUMBER OF DEST.		
			OK	N. G.	TOTAL
1460024580	11.02 12:37	8	4	0	4

*** COMPLETED ***

DESTINATION	P.
~~CIA~~#1	8
NMCC #2	8

DESTINATION	P.
~~STATE~~ #2	8
~~N.~~ OSD/CCC	8

*** END ***

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/1/2019
2015-0533-M

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE
- ☐ FLASH
- ☐ IMMEDIATE
- ☐ PRIORITY
- ☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC# 21261

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting SDC of DC on Bosnia 24 OCT PAGES: _____

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

SECRET
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/1/2019
2015-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21261

November 2, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, October 24, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

for Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~
Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5 (g)
Declassify on: 10/27/05

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By KVS NARA, Date 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (6 pages)	10/24/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4002

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0237 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, October 24, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs690

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21261

October 30, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: JOHN FEELEY

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, October 24, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of Conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia held October 24, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

Attachments may have been edited for format by Exec Sec

~~SECRET~~
Reason: 1.5 (g)
Declassify On: 10/27/05

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9521236
RECEIVED: 23 OCT 95 16

TO: BERGER

FROM: FEELEY
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 23 OCT 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
CROATIA
SERBIA
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 24 OCT DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: OBE PER BERGER DUE DATE: 26 OCT 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FEELEY LOGREF: 9521231 9521261

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0237 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BAKER JANE
		FEELEY
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB CLOSED BY: NSKDB DOC 1 OF 1

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By KDS NARA, Date 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M1

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ RECORD ID: 9521236

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	95102321	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	95102417	OBE PER BERGER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	John Feeley to Samuel Berger re: October 24 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)	10/24/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4002

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0237 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, October 24, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs690

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. agenda	NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)	10/24/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4002

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0237 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, October 24, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs690

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002c. paper	re: IFOR Issues (7 pages)	10/1995	P1/b(1)

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NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4002

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0237 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, October 24, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs690

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002d. paper	[Duplicate of 002c] (7 pages)	10/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4002

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0237 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, October 24, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs690

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002e. paper	re: Information Paper (16 pages)	10/23/1995	P1/b(1)

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([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4002

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0237 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, October 24, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs690

RESTRICTION CODES

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9521231
RECEIVED: 23 OCT 95 10

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 23 OCT 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA DC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 24 OCT DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: HARMON SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 26 OCT 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FEELEY LOGREF: 9521236 9521261

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0237 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BAKER JANE
		BERGER
		FEELEY
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS:

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By KBG NARA, Date 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	95102313	FOR DECISION
001		X	95102314	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
001	SENS	Z	95102314	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	95102315	HARMON SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	951023	FUERTH, L	
002	951023	BRILL, K	
002	951023	MCALEER, R	
002	951023	INDERFURTH, R	
002	951023	ADAMS, G	
002	951023	YANNUZZI, R	
002	951023	WILSON, F	

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National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 21231

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1		
Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg	copy		
Berger	2		
Hannon	3	Deputy Nat Sec Advisor has seen	Tab I
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	10/23	
Records Mgt.			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

DC Mtg on Bosnia
10/24, 7:00 a.m.

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

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LOG 9521231
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SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 24 OCT DC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: 1		
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	10-24-95 AM	6:00	Anthony Taylor A TAYLOR
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: VIA FAX +1		
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: VIA FAX		
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
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MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			
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EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX +1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: 1
MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX

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DATE 23 OCT 95

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 24 OCT DC MTG ON BOSNIA
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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	10/24	731	HOLMES PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX +1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
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WASHINGTON, DC 20506

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COPY: 1

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: VIA FAX +1

COL ROBERT P. MCALEER
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ROOM 3E880
PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: VIA FAX

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER
ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
2201 C STREET NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

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DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET
ROOM 238
OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG
WASHINGTON, DC 20503

10/23/95 5:05 L Graves

PRINT LAST NAME: GRAVES

COPY: 1

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS
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DTG: _____

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FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTIFICATION OF 24 OCT DC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21231

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS: URGENT

OPS CENTERS: BE ADVISED, MEETING IS SCHEDULED TO CONVENE AT 0700 TOMORROW MORNING.

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Initials: RDS Date: 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

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TIME OF RECEIPT

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PRECEDENCE
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- ☐ PRIORITY
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URGENT

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DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC LOG # 21231

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting 24 OCT DC MTG ON BOSNIA PAGES: 3

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

October 23, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia, Tuesday, October 24, 1995 from 7:00 a.m. to 8:30 a.m. in the White House Situation Room. The agenda is attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Joyce A. Henry for
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5 (g)
Declassify on: 1.6 x5

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. agenda	[Duplicate of 002b] (1 page)	10/24/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4002

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0237 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, October 24, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs690

RESTRICTION CODES

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21231

October 23, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: JOHN F. FEELEY, JR.

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, October 24, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Deputies meeting on Bosnia to be held October 24, 1995. The Memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: John Feeley
Reason: (a)
Declassify On: (a)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS, NARA, Date 10/1/2019
2010-0533-M

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See also 2013-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

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~~001. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)~~	~~11/01/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
002a. memo	John Feeley and Daniel Fried to Samuel Berger re: November 1 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia (6 pages)	11/01/1995	P1/b(1)
~~002b. agenda~~	~~[Duplicate of 003] (1 page)~~	~~11/01/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 02/06/2020
~~002c. paper~~	~~re: Executive Summary (21 pages)~~	~~10/31/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
002d. paper	re: Sustaining a Peace Agreement in Bosnia (12 pages)	10/31/1995	P1/b(1)
~~003. agenda~~	~~NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)~~	~~11/01/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 02/06/2020

COLLECTION:
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FOLDER TITLE:
DC0239 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, November 1, 1995

2010-0533-M
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P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 08 NOV 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
DC
CROATIA
SOC
SERBIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 1 NOV DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 06 NOV 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FEELEY LOGREF: 9521265

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0239 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		FEELEY
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2010-0533-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	95110722	FOR DECISION
001		X	95110818	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
001	SENS	Z	95110818	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	95110818	DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	951108	FUERTH, L	
002	951108	BRILL, K	
002	951108	NYE, J	
002	951108	MCALEER, R	
002	951108	INDERFURTH, R	
002	951108	ADAMS, G	
002	951108	YANNUZZI, R	
002	951108	WILLIAMS, A	
002	951108	WILSON, F	

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Harmon			
Dohse	1/3	D/W	Tab I plus
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger	2	mV	R/S DO asap
Lake			Done 11/8
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	mc 11/8	D
Records Mgt.			

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DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA NOELLE JENSEN ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	11/9/95	0922	Nikki Bernard PRINT LAST NAME: Bijola. Jensen COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	11-9-95	AM 550	Anthony Tagliu PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX+1
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DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	11/9/95	9:30	J. Graves PRINT LAST NAME: GRAVES COPY: 1

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	11/9/95	0729	Wms, MC PRINT LAST NAME: WILLIAMS COPY: VIA FAX+1
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MESSAGE NO.: 2379 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 4 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia NSC LOG # 21278

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	State	Executive Secretary		
K	Treasury	Executive Secretary		
V	Defense	Executive Secretary		
3	USUN/State	Rick Inderfurth		736-7699
A	CIA	Executive Secretary		
3	AID	Executive Secretary		
D	JCS	Secretary		

REMARKS:

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	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	State	Executive Secretary		
K	Treasury	Executive Secretary		
N	Defense	Executive Secretary		
B	USUN/State	Rick Inderfurth		736-7699
A	CIA	Executive Secretary		
B	AID	Executive Secretary		
D	JCS	Secretary		

REMARKS:

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FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia NSC LOG # 21278

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	State	Executive Secretary		
K	Treasury	Executive Secretary		
V	Defense	Executive Secretary		
B	USUN/State	Rick Inderfurth		736-7699
A	CIA	Executive Secretary		
B	AID	Executive Secretary		
D	JCS	Secretary		

REMARKS:

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia NSC LOG # 21278

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
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K	Treasury	Executive Secretary		
N	Defense	Executive Secretary		
B	USUN/State	Rick Inderfurth		736-7699
A	CIA	Executive Secretary		
B	AID	Executive Secretary		
D	JCS	Secretary		

REMARKS:

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A	CIA	Executive Secretary		
B	AID	Executive Secretary		
D	JCS	Secretary		

REMARKS:

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FROM: National Security Council PHONE: ~~202-456-2291~~ ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: ~~Notice of Meeting~~ SOC DC Mtg. on Bosnia PAGES: 4

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SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21278

November 8, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE
Executive Secretary
Department of Treasury

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. AARON S. WILLIAMS
Executive Secretary
Agency for International Development

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, November 1, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~
Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5 (a,d)
Declassify on: 11/2/2005

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/3/2019
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21278

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee
DATE: November 1, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 4:30 - 5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR
Sandy Berger

OVP
Leon Fuerth
Rick Saunders

STATE
Strobe Talbott
Peter Tarnoff
James Holmes

DEFENSE
John White
Walt Slocombe

USUN
David Scheffer

OMB
Jack Lew
Mark Sandy

CIA
Dennis Blair
Norman Schindler

JCS
William Owens
Michael Byron

NSC
John Feeley
Alexander Vershbow

Summary of Conclusions

Economic Reconstruction

1. Deputies reviewed the IWG paper on economic reconstruction for Bosnia and endorsed its overall approach to an international assistance package for Bosnia, noting that the paper was evolving and details such as conditionality, donor coordination and technical versus reconstruction assistance, needed further work. **(Action: State, Treasury, AID)** They agreed that a U.S. share ($600 million, roughly 20 percent of the projected contribution from individual donors) should be recommended to Principals for

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Reason: 1.5 (g)
Declassify on: 10/27/05

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approval as notional figures to be used for planning purposes. They endorsed Treasury's strategy for developing an international financial package for Bosnia. ~~(C)~~

2. Deputies agreed that OMB should prepare a paper for principals' decision with options for funding the U.S. share of both IFOR and reconstruction funding as a basis for consultations with Congress. Deputies further agreed that costs for equipping and training the Bosnian Government would not be included in the funding options but would be addressed separately. **(Action: OMB)** ~~(C)~~

Military Stabilization

3. Deputies reaffirmed the priority we attach to arms control and a "build-down" of the forces of the parties. They noted the difficulties of equipping and training Federation forces in the context of peace implementation, as well as the role it could play in an overall stabalization program and agreed that Principals should reexamine the U.S. role in coordinating the equipping and training of the Federation, based on the OSD paper. They further agreed to forward to Principals' for decision the recommendation that an assessment team be sent to Bosnia immediately. Deputies agreed that the Joint Staff should develop the terms of reference for the assessment team for Principals' approval. **(Action: JCS)** ~~(S)~~

4. Deputies further agreed to have OSD prepare for Principals a paper outlining the pros and cons of using exclusively contractors rather than a combination of military personnel and contractors to equip and train the Federation's military. **(Action: OSD)** ~~(S)~~

Sequencing

Deputies agreed to have the new Bosnia Implementation ExComm coordinate the preparation of a paper for Principals' decision outlining the sequencing of key events and decisions required before and after the signing of a peace agreement. **(Action: State and NSC)** ~~(C)~~

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21278

November 6, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: JOHN F. FEELEY, JR.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, November 1, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of Conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia held November 1, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to the agencies.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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Reason: 1.5 (g)
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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
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FROM: FEELEY
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 01 NOV 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
CROATIA
SERBIA
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 1 NOV DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER DUE DATE: 03 NOV 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FEELEY LOGREF: 9521265 9521278

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0239 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
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002a. memo	John Feeley and Daniel Fried to Samuel Berger re: November 1 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia (6 pages)	11/01/1995	P1/b(1)

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: November 1, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 4:30 - 5:30 p.m.

AGENDA

I. Economic Reconstruction.....State/Treasury/AID*

II. Equip and Train.....OSD/JCS*

* Papers to be provided by 1200, November 1

Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5 (g)
Declassify on: ~~November 1, 2005~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VB NARA, Date 2/6/2020
2013-0682-M

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NOTE:

1. This is a working draft and should be considered confidential.

2. Numbers to be updated November 1

October 31, 1995

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

BOSNIA TODAY

Bosnia is a country torn apart by war and ethnic conflict. The war has destroyed much of the Bosnian economy. In 1990, GDP was about $10 billion (about $1,900 per capita), compared with about $2 billion (about $500) today. War brought economic activity to a standstill:

- By August 1994, industrial output was about 2 percent of 1990 levels.
- Bosnia's exports dropped from $2 billion in 1990 to $6 million in 1993; imports were reduced from $2.2 billion in 1990 to $32 million in 1994.
- Employment has fallen from a 1991 level of 800,000 to 72,000.
- Approximately 1.3 million people (mostly Muslims) are currently displaced from Bosnia, with another 1.4 million internally displaced. In addition, about 200,000 Bosnians (of a total population of ?? million) are dead or missing.
- War has damaged a large portion of the physical infrastructure, much of which were military targets; 35 percent of Bosnia's roads, 40 percent of its bridges, 50 percent of its power stations and central telecommunications facilities are destroyed.
- As a consequence of the war, at least 80 percent of the population in the Federation receives some form of food aid.
- Lack of a strong central authority, continuing hostilities and ongoing transition pose unparalleled difficulties in establishing effective fiscal and monetary authorities. The situation is complicated by the widespread circulation of the German mark as the currency of choice.

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ESTIMATED NEED

Humanitarian needs will depend upon a stable peace and the flows of people. There are estimates of expected needs as high as $1 billion over the next three years. The USG contribution is expected to be approximately $200 million from State and USAID. Adequate FY 96 budget authority exists for this purpose in both agencies, and are expected to be adequate for following years.

Rehabilitation/reconstruction needs will be further refined as security conditions permit. The World Bank has established as an objective the restoration of two-thirds of pre-war per capita income of $1900 by the year 2000. To do so will require growth rates of more than 20 percent annually for the next 3-4 years. That goal will also require an estimated $6 billion in external support, including debt reduction, over the next three years. Of this, bilateral donors would need to provide $3 billion, largely on concessional terms.

Issues for Discussion

There are no issues for discussion for humanitarian assistance. The size of the U.S. commitment for the rest of the assistance package is discussed further under Congressional strategy.

MACRO-ECONOMIC VERSUS PROGRAM ASSISTANCE

The IMF/World Bank have developed a preliminary medium-term balance of payments scenario for Bosnia which includes debt reduction and arrears clearance, reconstruction and transition to a private market economy, the build-up of foreign exchange reserves and qualifying for IMF and World Bank membership so that Bosnia can begin its own self-help. Treasury estimates that this comprehensive reform and financial package will cost approximately $4.7 billion over three years, after debt reduction. Of this, the IMF/World Bank, the EBRD and commercial creditors could provide approximately $1.5 billion, leaving $3 billion to be provided by bilateral donors.

A traditional USG share (20 percent) would amount to approximately $600 million over three years. Treasury, working with World Bank data, calculates that through a mix of loans and grants, we can fund: $200 million grant money for essential inputs; an additional $400 million of inputs leveraged by a $200 million loan; $3 million budget costs for a two-thirds debt reduction; and, up to $100 million worth of additional project support, including technical assistance.

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Much of USAID's program assistance for Bosnia reconstruction ($xxx million over XXX years) would be grant money for key imports and, thus, also would count as Balance of Payments support. There will be a clear need, however, for equally important programs of reform and to build and strengthen Bosnia's political institutions. Elections, an independent media, dispute resolution, privatization, institution building, capital markets development -- all are as important for Bosnia's survival and transition to a private market economy as they have been for the other Central and East European countries. For the most part, such project assistance will not count against the USG share of Balance of Payments support.

Issue for Discussion

What is the appropriate mix of macro-economic, reconstruction, and project assistance for the USG assistance package? What is the mix that will be best received on Capitol Hill?

CONGRESSIONAL STRATEGY

Assuming that there can be agreement on the elements of a USG assistance package, three major issues remain:

-- the method and strategy for gaining congressional approval; and

-- the timing for implementing such a Congressional strategy, preserving at the same time maximum leverage for the U.S. negotiator at the peace talks.

--size of U.S. contribution to the comprehensive assistance package.

There are essentially four possible approaches to funding a reconstruction assistance package for Bosnia:

-- an emergency supplemental;

-- a supplemental with offsets;

-- reprogramming; and

-- inclusion of the Bosnia package in the budget endgame negotiations.

Neither State nor USAID can support a plan for reprogramming or a supplemental with offset within the Function 150 account. OMB is of the view that an emergency supplemental stands but the slenderest chance of success, and offsets and reprogramming the best. OMB offers as an alternative, an increased USG share of humanitarian assistance with other donors picking up a proportionately larger share of the reconstruction assistance.

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All agencies agree that consultations with Congress on the size and shape of the Bosnia assistance package should begin, but any formal request should not be made until a peace settlement is initially in hand. At that time, a case could be made that Congressional approval of the Bosnia package is necessary to cinch the deal.

Issues for Decision:

What is the size and shape of the USG assistance package? When do we begin to consult with Congress? What is the budget strategy -- supplemental, offsets or reconciliation? What is the budget strategy for requesting IFOR funding and reconstruction -- a single or separate request?

CONDITIONALITY

An objective of the US-led peace process is the emergence of a viable, unified Bosnian state where the rights of individuals are respected and protected. Already, however, certain proscriptions and limitations have been imposed. For example, FY96 SEED funds for Bosnia are limited to Federation territory.

Issues for Decision:

Is it possible to apply minimal standards of conditionality: respect for the War Crimes Tribunal, right of return, a commitment to democratic and economic reform? Is it prudent and practical to deny aid to Republika Srpska, Serbia and even to Croatia? What entity monitors conditionality -- individual states? Senior Steering Group? the Senior Implementation Coordinator?

DONOR COORDINATION

To date, donor coordination efforts have produced largely rhetorical responses, especially from the EU, the OIC and the Japanese. While all parties concur that a generous reform and reconstruction plan is critical and that a donor coordination mechanism is desirable, agreement on a concrete plan still eludes us. Press speculation abounds as to the amount of contributions to be expected for reconstruction, but without a peace agreement in place, donors have been reluctant to commit to precise numbers.

The EU has stated that they will take the lead as a donor and in donor coordination on the ground in Sarajevo. Economic reform policy should be designed by the World Bank and IMF. The accepted mechanism for donor pledging coordination by the Bank is the Consultative Group. We see the World Bank taking the lead here with a co-chair role for the EU. Other coordination issues, such as who will lead the coordination on the ground, to whom that person will answer, and where a coordinating policy body will sit, will be discussed at a World Bank meeting November 10.

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The role of the World Bank, which has been suggested as a technical secretariat for the coordinating mechanism, should be further refined so that negotiations can ensue and constraints on their participation (arrears) be addressed.

Issues for Decision:

Given the Europeans' concerns about the coordination mechanism and answerability, what should the U.S. position be in the November 10 World Bank negotiations on assistance coordination?

What is the appropriate level of a European contribution to the assistance package?

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2423 10/31 9:00 p.m.

Assistance for Bosnia

Bosnia is a country torn apart by war and ethnic conflict. The country has come to play an important role in the post-Cold War era, demonstrating some of the weaknesses and danger points in the new configuration of forces in Europe, and between Europe and the United States. The latest efforts to bring peace to the region demonstrate a firm U.S. commitment to support a stable and prosperous Europe. The USG is creating an assistance package that will lend credibility to the peace settlement, stimulate economic reform, lay the basis for a multi-ethnic democracy, and give the people and government of Bosnia a stake in the peace.

THE ECONOMY

The war has destroyed much of the Bosnian economy. In 1990, GDP was about $10 billion (about $1,900 per capita), compared with about $2 billion (about $500) today. War brought economic activity to a standstill:

- By August 1994, industrial output was about 2 percent of 1990 levels.
- Bosnia's exports dropped from $2 billion in 1990 to $6 million in 1993; imports were reduced from $2.2 billion in 1990 to $32 million in 1994.
- Employment has fallen from a 1991 level of 800,000 to 72,000.
- Approximately 1.3 million people (mostly Muslims) are currently displaced from Bosnia (pre-war population estimated at 4,366,000), with another 1.4 million internally displaced. In addition, about 200,000 are dead or missing.
- War has damaged much of the physical infrastructure, much of which were military targets; 35 percent of Bosnia's roads, 40 percent of its bridges, 50 percent of its power stations and central telecommunications facilities are destroyed.
- As a consequence of the war, at least 80 percent of the population in the Federation is dependent on food aid.
- Lack of a strong central authority, continuing hostilities and ongoing transition pose unparalleled difficulties in establishing effective fiscal and monetary authorities.

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The needs, therefore, are vast. Rehabilitation and new investments will be required in all infrastructure sectors, housing and the education and health systems. Funds will be needed for macro-economic assistance, financing supplies and recurrent budgetary costs.

WHAT IS NEEDED

A Needs Assessment by the World Bank. At the urging of G-7 Finance Ministers, the World Bank and the IMF have taken the lead in the design of an assistance package and financial normalization proposal for Bosnia that the international community will use as a blueprint.

It should be noted that World Bank figures are drawn from a discussion paper with data as late as August 15, 1995. This is before the Bosniacs made their recent territorial gains, and thus all data concern only thirty percent of internationally recognized Bosnian territory. Figures below concern the Federation. World Bank figures for Serb held parts of Bosnia and the new parts of Bosniac territory will be added later.

The financial plan is a complex series of events that offers a viable Bosnian state on the basis of Bosnian reform and reconstruction, substantial external finance, and comprehensive international coordination. This plan must be comprehensive and consist of many pieces, including addressing Bosnia's arrears, providing for its reconstruction and transformation to a private market economy, and satisfying the financial requirements for membership in the IMF and World Bank. Key details are as follows:

- The blueprint aims at restoring per capita income to 2/3 of pre-war levels of $1,900 by the year 2000. To do so will require achieving growth rates of 20 percent annually for the next three to four years. The growth will be possible only if sound economic reforms are implemented, key infrastructure is rehabilitated and economic activity is normalized.

- To achieve these results, it is estimated that a total of about $6 billion of external support, including debt reduction, will be required over the next three years. Bilateral donors will need to provide $3 billion of this amount. A 20 percent U.S. share of this package is likely to be around $600 million.

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- Deep debt reduction on Bosnian debts to official creditors (Paris Club) and commercial creditors (London Club) will have the effect of bringing Bosnia's inherited debt down to a level that will permit it to take on new loans without ending up financially non-viable.

- Bosnia is not a member of the IMF and World Bank. Bosnia has inherited arrears for former Yugoslavia, approximately $400+ million to the World Bank, and $35 million to the IMF. These arrears must be cleared before the institutions will begin lending operations. The arrears piece of the puzzle falls into place as part of the comprehensive financial plan. Bosnia's total debt stock to all creditors is $2.9 billion.

- Once arrears are cleared, the Bank estimates it might provide $400 million to Bosnia in the first year. This amount could facilitate arrears clearance through a de facto refinancing. The clearance of arrears will likely entail some bilateral contributions and bridge loans.

- EBRD and commercial flows are slated to come on-stream toward the end of three years. Commercial creditors will likely not find Bosnia creditworthy until they see the economy turning around.

U.S. OBJECTIVES

The U.S. is driving the peace process now. As part of our leadership of the negotiations, we are working cooperatively with the European Union and the international financial institutions to develop an assistance package that will reinforce the peace settlement. U.S. objectives are as follows:

- To create a stable, prosperous, multi-ethnic democracy in which human rights are respected and displaced people are allowed to go where the want on Bosnian territory.

- To encourage the achievement and subsequent implementation of a peace settlement; we expect the EU to take the lead as a donor and in organizing the implementation of reconstruction; the World Bank will take the lead in designing a financial plan that will lead to Bosnia's financial normalization.

- To play a prominent role in providing humanitarian relief and a supporting role in economic reconstruction and transition to a private-market economy in the Federation and other areas of the former Yugoslavia.

- To promote the development of political and economic structures in the Federation that will stimulate economic growth and the creation of democratic governance at the Federation, cantonal and local levels.

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- To foster political and economic ties between the Federation and Republika Srpska.

- To support the construction of peaceful and productive relations among the countries of former Yugoslavia and between them and their neighbors.

ELEMENTS OF THE ASSISTANCE PACKAGE

The U.S. assistance package should:

- Provide protection and care for refugee and displaced populations.

- Support a comprehensive repatriation plan to deal with vulnerable displaced populations and the return of refugees now in Western Europe, as well as those who choose to relocate as a result of redrawing of the map.

- Phase-out of humanitarian assistance as needs decline.

- Implement a quick impact municipal rehabilitation package.refugees now in western Europe, as well as those who choose to relocate as a result of redrawing of the map.

- Contribute to the physical reconstruction of Bosnia through provision of financial support for reconstruction, consistent with our part of the comprehensive international effort.

- Help meet Bosnia's financing needs, including providing it with the substantial concessionality it will need to rebuild its economy without creating excessive debt burden for the future.

- Implement programs that promote privatization, development of capital markets, stimulation of private enterprise.

- Encourage nation-building, evolution of democratic institutions and rebuilding of a civic society.

- Begin the process of self-help through membership for Bosnia in the World Bank and IMF and access to substantial funds and commercial credit which will result.

The assistance package will help Bosnia establish a market-based economy supported by democratic institutions. The Bosnians themselves have declared their interest in making the transition from socialism. A stable, secure and economically viable Bosnia, firmly anchored in international and European institutions, will no longer require an extensive foreign military presence.

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U.S. Treasury Analysis and Proposal for Financial Normalization.

The Fund/Bank blueprint points toward the following financing structure:

- To achieve economic transformation, Bosnia will need to stabilize, liberalize and privatize its economy. Stabilization will require sound fiscal and monetary policies that promote low inflation.

- Bosnia will require a single monetary authority in the future to ensure low inflation and promote confidence in the currency.

- Liberalization will require the dismantlement of price controls and regularization of payment for utilities. Bosnia must open its trade regime to the world at large so that commerce will help restart the economy.

- Bosnia's state firms and banks must be privatized.

Treasury cites the following steps as necessary for the comprehensive financing package to work:

- Total required financing (after debt reduction) over the three year period following peace will approximate $4.7 billion, of which:

  --The IMF and World Bank could provide $0.9 billion, assuming Bosnia implements sound reforms.

  --The EBRD and commercial creditors could provide $0.6 billion.

  --Bilateral donors would need to provide $3 billion, largely on concessional terms.

  --These amounts exclude humanitarian and technical assistance.

Burden-Sharing. In mobilizing bilateral pledges toward international support packages, the U.S. often contributes on the order of 25 percent. In the case of Bosnia, a lower contribution, perhaps around 20 percent, could be envisaged:

- The U.S. will cover a large portion of IFOR costs.

- The EU has indicated its strong desire to play a prominent role in Bosnia's reconstruction.

- The donor pool for Bosnia should be large due the exceptional focus of international attention.

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The U.S. Contribution. The notional U.S. contribution over three years should be around $600 million, assuming $3 billion is required in bilateral donor financing and a 20 percent U.S. share. We will seek out those projects that have super-high rates of return which will jumpstart recovery.

- The U.S. will want to seek out critical infrastructure projects to remove bottlenecks choking the economy.

- We should furnish Bosnia with material inputs to carry out these projects.

The U.S. has indicated it could provide $250 to $500 million. Taking this as a given, and trying to make it consistent with a 20 percent U.S. share of the bilateral contributions under the Fund/Bank blueprint, a hypothetical U.S. approach might entail the following pieces:

- The package of $250 to $500 million as a U.S. contribution could be translated into $600 million of support and allow us to meet our three year target.

- Bosnia owes the USG $51 million in Paris Club debt. The budget cost of 2/3 debt reduction on the U.S. amount might be $3 million. This amount would be the U.S. cost for triggering a $1.6 billion debt reduction package.

- Grant financing of $200 million could provide Bosnia with essential imports from U.S. suppliers.

(o To provide another $400 million in inputs, the U.S. could consider using grant monies to leverage loans. If we can extend loans of $400 million against budget scoring of $200 million, we can multiply our scarce resources.)

- This mix of loans and grants will allow us to meet our international financing commitments, while offering Bosnia appropriate concessionality.

- Substantial resources will remain (up to $100 million) for project assistance. Projects assistance will help Bosnia to put in place the legal institutions for democracy and free markets, to privatize the economy, and build capital markets.

SIZE AND MIX OF THE U.S. PROGRAM ASSISTANCE PACKAGE

Assistance to Bosnia is best seen as a package which puts the various elements in place simultaneously. Beyond the above-mentioned financial package, the U.S. program strategy will consist of three parts within the comprehensive, multi-donor economic revitalization and reconstruction program:

- Complete and redirect the humanitarian program from relief through a recovery phase.

- Mount a quick impact and then longer-term economic revitalization and reconstruction program.

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- Support urgent economic transformation steps and democratic reforms.

Timing. During the peace negotiations, humanitarian assistance will continue to be delivered. Extensive planning is under way for economic revitalization. A quick impact demonstration of U.S. reconstruction support will be launched as soon as a peace document is in place. It is anticipated that IFI funds will be slow at first, so the U.S. will front load its reconstruction program in the first four to six months. The larger multi-year reconstruction effort will start as supplemental funds become available.

Humanitarian Assistance. The need for humanitarian assistance in the Federation, Croatia and Serbia will flow primarily from the movements of people. We believe the best way to organize the multi-lateral humanitarian effort will be for the UNHCR, the agency that leads multi-lateral relief efforts on the ground, to continue that lead. The EU should head a donor group that will give policy guidance for operations. Based on discussions with UNHCR and the EU, this arrangement appears acceptable.

Role of the USG. USAID's Office for Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and Food for Peace (FFP), and the Office of Emergency and Humanitarian Assistance have provided food aid and temporary shelter materials and supplied health, hygiene, basic water and sanitation, and mental health activities.

State and Bureau of PRM

Quick Reaction.

Immediately following a peace settlement, there will be pressure to expand assistance activities. In part, such demands will arise from the terms of the peace accords themselves. Elections will be called, human rights monitors will be needed, mediation and arbitration mechanisms will have to be offered and populations on the move will demand care and protection. It will be incumbent upon the international community to respond quickly.

To engage citizens in the peace settlement, small, but highly visible projects will have to begin immediatley.

We are preparing to quickly expand our present activities, particularly in the area of quick impact municipal rehabilitations. The municipal rehabilitation program will provide intensive support to selected municipal or canton areas to repair municipal infrastructure, rehabilitate housing, and stimulate small business. The goal of the program is to facilitate the return of displaced populations and to immediately demonstrate the benefits of peace to local populations. Participating municipalities will be carefully selected based on a willingness to work through federation structures, accept the return of displaced persons, and build multi-ethnic communities.

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In addition, as disputes arise over issues such as property ownership, education, municipal and cantonal structuring, or freedom of movement, U.S. assistance in alternative dispute resolution ((ADR) and mediation will help diffuse tensions and ease the pressure these disputes would otherwise create on a weak judicial system.

USAID will accelerate delivery of ongoing relief programs for the most vulnerable, especially through the winter. Programs of refugee relief, food aid, temporary shelter material, support in basic water and sanitation and setting up basic services will continue.

USAID's humanitarian assistance will be redirected in the post-settlement phase to support repatriation and resettlement.

The State Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM), will work with UNHCR to assure a structured, phased repatriation/return regime. PRM will seek to cover between 20 and 25 percent of the funding needs of UNHCR and other international organizations operating in the former Yugoslavia. PRM will seek to meet these needs through a combination of FY96 program fund and funds from the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund (ERMA).

The Office of Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs at DOD works with USAID and State to deliver medical supplies, pharmaceuticals, winter clothing, school supplies, blankets and other items.

Economic Revitalization and Reconstruction.

Quick Reaction. Immediately following a peace settlement, there will be pressure to expand assistance activities. We must be prepared quickly to expand our present activities, especially in the event of large scale population moves as displaced persons return to their homes. An interagency working group is assembling a "quick reaction" proposal that will get immediate and visible assistance on the ground. A list of projects is being developed that will support the peace negotiations and will take initial steps to support the Federation.

Institutions at the Federation level, particularly banking, finance, customs and other financial institutions will receive technical assistance. Planning is under way for holding elections, and for work with canton-municipal entities.

With domestic production capacity operating at a minimal level, much of the materials and supplies for reconstruction must be imported, and this while foreign exchange reserves are depleted.

USAID proposes financial support for reconstruction inputs and will finance the importation of a specified list of materials, equipment, and spare parts. Commodity related services, such as installation and training, would be included. Among the anticipated results:

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- Timely supply of critical inputs for reconstruction.
- Establishment of market-exchange rates and real positive interest rates.
- Creation of demand for local currency, stimulus for the banking system.
- Strengthening of communications linkage between local private importers and international suppliers.

U.S. assistance will help ease the shortfall of foreign exchange needed for reconstruction projects. It will provide advisory services to the Bosnian government to assist with currency stabilization and support for federal financial organizations.

Systemic Economic and Democratic Reform

Critical projects include:

- Assistance for privatization of enterprises, including preparation of business plans for companies, tender preparation and bid evaluations.
- Capital markets development, including establishment of a Securities Commission and a stock exchange.
- Commercial law development, including civil and commercial codes, securities regulations and laws, banking laws, bankruptcy laws and tax codes.
- Bank reform for privatization, bank recapitalization, asset write-off and private mortgage financing.
- Government institution-building to help bring together divided municipal administrations.
- Support for free and independent media through training in the U.S., establishment of a media center, training in election coverage and in running a media entity as a business.
- Establishment of a network of human rights abuse monitors and longer term assistance to the judicial sector.

ISSUES WHICH DRIVE THE USG SHARE

The most critical element of the assistance package is the price tag. The budget situation this year will play a large role in determining the size of the Bosnia reconstruction package and thus its ultimate success or failure. The fact that the overall Bosnia interest has an expensive military component will also affect our ability to request reconstruction money from Congress.

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It is in our interest to bring the Bosnia conflict to a close and to begin to repair the extensive human and physical damage to the region. The negotiators at the Proximity Talks need to know their efforts are reinforced by a solid program for reconstruction. The Bosnians have stated publicly that it is important to have such a program in place for them to buy into a peace negotiation.

Our purpose is to see that the assistance package contributes to the creation of a stable and economically viable Federation with adequate protection of the rights of individuals of all ethnic groups. It must promote reform and stimulate the mobilization of internal resources. It must invest the people and authorities of Bosnia in the peace process and not create an aid-dependent state.

We intend to strongly encourage the EU to accept a donor rate which would make the EU a "majority stockholder" in the reconstruction effort. Anything less would belie their "lead role" in Bosnia reconstruction.

STRATEGY FOR BURDEN-SHARING

We support a donor coordination effort for post war construction that includes a strong decision making presence on the ground in Sarajevo for principal donors, supported by an inter-governmental body to provide policy guidance. Donor representatives in Sarajevo would be linked with whatever organization is created to monitor and direct implementation of the peace settlement.

The USG, EU Commission, World Bank/IMF will meet in Washington November to nail down reconstruction coordination roles and responsibilities.

At the November meeting, we will seek agreement on a Senior Steering Group (SSG) and Senior Implementation Coordinator. There is no agreement about the answerability of the SICOR or SSG, but there is agreement the policy authority will not be the EU Commission, G-24 or the UN.

If the SICOR is a European, there is agreement that the deputy would be the senior U.S. rep to the senior coordinating body.

USG Role. We want the EU in the coordination lead on the ground in Sarajevo; we want the Europeans as the largest donors. Nevertheless, we will have to play a very strong stimulating role. Our concept of a well coordinated but decentralized assistance effort is intended to avoid the pitfalls of over-centralization by Federation authorities in Sarajevo, and allow donors to deal with a range of public and private institutions at national

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and local levels. We must assure that donor efforts provide sufficient support to building political and economic institutions at the Federation level. A strong commitment to Sarajevo and the Federation will surely be essential to gain host government support for a reconstruction program.

Conditionality. The Federation concept is an essential ingredient in the Bosnian peace process. We will insist in the negotiations that bilateral assistance be conditional on observance of human rights, and that certain basic freedoms such as freedom of movement and open borders are established.

Donors Conference. As the peace settlement begins to come into view, there will be a need for a pledging conference. Once a country is a member of the World Bank, it is normal to have annual Consultative Group meetings at which Bank members can gather under the auspices of the Bank to pledge resources. There will have to be a new agreement on a CG-like mechanism.

The EU Commission and the World Bank are poised to organizing a compromise on a donor's conference. The Bank will provide its experience and know-how; the WB will provide and organize the venue.

A possible conference may also be a topic of discussion at the Bank during the November 9-10 meetings.

The timing of such a conference should be after a peace agreement has been signed, so that donors are convinced that they are contributing to a cause that has some chance of success. (Donors have been somewhat reluctant to fund the UN Coordinator's Office in Sarajevo over the past year as it seemed such a hopeless cause.)

HILL STRATEGY

The Bosnian Government believes they will need $6 billion in outside assistance to the Federation alone.

United we receive the updated WB needs assessment, possible U.S. contributions for humanitarian, reconstruction and financing assistance to Bosnia could range from $334 million in currently identified resources to approximately $xx million over a three-year period. (This figure does not include a separate estimate for possible U.S. positions of military goods and services to the Federation.)

For FY 1996, the Administration requested $21.2 billion for the International Affairs Function (Function 150) largely through three separate appropriations bills. Assuming the highest possible outcome for all three appropriations bills, the Congress is likely to appropriate only $18.1 billion.

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Despite this lower total for Function 150, the Congress is likely to provide most of the Administrations request for the major humanitarian assistance accounts that would fund their portions of a Bosnia program. There should be sufficient humanitarian funding for requirements in former Yugoslavia (c. $162 million in FY 96) from anticipate annual appropriations. Thus, supplemental resources for humanitarian assistance should not be necessary.

The situation for economic assistance accounts, however, is considerably less sanguine. These accounts are bearing the brunt of Congressional reductions from the FY 1996 requested level. At the currently anticipated appropriation level, U.S. economic assistance for rehabilitation and reconstruction is only about $54 million for FY 1996 (including carryover funds), with perhaps another $72 million in the outyears. Moreover, there is no money currently allocated to support a medium-term financing strategy for Bosnia. The gap between initial notional targets for reconstruction and financing is approximately $300 million.

Options for Funding

The Administration is in the midst of negotiations with Congress over both discretionary accounts (the appropriations bills) for FY 1996 and reconciliation, which includes both mandatory accounts and revenue provisions for FY 1996 through at least 2002.

Some appropriations bills have been or will be shortly signed by the President (e.g., Agriculture). Other bills, such as Defense appropriations (which provides $7 billion more than the Administration's request), Commerce/Justice/State and Foreign Operations (because of low funding and population provisions) are currently subject to veto threats. In addition, the Administration has major differences with various budget reconciliation proposals, which may lead to prolonged negotiations over major portions of the budget through the fall ('Budget Endgame').

In this context, three options for securing additional funds for Bosnia are discussed below (1) an FY 1996 emergency supplemental; (2) an increase in assistance to Bosnia as part of the "budget endgame" negotiations" or (3) a 1996 offset supplemental and/or reprogrammings from within probably international affairs resources.

Option 1: FY 1996 Emergency Supplemental. The Administration would propose an emergency supplemental to the Congress to cover the projected gap (between targets and identified funding) for FY 96 alone (c. $xx million) or for all three years (c. $xx million). The justification to the

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Congress would be the urgent need to provide assistance, namely to the Federation. As an "emergency," the supplemental would not require the Administration to propose budget offsets.

Advantages:

- The Administration could draw upon positive Congressional feelings over the US-led success in negotiating a peace settlement in Bosnia.

- The Administration would avoid making painful reductions in other foreign aid programs in order to offset the deficit impact of the supplemental.

- To the degree that the Administration could "front load" Bosnia funding requirements into an FY 1996 supplemental, it could relieve outyear funding pressure on other foreign aid accounts.

Disadvantages:

- An emergency supplemental would have only a slender chance of success. This congress has refused to pass supplementals without full offsets, even for defense and in the cases of the California earthquake and Oklahoma City bombing.

- If the Administration itself did not identify offsets, the Congress might impose them from other, perhaps higher, Administration priorities.

- "Front loading" an emergency supplemental with money that would otherwise be spent in 1997 or future years undermines the case for an "emergency" designation.

- Requesting a supplemental without offsets could undercut public and Congressional perception of the Administration's willingness to meet deficit targets.

Option 2: "Budget Endgame" Negotiations. The Administration initially thought that the FY 1996 and future budgets might be resolved in a manner similar to the 1990 Budget Agreement in which appropriations, revenues and entitlements were settled in one intense negotiation. Under this scenario, it might be possible to increase the level for FY 1996 foreign aid appropriations for Bosnia.

Such a scenario, however, is now less probable in that several appropriations bills are likely to be passed and signed with as yet unscheduled negotiations between Congress and the Administration over the major elements of a budget endgame -- entitlements and revenues. Nonetheless, the budget endgame remains an option, in which the Administration would request $xx million in appropriations for Bosnia in FY 1996 as part of a comprehensive budget package.

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Advantages:

- This option might avoid the need to identify offsets or tradeoffs for Bosnian assistance within the current limits of Foreign Operations appropriations bills.

- Endgame negotiations would be more acceptable to Congress than an emergency supplemental since funding for Bosnia would be within the deficit framework agreed to by Congress and the Administration.

Disadvantages:

- The budget endgame may not be known until the late fall, precluding meaningful Administration commitments to Bosnia during the Wright/Patterson negotiations.

- The relevant appropriations bills could be signed before any budget endgame negotiations on reconciliation, leaving no chance of increased funding for Bosnia.

- This option would still require offsets, since Bosnia funding would have to compete against other Administration priorities (Function 150 and otherwise) in the negotiations.

Option 3: Tradeoffs and offsets. Under this option, the Administration would propose FY 1996 spending for former Yugoslavia of up to $xx million, specify tradeoffs within related accounts (SEED, FSA and ESF) for Bosnia, and/or identify offsets within other unrelated Function 150 accounts. Based on current notional targets and identified resources, the Administration would have to shift other funds by as much as $xx million. Beyond FY 1996, funding for Bosnia would have to be accommodated within (probably declining) levels for Function 150. Under the Congressional budget resolution, Function 150 resources continue to decrease after FY 1996.

Advantages:

- Given this Congress, this option would be the most likely to increase resources to Bosnia in a timely manner.

- Proposing tradeoffs and offsets would underscore the Administration's commitment to apply fiscal discipline to itself.

- The Administration, rather than Congress, could take the initiative in suggesting accounts to be reduced.

Disadvantages:

- The Administration may not be able to agree in a timely manner on offsets in a resource constrained environment.

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- In a year of draconian budget cuts, many worthy but lower priority accounts would be reduced even further.

- The Administration would forgo the opportunity to request an emergency supplemental in the wake of a peace settlement.

Conclusion

In light of the constraints on any of the above three funding options, principals may want to consider reducing the overall notional target. This is essentially a sub-section to any of the three above, which is to lower the notional targets to more easily achievable levels. For this reason, it is crucial to prioritize potential US assistance programs, coordinate closely with other donors, and define the minimum level of international assistance necessary for a successful settlement.

Another route the Administration may want to consider is to ask other donors to provide a disproportionate share of assistance in a given area, e.g. in reconstruction or financing aid. The US might argue that it is bearing a disproportionate burden in other areas (e.g. for IFOR or military assistance). Alternatively, the US might trade off an increased share of humanitarian assistance (which Congress appears willing to fund) against a smaller share of economic assistance.

While it is appropriate to begin consultation with Congress on the shape and size of a Bosnia assistance package, it is probably premature to make a formal request at this time. The best time to make a formal request would be when a peace settlement is almost finished and the Administration can make the compelling case that the assistance package is necessary to cinch the deal. We should capitalize on the momentum of the lead up to a peace signing conference to maximize our leverage with the Hill.

There are political reasons why, however, weighting our assistance to one category such as humanitarian, will be unwise. If the USG does not play a lead role in all aspects of the assistance package, other donors will be less inclined to contribute. The assistance package will lose credibility if we are not involved in all phases.

CONDITIONALITY

An objective of the US-led peace process is the emergence of a viable, unified Bosnian state where the ethnic rights of individuals are respected and protected. Assistance ought to flow only in to those entities which respect basic human rights. For Bosnia and Croatia this means honoring the right of return of refugees and displaced persons, freedom of movement, respect for the War Crimes Tribunal and other such protections.

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The core causes of the war in Bosnia in Bosnia and Croatia plus the venality of the war itself suggest that it will be extraordinarily difficult to fully enforce respect for basic human rights, particularly rights of return of the displaced. While it is both morally defensible and prudent in Congressional negotiations and international fora to condition assistance on respect for human rights, such insistence will have the convenient effect of eliminating U.S. assistance to Repulika Srpska. It might, however, also produce the unwelcome effect of proscribing aid to Croatia and even the Bosnian Federation.

Donors will not be in agreement over conditionality and how it should be applied across the region. Tensions will exist between the preconditions for assistance, and the enormous demands for nation building assistance and the reactions of donors to this dilemma.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002d. paper	re: Sustaining a Peace Agreement in Bosnia (12 pages)	10/31/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
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NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4002

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0239 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, November 1, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs691

RESTRICTION CODES

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FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 30 OCT 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
AGENDA
SERBIA
DC
CROATIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 1 NOV DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 02 NOV 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FEELEY LOGREF: 9521278

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0239 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BAKER JANE
		BERGER
		FEELEY
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001	BERGER	Z	95103017	FOR DECISION
001		X	95103018	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
001	SENS	Z	95103018	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	95103019	DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	951030	FUERTH, L	
002	951030	BRILL, K	
002	951030	NYE, J	
002	951030	MCALEER, R	
002	951030	INDERFURTH, R	
002	951030	ADAMS, G	
002	951030	YANNUZZI, R	
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KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA DC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 1 NOV DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: FOR DECISION DUE DATE: 02 NOV 95 STATUS: X

STAFF OFFICER: FEELEY LOGREF:

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The White House

Rec'd 10/30 7PM

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1	D	
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger	2	AVL	
Lake Dohse	3	Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
~~Situation Room~~	4	D	Tab A pleas
West Wing Desk	5		
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A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

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MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA NOELLE JENSEN ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	10/31/95	0720	Noelle Bjoold Noelle Bjoold PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	10-31-95	6:00 AM	Christina Tapp PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX +1
MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY ROOM 3408, MAIN TREASURY BLDG 1500 PENNSYLVANIA AVE, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20220	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	10/31/95	10:10	S. Graves PRINT LAST NAME: GRAVES COPY: 1

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

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MR. AARON WILLIAMS AGENCY FOR INTL DEVELOPMENT ROOM 5945, NEW STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20523	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
COL. F. C. WILSON JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	10/31	0700	Holmes PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX +1
MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY ROOM 3408, MAIN TREASURY BLDG 1500 PENNSYLVANIA AVE, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20220	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX +1
MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY ROOM 3408, MAIN TREASURY BLDG 1500 PENNSYLVANIA AVE, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20220	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
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AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	10/31/95	_____	J. Graves PRINT LAST NAME: GRAVES COPY: 1

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PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: 1. Dunn

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 2295 CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOTAL: 3
(PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (202) 456-9425 WH SITROOM
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTICE/AGENDA FOR 1 NOV DC MEETING ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21265

TO (AGENCY)		DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	B	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
TREASURY	H	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	N	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	B	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
CIA	A	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
AID	B	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	D	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: 1. Pur

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 2295 CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (202) 456-9425 WH SITROOM
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTICE/AGENDA FOR 1 NOV DC MEETING ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21265

TO (AGENCY)		DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	B	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
TREASURY	K	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	N	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	B	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
CIA	A	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
AID	B	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	D	SECRETARY		

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30 OCT 95 20 10

NMCC/JCS

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: 1. Pewitt

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 2295 CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOTAL: 3
(PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTICE/AGENDA FOR 1 NOV DC MEETING ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21265

TO (AGENCY)		DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	B	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
TREASURY	H	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	N	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	B	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
CIA	A	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
AID	B	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	D	SECRETARY		

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Initials: RDS Date: 10/2/2019

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

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PRIORITY
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MESSAGE NO.: 2295 CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTICE/AGENDA FOR 1 NOV DC MEETING ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21265

TO (AGENCY)		DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	B	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
TREASURY	M	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	N	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	B	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
CIA	A	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
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(PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (202) 456-9425 WH SITROOM
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTICE/AGENDA FOR 1 NOV DC MEETING ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21265

TO (AGENCY)		DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	B	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
TREASURY	H	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	N	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	B	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
CIA	A	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
AID	B	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	D	SECRETARY		

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- ☐ PRIORITY
- ☒ ROUTINE

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DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

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SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting DC MTG ON BOSNIA - 1 NOV PAGES: 3

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

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If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21265

October 30, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. BENJAMIN NYE
Executive Secretary
Department of Treasury

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. AARON S. WILLIAMS
Executive Secretary
Agency for International Development

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia November 1, 1995, from 4:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Principals plus one. The agenda is attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

for
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5 (g)
Declassify on: November 1, 2005

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/2/2019
2010-0533-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 21265

NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA
DATE: November 1, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 4:30 - 5:30 p.m.

AGENDA

I. Economic Reconstruction.....State/Treasury/AID*

II. Equip and Train.....OSD/JCS*

* Papers to be provided by 1200, November 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5 (g)
Declassify On: November 1, 2005

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 2/6/2020
2013-0682-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21265

October 30, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: JOHN F. FEELEY, JR.

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, November 1, 1995.

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Deputies meeting on Bosnia to be held November 1, 1995. The Memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5 (g)
Declassify On: November 1, 2005

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

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MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. BENJAMIN NYE
Executive Secretary
Department of Treasury

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
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Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. AARON S. WILLIAMS
Executive Secretary
Agency for International Development

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: ~~Principals~~ Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

There will be a ~~Principals~~ Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia November 1, 1995, from 4:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Principals plus one. The agenda is attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5 (g)
Declassify on: November 1, 2005

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
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2010-0533-M

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See also 2013-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

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Folder Title: DC0241 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, November 13, 1995
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)~~	~~11/13/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
002a. memo	John Feeley to Samuel Berger re: November 13 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia (4 pages)	11/13/1995	P1/b(1)
~~002b. agenda~~	~~[Duplicate of 003] (1 page)~~	~~11/13/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
002c. paper	re: Timing of Lifting of the Arms Embargo (1 page)	11/01/1995	P1/b(1)
~~003. agenda~~	~~NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)~~	~~11/13/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
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FOLDER TITLE:
DC0241 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, November 13, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs692

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9521335
RECEIVED: 16 NOV 95 13

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 21 NOV 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA DC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 13 NOV DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: HARMON SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 20 NOV 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FEELEY LOGREF: 9521313 9521315

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0241 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		FEELEY
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

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2010-0533-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	95112110	FOR DECISION
001		X	95112120	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
001	SENS	Z	95112120	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	95112120	HARMON SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	951121	FUERTH, L	
002	951121	BRILL, K	
002	951121	MCALEER, R	
002	951121	INDERFURTH, R	
002	951121	ADAMS, G	
002	951121	YANNUZZI, R	
002	951121	WILSON, F	

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National Security Council
The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1/3	JM/JM	
Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg	copy		
Berger	2	AVR	
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	RE 11/21	D
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

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COMMENTS:

NOV 95 10:15

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

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National Security Council
The White House

6pm

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1/3		
Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg	copy		
Berger	2		
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4		
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9521335
DATE 21 NOV 95

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR DC MTG ON BOSNIA 13 NOV
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA NOELLE JENSEN ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX+1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

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Initials: [illegible] Date: 10/1/2016
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9521335
DATE 21 NOV 95

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR DC MTG ON BOSNIA 13 NOV
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

COL. F. C. WILSON
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
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WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001

DATE _____ TIME _____ SIGNATURE _____

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21335

November 21, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, November 13, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~
Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5 (g)
Declassify on: November 13, 2005

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/3/2019
2016-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21335

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee
DATE: November 13, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 3:30 - 6:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR
Sandy Berger

OVP
Leon Fuerth
Rick Saunders

STATE
Strobe Talbott
Peter Tarnoff
John Kornblum
Jim Steiner

DEFENSE
John White
Walt Slocombe

USUN
David Scheffer

OMB
David Morrison

CIA
George Tenet
Ray Converse

JCS
William Owens
John Walsh

NSC
John Feeley
Alexander Vershbow

Summary of Conclusions

Military Annex to the Framework Agreement

1. Deputies reviewed the Bosnian-proposed changes to the military annex to the framework agreement and the U.S. Delegation's recommendations on the proposals and agreed to a revised text (circulated separately). Deputies agreed that State should review the Russian-proposed changes and submit through the ExComm those proposals that required Deputy-level review **(Action: State)**. (S)

~~SECRET~~
Classify by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5 (g)
Declassify on: 11/13/05

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2010-0533-M
NSC 9/30/14 (2.42)
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NR 70-14 10/1/2013

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Eastern Slavonia

2. Deputies agreed that OSD and JCS should develop options for military implementation of the Eastern Slavonia settlement **(Action: OSD/JCS)**. Deputies further agreed that State should develop options for U.S. participation in a UN transitional administration in Eastern Slavonia **(Action: State)**. Finally, Deputies agreed that CIA should develop an analysis of the likely conditions that would exist during a transitional period to full reintegration of East Slavonia into Croatia **(Action: CIA)**. (S)

Military Stabilization

3. Deputies agreed to send an equip and train assessment team to Bosnia to evaluate the Federation's military capabilities. **(Action: OSD/JCS)** Deputies further agreed to recommend to Principals that they address again their decision of early October for the U.S. to take the lead in coordinating the equip and train effort. (S)

4. Deputies agreed to recommend for Principals' decision allied proposals for a phased approach to the lifting of the arms embargo that would delay the provision of arms to the parties until IFOR had established control on the ground and the parties had complied with the initial military requirements of the peace agreement. (S)

International Police Task Force

5. Deputies agreed on the importance of monitoring and training indigenous police forces to help implement the non-military aspects of the settlement. They agreed that deploying actual international police officers, in addition to monitors and trainers, to establish and staff an international police task force was neither desirable nor feasible in resource terms. (C)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21335

November 16, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: JOHN FEELEY

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, November 13, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of Conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia held November 13, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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Reason: 1.5 (g)
Declassify On: 11/13/05

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RECORD ID: 9521315
RECEIVED: 13 NOV 95 12

TO: BERGER

FROM: FEELEY
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 13 NOV 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
SERBIA
DC
CROATIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 13 NOV DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER DUE DATE: 16 NOV 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FEELEY LOGREF: 9521313 9521335

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0241 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		FEELEY
		NSC CHRON
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSASK CLOSED BY: NSMEC DOC 1 OF 1

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	95111317	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	95112713	NOTED BY BERGER

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National Security Council
The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	1	MC 1/8/97	N/R
Records Mgt:			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	John Feeley to Samuel Berger re: November 13 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia (4 pages)	11/13/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4002

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0241 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, November 13, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs692

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: November 13, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 3:30 - 4:30 p.m.

AGENDA

I. Military Annex, Framework Agreement ..... JCS

II. Eastern Slavonia ..... OSD/JCS

III. Military Stabilization

-- Timing of Lift ..... NSC
-- Assessment Team Visit ..... OSD

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5 (g)
Declassify on: November 13, 2005

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 2/6/2020
2013-0682-M

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November 12, 1995

Memorandum For The Deputies Committee

From A/S Holbrooke and the US Delegation.

Subject: Changes to the Military Annex to the Peace Plan

The US Delegation has reviewed the attached Bosnian response to the draft military annex to the peace agreement and refers its recommendations to the Deputies Committee for resolution. A Deputies Committee review is requested by COB Monday, November 13, 1995 to enable the delegation to refer accepted changes to other Contact Group members and the Bosnians.

Our delegation review was guided by the philosophy that we reject any change which could lead to mission creep or other substantive changes to a document which had received a thorough US national policy review.

Some proposed Bosnian changes can be accepted at no cost to the key elements of the annex. "OK" in margins of the Bosnian comments indicates that this delegation recommends acceptance of the change. We recommend rejection or Washington guidance on all other changes proposed by the Bosnians, as marked.

Two other documents are also being sent separatly. One is the Russian review of the military annex; the other is a set of State, DoD and Joint Staff legal staff comments. The delegation requests that Washington (DoD and State) coordinate the Russian proposed changes directly with the Russians and advise the delegation if legal staff changes are to be included in the next draft.

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11/10/95 1:30 pm

DELEGATION OF BOSNIA AND HERZOGOVINA
PROPOSED CHANGES TO ANNEX 1

NOTE: PROPOSED ADDITIONS ARE IN BOLD.
PROPOSED DELETIONS ARE STRUCK THROUGH.

AGREEMENT ON THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE PEACE SETTLEMENT

~~[The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Republica Srpska (hereinafter the "Parties") have agreed as follows.]~~ REJECT

Article I

General Obligations

1. The Parties undertake to recreate as quickly as possible normal conditions of life in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They understand that this requires a major contribution on their part in which they will make strenuous efforts to cooperate with each other and with the international organizations and agencies which are assisting them on the ground. They welcome the willingness of the international community to send to the region, ~~[for a period of approximately one year,]~~ a force to assist in implementation of the territorial, **human rights** and other ~~[militarily related]~~ provisions of the annex as described herein. It is the wish of the Parties that NATO establish such a force, which will operate under the authority and subject to the direction and political control of the North Atlantic Council ("NAC") through the NATO chain of command. They undertake to facilitate its operations. The Parties, therefore, hereby agree and freely undertake to fully comply with all obligations set forth in this annex. ~~[commencing as of the date this agreement takes effect and to be completed by the dates contained herein.]~~ OK REJECT

2. The purposes of these obligations are as follows:

(a) to establish a durable cessation of hostilities **and uphold the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzogovina within its internationally recognized borders**; RECOMMEND OK

(b) to provide for the support and authorization of the multi-national military Implementation Force ("IFOR") **which the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina has requested and invited onto its territory**. In particular to authorize the IFOR to take such actions as required, including the use of necessary force, to ensure compliance with this annex, and to ensure its own protection; and OK

(c) to establish a lasting security and arms control measures which aim to promote a permanent reconciliation between all Parties and to facilitate the achievement of

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all **other** political arrangements agreed to in the General Framework Agreement.

3. The Parties understand and agree that within Bosnia and Herzegovina the obligations undertaken in this annex shall be applied equally to both [~~the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republica Srpska, and that each of~~] the[se] Entities. **Both Entities** shall be held equally responsible for [~~their respective~~] compliance **herewith**, and **both will be** equally subject to such enforcement action by the IFOR as may be necessary to ensure implementation of this annex [~~and its attachments~~] and the protection of the IFOR.

OK → OK → OK →

Article II

Cessation of Hostilities

OK 1. The Parties shall **comply with** [~~continue~~] the cessation of hostilities in accordance with the agreement of October 5, 1995 and shall continue to refrain from all offensive operations of any type against each other. An offensive operation is an ~~military~~ action ~~which~~ that includes projecting forces forward of a Party's own lines. Each Party shall ensure that all organizations under its control or within its **region** with military capability, including **inter alia** private civilian organizations, national guards, army reserves, military police, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs Special Police (MUP) (hereinafter "Forces") comply with this annex. The term "Forces" does not include UNPROFOR, the IFOR or other elements authorized by or coordinated with the NAC for purposes of supporting the IFOR mission.

OK?

2. In carrying out the obligations set forth in paragraph 1, the Parties undertake, in particular, to cease the firing of all weapons and explosive devices except as authorized by this annex. The Parties shall not place any additional minefields, barriers, or protective obstacles. They shall not engage in patrolling, ground or air reconnaissance forward of their own force positions, or into the Zones of Separation as provided for in Article IV below, without IFOR approval.

3. The Parties shall provide a safe and secure environment for all persons in their respective **areas** including maintaining civilian law enforcement agencies operating in accordance with international standards and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Parties also commit themselves to disarm and disband all armed civilian groups, except for authorized local police forces.

4. The Parties shall cooperate fully with any international personnel including investigators, advisors, monitors, observers, or other personnel in Bosnia and Herzegovina pursuant to the General Framework Agreement, including facilitating free and unimpeded access and movement and by providing such status as is necessary for the effective conduct of their tasks.

RESECT 5. **To permit IFOR to fulfill its mission,** the Parties shall strictly avoid committing any reprisals, counter-attacks, or any unilateral actions in response to violations of this annex by another Party. The Parties shall respond to alleged violations of the provisions of this annex through the procedures provided in Article VIII.

Article III

Withdrawal of Foreign Forces

1. All Forces deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina as of the date this annex takes effect, which are not of local origin and which are not legally and militarily subordinated to the

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Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or Republica Srpska, shall be withdrawn ~~together with all their equipment~~ from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina within thirty (30) days. In accordance with Article II, paragraph 1, this paragraph does not apply to UNPROFOR, the IFOR or other elements authorized by or coordinated with the NAC for purposes of supporting the IFOR mission. **Furthermore, all forces that remain on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina must act consistently with the territorial integrity, sovereignty, national unity, and political independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina.**

2. In particular, all Forces of the Army of the Republic of Croatia (HV), the Army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (VJ) and all other foreign Forces, including individual advisors, freedom fighters, trainers, or volunteers, shall be withdrawn from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina in accordance with Article III, paragraph 1.

3. **Any violator of this provision shall be subject to military action by the IFOR, including the use of necessary force to ensure compliance.**

Article IV

Redeployment of Forces

1. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, **and the Entities** [~~the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Republica Srpska~~] shall redeploy their Forces in three phases:

2. PHASE I

(a) The Parties immediately after this annex takes effect shall begin promptly and proceed steadily to withdraw all Forces within thirty (30) days behind a Zone of Separation which shall be established on either side of the Agreed Cease-Fire Line that represents a clear and distinct demarcation between any and all opposing Forces. The precise Agreed Cease-Fire Line and Agreed Cease-Fire Zone of Separation are indicated on the maps at Appendix A of this Annex.

(b) The Agreed Cease-Fire Zone of Separation shall extend for a distance of approximately two (2) kilometers on either side of the Agreed Cease-Fire Line. No weapons other than those of the IFOR are permitted in this Agreed Cease-Fire Zone of Separation except as provided herein. No individual may retain or possess any military weapons or explosives within this four kilometer Zone without specific approval of IFOR. Violators of this provision shall be subject to military action by the IFOR, including the use of necessary force to ensure compliance. Specific provisions for the following locations are as follows:

(1) SARAJEVO (TO BE DETERMINED) (The Exclusion Zone remains in effect until ___)

(2) GORAZDE (TO BE DETERMINED) (The Exclusion Zone remains in effect until____)

[~~(3) BRCKO (TO BE DETERMINED)~~]

(c) The Parties shall within thirty (30) days after this annex takes effect: (1) remove all mines, unexploded ordnance, and barbed or razor wire from the Agreed Cease-Fire Zone of Separation or other areas from which their Forces are withdrawn; (2) mark all known mine emplacements, unexploded ordnance, explosive devices and demolitions within Bosnia

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and Herzegovina; and (3) remove all mines, unexploded ordnance, explosive devices and demolitions as required by the IFOR Commander. **Violators of this provision shall be subject to military action by the IFOR, including the use of necessary force to ensure compliance.**

(d) The IFOR is authorized to direct that **all military personnel, active or reserve,** who reside within the Agreed Cease-Fire Zone of Separation register with the appropriate IFOR command post referred to in Article VI which is closest to their residence.

3. PHASE II (AS REQUIRED IN SPECIFIC LOCATIONS)

This phase applies to those locations where the Inter-Entity Boundary Line does not follow the Agreed Cease-Fire Line.

(a) In those locations in which, pursuant to the General Framework Agreement, **areas** occupied by one Entity ~~are~~ to be transferred to another Entity, all Forces of the withdrawing Entity shall have forty-five (45) days after this annex takes effect to completely vacate and clear this **area** ~~or as otherwise directed by the IFOR Commander~~. This shall include the removal of all Forces, equipment, mines, obstacles, unexploded ordnance, and weapons. In those areas being transferred to a different Entity, in order to provide an orderly period of transition, however, the Entity to which an **area** is transferred shall not put **forces in** this **area** ~~[with its own Forces]~~ for ninety (90) days after this annex takes effect or until such later time as may be specified by the IFOR Commander. The Parties understand and agree ~~that the IFOR shall have the right to provide the military security for these transferred~~ **areas** from Day 30 until Day 91, or later as specified by the IFOR Commander, when these **areas** may be occupied by the Forces of the Entity to which they are transferred. Upon occupation by the Entity to which the **area** is transferred, a new Zone of Separation along the Inter-Entity Boundary Line as indicated on the map at Appendix A shall be established by the IFOR, and the Parties shall observe the same limitations on the presence of Forces and weapons in this Zone as apply to the Agreed Cease-Fire Zone of Separation. Specific provisions for the following locations are as follows:

(1)

(2)

(3)

(b) The IFOR is authorized to direct that **all armed personnel, active or reserve,** who reside within the Inter-Entity Zone of Separation register with the appropriate IFOR command post referred to in Article VI which is closest to their residence.

4. GENERAL. The following provisions apply to Phases I and II:

(a) In order to provide visible indication, the IFOR shall supervise the selective marking of the Agreed Cease-Fire Line and its Zone of Separation, and the Inter-Entity Boundary Line and its Zone of Separation. Final authority for placement of such markers shall rest with the IFOR. All Parties understand and agree that the Agreed Cease-Fire Line and its Zone of Separation and the Inter-Entity Boundary Line and its Zone of Separation are defined by the maps and documents agreed to as part of the General Framework Agreement and not the physical location of markers.

(b) ~~All Parties~~ **Each Party** understands and agrees **that IFOR is authorized to employ all means appropriate and necessary, including military force,** to deter, stop and

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punish violations of the annex. In particular, and without limiting the foregoing sentence, each Party understands and agrees that it shall be subject to military action by the IFOR ~~including the use of necessary force to ensure compliance,~~ for:

OK (1) failure to remove all **its** Forces and unauthorized weapons from the four (4) kilometer Agreed Cease-Fire Zone of Separation within thirty (30) days after this annex takes effect, as provided in Article IV, paragraph 2(a) and (b) above;

OK (2) failure to vacate and clear **areas** being transferred to another Entity within forty-five (45) days after this annex takes effect or as specified by the IFOR Commander, as provided in Article IV, paragraph 3(a) above;

OK (3) **Deploying Forces within areas** ~~[occupying with Forces territory]~~ transferred from another Entity earlier than ninety (90) days after this annex takes effect or as specified by the IFOR Commander, as provided in Article IV, paragraph 3(a) above;

(4) failure to keep all Forces and unauthorized weapons outside the Inter-Entity Zone of Separation after this Zone is declared in effect by the IFOR, as provided in Article IV, paragraph 3(a) above; or

(5) violation of the cessation of hostilities as agreed to by the Parties in Article II.

5. PHASE III

Following the transfer of **areas** and the withdrawal of all Forces from the Inter-Entity Zone of Separation, the Parties pledge as confidence building measures that they shall: OK

(a) within 120 days after this annex takes effect withdraw all heavy weapons and Forces to cantonment/barracks areas or other designated locations. Heavy weapons refers to all tanks and armored vehicles, all artillery 75 mm and above, all mortars 81 mm above and anti-aircraft weapons 20 mm above. This movement of these Forces to cantonment areas is intended to enhance mutual confidence by the Parties in the success of this agreement and help the overall cause of peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These cantonment/barracks areas and other designated locations are shown on the map at Appendix B.

(b) within 120 days after this annex takes effect, in accordance with Article X, paragraph 2(a), demobilize Forces which cannot be accommodated in cantonment/barracks areas as provided in subparagraph (a) above. Demobilization shall consist of removing from the possession of these personnel all weapons, including individual weapons, explosive devices, communications equipment, vehicles, and all other military equipment. All personnel belonging to these Forces shall be released from service and shall not engage in any further training or other military activities.

6. Notwithstanding [~~the provisions of paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 of this Article, or~~] any other provision of this annex, the Parties hereby agree that the IFOR has the right and is authorized to (a) compel from any location in Bosnia and Herzogovina the removal, withdrawal, or relocation of ~~specific~~ Forces ~~and~~ **or** weapons and (b) compel the cessation of any activities ~~which~~ **that** the IFOR **deems** [~~determines to constitute~~] a threat or potential threat to ~~either the IFOR~~ **itself** or its mission, or to another Party **or that constitutes a threat to the object and purpose of the Framework Agreement and its Annexes**. Forces **resisting IFOR action in these regards** ~~refusing to redeploy, withdraw, relocate, or to~~

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~~cease threatening or potentially threatening activities [following such a demand by the IFOR]~~ shall be subject to [~~military action by the IFOR, including~~] the use of necessary force **by IFOR.** ~~to ensure compliance., and to compel [order] the cessation of any activities in,~~

THIS DOES BELONG IN THIS ANNEX. WILL ADD, IF APPROPRIATE, TO FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT.

7. The Parties understand that violations of this annex may result in the imposition of non-military sanctions. These non-military sanctions may include full or partial economic sanctions, and in particular the discontinuation of economic assistance, the suspension of air traffic rights, and the imposition of a trade and financial embargo. [NOTE: WE DEEM THIS A HIGHLY IMPORTANT PROVISION. WE WANT IT INCLUDED HERE, BUT IF IT IS INCLUDED IN THE FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT IT CAN BE DELETED FROM ANNEX 1.]

Article V

Notifications

1. Within seven (7) days after this annex takes effect, each Party shall furnish to the Joint Military Commission, provided for in Article VIII, information regarding the location of all known explosive devices, demolitions, minefields, booby traps, wire entanglements, and all other physical or military hazards to the safe movement of any personnel within Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the location of lanes through the Agreed Cease-Fire Zone of Separation which are free of all such hazards.

2. Within thirty (30) days after this annex takes effect, each Party shall furnish to the Joint Military Commission the following specific information regarding the status of its Forces within Bosnia and Herzegovina and shall keep the Joint Military Commission updated on changes in this information:

(a) location, type, strengths of personnel and weaponry of all Forces within ten (10) kilometers of the Agreed Cease-Fire Line and Inter-Entity Boundary Line.

(b) maps depicting the forward line of troops and front lines;

(c) positions and descriptions of fortifications, mine fields, barriers, and other man-made obstacles, ammunition dumps, command headquarters, and communications networks within ten (10) kilometers of the Agreed Cease-Fire Line or Inter-Entity Boundary Line;

(d) position and description of all surface to air missiles/launchers, including mobile systems, anti-aircraft artillery, supporting radars and associated command and control systems;

REVISED (e) all mines, unexploded ordnance, obstacles, weapons systems, vehicles, or any other military equipment **that, despite** ~~which~~ the provisions of Article IV, Paragraphs 2(c) and 3(a), a party has been unable to remove, dismantle or destroy, it being understood that the reporting requirement of this subparagraph (e) does not relieve such party of its obligation to remove, dismantle or destroy such items; and

(f) any further information of a military nature as requested by the IFOR Commander.

3. Within 120 days after this annex takes effect, the Parties shall furnish to the Joint Military Commission the following specific information regarding the status of their Forces

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in Bosnia and Herzegovina and shall keep the Joint Military Commission updated on changes in this information:

(a) location, type, strengths of personnel and weaponry of all Forces;

(b) maps depicting the information in sub-paragraph (a) above; and

(c) positions and descriptions of fortifications, minefields, barriers, and other man-made obstacles, ammunition dumps, command headquarters, and communications networks.

4. **Violators of this provision shall be subject to military action by the IFOR, including the use of necessary force to ensure compliance.** REJECT

Article VI

Deployment of the Implementation Force

1. Recognizing the need to provide for the effective implementation of the provisions of this annex, and to ensure compliance, **the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina requests the establishment** [~~the Parties invite the United Nations Security Council to authorize member states or regional organizations and arrangements to establish~~] of a multinational military Implementation Force (IFOR). [~~acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.~~] **The Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina further requests that the United Nations endorse the establishment of IFOR through an appropriate Security Council Resolution.** The Parties understand and agree that this Implementation Force may be composed of units from NATO and non-NATO nations, deployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina to help ensure compliance with the provisions of this annex to serve the object and purpose of the Framework Agreement and all its Annexes. The Parties understand and agree that the IFOR shall have the right to deploy ~~on either side of the Inter-Entity Boundary Line and throughout~~ Bosnia and Herzegovina, **including the international borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina.** OK

2. The Parties understand and agree that the IFOR is authorized to fulfill its responsibilities, which, inter alia include the following:

(a) to monitor and help ensure compliance by all Parties with this annex (in particular, withdrawal and redeployment of Forces within agreed periods, and the establishment of a Zone of Separation);

(b) to authorize and supervise the selective marking of the Agreed Cease-Fire Line and its Zone of Separation and the Inter-Entity Boundary Line and its Zone of Separation as established by the General Framework Agreement;

(c) to establish liaison arrangements with local civilian and military authorities and other international organizations as necessary for the accomplishment of its mission; and

(d) to assist in the withdrawal of UN Peace Forces not transferred to the IFOR, including, if necessary, the emergency withdrawal of UNCRO Forces.

REJECT 3. The Parties **further** understand and agree that the IFOR is authorized to fulfill **additional** [~~its supporting~~] tasks, within the limits of its assigned principal tasks and available resources, [~~on request~~], which include the following:

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(a) in coordination with the OSCE, to help foster conditions conducive to free, fair, and secure elections;

(b) to assist the movement of organizations in the accomplishment of humanitarian missions;

(c) to assist the UNHCR and other international organizations in their humanitarian missions;

(d) to observe, secure, and prevent interference with, the movement of civilian populations, refugees, and displaced persons; and,

(e) to monitor **and provide technical assistance and equipment for** the clearing of minefields and obstacles.

4. The Parties understand and agree that further directives from the NAC may establish additional duties and responsibilities for the IFOR in implementing this annex.

5. The Parties understand and agree that the IFOR Commander shall have the authority, without interference or permission of any Party, to do all that the Commander judges necessary and proper to carry out the responsibilities listed above in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, and they shall comply in all respects with the IFOR requirements.

6. To fulfill the object and purpose of this Annex, the IFOR shall use the authority granted herein to the maximum extent consistent with its resources and its several priorities.

6. **7.** The Parties understand and agree that in carrying out its responsibilities, the IFOR shall have the unimpeded right to observe, monitor, and inspect any Forces, facility or activity in Bosnia and Herzegovina that the IFOR believes may have military capability. The refusal, interference, or denial by any Party of this right to observe, monitor, and inspect by the IFOR shall constitute a breach of this annex and the violating Party shall be subject to military action by the IFOR, to include the use of necessary force to ensure compliance with this annex.

7. **8.** The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Croat Defense Council Forces, and the Army of Republica Srpska shall establish Command Posts at IFOR brigade, battalion, or other levels which shall be co-located with specific IFOR command locations, as determined by the IFOR Commander. These Command Posts shall exercise command and control over all Forces of their respective sides which are located within ten (10) kilometers of the Agreed Cease-Fire Line or Inter-Entity Boundary Line, as specified by the IFOR. The Command Posts shall provide, at the request of the IFOR, timely status reports on organizations and troop levels in their areas.

8. **9.** In addition to co-located command posts, the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Croat Defense Council Forces, and the Army of Republica Srpska shall maintain liaison teams to be co-located with the IFOR Command, as determined by the IFOR Commander, for the purpose of fostering communication, and preserving the overall cessation of hostilities.

9. **10.** Air and surface movements in Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be governed by the following provisions:

(a) The IFOR shall have complete and unimpeded freedom of movement by

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ground, air, and water throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. It shall have the right to bivouac, maneuver, billet, and utilize any areas or facilities to carry out its responsibilities as required for its support, training, and operations, with such advance notice as may be practicable. The IFOR and its personnel shall not be liable for any damages to civilian or government property caused by combat or combat related activities. Roadblocks, checkpoints or other impediments to IFOR freedom of movement shall constitute a breach of this annex and the violating Party shall be subject to military action by the IFOR, to include the use of necessary force to ensure compliance with this annex.

(b) The IFOR Commander shall have sole authority to establish rules and procedures governing command and control of airspace over Bosnia and Herzegovina to enable civilian air traffic and non-combat air activities by the military or civilian authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, or if necessary to terminate civilian air traffic and non-combat air activities.

(1) All Parties agree there shall be no military air traffic, **or non-military aircraft performing military missions, including reconnaissance or logistics,** without the express permission of the IFOR Commander. The only military aircraft that may be authorized to fly in Bosnia and Herzegovina are those being flown in support of the IFOR, except with the express permission of the IFOR. Any flight activities by military fixed-wing or helicopter aircraft within Bosnia and Herzegovina without the express permission of the IFOR Commander are subject to military action by the IFOR, including the use of necessary force to ensure compliance. OK

(2) All air early warning, air defense, or fire control radars shall be shut down within 72 hours after this annex takes effect, and shall remain inactive [~~until the departure of the IFOR~~], unless authorized by the IFOR Commander. Any use of air traffic, air early warning or air defense radars not authorized by the IFOR Commander shall constitute a breach of this annex and the violating Party shall be subject to military action by the IFOR, including necessary force to ensure compliance. OK

(3) The Parties understand and agree that the IFOR Commander shall implement the transfer to civilian control of air space over Bosnia and Herzegovina **to the central government** in a gradual fashion consistent with the objective of the IFOR to ensure smooth and safe operation of an air traffic system upon IFOR departure. OK

(c) The IFOR Commander is authorized to promulgate appropriate rules for the control and regulation of surface military traffic throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the movement of the Forces of the Parties.

~~10.~~ **11.** The IFOR shall have the right to utilize such means and services as required to ~~assure~~ **ensure** its full ability to communicate and shall have the right to **the** unrestricted use of all of the electromagnetic spectrum for this purpose. In implementing this right, the IFOR **shall, after appropriate consultation** make every reasonable effort to coordinate with and take into account the rights of **the appropriate** [~~local~~] authorities. OK

~~11.~~ **12.** The Parties shall accord the IFOR and its personnel the assistance, privileges, and immunities set forth at Appendix C of this annex (SOFAs, MOA, and host-nations support agreements), applying to Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the unimpeded transit through, to, over and on the territory of all Parties.

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Article VII

Withdrawal of UNPROFOR

The Parties note that as a consequence of the forthcoming introduction of the IFOR into the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, **UNPROFOR may be withdrawn.** [the ~~conditions for the withdrawal of the UNPROFOR [established by United Nations Security Council Resolution 743 have been met.~~] The Parties request that the United Nations, in consultation with NATO, take all necessary steps to withdraw the UNPROFOR from Bosnia and Herzegovina, except those parts incorporated into the IFOR. REJECT

Article VIII

Establishment of a Joint Military Commission

1. A Joint Military Commission (JMC) shall be established with the deployment of the IFOR to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

2. The Commission shall:

(a) Serve as the central body for all Parties to this annex to bring any military complaints, questions, or problems that require resolution by the IFOR Commander, such as allegations of cease-fire violations or other noncompliance with this annex.

(b) Receive reports and agree on specific actions to ensure compliance with the provisions of this annex by the Parties.

(c) Assist the IFOR Commander in determining and implementing a series of local transparency measures between the Parties.

3. The Commission shall be chaired by the IFOR Commander or his or her representative and consist of the following members:

(a) the senior military commander of the forces of each Party within Bosnia and Herzegovina;

(b) other persons as the Chairman may determine;

(c) each Party to this annex may also select two civilians who shall advise the Commission in carrying out its duties;

(d) the High Representative/Senior Implementation Coordinator or his or her nominated representative shall attend Commission meetings, and offer his advice particularly on matters of a political-military nature.

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4. The Commission shall not include any persons who are now or **do in the future** [~~who~~] come under indictment by the International **Criminal** Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, **or those whom the IFOR commander, in his sole judgment, deems inappropriate for such service.** 3 OK

5. The Commission shall function as a consultative body for the IFOR Commander. To the extent possible, problems shall be solved by mutual agreement. However, all final decisions concerning its military matters shall be made by the IFOR Commander.

6. The Commission shall meet at the call of the IFOR Commander. The High Representative/Senior Implementation Coordinator may when necessary request a meeting of the Joint Military Commission.

7. **The commission shall act without delay to resolve matters that come before it.** The IFOR Commander shall have the right to decide on military matters, in a timely fashion, when there are overriding considerations relating to the safety of the IFOR or the Parties' compliance with the provisions of this annex. OK

8. The Commission shall establish subordinate military commissions for the purpose of providing assistance in carrying out the functions described above. Such commissions shall be at the brigade and battalion level or at other echelons as the local IFOR Commander shall direct and be composed of commanders from each of the Parties and the IFOR. The representative of the High Representative/Senior Implementation Coordinator shall attend and offer advice particularly on matters of a political-military nature. The local IFOR Commander shall invite local civilian authorities when appropriate.

9. Appropriate liaison arrangements will be established between the IFOR Commander and the High Representative/Senior Implementation Coordinator to facilitate the discharge of their respective responsibilities.

Article ___

REJECT FOR THIS ANNEX

The Parties shall create a mechanism to investigate individuals suspected of having committed Crimes Against Humanity, Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions or other War Crimes. In particular, the Parties shall review the personnel files, if available, of all current or former soldiers or persons currently or formerly belonging to regular or irregular military organizations or groups to determine if these individuals may have committed such acts. The mechanism, after screening all individuals in the forces of the Entities, shall oversee the discharge from such forces of any such individual reasonably suspected of responsibility for war crimes. The Parties shall assist and cooperate fully with such mechanism, as

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The IFOR commander shall also exclude from participation in IFOR-related activities any individual whom the commander reasonably suspects to be responsible for war crimes. REJECT

For purposes of this annex, the term "War Crimes" shall have the definition set forth in the statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia.

Article IX

Prisoner Exchanges

1. **Consistent with their obligations under international law,** the Parties shall release and transfer without delay all combatants and civilians held in relation to the conflict (hereinafter "prisoners") [~~who request transfer~~], in conformity with [~~international humanitarian law~~] and the provisions of this Article.

(a) Immediately and in no event more than ten days after the date on which this annex enters into force, each Party shall release from prison, work brigade, detention site or other custody all non-combatants detained by its forces during the course of the conflict.

(b) The Parties shall be bound by and implement such plan for release and transfer of all prisoners as may be developed by the ICRC, after consultation with the Parties.

(c) The Parties shall cooperate fully with the ICRC and facilitate its work in implementing and monitoring the plan for release and transfer of prisoners.

(d) No later than sixty (60) days after this annex takes effect, the Parties **shall arrange and coordinate regular and simultaneous exchanges** [~~release and transfer~~] of all prisoners held by them.

(e) In order to expedite this process, no later than ~~twenty-one (21)~~ ten (10) OK days after this annex takes effect, the Parties shall draw up comprehensive lists of prisoners OK and missing persons and shall provide such lists to the ICRC, to the other Parties, and to the Joint Military Commission and the High Representative/Senior Implementation Coordinator provided for in the General Framework Agreement. These lists shall identify OK prisoners and missing persons by nationality, name, rank (if any) and any internment or military serial number, to the extent applicable. The Parties shall permit and facilitate visits to all such prisoners by ICRC representatives and their registration by the ICRC. This provision applies to all prisoners and prisons located in Serbia and Montenegro as

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well as in Bosnia and Herzogovina.

(f) The Parties shall ensure that the ICRC enjoys full and unimpeded access to all places where prisoners are kept and to all prisoners. The Parties shall permit the ICRC to privately interview each prisoner at least forty-eight (48) hours prior to his or her release for the purpose of implementing and monitoring the plan, including determination of the onward destination of each prisoner.

(g) The Parties shall take no reprisals against any prisoner or his/her family in the event that a prisoner refuses to be transferred.

(h) Notwithstanding the above provisions, each Party shall comply with any order or request of the International **Criminal** Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia for **the** arrest, detention, surrender of or access to persons who would otherwise be released and transferred under this Article, but who are accused of violations within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Each Party **must** ~~[should]~~ detain persons reasonably suspected of such violations for a period **of time** sufficient to permit appropriate consultation with Tribunal authorities.

2. In those cases where places of burial, whether individual or mass, are known as a matter of record, and graves are actually found to exist, each Party shall permit graves registration personnel of the other Parties to enter, ~~[within a mutually agreed period of time]~~, for the limited purpose of proceeding to such graves, to recover and evacuate the bodies of deceased military and civilian personnel of that side, including deceased prisoners of war.

Article X

Stabilization

1. The Parties desire to ensure that the cessation of hostilities is lasting and stable and acknowledge the contribution toward that end made by the provisions of this annex, in particular those pertaining to the establishment of the Zones of Separation and the removal of mines and other hazards (Article IV), the establishment of the Joint Military Commission (Article VIII) and the notification of Forces and of mines and other hazards (Article V).

PHASE I

2. Promptly after this annex takes effect, the Parties shall at an appropriately high political level commence negotiations under OSCE chairmanship to agree upon a further series of measures to enhance mutual confidence and reduce the risk of conflict, drawing fully upon the relevant sections of the 1994 Vienna Document on the Negotiation of Confidence and Security-Building Measures of the OSCE. These negotiations shall focus on those measures that would apply to Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the objective of agreeing upon an initial set of such measures within forty-five (45) days after this annex takes effect. Such measures would include, but will not necessarily be limited to, the following:

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(a) reduction of Forces excess to their respective security needs;

(b) restrictions on military deployments and exercises in certain geographical areas;

(c) restraints on the reintroduction of foreign Forces in light of Article III above;

[~~(d) restrictions on locations of heavy weapons;~~] REJECT

[~~(e) withdrawal of military forces to designated cantonment areas as provided in Article IV, above;~~] REJECT

(f) restrictions on the number of military exercises;

(g) notification of disbandment of special operations and armed civilian groups;

(h) notification of certain planned military activities, including international military assistance and training programs;

(i) identification of and monitoring of weapons manufacturing capabilities;

(j) the establishment of an arms transfer monitoring regime at the frontiers of the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;

(k) immediate exchange of data on the five CFE weapons categories as defined in the CFE Treaty, with the additional understanding that artillery pieces will be defined as those above 75mm calibre; and

(l) immediate establishment of military liaison missions between the Chiefs of the Armed Forces of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republica Srpska;

PHASE II

REJECT 3. Recognizing the importance of achieving ~~balanced and stable~~ the lowest possible defense force levels **that will promote the interests of peace and stability and minimize the danger of the** , ~~at the lowest numbers consistent with their respective security, and understanding that the establishment of a stable military balance based on the lowest level of armaments will be an essential element in preventing the~~ recurrence of conflict, the Parties will commence negotiations within thirty (30) days after this annex takes effect to reach early agreement on numerical limitations on their holdings of tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, combat aircraft and attack helicopters, as defined in the relevant sections of the CFE Treaty. Unless lower limits than those listed below have been agreed during these negotiations, the following limits will apply and shall take effect six months after this annex takes effect:

	TANKS	ARTILLERY	ATTACK HELICOPTERS
FED REP of YUGOSLAVIA			
REPUBLIC of CROATIA			
B&H			

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	COMBAT AIRCRAFT	ARMORED COMBAT VEHICLES
FED REP of YUGOSLAVIA		
REPUBLIC of CROATIA		
B&H		

~~4. It is understood that the allocations for Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be divided on the basis of a ratio of ____.~~

5. Within thirty (30) days after this annex takes effect, the Parties shall commence negotiations on a CFE IA style agreement on military personnel.

6. Under the coordination of the High Representative/Senior Implementation Coordinator (**sic**), the Parties request the OSCE to assist them in their negotiations under paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 5 of this Article and in the implementation, including verification, of resulting agreements. They specifically request the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE to designate a special representative to help organize and conduct such negotiations under the aegis of the OSCE Forum on Security Cooperation ("FSC"), which would enable interested OSCE participating States to support these negotiations and relate the resulting agreements to the OSCE's overall efforts on behalf of regional arms control and stability in and around the former Yugoslavia. The Parties undertake to cooperate fully with the OSCE to that end and to facilitate regular inspections by other parties and/or OSCE multinational teams. Further, the Parties agree to establish a mixed commission together with representatives of the OSCE for the purpose of facilitating implementation of the above measures and facilitating the resolution of any disputes that might arise.

Article XI

Cooperation

The Parties shall cooperate fully with all entities involved in implementation of this peace settlement, as described in the General Framework Agreement, or which are otherwise authorized by the United Nations Security Council, including the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.

Article XII

Notification to Military Commands

Each Party shall ensure that the terms of this annex, and written orders requiring compliance, are immediately communicated to all of its Forces.

Article XIII

Final Authority to Interpret

In accordance with Article I, the IFOR Commander is the final authority in theater regarding interpretation of this annex on the military aspects of the peace settlement and its Appendices.

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ARTICLE XIV

[This annex shall enter into force upon signature.]

Parties:

For the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Republic of Croatia

For the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

For the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina

For Republica Srpska

Signatories:

REJECT

For the United States

For the European Union

For the Russian Federation

For the French Republic

For the Federal Republic of Germany

For the United Kingdom

NO

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Ambassador Office 385 41 450 394 12-11-95 16:59 [99] #2

BASIC AGREEMENT ON THE REGION

OF EASTERN SLAVONIA, BARANJA, AND WESTERN SIRMIUM

The Parties agree as follows:

1. There shall be a transitional period of 12 months which may be extended at most to another period of the same duration if so requested by one of the parties.

2. The U.N. Security Council is requested to establish a Transitional Administration, which shall govern the Region during the transitional period in the interest of all persons resident in or returning to the Region.

3. The U.N. Security Council is requested to authorize an international force to deploy during the transitional period to maintain peace and security in the Region and otherwise to assist in implementation of this Agreement. The Region shall be demilitarized according to the schedule and procedures determined by the international force. This demilitarization shall be completed not later than 30 days after deployment of the international force and shall include all military forces, weapons, and police, except for the international force and for police operating under the supervision of, or with the consent of, the Transitional Administration.

4. The Transitional Administration shall ensure the possibility for the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes of origin. All persons who have left the Region or who have come to the Region with previous permanent residence in Croatia shall enjoy the same rights as all other residents of the Region. The Transitional Administration shall also take the steps necessary to reestablish the normal functioning of all public services in the Region without delay.

5. The Transitional Administration shall help to establish and train temporary police forces, to build professionalism among the police and confidence among all ethnic communities.

6. The highest levels of internationally-recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms shall be respected in the Region.

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7. All persons have the right to return freely to their place of residence in the Region and to live there in conditions of security. All persons who have left the Region or who have come to the Region with previous permanent residence in Croatia have the right to live in the Region.

8. All persons shall have the right to have restored to them any property that was taken from them by unlawful acts or that they were forced to abandon and to just compensation for property that cannot be restored to them.

9. The right to recover property, to receive compensation for property that cannot be returned, and to receive assistance in reconstruction of damaged property shall be equally available to all persons without regard to ethnicity.

10. Interested countries and organizations are requested to take appropriate steps to promote the accomplishment of the commitments in this Agreement. After the expiration of the transition period and consistent with established practice, the international community shall monitor and report on respect for human rights in the Region on a long-term basis.

11. In addition, interested countries and organizations are requested to establish a commission, which will be authorized to monitor the implementation of this Agreement, particularly its human rights and civil rights provisions, to investigate all allegations of violations of this Agreement, and to make appropriate recommendations.

12. Not later than 30 days before the end of the transitional period, elections for all local government bodies, including for municipalities, districts, and counties, as well as the right of the Serbian community to appoint a joint Council of municipalities, shall be organized by the Transitional Administration. International organizations and institutions (e.g. the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the United Nations) and interested states are requested to oversee the elections.

13. The Government of the Republic of Croatia shall cooperate fully with the Transitional Administration and the international force. During the transitional period the Croatian Government authorizes the presence of international monitors along the international border of the Region in order to facilitate free movement of persons across existing border crossings.

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14. This Agreement shall enter into force upon the adoption by the U.N. Security Council of a resolution responding affirmatively to the requests made in this Agreement.

DONE this Twelfth day of November, 1995.

SIGNED:

Milan Milanovic
Head, Serb Negotiating Delegation

Hrvoje Sarinic
Head, Croatian Government Delegation

WITNESSED:

Peter W. Galbraith
United States Ambassador

Thorvald Stoltenberg
United Nations Mediator

Thorvald Stoltenberg
United Nations Mediator

Peter W. Galbraith
United States Ambassador

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Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
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FOLDER TITLE:
DC0241 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, November 13, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs692

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
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TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 13 NOV 95
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KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA DC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 13 NOV DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: HARMON SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 16 NOV 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FEELEY LOGREF: 9521315 9521335

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0241 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
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		BERGER
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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	95111314	FOR INFORMATION
002		X	95111314	HARMON SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	951113	FUERTH, L	
002	951113	BRILL, K	
002	951113	MCALEER, R	
002	951113	INDERFURTH, R	
002	951113	ADAMS, G	
002	951113	YANNUZZI, R	
002	951113	WILSON, F	

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Situation Room			
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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	11-13-95	4:10 PM	Anthony Lake PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX+1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
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DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	11-14-95	10:10	J. Graves PRINT LAST NAME: GRAVES COPY: 1
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WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	11/13	4:39PM	Karen Wood PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX+1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
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B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
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SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting : 13 Nov. DC on Bosnia PAGES: Cover + 2

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Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21313

November 13, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(C)~~

There will be a Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia November 13, 1995, from 3:30 p.m. to 4:30 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Principals plus one. The agenda is attached at Tab A. ~~(C)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5 (g)
Declassify on: November 13, 2005

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By KOS NARA, Date 10/2/2019
2010-0533-M

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NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: November 13, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 3:30 - 4:30 p.m.

AGENDA

I. Military Annex, Framework Agreement ..... JCS

II. Eastern Slavonia ..... OSD/JCS

III. Military Stabilization

-- Timing of Lift ..... NSC
-- Assessment Team Visit ..... OSD

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Reason: 1.5 (g)
Declassify On: November 13, 2005

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21313

November 13, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: JOHN F. FEELEY, JR.

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, November 13, 1995.

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Deputies meeting on Bosnia to be held November 13, 1995. The Memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove ____.

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

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Case Number: 2010-0533-M

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~~001. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)~~	~~12/28/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
002a. memo	John Feeley to Samuel Berger re: December 28 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia (3 pages)	12/27/1995	P1/b(1)
~~002b. agenda~~	~~[Duplicate of 003] (1 page)~~	~~12/28/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 02/06/2020
002c. paper	re: U.S. Policy and Equip and Train [partial] (1 page)	12/28/1995	P1/b(1) KC 6/11/2020
~~003. agenda~~	~~NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)~~	~~12/28/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 02/06/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4002

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0249 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, December 28, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs693

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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RECORD ID: 9521457
RECEIVED: 28 DEC 95 15

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 03 JAN 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA DC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 28 DEC DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 01 JAN 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9521451 9521452

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0249 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BAKER JANE
		BASS
		BERGER
		FEELEY
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By R25 NARA, Date 10/2/2019
2010-0533-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	96010217	FOR DECISION
001		X	96010317	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
002		X	96010318	DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	960103	FUERTH, L	
002	960103	LINO, M	
002	960103	MCALEER, R	
002	960103	INDERFURTH, R	
002	960103	YANNUZZI, R	
002	960103	WILSON, F	

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National Security Council
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Harmon			
Dohse	1/3	1/3	
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger	2	[illegible]	[illegible]
Lake	[illegible]	Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	1/3
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	[illegible] 1/3	[illegible]
Records Mgt.	5		

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

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Harmon			
Dohse	1 /3	D /D	
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger	2		R
Lake	3	Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	1/3
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	1/3	D
Records Mgt.	5		

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COMMENTS:

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9521457
DATE 03 JAN 96

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 28 DEC DC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA NOELLE BUJOLD ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	1/4/95	0945	Noëlle Bujold PRINT LAST NAME: Bujold COPY: 1
MS. MARISA R. LINO DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	1/4/95	6:00 AM	Anthony Lake PRINT LAST NAME: A. Lake COPY: VIA FAX+1
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COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
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MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
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NMCC/JCS

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X PRIORITY
____ ROUTINE

RELEASER: [signature]

DTG: ____

MESSAGE NO: 17 : 08 SECRET PAGES: 13 (Including Cover)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions for 28 Dec. DC Meeting on Bosnia NSC LOG # 21457

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
B	State	Executive Secretary		
N	DOD	Executive Secretary		
B	USUN	Ofc. of the Rep. of the U.S.	(Wash.)	736-7699
A	CIA	Executive Secretary		
D	JCS	Secretary, Joint Staft		

REMARKS:

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Initials: BDS Date: 10/2/2019

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RELEASER: [signature]

DTG: ____

MESSAGE NO: 17 : 08

~~SECRET~~

PAGES: 13 (Including Cover)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions for 28 Dec. DC Meeting on Bosnia

NSC LOG # 21457

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
B	State	Executive Secretary		
N	DOD	Executive Secretary		
B	USUN	Ofc. of the Rep. of the	U.S. (Wash.)	736-7699
A	CIA	Executive Secretary		
D	JCS	Secretary, Joint Staff		

REMARKS:

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Initials: RDS Date: 10/2/2019
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B

PRECEDENCE: ___ IMMEDIATE
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RELEASER: [signature]

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO: 17 : SECRET PAGES: 13 (Including Cover)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (202) 456-9425 WH SITROOM
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions for 28 Dec. DC Meeting on Bosnia

NSC LOG # 21457

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
B	State	Executive Secretary		
N	DOD	Executive Secretary		
B	USUN	Ofc. of the Rep. of the U.S.	(Wash.)	736-7699
A	CIA	Executive Secretary		
D	JCS	Secretary, Joint Staff		

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DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO: 17 : 08 SECRET PAGES: 13 (Including Cover)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions for 28 Dec. DC Meeting on Bosnia

NSC LOG # 21457

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
B	State	Executive Secretary		
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A	CIA	Executive Secretary		
D	JCS	Secretary, Joint Staff		

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- ☒ PRIORITY
- ☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Summary ~~Notice of Meeting~~ : 28 Dec. on Bosnia PAGES: Cover + 12

PLEASE DELIVER TO: NSC # 21457

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN - New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21457

January 3, 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

MS. MARISA R. LINO
Acting Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, December 28, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

for
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions (with attachment)

~~SECRET~~
Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5 (a)(d)
Declassify On: 12/28/05

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/2/2019
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee
DATE: December 28, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:45 - 4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR
Sandy Berger

OVP
Leon Fuerth

STATE
Strobe Talbott
Robert Gallucci
Nancy Ely-Raphel
James Pardew

DEFENSE
John White
Walter Slocombe

USUN
David Scheffer

CIA
Dennis Blair
Norman Schindler

JCS
Michael Byron
John Van Alstyne

NSC
Alexander Vershbow
John Feeley

Summary of Conclusions

IFOR Update

1. Deputies agreed that State should: approach the Government of Brunei once again about providing funds to support Pakistani forces previously attached to UNPROFOR and now slated to join IFOR; approach the Government of Pakistan and request that their forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina remain until funding can be found; and request that the UN provide temporary logistical support to the Pakistani units until donor funding can be found **(Action: State)**. They further agreed that OSD should continue efforts to obtain funding support for Pakistan from Saudi Arabia **(Action: OSD)**. (C)

~~SECRET~~
Classify by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5(a)(d)
Declassify on: 12/28/05

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0533-M
RS 9/30/14 (2.45)
CIA Historical Collections Division AR 70-14
10/1/2015

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Eastern Slavonia

2. Deputies agreed to recommend to the President that he approve an approach to the North Atlantic Council to extend NATO's *in extremis* commitment to help withdraw UNCRO forces to forces participating in the new operation in Eastern Slavonia **(Action: NSC)**. They also agreed that appropriate calls should be made to Congress before any public confirmation **(Action: OSD/NSC)**. (Note: On Friday, December 29, the President approved the recommendation). (S)

Military Stabilization: Equip and Train

3. Deputies approved the attached State paper regarding policy, goals, leadership, objectives, concept and next steps on equipping and training for Bosnian Federation forces. They reiterated that no U.S. military personnel in Bosnia-Herzegovina will be involved in the program but agreed that Defense Attaches in third countries could be involved. They agreed that we would channel U.S. assistance through the Federation, that we would encourage the Bosnians to obtain the services of a competent U.S. contractor to coordinate the equip and train effort and that the U.S. would have an "integrator" on the ground representing the U.S. Equip and Train task force. (S)

4. Deputies agreed on the need to continue to press the Bosnians to sever their military supply relationship and operational intelligence cooperation with Iran as the precondition for U.S. assistance and that Lake would spell out the details of our expectations with Foreign Minister Sacirbey on December 29 **(Action: NSC/State)**. (S)

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21457

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

January 2, 1996

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: JOHN FEELEY

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, December 28, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of Conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia held December 28, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to the agencies

Approve ok Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions (with attachment)

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/12/2019
2010-0533-M

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RECORD ID: 9521452
RECEIVED: 27 DEC 95 16

TO: BERGER

FROM: FEELEY
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 27 DEC 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
CROATIA
DC
SERBIA
PEACEKEEPING

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 28 DEC DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER DUE DATE: 30 DEC 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FEELEY LOGREF: 9521451 9521457

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0249 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BAKER JANE
		FEELEY
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
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COMMENTS: _____

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001		X	95122819	NOTED BY BERGER

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National Security Council
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Harmon	4		
Dohse			
Sens	1	Copy	
Soderberg			
Berger	2	AV	
Lake		Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	MB 12/28	N
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: Bosnia DC mtg pkg
12/28

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	John Feeley to Samuel Berger re: December 28 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia (3 pages)	12/27/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4002

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0249 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, December 28, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs693

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: December 28, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:45 - 3:45 p.m.

AGENDA

I. IFOR Update.....JCS

II. Equip and Train.....State*

* Paper to be circulated by OOB December 28.

~~SECRET~~
Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: 12/27/05

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 2/6/2020
2013-0682-M

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US Policy and Equip and Train

Military stabilization in the Balkans should be achieved through a combination of arms limitations and the provision of equipment and training to the Federation in a manner that creates a military balance conducive to peace in the region.

As significant as the arms control measures are, they will not, in themselves, be sufficient to achieve adequate military stabilization over the short term. Federation armed forces, which have been the most severely constrained by the arms embargo, will need to obtain sufficient military equipment and training to establish an effective self-defense capability, consistent with the weapons ceilings established by the peace agreement.

The US will work with other countries to ensure that Federation armed forces obtain the necessary equipment and training over the coming year. This will be essential to making the peace agreement self-sustaining and to ensuring Bosnia-Herzegovina's right to self-defense. However, it is also important to prevent a situation in which the Federation or its members feel they can resume the war. US civilian contractors are now completing an assessment of the requirements of Federation armed forces.

The conduct of such a program would be contingent on the GOBH ending all military support and assistance relationships with Iran and extremist forces and their withdrawal from Bosnia-Herzegovina.

US Policy Goals and Equip and Train

Two principal US policy goals in Bosnia relate directly to the concept of equip and train:

- Achieve a stable military balance in the region.
- Eliminate radical fundamentalist influence in Bosnia.

To achieve these goals, an internationally supported program is required to put in place a Federation military force capable of deterring ground attacks and defending Federation territory should deterrence fail. This capability must be in place to the extent possible over the coming year.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

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~~2000-0533-M~~
#30714 (1) (4.02)
2013-0682-M 2/6/2020

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Leadership of the Equip and Train Program.

US leadership of the international equip and train effort is required to achieve the policy goals described above. Without US leadership, equipping and training will be fragmented, less effective, perhaps destabilizing, and subject to the actions of nations seeking to undermine US goals. The Bosnians may increase their reliance on supporters who are unacceptable to the US and alarming to Zagreb and Belgrade. Additionally, without US leadership, the Croats and Muslims in Bosnia are likely to continue to develop separate armies independent of the Federation.

US Leadership of the equip and train effort entails three requirements:

-- a strong diplomatic effort to identify and coordinate the international donors;
-- indirect and limited US-Bosnian military cooperation (orientation visits, access to some US equipment, an IMET program); these, consistent with the international effort;
-- a US contractor to manage the execution of the equip and train program.

US leadership along these lines will increase our ability to control the origin, type and extent of assistance provided to the Federation. By extension, this will increase our ability to reassure our NATO allies, Zagreb and Belgrade, and make the case that a limited equip and train program for the Federation is consistent with the Dayton Accords and IFOR impartiality. In addition, this kind of US leadership will increase the effectiveness of the equip and train effort in providing a sufficient defense capability for the Federation.

Objectives of the Equip and Train Program.

-Enhance military stability and prevent an arms race in the Former Yugoslavia.

-Promote unity in the Federation.

-Create an effective Federation civilian structure capable of command management of the Federation military.

-In one year, equip and train a Federation military force capable of deterring ground attacks on Federation territory by Srpska and successfully defending Federation territory from a revived Bosnian Serb Army, with no more than modest material support from Belgrade, should deterrence fail.

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-Minimize the possibility of destabilizing influence from foreign forces.

-Over the long term, promote an integrated military structure in B-H which is oriented toward Europe and NATO and is a stabilizing force in the region.

-Protect IFOR's position of even-handedness among the parties in B-H by isolating the equip and train program from IFOR and its US military component.

US Equip and Train Concept.

A US Special Representative for Military Stabilization in the Balkans will direct a Task Force in the State Department to develop and implement the US program to lead the international effort to equip and train the Federation. The task force organization is attached. The US program will be governed by these principles:

-The US will lead the international effort to equip and train Federation forces. This effort will include European and Asian, as well as potential Middle Eastern donors.

-The program will provide sufficient deterrence and defense capability for the Federation.

- The threat to the Federation is defined as renewed shelling of Federation population centers and/or attack by a revived Bosnian Serb Army with no more than modest material support from Belgrade. A capability for a sustained offensive or for defense against regional powers would exceed the concept.

-Emphasis will be given to obtaining as much defensive and deterrence capability in the first twelve months as is consistent with US goals, although a long term program is required.

-The Institute for Defense Analyses assessment of Federation forces, with the approval of the Federation leadership, will form the basis of defining the equip and train requirement.

-No US troops will directly participate in equipping and training the Bosnians. However, IMET and orientations in the US and other indirect activities are authorized; these, to be consistent with the international effort.

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-Most equip and train funding will be provided from non-US sources. As appropriate, donors will also be asked to contribute equipment and required training to be applied against the requirement established by the US and the Federation. The US will lead the effort to establish donors from the international community. The US will create an international coordinating body of donors.

-All funding of the equip and train program in Bosnia will be done through the Federation structure, initially working through the Federation Presidency and extending as far as possible down through a joint military command structure.

--The effort to promote military integration in the Federation will commence at the outset of the equip and train program with the provision of non-lethal equipment. Planning and management of the full program, however, will require augmentation by US contractors since current Federation structures are inadequate.

-- A US integrator, subordinate to the Military Stabilization Task Force, will monitor the activities of the US contractors and serve as the task force representative in Sarajevo.

-US companies, under contract to the Federation, will assist the Federation in developing its equip and train requirements and plans.

-US equipment will be available for purchase.

-Equip and train will be overt. Belgrade and Zagreb will be kept informed of planning and execution, as will our NATO allies.

-The program will be consistent with Annex 1B of the Peace Agreement and arms control agreements which result from it.

Next Steps

- Interagency approval of the equip and train concept.

- Special Representative and task force members visit to B-H immediately after approval to discuss IDA assessment and US concept with Presidents Zubak, Izetbegovic and others. The visit will also be used to secure the signed letter holding up Bosnian participation in IMET. (The letter pledges the Bosnians not to pass training or equipment on to third parties.)

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- The Federation encouraged to contact US contractors to assist in the management of equip and train.

- Visit by the Special Representative to Belgrade and Zagreb to establish transparency.

- Development of a congressional and public affairs strategy.

What About the BSA?

The condition of two or three separate military forces in Bosnia is incompatible with the long-term goal of a peaceful, unitary state in Bosnia. Accordingly, the Special Representative also will begin to explore ways in which, after indicted war criminals are removed and after conditions are met, the BSA and Federation armed forces can begin a peaceful evolution that will prevent a reoccurrence of hostilities.

EUR/ TMS x72797
12/28/95

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002c. paper	re: U.S. Policy and Equip and Train [partial] (1 page)	12/28/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4002

FOLDER TITLE:
DC0249 DC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, December 28, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs693

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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STAFFING: US TASK FORCE ON MILITARY STABILIZATION.

James W. Pardew Jr. US Special Representative for Military Stabilization in the Former Yugoslavia and Director of the Task Force (DoD)

-**Dr. Mark Sawoski.** Executive Assistant (DoD)

-Secretary (State)

Amb. Darryl N. Johnson. Deputy Director for International Coordination (State)

(b)(1)

Dr. Christopher Lamb Deputy Director for Military Development in Bosnia. (DoD)

-Equipment Officer (DOD--DSAA)

(b)(1)

-Political/Military Staff Officer (State)

-**LTG (ret) Rick Brown.** Consultant support -- IDA

TOTALS:

DOD--4

State--3

(b)(1)

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DEC-22-1995 13:02

Current Military Structure and C^2 Relationships

President Zubak (?)
Vice President Ganic
MOD Prlic



command ——————→

coordination - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

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DEC-22-1995 13:02 P.02

Proposed Military Structure and C^2 Relationships



operational control ——————→

coordination - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

planning & mgt - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

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Equip and Train Structure



E & T Implementation: ————————

Requirements: - - - - - - - -

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RECORD ID: 9521451
RECEIVED: 27 DEC 95 15

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 28 DEC 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
SERBIA
DC
CROATIA
AGENDA
PEACEKEEPING

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 28 DEC DC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 30 DEC 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FEELEY LOGREF: 9521452 9521457

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0249 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BAKER JANE
BERGER
FEELEY
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By RDS NARA, Date 10/12/2019
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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
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001		X	95122810	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
001	SENS	Z	95122810	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	95122811	SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	951228	FUERTH, L	
002	951228	LINO, M	
002	951228	MCALEER, R	
002	951228	INDERFURTH, R	
002	951228	YANNUZZI, R	
002	951228	WILSON, F	

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National Security Council
The White House

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COMMENTS: 12/28 Bosnia DC Non-Agenda

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

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DATE 28 DEC 95

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DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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MS. MARISA R. LINO DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	12/29/95	10:30 AM	Isabelle Thomas PRINT LAST NAME: Thomas COPY: VIA FAX +1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
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MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
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MS. MARISA R. LINO DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	12/29/95	11:13	Wms, MC PRINT LAST NAME: Williams COPY: VIA FAX +1
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MESSAGE NO.: _____ CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: DC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21451

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN(STATE)	OFFICE OF AMB		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

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NSC# 21451

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting DC MTG ON BOSNIA PAGES: 2

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DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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21451

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

December 28, 19995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

MS. MARISA R. LINO
Acting Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia on December 28, 1995 from 2:45 to 3:45 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Deputies plus one. The agenda is attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

~~SECRET~~
Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: 12/28/05

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/3/2019
2010-0533-M

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NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA
DATE: December 28, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:45 - 3:45 p.m.

AGENDA

I. IFOR Update.....JCS

II. Equip and Train.....State*

* Paper to be circulated by OOB December 28.

~~SECRET~~
Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5 (d)
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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 2/6/2020

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21451

December 27, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: JOHN FEELEY

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia
December 28, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Deputies meeting on Bosnia to be held December 28, 1995. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

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Reason: 1.5 (d)
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Case Number: 2010-0533-M

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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001b. memo	re: Diplomatic Strategy (2 pages)	ca. 02/1993	P1/b(1)
001c. memo	re: Draft Press Backgrounder (2 pages)	ca. 02/1993	P1/b(1)
001d. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS re: U.S. Policy Toward the Former Yugoslavia (4 pages)	ca. 02/1993	P1/b(1)
002. minutes	re: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, February 5, 1993 [partial] (1 page)	02/05/1993	P1/b(1) KC 6/11/2020
003a. memo	Lake to POTUS re: Today's Principals Committee Meeting on Yugoslavia (2 pages)	02/05/1993	P1/b(1), ~~P5~~
003b. memo	[Duplicate of 001d] (4 pages)	ca. 02/1993	P1/b(1)
003c. memo	[Duplicate of 001a] (2 pages)	ca. 02/1993	P1/b(1)
003d. memo	[Duplicate of 001b] (2 pages)	ca. 02/1993	P1/b(1)
003e. memo	[Duplicate of 001c] (2 pages)	ca. 02/1993	P1/b(1)
004a. memo	[Duplicate of 001a] (2 pages)	ca. 02/1993	P1/b(1)
004b. memo	[Duplicate of 001b] (2 pages)	ca. 02/1993	P1/b(1)

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PC0003 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, February 5, 1993

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P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOC DATE: 05 FEB 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: PC YUGOSLAVIA
BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PC MTG ON FORMER YUGOSLAVIA for 2/5/93 5-7 PM

ACTION: ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 08 FEB 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL LOGREF:

FILES: IFM NSCP: PC0003 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		HOLL
		ITOH
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		WALKER

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJSL CLOSED BY: NSJDA DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By DW NARA, Date 3/20/13
2012-0533-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	93020420	FOR DECISION
001		X	93020510	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
002		X	93020510	ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	930205	FUERTH, L	
002	930205	GROSSMAN, M	
002	930205	SHERFIELD, M	
002	930205	OLIVER, J	
002	930205	SHEFFIELD, H	
002	930205	INDERFURTH, R	

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National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 20073

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 182 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	1		A
ExecSec			
Staff Director			
D/APNSA			
APNSA	2	AVR	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	JDA 2/5	D
NSC Secretariat			

(A = Action) I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

C 2/5/93

PER MARY EMERY,
LAKE HAS GIVEN FULL COPY
OF #20073 TO GEORGE
STEPHANOUPOLIS, FORN
PRESS OFFICE

JDA

2/5/93

PER CATHY MILLISON,
DO NOT SEND COPY TO RICK
INDERFURTH. STATE WILL
TAKE CARE OF IT.

PER ~~WILMA~~ HALL,
PODESTA RECEIVED COPY OF
THE PRESIDENT MEMO (NO
ATTACHMENTS WERE INCLUDED).

JDA

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9320073
DATE 05 FEB 93

SUBJECT: PC MTG ON FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20500	_____	_____	_____ COPY: 1
MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	_____	_____	_____ COPY: 1

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MW NARA, Date 3/30/10
2010-0533-N

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC, ROOM 379 OEOB

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
1993 FEB -5 AM 10: 58

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF RECEIPT
D
NMCC/CWO
5 Feb 93
1129

PRECEDENCE: ~~IMMEDIATE~~ PRIORITY ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

~~SECRET~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~

MESSAGE NO. 0153 CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES 11

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) 456-6536 (PHONE NUMBER) _____ (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION MEETING ON FEB. 5 ~~EYES ONLY~~

NSC LOG # 20073

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	MARC GROSSMAN		
DOD	COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD		
CIA	JAMES R. OLIVER		
JCS	CAPT. H.L. SHEFFIELD		

REMARKS:

~~EYES ONLY~~

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By MS NARA, Date 3/30/12
2012-0533-M

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SITUATION ROOM
1993 FEB -5 AM 10:58

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF RECEIPT

PRECEDENCE: ~~IMMEDIATE~~ PRIORITY ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

~~SECRET~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~

MESSAGE NO. 0153 CLASSIFICATION PAGES 11

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) 456-6536 (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION MEETING ON FEB. 5 ~~EYES ONLY~~

LOG # 20073

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	MARC GROSSMAN		
DOD	COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD		
CIA	JAMES R. OLIVER		
JCS	CAPT. H.L. SHEFFIELD		

REMARKS:

~~EYES ONLY~~

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By NARA, Date 3/20/12
2012-0533-M

URGENT

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
1993 FEB -5 AM 10: 58

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF RECEIPT

1110L

PRECEDENCE: ~~IMMEDIATE~~ PRIORITY ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO. 0153 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~ PAGES 11

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) 456-6536 (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION MEETING ON FEB. 5 ~~EYES ONLY~~

M[illegible]G # 20073

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	MARC GROSSMAN		
DOD	COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD		
CIA	JAMES R. OLIVER		
JCS	CAPT. H.L. SHEFFIELD		

REMARKS:

~~EYES ONLY~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MW NARA, Date 3/30/10
2010-0533-M

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

1993 FEB -5 AM 10:58

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: ~~IMMEDIATE~~ PRIORITY ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO. 0153 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~ PAGES 11

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) 456-6536 (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION MEETING ON FEB. 5 ~~EYES ONLY~~

NSC LOG # 20073

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	MARC GROSSMAN		
DOD	COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD		
CIA	JAMES R. OLIVER		
JCS	CAPT. H.L. SHEFFIELD		

REMARKS:

~~EYES ONLY~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NARA, Date 3/30/12
2012-0535-M

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~ PAGES 11

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) 456-6536 (PHONE NUMBER) _____ (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION MEETING ON FEB. 5 ~~EYES ONLY~~ NSC LOG # 20073

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	MARC GROSSMAN		
DOD	COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD		
CIA	JAMES R. OLIVER		
JCS	CAPT. H.L. SHEFFIELD		

REMARKS:

~~EYES ONLY~~

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By ahs NARA, Date 3/30/10
2012-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20073

February 5, 1993

~~EYES ONLY~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JAMES R. OLIVER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

CAPTAIN H.L. SHEFFIELD
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the United States to the
United Nations

SUBJECT: Principals Only Meeting on the Former Yugoslavia (S)

There will be a Principals Committee Meeting on the Former Yugoslavia, February 5, 1993, from 5:00-7:00pm in the White House Situation Room. Attached for distribution directly to the Principals are the discussion papers for the meeting. Attendance at the meeting is Principals only. (S)

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
As stated

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MI NARA, Date 3/30/10
2012-0539-M

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	re: Actions Proposed to Induce the Parties to Reach Agreement (2 pages)	ca. 02/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4005

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0003 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, February 5, 1993

2010-0533-M
rs527

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. memo	re: Diplomatic Strategy (2 pages)	ca. 02/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4005

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0003 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, February 5, 1993

2010-0533-M
rs527

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001c. memo	re: Draft Press Backgrounder (2 pages)	ca. 02/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4005

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0003 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, February 5, 1993

2010-0533-M
rs527

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001d. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS re: U.S. Policy Toward the Former Yugoslavia (4 pages)	ca. 02/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4005

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0003 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, February 5, 1993

2010-0533-M
rs527

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 4, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER

FROM: JANE E. HOEL

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on the Former Yugoslavia, Friday, February 5, 1993, 5:00-7:00pm

The materials for the subject meeting are attached for your review. We are circulating the Decision Memorandum for the President (Tab II) and its associated attachments: Diplomatic Strategy (Tab A) and draft Press Backgrounder (Tab B).

As the only item for discussion will be the package for the President, we have not prepared an agenda.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you approve distribution of the attached materials to Principals.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

That you authorize Will Itoh to release the Memorandum to Agencies attached at Tab III.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Cover Memo to Principals
Tab II Decision Memorandum for the President
Tab A Proposed Action
Tab B Diplomatic Strategy
Tab C Draft Press Backgrounder
Tab III Memorandum to Agencies

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MS NARA, Date 3/30/10
2010-0533-M

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9320945
RECEIVED: 25 AUG 93 14

TO: MEMO FOR RECORD

FROM: HOLL

DOC DATE: 10 FEB 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
YUGOSLAVIA
MINUTES
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MINUTES OF 5 FEB PC MTG RE BOSNIA

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE DATE: 28 AUG 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL LOGREF: 9320073

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0003 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO

check participants list

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MM NARA, Date 3/30/10
2012-0533-M

COMMENTS: ONLY MINUTES AVAILABLE. NO RECORD OF SOC

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OPENED BY: NSGVE CLOSED BY: NSGVE DOC 1 OF 1

OCR'd 11/14/97

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~~SECRET~~ RECORD ID: 9320945

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001		X	93082515	FOR RECORD PURPOSES

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9320073
RECEIVED: 04 FEB 93 12

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 05 FEB 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: PC
BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
YUGOSLAVIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & INVITATION TO PRES TO PARTICIPATE IN 5 FEB PC MTG ON FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES DUE DATE: 08 FEB 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL LOGREF: 9320945

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0003 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		HOLL
		NSC CHRON
		WALKER

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MS NARA, Date 3/30/10
2012-0533-M

COMMENTS:

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OPENED BY: NSJSL CLOSED BY: NSMEM DOC 4 OF 4

~~SECRET~~

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	93020420	FOR DECISION
001		X	93020510	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
002		X	93020510	ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES
003	LAKE	Z	93020515	FOR SIGNATURE
003		X	93020515	LAKE SGD MEMO
004	PRESIDENT	Z	93020515	FOR INFORMATION
004		X	93020612	NOTED BY PRES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	930205	FUERTH, L	
002	930205	GROSSMAN, M	
002	930205	SHERFIELD, M	
002	930205	OLIVER, J	
002	930205	SHEFFIELD, H	
002	930205	INDERFURTH, R	

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20945

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA, FEBRUARY 5 1993

Tony Lake began by introducing the issue of the "end game": i.e., if we started down the road envisioned in the draft Presidential Decision Document, were we comfortable knowing that at the end of the road we would be under great pressure to help implement a settlement including with forces on the ground.

Madeleine Albright: Before we do that, I want to raise a more basic question. I am troubled by the conclusion we have reached. We are treating this area as of peripheral interest. History suggests it is more central. This policy (comment: the one in the draft PDD) legitimizes ethnic cleansing. It signals to the Central and east Europeans and to Russia that we will do nothing about it. The pieces in the draft PDD are "pretty pallid". I understand that deciding to use American forces in Bosnia would be crossing the Rubicon. But we should think about whether sweeping the problem under the rug creates more problems. The draft PDD is contrary to what Governor Clinton said and not commensurate with the importance of the issue.

Jim Woolsey: I agree with Madeleine.

Lake: (to Madeleine): You mean we should use force to enforce a settlement, not impose one?

Albright: If we say we would never impose a settlement we are blessing ethnic cleansing.

Secretary Aspin: A better way to explain the draft PDD is to say that we have a three pronged strategy. (1) more on the humanitarian front; we may come up with something more muscular. (2) pressure the parties so they will agree under Vance/Owen auspices. (3) try, under Vance/Owen, to come up with a settlement that does not require massive force to enforce.

Secretary Christopher: We should be more aggressive in describing our negative position about the current Vance/Owen plan and the only way we would get people to agree is to be prepared to enforce a settlement. But we should not throw out Vance/Owen at this point and do it ourselves. The whole EC and important figures on the Hill as well as the Russians support Vance/Owen. We cannot create a whole different structure. If an agreement can be reached, we should commit the U.S. to a greater degree of enforcement.

General Powell: I agree the draft PDD is too pallid. It reads more like a press statement than a decision document. But what would Madeleine suggest we do?

Albright: NATO action.

Several speakers: I thought we had agreed that we would help enforce a settlement.

Miss Walker: OSD and JCS Working Group members believed their principals had not agreed to that. That we would only help monitor, not enforce, a settlement.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. minutes	re: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, February 5, 1993 [partial] (1 page)	02/05/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4005

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0003 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, February 5, 1993

2010-0533-M
rs527

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Powell and Aspin both said that had not been their position.

General Powell: I thought we agreed that we would be willing to use force to enforce a settlement, but leave our willingness to do so "just behind the screen".

Mr. Berger: What is the end toward which Madeleine would apply force? To get an agreement or enforce it?

General Powell: The military will do anything that is decided, but we need to know what "it" is that we are being asked to do.

(my notes don't make clear who asked: ground or air forces?

Secretary Christopher: we should start with air power but be willing to use ground forces if necessary.

Mr. Woolsey: We keep talking about enforcing the whole agreement, fixing the whole situation. But we also talk about using only air power. (b)(1) There is no carrot in the present draft PDD for Bosnia. If we at least used air power to lift the siege of Sarajevo, maybe in time doing more, we could have not only a "no fly zone" but also a "no drive zone". (b)(1) So we could tell the UN that part of the package is that Bosnia can go along with something close to Vance/Owen but we potentially could bring to the party of NATO enforcement a ban on tanks, artillery, and APCs about 20-20 kilometers around Sarajevo.

General Powell" OK, but it is a commitment of bombers to go bomb. (Note: I did not take "OK" to mean agreement that we should do it.)

Secretary Christopher: Madeleine and I did not coordinate our positions before the meeting. But the draft PDD put me in the wrong mood.

Secretary Aspin: In presenting our decision we should start with what we are trying to achieve, call on all parties to end violence, reach a settlement, open the camps, and then say that to accomplish that we have a three prong strategy.

Mr. Lake The problem all along has been promising more than we can deliver. Les' press approach is OK, but only if we can say that at the end of the game we would help enforce something that the parties agree to.

Mr. Berger: What does the use of force mean? Air power, or air and ground?

General Powell: Both. We can use air power but ultimately must go in and separate the parties.

Mr. Lake: And the West Europeans won't do it alone.

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Mr. Furerth: Also, if in going in we can demand implementation of some of the London Accords the Serbs agreed to, especially lifting the siege of Sarajevo. That raises the question of what we would do if the Serbs don't comply.

Mr. Lake: Let me clarify what we seem to be saying. Do we want to add to the President's package that we should say now that if all the parties voluntarily come to an agreement the US will say at the start that we are prepared to use force, including ground forces if necessary, as part of a NATO effort to help implement an agreement. An agreement that the parties had signed would include enforcement provisions.

Mr Berger: For now we should say only "including the use of force." (Secretary Aspin, others indicate agreement with Berger)

Mr. Lake: If asked whether that means ground forces, say we don't rule it out.

Secretary Aspin: Addressing it later means soon. We will need ground forces to do what the agreement calls for, such as lifting the siege of Sarajevo.

Mr. Woolsey: It would be something useful if we could stop people from killing each other with heavy weapons. Even if small arms continue to be used, that is a game the Bosnians can play. We can take away from the Serbs the heavy stuff and frighten with some of the other.

Secretary Christopher: We should describe our policy as entering the negotiations in a more aggressive way.

Mr. Lake: Yes. The draft press statement was written back because we thought there was no agreement that we would be willing to use force, including ground forces if necessary, to enforce an agreement.

Mr. Lake: Let's talk about options for contributing to the humanitarian effort

General Powell: We have several ideas we're studying. One is to take responsibility for the area southeast of Sarajevo that is not now being served. We would need an UNPRO force similar to what the UK and France have. We would open a corridor from Split or Belgrade. The latter is less promising because we would need Serbian permission. This would show that the US was making a contribution equal to, even greater than, what others are doing. Casualties would not be serious if we do essentially what the British and French are doing. The reason they don't just blast their way through is that sometimes it is better to negotiate than to blast. We would be somewhat more aggressive than the British and French, but not to the point where we have to protect the whole route. Other things we are looking at are do-able but trivial and we would be seen as not entirely serious. Air drops, for instance, are gimmicky and would look like a gimmick. They are not a serious way of delivering supplies. We would not look good just dropping medicines out of a C-130 and not knowing what happens to them. They could turn up on the black market.

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Secretary Christopher: What about a one-time surge?

Mr. Lake: Are you also doing an option of lifting the siege of Sarajevo?

General Powell: The French have tossed that out recently. You can take out some artillery. That will make a difference even if not guarantee ending the siege. When the F-16s go home at night the shelling can begin again. Maybe we would luck out and get the same reaction we did by declaring the no fly zone and getting pretty good compliance without enforcement. But to really end the siege would take a full infantry division with air support.

Mr. Berger: What would be the psychological impact on the Serbs of intermittent bombing, of planes taking out batteries on an intermittent basis?

General Powell: I think it would have a deterrent impact. They would have to decide wither to take on the U.S. If they decided to continue the shelling, knowing that we from time to time would get a target would reduce the shelling but not end it.

Mr. Berger: The American people would see a big difference between using force when the parties have asked us to enforce an agreement, and pre-emotive use of force.

General Powell: Also, the relief effort would stop if we used force before a settlement.

Mr. Woolsey: The way the siege was supposed to be ended before was an agreement to put the heavy weapons in cantonments, but within range of Sarajevo. We should require that they move out of range.

Mr. Fuerth: We should insist that the guns be silenced or we will try to silence them, then that they be moved beyond range as part of a settlement.

Mr. Woolsey: Keep in mind the need for NATO agreement if we are to use our planes.

General Powell: If we decided to join the humanitarian effort on the ground, there would be great expectations that the US would force its way through. Field Marshall Dan Rather would criticize us if we did not.

Mr.Lake: What should be our diplomatic strategy?

Secretary Christopher: We should just spread out and do everything. In capitals, by telephone, work on the Bosnians, get the Germans to work on the Croatians and the Russians on the Serbs. Our message to all should be that we are prepared, under a UN and NATO umbrella, to participate in enforcing an agreement, including through the use of force if necessary.

Secretary Aspin: Are the Serbs and Bosnian Serbs the same? How can we bring pressure on all of them?

Secretary Christopher: The Serbs will say "it's not us" but Serbia supplies and controls the Bosnian Serbs. And Russia has a

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big influence on Serbia and claims a strong desire to solve the problem peacefully. It would serve Yeltsin's purposes to be effective in bringing about a settlement. The US and Turkey can influence Bosnia. We can change the atmosphere a lot if the US stops sitting on the sidelines.

Mr. Berger: Should we reiterate the warning on Kosovo?

Mr. Lake: How would we tell who was a fault?

Mr. Fuerth: We could elaborate our Christmas demarche, saying we are less interested in who started a riot than in insisting that heavy artillery not be used to put down civil disturbances. We would establish a principle of proportionate response.

Ambassador Albright: What about war crimes?

Secretary Christopher: That will be part of our diplomatic strategy. Part of Madeleine's job is to move it at the UN.

Mr. Berger: Is there a tension or inconsistency between pressing on war crimes and trying to negotiate?

Mr. Lake: We could focus on the grass roots offenders first rather than their leaders who give the commands.

(Speaker unclear in my notes): The US also will take more refugees

Mr. Lake: Jenonne Walker will work with State on a diplomatic, public, and Hill package for the Deputies to review over the weekend. The press package should begin with a roll of the drums: this is what we want and how we are going to achieve it.

Secretary Christopher: We can't do this with backgrounders. We have promised a statement--we've promised a Presidential statement. We should not forego the use of TV if we want to reach the public.

Secretary Aspin, Mr Berger: (Both recommended a Christopher speech, with lots of backgrounding by various officials all speaking from the same prepared text.

Mr. Lake: The sequence should be quick movement from informing allies in capitals, informing Vance and Owen and the Hill, just before the speech on Tuesday or Wednesday.

Secretary Christopher: The US will take the leadership on the diplomatic front to work on Russia to press the Serbs, on Turkey to press the Muslims,a nd on Germany to press the Croats.

Vice President Gore had joined the meeting a few minutes earlier and Leon Fuerth had been giving him a whispered summary of the group's conclusion, including willingness to help enforce an agreement.

The Vice President: I disagree. The world has let a terrible thing happen in Bosnia, but I always have been very reluctant to use American ground forces and I am sure Bill Clinton will be unless we have absolutely valid achievable objectives. There is

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a tension between the word "agree" and "enforce". In that creative tension we might find the parameters of our role. If there truly is an agreement, the requirements of enforcement are minimal. The current Vance/Owen plan would need to be not only enforced but imposed. Then we would have the worst of both worlds. Vance/Owen has a terrible map, and would require lots of American blood and treasure. We do not need to bring to the table a willingness to commit forces. We bring the willingness of the world's leading power to help get a true agreement. We have a great opportunity to position ourselves as the principal spokesman and advocate of a Muslim dominated coalition. In a creative way, we would identify ourselves with the core of the Muslim world. Rabin has spoken out against what is happening in Bosnia. The pressure will build because they are all looking for a way out and looking for an excuse.

Mr. Lake: Yes, to the degree a settlement is imposed, to that degree the requirement to enforce it is greater. But even when they agree, the Croatian experience shows that there still is lots of work to do.

Vice President Gore: We could test their willingness really to agree, for instance by lifting the siege of Sarajevo.

Mr. Lake: At a minimum it will need something on the ground. The more we are prepared to say we will be prepared to help with that, the more we will be taken seriously.

Vice President Gore: There is far more legitimacy to the Bosnian objections to the Vance/Owen map than Vance/Owen agree. Vance/Owen claim that the Bosnians only hold out because they hope we would come in.

Mr. Woolsey: One way to square the circle would be something that was not against Serbia, but against heavy weapons in this conflict. In principle it would be neutral.

Secretary Christopher: We should make an all out effort to persuade and convince the parties rather than impose a settlement. On the other hand, we are not talking about an agreement among three Church groups in California. This is the Balkans. It is not realistic to think that we can do without enforcement, even of a good agreement. To give an air of reality to our position, we have to say that the US will assist in carrying out the enforcement, in conjunction with the UN and NATO.

Vice President Gore: But the American people will not want to send our boys there.

General Powell: The risk of casualties would be relatively low if there is an agreement even by Balkan standards. None of the parties would stand up to a Western force that included the U.S. There would be some snipers or ambushes, but not major resistance.

At this point the President joined the meeting, and Colin Powell described the issue and repeated the last point to him.

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General Powell : The nature of a Bosnian agreement will require ground forces. We can punish from the air but not enforce from the air. If there is a reasonably good agreement, even by Balkan standards, the casualties would be acceptable. None of the parties would take on a US/NATO force. There would be snipers, road blocks, ambushes, and the like but it would not be a big deal. It will be expensive. We might luck out and be able to flood the country with troops for a time and then get out.

The President to General Powell: What's your advice?

General Powell: We can perform this mission. But it would be expensive and could be open ended with no promise of getting out. But if we start down the road of diplomatic engagement, we must be willing to help enforce a settlement.

Secretary Christopher: I agree. Vance/Owen as it stands would take a great number of troops to enforce. The alternative is a diplomatic strategy but unless we commit troops it won't get you where you want to go. So we are recommending a middle position, in which we would keep vague just what we will do but commit to some use of American forces.

Secretary Aspin: I agree.

The President: (to General Powell) Can we get out of Somalia first?

General Powell: We could get out of Somalia now if the UN would agree to take it over.

Secretary Christopher: We won't have an agreement in the near term.

The President: About six months?

Secretary Christopher: That's about right

Mr. Woolsey: We should examine whether we could do something useful without troops on the ground. We might limit what we were willing to enforce, agree not to enforce the whole agreement but to prevent the use of heavy weapons. This would mean a no drive zone as well as a no fly zone. It would not be perfect but it would be useful and could be done from the air.

Mr. Berger: There is another possible approach. I don't necessarily recommend it but it should be considered. We could say this is a European problem and they should take responsibility for enforcing a settlement.

The President (interrupting): We can't do that without giving up our whole position in the world.

Mr. Lake: We will prepare a strategy for implementing this policy.

The President and Vice President left the meeting. After a few minutes the meeting resumed to confirm that State, assisted by the Working Group, would prepare the outline of a speech as well

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as cables to key leaders and talking points for telephone calls, for consideration by the Deputies Committee.

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PRINCIPALS MTG

SRB HAS CY

2:15pm

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 20073

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG JSZ A/O 1

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec			
ExecSec			
Staff Director			
D/APNSA	1		A
APNSA		arb	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2	JJ 2/5	D
NSC Secretariat	3		N/A

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

5 FEB 93 23 1[illegible]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. memo	Lake to POTUS re: Today's Principals Committee Meeting on Yugoslavia (2 pages)	02/05/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4005

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0003 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, February 5, 1993

2010-0533-M
rs527

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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TAB

I.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. memo	[Duplicate of 001d] (4 pages)	ca. 02/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
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NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4005

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0003 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, February 5, 1993

2010-0533-M
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TAB

A.

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TAB B

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003c. memo	[Duplicate of 001a] (2 pages)	ca. 02/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
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NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4005

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0003 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, February 5, 1993

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TAB C

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003d. memo	[Duplicate of 001b] (2 pages)	ca. 02/1993	P1/b(1)

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NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4005

FOLDER TITLE:
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003e. memo	[Duplicate of 001c] (2 pages)	ca. 02/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4005

FOLDER TITLE:
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20073
A/O 1

February 5, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER

FROM: JANE E. HOLL

SUBJECT: Your Memo to the President on Today's Principals Committee Meeting

The memorandum you requested for the President is attached at Tab I for your review.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the Memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab II Decision Memorandum

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NARA, Date 3/30/10
2012-0533-M

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9320073
DATE 05 FEB 93

SUBJECT: PC MTG ON FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20500	5 Feb	1702	J. H. Brown COPY: 1
MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520			COPY: 1

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
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RECORD ID: 9320073
RECEIVED: 04 FEB 93 12

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 05 FEB 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: PC
BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
YUGOSLAVIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 5 FEB PC MTG ON YUGOSLAVIA

ACTION: ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 08 FEB 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL LOGREF: 9320945

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0003 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		HOLL
		ITOH
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		WALKER

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	93020420	FOR DECISION
001		X	93020510	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
002		X	93020510	ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES
003	LAKE	Z	93020515	FOR SIGNATURE
003		X	93020515	LAKE SGD MEMO
004	PRESIDENT	Z	93020515	FOR INFORMATION
004		X	93020612	NOTED BY PRES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	930205	FUERTH, L	
002	930205	GROSSMAN, M	
002	930205	SHERFIELD, M	
002	930205	OLIVER, J	
002	930205	SHEFFIELD, H	
002	930205	INDERFURTH, R	

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9320073
RECEIVED: 04 FEB 93 12

TO: AGENCIES

CHRON FILE

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 05 FEB 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: PC
BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
YUGOSLAVIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PC MTG ON FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

ACTION: ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 08 FEB 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL LOGREF:

FILES: IFM NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		HOLL
		ITOH
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		WALKER

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSJSL CLOSED BY: NSJDA DOC 2 OF 2

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MM NARA, Date 3/12/10
2012-0533-M

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National Security Council
The White House

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 182 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	1		A
ExecSec			
Staff Director			
D/APNSA			
APNSA	2	Arf	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	JDA 2/5	D
NSC Secretariat			

(A = Action) I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

C 2/5/93

PER MARY EMERY,
LAKE HAS GIVEN FULL COPY
4 FEB OF #20073 TO GEORGE
STEPHANOUPOLIS, FORN
PRESS OFFICE
C

JDA

2/5/93

PER CATHY MILLISON,
DO NOT SEND COPY TO RICK
INDERFURTH. STATE WILL
TAKE CARE OF IT.

PER ~~WILMA~~ HALL,
PODESTA RECEIVED COPY OF
THE PRESIDENT MEMO (NO
ATTACHMENTS WERE INCLUDED).

JDA

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20073

February 5, 1993

~~EYES ONLY~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JAMES R. OLIVER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

CAPTAIN H.L. SHEFFIELD
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the United States to the
United Nations

SUBJECT: Principals Only Meeting on the Former Yugoslavia (S)

There will be a Principals Committee Meeting on the Former Yugoslavia, February 5, 1993, from 5:00-7:00pm in the White House Situation Room. Attached for distribution directly to the Principals are the discussion papers for the meeting. Attendance at the meeting is Principals only. (S)

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
As stated

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 3/30/10
2010-0533-M

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004a. memo	[Duplicate of 001a] (2 pages)	ca. 02/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4005

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0003 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, February 5, 1993

2010-0533-M
rs527

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004b. memo	[Duplicate of 001b] (2 pages)	ca. 02/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4005

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0003 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, February 5, 1993

2010-0533-M
rs527

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004c. memo	[Duplicate of 001c] (2 pages)	ca. 02/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4005

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0003 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, February 5, 1993

2010-0533-M
rs527

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004d. memo	[Duplicate of 001d] (4 pages)	ca. 02/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4005

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0003 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, February 5, 1993

2010-0533-M
rs527

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20073

February 4, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER

FROM: JANE E. HOLL

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on the Former Yugoslavia, Friday, February 5, 1993, 5:00-7:00pm

The materials for the subject meeting are attached for your review. We are circulating the Decision Memorandum for the President (Tab II) and its associated attachments: Diplomatic Strategy (Tab A) and draft Press Backgrounder (Tab B).

As the only item for discussion will be the package for the President, we have not prepared an agenda.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you approve distribution of the attached materials to Principals.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

That you authorize Will Itoh to release the Memorandum to Agencies attached at Tab III.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Cover Memo to Principals
Tab II Decision Memorandum for the President
Tab A Proposed Action
Tab B Diplomatic Strategy
Tab C Draft Press Backgrounder
Tab III Memorandum to Agencies

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MO NARA, Date 3/30/10
2012-0533-M

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See also 2013-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

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Folder Title: PC0006 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, March 3, 1993				
Staff Office-Individual: Records Management				
Original OA/ID Number: 4005				
Row: 43	Section: 6	Shelf: 5	Position: 2	Stack: V

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~re: Decisions of March 3 Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)~~	~~03/08/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/202.

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4005

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0006 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, March 3, 1993

2010-0533-M
rs528

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9320198
RECEIVED: 03 MAR 93 15

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 08 MAR 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
PC
YUGOSLAVIA
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 3 MAR PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: LAKE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 06 MAR 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF:

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0006 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		MILLISON
		NSC CHRON
		WALKER

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MW NARA, Date 3/30/10
2010-0533-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	93030819	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	93030819	LAKE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	930308	CHRISTOPHER, W	
002	930308	ASPIN, L	
002	930308	WOOLSEY, R	
002	930308	POWELL, C	
002	930308	ALBRIGHT, M	
002	930308	FUERTH, L	

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9320198
RECEIVED: 03 MAR 93 15

TO: LAKE

FROM: WALKER

DOC DATE: 03 MAR 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA YUGOSLAVIA
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DECISIONS FM PC MTG ON 3 MAR RE BOSNIA

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE DUE DATE: 06 MAR 93 STATUS: X

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF:

FILES: IFG NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
LAKE		

COMMENTS: _____

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MJ NARA, Date 3/30/10

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2018-0533-~

National Security Council
The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	1		
ExecSec			
Staff Director			
D/APNSA			
APNSA			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk		JB 3/4	
NSC Secretariat			
Walker	2		AL for JM

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS: Changes made 3/5/93

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National Security Council
The White House

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	3		
ExecSec	4		
Staff Director	5		
D/APNSA		Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
APNSA	6		
Situation Room		Natl Sec Advisor has seen 3/8	
West Wing Desk	7		R
NSC Secretariat	8	3/24/93	

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 8, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
RREPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANT TO THE VICE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Decisions of March 3 Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia

1. The U.S. will support the draft statement prepared by the Security Council P-4, to be made by the Council President following the March 4 meeting on the fighting in eastern Bosnia. ~~(S)~~

2. State will prepare instructions for consultations with European P-4 members including Russia about what we might do together if necessary to back up the words of the statement. Questions and ideas to be considered include: ~~(S)~~

   -- clarification of what is meant by a ceasefire in Council President's statement; ~~(S)~~

   -- possible changes in UNPROFOR's mandate or Rules of Engagement; ~~(S)~~

   -- enforcement of the No-Fly Zone over Bosnia; ~~(S)~~

   -- tightening enforcement of existing sanctions, e.g. including the possibility of a WEU or NATO/WEU operation to prevent violations via the Danube; and ~~(S)~~

   -- proposing new sanctions, especially to seize Serbian assets and impound vessels involved in sanctions violations. ~~(S)~~

3. State also will prepare messages to all parties in the Bosnian conflict reinforcing the Security Council President's statement. ~~(S)~~

4. Publicly and in other diplomatic exchanges, we will say that the situation in Bosnia and the Security Council President's statement mark a serious moment, and that we continue to consult on how the statement should be followed up. ~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR
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PER E.O. 13526
RT 2/6/2020 (1.02)
2010-0533-M

5. The air drops will continue as planned, including continuing to assess how long this phase should continue. In public and in diplomatic exchanges we will say that they are being effective and that we plan to continue the operation, without specifying when drops will be made or to what sites. ~~(S)~~

6. Since land convoys presently are able to reach Tuzla, we will not now actively explore the possibility of using the airport there to fly in relief supplies. We will reconsider that possibility if the situation changes. ~~(S)~~

7. The Principals agreed to revisit the question of what more the U.S. might do if the situation deteriorates in the next few days. ~~(S)~~

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

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~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20198

March 3, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: JENONNE WALKER

SUBJECT: Decisions of March 3 Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia

Attached is a memo to your counterparts with the decisions from the March 3 Principals Committee Meeting.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the Principals at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Memo to the Principals

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By: MI NARA, Date 3/30/15
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9320198
DATE 08 MAR 93

SUBJECT: DECISIONS OF 3 MAR PC MTG RE BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. WARREN CHRISTOPHER DEPT OF STATE 7TH FLOOR 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC	3/8	2038	Wms, MC COPY: 1
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	9 Mar	0635	 COPY: 1

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NARA, Date 3/30/10
2010-0533-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC, ROOM 379 OEOB

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DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9320198
DATE 08 MAR 93

SUBJECT: DECISIONS OF 3 MAR PC MTG RE BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. WARREN CHRISTOPHER DEPT OF STATE 7TH FLOOR 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC	3/8	9:00pm	Charles W. Redman COPY: 1
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506			COPY: 1

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MS NARA, Date 3/30/10
2010-0533-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC, ROOM 379 OEOB

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9320198
DATE 08 MAR 93

SUBJECT: DECISIONS OF 3 MAR PC MTG RE BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. WARREN CHRISTOPHER DEPT OF STATE 7TH FLOOR 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC			COPY: 1
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	9 Mar	0630	COPY: 1

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 3/30/10
7010-0533-NF

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See also 2013-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

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Folder Title:
PC0009 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, March 13, 1993
Staff Office-Individual:
Records Management
Original OA/ID Number:
4005

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
43	6	5	2	V

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. memo~~	~~re: Decisions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, March 13, 1993 (1 page)~~	~~03/24/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
001b. memo	re: Decisions of March 13 Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)	ca. 03/1993	P1/b(1)
~~001c. memo~~	~~[Duplicate of 001a] (1 page)~~	~~ca. 03/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
001d. memo	[Duplicate of 001b] (1 page)	ca. 03/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4005

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0009 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, March 13, 1993

2010-0533-M
rs529

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9320240
RECEIVED: 15 MAR 93 19

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 24 MAR 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
PC
YUGOSLAVIA
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR PART 3 OF 13 MAR PC MTG - BOSNIA

ACTION: LAKE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 18 MAR 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF: 9320228 9320233

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0009 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
HOLL
NSC CHRON
WALKER

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NJ NARA, Date 3/30/10
2010-0533-M

COMMENTS: THIS IS PART 3 OF 3 PART MTG - SUBJECT FOR THIS PART: BOSNIA

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: NSKDB DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

OCR of 11/18/97 ad

~~SECRET~~ RECORD ID: 9320240

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	93032420	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	93032420	LAKE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	930324	CHRISTOPHER, W	
002	930324	ASPIN, L	
002	930324	WOOLSEY, R	
002	930324	POWELL, C	
002	930324	ALBRIGHT, M	
002	930324	FUERTH, L	

~~SECRET~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9320240
RECEIVED: 15 MAR 93 19

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 24 MAR 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
PC
YUGOSLAVIA
SOC

PERSONS:

11:45 - 12:30

SUBJECT: DECISIONS OF PC MTG ON 13 MAR RE BOSNIA

ACTION: LAKE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 18 MAR 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF:

FILES: IFG O NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		HOLL
		NSC CHRON
		WALKER

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: NSKDB

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By W NARA, Date 3/30/10
2010-0533-M

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9320240
RECEIVED: 15 MAR 93 19

TO: LAKE

FROM: WALKER

DOC DATE: 15 MAR 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
PC
YUGOSLAVIA
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DECISIONS OF 13 MAR PC MTG RE BOSNIA

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE DUE DATE: 18 MAR 93 STATUS: X

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF:

FILES: IFM NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
LAKE		

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MR NARA, Date 3/30/10
2010-0533-M

Rec'd 3/18 2:55pm

National Security Council
The White House

3/18 1500

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 20240

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (KH) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	1/3		A
ExecSec			
Staff Director			
D/APNSA	2		
APNSA	4	~~Nati Sec Advisor~~ has seen	TAB A - Redo
Situation Room		~~Nati Sec Advisor~~	
West Wing Desk	5	(KH) has seen 3/24	D
NSC Secretariat	6		R

(A = Action) I = Information D = Dispatch (R = Retain) N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

COMMENTS: Ready for Signature

17 MAR 93 A 5 40

/S/

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Nati Sec Advisor has seen

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

1FG

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9320240
DATE 24 MAR 93

SUBJECT: DECISIONS OF PC MTG ON 13 MAR RE BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. WARREN CHRISTOPHER DEPT OF STATE 7TH FLOOR 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC	3-24-93	2253	B Allen COPY: 1
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	25 Mar	1055	J H Brown COPY: 1

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MW NARA, Date 3/30/10
2010-0533-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC, ROOM 379 OEOB

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9320240
DATE 24 MAR 93

SUBJECT: DECISIONS OF PC MTG ON 13 MAR RE BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. WARREN CHRISTOPHER DEPT OF STATE 7TH FLOOR 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC	3/24/93	11:15am	Stacey A Rowe COPY: 1
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506			COPY: 1

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NARA, Date 3/30/10
2010-0533-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC, ROOM 379 OEOB

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9320240
DATE 24 MAR 93

SUBJECT: DECISIONS OF PC MTG ON 13 MAR RE BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. WARREN CHRISTOPHER DEPT OF STATE 7TH FLOOR 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC	_____	_____	_____ COPY: 1
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	25 Mar	1055	L. Branscum COPY: 1

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MS NARA, Date 3/30/10
2010-0533-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC, ROOM 379 OEOB

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

~~SECRET~~

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. _____ **CLASSIFICATION** ~~SECRET~~ **PAGES** 1

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) _____ (PHONE NUMBER) _____ (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION DECISIONS OF PC MTG ON 13 MAR NSC LOG #20240

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

FOR IMMEDIATE TRANSMITTAL TO ADDRESSEES

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MM NARA, Date 3/30/10
2010-0533-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE
- ☐ FLASH
- ☐ IMMEDIATE
- ☐ PRIORITY
- ☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC LOG # 20240

FROM: **National Security Council** PHONE: **202-456-2291** ROOM: **WHSR**

SUBJECT: **Notice of Meeting** PAGES: 1

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MM NARA, Date 3/30/10
2010-0533-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ 20240

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 24, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANT TO THE VICE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Decisions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, March 13, 1993 ~~(S)~~

Committee members agreed on the need to develop a concept of phased implementation/enforcement of a Bosnian settlement that:

-- avoids a self-defeating delay during which an agreement could fall apart precisely because of failure to enforce it;

-- while also building in fail safe provisions to prevent the involvement of U.S. ground forces in a situation in which a settlement was being ignored and fighting continued virtually unabated. ~~(S)~~

During an initial period after signature of an agreement by all three parties and before this condition could be judged to have been met, air power might be used against any party engaged in a major violation. ~~(S)~~

Elements of a possible U.S. ground contribution could be getting into place, e.g. in Split, during this interim period. ~~(S)~~

The Committee will meet again to refine this concept. It will address questions such as whether we would threaten punitive action against targets in Serbia, or tactical action, e.g. against Bosnian Serb artillery shelling Sarajevo; how to frame the message we would send at time of signature; and when and how to inject this concept into multilateral planning. ~~(S)~~

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR
CLINTON LIBRARY ~~SECRET~~ PHOTOCOPY
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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ 20240

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 16, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: JENONNE WALKER

SUBJECT: Decisions of March 13 Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia

Attached is a memo to your counterparts with the decisions from the March 13 Principals Committee Meeting.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the Principals at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Memo to the Principals

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MI NARA, Date 5/28/10
240-0533-m

~~SECRET~~
Declassify On: OADR

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. memo	re: Decisions of March 13 Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)	ca. 03/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4005

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0009 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, March 13, 1993

2010-0533-M
rs529

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR-DESIGNATE OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
USUN AMBASSADOR

SUBJECT: Decisions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, March 13, 1993 (S)

Committee members agreed on the need to develop a concept of phased implementation/enforcement of a Bosnian settlement that:

-- avoids a self-defeating delay during which an agreement could fall apart precisely because of failure to enforce it;

-- while also building in fail safe provisions to prevent the involvement of U.S. ground forces in a situation in which a settlement was being ignored and fighting continued virtually unabated. (S)

During an initial period after signature of an agreement by all three parties and before this condition could be judged to have been met, air power might be used against any party engaged in a major violation. (S)

Elements of a possible U.S. ground contribution could be getting into place, e.g. in Split, during this interim period. (S)

The Committee will meet again to refine this concept. It will address questions such as whether we would threaten punitive action against targets in Serbia, or tactical action, e.g. against Bosnian Serb artillery shelling Sarajevo; how to frame the message we would send at time of signature; and when and how to inject this concept into multilateral planning. (S)

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0533-M
RS 9/30/14 (4.2a)

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LOG # 20240

DATE: 3/22/93

NOTE FOR: Betty Marshall

FROM: Kay LaPlante

PLEASE REVISE AS INDICATED AND RETURN ORIGINAL TO OUR OFFICE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THANKS.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001d. memo	[Duplicate of 001b] (1 page)	ca. 03/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4005

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0009 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, March 13, 1993

2010-0533-M
rs529

RESTRICTION CODES

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See also 2013-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title: PC0010 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, March 25, 1993
Staff Office-Individual: Records Management
Original OA/ID Number: 4005

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
43	6	5	2	V

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~re: Decisions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, March 25, 1993 (2 pages)~~	~~03/30/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RDS 04/17/2015
002. memo	Jane Holl to Anthony Lake re: Principals Meeting on Bosnia, March 25, 1993 (3 pages)	03/23/1993	P1/b(1)
003a. memo	re: Principals Only Meeting on the Former Yugoslavia, March 24, 1993 (2 pages)	03/23/1993	P1/b(1)
003b. paper	re: Options for U.S. Military Force to Implement Vance/Owen (3 pages)	ca. 03/1993	P1/b(1)
~~003c. paper~~	~~re: Vance/Owen Plan: How to Bring the Bosnian Serbs on Board (4 pages)~~	~~ca. 03/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003d. paper~~	~~re: Lifting the Siege of Sarajevo (9 pages)~~	~~ca. 03/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 08/03/2015
003e. memo	[Duplicate of 003a] (2 pages)	ca. 03/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4005

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0010 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, March 25, 1993

2010-0533-M
rs530

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9320291
RECEIVED: 26 MAR 93 15

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 30 MAR 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 25 MAR PC MTG ON BOSNIA / CY TO PRINCIPAL

ACTION: LAKE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 30 MAR 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF: 9320269

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0010 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By: NARA, Date 3/30/10
2010-0533-M

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB CLOSED BY: NSWEA DOC 3 OF 3

~~SECRET~~

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	93032619	FOR DECISION
001		X	93033016	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
002		X	93033016	ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES
003		X	93033017	LAKE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	930330	FUERTH, L	
002	930330	GROSSMAN, M	
002	930330	SHERFIELD, M	
002	930330	OLIVER, J	
002	930330	SHEFFIELD, H	
002	930330	INDERFURTH, K	
003	930330	CHRISTOPHER, W	
003	930330	ASPIN, L	
003	930330	WOOLSEY, R	
003	930330	POWELL, C	
003	930330	ALBRIGHT, M	
003	930330	FUERTH, L	

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9320291
RECEIVED: 26 MAR 93 15

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 30 MAR 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
SOC

PERSONS:

3:30PM - 4:45 PM
PER M. WADSWORTH

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 25 MAR PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 30 MAR 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF:

FILES: IFG O NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		NSC CHRON
		WALKER

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY WAT DATE 3/30 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB CLOSED BY: NSWEA DOC 2 OF 2

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
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2010-0533-M

SRB has cy 3/27 5:38

National Security Council
The White House

CEK 3/29 0730

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URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (MA) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec			
ExecSec			
Staff Director	1	MA	
D/APNSA	2		
APNSA	3	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
~~Situation Room~~	4		
West Wing Desk	5	WA 3/30	Tab I D
NSC Secretariat			

(A = Action) I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

(cc:) VP McLarty Other B. Hilliard

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(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

26 MAR 93 7:17

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LOG 9320291
DATE 30 MAR 93

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 25 MAR MTG
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	_____	_____	_____ COPY: 1
MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	_____	_____	_____ COPY: 1

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1993 MAR 30 PM 5:40

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF RECEIPT

93 MAR 30 P6:15

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: B. Mitchell

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 0556 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 3

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) _____ (PHONE NUMBER) _____ (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION DECISIONS OF MTG ON 25 MAR

20291

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		

0208

REMARKS:

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF RECEIPT

MAR 30 6:00 PM '93

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: B. Mataxas

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 0556 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 3

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH WHA (NAME) _____ (PHONE NUMBER) _____ (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION DECISIONS OF MTG ON 25 MAR

20291

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		

DOD

REMARKS:

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1993 MAR 30 PM 5:40

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE / PRIORITY / ~~ROUTINE~~

RELEASER: B. Mataxis

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 0556 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 3

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) _____ (PHONE NUMBER) _____ (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION DECISIONS OF MTG ON 25 MAR

20291

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		

DOD

REMARKS:

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WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

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PRECEDENCE
- ☐ FLASH
- ☐ IMMEDIATE
- ☐ PRIORITY
- ☒ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: ~~Notice of Meeting~~ Summary of Conclusions PAGES: 3

~~20296~~ 20291

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

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USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

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Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~ 20291

March 30, 1993

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JAMES R. OLIVER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

CAPTAIN H. L. SHEFFIELD
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the United States
United Nations

SUBJECT: Decisions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, March 25, 1993 ~~(S)~~

Attached for distribution to Principals only is the Decisions Memorandum for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia for March 25, 1993. ~~(S)~~

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum to Principals

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MI NARA, Date 3/30/10
2013-0533-M

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~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ 20291

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 30, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
USUN AMBASSADOR
ASSISTANT TO THE VICE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Decisions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, March 25, 1993 ~~(S)~~

1. Principals agreed on a statement to be issued by the State Department about Bosnian President Izetbegovic's signing of the Vance/Owen plan. ~~(S)~~

2. Principals agreed on the points to describe American willingness to help implement and enforce an agreement signed by all the Bosnian parties. ~~(S)~~

3. CIA Director Woolsey will prepare an assessment of how we would determine who was responsible for serious non-compliance with an agreement. ~~(S)~~

4. Multilateral movement to deploy forces would begin after signature of an agreement and passage of the necessary UN resolution. OSD and JCS will prepare a timeline, integrating those envisioned in the Vance/Owen "Military Accords" with SHAPE's contingency planning for deploying a force. The Principals will discuss this integrated timeline at an early meeting--probably Saturday March 27. ~~(S)~~

5. We will phase implementation of commitments made to Bosnian President Izetbegovic in the event of his signing in the following order: (1) tightening sanctions and closing loopholes in them (this will include proposing new Security Council resolutions, but will be described as "tightening" and "closing loopholes" in hopes of making them more palatable in Russia; (2) passage of a resolution authorizing enforcement of the No Fly Zone, on the timetable agreed between Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev and Secretary Christopher; and (3) trying to ease the arms embargo. ~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

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2010-0533-M
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6. The Vice President will meet with President Izetbegovic on Friday March 26. (C)

7. Leon Fuerth will background the press on Friday March 26 about our sanctions efforts to date. (C)

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

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~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~ 20291

March 26, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: JENONNE WALKER

SUBJECT: Decisions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, March 25, 1993

Attached at Tab I is the memorandum to agencies for the subject meeting. Due to the sensitive nature of the subject, we recommend that the Memorandum to Principals be on a close-hold basis for Principals use only.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve distribution of the attached memo to Principals.

Approve R Disapprove _____

That you authorize Will Itoh to release the memorandum to agencies attached at Tab A.

Approve R Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to Agencies
Tab A Memorandum to Principals

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By LW NARA, Date 4/1/10
7012-0533-M

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9320276
RECEIVED: 23 MAR 93 18

TO: LAKE

FROM: HOLL
WALKER

DOC DATE: 23 MAR 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 25 MAR PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 26 MAR 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL LOGREF: 9320269 9320291

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0010 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		HOLL
		NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	93032608	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	93032608	NOTED BY LAKE

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The White House

3/24 1700

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG MM A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	1	Mark	
ExecSec	2	VI	
Staff Director			
D/APNSA	3		
APNSA	4		
Situation Room		Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
West Wing Desk	5	3/30	N
NSC Secretariat	6	Bom	R
		3/29/93	

A = Action (I = Information) D = Dispatch (R = Retain) N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS: Principals Mtg on Bosnia, March 25, 3:30 - 4:45 pm

cc: ~ sv

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. memo	Jane Holl to Anthony Lake re: Principals Meeting on Bosnia, March 25, 1993 (3 pages)	03/23/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4005

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0010 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, March 25, 1993

2010-0533-M
rs530

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9320269
RECEIVED: 22 MAR 93 19

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 23 MAR 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: YUGOSLAVIA
SERBIA
AGENDA
BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 25 MAR PC MTG ON FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

ACTION: ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 25 MAR 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL LOGREF: 9320276 9320291

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0010 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
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		MILLISON
		NSC CHRON
		WALKER
		WRIGHT

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	93032220	FOR DECISION
001		X	93032315	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
002		X	93032315	ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	930323	FUERTH, L	
002	930323	GROSSMAN, M	
002	930323	SHERFIELD, M	
002	930323	OLIVER, J	
002	930323	SHEFFIELD, H	
002	930323	INDERFURTH, K	

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ExecSec	1	W	
Staff Director			
D/APNSA	2		
APNSA	3	TL HAS SEEN	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4		D
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

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22 MAR 95 8:44

cc: NS

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LOG 9320269
DATE 23 MAR 93

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION FOR 24 MAR PC MTG ON FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	23 Mar	1617	[signature]
			COPY: 1
MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	323 93	2258	[signature]
			COPY: 1

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RELEASER: Jennifer Sheet

DTG: _____

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MESSAGE NO. 0491 CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES 20

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (EAP) _____ _____
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PC MEETING ON YUGOSLAVIA ON 24 MAR

20269

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		

BDAD

REMARKS:

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1993 MAR 23 PM 3:07

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93 MAR 23 P3:32

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE (PRIORITY) ROUTINE

RELEASER: Jennifer Sheet

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 0491 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 20

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (DRAFT)
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PC MEETING ON YUGOSLAVIA ON 24 MAR

20269

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		

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231543L

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
~~PRIORITY~~
ROUTINE

RELEASER: Jennifer Atlee

DTG: _____

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MESSAGE NO. 0491 CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES 20

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH WAH
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PC MEETING ON YUGOSLAVIA ON 24 MAR

20269

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		

B
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RELEASER: Jennifer Shelt

DATE/TIME: 23 2017Z MAR 93

MESSAGE #: 188

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting RE YUGOSLAVIA ON 24 MAR PAGES: 20

20269

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DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 23, 1993

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. JAMES R. OLIVER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

CAPTAIN H. L. SHEFFIELD
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

COLONEL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the United States to the

SUBJECT: Principals Only Meeting on the Former Yugoslavia (U)

Attached for principals eyes only is a memorandum forwarding background material for the Principals Meeting on the Former Yugoslavia, being held March 24, 1993 in the White House Situation Room. ~~(S)~~

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachments
Tab I Lake Memo to Principals
Tab A Agenda
Tab B Options Paper on Implementation of Vance/Owen
Tab C Responding to Serb Intransigence in Yew York
Tab D Lifting the Siege of Sarajevo

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2012-0532-M

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. memo	re: Principals Only Meeting on the Former Yugoslavia, March 24, 1993 (2 pages)	03/23/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4005

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0010 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, March 25, 1993

2010-0533-M
rs530

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
DATE: March 24, 1993
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 3:30-5:00pm

AGENDA

I. Opening Remarks.....NSC

II. Policy Discussion.....All Participants

a. Full Agreement to Vance/Owen

b. Partial Agreement to Vance/Owen

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
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Vance/Owen Plan: How To Bring The Bosnian Serbs On Board

1. We welcome acceptance of the Vance/Owen plan by the Bosnian government [and earlier by the Bosnian Croats] as a major step toward a settlement of the tragic conflict besetting Bosnia. President Izetbegovic's decision to sign, despite his government's well known reservations about the map, is an act of statesmanship. He has demonstrated flexibility and done all that we in the international community have asked of him. Despite the plan's imperfections, the U.S. believes we should all support the decision by the Bosnian government to reach agreement. We consider it imperative that the Bosnian Serbs now also reach agreement.

2. Regrettably, the Bosnian Serbs are continuing their aggression against the Bosnian state rather than ending the conflict on a just basis. This implies that ethnic cleansing and other atrocities will continue. If we do not act, the Bosnian government will find more and more of its territory forcefully incorporated into Bosnian Serb controlled areas. the Bosnian Serbs will continue to alter the map which Vance and Owen have proposed and which the Bosnian government, and the Bosnian Croats, have agreed to.

3. In essence, a sovereign government and member of the UN which has reached agreement on a plan which the EC, the Secretary General and others have accepted continues to be subjected to a cruel assault unrivaled in recent European history. This is a situation which, if allowed to continue, will send a message which will inexorably lead to the scourge of ethnic cleansing elsewhere. It is a message which we cannot be a party to and one which our publics will not understand. We are, not least of all, concerned about the signal our inaction will send to the Muslim world and the impetus it could give to Islamic fundamentalism.

4. Moreover, if the Serbs succeed in dismembering Bosnia, it could lead in short order to a wider Balkan war. The Serbs might begin ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, which could easily lead to a spillover into Albania, Macedonia and Bulgaria. This would have dangerous and unpredictable consequences for all of us, not least of all the possible involvement of our NATO allies, Greece and Turkey.

5. We, therefore, attach the highest priority to a joint effort by the leadership of the international community to

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convince the Bosnian Serbs and their supporters in Belgrade that they must cease making war on Bosnia and reach agreement. To this end, we must all exert maximum diplomatic, economic and other pressure on Serbia to induce it to pressure the Bosnian Serbs to accept the plan.

6. We propose the following series of phased measures, some of which we previewed to you earlier designed to bring about a Bosnian Serb signature.

a. We have already issued a strong statement of support for the Bosnian decision, including a message pressing the Serbs to negotiate and reach an agreement soon. We strongly urge you to issue similar statements.

b. In our statement, we also reiterated Secretary Christopher's Feb 10 statement on U.S. willingness to participate in a multilateral implementation and enforcement of a Tripartite Agreement. Our statement also called on the international community to offer economic aid and reconstruction assistance to Bosnia once a settlement is reached. We urge you to make a statement along these lines as well.

c. We should immediately adopt a UNSC resolution to enforce a no-fly zone over Bosnia.

d. We will now seek on an urgent basis a UNSC statement/resolution whose major elements would include: a firm statement of support for Izetbegovic's decision to sign; a demand that the Bosnian Serbs also reach agreement; and a call upon the international community to offer economic and reconstruction assistance to Bosnia. We seek your support for this resolution which Ambassador Albright will discuss with your representative at the UN.

7. If the Bosnian Serbs do not react very promptly to the foregoing steps, we believe it will be necessary to take the following additional actions;

e. An intensive diplomatic campaign aimed at further isolating and pressuring Milosevic and the Bosnian Serbs.

f. A major effort to tighten and toughen the sanctions on Serbia to new levels.

g. If the Bosnian Serbs still did not soon negotiate and reach agreement, and participate in a reduction of hostilities, we believe the international community would then have no choice but to consider a series of stronger, more forceful measures.

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Some of the measures to be examined would include the following:

[TO BE DISCUSSED ORALLY]

8. We put forward these ideas as the start of a consultative process designed to end a tragic conflict. We assume you may have other ideas and we would welcome them along with your early thinking on the menu we are advancing for your consideration. We fully recognize that we are proposing consideration of a serious course of action. Some of these measures have downsides and have been considered and put aside in earlier deliberations. We will want to consult closely with you, with the Russians -- who will have some concerns -- and with Vance/Owen before proceeding. An important priority will be to assure the safety of UNPROFOR and humanitarian aid personnel on the ground.

9. But we cannot permit our aid effort to become a hostage which prevents a firm response to continuing violence and ethnic cleansing. Nor can we continue to avoid taking the tough decisions necessary to prevent a wider Balkan conflict which is a fundamental challenge to our security interests along with a continuation of the inhumanity being visited on the Bosnian people. A strong multilateral response which gets the Serbs to reach agreement. Our goal remains the achievement of an agreement accepted by all the parties, which would obviate the need for the military actions outlined above.

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More Forceful Measures

-- Reinforcing and expanding through more assertive means the UNPROFOR and UNHCR humanitarian relief efforts, especially into areas where Bosnian Muslims are presently under siege and unreachable. We would be prepared to continue and even increase airdrops.

-- Fully lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia so that the legitimate government can better defend itself against Bosnian Serb heavy weapons;

-- Alternatively, a partial lifting of the arms embargo to permit the Bosnians to acquire light weapons. We might then equalize the military equation by launching multilateral air strikes against Bosnian Serb heavy artillery sites. (We would, in essence, strike at those weapons which the Bosnian Serbs had agreed to withdraw as part of the London agreements but which continue to be the spearhead of their attacks).

-- Warn the Bosnian Serbs and Belgrade that if they persist in their intransigence and their attacks, including any retaliation against UNPROFOR and humanitarian aid personnel, we would be prepared to carry out multilateral air strikes against Serb-military targets in Bosnia or in Serbia itself;

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ISSUE PAPER

LIFTING THE SIEGE OF SARAJEVO

Background

This plan for lifting the siege of Sarajevo would be but one element -- albeit a major one -- of a larger plan of military arrangements for implementing an overall peace plan agreed upon by the parties. It is recognized that there are inherent limitations in drafting a plan without knowing more about the overall context.

Despite the agreements made at the London Conference last August, Bosnian Serb forces under the direction of Radovan Karadzic continue to pound the city of Sarajevo from 15 "major" artillery sites in the hills around Sarajevo. Additionally, with the exception of the Sarajevo airport, which is held by UNPROFOR, we believe there are 6000-8000 Bosnian Serb Army regular troops and 4000-5000 Serb irrregulars in the area of Sarajevo. Opposing them are 15,000-20,000 Bosnian government forces. The map at Tab A shows the reported locations of Bosnian Serb artillery in the immediate area of Sarajevo. In recent days, Bosnian Serb units have pressed forward into the suburbs of Sarajevo and into Stup, threatening to cut off the city from the airport.

There is no reliably open land route from Sarajevo to Muslim-controlled territory, all roads out being held by Serbian forces or subject to fire from them. Sarajevo depends for its food on UNHCR supplies, mostly delivered by airlifts (in which US planes participate). UNHCR estimates that, despite periodic interruptions of the airlift and of distributions from the airport warehouses, it has provided minimum subsistence rations to the city, at virtually the full level of requirements. However, food beyond survival rations, and other basic services -- water, electricity, medical supplies, fuel, building materials -- are not being provided with any regularity. Though the electrical power substaions that serve the city remain largely intact, the main power switching center in downtown Sarajevo has been destroyed, and the gas pipeline and three major (400kv) power lines servicing the city pass through Serb-controlled areas. It must be noted that the city's water and sewerage systems depend on electricty.

Sarajevo continues to function as the official headquarters of the GOBH, which the USG recognizes, although we do not, for security reasons, maintain an embassy in the city. (No country maintains an embassy there, although France does have a resident ambassador on the ground.) Significant numbers of foreigners, including UN officials (some of whom are American military attached to the UNPROFOR headquarters), journalists, and relief workers, are in the city.

Two proposals have been made for breaking this siege: the Western European Union's "Safe Haven Sarajevo" document and the Vance/Owen plan's Draft Military Accord. In addition, NATO has proposed a concept analysis of "relief areas" and "safe zones" (NATO 742). All contain many common elements, similar schedules for being put into effect -- though the Vance/Owen plan is more detailed and offers more specifics on necessities for implementation.

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The plan developed below attempts to draw upon the strengths of the two existing proposals, bearing in mind the political and military realities. Since we do not have a clear sense of what different Russians have meant when they talk of a joint initiative to lift the siege, we have not endeavored to factor possible Russian views into this plan. Indeed, since their ideas might be problematic at best, perhaps it would be better to present them with our concept.

Design of the plan was based upon several assumptions. First, it assumes agreement and full compliance by all parties with all steps of the implementation process, which is problematical at best. Second, no estimates for the number of troops required to enforce the plan after compliance by the parties have been made independently. Rather, the estimates used in the original Vance/Owen and WEU formulations are repeated. Additionally, there will be a continuing requirement for humanitarian aid. The plan assumes that such will be provided by other agencies and makes no provision for escort, distribution, etc.

A major consideration is that the plan, like the Vance/Owen and WEU models, calls for the demilitarization of the city proper. In effect the legitimate government of Bosnia-Herzegovina is denied the ability to maintain military forces in its own capital.

There are, in principle, at least two other conceptual approaches to "lifting the siege":

1) Driving the Serb forces investing the city back a sufficient distance -- some 30 km for them to be out of artillery range of the city and vital infrastructure facilities -- that they could no longer impose a direct threat to the population in the city or its links with the airport, while permitting GOBH functions to continue to operate from Sarajevo.

Such an approach would seek to replicate the effects of decisive local military success by the Bosnian forces. There is no reason to believe the Serbians would voluntarily agree to pull back unilaterally, other than as a part of a general settlement (if then). Use of foreign forces to compel such an end to the vulnerability of Sarajevo to military attack would require very substantial ground and air forces and would amount to large scale, direct combat intervention on the Bosnian side. Accordingly, this approach has not been examined in detail.

2) Securing an agreement not to use heavy weapons against Sarajevo, or to a withdrawal of heavy weapons by both sides. (For these purposes, "heavy weapons" mean direct fire weapons over 12.7mm, mortars and artillery of 82mm and above, tanks, and ground-to-ground missiles.)

This would entail the Bosnian government forces' removing their heavy weapons from the city altogether and the Serbians' pulling their heavy weapons back some 30 km from the city. (Alternatively, heavy weapons would be assembled in set locations and placed under UN control.) Thereafter, both sides would remain free to continue to fight over the city and access to it, but only with lightly armed units. The focus in the plan is therefore on heavy weapons rather than on driving the Serbs back. The effect would be to reduce the dangers to the

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civilian population-- and, in practice, to shift the military balance toward the Muslims, who have more troops but many fewer heavy weapons.

Bosnian President Izetbegovic has said he will insist on a halt to the shelling of Sarajevo as a condition to participating further in the Vance/Owen talks. Presumably he would be prepared to agree to have Bosnian units stop their shelling of Serb positions in exchange. Whether the Serbian forces would regard keeping the Bosnians in the talks as a sufficient incentive to agree to cease shelling, much less place their heavy weapons under UN control, is uncertain.

Some element of outside enforcement is likely to be necessary for a limit on heavy weapon use to be meaningful. After the 1991 Vance accords for Croatia, Krajina Serb heavy weapons were assembled under UNPROFOR guard, but when Croatian forces broke the truce to attack Krajina Serb positions in the "pink zone," the Krajina Serb forces pushed the UN guards aside and retook control of the assembled weapons. Without an international commitment to monitor compliance with a ban on heavy weapons deployment or use and to take action against violators, it is unlikely that a ban would hold for long.

However, whether described as a prohibition on use of heavy weapons or an agreement to withdraw them from the area, this approach would differ from the first in that it might be enforceable with less foreign ground involvement. The USG, and possibly other outside governments as well, by use of highly sophisticated surveillance equipment and airborne weapons capabilities, might be able to locate and attack weapons deployed or used in violation of such an agreement, without having to use ground forces, and with a more focused and limited military commitment than would be entailed by attempting to drive off Serbian forces generally from around Sarajevo. While capabilities to detect violations and attack heavy weapons used or deployed in violation of a ban would be much less than 100%, it would probably be possible to impose a significant cost on violations. However, the weapons involved are relatively easy to conceal and are highly mobile, and the US would definitely not be able to detect and attack all violating weapons. Further analysis of US surveillance and attack capabilities are at the Codeword level.

In the event the US or other outside countries used air power to enforce a heavy weapons ban around Sarajevo, they would have crossed the line to direct military action in the conflict and, because of the imbalance in heavy weapons capability, to de facto intervention on the Bosnian government side. Even if, as seems likely, that action could be taken with relatively good effect and without requiring ground forces, US planes would be exposed to Serbian air defenses (and to the risk of a Bosnian Muslim provocation). Moreover, the Serbian forces would have the option of responding to the US action in other areas, e.g. by ceasing to permit UN relief operations or attacking UNPROFOR units. In this respect, enforcing a heavy weapons ban presents considerations similar to those involved in enforcing the no-fly zone.

The balance of this paper details a proposal for an agreed demilitarization of Sarajevo.

Basic Elements of Plan

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Stopping the fighting in and around Sarajevo on an agreed, internationally monitored basis will require the following basic elements:

- An **agreement** by the warring parties to undertake this plan and to accept international monitoring of its implementation.

- In conjunction with this agreement will be a **declaration of forces and weapons**, followed by a **cease-fire** within three days of agreement. A **demarcation line** -- whose position will be determined in the agreement -- will be established, and within 48 hours of a cease-fire parties must withdraw personnel, heavy weaponry, and equipment to 1-3 km (depending on terrain) beyond the demarcation line.

- Establishment of a **2-part "safe zone"** that will require the **withdrawal of troops and their heavy weapons** in order to provide protection to the civilian population in and around Sarajevo. The **inner zone** would consist of the Sarajevo core, its airport, signifiicant power infrastructure, and the immediate concentration of civilians in the plain of Sarajevo. It will measure 15 km east to west and 2-3 km north to south except in the heavily disputed western part of the city, where it will measure 8-9 km north-south. All military personnel and their equipment will be withdrawn from within the inner zone. For the Bosnian Muslims, compliance would mean withdrawal of all military forces from the inner zone, along established "safe routes" (see below) through Serb-controlled areas, to Muslim-controlled areas in central Bosnia. There is risk and difficulty in demanding that the GOBH demilitarize the city as a quid, but the Serbians would probably insist. The advantage, however, is that GOBH demilitarization of Sarajevo gives us some hope of presenting this as even-handed, still neutral, and therefore it would not be necessary to end the humanitarian aid effort. This advantage holds especially if Russia participates in monitoring/enforcement. Moreover, since we might be seen as having entered the war on Bosnia's side, we might be able to play up disarming the city's defenders as balancing the pain on both sides.

  We should also consider, however, if we would want first to propose enforcement of the heavy weapons part of the London agreement, and save demilitarization of Sarajevo to offer the Serbians if they demand a quid. Another alternative might be to move not just the Serb heavy weapons but the Serb forces themselves outside the 30-Km outer zone, and allow Bosnian forces minus heavy weapons to remain in the city, perhaps with their strength significantly reduced and subject to monitoring by the Joint Commission. A variation of this would be to require all Bosnian forces (Serb and Muslim) to withdraw beyond the 30-kilometer ring. That would also be easiest for UNPROFOR to enforce.

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Although UNPROFOR military personnel will continue to monitor the boundary of the inner zone, civilian authorities under UN supervision will be responsible for maintaining law and order within it. The **outer zone** would extend to a 30 km radius from Sarajevo and would be patrolled by UNPROFOR. Teams of UNPROFOR members and local authorities will maintain civil order in the towns on the outer zone. All heavy weapons would be removed from the outer zone to beyond the 30 km radius from the center of the city and placed in depots under UN control. In practice, this would create a "doughnut" around Sarajevo into which Serbian units would not be permitted to move heavy weapons.

- Introduction of a **10,000-member UNPROFOR military and civilian contingent** to undertake the operations listed below. This contingent will maintain its own, organic air support. (This represents a minimum force, according to the WEU plan, based on "confidence in political agreements." The WEU "worst case" stated that up to a division (15-20,000) would be needed.) This augmented UNPROFOR will be responsible for:

  - monitoring the inner zone boundary between Serb-controlled territory outside Sarajevo and the demilitarized city inside;
  - monitoring compliance with the cease-fire and with the ban on heavy weapons in the 30 km radius area; in the event of violations, UNPROFOR peace keepers would , through the joint commission, issue a warning to the offending parties, including a short deadline for "cease and desist;" upon expiration of deadline, peace keepers would shift to a peace-enforcing operation, using their broad ROE authority and air support to force compliance
  - opening the blue roads and monitoring compliance with the requirement of free passage along the "blue routes" from the city, to include operation of checkpoints and convoy escorts;
  - maintaining civil order within the inner zone with local authorities, i.e. in the city and its immediate environs. Civil authorities in the outer zone would be executed by teams consisting of combined units of UNPROFOR troops and local civil police authorities;
  - its own self-defense without issuance of a warning, initiated by commanders on the scene;
  - occupation of militarily significant points in the outer zone so as to form quick, mutually supporting reaction forces in the event of cease-fire violations.

{Note that these are the forces' duties assume compliance by the parties; compelling compliance or punishing non-compliance would require additional effort}

- Establishment of a **Joint Commission** for executing and monitoring the plan. It will be composed of the Commander of the UNPROFOR Sarajevo Command, a command and support element from UNPROFOR, and a representative from each of the warring sides consisting of the commander for the troops in the area affected.

- The opening of **safe routes** along the major transportation corridors surrounding Sarajevo in order to allow for the protected withdrawal of forces and weaponry, the free movement of UN forces and relief convoys, and the control of entry to and exit from the "safe zone." Safe routes would be from Sarajevo northwest to Zenica, northeast to Zvornik on the Serbian border (which is the main entry point for UNHCR relief convoys from Belgrade), southwest to Mostar, and to Split. Except to the northwest, these routes extend through contested areas outside the 30 km circle. (It would, theoretically, be possible to add other routes, e.g. to the

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east and northeast to permit supply to eastern Bosnia from Sarajevo). UNPROFOR personnel would establish checkpoints along these routes and at the outer limits of the "safe zone."

- **Restoration of civilian infrastructure**, with a joint commission of representatives of all sides and a UN civilian team determining priorities and needs and executing the work with civil authorities and UN technical experts.

Implementation of the Plan

The plan is to be carried out in 4 phases. Under the best of circumstances the full implementation could take place over a period of approximately 3 weeks. Though phases will follow a sequential order, steps within each phase may be carried out in a parallel manner, except where noted.

Phase I: Agreement and cease-fire

Step 1 - Agreement by the warring parties.
Step 2 - Cease-fire within 24 hours of agreement and a freeze on movement of forces and weapons. Within 48 hours of cease-fire, warring parties will move all troops, weapons, and equipment to 1-3 km (depending on terrain) beyond a demarcation line along the to be determined by the agreement.
Step 3 - Declaration of forces within 72 hours of cease fire, which will include precise documentation of number and location of personnel, heavy weapons, and a description of minefields.
Step 4 - Declaration of "safe routes" between Sarajevo and the 3 cities listed above.
Step 5 - Declaration of the inner and outer safe zones.
Step 6 - Declaration of fall back/assembly areas beyond the outer zone to which the warring parties and their heavy weapons will be withdrawn.

Step 7 - Establishment of Joint Commissions for weapon inspections and infrastructure repair.

Phase 1 should require 4 days to complete. Steps 3-6 can be executed simultaneously.

Phase II: Demilitarization of inner zone

Step 1 - UNPROFOR military personnel will move to the following areas: 1) the demarcation line to complete the separation of forces; 2) the outer limits of the inner zone to control access to it and prevent reinforcements to any of the parties; 3) the checkpoints along the "safe routes" and the entry and exit point to these routes. Along with inspectors from the Joint Commission, UNPROFOR military personnel will begin to move into the outer zone to establish positions for the later removal of weapons
Step 2 - UNPROFOR military personnel begin clearing "safe routes" of obstacles and land mines. They also carry out repairs on these routes where necessary.
Step 3 - Upon completion of Step 2, safe routes will be open to civilian and humanitarian movement.

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Step 4 - All parties begin removal of heavy weapons from the inner zone, withdrawing along designated safe routes to designated areas established by the agreement beyond the 30 km limit of the outer zone.

Step 5 - Only upon full completion of step 4, all parties will evacuate troops from the inner zone, withdrawing along the safe routes to designated areas established by the agreement beyond the 30 km limit of the outer zone. (As noted above, this effectively de-militarizes the city, because the Muslim forces must move out entirely.) The evacuation would have to be conducted in a fashion that does not upset the military balance, i.e., there must be provisions that ensure Serbian forces now in place would not be able to over run or seriously harass a city which had been left defenseless except for Muslim forces in the outer zone. Specifically, we recognize the potential danger of requiring the Bosnian government to pull all of its forces out of Sarajevo and relocate them in central Bosnia, whereas Serbian troops minus their heavy weapons wouldd be allowed within 2-15 KM of the city, with heavy weapons close enough to the city to permit rapid reinforcement if the ceasefire were broken at any point. Moreover, even if the present non-heavy-weapons balance in the outer zone would enable Bosnian forces there to protect themselves and the city, there must be some provisions for preventing influx of new forces, e.g., implementation of a military freeze and some kind of patrols of the perimeter to prevent a buildup.

Step 6 - UNPROFOR military personnel previously in place along the demarcation line and Joint Commission teams undertake inspections to determine full compliance with withdrawal of heavy weapons and troops. This plan allows for UNPROFOR to issue warnings in cases of non-compliance with deadlines, then shifting from peacekeeping to peace enforcing if deadlines pass. The U.S. would not participate in peacekeeping operations in Bosnia on the assumption that the parties will voluntarily comply with the agreements; the best hope for getting "voluntary" compliance is to have the muscle and clear intent to enforce if necessary. Because, short of a decision to sweep all Serbian forces (the likely violators of the cease-fire) from the 30 KM zone through major military action (which would probably require even more than the division planned by the WEU and serious -- read NATO -- command and control), UNPROFOR would be in a difficult situation: constantly faced with decisions on when to shift modes, asuming even a low-level of violence.

The shifting back and forth under these circumstances would see firefights breaking out between forces previously on peaceful terms, followed by a period of tense peace, and then possibly more violence, an extremely difficult scenario for small unit commanders.

The remedies for the problems outlined above might be (1) a universal, ceasefire followed immediately by political negotiations country-wide, to

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encourage the Bosnians to withdraw and the Serbs to cooperate; and (2) a crediblwe threat of overwhelming force were the Serbs to carry out even low-intensity attacks against Muslims or even UNPROFOR. "Nickle and dime" Serbian attacks producing clumsy UNPROFOR response as it trys to shift from peacekeeping to police to peacemaking and back is a recipe for disaster. Yet the threat to be credible has to be real (i.e., involving the U.S.).

Step 7 - UNPROFOR civilian personnel move to inner zone to oversee the maintenance of law and order in conjunction with existing civil authorities.
Step 8- Joint Commission for infrastructure begins determining and mapping most vital installations for attention and repair.

The steps of phase 2 should take about 7 days for completion under the most benign circumstances, though necessary repairs on the safe routes may require additional time.

Phase III: Heavy weapons removal from outer zone

Step 1 - All parties begin removal heavy weapons from the outer zone. Weapons are to be moved outside the 30 km limit of the safe zone and turned over to UNPROFOR personnel at designated locations. Those that cannot be moved will be placed under UNPROFOR supervision. Military personnel will not be required to evacuate this outer zone.
Step 2 - UNPROFOR and Joint Inspection teams begin inspection searches within the outer zone to monitor compliance with weapons withdrawal/deactivation.

Step 3 - UNPROFOR/local police teams move into place to maintain civil authority within the outer zone. Such police teams could not guarantee that the outer zone would not become a dangerous no-man's land, with a largely Muslim population, Serbian troops, and UNPROFOR forces in an area of hundreds of square miles. UNPROFOR by its presence would have an obligation to do its best to preserve the peace between Muslims and Serbs, but probably has inadequate forces to cover every hamlet, in a situation wheree at least low-level violence and "settling of accounts" are almost inevitable.

Step 4 - Repair of Sarajevo's civilian infrastructure begins, using local help as well as UN technical teams.

The steps of Phase III should require 7 days under the best of circumstances.

Phase IV: End State (approximately 3 weeks after agreement)

UNPROFOR military personnel and Joint Commission Inspectors continue monitoring compliance of weapons removal from outer zone.

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UNPROFOR observers are in place on safe routes and at entry and exit points or the safe zone.

Civil Authority is functioning.

UNPROFOR patrols are operating along limits of inner zone. (Note: the Joint Commission responsible for executing and monitoring such patrols will be comprised of UNPROFOR representatives, Serbian military Commanders, and GOBH civilian officials since, in the latter's case, there would be no GOBH military commander in the inner zone)

Most significant power, transportation, and communication infrastructure is functioning.

Comment

The Vance-Owen plan makes no provision for the number of UNPROFOR civilian and military personnel that will be necessary for its implementation. The WEU plan estimates that it could require a force of up to 20,000. It is questionable that current troop contributing countries, having provided 24,000 UNPROFOR personnel for the former Yugoslavia, will make 20,000 more available for Sarajevo. It will be extremely difficult to obtain 10,000 for the mission, but it could be possible under two conditions. First, almost half of this number could be obtained from the existing UNPROFOR contingents, with perhaps 1,000 from each of the four UNPA's in Croatia. Second, it will be easier to obtain more European and Canadian and other participation if the United States commits forces to this mission. These US personnel could be in the civilian UN component and involved in the supervision of the civil authorities in the inner zone and the rebuilding of Sarajevo's infrastructure. Even this small US contingent might have symbolic meaning and could encourage current participating countries to provide the remaining needed forces. If a small U.S. contingent fails to prompt other participating states to provide real military forces, significant U.S. forces on the ground would probably be necessary. Ultimately only the U.S. might be able to provide the credible "overwhelming force" threat cited above as necessary. We note in conclusion that it would be inadvisable to redeploy forces in Croatia to Bosnia; not only would that weaken the already inadequate forces in Croatia, it would send precisely the wrong signal to Zagreb and the Krajina Serbs alike.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 22, 1993



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER

FROM: JANE E. HOLL

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on the Former Yugoslavia, March 24, 1993

The agenda and supporting materials for the subject meeting are attached for Principals review.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to release the Memorandum to Agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to Agencies
Tab A Agenda
Tab B Options Paper on Implementing Vance/Owen
Tab C Responding to Serb Intransigence in New York
Tab D Lifting the Sarajevo Siege

Tony - Sandy's paper at Tab C was Principals Only. Do you want it distributed this way? J

From me to Principals

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MW NARA, Date 4/1/10

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

2010-0533-M

~~SECRET~~

3/23/93

TL:

I have attached the memo on the March 24 Principals' Committee meeting, revised per your instructions to have the report originate from you directly to the Principals.

Will strongly recommends, however, that he personally send the completed versions "Eyes Only" to the Principals through their Executive Secretaries, with no copies. Problems occurred in the past when we tried to hand-deliver copies to the Principals because of confusion in the Principals' offices. Sending the reports E.O. to the Principals through the Executive Secretary builds accountability into the system.

DECISION:

✓ Approve Will's recommendation to have him personally transmit the PC meeting reports (although drafted to read from you to the Principals) "Eyes Only" to the Principals, through their Executive Secretaries, with no copies.

____Disapprove -- See me for further instruction.

CEK

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003e. memo	[Duplicate of 003a] (2 pages)	ca. 03/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4005

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0010 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, March 25, 1993

2010-0533-M
rs530

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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PC ID

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9320269
DATE 23 MAR 93

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION FOR 24 MAR PC MTG ON FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	24 Mar	0600	LBBranscum COPY: 1
MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520			COPY: 1

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9320269
DATE 23 MAR 93

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION FOR 24 MAR PC MTG ON FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506			COPY: 1
MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	3/23/93	23:12	COPY: 1

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MI NARA, Date 4/1/10
2010-0533-M

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See also 2013-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title: PC0011 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, March 27, 1993				
Staff Office-Individual: Records Management				
Original OA/ID Number: 4005				
Row: 43	Section: 6	Shelf: 5	Position: 2	Stack: V

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~re: Decisions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, March 27, 1993 (1 page)~~	~~04/09/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RDS 04/17/2015

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4005

FOLDER TITLE:
PC011 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, March 27, 1993

2010-0533-F
rs531

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9320311
RECEIVED: 01 APR 93 10

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 09 APR 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 27 MAR PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 05 APR 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF:

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0011 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		MILLISON
		NSC CHRON
		WALKER

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MS NARA, Date 4/11/05
2010-0533-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: NSJDA DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	93040118	FOR DECISION
001		Z	93040912	LAKE APPROVED RECOMS
002		X	93040912	KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	930409	FUERTH, L	
002	930409	GROSSMAN, M	
002	930409	SHEFFIELD, H	
002	930409	LAUDER, J	
002	930409	SHERFIELD, M	
002	930409	INDERFURTH, K	

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9320311
RECEIVED: 01 APR 93 10

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 09 APR 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
SOC

PERSONS: 2:30 PM - 4:00 PM PER M. WADSWORTH

SUBJECT: DECISION OF PC MTG ON BOSNIA ON 27 MAR

ACTION: KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 05 APR 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF:

FILES: IFG O NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		MILLISON
		NSC CHRON
		WALKER

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 4/11/10
2010-0533-[illegible]

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY JDA DATE 4/9 BY HAND W/ATTCH

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National Security Council
The White House

4/4 0800

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 20311

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	1		
ExecSec			
Staff Director			
D/APNSA	2	Adv Dec Advisor has seen	
APNSA	3		
~~Situation Room~~	4		Tab I
West Wing Desk	5		
NSC Secretariat	6		R

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

APR 95 6:30

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9320311
DATE 09 APR 93

SUBJECT: DECISION OF PC MTG ON BOSNIA ON 27 MAR
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	9Sep93	1538	Sandra Schmitt COPY: 1
MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520			COPY: 1

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 4/11/10
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DATE 09 APR 93

SUBJECT: DECISION OF PC MTG ON BOSNIA ON 27 MAR
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
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ROOM 292, OEOB
WASHINGTON, DC 20506

COPY: 1

DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
4/9/93	2:10 PM	Christina Tarpley

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

COPY: 1

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 4/1/20
2012-0533-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC, ROOM 379 OEOB

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NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER (FRI) 04.09. '93 14:16 NO. 1460069318 PAGE 1

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

DELTA/NMCC FAX
1417L
9 APR 93

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

1993 APR -9 PM 2:06

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE NO. 0635 CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION DECISIONS OF PC MTG

LOG # 20311

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		

NSR

REMARKS:

PLEASE NOTE IS EYE ONLY PACKAGE!!!!

~~EYES ONLY~~

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MI NARA, Date 4/1/10
2010-0533-M

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT
09/14/96 0129

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE
- ☐ FLASH
- ☐ IMMEDIATE
- ☐ PRIORITY
- ☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: [signature]

DATE/TIME: 09/14/96 0129

MESSAGE #: 0012

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: DECISION OF PC MTG PAGES: 2

PLEASE DELIVER TO: LOG # 20311

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By AW NARA, Date 4/11/12

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~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

20311

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 9, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JAMES A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

CAPTAIN H. L. SHEFFIELD
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the United States United Nations

SUBJECT: Decisions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, March 27, 1993 (S)

Attached for distribution to Principals only is the Decisions Memorandum for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia for March 27, 1993. (S)

for Kristie A. Kenney
William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum to Principals

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 4/1/10
2012-0573-M

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 9, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
USUN AMBASSADOR
ASSISTANT TO THE VICE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Decisions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, March 27, 1993 ~~(S)~~

-- Approved a demarche to Belgrade on the activities of its forces in Bosnia and those of the Bosnian Serbs. ~~(S)~~

-- Decided to send demarches to Athens, Paris, and Moscow urging them to press Belgrade to persuade the Bosnian Serbs to negotiate seriously and reach agreement. ~~(S)~~

-- Decided to see whether next weeks's meeting of NACC Defense Ministers (the GDM) could issue a statement calling on the Bosnian Serbs and Belgrade to cease aggression and reach agreement. ~~(S)~~

-- Authorized Ambassador Albright to (1) detach the No Fly enforcement resolution at the UN from a resolution tightening sanctions; and (2) to phrase the latter as "tightening" rather than new sanctions, in order to make it more palatable to Moscow. ~~(S)~~

-- Asked Samuel Berger to ask Leon Fuerth to prepare a 2-3 page report on what has been done to improve sanctions enforcement. ~~(S)~~

-- Asked Jenonne Walker to prepare an options paper on other steps to press the Bosnian Serbs to reach agreement, for consideration at a future Principals meeting. ~~(S)~~

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0533-M
~~RS 9/30/14~~
RDS 4/11/2015

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~~SECRET~~

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

20311

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 1, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: JENONNE WALKER

SUBJECT: Decisions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, March 27, 1993

Attached at Tab I is the memorandum to agencies for the subject meeting. Due to the sensitive nature of the subject, we recommend that the Memorandum to Principals be on a close-hold basis for Principals use only.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you approve distribution of the attached memo to Principals.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

That you authorize Will Itoh to release the memorandum to agencies attached at Tab A.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to Agencies
Tab A Memorandum to Principals

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MS NARA, Date 4/1/10

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Declassify on: OADR

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SECRET

See also 2013-0667-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

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Folder Title: PC0012 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, April 9, 1993				
Staff Office-Individual: Records Management				
Original OA/ID Number: 4005				
Row: 43	Section: 6	Shelf: 5	Position: 2	Stack: V

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. paper~~	~~re: Interim Objectives for Bosnia (7 pages)~~	~~04/16/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 08/03/2015
~~001b. paper~~	~~re: Proposed Phasing of Implementation (1 page)~~	~~04/15/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VR 6/11/2020
~~002a. memo~~	~~re: Decisions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, April 9, 1993 (2 pages)~~	~~04/19/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RDS 04/17/2015
~~002b. memo~~	~~[Draft Version of 002a, with annotations] (2 pages)~~	~~ca. 04/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VR 6/11/2020
003. form	Distribution Receipt [partial] (1 page)	04/07/1993	P3/b(3)
004a. memo	re: Principals Committee Meeting on the Former Yugoslavia, April 9, 1993 (1 page)	04/08/1993	P1/b(1)
004b. memo	Memorandum for the President re: U.S. Policy Toward Bosnia (5 pages)	ca. 04/1993	P1/b(1)
004c. report	re: Monitoring the Vance-Owen Agreement (6 pages)	04/05/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4005

FOLDER TITLE:
PC012 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, April 9, 1993

2010-0533-F
rs532

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9320412
RECEIVED: 23 APR 93 16

TO: LAKE

FROM: ASPIN, L

DOC DATE: 16 APR 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
CM

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP PAPER FOR 9 APR PC MTG ON BOSNIA - JOINT OSD / JCS PAPER ON PROPOSED INTERIM STEPS

ACTION: TRANSFERED FM PRS LOG 9302546 DUE DATE: 27 APR 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: LAKE LOGREF: 9320335 9320350

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0012 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJWF CLOSED BY: NSJWF DOC 1 OF 1

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MT NARA, Date 4/1/10
2010-0533-F

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001		X	93042316	NOTED BY LAKE
001		X	93042316	TRANSFERED FM PRS LOG 9302546

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20412

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

April 16, 1993

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Tony:

Enclosed is the paper on interim steps in Bosnia that was tasked during our Principal's meeting of 9 April. It is a combined OSD and Joint Staff effort. Please circulate it for comment as appropriate.

We would appreciate the opportunity to review the other papers tasked during that meeting and request they be circulated as they become available.

Sincerely,

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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ISSUE PAPER

INTERIM OBJECTIVES FOR BOSNIA

This paper outlines the pros and cons of adopting as an interim objective for Bosnia the establishment of a UN-supervised cease-fire in place, with the features described below, based on the principles of the London Conference.

Context. The current US -- and UN and EC -- objective in Bosnia is to have the Serbs sign and comply with the Vance-Owen Peace Plan. A key feature of that plan is that it requires large scale Serbian withdrawals from territory they now control and from which the Muslim population has been forcibly expelled. (See attached map) In addition, it would establish a new Bosnian state of ten provinces, each (except nominally for Sarajevo) dominated by one ethnic group, but with a complex tripartite power sharing structure, and it would entitle those expelled and refugees to return to their former homes.

Despite vigorous negotiating efforts, there is little immediate prospect of Serbian agreement to sign, much less to fully implement, the VOPP. There is, to be sure, some level of US force with which we could occupy the entire country, and force acceptance of whatever peace terms we like. However, there is no significant support in the Administration, much less in the Congress or among our allies, for sending a direct intervention force of this scale. While various increased pressures -- ranging from tightened sanctions to limited air strikes -- are being considered, there are difficulties about all the pressure options, if only because of the need to secure UN, allied, and/or Russian authorization or participation. Moreover, there is also serious question whether even the strongest actions being considered -- such as strikes against Serbian artillery and other heavy weapons -- would suffice to induce the Serbs to surrender by agreement much of the territory they have won by military force, brutally but successfully applied, in what they regard as a national crusade.

The Proposal. The goal laid out by the Administration on February 10 was a "negotiated settlement...acceptable to all parties." An alternative to continuing, given the present context, to focus our principal effort on seeking Serbian agreement to the VOPP is to seek, as an interim step, the implementation of key features of the London Accords -- a cease fire, limited withdrawals of forces, control of heavy weapons, free movement of relief, and release of prisoners. This more modest objective would be based on the urgent need to stop the fighting and civilian suffering, pending agreement on the future political structure of the country. It would also seek to broaden the scope of the discussion beyond Bosnia itself, to try to create stability in the Former Yugoslavia generally.

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2013-0682-M
8/3/15 KBH (4.31)

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The proposal has the following elements:

1. We would seek to have the parties agree to a cease-fire in place. In order to avoid the uncertainties of the multiple prior aborted cease fire agreements, it should be negotiated in advance, and would come into effect on a phased basis in different areas and as progress was made in implementation (see Annex A for a possible phasing system). As cease-fires were established across the country, opposing forces would separate by withdrawals to pre-agreed lines (creating a DMZ between forces) and heavy weapons would be turned over to UN control.

2. The cease fire would be followed by limited Serbian withdrawals from around Sarajevo, as well as other places, such as Tuzla and Mostar, where they can easily cut off relief supplies to Muslim-held areas. The Muslim enclaves in Eastern Bosnia, but not Bihac in the West, would be evacuated. Other geographic arrangements are possible.

3. Muslims who wished to leave Serb (or Croatian) controlled areas would be assisted to do so. Similar assistance would be offered other ethnic groups who found themselves on the "wrong" side of a line of de facto control. All prisoners would be released, with some system to deal with prisoners who are alleged war criminals, such as having them screened by an international tribunal.

4. UN and other relief efforts would have free movement throughout the country. Humanitarian programs would be stepped up, and expanded beyond subsistence food supply to include restoration of basic services (fuel, water, sewer, power) and construction of housing, both to replace damaged residences and to accommodate refugees.

5. The US would, through NATO, and with UNSC authority, participate with other nations in an expanded UN force to implement the interim agreement. Deployments would be phased to match progress on compliance by the parties. The force deployed would be sized and configured (as is the notional VOPP implementation force) to overwhelm local resistance, not merely to monitor voluntary implementation, and would have ROEs authorizing use of effective force for that mission. In particular, once a cease fire had been established in an area, violators would be counterattacked vigorously, as would those who interfered with relief convoys. In the event of a general breakdown of the cease fire, i.e., of a collapse of the basic political agreement to end the war essentially in place, the implementation force would either be re-enforced or withdrawn.

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6. There would be no effort to establish multi-ethnic civil authorities: De facto, Muslim controlled areas, including Sarajevo, would be run by the Bosnia-Hercegovina Government, while Serbian and Croatian controlled areas would be run by the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat "governments" respectively. The exact control and relationship of Croatian areas is not certain.

7. A similar cease fire in place, with weapons under international control, would be established for Croatia, leaving the Croatian Serbs in effective control of the bulk of the area they now hold. This would replace the 1991 Vance plan for Croatia. Alternatively, no explicit changes would be made in arrangements for Croatia.

8. US would lead international efforts focused on securing an effective cease fire, limited withdrawals, and expanded humanitarian programs of the interim agreement, not on an ultimate political solution, and we would not, in practice, resist the de facto extension of Belgrade and Zagreb authority to the Serbian and Croatian controlled areas.

9. Economic sanctions and the NFZ would continue, as additional sureties for Serbian compliance with the interim agreement, to be relaxed in a phased process in conjunction with implementation of the agreement.

10. Consistent with the idea of creating a viable Muslim enclave state, the arms embargo on the Sarajevo government would be lifted, possibly in phases as other sanctions were eased.

11. The US would repeat its warnings about Serbian and other factions' misconduct in Kosovo -- and extend them to actions in the Vojvodina and Sandzak.

Although nominally only an interim agreement, without prejudice to final political settlement along the lines of the VOPP, the cease-fire in place, limited withdrawals, and population transfers would, if it succeeded, create a de facto partition of Bosnia, establishing de facto a Muslim enclave state, essentially within territory now controlled by the Muslims (less the eastern enclaves, and plus some territory around Sarajevo and other cities, e.g., Tuzla and Mostar) along with de facto Serbian and Croatian "ministates" with very close connections to Serbia and Croatia.

Arguments for and against.

The case against shifting our focus to a cease-fire in place, limited withdrawals, and orderly population transfers includes the following points:

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-- The "solution" rewards ethnic cleansing and aggression, and indeed all but concedes the creation of a Greater Serbia, absorbing big chunks of Croatia and Bosnia. As such it is immoral, and likely to encourage further ethnic aggression in the Balkans and elsewhere.

-- It would be seen by many as a significant retrenchment by the USG. The outcry from the press and the international community could be significant.

-- The proposal will be strongly resisted by the Muslims, who believe they have - or should have - a commitment from the US to pressure the Serbs into signing up for Vance-Owen.

-- The Muslims may prefer to "go down fighting" rather than, in effect, surrender. Securing Croatian support will prove nearly as difficult as Muslim support.

-- The Serbs would be less likely to agree to the provisions of this proposal, notably the cease-fire, if the arms embargo against the Muslims were to be lifted.

-- In the event of a general breakdown of the cease-fire, a decision would be required to reinforce or withdraw the implementation force. Both alternatives represent an admission of failure with respect to the mission upon which we embarked.

-- Accepting so limited and unsatisfactory an outcome is wholly inconsistent with the Administration's past declarations that even Vance-Owen is unfair to the Muslims, and that partition is not an acceptable solution.

-- The success such an outcome would represent for Serbian nationalism would re-enforce all the worst forces in Serbia and encourage ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and the Vojvodina, and actually ratifies Serbian intransigence in the Krajina and the other UNPAs and pink zones in Croatia.

-- Croatia will gladly pocket ratification of its de facto annexation of the Croatian parts of Bosnia-Hercegovina, but it will not acquiesce in the loss of the UNPAs, or the creation of a secure Serbian Northern Corridor along the Sava. Even if the cease fire held in Bosnia, the Croats may resume military probes at the UNPAs.

-- The proposal is not even stable so far as the Muslims are concerned. Even if they accepted it now, on the ground that, having been abandoned by the West, they have no choice, they will never be reconciled to the result. We will have created what former French Defense Minister Joxe rightly called "a Gaza strip in the middle of Europe."

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-- Implementation of the agreement, assuming only limited local opposition, would probably require about the same force as envisioned for the Vance-Owen plan, and face similar difficulties.

-- The Muslim enclave state will not be viable politically, economically, or militarily. The international community (with heavy reliance on the U.S.) will be committed to protecting it militarily and supporting it economically for years to come.

The case for the proposal includes the following:

-- Granted that the VOPP, or some variant of it that denied the Serbs the fruits of their brutal ethnic cleansing, would be the ideal solution, there is simply no prospect of its being achieved short of massive -- corps plus scale -- US intervention. Only those who favor such intervention, or have some evidence lesser pressures will work to produce massive Serbian concessions, can credibly argue against an interim solution on the ground that VOPP is not only better (which everyone should concede) but that it is attainable.

-- If the US is not prepared to support substantially the large scale international military intervention needed to force the Serbs to accept and implement VOPP, the only possible outcomes are (1) indefinite war, (2) a Serbian victory, and (3) some negotiated cease-fire with much smaller Serbian withdrawals than VOPP requires. Among these three - the only real - possible outcomes, the third is clearly better.

-- It ends the fighting early, avoiding the very real prospect of a final Serb push this spring to eliminate the Muslim hold on the eastern enclaves, and perhaps even Sarajevo itself, with all that would entail in human suffering and frustration of US goals.

-- It provides a framework for a greatly enhanced humanitarian effort, which remains the aspect of the US (and UN and European) effort that has the greatest popular support.

-- Serbians (whether in Belgrade, Pale, or Knin) will now probably accept an outcome which requires a real cease fire, separation of forces, control of heavy weapons, free movement of relief, and even some locally significant withdrawals. There is no particular evidence they seek to eliminate Muslims throughout Bosnia, so long as they get control of the territory they believe should be Serbian. They have (except for the eastern enclaves) now secured the territory they regard as Serbian by right, and could well be prepared to make modest concessions to solidify that control. Further military successes -- which are well within their capability -- might well increase their minimum requirements for peace.

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-- While the Muslims would certainly prefer a more favorable solution, they recognize the desperation of their military position, and the unlikelihood of major military intervention. They will need to be convinced that they will do better to cut a deal now, before their situation deteriorates further.

-- A reasonably contiguous, internationally protected, Muslim state, while facing many problems, is more likely to be viable and stable than whatever would come out of another year or so of continued fighting.

-- Given the profound ethnic tensions in the area, and the effects of two years of ethnic war, an ethnic-based partition, however distasteful, is likely to be the only stable solution. (Even VOPP is an ethnic partition in all but name.) Better that it should be negotiated, and effected under international supervision, than result purely from military operations.

-- By frankly recognizing that large-scale population movements (mostly but by no means exclusively by Muslims) will accompany any settlement, the agreement can provide explicitly for those movements and for accommodating the people who move.

-- The financial costs of enforcing an agreement that has a better chance of actually being complied with by the parties, and of sustaining a Muslim state, while large, are likely to be small compared to the costs of the military effort that would be needed to force acceptance of the VOPP.

-- A de facto partition provides also a framework for resolving the Croatian-Serbian conflict. For all their horrible and treacherous actions, the Serbs have some legitimate grievances, chief among them being mistreatment of Serbs by Croatians on a massive scale in living memory, especially in the Krajina. Serbia will intervene with the old Yugoslav army to prevent Croatia from regaining control of the Krajina. A partition in which Croatia is compensated for the loss of the Krajina with de facto control of Western Hercegovina may well represent the best hope of a stable outcome of that conflict.

-- Reluctant international acceptance of a result that gives the Serbs much of what they feel entitled to, and resolution to enforce that result, will be the best basis on which to convince the Serbs that they will lose badly if they press their luck by making trouble in Kosovo or Vojvodina.

-- The proposal requires significant Serbian concessions, including some withdrawals and a willingness not to press their military advantage. The scale of pressures we are actually prepared to apply -- sanctions, lifting the arms embargo, NFZ enforcement -- are far more likely to be successful in achieving these limited but meaningful concessions than in forcing greater ones.

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-- Moving to a policy that would stress an interim arrangement along these lines is not inconsistent with our backing Vance-Owen up to this point. We have always made clear that we want a settlement the parties themselves agree on, not that we will impose our own notion of a good solution. The proposal seeks, in effect, to implement the key features of the London accords, which has long been US policy.

-- Moreover, there is a view that even if VO were signed, we would be doing very well if it produced, not full implementation, but merely Serbian action to meet the conditions proposed by DOD for commitment of a US force element, namely an effective cease fire, control of heavy weapons, separation of forces, free movement of relief, and release of prisoners. These elements of Vance-Owen would amount, in effect, to a cease fire in place, marginal local Serbian withdrawals, and the creation of a Muslim enclave under UN protection. In short, the practical difference between what it would be reasonable (some even argue too much) to expect of Vance-Owen, and the new proposal, may be rather slight. Moreover, seeking an interim agreement on these lines would not preclude continuing to treat the VOPP as a long term objective.

-- And it would allow for a negotiated settlement, albeit long term, to be conducted out from under the gun.

-- A policy along these lines has the greatest chance of winning active Russian support, which is important not only for its own sake but as a contribution to our overriding goal of protecting reform in Russia.

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PROPOSED PHASING OF IMPLEMENTATION

- **Phase I.** This phase would consist of a cease-fire in place. NATO lead peacekeeping forces, under a UN mandate, would be introduced once indications of seriousness have been demonstrated.

- **Phase II.** Once a stable cease-fire is in place, peacekeeping forces (including the US/NATO under UNSC authority) can oversee the separation of forces and take control of heavy weapons. This phase should include the release of detainees and freedom of movement for humanitarian aid.

- **Phase III.** During this phase limited Serbian withdrawals from areas such as Sarajevo, Tuzla and Mostar would take place. Proceeding to this phase requires solid agreement on and cooperation with the previous phases. Any decision to proceed from phase to phase needs to be based on actions, not time.

- **Phase IV.** This phase consists of refugee resettlement and reconstruction. Although, in theory, it would be beneficial to delay these tasks until after the previous three steps are complete, we must "face reality."

    - The moment there is some freedom of movement for beleaguered civilians, they will flow to areas of relative safety.

    - The purpose of the resettlement phase is not to return refugees to their homes, but, to deal with the flow of those who find themselves on the "wrong side of the line."

    - Infrastructure repairs must proceed to the greatest extent possible, if civilian suffering is to be minimized.

- **Phase V.** This would be the final phase of the interim program.

    - Following resettlement and reconstruction of basic services, civil government would need to be reestablished on all sides of the cease-fire lines.

    - These civil authorities would engage in a continuing dialogue (no doubt of a long-term nature) to determine the future political and physical structure of the country.

    - This phase would, for at least the near-term (perhaps decades), result in a de facto partition of Bosnia. The current Bosnian government would control Muslim areas; The SRBH Serbians areas. The exact control and relationship of Croatian areas is not certain.

    - Sanctions, including the arms embargo, would eventually be fully lifted as to all parties.

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DOC DATE: 19 APR 93
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KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 9 APR PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: LAKE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 15 APR 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF: 9320335 9320412

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0012 PRD0001 CODES: BOS

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		WALKER

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002		X	93041921	KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES
003		X	93041921	LAKE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

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002	930419	SHERFIELD, M	
002	930419	INDERFURTH, K	
003	930419	CHRISTOPHER, W	
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KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DECISIONS OF PC MTG ON 9 APR RE BOSNIA

ACTION: LAKE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 15 APR 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF: 9320335 9320412

FILES: IFG O NSCP: PRD0001 CODES:

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TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 19 APR 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DECISIONS OF PC MTG ON 9 APR RE BOSNIA

ACTION: KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 15 APR 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF:

FILES: IFG NSCP: CODES:

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The White House

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West Wing Desk	7		D
NSC Secretariat	8		R

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

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(Date/Time)

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12 APR 93 6:34

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SUBJECT: DECISIONS OF MTG ON 9 APR
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MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	_____	_____	_____ COPY: 1
MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	_____	_____	_____ COPY: 1

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MESSAGE NO. _____ **CLASSIFICATION** ~~SECRET~~ **PAGES** 3

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (WHI FOR)
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION DECISIONS OF 9 APR MEETING

~~EYES ONLY~~

NSC LOG # 20350

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

"EYES ONLY"

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NSC LOG #20350

FROM: **National Security Council** PHONE: **202-456-2291** ROOM: **WHSR**

SUBJECT: **Notice of Meeting** PAGES: 3

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 19, 1993

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

Mr. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

CAPTAIN H. L. SHEFFIELD
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the United States
United Nations

SUBJECT: Decisions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, April 9, 1993 (S)

Attached for distribution to Principals only is the Decisions Memorandum for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia for April 9, 1993. (S)

for William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum to Principals

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By JW NARA, Date 4/1/10

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 19, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
USUN AMBASSADOR
ASSISTANT TO THE VICE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Decisions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, April 9, 1993 (S)

Omnibus Sanctions Resolution

-- As requested by Russian President Yeltsin in his letter to the President, we will recommend to the President that we not press the omnibus sanctions resolution to a vote in the U.N. Security Council until after the Russian referendum on April 25. We will explain our decision to defer by the especially delicate situation in Russia just before the referendum, and use the time to press the Bosnian Serbs to negotiate seriously on the basis on the Vance/Owen plan. (S)

-- Secretary Christopher will write Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev saying that after the referendum we want to bring the resolution promptly to a vote, without a delay between its passage and the effective date of its provisions, and that we will expect Russia either to vote for it or to abstain. In the meantime, Secretary Christopher will urge that Russia use the delay to press the Serbs to negotiate seriously and reach agreement in order to avoid tighter sanctions. (S)

-- Leon Fuerth will prepare a list of sanctions-tightening measures that can be taken without a new resolution. We will urge other Western states to join us in taking them. (S)

-- State will prepare a cable to capitals explaining our position, and Secretary Christopher will take it up when he hosts the other G-7 Foreign Ministers for lunch in Tokyo on April 14. (S)

-- If Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Churkin asks Ambassador Bartholomew about our response to the Yeltsin letter,

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2010-0533-M
RS 9/30/14 (1.06)

Bartholomew will reply that Secretary Christopher will be responding to Foreign Minister Kozyrev. (S)

Peace Process

The following Principals Committee members will draft papers making the best case for the following options, which will be sent to Jenonne Walker for coordination/distribution by Wednesday, April 14:

Leon Fuerth: Pressing hard for a Vance-Owen settlement. We would use the threat of lifting the arms embargo as leverage with the Serbs. (S)

Secretary Aspin: Enforcing a cease-fire through air or ground action or both, along essentially the lines now held by the parties. (S)

Secretary Christopher: Making a major effort to lift the arms embargo in order to let the Bosnian government have a better chance of holding its own with the Bosnian Serbs. This option will include consideration of a new international forum or mechanism that might finally establish a peace after the parties themselves have found a natural balance on the ground. (S)

Ambassador Albright: Using American air power to help redress the military balance. This could be in conjunction with lifting the arms embargo (e.g., to protect the Bosnians until they could acquire and learn to use heavy weapons) or as an alternative to letting them better arm themselves. (S)

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 12, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: JENONNE WALKER

SUBJECT: Decisions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, April 9, 1993

Attached at Tab I is the memorandum to agencies for the subject meeting. Due to the sensitive nature of the subject, we recommend that the Memorandum to Principals be on a close-hold basis for Principals' use only.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you approve distribution of the attached memo to Principals.

Approve ___ Disapprove ___ as amended

That you authorize Will Itoh to release the memorandum to agencies attached at Tab A.

Approve ___ Disapprove ___

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to Agencies
Tab A Memorandum to Principals

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MW NARA, Date 4/1/12

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
USUN AMBASSADOR
ASSISTANT TO THE VICE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Decisions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, April 9, 1993 ~~(S)~~

Omnibus Sanctions Resolution — recommend to the President that we

-- As requested by Russian President Yeltsin in his letter to the President, we will not press the omnibus sanctions resolution to a vote in the U.N. Security Council until after the Russian referendum on April 25. We will explain our decision to defer by the especially delicate situation in Russia just before the referendum, and ~~say that we will~~ use the time to press the Bosnian Serbs to negotiate seriously on the basis on the Vance/Owen plan. ~~(S)~~

-- Secretary Christopher will write Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev saying that after the referendum we want to bring the resolution promptly to a vote, without a delay between its passage and the effective date of its provisions, and that we will expect Russia either to vote for it or to abstain. In the meantime, Secretary Christopher will urge that Russia use the delay to press the Serbs to negotiate seriously and reach agreement in order to avoid tighter sanctions. ~~(S)~~

-- Leon Fuerth will prepare a list of sanctions tightening measures that can be taken without a new resolution. We will urge other Western states to join us in taking them. ~~(S)~~

-- State will prepare a cable to capitals explaining our position, and Secretary Christopher will take it up when he hosts the other G-7 Foreign Ministers for lunch in Tokyo on April 14. ~~(S)~~

-- If Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Churkin asks Ambassador Bartholomew about our response to the Yeltsin letter, Bartholomew will reply that Secretary Christopher will be responding to Foreign Minister Kozyrev. ~~(S)~~

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NR 2/6/2020 (4.34)
2013-0682-M

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Peace Process

The following Principals Committee members will draft papers making the best case for the following options, which will be sent to Jenonne Walker for coordination/distribution by Wednesday April 14:

Leon Fuerth: ~~Continuing essentially our present policy. This would include continuing to favor lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia but not pressing hard for it~~ Pressing hard for a Vance-Owen settlement. We would, ~~however, try to~~ use the threat of lifting ~~it~~ the arms embargo as leverage with the Serbs. ~~(S)~~

Secretary Aspin: Enforcing a cease fire through air or ground action or both, along essentially the lines now held by the parties. ~~(S)~~

~~Ambassador Bartholomew~~ Secretary Christopher: Making a major effort to lift the arms embargo in order to let the Bosnian government have a better chance of holding its own with the Bosnian Serbs. This option will include consideration of a new international forum or mechanism that might finally establish a peace after the parties themselves have found a natural balance on the ground. ~~(S)~~

Ambassador Albright: Using American air power to help redress the military balance. This could be in conjunction with lifting the arms embargo (e.g., to protect the Bosnians until they could acquire and learn to use heavy weapons) or as an alternative to letting them better arm themselves. ~~(S)~~

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9320335
RECEIVED: 07 APR 93 19

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 07 APR 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: YUGOSLAVIA
PC
BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 9 APR PC MTG ON FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

ACTION: ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 10 APR 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL LOGREF: 9320350 9320412

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0012 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		HOLL
		MILLISON
		NSC CHRON
		WALKER

COMMENTS: _____

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	93040718	FOR DECISION
001		X	93040719	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
001	ITOH	Z	93040719	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	93040720	ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	930407	FUERTH, L	BARTHOLOMEW, R
002	930407	LAUDER, J	
002	930407	GROSSMAN, M	
002	930407	SHEFFIELD, H	
002	930407	SHERFIELD, M	
002	930407	INDERFURTH, K	

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RECORD ID: 9320335
RECEIVED: 07 APR 93 19

TO: LAKE

FROM: HOLL
WALKER

DOC DATE: 07 APR 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: YUGOSLAVIA
PC
BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PC MTG ON 9 APR RE FOREMER YUGOSLAVIA

ACTION: FOR DECISION DUE DATE: 10 APR 93 STATUS: X

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL LOGREF:

FILES: IFG NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
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COMMENTS:

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11:05 PM

National Security Council
The White House

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

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ExecSec	1		
Staff Director			
D/APNSA	2		
APNSA	3		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5	4/8	D
NSC Secretariat	6		R

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

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003. form	Distribution Receipt [partial] (1 page)	04/07/1993	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4005

FOLDER TITLE:
PC012 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, April 9, 1993

2010-0533-F
rs532

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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LOG 9320335
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SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION OF PC MTG ON 9 APR RE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
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PRECEDENCE: ~~IMMEDIATE~~
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO. 0627 CLASSIFICATION ~~TOP SECRET~~ PAGES 16

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH FOR
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PC MEETING ON 9 APRIL NSC LOG #20335

A
B
D
D

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (please provide copy to Bartholomew)		
JCS	SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

PLEASE DELIVER TO MEETING PARTICIPANTS
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FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH FOR

(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PC MEETING ON 9 APRIL NSC LOG #20335

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DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

A
B
D
D

REMARKS:

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PRECEDENCE: ~~IMMEDIATE~~
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ROUTINE

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DTG:

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FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH FOR

(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

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(THU) 04.08. '93 20:19

C2. WHSR#2

DOCUMENT #	TIME STORED	PAGE	NUMBER OF DEST.		
			OK	N. G.	TOTAL
1460051258	04.08 20:01	17	3	0	3

*** COMPLETED ***

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A1. CIA#1	17
D1. NMCC#1	17

DESTINATION	P.
B2. STATE#2	17

*** END ***

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004a. memo	re: Principals Committee Meeting on the Former Yugoslavia, April 9, 1993 (1 page)	04/08/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4005

FOLDER TITLE:
PC012 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, April 9, 1993

2010-0533-F
rs532

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
DATE: April 9, 1993
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:00-4:00pm

AGENDA

I. Opening Remarks.....NSC

II. Policy Discussion.....All Participants

a. Options for Presidential Decision

b. Timing/implementation of Vance/Owen

c. Kosovo

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MW NARA, Date 4/1/13

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004b. memo	Memorandum for the President re: U.S. Policy Toward Bosnia (5 pages)	ca. 04/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4005

FOLDER TITLE:
PC012 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, April 9, 1993

2010-0533-F
rs532

RESTRICTION CODES

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004c. report	re: Monitoring the Vance-Owen Agreement (6 pages)	04/05/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4005

FOLDER TITLE:
PC012 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, April 9, 1993

2010-0533-F
rs532

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~ SECRET 20335

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 7, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER

FROM: JANE E. HOLE

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on the Former Yugoslavia, April 9, 1993

The agenda and draft Presidential Decision Memorandum for the subject meeting are attached for Principals' review.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to release the memo to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve ____ Disapprove ____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda
Tab B Presidential Decision Memorandum
Tab C CIA Paper on Monitoring the Vance/Owen Agreement

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By ___ NARA, Date 4/1/10

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SECRET

See also 2013-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title: PC0014 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, April 17, 1993
Staff Office-Individual: Records Management
Original OA/ID Number: 4005

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
43	6	5	2	V

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. paper	re: Options Paper Vance/Owen as Organizing Principle (2 pages)	ca. 04/1993	P1/b(1), ~~P5~~
~~001b. memo~~	~~Madeleine Albright to National Security Adviser re: Options for Bosnia (4 pages)~~	~~04/14/1993~~	~~P1/b(1), P5~~ KC 6/11/2020
~~001c. paper~~	~~re: Lifting the Embargo on Arms Shipments to the Bosnian Government... (10 pages)~~	~~ca. 04/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4005

FOLDER TITLE:
PC014 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, April 17, 1993

2010-0533-F
rs533

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9320397
RECEIVED: 21 APR 93 15

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 23 APR 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF DECISION AT 17 APR PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: LAKE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 24 APR 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF: 9320001 9320023

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0014 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		ITOH
		MILLISON
		NSC CHRON
		WALKER

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MS NARA, Date 4/1/10
2010-0533-M

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: NSJEB DOC 3 OF 3

~~SECRET~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~ RECORD ID: 9320397

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	93042216	FOR DECISION
002		X	93042311	ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES
003		X	93042311	LAKE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	930423	FUERTH, L	
002	930423	GROSSMAN, M	
002	930423	SHERFIELD, M	
002	930423	LAUDER, J	
002	930423	SHEFFIELD, H	
002	930423	INDERFURTH, K	
003	930423	CHRISTOPHER, W	
003	930423	ASPIN, L	
003	930423	WOOLSEY, R	
003	930423	POWELL, C	
003	930423	ALBRIGHT, M	
003	930423	FUERTH, L	

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Recd 4/22 6:10 pm JWR 4/22 1910 h.

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: WA LOG # 20397

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	1	WA	
ExecSec			
Staff Director			
D/APNSA	2	orb	
APNSA	3	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
~~Situation Room~~ Itoh	4		Sign Tab I
West Wing Desk	5	4/22	D
NSC Secretariat	6		R

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

93 APR 23 A8:12

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Exec Sec has distribute

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~~SECRET~~ SECRET 20397

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 23, 1993

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

CAPTAIN H. L. SHEFFIELD
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the United States
United Nations

SUBJECT: Decisions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, April 17, 1993 (S)

Attached for distribution to Principals only is the Decisions Memorandum for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia for April 17, 1993. (S)

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum to Principals

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NARA, Date 4/1/10
Dpa 0533-m

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

SECRET

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 23, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
USUN AMBASSADOR
ASSISTANT TO THE VICE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Decisions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, April 17, 1993 (S)

The options papers written by Secretary Christopher, Secretary Aspin, and Ambassador Albright will be revised in light of the discussion at the meeting. (S)

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NARA, Date 4/1/13
2013-0533-M

Declassify on: OADR

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 21, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: JENONNE WALKER

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

SUBJECT: Decisions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, April 17, 1993

Attached at Tab I is the memorandum to agencies for the subject meeting. Due to the sensitive nature of the subject, we recommend that the Memorandum to Principals be on a close-hold basis for Principals' use only.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you approve distribution of the attached memo to Principals.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

That you authorize Will Itoh to release the memorandum to agencies attached at Tab A.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to Agencies
Tab A Memorandum to Principals

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MW NARA, Date 4/1/10
2010-0533-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9320397
DATE 23 APR 93

SUBJECT: DECISIONS OF PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MTG ON BOSNIA 17 APR
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	23Apr	1430	[signature]
			COPY: 1
MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520			
			COPY: 1

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 4/1/12
2012-0533-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC, ROOM 379 OEOB

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9320397
DATE 23 APR 93

SUBJECT: DECISIONS OF PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MTG ON BOSNIA 17 APR
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	23apr	1400	

COPY: 1

MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520			

COPY: 1

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By M NARA, Date 4/1/10
2010-0573-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC, ROOM 379 OEOB

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9320397
DATE 23 APR 93

SUBJECT: DECISIONS OF PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MTG ON BOSNIA 17 APR
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506			COPY: 1
MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	4/23	2:30P	COPY: 1

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MS NARA, Date 4/1/10
2012-0533-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

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TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
1993 APR 23 AM 11:20

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

RECEIVED
DELTA
23 [illegible] 11 24

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: [signature]

DTG: _____

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE NO. 0745 CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) _____ (PHONE NUMBER) _____ (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION DECISIONS OF PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MTG ON BOSNIA 17 APR LOG # 20397

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
B	STATE	MR. MARC GROSSMAN	Exec Sec	
D	DOD	COL. MICHAEL SHERFIELD	Exec Sec	
A	CIA	MR. John LAUDER	Exec	
D	JCS	CAPT. H.L. Sheffield	Secretary, JCS	

REMARKS:

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MS NARA, Date 4/11/2
2010 0533 - A

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
1993 APR 23 AM 11:20

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE / PRIORITY / ROUTINE

RELEASER: [signature]

DTG:

SECRET

MESSAGE NO. 0745 CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) _____ (PHONE NUMBER) _____ (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION DECISIONS OF PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MTG ON BOSNIA 17 APR LOG # 20397

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/AGENCY	PHONE NUMBER
B	STATE	MR. MARC GROSSMAN	Exec Sec	
D	DOD	COL. MICHAEL SHERFIELD	Exec Sec	
A	CIA	MR. John LAUDER	Exec	
D	JCS	CAPT. H.L. Sheffield	Secretary, JCS	

REMARKS:

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 4/1/2018
2018-0533-M

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TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
1993 APR 23 AM 11:20

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

23 April 93
11 29

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: [signature]

DTG: _____

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE NO. 0745 CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) _____ (PHONE NUMBER) _____ (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION DECISIONS OF PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MTG ON BOSNIA 17 APR LOG # 20397

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
B	STATE	Mr. MARC GROSSMAN	Exec Sec	
D	DOD	COL. MICHAEL SHERFIELD	Exec Sec	
A	CIA	Mr. John LAUDER	Exec	
D	JCS	CAPT. H.L. Sheffield	Secretary, JCS	

REMARKS:

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MJ NARA, Date 4/1/10
2010-0533-M

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9320377
RECEIVED: 16 APR 93 18

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 16 APR 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION OF 17 APR PC MTG ON FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

ACTION: ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 20 APR 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL LOGREF: 9320001 9320023

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0014 PRD0001 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		HOLL
		MILLISON
		NSC CHRON
		WALKER

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: NSKDB DOC 3 OF 3

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NARA, Date 4/1/10
2012-0573-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	93041610	FOR DECISION
001		X	93041617	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
001	ITOH	Z	93041617	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	93041619	LAKE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES
003		X	93041619	ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	930416	CHRISTOPHER, W	FUERTH, L
002	930416	ASPIN, L	BARTHOLOMEW, R
002	930416	WOOLSEY, R	
002	930416	POWELL, C	
002	930416	ALBRIGHT, M	
003	930416	FUERTH, L	BARTHOLOMEW, R
003	930416	LAUDER, J	
003	930416	GROSSMAN, M	
003	930416	SHEFFIELD, H	
003	930416	SHERFIELD, M	
003	930416	INDERFURTH, K	

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9320377
DATE 16 APR 93

SUBJECT: MTG ON 17 APR
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506			COPY: 1
MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520			COPY: 1
MR. RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS IO/UNA -- ROOM 6311 DEPT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319		Apr 17 12:30 pm	COPY: 1

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NARA, Date 4/1/10
2010-0533-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC, ROOM 379 OEOB

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9320377
DATE 16 APR 93

SUBJECT: MTG ON 17 APR
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. REGINALD BARTHOLOMEW DEPT OF STATE	_____	_____	_____

COPY: 1

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MW NARA, Date 4/1/10
2010-0533-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC, ROOM 379 OEOB

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

~~SECRET~~

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: ~~IMMEDIATE~~ Urgent
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: B. Mitchell

DTG: _____

~~EYES ONLY~~

MESSAGE NO. 0699 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 19

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH FOR NSC LOG #20377
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NOTICE OF MEETING ON 16 APR

~~EYES ONLY~~

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		
D	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

DELIVER IMMEDIATELY TO ADDRESSEES "EYES ONLY"

~~EYES ONLY~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MM NARA, Date 4/1/10
2010-0533-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 16, 1993

~~EYES ONLY~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JOHN LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

CAPTAIN H.L. SHEFFIELD
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the United States to the United Nations

SUBJECT: Principals Only Meeting on the Former Yugoslavia (S)

There will be a Principals Only Committee Meeting on the Former Yugoslavia, April 17, 1993, from 3:00-4:30pm in the White House Situation Room. The discussion papers for the meeting are attached and should be distributed EYES ONLY to Principals. (S)

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachments
As stated

cc: Reginald Bartholomew

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MH NARA, Date 4/1/20
2010-0533-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~ SECRET 20377

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 16, 1993

EYES ONLY

MEMO FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
USUN AMBASSADOR

SUBJECT: Bosnia

Three of the four option papers tasked at the last Principals meeting are attached for your review in preparation for tomorrow's meeting. OSD will circulate the latest draft of its paper separately. In view of the sensitive nature of the subject, I ask that you treat these as close-hold.

I have not circulated a formal agenda for this meeting, in order not to constrain our discussion.

Anthony Lake

Attachments
As stated

cc: Leon Fuerth
Reginald Bartholomew

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MI NARA, Date 4/1/10
2012-0533-M

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

SECRET

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. paper	re: Options Paper Vance/Owen as Organizing Principle (2 pages)	ca. 04/1993	P1/b(1), P5

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4005

FOLDER TITLE:
PC014 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, April 17, 1993

2010-0533-F
rs533

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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April 14 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER

FROM AMBASSADOR MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT MKA

SUBJECT: OPTIONS FOR BOSNIA:

1. ISSUE FOR DECISION

Whether to use American air power to supplement an enhanced UNPROFOR presence in Bosnia and Serbia.

2. BACKGROUND

We have never tested the proposition that American military intervention might intimidate the Bosnian Serb militia and their patrons in Belgrade. That premise should be tested. Air power supporting an UNPROFOR presence in key Muslim enclaves ought to create a doubt in Serbian minds that they can pursue their objectives unchecked, a doubt that certainly does not exist today. If this is true, then we would be in a better position to bring pressure to bear on the Serbs to cease their aggressive behavior and sign the peace accords.

A military package which includes air strikes and internationalization of the enclaves could collaterally facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to beseiged civilian populations and aid in the defense of civilians under military attack, one of our highest priorities.

3. U.S. OPTIONS

On February 10, the Secretary outlined a six point program for dealing with Bosnia. Since that time our options have been narrowed while the situation gets worse. Our objective was to level the playing field for the Bosnian Muslims, but while we have made significant progress on the six points, the tide of battle now calls into question the very survival of Bosnia.

Lifting the arms embargo, almost our only remaining publicly announced option, is our greatest threat, but it also has the greatest potential cost and may be the hardest to accomplish. Once we lift the arms embargo, we lose control of what would certainly be a flow of Muslim weapons, not only into Bosnia, but also into the surrounding area. The consequences of more arms could have significant ramifications for neighboring countries.

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AR 70-4 10/1/2013
2013-0682-M (4 of 10)

4. OBJECTIVES

The limited objectives of air power -- unilateral or multilateral -- should include:

1) To get the Serbs to sign the agreement.

2) To demonstrate the commitment and will of the U.S. to prevent "ethnic cleansing" and erase its effects.

3) To help defend remaining Bosnian Muslim enclaves.

4) To provide retaliation in the event that Bosnia Serb military actions prevent humanitarian land convoys.

5) To help protect UNPROFOR from Serb retaliation.

Two significantly more controversial objectives would be:

6) To strike at Serbian military assets that are being used in an aggressive manner in Bosnia or from Serbia.

7) To strike at Bosnian Serb strategic targets (i.e. power nodes, communications and infrastructure in cities like Banja Luka) to demonstrate a real cost for continued aggression.

5. AUTHORITY

Recognizing that legal authority alone will not provide a receptive political environment, a strong case can be made that sufficient authority already exists under Article 51 of the Charter and the Chapter VII provisions of UNSC resolution 770 to employ air power for at least objectives (1) through (5) and perhaps (6) and (7), without obtaining new and explicit Security Council approval.

Having said this, we have to recognize that public denial of our authority by the Secretary-General or by the United Kingdom and France, would severely undercut our case that we have international support or authority for our actions. We may be able to get the support of our allies and possibly the UN Secretary-General, but only if we are willing to commit adequate U.S. military assets to do the job.

6. CONSEQUENCES

Air strikes could result in shutting down the land operations by humanitarian agencies and the United Nations and change the nature and role of UNPROFOR. But neither

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institution has the current capability to do much except to extend the demise of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Today the reality is that humanitarian operations are increasingly being blocked on the ground by Bosnian Serb action.

Further delay in applying a genuine military component to the Bosnian situation risks humanitarian catastrophe for Bosnian Muslims and the total collapse of most of Bosnia to Serb control. Failure to act will embolden the Serbs to overwhelm remaining pockets of Bosnian Muslims, target Bosnian Croatian-controlled regions, consolidate control over areas of Croatia still held by Serbs (like Krajina), and threaten Kosovo and Macedonia.

7. SUPPORTING INITIATIVE

If we are prepared to use air power, I would recommend a further initiative which would supplement and enhance the effectiveness of our control of the skies.

-- We should create United Nations Protected Enclaves. The creation of United Nations protected enclaves (defended by U.S./NATO/Russian forces under an UNPROFOR label) and supported by U.S. air power will be the only way to add the necessary ground component capable of saving these towns and regions from Serb intervention and assault. This would be similar to the security zone created in northern Iraq in 1991. Embassy Belgrade has strongly recommended that Srebrenica be declared a UN-protected area.

EXEC 2206

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-- Resolution 770 of August 13, 1992, invokes Chapter VII enforcement authority to authorize "States to take nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements all measures necessary to facilitate in coordination with the United Nations the delivery by relevant United Nations humanitarian organizations and others of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and wherever needed in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina". This authority has never been fully utilized, but it remains available. We can manage "coordination with the United Nations" in a manner that respects the Secretariat's need to be properly informed and notified of U.S. actions. Further, the air power will have to be used in accordance with the activities of the United Nations humanitarian agencies and UNPROFOR. It would be mistaken to read the "coordination" language as giving the United Nations Secretariat a veto power on the "necessary measures" that States employ to get the humanitarian aid delivered.

-- Article 51 of the United Nations Charter preserves "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security". We would be acting in collective self-defense at the request of the Bosnian Government against an internal foe aided by Serbian authorities in a situation where the Security Council in fact has not yet taken the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security. Nor has the Security Council denied the Bosnian Government the right of self-defense. It has denied the Bosnian Government the right to acquire additional arms from outside Bosnia to exercise the right of self-defense. The use of Americans arms, for example, controlled by U.S. forces is not prohibited by the arms embargo resolution (713).

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LIFTING THE EMBARGO ON ARMS SHIPMENTS TO THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT AND DEVELOPING AN ALTERNATIVE NEGOTIATING FORUM IN THE EVENT THE VANCE-OWEN PROCESS CEASES

Assumptions

This paper discusses options for lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian Government and for developing an alternative negotiating forum in the event the Vance-Owen process ceases. It assumes (a) that the Bosnian Serbs will not have agreed to the revised Vance-Owen package by April 25 and that prospects for their signature will remain dim; (b) that the UNSC Resolution to tighten sanctions will be pursued aggressively as of April 26; and (c) that a negotiated settlement remains the preferred means of achieving a long-term solution in Bosnia.

Next Steps: A Two-Track Approach

If the Bosnian Serbs do not agree to the revised Vance-Owen package and prospects for their agreement remain bleak, one option is to press to lift the arms embargo as it pertains to the Bosnian Government, while simultaneously developing an alternative negotiating forum or vehicle.

The Situation on the Ground

When hostilities broke out, there was a serious disparity in arms between the Bosnian Serb forces and those of the Bosnian Government. The arms embargo, applying to all parties, has frozen this disparity in place.

This situation developed when the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) left behind some 85 percent of its stationed personnel (largely Bosnian Serbs) and a significant arsenal -- including tanks, APCs and combat aircraft -- when it "withdrew" from Bosnia in May 1992. The Bosnian Government, by contrast, had only those armaments it was able to seize from JNA facilities it captured. Those were mostly small arms.

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The disparity persists. Serbia and Montenegro have continued to provide fuel, food, and in some cases arms and ammunition to Bosnian Serb forces, which in any event are reinforced by Serbian irregular forces based in Serbia and Montenegro. There is clear evidence of JNA support, including the use of modern tanks, in the recent Bosnian Serb campaign in eastern Bosnia.

The Bosnian Government has no such steady source of supply, although it has received a trickle of smuggled small arms.

Following is a chart comparing the Bosnian Government, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats in manpower and weaponry. Forces of the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," or "FRY," and of the Republic of Croatia are also included. Note that these figures are estimates; no reliable counts are available. (The Intelligence Community expects to produce a Community-agreed estimate of forces soon.)

Regular Troops

Bosnian Government	40,000
Bosnian Serbs	42,000
Bosnian Croats	30,000
FRY	80,000
Croatia	60,000

Paramilitary Forces

Bosnian Government	50-80,000
Bosnian Serbs	70,000
Bosnian Croats	Not Known
FRY	Not Known
Croatia	Not Known

Tanks/APCs

Bosnian Government	35
Bosnian Serbs	575
Bosnian Croats	70
FRY	2400
Croatia	500

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Artillery Pieces

Bosnian Government	80
Bosnian Serbs	600-700
Bosnian Croats	70
FRY	1300
Croatia	200

Fixed-wing Aircraft

Bosnian Government	0
Bosnian Serbs	22
Bosnian Croats	0
FRY	400
Croatia	13

Helicopters

Bosnian Government	1
Bosnian Serbs	20
Bosnian Croats	0
FRY	120
Croatia	13

As indicated above, the disparity is most pronounced in artillery pieces and tanks and APCs. (Tanks are often used as stationary artillery pieces by the Bosnian Serbs.) The Bosnian Serbs have used the artillery to bombard besieged towns, such as Sarajevo and Muslim enclaves in eastern Bosnia, causing very large numbers of civilian casualties.

Arguments for Lifting the Arms Embargo

Reasons to support lifting the arms embargo as it pertains to the Bosnian Government.

-- Lifting the arms embargo would allow a sovereign state and UN member -- deemed by the international community to be the least culpable party -- to defend itself.

-- This move would fulfill our commitment to Bosnian President Izetbegovic to pursue lifting the arms embargo in some form if the Bosnian Government agreed to the revised Vance-Owen package but the Bosnian Serbs did not.

-- It might pressure the Bosnian Serbs to reach a negotiated agreement.

-- It would signal support for the Bosnian Government, therefore helping to sustain the Bosnian state.

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-- It would help redress the military imbalance, and might restrain Bosnian Serb military advances and ethnic cleansing.

-- In the United States and Europe, lifting the arms embargo would have more public support than direct military action.

Arguments against Lifting the Arms Embargo

-- Troop contributing countries -- including the UK, France and Canada -- oppose lifting the arms embargo, as do the Russians and the UN relief agencies. (Lord Owen, long an opponent of lifting the embargo, has softened his view since the Bosnian Serbs refused to sign the revised Vance-Owen package.) If the embargo is lifted, the UK, France and Canada are likely to withdraw their UNPROFOR forces, and the UN relief agencies are likely to withdraw their personnel, which would significantly harm the humanitarian assistance effort. (Of course, that effort might grind to a halt in any event if the Bosnian Serbs continue to be allowed to proceed militarily without significant impediment. Also, we could increase the airdrops to help compensate for the loss of humanitarian assistance.)

-- Lifting the arms embargo probably will exacerbate the fighting. The Bosnian Serbs could accelerate their military efforts over the short term, particularly by seizing Eastern Bosnian enclaves, and Bosnian government forces might try to break sieges.

-- Lifting the embargo might be ineffective in assisting the Bosnian Government militarily, given the minor impact of an increase in light weaponry, the time needed to train Bosnian Government forces in key heavier weapons (especially counter-battery artillery with its sophisticated radar) and the possibility that many weapons could fall into the hands of the Bosnian Croats. (The Bosnian Croats, along with Croatia, would oppose lifting the embargo on the Bosnian Government only and would seek to be included.)

-- Lifting the embargo might persuade hardline elements within the Bosnian Government to pursue the military track rather than adhere to the peace process.

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-- Absent evidence that the international community is willing to become involved in a militarily significant way, lifting the embargo could be interpreted by the Serbs as a way for the U.S. to avoid direct intervention rather than as a signal of resolve.

-- Lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian Government will spark massive violations of the embargo -- and possibly further direct intervention -- by Serbia.

A Diplomatic Strategy for Lifting the Arms Embargo

The arms embargo was imposed by the UN Security Council. (UNSCR 713 imposed the embargo on Yugoslavia on September 25, 1991; UNSCR 727 of January 8, 1992, found that the embargo applied to all parts of the former Yugoslavia.) Lifting the embargo on the Bosnian Government would require action by the Council.

Limiting the lifting to specified "defensive" weapons, such as anti-tank weapons, might increase prospects for international support (though much "defensive" weaponry can be used offensively as well).

A diplomatic offensive on this issue should be sequential and should perhaps begin at the UN with the UK, France and Russia. Our approach to Russia will depend in large part on the results of the April 25 Russian referendum. (The downside of beginning at the UN is that we might get an instinctive negative reaction more quickly than if we were to begin with a high-level approach in capitals. This might be particularly true of the British and Russian UN representatives.)

Our approaches should include the following arguments:

-- The Bosnian Serbs refuse to agree to a negotiated settlement. They continue their attacks and campaign of ethnic cleansing, which are made possible by their military superiority.

-- The arms embargo has come to serve the military purposes of the Bosnian Serbs and the political purposes of their backers in Belgrade. It allows the Bosnian Serbs to seek a military victory and to refuse to negotiate seriously.

-- The Bosnian state needs not only the moral support of the international community but the means to defend itself; it has the right of self-defense.

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-- There is more public support both in the U.S. and in Europe for lifting the arms embargo than for embarking on direct military action -- an option the West may be forced to consider if events continue on their present course.

-- We are aware of the possibility that lifting the arms embargo could harm the current humanitarian assistance effort throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. That is not desirable. If the Bosnian Serbs continue unimpeded in eastern Bosnia, however, much of the humanitarian assistance effort there will fail in any event. In addition, the U.S. is prepared to increase humanitarian assistance efforts -- especially airdrops -- to compensate at least in part for shortfalls in assistance. We will urge others to increase contributions to the airdrops as well.

After an initial approach to the UK, France and Russia, we should widen the circle to include Secretary General Boutros-Ghali (and through him, UNHCR Ogata) and other members of the Security Council. We anticipate that neutral and non-aligned Council members will be very sympathetic to lifting the embargo.

If we cannot achieve a consensus at the UN, we should make a high-level appeal (either from the President or the Secretary) in capitals of Security Council members. We may seek similar demarches from those who favor lifting the embargo (chiefly the OIC states).

If we fail to obtain consensus through diplomatic channels, we should go public with greater intensity to make the case for lifting the arms embargo. A public approach might rally opinion, thus helping to overcome the resistance of other Security Council members. A public campaign will at least signal the Bosnian Government that it has our support, may help convince it to continue with the negotiating process, and may help Izetbegovic against hardline elements. It might also pressure the Bosnian Serbs to return to the negotiating table.

<u>Developing an Alternative Negotiating Forum in the Event the Vance-Owen Process Ceases</u>

If the Bosnian Serbs persist in their refusal to agree to the revised Vance-Owen package and the Vance-Owen process effectively comes to an end, we will have to consider whether we should seek to (a) reconvene the London Conference; or (b) open a new negotiating forum.

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Reconvening the London Conference

UN SYG Boutros-Ghali, Germany and Russia are interested in reconvening the London Conference to reinvigorate the negotiating process. (The German intention is to put additional pressure on the Bosnian Serbs and/or agree on new punitive measures; the Russians apparently see this more as a summit meeting to reinvigorate the peace process.) (An alternative discussed subsequently below would be to reconvene not the entire London Conference but rather the "Steering Committee" of the Conference.)

The London Conference of August 1992 was attended by ministerial delegations from the EC-12, the CSCE, the Security Council Perm 5, neighbors of the former Yugoslavia, Turkey (representing the OIC), Saudi Arabia, Canada, and Japan, the six successor states of the former Yugoslavia, and international organizations (such as the ICRC and the UNHCR). It developed, inter alia, an agreed list of principles and established a work program for continued negotiations in Geneva.

Pros

-- Since Vance-Owen grew out of the London Conference, it is possible that this approach could permit some continuity with Vance-Owen, possibly even allowing agreements struck in Vance-Owen to be carried over into a new forum.

-- A London Conference framework would keep the UN and EC engaged.

-- The Bosnian Serbs have said they would be willing to return to the Geneva talks, which grew out of the London Conference.

Cons

-- The London Conference is freighted with failure; the London Conference agreements were never implemented. Nor did the Geneva talks get far; the Bosnian Serbs' willingness to negotiate there may be a maneuver to gain time and stave off tougher measures.

-- Reconvening the London Conference means reshuffling the same deck. The Bosnian players and their fundamental differences remain unchanged, so there would be little hope of an agreement in a new London Conference negotiation.

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Reconvening the London Conference Steering Committee

The London Conference Steering Committee has essentially the same membership as the original London Conference, except that the six successor states of the former Yugoslavia are not on the Steering Committee. The Steering Committee includes the U.S., Russia, EC, OIC, and CSCE representatives, representatives of the neighbors of the former Yugoslavia and others, as invited. Membership has never been fixed; it has grown over time, as the UN and EC drew in additional countries, especially those involved in humanitarian assistance to Bosnia.

The Steering Committee met at Ministerial level only once (December 16, 1992) and at the experts' level twice. Between September 1992 and January 1993, representatives of the Steering Committee were convened once or twice monthly in Geneva for briefings by Vance and Owen. The Geneva phase of the talks concluded in late January.

Pros

-- A high-level gathering of countries interested in -- and often involved in -- the crisis in the former Yugoslavia could pressure the parties to negotiate.

-- There is possible continuity with Vance-Owen, as with the London Conference itself.

-- This approach would keep the UN and EC engaged.

Cons

-- This has the same problems as the London Conference generally. In addition, the Steering Committee, like the London Conference itself, may be too large and amorphous to operate effectively.

-- The absence of the parties to the conflict could make this effort more international arbitration than negotiation. An agreement handed down to the parties is unlikely to stick, at least without robust enforcement measures.

Switching to Another Multilateral Forum

We could attempt to start again in a different forum, such as the CSCE, possibly on the model of the Minsk Group for Nagorno-Karabakh. (The Nagorno-Karabakh negotiation has a small group involving the immediate parties as well as the U.S., Russia and Turkey, and a larger group of CSCE members states meant to work on the negotiation. The Minsk Group has no fixed membership.)

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Pros

-- This would keep the Europeans involved and keeps U.S. efforts in a multilateral context.

-- This could still make use of the expertise developed in the Vance-Owen process and perhaps of the agreements reached there.

Cons

-- This effort would face the same difficulties as any other negotiating forum on Bosnia. The Minsk Group has not gotten off the ground, suggesting that the CSCE is not ready to take on this sort of negotiation. Nor does the CSCE have the same sort of implementation possibilities that the UN has.

Alternatively, we could try to organize a regional negotiation on Bosnia, involving neighboring countries, such as Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, and Albania.

Pros

-- This creates a regional, multilateral framework for negotiation while providing a clear break from the Vance-Owen process.

Cons

-- The regional states have much to lose and little to gain from such a venture. Many fear Serbia and some, such as Hungary and Albania, have ethnic minorities in Serbia, complicating their participation.

-- These countries have so many conflicts -- and their own agendas in Bosnia, as witness Greece and Turkey -- that it would be difficult for them to broker an agreement. Nor could they help very much in implementing an agreement.

The Bottom Line

Neither reconvening the London Conference, nor initiating a new negotiation is ideal under current circumstances: there is the unhappy prospect of lengthy, fruitless talks while fighting, ethnic cleansing, and the humanitarian crisis continue on the ground. Nevertheless, the civilized nations need to find some way to focus on this problem.

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A negotiated settlement would appear to be feasible only if circumstances on the ground were to change in ways that give the Bosnian Serbs reasons to negotiate. For instance, the combination of enforcement of the No-Fly Zone, much tougher sanctions, Russian pressure and a lifting of the arms embargo on the Bosnian Government might persuade the Bosnian Serbs to negotiate in good faith (although the Bosnian Government might, in those circumstances, reject negotiations).

Alternatively, if the UN presence on the ground in Bosnia could be beefed up and given a more robust mission -- such as placing UNPROFOR forces in besieged Muslim enclaves, as General Morillon attempted to do in Srebrenica, and using force if necessary to transit checkpoints -- it might be possible to stem Bosnian Serb gains and ensure better delivery of humanitarian assistance while negotiations proceed. This could mean that the negotiations are not marginalized by events and might force the Bosnian Serbs to the table if they cannot achieve their goals on the ground.

Finally, it may be that a negotiated settlement can only come about if the international community takes more muscular measures to persuade the Bosnian Serbs that they will not achieve their goals on the ground and will have to reach a compromise settlement with the other parties.

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20377

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 16, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER

FROM: JANE E. HOLL

SUBJECT: Bosnia

We have received three of the four options papers tasked out of the last Principals meeting. We have drafted a note (Tab I) for your signature circulating these papers to Principals for their consideration and comment.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the distribution of the attached materials to Principals.

Approve JWR Disapprove _____

That you authorize Will Itoh to release the Memorandum to Agencies attached at Tab II.

Approve JWR Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Note to Principals
Tab A Informal Options Papers
Tab II Memorandum to Agencies

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MS NARA, Date 4/1/10
2010-0533-M

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See also 2013-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Jane Holl to Anthony Lake re: Principals Meeting on Bosnia, May 1, 1993 (1 page)	04/30/1993	P1/b(1), ~~P5~~
~~001b. memo~~	~~Madeleine Albright to the Secretary of State re: Bosnian Refugees: Urgent Needs (3 pages)~~	~~04/28/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~001c. cable~~	~~re: Russian Elements for a Framework Resolution on Bosnia Herzegovina (4 pages)~~	~~04/30/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~001d. cable~~	~~re: Milosevic Says His About-Face on Vance/Owen Is For Real (9 pages)~~	~~04/30/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002. agenda~~	~~Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)~~	~~05/01/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 02/06/2020

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FROM: HOLL
WALKER

DOC DATE: 30 APR 93
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KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 3 MAY PC MTG ON BOSNIA - ADDL POINTS

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 04 MAY 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL LOGREF: 9320445

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0016 PRD0001 CODES: BOS

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1 MAY 8:00 AM - 9:30 AM ROOS RM
3 MAY 2:00 - 3:30 PM SIT ROOM
PER M. WADSWORTH

SUBJECT: PC MTG ON 1 MAY RE BOSNIA - ADDL POINTS

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 04 MAY 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL LOGREF: 9320445

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The White House

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Situation Room			
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A = Action (I = Information) D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

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Done (MA) CC's 5/3

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Jane Holl to Anthony Lake re: Principals Meeting on Bosnia, May 1, 1993 (1 page)	04/30/1993	P1/b(1), P5

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4005

FOLDER TITLE:
PC016 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, [May 3,] 1993

2010-0533-F
rs534

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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Rick

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 28, 1993

MEMORANDUM

TO: The Secretary of State

FROM: Ambassador Madeleine K. Albright MKA

SUBJECT: Bosnian Refugees: Urgent Needs

I greatly appreciated your phone call this morning. The choices we face are very difficult. As we approach the decision point in our review of policy options in Bosnia, however, I would like to make certain that we do not overlook the urgent need to take additional steps to ease the suffering of those injured and made homeless by the war. The humanitarian situation in Bosnia was a major element in your February 10 statement outlining the Administration's policy towards the crisis. It should be a major element in the new policy soon to be announced.

As you know, the humanitarian situation in Bosnia has continued to worsen and the number of refugees and displaced persons has continued to rise. Recent fighting in Central and Eastern Bosnia has resulted in new massacres and increased homelessness. Another 300,000 people could soon be forced to flee. The number of severely wounded is increasing, and more needs to be done to take in refugees from the neighboring countries, whose fragile economies cannot support the tremendous number of refugees.

Urgent steps to address this ongoing humanitarian tragedy should therefore be a key part of the Administration's policy towards Bosnia. I recommend that, as a part of this new policy, we announce the following measures:

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-- Open U.S. medical facilities in Western Europe and the United States to Bosnian refugees in need of specialized care. An offer to treat wounded refugees would save lives while vividly demonstrating our concern. You may have seen a recent photograph in the newspaper of a child arriving in the United States for medical treatment. Assisting the critically injured in this fashion is one humanitarian requirement that we have it in our power to address.

-- Encourage the Europeans, especially those near Yugoslavia to accept refugees and provide temporary protection with the assistance of the UNHCR. To set an example we should offer to raise the immigrant quota for Bosnian or Croatian refugees and appropriate more funds for the care and feeding of the refugees.

-- Send a high level official to the region to discuss what more could be done with the governments of neighboring states. Croatia, Macedonia, and Hungary have complained that Yugoslav refugees have become an increasing economic and social burden. We should show these countries that we share their concern and are willing to help within the constraints on our own resources.

-- Finally, provide relief to Serb refugees as well as Croats and Muslims. Providing aid to displaced persons and refugees of all ethnic backgrounds will demonstrate that while we abhor the Serbian government we remain concerned about the suffering of innocent Serbs. Providing assistance to Serbian refugees will make it harder for Milosevic to argue that the United States is inherently anti-Serb.

I have attached a draft statement that could be incorporated into the Administration's new policy when it is announced. I look forward to hearing your reaction to these recommendations.

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Draft Statement For Incorporation Into the Administration's Policy Announcement on Bosnia

I know that the American people have been moved by the immense human suffering in Bosnia and other parts of the former Yugoslavia. The number of refugees in Bosnia and other parts of the former Yugoslavia has continued to worsen with up to 3.8 million persons now dependent on international assistance. The number of refugees and displaced persons has also risen, and the fighting in eastern Bosnia could force an additional 300,000 people to flee their homes. The number of severely wounded is also increasing.

In order to ease the human suffering of refugees in the former Yugoslavia I have decided to take the following steps:

-- our medical facilities in Western Europe and the United States will be opened to refugees and displaced persons in need of medical care not available in the region;

-- we will encourage European nations to accept as many refugees as they can and provide temporary protection with the assistance of the UNHCR. To set an example, the United States will offer to take in additional refugees.

-- many refugees have found refuge in neighboring states, some of whom are finding it increasingly difficult to provide them with adequate food and shelter. I will therefore dispatch a high level envoy to visit the region and discuss how the United States can be of help;

-- finally, I want to make clear that our response to this humanitarian tragedy will not be based on ethnic factors. We will do what we can to help all refugees, be they Serbs, Croats or Muslims. While we believe that Serbia's aggression in Bosnia and Croatia has caused this war, we will not ignore human suffering among innocent Serbs.

16

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RUFHBE/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 0739
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUFHZG/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB IMMEDIATE 0694
RUFQAAA/USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY
RUFHSK/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 0555
RUFHMB/USMISSION USVIENNA PRIORITY 0785
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USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE: CINCLANT FOR POLAD, SHAPE FOR POLA
MINISTER PENNER
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UNSC, UNGA, UNHCR, BK, HR, SR
SUBJECT: CGYOOL: RUSSIAN ELEMENTS FOR A FRAMEWORK
RESOLUTION ON BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA
REF: MOSCOW 12697

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DURING AN APRIL 29 PERMFOUR MEETING RUSSIAN PERMREP VORONTSOV PASSED TO THE US, UK AND FRANCE THE NOTIONAL RUSSIAN ELEMENTS FOR A FRAMEWORK SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION TO SETTLE THE BOSNIAN CRISIS (FULL TEXT IN PARA 5). HE ADDED THAT SIMILAR REPRESENTATIONS WERE BEING MADE IN MOSCOW AND IN THE PERMTHREE CAPITALS.

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3. VORONTSOV NOTED THAT THE PARAGRAPH CALLING FOR THE MORATORIUM ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SANCTIONS RESOLUTION OR THE LIFTING OF THE SANCTIONS WAS ONE TO WHICH MOSCOW WANTED AN EARLY REACTION. AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT AFTER A QUICK LOOK AT THAT PARAGRAPH SAID IT WAS TOO MUCH CARROT TOO SOON. THE FRENCH AND UK DEPUTY PERMREPS STRONGLY AGREED. ALL THREE EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES THAT A CEASEFIRE IN PLACE COULD HAVE ON THE VANCE-OWEN PLAN. THE UK NOTED THAT THERE WAS NO MENTION OF THE USE OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TO ENFORCE THE CEASEFIRE. THE FRENCH POLCONS WHISPERED LOUDLY UPON HEARING THIS COMMENT ABOUT THE UK BEING INFECTED WITH "A SEVERE CASE OF NATO-ITIS".

4. VORONTSOV WENT ON TO NOTE THAT BELGRADE IS GENUINELY CONCERNED ABOUT THE SANCTIONS. YELTSIN'S STATEMENT TO THE RUSSIAN PARLIAMENT HAD HAD AN EFFECT AS WELL. HIS DEPUTY ADDED THAT PUBLIC OPINION POLLS IN THE FRY INDICATED THAT THE PERCENTAGE IN FAVOR OF SUPPORTING THE BOSNIAN SERBS BAD DROPPED FROM 78 PERCENT TO 30 PERCENT. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES VORONTSOV CONCLUDED THAT SOMETHING POSITIVE COULD COME OUT OF THE ATHENS MEETING.

5. BEGIN TEXT OF RUSSIAN ELEMENTS FOR FRAMEWORK RESOLUTION ON BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA:

1. PREAMBLE:

- EFFORTS OF MANY COUNTRIES, THE CO-CHAIRMEN AND, AT THE LAST STAGE, THE LEADERSHIP OF THE FRY HAVE NOT RESULTED IN ACCEPTANCE OF THE VANCE-OWEN PLAN BY THE BOSNIAN SERBS, WHO, AT THE FORTHCOMING REFERENDUM ON THAT PLAN, SHOULD EMBARK ON THE PATH OF COOPERATION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY;
- ALL SIDES IN THE CONFLICT CONTINUE TO VIOLATE PROVISIONS OF THE RELEVANT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS AND THEIR OWN AGREEMENTS;
- THE SITUATION HAS DRAMATICALLY DETERIORATED DUE TO THE

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BLOODSHED IN THE CENTRAL BOSNIA AS A RESULT OF FIGHTING BETWEEN CROATS AND MUSLIMS:
- IT IS INTOLERABLE THAT ANY PARTY IN THE CONFLICT RELY ON THE USE OF FORCE.
2. OPERATIVE PART:
- WITH THE AIM OF REACHING THE SPEEDIEST CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES ALL OVER THE TERRITORY OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA THE SECURITY COUNCIL DECLARES AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE AND DEMANDS THAT ALL THE BOSNIAN SIDES SHOULD NOT UNDERTAKE ANY FURTHER ARMED ATTACKS AGAINST EACH OTHER, HUMANITARIAN CONVOYS AND PERSONNEL OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS;
-THE SECURITY COUNCIL ESTABLISHES ADDITIONAL SAFE AREAS ON THE TERRITORY OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA AND REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO STRENGTHEN THE PRESENCE OF UNPROFOR IN THESE AREAS;
- THE SECURITY COUNCIL AUTHORIZES THE UN FORCES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TO UNDERTAKE ALL NECESSARY MEASURES TO INTERDICT ACTIONS BY ANY BOSNIAN SIDE IN VIOLATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE REGIME ESTABLISHED BY THE

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UNSC, UNGA, UNHCR, BK, HR, SR
SUBJECT: CGYOOL: RUSSIAN ELEMENTS FOR A FRAMEWORK RESOLUTION ON BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA
SECURITY COUNCIL:
- THE SECURITY COUNCIL WARNS T
HAT SANCTIONS WILL BE IMPOSED ON A VIOLATOR OF THIS REGIME;
- TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE APPEAL BY THE LEADERSHIP OF THE FRY TO THE BOSNIAN SERBS TO ACCEPT IMMEDIATELY THE VANCE-OWEN PLAN, THE SECURITY COUNCIL DECIDES TO

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INTRODUCE A MORATORIUM ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PARAGRAPHS 10-30 OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 820 AND. DEPENDING ON THE RESULTS OF THE BOSNIAN SERBS REFERENDUM IN MAY. TO CONSIDER EITHER CANCELLING THE MORATORIUM OR REPEALING THE RESOLUTION 820. IN LINE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF ITS PARAGRAPH 31.
END TEXT.
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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NODIS
NSC EYES ONLY LAKE/ITOH
FOLLOWING BELGRADE 03326 SENT ACTION SECSTATE APR 30
BEING RPTD FOR UR INFO:
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FOR THE SECRETARY
DEPT PASS TO NSC/LAKE
DEPT ALSO FOR TARNOFF, OXMAN AND BARTHOLOMEW
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, PGOV, UN, EC, US, BK, HR, SR
SUBJECT: MILOSEVIC SAYS HIS ABOUT-FACE ON
- VANCE/OWEN IS FOR REAL
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
SUMMARY

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2. IN A MOVE TOTALLY OUT OF CHARACTER, MILOSEVIC CALLED ME AT 5:30 P.M. TODAY (APRIL 29) AND ASKED THAT I COME OVER FOR A TALK. MEETING AT HIS OFFICE FOR ABOUT AN HOUR THIS EVENING. IN HIS NEW-FOUND SPIRIT OF OPENNESS AND ROLE AS ARDENT PROPONENT OF VANCE/OWEN, MILOSEVIC TOLD ME HE WANTED THE U.S. "TO BE THE FIRST TO KNOW" HE HAD MUSCLED KARADZIC INTO SCHEDULING A NEW ASSEMBLY SESSION TO RECONSIDER THE PEACE PLAN BEFORE THE SCHEDULED MAY 15 BOSNIAN SERB REFERENDUM. A PUBLIC

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ANNOUNCEMENT WAS EXPECTED THIS EVENING.

3. MILOSEVIC CONCEDED HE WAS STILL UNCERTAIN KARADZIC WOULD AGREE TO SIGN. TO BRING KARADZIC AROUND. MILOSEVIC SAW ONE THING AS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL: NAILING DOWN OWEN'S REPORTED ASSURANCE LAST WEEKEND THAT ONLY UNPROFOR FORCES (NOT THE HVO OR "MUSLIM GREEN BERETS") WOULD BE PRESENT IN AREAS WITH SERB POPULATIONS OUTSIDE THE DESIGNATED SERB-MAJORITY PROVINCES. THIS WAS ESSENTIAL. MILOSEVIC ARGUED, TO OVERCOME THE BOSNIAN SERBS' FEAR OF REPRISALS. IN ORDER TO SUPPORT OWEN'S EFFORTS, MILOSEVIC WANTED (AND HAD PERSUADED) MITSOTAKIS TO HOST A MEETING IN ATHENS WITH MILOSEVIC, TUDJMAN, KARADZIC, IZETBEGOVIC AND BOBAN. MILOSEVIC SAID HE WOULD WELCOME U.S. HELP WITH BRINGING ABOUT SUCH A MEETING (WHICH COULD HAVE A DIFFERENT VENUE, HE CONCEDED).

NODIS

3. I QUESTIONED IF UNPROFOR PROTECTION FOR SERBS WAS THE ONLY REMAINING STICKING POINT FOR KARADZIC -- WHAT ABOUT THE CORRIDORS? MILOSEVIC ADMITTED HE WAS NOT SURE THE BOSNIAN SERBS WOULD ACCEPT OWEN'S "BERLIN ROAD" OFFER IN LIEU OF THEIR OWN TERRITORY, ALTHOUGH THAT COMPROMISE WAS FINE BY MILOSEVIC. HE CLAIMED, HOWEVER, TO HAVE THREATENED TODAY TO KICK KARADZIC AND HIS CRONIES OUT OF BELGRADE AND SEAL THE BORDERS IF THEY DID NOT PLAY BALL. MILOSEVIC'S MAIN MESSAGE FOR US APPEARED TO BE THAT HE IS DETERMINED TO DISTANCE SERBIA FROM KARADZIC IF THEY DO NOT TOE THE NEW MILOSEVIC LINE. THE FACT OF THIS MEETING AND THE MESSAGE REPRESENT A REAL CHANGE OF PATTERN FOR MILOSEVIC, AND SUGGEST THAT HE IS FEELING THE PRESSURE AND IS GROPING FOR A WAY OUT. END SUMMARY.

NODIS

COME ON OVER

NODIS

4. AFTER RECEIVING MILOSEVIC'S PERSONAL CALL AND INVITATION TO MEET (A FIRST DURING MY FOUR YEARS IN BELGRADE), I AGREED TO GO OVER TO HIS OFFICE IN THIRTY

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MINUTES. WE MET ALONE. HE SEEMED HIS USUAL CONFIDENT SELF. IN A GOOD MOOD BUT PURPOSEFUL.

5. MILOSEVIC SAID KARADZIC AND BOSNIAN SERB ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT MOMCILO KRAJISNIK HAD JUST LEFT HIS OFFICE BEFORE I ARRIVED. THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THE REQUEST TO SEE ME WAS TO INFORM US. HE EXPLAINED. HE WANTED THE U.S. TO BE THE FIRST TO KNOW THAT KARADZIC AND KRAJISNIK HAD JUST AGREED TO RECONVENE THE BOSNIAN SERB ASSEMBLY ON MAY 5 TO TAKE UP THE VANCE/OWEN PLAN AGAIN. THE NEWS WOULD BE ANNOUNCED ON BELGRADE TELEVISION THIS EVENING.

6. MILOSEVIC THEN PROCEEDED TO DESCRIBE HIS MEETING WITH THE TWO BOSNIAN SERB LEADERS. ACCORDING TO HIS ACCOUNT:

-- MILOSEVIC WARNED THEM AGAINST GOING AHEAD WITH THE MAY 15 REFERENDUM. A REFERENDUM WAS A "TRICKY GAME" WHICH WOULD BOX THEM IN. THE IDEA SHOULD BE DROPPED.

-- HE TOLD THEM THEY HAD TO ACCEPT THE REQUEST TO AGREE

NODIS

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NODIS

NSC EYES ONLY LAKE/ITOH

NODIS

TO THE VANCE/OWEN PLAN AS IT CAME NOT JUST FROM THE THREE PRESIDENTS (MILOSEVIC, COSIC, BULATOVIC) BUT ALSO FROM THE SERBIAN ASSEMBLY.

-- MILOSEVIC ASKED THAT THE MAY 5 BOSNIAN SERB ASSEMBLY MEETING "ELABORATE" ON THE UNDERSTANDINGS REACHED WITH OWEN ~~LAST WEEKEND~~.

OWEN'S ASSURANCES, ACCORDING TO MILOSEVIC

NODIS

7. MILOSEVIC MADE CLEAR THAT THE KEY UNDERSTANDING, IN HIS VIEW, WAS WHAT HE CALLED OWEN'S GUARANTEE THAT IN THOSE AREAS WITH SERBIAN POPULATIONS IN NON-SERB PROVINCES, UNPROFOR WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR SECURITY AND NEITHER THE HVO OR BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT FORCES (HE CALLED THE LATTER "MUSLIM GREEN BERETS") WOULD BE ALLOWED IN. HE CAME BACK TO THIS POINT REPEATEDLY DURING OUR CONVERSATION, ARGUING THAT THIS WAS

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ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO PERSUADE THE BOSNIAN SERBS TO SIGN. SINCE THEY FEARED SERB CIVILIANS WOULD BE MASSACRED IF THEIR FORCES WITHDREW AND THE FIELD WERE WIDE OPEN FOR CROAT OR MUSLIM SOLDIERS TO ENTER. MILOSEVIC CITED THE SERBS' EXPERIENCE IN GORAZDE LAST SUMMER AS PROOF OF WHAT WOULD HAPPEN. (NOTE: WESTERN JOURNALISTS CONFIRMED REPORTS OF MUSLIM REPRISALS AND MASSACRES OF CIVILIANS AFTER BOSNIAN SERB FORCES RETREATED FROM GORAZDE.) ILLUSTRATING WHAT HE HAD IN MIND. HE SAID IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL TO HAVE UNPROFOR PRESENT IN PLACES LIKE ZVORNIK, BRATUNAC AND KOZARA (NOTE: ALL SERB-OCCUPIED TOWNS, LOCATED IN MUSLIM-DOMINANT PROVINCES).

NODIS

AN ATHENS EX-YUGOSLAVIA MINI-SUMMIT

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8. TO NAIL DOWN OWEN'S "ASSURANCE" ON THIS POINT. WHAT MILOSEVIC WANTS TO DO I'S HOLD A MINI-SUMMIT OF SELECTED LEADERS FROM THE EX-YUGOSLAVIA (TUDJMAN. IZETBEGOVIC, KARADZIC. BOBAN AND MILOSEVIC HIMSELF). MILOSEVIC SAID HE HAD SPOKEN ABOUT THIS SEVERAL TIMES IN THE PAST FEW DAYS WITH MITSOTAKIS. WHO HAD AGAIN TODAY (APRIL 29) REITERATED HIS READINESS TO HOST SUCH A MEETING. MILOSEVIC ACKNOWLEDGED THE INITIATIVE FOR THE MEETING WAS HIS.

NODIS

9. MILOSEVIC'S PURPOSE IN SEEKING SUCH A GATHERING (WHICH HE SAID DID NOT HAVE TO TAKE PLACE IN ATHENS) WAS TWO-FOLD: (1) TO CLARIFY THE UNDERSTANDINGS LORD OWEN HAD GIVEN AND (2) TO INCREASE THE PRESSURE ON KARADZIC TO SIGN. MILOSEVIC EXPLAINED THAT HE WANTS TO BE SURE THAT WHAT OWEN SAID TO HIM IN BELGRADE IS BACKED BY THE OTHER PARTIES. (OWEN HAD EVIDENTLY DECLINED TO GIVE MILOSEVIC ANY WRITTEN DOCUMENT RECORDING THEIR DISCUSSIONS.)

NODIS

A REQUEST FOR U.S. HELP

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10. MILOSEVIC THEN ASKED IF THE U.S. COULD HELP IN

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PUTTING TOGETHER SUCH A MEETING. SPECIFICALLY, HE WANTED OUR ASSISTANCE IN PERSUADING IZETBEGOVIC TO ATTEND AND ASKED IF WE COULD SEE IF VANCE WOULD BE AVAILABLE.

11. I RESPONDED BY ASKING MILOSEVIC IF HE HAD TALKED TO OWEN ABOUT THIS. SOMEWHAT EVASIVELY HE SAID NO, MENTIONING THAT OWEN WAS IN NEW YORK, AS IF TO IMPLY THAT HE WAS THEREFORE OUT OF REACH.

MILOSEVIC'S HARD SELL TO THE BOSNIAN SERBS

---

12. I ASKED MILOSEVIC IF HE HAD SOUNDED OUT BOSNIAN SERB ARMY COMMANDER MLADIC AS WELL AS KARADZIC ON ACCEPTANCE OF VANCE/OWEN. MILOSEVIC ROUGHLY DISMISSED MLADIC'S IMPORTANCE, CLAIMING THAT MLADIC "DOESN'T DECIDE ANYTHING OF POLITICAL IMPORTANCE."

13. COMING BACK AGAIN TO HIS MEETING THAT AFTERNOON WITH KARADZIC AND KRAJISNIK, MILOSEVIC DESCRIBED HIS EFFORTS TO PORTRAY VANCE/OWEN AS PALATABLE TO THEM. HE HAD TOLD THEM:

-- THE PLAN GUARANTEES THEIR SECURITY, SINCE OWEN HAD SAID NO HVO OR "GREEN BERET" FORCES WOULD BE ALLOWED ON THOSE AREAS WHERE SERBS NOW LIVE OUTSIDE SERB PROVINCES.

-- PARTICIPATION IN THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT WOULD RESTORE THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AS ONE OF THREE EQUAL CONSTITUENT PEOPLES AND STRIP IZETBEGOVIC'S GOVERNMENT OF ANY LEGITIMACY. IZETBEGOVIC WOULD BE

REDUCED TO BEING THE LEADER OF ONE OF THREE PEOPLES.

-- THE TIME HAD COME TO END THE WAR. THE BOSNIAN SERB COMMANDERS HAVE TOO MUCH AUTONOMY. MILOSEVIC COMPLAINED, CITING THE APPEARANCE ON TELEVISION OF A LOCAL COMMANDER WHO DENIED THAT SREBRENICA WAS BEING SHELLED -- NEATLY IGNORING THE SMOKING MORTAR BEHIND HIM. "IF I DON'T BELIEVE WHAT THEY SAY," MILOSEVIC QUOTED HIMSELF AS

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TELLING KARADZCIC "WHAT DOES THE WORLD THINK?"
KARADZIC PROMISES PEACE

14. I ASKED IF MILOSEVIC HAD PRESSED KARADZIC SPECIFICALLY TO STOP ALL MILITARY ACTIVITY. ABSOLUTELY, MILOSEVIC REPLIED. KARADZIC HAD PROMISED TO RESPECT THE CEASE-FIRE. WHEN HE COMPLAINED THAT OTHERS WERE VIOLATING IT. MILOSEVIC RESPONDED THE BOSNIAN SERBS SHOULD NOT RESPOND TO PROVOCATIONS. MILOSEVIC VOLUNTEERED THAT HE HAD ENLISTED YUGOSLAV ARMY CHIEF GENERAL PANIC'S ASSISTANCE IN PRESSING MLADIC AND HIS DEPUTY MILOVANOVIC TO RESPECT THE CEASE-FIRE. MILOVANOVIC HAD CLAIMED TO HAVE REACHED AN AGREEMENT WITH UNPROFOR COMMANDER WAHLGREN.

15. MILOSEVIC, FOR HIS PART, CLAIMED TO HAVE URGED WAHLGREN TO SEND UN OBSERVERS TO THE HOT SPOTS IN BOSNIA. MILOSEVIC ADDED THAT HE HAD TOLD BOTH PANIC AND THE BOSNIAN SERBS THAT SREBRENICA SHOULD NOT/NOT BE OCCUPIED. SINCE THE BOSNIAN SERB FORCES WOULD BE LIKELY TO MASSACRE ALL ITS INHABITANTS GIVEN THE ATROCITIES COMMITTED AGAINST SERBS IN THE AREA.

MILOSEVIC PUTS KARADZIC ON NOTICE

16. I TOLD MILOSEVIC THAT I WANTED HIS DIRECT ANSWER TO A FRANK QUESTION: WHAT WAS HE PREPARED TO DO TO PRESSURE KARADZIC TO SIGN THE VANCE/OWEN PLAN? MILOSEVIC SAID HE WOULD BE VERY OPEN. HE HAD WARNED KARADZIC AND KRAJISNIK THAT IF THEY REFUSED TO SIGN, HE WOULD ISOLATE THEM. AGAIN QUOTING HIMSELF TO KARADZIC: "IF YOU THINK YUGOSLAVIA HAS BEEN SEALED OFF, WAIT UNTIL YOU SEE WHAT WE DO TO YOU. IT'S EASY TO BE COURAGEOUS SITTING IN THE (BELGRADE) INTERCONTINENTAL HOTEL, TRY IT FOR A WHILE AT THE FRONT WITH YOUR SOLDIERS." MILOSEVIC ADDED THAT HE HIMSELF WOULD GO ON SERBIAN TELEVISION AT THE RIGHT MOMENT (EVIDENTLY NOT YET) IN ORDER TO SELL ACCEPTANCE OF THE PEACE PLAN.

NODIS

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NOT READY TO RECOGNIZE BOSNIA

17. I THEN ASKED MILOSEVIC THE SAME QUESTION I PUT TO COSIC'S ADVISOR STOJANOVIC THIS AFTERNOON -- AS A SIGN OF COMMITMENT TO THE VANCE/OWEN PLAN. WAS BELGRADE NOW PREPARED TO RECOGNIZE BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA? WHEREAS STOJANOVIC STUDIOUSLY AVOIDED A REPLY. MILOSEVIC SAID NO. NOT AT THIS STAGE. IT WAS TOO DIFFICULT POLITICALLY: HE WASN'T EVEN THINKING OF SUCH A MOVE NOW.

NODIS

DISREGARD COSIC

18. REFERRING TO COSIC'S LETTER OF TODAY TO PRESIDENT CLINTON PROPOSING A SUMMIT MEETING ON BOSNIA. I TOLD MILOSEVIC WASHINGTON MIGHT WELL BE CONFUSED ABOUT THE DIFFERENT SIGNALS IT WAS RECEIVING. MAKING CLEAR THAT COSIC WAS FREE-LANCING. MILOSEVIC DISMISSED HIS PROPOSAL AS "UNACCEPTABLE AND UNREALISTIC." HE SAID THAT BULATOVIC HAD CALLED HIM THIS MORNING TO ASK IF MILOSEVIC HAD BEEN CONSULTED ON COSIC'S INITIATIVE. WHICH BULATOVIC ALSO FOUND OFF-THE-WALL. "I LOVE COSIC AS A PERSON," MILOSEVIC EXPOUNDED, "BUT AS A POLITICIAN HE IS AN INCOMPETENT -- AN ELEPHANT IN A CHINA SHOP."

NODIS

MILOSEVIC ON SESELJ

19. ASKED ABOUT SESELJ'S OPPOSITION TO VANCE/OWEN, MILOSEVIC DISMISSED ANY THREAT TO HIM FROM SESELJ AND EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT SESELJ WOULD NOT GET THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE. JUST THE SAME, MILOSEVIC WARNED THAT THE ALTERNATIVE TO MILOSEVIC'S LEADERSHIP IN SERBIA WAS NOT THE DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION, AS MANY IN THE WEST WANTED TO THINK, BUT RATHER "SESELJ AND FASCISM."

NODIS

CORRIDOR ISSUE STILL A PROBLEM

20. UP UNTIL THAT POINT MILOSEVIC HAD ONLY MENTIONED ONE ISSUE -- SECURITY GUARANTEES FOR SERBS OUTSIDE

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NODIS
NSC EYES ONLY LAKE/ITOH
"SERB" PROVINCES -- AS AN OBSTACLE TO KARADZIC'S SIGNATURE. I THEREFORE ASKED IF THE CORRIDOR ISSUE WAS NOW RESOLVED WITH OWEN'S PROPOSAL FOR A "BERLIN ROAD." MILOSEVIC RESPONDED AT FIRST BY BRINGING UP DISCUSSIONS HE HAD RECENTLY WITH TUDJMAN ABOUT THE POSAVINA (CROAT-DOMINANT PROVINCE THREE WHICH INTERRUPTS THE SERB NORTHERN CORRIDOR). MILOSEVIC CLAIMED THAT CURRENTLY THE POPULATION OF PROVINCE THREE CONSISTED OF 135,000 SERBS AND ONLY 30,000 CROATS. MOST OF THESE SERBS WERE REFUGEES FROM WESTERN SLAVONIA (CROATIA) AND TUDJMAN DIDN'T WANT THEM BACK.

NODIS

21. WHEN I PRESSED FURTHER ON KARADZIC'S ATTITUDE. MILOSEVIC ADMITTED THAT THE NORTHERN CORRIDOR WAS STILL A STICKING POINT FOR HIM AND THE OTHER BOSNIAN SERBS. AS FAR AS MILOSEVIC WAS CONCERNED, THE BERLIN ROAD COMPROMISE WAS FINE. BUT HE WASN'T SURE THAT THE BOSNIAN SERBS COULD SWALLOW IT. HE SAID HE HAD PRESSED OWEN TO GIVE THEM A SLIVER OF THEIR OWN TERRITORY BUT OWEN WAS ADAMANT THAT COULDN'T BE DONE.

NODIS

22. CONCLUDING. I TOLD MILOSEVIC AGAIN WE WILL BE WATCHING TO SEE WHAT HE DOES -- NOT JUST WHAT HE SAYS -- TO PRESSURE KARADZIC TO SIGN THE VANCE/OWEN PLAN AND ~~HALT THE~~ BLOODSHED

COMMENT

NODIS

22. MILOSEVIC'S UNUSUAL MOVE TO SOLICIT OUR HELP SUGGESTS THAT HE IS FEELING THE PRESSURE. AS HIS PROPOSAL FOR AN ATHENS SUMMIT SUGGESTS. HE IS GROPING FOR A WAY OUT. HIS PROBLEMS IN PERSUADING THE BOSNIAN SERBS TO ENDORSE VANCE/OWEN ARE REAL. NOT INVENTED. AND IT SEEMS THAT HE IS MAKING A GENUINE EFFORT TO SECURE THEIR FORMAL SIGNATURE TO THE VANCE/OWEN PLAN. I AM UNABLE TO JUDGE WHAT ASSURANCES OWEN MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE GIVEN MILOSEVIC REGARDING UN GUARANTEES FOR SERBS IN

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

NON-SERB PROVINCES. BUT THE NUMBERS OF UN TROOPS WHICH COULD BE REQUIRED COULD BE QUITE LARGE. IN ANY EVENT THE PROSPECTS FOR A HASTILY CALLED SUMMIT IN ATHENS OR ELSEWHERE PRODUCING CONVINCING NEW AGREEMENTS STRIKES ME AS REMOTE. RACKMALES UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

BT

#1222

NNNN

<MSGID> M0364318

NODIS

NODIS

NODIS

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9320445
RECEIVED: 30 APR 93 13

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 30 APR 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 3 MAY PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 04 MAY 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL LOGREF: 9320449

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0016 PRD0001 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		HOLL
		ITOH
		KENNEY
		LAKE
		MILLISON
		NSC CHRON
		REED
		SODERBERG
		WALKER

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB CLOSED BY: NSKDB DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By DCV NARA, Date 4/1/15
2010-0533-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	93043014	FOR DECISION
001		X	93043015	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
001	ITOH	Z	93043015	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	93043015	ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	930430	FUERTH, L	
002	930430	LAUDER, J	
002	930430	GROSSMAN, M	
002	930430	SHEFFIELD, H	
002	930430	SHERFIELD, M	
002	930430	INDERFURTH, K	

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9320445
RECEIVED: 30 APR 93 13

TO: LAKE

FROM: WALKER

DOC DATE: 30 APR 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA DC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PC MTG ON 1 MAY RE BOSNIA

ACTION: FOR DECISION DUE DATE: 04 MAY 93 STATUS: X

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL LOGREF:

FILES: IFM NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
LAKE		

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB CLOSED BY: DOC 1 OF 1

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National Security Council
The White House

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (MH) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec			
ExecSec	2		
Staff Director			
D/APNSA			
APNSA	1		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	(MH) 4/30	D
NSC Secretariat			

(A = Action) I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

30 APR 95 21 20

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9320445
DATE 30 APR 93

SUBJECT: MEETING NOTIFICATION
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	30 Apr	1645	[signature] COPY: 1
MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	4/30/93	PM 4:00	[signature] COPY: 1
MR. RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W -- ROOM 6333 DEPT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW	4/30/93	PM 4:00	[signature] COPY: 1

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: (IMMEDIATE) PRIORITY ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (WHI)

(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NOTICE OF PC MEETING

~~EYES ONLY~~

LOG # 20445

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

~~"EYES ONLY"~~
FOR IMMEDIATE DELIVERY TO ADDRESSEES ONLY

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MS NARA, Date 4/11/12
2018-0533-M

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE
- ☐ FLASH
- ☒ IMMEDIATE
- ☐ PRIORITY
- ☐ ROUTINE

~~EYES ONLY~~

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC LOG #20445

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting PAGES: 2

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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By DLI NARA, Date 9/13/12

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2018-0533-M

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 30, 1993

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

CAPTAIN H. L. SHEFFIELD
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the United States
United Nations

SUBJECT: Principals Only Meeting on Bosnia (S)

A Principals only meeting on Bosnia is scheduled for 8:00 - 9:30am, Saturday, May 1, 1993 in the Roosevelt Room. An agenda is attached at Tab A. (S)

for Kristie A. Kenney
William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By dcs, NARA, Date 4/1/10
2010-0533-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

TAB

A.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: May 1, 1993
LOCATION: Roosevelt Room
TIME: 8:00-9:30am

AGENDA

I.	Objectives	All Participants
II.	Lifting the Arms Embargo/Options	All Participants
III.	Air Strikes/Objectives	All Participants
IV.	Vance/Owen: Status/Implementation ...	All Participants
V.	Secretary Christopher's Trip	All Participants
VI.	Congress/Public Position	All Participants

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 2/6/2020
2013-0682-M

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~~SECRET~~

20445

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 30, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: JENONNE WALKER

SUBJECT: Principals Only Meeting on Bosnia, May 1, 1993

Attached at Tab I is the memo to the agencies for the subject meeting.

RECOMMENDATION

That you have Will Itoh sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓TL Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By RNS NARA, Date 4/1/12
2010-0533-M

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PC 0016

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TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
1993 APR 30 PM 4:25

PRECEDENCE: (IMMEDIATE) PRIORITY ROUTINE

RELEASER: Itoh

RTG: _____

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE NO. 0806 CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (WHI)
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NOTICE OF PC MEETING

EYES ONLY

LOG # 20445

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
O	JCS	SECRETARY		
D	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
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2012-0533-M

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-2028634421-
95-04-30-16-25/001-001

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

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TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

1993 APR 30 PM 4:25

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

30 April 93
1635
A

PRECEDENCE: (IMMEDIATE) PRIORITY ROUTINE

RELEASER: Anne

DTG: _____

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE NO. 0806 CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (WHI)

(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NOTICE OF PC MEETING

~~EYES ONLY~~

LOG # 20445

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
O	JCS	SECRETARY		
D	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

"~~EYES ONLY~~"
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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 4/1/11
2012-0533-M

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

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TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

1993 APR 30 PM 4:25

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

SitCen D
NMCC / CWO
30 1807 Apr 93

PRECEDENCE: (IMMEDIATE) PRIORITY ROUTINE

RELEASER: [signature]

DTG: _____

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE NO. 0806 CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (WHI)

(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NOTICE OF PC MEETING

~~EYES ONLY~~

LOG # 20445

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

A
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OSD D

REMARKS:

"~~EYES ONLY~~"
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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 4/1/10
2010-0533-m

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See also 2013-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

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Folder Title:
PC0017 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, May 6, 1993
Staff Office-Individual:
Records Management
Original OA/ID Number:
4005

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43	6	5	2	V

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Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)~~	~~05/06/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RDS 04/17/2015

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4005

FOLDER TITLE:
PC017 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, [May 3,] 1993

2010-0533-F
rs535

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9320482
RECEIVED: 06 MAY 93 17

TO: LAKE

FROM: HOLL

DOC DATE: 07 MAY 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 6 MAY PC MTG RE BOSNIA

ACTION: LAKE DISAPPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 10 MAY 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL LOGREF: 9320479

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0017 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		HOLL
		NSC CHRON
		WALKER

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By ths NARA, Date 4/1/10
2010-0533-MR

COMMENTS: _____

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Me and 11/24/13

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	93050718	FOR DECISION
001		X	93051116	LAKE DISAPPROVED RECOM

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National Security Council
The White House

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (MB) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	1		
ExecSec	4		F4J
Staff Director			
D/APNSA	2		
APNSA	3		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5	5/11	File
NSC Secretariat	6		R

(A = Action) I = Information D = Dispatch (R = Retain) N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS: FILE, NO DISTRIBUTION File here

7 MAY 93 [illegible] 12

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS: cc: NSC

Exec Sec has diskette

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

10 May 93

EXEC SEC:

Tony Lake would like to have the attached Summary of Conclusions held on file but not distributed.

Thanks.

JWR

Reed

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of NSC Principals Committee
DATE: May 6, 1993
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 1:30 - 2:30pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

The Vice President's Office:
Leon Fuerth

State:
Clifton Wharton
Peter Tarnoff

DOD
Les Aspin
Frank Wisner

CIA
James Woolsey
Gene Wicklund

JCS
Colin Powell
Michael Ryan

USUN
Rick Inderfurth

White House
Anthony Lake
Sandy Berger

NSC
Jane Holl

Summary of Conclusions

Review of Current Situation

Principals agreed on the following:

Review of Current Situation

-- U.S. has been following two tracks: the "Christopher" track and the Vance/Owen negotiation track. The Christopher Track has reinforced the Vance/Owen track. (S)

-- With the vote in Pale, focus must now shift back to the Christopher track. (S)

-- We will not let the referendum be used as a delaying device. (S)

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0533-M
RDS 4/17/2015 (1.07)

-- The course Secretary Christopher is presenting to allies is the only coherent and workable strategy on the table. It represents a set of measures designed to come to grips with the situation in Bosnia. (S)

-- The ball is now in the Europeans' court, and our task is to pressure them into action. (S)

Eastern Bosnia/Safe Havens

Principals agreed that the U.S. should not offer U.S. ground troops to secure safe havens since that was not a militarily tenable mission. (S)

They were divided on the extent to which we would consider the use of U.S. air power. (S)

-- Lake, Powell, Aspin, Berger, and Woolsey agreed that, in addition to the plan being presented by Christopher, we must be prepared to contemplate use of air power in Eastern Bosnia in support of the establishment of additional safe havens, assuming that UNPROFOR forces were willing and able to gain access to other enclaves in Eastern Bosnia (as an extension of our existing bilateral commitments to protect UNPROFOR forces already in Bosnia). (S)

-- Tarnoff argued not only for the use of air power to protect/defend UNPROFOR, both against category I and category II targets, but also to consider air power as punishment against category II targets -- decoupled from the arms embargo. (S)

Contingencies

Lake summarized options for Principals to consider as next steps if the Europeans completely reject the strategy being presented by Christopher:

-- Unilateral military action by the United States. (S)

-- Leave the Europeans to handle the crisis alone. (S)

-- Adopt one of the various European approaches (i.e., air strikes, blockade, etc.). (S)

-- Continue the present course (i.e., embargo plus diplomacy). (S)

-- Develop a strategy based upon containing the conflict to Bosnia (i.e., preventing spread to Kosovo). (S)

-- Undertake a campaign of air strikes for the explicit purpose of punishment. (S)

-- Pursue a cease-fire, enforced by the UN. (S)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 7, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: JANE E. HOLL

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting, May 6, 1993, 1:30-2:30pm, Situation Room

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from Will Itoh to his counterparts asking that the Summary of Conclusion (Tab A) be passed to the Principals.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memorandum to the agencies transmitting the Summary of Conclusions.

Approve _____ Disapprove ✓

Attachments
Tab I Will Itoh's memo to the agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By Lm NARA, Date 4/1/10
2010-0533-M

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~~SECRET~~

20482

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

CAPTAIN H. L. SHEFFIELD
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the U.S. Permanent
Representative to the
United Nations

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, May 6, 1993 (S)

Please pass for principals eyes only the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. (S)

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By Bas NARA, Date 4/1/10
2010-0533-M

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Declassify on: OADR

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9320479
RECEIVED: 06 MAY 93 10

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 06 MAY 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 6 MAY PC MTG ON BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

ACTION: KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 10 MAY 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL LOGREF: 9320482

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0017 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		HOLL
		NSC CHRON
		WALKER
		WRIGHT

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEM CLOSED BY: NSJDA DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 4/1/10
2010-0533-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	93050611	FOR DECISION
001		X	93050612	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
002		X	93050612	KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	930506	FUERTH, L	
002	930506	GROSSMAN, M	
002	930506	SHERFIELD, M	
002	930506	LAUDER, J	
002	930506	SHEFFIELD, H	
002	930506	INDERFURTH, K	

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Rec'd 5/6 12 Noon

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: JDG LOG # 20479

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG JDG A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	1	LY	
ExecSec	2	LY	
Staff Director	3	CY	
D/APNSA	4		
APNSA	5		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	6	MA 5/6	R
NSC Secretariat	7		

(A = Action) I = Information D = Dispatch (R = Retain) N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

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~~SECRET~~ 20479

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
May 6, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

CAPTAIN H. L. SHEFFIELD
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the United States
to the United Nations

SUBJECT: Principals Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

A Principals meeting on Bosnia is scheduled for today, May 6, 1:30 - 2:30 p.m., in the Situation Room. The agenda is attached at Tab A; a draft UN resolution on Safe Havens is attached at Tab B. ~~(S)~~

for Kristie A. Kenney
William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachments
Tab A Agenda
Tab B Draft UN Resolution

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By lns NARA, Date 4/11/00

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PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: May 6, 1993
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 1:30-2:30pm

AGENDA

I. Review of Current Situation..... All Participants

II. Eastern Bosnia/Safe Havens..... All Participants

III. Next Steps..... All Participants

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 4/1/10
2010+ 0533-m

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5 May 1993
8:30 pm

DRAFT RESOLUTION

The Security Council,

A. Reaffirming all its earlier relevant resolutions,

B. Reaffirming also the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

C. Having considered the report of the Mission of the Security Council to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina authorized by Resolution 819 (1993), and in particular, its recommendations concerning safe-areas, *

D. Reaffirming again its condemnation of all violations of international humanitarian law, in particular, ethnic cleansing and all practices conducive thereto, as well as the denial or the obstruction of access of civilians to humanitarian aid and services such as medical assistance and basic utilities,

E. Taking into consideration the urgent security and humanitarian needs faced by several towns in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as exacerbated by the constant influx of large numbers of displaced persons including, in particular, the sick and wounded,

F. Taking note of the request in this regard submitted by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (S/25718),

G. Deeply concerned at the continuing armed hostilities by Bosnian serb paramilitary units against several towns in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and determined to insure peace and stability throughout the country, most immediately in the towns of Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa and Gorazde,

H. Convinced that the threatened towns and their surroundings should be treated as safe areas, free from armed attacks and from any other hostile acts which endanger the wellbeing and the safety of their inhabitants,

I. Aware in this context of the unique character of the city of Sarajevo, as a multicultural, multiethnic and pluri-religious center which exemplifies the viability of coexistence and inter-relations between all the communities of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which should be spared from further destruction,

J. Affirming that nothing in the present resolution should be construed as contradicting or in any way departing from the spirit or the letter of the above Peace Plan,

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K. Convinced that considering the towns referred to above as safe areas will contribute to the early implementation of the Peace Plan,

L. Recalling the provisions of reolution 815 (1993) on the mandate of UNPROFOR and in that context acting under chapter VII of the Charter,

1. Welcomes the report of the Mission of the Security Council established pursuant to Resolution 819 (1993) and in particular its recommendation concerning safe areas;

2. Demands that the taking of territory by force cease immediately;

3. Declares that the capital city of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, and other such threatened areas, in particular the towns of Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, and their surroundings should be treated as safe areas by all the parties concerned and should be free from armed attacks and from any other hostile act;

4. Further declares that in these safe areas the following should be observed;

a) the immediate cessation of armed attacks or any hostile act against these safe areas, and the withdrawal of all Bosnian Serb military or paramilitary units from these towns to a distance from which they cease to constitute a threat to the security of the towns and their inhabitants, *

b) full respect by all parties of the rights of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and the international humanitarian agencies to free and unimpeded access to all safe-areas in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and full respect for the safety of the personnel engaged in these operations,

5. Demands to that end that all parties and others concerned cooperate fully with UNPROFOR and take any necessary measures to respect these safe areas,

6. Requests the Secretary-General to take appropriate measures with a view to monitoring the humanitarian situation in the safe areas and demands that all parties and others concerned cooperate fully and promptly with UNPROFOR towards that end;

7. Declares that arrangements pursuant to the present resolution shall remain in force up until the provisions for the cessation of hostilities, separation of forces and supervision of heavy weaponry as envisaged in the peace plan for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, are implemented;

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8. Decides to remain seized of the matter and to consider further steps as necessary to achieve the objectives of this resolution.

N.B. Asterisks denote deletion of part of a sentence. Former preambular paragraphs 8, 9bis and 11 and operative paragraph 7 have been deleted.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9320479
DATE 06 MAY 93

SUBJECT: PC MTG ON BOSNIA ON 6 MAY
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	6 May	1235	[signature]
			COPY: 1
MR. RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W -- ROOM 6333 DEPT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW			
			COPY: 1

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By [illegible] NARA, Date 4/1/10
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DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9320479
DATE 06 MAY 93

SUBJECT: PC MTG ON BOSNIA ON 6 MAY
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506			COPY: 1
MR. RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W -- ROOM 6333 DEPT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW	5/6/93	1:28 PM	Walter E. Ave COPY: 1

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SITUATION ROOM
1993 MAY -6 PM 12:16

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: ~~IMMEDIATE~~ PRIORITY ROUTINE

RELEASER: [signature]

DTG: _____

URGENT

MESSAGE NO. 0057 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 5

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) _____ (PHONE NUMBER) _____ (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PC MTG ON 6 MAY

LOG # 20479

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
B	STATE	MARC GROSSMAN		
D	DOD	MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD		
A	CIA	MR. JOHN A. LAUDER		
D	JSC	H. L. SHEFFIELD		

REMARKS:

URGENT

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1993 MAY -6 PM 12:16

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D
1225
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6 May93

PRECEDENCE: ~~IMMEDIATE~~
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: [signature]

DTG: _____

URGENT

MESSAGE NO. 0057 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 5

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PC MTG ON 6 MAY

LOG # 20479

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
B	STATE	MARC GROSSMAN		
D	DOD	MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD		
A	CIA	MR. JOHN A. LAUDER		
D	JSC	H. L. SHEFFIELD		

REMARKS:

URGENT

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By Jnc NARA, Date 4/1/10
2012-0533-M

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
1993 MAY -6 PM 12:16

TIME OF RECEIPT

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12: PM

(A)

PRECEDENCE: ~~IMMEDIATE~~ PRIORITY ROUTINE

RELEASER: BBy Ltr

DTG: _____

URGENT

MESSAGE NO. 0857 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 5

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) _____ (PHONE NUMBER) _____ (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PC MTG ON 6 MAY

LOG # 20479

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
B	STATE	MARC GROSSMAN		
D	DOD	MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD		
A	CIA	MR. JOHN A. LAUDER		
D	JSC	H. L. SHEFFIELD		

REMARKS:

URGENT

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By TM NARA, Date 4/1/10
2010-0533-F

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6MAY93 1308

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- ☒ ~~IMMEDIATE~~
- ☐ PRIORITY
- ☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: [signature]

DATE/TIME:

MESSAGE #:

FROM: **National Security Council** PHONE: **202-456-2291** ROOM: **WHSR**

SUBJECT: **Notice of Meeting** PAGES: 5

PLEASE DELIVER TO: LOG # 20479

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
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2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 6, 1993



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: JANE HOLL

SUBJECT: Principals Meeting on Bosnia, May 6, 1993

Attached at Tab I is the memo to the agencies for the subject meeting.

RECOMMENDATION

That you have Will Itoh sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve OK JWR Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda
Tab B Draft UN Resolution on Safe Havens

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MS NARA, Date 9/1/10

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2 pp. 0533-M

See also 2013-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

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Folder Title: PC0018 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, May 8, 1993				
Staff Office-Individual: Records Management				
Original OA/ID Number: 4005				
Row: 43	Section: 6	Shelf: 5	Position: 2	Stack: V

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. memo~~	~~re: Decisions of Principals Committee Meeting... (2 pages)~~	~~05/08/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RDS 04/17/2015
~~001b. memo~~	~~[Draft version of 001a] (2 pages)~~	~~ca. 05/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
002. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS re: International Reaction to the Christopher Trip (2 pages)	05/07/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4005

FOLDER TITLE:
PC018 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, May 8, 1993

2010-0533-F
rs536

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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RECORD ID: 9320512
RECEIVED: 13 MAY 93 11

TO: LAKE

FROM: WALKER

DOC DATE: 13 MAY 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 8 MAY PC MTG ON BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

ACTION: LAKE DISAPPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 17 MAY 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF: 9320516 9321055

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0018 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		NSC CHRON
		WALKER

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By fns NARA, Date 4/1/10
2010-0533-M

COMMENTS:

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ocr'd 1/23/93

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	93051413	FOR DECISION
001		X	93051514	LAKE DISAPPROVED RECOM

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Rec'd 5/14 5:17pm JWR

National Security Council 5/14 1740L.
The White House

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (WA) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	1/4 FYI	WA	F
ExecSec			
Staff Director			
D/APNSA	2	ok	
APNSA	3		
Situation Room		Natl Sec Advisor has seen	~ please note TL's comment
West Wing Desk	5	WAS/IS	File
NSC Secretariat	6		AR

(A = Action) I = Information D = Dispatch (R = Retain) N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

14 MAY 93 16 16

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Disketts requested

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20512

May 13, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: JENONNE WALKER

SUBJECT: Decisions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, May 8, 1993

Attached at Tab I is the memorandum to agencies on the subject meeting. Due to the sensitive nature of the subject, we recommend that the Memorandum to Principals be on a close-hold basis for Principals use only.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you approve distribution of the attached memo to Principals.

Approve _____ Disapprove ✓ File For Record only KAK per TL note

That you authorize Will Itoh to release the memorandum to agencies attached at Tab A.

Approve _____ Disapprove ✓ File For Record only KAK per TL note

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to Agencies
Tab A Memorandum to Principals

Type & file.
No distribut.

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 4/1/10
2010-0533-M

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANT TO THE VICE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Decisions of Principals Committee Meeting with the President and Vice President on Bosnia, May 8, 1993 (S)

-- Stress growing determination of allies and others to maintain and increase pressure on the Serbs, and that all options remain open -- thus leaving open the possibility of lifting the arms embargo. We will not legitimize the Bosnian Serb referendum as a reason for delay in agreeing on tougher measures, but as necessary will note that the delay is caused by European desires to wait until after that vote. Encourage the Europeans to endorse this position. (Secretary Christopher will phone EC Foreign Ministers May 8 and 9.)

-- Step up the containment elements of U.S. strategy. This could include placing U.S. Army personnel in Macedonia as part of UN mission to serve as a deterrentand perhaps with the express task of helping enforce the sanctions. (General Powell will recommend optimum mission, numbers and types of units or individuals.) U.S. will encourage allies and UN to push Milosevic to allow more CSCE observers in Kosovo. (Secretary Christopher will urge European Community members to take the lead.)

-- Test Milosevic on his promise to close the Serbian-Bosnian Border. This will include encouraging UNPROFOR to put monitors on the Serbian/Bosnian border, including the Drina River bridges. (By COB Monday, May 10, Leon Fuerth's Sanctions Committee will devise other specific steps we can ask Milosevic to take to make good on his promise.)

-- Congressional consultations. The President will try to meet with Senators Nunn, Lugar, Warner, and Bumpers and possibly Pell and Stevens. (NSC staff will prepare talking points.)

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2010-0533-M
NS 9/30/14
4/17/2015 (1.08)

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-- Further review of air power options. NSC staff, with State and Defense, will prepare a brief options paper by Monday, May 8.

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

~~SECRET~~ CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY ~~SECRET~~

← Director, Central Intelligence

← Chairman of the J.C.O.S.

← Permanent Representative of the U.S. to the UN.

20512
district legend

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~~SECRET~~ 20512

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
USUN AMBASSADOR
ASSISTANT TO THE VICE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Decisions of Principals Committee Meeting with the President and Vice President on Bosnia, May 8, 1993 ~~(S)~~

-- Stress growing determination of allies and others to maintain and increase pressure on the Serbs, and that all options remain open -- thus leaving open the possibility of lifting the arms embargo. We will not legitimize the Bosnian Serb referendum as a reason for delay in agreeing on tougher measures, but as necessary will note that the delay is caused by European desires to wait until after that vote. Encourage the Europeans to endorse this position. (Secretary Christopher will phone EC Foreign Ministers May 8 and 9.)

-- Step up the containment strategy. This ~~will~~ include placing U.S. Army personnel in Macedonia to serve as a ~~tripwire~~ deterrent ~~function~~ and perhaps with the express task of helping enforce the sanctions. (General Powell will recommend optimum mission, numbers and types of units or individuals.) ~~It will include pushing~~ Milosevic to allow more CSCE observers in Kosovo. (Secretary Christopher will urge European Community members to take the lead.)

-- Test Milosevic on his promise to close the Serbian-Bosnian Border. This will include encouraging UNPROFOR to put monitors on the Serbian/Bosnian border, including the Drina River bridges. (By COB Monday, May 10, Leon Fuerth's Sanctions Committee will devise other specific steps we can ask Milosevic to take to make good on his promise.)

-- Congressional consultations. The President will try to meet with Senators Nunn, Lugar, Warner, and Bumpers and possibly Pell and Stevens. (NSC staff will prepare talking points.)

-- ~~Explore~~ air power options. NSC staff, with State and Defense, will prepare a brief options paper by Monday, May 8.

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PER E.O. 13526
BY 2/6/2020 (4.48)
2013-0682-M

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~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

* * * *

*UNPROFOR does not now have responsibility for monitoring or enforcing sanctions. Putting U.S. forces into Macedonia under UNPROFOR with a sanctions-related mission could require reopening the UNPROFOR mandate.

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

cc: Thomas McLarty
Bruce Lindsey
George Stephanopoulos



CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

CAPTAIN H. L. SHEFFIELD
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the United States
United Nations

SUBJECT: Decisions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, May 8, 1993 (S)

Attached for distribution to Principals only is the Decision Memorandum for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia for May 8, 1993. (S)

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum to Principals

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By: NS NARA, Date 4/1/10
2010-0533-N

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~

NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9320488
RECEIVED: 07 MAY 93 19

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 07 MAY 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & MTG DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 8 MAY PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 11 MAY 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ITOH LOGREF: 9320512 9320516

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0018 PRD0001 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		CLARKE
		HOLL
		ITOH
		KENNEY
		LAKE
		MILLISON
		NSC CHRON
		REED
		ROSNER
		WALKER

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB CLOSED BY: NSKDB DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By RNS NARA, Date 4/1/12
2012-0533-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001		X	93050719	KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
001	930507	FUERTH, L	
001	930507	GROSSMAN, M	
001	930507	SHERFIELD, M	
001	930507	SHEFFIELD, H	
001	930507	LAUDER, J	
001	930507	INDERFURTH, K	

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ *LOG #* 20488

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ *SYSTEM* *PRS* (NSC) *INT*

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ *DOCLOG* _____ *A/O* _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	1		
ExecSec			
Staff Director			
D/APNSA			
APNSA			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2	5/7	
NSC Secretariat	3		R

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9320488
DATE 07 MAY 93

SUBJECT: PAPER FOR PC MTG
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	D. May	0700	L H Branscum COPY: 1
MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	5/7/93	2308	A. Wilkins COPY: 1
MR. RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W -- ROOM 6333 DEPT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW	5/11	0800	K G Klein COPY: 1

State Dept

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By RGS NARA, Date 4/1/10
2010-0533-M

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DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9320488
DATE 07 MAY 93

SUBJECT: PAPER FOR PC MTG
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	10 May	0700	J H Branscum COPY: 1
MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520			COPY: 1
MR. RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W -- ROOM 6333 DEPT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW			COPY: 1

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MS NARA, Date 4/11-2
2012-0533-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC, ROOM 379 OEOB

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9320488
DATE 07 MAY 93

SUBJECT: PAPER FOR PC MTG
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506			COPY: 1
MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	5/7/93	6 p.m.	M Goodwin Mill COPY: 1
MR. RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W -- ROOM 6333 DEPT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW			COPY: 1

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By RNS NARA, Date 4/1/10
2010-0533-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC, ROOM 379 OEOB

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9320488
DATE 07 MAY 93

SUBJECT: PAPER FOR PC MTG
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506			COPY: 1
MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520			COPY: 1
MR. RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W -- ROOM 6333 DEPT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW	5/11	0800	K J Klein COPY: 1

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By RMS NARA, Date 4/1/10
2012-0533-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC, ROOM 379 OEOB

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 3

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (WHI) (NAME) | (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) | WH/WEST WING (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PAPER FOR SATURDAY MEETING

LOG # 20488

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

EYES ONLY - DELIVER IMMEDIATELY TO PRINCIPALS

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By RDS NARA, Date 4/11/12
2010-0533-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE
- ☐ FLASH
- ☐ IMMEDIATE
- ☐ PRIORITY
- ☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

FROM: **National Security Council** PHONE: **202-456-2291** ROOM: **WHSR**

SUBJECT: **Notice of Meeting** PAGES: 3

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By Ths NARA, Date 4/1/12

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

2010-0533-M

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ 20488

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 7, 1993

~~EYES ONLY~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

CAPT. H. L. SHEFFIELD
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the United States to the UN

SUBJECT: Paper for the Principals Committee Meeting on Saturday, May 8, 1993, 8:30 a.m. - 9:30 a.m., Roosevelt Room (S)

The attached is for principals eyes only for the May 8 Principals Committee meeting in the Roosevelt Room. (S)

for Kristie A. Kenney
William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Paper

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 4/1/10
2010-0533-M

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS re: International Reaction to the Christopher Trip (2 pages)	05/07/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4005

FOLDER TITLE:
PC018 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, May 8, 1993

2010-0533-F
rs536

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

See also 2013-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title: PC0021 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, May 17, 1993
Staff Office-Individual: Records Management
Original OA/ID Number: 4005

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
43	6	5	2	V

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. memo~~	~~re: Decisions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, May 17, 1993 (2 pages)~~	~~05/17/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RDS 04/17/2015
~~001b. memo~~	~~[Duplicate of 001a] (2 pages)~~	~~05/17/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
~~001c. memo~~	~~[Duplicate of 001a] (2 pages)~~	~~05/17/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
001d. memo	[Draft Version] re: Decisions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, May 17, 1993 (2 pages)	05/17/1993	P1/b(1)
~~001e. memo~~	~~[Duplicate of 001a] (2 pages)~~	~~05/17/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002a. agenda~~	~~re: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)~~	~~05/17/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 02/06/2020
~~002b. agenda~~	~~[Duplicate of 002a] (1 page)~~	~~05/17/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 02/06/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4005

FOLDER TITLE:
PC021 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, May 17, 1993

2010-0533-F
rs537

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9320527
RECEIVED: 17 MAY 93 17

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 20 MAY 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF DECISIONS FOR 17 MAY PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: PRES APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 20 MAY 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF: 9320488 9320512

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0021 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		MILLISON
		NSC CHRON
		WALKER

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 4/1/12
2012-0533-M

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB CLOSED BY: NSMEM DOC 4 OF 4

~~SECRET~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	93051810	FWD TO PRES FOR DECISION
002		X	93051816	LAKE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES
003	LAKE	Z	93052018	REOPEN / FWD TO PRES FOR DECISION
004	PRESIDENT	Z	93052018	FOR DECISION
004		X	93052217	PRES APPROVED RECOM

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	930518	CHRISTOPHER, W	
002	930518	ASPIN, L	
002	930518	WOOLSEY, R	
002	930518	POWELL, C	
002	930518	ALBRIGHT, M	
002	930518	FUERTH, L	
004	930520		VICE PRESIDENT
004	930520		WH CHIEF OF STAFF

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9320527
RECEIVED: 17 MAY 93 17

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 18 MAY 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DRAFT DECISIONS OF 17 MAY PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: LAKE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 20 MAY 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF:

FILES: IFG O NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		HOLL
		NSC CHRON
		WALKER

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY WA DATE 5/18 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB CLOSED BY: NSWEA DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By BJS NARA, Date 4/1/12
2012-0533-M

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National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ *LOG #* 20527

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ *SYSTEM* *PRS* *NSC* *INT*

BYPASSED WW DESK: ✓ *DOCLOG* _____ *A/O* _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec			
ExecSec			
Staff Director			
D/APNSA	✓		
APNSA			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk			
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS: Distribution w/ Exec Sec Rpt

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~ OK)

This now is cleared by all Principals (assuming you have no problems with this change to # 5 & 8

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

TIME OF TRANSMISSION
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
1993 MAY 18 PM 1:33

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF RECEIPT
'93 MAY 18 P1:52

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE / PRIORITY / ROUTINE

RELEASER: Murphy

EYES ONLY DTG:

MESSAGE NO. 0951 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 3

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) WH/WEST WING (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION DECISIONS

LOG #

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER		
DOD	SECRETARY ASPIN		
CIA	DIRECTOR WOOLSEY		
JCS	CHAIRMAN POWELL		

B
D
A
D

REMARKS:

EYES ONLY TO PRINCIPALS.

ABSOLUTELY NO DISTRIBUTION OR COPIES MADE FOR ANYONE OTHER THAN PRINCIPALS

ABSOLUTELY EYES ONLY!!!!

~~EYES ONLY~~

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By TM NARA, Date 4/14/10

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

TIME OF TRANSMISSION
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
1993 MAY 18 PM 1:33

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

EYES ONLY

DTG:

RELEASER:

MESSAGE NO. 0951 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 3

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) WH/WEST WING (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION DECISIONS

LOG #

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER		
DOD	SECRETARY ASPIN		
CIA	DIRECTOR WOOLSEY		
JCS	CHAIRMAN POWELL		

B
D
A
D

REMARKS:

EYES ONLY TO PRINCIPALS.

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ABSOLUTELY EYES ONLY!!!!

EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By ths NARA, Date 4/1/10
2010-0533-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

TIME OF TRANSMISSION
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
1993 MAY 18 PM 1:33

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF RECEIPT
8
13 29

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

EYES ONLY

RELEASER: Murphy

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 0951 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 3

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH/WHSR (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) WH/WEST WING (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION DECISIONS

LOG #

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER		
DOD	SECRETARY ASPIN		
CIA	DIRECTOR WOOLSEY		
JCS	CHAIRMAN POWELL		

B
D
A
D

REMARKS: EYES ONLY TO PRINCIPALS

ABSOLUTELY NO DISTRIBUTION OR COPIES MADE FOR ANYONE OTHER THAN PRINCIPALS

ABSOLUTELY EYES ONLY!!!!

EYES ONLY

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MS NARA, Date 4/1/13
2018-0533-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

TIME OF TRANSMISSION
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
1993 MAY 18 PM 4: 02

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF RECEIPT
'93 MAY 18 PM 4:43

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: Barb

DTG:

EYES ONLY

SECRET

MESSAGE NO. 0954 CLASSIFICATION PAGES 3

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (202) 456-2585 WH/WEST WING
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION DECISIONS

LOG # 20527

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	REGINALD BARTHOLOMEW		

B

REMARKS:
EYES ONLY TO ADDRESSEE
ABSOLUTELY NO COPIES TO BE MADE.

EYES ONLY

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By tns NARA, Date 4/1/10
2010-0533-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~ 1357L

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

WHITE HOUSE
TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE
- ☐ FLASH
- ☐ IMMEDIATE
- ☒ PRIORITY
- ☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: Murphy

DATE/TIME: 18 May 1335L

MESSAGE #: 0069

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting DECISIONS PAGES: 3

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

ABSOLUTELY EYES ONLY TO MADELINE ALBRIGHT

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

ABSOLUTELY EYES ONLY TO MADELINE ALBRIGHT

~~SECRET~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NI NARA, Date 4/1/10
2012-0533-M

~~SECRET~~ 20527

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 20, 1993

93 MAY 20 P6:39

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

5/22/93

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Decisions Memorandum of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, May 17, 1993

Purpose

For your information and review.

Background

Memorandum of decisions reached at Monday's Principals Committee on Bosnia, subject to your review.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the decisions in the attached memorandum at Tab A.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab A Decisions Memorandum

PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By TMS NARA, Date 4/1/12
2012-0533-M

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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SUBJECT: Decisions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, May 17, 1993

1. Possible Meeting of UNSC Foreign Ministers. If a meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Security Council cannot be deferred, Secretary Christopher will attend. We will continue to make clear our belief that such a meeting should be better prepared but will not stay away if others attend.

2. Basic U.S. Policy. We will continue raising our preferred course of lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia and interim air strikes, making clear our reasons for believing it is the best course, but will not press it to the point of shattering relations with Allies or the Russians.

3. Possible Sanctions on Croatia. We will explore with EC capitals, especially Bonn, the possibility of economic sanctions on Croatia if Bosnian Croat aggression continues. Leon Fuerth's sanctions committee will begin close-hold consideration of how such sanctions might be designed, assuming no change in the situation.

4. Monitoring the Serbian-Bosnian Border. The United States will continue supporting the draft UNSC resolution on monitoring Milosevic's alleged intent to close the Bosnian-Serb border, but U.S. personnel will not participate in the monitoring effort. State will immediately clear a cable giving our ideas on how that job might be done. USUN will draw on that cable in giving technical advice to the UN Secretariat. The same advice can reach capitals via their UN missions. We would be willing to provide intelligence to a border monitoring force.

5. Preventing Spillover into Macedonia. Principals will recommend to the President that the Christmas Day 1992 warning to Milosevic on Kosovo should be publicly expanded to cover U.S. military reaction against Serbia in the case of Serbian aggression against Macedonia. JCS will provide a menu to the Principals of steps we might take to back up that warning. The basic recommendation to the President will be held until Principals can also recommend back-up steps.

6. Additional CSCE Monitors for Kosovo. State will mount a strong effort to increase the number of CSCE monitors in Kosovo. The U.S. will be willing to contribute to a larger monitoring effort.

7. A New Conference and Possible New Map. Ambassador Albright will sound out UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali's thinking

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about a new or reconvened conference on the former Yugoslavia, in order to encourage him to call one without making a U.S. proposal to do so.

8. Air Support for Allies in UNPROFOR. The Administration will find occasion to make public (especially to Congress) the commitment we inherited from the Bush Administration to use air power to rescue Allied troops in UNPROFOR if they need and request it. We will not, however, agree to use air power to help defend safe havens that contain Allied forces, citing as necessary our basic reservations about the limits of air power and the lack of an end-point to the safe haven strategy.

9. Implementing Vance/Owen. Principals will give comments/clearance on the NSC staff's draft Presidential Decision Memorandum on U.S. participation in implementing Vance/Owen to the NSC staff. That Decision Memorandum will not go to the President, however, unless Vance/Owen seems likely to be agreed by the Bosnian Serbs.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20527

May 18, 1993



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: JENONNE WALKER

SUBJECT: Decisions Memorandum of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, May 17, 1993

Attached at Tab A is the Decisions Memorandum of the Principals Committee meeting for view of the President before distribution.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Draft Decisions Memorandum

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By RNS NARA, Date 4/1/10

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 20, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: JENONNE WALKER

SUBJECT: Decisions Memorandum of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, May 17, 1993

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Attachments
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Tab A Draft Decisions Memorandum

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 4/1/10
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~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 18, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF STATE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
USUN AMBASSADOR
ASSISTANT TO THE VICE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Draft Decisions of Principals Meeting on Bosnia, May 17, 1993

Could you give us your clearance on the attached by COB today?

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Attachment
As stated

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By AS NARA, Date 4/1/10
2010-0533-M

~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

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SUBJECT: Decisions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, May 17, 1993

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6. Additional CSCE Monitors for Kosovo. State will mount a strong effort to increase the number of CSCE monitors in Kosovo. The U.S. will be willing to contribute to a larger monitoring effort.

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2010-0533-M
RS 9/30/14 (451)

about a new or reconvened conference on the former Yugoslavia, in order to encourage him to call one without making a U.S. proposal to do so.

8. Air Support for Allies in UNPROFOR. The Administration will find occasion to make public (especially to Congress) the commitment we inherited from the Bush Administration to use air power to protect or rescue Allied troops in UNPROFOR if they need and request it. We will not, however, agree to use air power to help defend safe havens that contain Allied forces, citing as necessary our basic reservations about the limits of air power and the lack of an end-point to the safe haven strategy.

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RS 9/30/14 (4.52)

about a new or reconvened conference on the former Yugoslavia, in order to encourage him to call one without making a U.S. proposal to do so.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION
~~INFORMATION~~
~~ACTION~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: ~~Draft~~ Decisions Memorandum of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, May 17, 1993

Purpose

For your ~~review and comment before distribution~~ information and review.

Background

~~Draft of the~~ Memorandum of decisions ~~tentatively~~ reached at ~~yesterday's~~ Monday's Principals Committee on Bosnia, subject to your review.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve ~~of~~ the decisions in the attached memorandum at Tab A.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab A ~~Draft~~ Decisions Memorandum

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By ths NARA, Date 4/1/10
2010-0533-M

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Draft Decisions Memorandum of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, May 17, 1993

Purpose

For your review and comment before distribution.

Background

Draft of the memorandum of decisions tentatively reached at yesterday's Principals Committee on Bosnia.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve of the attached memorandum at Tab A.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab A Draft Decisions Memorandum

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 4/1/10
2010-0533-M

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001d. memo	[Draft Version] re: Decisions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, May 17, 1993 (2 pages)	05/17/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4005

FOLDER TITLE:
PC021 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, May 17, 1993

2010-0533-F
rs537

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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SUBJECT: Decisions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, May 17, 1993

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9320516
RECEIVED: 14 MAY 93 12

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 15 MAY 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 17 MAY PC MTG ON BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

ACTION: KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 18 MAY 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF: 9320488 9320512

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0021 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		NSC CHRON
		WALKER

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJEB CLOSED BY: NSWEA DOC 2 OF 2

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2 of 0533-m

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	93051413	FOR DECISION
001		X	93051416	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
001	ITOH	Z	93051416	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	93051512	KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	930515	FUERTH, L	
002	930515	GROSSMAN, M	
002	930515	SHERFIELD, M	
002	930515	LAUDER, J	
002	930515	SHEFFIELD, H	
002	930515	INDERFURTH, K	

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National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: WA LOG # 20516

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (44) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	1	KWW	
ExecSec			
Staff Director			
D/APNSA	2		
APNSA			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	WA 5/15	R
NSC Secretariat	4		

(A = Action) I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

14 MAY 93 4:5 10

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

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~~Requested dispatch 1545 5/14 w/memo~~

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LOG 9320516
DATE 15 MAY 93

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION OF 17 MAY PC
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	17 May	0630	L Bransc COPY: 1
MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	5/15	7:05 PM	Charles W Redman COPY: 1

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By MS NARA, Date 4/1/10
2010-0533-M

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MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520			COPY: 1

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NW NARA, Date 4/1/10
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DATE 15 MAY 93

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION OF 17 MAY PC
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MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	5/15	7:05 PM	Charles W. Hopper COPY: 1

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By MS NARA, Date 4/1/10
2010-0533-M

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SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF TRANSMISSION
1993 MAY 15 PM 12:09

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF RECEIPT
A
MAY 15 12 13 PM '93

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: [signature]

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 0935 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) _____ (PHONE NUMBER) _____ (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PC MTG ON 17 MAY

LOG # 20516

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
K	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
P	JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS: URGENT - FOR IMMEDIATE DELIVERY TO ADDRESSEES !

URGENT

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By MS NARA, Date 4/1/10
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WHITE HOUSE
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1993 MAY 15 PM 12:09

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

B

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: A Mead

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 0935 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) _____ (PHONE NUMBER) _____ (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PC MTG ON 17 MAY

LOG # 20516

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
K	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
J	JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS: URGENT - FOR IMMEDIATE DELIVERY TO ADDRESSEES !

URGENT

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SITUATION ROOM
1993 MAY 15 PM 12: 09

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

Washfax-D - 151433 May 93

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE (PRIORITY) ROUTINE

RELEASER: [signature]

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 0935 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH/WHA for _____ _____
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PC MTG ON 17 MAY

LOG # 20516

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
K	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
P	JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS: URGENT - FOR IMMEDIATE DELIVERY TO ADDRESSEES !

URGENT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By TM NARA, Date 4/1/10
2012-0533-M

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE
- ☐ FLASH
- ☐ IMMEDIATE
- ☒ PRIORITY
- ☐ ROUTINE

URGENT

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting ON MAY 17 PAGES: 2

PLEASE DELIVER TO: 20516

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

URGENT

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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E.O. 12958, As Amended Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines August 28, 1997
By MW NARA, Date 4/1/10
2012-0537-F

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 15, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

CAPTAIN H. L. SHEFFIELD
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the United States
United Nations

SUBJECT: Principals Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia, May 17, 1993, from 12:30-1:45 pm in the White House Situation Room. There is an agenda attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

for Kristie A. Kenney
William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NI NARA, Date 9/1/10

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PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA
DATE: May 17, 1993
LOCATION: White House Situation
TIME: 12:30-1:45pm

AGENDA

I. General Assessment of Situation; of Allied and Other Positions, Including Prospects for Lifting the Arms Embargo ..... (State)

II. U.S. Measures

a. Monitoring the Serbian/Bosnian Border: Draft UN resolution and demarche to Milosevi..... (State)

b. Enhancing the Containment Strategy

1. Options for U.S. military role in Macedonia ..... (DOD/State)

2. Increasing the international presence in Kosovo ..... (State)

3. Possibly extending Kosovo warning to Macedonia..... (State)

4. Other measures (e.g. regarding Albania)... (State)

c. Possible New International Conference (UN or elsewhere)

d. Air Options (including backup for UNPROFOR Troops in safe havens.....(All)

e. Vance/Owen Implementation Planning.....(All)

f. Other Possible U.S. Initiatives ..... (All)

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SECRET

20516

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 14, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: JENONNE WALKER

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, Monday, May 17, 1993, 12:30-1:~~30~~45pm

Attached is the memo to the agencies and an agenda for the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to release the Memorandum to Agencies attached at Tab I.

Approve JWR for TL Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to Agencies
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1995
By NS NARA, Date 4/1/10
2010-0533-M

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PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA
DATE: May 17, 1993
LOCATION: White House Situation
TIME: 12:30-1:45pm

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2. Increasing the international presence in Kosovo ..... (State)

3. Possibly extending Kosovo warning to Macedonia..... (State)

4. Other measures (e.g. regarding Albania)... (State)

c. Possible New Informational Conference (UN or elsewhere)

d. Air Options (including backup for UNPROFOR Troops in safe havens.....(All)

e. Vance/Owen Implementation Planning.....(All)

f. Other Possible U.S. Initiatives ..... (All)

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 2/6/2020
2013-0662-M

See also 2013-0652-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title: PC0026 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, September 1, 1993
Staff Office-Individual: Records Management
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Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
43	6	5	2	V

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (3 pages)~~	~~09/01/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RDS 04/17/2015
~~001b. memo~~	~~[Duplicate of 001a] (3 pages)~~	~~09/01/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
~~002a. memo~~	~~Memorandum for Leon Fuerth et al. re: Principals Committee Meeting on the Former Yugoslavia (1 page)~~	~~08/31/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002b. agenda~~	~~re: Principals Committee Meeting on the Former Yugoslavia (1 page)~~	~~09/01/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
002c. list	re: Questions to be Addressed by Principals (1 page)	ca. 08/1993	P1/b(1)
002d. report	re: Bosnia Aid and Reconstruction (1 page)	08/27/1993	P1/b(1)
002e. report	re: Bosnia and Herzegovina...Aid and Reconstruction Needs (4 pages)	08/20/1993	P1/b(1)
002f. report	re: Proposal for a Balkan Conference (5 pages)	08/27/1993	P1/b(1)
~~002g. report~~	~~re: Strategy for Lifting Sanctions Against Serbia (4 pages)~~	~~08/27/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002h. report~~	~~re: Relating Steps in Fuerth Paper (1 page)~~	~~ca. 08/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002i. report~~	~~re: Maintaining Sanctions After a Bosnian Settlement (5 pages)~~	~~08/30/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
002j. list	re: Public Policy on Bosnia: Terms of Reference (3 pages)	ca. 08/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4005

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0026 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, September 1, 1993

2010-0533-M
rs538

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002k. report	re: Implications of a Failure (6 pages)	08/27/1993	P1/b(1)
002l. list	[Duplicate of 002c] (1 page)	ca. 08/1993	P1/b(1)
002m. list	[Duplicate of 002j] (3 pages)	ca. 08/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
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([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4005

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0026 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, September 1, 1993

2010-0533-M
rs538

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9320983
RECEIVED: 03 SEP 93 14

TO: LAKE

FROM: WALKER

DOC DATE: 03 SEP 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
SOC

PERSONS: IZETBEGOVIC, ALIJA

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 1 SEP PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: LAKE DISAPPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 07 SEP 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF: 9320962

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0026 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
WALKER

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MI NARA, Date 4/5/10
2010-0533-M1

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJEB CLOSED BY: NSASK DOC 1 OF 1

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OC/C 9
11/29/93
DR2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	93090911	FOR SIGNATURE AND DECISION
001		X	93091314	LAKE DISAPPROVED RECOM

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Rec'd 9/10 12:12 pm

JWR 9/10

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: JB LOG # 20983

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG JB A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	1	Walk	
ExecSec			
Staff Director			
D/APNSA	2/5/6		
APNSA		Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3		
NSC Secretariat	4		FYI
WWD	7		File

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Exec Sec has diskette

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~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ 20983

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 3, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: JENONNE WALKER

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting, September 1, 1993, 5:00-7:00pm, Situation Room

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from Will Itoh to his counterparts asking that the Summary of Conclusions (Tab A) be passed to the Principals.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memorandum to the agencies transmitting the Summary of Conclusions.

Approve _____ Disapprove R

file, as revised

Attachments
Tab I Will Itoh's Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NLS, NARA, Date 4/5/10

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2010-0532-M

~~SECRET~~ 20983

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of NSC Principals Committee
DATE: September 1, 1993
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 5:00pm - 7:00pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

The Vice President's Office:
Leon Fuerth

State:
Warren Christopher
Stephen Oxman

DOD
Les Aspin
Frank Wisner

CIA
William Studeman
Oliver Wicklund

JCS
Colin Powell
Barry McCaffrey

USUN
Madeleine Albright

White House
Sandy Berger

NSC
Jenonne Walker

Summary of Conclusions

Public Position and Messages to Foreign Leaders

State will prepare a public statement, for use when we have more information about Geneva developments (probably Tuesday, September 2), as well as letters from Secretary Christopher to Allied and Russian foreign ministers and messages to the Bosnian parties. All will include some common themes: (S)

-- General support for the Bosnians without seeming to endorse all their demands. (S)

-- Interruption of the talks was premature, and all should return to the negotiations to finish the job. (S)

-- NATO's air strike warning remains in effect. (S)

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526
2016-0533-M
RS 9/30/14 (1.10)
4/17/2018

-- We will not consider any easing of sanctions until an agreement is being implemented in good faith. (S)

-- We remain committed to the War Crimes Tribunal. Full lifting of sanctions will require Serbian cooperation with the Tribunal. (S)

Additional points for individual parties will include:

-- State will instruct Ambassador Redmond to tell Izetbegovic that we are committed to helping implement a settlement even though we cannot announce a ground force role until there is an implementable agreement. At the same time, we will point out the opposition we are likely to face in the U.S. and urge him to say publicly <u>now</u> what he already has told us: that he would want the U.S. to help implement an agreement. (S)

-- We will warn Tudjman of possible sanctions on Croatia if both he and the Bosnian Croats do not return to Geneva and show more flexibility. (S)

-- Allies will be told now is the time to press the Serbs and Croats to go as far as possible to meet the minimum requirements of the victim of aggression. We further will argue that seeming to blame the Bosnians would encourage renewed Serb or Croat aggression, thus triggering NATO's air strike commitment and/or reviving our interest in lifting the arms embargo. (S)

<u>Air Operations</u>. JCS will look into another air exercise over Bosnian Serb troops, at a lower altitude than previous exercises, to remind them of NATO's readiness to act on its air strike warning if necessary. (S)

<u>Sanctions Easing</u>

The NSC Staff will work with State to further develop a concept of how sanctions might be eased if a settlement is reached and is being implemented, and what Serbian behavior we would require at each stage. A decision on when and how to share our views with allies and other will be taken later. (S)

The NSC Staff will ask Treasury to explore whether blocked Serbian assets can be used to pay war-related claims against Serbia. (S)

<u>Implementation</u>

We will make public our insistence that we will participate in implementing a settlement only if it is a NATO operation, authorized by the UN but under NATO's operational control. (S)

State will work with OSD and OMB to develop the concept of a voluntary fund to pay the expenses of an implementing force. (S)

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

When announcing our commitment to contribute ground forces to an implementation/enforcement effort, we will say that it is for two years only with a review at the end of the first year. (S)

In order to involve Congress early in a U.S. role in implementation, we would welcome a Congressional support for our participation. The NSC Staff will draft possible wording of such a resolution. (S)

The NSC Staff will verify that calls to staffs of appropriate Congressmen and Senators have been made, alerting them to a meeting on Bosnia and Somalia toward the end of next week. (S)

Balkan conference

State will prepare a plan for encouraging the EC to propose that a Bosnian settlement be followed by a broader conference to address the Croatian UNPAS and other potentially destabilizing issues in the Balkans. (S)

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~ 20983

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COLONEL ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

CAPTAIN T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the U.S. Permanent
Representative to the
United Nations

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, September 1, 1993 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. (S)

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NARA, Date 4/5/00

~~SECRET~~
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of NSC Principals Committee
DATE: September 1, 1993
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 5:00pm - 7:00pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

The Vice President's Office:
Leon Fuerth

State:
Warren Christopher
Stephen Oxman

DOD
Les Aspin
Frank Wisner

CIA
William Studeman
Oliver Wicklund

JCS
Colin Powell
Barry McCaffrey

USUN
Madeleine Albright

White House
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-- NATO's air strike warning remains in effect. ~~(S)~~

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0533-M
RS 9/30/14 (4.56)

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9320962
RECEIVED: 31 AUG 93 12

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 31 AUG 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 1 SEP PC MTG RE BOSNIA

ACTION: KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 03 SEP 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL LOGREF: 9320983

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0026 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		EMERY
		HALL
		HOLL
		LAKE
		MILLISON
		NSC CHRON
		WALKER

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEM CLOSED BY: NSKDB DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MH NARA, Date 4/5/10
2012-0533-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	93083111	FOR DECISION
001		X	93083116	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
001	ITOH	Z	93083116	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	93083117	KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	930831	FUERTH, L	
002	930831	LAUDER, J	
002	930831	GROSSMAN, M	
002	930831	PATRICK, T	
002	930831	MCALEER, R	
002	930831	INDERFURTH, K	
002	930831	ADAMS, G	

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9320962
RECEIVED: 31 AUG 93 12

TO: LAKE

FROM: HOLL
WALKER

DOC DATE: 31 AUG 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 1 SEP PC MTG RE BOSNIA

ACTION: FOR DECISION DUE DATE: 03 SEP 93 STATUS: X

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL LOGREF:

FILES: IRM NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
LAKE		

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEM CLOSED BY: DOC 1 OF 1

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NSC LOG # 20962

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STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

31 August 1993

Tony:

Papers and agenda for tomorrow's PC on Bosnia.

JWR

Reed

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SR SEE CHANGES - BF

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 31, 1993

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MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COLONEL ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

DR. GORDON ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on the Former Yugoslavia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Principals Committee Meeting on the former Yugoslavia on Wednesday, September 1, 5:00 - 7:00pm, in the White House Situation Room. The agenda for the subject meeting is attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Principals should be prepared to discuss next steps to follow a possible agreement in Geneva or, alternatively, steps to take in the event the talks collapse. Papers to aid Principals' discussions are attached as indicated. ~~(S)~~

for Yvette A Kenney
William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Tab A Agenda
Tab B Questions for Discussion
Tab C Bosnian Reconstruction
Tab D Follow-on Balkans Conference
Tab E Easing Sanctions
Tab F Draft Terms of Reference for Public Policy
Tab G What if the Talks Collapse?

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PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

DATE: September 1, 1993
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 5:00-7:00pm

AGENDA

I. Opening Remarks.....NSC

II. Policy Discussion.....All Participants

A. Implementation

B. Reconstruction Fund

C. Follow-On Balkans Conference

D. Easing Sanctions

E. Public Policy Strategy

F. What if the Talks Collapse?

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002c. list	re: Questions to be Addressed by Principals (1 page)	ca. 08/1993	P1/b(1)

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002d. report	re: Bosnia Aid and Reconstruction (1 page)	08/27/1993	P1/b(1)

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002e. report	re: Bosnia and Herzegovina...Aid and Reconstruction Needs (4 pages)	08/20/1993	P1/b(1)

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TAB E/1 [redacted]

~~SECRET~~ August 27, 1993

STRATEGY FOR LIFTING SANCTIONS AGAINST SERBIA

UN economic sanctions against Serbia, first spelled out in UNSC Res 757, were imposed in response to Serbian aggression in Bosnia. This has led many in Europe to suppose, if not to hope, that sanctions will be lifted once an agreement on Bosnia is successfully implemented. Some may even believe that sanctions should be lifted in return for a settlement itself, in advance of implementation. The U.S. has been careful, however, not to commit itself to any timetable for the removal of sanctions. Indeed, in the letter that Secretary Christopher sent to Milosevic on August 20 we were careful to state that "there can be no movement toward moderating the sanctions imposed on Serbia until there is a settlement in Bosnia, and until the international community sees that it is being implemented in good faith." This formulation clearly forsees the possibility that sanctions may survive a Bosnia settlement in Geneva, as well as at least the initial stages of its implementation.

A very good case can be made for maintaining at least some sanctions on Serbia independent of a Bosnian settlement. Although Bosnia has been the key focus of our attention over the past year-and-a-half, it is not the only crisis point in the Balkans. The struggle between Zagreb and the Serbs over Croatian Krajina and Slavonia has not been resolved and could easily ignite when attention is diverted from Bosnia. Kosovo, likewise, remains a time bomb waiting to explode. In the absence of a credible military threat from the West, any large-scale lifting of sanctions against the Serbs would remove whatever incentive they may have to settle these and other outstanding issues on reasonable terms.

The Office of the Legal Adviser at the State Department is now considering the question of whether the UNSC resolutions require the Security Council to take action to lift sanctions once an agreement on Bosnia is reached. Their preliminary assessment is that they do not. Even so, however, any attempt on our part to seek to maintain a comprehensive sanctions regime following implementation of a Bosnia agreement would be stoutly resisted by some of our allies, by Russia and by the front-line states, who have been particularly hard hit economically by the sanctions regime and who would be strongly tempted to ignore sanctions should a comprehensive regime remain in place. Serbia itself might feel inclined to renew the war in Bosnia or Croatia, or to begin ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, in retaliation for a robust continuation of the regime.

The challenge for U.S. policy is to find a middle ground that would give Serbia some reward for a Bosnia settlement, ease the economic consequences on the front-line states, while keeping in place a sanctions regime onerous enough to give the

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Serbs an incentive both to complete in good faith the implementation of the Bosnia agreement, and to negotiate prompt and reasonable settlements to the outstanding disputes in Krajina, Kosovo and elsewhere, and to cooperate with the newly-established War Crimes Tribunal. As is argued in a separate discussion paper, these settlements could be negotiated in the context of a follow-on Balkan Conference whose purpose would be to resolve in a comprehensive fashion the remaining political and economic problems generated by the collapse of Yugoslavia.

In a very useful paper reflecting the views of the sanctions community , which has already been distributed interagency, Leon Fuerth identifies steps that could be taken in removing sanctions against Serbia. These steps are not necessarily tied to any particular events, such as implementation of a Bosnia settlement, but lay out possible stages in the lifting of the sanctions regime that would be aimed in the first instance at easing the burden on the front-line states while maintaining significant economic pressure on Serbia. (See attached annex which ties the steps outlined in the Fuerth paper to specific events or actions.)

The Fuerth paper identifies three possible first steps in such a process:

-- lifting all restrictions against transshipments;
-- lifting trade restrictions; and
-- authorizing aircraft landing rights in Serbia

Implementation of the first two steps would clearly ease the economic burden on the front-line states, and would be of some benefit to Serbia, since goods would be able to transit the country and the Serbs would be able to import and export on a cash or barter basis. The consensus of the U.S. sanctions community, however, is that Serbia would obtain relatively little benefit from the lifting of trade restrictions, so long as it was denied access to commercial and development loans and credit. In the Fuerth paper, access to the various forms of trade financing would only come at later stages.

There also appears to be substantial agreement in the sanctions community that once a settlement to the Bosnia conflict is reached in Geneva, the front-line states will begin to ignore the restrictions on transshipments and trade, and be able to do so with relative impunity, given the political climate likely to exist in the immediate aftermath of a Bosnia settlement.

If the sanctions community is correct, we face some very difficult choices in considering what, if anything, to do about lifting sanctions at the conclusion of the Geneva

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negotiations. If we attempt to hold the line on all sanctions, pending a certain interval to judge Serb good faith in implementation, we would face considerable opposition from Russia and some of our European allies, and widespread violation of the transshipment and trade restrictions by the front-line states. This political and economic hemorrhage of the sanctions regime could foster an image of weakness that would make it all the harder for us to sustain the more telling financial and other sanctions that we would need to pressure Serbia into negotiating an end to the stalemates in Krajina and Kosovo. It would also feed popular perceptions that sanctions do not work.

On the other hand, if both transshipment and trade restrictions were lifted in return for a negotiated settlement, but prior to successful implementation, we could be left with little to offer the Serbs in return for successful implementation. The Fuerth paper identifies easing access to commercial and other financial credits and loans as the primary medium-range step we could take in lifting the sanctions regime. Although the immediate economic impact of easing such access might be minimal, we need to consider what its impact would be on Serbian willingness to move forward promptly to negotiate solutions in Krajina and Kosovo. There is also the problem of public perceptions. Were we to agree to lift restrictions against both transshipments and trade as soon as a Geneva settlement is reached, then ease restrictions on commercial credits and loans in return for moves toward implementation, it might appear that Serbia had been rewarded for its aggression in Bosnia, despite the minimal impact on the Serbian economy that lifting these restrictions might have.

One possible solution to this dilemma would be to lift the ban on transshipments in return for conclusion of a Geneva settlement, thus easing the most serious hardship on the front-line states, while tying the lifting of trade sanctions to successful implementation of the initial phase of the settlement (e.g. after 60 days). The return of access to commercial credits and loans would then be saved for a later stage in the process. With respect to other, fairly modest, steps that we might take, either immediately or in the medium-term, such as authorizing landing rights in Serbia, releasing impounded ships, and other steps of benefit primarily to the Serbs, it may also be preferable to wait until a later stage in order to avoid the perception that we are unduly rewarding the Serbs.

All this depends on what we think is sustainable politically, both domestically and within the international community. If we truly wish to move onward from Geneva to seek a settlement to the remaining issues threatening the peace of

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the region, from Krajina to Kosovo, all of which stem ultimately from Serbian aggression and misbehavior, then we must be willing to maintain a vigorous sanctions regime, which is the only real leverage we have over Serbian behavior short of the use of military force. This will require us to keep in place, pending a comprehensive settlement, those medium and longer-term sanctions whose removal would substantially benefit the Serbian economy. These include access to commercial credits and loans, access to development credit and the release of frozen assests, as outlined in the Fuerth paper.

As is argued elsewhere, convening a Balkan Conference to address the outstanding issues in the region and tying the lifting of remaining economic and political sanctions to the successful outcome of the Conference would place maximum pressure on Serbia to negotiate quickly and in good faith. While there might be interim steps to remove sanctions that we could take during the course of such a Conference, this could best be judged as the Conference progressed. The Fuerth paper provides a useful guide as to the order in which these steps might be taken. (See annex which ties the steps listed in the Fuerth paper to specific actions or events.) Presumably, in order to maximize pressure, we would want to leave the major sanctions in place until the endgame.

Since the Russians, some European allies, the front-line states and Lord Owen himself are likely to resist maintaining a vigorous sanctions regime in the wake of Geneva, we will need to make our case early and well. We should carefully but firmly explain to these key players, as well as to those likely to support us, that in our view a Bosnia settlement is only a step on the road to returning the Balkans to stability, and that unless we move on to effectively address the remaining incendiary issues in the region, in Krajina, Kosovo and elsewhere, we face the near certainty of renewed conflict, in Bosnia and elsewhere. Since the Serbs are the primary malefactors in the region and have the advantage in the areas of dispute, they must be given an incentive to come to the table. Sanctions provide the only credible incentive, short of the use of military force.

Ideally, we should lay out our entire sanctions strategy; lifting the restrictions on transshipment in return for a Bosnia settlement, lifting restrictions on trade in return for successful implemetation, and tying the removal of the remainder to the successful outcome of a Balkan Conference, the initiative for which we would launch at the same time. Since a Geneva settlement could be looming on the near horizon, we will need to move quickly to agree on and implement a U.S. government strategy.

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ANNEX

RELATING STEPS IN FUERTH PAPER TO SPECIFIC ACTIONS *

Immediate Steps

-- Lift all restrictions against transshipment (on conclusion of a Geneva agreement)

-- Lift trade restrictions (within 60 days of an agreement, pending progress toward successful implementation)

-- Stand down (but do not disband) SAMs and other sanctions enforcement capabilities ** (in tandem with lifting trade restrictions)

-- Authorize aircraft landing rights for Serbia (in return for progress at Balkan Conference)

Short and Medium-Range Steps

-- Allow commercial credits, loans, and other financing of trade and investments in Serbian enterprises (in return for progress at Balkan Conference)

-- Release impounded ships and planes subject to payment of costs (in return for progress at Balkan Conference)

-- Increase diplomatic representation and allow Serbian participation in cultural/sports/S&T exchanges (in return for progress at Balkan Conference)

Longer-term actions

-- Authorize services to and within Serbia (Balkan Conference endgame)

-- Release of frozen assets (Balkan Conference endgame)

-- Disbanding the Adriatic patrol and SAMs (Balkan Conference endgame)

-- Assess to development credit (Balkan Conference endgame)

* See also the Fuerth paper, which ties each of the above steps to their respective UNSC sanctions resolutions and estimates how difficult it would be to reimpose the sanctions in question once they are lifted.

** This step was inadvertently misplaced in the Fuerth paper.

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TAB C/2

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August 30, 1993

Maintaining Sanctions After a Bosnian Settlement

ISSUE

The question has arisen whether there would be a legal basis under the current UN sanctions regime for maintaining UN sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) ("FRY") even after an agreement on ending the conflict in Bosnia is reached and implemented.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Under the current sanctions regime, Security Council action is required to lift sanctions even after an agreement on ending the conflict has been reached and implemented. While some of the relevant resolutions indicated that sanctions are to be lifted by the Council when the FRY and Bosnian irregular forces have taken certain actions, and when a peace has been achieved which respects the principle that any change of borders by force is not acceptable, it is up to the Council to decide whether those conditions have been fulfilled. Moreover, subsequent resolutions impose other demands on the FRY relating to the restoration of peace which must be considered in connection with any action to lift sanctions. In that respect, it is important to note that the Council is free to continue the sanctions, or modify them as it sees fit in the exercise of its responsibility to restore and maintain international peace and security. Any such actions would be subject to the concurrence of the USG.

DISCUSSION

The UN Security Council has imposed an economic embargo and related sanctions on the FRY since May 1992, by virtue of Resolution 757. That resolution imposes, inter alia, a wide-ranging ban on imports of FRY products; prohibits provision of financial or economic resources to FRY entities; and restricts flights to and from the FRY. Subsequent resolutions strengthened or expanded the economic sanctions. Resolution 760 clarified the humanitarian aid exception in Res. 757. Resolution 787 prohibited transshipment of, inter alia, crude oil, coal, iron, steel, chemicals, vehicles and aircraft unless authorized by the UN Sanction Committee, and ordered the halting for inspection of maritime shipping to and from the FRY. Resolution 820 significantly tightened the sanctions by requiring all transshipments of commodities and products

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through the FRY on the Danube to be authorized by the Sanctions Committee; ordered the freezing of FRY government and commercial funds found outside the FRY; limited transport of goods across FRY land borders or through its ports; and prohibited the provision of services to any person or body for purposes of any business carried on in the FRY. In addition, an arms embargo has been in effect with respect to all of the former Yugoslavia since September of 1991 (Res. 713).

The language of the Security Council resolutions in the case of Yugoslavia is clear that sanctions continue absent affirmative Security Council action to terminate them. Resolution 757 provides, in paragraph 3, that the sanctions in Res. 757 "shall apply until the Security Council decides that the authorities in the [FRY], including the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), have taken effective measures to fulfill the requirements of resolution 752 (1992)." Resolution 820 similarly provides that the Security Council would review the economic sanctions with a view to lifting them once the peace plan then under consideration was implemented.

By calling expressly for a Security Council decision, Resolution 757 eliminates a potential ambiguity regarding termination which was present in earlier sanctions regimes. In the case of the economic sanctions imposed against southern Rhodesia, for example, the Security Council did not specify when sanctions would lapse, but stated that their purpose was the termination of the rebellion by the white minority of Rhodesia against UK rule. The United States, the UK and other Western states took the position that sanctions lapsed when the rebellion ended, without the need for further action, and unilaterally lifted sanctions. A number of African states disagreed with that interpretation of the resolutions and criticized the UK and the United States for their actions. To put the matter to rest, the United States and UK agreed to the adoption by the Security Council of a resolution formally terminating the sanctions. The Rhodesian experience provides a precedent in support of the argument that the Yugoslav sanctions continue until the Security Council says otherwise. In the case of Iraq, under Resolution 661 the Council decided to "take the following measures [i.e., the implementation of the sanctions regime] to secure compliance with paragraph 2 of resolution 660 [which required Iraq to withdraw its forces from Kuwait]." The Council remedied any ambiguity in that case by explicitly continuing sanctions, following the end of the conflict, in Resolution 687.

The "requirements of resolution 752" which are to be fulfilled include an end to the fighting, respect for the

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cease-fire, cooperation in bringing about "a negotiated political solution respecting the principle that any change of borders by force is not acceptable," cessation of outside interference and respect for the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and withdrawal or disbanding of JNA and Croation Army forces in Bosnia.

To the extent the United States or another country appears to depart from the factors explicitly set forth in Resolutions 752 and 820 in deciding whether to lift sanctions, other states may object, insisting that these factors should be the primary or sole basis of the Council's deliberations. However, the language of the resolutions, and the evolving context in which the sanctions were established and implemented, supports the conclusion that the Council is not bound by only those considerations.

In retrospect one could take the broader view that the "requirements" of Res. 752 are not limited to the specific "demands" in that resolution but include the more general responsibility of the FRY to cooperate in eliminating the threat to international peace and security in Bosnia. In this respect, it is important to note that the conditions specified in Res. 752 reflect circumstances as they were in May, 1992. Those circumstances have changed, and have resulted in the adoption of over thirty additional Council resolutions on this crisis, many of which make new demands on the parties to the hostilities and strengthen or expand sanctions. Paragraph 6 of Res. 859, for example, lists a number of factors as relevant to "a solution to the conflict," including the principle of individual responsibility for war crimes.

This broader view finds support in Res. 820, in which the Security Council

> expresses its readiness, after all three Bosnian parties have accepted the peace plan and on the basis of verified evidence . . . that the Bosnian Serb party is cooperating in good faith in effective implementation of the plan, to review all the measures in the present resolution and its other relevant resolutions with a view to gradually lifting them . . . . (Para. 31.)

This provision appears to go beyond the precise demands of Res. 752 in contemplating that the Bosnian Serb party is cooperating in good faith in implementation of the plan, as opposed merely to negotiation. Moreover, insofar as it merely sets forth the Security Council's readiness to "review" the measures, as opposed to expressing a definite intention clearly or

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immediately to lift them, Res. 820 suggests that other factors may be taken into account at that stage.

In any event, the Security Council, in exercising its responsibility for the restoration and maintenance of peace, is not bound to consider only the conditions specified in Res. 752 in deciding whether to lift the sanctions in whole or in part, but is free to continue, revise or terminate the sanctions as it deems appropriate. The Security Council may decide, for example, that international peace and security cannot be secured until the FRY in fact ceases its efforts in support of the territorial ambitions of the Bosnian Serbs, or in aid of ethnic cleansing, and demonstrates cooperation with the War Crimes Tribunal.

but all Bosnia issues - not Croatia, Kosovo, etc ?

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L/UNA:BCRashkow
L/EUR:DMann
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20962

August 31, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER

FROM: JANE E. HOLL

SUBJECT: Principals Meeting on Bosnia

As you requested, the materials to be circulated for the subject meeting are attached as indicated.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to release the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Note change in guests

Attachments
Tab I Memo to Agencies
Tab A Agenda
Tab B Questions for Discussion
Tab C Bosnian Reconstruction
Tab D Follow-On Balkans Conference
Tab E Easing Sanctions
Tab F Draft Terms of Reference for Public Policy
Tab G What if the Talks Collapse?

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NARA, Date 4/5/10

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001b. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)	09/20/1993	P1/b(1)
~~002a. agenda~~	~~re: [Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia] (1 page)~~	~~ca. 09/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 02/06/2020
002b. report	re: Funding Options for a Bosnian Peacekeeping Operation (7 pages)	ca. 09/1993	P1/b(1)

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PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 20 SEP PC MTG ON BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

ACTION: ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 25 SEP 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF: 9320488 9320512

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COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503			COPY: 1
MR. JOHN A. LAUDER CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			COPY: VIA FAX
COL. T. R. PATRICK JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001			COPY: VIA FAX

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DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	9/30/93	11:40	COPY: 1
MR. JOHN A. LAUDER CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			COPY: VIA FAX
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MESSAGE #: 51

FROM: **National Security Council** PHONE: **202-456-2291** ROOM: **WHSR**

SUBJECT: **Notice of Meeting** SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS PAGES: 3

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USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

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If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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MESSAGE NO. 1911 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 3

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) _____ (PHONE NUMBER) _____ (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR PC MTG

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DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		

BDAD

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DTG:

MESSAGE NO. 1911 **CLASSIFICATION** ~~SECRET~~ **PAGES** 3

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR PC MTG

21055

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		

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PRIORITY
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DTG:

MESSAGE NO. 1911 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 3

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) _____ (PHONE NUMBER) _____ (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR PC MTG

21055

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 29, 1993

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COLONEL ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National
Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

CAPTAIN T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Permanent
Representative of the
United States to the
United Nations

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, September 20, 1993 (S)

Please pass for eyes only to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. (S)

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MJ NARA, Date 4/5/00

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of NSC Principals Committee
DATE: September 20, 1993
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 4:30 - 6:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

The Vice President's Office:
Leon Fuerth

State:
Peter Tarnoff

DOD
Les Aspin
Frank Wisner

OMB
Leon Panetta
Gordon Adams

CIA
James Woolsey
Gene Wicklund

JCS
Colin Powell
Barry McCaffrey

USUN
No Representative

White House
Anthony Lake
Sandy Berger

NSC
Jenonne Walker

Summary of Conclusions

If the Invincible agreement is accepted by all Bosnian parties, we will not claim a triumph for American diplomacy or describe the settlement as meeting all our wishes or principles. We will, however, note that American policies and actions have helped produce a better deal for Bosnia's Muslims and those who still want a multi-religious society than would otherwise have been the case. If accepted, the agreement can produce a situation that is better than another winter of war. (S)

Congressional Liaison Staffs of all agencies will telephone key Hill Staffers to (a) tell them what we know of the Invincible agreement; (b) note that new aspects of the agreement address key Bosnian government concerns (access to the Adriatic and links with Muslim-majority enclaves in eastern Bosnia); (c) say that while the Bosnian Parliament still must accept the agreement, if it does prove satisfactory to them, it would in our judgment be

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better than another winter of war. This will be done promptly, before Hill friends of Bosnia in particular make public statements critical of the agreement that could make it harder for them to support our role in implementation. (S)

During the Hill leadership consultations scheduled for Thursday, September 23, we will present our conditions for participating in implementation/enforcement. (OSD to provide written text Tuesday, September 21, for Principals' review.) (S)

Principals reaffirmed their earlier decision that we would welcome a Congressional resolution of support for U.S. participation in implementation/enforcement, and further agreed that it would be useful with Allies if the resolution contains our conditions for participation. NSC staff will revise its draft Congressional resolution accordingly. (S)

While we do not require prior Congressional approval for American participation, if Congress passes a resolution opposing it, we will not proceed. (S)

OMB will assess whether it is possible and/or desirable to combine a resolution supporting American participation with a supplemental. (S)

OMB and OSD will prepare a recommendation on funding options on Tuesday, September 21. (S)

DOD will reassess NATO plans for unified command throughout the FRY. (S)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 22, 1993

ACTION

ANTHONY LAKE

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: JENONNE WALKER

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting, September 20, 1993, 4:30-6:00pm, Situation Room

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from Will Itoh to his counterparts asking that the Summary of Conclusions (Tab A) be passed to the Principals.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memorandum to the agencies transmitting the Summary of Conclusions.

Approve R Disapprove _____

as revised

Attachments
Tab I Will Itoh's Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MY NARA, Date 4/5/10

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([PC and Bosnia...])
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PC0033 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, September 20, 1993

2010-0533-M
rs539

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P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 18 SEP 93
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PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 20 SEP PC MTG ON BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

ACTION: KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 21 SEP 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL LOGREF: 9320488 9320512

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0033 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
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		HOLL
		LAKE
		MILLISON
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001		X	93091818	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
002		X	93091818	KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

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DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	930918	FUERTH, L	
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002	930918	ADAMS, G	
002	930918	LAUDER, J	
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DR. GORDON ADAMS NATL SECURITY & INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238, OEOB	9/20/93	10:45	M. J. Sullivan

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DR. GORDON ADAMS NATL SECURITY & INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238, OEOB			

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DR. GORDON ADAMS NATL SECURITY & INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238, OEOB	9/20/93	1:10	Gordon Adams

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PC MTG on 20 SEP

NSC LOG # 21032

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CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	COL. PATRICK		

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PC MTG on 20 SEP

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CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	COL. PATRICK		

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CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	COL. PATRICK		

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 18, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

BG MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia on September 20, 4:30-6:00pm, in the White House Situation Room. An agenda and paper on funding options are attached as indicated. Principals should be prepared to take the lead in discussing those agenda items against which their agencies appear. ~~(S)~~

for William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Tab A Agenda
Tab B Funding Options

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NARA, Date 4/5/10
2010-0533-m

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AGENDA

A. NATO/U.S. Implementation Plans.....State/NSC

B. Exit Strategy.....OSD

C. Command and Control Issues.....JCS/OSD

D. Funding for Implementation.....State/NSC

E. Getting Others to
Contribute More Troops.....OSD/JCS/State

F. Congressional Strategy;
What if Congress Says No?.....All

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 2/6/2070
2013-0682-M

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. report	re: Funding Options for a Bosnian Peacekeeping Operation (7 pages)	ca. 09/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4006

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0033 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, September 20, 1993

2010-0533-M
rs539

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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21032

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 17, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER

FROM: JANE E. HOLL

SUBJECT: Principals Meeting on Bosnia, September 20, 1993, 4:30-6:00pm, White House Situation Room

As you requested, the materials to be circulated for the subject meeting are attached as indicated.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to release the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve JV Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to Agencies
Tab A Agenda
Tab B Funding Options

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MV NARA, Date 4/5/10
2012-0533-M

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See 2013-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

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Folder Title: PC0035 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, October 2, 1993				
Staff Office-Individual: Records Management				
Original OA/ID Number: 4006				
Row: 43	Section: 6	Shelf: 6	Position: 1	Stack: V

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Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Memorandum to Leon Fuerth et al. re: Muslim-Croat Rapproachment (1 page)	ca. 10/1993	P1/b(1)
001b. report	re: Promoting Muslim-Croat Rapproachment (5 pages)	ca. 10/1993	P1/b(1)
~~002a. note~~	~~Jenonne [Walker] to Tony [Lake] re: [Item 7] (1 page)~~	~~ca. 10/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 02/06/2020
~~002b. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of NSC Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)~~	~~10/02/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RDS 04/17/2015
~~003a. agenda~~	~~re: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)~~	~~10/02/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 02/06/2020
003b. report	re: Funding Options (3 pages)	ca. 10/1993	P1/b(1)
003c. memo	Leon Panetta to Anthony Lake re: Funding of a NATO Operation (11 pages)	09/30/1993	P1/b(1)
003d. chart	re: Bosnia Peacekeeping Funding Mechanisms (1 page)	09/24/1993	P1/b(1)
003e. chart	re: [Bosnia Ground Forces] (1 page)	09/30/1993	P1/b(1)
~~003f. report~~	~~re: Diplomatic Options in the Balkans (6 pages)~~	~~10/01/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~004a. agenda~~	~~re: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)~~	~~10/02/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 02/06/2020
~~004b. agenda~~	~~[Duplicate of 004b] (1 page)~~	~~10/02/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 02/06/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number:

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0035 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, October 2, 1993

2010-0533-M
rs540

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9321109
RECEIVED: 06 OCT 93 17

TO: LAKE

FROM: WALKER

DOC DATE: 06 OCT 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
IWG
CROATIA
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FOLLOW UP TO 2 OCT PC MTG ON BOSNIA - MUSLIM CROAT RAPPROCHEMENT PAPER

ACTION: OBE PER WWD
DUE DATE: 09 OCT 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER
LOGREF: 9321082 9321089

FILES: IFM C
NSCP: PC0035
CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: NSKDB

DOC 1 OF 1

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
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2012-0535-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	93100818	FOR DECISION
001		X	94050416	OBE PER WWD

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~~SECRET~~ 21109

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 6, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: JENONNE WALKER

SUBJECT: Muslim-Croat Rapprochement Paper

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from Will Itoh to his counterparts a paper on promoting Muslim-Croat rapprochement to be passed to the Principals (Tab A).

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to release the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to Agencies
Tab A Paper

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NARA, Date 4/15/02

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Memorandum to Leon Fuerth et al. re: Muslim-Croat Rapproachment (1 page)	ca. 10/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number:

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0035 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, October 2, 1993

2010-0533-M
rs540

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. report	re: Promoting Muslim-Croat Rapproachment (5 pages)	ca. 10/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number:

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0035 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, October 2, 1993

2010-0533-M
rs540

RESTRICTION CODES

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P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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RECORD ID: 9321108
RECEIVED: 06 OCT 93 14

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 08 OCT 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 2 OCT PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 09 OCT 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF: 9320488 9320512

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0035 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		NSC CHRON
		WALKER

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MS NARA, Date 4/5/12
2012-0533-M

COMMENTS: _____

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DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	93100814	FOR DECISION
001		X	93100814	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
002		X	93100814	ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	931008	FUERTH, L	
002	931008	GROSSMAN, M	
002	931008	MCALEER, R	
002	931008	ADAMS, G	
002	931008	LAUDER, J	
002	931008	PATRICK, T	
002	931008	INDERFURTH, K	

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National Security Council
The White House

JWB 10/7

21108

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BYPASSED WW DESK: DOCLOG A/O

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
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ExecSec	4	VI	Sign Tab I
Staff Director			
D/APNSA	2	sbr	
APNSA	3		
~~Situation Room~~			
West Wing Desk	5	~~ASK~~ 10/8	~~D~~
NSC Secretariat	6	RSM	R

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other

Should be seen by: (Date/Time)

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
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2012-0533-M

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2010-0533-M

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MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	10/8/93	10:55pm	S Braus COPY: 1
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By MI NARA, Date 4/5/10
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DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	10/8/93	4:55	Ophelia D. West COPY: 1
MR. JOHN A. LAUDER CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			COPY: VIA FAX
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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
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2012-0533-M

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RELEASER: B H C

DTG:

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE NO. 1985 CLASSIFICATION PAGES 3

FROM WILLIAM H ITOH (NAME) 456-6534 (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SOC PC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21108

B
A
D

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	COL. PATRICK		

REMARKS:

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MM NARA, Date 4/5/12
2012-0533-M

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION (FR) 10.08. '00 15:03 NO. 1460024823 PAGE 1

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Oct 9 3 03 PM '93

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE / ~~PRIORITY~~ / ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

~~EYES ONLY~~

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MESSAGE NO. 1985 CLASSIFICATION PAGES 3

FROM WILLIAM H ITOH (NAME) 456-6534 (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SOC PC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21108

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	COL. PATRICK		

REMARKS:

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NARA, Date 9/5/12

2000 0533-M

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DELTA/NMCC FAX
1507L
8 OCT 93

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: ~~IMMEDIATE~~ PRIORITY ROUTINE

RELEASER: Bhg

DTG:

~~EYES ONLY~~
~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE NO. 1985 CLASSIFICATION PAGES 3

FROM WILLIAM H ITOH (NAME) 456-6534 (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SOC PC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21108

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	COL. PATRICK		

REMARKS:

DECLASSIFIED
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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MW NARA, Date 4/5/10
2010-0533-M

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Tony--

Please note item 7 (funding option) in particular. It's what my notes say and what Aspin and Panetta both told their staffs. But I wasn't sure the Principals were focusing when they got to that issue. Aspin told his staff "but it doesn't make sense". And Gordon Adams thinks it unlikely the Hill will let us get away with counting our 18,000 air and naval personnel as part of the supplemental but not part of our contribution to the implementation force.

Jenonne

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DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC # 21108

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting SOC PC MTG ON BOSNIA PAGES: 3

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeleine Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 8, 1993

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

DR. GORDON ADAMS
Assocaite Director for National
Security & International Affairs

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

CAPTAIN T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the U.S. Permanent
Representative to the
United Nations

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, October 2, 1993 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By IW NARA, Date 4/15/10

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of NSC Principals Committee
DATE: October 2, 1993
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 9:30am - 11:30am

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

The Vice President's Office:
No Representative

State:
Secretary Warren Christopher

DOD
Secretary Les Aspin

Special Envoy
Charles Redman

OMB
Leon Panetta

CIA
Gene Studeman

JCS
Admiral David Jeremiah

USUN
Ambassador Madeleine Albright

White House
Anthony Lake
Sandy Berger

NSC
Jenonne Walker

Summary of Conclusions

1. The IWG will prepare proposals for promoting Muslim-Croat cooperation and for broadening the basis of negotiations to cover all of the former Yugoslavia. (S)

2. The IWG will prepare proposals on meeting humanitarian needs throughout the winter. (S)

3. State will propose ways to reaffirm that NATO's air strike warning remains in effect to prevent strangulation of Bosnian government-held areas. (S)

4. In her Explanation of Vote on expanding the UNPROFOR mandate, Ambassador Albright, if necessary, will link complete lifting of

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sanctions on Serbia with satisfactory solution of the UNPAS in Croatia. (S)

5. JCS will research the precise terms of the initial, unilateral U.S. commitments to aid allies participating in UNPROFOR in Croatia. (S)

6. State's draft proposal for describing SACEUR's role in an implementation effort was approved. (S)

7. The U.S. will support a NATO assessment for paying incremental costs of NATO states participating in an implementation force, with other participants paying their own way. We also will propose a voluntary fund to repay some of the costs of all participants. (S)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 6, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: JENONNE WALKER

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting, October 2, 1993, 9:30-11:30am, Situation Room

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from Will Itoh to his counterparts asking that the Summary of Conclusions (Tab A) be passed to the Principals.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memorandum to the agencies transmitting the Summary of Conclusions.

Approve ___R___ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Will Itoh's Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By AM NARA, Date 4/15/10
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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9321089
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TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 01 OCT 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: REVISED NOTIFICATION W/ AGENDA & OPTIONS PAPER FOR 2 OCT PC MTG ON BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

ACTION: KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 05 OCT 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF: 9320488 9320512

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0035 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		BLOXTON
		CICIO
		HOLL
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		WALKER

COMMENTS: _____

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	93100117	FOR DECISION
001		X	93100118	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
001	ITOH	Z	93100118	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	93100118	KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	931001	FUERTH, L	
002	931001	GROSSMAN, M	
002	931001	MCALEER, R	
002	931001	LAUDER, J	
002	931001	PATRICK, T	
002	931001	INDERFURTH, K	

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TO: LAKE

FROM: HOLL
WALKER

DOC DATE: 30 SEP 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: REVISED NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 2 OCT PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: FOR DECISION DUE DATE: 05 OCT 93 STATUS: X

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF:

FILES: IFM NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
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cc: VP McLarty Other _____

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MESSAGE NO. 1932 CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES 35

FROM WILLIAM H ITOH (WH) 456-6534 _____
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION REVISED NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR PC MEETING

NSC LOG # 21089

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STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
STATE	USUN OFFICE - AMB INDERFURTH		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
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FROM WILLIAM H ITOH (NH) 456-6534
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION REVISED NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR PC MEETING

NSC LOG # 21089

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STATE	USUN OFFICE - AMB INDERFURTH		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		

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REMARKS:

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STATE	USUN OFFICE - AMB INDERFURTH		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 1, 1993

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COLONEL ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

CAPTAIN T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations

SUBJECT: Principals Meeting on Bosnia, October 2, 1993, 9:30 - 11:30am, White House Situation Room

A revised agenda for the subject meeting is attached at Tab A. Also attached is a UN Non-Paper on Implementation (Tab C) and a State "Food for Thought" Paper on Diplomatic Options (Tab D). Additionally, OMB's memorandum on funding options is attached at Tab B, covered by an NSC paper summarizing the decision criteria for choosing among the options. (S)

for Kristie A. Kenney
William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachments
Tab A Revised Agenda
Tab B Funding Options
Tab C UN Non-Paper
Tab D Food for Thought Paper: Diplomatic Options

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A.

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PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: October 2, 1993
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 9:30-11:30AM

AGENDA

I. Options available to us in the wake of the Bosnian Parliament's rejection of the Owen/Stoltenberg Plan, including:

(State lead)

-- Re-starting negotiations (Reviving Owen/Stoltenberg negotiations? London Conference? Balkan Conference? Other?)

-- Ways to promote Bosnian-Croatian Cooperation

-- Pushing again to lifting the Arms Embargo

-- Expanding/Redefining NATO's current air warning

-- Prospects for the humanitarian effort through the winter

II. Contingency Planning for Implementation

-- Funding Options (OMB lead)

-- NATO command and Croatia (OSD lead)

-- Status of Command and Control issues with the French (JCS lead)

III. Close Air Support for UNPROFOR Croatia

IV. Kosovo

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By rl NARA, Date 2/6/2020
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TAB

B

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. report	re: Funding Options (3 pages)	ca. 10/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number:

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0035 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, October 2, 1993

2010-0533-M
rs540

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003c. memo	Leon Panetta to Anthony Lake re: Funding of a NATO Operation (11 pages)	09/30/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number:

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0035 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, October 2, 1993

2010-0533-M
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003d. chart	re: Bosnia Peacekeeping Funding Mechanisms (1 page)	09/24/1993	P1/b(1)

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([PC and Bosnia...])
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003e. chart	re: [Bosnia Ground Forces] (1 page)	09/30/1993	P1/b(1)

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([PC and Bosnia...])
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FOLDER TITLE:
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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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September 30,1993

Tab C

COMPARISON OF UN AND NATO FUNDING SHARES

	1991 GDP* ($ IN B)	UN PEACEKEEPING ASSESSMENT RATE	NATO ADMINISTRATIVE BUDGET
U.S.	5,673	31.70%	23.35%
Japan	2,361	12.52%	
Germany	1,331	8.98%	15.54%
France	1,034	7.62%	16.50%
U.K.	916	6.37%	18.12%
Italy	965	4.31%	5.75%
Canada	522	3.13%	5.60%
Spain	488	1.99%	3.50%
Netherlands	250	1.51%	2.75%
Belgium	172	1.07%	2.76%
Denmark	91	0.65%	1.59%
Norway	73	0.55%	1.11%
Saudi Arabia	104	0.19%	
Greece	78	0.07%	0.38%
Luxembourg	8	0.06%	0.08%
Turkey	198	0.06%	1.59%
Portugal	87	0.04%	0.63%
TOTAL EUROPE	5,691	33.27%	70.30%
TOTAL ALL LISTED COUNTRIES	14,351	80.81%	99.25%

* SOURCE: THE WORLD FACTBOOK 1992, CIA

TAB

C.

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Circulated By Butros Ghali

9/30/93

Non-Paper

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

1. The present draft of the Peace Agreement (S/26337/Add.1 of 23 August 1993) provides for a variety of multinational bodies to support implementation of the Agreement:

(a) the military aspects are almost entirely allocated to UNPROFOR. They include:

(i) monitoring, and adjudicating disputes relating to, a cease-fire, separation of forces and withdrawal of heavy weapons;

(ii) supervising, with the European Community (which already has a monitoring mission in the Former Yugoslavia), the progressive disarmament and disbandment of all military forces in the proposed Union of Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina (URBH);

(iii) establishing complete freedom of movement and escorting convoys as necessary;

(iv) monitoring the borders of the URBH;

(v) chairing, and reporting to the United Nations on, a Joint Commission;

(b) the police aspects, consisting primarily of monitoring the police of the Constituent Republics and the Sarajevo District, are allocated to the civilian police element (UNCIVPOL) of UNPROFOR;

(c) the human rights aspects are mainly allocated to the United Nations, whose Secretary-General would establish an International Human Rights Monitoring Mission to be deployed throughout the territory of the URBH; but responsibilities are also allocated to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (appointment of judges to the Human Rights Court) and to the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the ICFY (appointment of Ombudsmen and receipt of reports from them);

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(d) the supervision of elections is allocated to the United Nations and the European Community;

(e) the boundary aspects, primarily the appointment of a Boundary Commission and the arbitration of disputes, are allocated to the United Nations;

(f) the administration of Sarajevo is allocated to the United Nations and that of Mostar to the European Community;

(g) UNHCR would continue to take the lead in humanitarian efforts.

2. It is assumed that the parties' record of non-cooperation with previous United Nations and European Community efforts means that a decision by the Security Council to support implementation of the Agreement would have to be taken under Chapter VII of the Charter. On this basis, the UNPROFOR Force Commander and NATO's CINCSOUTH estimate that the military aspects would require a force of approximately 60,000 all ranks, that is an addition of some 50,000 to UNPROFOR's current strength in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

3. An initial estimate by UNPROFOR is that the requirement for police officers could be as high as 2,900 (of whom 250 would be for Sarajevo) but this estimate may be revised downwards after further study.

4. Several hundred international professional staff would be required for the civilian operations listed at (c) to (f) in paragraph 1, especially the Human Rights Monitoring Mission.

5. The cost of an operation on this scale (excluding humanitarian efforts and the costs of rehabilitation and reconstruction) would probably be in the range of $4-5 billion per annum.

6. The Security Council's decision on how best to support implementation of the Peace Agreement will need to take into account the following factors:

(a) the readiness of Member States to make the necessary military and civilian personnel, with the necessary equipment, available to the United Nations;

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(b) the United Nations' ability to deploy them on time, with the necessary logistic support, and thereafter to exercise effective political, operational and administrative control;

(c) the availability of the necessary finance from Member States;

(d) the impact of this operation on the other peace-keeping operations which the Organization is already undertaking;

It may also be necessary to take into account the Bosnian Serb side's strong preference for an operation under United Nations control.

7. Recent difficulties in obtaining personnel for other missions suggest that the current deployment of United Nations peace-keeping troops and police (about 75,000 and 3,500 respectively) may be close to the limit of what the international community is ready to make available, at any rate when the Organization is unable to reimburse to troop-contributing Governments the sums due to them. It has also become clear that rather few Member States are in a position to contribute troops equipped for a potential combat mission under Chapter VII of the Charter and that some of those have reservations about placing their troops under United Nations command and control in such a mission.

8. It has also been increasingly difficult for the Organization to obtain, from its own resources or from Member States, the civilian personnel needed for peace-keeping operations. The complexity of its personnel procedures can also cause additional delays. Six months after UNTAC began to function in Cambodia, nearly a fifth of its international civilian personnel had still not arrived in the country. Three months after it was decided that ONUSAL's electoral division required 36 international professionals, only 11 had been deployed.

9. The rapid expansion of United Nations peace-keeping activity (currently running at six times the level of four years ago) has exceeded the Secretariat's capacity to manage operations on this scale. Before additional major commitments are accepted, it will be necessary to build up the staff of the Departments concerned and to streamline existing procedures for administration, procurement and personnel management, all of which will require the support and cooperation of Member States. The operation

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envisaged for Bosnia and Herzegovina would almost double the Organization's peace-keeping commitments. The Secretariat does not at present have the capacity for this.

10. Nor does recent experience provide grounds for believing that the Member States would be ready to finance a United Nations operation on this scale through assessed contributions. Current arrears on the peace-keeping accounts amount to about $1.5 billion. Of the amounts assessed for UNPROFOR since its inception, only 45% has been paid. With non-payment on this scale having become routine, would Member States find another $4-5 billion a year for Bosnia and Herzegovina?

11. Against this background, the Security Council has three broad options for organizing an operation to support implementation of the Peace Agreement.

12. The first option would be to establish a normal United Nations field operation, comprising military, police and civilian elements, all of them under United Nations command and control exercised through a Special Representative of the Secretary-General, using the United Nations flag and financed by Member States collectively through assessed contributions; in short, an operation similar to those in Namibia and Cambodia. However, as indicated above, this option would require the Organization to take on a task for which the necessary personnel and finance would not be available and for whose command, control and management it would not have the necessary capacity.

13. The second option would be to establish a United Nations operation on the lines described in the preceding paragraph, except that the Council would request the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to carry out the military functions. No precedent for such an arrangement exists and there are a number of variables on which agreement would have to be reached between the Security Council and the North Atlantic Council before the operation was established. For instance:

(a) the extent to which the concept of operations, rules of engagement etc. of the NATO force would require Security Council approval;

(b) the degree of United Nations political control of the force in the field and how it would be exercised;

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(c) the extent to which the NATO force could operate under the United Nations flag?

(d) arrangements for coordination between the military elements (which would be under NATO command) and the police and civilian elements (which would be under United Nations command). Would there for instance be an integrated logistic support system?

(e) the modalities for participation by non-NATO countries;

(f) the extent to which the NATO force would be financed collectively by the Member States through assessed contributions.

It would also be necessary to devise ways of ensuring that the United Nations would not be held responsible for actions by the NATO force over which, in reality, it had no effective control.

14. The third option would be for the Security Council to authorize interested Member States and regional organizations to form an ad hoc unified task force. This task force would undertake all the functions - military, police and civilian - allocated to "the United Nations" or "UNPROFOR" in the agreement, and perhaps those allocated to other international bodies as well. Certain Member States and/or regional organizations would take the lead in inviting others to contribute to the task force. The contributing countries would reach agreement amongst themselves on how it should be financed, including the solicitation of voluntary contributions from non-contributing States. This option would ensure unity of command and full coordination, under a single command, of the military, police and civilian functions. It would also facilitate an integrated logistic support system for the operation as a whole.

15. The United Nations would play no direct part in the conduct of such an operation, though UNHCR would continue to provide humanitarian relief and assist the return of refugees. Most of the questions in paragraph 13 above would be avoided. The Security Council might decide that the Secretary-General should establish a presence on the ground to monitor the way in which the task force carried out the activities authorized by the Council. But if that presence was required to exercise any degree of political supervision, the relationship between it and the head of

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the task force would have to be very carefully defined and agreed by the Security Council and by the members of the task force.

30 September 1993

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DIPLOMATIC OPTIONS IN THE BALKANS

The Bosnian Decision

On September 29 the Bosnian Parliament voted not to accept the most recent Owen-Stoltenberg plan unless the Bosnian Serbs return the territory they have conquered in eastern Bosnia. The apparent sweeping nature of this decision is likely to stop the Geneva negotiating process dead in its tracks. The Parliament was clearly expressing bitterness and frustration over the failure of the Geneva process to secure the return of a significant portion of their lost territories. The most recent flurry of diplomatic activity, which began with the breakdown of the talks in Geneva on September 1 and ended with the negotiations aboard HMS Invincible, may have been beside the point: The Bosnians clearly were unwilling to codify Serb conquests and ethnic cleansing; another 2-3 percent of territory would have made little difference.

Faced with a choice between an "unjust" peace and an uncertain, highly dangerous future, Izetbegovic and company opted for the latter. We do not know where the Bosnian government intends to go from here. They have indicated a willingness to return to the negotiating table, but appear to have used up all their flexibility. They may hope that the August 9 NATO warning will protect them from renewed Serb attack, while they patiently wait for sanctions to force the Serbs back to the table with more concessions in hand.

The situation on their Croatian flank is also unclear. Some Bosnian Government officials have expressed interest in prosecuting the war against the HVO in central Bosnia, where Government forces are doing well. Others, Silajdzic prominent among them, appear interested in pursuing a rapprochement with Zagreb, along the lines of the secret Izetbegovic-Tudjman agreement, as a bulwark against the Serbs. By all accounts, the Bosnian Government was satisfied with the deal offered by Zagreb on access to the sea. The only real certainty on this front is that, despite the secret agreement, fighting has continued in central Bosnia. This could serious jeopardize humanitarian aid deliveries as winter approaches.

Croatian and Serbian Attitudes

On the Croat side, Tudjman is probably disappointed by the apparent breakdown in the Geneva process. He has been having a difficult time getting the international community to focus on his big problem, which is Krajina. He may feel that he finally got our attention with his threat not to renew the UNPROFOR mandate in the UNPAs. Although no doubt relieved at our recent assurances that we will maintain substantial sanctions against Serbia pending a Krajina settlement, he may fear that Krajina

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will again recede into the background pending a Bosnia agreement. He could opt for the military option despite our warnings against it, or pursue rapprochement with the Muslims as his own bulwark against the Serbs.

The Serbs were very close to getting what they wanted in Bosnia and no doubt received the news from Sarajevo with dismay. Milosevic now faces the prospect of a winter under a harsh sanctions regime with no let-up in sight. If easing sanctions is uppermost in his mind, he could decide to use whatever influence he still possesses to get the Bosnian Serbs to give the Muslims a better deal. On the other hand, he could decide to play a riskier game and encourage them to resume the offensive, in the belief that NATO intervention can be avoided and the Muslims either totally defeated or forced back to the bargaining table on Serb terms.

Options for Next Steps

Given the current positions of the three parties, one of two things must happen to achieve a settlement in Bosnia. Either the Bosnian Government must get enough territory in eastern Bosnia to satisfy its needs or it must be convinced or forced to settle for considerably less. Since both the Muslims and Serbs seem to have gotten down to their bottom lines, it is hard to see how the Owen/Stoltenberg negotiating process can achieve either of these outcomes. Owen and Stoltenberg have no power to compel the Serbs to cede territory to the Muslims or to force the latter to settle for less. Something else needs to be added to the mix.

Short-Term Strategy

Given the uncertainty over how the other parties will react to the Bosnian Parliament's dramatic decision, it may be prudent to wait a few weeks to let the dust to settle before committing ourselves to any medium- or longer-term strategy. The parties may themselves take actions or make proposals during the next week or two which could help determine our longer-term strategy. It may take a few weeks -- and the onset of winter -- for the Bosnian Muslims to fully absorb the consequences of the parliament's decision and to arrive at a coherent position.

During this interim period, we should urge the parties to return to follow through on their Joint Declaration commitments, including the establishment of working groups to discuss territorial issues. We should also caution them to avoid actions that could undermine prospects for renewed negotiations; we should try to preempt a renewal of Serb-Muslim hostilities by reaffirming our commitment to the August 9 NATO air-strike decision; and we should begin serious planning for

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stepping up humanitarian relief efforts for the coming winter. Once we have had an opportunity to assess developments on the ground, there are a number of longer-term options we can consider.

Although we have probably gone as far as we can in imposing sanctions on Belgrade, it might be worthwhile to spell out for Milosevic what our plans are for easing sanctions against Serbia. The realization that sanctions will only begin to come off in return for a Bosnia settlement, and that the most biting sanctions will only be lifted in return for settlements or an easing of tensions in Krajina and Kosovo, might give him an incentive to move sooner rather than later on Bosnia.

Military Options

One possibility is the application of outside military force. Last spring, we put our allies and Moscow on notice that if the Geneva negotiations broke irretrievably down we would reserve the right to resurface the "lift and strike" option. This option attracted little support when first raised and is unlikely to prove any more popular now, either at home or abroad. Nor would it be certain to produce a positive outcome on the ground. A less sweeping military option would be to implement only the "lift" portion of the "lift and strike" option and remove the arms embargo against Bosnia. We have supported this option previously and could press again for a UNSC resolution lifting the embargo. Key allies as well as Moscow remain adamantly opposed, however, and are unlikely to change their minds except, perhaps, in the case of large-scale Serb aggression against Sarajevo and Muslim-held areas. Nor is it certain that lifting the embargo at this point would do anything more than prolong the conflict and add to the suffering.

Another option might be to promote a partial settlement among the parties -- e.g. implementing the accord to make Sarajevo a UN-administered province -- and enforce it with U.S. and NATO peacekeeping forces. This could ensure the survival of Sarajevo through the winter and beyond; it could also be a powerful deterrent against new Serb offensives and give the Bosnians greater confidence in seeking a wider political settlement. On the other hand, it would place U.S. and NATO forces in an exposed position, and perhaps elicit even greater Congressional resistance than has been the case for implementation of the Owen/Stoltenberg plan.

Buying Time for Sanctions

We know that sanctions are having a devastating impact on the Serbian economy. What we do not know is how long it might take for sanctions to force Serbian concessions on Bosnia, if

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ever. Nonetheless, one possible option would be to adopt a mid- to long-term strategy aimed at maintaining the status quo on the ground in Bosnia until the pain of the sanctions regime forces the Serbs to be more reasonable. This would, in fact, be a continuation of the short-term strategy we recommend pursuing over the next few weeks. Under this option, we would continue to support the Owen-Stoltenberg process and continue to urge the parties to negotiate in good faith.

Maintaining the Status Quo on the Ground: While working to keep the Owen-Stoltenberg process going, we would continue efforts to prevent renewed hostilities from breaking out and to mobilize the international community to carry out the humanitarian relief effort needed to get the Bosnian people through the coming winter. As noted above, this would involve getting our Allies to reaffirm NATO's August 9 air-strike decision (and perhaps to spell out more explicitly the categories of Serb and Croat behavior that could trigger air strikes). At the same time, we should caution the Bosnians that the humanitarian purpose of our air-strike threat has not changed, and that they should not expect outside military intervention to help them win the war.

We should recognize, however, that our ability to influence events on the ground is far from complete. One problem we may face is that, even if the Bosnian Serbs do not renew their stranglehold on Sarajevo, they could prosecute the war in areas arguably not covered by the August 9 decision. This could face us with a choice between drawing yet another line in the sand, an approach which could be difficult to sell to allies, or acquiescing in the loss of more Bosnian government territory.

Clearly, the possibility of renewed fighting is directly related to the humanitarian relief effort. If we are successful in averting a large-scale resumption in fighting, the humanitarian relief effort this winter will be much more manageable. Should we fail, we could face a humanitarian catastrophe.

Encouraging Croat-Muslim Rapprochement: While supporting continuation of the Geneva process and working to prevent intensified fighting on the ground, there are a number of other diplomatic initiatives we could pursue under this option. One could be to encourage the rapprochement between Zagreb and the Bosnian Muslims that began with the secret agreement between Tudjman and Izetbegovic in Geneva on September 14. While this could prove to be a dead-end, successful movement toward merger would put pressure on Belgrade, help to preserve a genuinely multi-ethnic entity in the heart of the Balkans, and strengthen the strategic position of both Zagreb and Sarajevo vis-a-vis the Serbs. The Muslims might even be persuaded to drop their

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pursuit of additional territory in eastern Bosnia in return for the strategic security and enhanced viability that confederation with Croatia would provide.

London Conference II

Another possible option would be to try to regenerate negotiating momentum by seeking to replace the Owen/Stoltenberg process with a new negotiating forum with a different mandate. The Bosnia negotiations launched by the London Conference and initially co-chaired by Vance and Owen under ICFY sponsorship sought to preserve a single Bosnian state within its current boundaries. However, all three parties are now prepared to accept the partition of the country under certain conditions. The secret Tudjman-Izetbegovic agreement foresees partition, as does the September 16 Serb-Muslim Joint Declaration. The sticking point, from the Bosnian government point of view, is the territorial issue.

A London Conference II, which would reflect the changes circumstances on the ground in Bosnia and whose mandate would be to implement a humane and orderly partition of Bosnia, while seeking territorial adjustments and perhaps some voluntary transfer of populations, could create a new dynamic and give renewed momentum to negotiations. The Serbs and Croats might be attracted to the idea since it would hold out the promise of early partition. The Bosnian government might be harder to convince, but we could try to persuade them that they stand a better chance of getting an acceptable deal on territory by agreeing to a rapid partition of the country. The Bosnian Serbs have recently hinted they might cede more territory in eastern Bosnia in the context of partition and merger with Serbia. Such negotiations could also be used to promote the idea of a Croat-Muslim merger.

Even if a London Conference II was not immediately successful, it could buy valuable time. By moving swiftly to energize a new negotiating process, we might be able to avert a return to the battlefield and help the Bosnian Muslims get through another winter. This, in turn, could give sanctions more time to work and perhaps make Belgrade more amenable to serious negotiations by next spring. Although a London Conference II could be convened under the auspices of the ICFY, we would have the option of using negotiations on a new mandate to change the sponsorship and chairmanship of the new forum. One possibility would be to propose having the new negotiations conducted under CSCE auspices, as a way of making a clear break with an Owen-Stoltenberg process that has been largely discredited.

Balkan Conference

Although a London Conference II could succeed in regenerating negotiating momentum, it would by definition focus

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exclusively on Bosnia. As we are becoming increasingly aware, however, Bosnia does not exist in a vacuum. A renewal of war in Krajina, for example, would threaten to spill back over into Bosnia regardless of any settlement there, with obvious implications for any NATO implementation force. Although not directly related to Bosnia, an explosion in Kosovo could have region-wide repercussions. Certainly, there will be no return of stability to the Balkans unless the crises in these other areas are resolved.

There are also time considerations. Tudjman is increasingly frustrated at the unwillingness of the international community to engage on Krajina. He may not be willing to wait for a new Bosnia negotiation to run its course. Milosevic, similarly, is likely to feel impatient once he realizes that we do not intend to lift the most biting sanctions until there is a settlement on Krajina, and perhaps on Kosovo as well. One possible way to deal with these frustrations would be to establish a single "Balkan Conference" negotiating forum in which all these issues could be addressed simultaneously.

Under such a scheme, negotiations on Bosnia, Krajina and Kosovo would be conducted separately but the synergy from each could influence the others and create new possibilities for trade-offs. It is possible, for example, that the Serbs might be more willing to concede territory in eastern Bosnia in return for concessions in Croatia. In addition, the prospect of a complete lifting of sanctions at the successful conclusion of a Balkan Conference might make Milosevic more willing to make concessions on territory and in other areas. This point could be made to the Bosnian Muslims, who might otherwise fear that their interests would be submerged in a more broadly-based forum. While addressing Bosnia, Krajina and Kosovo, a Balkan Conference could also be used to tackle such region-wide issues as arms control, the rights of ethnic minorities and economic reconstruction. The overall aim of the Conference would be to bring a comprehensive peace to the Balkans.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 30, 1993



Nat'l Sec Advisor has seen

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER

FROM: JANE E. HOLL

SUBJECT: Updated Package

An updated package for tomorrow's Principals Meeting is attached at Tab I with a revised agenda attached at Tab A. State has provided both a UN Non-Paper on Implementation (Tab C) and a Food for Thought Paper on Diplomatic Options (Tab D). Additionally, OMB's memorandum on funding options is attached at Tab B, covered by an NSC paper summarizing the decision criteria for choosing among the options.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the Memo to Agencies at Tab I.

Attachments
Tab I Memo to Agencies
Tab A Revised Agenda
Tab B Funding Options
Tab C UN Non-Paper
Tab D Food for Thought Paper: Diplomatic Options

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NARA, Date 4/5/2010
2007-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COLONEL ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

CAPTAIN T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations

SUBJECT: Principals Meeting on Bosnia, October 2, 1993, 9:30 - 11:30am, White House Situation Room

A revised agenda for the subject meeting is attached at Tab A. Also attached is a UN Non-Paper on Implementation (Tab C) and a "Food for Thought" Paper on Diplomatic Options (Tab D). Additionally, OMB's memorandum on funding options is attached at Tab B, covered by an NSC paper summarizing the decision criteria for choosing among the options. ~~(S)~~

State

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachments
Tab A Revised Agenda
Tab B Funding Options
Tab C UN Non-Paper
Tab D Food for Thought Paper: Diplomatic Options

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 4/5/10

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FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 30 SEP 93
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KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 2 OCT PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 02 OCT 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF: 9320488 9320512

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0035 CODES: BOS

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	93092919	FOR DECISION
001		X	93093012	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
002		X	93093012	ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	930930	FUERTH, L	
002	930930	GROSSMAN, M	
002	930930	MCALEER, R	
002	930930	LAUDER, J	
002	930930	PATRICK, T	
002	930930	INDERFURTH, K	

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LOG 9321082
DATE 30 SEP 93

SUBJECT: PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MTG ON BOSNIA
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DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9321082
DATE 30 SEP 93

SUBJECT: PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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1993 SEP 30 PM 12:35

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

SEP 30 12 35 PM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE ~~PRIORITY~~ ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE NO. 1913 CLASSIFICATION PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H ITOH ~~JB for~~ (NAME) 456-6534 (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Principals Committee Mtg on Bosnia

NSC LOG # 21082

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	Mr. Marc Grossman	
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	Mr. John Lauder	
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	Col. Mealeer	
JCS	COL. PATRICK / Secretary, JCS		
[redacted]	[redacted]		

REMARKS:

~~EYES ONLY~~

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
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NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER (TH) 09. 30. '93 12:38 NO. 1460069886 PAGE

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

1993 SEP 30 PM 12:35

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

WA FAX

DELTA

30 12 38

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE ~~PRIORITY~~ ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE NO. 1913 CLASSIFICATION PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H ITOH for (NAME) 456-6534 (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Principals Committee Mtg on Bosnia

NSC LOG # 21082

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	Mr. Marc Grossman	
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	Mr. John Lauder	
D	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	Col. Mcaleer	
D	JCS	COL. PATRICK / Secretary, JCS		
	[redacted]	[redacted]		

REMARKS:

~~EYES ONLY~~

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NARA, Date 9/5/00
2010-0533-M

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

(TH) 09. 30. '93 12:40 NO. 1460120181 PAGE 1

TIME OF RECEIPT

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1993 SEP 30 PM 12:35

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

'93 SEP 30 P12:44

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE ~~PRIORITY~~ ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE NO. 1913 CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H ITOH for (NAME) 456-6534 (PHONE NUMBER) _____ (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Principals Committee Mtg on Bosnia

NSC LOG # 21082

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	Mr. Marc Grossman	
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	Mr. John Lauder	
D	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	Col. Mcaleer	
D	JCS	COL. PATRICK, Secretary, JCS		
	[redacted]	[redacted]		

REMARKS:

~~EYES ONLY~~

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MS NARA, Date 4/5/10
2018-0533-M

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

EYES ONLY

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE
- ☐ FLASH
- ☐ IMMEDIATE
- ☐ PRIORITY
- ☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting PAGES: 2

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeleine Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

SECRET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

EYES ONLY

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NARA, Date 9/5/10
2010-0533-F

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ 21082

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 30, 1993

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COLONEL ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

CAPTAIN T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the U.S. Permanent
Representative to the
United Nations

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia on Saturday, October 2, 9:30 - 11:30am, in the White House Situation Room. The agenda for the subject meeting is attached at Tab A.
~~(S)~~

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MJ NARA, Date 9/5/10
7018-0533-M

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~~SECRET~~

PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: October 2, 1993
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 9:30-11:30AM

AGENDA

I. Options available to us in the wake of the Bosnian Parliament's rejection of the Owen/Stoltenberg Plan, including:

(State lead)

-- Re-starting negotiations
(Reviving Owen/Stoltenberg negotiations? London Conference? Balkan Conference? Other?)

-- Ways to promote Bosnian-Croatian cooperation

-- Pushing again to lift the arms embargo?

-- Expanding/Redefining NATO's current air warning?

-- Prospects for the humanitarian effort through the winter

II. Contingency Planning for Implementation

-- Funding Options (OMB lead)

-- NATO command and Croatia (OSD lead)

-- Status of command and control issues with the French (JCS lead)

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By NL NARA, Date 2/6/2020

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 29, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: JENONNE WALKER

SUBJECT: Principals Meeting on Bosnia, October 2, 1993

As requested at Tab A is the agenda for the subject meeting.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memorandum to the agencies Tab A.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By TNM NARA, Date 4/5/10
2010-0533-M

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SECRET

~~SECRET~~ SECRET 21082

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COLONEL ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

CAPTAIN T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the U.S. Permanent
Representative to the
United Nations

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

There will be a Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia on Saturday, October 2, 9:30 - 11:30am, in the White House Situation Room. The agenda for the subject meeting is attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By DNS NARA, Date 4/5/10

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2448 0533-m

PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: October 2, 1993
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 9:30-11:30AM

AGENDA

I. Options available to us in the wake of the Bosnian Parliament's rejection of the Owen/Stoltenberg Plan, including:

(State lead)

-- Re-starting negotiations (Reviving Owen/Stoltenberg negotiations? London Conference? Balkan Conference? Other?)

-- Ways to promote Bosnian-Croatian cooperation

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II. Contingency Planning for Implementation

-- Funding Options (OMB lead)

-- NATO command and Croatia (OSD lead)

-- Status of command and control issues with the French (JCS lead)

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
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2013-0682-M

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See also 2013-0662-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

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Staff Office-Individual: Records Management				
Original OA/ID Number: 4006				
Row: 43	Section: 6	Shelf: 6	Position: 1	Stack: V

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. note~~	~~Nancy [Soderberg] to Tony [Lake] re: Summary of Conclusions for Oct. 18 PC (1 page)~~	~~10/27/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 02/06/2020
001b. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia [partial] (1 page)	10/19/1993	~~P1/b(1)~~, P3/b(3) RDS 4/17/15
001c. memo	[Draft version of 001b] (1 page)	10/18/1993	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4006

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0039 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, October 19, 1993

2010-0533-M
rs541

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9321197
RECEIVED: 26 OCT 93 14

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 29 OCT 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 19 OCT PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 29 OCT 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF:

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0039 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
		MILLISON
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		WALKER

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COMMENTS: _____

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	93102617	FOR DECISION
001		X	93102914	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
001	ITOH	Z	93102914	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	93102916	KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	931029	FUERTH, L	
002	931029	GROSSMAN, M	
002	931029	MCALEER, R	
002	931029	INDERFURTH, K	
002	931029	LAUDER, J	
002	931029	PATRICK, T	

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RECORD ID: 9321197
RECEIVED: 26 OCT 93 14

TO: LAKE

FROM: WALKER

DOC DATE: 26 OCT 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 18 OCT PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: FOR DECISION DUE DATE: 29 OCT 93 STATUS: X

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF:

FILES: IFM NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
LAKE		

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By ths NARA, Date 4/5/10
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 27, 1993

MEMO TO TONY

FROM: NANCY

RE: Summary of Conclusions for Oct. 18 PC

My notes indicate the decision was to delay close air support and to follow up by informing capitals.

Jenonne says she has no recollection of such statements but my notes are pretty clear.

My recollection in between: delay CAS. Don't remember informing capitals beyond Madeleine.

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recd 10-27 8:16 PM JWR 10/28

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 21197

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (AH) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	1		
ExecSec			
Staff Director	2		
D/APNSA	3		
APNSA	4	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	as amended
~~Situation Room~~	5		Tab I
West Wing Desk	6	(AH) 10/29	D
NSC Secretariat			

(A = Action) I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS: FYI: PC mtg now on TUESDAY, OCT 19th (not OCT 18)

96 OCT 93 5:43

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Eric Sechen diskette

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9321197
DATE 29 OCT 93

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 19 OCT PC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520			COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			COPY: VIA FAX
MR. RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W -- ROOM 6333 DEPT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			COPY: VIA FAX
MR. JOHN A. LAUDER CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			COPY: VIA FAX
COL. T. R. PATRICK JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001			COPY: VIA FAX

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NNI NARA, Date 4/5/10
2010-0533-M

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1993 OCT 29 PM 4:50

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Oct 29 4 50 PM '93

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE PRIORITY ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO. 2144 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H ITOH (WHI) 456-6534 (NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PRINCIPALS SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION

NSC LOG # 21197

BDAD

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXEC SEC		
DOD	EXEC SEC		
CIA	EXEC SEC		
JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

~~EYES ONLY~~

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 4/5/12
2010-0533-M

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (FR) 10.29.'93 16:50 NO. 14600446 39 PAGE 2

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
1993 OCT 29

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FAX

DELTA

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE ~~PRIORITY~~ ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE NO. 2144 CLASSIFICATION PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H ITOH (WHI) 456-6534
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PRINCIPALS SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION

NSC LOG # 21197

BDAD

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXEC SEC		
DOD	EXEC SEC		
CIA	EXEC SEC		
JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

~~EYES ONLY~~

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By DJ NARA, Date 4/5/10
2010-0533-M

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

1993 OCT 29

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE PRIORITY ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

SECRET

MESSAGE NO. 2144 CLASSIFICATION PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H ITOH (WHI) 456-6534
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PRINCIPALS SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION

NSC ~~LOG~~ # 21197

BDAD

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXEC SEC		
DOD	EXEC SEC		
CIA	EXEC SEC		
JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

~~EYES ONLY~~

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NARA, Date 4/5/10
2010-0533-M

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~~SECRET~~ 21197

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 29, 1993

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COLONEL ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

CAPTAIN T.R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, October 19, 1993 (S)

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. (S)

for Christie A Kenney
William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By RDS NARA, Date 9/5/00
2012-0533-M

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TAB

A.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia [partial] (1 page)	10/19/1993	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4006

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0039 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, October 19, 1993

2010-0533-M
rs541

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of NSC Principals Committee
DATE: October 19, 1993
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 3:30pm - 4:30pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

The Vice President's Office:
Leon Fuerth

State:
Secretary Warren Christopher
Peter Tarnoff

DOD:
Secretary Les Aspin
Frank Wisner

USUN:
Ambassador Madeleine Albright

CIA:
James Woolsey
(b)(3)

JCS:
David Jeremiah
Barry McCaffrey

JCS:
Admiral David Jeremiah
Barry McCaffrey

White House:
Anthony Lake
Sandy Berger

NSC:
Jenonne Walker

Summary of Conclusions

At the conclusion of its October 18 meeting on NATO Summit issues, the Principals Committee briefly discussed the French proposed UNSC resolution that would authorize states or regional organizations to give Close Air Support to UNPROFOR in Croatia. (S)

1. No positive decision will be taken for now. (S)

2. Ambassador Albright may tell the UNSYG that the difficulties created with regard to procedures for Close Air Support for UNPROFOR in Bosnia make us wary of undertaking a similar endeavor in Croatia at this time. (S)

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0533-M
RS 9/30/14

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001c. memo	[Draft version of 001b] (1 page)	10/18/1993	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4006

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0039 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, October 19, 1993

2010-0533-M
rs541

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 26, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: JENONNE WALKER

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting, October 18, 1993, 3:30-4:30pm, Situation Room

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from Will Itoh to his counterparts asking that the Summary of Conclusions (Tab A) be passed to the Principals.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memorandum to the agencies transmitting the Summary of Conclusions.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

as amended

Attachments
Tab I Will Itoh's Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NARA, Date 4/5/10

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COLONEL ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

CAPTAIN T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the U.S. Permanent
Representative to the
United Nations

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, October 18, 1993 (S)

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. (S)

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 4/5/10

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See also 2013-0862-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

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~~001a. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of NSC Principals Committee (3 pages)~~	~~02/18/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RDS 04/17/2015
~~001b. memo~~	~~[Duplicate of 001a, incomplete copy] (1 page)~~	~~02/18/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RDS 04/17/2015
~~002. memo~~	~~Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Conclusions of the February 18 Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)~~	~~ca. 02/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RDS 04/17/2015
~~003a. agenda~~	~~re: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)~~	~~02/18/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 02/06/2020
~~003b. paper~~	~~re: Russia Strategy (1 page)~~	~~ca. 02/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RDS

COLLECTION:
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([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0060 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, February 18, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs542

RESTRICTION CODES

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P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 11 MAR 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 18 FEB PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 26 FEB 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF: 9420213

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0060 CODES: BOS

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FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
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		DARBY
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
		MILLISON
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		WALKER

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DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94030412	FOR DECISION
001		X	94031119	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
001	ITOH	Z	94031119	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	94031120	KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	940311	FUERTH, L	
002	940311	GROSSMAN, M	
002	940311	MCALEER, R	
002	940311	ADAMS, G	
002	940311	INDERFURTH, K	
002	940311	LAUDER, J	
002	940311	PATRICK, T	

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SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 18 FEB PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE DUE DATE: 26 FEB 94 STATUS: X

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF:

FILES: IFG NSCP: CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
LAKE		

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Soderberg	2		
Berger	3		
Lake	4	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	6	3/11	D
NSC Secretariat			

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Itoh			
Soderberg	2		
Berger	~~2~~ 3		
Lake	4	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	6	3/11	8
NSC Secretariat			

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cc: VP McLarty Other _____

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COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			COPY: VIA FAX
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AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			COPY: VIA FAX
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DTG:

MESSAGE NO. 461 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 5

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 18 FEB PC MEETING

~~EYES ONLY~~ NSC LOG # 20252

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

B B N D A

REMARKS:

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TIME OF RECEIPT

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RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO. 461 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 5

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 18 FEB PC MEETING

~~EYES ONLY~~ NSC LOG # 20252

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

B
B
N
D
A

REMARKS:

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11 MAR 94 21 082

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: [signature]

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 461 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 5

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (WHI) (202) 456-2585 West Wing Desk
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 18 FEB PC MEETING

~~EYES ONLY~~ NSC LOG # 20252

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

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REMARKS:

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PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
~~PRIORITY~~
ROUTINE

RELEASER: [signature]

DTG:

MESSAGE NO. 461 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 5

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (202) 456-2585 West Wing Desk
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 18 FEB PC MEETING

~~EYES ONLY~~ NSC LOG # 20252

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B	USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 11, 1994

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the United States to the United Nations

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COLONEL T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, February 18, 1994 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

for Kristie A Kenney
William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 4/5/10
2012-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of NSC Principals Committee
DATE: February 18, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 10:00am - 12:30pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR
Anthony Lake

The Vice President's Office:
Leon Fuerth

State:
Secretary Warren Christopher
Peter Tarnoff

DOD
Secretary William Perry
Frank Wisner

OMB
Director Leon Panetta (Georgia)
Gordon Adams (T) (Georgia)

USUN
Ambassador Madeleine Albright
Dave Scheffer (T)

CIA
Director James Woolsey
John McLaughlin (Georgia)
A. Norman Schlinder (Bosnia)

JCS
General John Shalikashvili
James Hill

WHITE HOUSE
Samuel Berger
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
Richard Clarke (Georgia)
R. Nicholas Burns (Georgia)
Jenonne Walker (Bosnia)

Summary of Conclusions

NATO Planning for Expiration of the Sarajevo Exclusion Zone Deadline

-- No further political decision needed by NATO capitals. Heavy weapons not withdrawn from the Sarejevo exclusion zone

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0533-M
RDS 9/30/14
RDS 4/17/2015 (1.14)

or put under UNPROFOR control by 7:00 pm EST Sunday will be subject to attack. (S)

-- We welcome Russian help in gaining Bosnian Serb promise to comply with NATO's ultimatum, but need to see results on the ground. Not willing to re-negotiate NATO's deadline. (S)

-- Bill Perry and Shali's meeting with French, British, Dutch and Italian opposite numbers in Aviano Sunday will review contingency planning with participating allies but not reopen decisions. (S)

Diplomacy

-- Demarches will be made to the Serbs about the dangers of retaliation against UNPROFOR or civilians and to the Bosnian government about the damage to its international support if it fails to turn in its (few) heavy weapons or takes advantage of NATO's action to raise its negotiating demands or seize battlefield advantage in the Sarajevo region. (S)

-- Secretary Christopher will write NATO foreign ministers on the need for NATO firmness and unity and telephone those whose governments may need stiffening. (S)

-- Agreed to hold off on decision on Presidential calls to Kohl, Yeltsin, Major, Boutros-Ghali and Ciampi (if we expect to be using Italian bases for air strikes). (S)

-- Secretary Christopher and Ambassador Albright will clarify with Boutros-Ghali the consequences for U.S./UN relations if he withholds authority. (S)

-- Ambassador Albright will continue working for a statement by concerned Security Council members (U.S., UK, France, Russia and Spain) that can help Yeltsin without weakening NATO's ultimatum. (S)

-- To bring Russia constructively into the negotiations, Secretary Christopher may invite Kozyrev to Washington. Steve Oxman also may meet with his key West Europeans and Russian counterparts. (S)

-- State will prepare a letter from the President to Tudjman urging his cooperation in the negotiations. (S)

-- Secretary Christopher and Anthony Lake and possibly Vice President Gore will see Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic in Washington next week. We may invite Croatian Foreign Minister Granic at the same time if it seems that would be productive. (S)

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

American Counter Battery Radar for Bosnia

-- We will provide systems to UNPROFOR if an appropriate State whose forces already are trained to use them will provide the troops. (S)

Congress

-- Key members will be telephoned Friday and Saturday. (S)

-- Follow-up calls as necessary, depending on events. (S)

-- Secretary Perry testifies before the House and Senate Armed Services Committees Wednesday. (S)

The Public

-- Recommend the President address the nation on television Saturday morning. (S)

-- Secretaries Christopher and Perry (from Aviano) and Ambassador Albright will be on Sunday talk shows. (S)

-- Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili will hold a press briefing Monday morning, explaining strikes or reasons for decision that they were not necessary. (S)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 28, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: JENONNE WALKER

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, February 18, 1994

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia held February 18, 1994.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

Sandy -

I recommend you not sign this out for R - he had some news on how he wanted it done & should see us.

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NNS NARA, Date 4/5/10
2010-0533-M

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Declassify on: OADR

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or put under UNPROFOR control by 7:00 pm EST Sunday will be subject to attack. (S)

-- We welcome Russian help in gaining Bosnian Serb promise to comply with NATO's ultimatum, but need to see results on the ground. Not willing to re-negotiate Nato's deadline. (S)

-- Bill Perry and Shali's meeting with French, British, Dutch and Italian opposite numbers in Aviano Sunday will review contingency planning with participating allies but not reopen decisions. (S)

Diplomacy

-- Demarches will be made to the Serbs about the dangers of retaliation against UNPROFOR or civilians and to the Bosnian government about the damage to its international support if it fails to turn in its (few) heavy weapons or takes advantage of NATO's action to raise its negotiating demands or seize battlefield advantage in the Sarajevo region. (S)

-- Secretary Christopher will write NATO foreign ministers on the need for NATO firmness and unity and telephone those whose governments may need stiffening. (S)

-- Agreed to hold off on decision on Presidential calls to Kohl, Yeltsin, Major, Boutros-Ghali and Ciampi (if we expect to be using Italian bases for air strikes). (S)

-- Secretary Christopher and Ambassador Albright will clarify with Boutros-Ghali the consequences for U.S./UN relations if he withholds authority. (S)

-- Ambassador Albright will continue working for a statement by concerned Security Council members (U.S., UK, France, Russia and Spain) that can help Yeltsin without weakening NATO's ultimatum. (S)

-- To bring Russia constructively into the negotiations, Secretary Christopher may invite Kozyrev to Washington. Steve Oxman also may meet with his key West Europeans and Russian counterparts. (S)

-- State will prepare a letter from the President to Tudjman urging his cooperation in the negotiations. (S)

-- Secretary Christopher and Anthony Lake and possibly Vice President Gore will see Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic in Washington next week. We may invite Croatian Foreign Minister Granic at the same time if it seems that would be productive. (S)

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~~2010-0533-M~~
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2013-0682-M
KC 2/6/2020 (4.80)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9420252
DATE 11 MAR 94

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 18 FEB PC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506			COPY: 1
MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520			COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	3/14/94	10:45	COPY: 1
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			COPY: VIA FAX
MR. JOHN A. LAUDER CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			COPY: VIA FAX

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NMS NARA, Date 4/5/12
2012-0593-M

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9420232
RECEIVED: 18 FEB 94 20

TO: LAKE

FROM: WALKER

DOC DATE: 18 FEB 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FOLLOW UP MEMO TO PRES FM 18 FEB PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: OBE / STATUS OF ORIGINAL UNKNOWN DUE DATE: 22 FEB 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF: 9420213 9420252

FILES: IFM C NSCP: PC0060 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSASK CLOSED BY: NSKDB DOC 1 OF 1

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 4/5/10
2015-0533-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94021820	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
001	WALKER	Z	94022016	FOR REDO
001		X	95010919	OBE / STATUS OF ORIGINAL UNKNOWN

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~~1294~~
20232

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 18, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: JENONNE WALKER

SUBJECT: Conclusions of the February ~~19~~ 18 Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President.

Concurrence by: Richard Clarke

RECOMMENDATION

That that you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to the President

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 4/5/10

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Conclusions of the February ~~19~~ 18 Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia

NATO Planning

-- No further political decision needed by NATO capitals; heavy weapons not withdrawn from the Sarejevo exclusion zone or put under UNPROFOR control by 7:00 p.m. EST Sunday will be subject to attack.

-- We welcome Russian help in gaining Bosnian Serb promise to comply with NATO's ultimatum, but need to see results on the ground. Not willing to re-negotiate NATO's deadline.

-- Bill Perry and Shali's meeting with French, British, Dutch and Italian opposite numbers in Aviano Sunday will review contingency planning with participating allies but not reopen decisions.

Congress

-- Key members will be telephoned Friday and Saturday.

-- Follow-up calls as necessary, depending on events.

-- You should meet with the leadership Tuesday.

-- Bill Perry testifies before the House and Senate Armed Services Committees Wednesday.

The Public

-- You will address the nation on television Saturday morning.

-- Chris, Bill (from Aviano) and Madeleine will be on Sunday talk shows.

-- Bill and Shali will brief Monday morning, explaining strikes or reasons for decision that they were not necessary.

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By kt NARA, Date 7/6/2014
2013-0682-M (4.91)

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Diplomacy

-- Demarches to Serbs about the dangers of retaliation against UNPROFOR or civilians, and to the Bosnian government about the damage to its international support if it fails to turn in its (few) heavy weapons or takes advantage of NATO's action to raise its negotiating demands or seizes battlefield advantage in the Sarajevo region.

-- Chris will write NATO foreign ministers on the need for NATO firmness and unity, and telephone those whose governments may need stiffening.

-- You will talk to Mitterrand Saturday morning. We also recommend that you call other key figures Sunday -- Kohl, Yeltsin, Major, Ciampi if we expect to be using Italian bases for air strikes.

-- Chris and Madeleine clarify with Boutros-Ghali the consequenses for U.S./UN relations if he witholds authority; you should call him if that seems necessary.

-- Madeleine will continue working for a statement by concerned Security Council members (US, UK, France, Russia, and Spain) that can help Yeltsin without weakening NATO's ultimatum.

-- To bring Russia constructively into the negotiations, Chris may invite Kozyrev to Washington. Steve Oxman also may meet with his key West Europeans and Russian counterparts.

-- We are preparing a letter from you to Tudjman urging his cooperation in the negotiations.

-- Chris and I, and possibly Al Gore, will see Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic in Washington next week. We may invite Croatian Foreign Minister Granic at the same time if it seems that would be productive.

American counter battery radar for Bosnia

-- We will provide systems to UNPROFOR if an appropriate state whose forces already are trained to use them will provide the troops.

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9420213
RECEIVED: 17 FEB 94 13

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 17 FEB 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION / AGENDA & DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 18 FEB PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 21 FEB 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF: 9420252

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0060 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		DARBY
		HOLL
		LAKE
		MILLISON
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		WALKER

COMMENTS: _____

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2010-0533-M

~~SECRET~~ RECORD ID: 9420213

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94021720	FOR DECISION
001		X	94021720	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
001	ITOH	Z	94021720	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	94021721	KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	940217	FUERTH, L	
002	940217	GROSSMAN, M	
002	940217	MCALEER, R	
002	940217	LAUDER, J	
002	940217	PATRICK, T	
002	940217	INDERFURTH, K	

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RECORD ID: 9420213
RECEIVED: 17 FEB 94 13

TO: LAKE

FROM: HOLL
WALKER

DOC DATE: 17 FEB 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION / AGENDA & DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 18 FEB PC MTG ON BOSNIA 11:00AM

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE DUE DATE: 21 FEB 94 STATUS: X

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF:

FILES: IFG NSCP: CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
LAKE		

COMMENTS: _____

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By tnl NARA, Date 4/3/13
2012-0533-C

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National Security Council
The White House

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG MA A/O _____

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Soderberg			
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Lake	1	✓	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	MA 2/17	D
NSC Secretariat			

(A = Action) I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other Kristol

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

CC: NS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

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DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9420213
DATE 17 FEB 94

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION / AGENDA & DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 18 FEB PC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	18 Feb	0645	[signature]
			COPY: 1
MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	2/17/94	2300	[signature]
			COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			
			COPY: VIA FAX
MR. JOHN A. LAUDER CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			
			COPY: VIA FAX
COL. T. R. PATRICK JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001			
			COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW			
			COPY: VIA FAX

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
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2010-0533-M

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DATE 17 FEB 94

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION / AGENDA & DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 18 FEB PC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	18 Feb	0700	[signature] COPY: 1
MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520			COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			COPY: VIA FAX
MR. JOHN A. LAUDER CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			COPY: VIA FAX
COL. T. R. PATRICK JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001			COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW			COPY: VIA FAX

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By DOS NARA, Date 4/5/10
2012-0533-M

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DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9420213
DATE 17 FEB 94

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION / AGENDA & DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 18 FEB PC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506			COPY: 1
MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	2/18	0700	M D Hembry COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			COPY: VIA FAX
MR. JOHN A. LAUDER CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			COPY: VIA FAX
COL. T. R. PATRICK JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001			COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW			COPY: VIA FAX

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 9/5/00
2010-0533-M

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FEB 17 10 21 PM '94

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE PRIORITY ROUTINE

RELEASER: SS

DTG:

~~EYES ONLY~~

MESSAGE NO. 0315 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 11

FROM WILLIAM H ITOH (NAME) 456-6534 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NOTICE OF PC MEETING ON BOSNIA - 11:00am, 18 FEB

NSC LOG # 20213

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

BNDA

REMARKS:

PLEASE DELIVER ASAP TO ADDRESSEES "EYES ONLY"

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By 1401 NARA, Date 9/15/10
2010-0533-M

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PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

~~EYES ONLY~~

MESSAGE NO. 0315 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 11

FROM WILLIAM H ITOH (NAME) 456-6534 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NOTICE OF PC MEETING ON BOSNIA - 11:00am, 18 FEB

NSC LOG # 20213

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

BNDA

REMARKS:

PLEASE DELIVER ASAP TO ADDRESSEES "EYES ONLY"

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
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2012-0533-M

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WHITE HOUSE
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17 FEB 94 22 282

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE (PRIORITY) ROUTINE

RELEASER: SG

DTG:

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE NO. 0315 CLASSIFICATION (W) PAGES 11

FROM WILLIAM H ITOH (NAME) 456-6534 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NOTICE OF PC MEETING ON BOSNIA - 11:00am, 18 FEB

NSC LOG # 20213

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

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REMARKS:

PLEASE DELIVER ASAP TO ADDRESSEES "EYES ONLY"

~~EYES ONLY~~

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By DM NARA, Date 4/5/10
2012-0533-M

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: SS

DTG:

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE NO. 0315 CLASSIFICATION (W) PAGES 11

FROM WILLIAM H ITOH (NAME) 456-6534 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NOTICE OF PC MEETING ON BOSNIA - 11:00am, 18 FEB

NSC LOG # 20213

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

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REMARKS:

PLEASE DELIVER ASAP TO ADDRESSEES "EYES ONLY"

~~EYES ONLY~~

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NS NARA, Date 4/5/00

2010-0533-M

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

1994 FEB 18 [illegible] 37

WHSR CONTROL

TIME OF RECEIPT

181359Z FEB 94

[illegible] 18 [illegible] 96

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- ☐ IMMEDIATE
- ☒ PRIORITY
- ☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: 88

DATE/TIME: 181315Z FEB 94

MESSAGE #: [redacted] 21

NSC LOG # 20213

FROM: National Security Council (NH) PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting PAGES: 11

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NWS NARA, Date 9/15/00

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~~SECRET~~ SECRET 20213

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 17, 1994

~~EYES ONLY~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COLONEL ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

CAPTAIN T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations
Department of State

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia on Friday, February 18, 11am - 12:30pm, in the White House Situation Room. The agenda for the subject meeting is attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

The attached papers support Principals discussion on agenda covering our strategies for dealing with the press (Tab B), Congress (Tab C), and Russia (Tab D), respectively. Agencies should be prepared to take the lead on additional topics, as indicated, supplying supporting materials as necessary. ~~(S)~~

for Kristie A. Kenney
William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachments
Tab A Agenda
Tab B Press Strategy
Tab C Legislative Strategy
Tab D Russia Strategy

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NLS NARA, Date 9/5/10

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PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: February 18, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 11am - 12:30pm

AGENDA

I. Ensuring UN Icebreaker.....USUN

II. Status of Military Planning.....OSD/JCS

III. Notional Press Strategy.....NSC

IV. Legislative Strategy.....NSC

V. Russia Strategy.....NSC/State

VI. Approach to the Serbs.....State

VII. Approach to the Bosnian Government.....State

VIII. Status of the Negotiations.....State

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 2/6/2020

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Bosnia Press Strategy -- Notional

Friday, February 18

-- President makes a statement and takes several questions at 2:15pm.

-- No backgrounder; (Shali and Perry unavailable due to swearing in at 3pm)

-- [?Any Europe statements?]

Saturday, February 19

-- CBS Evening News -- Anthony Lake

Sunday, February 20

-- Meet the Press: Vice President

-- Brinkley: Secretary Christopher

-- CNN Late Edition: Ambassador Albright

[NOTE: White House and Pentagon Press Offices will be staffed all evening.]

If military action:

-- Presidential statement following action

-- NATO briefs from Naples, initial details by British Naval Captain, Boorda once details are known.

Monday, February 21

-- Whether or not military action occurs, on morning shows, combination of White House Senior Official, Perry, Shali, Christopher.

-- Also briefings on camera:

    -- Defense Secretary Perry and JCS Chairman Shali brief (either on action taken or how Serbs have complied with terms)

    -- Secretary Christopher briefs on diplomatic course.

-- White House Press Secretary Daily Brief.

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Bosnia Congressional Consultation Strategy

Following is a summary of recent completed congressional consultations and a proposal for upcoming consultations on Bosnia. This proposal has been reviewed and approved by Pat Griffin (White House Legislative Affairs).

Recent congressional consultations on Bosnia

2/9	President met with top Senate/House leaders at WH.
2/16	During monthly House and Senate briefings for congressional staff on upcoming UN calendar, there was extensive discussion on Bosnia

Proposal for congressional consultations prior to military action

2/18	Unclassified briefing (Walker/Vershbow/Kruzel) for bipartisan leadership and key committee staff. House at 11:30; Senate at 2:00.
2/18-2/20	Do calls from State and DoD to key members. See "First Call List," attached. NSC will talk to leadership staff at the 2/18 briefing or by phone and tell them we can arrange calls to their members, if requested.
2/20	If military action is imminent, President and principals call key members. See "Second Call List," attached.

Other upcoming consultations

2/22	Sec. Perry (with Gen. Shali) testifies before House Armed Services Committee on budget; Bosnia will be raised.
2/23	POTUS weekly meeting with bipartisan leaders; Bosnia will be discussed.
2/23	Sec. Christopher testifies before House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees on budget; Bosnia will be raised
2/23	Sec. Perry briefs Senate Armed Services and Senate Defense Appropriations Committees on Bosnia.
2/24	Sec. Perry (with Gen. Shali) testifies before House Defense Appropriations Committee on budget; Bosnia will be raised.
TBA	Periodic Christopher-Perry-Shali-Albright-Lake consultation with top House and Senate members.

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First Call List to Update Members on Bosnia: 2/18-2/19

State (Tarnoff/Oxman)
Pell
Helms
Biden
Lugar
Leahy
McConnell
Sarbanes
Moynihan
Hamilton
Gilman
Obey
Livingston
Lantos
Hyde
Kasich

DoD (Wisner/Slocum)
Nunn
Thurmond
Inouye
Stevens
DeConcini
Warner
Dellums
Spence
Murtha
McDade
Glickman
Combest
Levin
Lieberman

NSC (offer a Lake/Berger conversation with Member)
Mitchell (Ed King)
Dole (Randy Shuneman)
Foley (Mike O'Neil)
Byrd (Dick D'Amato)
Gephardt (Margie Sullivan)
Michel (Bill Pitts)
Gingrich (Len Swinehart/Krister Holiday)
Bonior (Kathy Gilley)

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Second Call List for Imminent Military Action: 2/20?

POTUS
Mitchell
Dole
Byrd
Foley
Michel

If time permits:
Nunn
Gephardt
Gingrich

Lake
Gephardt (if POTUS does not call)
Gingrich (if POTUS does not call)

Berger
Bonior
Simpson
Ford

Christopher
Pell
Helms
Biden
Lugar
Leahy
McConnell
Moynihan
Hamilton
Gilman
Obey
Livingston

If time permits or at lower level:
Sarbanes
Lantos
Hyde
Kasich

Perry
Nunn
Thurmond
Inouye
Stevens
DeConcini
Warner
Dellums
Spence
Murtha
McDade
Glickman
Combest

If time permits or at lower level:
Levin
Lieberman

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RUSSIA STRATEGY

Our short-term strategy with the Russians over the coming week is to try to ameliorate their irritation at having been "cut out" of the decisionmaking on Bosnia, while simultaneously to set straight their persistent misunderstanding of the January 9 decision. Key elements of this strategy include:

-- The President's February 17 letter to Yeltsin (including a recognition of Russian efforts to pressure the Serbs, an explanation of the UN "icebreaker" role, and a pledge to try to inform Yeltsin in advance if airstrikes are imminent);

-- Continued consultations at the UN to see if there is any chance for a statement or letter that would meet Russian concerns;

-- The President's public statements on Bosnia before Monday, which should emphasize points of importance to Russia (compliance with the UN plan will obviate airstrikes; the "icebreaker" role) and highlight their role in persuading the Serbs to withdraw their heavy weaponry (if this agreement has been carried out);

-- The President's phone call to Yeltsin on Sunday, to review with him the state of play and inform him, if necessary, that air strikes are imminent.

Longer term, we will seek to keep the Russians involved in the process on several fronts. As regards the corralling of weapons within the exclusion zone, we will continue to rely on their influence to hold the Serbs to the agreements. With regard to the settlement negotiations, if it is decided that the United States might play a special role in working with the Muslims under any EU plan, then we might at the same time consider wrapping the Russians into an analogous role with the Serbs. We have been reluctant to involve the Russians in the past because of our doubts about the purity of their motives. If, however, they have in fact been successful in influencing Serbs in the right direction with regard to the exclusion zone, then there may no longer be a viable reason not to try to have them use their influence on the negotiating track as well.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 17, 1994

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER

FROM: JANE E. HOLE

SUBJECT: Principals Meeting on Bosnia, February 18, 1994

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Principals Meeting on Bosnia to be held on February 18, 1994. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I. Tabs B, C and D contain papers to support Principals' discussion on strategies for dealing with the press, Congress and Russia, respectively.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda
Tab B Press Strategy
Tab C Legislative Strategy
Tab D Russia Strategy

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By DOS NARA, Date 9/5/10
2010-0533-M

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See also 2013-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)~~	~~02/28/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RDS 04/17/2015
~~001b. memo~~	~~[Duplicate of 001a] (2 pages)~~	~~02/28/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~001c. memo~~	~~[Duplicate of 001a, incomplete copy] (1 page)~~	~~02/28/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020

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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 21 MAR 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 28 FEB PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 03 MAR 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF:

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0062 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
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		KRECZKO
		LAKE
		MILLISON
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
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DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94030122	FOR DECISION
001	WALKER	Z	94030722	FOR FURTHER ACTION
001	LAKE	Z	94031015	FOR DECISION
001		X	94032112	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
001	ITOH	Z	94032112	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	94032115	KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	940321	FUERTH, L	
002	940321	GROSSMAN, M	
002	940321	MCALEER, R	
002	940321	LAUDER, J	
002	940321	PATRICK, T	
002	940321	INDERFURTH, K	

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Reed			
Kenney	1		A
Itoh	6		
Soderberg			
Berger	2/5		~~see chronology~~
Lake	~~6~~		~~questions~~
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3/7	3/21	D
NSC Secretariat			
Walker	4		FFA

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other Millison

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The White House

Rec'd 3/10
3:20pm
3:40pm

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
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Kenney	1		A
Itoh	6		
Soderberg			
Berger	2/5		~~as changed~~
Lake	~~6~~		~~as noted~~
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3 7	3/21	D
NSC Secretariat			
Walker	4		FFA

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other Millison

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MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES 4

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (WHI) (202) 456-2585 West Wing Desk
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 28 FEB PC MTG ON BOSNIA NSC LOG # 20267

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

PLEASE DELIVER TO ADDRESSEES "EYES ONLY"

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By MS NARA, Date 4/7/15
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- ☐ IMMEDIATE
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DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC LOG # 20267

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting SOC FOR 28 FEB PC ON BOSNIA PAGES: 4

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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2013-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 21, 1994

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL T.R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the U.S. Permanent
Representative to the
United Nations

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, February 28, 1994 (S)

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. (S)

for Kristie A. Kenney
William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By ths NARA, Date 4/7/2010
2010-0833-M

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TAB

A.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of NSC Principals Committee
DATE: February 28, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 9:30am - 10:30am

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Anthony Lake

Office of the Vice President
Leon Fuerth

State
Secretary Christopher
Peter Tarnoff
Charles Redman

DOD
Secretary Perry
Frank Wisner

USUN
Ambassador Albright
Ambassador Inderfurth

CIA
Director Woolsey
Norman Schlinder

JCS
Gen John Shalikashvili
Gen Michael Ryan
Gen John Sheehan

White House
Samuel Berger

NSC
Jenonne Walker

Summary of Conclusions

Bosnian-Croat Negotiations

-- Secretary Christopher will prepare a status report for the President on the negotiations now underway in Washington, which Mr. Lake will take to the President in Pittsburgh the afternoon of February 28. (S)

NATO February 28 Enforcement of Bosnian No-Fly-Zone

-- In public, we will stress that the February 28 action was a NATO rather than U.S. operation, and that NATO acted in response to a clear violation without certainty as to the nationality of the aircraft. NATO was enforcing a UN Security Council resolution that applies equally to all the Bosnian parties. (S)

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0533-F
RS 9/30/14 (1.15)

-- Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvilli will brief the Hill leadership and key committee chairmen the afternoon of February 28. (S)

-- The Pentagon will give a press background briefing the afternoon of February 28, amplifying public remarks already made by President Clinton. (S)

-- Ambassador Albright will suggest to UN Under Secretary Annan that he request a briefing through NATO military channels, on the basis of which he could then brief the Security Council. (S)

Possible Further Actions

-- The Deputies Committee will meet during the week of February 28 on possible steps to aid or accelerate the opening of Tuzla airport. The IWG paper of February 14 describing possibilities will be used as the basis for consideration of the latter point. (S)

-- The Principals Committee will meet on the latter point, and the former if necessary, Monday March 7. (S)

Congressional support for Bosnian policy

-- The Administration will explore with Representative Hamilton prospects for passage of his draft resolution without opening a full debate on Bosnia policy. Our basic position remains, as the President has said, that we welcome a resolution endorsing the Administration's plans. (S)

French Draft UNSC Resolution

-- We will continue supporting the French draft but not push for it. If useful to meet Russian concerns, we will agree to drop reference to Brcko. (S)

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~~SECRET~~ 20267

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 1, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: JENONNE WALKER

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, February 28, 1994

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia held February 28, 1994.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve ___ Disapprove ___

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By ___ NARA, Date 4/7/10

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of NSC Principals Committee
DATE: February 28, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 9:30am - 10:30am

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Anthony Lake

Office of the Vice President
Leon Fuerth

State
Secretary Christopher
Peter Tarnoff
Charles Redman

DOD
Secretary Perry
Frand Visner

USUN
Ambassador Albright
Ambassador Inderfurth

CIA
Dir Woolsey
Norman Schlinder

JCS
Gen John Shalikashvili
Gen Michael Ryan
Gen John Sheehan

White House
Samuel Berger

NSC
Jenonne Walker

Summary of Conclusions

Bosnian-Croat Negotiations

-- Secretary Christopher will prepare a status report for the President on the negotiations now underway in Washington, which Mr. Lake will take to the President in Pittsburgh the afternoon of February 28. ~~(S)~~

NATO February 28 Enforcement of Bosnian No-Fly-Zone

-- In public, we will stress that the February 28 action was a NATO rather than U.S. operation, and that NATO acted in response to a clear violation without certainty as to the nationality of the aircraft. NATO was enforcing a UN Security Council resolution that applies equally to all the Bosnian parties. ~~(S)~~

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12/6/2020 (4.83)
2013-0682-M

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-- Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvilli will brief the Hill leadership and key committee chairmen the afternoon of February 28. ~~(S)~~

-- The Pentagon will give a press background briefing the afternoon of February 28, amplifying public remarks already made by President Clinton. ~~(S)~~

-- Ambassador Albright will suggest to UN Under Secretary Annan that he request a briefing through NATO military channels, on the basis of which he could then brief the Security Council. ~~(S)~~

Possible Further Actions

-- The Deputies Committee will meet during the week of February 28 on (1) possible steps to aid or accelerate the opening of Tuzla airport, and (2) other possible military steps NATO and UNPROFOR might take to apply. The IWG paper of February 14 describing possibilities will be used as the basis for consideration of the latter point. ~~(S)~~

-- The Principals Committee will meet on the latter point, and the former if necessary, Monday March 7. ~~(S)~~

Congressional support for Bosnian policy

-- The Administration will explore with Representative Hamilton prospects for passage of his draft resolution without opening a full debate on Bosnia policy, ~~but without indicating that we are negative about it~~. Our basic position remains, as the President has said, that we ~~would~~ welcome a resolution endorsing the Administration's plans. ~~(S)~~

French Draft UNSC Resolution

-- We will continue supporting the French draft but not push for it. If useful to meet Russian concerns, we will agree to drop reference to Brcko. ~~(S)~~

the Sarajevo model to other cities in Bosnia

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-- Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvilli will brief the Hill leadership and key committee chairmen the afternoon of February 28. ~~(S)~~

-- The Pentagon will give a press background briefing the afternoon of February 28, amplifying public remarks already made by President Clinton. ~~(S)~~

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Possible Further Actions

-- The Deputies Committee will meet during the week of February 28 on ~~(1)~~ possible steps to aid or accelerate the opening of Tuzla airport, ~~and (2) other possible military steps NATO and UNPROFOR might take to apply the Sarajevo model to other cities in Bosnia.~~ The IWG paper of February 14 describing possibilities will be used as the basis for consideration of the latter point. ~~(S)~~

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French Draft UNSC Resolution

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See also 2013-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

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Folder Title: PC0064 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, March 8, 1994				
Staff Office-Individual: Records Management				
Original OA/ID Number: 4007				
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)~~	~~03/08/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RDS 04/17/2015
~~001b. memo~~	~~[Incomplete copy of 001a, page 1 only] (1 page)~~	~~03/08/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002a. agenda~~	~~re: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)~~	~~03/08/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
002b. paper	re: Issues Paper (1 page)	ca. 03/1994	P1/b(1)
~~002c. paper~~	~~re: U.S. Support to Strengthen UNPROFOR (5 pages)~~	~~ca. 03/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
002d. paper	re: Summary of Conclusions Peackeeping Core Group Meeting (2 pages)	03/07/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0064 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, March 8, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs544

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9420320
RECEIVED: 09 MAR 94 16

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 11 MAR 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 8 MAR PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 12 MAR 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL LOGREF: 9420300

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0064 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		DARBY
		HOLL
		KRECZKO
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		MILLISON
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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	94030921	FOR DECISION
001		X	94031108	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
002		X	94031108	KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	940311	FUERTH, L	
002	940311	GROSSMAN, M	
002	940311	MCALEER, R	
002	940311	INDERFURTH, K	
002	940311	LAUDER, J	
002	940311	PATRICK, T	

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The White House

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URGENT NOT PROOFED: (WH) SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (WH) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
W Reed			
Kenney	1/4	[illegible]	A
Itoh			
Soderberg			
Berger	2	Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Lake	3		
Situation Room	5	3/11	D
West Wing Desk			
NSC Secretariat			

(A = Action) I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

(cc:) VP McLarty Other Millson

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

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The White House

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (NH) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Kenney	1/4		A
Itoh			
Soderberg			
Berger	2	Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Lake	3		
Situation Room	5		
West Wing Desk		3/11	D
NSC Secretariat			

(A = Action) I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other Millson

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

E+Sec's Office has disclette

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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LOG 9420320
DATE 11 MAR 94

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS OF PC MTG ON BOSNIA 8 MAR
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	14 Mar	0630	[signature] COPY: 1
MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	3/11/94	11:19 AM	[signature] COPY: 1

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NS NARA, Date 4/3/10
2010-0573-M

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LOG 9420320
DATE 11 MAR 94

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS OF PC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520			COPY: 1

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By [illegible] NARA, Date 4/7/10
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MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	3/11	1315	S. McCall COPY: 1

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 4/24/00
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11 MAR 94 09 42

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RreleaseR: SS

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 452 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 3

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS PC MTG ON BOSNIA NSC LOG # 20320

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

B B N D A

REMARKS:

~~EYES ONLY~~

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MS NARA, Date 4/7/10
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 11, 1994

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T.R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, March 8, 1994 (S)

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. (S)

for Christi A. Kenney
William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By RM NARA, Date 4/7/10
7012-0533-A

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION
SITUATION ROOM
1994 MAR 11 AM 9:22

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF RECEIPT
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PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: SS

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 452 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 3

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH JB for (202) 456-2585 West Wing Desk
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS PC MTG ON BOSNIA NSC LOG # 20320

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B	USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
P	JCS	SECRETARY		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

~~EYES ONLY~~

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NLJ NARA, Date 4/7/10
2010-0533-M

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION
SITUATION ROOM
1994 MAR 11 AM 9:22

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF RECEIPT
MAR 11 9 38 AM '94

A

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: SS

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 452 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 3

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (202) 456-2585 West Wing Desk
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS PC MTG ON BOSNIA NSC LOG # 20320

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B	USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

~~EYES ONLY~~

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 4/7/10
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF RECEIPT

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: SS

DTG:

MESSAGE NO. 452 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 3

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS PC MTG ON BOSNIA NSC LOG # 20320

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

B B N D A

REMARKS:

~~EYES ONLY~~

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NARA, Date 4/7/10
2010-0533-M

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

EYES ONLY

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TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE
- ☐ FLASH
- ☐ IMMEDIATE
- ☐ PRIORITY
- ☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

FROM: **National Security Council** PHONE: **202-456-2291** ROOM: **WHSR**

SUBJECT: **Notice of Meeting** * 20320 PAGES: 3

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

EYES ONLY

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NARA, Date 4/7/10
2018-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of NSC Principals Committee
DATE: March 8, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 5:00 - 6:30pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Samuel Berger

OVP
Leon Fuerth

STATE
Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott
Alexander Vershbow

USUN
Ambassador Rick Inderfurth
David Scheffer

CIA
James Woolsey
Norman Schindler

JCS
General John Shalikashvili
John Admire

White House
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
Jane Holl
Richard Clarke

Summary of Conclusions

-- Principals agreed to recommend that the President decide to approve an increase in the U.S. contingent in UNPROFOR Macedonia to free up Nordic contributors for deployment elsewhere in UNPROFOR. (S)

  -- Consultations with Democratic leaders on the Hill generally have been favorable. Principals will consult informally on the Hill with Republican leadership. (S)

  -- State and DOD will take soundings from Nordic counterparts to determine their willingness to be displaced. (S)

  -- The U.S. will seek to command UNPROFOR Macedonia. (S)

  -- Other contributors would provide a significant non-U.S. presence in the total force deployed in Macedonia. (S)

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2010-0533-M
RS 9/30/14
4/17/2015 (LL)

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-- Principals agreed that the U.S. should work with the UN to identify and facilitate potential sources of additional contributions to UNPROFOR. (S)

  -- We would approach the Eastern Europeans and encourage them to make more than a token contribution to UNPROFOR. (S)

  -- We would support the participation of the Italians. (S)

  -- We would not advocate, but would not oppose, the participation of the Turks. (S)

  -- We would support the participation of the Pakistanis. (S)

  -- DOD will work up a reimbursement scheme for airlift and logistics support that charges the UN our marginal costs of providing this support in order to make our offer more attractive to the UN. (S)

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~~SECRET~~ 20320

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 9, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: JANE E. HOLL

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, March 8, 1994

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia held March 8, 1994.

Concurrence by: Richard Clarke

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____
w/changes

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NS NARA, Date 4/2/10

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~~SECRET~~ 20320

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of NSC Principals Committee
DATE: March 8, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 5:00 - 6:30pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Samuel Berger

OVP
Leon Fuerth

STATE
Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott
Alexander Vershbow

USUN
Ambassador Rick Inderfurth
David Scheffer

CIA
James Woolsey
Norman Schindler

JCS
General John Shalikashvili
John Admire

White House
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
Jane Holl
Richard Clarke

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-- Other contributors would provide a significant non-U.S. presence in the total force deployed in Macedonia. (S)

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PER E.O. 13526
~~2010-0533-M~~
~~CS 9/30/14~~
2013-0682-M
VZ 2/6/2020 (4.16)

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9420300
RECEIVED: 07 MAR 94 16

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 08 MAR 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION / AGENDA & ISSUES PAPER FOR 8 MAR PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 10 MAR 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL LOGREF: 9420320

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0064 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		DARBY
		HOLL
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
		MILLISON
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG

COMMENTS: _____

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By MM NARA, Date 4/7/10
2012-0533-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	94030722	FOR DECISION
001		X	94030809	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
002		X	94030809	KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	940308	FUERTH, L	
002	940308	GROSSMAN, M	
002	940308	MCALEER, R	
002	940308	LAUDER, J	
002	940308	PATRICK, T	
002	940308	INDERFURTH, K	

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Reed	1	JWR	
Kenney	4 Copy	Ken	
Itoh			
Soderberg	2 Copy	copy	
HW Berger	3	Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Lake			
Situation Room	5	3/8	A
West Wing Desk			
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

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cc: KK NOM Bosnia PC

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MESSAGE NO. 0425 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 10

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH WB For (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PC MTG ON BOSNIA 8 MAR 5 PM NSC LOG # 20300

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USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
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JCS	SECRETARY		
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MESSAGE NO. 0425 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 10

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

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MESSAGE NO. 0425 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 10

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH FOR (202) 456-2585 West Wing Desk
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PC MTG ON BOSNIA 8 MAR 5 PM NSC LOG # 20300

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FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR
SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting 8 MAR - 5PM PAGES: 10

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

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If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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MESSAGE #: _____

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting 8 MAR PAGES: 10

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USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 8, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COLONEL ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

CAPTAIN T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia on Tuesday, March 8, 1994, 5:00 - 6:00pm, in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Principals plus one. The agenda for the subject meeting is attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

An issues paper (Tab B), background paper (Tab C), and Summary of Conclusions from the Peacekeeping Core Group meeting of March 7 (Tab D) are also attached. ~~(S)~~

for Kristie A. Kenney
William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachments
Tab A Agenda
Tab B Issues Paper
Tab C Background Paper
Tab D Summary of Conclusions: Peacekeeping Core Group, March 7, 1994

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By DAL NARA, Date 7/7/10
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PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: March 8, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 5:00 - 6:00pm

AGENDA

I. Increasing U.S. participation in UNPROFOR Macedonia.....All

-- Avoiding a break in the UNPA ceiling

-- Other potential contributors

-- Managing the reaction from Greece

II. U.S. Policy Toward Additional Troops for UNPROFOR.....All

-- U.S. Planning Team to the UN

-- Helping the UN find Contributors

-- Italy

-- Turkey

-- Pakistan

-- Others?

-- Lift/Logistics Reimbursement

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VG NARA, Date 2/6/2020
2013-0682-M

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([PC and Bosnia...])
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PC0064 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, March 8, 1994

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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U.S. Support to Strengthen UNPROFOR

Recent developments in Bosnia have seriously strained UNPROFOR's ability to fulfill its many mandates and new responsibilities, including monitoring the Sarajevo exclusion zone and ceasefire in Central Bosnia. The requests for new troops range up to 10,650, but the immediate priority is to fill the UN's first request for an additional 3,000 troops to help police the Sarajevo exclusion zone. We assume for the purpose of this paper that the request for 3,000 additional troops is permissible under existing mandates, the request for 10,650 will undoubtedly require a new Security Council resolution. The British are reportedly about to offer an additional 900 new troops, if the other 2,100 can be found from other contributors. The additional troops should preferably be NATO or NATO standard troops in order to enhance UNPROFOR effectiveness.

The British are expected to ask us to provide airlift and possibly some equipment or logistical support for the new troops on a non-reimbursable or reduced rate basis. They are also pushing for us to send more troops to Macedonia to relieve the Nordic battalion, enabling them to move to Bosnia. The French have also demarched us on this request. This paper looks at these issues, as well as the broader issue of increasing UNPROFOR's strength.

Additional U.S. Troops for Macedonia

As of February 16, there were 1,024 troops in UNPROFOR FYROM, 307 of which were from the United States and the rest from the Nordic countries (Norway 236, Sweden 260, Finland 217 and Denmark 4). These numbers fluctuate constantly within a narrow range. The commander is a member of the Nordic Brigade, but the U.S. is in the process of informing the UN of our willingness to send a U.S. army officer to fill the Chief of Staff position at the UN's request.

An increased U.S. deployment to UNPROFOR FYROM could free part of the Nordic Battalion to move from Macedonia to Bosnia. The Nordic troops are among the better-trained and -equipped troops in UNPROFOR and could play an important role in Bosnia. Some of the Nordic troops in Macedonia may be volunteers, and we are not certain if they are available for deployment to the more hostile environment in Bosnia. Embassy Oslo has previously indicated that UN interest in redeploying elements of the Nordic force continues to cause political problems for

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the Government of Norway, and may require future parliamentary action. The Swedes have told the French that pariliamentary approval would be necessary to move their troops. Clearly, we cannot automatically assume that a larger deployment of US troops to FYROM will necessarily result in more Nordic troops being available for duty in Bosnia. We or the UN would have to raise this issue with the Nordic governments.

We should avoid any wholesale replacement of the Nordic troops in FYROM by U.S. troops. Doing so would make this a U.S. operation and involve a considerably greater political commitment. A limit of 600 to 700 troops would be about right. The Greeks could very well react irrationally to an increased U.S. deployment to FYROM, but their reaction would most likely be milder if we do not assume the whole operation.

Another approach might be to rotate the entire Nordic detachment, increase the U.S. contribution to 600 to 700 and backfill the additional Nordic troops with less highly trained troops. There are potential drawbacks to putting U.S. troops in a close working relationship with less capable troops, but the environment is not nearly as demanding as that in Bosnia. We might also have to provide a U.S. commander, which would raise the U.S. profile.

High-level Congressional consultations would be necessary before we deploy additional U.S. troops. We will also have to look closely at funding issues. Our contingent to Macedonia has been provided under the UN Participation Act (UNPA). In order to expand the contingent significantly under the UNPA we would need a UN request and another Secretary of State to Secretary of Defense letter to invoke the Act. There is also a 1000 person global limit under the UNPA to consider -- this expansion might exhaust most of the 1000 and thus not permit the use of UNPA to detail other contingents such as Haiti when circumstances warrant. (Use of section 628 of the FAA to detail armed forces personnel for UN peacekeeping purposes might provide another option, but would require further study.)

U.S. Airlift Support

We will also be pressed by the British and others to provide airlift support and possibly some logistic and equipment support for the additional troops. The UN generally considers U.S. rates for airlift assistance to be prohibitive, and there will likely be requests for the U.S. to provide this airlift for free or at a reduced rate. We have, in fact, been

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told informally that the UN would be unlikely to accept an offer for airlift on a reimbursable basis as U.S. costs are as much as three times as high as commercial rates. The airlift support could be provided on a reimbursable basis under the FAA section 607 agreement currently being negotiated.

Providing the airlift at no cost to the UN would require use of Presidential drawdown authority (probably under Section 506(a)(1) of the FAA). Providing airlift services to the UN at a reduced rate would also require the use of drawdown authority for part of the services to reduce the total cost. The use of Presidential drawdown authority to provide support to UNPROFOR without reimbursement could have serious ramifications for our efforts to secure funding for our arrears to the UN for peacekeeping assessments from Congress.

Participation of Italy and Turkey in UNPROFOR

According to press accounts, Italy offered to provide troops to UNPROFOR about two years ago, but has so far been rebuffed because Italy is a neighboring country to the former Yugoslavia and a former colonial power. We are not certain they will be willing to provide troops now. The UN Secretariat may now be willing to reconsider its opposition to Italian participation in UNPROFOR, but as of March 7, was still holding to its position opposing the inclusion of neighboring states. There might also be Secretariat resistance to adding troops from countries that are not already participating in UNPROFOR. Boutros Ghali opposed inclusion of the Italians in Somalia, once again because of the Colonial relationship. Italian participation would provide a significant increase in NATO troops in Bosnia, which would enhance UNPROFOR's ability to fulfill its missions. The major drawback to deploying Italian troops may be that it would make it more difficult to exclude Turkish troop contributions.

The advantages of bringing Italian forces into UNPROFOR are several. As a NATO member, Italy has limited forces which are well trained, well equipped and operationally integrated with other NATO forces already serving with UNPROFOR. Italians know ex-Yugoslavia and share a similar terrain and climate. Since the Italians are withdrawing about two battalions from Somalia in April, they would be in a position to send that many units and perhaps more to Bosnia. Time and cost should be relatively negligible, and disruption of other peacekeeping operations would be minimized. Finally, Italy has had recent experience of peace enforcement, in Somalia.

A more problematic alternative would be Turkey. Turkey has expressed a desire to send forces and could probably make available substantial numbers. Turkey shares many of Italy's

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advantages, including NATO membership and proximity. The UN, however, has barred Turkish participation in UNPROFOR because a Turkish presence would not be viewed as neutral. We have not opposed Turkish participation in UNPROFOR and may want to consider a non-combat role, such as logistics, for Turkish forces.

Any Turkish role in the Balkans would be opposed by the Greeks, so it may prove difficult to achieve necessary EU agreement to their participation. Greece might even find a Turkish presence sufficiently provocative to side more openly herself with Serbia. Turkish participation could undermine our efforts to contain the conflict. As the ancient enemy of Serbia, Turkey arouses such hatred and fear among the Serbs that they might oppose a political settlement which involves a Turkish presence. Russia's deployment might find a parrallel in deployment of Turks among the Bosnian muslims, although this would be a wide departure from the concept that peacekeeping troops should be neutral.

More Troops - Borrowing from current UN Missions

Deploying new units will require a significant amount of time and money. Our first priority should be to seek units that fit the profile of what UNPROFOR needs: NATO or NATO compatible troops mostly in battalion size units (or larger). In current UN missions, these are in relatively short supply, although some possibilities are listed below:

Belgium: 430 troops in Rwanda;

Finland: 519 troops in Lebanon;

France: 436 troops in Lebanon;

Italy: 2185 troops in Somalia (being w/d);
1004 troops in Mozambique;

Sweden: 490 troops in Lebanon.

Possible problems: (a) Three of the five above are in Lebanon, a sensitive mission where it is difficult for the parties to agree on replacements; (b) the numbers are relatively small; (c) rotating troops from other peacekeeping operations could be time consuming and disruptive to the other missions.

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Tougher Political Approach to Europeans

We could adopt a tougher line with the Europeans, noting that we are now heavily engaged politically, as they wanted, and that in order for the peace process to succeed they should provide more troops.

A number of countries with relatively large, capable militaries have made small contributions, including:

Belgium, currently 990, could be asked to provide an additional battalion;

Spain, currently 1,189, could be asked to provide and additional one to two battalions;

UK, currently 2,142, will likely offer an additional 900 troops.

Italy, could be asked to provide at least two battalions. (NOTE: the UN has requested two engineer battalions and two logistical battalions, so the Italians need not assume a combat role.)

The Netherlands has just doubled its contribution, although they may be able to provide additional company size forces --see below. Denmark could also be approached for these smaller units.

Eastern Europe

We could also approach Eastern European countries interested in cooperating with the West (and that are not involved in the conflict), such as Poland and the Czech Republic, for at least one battalion each. This would not only be an additional source of personnel, but would help keep the UN comfortable that UNPROFOR is not becoming an all NATO show.

Pakistani Troops

The deployment of 3,000 Pakistani troops is now scheduled for mid-summer. They are planning to take refresher training in Austria on equipment being provided by Germany. It might be possible to push-up this deployment.

Russian Troops

Our efforts to recruit more troops from Western and Eastern Europe may lead to offers from the Russians of more troops. We may not always welcome these offers.

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March 7, 1994



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: JANE E. HOLL

SUBJECT: Principals' Committee Meeting on Bosnia, March 8, 1994, 5:00 - 6:00pm

The package for tomorrow's Principals' Committee Meeting is attached at Tab I.

Concurrences by: Dick Clarke

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize the release of the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve SRN Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to Agencies
Tab A Agenda
Tab B Issues Paper
Tab C Background Paper
Tab D Summary of Conclusions: Peacekeeping Core Group, March 7, 1994

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
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See also 2013-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title: PC0069 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, April 10, 1994
Staff Office-Individual: Records Management
Original OA/ID Number: 4007

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
43	6	6	2	V

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia [partial] (2 pages)	04/10/1994	~~P1/b(1)~~, P3/b(3) RDS 04/17/2015

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0069 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, April 10, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs545

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9420467
RECEIVED: 11 APR 94 09

TO: LAKE

FROM: WALKER

DOC DATE: 11 APR 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 10 APR PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: LAKE APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 14 APR 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF:

FILES: IFG O NSCP: PC0069 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION: IFM

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BERGER
CICIO
DARBY
KRECZKO
LAKE
MILLISON
NSC CHRON
SODERBERG
WALKER
WOLIN

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA CLOSED BY: NSJDA DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
BY NARA, Date 4/12/10
2010-0533-M

~~SECRET~~ RECORD ID: 9420467

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94041810	FOR DECISION
001		X	94041810	LAKE APPROVED RECOM

~~SECRET~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~rec'd 4/13 4:30pm~~ rec'd 4/14 12:05p

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 10467

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM ~~PRS~~ (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Kenney	1		A
Itoh			
Soderberg			
Berger	2	APNSA ~~Has Seen~~	
Lake	3		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4		N
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

(cc:) VP McLarty Other Millison

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

EXECSEC HAS DISC

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

National Security Council rec'd 4/14 12:05p
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 20467

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM EES (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Kenney	1		A
Itoh			
Soderberg			
Berger	2		
	3	APNSA Has Seen	
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4		N
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other Millison

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

EXECSEC HAS ORIG

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~ 20467

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 11, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: JENONNE WALKER

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, April 10, 1994

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia held April 10, 1994.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will It~~oh to sign the memo to agencies~~ at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

for files

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MS NARA, Date 4/12/13

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia [partial] (2 pages)	04/10/1994	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0069 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, April 10, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs545

RESTRICTION CODES

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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~~SECRET~~

[001]
20467

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of NSC Principals Committee
DATE: April 10, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 1:50pm - 4:10pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

The President

Chair
Anthony Lake

OVP
Leon Fuerth

STATE
Sec Warren Christopher
Peter Tarnoff

DOD
Sec William Perry
Walter Slocombe
BGen Paul Kern

USUN
Ambassador Albright

CIA
Dir James Woolsey
Adm William Studeman
Norman Schindler
(b)(3)

JCS
Gen John Shalikashvili
Gen Wesley Clark
Gen John Sheehan

White House
Samuel Berger
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
Jenonne Walker

Summary of Conclusions

-- The attached points will form the basis of Presidential remarks to the press, telephone calls to key Hill staff members and foreign leaders, and remarks by departmental press spokesmen. (S)

-- The IWG will draft a contingency NAC resolution, for further consideration by Principals. (S)

-- The President will telephone President Yeltsin. (S)

-- Secretary Christopher will telephone Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev. Secretaries Christopher and Perry will then discuss latter's telephone call to Russian Defense Minister Grachev. (S)

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0533-M
RS 9/30/14 (1.17)

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-- Secretary Perry will telephone Defense Ministers of the "Aviano Group" of NATO allies. (S)

-- The Pentagon will consider holding a press briefing on Monday, after NATO military authorities have briefed on results of today's events. General Shalikashvili will urge that the NATO military briefing take place as soon as possible. (S)

-- State will prepare a demarche to Milosevic. (S)

-- Ambassador Albright will affirm to Kofi Annan our readiness to help Ukrainian counterpart get to Sarajevo. (S)

-- State will prepare a cable for use by our Embassies in Central and East European states. (S)

-- General Shalikashvili will instruct Admiral Smith to impress upon General Rose the deterrent value of prompt follow through to today's action if necessary. (S)

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

4/10/94

Bosnia Points

-- Today, while negotiations were being held on a cease-fire in Bosnia, the Serbs launched a new attack on Gorazde.

-- These attacks on Gorazde have resulted in heavy casualties and have put United Nations personnel at risk.

-- UNPROFOR commander in Bosnia, General Rose, requested and received authorization from UN civilian authorities to request NATO close air support.

-- Under existing authority and policy, NATO forces promptly responded. U.S. F-16 aircraft, under NATO command and control, attacked at least one target identified by UNPROFOR.

-- French aircraft under NATO are carrying out reconnaissance to assess damage.

-- We have said we would act if requested; we have done so, and will do so again, as asked.

-- The Serbs should cease their attacks on Gorazde and pull back.

-- The talks on cessation of hostilities in Bosnia should resume.

Q: What are you prepared to do if attacks continue, putting Gorazde in danger of falling?

A: We have confidence in General Rose's determination. We are prepared to continue to act as we did today.

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~~SECRET~~ 20467

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

CAPTAIN H. L. SHEFFIELD
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, April 10, 1994 (S)

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. (S)

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 4/12/10

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
2010-0533-M

See also 2013-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title: PC0070 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, April 18, 1994				
Staff Office-Individual: Records Management				
Original OA/ID Number: 4007				
Row: 43	Section: 6	Shelf: 6	Position: 2	Stack: V

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia with the President [partial] (1 page)	04/19/1994	P3/b(3)
001b. paper	re: Bosnia (3 pages)	ca. 04/1994	P1/b(1)
~~001c. list~~	~~re: Time Line (1 page)~~	~~ca. 04/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 02/06/2020
002. paper	[Duplicate of 001b] (3 pages)	ca. 04/1994	P1/b(1)
~~003a. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)~~	~~04/18/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RDS 04/17/2015
~~003b. memo~~	~~[Duplicate of 003a, incomplete copy] (1 page)~~	~~04/18/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
~~003c. memo~~	~~[Duplicate of 003a, incomplete copy] (1 page)~~	~~04/18/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
004a. paper	re: Bosnia: Next Steps (3 pages)	ca. 04/1994	P1/b(1)
004b. paper	[Duplicate of 004a] (3 pages)	ca. 04/1994	P1/b(1)
~~005a. agenda~~	~~re: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)~~	~~04/18/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 02/06/2020
005b. paper	re: Issue Paper: Use of Force to Gain Compliance with UN Safe Areas (3 pages)	ca. 04/1994	P1/b(1)
005c. paper	re: Option I (2 pages)	ca. 04/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0070 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, April 18, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs546

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005d. paper	re: Option II (2 pages)	ca. 04/1994	P1/b(1)
005e. paper	re: Option III (2 pages)	ca. 04/1994	P1/b(1)
005f. paper	re: Option IV (2 pages)	ca. 04/1994	P1/b(1)
005g. paper	re: Option V (1 page)	ca. 04/1994	P1/b(1)
~~005h. memo~~	~~Jane Holl to Anthony Lake re: Principals Meeting on Bosnia, April 18, 1994 (1 page)~~	~~04/17/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KDE 05/26/2016
~~005i. paper~~	~~re: Comments on Draft NSC Issues Paper on Bosnia 17 Apr (3 pages)~~	~~04/17/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 08/03/2015

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0070 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, April 18, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs546

RESTRICTION CODES

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9420525
RECEIVED: 26 APR 94 09

TO: LAKE

FROM: WALKER

DOC DATE: 13 MAY 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION 18 APR PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: SEE 9420522 FOR FINAL ACTION DUE DATE: 29 APR 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF: 9420485 9420522

FILES: IFM C NSCP: PC0070 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSJEB CLOSED BY: NSKDB DOC 1 OF 1

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By ___ NARA, Date 9/13/15
2012-0533-M

~~SECRET~~ RECORD ID: 9420525

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94051415	DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
001		X	95010919	OBE / STATUS OF ORIGINAL UNKNOWN
001		X	96070913	SEE 9420522 FOR FINAL ACTION

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~ 20525

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 13, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: JENONNE WALKER

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia with the President, April 19, 1994

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia held April 19, 1994.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions
Tab B Decision Sheet
Tab C Time Line

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By LM NARA, Date 4/15/11
2012-0533-F

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

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~~SECRET~~ 20525

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia with the President, April 19, 1994 (S)

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. (S)

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachments
Tab A Summary of Conclusions
Tab B Decision Paper
Tab C Time Line

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 1/10/12
2012-0533-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia with the President [partial] (1 page)	04/19/1994	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0070 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, April 18, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs546

RESTRICTION CODES

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~ 20525

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of NSC Principals Committee
DATE: April 19, 1994
LOCATION: Cabinet Room
TIME: 3:00pm - 4:00pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia with the President (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

The President
The Vice President

Chair
Anthony Lake

OVP
Leon Fuerth

STATE
Secretary Warren Christopher
Peter Tarnoff

DOD
John M. Deutch
BGEN Paul Kern
Walter Slocombe

USUN
Ambassador Madeleine Albright

(b)(3)

0019

JCS
GEN John Shalikashvili
GEN Wesley Clark
GEN John Sheehan

White House
Thomas McLarty
Samuel Berger
David Gergen
George Stephanopoulos
Bowman Cutter
Dee Dee Meyers
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
Jenonne Walker

Summary of Conclusions

The meeting agreed on the attached decision sheet and time line for implementating steps.

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachments

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NLC NARA, Date 4/15/10
2010-0533-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. paper	re: Bosnia (3 pages)	ca. 04/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0070 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, April 18, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs546

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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Time Line

Tuesday April 19

Mr. Lake backgrounds the press

Legislative offices give key Hill staffers "heads up" that we will be putting a proposal to the NAC.

Secretary Christopher writes British, French, German and Russian Foreign Ministers, setting forth our proposal and its rationale

State cable to other Allied governments and USNATO with more general talking points on our proposal

Wednesday April 20

Secretary Christopher telephones French, British, German, Russian and Canadian Foreign Ministers

Secretary Deutch telephones "Aviano Group" (French, British, Dutch, and Italian) Defense Ministers with rationale

Ambassador Albright briefs Boutros Ghali

Brief Presidential appearance in White House press room for brief assessment of the situation, overall policy goals,

White House briefing for Hill leadership

Quad Political Directors meet in Washington

Thursday April 21

Presidential telephone calls as necessary

UNSC resolution or statement, if Russians willing to support

Friday April 22

NAC decision meeting, possibly reinforced from capitals

Saturday April 23

Demarches to Belgrade and Sarajevo

President devotes Saturday radio talk to Bosnia

Sunday April 24

National security team on Sunday TV shows

Possible Foreign Ministers meeting on peace negotiations

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By RVS NARA, Date 4/7/2014
2013-0682-M

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9420523
RECEIVED: 25 APR 94 16

TO: LAKE

FROM: WALKER

DOC DATE: 13 MAY 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 18 APR PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: SEE 9420522 FOR FINAL ACTION DUE DATE: 28 APR 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF: 9420485 9420522

FILES: IFM C NSCP: PC0070 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSASK CLOSED BY: NSKDB DOC 1 OF 1

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By DM NARA, Date 4/12/10
2012-0533-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94051415	FOR DECISION
001		X	95010919	OBE / STATUS OF ORIGINAL UNKNOWN
001		X	96070913	SEE 9420522 FOR FINAL ACTION

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20523

May 13, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: JENONNE WALKER

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, April 18, 1994

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia held April 18, 1994.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions
Tab B Position Paper

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MS NARA, Date 9/13/10

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

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~~SECRET~~ 20523

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, April 19, 1994 (S)

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. (S)

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachments
Tab A Summary of Conclusions
Tab B Position Paper

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NNI NARA, Date 9/13/10

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of NSC Principals Committee
DATE: April 18, 1994
LOCATION: Cabinet Room
TIME: 3:00pm - 4:00pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia with the President ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

The President
The Vice President

Chair
Anthony Lake

OVP
Leon Fuerth

STATE
Secretary Warren Christopher

DOD
Acting Secretary Deutch

USUN
Ambassador Madeleine Albright

CIA
ADM William Studeman

JCS
GEN John Shalikashvili

White House
Thomas McLarty
Samuel Berger
David Gergen
George Stephanopoulos

NSC
Jenonne Walker

Summary of Conclusions

The meeting directed that the attached draft position paper be prepared for the President's consideration at a subsequent meeting to be held at 3:00 April 19, 1994.

Attachment
As stated

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NARA, Date 4/13/10

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9420522
RECEIVED: 25 APR 94 14

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 13 APR 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 18 APR PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 28 APR 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF: 9420485

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0070 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		DARBY
		HALL
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
		MILLISON
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		WALKER
		WOLIN

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB CLOSED BY: NSASK DOC 2 OF 2

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94051415	FOR DECISION
001		X	94052319	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
002		X	94052319	KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	940413	FUERTH, L	
002	940413	GROSSMAN, M	
002	940413	MCALEER, R	
002	940413	GARTHOFF, D	
002	940413	PATRICK, T	
002	940413	INDERFURTH, K	

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National Security Council
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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG PK A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Kenney			
Itoh			
Soderberg	1	NE	
Berger	2	srb	
Lake		Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room	Kenney / 3		
West Wing Desk	4		
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

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National Security Council
The White House

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URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG [illegible] A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Kenney			
Itoh			
Soderberg	1		
Berger	2		
Lake			
~~Situation Room~~ Kenney	3		
West Wing Desk	4		
NSC Secretariat			

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen

Tab I

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9420522
DATE 13 APR 94

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR PC MTG ON BOSNIA 18 APRIL
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~/EYES ONLY

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	_____	_____	_____ PRINT NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT NAME: _____ COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
COL. T. R. PATRICK JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001	_____	_____	_____ PRINT NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW	_____	_____	_____ PRINT NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

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2012-0533-M

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM 1994 MAY 23 PM 5:10

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT 18:06

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE / PRIORITY / ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

EYES ONLY

MESSAGE NO. 960 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 4

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SOC for PC on Bosnia

NSC LOG # 20523

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

BBNDA

REMARKS:

EYES ONLY

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NARA, Date 4/13/10
2012-0533-M

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TIME OF RECEIPT

May 23 5 15 PM '94

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE / PRIORITY / ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

EYES ONLY

MESSAGE NO. 960 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 4

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SOC for PA on Bosnia

NSC LOG # 20527

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

BBNDA

REMARKS:

EYES ONLY

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
1994 MAY 23 PM 5:10

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

17:17

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE / PRIORITY / ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

EYES ONLY

MESSAGE NO. 960 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 4

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SOC for PC on Bosnia

NSC LOG # 20523

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

BBNDA

REMARKS:

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By MI NARA, Date 4/13/10
2010-0533-M

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM 1994 MAY 23 PM 5:10

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT
WASHFAX

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

23 MAY 94 17 14
NMEC/JCS

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE / PRIORITY / ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

EYES ONLY

MESSAGE NO. 960 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 4

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SOC for PC on Bosnia

NSC LOG # 20523

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

BBNDA

REMARKS:

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
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2012-0533-M

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

EYES ONLY

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE
- ☐ FLASH
- ☐ IMMEDIATE
- ☐ PRIORITY
- ☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC LOG # 20522

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting SOC PC ON BOSNIA PAGES: 4

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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By NARA, Date 4/13/10
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the U.S. Permanent
Representative to the
United Nations

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, April 18, 1994 (S)

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. (S)

for William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachments
Tab A Summary of Conclusions
Tab B Press Points

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By ns NARA, Date 4/10/12

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. paper	[Duplicate of 001b] (3 pages)	ca. 04/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0070 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, April 18, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs546

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Meeting of NSC Principals Committee
DATE: April 18, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 11:10am - 1:45pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Anthony Lake

OVP
The Vice President
Leon Fuerth

STATE
Secretary Warren Christopher
Peter Tarnoff

DOD
Secretary William Perry
Walter Slocombe

USUN
Ambassador Madeleine Albright
William Woodward

CIA
Director James Woolsey
Norman Schindler

JCS
GEN John Shalikashvili
GEN Wesley Clark

White House
Thomas McLarty
Samuel Berger
David Gergen
George Stephanopoulos
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
Jenonne Walker

Summary of Conclusions

1. Secretary Christopher will review what we earlier have said to Belgrade about not interfering with U.S./NATO aircraft (including those participating in humanitarian air drops). (S)

2. Ambassador Albright will ask about the UN's planning for the humanitarian effort. (S)

3. Sarajevo exclusion zone: In light of Gorazde events, it is more important than ever that the exclusion zone be enforced. To that end:

--By COB 4/18, CIA will circulate an assessment of the effectiveness of the Sarajevo exclusion zone, including the issue of the tank menacing UNPROFOR troops on 4/14. (S)

--Admiral Smith will inquire whether UNPROFOR is satisfied with the degree of its control over heavy weapons in the Sarajevo

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2010-0533-M
RS 9/30/14 (1.18)

exclusion zone in order to engage UNPROFOR in a discussion of how to ensure control. (S)

--Ambassador Albright will ask the UN Secretariat for a briefing on the status of the exclusion zone. (S)

--State will instruct USNATO to raise the issue. (S)

4. At the United Nations, Ambassador Albright will not oppose calls for positive action that come before the Security Council but will privately suggest to the French and others as appropriate that further calls that are unlikely to be implemented only further damage the organization's credibility. (S)

5. General Shalikashvili will review the possibility of augmenting U.S. forces in UNPROFOR Macedonia (beyond the increases being made this week) and our ability to assist them with greater power if necessary. (S)

6. We will support the proposed increase in UNPROFOR's ceiling. (S)

7. We will support easing restrictions on Turkish troops for UNPROFOR. (S)

8. OSD will prepare proposals for providing more U.S. equipment to UNPROFOR troops. (S)

9. The sanctions Working Group will prepare proposals on tightening sanctions by COB today for the President's review tomorrow. (S)

10. The IWG will elaborate two options for PC consideration: (1) a combination of options II and III of the paper prepared for today's Principals meeting; and (2) Option III alone. Both will be completed by COB 4/18. (S)

11. The attached points will be used for all press, Hill, and other public contacts today. In addition, Hill members and Staff will be asked what action they believe the Congress would support. (S)

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PUBLIC LINE FOR TODAY

-- Gorazde situation grim and unpredictable.

-- Bosnian Serbs have violated their agreements with the UN and with Russia.

-- This is a setback to recent positive momentum achieved by success of NATO's Sarajevo ultimatum. (Bosnian-Croat agreements which are holding and have changed the balance of power on the ground; Tuzla airport opening; Krajina ceasefire).

-- National security team met today. Assessing how to regain the momentum toward a cessation of hostilities throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina and a negotiated settlement. As the President repeatedly has said, the conflict can only be resolved by agreement, not on the battlefield.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 13, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: JENONNE WALKER

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, April 18, 1994

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia held April 18, 1994.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve w/ change Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions
Tab B Press Points

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
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By MI NARA, Date 4/13/10

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6. We will support the proposed increase in UNPROFOR's ceiling. (S)

7. We will support easing restrictions on, e.g., Turkish troops for UNPROFOR. (S)

8. OSD will prepare proposals for providing more U.S. equipment to UNPROFOR troops. (S)

9. The sanctions Working Group will prepare proposals by COB today on tightening sanctions for the President's review tomorrow. (S)

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11. The attached points will be used for all press, Hill, and other public contacts today. In addition, Hill members and Staff will be asked what action they believe the Congress would support. (S)

Change made 5/23

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~~2010-0533-M~~
~~ES 4/30/14~~
2013-0682-M
KL 2/6/2020 (4:44)

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exclusion zone in order to engage UNPROFOR in a discussion of how to ensure control. (S)

--Ambassador Albright will ask the UN Secretariat for a briefing on the status of the exclusion zone. (S)

--State will instruct USNATO to raise the issue. (S)

4. At the United Nations, Ambassador Albright will not oppose calls for positive action that come before the Security Council but will privately suggest to the French and others as appropriate that further calls that are unlikely to be implemented only further damage the organization's credibility. (S)

5. General Shalikashvili will review the possibility of augmenting U.S. forces in UNPROFOR Macedonia (beyond the increases being made this week) and our ability to assist them with greater power if necessary. (S)

6. We will support the proposed increase in UNPROFOR's ceiling. (S)

7. We will support easing restrictions on Turkish troops for UNPROFOR. (S)

8. OSD will prepare proposals for providing more U.S. equipment to UNPROFOR troops. (S)

9. (h) The sanctions Working Group will prepare proposals on tightening sanctions by COB today for the President's review tomorrow. (S)

10. The IWG will elaborate two options for PC consideration: (1) a combination of options II and III of the paper prepared for today's Principals meeting; and (2) Option III alone. Both will be completed by COB 4/18. (S)

11. The attached points will be used for all press, Hill, and other public contacts today. In addition, Hill members and Staff will be asked what action they believe the Congress would support. (S)

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
~~2010-0533-M~~
~~NLS 9/30/14~~
2013-0682-M
ICC 2/6/2020 (4.45)

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9420592
RECEIVED: 10 MAY 94 17

TO: LAKE

FROM: REED

DOC DATE: 18 APR 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
LIMITED ACCESS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: OPTIONS PAPER FOR 18 APR PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: LAKE APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 13 MAY 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: REED LOGREF: 9420485 9420522

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0070 CODES: BOS YUG

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MD NARA, Date 4/13/10
2012-0533-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94041819	FOR DECISION
001		X	94041819	LAKE APPROVED RECOM

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
001	940418	CHRISTOPHER, W	
001	940418	DEUTCH, J	
001	940418	ALBRIGHT, M	
001	940418	WOOLSEY, R	
001	940418	SHALIKASHVILI, J	

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National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 20592

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			JOHN - NOT SURE HOW TO HANDLE THIS LIMITED ACCESS. PRS* ___? OR NSC* X
Kenney	1		
Itoh			
Soderberg			
Berger			KYLE
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk			
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

4/19

COMMENTS:

KAK-
Attached is the Non Log paper for yesterday's Bosnia mtg. Can we log as limited access?

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Yes ✓ No ___

Cathy

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 18, 1994

MEMO FOR TONY LAKE

SUBJ: Bosnia -- Next Steps

Tony:

Attached for your approval is the options paper for the 9:00 a.m. Oval Office meeting on Bosnia.

Per Jenonne Walker, the paper has been cleared at Working Group level by State, OSD and the Joint Staff.

Recommend you authorize Will Itoh to dispatch the paper to the Principals prior to the meeting.

JWR

Reed

R APPROVED _____ SEE CHANGES

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

EYES ONLY DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 3

FROM William H Itoh _____ _____
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION ~~Memo~~ Bosnia

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
State	Secretary Christopher		
DOD	Deputy Secretary Deutch		
USUN	Amb Albright		
CIA	Director Woolsey		
JCS	General Shalikashvili		

REMARKS:

Attached is the staff paper requested at yesterday's Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia

EYES ONLY

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MI NARA, Date 4/15/99
202-2533-m

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004a. paper	re: Bosnia: Next Steps (3 pages)	ca. 04/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0070 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, April 18, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs546

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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April 18, 1994

NOTE FOR TONY LAKE

FROM: WILL ITOH

Re: Meeting with the President
on Bosnia

You are scheduled to meet with
the President tomorrow from
9:00 to 10:00 am to discuss
Bosnia.

Oval Office

Recommended Participants:

~~Vice~~ President
~~Christopher~~ w/o
~~Deutch~~ (Perry in Korea) Lynn??
~~McLarty~~ √BERGER
~~Lake~~
~~Albright~~ Tucker
~~Woolsey~~
~~Shali~~
~~Gergen~~
~~Stephanopolous~~
~~Walker~~ (Notetaker)

Approve ----- Disapprove -----

Add ----------

Brenda,
Kristie seems to think Berger might add Fuerth. I did not call him. Please check in a.m. Kay thanks

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004b. paper	[Duplicate of 004a] (3 pages)	ca. 04/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0070 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, April 18, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs546

RESTRICTION CODES

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9420485
RECEIVED: 18 APR 94 08

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 18 APR 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION / AGENDA & ISSUES PAPER FOR 18 APR PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 21 APR 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL LOGREF: 9420522

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0070 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		CICIO
		DARBY
		HOLL
		LAKE
		MILLISON
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		WALKER

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MM NARA, Date 4/13/20
2010-0533-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94041808	FOR DECISION
001		X	94041808	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
002		X	94041808	KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	940418	FUERTH, L	
002	940418	GROSSMAN, M	
002	940418	PATRICK, T	
002	940418	INDERFURTH, K	
002	940418	GARTHOFF, D	

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9420485
DATE 18 APR 94

SUBJECT: PC MTG ON BOSNIA ON 18 APR
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	18 apr	0840	L.H. Branscum COPY: 1
MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520			COPY: 1

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By: MM NARA, Date 9/13/12
2012-0533-M

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LOG 9420485
DATE 18 APR 94

SUBJECT: PC MTG ON BOSNIA ON 18 APR
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE TIME SIGNATURE

4/18/94 10:15 C. Bobard

COPY: 1

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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
VIA LARRY BRANSCUM
ROOM 290, OEOB
WASHINGTON, DC 20506

4/18/94 10:15 C. Bobard

COPY: 1

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

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By MN NARA, Date 4/13/10
2010-0573-M

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PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: S. G. [illegible]

DTG:

URGENT

20485 PC 18 APR

MESSAGE NO. 679 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 14

BROADCAST REPORT

(MON) 04. 18. '94 08:29

WHSR#2

DOCUMENT #	TIME STORED	PAGE	NUMBER OF DEST.		
			OK	N. G.	TOTAL
1460051524	04. 18 08:20	15	4	0	4

*** COMPLETED ***

DESTINATION	P.
CIA#1	15
~~D1~~ NMCC#1	15

DESTINATION	P.
~~STATE~~ #1	15
~~N.~~ OSD/CCC	15

*** END ***

LOSLVP

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By RM NARA, Date 9/12/12

2012-0573-M

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1994 APR 18 AM 8:22

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-P-
18 APR 94 08 43
NMCC/JCS

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: S.G.

DTG:

URGENT

MESSAGE NO. 679 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 14

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PC MTG ON 18 April

NSC LOG # 20485

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

BBNDA

REMARKS:

Please Deliver to addressees upon reciept!

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NARA, Date 4/13/10
2012-0537-M

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
1994 APR 18 AM 8:22

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF RECEIPT
'94 ABR 18 A8:35

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: S. G.

DTG:

URGENT

MESSAGE NO. 679 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 14

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PC MTG ON 18 April

NSC LOG # 20485

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

B
B
N
D
A

REMARKS:

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NM NARA, Date 4/12/10
2010-0533-M

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WHITE HOUSE
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1994 APR 18 AM 8:22

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF RECEIPT

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PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: S. G. [signature]

DTG:

URGENT

MESSAGE NO. 679 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 14

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PC MTG ON 18 April

NSC LOG # 20485

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

B
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A

REMARKS:

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MW NARA, Date 4/13/10
2012-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20485

April 18, 1994

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COLONEL ROBERT MC ALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COLONEL TIMOTHY R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations

SUBJECT: Principals Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia on Monday, April 18, 11:00am - 12:30pm, in the White House Situation Room. Attendees are Principals plus one. The agenda for the meeting is attached at Tab A. An issues paper for discussion is attached at Tab B. ~~(S)~~

for Kristie A. Kenney
William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachments
Tab A Agenda
Tab B Issues Paper

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MS NARA, Date 4/13/10

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~~SECRET~~

PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: April 18, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 11:00am - 12:30pm

AGENDA

I. Intelligence Update.....CIA

II. Discussion.....ALL

A. Use of Force to Ensure Compliance with UN-Declared Safe Areas

Military Analysis of Options.....OSD/JCS

B. Other Approaches

III. Next Steps.....ALL

A. Key Allies and in NATO

B. At the UN

C. With Russia

IV. Congressional and Public Affairs Strategy.....ALL

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By NARA, Date 4/17/2014

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005b. paper	re: Issue Paper: Use of Force to Gain Compliance with UN Safe Areas (3 pages)	ca. 04/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0070 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, April 18, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs546

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005c. paper	re: Option I (2 pages)	ca. 04/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0070 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, April 18, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs546

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005d. paper	re: Option II (2 pages)	ca. 04/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0070 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, April 18, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs546

RESTRICTION CODES

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PC0070 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, April 18, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs546

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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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005g. paper	re: Option V (1 page)	ca. 04/1994	P1/b(1)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 17, 1994

Tony:

Attached for your review is the discussion paper for the Principals Meeting on Bosnia.

If you approve, please call the Sit Room -- they are standing by to dispatch this to the Principals immediately.

Reed

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506



April 17, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER

FROM: JANE E. HOLL

SUBJECT: Principals Meeting on Bosnia, April 18, 1994

The package for the Principals meeting on Bosnia is attached at Tab I. Tab B contains the issues paper for discussion and has been reviewed by State, OSD and JCS.

OSD and JCS believe strongly that Principals should review whether ratchetting up the military pressure to force Serb compliance with UN resolutions is a sound strategy to pursue at this juncture. To give you a flavor of their concerns, I have attached the informal JCS scrub of the issues paper at Tab II. Additionally, the draft agenda opens the discussion to alternative strategies Principals might wish to suggest.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memorandum to agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to Agencies
Tab A Agenda
Tab B Issues Paper
Tab II JCS Comments on the Issues Paper

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PER E.O. 13526
2013-0682-M
05126116 KDE (5.04)

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Declassify On: OADR

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~~SECRET~~ 17 APR 94

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Comments on Draft NSC Issues Paper on Bosnia 17 APR (U)

1. (U) Purpose. To provide comments on draft NSC issues paper on Bosnia.

2. (S) Discussion. General comments:

•All options are escalatory in nature using brinksmanship to make the Bosnian-Serbs back down (which they've just demonstrated they're not liable to do). Air power options can not guarantee military impact sufficient to compel compliance.

•All options put UNPROFOR at increased risk.

•All options could result in Bosnian government manipulation of NATO responses.

•Failure of chosen option could result in total failure and withdrawal of UNPROFOR with subsequent impact on humanitarian aid.

•All 5 options are escalatory in nature and could lead to spillover.

•All proposed options assume NAC consensus (which would be extremely difficult to obtain in all cases, and impossible in the more aggressive options) and UN cooperation in execution (such UN resolve after last week's action is questionable).

OPTION 1: NATO Air Strikes on heavy weapons and infantry

PROs:

-Demonstrates forceful action.
-Consistent with NATO decisions of 2/9 Aug 93 declaring concern for B-H safe areas (NAC decision still required to execute air strikes).

CONs:

-Successful only if bombs don't drop.
-Most escalatory of all options.
-Taking on both attacks on heavy weapons and small infantry units places high requirement for air capability and increases danger to NATO pilots.
-Ignores likely Bosnian-Serb reactions.
-Relies on airpower alone to force B-S concessions on ground.
-Ultimately would weaken NATO; debate would be fractious, and if passed, would promise more than air power can deliver.
-Likely to further antagonize Russians.

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Declassify on OADR

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2013-0682-M
3/3/15 KRH (S.05)

OPTION 2: UNPROFOR exclusion areas around safe areas

PROs:

-Follows successful Sarajevo model.
-Builds on Feb 94 NAC decisions.
-Demonstrates evenhandedness in that it also warns Bosnian Muslims against attacking from safe areas (wording should be changed to reflect not launching assaults from inside safe areas vice refraining from use of heavy weapons from inside safe areas - applies to options 2,3,4).

CONs:

-Would require 8-10,000 additional UNPROFOR troops to enforce.
-Monitoring effort would scatter UNPROFOR forces leaving them vulnerable to harassment/detention, etc.
-Additional cost to USG for troops and additional flight hours.

OPTION 3: Exclusion areas without UNPROFOR control

PROs:

-Requires less troops.
-UNPROFOR less vulnerable and less visibly identified with enforcement.

CONs:

-Makes NATO appear a belligerent.
-Contrary to existing UNSCRs.
-Without ground observers, targeting and execution difficult.
-Requires extensive recon.

OPTION 4: No-bombardment zone

PROs:

-Consistent with UNSCRs supporting safe areas.
-If passed sends strong message of NATO solidarity.
-Probably most saleable to NAC.
-Doesn't attempt to roll back B-S.
-Could be used as basis for country-wide cease fire.

CONs:

-Subject to manipulation given lack of ground presence.
-Extremely difficult to enforce.

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OPTION 5: Complete withdrawal from around safe areas

PROs:

-Evenhanded approach, demanding compliance from both sides.
-Provides comprehensive safety for safe areas.

CONs:

-Manpower intensive to monitor on ground.
-Probably unacceptable to B-S.
-Probably unacceptable to Bosnian Government in that lines of conflict would be frozen.

NSC ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY

General comments noted above also applicable to alternative strategy.

PROs:

-Recognizes geographic isolation of Gorazde and lack of long-term viability in comprehensive agreement.

CONs:

-Doesn't specify how other safe areas are going to be protected by NATO.
-Admits UNPROFOR failure in Gorazde.

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MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

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~~001a. memo~~	~~re: Minutes of PC Meeting on Bosnia (4 pages)~~	~~04/23/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RDS 10/01/2013
~~001b. memo~~	~~[Duplicate of 001a, incomplete copy] (3 pages)~~	~~04/23/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
002. memo	re: Minutes of PC Meeting on Bosnia (3 pages)	04/23/1994	P1/b(1)
003. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of NSC Principals Committee [partial] (1 page)	04/23/1994	~~P1/b(1),~~ P3/b(3) KC 6/11/2020

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2010-0533-M
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9420690
RECEIVED: 02 JUN 94 08

TO: LAKE

FROM: WALKER

DOC DATE: 02 JUN 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
MINUTES

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MINUTES FOR 23 APR PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: BERGER APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 06 JUN 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF: 9420605 9420606

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0072 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		DARBY
		HALL
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
		MILLISON
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		WOLIN

COMMENTS: MTG CONVENED AT 1:30PM 23 APR, THEN RECONVENED AT 5:00PM 23 APR. THIS MINUTES COVERS THE 1:30PM PORTION OF THAT MTG.

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA CLOSED BY: DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 4/13/10

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Z90-0533-F

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94061709	FOR DECISION
001		X	94061709	BERGER APPROVED RECOM

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Rec'd ~~6/13 4:20pm~~ 6/16 8:15am

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: Jon LOG # 20690

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG Jon W/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Kenney	1	Wain	
Itoh			
Soderberg			
Berger	2	SRB	needs w/ changes
Lake			
Situation Room		Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
West Wing Desk	3		N
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

SRB -

Pls. sign out for N. Mr. N.

(Your changes have been made.)

Exec Sec has disdutte

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 13, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: JENONNE R. WALKER

SUBJECT: Minutes of the Principal's Committee on Bosnia, April 23, 1994

Attached at Tab A are the minutes from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia held 1:30pm - 2:30pm, April 23, 1994.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached minutes be filed for the record.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab A Minutes

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By lhl NARA, Date 4/13/10

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Meeting of the Principal Committee
DATE: April 23, 1994
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 1:30 - 2:30pm

SUBJECT: Minutes of PC Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

The President

The Vice President

The Vice President's Office
Leon Fuerth

State
Secretary Warren Christopher

DOD
Secretary William Perry
Walter Slocombe

USUN
Ambassador Albright

CIA
ADM William Studeman

JCS
GEN John Shalikashvili

DIA
ADM Michael W. Kraemer

White House
Thomas McLarty
Anthony Lake
David Gergen
George Stephanopoulos

NSC
Jenonne Walker

Minutes

Admiral Kraemer of DIA described continuing Bosnian Serb attacks on Gorazde despite NATO's ceasefire ultimatum. Mr. Stephanopoulos noted CNN reports of preliminary indications of a Bosnian Serb pullback, which Mr. Lake said UNPROFOR General Rose believes to be the case. The President asked why, if the Bosnian Serbs intended to comply, they had not already done so and Mr. Lake described evidence of serious command and control problems they are experiencing.

General Shalikashvili reviewed NATO actions to date: (1) CINCSOUTH Admiral Smith at 0630 EDT April 23 had asked UNPROFOR agreement to NATO air strikes in response to clear violations of the ceasefire ultimatum but was told by UNPROFOR Deputy Commander McGinnis that both Akashi and de Lapresle were away and the Deputy Commander did not have authority to agree; (2) at 0830 Admiral Smith faxed a written request to UNPROFOR and received no answer; (3) SACEUR General Joulwan sent Admiral Smith to Zagreb for a face to face meeting with UNPROFOR officials at which General de Lepresle said that the threat of NATO air strikes was

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working and Akashi should be given time to get the Bosnian Serbs both to cease shelling Gorazde and to withdraw forces as demanded by NATO. Admiral Smith was now meeting with Akashi to determine the latter's intentions and especially to press for a clear understanding of the conditions for NATO air strikes.

Ambassador Albright reviewed NATO Secretary General Woerner's efforts to persuade Akashi to agree to air strikes and Akashi's plea to Woerner that the Bosnian Serbs should be given more time. She also noted the UN's view that an UNPROFOR presence in Gorazde would permit verification of what is happening and that Akashi had told Kofi Annan that the presence of UNPROFOR should not impede air strikes. Mr. Lake added that Karadzic is claiming that NATO's conditions will be met when UNPROFOR is in Gorazde. He further noted the French refusal to join an UNPROFOR detachment for Gorazde.

The President asked if Akashi in effect had authorized Gorazde to be shelled today. Mr. Lake said our view was that there should have been NATO air strikes today and that should be made public.

Mr. Lake said there was no important operational decision to be taken as to what will happen in the next few hours. The important thing is what we say to UNSYG Boutros Ghali about what should happen after midnight Sunday GMT. His recommendation, accepted by the Group, was to distinguish at that time between continued shelling and compliance with NATO's demand for force withdrawals. If shelling continues, there should be NATO airstrikes. But if the ceasefire is holding and there is evidence that the Bosnian Serbs are withdrawing as demanded by NATO, then we would be in a poor position to push for air strikes. This is so both because the best outcome on the ground would be one similar to Sarajevo--compliance without airstrikes, even if the deadline slips somewhat--and because since there is evidence that Mladic and local Bosnian Serb commanders are calling for a ceasefire and pullback, if NATO conducts airstrikes and if Bosnian Serbs then take UNPROFOR lives, there would be serious problems with London, Paris, and other UNPROFOR governments.

In response to a question from Secretary Christopher, General Shalikashvili said that night operations are possible. In response to a question from the President, the General replied that there would be a little less danger to NATO pilots from some air defense guns but the risk from heat seeking missiles would be about the same as during daytime operations.

Mr. Gergen, who joined the meeting late, noted that he had come from CNN where the public disagreement between NATO and the UN was "going down very badly". But, he continued, there was no pressure to do anything now. People seemed to understand that we should wait until tomorrow morning in Bosnia and, if by then the firing had subsided and a pullback was underway, there would not be strong media pressure for airstrikes.

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The President then concluded that we need some time to see what happens on the ground, but also a credible explanation for the the UN-NATO conflict. That explanation should be as honest as possible without unduly complicating the ability of the two organizations to work together.

Mr. Lake suggested making clear that CINCSOUTH, the USG, and NATO Secretary General Woerner all believed that the Bosnian Serbs were in violation of NATO's ultimatum and that there should be airstrikes; NATO's commander and the UN met during the course of the day; but because they saw evidence that the threat of NATO airstrikes was having the desired effect, UN officials recommended delaying airstrikes. Mr. Berger suggested we make any such statement prospective, emphasizing that NATO's threat still obtains, with which the President agreed.

Secretary Christopher concurred with the decision, but said someone should telephone UNSYG Boutros-Ghali to point out how he has damaged the UN. UN officials had been claiming that procedures for authorizing airstrikes had been streamlined, but had really screwed up.

The President speculated that Rose, de Lapresle and Akashi wanted to avoid airstrikes if at all possible in order to minimize the risk to UN personnel in Bosnia. The question, he continued, is how to avoid the absence of strikes today looking like a major defeat for NATO and the US.

Mr. Lake said that the next four hours do not matter very much; the next 12 hours matters a lot and in the next 12 days most of all.

The Vice President asked if the NATO-UN decision-making procedures have changed. Mr. Lake replied that the "ice breaker" issue has not been resolved. Our position is that it has been broken, but it may not matter because UNPROFOR seems to be consulting Akashi. General Shalikashvili said that the NAC's April 22 decision did not change procedures and UNPROFOR still can keep NATO from conducting air strikes or limit the scope of airstrikes if they do occur. The Vice President termed that "untenable".

Secretary Perry said we need to prepare now so if firing resumes in Gorazde tomorrow we can go in big. Mr. Lake agreed, asking Ambassador Albright to ensure that Boutros Ghali makes clear to all in the UN chain of command that if Gorazde is shelled on Sunday "we whack them". The President asked how best to convey that message: Boutros-Ghali to Akashi? Ambassador Albright said that Boutros-Ghali believed he already had done so.

The President said that it may not be the worst thing in the world not to have conducted airstrikes today, since three of the nations with people on the ground are NATO members, if we can get agreement now to go all out tomorrow if necessary. We must not spend six hours tomorrow repeating today's exercise. Secretary Christopher said he would call Boutros-Ghali. General

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Shalikashvili will ask Admiral Smith to verify that Boutros-Ghali has passed the message to Akashi.

The President said the group should reconvene at 5:00 today, just before the NATO deadline expires. We dodged a bullet today, he noted, but we cannot permit the same thing to happen tomorrow.

Secretary Christopher suggested we say there was some confusion today; Secretary Perry that the policy is working because we are getting compliance. The Vice President and Mr. Lake suggested it had not worked well for those who died from continued Serb shelling today. Mr. Lake said we should just lay out the facts without characterizing them, including by saying there had been confusion.

Mr. Gergen said we would need to background the press today, especially on the UN veto of NATO airstrikes. The President said the UN had not vetoed; it honestly believed the policy was being complied with and wanted a delay when NATO wanted immediate action, but did not veto the basic decision. Dumping on someone on background, the President continued, hurts us tomorrow; it only makes us look weak. So we should stick to facts: we were ready to go this morning, the UN thought NATO's ultimatum was working and made a decision not to undermine the policy but to delay it. If we get into a pissing match with the UN it will make us look weak. We believed there was a violation and the UN did not disagree.

The Vice President asked what criteria would trigger NATO strikes. Mr. Lake said (1) clear violation of the ceasefire must be responded to and that means any shelling by heavy weapons rather than small arms fire; (2) absence of clear sign that the Bosnian Serbs are doing all they can to comply with the withdrawal demand and UNPROFOR troops are permitted into Gorazde area to see it.

General Shalikashvili said that if NATO strikes, its targets must not be limited to offending guns but should include groups of targets. Mr. Lake agreed, saying the targeting should be pursuant to NATO's decision. General Shalikashvili said we have identified 110 Bosnian Serb heavy weapons around Gorazde, and within a day or so would like to hit all of them.

The President asked what he should say to the press when walking back to Blair House. The Vice President recommended that he avoid comment. Mr. Lake said he would background the press.

The President closed the meeting by asking the group to reconvene at 5:00.

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working and Akashi should be given time to get the Bosnian Serbs both to cease shelling Gorazde and to withdraw forces as demanded by NATO. Admiral Smith was now meeting with Akashi to determine the latter's intentions and especially to press for a clear understanding of the conditions for NATO air strikes.

Ambassador Albright reviewed NATO Secretary General Woerner's efforts to persuade Akashi to agree to air strikes and Akashi's plea to Woerner that the Bosnian Serbs should be given more time. She also noted the UN's view that an UNPROFOR presence in Gorazde would permit verification of what is happening and that Akashi had told Kofi Annan that the presence of UNPROFOR should not impede air strikes. Mr. Lake added that Karadzic is claiming that NATO's conditions will be met when UNPROFOR is in Gorazde. He further noted the French refusal to join an UNPROFOR detachment for Gorazde.

The President asked if Akashi in effect had ~~made it OK for~~ authorized Gorazde to be shelled today. Mr. Lake said our view was that there should have been NATO air strikes today and that should be made public.

Mr. Lake said there was no important operational decision to be taken as to what will happen in the next few hours. The important thing is what we say to UNSYG Boutros Ghali about what should happen after midnight Sunday GMT. His recommendation, accepted by the Group, was to distinguish at that time between continued shelling and compliance with NATO's demand for force withdrawals. If shelling continues, there should be NATO airstrikes. But if the ceasefire is holding and there is evidence that the Bosnian Serbs are withdrawing as demanded by NATO, then we would be in a poor position to push for air strikes. This is so both because the best outcome on the ground would be one similar to Sarajevo--compliance without airstrikes, even if the deadline slips somewhat--and because since there is evidence that Mladic and local Bosnian Serb commanders are calling for a ceasefire and pullback, if NATO conducts airstrikes and if Bosnian Serbs then take UNPROFOR lives, there would be ~~hell to pay~~ serious problems with London, Paris, and other UNPROFOR governments.

In response to a question from Secretary Christopher, General Shalikashvili said that night operations are possible. In response to a question from the President, the General replied that there would be a little less danger to NATO pilots from some air defense guns but the risk from heat seeking missiles would be about the same as during daytime operations.

Mr. Gergen, who joined the meeting late, noted that he had come from CNN where the public disagreement between NATO and the UN was "going down very badly". But, he continued, there was no pressure to do anything now. People seemed to understand that we should wait until tomorrow morning in Bosnia and, if by then the firing had subsided and a pullback was underway, there would not be strong media pressure for airstrikes.

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PER E.O. 13526
~~2016-0533-M~~
~~RS 9/30/14~~
2018-0682-M KC (5.07)
CIA Historical Collection Division Archives 10/1/2015

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The President then concluded that we need some time to see what happens on the ground, but also a credible explanation for ~~the media of~~ the UN-NATO conflict. That explanation should be as honest as possible without unduly complicating the ability of the two organizations to work together.

Mr. Lake suggested making clear that CINCSOUTH, the USG, and NATO Secretary General Woerner all believed that the Bosnian Serbs were in violation of NATO's ultimatum and that there should be airstrikes; NATO's commander and the UN met during the course of the day; but because they saw evidence that the threat of NATO airstrikes was having the desired effect, UN officials recommended delaying airstrikes. Mr. Berger suggested we make any such statement prospective, emphasizing that NATO's threat still obtains, ~~to~~ with which the President ~~replied "damn right"~~ agreed.

Secretary Christopher concurred with the decision, but said someone should telephone UNSYG Boutros-Ghali to point out how he has damaged the UN. UN officials had been claiming that procedures for authorizing airstrikes had been streamlined, but had really screwed up.

The President speculated that Rose, de Lapresle and Akashi wanted to avoid airstrikes if at all possible in order to minimize the risk to UN personnel in Bosnia. The question, he continued, is how to avoid the absence of strikes today looking like a major defeat for the US. NATO and

Mr. Lake said that the next four hours do not matter very much; the next 12 hours matters a lot and in the next 12 days most of all.

The Vice President asked if the NATO-UN decision-making procedures have changed. Mr. Lake replied that the "ice breaker" issue has not been resolved. Our position is that it has been broken, but it may not matter because UNPROFOR seems to be consulting Akashi. General Shalikashvili said that the NAC's April 22 decision did not change procedures and UNPROFOR still can keep NATO from conducting air strikes or limit the scope of airstrikes if they do occur. The Vice President termed that "untenable".

Secretary Perry said we need to prepare now so if firing resumes in Gorazde tomorrow we can go in big. Mr. Lake agreed, asking Ambassador Albright to ensure that Boutros Ghali makes clear to all in the UN chain of command that if Gorazde is shelled on Sunday "we whack them". The President asked how best to convey that message: Boutros-Ghali to Akashi? Ambassador Albright said that Boutros-Ghali believed he already had done so.

The President said that it may not be the worst thing in the world not to have conducted airstrikes today, since three of the nations with people on the ground are NATO members, if we can get agreement now to go all out tomorrow if necessary. We must not spend six hours tomorrow repeating today's exercise. ~~He asked who should call Boutros-Ghali, and~~ Secretary Christopher said he

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would call Boutros Ghali. ~~be glad to do so~~. General Shalikashvili will ask Admiral Smith to verify that Boutros-Ghali has passed the message to Akashi.

The President said the group should reconvene at 5:00 today, just before the NATO deadline expires. We dodged a bullet today, he noted, but ~~will look like keystone cops if~~ the same thing happens tomorrow. we cannot permit to be

Secretary Christopher suggested we say there was some confusion today; Secretary Perry that the policy is working because we are getting compliance. The Vice President and Mr. Lake suggested it had not worked well for those who died from continued Serb shelling today. Mr. Lake said we should just lay out the facts without characterizing them, including by saying there had been confusion.

Mr. Gergen said we would need to background the press today, especially on the UN veto of NATO airstrikes. The President said the UN had not vetoed; it honestly believed the policy was being complied with and wanted a delay when NATO wanted immediate action, but did not veto the basic decision. Dumping on someone on background, the President continued, hurts us tomorrow; it only makes us look weak. So we should stick to facts: we were ready to go this morning, the UN thought NATO's ultimatum was working and made a decision not to undermine the policy but to delay it. If we get into a pissing match with the UN it will make us look weak. We believed there was a violation and the UN did not disagree.

The Vice President asked what criteria would trigger NATO strikes. Mr. Lake said (1) clear violation of the ceasefire must be responded to and that means any shelling by heavy weapons rather than small arms fire; (2) absence of clear sign that the Bosnian Serbs are doing all they can to comply with the withdrawal demand and UNPROFOR troops are permitted into Gorazde area to see it.

General Shalikashvili said that if NATO strikes, its targets must not be limited to offending guns but should include groups of targets. Mr. Lake agreed, saying the targeting should be pursuant to NATO's decision. General Shalikashvili said we have identified 110 Bosnian Serb heavy weapons around Gorazde, and within a day or so would like to hit all of them.

The President asked what he should say to the press when walking back to Blair House. The Vice President recommended that he avoid comment. Mr. Lake said he would background the press.

The President closed the meeting by asking the group to reconvene at 5:00.

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9420606
RECEIVED: 12 MAY 94 17

TO: LAKE

FROM: WALKER

DOC DATE: 12 APR 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
MINUTES

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MINUTES FOR RECONVENED 23 APR PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: OBE / STATUS OF ORIGINAL UNKNOWN DUE DATE: 16 MAY 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF: 9420605 9420690

FILES: IFM C NSCP: PC0072 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: MTG CONVENED AT 1:30PM 23 APR, THEN RECONVENED AT 5:00PM 23 APR. THIS MINUTES COVERS THE 5:00PM PORTION OF THAT MTG.

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA CLOSED BY: NSKDB DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By RW NARA, Date 4/13/10

2010-0533-M

~~SECRET~~ RECORD ID: 9420606

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94051415	FOR DECISION
001		X	95010919	OBE / STATUS OF ORIGINAL UNKNOWN

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~ 20606

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 13, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: JENONNE WALKER

SUBJECT: Minutes of the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, April 23, 1994

Attached are the minutes of the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia, April 23, 1994.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached minutes of the Principals Committee meeting be filed for the record.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab A Minutes

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By AN NARA, Date 4/13/10

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

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2008-0533-M

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. memo	re: Minutes of PC Meeting on Bosnia (3 pages)	04/23/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0072 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, April 23, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs547

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9420605
RECEIVED: 12 MAY 94 09

TO: LAKE

FROM: WALKER

DOC DATE: 12 MAY 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR RECONVENED 23 APR PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: OBE / STATUS OF ORIGINAL UNKNOWN DUE DATE: 16 MAY 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF: 9420606 9420690

FILES: IFM C NSCP: PC0072 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: MTG CONVENED AT 1:30PM 23 APR, THEN RECONVENED AT 5:00PM 23 APR. THIS SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS COVERS THE 5:00PM PORTION OF THAT MTG.

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJEB CLOSED BY: NSKDB DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 4/13/10

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94051415	FOR DECISION
001		X	95010919	OBE / STATUS OF ORIGINAL UNKNOWN

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~~SECRET~~ 20605

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 13, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: JENONNE WALKER

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, April 23, 1994

Attached at Tab A is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia held April 23, 1994.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Summary of Conclusions be filed for the record.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By: AK NARA Date: 4/13/10
2018-0533-M

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of NSC Principals Committee [partial] (1 page)	04/23/1994	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0072 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, April 23, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs547

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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[003]

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of NSC Principals Committee
DATE: April 23, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 5:00pm - 5:30pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

The President

Chair
Anthony Lake

OVP
Leon Fuerth

STATE
Secretary Warren Christopher
Peter Tarnoff

DOD
Secretary William Perry
BGEN Paul Kern
Walter Slocombe

USUN
Ambassador Madeleine Albright

CIA
Director James Woolsey
ADM William Studeman
Norman Schindler
[redacted] (b)(3)

JCS
GEN John Shalikashvili
GEN Wesley Clark
GEN John Sheehan

White House
Thomas McLarty
David Gergen
George Stephanopoulos
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
Jenonne Walker

Summary of Conclusions

-- If air strikes are necessary, NATO should wait until daylight Sunday in order to be able to strike the broadest possible number of targets with the least risk of collateral damage. (S)

-- General Shalikashvili will convey this to General Joulwan by means of seeking the latter's views. (S)

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PER E.O. 13526
~~2010-0533-M~~
~~RS~~ 9/30/14

2013-0682-M
KL 2/6/2020 (sm)

See also 2013-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

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Folder Title: PC0076 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, May 20, 1994
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)~~	~~05/20/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RDS 4/17/2015
002. form	Routing slip with annotations and post-it note [partial] (1 page)	05/20/1994	P3/b(3)
003. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Summary of Today's Principals Meetings on Bosnia and North Korea (2 pages)	05/20/1994	P1/b(1)
004a. memo	Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake re: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, Friday, May 20, 1994 (2 pages)	05/18/1994	P1/b(1)
004b. report	re: Military Status Report for Sarajevo, Gorazde, and Tuzla [partial] (3 pages)	05/12/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 8/03/2015
004c. map	re: Bosnian Government Offensive Operations (1 page)	05/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia])
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0076 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, May 20, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs548

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9420641
RECEIVED: 23 MAY 94 09

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 24 MAY 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 20 MAY PC MTG RE BOSNIA

ACTION: KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 26 MAY 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF: 9420619

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0076 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		DARBY
		HALL
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
		MILLISON
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		WALKER
		WOLIN

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSJDA CLOSED BY: NSJDA DOC 2 OF 2

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NARA, Date 7/14/11

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94052411	FOR DECISION
001		X	94052411	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
002		X	94052411	KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	940524	FUERTH, L	
002	940524	GROSSMAN, M	
002	940524	MCALEER, R	
002	940524	INDERFURTH, K	
002	940524	GARTHOFF, D	
002	940524	PATRICK, T	

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rec'd 5/23 3:30p

National Security Council
The White House

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Kenney	1		A
Itoh			
Soderberg			
Berger	2		
~~Lake~~ Kenney	3		Tab +
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	5/24	
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

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The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Kenney	1		A
Itoh			
Soderberg			
Berger	2		
~~Lake~~ Kenney	3		Tal +
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	3/24	D
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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LOG 9420641
DATE 24 MAY 94

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR PC MTG RE BOSNIA ON 20 MAY
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	_____	_____	FBK in STROOM FOY PRINT NAME: KERR COPY: 1
MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	5/24/94	4:10 PM	Anthony Tarr PRINT NAME: COPY: 1

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NARA, Date 4/14/10
2012-0533-M

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DATE 24 MAY 94

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR PC MTG RE BOSNIA ON 20 MAY
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	5/25/94	0800	Sandra E. DeLucett PRINT NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT NAME: _____ COPY: 1

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By RAS NARA, Date 4/14/10
290-0533-F

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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LOG 9420641
DATE 24 MAY 94

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR PC MTG RE BOSNIA ON 20 MAY
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	_____	_____	_____ PRINT NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	5/24/94	1630	C S Landis PRINT NAME: CAROL LANDIS COPY: 1

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MS NARA, Date 4/14/10
2010-0573-F

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM 1994 MAY 24 PM 1:44

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF RECEIPT 13:55 P

PRECEDENCE: ~~IMMEDIATE~~ PRIORITY ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

EYES ONLY

MESSAGE NO. 984 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 3

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Summary of Conclusions for PC MTG on 20 May NSC LOG # 20641

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
✓STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
✓USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
✓DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
✓JCS	SECRETARY		
✓CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

B N D A

REMARKS:

EYES ONLY

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MM NARA, Date 9/14/10
2010-0573-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER

TIME OF TRANSMISSION: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM 1994 MAY 24 PM 1:44

TIME OF RECEIPT: WASHTAX 24 MAY 94 13:50 NMCC/JCS

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: (IMMEDIATE) PRIORITY ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

EYES ONLY

MESSAGE NO. 984 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 3

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Summary of Conclusions for PC MTG ON 20 May NSC LOG # 20641

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
✓STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
✓USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
✓DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
✓JCS	SECRETARY		
✓CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

B N D A

REMARKS:

EYES ONLY

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MS NARA, Date 4/14/12
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TIME OF TRANSMISSION: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM 1994 MAY 24 PM 1:44

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF RECEIPT: B 13:55

PRECEDENCE: (IMMEDIATE) PRIORITY ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

EYES ONLY

SECRET

MESSAGE NO. 984 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 3

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Summary of Conclusions for PC MTG on 20 May

NSC LOG # 20641

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
✓STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
✓USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
✓DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
✓JCS	SECRETARY		
✓CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

B N D A

REMARKS:

EYES ONLY

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NARA, Date 4/14/10
2010-0533-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

-9928634413- /94-05-24-13-47/001-001

TIME OF TRANSMISSION: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM 1994 MAY 24 PM 1:44

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF RECEIPT May 24 1 51 PM '94

PRECEDENCE: (IMMEDIATE) PRIORITY ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

EYES ONLY

MESSAGE NO. 984 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 3

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Summary of Conclusions for PC MTG on 20 May NSC LOG # 20641

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
✓STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
✓USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
✓DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
✓JCS	SECRETARY		
✓CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

B N D A

REMARKS:

EYES ONLY

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NLS NARA, Date 4/14/10
2010-0533-M

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT
24/1800Z MAY 94

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE
- ☐ FLASH
- ☑ IMMEDIATE
- ☐ PRIORITY
- ☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: [signature]

DATE/TIME: 24/1742Z MAY 94

MESSAGE #: 34

NSC LOG # 20641

FROM: National Security Council (jpk) PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting PAGES: 3

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

SECRET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MI NARA, Date 4/14/10
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 24, 1994

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, May 20, 1994 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

for William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 4/14/10
2012-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of NSC Principals Committee
DATE: May 20, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 3:30pm - 4:30pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Anthony Lake

OVP
Leon Fuerth

STATE
Sec Warren Christopher
Peter Tarnoff
Charles Redman

DOD
Secretary William Perry
Walter Slocombe

JSC
General John Shalikashvili
General Wesley Clark

USUN
Ambassador Madeleine Albright

CIA
Director James Woolsey
Norman Schindler

White House
Samuel Berger
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
Jenonne Walker

Summary of Conclusions

1. The IWG will examine possibilities for international economic assistance to pacified areas in the Bosniac-Croat Federation. (S)

2. Secretary Christopher will reaffirm to Allied Foreign Ministers that the U.S. will only participate in implementing a peace agreement under NATO command. (S)

3. C/JCS will prepare an analysis of likely scenarios and consequences if we pushed to make Tuzla an exclusion zone. (S)

4. Ambassador Redman will try to accelerate UN efforts to negotiate a cessation of hostilities. He will involve the Contact Group in that effort and otherwise try to ensure it receives higher priority and attention. (S)

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0533-M
RS 9/30/14 (1.21)

5. All Principals will have their staffs begin thinking about what would indicate that the current negotiating effort had failed and what our strategy might be then. ~~(S)~~

6. State will prepare demarches to Skopje and Athens about violations of economic sanctions on Serbia. ~~(S)~~

7. State will respond to the National Security Advisor's memorandum on increasing Sanctions Assistance Monitors. ~~(S)~~

8. State will make a recommendation on the visa application of ex-Yugoslav National Bank Governor Avramovic. ~~(S)~~

9. Since no other country now is pushing a UNSC resolution declaring Brcko a cease-fire area, we will not. ~~(S)~~

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~~SECRET~~ 20641

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 20, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: JENONNE WALKER

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, May 20, 1994

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia held May 20, 1994.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MS NARA, Date 4/14/13
2010-0533-M

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

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~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9420640
RECEIVED: 20 MAY 94 18

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 20 MAY 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA KOREA NORTH
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PRES BRIEFING MEMO FOR 20 MAY PC MTG ON BOSNIA & NORTH KOREA

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT DUE DATE: 24 MAY 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: LAKE LOGREF:

FILES: ~~IFG~~ O NSCP: PC0076 PC0077 CODES: BOS DRK

IFM

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		DARBY
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
		MILLISON
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG

COMMENTS: POTUS MEMO COVERS ISSUES DISCUSSED AT BOTH MEETINGS HELD TODAY, 20 MAY

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB CLOSED BY: NSJEB DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By DM NARA, Date 4/14/10
2010-0573-M

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~~SECRET~~ RECORD ID: 9420640

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	PRESIDENT	Z	94052021	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	94060215	NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
001	940520		VICE PRESIDENT
001	940520		WH CHIEF OF STAFF

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Rec'd 5/20
7:10 PM

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 20640

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Kenney			
Itoh			
Soderberg			
Berger	1	Copy	
Lake	2	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	5/20	D To POTUS
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. form	Routing slip with annotations and post-it note [partial] (1 page)	05/20/1994	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia])
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0076 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, May 20, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs548

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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TIME OF RECEIPT

94 MAY 20 PM 1:50

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 6

FROM Sharon Wagner/ The White House 62702 _____
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION _____

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
CA	(b)(3) (FOR THE PRESIDENT/INFORMATION)		

[002]

President saw per P. (b)(3)

JW 6/2

REMARKS:

(b)(3) attached are 3 NSC info memos for the President that I have run by John. He said ok to send and for you to forward.

1. Contested Elections in the Dominican Republic.(1 page)
2. North Korea/re Perry's recommendation (3 pages)
3. Summary of Today's Principals Meetings on Bosnia and North Korea (2 pages)

Lacks 5/23

FOR A.M. DELIVERY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MM NARA, Date 4/14/10

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2010-0533-M

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. _____ **CLASSIFICATION** ~~SECRET~~ _____ **PAGES** 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SUMMARY OF 20 MAY PC MEETING ON BOSNIA & NORTH KOREA NSC LOG # 20640

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
	KRISTIE KENNEY		

REMARKS:

KAK: FOR INFO ONLY. DO NOT FORWARD TO POTUS.
PODESTA'S OFFICE WILL SEND TO POTUS.

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By AMS NARA, Date 9/14/12
2012-0533-C

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Summary of Today's Principals Meetings on Bosnia and North Korea (2 pages)	05/20/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia])
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0076 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, May 20, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs548

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9420624
RECEIVED: 18 MAY 94 17

TO: LAKE

FROM: KERRICK
WALKER

DOC DATE: 18 MAY 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 20 MAY PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 21 MAY 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9420619 9420641

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0076 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		DARBY
		HALL
		KERRICK
		LAKE
		MILLISON
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		WALKER
		WOLIN

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJEB CLOSED BY: NSJDA DOC 1 OF 1

~~TOP SECRET~~

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MI NARA, Date 4/14/12
2012-1533-m

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94052311	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	94052311	NOTED BY LAKE

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National Security Council
The White House

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Kenney	1	Walt	
Itoh			
Soderberg			
Berger	2	copy	
Lake	3	Nat'l Sec Adviser has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4		
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

PC Mtg, 5/20, 3:30 pm

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS: cc: NS

Exec Sec has deskette

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004a. memo	Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake re: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, Friday, May 20, 1994 (2 pages)	05/18/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia])
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0076 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, May 20, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs548

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004b. report	re: Military Status Report for Sarajevo, Gorazde, and Tuzla [partial] (3 pages)	05/12/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia])
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0076 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, May 20, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs548

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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~~TOP SECRET~~ 3.5c

[0046]

DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force
12 May 1994

Military Status Report
for Sarajevo, Gorazde, and Tuzla

Both Bosnian Serb and Government forces have continued to violate the cease-fire agreement and heavy weapon exclusion zone around Sarajevo. Indeed, the Bosnian Serbs appear to be systematically challenging the UN's control over the zone. Bosnian Serb forces also have not fully implemented their withdrawal agreement with the UN around Gorazde. The Bosnian Serbs shelled Tuzla city and the surrounding area on 11 May for the fifth time since NATO conducted airstrikes on Serb forces attacking Gorazde last month. 3.5c

Recent Sarajevo Exclusion Zone Violations

Bosnian Serbs are increasingly flaunting UN control of the 20-kilometer exclusion zone around Sarajevo. Serb forces continue to operate heavy weapons outside of UN control or supervision within the Sarajevo exclusion zone. Serb forces also are reportedly blocking UN patrols in some areas of the exclusion zone and have a generally hostile attitude toward UN personnel.

-- The Bosnian Serbs violated most of the stipulations in the tank transit deal worked out by UN special envoy Akashi and Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic on 3 May. 1.4c

-- The Serbs have removed and not returned about 20 heavy weapons from UN weapon collection points since the NATO airstrikes around Gorazde in April.

-- 1.4c

3.5c

3.5c

3.5c

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

2013-0682-M
8/3/15 KBH (S.14)

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-- Small arms and machine gun exchanges occur regularly throughout Sarajevo, and the UN stated the first tank round since the February cease-fire and ultimatum was fired on 9 May.

-- The Bosnian Serbs are limiting freedom of movement for UN personnel within the exclusion zone. For example, the Grbavica bridge is again closed to UN personnel, 1.4c 3.5c

Bosnian Government forces have also violated the Sarajevo heavy weapon exclusion zone and cease-fire agreements, although not as blatantly as the Bosnian Serbs.

-- 1.4c six or seven heavy weapons and preparations for four or five new heavy weapon positions on Mount Igman, reports of 1,000 Government troops massing in the area. Some Government units are usually stationed in this area, but these forces probably have been reinforced with some additional troops and the heavy weapons. 3.5c

inside ZPK? Zone?

Bosnian Serb Compliance with Gorazde Ultimatum

The UN has become increasingly concerned about Bosnian Serb violations of the Gorazde exclusion zones. UN Special Representative Akashi told Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic on 10 May that unless the Bosnian Serbs immediately complied with the cease-fire agreement, he would have to refer the matter to the UN Secretary-General and the Security Council, 1.4c A series of Serb violations have been noted in recent days:

-- About 100 to 150 armed Bosnian Serb "police" remain stationed inside the three-kilometer exclusion zone, according to UN officials. Akashi has demanded these personnel be removed, 1.4c

-- The UN commander in Gorazde recently stated publicly that he is certain there are still heavy weapons being held within the zone. UN military observers recently found two 20mm AA weapons, which they escorted out of the zone, 1.4c The UN commander also stated that the Serbs probably are hiding weapons in areas they have declared off limits to UN observers.

3.5c

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-- The Bosnian Serbs continue to harass and delay UN military and relief convoys entering Gorazde. A French logistics convoy held up at a Serb checkpoint for three days finally arrived in Gorazde on 9 May, 1.4c Some personnel reportedly were not allowed through and forced to return to Sarajevo. 3.5c

Bosnian Serb Actions Against Tuzla

Bosnian Serb forces shelled Tuzla city and the surrounding area on 11 May, 1.4c This is the fifth artillery attack on Tuzla city or Tuzla airport since the NATO airstrikes.

-- The latest shelling of the city may be a Serb response to the Government mortar attack against Brcko on 10 May that killed several civilians. 3.5c

3.5c

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004c. map	re: Bosnian Government Offensive Operations (1 page)	05/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia])
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0076 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, May 20, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs548

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9420619
RECEIVED: 17 MAY 94 10

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 19 MAY 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 20 MAY PC MTG ON BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

ACTION: REED SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 20 MAY 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9420641

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0076 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		DARBY
		KERRICK
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
		MILLISON
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		WALKER

COMMENTS: _____

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By CTR, NARA, Date 4/14/10
2010-0532-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94051917	FOR DECISION
001		X	94051917	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
002		X	94051917	REED SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	940519	FUERTH, L	
002	940519	GROSSMAN, M	
002	940519	MCALEER, R	
002	940519	INDERFURTH, K	
002	940519	GARTHOFF, D	
002	940519	PATRICK, T	

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recd 5/19 7:30am

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: JB LOG # 20619

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG JB A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
W Reed	1/5	JWR	
Kenney			
Itoh			
Soderberg	2	NM	
Berger	3	copy	
NL Lake	~~5~~ 4		
Situation Room		Nat'l Sec Advisor has seen	
West Wing Desk	~~B~~ 5	JB 5/19	D
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

cc: WJ/KK

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

—

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9420619
DATE 19 MAY 94

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION OF PC MTG ON BOSNIA 20 MAY
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE TIME SIGNATURE

MR. LEON FUERTH
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
VIA LARRY BRANSCUM
ROOM 290, OEOB
WASHINGTON, DC 20506

5/19 5:3 PM

PRINT NAME: _____

COPY: 1

5/19/94 6:35pm

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

PRINT NAME: _____

COPY: 1

DECLASSIFIED
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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MR NARA, Date 9/14/10
2012-0533-F

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9420619
DATE 19 MAY 94

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION OF PC MTG ON BOSNIA 20 MAY
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE TIME SIGNATURE

5/19 8:30 PM Sandra W. Hegard

MR. LEON FUERTH
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
VIA LARRY BRANSCUM
ROOM 290, OEOB
WASHINGTON, DC 20506

PRINT NAME: _____

COPY: 1

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

_____ _____ _____

PRINT NAME: _____

COPY: 1

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By NARA, Date 4/14/10
2010-0533-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF TRANSMISSION
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
1994 MAY 19 PM 4:43

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF RECEIPT

B

PRECEDENCE: (IMMEDIATE) PRIORITY ROUTINE

RELEASER: SS

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 931 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (202) 456-2585 West Wing Desk
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PC MTG BOSNIA 20 MAY

NSC LOG # 20619

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

B
B
N
D
A

REMARKS:

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 4/14/10
2010-0537-M

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
1994 MAY 19 PM 4:43

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF RECEIPT
19 MAY 94 16 46
NMCC/JCS

PRECEDENCE: (IMMEDIATE) PRIORITY ROUTINE

RELEASER: SB

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 931 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (202) 456-2585 West Wing Desk
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PC MTG BOSNIA 20 MAY

NSC LOG # 20619

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

B
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REMARKS:

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NS NARA, Date 4/14/10
2010-0533-M

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
1994 MAY 19 PM 4:43

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF RECEIPT
Rec'd
N

PRECEDENCE: (IMMEDIATE) PRIORITY ROUTINE

RELEASER: SS

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 931 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (202) 456-2585 West Wing Desk
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PC MTG BOSNIA 20 MAY

NSC LOG # 20619

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

B
B
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REMARKS:

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By MS NARA, Date 4/14/10
2010-0533-M

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
1994 MAY 19 PM 4:43

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF RECEIPT
MAY 19 4 51 PM '94

PRECEDENCE: (IMMEDIATE) PRIORITY ROUTINE

RELEASER: SA

DTG:

MESSAGE NO. 931 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (202) 456-2585 West Wing Desk
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PC MTG BOSNIA 20 MAY

NSC LOG # 20619

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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2018-0533-M

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE
- ☐ FLASH
- ☐ IMMEDIATE
- ☐ PRIORITY
- ☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC LOG # 20619

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting 20 MAY 3:30 PM PAGES: 2

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

SECRET

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By DNS NARA, Date 4/14/10
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 19, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COLONEL ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

MR. DOUGLAS GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COLONEL T.R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

There will be a Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia on Friday, May 20, 3:30 - 4:30pm, in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Principals plus one. The agenda for the meeting is attached at Tab A. (S)

James W. Rudd
for William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NNS NARA, Date 4/14/10
2010-0533-M

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PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: May 20, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 3:30 - 4:30pm

AGENDA

I. Contact Group: Status and Prospects..... State

II. Situation on the Ground..... CIA

III. Long Range Strategy..... NSC/All

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By ms NARA, Date 4/14/10

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2012-0533-M

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20619

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 18, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER

FROM: DONALD L. KERRICK

SUBJECT: Principals Meeting on Bosnia, May 20, 1994

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Principals Meeting on Bosnia to be held on May 20, 1994. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

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By NARA, Date 4/14/10

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1014-0533-m

Src Also 2013-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M; 2012-0798-F

MR MARKER

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Folder Title: PC0078 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, April 23, 1994				
Staff Office-Individual: Records Management				
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Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. list	NSC / PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina [partial] (1 page)	05/23/1994	P3/b(3)
~~002a. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)~~	~~04/23/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RDS 04/17/2015
~~002b. memo~~	~~[Duplicate of 002a] [incomplete copy] (1 page)~~	~~04/23/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0078 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, April 23, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs620

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. list	NSC / PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina [partial] (1 page)	05/23/1994	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0078 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, April 23, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs620

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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PC0078 DOCUMENT= 6 OF 9 NUMBER OF LINES - 110

NSCPID = PC0078
CREDATE = 19940629
DOCDATE = 19940523

TITLE/TC NSC/PC MEETING ON BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA S

KEYWORDS BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA YUGOSLAVIA

ADMIN WJC
TYPE PC
DOCCLAS ~~SECRET~~
NSCPRIME 9420691
STAFFOFF WALKER
SYS S/O WALKER

MTGDOCS MEETING NOTIFICATION MEMO NONE
MEETING AGENDA NONE
MEETING PARTICIPANTS LIST ORIG 9420691
SEE SOC
MEETING SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS ORIG 9420691
MEETING MINUTES NONE

PARTICPTS (b)(3)

KERN, P DEFENSE
PERRY, W DEFENSE
SLOCOMBE, W DEFENSE

(b)(3)

CLARK, W JCS
SHALIKASHVILI, J JCS
SHEEHAN, J JCS
WALKER NSC
FUERTH, L OFC OF VICE PRESIDENT
GORE, A OFC OF VICE PRESIDENT
CHRISTOPHER, W STATE
TARNOFF, P STATE
GERGEN, D WHITE HOUSE
MCLARTY, T WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT WHITE HOUSE
STEPHANOPOULOS, G WHITE HOUSE

MTIME/MIN 1330 1430 NO
COM/CHMN PC LAKE

MTGTREE PC0001 19930128 NSC/PC MEETING ON FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
PC0002 19930203 NSC/PC MEETING ON FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
PC0003 19930205 NSC/PC MEETING ON BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
PC0005 19930219 NSC/PC MEETING ON FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
PC0006 19930303 NSC/PC MEETING ON BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
PC0009 19930313 NSC/PC MEETING ON BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
PC0010 19930325 NSC/PC MEETING ON BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
PC0011 19930327 NSC/PC MEETING ON BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
PC0012 19930409 NSC/PC MEETING ON BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
PC0014 19930417 NSC/PC MEETING ON BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
PC0016 19930503 NSC/PC MEETING ON BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
PC0017 19930506 NSC/PC MEETING ON BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
PC0018 19930508 NSC/PC MEETING ON BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
PC0021 19930517 NSC/PC MEETING ON BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
PC0025 19930806 NSC/PC MEETING ON FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
PC0026 19930901 NSC/PC MEETING ON BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
PC0033 19930920 NSC/PC MEETING ON BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
PC0035 19931002 NSC/PC MEETING ON BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
PC0039 19931019 NSC/PC MEETING ON BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
PC0047 19931210 NSC/PC MEETING ON FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
PC0060 19940218 NSC/PC MEETING ON BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
PC0062 19940228 NSC/PC MEETING ON BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
PC0064 19940308 NSC/PC MEETING ON BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
PC0069 19940410 NSC/PC MEETING ON BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
PC0070 19940413 NSC/PC MEETING ON BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

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By NLS NARA, Date 6/15/15
2010-0033-F

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9420691
RECEIVED: 02 JUN 94 08

TO: LAKE

FROM: WALKER

DOC DATE: 02 JUN 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR PC 23 MAY PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: BERGER APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 06 JUN 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF:

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0078 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		DARBY
		HALL
		LAKE
		MILLISON
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		WALKER
		WOLIN

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSJDA CLOSED BY: NSASK DOC 1 OF 1

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By: AS NARA, Date 6/16/10
2010-0533-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94061517	FOR DECISION
001		X	94061517	BERGER APPROVED RECOM

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National Security Council
The White House

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Kenney	1		
Itoh			
Soderberg			
Berger	2	Deputy Nat Sec Advisor has seen	
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3		N
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Exec Sec has distributed

13 JAN 94

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National Security Council
The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Kenney	1		
Itoh			
Soderberg			
Berger	2	Deputy Nat. Sec Advisor has seen	
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3		N
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

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15 JAN 24 11:5

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20691

June 9, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: JENONNE WALKER

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, April 23, 1994

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia held April 23, 1994.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to ~~sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.~~ file memo for record. No need to send.

Approve AL Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions
Tab B Talking Points

6/13

Suggest, at this late date, we just file for the record.

Jenonne is obviously making a serious effort

Agree.

N.

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By RNS NARA, Date 5/16/12
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of NSC Principals Committee
DATE: April 23, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 1:30 - 2:30pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

The President

Chair
Anthony Lake

OVP
The Vice President
Leon Fuerth

STATE
Secretary Warren Christopher
Peter Tarnoff

DOD
Secretary William Perry
BGEN Paul Kern
Walter Slocombe

CIA
Director James Woolsey
ADM William Studeman
Norman Schindler

JCS
GEN John Shalikashvili
GEN Wesley Clark
GEN John Sheehan

DIA
ADM Michael Kraemer

White House
Thomas McLarty
David Gergen
George Stephanopoulos

NSC
Jenonne Walker

Summary of Conclusions

-- No NATO airstrikes will take place within the next few hours. (S)

-- After midnight GMT (2000 EDT) NATO should respond if (1) there is continued heavy weapons' shelling of the Gorazde safe area; or (2) absent evidence that the Bosnian Serbs are complying with NATO's three-kilometer withdrawal ultimatum. (S)

-- Secretary Christopher and Ambassador Albright will ensure that UNSYG Boutros-Ghali understands this view and seek his support. They will make clear our unhappiness with the UN's

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RS 9/30/14 (1.22)

refusal to authorize NATO response to today's violations. (S)

-- Mr. Lake will background the press, key Hill staffers will be called, using the attached points. (S)

-- The group will reconvene at 5:00 today. (S)

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Bosnia Points

-- Today, while negotiations were being held on a cease-fire in Bosnia, the Serbs launched a new attack on Gorazde.

-- These attacks on Gorazde have resulted in heavy casualties and have put United Nations personnel at risk.

-- UNPROFOR commander in Bosnia, General Rose, requested and received authorization from UN civilian authorities to request NATO close air support.

-- Under existing authority and policy, NATO forces immediately responded. U.S. F-16 aircraft, under NATO command and control, attacked at least one target identified by UNPROFOR.

-- French aircraft as part of the NATO operation are carrying out reconnaissance to assess damage.

-- We have said we would act if requested; we have done so, and will do so again, as asked.

-- The Serbs should cease their attacks on Gorazde and pull back.

-- The talks on cessation of hostilities in Bosnia should resume.

Q: What are you prepared to do if attacks continue, putting Gorazde in danger of falling?

A: We have confidence in General Rose's determination. We are prepared to continue to act as we did today.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, April 23, 1994 (S)

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. (S)

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachments
Tab A Summary of Conclusions
Tab B Talking Points

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2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of NSC Principals Committee
DATE: April 23, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 1:30 - 2:30pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

The President

Chair
Anthony Lake

OVP
The Vice President
Leon Fuerth

STATE
Secretary Warren Christopher
Peter Tarnoff

DOD
Secretary William Perry
BGEN Paul Kern
Walter Slocombe

CIA
Director James Woolsey
ADM William Studeman
Norman Schindler

JCS
GEN John Shalikashvili
GEN Wesley Clark
GEN John Sheehan

DIA
ADM Michael Kraemer

White House
Thomas McLarty
David Gergen
George Stephanopoulos

NSC
Jenonne Walker

Summary of Conclusions

-- No NATO airstrikes will take place within the next few hours. (S)

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-- Secretary Christopher and Ambassador Albright will ensure that UNSYG Boutros-Ghali understands this view and seek his support. They will make clear our unhappiness with the UN's

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~~2010-0533-M~~
~~RS 9130414~~
2012-0682-M (5.1)

See also 2017-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:
PC0080 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, May 31, 1994
Staff Office-Individual:
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Original OA/ID Number:
4007

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43	6	6	2	V

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)~~	~~05/31/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RDS 04/17/2015
002. memo	Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake re: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)	05/28/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0080 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, May 31, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs621

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9420682
RECEIVED: 31 MAY 94 15

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 02 JUN 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 31 MAY PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 03 JUN 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF: 9420675

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0080 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		DARBY
		HALL
		KERRICK
		LAKE
		MILLISON
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		WALKER
		WOLIN

COMMENTS: _____

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94060208	FOR DECISION
001		X	94060208	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
002		X	94060208	KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	940602	FUERTH, L	
002	940602	GROSSMAN, M	
002	940602	MCALEER, R	
002	940602	INDERFURTH, K	
002	940602	GARTHOFF, D	
002	940602	PATRICK, T	

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The White House

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4:45PM

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG Jon A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Kenney	1	Wall	
Itoh			
Soderberg			
Berger	2		
~~Lake~~ Kenney	3	Wall	Tab I
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4		
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Kenney	1	Wall	
Itoh			
Soderberg			
Berger	2	DR	
~~Lake~~ Kenney	3	Wall	Tab I
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	JNG 5/2	
NSC Secretariat			

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cc: VP McLarty Other _____

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DATE 02 JUN 94

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR PC MTG ON BOSNIA ON 31 MAY
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	2 JUN	1435	L A Branscum
	PRINT NAME: BRANSCUM		
	COPY: 1		
MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	6/3/94	2:43 pm	Ed. Thomas
	PRINT NAME: THOMAS		
	COPY: 1		

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2012-0533-M

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DATE 02 JUN 94

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR PC MTG ON BOSNIA ON 31 MAY
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
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MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT NAME: _____ COPY: 1

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LOG 9420682
DATE 02 JUN 94

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR PC MTG ON BOSNIA ON 31 MAY
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506			PRINT NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	6/2/94	4:45pm	PRINT NAME: _____ COPY: 1

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By MS NARA, Date 6/16/10
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM 1994 JUN 2 AM 10:10

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE PRIORITY ROUTINE

RELEASER: Quigley

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 1025 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 3

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Summary of Conclusions

NSC LOG # 20682

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

BBNDA

REMARKS:

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

Jun 2 12 21 AM '94

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM 1994 JUN AM 10:10

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE / PRIORITY / ROUTINE

RELEASER: R Rigsell

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 1025 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 3

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Summary of Conclusions

NSC LOG # 20682

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

B B V D 4

REMARKS:

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2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM 1994 JUN 10 AM 10:

2 JUN 94 10 21 NMCC/JCS

WASHFAX

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: Quigley

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 1025 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 3

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Summary of Conclusions

NSC LOG # 20682

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

BBNDA

REMARKS:

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TIME OF RECEIPT 1020

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM 1994 JUN 2 AM 10:10

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE / PRIORITY / ROUTINE

RELEASER: E Quigley

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 1025 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 3

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Summary of Conclusions

NSC LOG # 20682

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

B B N D A

REMARKS:

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE
- ☐ FLASH
- ☐ IMMEDIATE
- ☐ PRIORITY
- ☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC LOG # 20682

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: ~~Notice of Meeting~~ Summary of Conclusions PAGES: 3

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
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~~SECRET~~

20682

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 2, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, May 31, 1994 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

for Kristie A Kenney
William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By IRS NARA, Date 7/16/10
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of NSC Principals Committee
DATE: May 31, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 1:00pm - 1:20pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Anthony Lake

OVP
Leon Fuerth

STATE
Secretary Warren Christopher
Stephen Oxman
Charles Redman

DOD
Secretary William Perry
Walter Slocombe

JCS
General John Shalikashvili
General Wesley Clark
John Sheehan

USUN
Ambassador Madeleine Albright
David Scheffer

CIA
William Studeman
Norman Schindler

White House
Samuel Berger

NSC
Jenonne Walker

Summary of Conclusions

1. We will push for Bosnian Serb compliance with the Gorazde exclusion zone and, if necessary, point to their failure to comply to explain lack of progress on a country-wide cessation of hostilities. (S)

2. To that end, Ambassador Albright will explore the possibility of a Security Council Presidency statement urging compliance with the Gorazde zone. If the GOBH is holding Serb hostages in the Gorazde area, the Presidency statement could call for their release. (S)

3. We will not press the GOBH to drop its insistence on compliance with the Gorazde zone as a condition for a country-wide cessation of hostilities. (S)

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2010-0533-M
RS 9/30/14 (1.25)

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4. We will strongly urge the GOBH to accept the Contact Group's proposals for a 51-49% territorial division. (S)

5. To encourage the GOBH, we will reiterate our commitment to helping implement a viable settlement as strongly as possible while still noting the need for Congressional support. (S)

6. We also will tell other Contact Group members that if the GOBH accepts the Group's proposal and the Bosnian Serbs reject it, we will expect their support for further tightening sanctions on Serbia. (S)

7. Leon Fuerth will prepare an analysis of the New York Times 5/29 allegation that sanctions are having no serious effect on Serbia. (S)

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~~SECRET~~ 20682

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 31, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: JENONNE WALKER

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, May 31, 1994

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia held May 31, 1994.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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By MS NARA, Date 6/16/10

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9420675
RECEIVED: 28 MAY 94 11

TO: LAKE

FROM: KERRICK
WALKER

DOC DATE: 28 MAY 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BRIEFING MEMO FOR 31 MAY PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 01 JUN 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9420682

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0080 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		DARBY
		HALL
		KERRICK
		LAKE
		MILLISON
		NSC CHRON
		WALKER
		WOLIN

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTAS CLOSED BY: NSJDA DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By AWS NARA, Date 6/16/20
2012-0533-M

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~~SECRET~~ RECORD ID: 9420675

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94060110	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	94060110	NOTED BY LAKE

~~SECRET~~

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Rec'd 5/28 4:15 pm

National Security Council
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PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 20675

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Kenney	1	Walt	A
Itoh			
Soderberg			
Berger	2	Copy	
Lake	3	~~Natl Sec Advisor~~ has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4		N
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

CC: NS ✓

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. memo	Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake re: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)	05/28/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0080 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, May 31, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs621

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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See also 2013-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title: PC0085 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, 1994
Staff Office-Individual: Records Management
Original OA/ID Number: 4007

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
43	6	6	2	V

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Options Paper on Bosnia (7 pages)	06/1994	P1/b(1)
002a. memo	Don Kerrick to Lake re: Principals Committee on Bosnia (2 pages)	06/13/1994	P1/b(1)
~~002b. paper~~	~~re: Options Paper: Giving the Parties Incentives to Settle (8 pages)~~	~~06/11/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
002c. memo	Leon Fuerth to Anthony Lake re: Alternative Approaches for Employing Sanctions Leverage (4 pages)	06/11/1994	P1/b(1)
002d. paper	re: Options Paper Territorial Negotiations Break Down with Neither Side Accepting (4 pages)	06/1994	P1/b(1)
002e. list	re: Key Issues (2 pages)	06/1994	P1/b(1)
002f. paper	re: Lifting the Arms Embargo: Impact on the War in Bosnia [partial] (10 pages)	05/13/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 6/11/2020
~~003a. paper~~	~~[Duplicate of 002b] (8 pages)~~	~~06/11/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
003b. memo	[Duplicate of 002c] (4 pages)	06/11/1994	P1/b(1)
003c. paper	[Duplicate of 002d] (4 pages)	06/1994	P1/b(1)
004a. memo	Lake to POTUS re: Bosnia (1 page)	06/1994	P1/b(1)
004b. memo	Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake; Re: Memo to the President on Bosnia (1 page)	06/06/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0085 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, [June 14,] 1994

2010-0533-M
rs1016

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9420742
RECEIVED: 15 JUN 94 13

TO: LAKE

FROM: WALKER

DOC DATE: 15 JUN 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FOLLOW UP OPTIONS PAPER FOR 14 JUN PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: OBE / STATUS OF ORIGINAL UNKNOWN DUE DATE: 18 JUN 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER LOGREF: 9420723 9420724

FILES: IFM C NSCP: PC0085 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA CLOSED BY: NSKDB DOC 1 OF 1

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MPS NARA, Date 6/16/10
2010-0533-M

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~~SECRET~~ RECORD ID: 9420742

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94061515	FOR SIGNATURE
001		X	95030718	OBE / STATUS OF ORIGINAL UNKNOWN

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~~SECRET~~ 20742

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 15, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: JENONNE WALKER

SUBJECT: Options Paper on Bosnia

Attached is the options memo, in pro/con format as you requested at yesterday's PC. Peter Tarnoff, Wes Clark, Walt Slocombe and Chuck Redman all recommend strongly against the pro/con format. (As you know, so do I.) State and DOD already are drafting prose arguments for the options they think their Principals prefer. I have drafted for distribution for Principals only your cover note.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Options Paper

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/3/2019
~~2010-0533-M~~
2013-0682-M

~~SECRET~~
Declassify On: OADR

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~~SECRET~~ 20742

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Options Paper on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

Attached for is the IWG-cleared options paper on Bosnia that we requested at yesterday's Principals Committee meeting. ~~(S)~~

I hope this paper will help focus our thinking about the available options. I propose that in a Memorandum to the President we include only the options that one or more Principals support. I know that some of you would like to make the case for your preferred option in your own prose. If so, please circulate your proposals -- as brief as possible -- to all of us by noon, Thursday, June 16. We would do the minimum editing necessary to eliminate overlap and circulate a composite draft by COB that day. This schedule would enable us to get a memorandum to the President before the weekend. ~~(S)~~

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Attachment
Tab A Options Paper on Bosnia

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/3/2019
~~2010-0533-M~~
2013-0692-M

~~SECRET~~
Declassify On: OADR

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Options Paper on Bosnia (7 pages)	06/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0085 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, [June 14,] 1994

2010-0533-M
rs1016

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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RECORD ID: 9420732
RECEIVED: 13 JUN 94 15

TO: LAKE

FROM: KERRICK
WALKER

DOC DATE: 13 JUN 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BRIEFING MEMO FOR 14 JUN PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 16 JUN 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9420724 9420727

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0085 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		KERRICK
		NSC CHRON
		WALKER

COMMENTS:

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CJ NARA, Date 6/16/10
2010-0533-F

~~SECRET~~ RECORD ID: 9420732

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94061321	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	94061608	NOTED BY LAKE

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Rec'd 6/14 7:30am

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 20732

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (14) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Kenney	Copy		
Itoh			
Soderberg	Copy		
Berger	2	Copy	
Lake		Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3		N
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action (I = Information) D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

13 JUN 94 06:54

Bosnia PC 6/14

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	Don Kerrick to Lake re: Principals Committee on Bosnia (2 pages)	06/13/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0085 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, [June 14,] 1994

2010-0533-M
rs1016

RESTRICTION CODES

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TAB A

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June 11, 1994

OPTIONS PAPER: GIVING THE PARTIES INCENTIVES TO SETTLE

The Problem

A Bosnia settlement along the lines being developed in the Contact Group still appears out of reach because the parties do not have sufficient incentive to settle. The Bosnian government has expressed some willingness to accept a 51/49 solution, but is not likely to do so unless we can assure them that we are prepared to take decisive action to compel the Bosnian Serbs to go along. They will also want firmer assurances regarding U.S. participation in an implementation force. The Bosnian Serbs, on the other hand, have given no indication they would be prepared to accept a 51/49 settlement under current circumstances. Faced with a situation that could continue indefinitely, we should consider the possibility of raising the stakes in the hope of forcing a final settlement.

The Concept: Giving Each Party Incentives

One way to do this would be to take advantage of the stated willingness of the government to accept a 51/49 solution if the international community can provide assurances that the Serbs will be compelled to go along. We could seek EU and Russian agreement to take strong measures against the Bosnian Serbs in case the government agrees to a 51/49 Contact Group proposal and the Serbs do not. We could then make this agreement known to the government, in the hope of getting them to accept the proposal.

The Russians, however, and some of our European allies as well, are likely to balk at the idea of providing incentives only to the government and directing threats only at the Serbs. In order to get the Russians to agree to threaten stern measures against the Bosnian Serbs, therefore, we would almost certainly need to agree to reward the Serbs should they prove willing to settle for 51/49, particularly in a scenario in which the government says no. Although we would risk appearing to pressure the Bosnian government, this is by far the least likely of the two scenarios.

The Churkin Proposal

The above concept is very similar to a proposal already floated by the Russians. Following up on remarks made by Kozyrev at the May 13 Geneva Ministerial, Churkin has suggested to Ambassador Redman that, if the Bosnian government agrees to a 51/49 percent Contact Group proposal and the Bosnian Serbs do not, the arms embargo should be lifted. Conversely, if the Bosnian Serbs agree to the proposal and the government does not, and if the Serbs further unilaterally withdraw to the agreed territorial limits, sanctions would be lifted. If the

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PER E.O. 13526
NL 2/6/2020 (S.22)
2013-0682-M

Russians are really serious about their proposal (and there is reason for doubt on this score), it might be possible to get them to agree to use some combination of incentives and threats as leverage against the parties.

Should we decide to pursue such an initiative, we need to consider what specific combination of incentives and threats we would use under each scenario. We could then decide to float the proposal with key allies before discussing it with the Russians. If agreement is reached with the EU and Russia to undertake such an initiative, the Contact Group could approach each of the parties with the specific proposal. We will need to consider what constitutes an appropriate response from the parties (i.e. are we asking for acceptance on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, or just as a framework for a settlement). Presumably, we would want them to sign an appropriate document recording their agreement to the proposal. We would also need to consider the relative advantages of informing each party what we are offering to the other.

SCENARIO 1: BOSNIAN SERBS ACCEPT, BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT REFUSES

Although this is by far the least likely scenario, in order to bring the Russians along, we would need to make sure that the carrots offered to the Bosnian Serbs are credible. Since sanctions are the key leverage we have against the Serbs, any credible incentive would have to involve some sanctions relief. A key question is whether we offer sanctions relief on signature of an agreement, or insist on partial or total withdrawal of Serbian forces to the specified territories before initiating sanctions relief. The three numbered options below consider these alternatives; we could choose a single option, or pursue two or three of them in sequential fashion.

Option 1: Sanctions Relief on Signature

The most attractive incentive for the Bosnian Serbs would be to offer them sanctions relief for simply agreeing to a Contact Group 51/49 proposal and signing an appropriate instrument confirming that agreement. This would be a significant departure from our stance to date, whereby sanctions relief would depend on Serb actions to implement the terms of a settlement. But it would reflect the reality that there are few other carrots available. The incentives could be made more or less appealing depending on the amount of relief offered.

A minimalist approach would be to suspend some of the more symbolic sanctions (culture/sports bans, civil air links) and/or implement a more liberal humanitarian exceptions policy in the UN Sanctions Committee, with further steps tied to concrete actions, such as unilateral withdrawal of forces in

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accordance with the Contact Group map. Alternatively, we could go further -- e.g. to suspend trade and transhipment sanctions on non-strategic goods upon acceptance of the Contact Group map -- with the offer of further relief to follow in return for withdrawals toward the territories allotted them in the proposal. The latter approach would involve actions that would be less reversible, as well as harder to defend domestically.

Option 2: Sanctions Relief for Partial Withdrawal

Under this option, the Serbs would be given initial sanctions relief in return for a partial withdrawal to the territories allotted them in the Contact Group proposal. We could, for example, identify key areas from which we would ask them to withdraw, at which time sanctions relief could begin. Once again, we could agree to provide them with some measure of relief in return for the initial withdrawals, holding the rest in reserve for future withdrawals, or for full withdrawal. Although a less attractive option for the Serbs, this would still give them a greater incentive than requiring full withdrawal at the outset.

Option 3: Sanctions Relief for Full Withdrawal

Under this option, we would provide them with sanctions relief only in return for full withdrawal to the territories given them in the Contact Group map. To make the offer more attractive, we could agree to insert UNPROFOR forces along the new borders to deter government attacks. In return for such withdrawal, we could agree to suspend the full array of UN sanctions envisaged in the EU's front-loaded plan. Suspending rather than lifting sanctions would mean our actions would be reversible, although it would be very difficult in practice to reestablish the enforcement regime. Nevertheless, this would give us at least some leverage in case of backsliding.

The one prominent exception to this is the freeze on assets, whose suspension could not be easily reversed, since the Serbs could take immediate concrete steps to move and hide their assets. We could therefore agree to hold the freeze in place until a Krajina settlement is being implemented, thus giving the Serbs some incentive to settle there and helping to reassure Zagreb (which believes we are firmly committed to maintaining a link between sanctions relief and the Krajina). This would be the one major point of departure from the original EU plan, and might prove acceptable to both the Europeans and the Russians.

While options 1 and 2 would provide the Bosnian Serbs with greater incentive to agree, option 3 would ensure greater Serb compliance, and may be consistent with the proposal floated by Churkin in any event.

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Punitive and Other Options

Although the above options focus on providing the Serbs with sanctions relief if they agree to the Contact Group map and the Bosnian government does not, we could also consider taking punitive measures against the government to encourage its agreement. We could disavow our support for lifting the arms embargo, suspend implementation of NATO's air-strike decisions, or threaten to pull out of the humanitarian relief effort. We could modify the Contact Group proposal to reduce the quality of territory designated for the Bosnian government (e.g. grant the Serbs a 4-kilometer wide northern corridor). Punitive measures against the government would be hard to sustain domestically, however, particularly if they seemed likely to cause humanitarian suffering or further battlefield reverses.

Another possibility would be to offer, or to encourage the Russians and others to offer, the Serbs economic and other positive incentives that go beyond sanctions relief. Any such encouragement, however, would be inconsistent with the current U.S./EU position that Serbia should not receive reconstruction or other economic assistance until the disputes over Krajina and Kosovo have been satisfactorily resolved.

SCENARIO 2: BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT AGREES, BOSNIAN SERBS REFUSE

Just as sanctions relief is the key carrot we could offer the Bosnian Serbs, a willingness to act militarily against the Serbs is probably the only credible carrot we have that might induce the government to accept a 51/49 Contact Group proposal. The Europeans and the Russians, to the extent they can support any military action against the Serbs, would want to ensure that it maximizes pressure on Pale but avoids encouraging an escalation of Bosnian government war and negotiating aims. The Europeans are also likely to insist on pulling out of UNPROFOR under any option that would risk subjecting their forces to continuing Bosnian Serb attacks. Needless to say, Russian support for any robust military action against the Serbs remains highly problematic.

Option 1: Lifting the Arms Embargo

Under this option, we would agree to lift the UN arms embargo against Bosnia (and presumably Croatia) in return for Bosnian government agreement to the Contact Group proposal. This has long been a key Bosnian government demand and is also the option set forth in the Churkin proposal. We would probably also be expected to help them in their rearmament effort, by providing them with equipment and helping to transport it.

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Any decision to lift the arms embargo, however, would be almost certain to provoke an immediate and violent Bosnian Serb response against UNPROFOR, the eastern enclaves, and Sarajevo. Understanding this, our European allies might insist on pulling out of UNPROFOR as a condition for agreeing to any lift option. Should UNPROFOR pull out in connection with this option, the Bosnian Serbs would almost certainly be able to overrun the eastern enclaves and starve Sarejevo into submission long before arms shipments to the government could begin to turn the tide. We could quickly find ourselves faced with a choice between upping the military stakes significantly, as contemplated in option 2 below, or acquiescing in the fall of Sarajevo and the eastern enclaves.

For this option to work, therefore, the Europeans would have to be persuaded to stay in UNPROFOR, while taking prudent measures to protect their forces -- a formidable task. Even if they could be persuaded to stay, in order to make this option work both the Europeans and the Russians would need to agree in advance that existing close air support and air-strike authority would be vigorously used to counter attacks against UNPROFOR and the safe areas.

The key limitations to a lift-only approach are that the UN remains very hesitant about using force, and that Serb military advances outside safe areas would not be covered. Dealing with this latter problem might require agreement to create new exclusion zones to stop the Serbs from undertaking offensive military actions elsewhere, as we considered doing at Brčko, and which is discussed in greater detail under Option 3, Variation 2 below.

Option 2: Lift and Strike

This would be a more aggressive variation on the lifting the arms embargo option. Under this option, lifting the embargo would be combined from the outset with a determined bombing campaign aimed at Bosnian Serb strategic military and economic infrastructure targets. By agreeing to carry out substantial air strikes from the very outset, we would help ensure that the Bosnian government survived until it received sufficient military equipment to become competitive on the battlefield. At the end of this transition period, the bombing campaign would end and the Bosnians would assume responsibility for their own defense.

Under this option the Europeans would also be likely to pull out of UNPROFOR. In the absence of UNPROFOR ground tactical air control parties (TACPs) we would find it difficult to provide anything more than limited tactical support for Bosnian government ground forces; there would be increased risks of collateral damage to civilian populations as a result. Larger strategic

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military and economic infrastructure targets could be more readily identified and attacked, but the risk to collateral targets would remain. Should the absence of TACPs cause serious problems, we might need to consider inserting our own or training Bosnian government or other volunteer forces (such as the Pakistanis or Turks) to perform this function.

The promise of aggressive international military intervention as proposed under this option would no doubt prove very attractive to the Bosnian government. On the other hand, it would be more difficult to sell to the Russians and our European allies. It would also raise questions about the purpose and duration of our own involvement. Our involvement would presumably last until the Bosnian Serbs agreed to the Contact Group proposal -- or some lesser territorial offer as a penalty for their initial refusal -- or until the Bosnian government was capable of taking over the task of its own defense. Some believe, however, that committed ourselves to protecting and rearming the Bosnians, we would have a continuing obligation to come to their aid if they suffered further losses after the transition period. Thus, we could face the prospect of an open-ended or escalating involvement. Direct intervention by Serbia in the conflict would also seriously complicate our task.

Option 3: Strike Without Lift

A third option would be to agree to carry out air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs in certain circumstances but without simultaneously lifting the arms embargo. This could help prevent a widening of the ground war while still bringing military pressure to bear against the Bosnian Serbs to match government acceptance of a Contact Group proposal. Other things being equal, a strike-without-lift option is likely to be less attractive to the government than one which provides for lifting the arms embargo. The more robust the strike option, however, the more attractive the government would find it.

The Europeans would probably prefer this option because it allows for punitive action against the Serbs without directly enhancing the Bosnian government's independent war-fighting capacity. It thus would maintain international control over the scope of the military action without unduly encouraging increased government war and negotiating aims. The Europeans might also be more willing to remain in UNPROFOR under this option, although this would depend in part on which of the variations set out below was adopted, and the feasibility of redeploying to more secure positions. The more robust the strike option, the more likely that UNPROFOR would pull out.

The reaction of the Bosnian Serbs to a strike-only option cannot be predicted with certainty. There is a good chance

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that they would retaliate against UNPROFOR and Western civilian personnel, and that they could pull out of all negotiations to show their defiance -- raising the question of whether we would be prepared to escalate further.

Variation 1: Strict Enforcement of Existing Regimes

Under this variation, we would agree to bring added pressure to bear on the Bosnian Serbs by more strictly enforcing existing NATO exclusion zone decisions. Any violations of the exclusion zones would be met by retaliatory air strikes as called for in the February 9 and April 22 NAC decisions. This would require a new understanding with the UN and UNPROFOR that would, effectively, pre-authorize air strikes and provision of close air support.

Ideally, coordination would be limited to the requirements established for the No-Fly Zone (i.e., the UNPROFOR commander could request a temporary suspension or delay of air operations in circumstances where he had concerns about the safety of UN personnel; but there would be no dual political decision-making). The NATO theater commander would also be authorized to declare new exclusion zones around other safe areas pursuant to the April 22 NAC decisions.

Variation 2: Establishing New Air Strike Authorities

This variation would build on the previous approach. In addition to enforcement of existing regimes, exclusion zones could be established around the safe areas without any need for triggering by provocative Bosnian Serb actions as required under the April 22 decisions. In addition, we could agree to authorize the NATO commander to declare exclusion or no-fire zones in any area where the Bosnian Serbs mass men and matériel, carry out shelling, or conduct offensive military operations. This could include forcing them to withdraw from areas where they have currently massed forces, as in Brčko. The objective would be to freeze the Bosnian Serb military in place and deter or prevent it from going on the offensive anywhere in Bosnia.

Variation 3: Air Strikes to Compel Serb Agreement

Although variation 2 would make it difficult for the Bosnian Serbs to conduct offensive operations and could even make it difficult for them to defend themselves against Bosnian government attack, air power could be even more damaging if variations 1 and 2 were combined with the threat or implementation of a bombing campaign against strategic military and economic infrastructure targets. This could be restricted to targets within Bosnia, as set out in the Operational Options paper agreed in the NATO Military Committee on August 8, 1993, or it could go beyond this, to include the Drina bridges and, perhaps, military support facilities inside Serbia proper.

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This variation could be implemented from the outset or be held in reserve if variations 1 and/or 2 did not compel Bosnian Serb agreement to the Contact Group proposal. Under either scenario, we could agree to give the Bosnian Serbs an ultimatum: that they either accept the Contact Group proposal or withdraw to certain specified territories by a specific date.

Of the three variations, the Bosnian government would clearly prefer the third. Although they would prefer a intensive bombing campaign from the outset -- particularly if the arms embargo remained in place -- they might consider agreeing to begin with variations 1 and 2 if they had definitive assurances that variation 3 would be implemented in the event that the first two options failed to produce the desired results. Agreeing to lift the arms embargo if variation 3 failed to produce Bosnian Serb agreement by a specified date would further enhance their interest.

Conversely, the Russians and some of our European allies would be unlikely to agree to begin with variation 3 under this scenario, but might be more amenable to a step-by-step implementation of the variations leading up to and through variation 3 in a specifically defined and agreed manner. They would balk, however, at attacks on targets in Serbia proper.

Postscript: Tightening Sanctions

In tandem with the above options, we could, in concert with our Allies and the Russians, threaten to tighten further the sanctions against Serbia (more aggressive monitoring of Serbian borders, greater economic and infrastructure assistance for front-line states, and a new UNSC resolution aimed at closing loopholes and imposing additional financial sanctions). However, such a threat would not be an effective approach on its own: the threatened measures could worsen the economic situation in Serbia, but would not likely be seen by either party as a sufficient incentive to settle. It would also be viewed domestically as a weak policy response to Serb intransigence.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002c. memo	Leon Fuerth to Anthony Lake re: Alternative Approaches for Employing Sanctions Leverage (4 pages)	06/11/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0085 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, [June 14,] 1994

2010-0533-M
rs1016

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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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TAB 3

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002d. paper	re: Options Paper Territorial Negotiations Break Down with Neither Side Accepting (4 pages)	06/1994	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002e. list	re: Key Issues (2 pages)	06/1994	P1/b(1)

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TAB D

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002f. paper	re: Lifting the Arms Embargo: Impact on the War in Bosnia [partial] (10 pages)	05/13/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:
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Director of
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National Intelligence Council Memorandum

Lifting the Arms Embargo: Impact on the War in Bosnia

Key Points A UN Security Council decision to lift the arms embargo against Bosnia would intensify the fighting and would not lead to early termination of the conflict.

- It would help Bosnian Government forces to defend the main body of government-held territory but would not enable them to retake significant amounts of lost territory or defend their enclaves against determined Serb offensives. 3.5c

Croatia's acquiescence would be necessary before large quantities of arms could reach Bosnian forces. The Croats are permitting additional deliveries of light weapons—small arms, mortars, and antitank missiles—but would be leery of large amounts of heavy weaponry—tanks and artillery. 3.5c

Bosnian Serbs would not be cowed into concessions if the embargo were lifted. They would bank on Belgrade's sending more weapons and supplies to offset major shipments of heavy weapons to Bosnian Government forces.

- The Bosnian Serbs would respond forcefully, attacking isolated enclaves and detaining UN personnel. 3.5c

UNPROFOR's operations would be subject to Bosnian Serb retaliatory attacks. Many states would withdraw their forces, and the mission would collapse. 3.5c

This memorandum was prepared by the National Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces and the National Intelligence Officer for Europe. It was coordinated with representatives of CIA, DIA, State/INR, NSA, and the military services.

E.O. 13526 3.5(c)

E.O. 13526 3.5(c)
13 May 1994

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2013-0682-M (5.26)
VZ 02/06/2020

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Lifting the Arms Embargo: Impact on the War in Bosnia

SCOPE NOTE: This memorandum assumes that the arms embargo is lifted by the UN Security Council, and that it is lifted selectively against Bosnia (and perhaps Croatia) but remains in force, along with other sanctions, against Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs. We do not address the prospects for, or obstacles to, achieving such agreement in the United Nations. 3.5c

Lifting the arms embargo would require redefining the no fly zone (NFZ), safe areas, and exclusion zones and the role of NATO in enforcing them. If these were not changed, NATO would become directly engaged with the Bosnian Serbs. Our analysis assumes that the NFZ, safe areas, and exclusion zones will fundamentally change with the lifting of the embargo. 3.5c

Effect of the Embargo

One-sided impact

The main impact of the embargo on supplying arms to governments of the former Yugoslavia has been to limit the Bosnian Government's military capabilities. It has had little impact on Croatia, and virtually no effect on Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs. 3.5c

The UN Arms Embargo

The United Nations imposed a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of arms and military equipment to Yugoslavia on September 25, 1991, under Security Council Resolution 713. The Resolution did not specify embargoed items, but most Western nations use the COCOM International Munitions List or more comprehensive national laws. Other nations have similar lists of items considered war materiel, although they are usually less detailed and may omit some dual-use items. Russia, for example, probably uses a list inherited from the USSR that does not include military transport helicopters. 3.5c

Security Council resolution 724 of December 1991 created a committee to oversee the embargo. In January 1992, Resolution 727 declared that the embargo applies to all successor states of Yugoslavia. 3.5c

Some leakage to Bosnian forces

Since Croatia cut off arms deliveries in April 1993 the Bosnian Government has been sustained by weapons stockpiled in Bosnia by the former Yugoslavia, by limited indigenous production of arms, and by captured small caliber weapons and ammunition. Malaysia and

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Iran have smuggled in limited amounts of ordnance and munition components. In addition, the Bosnian Government probably is purchasing some military goods on the gray market. For example, it has obtained Red Arrow antitank guided missiles—limited quantities of both launchers and missiles. 3.5c

The success of the embargo in denying armaments to Bosnian Government forces stems from their geographic isolation: they are surrounded by Serbs and Croats. 3.5c

Serbs largely self-sufficient

The Bosnian Serbs are largely self sufficient in armaments. When Yugoslavia collapsed, they inherited most of the Yugoslav Army's military stockpile in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was scaled to fight a war of attrition against a Soviet invasion and so was very large. In fact, the Bosnian Serbs are largely fighting the war out of in-country Yugoslav inventory, which at the current rate will permit them to fight on for years.

- Serbia has obtained small amounts of equipment, mostly components used in arms production, in violation of the arms embargo. 3.5c

The Bosnian Government's Wishlist

The Bosnian government seeks a range of light and heavy armament, ammunition, and basic supplies. It wants first the weapons it can quickly absorb; Bosnian forces have the experience and infrastructure needed to use mortars, recoilless rifles, and antitank missiles effectively.

Light armament more easily absorbed

- Small-caliber armaments, mortars, antitank weapons, and shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile systems are already in the Bosnian Government arsenal, and more could be assimilated quickly. These weapons provide an increased—but not assured—capability to protect existing territory and population centers. Moreover, these kinds of weapons are plentiful on the world market through official and private sources; Turkey has stockpiled such weapons in Istanbul, for example, and earmarked them for Bosnian Government forces.

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Heavy armament more difficult

- The Bosnian government also would seek heavy weapons—tanks and artillery. Obtaining these weapons—and the training essential to use them effectively—is fundamental to ultimate Bosnian government aims: rolling back Serb gains and seizing sufficient territory to block the linkage of Serb-held territory in eastern and western Bosnia via Brcko and the Posavina corridor. 3.5c

The Bosnian Government has millions of dollars set aside for weapons purchases. Dramatic improvement in Bosnian internal distribution systems makes it likely that once in Bosnian government hands, weapons would very quickly reach most forces in the field. 3.5c

Role of Croatia

Croatian support would be critical

Barring an unlikely UN decision to take and hold territory, including airfields, as staging areas for arms deliveries, Croatian acquiescence would be necessary before materiel could be delivered to the Bosnian Government. If the Croatians agreed, the arms spigot could be opened almost immediately.

- Zagreb has already allowed weapons and supplies to reach Bosnian Government forces. 3.5c

But Croats would take a cut...

The Croatians would facilitate movement of light arms primarily because they would take a percentage of everything coming in, especially of items they want themselves—for example, secure communications gear and logistic support equipment, including transport. 3.5c

...and would limit heavy weapons

Unless the Croatian government was satisfied with the progress in implementing the Bosnian-Croat Federation in Bosnia, specifically the creation of a joint Bosnian Croat and Government army, it would be reluctant to permit the delivery of heavy weapons to Bosnia. The Croats would fear that such weapons would be turned against the Bosnian Croats. (The two sides fought a bitter struggle over the last year.) Nevertheless, Croatia would not confront what it perceived to be the will of the international community and would not block deliveries in the face of firm US diplomatic pressure—if it also received similar arms. 3.5c

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Delivery Routes

Because airfields can be easily closed, especially by artillery attack, airlifts and air drops probably would be able to provide only limited amounts of light weaponry. Therefore, most weapons shipments would be across land from the port of Ploce and perhaps Split. 3.5c

Bosnia's topography channels most major ground routes from Croatia to the Bosnian interior through a few key roads. If the Serbs interdicted several key roads, for example, they would be able to stop most arms shipments from reaching territory controlled by the Bosnian Government. Because humanitarian relief convoys from Croatia follow the same routes the arms shipments probably would use, interdiction of these routes could slow or block humanitarian aid deliveries to Bosnian Muslims. 3.5c

At the same time, Bosnia's rugged terrain, heavy forestation, and numerous tracks and trails would make small shipments of arms virtually impossible to block. Early in the conflict, Bosnian Government forces used tracks and trails that crossed Bosnian Serb-controlled territory to deliver significant amounts of food and weapons to the Gorazde enclave. 3.5c

The Current Military Balance

Bosnian Serbs have the edge

Bosnian Serb forces have been effective on the battlefield because they are better organized and equipped. In addition, during early military actions they seized key areas, routes, and equipment stocks that continue to confer a military advantage. Bosnian Government forces have advantages in manpower and morale and have improved their leadership and organization since mid-1993. Bosnian Croat forces are less effective and depend on support from the Croatian Army, which currently has at least several thousand troops and several dozen tanks and artillery pieces deployed in Bosnia (see table). 3.5c

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The Military Balance in Bosnia
March 1994

	Bosnian Serb Army	Bosnian Government Forces	Bosnian Croat Army
Troops	Up to 85,000	100,000-130,000[a]	40,000-50,000
Tanks	400-600	20-30	40-50[b]
Armored vehicles	200	Less than 25	Unknown
Heavy mortars, rocket launchers, and artillery	1,000-1,400[c]	200-300[d]	50-80[b]
Combat aircraft	20	0	0
Helicopters	22	4-5	6[e]

[a]Plus 5,000 formerly in Bosnian Croat Army.
[b]Includes some Croatian Army equipment in Bosnia.
[c]Includes artillery 76mm and larger; mortars 120mm and larger.
[d]Includes heavy mortars 120mm and larger.
[e]Deployed from Croatia

E.O. 13526 3.5(c)

Impact and Implications of Lifting the Embargo

Lifting the arms embargo against the Bosnian Government would intensify the fighting and would not lead to early termination of the conflict. Instead, the apparent international tilt toward the Bosnian Government would embolden it to fight on, leading to a more violent Bosnian Serb reaction. 3.5c

Government forces would take action

With additional weapons, the Bosnian Government would expand its current offensive military effort to retake territory from the Bosnian Serbs. Bosnia's leaders would be encouraged to maximize their territorial demands and would reject any negotiating formula that did not meet this goal. 3.5c

...but could not roll Serbs back

With additional light weaponry, Government infantry could do more, but without the means to offset the overwhelming Serb advantage in heavy artillery, Bosnian Government forces could not retake significant territory from the Serbs. Additional light arms would help secure Government gains in central Bosnia, but they would not permit Government forces to successfully defend the more isolated Bosnian enclaves—Gorazde, Srebrenica, Zepa, and possibly Bihac—against

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determined Serb offensives. Indeed, if lifting the embargo resulted in the UN's departure from the enclaves—a highly likely outcome—these isolated locations would fall quickly. 3.5c

Heavy weaponry would be more expensive and difficult to field. While such weapons would provide some immediate help, an extended training period would be required for the Bosnian Army to field units capable of conquering significant amounts of territory. The difficulties of integrating newly delivered weaponry would be compounded if Government forces acquired diverse weapons types and models, or if training programs were not part of the acquisition deals. 3.5c

Bosnian Serbs would respond

We judge that the Bosnian Serbs—whose conduct Belgrade cannot completely control—would respond forcefully, and probably preemptively, to a lifting of the arms embargo. They would immediately go on the offensive, attacking Government enclaves and detaining UN and non-government organization personnel, and would call for additional support from Belgrade. In an attempt to prevent or complicate arms shipments via Croatia, Bosnian Serbs might coordinate operations with Krajina Serbs, risking a reopening of the war in Croatia. Bosnian Serbs would break off any active peace negotiations, claiming a lack of good faith and impartiality on the part of the international community and the UN. 3.5c

Belgrade would increase support

Belgrade would not be cowed but would be unlikely to act precipitously in the event of a UN decision to lift the arms embargo. For example, Belgrade probably would not extend the geographic scope of the conflict beyond Bosnia. Nevertheless, we judge that Serbia would provide whatever support was needed to keep the Bosnian Serbs from being defeated and might take steps that would escalate the conflict within Bosnia, including:

- Sending in "volunteers."
- Providing more direct logistic—and perhaps lethal—support for Bosnian Serb attacks on enclaves and Bosnian airfields.
- Attempting to mine ports receiving arms shipments. 3.5c

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What would it take to make a difference?

The greatest shortfall Bosnian Government forces face is their firepower disadvantage with Bosnian Serb forces. Government forces are rarely able to respond to Serb artillery attacks or counter Serb armor. This disadvantage is most apparent when Government forces are forced to defend large population centers under siege or challenge determined Serb offensives supported by heavy artillery and armor. 3.5c

To recapture and hold meaningful amounts of territory from the Serbs, Bosnian Government forces would need:

- Large numbers of tanks, artillery (of caliber greater than 100mm), antitank weapons, and counterbattery radars.
- C3 and training to use this equipment in coordinated offensive operations (and the time—several months—in which to train).
- The infrastructure to supply and repair heavy weapons on the battlefield. 3.5c

UN troops likely targets

UN operations on Serb-held territory would quickly collapse if the arms embargo were lifted. UN personnel would become targets for Serbian retribution. For this reason, West European UNPROFOR contributors almost certainly would pull their forces out. Alternatively, the UN could withdraw its personnel before the lifting of the embargo, but this move would tip off the Serbs and prompt them to act. 3.5c

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Alternatively, a De Facto Lifting of the Embargo

Without a UN Security Council resolution, the arms embargo could be lifted "de facto," by Western powers turning a "blind eye" to increasingly significant violations or unilaterally by the US. We judge, however, that the ultimate outcome for Bosnia would be much the same as under a formal lifting by the UN, although the dynamics—especially political—would be different.

- Violations of the embargo on a scale large enough to make a difference in Bosnian military capabilities would be noticed and hard for Western governments to plausibly deny.
- Militarily significant violations would elicit most of the same reactions by the parties—especially the Bosnian Serbs—as a formal lifting.
- A unilateral US lifting of the embargo would strain US relations with Russia and the NATO Allies, principally Britain and France.
- It would undermine other UN arms embargoes, for example, in Iraq. 3.5c

Wider implications

In addition to the military effects of lifting the arms embargo, other immediate and longer term ramifications would be likely. (S NF)

On the plus side, lifting the embargo could:

- Boost US and Western credibility with members of the Organization of Islamic Countries, particularly Turkey.
- Force Bosnian Serbs, and to some extent Belgrade, to pay a higher military price to continue the war in Bosnia.
- Put new strains on Belgrade's economic ability to support the Bosnian Serbs. 3.5c

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On the **negative** side, such action could:

- Lead to renewed fighting between Croatia and Krajina Serbs.
- Highlight the inability of the UN and NATO to end the conflict and bloodshed in Bosnia.
- Further "internationalize" the conflict via introduction of foreign military equipment and trainers.
- Provide opportunities for greater meddling by Iran and other radical states.
- Tempt EU members to wash their hands of the crisis and pin the blame for greater bloodshed on the United States--which will be viewed as responsible for post-embargo developments in Bosnia.
- Undermine economic sanctions and arms embargoes against Serbia.
- Encourage other non-Serb minorities (for example, ethnic Albanians in Kosovo) to challenge Belgrade's authority in hopes of attracting Western military assistance. 3.5c

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RECORD ID: 9420727
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FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 13 JUN 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUPPORTING PAPERS FOR 14 JUN PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 14 JUN 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9420724 9420732

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0085 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		CLARKE
		DARBY
		KERRICK
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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94061308	FOR DECISION
001		X	94061311	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
001	ITOH	Z	94061311	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	94061314	KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	940613	FUERTH, L	
002	940613	GROSSMAN, M	
002	940613	MCALEER, R	
002	940613	INDERFURTH, K	
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6/13 10:45am

National Security Council
The White House

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Kenney	1/4		A
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Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5	6/13	D
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

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MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	6/13/94	4:19 pm	Lt. Thomas PRINT NAME: Thomas COPY: 1
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MESSAGE NO. 1125 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 19

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (A) (202) 456-2585 West Wing Desk
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SUPPORTING PAPERS FOR 14 JUNE PC MEETING ON BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA NSC LOG # 20727

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
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TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 13, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations
Department of State

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COLONEL ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COLONEL T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Supporting Papers for the June 14, 1994 Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia on Tuesday, June 14, 3:15 - 4:15 p.m. in the Roosevelt Room. Attendance will be Principals plus one. Supporting papers are attached. ~~(S)~~

for Kristine A. Kenney
William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachments
Tab A If One Side Agrees
-- IWG Paper
-- Fuerth Paper
Tab B If Neither Side Agrees

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June 11, 1994

OPTIONS PAPER: GIVING THE PARTIES INCENTIVES TO SETTLE

The Problem

A Bosnia settlement along the lines being developed in the Contact Group still appears out of reach because the parties do not have sufficient incentive to settle. The Bosnian government has expressed some willingness to accept a 51/49 solution, but is not likely to do so unless we can assure them that we are prepared to take decisive action to compel the Bosnian Serbs to go along. They will also want firmer assurances regarding U.S. participation in an implementation force. The Bosnian Serbs, on the other hand, have given no indication they would be prepared to accept a 51/49 settlement under current circumstances. Faced with a situation that could continue indefinitely, we should consider the possibility of raising the stakes in the hope of forcing a final settlement.

The Concept: Giving Each Party Incentives

One way to do this would be to take advantage of the stated willingness of the government to accept a 51/49 solution if the international community can provide assurances that the Serbs will be compelled to go along. We could seek EU and Russian agreement to take strong measures against the Bosnian Serbs in case the government agrees to a 51/49 Contact Group proposal and the Serbs do not. We could then make this agreement known to the government, in the hope of getting them to accept the proposal.

The Russians, however, and some of our European allies as well, are likely to balk at the idea of providing incentives only to the government and directing threats only at the Serbs. In order to get the Russians to agree to threaten stern measures against the Bosnian Serbs, therefore, we would almost certainly need to agree to reward the Serbs should they prove willing to settle for 51/49, particularly in a scenario in which the government says no. Although we would risk appearing to pressure the Bosnian government, this is by far the least likely of the two scenarios.

The Churkin Proposal

The above concept is very similar to a proposal already floated by the Russians. Following up on remarks made by Kozyrev at the May 13 Geneva Ministerial, Churkin has suggested to Ambassador Redman that, if the Bosnian government agrees to a 51/49 percent Contact Group proposal and the Bosnian Serbs do not, the arms embargo should be lifted. Conversely, if the Bosnian Serbs agree to the proposal and the government does not, and if the Serbs further unilaterally withdraw to the agreed territorial limits, sanctions would be lifted. If the

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2013-0682-M

Russians are really serious about their proposal (and there is reason for doubt on this score), it might be possible to get them to agree to use some combination of incentives and threats as leverage against the parties.

Should we decide to pursue such an initiative, we need to consider what specific combination of incentives and threats we would use under each scenario. We could then decide to float the proposal with key allies before discussing it with the Russians. If agreement is reached with the EU and Russia to undertake such an initiative, the Contact Group could approach each of the parties with the specific proposal. We will need to consider what constitutes an appropriate response from the parties (i.e. are we asking for acceptance on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, or just as a framework for a settlement). Presumably, we would want them to sign an appropriate document recording their agreement to the proposal. We would also need to consider the relative advantages of informing each party what we are offering to the other.

SCENARIO 1: BOSNIAN SERBS ACCEPT, BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT REFUSES

Although this is by far the least likely scenario, in order to bring the Russians along, we would need to make sure that the carrots offered to the Bosnian Serbs are credible. Since sanctions are the key leverage we have against the Serbs, any credible incentive would have to involve some sanctions relief. A key question is whether we offer sanctions relief on signature of an agreement, or insist on partial or total withdrawal of Serbian forces to the specified territories before initiating sanctions relief. The three numbered options below consider these alternatives; we could choose a single option, or pursue two or three of them in sequential fashion.

Option 1: Sanctions Relief on Signature

The most attractive incentive for the Bosnian Serbs would be to offer them sanctions relief for simply agreeing to a Contact Group 51/49 proposal and signing an appropriate instrument confirming that agreement. This would be a significant departure from our stance to date, whereby sanctions relief would depend on Serb actions to implement the terms of a settlement. But it would reflect the reality that there are few other carrots available. The incentives could be made more or less appealing depending on the amount of relief offered.

A minimalist approach would be to suspend some of the more symbolic sanctions (culture/sports bans, civil air links) and/or implement a more liberal humanitarian exceptions policy in the UN Sanctions Committee, with further steps tied to concrete actions, such as unilateral withdrawal of forces in

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accordance with the Contact Group map. Alternatively, we could go further -- e.g. to suspend trade and transhipment sanctions on non-strategic goods upon acceptance of the Contact Group map -- with the offer of further relief to follow in return for withdrawals toward the territories allotted them in the proposal. The latter approach would involve actions that would be less reversible, as well as harder to defend domestically.

Option 2: Sanctions Relief for Partial Withdrawal

Under this option, the Serbs would be given initial sanctions relief in return for a partial withdrawal to the territories allotted them in the Contact Group proposal. We could, for example, identify key areas from which we would ask them to withdraw, at which time sanctions relief could begin. Once again, we could agree to provide them with some measure of relief in return for the initial withdrawals, holding the rest in reserve for future withdrawals, or for full withdrawal. Although a less attractive option for the Serbs, this would still give them a greater incentive than requiring full withdrawal at the outset.

Option 3: Sanctions Relief for Full Withdrawal

Under this option, we would provide them with sanctions relief only in return for full withdrawal to the territories given them in the Contact Group map. To make the offer more attractive, we could agree to insert UNPROFOR forces along the new borders to deter government attacks. In return for such withdrawal, we could agree to suspend the full array of UN sanctions envisaged in the EU's front-loaded plan. Suspending rather than lifting sanctions would mean our actions would be reversible, although it would be very difficult in practice to reestablish the enforcement regime. Nevertheless, this would give us at least some leverage in case of backsliding.

The one prominent exception to this is the freeze on assets, whose suspension could not be easily reversed, since the Serbs could take immediate concrete steps to move and hide their assets. We could therefore agree to hold the freeze in place until a Krajina settlement is being implemented, thus giving the Serbs some incentive to settle there and helping to reassure Zagreb (which believes we are firmly committed to maintaining a link between sanctions relief and the Krajina). This would be the one major point of departure from the original EU plan, and might prove acceptable to both the Europeans and the Russians.

While options 1 and 2 would provide the Bosnian Serbs with greater incentive to agree, option 3 would ensure greater Serb compliance, and may be consistent with the proposal floated by Churkin in any event.

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Punitive and Other Options

Although the above options focus on providing the Serbs with sanctions relief if they agree to the Contact Group map and the Bosnian government does not, we could also consider taking punitive measures against the government to encourage its agreement. We could disavow our support for lifting the arms embargo, suspend implementation of NATO's air-strike decisions, or threaten to pull out of the humanitarian relief effort. We could modify the Contact Group proposal to reduce the quality of territory designated for the Bosnian government (e.g. grant the Serbs a 4-kilometer wide northern corridor). Punitive measures against the government would be hard to sustain domestically, however, particularly if they seemed likely to cause humanitarian suffering or further battlefield reverses.

Another possibility would be to offer, or to encourage the Russians and others to offer, the Serbs economic and other positive incentives that go beyond sanctions relief. Any such encouragement, however, would be inconsistent with the current U.S./EU position that Serbia should not receive reconstruction or other economic assistance until the disputes over Krajina and Kosovo have been satisfactorily resolved.

SCENARIO 2: BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT AGREES, BOSNIAN SERBS REFUSE

Just as sanctions relief is the key carrot we could offer the Bosnian Serbs, a willingness to act militarily against the Serbs is probably the only credible carrot we have that might induce the government to accept a 51/49 Contact Group proposal. The Europeans and the Russians, to the extent they can support any military action against the Serbs, would want to ensure that it maximizes pressure on Pale but avoids encouraging an escalation of Bosnian government war and negotiating aims. The Europeans are also likely to insist on pulling out of UNPROFOR under any option that would risk subjecting their forces to continuing Bosnian Serb attacks. Needless to say, Russian support for any robust military action against the Serbs remains highly problematic.

Option 1: Lifting the Arms Embargo

Under this option, we would agree to lift the UN arms embargo against Bosnia (and presumably Croatia) in return for Bosnian government agreement to the Contact Group proposal. This has long been a key Bosnian government demand and is also the option set forth in the Churkin proposal. We would probably also be expected to help them in their rearmament effort, by providing them with equipment and helping to transport it.

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Any decision to lift the arms embargo, however, would be almost certain to provoke an immediate and violent Bosnian Serb response against UNPROFOR, the eastern enclaves, and Sarajevo. Understanding this, our European allies might insist on pulling out of UNPROFOR as a condition for agreeing to any lift option. Should UNPROFOR pull out in connection with this option, the Bosnian Serbs would almost certainly be able to overrun the eastern enclaves and starve Sarejevo into submission long before arms shipments to the government could begin to turn the tide. We could quickly find ourselves faced with a choice between upping the military stakes significantly, as contemplated in option 2 below, or acquiescing in the fall of Sarajevo and the eastern enclaves.

For this option to work, therefore, the Europeans would have to be persuaded to stay in UNPROFOR, while taking prudent measures to protect their forces -- a formidable task. Even if they could be persuaded to stay, in order to make this option work both the Europeans and the Russians would need to agree in advance that existing close air support and air-strike authority would be vigorously used to counter attacks against UNPROFOR and the safe areas.

The key limitations to a lift-only approach are that the UN remains very hesitant about using force, and that Serb military advances outside safe areas would not be covered. Dealing with this latter problem might require agreement to create new exclusion zones to stop the Serbs from undertaking offensive military actions elsewhere, as we considered doing at Brčko, and which is discussed in greater detail under Option 3, Variation 2 below.

<u>Option 2: Lift and Strike</u>

This would be a more aggressive variation on the lifting the arms embargo option. Under this option, lifting the embargo would be combined from the outset with a determined bombing campaign aimed at Bosnian Serb strategic military and economic infrastructure targets. By agreeing to carry out substantial air strikes from the very outset, we would help ensure that the Bosnian government survived until it received sufficient military equipment to become competitive on the battlefield. At the end of this transition period, the bombing campaign would end and the Bosnians would assume responsibility for their own defense.

Under this option the Europeans would also be likely to pull out of UNPROFOR. In the absence of UNPROFOR ground tactical air control parties (TACPs) we would find it difficult to provide anything more than limited tactical support for Bosnian government ground forces; there would be increased risks of collateral damage to civilian populations as a result. Larger strategic

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military and economic infrastructure targets could be more readily identified and attacked, but the risk to collateral targets would remain. Should the absence of TACPs cause serious problems, we might need to consider inserting our own or training Bosnian government or other volunteer forces (such as the Pakistanis or Turks) to perform this function.

The promise of aggressive international military intervention as proposed under this option would no doubt prove very attractive to the Bosnian government. On the other hand, it would be more difficult to sell to the Russians and our European allies. It would also raise questions about the purpose and duration of our own involvement. Our involvement would presumably last until the Bosnian Serbs agreed to the Contact Group proposal -- or some lesser territorial offer as a penalty for their initial refusal -- or until the Bosnian government was capable of taking over the task of its own defense. Some believe, however, that committed ourselves to protecting and rearming the Bosnians, we would have a continuing obligation to come to their aid if they suffered further losses after the transition period. Thus, we could face the prospect of an open-ended or escalating involvement. Direct intervention by Serbia in the conflict would also seriously complicate our task.

Option 3: Strike Without Lift

A third option would be to agree to carry out air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs in certain circumstances but without simultaneously lifting the arms embargo. This could help prevent a widening of the ground war while still bringing military pressure to bear against the Bosnian Serbs to match government acceptance of a Contact Group proposal. Other things being equal, a strike-without-lift option is likely to be less attractive to the government than one which provides for lifting the arms embargo. The more robust the strike option, however, the more attractive the government would find it.

The Europeans would probably prefer this option because it allows for punitive action against the Serbs without directly enhancing the Bosnian government's independent war-fighting capacity. It thus would maintain international control over the scope of the military action without unduly encouraging increased government war and negotiating aims. The Europeans might also be more willing to remain in UNPROFOR under this option, although this would depend in part on which of the variations set out below was adopted, and the feasibility of redeploying to more secure positions. The more robust the strike option, the more likely that UNPROFOR would pull out.

The reaction of the Bosnian Serbs to a strike-only option cannot be predicted with certainty. There is a good chance

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that they would retaliate against UNPROFOR and Western civilian personnel, and that they could pull out of all negotiations to show their defiance -- raising the question of whether we would be prepared to escalate further.

Variation 1: Strict Enforcement of Existing Regimes

Under this variation, we would agree to bring added pressure to bear on the Bosnian Serbs by more strictly enforcing existing NATO exclusion zone decisions. Any violations of the exclusion zones would be met by retaliatory air strikes as called for in the February 9 and April 22 NAC decisions. This would require a new understanding with the UN and UNPROFOR that would, effectively, pre-authorize air strikes and provision of close air support.

Ideally, coordination would be limited to the requirements established for the No-Fly Zone (i.e., the UNPROFOR commander could request a temporary suspension or delay of air operations in circumstances where he had concerns about the safety of UN personnel; but there would be no dual political decision-making). The NATO theater commander would also be authorized to declare new exclusion zones around other safe areas pursuant to the April 22 NAC decisions.

Variation 2: Establishing New Air Strike Authorities

This variation would build on the previous approach. In addition to enforcement of existing regimes, exclusion zones could be established around the safe areas without any need for triggering by provocative Bosnian Serb actions as required under the April 22 decisions. In addition, we could agree to authorize the NATO commander to declare exclusion or no-fire zones in any area where the Bosnian Serbs mass men and matériel, carry out shelling, or conduct offensive military operations. This could include forcing them to withdraw from areas where they have currently massed forces, as in Brčko. The objective would be to freeze the Bosnian Serb military in place and deter or prevent it from going on the offensive anywhere in Bosnia.

Variation 3: Air Strikes to Compel Serb Agreement

Although variation 2 would make it difficult for the Bosnian Serbs to conduct offensive operations and could even make it difficult for them to defend themselves against Bosnian government attack, air power could be even more damaging if variations 1 and 2 were combined with the threat or implementation of a bombing campaign against strategic military and economic infrastructure targets. This could be restricted to targets within Bosnia, as set out in the Operational Options paper agreed in the NATO Military Committee on August 8, 1993, or it could go beyond this, to include the Drina bridges and, perhaps, military support facilities inside Serbia proper.

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This variation could be implemented from the outset or be held in reserve if variations 1 and/or 2 did not compel Bosnian Serb agreement to the Contact Group proposal. Under either scenario, we could agree to give the Bosnian Serbs an ultimatum: that they either accept the Contact Group proposal or withdraw to certain specified territories by a specific date.

Of the three variations, the Bosnian government would clearly prefer the third. Although they would prefer a intensive bombing campaign from the outset -- particularly if the arms embargo remained in place -- they might consider agreeing to begin with variations 1 and 2 if they had definitive assurances that variation 3 would be implemented in the event that the first two options failed to produce the desired results. Agreeing to lift the arms embargo if variation 3 failed to produce Bosnian Serb agreement by a specified date would further enhance their interest.

Conversely, the Russians and some of our European allies would be unlikely to agree to begin with variation 3 under this scenario, but might be more amenable to a step-by-step implementation of the variations leading up to and through variation 3 in a specifically defined and agreed manner. They would balk, however, at attacks on targets in Serbia proper.

Postscript: Tightening Sanctions

In tandem with the above options, we could, in concert with our Allies and the Russians, threaten to tighten further the sanctions against Serbia (more aggressive monitoring of Serbian borders, greater economic and infrastructure assistance for front-line states, and a new UNSC resolution aimed at closing loopholes and imposing additional financial sanctions). However, such a threat would not be an effective approach on its own: the threatened measures could worsen the economic situation in Serbia, but would not likely be seen by either party as a sufficient incentive to settle. It would also be viewed domestically as a weak policy response to Serb intransigence.

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rs1016

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003c. paper	[Duplicate of 002d] (4 pages)	06/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0085 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, [June 14,] 1994

2010-0533-M
rs1016

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004a. memo	Lake to POTUS re: Bosnia (1 page)	06/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0085 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, [June 14,] 1994

2010-0533-M
rs1016

RESTRICTION CODES

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Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004b. memo	Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake; Re: Memo to the President on Bosnia (1 page)	06/06/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0085 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, [June 14,] 1994

2010-0533-M
rs1016

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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See also 2013-0652-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

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Folder Title:
PC0090 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, July 27, 1994
Staff Office-Individual:
Records Management
Original OA/ID Number:
4007

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
43	6	6	2	V

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)~~	~~07/27/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RDS 04/17/2015
~~002. agenda~~	~~PC Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)~~	~~07/27/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 02/06/2020
003a. memo	Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake re: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (3 pages)	07/26/1994	P1/b(1)
~~003b. paper~~	~~re: Diplomatic Strategy: July 30 Geneva Ministerial (9 pages)~~	~~07/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
003c. paper	re: Effects of Creating and Strictly Enforcing Exclusion Zones [partial] (4 pages)	07/25/1994	P1/b(1), P3/b(3) KBH 08/03/2015
~~003d. paper~~	~~re: Decision Sheet for 7/27 Principals Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)~~	~~07/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0090 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, July 24, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs622

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9420891
RECEIVED: 27 JUL 94 15

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 01 AUG 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 27 JUL PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 30 JUL 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9420869 9420883

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0090 CODES: BOS YUG

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		DARBY
		KERRICK
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW
		WOLIN
		WRIGHT

COMMENTS: PART 2 OF 2 PART MTG - THIS MTG HELD 11:22AM-12:10PM

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP CLOSED BY: NSGP DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MO NARA, Date 6/16/10
2010-0533-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94072812	FOR DECISION
001		X	94080116	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
001	ITOH	Z	94080116	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	94080119	SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	940801	FUERTH, L	
002	940801	GROSSMAN, M	
002	940801	MCALEER, R	
002	940801	INDERFURTH, K	
002	940801	GARTHOFF, D	
002	940801	PATRICK, T	

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9420891
RECEIVED: 27 JUL 94 15

TO: LAKE

FROM: KERRICK
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 27 JUL 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 27 JUL PC MTG RE BOSNIA

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE DUE DATE: 30 JUL 94 STATUS: X

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF:

FILES: IFG NSCP: CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
LAKE		

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP CLOSED BY: DOC 1 OF 1

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By AM NARA, Date 6/16/10
2010-0533-M

Rec'd 7/28 5:10pm

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: [illegible] LOG # 20891

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG [illegible] A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Kenney	1/4	Walt AOS	
Itoh			
Soderberg			
Berger	2	[illegible]	
Lake	3	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5	SP 8/1	
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

E4 Sec's Office has details

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: [illegible] LOG # 20891

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG [illegible] A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Kenney	1/4	[illegible] AOS	
Itoh			
Soderberg			
N Berger	2	[illegible]	
Lake	3	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5	SP 8/1	
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

E4 Sec's Office has details

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9420891
DATE 01 AUG 94

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 27 JUL PC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	8/2	8:50	Ann E Woolston PRINT LAST NAME: Woolston COPY: 1
MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	8/1/94	2304	K Allen PRINT LAST NAME: Allen COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
COL. T. R. PATRICK JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MJ NARA, Date 6/16/10
2010-0533-M

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LOG 9420891
DATE 01 AUG 94

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 27 JUL PC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	3 Aug	10:30	JHBranscum PRINT LAST NAME: BRANSCUM COPY: 1
MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
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COL. T. R. PATRICK JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

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2010-0173-M

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SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 27 JUL PC MTG ON BOSNIA
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MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	8/1/94	2350	[signature] PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
COL. T. R. PATRICK JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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2010-0533-M

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1994 AUG -1 PM 9:34

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF RECEIPT

N 2145

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
~~ROUTINE~~

RELEASER: KEO

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 3

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (202) 456-2585 West Wing Desk
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 27 JUL PC MEETING ON BOSNIA NSC LOG # 20891

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

BBNDA

REMARKS:

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By WS NARA, Date 6/16/10
2012-0533-M

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF TRANSMISSION
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
1994 AUG -1 PM 9:34

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF RECEIPT
AUG 1 9 28 PM '94

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: KEO

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 3

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (WHI) (202) 456-2585 West Wing Desk
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 27 JUL PC MEETING ON BOSNIA NSC LOG # 20891

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

BBNDA

REMARKS:

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By WS NARA, Date 6/16/10
2010-0533-F

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF TRANSMISSION
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
1994 AUG -1 PM 9:34

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF RECEIPT
'94 JUL 32 09:41

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
~~ROUTINE~~

RELEASER: KEO

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 3

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 27 JUL PC MEETING ON BOSNIA NSC LOG # 20891

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

B
B
N
D
A

REMARKS:

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MS NARA, Date 6/16/98
2010-0533-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER

(MON) 08. 01. '94 21:35 NO. [illegible]

TIME OF TRANSMISSION
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
1994 AUG -1 PM 9:34

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF RECEIPT
-1 AUG 94 21 -- 36
NMCC/JCS

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: KEO

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION SECRET PAGES 3

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (WHI) (202) 456-2585 West Wing Desk
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 27 JUL PC MEETING ON BOSNIA NSC LOG # 20891

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

B B N D A

REMARKS:

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MN NARA, Date 6/16/10
2010-0533-M

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~~SECRET~~ 20891

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 1, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National Security

AMB RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the U.S. Permanent
Representative to the United Nations

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, July 27, 1994 (S)

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. (S)

for William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 6/16/10
NLC-10-5-33-2

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions
Meeting of NSC Principals Committee
DATE: July 27, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 11:22am - 12:10pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Anthony Lake

OVP
Leon Fuerth

State
Secretary Warren Christopher
David Gergen
Peter Tarnoff
Ambassador Charles Redman

DOD
Secretary William Perry
Walter Slocombe

USUN
Ambassador Albright

CIA
Director James Woolsey
Norman Schindler

JCS
GEN John Shalikashvilli
LTG Michael Ryan
LTG Wesley Clark

White House
Leon Panetta
Samuel Berger
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
Don Kerrick

Summary of Conclusions

1. Secretary Christopher will seek Contact Group Ministers' support at the July 30 meeting for the full range of consequences: sanctions tightening, and extension and enforcement of exclusion zones. Recognizing Contact Group consensus on all measures is unlikely, Secretary Christopher will insist on strict enforcement of existing zones and support urgent planning for extension of exclusion zones to other safe areas, which could be implemented in phases. There can be no extension without agreement to strictly enforce existing zones. A strong marker will be laid down that if there are no agreed serious consequences, we will move sooner rather than later to seek multilaterally lifting the arms embargo, and failing that, there will be irresistible pressures to lift unilaterally . (S)

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0533-M
BS 9/30/14 (1.24)

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2. Leon Fuerth will develop a strategy to increase high-level U.S. pressure on the British to accede to our view concerning tightening of economic sanctions, specifically dealing with closing down offshore "FRY"enterprises. ~~(S)~~

3. Leon Fuerth and Ambassador Redman will spearhead an effort to urgently develop a strategy to separate Milosevic from the Bosnian Serbs. ~~(S)~~

4. In view of recent Bosnian Serb provocations, the Principals agreed to press for implementation of existing NATO decisions on enforcement of exclusion zones. ~~(S)~~

5. The IWG will urgently examine two scenarios for lifting the arms embargo: (1) with no follow-on U.S. requirement to support the Bosnian Government; and (2) with a presumption that external support will be required. The analysis will include a review of UNPROFOR with a view to the creation of an UNPROFOR II with appropriate mandates. ~~(S)~~

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~~SECRET~~

20891

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 27, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: DON KERRICK

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, July 27, 1994

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Commtitee meeting on Bosnia held July 27, 1994.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NARA, Date 6/16/10
2010-0533-M

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9420869
RECEIVED: 22 JUL 94 13

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 25 JUL 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA AGENDA
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 27 JUL PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: KENNEY SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 26 JUL 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9420883 9420891

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0090 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		DARBY
		HALL
		KERRICK
		LAKE
		MILLISON
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW
		WOLIN

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA CLOSED BY: NSGP DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MD NARA, Date 6/16/10
2010-0533-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94072218	FOR DECISION
001		X	94072520	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
002		X	94072520	KENNEY SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	940725	FUERTH, L	
002	940725	GROSSMAN, M	
002	940725	MCALEER, R	
002	940725	INDERFURTH, K	
002	940725	GARTHOFF, D	
002	940725	PATRICK, T	

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National Security Council
The White House

Rec'd 7/22
6:30pm

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 20869

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG PRS A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Kenney	1/4		
Itoh			
Soderberg			
Berger	2		
Lake	3	Nat. Sec. Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5	GP 7/25	D
NSC Secretariat			N
Cy to Wilma HWJ pls			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS: Bosnia PC Mon - 7/27

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Ex Sec's Office has details

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LOG 9420869
DATE 25 JUL 94

SUBJECT: PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	26 Jul	0700	J. Branscum
	PRINT LAST NAME: BRANSCUM		
	COPY: 1		
MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	7/25	9:50pm	
	PRINT LAST NAME: REAVES		
	COPY: 1		
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			
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AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: VIA FAX		
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: VIA FAX		
COL. T. R. PATRICK JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001			
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DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MS NARA, Date 6/16/10
2010-0533-M

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	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: 1		
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
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	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: VIA FAX		
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: VIA FAX		
COL. T. R. PATRICK JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001			
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2010-0533-M

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MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	7/25/94	10:55	J. Grossman PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
COL. T. R. PATRICK JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CW NARA, Date 6/16/10
2010-0573-~

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JUL 25 9 11 PM '94

PRECEDENCE (IMMEDIATE) PRIORITY ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 1413 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Principals Committee Mtg on Bosnia NSC LOG # 20869

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
B	State	Executive Sec		
N	DOD	Executive Sec		
B	USUN	Amb Inderfurth		
A	CIA	Executive Sec		
D	JCS	Secretary		

REMARKS:

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MS NARA, Date 6/16/12
2012-0533-M

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PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE / PRIORITY / ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

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MESSAGE NO. 1413 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Principals Committee Mtg on Bosnia NSC LOG # 20869

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
B	State	Executive Sec		
N	DOD	Executive Sec		
B	USUN	Amb Inderfurth		
A	CIA	Executive Sec		
D	JCS	Secretary		

REMARKS:

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MI NARA, Date 6/16/10
2010-0533-M

-202863442 1- CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY 1994-07-25-21:12:001:001

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1994 JUL 25 PM 9:11

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25 JUL 94 21 12
NMCC/JCS

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE (circled) / PRIORITY / ROUTINE

RELEASER: [signature]

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 1413 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ SD PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Principals Committee Mtg on Bosnia NSC LOG # 20869

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
B	State	Executive Sec		
N	DOD	Executive Sec		
B	USUN	Amb Inderfurth		
A	CIA	Executive Sec		
D	JCS	Secretary		

REMARKS:

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MM NARA, Date 6/16/10
2010-0533-M

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DTG: _____

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FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Principals Committee Mtg on Bosnia NSC LOG # 20869

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
B	State	Executive Sec		
N	DOD	Executive Sec		
B	USUN	Amb Inderfurth		
A	CIA	Executive Sec		
D	JCS	Secretary		

REMARKS:

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MU NARA, Date 6/16/10
2010-0533-M

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2617392 QSC

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- ☒ IMMEDIATE
- ☐ PRIORITY
- ☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DATE/TIME: 2/6/12257

MESSAGE #: 42

NSC LOG # 20869

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting PAGES: 2

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MS NARA, Date 6/16/10

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2010-0533-M

~~SECRET~~ 20869

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 25, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations
Department of State

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

There will be a Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia on Wednesday, July 27, 10:30am - 12:00pm in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Principals plus one. The agenda for the meeting is attached at Tab A. (S)

State should be prepared to provide Principals a status report on the Contact Group and strategy for the next Geneva Ministerial. Papers should be circulated by the lead agency not later then COB July 25. (S)

for William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MI NARA, Date 6/16/10

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PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: July 27, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 10:30am - 12:00pm

AGENDA

I. Contact Group: Status/Prospects..... State

II. Sanctions Strategy..... OVP

III. Extension and Strict Enforcement of Exclusion Zones:

A. Strategy for Implementation..... State
(NATO, U.N., Russian Angles)

B. Intelligence Assessment of Consequences..... CIA

C. Progress of NATO Planning..... JCS

IV. Congressional Strategy..... State

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By N NARA, Date 2/6/2020

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2017-0082-M

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20869

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 22, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: DONALD L. KERRICK

SUBJECT: Principals Meeting on Bosnia, July 27, 1994

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Principals Meeting on Bosnia to be held on July 27, 1994. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

Concurrence by: Bill Wise FOR

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MS NARA, Date 6/16/10

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9420883
RECEIVED: 26 JUL 94 14

TO: LAKE

FROM: KERRICK
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 26 JUL 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 27 JUL PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 29 JUL 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9420869 9420891

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0090 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		DARBY
		HALL
		KERRICK
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW
		WOLIN
		WRIGHT

COMMENTS: _____

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
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2013-0533-M

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DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94072915	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	94072915	NOTED BY LAKE

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National Security Council
The White House

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ NO _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Kenney			
Itoh	1	VE	
Soderberg			
Berger	2		
Lake	3		
Situation Room		Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
West Wing Desk	~~3~~ 4		A
NSC Secretariat	~~3~~ 5	SP 7/29	N

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS: cc: NS
Bosnia PC

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Ex Sec's Office Tas Asbels

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. memo	Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake re: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (3 pages)	07/26/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0090 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, July 24, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs622

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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TAB A

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY: JULY 30 GENEVA MINISTERIAL

The Communique

Our primary goal for the July 30 Geneva Ministerial should be to reach agreement on a Ministerial Communique announcing the phased imposition of consequences against the Bosnian Serbs. Contact Group Ministers need to commit themselves publicly to tighten sanctions against the Serbs, to extend and strictly enforce the exclusion zones, and to agree that lifting the arms embargo could become inevitable if the Bosnian Serbs continue in their refusal to accept the Contact Group map. This should include, at the very least, tasking NATO to take prompt action to extend the exclusion zones to the other safe areas.

Ministers should also welcome the unconditional Bosnian government acceptance of the map and express disappointment at Bosnian Serb rejection. Contact Group commitment to preserving the territorial integrity of Bosnia within its internationally recognized borders should also be stressed.

Preparing for the Meeting

Although the Communique is the public manifestation of ministerial agreement, we will need to work hard in the run-up to the meeting, and probably in its aftermath as well, to ensure that the consequences package agreed to is as tough as we can possibly make it. This will not be easy, since both the Europeans and the Russians will probably become increasingly nervous at the prospect of bringing increasing pressure, particularly military pressure, to bear against the Serbs. An added complication is the Boutros Ghali letter stating that UNPROFOR should be withdrawn if any additional military steps against the Bosnian Serbs are implemented.

Taking a "No" for a "Yes But"

We may face pressure from the Russians and Europeans to give the Bosnian Serbs more time to change their minds, or even to agree to resume negotiations. Since we have already agreed with the Russians that we would use the July 30 meeting to present any recalcitrant party with a final deadline for accepting the map, we can agree to give the Serbs an additional week or ten days to do so, at which time the consequences package would begin to be implemented. Under no circumstances, however, should we agree to let the Serbs reopen negotiations.

Another possibility is that the Russians will succeed in convincing the Bosnian Serbs to take a more forthcoming position in the run-up to July 30. To satisfy us as a "yes" they would have to drop all their territorial reservations, as well as their linkages to extraneous issues. We need to make certain that this remains our bottom line, and that we do not permit further negotiations. The case will be more difficult if the Serbs whittle down their

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objections to the constitutional issue alone. In that case, we would face considerable pressure from both the Russians and the Europeans to provide assurances. Since the Contact Group has already done work in this area, we should be in a position to quickly table a proposal that does not prejudge key constitutional issues, such as partition.

Sanctions and the Russians

In our judgment, no amount of sanctions relief is likely to turn the Bosnian Serb "no" into a "yes." Nonetheless, the Russians have been intimating that unless we drop all sanctions linkages to Krajina and produce a draft UNSC resolution that would essentially lift all sanctions in return for full withdrawal, they might not be able to attend the July 30 meeting, much less agree to a robust consequences package against the Bosnian Serbs. Given the almost certain prospect of war over Krajina if we do not maintain some credible linkages, we cannot afford to give in to this Russian demand. The Russians and we have very similar interests in preventing new hostilities in Krajina, and we worked well together in brokering the Krajina cease-fire earlier this spring. We should play on this theme to win Moscow over to our position.

Our current position would suspend all sanctions against Serbia except those on strategic trade in return for full Bosnian Serb withdrawal to the territories allotted them in the Contact Group map. Strategic trade sanctions would be suspended in return for achievement of a modus vivendi in Krajina, including a cease-fire and confidence-building measures. Although strategic trade is a big-ticket item, we believe that Milosevic has the influence to deliver a modus vivendi in fairly short order. We need to continue to press this position with the Russians and hold firm to our key equities.

The Europeans and the Consequences Package

Tightening Sanctions

Although they very reluctantly agreed to the concept of disincentives for the Serbs, the British and the French do not like what they see when they look down the road to implementation. The British, in particular, do not like any aspect of the consequences package. They have refused to agree to a sanctions tightening resolution that would really shut down FRY offshore operations, since it would throw people working for FRY firms in Britain out of work. Although the UK successfully prevents the repatriation of profits from these firms, others do not, particularly the Cypriots, the Russians and the Greeks. Unless this loophole can be closed, any agreement to tighten sanctions will ring hollow.

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Barriers to Strict Enforcement

Strict enforcement of the exclusion zones is an essential--and neuralgic--element of our strategy. The following considerations are in play. In order to implement strict enforcement, we must be prepared to address the following:

- The UK, France and the UN tend to equate strict enforcement with the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from the safe areas, and perhaps from Bosnia. This is the central issue.
- Any NATO decision on strict enforcement will require full key allied support, and must be implemented in order to avoid damaging the Alliance.
- The risks of doing nothing are now seen by many as less than the risk of implementing the disincentives.
- Strict enforcement (even extension) will be widely seen as partisan, involving NATO on the Bosnian side. This is why Boutros Ghali apparently wants to pull UNPROFOR out prior to beginning extension.
- Allied militaries and the UN have opposed going to strict enforcement.
- UNPROFOR's withdrawal will mean the loss of ground observers, which will severely limit the effectiveness of air power.
- Prior to a NATO decision on strict enforcement, we need assurances from UNPROFOR that they will approve the use of NATO air power. (Assuming UNPROFOR will still be there to perform an approval function.)

Implementing Strict Enforcement

Since movement to enforcement is generally understood to mean the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from the enclaves (and perhaps from Bosnia), our Allies, the UN and the Russians are extremely reluctant to implement the military consequences. While never nailed down in the Contact Group, it was understood that tightening of sanctions and extension of the exclusion zones were "less difficult." A phased approach, such as the UK wants, makes sense as long as implementation is not overly lengthy. Strict enforcement would come later, and require a separate (and very difficult) NAC decision. The British seem less concerned about how strict enforcement would be staged, since they have made clear they would have removed their UNPROFOR forces before then. The French may harbor similar sentiments.

Since our Allies, Russia and the UN all want UNPROFOR to remain as long as possible, it is likely to prove very difficult for us to get the strict enforcement we are looking for regardless of what might be agreed to on paper. Sarajevo and Gorazde make clear that the British and French are not prepared to authorize that kind of

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escalation when their forces are so vulnerably in harms way. Given this fundamental fact, if we need to move to enforcement we may be better off seeing them go sooner rather than later. This could make the transition to lifting the arms embargo easier, although the Russians might balk at taking action in the Security Council regardless of whether UNPROFOR has departed.

The same arguments would apply to Boutros Ghali's threat to pull out UNPROFOR prior to extension, although we would find ourselves looking at the lift option that much earlier. Although Contact Group partners might try to use Boutros Ghali's threat to delay action, if the Contact Group remains united and agrees to commence extending the exclusion zones by tasking the NAC to take the necessary steps, we can probably keep UNPROFOR in place through the extension phase.

Basic Principles on Strict Enforcement

Although it may be overly ambitious to think that we can agree on all the details of implementing the consequences package prior to July 30, we should at least lay down some fundamental principles and seek agreement to phased implementation of the disincentives package. This will give us time to work the Serbs, keep the pressure on the Russians, and give NATO and UNPROFOR time to refine planning and redeploy forces if needed.

- The **first principle** should be that **tightening sanctions and moving to extend the exclusion zones should begin simultaneously.** Otherwise, we will look like we are stalling from the get-go and Congress will be right back at us with pressure for unilateral lift. This problem will only be compounded if we do not get a robust tightening package. The British want to extend the regime to one zone at a time; we should agree as long as they accept simultaneity. If the other Contact Group members balk, our fallback should be to press for as short a period as possible between the beginning of sanctions tightening and exclusion zone extension.

- Our **second principle** should be that **the entire extension stage should not be unduly prolonged, and should take about one month.** The point here is the same. Taking more time will make it look like we are stalling and invite the same response.

- In moving through extension and toward strict enforcement, we cannot avoid the consequences for UNPROFOR. Even prior to beginning to extend the exclusion zones, we should encourage UNPROFOR and other UN and civilian personnel to consolidate themselves as far as possible out of harm's way. Our **third principle** should be that **time--perhaps a week, perhaps a bit more--should be set aside before beginning to extend the exclusion zones during which at-risk troops and civilians could move to places of relative safety.** We should seriously consider recommending that UNMOs be called in and that UNPROFOR forces guarding weapons depots within the Sarajevo exclusion zone withdraw.

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- Given the likelihood that the British and French will want to lead a European exodus from UNPROFOR prior to commencement of strict enforcement, **we should provide a stage of perhaps three weeks between the end of extension and the beginning of strict enforcement during which time they and anyone else who wishes could depart.** In laying this down as our **fourth principle**, we should consider making the following points.

- If the Europeans do depart and UNPROFOR unravels we should ensure that this is perceived not as a rout or setback, but as a necessary step to set the stage for more robust military action, up to and including lifting the arms embargo. If UNPROFOR remains, however, **we must insist that UNPROFOR agrees that in those new circumstances the dual key arrangement will not be used to thwart genuine implementation of strict enforcement.** This should be our **fifth principle**. We cannot afford a situation in which NATO reconfirms its intent to enforce, and then is still blocked by the UN.

- **If UNPROFOR departs prior to strict enforcement, we should be prepared to move quickly to lift the arms embargo.** This should be our **sixth principle**. Whether we move immediately to this stage should depend in large part on whether the Bosnian Serbs took advantage of the departure to take over the eastern enclaves, close the noose around Sarajevo or otherwise terminate the humanitarian relief effort through areas under their control. Although we would presumably respond with air power to such provocations, there would be no reason to delay seeking to rearm the Bosnian government. Assuming the Serbs did not engage in provocations, then we should begin the process of building support for multi-lateral lifting as the final element of pressure on the Serbs.

- Assuming that Bosnian Serb actions do not precipitate immediate movement to lift, **the process of implementing strict enforcement in each of the zones should not be unduly delayed.** Although we could agree to progressive strict enforcement, beginning perhaps with Sarajevo and Gorazde and then moving on to the others, **the entire process should not take any longer than one month to complete.** The reasons here are the same as for the extension stage. This should be our **seventh principle**.

- Given past Bosnian Serb behavior, there is good reason to believe that they will respond sooner rather than later to a ministerial decision to implement the consequences package against them. They have already managed to shut down Sarajevo airport in a show of displeasure. Such relatively minor behavior could easily escalate out of control, with hostages taken prior to consolidation, the humanitarian relief effort through Serb territories shut down, and perhaps UNPROFOR forces themselves directly attacked. We need to frame these possibilities for the other Contact Group members and **seek agreement that in such a situation we would need to respond**

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quickly and decisively, including rapidly moving through the extension and strict enforcement, directly to lifting the embargo. This should be our **eighth principle**. We should also explore whether a prudent warning from all or some of the members of the Contact Group of the military consequences of such behavior is advisable.

Although we should seek agreement to as many of the above principles as possible, other Contact Group members are unlikely to be willing to agree to all of them at this time. Nonetheless, pressing these principles forward will give the Europeans and the Russians a good idea of our own view of the situation and of our determination to follow through. At the very least, we need to produce ministerial agreement to ask the NAC to produce the requisite decision on extending the exclusion zones.

Lifting the Arms Embargo

At the July 5 ministerial, Secretary Christopher reminded ministers of Congressional efforts to unilaterally lift the arms embargo and made clear that we beat back these efforts--barely--only because a negotiating process was in train that would either produce a peace settlement or ultimately lead to multilateral lift. The Secretary made clear that if the Contact Group effort did not produce either result, pressure in the Congress would redouble and could prove overpowering.

At this key ministerial meeting, we need to make clear that the current Contact Group effort is the last best hope we have to produce peace through a negotiated settlement. In putting forward the consequences package the Contact Group has made use of all the leverage available to the international community. If the Bosnian Serbs do not accept peace on these terms, then the Contact Group has no choice but to implement the consequences against them. If the international community steps back from this effort, then it will have conceded victory to the Bosnian Serbs and accepted a precedent that can only have the gravest consequences for stability in the region.

Although the Secretary laid down a marker on July 5, we now need to go beyond this and make clear that we will not permit this to happen. We need to let them know that if the other members of the Contact Group waver and step back from vigorous implementation of the consequences package, including multilateral lift when the time comes, we will have no choice but to move together with the Congress to unilaterally lift the arms embargo, and to provide the Bosnian government with the arms and air support they would need to carry the conflict to the Bosnian Serbs.

ATTACHMENT: Paper on New Exclusion Zones and Strict Enforcement

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July 25, 1994

NEW EXCLUSION ZONES AND STRICT ENFORCEMENT

The Contact Group agreed that if the Bosnian Serbs reject the proposed territorial settlement, NATO could impose Gorazde-type exclusion zones around the other safe areas -- Srebrenica, Zepa, Bihac and Tuzla. In addition, NATO could strictly enforce the exclusion zones (which would require that new instructions be given to UNPROFOR, to ensure that it approves the use of air power when NATO decides to strike).

Declaring new zones around established safe areas would require a NAC decision demanding that the Bosnian Serbs withdraw all their military personnel and weapons from around the other safe areas and prohibiting heavy weapon and ground attacks. If the Bosnian Serbs fail to comply, their military forces in proximity to the safe areas, including support facilities, would be subject, with UN approval, to NATO air strikes.

Timing: The NAC could declare new exclusion zones around the other safe areas and NATO could implement strict enforcement at once or in phases. Assuming that -- as the British and French want -- new exclusion zones are created first, followed by strict enforcement, we should press to have the time period during which the new exclusion zones are created made as short as possible; Bihac and Tuzla are the most difficult cases, given the array of forces in these areas. The "strict enforcement" decision should be taken shortly thereafter to maintain credibility. Enforcement may be phased in as well, beginning with Gorazde and Sarajevo.

Risks to UNPROFOR: The creation of new zones, and especially their strict enforcement, will be perceived by the Serbs as a UN/NATO intervention on the side of the Bosnian Government. As risk to its forces increases, UNPROFOR should:

- o redeploy from exposed positions (e.g. heavy weapons sites);
- o withdraw from the safe areas; or
- o withdraw completely from Bosnia.

NATO's Military Committee sees these steps as virtually undifferentiated, simply stages in a withdrawal process. UNPROFOR should be prepared to redeploy on short notice on the date that Contact Group Foreign Ministers give the Bosnian Serbs their final ultimatum on accepting the map. Isolated UNPROFOR units should be redeployed before that date. However, even if UNPROFOR redeploys from exposed positions, it would remain a lightly armed peacekeeping force not equipped for combat. These withdrawals would limit UNPROFOR's ability to carry out its mandate, including protection of humanitarian relief convoys and monitoring the safe areas and the heavy weapons collection sites around Sarajevo.

If we move to strict enforcement, the UK and France must take the lead to get UNPROFOR out of harm's way. The UN may offer some assistance but past experience suggests they will not

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move quickly. We may be asked to help support the withdrawal. In response to limited NATO bombing around Gorazde, the Bosnian Serbs closed all convoy routes and stopped all ground and air delivery of humanitarian aid, took some UNPROFOR personnel hostage, confiscated UNPROFOR equipment and fired on NATO aircraft. We must be prepared for a similar -- or harsher -- reaction should NATO again use air power. The UK and the UN/SYG will insist on UNPROFOR withdrawal prior to strict enforcement. UNPROFOR troops in the Krajina present a difficult problem: withdrawal could help precipitate a Croat-Serb confrontation; staying puts ten thousand UNPROFOR troops at increased risk of Serb retaliation.

One partial way to address these problems would be to establish a time period of up to several weeks between the end of the extension period and the beginning of strict enforcement, during which time those UNPROFOR forces that wished to depart could do so. The remaining UNPROFOR forces could use the time to further consolidate around Sarajevo, and possibly in the interior cores of the other safe areas (the Turks have indicated a willingness to do this). We should be aware that most of the remaining forces are likely to be from Muslim countries -- Turkey, Malaysia -- and would be seen as staying to assist the Bosnian Government. In addition, without the logistical network set up by the UK and France, they would have difficulty maintaining their forces in Bosnia. A British and French withdrawal will result in the de facto end of UNPROFOR.

Moving to Strict Enforcement: We need assurances before deciding on strict enforcement that the UN/SYG is on board, and that UNPROFOR will approve the use of NATO air power. UNPROFOR, at the direction of the UN/SYG, should agree in advance that NATO can carry out strikes for a fixed period of time against Bosnian Serb forces and their support facilities. Our decision on strict enforcement should be:

- o transparent, and give the Serbs time to change their minds and sign on to the Contact Group proposals;
- o preceded by a warning to the Serbs by the Contact Group that attacks against UN/aid personnel or hostage taking will elicit an appropriate military response;
- o accompanied by UNPROFOR redeployment.

Other Bosnian Serb Reactions: Reacting either to new exclusion zones or strict enforcement, the Bosnian Serbs may step up military activity in areas not covered by the exclusion zones, such as Maglaj or Brcko. In order for NATO to respond directly, other than in defense of UNPROFOR, we would need a new Security Council resolution authorizing further NATO action (such as creating a new exclusion zone in the area of the offensive). The Serbs may also take hostages from among the many civilian UN and NGO humanitarian aid workers spread throughout Bosnia. If NATO plans to implement strict enforcement, and UNPROFOR is withdrawing, it would be prudent for aid workers to withdraw as well (at least from areas where the Serbs can take them hostage).

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TAB B

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003c. paper	re: Effects of Creating and Strictly Enforcing Exclusion Zones [partial] (4 pages)	07/25/1994	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0090 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, July 24, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs622

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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[003c]

DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force
25 July 1994

Effects of Creating and Strictly Enforcing Exclusion Zones

The creation of new exclusion zone is unlikely to force the Bosnian Serbs to settle. While strict enforcement of those zones would rachet up the pressure on the Serbs, it could also undermine the continuation of a Western troop presence in Bosnia and exacerbate fissures between NATO and the UN and within the Alliance.

The creation of new exclusion zones around Bihac, Tuzla, Zepa, and Srebrenica without their strict enforcement will place much of Bosnia's Muslim population under Western protection but will have little military or diplomatic impact on the Bosnian conflict.

-- The sites for the new zones, which have already been declared safe havens, are not the current scenes of major fighting.

-- The Serbs and the Muslims probably will redeploy their forces in the zones to more contentious areas. Refugees may try to return to areas under Serb control within the zones, increasing ethnic tensions there.

New exclusion zones are not likely to propel the Serbs into accepting the Contact Group plan. Instead, they are likely to **increase their harassment of UN personnel in Bosnia** by blocking UN resupply convoys, aggravating UN troops with small-arms fire, and restricting the UN's freedom of movement.

-- The UN said that Bosnian Serb Army Commander Mladic on Monday threatened to "make life difficult" for UN forces beginning on 30 July, when the Contact Group foreign ministers discuss how to try to reverse the Serbs' rejection of the peace plan.

-- Bosnian Serbs have already stepped up actions against the UN, probably to remind the Contact Group of the potential costs of their decisions. In Sarajevo, Bosnian Serb forces may have hit as many as five UN aircraft with small-arms fire late last week and attempted to withdraw heavy weapons from storage sites. On Sunday, Serb forces moved an artillery piece into the

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(003c)

Gorazde exclusion zone and fired on Muslim civilians.

(b)(3)

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The Bosnian Government has indicated that it will complain bitterly if the international community does not act quickly and decisively to compel Serb acceptance of the Contact Group plan, according to press 1.4c Sarajevo probably will attempt to tie the credibility of the Contact Group, the UN, and NATO to international support for more aggressive action.

-- Bosnian President Izetbegovic told the press that his government would drop their support for the plan if the Serbs maintain their demands or the major powers fail to act.

-- Bosnia's UN Ambassador Sacirbey noted that "it was time for the Contact Group to show it has some kind of teeth." (b)(3)

Once the international community moves to strictly enforce the exclusion zones, the Bosnian Serbs probably will dramatically step up their pressure on UNPROFOR and relief agencies.

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-- After NATO airstrikes around Gorazde this spring, Bosnian Serb President Karadzic, charging that the UN

(b)(3) (b)(3)

(b)(3)

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had sided with the Muslims, placed UN personnel under house arrest and attempted to remove Serb weapons from UN collection sites around Sarajevo. (b)(3)

The Bosnian Serbs probably will continue to reject the plan in hopes they can exploit any rifts between Contact Group members, and the UN and NATO, to minimize the possibility of action against them. The Serbs will escalate their tests of the international community's resolve unless they face a threat that they calculate will inflict severe damage to their forces.

-- **The Bosnian Serb military remains unintimidated by the threat of NATO military strikes**, a point Mladic has made to various Western interlocutors. Karadzic perhaps is more fearful, but in the face of a perceived onslaught by NATO forces, the Bosnian Serb leadership, which thrives on feelings of persecution, probably will rally around the cause of zealous nationalism.

-- Even Milosevic, who would prefer acceptance of the Contact Group plan, worries that he will have to bow to domestic pressure to help his Bosnian Serb brothers if they come under Western attack, according to special intelligence.

-- The Bosnian Muslims, meanwhile, would take advantage of airstrikes against the Bosnian Serbs by continuing their operations outside of the zones and by resupplying their troops. (b)(3)

The burden of strict enforcement of the zones is likely to alter seriously Western involvement in UNPROFOR and exacerbate fissures between NATO and the UN and within NATO.

-- 1.4c

without the continued presence of UNPROFOR, the eastern enclaves probably cannot survive. Even if UNPROFOR stays, the West European are likely to reduce their troop commitments, increasing UN reliance on Islamic contributors.

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

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TAB C

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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has seen

Tony:

2 late papers for the P.C.
from State.

-- Congressional Strategy
(circulated to all agencies)

-- "Decision Sheet" for the
P.C. (NOT circulated --
Chris may distribute at the
meeting, but hold closely
until then)

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7/27

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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Sandy V.



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By RDS NARA, Date 10/3/2019
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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

July 26, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

FROM: LEON FUERTH

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting Agenda Item: Sanctions Strategy

At the Principals Committee Meeting on July 27, 1994, the topic "sanctions strategy" is to be discussed. The following attachments are provided for background/preparation purposes:

- Charts outlining July 15 strategy and revised July 25 strategy; and
- Impact on Easing Sanctions.

The charts illustrate how the strategy has evolved recently while the second attachment describes the impact of easing sanctions. An update on the outcome of the Contact Group's July 26 meeting in New York will be provided at the Principals Committee meeting.

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FRY ENDORSES PEACE ACCORD: BOSNIAN SERBS ACCEPT
Revised July 25

Goals	Sanctions Levers
Stage 1: Serbs Accept Map: FRY Gov't endorses Contact Group territorial proposal, Bosnian Serbs sign, Bosnian Serb Parliament ratifies.	UNSC Resolution allowing commercial air passenger service to Belgrade AND PODGORICA airports servicing and certification of aircraft and incorporating subsequent stages. (Automatic reimposition after 6 months, at 12 months UNSC considers continuation of suspension or lifting.) Sanctions Committee drops objections to requests for humanitarian waivers for pharmaceutical precursors, fertiliser and natural gas. This is reflected in the resolution. Sanctions Committee streamlines procedures to clear backlog and speed processing.
Stage 2: Serbs Withdraw to Allotted Territories: Bosnian Serb forces withdraw to territory designated in the Contact Group territorial proposal.	UNSC Resolution to suspend all remaining sanctions except ban on trade and transhipments of SOME strategic goods*. (Automatic reimposition after 6 months, at 12 months UNSC considers continuation of suspension or lifting.) Would allow: --All imports and exports except SOME strategic goods*, --Services, including financial services and commercial credit, --Air cargo service, --Use of foreign exchange reserves, --Use of available conveyances (but not release of impounded conveyances), --Cultural, sports, S&T, and other contacts. --Release of frozen funds, --Release of impounded vessels, aircraft, rolling stock and vehicles.

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Stage 3: Modus Vivendi in Krajina: Cease-fire plus rigorous confidence-building measures providing inter alia for the economic reintegration of Croatia.	UNSC Resolution to suspend sanctions on trade and transshipment of remaining strategic goods*. **(Automatic reimposition after 6 months, at 12 months UNSC considers continuation of suspension or lifting.)**
Stage 4: Full Settlements in Krajina and Bosnia: Political accord in Bosnia and Krajina acceptable to all parties. **FRY recognition of Croatia and Bosnia with their internationally recognized borders.**	
Stage 5: Regional Settlement: Including inter alia Kosovo settlement, regional arms control agreement, progress on war crimes.	**Serbia becomes eligible for IFI funds and regional reconstruction programs.**

*** Strategic Goods are defined in para 9 of UNSCR 787 as: Crude oil, petroleum products, coal, energy-related equipment, iron, steel, other metals, chemicals (except pharmaceutical precursors), rubber, tires, vehicles, aircraft, and motors of all types. According to this plan, only items in bold print would be withheld to Stage III.**

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FRY ENDORSES PEACE ACCORD: BOSNIAN SERBS ACCEPT
SUGGESTED US APPROACH - JULY 15

Goals	Sanctions Levers
Stage 1: Serbs Accept Map: FRY Gov't endorses Contact Group territorial proposal, Bosnian Serbs sign, Bosnian Serb Parliament ratifies.	UNSC Resolution allowing commercial air passenger service to Belgrade airport and establishing principles for subsequent stages. (With automatic reimposition language.) Sanctions Committee drops objections to requestes for humanitarian waivers for pharmaceutical precursors and fertilizer and natural gas. Sanctions Committee streamlines procedures to clear backlog and speed processing.
Stage 2: Serbs Withdraw to Allotted Territories: Bosnian Serb forces withdrew to territory designated in the Contact Group territorial proposal.	UNSC Resolution to suspend all remaining sanctions except ban on trade and transhipments of stategic goods*, assets freeze, and impoundment of conveyances. (Requires extension every three months.) Would allow: --All imports and exports except strategic goods*, --Services, including financial services and commercial credit, --Air cargo service, --Use of foreign exchange reserves (but not access to frozen accounts), --Use of available conveyances (but not release of impounded conveyances), --Cultural, sports, S&T, and other contacts.

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Stage 3: Modus Vivendi in Krajina: Cease-fire plus rigorous confidence-building measures providing inter alia for the economic reintegration of Croatia.	UNSC Resolution to suspend sanctions on trade and transshipment of strategic goods*. (Requires extension every three months.)
Stage 4: Full Settlements in Krajina and Bosnia: Political accord in Bosnia and Krajina acceptable to all parties.	UNSC rescinds all sanctions; permits release of Serbian assets except those required for claims; and dismantles remaining enforcement mechanisms.
Stage 5: Regional Settlement: Including inter alia Kosovo settlement, regional arms control agreement, progress on war crimes.	Serbia becomes eligible for IF funds and regional reconstruction programs.

* Strategic Goods are are defined in para 9 UNSCR 787 as: Crude oil, petroleum products, coal, energy-related equipment, iron, steel, other metals, chemicals (except pharmaceutical precursors), rubber, tires, vehicles, aircraft, and motors of all types.

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Impact of Easing Sanctions

If the UN were again to allow Serbia/Montenegro to import everything except for energy products and basic metals, it would give the "FRY" the ability to restore many of its heavy industries, particularly chemicals, textiles, electronics, transportation, and other heavy equipment.

Eventually, with the reopening of large factories, some workers returning to work, and trade resuming, Belgrade would no longer face the financial crunch or the potential for public unrest which has, at least to some limited degree, been prompting it to maintain diplomatic pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to accept the Contact Group proposal.

-- It is questionable whether Milosevic, even if offered sanctions relief, would be any more able to force Pale into accepting the Contact Group's plan.

Allowing the importation of energy-related equipment would allow Belgrade to repair and refurbish its electric power system which had fallen into severe disrepair over the past two years because of the lack of spare parts. The potential for the system to collapse during heavy winter usage was also a problem putting considerable pressure on Belgrade to get sanctions lifted. Also, the ability to import equipment and spare parts might allow Belgrade to stretch its domestic fuel supplies by adopting energy saving measures.

In addition, the ability to import or even transship some of those goods will improve the FRY's ability to smuggle the remaining prohibited items:

-- Documents for energy-related equipment and motors can be used to disguise shipments of arms and other military imports.

-- Belgrade will also attempt to bring in military vehicles and aircraft under the category that allows imports of civilian items. Likewise, it will try to import tires for military vehicles among civilian orders. UNSCR 820 kept military tires out by prohibiting all tires.

-- The ability to import chemicals will allow greater numbers of rail tanker cars to cross the borders of the frontline states. Neither the SAM team nor local customs services currently inspect the contents of rail tankers, allowing Belgrade to import large quantities of fuel by rail from Thessaloniki and Bulgaria.

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(1)

CONGRESSIONAL STRATEGY

CONTACT GROUP MINISTERIAL

Run-up

Briefings and testimony to create reasonable expectations for July 30 Contact Group Ministerial:

--Closed briefing for SASC and HASC on Contact Group, 7/25

NSC(Vershbow)/State(Weston)/DOD(Kruzel)/CIA(Schindler)

--Closed briefings for HFAC and SFRC on Contact Group, 7/27

--Secretary Perry Breakfast Meeting on Balkan trip with Nunn, Thurmond, Inouye, Stevens, Dellums, Spence, Murtha and McDade, 7/27.

--Testimony by Secretary Christopher, HFAC, 7/28

Aftermath

Phone calls to staffs of key members to outline results, 7/30:

NSC to provide talking points, 7/30

State/DOD/NSC to make staff calls per attached list, 7/30

Follow-up briefings to be organized week of 8/2 (DOD and State): DOD conferees, SFRC, HFAC

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(2)

CONTACT GROUP MINISTERIAL

SUGGESTED PHONE CALLS

NSC

Dole
Mitchell
Byrd

Foley
Gephardt
Michel

DOD

Nunn
Thurmond
Warner
Levin

Inouye
Stevens

Dellums
Spence

Murtha
McDade

State

Pell
Helms
Biden
Lugar

Leahy
McConnell
DeConcini

Hamilton
Gilman
Gingrich
Bonior
Hoyer
McCloskey
Lantos
Bereuter

Obey
Livingston

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STATE paper
Clews may hand this out at the meeting. Hold close until then

DECISION SHEET FOR 7/27 PRINCIPALS' MEETING ON BOSNIA

Strategic Decisions

1. Assuming we could get Contact Group agreement on a tough consequences package, are we ready to face up to its immediate implications: UNPROFOR withdrawal, Serb take-over of the eastern enclaves, the possible fall of Sarajevo, widened conflict, retaliatory air strikes?

2. Can we afford to acquiesce in Serb provocations, given the signal it will send about U.S., NATO, and Contact Group impotence and indecision, and the green light it will give for even more aggressive, offensive action?

3. Or should we step back, bail out and seek a muddle through approach on the grounds that the risks of doing something are greater than the risks of not doing anything?

4. What is our real agenda in Geneva? Should our primary goal be achieving immediate agreement on tough consequences or positioning ourselves to eventually move to lift, preferably multilateral but unilateral if necessary?

Tactical Decisions

5. Do we stake a maximalist position on the consequences package that seeks agreement on the entire menu of disincentives, knowing we will not get agreement, but at least framing the discussions around a higher rung of the escalatory ladder?

6. Or do we opt for a more measured approach, focusing for now on tightened sanctions and extension of exclusion zones only, while deferring steps on other military consequences because of their inherent riskiness, lack of NAC consensus, and UN opposition?

7. Should we build language into the communique which would invite the Serbs to provide a "final" response by August 10 in order to give more time for Russian and Milosevic arm-twisting of Pale? Or do we treat their July 20 response as final? (Kozyrev had earlier proposed such a lag so Moscow would have more political cover to demonstrate the Serbs were being given every opportunity to come to their senses.)

8. If the Russians come up with an improved Bosnian Serb response but one which still falls short of unconditional acceptance, do we opt for negotiations as the lesser of two evils or firmly hold to our current line of unconditional acceptance or nothing?

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2/6/2020 (5:35)
2013-0687-M

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SEE Also 2013-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M; 2012-0798-F

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Folder Title: PC0094 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, August 10, 1994				
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)~~	~~08/10/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RDS 04/17/2015
~~002. agenda~~	~~Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia - Revised Agenda (1 page)~~	~~08/10/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
003a. memo	Alexander Vershbow to Anthony Lake re: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (4 pages)	08/09/1994	P1/b(1)
003b. memo	Leon Fuerth to Members of the Principals Committee re: Sanctions Issues for the August 10 PC Meeting (10 pages)	08/09/1994	P1/b(1)
003c. paper	re: UNPROFOR-Macedonia: Status Quo vs Enhancement [partial] (2 pages)	08/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 6/11/2020
~~003d. paper~~	~~re: Measures to Enhance Macedonian Stability (5 pages)~~	~~08/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
003e. paper	re: Trends in Violations of the Sarajevo [partial] (7 pages)	08/03/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 08/03/2015
003f. paper	re: Violations of the Sarajevo [partial] (2 pages)	08/04/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 08/03/2015
003g. paper	re: Recent Incidents in Sarajevo and Gorazde [partial] (4 pages)	08/05/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 08/03/2015
003h. paper	re: Strict Enforcement of Sarajevo and Gorazde [NATO] (2 pages)	08/03/1994	P1/b(1)
~~004a. paper~~	~~re: Krajina Strategy (2 pages)~~	~~08/09/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~004b. paper~~	~~[Duplicate of 004a, with one extra routing page] (3 pages)~~	~~08/09/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 12 AUG 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 10 AUG PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 13 AUG 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9420943 9420947

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0094 CODES: BOS

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DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
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001		X	94081313	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
002		X	94081313	SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	940812	FUERTH, L	
002	940812	GROSSMAN, M	
002	940812	MCALEER, R	
002	940812	INDERFURTH, K	
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Itoh			
Soderberg			
Berger	2	MW	
Lake	3	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
~~Situation Room~~ Sens	4	~~RBK~~	Tab I
West Wing Desk	5		D
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

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~~Kenney~~ Sens	1	ADS	
Itoh			
Soderberg			
Berger	2	MW	
Lake	3	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
~~Situation Room~~ Sens	4	~~ADS~~	Tab I
West Wing Desk	5		D
NSC Secretariat			

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SOC of PC on Bosnia

NSC LOG # 20954

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SOC of PC on Bosnia

NSC LOG # 20954

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SOC of PC on Bosnia

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USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
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CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

BNDA

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SOC of PC on Bosnia

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B	USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

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DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC LOG # 20954

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting SOC OF PC ON BOSNIA PAGES: 3

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DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 12, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National Security

AMB RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the U.S. Representative
to the United Nations

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, August 10, 1994 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions
Meeting of NSC Principals Committee
DATE: August 10, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 10:00-11:55am

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Anthony Lake

OVP
Leon Fuerth
Rick Saunders

State
Secretary Warren Christopher
Ambassador John Kornblum
Ambassador Charles Redman

DOD
Secretary William Perry
Walter Slocombe

USUN
Ambassador Albright

CIA
William Studeman
Ray Converse

JCS
GEN John Shalikashvilli
LTG Wesley Clark

White House
Samuel Berger
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
Alexander Vershbow

Summary of Conclusions

Sanctions Issues

1. The U.S. should table an omnibus sanctions resolution in the UN Security Council encompassing sanctions tightening in the face of the Bosnian Serbs' rejection of the Contact Group proposal, sanctions easing in the event of Bosnian Serb acceptance of the Contact Group proposal, and sanctions easing in the context of acceptance by Milosevic of international monitors to verify a permanent cut-off of support for the Bosnian Serbs. This may be the most effective way of gaining Russian support for sanctions-tightening provisions. The draft will be shown first to the Russians and then to other Contact Group partners prior to tabling in New York. Action: OVP to prepare draft UNSC resolution by as soon as possible. (S)

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0533-M
LS 9/30/14 (1.25)

2. On sanctions tightening, we should press the British on the one serious issue unresolved in August 9 bilateral negotiations, blocking access to FRY funds even for humanitarian purposes. Action: OVP and State to coordinate demarches to the British. (S)

3. On sanctions easing in the context of a Bosnia settlement, the five-stage approach in the OVP memorandum of August 9 was reaffirmed. The U.S. will hold firm in linking the third stage of sanctions suspension (strategic trade sanctions) to a *modus vivendi* in the Krajina; if the Russians continue to object, we will be prepared to limit the UN Security Council resolution to the first two stages of sanctions suspension, but we will maintain our position on the Krajina linkage. On cooperation with the War Crimes Tribunal, we will not insist on an explicit linkage to any of the first four stages of sanctions easing, but make reintegration of Serbia into the world community (including IFI assistance) contingent upon progress with the Tribunal. Similarly, on compliance with all other relevant UNSC resolutions, we will include hortatory language but not draw any explicit linkages to the sanctions-easing program. (S)

4. On sanctions easing in response to a Milosevic cut-off of the Bosnian Serbs, international monitoring of the Serbian-Bosnian border is essential to verify Serbian performance, and sanctions relief can only be provided on that basis. The four-stage approach to sanctions easing in the OVP memorandum will be modified to raise the thresholds so that Milosevic would get no sanctions relief until the monitors were actually deployed. This revised plan will be integrated into the omnibus sanctions resolution cited above. Action: OVP and State to prepare revised sanctions-easing plan. (S)

Exclusion Zone Enforcement

5. Principals will continue to press their UK and other NATO counterparts on the need for further NATO air strikes in response to continuing Serb violations of the Sarajevo and Gorazde exclusion zones. Ambassador Albright will in parallel press the UN on the need for broader targeting of Serb assets than occurred on August 5 in response to future Serb violations. (S)

6. The U.S. should press for completion by the end of August of the planning for UNPROFOR redeployment/withdrawal that was agreed at the July 30 Contact Group Ministerial as the prerequisite to strict enforcement and extension of exclusion zones. That planning should include the option of redeployment to Sarajevo as well as withdrawal. Action: JCS to follow-up. (S)

Macedonia

7. Planning should be completed on a concept for expanding UNPROFOR/Macedonia, but a decision is not needed at this time. Action: IWG complete options paper for future PC meeting. (S)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20954

August 10, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, August 10, 1994

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia held August 10, 1994.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authroize Will Itoh to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MM NARA, Date 6/16/15

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9420947
RECEIVED: 09 AUG 94 16

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 09 AUG 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 10 AUG PC MTG ON BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

ACTION: ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 12 AUG 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9420943 9420954

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0094 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		DARBY
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW
		WRIGHT

COMMENTS: _____

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NLC NARA, Date 6/16/10
2010-0533-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94081009	FOR DECISION
001		X	94081009	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
002		X	94081009	ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	940809	FUERTH, L	
002	940809	GROSSMAN, M	
002	940809	MCALEER, R	
002	940809	INDERFURTH, K	
002	940809	GARTHOFF, D	
002	940809	PATRICK, T	

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National Security Council
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Itoh	4	VI	
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Berger	2	Copy	
Lake	3	Actually Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5	8/10	N
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

8/9 Cumebacks ASAP

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Exec Sec has distribution

Jake
When this came down at 7:30 I faxed it & put a copy in FUERTH'S box. However I was overwhelmed and didn't get back to it until after 9:00 so I couldn't do anything w/ it. Sorry ASK 10:05

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9420947
DATE 09 AUG 94

SUBJECT: AGENDA FOR PC MTG ON BOSNIA 10 AUG
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
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2012-0533-M

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MESSAGE NO. 1527 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 20947

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B	USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MM NARA, Date 6/16/10
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NSC LOG # 20947

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STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By M NARA, Date 6/16/10
2010-0533-M

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[illegible] 7:41

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-9 AUG 94 19 -- 50
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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 20947

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
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B	USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
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A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
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MESSAGE NO. 1527 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 20947

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
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DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

BNDA

REMARKS:

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MI NARA, Date 6/16/10
2010-0573-M

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20947

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 9, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of
the U.S. to the United Nations
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia on Wednesday, August 10, 10-11:30am in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Principals plus one. The revised agenda for the meeting is attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MS NARA, Date 6/16/98
2012-0533-M

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PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: August 10, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 10-11:30am

REVISED AGENDA

I. Sanctions Strategy ..... OVP

A. Verifying and Responding to Milosevic's Cutoff of the Bosnian Serbs

B. Tightening Sanctions - Getting International Agreement on a Financial Sanctions Resolution

C. Easing Sanctions - Krajina Linkage; War Crimes; Criteria for Relaxation and Reimposition

II. Macedonia Strategy ..... State/OVP/OSD

A. Improving Sanctions Compliance ..... OVP

B. Increasing U.S. Forces Participation in Macedonia ..... OSD

C. Measures to Enhance Macedonian Stability ..... State

III. Exclusion Zone Enforcement

A. Status of Planning for UNPROFOR Redeployment ..... JCS

B. Next Steps in Response to Serb Violations ..... NSC

IV. Krajina Strategy ..... State

V. Congressional and Public Affairs Strategy ..... OSD/State

A. Update on Arms Embargo Legislation ..... OSD

B. Public Affairs Strategy ..... State

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 2/6/2020
2013-0682-M

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20947

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 9, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

SUBJECT: Principals Meeting on Bosnia, August 10, 1994

Attached at Tab A is the revised agenda for the Principals Meeting on Bosnia to be held on August 10, 1994. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By DSI NARA, Date 6/16/10
2010-0533-M

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RECORD ID: 9420943
RECEIVED: 08 AUG 94 13

TO: LAKE

FROM: KERRICK

DOC DATE: 08 AUG 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MTG BACKGROUND PAPERS FOR 10 AUG PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 11 AUG 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9420947 9420954

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0094 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		DARBY
		HALL
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW
		WOLIN
		WRIGHT

COMMENTS: _____

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By DD NARA, Date 6/16/10
2010-0573-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

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001	LAKE	Z	94081314	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	94081314	NOTED BY LAKE

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Berger	2 3	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	ASR 8/13	N
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

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PC Mtg on Bosnia
8/10

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. memo	Alexander Vershbow to Anthony Lake re: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (4 pages)	08/09/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0094 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, August 10, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs623

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. memo	Leon Fuerth to Members of the Principals Committee re: Sanctions Issues for the August 10 PC Meeting (10 pages)	08/09/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0094 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, August 10, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs623

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003c. paper	re: UNPROFOR-Macedonia: Status Quo vs Enhancement [partial] (2 pages)	08/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0094 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, August 10, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs623

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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Revision 1

ISSUE PAPER

UNPROFOR-MACEDONIA: STATUS QUO VS ENHANCEMENT

Decision for Principals

The Inter-agency Working Group proposes the Principals choose from among three options for UNPROFOR in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia:

I. Status Quo -- no change in numbers of troops, type & ratio of nationalities, or kinds and quantities of heavy weapons.

II. Increase only the U.S. Contingent -- substantial increase in numbers and heavy weapons (precise figures would depend on specific details of scenarios and attendant military planning-- beyond scope of this paper)

III. Multinational Increase -- substantial increase of both US and other nations' UNPROFOR troops, including Nordic, German and/or other contingents.

Mission

The mission outlined in the UN Secretary General's report of December 9, 1992 is arguably broad enough to apply to any one of the three options. It states:

"Its (UNPROFOR) objectives should be:
(a) To monitor the border areas and report to the Secretary-General, through the Force Commander, any developments which could pose a threat to Macedonia;
(b) By its presence, to deter such threats from any source, as well as help prevent clashes which could otherwise occur between external elements and Macedonian forces, thus helping to strengthen security and confidence in Macedonia."

I. Status Quo

Advantages:

- *Uncontroversial*: the UN, our Allies, and the US Congress are in broad agreement on the numbers and nationalities, Authority (Chapter VI), funding, Command and Control, and ROE.
- *Minimizes expectations and obligations*: not a security guarantee, no issue of diplomatic ties.
- *Preserves primacy of multinational character*: this is mainly a UN, not US activity.
- *Fewer losses*: less casualties caused by isolated incidents or terrorism.
- *Easier to extract*: either from massive Serb attack or in event of domestic chaos and collapse.

Disadvantages:

- *Too small & light*: cannot plausibly help prevent a wider Balkan war; if Serbs threaten, we have little alternative except to pull out, a limitation apparent to all parties; headlong evacuation suggests US retaliation unlikely.

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 02/06/2020 (5.39)
2013-0682-M

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- *Confused perceptions*: token character of US deployment confuses both the Gligorov government and the Milosevic regime as to the real purpose of our presence.

II. Increase only the US Contingent

Advantages:

- *Serbia must reckon with UNPROFOR*: intimidation or invasion of Macedonia would automatically involve confrontation with the US, i.e., UNPROFOR becomes a plausible deterrent at relatively low cost.
- *Simplifies coordination*: would necessitate concurrence of Nordic nations already there, and agreement with the UN on funding, but avoids delay inherent in seeking contributions from other nations.
- *May win Boutros Ghali's support*: the UN SYG, who would like to pull UNPROFOR out of Bosnia, is unlikely to support more UN peacekeepers in the Balkans, but probably would not resist "offer" from US (possibly except for funding arrangements).
- *US control*: our prerogative to have overall command of the operation uncontested.
- *Complements Potential Bosnia OPS*: strong presence on Macedonian/Serbia border would complicate Serb army planning in event massive US intervention in Bosnia becomes necessary to bring food to Sarajevo and other population centers in wake of lifting arms embargo.

Disadvantages:

- *Costly backup support*: must also consider financial and resource obligations in the increased stand-by air support for a "stand and fight" force.
- *Implicit expectations & obligations*:

(a) constitutes a virtual security guarantee to an unstable nation.
(b) expectation to lift arms embargo, equip and train FYROM armed forces.
(c) expectation to establish formal diplomatic relations.
(d) increased pressure for massive economic aid to Macedonia to avoid economic collapse

- *Embroiled in domestic Macedonian unrest*: severe domestic problems could lead to collapse of the Gligorov government -- UNPROFOR not police force, but departure could be seen as an open invitation for Serbia (and other neighbors) to intervene.
- *Encourage Upheaval in Kosovo*: could encourage Kosovars to stage revolt.
- E.O.13526 3.3(b)(6)

E.O.13526 3.3(b)(6)

- *Sanctions enforcement*: calls would increase for UNPROFOR role in sanctions enforcement which, if undertaken, would put them in direct confrontation with smugglers, offend the host government and bring about the final collapse of the economy.
- *Funding*: Peacekeeping operations receive funding from the UNGA based on size of the force authorized in the UNSC resolution; larger force requires new resolution. US Congress also likely to resist funding requests.
- *Logistical problems*: Bulgarian opposition parties vehemently opposed our modest reinforcement last April; E.O.13526 3.3(b)(6)
- *UN Authority*: Chapter VII authority, which requires a new UNSC resolution, may ultimately be needed. Retaining present authority is complicated by US legislation limiting deployment of US troops under Chapter VI peacekeeping operations to 1000 personnel worldwide.

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III. Multinational Increase

Most of the advantages and disadvantages that obtain from increasing only the US contingent also apply to increasing all contingents in UNPROFOR-Macedonia. The following focuses on other considerations.

Advantages:

- *International Policy of Containment*: would mark a major step toward multinational containment of "spillover" in the Balkans.
- *Preserves "European" character of problem*: demonstrates US willingness to assist European nations in addressing *their* security problems in the post Cold War era.
- *Enhances prospect of burden sharing*: total burden obviously shared more equitably, but might also strengthen argument for UN funding.
- *FRG Coming Out Party*: German role in European peacekeeping must reflect its political and economic status; qualms about WW-II legacy offset by Russian peacekeeping role in Bosnia and by Macedonia's comparatively less central historical role.
- *Retaining Involvement of Others*: Nordic and German participation could be augmented by troops from other nations, or supplanted, if their participation is too problematic. If UNPROFOR vacates Bosnia in the wake of lifting the arms embargo, British, French, Russian and other UNPROFOR participants could contribute to a regional Containment strategy, beginning in Macedonia.

Disadvantages:

- *Bosnia*: could be misconstrued as "abandoning" Bosnia.
- *Complicates Exit Strategy*: our Exit Strategy would have to take into account the intentions of other national contingents.
- *German elections*: no chance Kohl will discuss this proposal until after the October 16 elections. Participation highly unlikely if SPD wins election.
- [redacted] E.O. 13526 3.3(b)(6)

[redacted] 3.3(b)(6)

Drafted 8-9-94:OSD/ISA/EUR:poc: [redacted]

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MEASURES TO ENHANCE MACEDONIAN STABILITY

In considering steps we could take to further both long- and short-term policy objectives for bolstering The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, our primary goal is to reduce the risk of further instability in the Balkans, including the possibility of a wider war. In our attempts to facilitate Greece/FYROM negotiations, our ability to influence either side to settle the dispute is limited. Both countries' positions are dictated by internal politics over which we have no influence. Additionally, we have little practical leverage on Greece to get it to lift its embargo or settle the FYROM name issue responsibly, and we have few resources to offer the FYROM to alleviate its current economic difficulties.

President Gligorov has dominated FYROM politics since his election in 1991. He is a moderating force in the FYROM and to date has been personally responsible for keeping peace and stability in the FYROM in the face of mounting external and internal pressures. This fall he faces elections under extremely difficult conditions. The convergence of rapidly deteriorating economic conditions and rising international pressure on the FYROM to plug its sanctions leaks may stir popular unrest that could be exploited by the extreme nationalist opposition. Greece's embargo on the FYROM is contributing heavily to its economic implosion, with losses reaching at least $200 million.

Within the limits of existing restraints, there are some steps we could take that would bolster the FYROM's position. A relatively modest infusion of assistance now may well turn out to be critical to this effort. We should not wait until after a genuine crisis erupts to act. We must also strive to balance steps to achieve regional stability with domestic concern that we not undermine our relationship with Greece.

Short-term Objectives and Steps

Diplomatic Support

Both the U.S. and the FYROM have reaped positive results from the recent visits of Secretary of Defense Perry and Under Secretary Davis to Skopje. Gligorv's August 10 meeting with the Vice President offers another opportunity to send a strong signal of support. We should continue to seek more such high-level contacts between our countries.

Lift Greek Embargo

One of our immediate goals should be the lifting of the

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NLC 2/6/2020 (S.40)
2013-0682-M

embargo unilaterally imposed by Greece last February. Getting the embargo lifted would relieve rising tension over layoffs in the FYROM's heavy industry sector. Removing the embargo would also facilitate our efforts to tighten sanctions on Serbia and eliminate a major source of tension and instability. To require the FYROM to enforce the sanctions more strictly, while the Greece/FYROM border remains closed, would critically destabilize the country and the region.

Recognizing that no single message will sway the Greeks, a constant stream of demarches from us and from willing EU partners may eventually have some effect, although the Greeks will expect to receive a gesture from Skopje in return. One or more calls from the President to Papandreou during this period would help emphasize the seriousness with which the USG views the issue. We should urge other EU members to make similar demarches. In the final analysis, Papandreou is likely to make any decision on lifting the embargo on the basis of domestic political calculations. Nonetheless, actively pressing will in itself reassure Skopje that we are looking after its interests. In the fall as Macedonian elections approach, we should seek opportunities to quietly discuss with Gligorov, through Special Envoy Matthew Nimetz, what gesture the FYROM could make in order to facilitate lifting the embargo.

Sanctions Enforcement and Immediate Assistance

In the past, when we have pressed for stricter sanctions enforcement, FYROM leaders have said they could stop the leaks if the Greek embargo were lifted or if some compensation were forthcoming. Thus, if the U.S. could offer immediate tangible economic assistance to at least partially offset the strain of tightening sanctions with the Greek embargo still on, we would strengthen the GOFYROM's political will and ability to take such a step.

The Macedonians have indicated to our Skopje Liaison Office (USLO) that two types of immediate assistance would help the FYROM stave off economic disaster: adequate oil supplies for the winter, and financial support for its failing social security and unemployment fund. If the Greeks cannot be convinced to lift the embargo, they should be pressed to allow rail shipment of petroleum on humanitarian grounds. We could tell Gligorov that we will talk to the GOG about this. USLO Skopje estimates that additional social security assistance would amount to $4.1 million per month. A relatively small contribution of $10-$15 million would counter the impact of rapidly increasing embargo/sanctions-related unemployment, and would buy 3-4 months of time while we press for a solution later this fall. While we naturally would prefer channelling assistance into job-creation activities, the impact may be too long-term and not adequate to address the immediate economic

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and social pressures undermining Macedonian stability. We should identify undisbursed ESF funds and consider reallocating them to the FYROM to help with job creation, the social safety net, or a mix of the two.

Activating the IFI's

Another immediate step that would stimulate an influx of badly needed funds into the FYROM would be to press the World Bank and IMF at senior levels to underscore the priority we place on the FYROM's economic survival (EU balance-of-payments support, which is important in moving these IFI programs forward, has been blocked by Greece). The Bank and IMF need to hear this forcefully from us at a very high level. Despite reasonable efforts toward macro-economic stabilization, negotiations for the FYROM's IMF Stand-By Arrangement and $60 million World Bank Adjustment Loan could well be difficult, especially in light of upcoming elections. Under current circumstances, structural reform may have to be undertaken slowly, if not postponed entirely, until the embargo is lifted. EB believes that IFIs cannot be expected to prop up economies suffering from external political factors. The IFIs need to consider the arguments for flexibility and must avoid getting mired in election politics; fundamental adjustment principles cannot be abandoned.

Energize East-West Infrastructure Projects

We should also move quickly to lessen the FYROM's dependency on Serbia for trade and transportation routes by energizing the rapid development of planned East-West road/rail links with Albania and Bulgaria. In the short term this could be initiated by providing a transport advisor to Skopje and funding expansion of the border crossing at Novo Selo in the south, to speed transport and processing of winter oil imports. Currently, tanker trucks carrying the FYROM's oil imports experience long and costly delays as they traverse mountain roads and queue up at overcrowded customs facilities. As an immediate sign of support, our thinly-staffed USAID mission in Skopje could be expanded to accelerate lagging disbursement of funds for current SEED programs.

Serbia Corridor

While the Greek embargo remains in place, we should reconsider our opposition to strictly-controlled transshipments of critical imports through Serbia. The FYROM's heavy industry sector is being devastated as a result of import starvation, or

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through high cost alternate transport routes. This would offer some help on the employment -- as well as the political -- front, by keeping factories in operation. The "Balkan Beltway" infrastructure projects now underway can only offer partial relief. The corridor idea should be negotiated in exchange for much stricter sanctions compliance. Serbian cooperation would be necessary, but this could perhaps be handled in the context of any loosening that might flow from verified Serb efforts to seal the Bosnia/Serbia border. EB and the Sanctions Task Force object to the idea of reconsidering this corridor proposal and believe that developing alternate routes is the appropriate way to address these transport problems. We should not advocate easing the way the sanctions are applied, or granting some countries "exceptions." Were we to allow an exception for the FYROM, we would immediately face intense pressure from Bulgaria, Romania and others. Sanctions enforcement would be seriously compromised and the current Contact Group initiative would be undercut.

Full Diplomatic Relations

Establishing full diplomatic relations with the FYROM at this time remains the most significant sign of support the FYROM seeks in the face of its neighbors' doubts about its viability. As important as establishing relations is, there is little point in taking that step unless it will produce a net gain for us in the region. If the Greece/FYROM negotiations break down without resolving their outstanding differences, we will need to carefully consider whether the risks of not establishing relations outweigh Greece's probable negative reaction. We have already told Greece we cannot wait indefinitely to establish relations with Skopje. If the dispute drags on, a strong argument can be made that Greece's long-term interest in regional stability will be served by such a U.S. move.

Increase Military Presence

We should also consider whether increasing the presence of UNPROFOR troops in the FYROM would further our goal of bringing peace to Bosnia, or whether such a move would create more problems in the region. If the purpose of increasing the force would be to seal the border with Serbia, UNPROFOR's mandate would have to be revised by the Security Council. The UNSC may not agree to expand UNPROFOR at this point, given the UNSYG's inclination to shut it down. The Serb invasion in the current context is considered unlikely. Merely increasing the size of the force will not necessarily enhance its self-defense

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capabilities or its deterrent effect. We would have to consider whether putting more troops in the FYROM may encourage an uprising or exodus from Kosovo. Given Milosevic's new willingness to apply pressure to the Bosnian Serbs, such a move may send the wrong signal to Belgrade.

Military Assistance/Mil-to-Mil Ties

We should move forward with planned military assistance programs (such as a $125,000 FY 95 IMET program) and Secretary of Defense Perry's proposal for a Bilateral Working Group. Expanding military ties with the nascent FYROM army and increasing U.S. military assistance would allow us to influence the positive development of the Macedonian armed forces.

Congressional Reaction

Any or all of the above carrots for the FYROM could provoke significant opposition in Congress if they do not form part of an overall settlement of the Greece-FYROM dispute. Some Members, notably Senator Sarbanes, may strongly oppose any additional assistance to FYROM unless it is tied to concessions from Skopje in the negotiations. While reinforcing modestly the U.S. contingent in the UNPROFOR force in the FYROM would be problematic in the Congress, careful consultations in advance, especially by DOD and especially with the Republican leadership, could secure adequate bipartisan support.

Long-term Objectives and Steps

Economic Long-Term Measures

Our long-term policy in the FYROM and the southern Balkans should seek to solidify economic ties between Greece and its less-developed neighbors and to expand and complete embryonic East-West trade routes. In the long term, the FYROM can become a major hub in the regional transport net, at the confluence of East-West and (when reopened) North-South routes. Lessening dependence on Serbia for trade and trade routes will counteract Serbia's ability to use its monopoly on current trade routes as a destabilizing foreign policy tool. In the FYROM, continuing the processes of privatization, transition to a market economy and reforming the tax system and social safety net should be carried out by significantly expanding the SEED program and by assuring IFIs meaningful contributions to the FYROM's development.

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003e. paper	re: Trends in Violations of the Sarajevo [partial] (7 pages)	08/03/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
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FOLDER TITLE:
PC0094 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, August 10, 1994

2010-0533-M
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RESTRICTION CODES

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DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force
3 August 1994

Trends in Violations of the Sarajevo and Gorazde Cease-Fire Agreements and Heavy-Weapon Exclusion Zones
(Information Current as of 1500, 3 August 1994)

Summary

The security situation in Sarajevo and Gorazde has deteriorated since the Bosnian Serb rejection of the Contact Group peace proposal.

-- 1.4c the number of reported cease-fire violations is at its highest level in months; in Gorazde, there was a high of 180 on 26 July, and in Sarajevo there were over 700 on 2 August--up from an average of 100 to 200 for the last several months.

-- Small-arms and machine-gun fire accounts for almost all of the cease-fire violations that occur in the Sarajevo and Gorazde heavy-weapon exclusion zones. The level of reported heavy-weapons fire remains very low and is not comparable to the level of fire prior to implementation of the exclusion zones.

-- Bosnian Serb forces are renewing their challenge to UN control over the Sarajevo heavy-weapon exclusion zone--they reportedly tried on 2 August to recover weapons stored at UN collection points--and have continuously flouted UN authority in the Gorazde exclusion zones.

-- Both Bosnian Serb and Government forces have restricted UN personnel freedom of movement in the Sarajevo and Gorazde areas. 3.5c

Bosnian Serb actions seem intended to remind the Contact Group that it needs Serb cooperation to control the exclusion zones, that a decision to create additional exclusion zones without Serb concurrence would be resisted, and that there is a price to be paid for implementing the other "sticks" in the Contact Group plan. The Bosnian Serb actions also come at a time when they are very frustrated by Bosnian Government failure to agree to prisoner exchanges, as well as Government offensive operations, despite the Bosnia-wide cease-fire agreement that went into effect on 10 June. 3.5c

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The Sarajevo and Gorazde Heavy-Weapon Exclusion Zones

The Sarajevo heavy-weapon exclusion zone was created by a Northern Atlantic Council (NAC) decision on 9 February. The decision gave Bosnian Serb and Government forces 10 days to withdraw or place under UNPROFOR control all weapons larger than 12.7mm (e.g. tanks, artillery pieces, mortars, multiple rocket launchers, missiles, and anti-aircraft weapons) within 20 kilometers of the center of Sarajevo, excluding an area within two kilometers of Pale; the decision stipulated, moreover, that any heavy weapons within the exclusion zone and not under UN control would be subject to NATO airstrikes. Nine collection sites are situated throughout the 20-kilometer exclusion zone and the UN currently controls or supervises over 300 Serb and about 50 Muslim heavy weapons in the Sarajevo area. The NAC decision also decreed that all UN and relief personnel in Bosnia should have free access to Sarajevo. 3.5c

The Gorazde heavy-weapon exclusion zone went into effect on 24 April 1994. A 22 April NAC decision gave the Bosnian Serbs until 0100 on 24 April to cease attacks on Gorazde, withdraw their forces three kilometers from the city center, and allow UN forces, humanitarian relief convoys, and medical assistance teams free access to the city. CINCSouth was authorized to conduct airstrikes against Serb heavy weapons within 20 kilometers of Gorazde city center, provided they were inside Bosnian territory. The NAC decision also called on the Bosnian Government not to undertake offensive military action from within the safe area of Gorazde. 3.5c

Sarajevo

Small-arms fire and sporadic shelling have been reported within the Sarajevo 20-kilometer zone since the NATO ultimatum in mid-February. These incidents, which averaged between 100 and 200 per day over the last few months (see table), have rapidly escalated in the last two weeks.

-- 1.4c 706 cease-fire violations on 2 August, 578 violations on 1 August, and 580 on 31 July. Small-arms and machine-gun fire accounts for almost all of the violations.

-- Both warring factions have violated the Sarajevo cease-fire agreement over the past week, with increased sniping and several significant clashes reported in the Grbavica area. 1.4c heavy sniper fire forced

3.5c

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*Cease-fire Violations in Sarajevo and Gorazde**



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the city's tram lines to close on 29 July after six passengers were wounded by snipers.

-- The UN closed Sarajevo airport on 22 July after five UN aircraft were hit by small-arms fire, according to press reports. Secretary of Defense Perry's scheduled visit to Sarajevo on 22 July was canceled as a result of these actions. 1.4c

Aircraft landing at Sarajevo airport occasionally have come under small-arms fire since April.

-- After a lull following the establishment of the Sarajevo exclusion zone, small-arms fire broke out within the city center shortly after the NATO airstrikes in Gorazde in April and remains a daily concern. On 9 May, 1.4c the first report of tank fire since the mid-February ultimatum, and a UN observer was killed in a mortar attack--probably by Serb forces--within the zone on 12 May,

-- 1.4c, 3.5c

The Bosnian Serbs have been challenging UN control of the Sarajevo heavy-weapon exclusion zone since the NATO airstrikes in Gorazde in April, probably as a means of testing UN resolve to maintain control of the zone and demonstrating Serb freedom of action. The Serbs have the capability to take the weapons against UNPROFOR resistance should they choose to do so.

-- 1.4c

Bosnian Serb forces attempted to retrieve weapons from one of the sites but were turned away by UN troops. UNPROFOR Bosnia Commander Rose stated publicly on 3 August that force would be used to prevent the Serbs from recovering weapons.

3.5c

3.5c

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1.4c

-- 1.4c Bosnian Serb forces disassembled and removed a 20mm anti-aircraft gun from the Ilidza collection site in late July.

In the weeks following the airstrikes at Gorazde, Serb forces removed--and reportedly have not returned--about 20 heavy weapons and some ammunition from various collection sites throughout the zone.

-- 1.4c

Serb forces were maintaining weapons at some collection sites, possibly in preparation for pulling the weapons out in case the situation deteriorates further. 1.4c, 3.5c

Bosnian Government forces also have reneged on some of their commitments around Sarajevo. UNPROFOR claims that Bosnian Government forces have violated the August 1993 agreement demilitarizing the Mt. Igman area. 1.4c

-- In early May, 1.4c six or seven heavy-weapons positions on Mt. Igman and preparations under way for more weapons positions.

-- 1.4c, 3.5c

Gorazde

The Bosnian Serbs have violated both the three-kilometer military withdrawal zone or the 20-kilometer heavy-weapon exclusion zone established around Gorazde in April.

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3.5c

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-- Incidents of small-arms and machine-gun fire in Gorazde prior to the Contact Group ministerial last weekend peaked at 180 on 26 July, according to press 1.4c The level of violations has tapered off in recent days to 70-80 violations, but remains higher than before the announcement of the Bosnian Serb rejection of the Contact Group proposal.

-- 1.4c

-- 1.4c On the night of 24 July, Serb forces turned a 40mm anti-aircraft gun inside the exclusion zone on Muslim civilians harvesting crops, according to press reports. Negotiations for the removal of this weapon are under way. The next day, Serb forces fired an 82mm mortar from within the zone at Bosnian Government positions, according to a UN spokesman. Bosnian Serb troops also fired on UN observation positions in the enclave.

-- The Bosnian Serbs have never complied fully with the Gorazde 20-kilometer exclusion zone, withdrawing weapons only after UN observers discovered them. In mid-May, the UN Commander in Gorazde stated that the Serbs probably were hiding other weapons in areas they had declared off-limits to UN observers. Bosnian Government forces have harassed Serb troops in the Gorazde area. 3.5c

Freedom of Movement

Bosnian Serb forces have denied UN and relief personnel, as well as civilians, freedom of movement in the Sarajevo and Gorazde areas. Increased harassment of UN and relief personnel appears to coincide with international attempts to pressure the Bosnian Serbs into compliance with ultimatums.

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-- Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic announced on 26 July that he could no longer guarantee the safety of traffic on two UN monitored routes; he claimed that the routes were being used by the Bosnian Government to smuggle arms. The next day, Bosnian Serb forces attacked a UN resupply convoy on one of these routes outside Sarajevo--killing a British UN soldier--and later fired on a French contingent attempting to recover the vehicles. Serbs also fired on Federation President Zubak's motorcade returning to the city, according to press 1.4c

-- Bosnian Serb forces have at various times restricted and blocked movement in and around Sarajevo; for a time shortly after the NATO airstrikes around Gorazde in April, they placed all UN personnel in Serb-held territory under virtual house arrest. The Serbs temporarily mined the perimeters of several weapons collection sites and detained UN personnel supervising Serb weapons in the exclusion zone.

-- Bosnian Serb forces now close convoy checkpoints enroute to Gorazde from Friday to Monday each week and employ other delaying tactics. On 26 July, Bosnian Serb officials detained a UNHCR official on his way to Gorazde. Serb authorities recently denied entry for a water specialist and confiscated part of a convoy shipment, including rat poison needed to control the growing rat population of Gorazde that has led to a possible outbreak of hemorrhagic fever.

-- 1.4c, 3.5c

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003f. paper	re: Violations of the Sarajevo [partial] (2 pages)	08/04/1994	P1/b(1)

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PC0094 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, August 10, 1994

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[003F]

DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force
4 August 1994

Violations of the Sarajevo and Gorazde Cease-Fire Agreements and Heavy-Weapon Exclusion Zones: An Update
(Information Current as of 0900, 4 August)

Small-arms fire and explosions continued in Sarajevo overnight, and Gorazde remains unstable.

-- Sniping continues in Sarajevo despite a Tuesday agreement between the warring parties to end this form of harassment of civilians, according to press reports. French, Russian, and Ukrainian UNPROFOR contingents have placed armored vehicles near the Holiday Inn to discourage snipers.

-- The Bosnian Serbs also continue to challenge UN control of the Sarajevo heavy-weapon exclusion zone. 1.4c [redacted] Recently, Bosnian Serb forces twice have attempted to remove mortars from the Poljine weapons collection point but were turned away by French UNPROFOR troops, [redacted] Yesterday, the Bosnian Serb forces placed mines around the compound after the French again intervened, but after two hours of negotiations the mines were removed and the Serbs withdrew.

-- 1.4c [redacted] the home-made heavy rocket fired at Visoko on 2 August--probably from within the Sarajevo heavy-weapon exclusion zone--was of a type previously used by Bosnian Serb forces.

-- Cease-fire violations continue at high levels and 1.4c [redacted] an increasing number of explosions in and around the city. 3.5c

The recent events are typical of the steadily deteriorating security situation around Gorazde and Sarajevo over the last month.

3.5c [redacted]

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-- By Tuesday, cease-fire violations in Sarajevo, primarily small-arms fire, were the highest level--over 700--since the mid-February NATO ultimatum. A week before, the United Nations had been forced to close the Sarajevo airport due to five attacks on relief aircraft, 1.4c

-- The Bosnian Serbs continue to violate the exclusion zones around Gorazde. 1.4c the two sides have more than 10 heavy weapons in the exclusion zone. Small-arms and machine-gun fire in the exclusion zone peaked at 180 on 26 July, but has tapered off to some 70-80 in recent days, according to press

1.4c, 3.5c

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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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[003g]

DCI Interagency Balkan Force
5 August 1994

Recent Incidents in Sarajevo and Gorazde

Sarajevo

-- NATO aircraft were deployed on 5 August against a known Bosnian Serb heavy weapon position within the 20-kilometer exclusion zone, according to 1.4c press reports.

-- 1.4c

-- On 5 August, 1.4c Bosnian Serb forces removed a T-55 tank, two armored personnel carriers, and an antiaircraft gun from the Ilidza heavy weapons collection site, according to press reports.

-- The UN resumed humanitarian flights into Sarajevo airport on 5 August after a two-week suspension. After Bosnian Serb troops removed weapons from the Ilidza collection site, the UN suspended all flights into the airport, according to various press reports.

-- 1.4c

-- 1.4c

-- 1.4c 670 cease-fire violations on 4 August.

-- On 3 August, UNPROFOR/Bosnia Commander Rose publicly stated that force would be used to prevent the Serbs from recovering weapons from UN-controlled heavy weapon collection sites. 1.4c

3.5c

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3.5c

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1.4c

-- Bosnian Serb and Government force agreed to cease sniper activity in Sarajevo on 3 August, according to press reports. UN anti-sniping teams responded to continued Serb sniping with retaliatory fire, according to press reports. French, Russian, and Ukrainian UNPROFOR contingents placed armored vehicles near the Holiday Inn to discourage snipers, 1.4c

-- 1.4c 661 cease-fire violations on 3 August.

-- On 3 August, 1.4c a home-made rocket fired at Visoko the day before--probably from within the the Sarajevo 20-kilometer exclusion zone-- was of a type previously used by Bosnian Serb forces. 1.4c

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1.4c

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-- 1.4c 706 cease-fire violations on 2 August, 578 on 1 August, 580 on 31 July, and 597 on 30 July.

-- On 29 July, 1.4c 406 cease-fire violations. heavy sniper fire forced the city's tram lines to close after six passengers were wounded by snipers.

-- On 28 July, 1.4c 435 cease-fire violations.

-- On 27 July, Bosnian Serb forces disassembled and removed a 20mm antiaircraft gun form the Ilidza collection site,

1.4c

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[003g]

-- 1.4c

-- Bosnian Serb forces attacked a UN resupply convoy outside of Sarajevo on 27 July--killing a British UN soldier--and later fired on a French contingent attempting to recover the vehicles. Serbs also fired on Federation President's motorcade returning to the city, 1.4c

-- On 26 July, Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic announced that he could no longer guarantee the safety of traffic on two UN monitored routes; he claimed that the routes were being used by the Bosnian Government to smuggle arms.

-- 1.4c 337 cease-fire violations on 26 July, 184 on 25 July, 173 on 24 July, and 314 on 23 July.

-- The UN closed Sarajevo airport to all but UNPROFOR flights on 22 July after five UN aircraft were hit by small-arms, according to press reports. 1.4c

-- 1.4c 264 cease-fire violations on 22 July.
3.5c

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Gorazde

-- 1.4c 197 cease-fire violations in the Gorazde exclusion zone on 4 August and 160 on 3 August.

--

-- 38 cease-fire violations on 31 July and 73 on 30 July.

--

-- 12 cease-fire violations on 28 July and 180 on 26 July.

--

-- Bosnian Serb forces fired an 82mm mortar from within the 20-kilometer zone at Bosnian Government positions on 25 July, according to a UN spokesman. Bosnian Serb troops fired on UN observation positions in the enclave.

-- On 25 July, 65 cease-fire violations.

-- On the night of 24 July, Serb forces turned a 40mm antiaircraft gun inside the heavy weapon exclusion zone on Muslim civilians harvesting crops, according to press reports.

-- 41 cease-fire violations on 24 July and 29 on 23 July.

--

-- 30 cease-fire violations on 22 July.

3.5c

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003h. paper	re: Strict Enforcement of Sarajevo and Gorazde [NATO] (2 pages)	08/03/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
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PC0094 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, August 10, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs623

RESTRICTION CODES

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August 9, 1994

KRAJINA STRATEGY

A settlement in the Krajina is an essential piece in the Balkan puzzle. With the lifting of the arms embargo and broadened fighting in Bosnia a real possibility, our immediate goal with respect to Krajina must be to secure the Croatian flank and avoid spillover from Bosnia. In this regard, securing a renewal of UNPROFOR's mandate in Croatia, when it expires on September 30, will be a key first step. The force plays a stabilizing role and we should work to keep it in Croatia even if UNPROFOR withdraws from Bosnia proper because of the lifting of the embargo.

Keeping Krajina-Sanctions Linkage

One way to ensure that Tudjman agrees to extend the UNPROFOR mandate is to hold firm to our sanctions linkages to Krajina, while making clear that our new partnership requires Croatian cooperation and restraint even as we move toward lifting the embargo. Moscow continues to oppose any linkage, however, and this poses a major obstacle. But it does recognize the importance of resolving Krajina, argues that modus vivendi issues will be resolved "early", and says Milosevic is firmly on notice that the Krajina talks process which resumed August 5 must produce results. If Moscow continues with this approach, our only recourse may be to insist that the intended results of linkage -- modus vivendi and mutual recognition -- be achieved up front. Arguably, this should be easier for Milosevic now that he has bitten the bullet and broken with Pale.

Cautioning Tudjman

At the same time, we will also need to be very direct with Tudjman in cautioning him not to take advantage of events in Bosnia by seeking to force the pace of events on Krajina -- a course which could easily spin out of control. We must emphasize in no uncertain terms that the departure of UNPROFOR and new fighting in Krajina would lead to a renewed and much more dangerous conflict between Serbia and Croatia -- a conflict in which Croatia would likely take a shellacking. Tudjman should be under no illusion about continued U.S. diplomatic and financial support should he choose the route of renewed conflict.

Keeping the Krajina Talks Alive

In parallel, we should seek to contain the situation by doing what we can to keep the Krajina negotiating process alive and to demonstrate that negotiations can produce a settlement acceptable to Croatia. Working within the current, informal negotiating framework set up last March (which brought together ICFY negotiators Ahrens and Eide, with Ambassador Galbraith and

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Russian Ambassador Kerestedianc), we should help accelerate efforts to develop a framework accord. In this regard, a July exchange of notes between Zagreb and Belgrade on furthering their dialogue and reaffirming their interest in economic confidence-building measures was a helpful building block. So also was the August 5 meeting between the Croats and Krajina Serbs. While accomplishing nothing specific, it did end the four-month hiatus in talks and produce agreement for a further meeting.

And Pushing them Forward

In the context of Milosevic's break with Pale and (hopefully) continued Russian pressure for progress on a modus vivendi, there could in fact be some new possibilities for moving forward on this track. Milosevic's endorsement of the Contact Group plan -- which implicitly includes concepts such as mutual recognition, recognition of existing borders, abandoning the idea (at least for now) of a Greater Serbia, and granting a relationship for Serbs with Belgrade -- lays important groundwork for similar concepts for resolving Krajina. In this regard, the ad hoc group has scheduled a meeting in late August to put together a confidence-building measures package as well as principles for a political settlement. We should help take the lead in driving that process forward, be prepared to provide constitutional experts to help with constitutional language, and aim to have specific proposals ready by the middle of September.

Developing a Confidence-Building Measures/Incentives Package

Among the confidence-building measures likely to be included in an economic reintegration package are the reopening of road, rail, river, and air links; the restoration of energy and water facilities and supplies; the resumption of commercial trade activities; the restoration of post and telecommunications links; and the cessation of extraction and removal of oil and other natural resources from Sector East and other UNPAs without permission of the Croatian government.

If necessary, we could also follow the Bosnia precedent and develop an incentives and disincentives package to motivate the parties to accept the proposals. While Croatia is anxious to finalize an agreement, the Krajina Serbs are not. Milosevic remains the key to delivering the Krajina Serbs. There is good reason to believe he would be prepared to press forward with a Krajina settlement once a Bosnia settlement has been reached, particularly if credible sanctions remain linked to Krajina, as both we and the EU propose.

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RECORD ID: 9420985
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TO: SENS

FROM: ERDMAN, R

DOC DATE: 09 AUG 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA MACEDONIA
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: STATE INPUT FOR 10 AUG PC MTG RE BOSNIA & MACEDONIA

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE DATE: 23 AUG 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE LOGREF: 9420943 9420947

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0094 CODES: BOS MAC

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FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
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		HAWKINS
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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
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1994 AUG -9 PM 4:52

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MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ No. Pages 9

FROM: Richard Erdman (Officer name) EUR/EE (Office symbol) 647-4138 (Extension) 5221 (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION State Department input for Principals' Committee Meeting of August 10.

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
OVP C	MR. Leon Fuerth		
DOD D	Col. Robert P. McALEER		
USUN/W	Amb. Rick Inderfurth		
CIA A	MR. DOUGLAS F. Garthoff		
JCS D	Col. T. R. Patrick		
NSC C	Ms Sandy Vershbow / Mr. William Itoh		SENS

OR: CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☑ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: _____

S/S Officer: GNS

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August 9, 1994

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Ext 6-7361 SEEEYYUG 9138
Cleared:EUR:RFrasure
EUR:CRedman
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EUR/EE/BCG:JSchmidt
P:LButler
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MEASURES TO ENHANCE MACEDONIAN STABILITY

In considering steps we could take to further both long- and short-term policy objectives for bolstering The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, our primary goal is to reduce the risk of further instability in the Balkans, including the possibility of a wider war. In our attempts to facilitate Greece/FYROM negotiations, our ability to influence either side to settle the dispute is limited. Both countries' positions are dictated by internal politics over which we have no influence. Additionally, we have little practical leverage on Greece to get it to lift its embargo or settle the FYROM name issue responsibly, and we have few resources to offer the FYROM to alleviate its current economic difficulties.

President Gligorov has dominated FYROM politics since his election in 1991. He is a moderating force in the FYROM and to date has been personally responsible for keeping peace and stability in the FYROM in the face of mounting external and internal pressures. This fall he faces elections under extremely difficult conditions. The convergence of rapidly deteriorating economic conditions and rising international pressure on the FYROM to plug its sanctions leaks may stir popular unrest that could be exploited by the extreme nationalist opposition. Greece's embargo on the FYROM is contributing heavily to its economic implosion, with losses reaching at least $200 million.

Within the limits of existing restraints, there are some steps we could take that would bolster the FYROM's position. A relatively modest infusion of assistance now may well turn out to be critical to this effort. We should not wait until after a genuine crisis erupts to act. We must also strive to balance steps to achieve regional stability with domestic concern that we not undermine our relationship with Greece.

Short-term Objectives and Steps

Diplomatic Support

Both the U.S. and the FYROM have reaped positive results from the recent visits of Secretary of Defense Perry and Under Secretary Davis to Skopje. Gligorv's August 10 meeting with the Vice President offers another opportunity to send a strong signal of support. We should continue to seek more such high-level contacts between our countries.

Lift Greek Embargo

One of our immediate goals should be the lifting of the

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embargo unilaterally imposed by Greece last February. Getting the embargo lifted would relieve rising tension over layoffs in the FYROM's heavy industry sector. Removing the embargo would also facilitate our efforts to tighten sanctions on Serbia and eliminate a major source of tension and instability. To require the FYROM to enforce the sanctions more strictly, while the Greece/FYROM border remains closed, would critically destabilize the country and the region.

Recognizing that no single message will sway the Greeks, a constant stream of demarches from us and from willing EU partners may eventually have some effect, although the Greeks will expect to receive a gesture from Skopje in return. One or more calls from the President to Papandreou during this period would help emphasize the seriousness with which the USG views the issue. We should urge other EU members to make similar demarches. In the final analysis, Papandreou is likely to make any decision on lifting the embargo on the basis of domestic political calculations. Nonetheless, actively pressing will in itself reassure Skopje that we are looking after its interests. In the fall as Macedonian elections approach, we should seek opportunities to quietly discuss with Gligorov, through Special Envoy Matthew Nimetz, what gesture the FYROM could make in order to facilitate lifting the embargo.

Sanctions Enforcement and Immediate Assistance

In the past, when we have pressed for stricter sanctions enforcement, FYROM leaders have said they could stop the leaks if the Greek embargo were lifted or if some compensation were forthcoming. Thus, if the U.S. could offer immediate tangible economic assistance to at least partially offset the strain of tightening sanctions with the Greek embargo still on, we would strengthen the GOFYROM's political will and ability to take such a step.

The Macedonians have indicated to our Skopje Liaison Office (USLO) that two types of immediate assistance would help the FYROM stave off economic disaster: adequate oil supplies for the winter, and financial support for its failing social security and unemployment fund. If the Greeks cannot be convinced to lift the embargo, they should be pressed to allow rail shipment of petroleum on humanitarian grounds. We could tell Gligorov that we will talk to the GOG about this. USLO Skopje estimates that additional social security assistance would amount to $4.1 million per month. A relatively small contribution of $10-$15 million would counter the impact of rapidly increasing embargo/sanctions-related unemployment, and would buy 3-4 months of time while we press for a solution later this fall. While we naturally would prefer channelling assistance into job-creation activities, the impact may be too long-term and not adequate to address the immediate economic

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and social pressures undermining Macedonian stability. We should identify undisbursed ESF funds and consider reallocating them to the FYROM to help with job creation, the social safety net, or a mix of the two.

Activating the IFI's

Another immediate step that would stimulate an influx of badly needed funds into the FYROM would be to press the World Bank and IMF at senior levels to underscore the priority we place on the FYROM's economic survival (EU balance-of-payments support, which is important in moving these IFI programs forward, has been blocked by Greece). The Bank and IMF need to hear this forcefully from us at a very high level. Despite reasonable efforts toward macro-economic stabilization, negotiations for the FYROM's IMF Stand-By Arrangement and $60 million World Bank Adjustment Loan could well be difficult, especially in light of upcoming elections. Under current circumstances, structural reform may have to be undertaken slowly, if not postponed entirely, until the embargo is lifted. EB believes that IFIs cannot be expected to prop up economies suffering from external political factors. The IFIs need to consider the arguments for flexibility and must avoid getting mired in election politics; fundamental adjustment principles cannot be abandoned.

Energize East-West Infrastructure Projects

We should also move quickly to lessen the FYROM's dependency on Serbia for trade and transportation routes by energizing the rapid development of planned East-West road/rail links with Albania and Bulgaria. In the short term this could be initiated by providing a transport advisor to Skopje and funding expansion of the border crossing at Novo Selo in the south, to speed transport and processing of winter oil imports. Currently, tanker trucks carrying the FYROM's oil imports experience long and costly delays as they traverse mountain roads and queue up at overcrowded customs facilities. As an immediate sign of support, our thinly-staffed USAID mission in Skopje could be expanded to accelerate lagging disbursement of funds for current SEED programs.

Serbia Corridor

While the Greek embargo remains in place, we should reconsider our opposition to strictly-controlled transshipments of critical imports through Serbia. The FYROM's heavy industry sector is being devastated as a result of import starvation, or

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through high cost alternate transport routes. This would offer some help on the employment -- as well as the political -- front, by keeping factories in operation. The "Balkan Beltway" infrastructure projects now underway can only offer partial relief. The corridor idea should be negotiated in exchange for much stricter sanctions compliance. Serbian cooperation would be necessary, but this could perhaps be handled in the context of any loosening that might flow from verified Serb efforts to seal the Bosnia/Serbia border. EB and the Sanctions Task Force object to the idea of reconsidering this corridor proposal and believe that developing alternate routes is the appropriate way to address these transport problems. We should not advocate easing the way the sanctions are applied, or granting some countries "exceptions." Were we to allow an exception for the FYROM, we would immediately face intense pressure from Bulgaria, Romania and others. Sanctions enforcement would be seriously compromised and the current Contact Group initiative would be undercut.

Full Diplomatic Relations

Establishing full diplomatic relations with the FYROM at this time remains the most significant sign of support the FYROM seeks in the face of its neighbors' doubts about its viability. As important as establishing relations is, there is little point in taking that step unless it will produce a net gain for us in the region. If the Greece/FYROM negotiations break down without resolving their outstanding differences, we will need to carefully consider whether the risks of not establishing relations outweigh Greece's probable negative reaction. We have already told Greece we cannot wait indefinitely to establish relations with Skopje. If the dispute drags on, a strong argument can be made that Greece's long-term interest in regional stability will be served by such a U.S. move.

Increase Military Presence

We should also consider whether increasing the presence of UNPROFOR troops in the FYROM would further our goal of bringing peace to Bosnia, or whether such a move would create more problems in the region. If the purpose of increasing the force would be to seal the border with Serbia, UNPROFOR's mandate would have to be revised by the Security Council. The UNSC may not agree to expand UNPROFOR at this point, given the UNSYG's inclination to shut it down. The Serb invasion in the current context is considered unlikely. Merely increasing the size of the force will not necessarily enhance its self-defense

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capabilities or its deterrent effect. We would have to consider whether putting more troops in the FYROM may encourage an uprising or exodus from Kosovo. Given Milosevic's new willingness to apply pressure to the Bosnian Serbs, such a move may send the wrong signal to Belgrade.

Military Assistance/Mil-to-Mil Ties

We should move forward with planned military assistance programs (such as a $125,000 FY 95 IMET program) and Secretary of Defense Perry's proposal for a Bilateral Working Group. Expanding military ties with the nascent FYROM army and increasing U.S. military assistance would allow us to influence the positive development of the Macedonian armed forces.

Congressional Reaction

Any or all of the above carrots for the FYROM could provoke significant opposition in Congress if they do not form part of an overall settlement of the Greece-FYROM dispute. Some Members, notably Senator Sarbanes, may strongly oppose any additional assistance to FYROM unless it is tied to concessions from Skopje in the negotiations. While reinforcing modestly the U.S. contingent in the UNPROFOR force in the FYROM would be problematic in the Congress, careful consultations in advance, especially by DOD and especially with the Republican leadership, could secure adequate bipartisan support.

Long-term Objectives and Steps

Economic Long-Term Measures

Our long-term policy in the FYROM and the southern Balkans should seek to solidify economic ties between Greece and its less-developed neighbors and to expand and complete embryonic East-West trade routes. In the long term, the FYROM can become a major hub in the regional transport net, at the confluence of East-West and (when reopened) North-South routes. Lessening dependence on Serbia for trade and trade routes will counteract Serbia's ability to use its monopoly on current trade routes as a destabilizing foreign policy tool. In the FYROM, continuing the processes of privatization, transition to a market economy and reforming the tax system and social safety net should be carried out by significantly expanding the SEED program and by assuring IFIs meaningful contributions to the FYROM's development.

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PC paper on MK strategy
Drafted:EUR/EE:MQuesada
SEEEYMAC 134 x70757 August 6, 1994

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S/P:SFlanagan/SHeslin
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EUR/RPE:YWong
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EB/ODF:SDriano
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TFSR01:WMithoefer

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See also 2013-0652-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

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Folder Title: PC0095 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and the Eastern Mediterranean, August 17, 1994 [1]				
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and the Eastern Mediterranean (3 pages)~~	~~08/17/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RDS 04/17/2015
~~001b. memo~~	~~[Duplicate of 001a] [incomplete copy] (2 pages)~~	~~08/17/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
002. memo	Leon Fuerth to Principals Committee Members re: Sanctions Issues for August 17 Principals Committee Meeting (3 pages)	08/17/1994	P1/b(1)
~~003. paper~~	~~re: The Eastern Mediterranean: A Region of Crisis (11 pages)~~	~~08/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
004a. memo	Don Kerrick/Kathy Stephens to Anthony Lake re: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and the Eastern Mediterranean (5 pages)	08/16/1994	P1/b(1)
004b. paper	re: Interagency Review of Lifting the Arms Embargo (1 page)	08/1994	P1/b(1)
~~004c. paper~~	~~re: Options Paper: Lifting the Arms Embargo (9 pages)~~	~~08/15/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
004d. paper	re: Leveling the Battlefield in the Bosnian Conflict (6 pages)	07/29/1994	P1/b(1)
004e. paper	re: Lifting the Arms Embargo on Bosnia [partial] (6 pages)	08/03/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 02/27/2017
~~004f. paper~~	~~[Duplicate of 003] (11 pages)~~	~~08/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020

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FOLDER TITLE:
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2010-0533-M
rs624

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 17 AUG PC MTG ON BOSNIA & EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 22 AUG 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9420963 9420967

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0095 CODES: BOS MED

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001	LAKE	Z	94081817	FOR DECISION
001		X	94081909	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
001	ITOH	Z	94081909	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	94081917	SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	940819	FUERTH, L	
002	940819	ROBINSON, M	
002	940819	MCALEER, R	
002	940819	INDERFURTH, K	
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DOC DATE: 18 AUG 94
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SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 17 AUG PC MTG ON BOSNIA & EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE DUE DATE: 22 AUG 94 STATUS: X

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF:

FILES: IFM NSCP: CODES: BOS

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	PRINT LAST NAME:		Palmieri
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SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 17 AUG PC MTG ON BOSNIA & EASTERN
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ROBINSON, M ACTING EXECUTIVE SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224 MAIN STATE	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
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DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 4

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 17 AUG PC MTG ON BOSNIA & EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN NSC LOG # 20981

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
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DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC LOG # 20981

FROM: National Security Council (ML) PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS PAGES: 4

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 19, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. MAX ROBINSON
Acting Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to
the United Nations

MR. LEON E. PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President
of the United States

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and the Eastern Mediterranean, August 17, 1994 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MO NARA, Date 6/16/10
2010-0533-M

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TAB A

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions
Meeting of NSC Principals Committee
DATE: August 17, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 4:30 - 6:10pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and the Eastern Mediterranean (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Anthony Lake

OVP
Bill Wise
Rick Saunders

State
Secretary Warren Christopher
Peter Tarnoff
Charles Redman
John Kornblum
Charles Thomas
David Gergen

DOD
Secretary William Perry
Walter Slocombe

USUN
Ambassador Madeleine Albright
Dave Scheffer

CIA
William Studeman
Norman Schindler

JCS
Admiral William Owens
LTG Wesley Clark

White House
Leon Panetta
George Stephanopoulos

OMB
Alice Rivlin
Gordon Adams

NSC
Donald Kerrick
Kathleen Stephens

Summary of Conclusions

Sanctions:

1. The Principals agreed to continue to push for completion of the easing and tightening resolutions in New York and to continue to insist on Krajina linkage in the easing resolution. Secretary Christopher will consult with allies on options for moving forward with sanctions. (S)

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2010-0533-M
RS 9/30/14 (1.26)

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2. Regarding Milosevic's closure of his border with Bosnian Serb territory, the Principals agreed that an effective international monitoring system was essential if the UNSC were to be able to determine whether to extend the delay in imposition of new sanctions or to take other sanctions measures in response to Serbian enforcement of the embargo. (C)

Lifting the Arms Embargo:

3. Principals agreed the goal in seeking a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo on the Federation is to provide the Bosnians with a defensive capability to ensure the inherent right of self-defense. A detailed planning document developing a concept of how arms might be provided, and including a range of options, should be developed within two weeks time. Action: OSD and JCS to develop comprehensive plan. (S)

4. The U.S. should be prepared to provide air support, but not ground troops, to the Bosnian government in connection with the arms embargo lifting in the likely event of increased Bosnian Serb military action against the Federation. Planning should focus on the development of robust air options, including the use of air power for tactical, punitive, deterrent, or other purposes. Planning should include options for responses to Bosnian Serb action against the eastern enclaves, Sarajevo, Tuzla, and elsewhere. Scenarios considered should include: 1) air options following complete UNPROFOR withdrawal, and 2) air strike options within the context of a remaining, reconfigured UNPROFOR presence following lift. Planning should assume action in the NATO context, or within a coalition of willing allies. Action: OSD and JCS. (S)

5. On the future of UNPROFOR, Principals agreed to review options for a new role for UNPROFOR. The options should include at a minimum, a defense of Sarajevo model, and a humanitarian aid escort mission through Federation territory. Once the options are developed and reviewed by the Principals, they will be presented to the allies. Action: OSD and JCS to develop options. (C)

6. The U.S. will seek multilateral support for the lifting of the arms embargo against the Bosnian government. NATO should remain engaged as we move toward a more robust use of air power. Action: State develop a paper outlining a diplomatic and Congressional strategy for achieving these objectives, including options for sustaining the negotiating track. (C)

The Eastern Mediterranean:

7. A Presidential emissary to both Greece and Turkey should deliver a strong message to each country warning that recent incidents, and the overall increase in Greek-Turkish military tensions, risk leading to serious erosion of U.S. support for both countries. The envoy's message should be specific, with sticks and carrots for each country. Action: State to draft concept and talking points. (S)

8. The new U.S. Special Coordinator for Cyprus should be identified and announced as soon as possible. It should be someone perceived by all sides as impartial. Action: State to recommend candidates. (C)

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9. On Macedonia, the previously tasked study of reinforcing UNPROFOR there should be completed, concurrent with the completion of the arms embargo lift paper. Further attention is required to economic assistance to Macedonia as well. Action: OSD and JCS to develop options for UNPROFOR-Macedonia reinforcement planning by end of August. State to develop options for increased economic assistance. (C)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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LOG 9420981
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SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 17 AUG PC MTG ON BOSNIA & EASTERN
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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20981

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 18, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: DON KERRICK/KATHY STEPHENS

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and the Eastern Mediterranean, August 17, 1994

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia and the Eastern Mediterranean held August 17, 1994.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ as revised Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 6/16/03

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2. Regarding Milosevic's closure of his border with Bosnian Serb territory, the Principals ~~(1) reaffirmed that the U.S. should accept a finite delay in implementation of the tightening resolution but that the resolution must provide for an affirmative UNSC vote to extend the delay; and (2)~~ agreed that an effective international monitoring system was essential if the UNSC were to be able to determine whether to extend the delay in imposition of new sanctions or to take other sanctions measures in response to Serbian enforcement of the embargo. ~~(C)~~

Changes @ Tab A; then send

Lifting the Arms Embargo:

3. Principals agreed the goal in seeking a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo on the Federation is to provide the Bosnians with a defensive capability to ensure the inherent right of self-defense. A detailed planning document developing a concept of how arms might be provided, and including a range of options, should be developed within two weeks time. Action: OSD and JCS to develop comprehensive plan. ~~(S)~~

4. The U.S. should be prepared to provide air support, but not ground troops, to the Bosnian government in connection with the arms embargo lifting in the likely event of increased Bosnian Serb military action against the Federation. Planning should focus on the development of robust air options, including the use of air power for tactical, punitive, deterrent, or other purposes. Planning should include options for responses to Bosnian Serb action against the eastern enclaves, Sarajevo, Tuzla, and elsewhere. Scenarios considered should include: 1) air options following complete UNPROFOR withdrawal, and 2) air strike options within the context of a remaining, reconfigured UNPROFOR presence following lift. Planning should assume action in the NATO context, or within a coalition of willing allies. Action: OSD and JCS. ~~(S)~~

5. On the future of UNPROFOR, Principals agreed to review options for a new role for UNPROFOR. The options should include at a minimum, a defense of Sarajevo model, and a humanitarian aid escort mission through Federation territory. Once the options are developed and reviewed by the Principals, they will be presented to the allies. Action: OSD and JCS to develop options. ~~(C)~~

6. The U.S. will seek multilateral support for the lifting of the arms embargo against the Bosnian government. NATO should remain engaged as we move toward a more robust use of air power. Action: State develop a paper outlining a diplomatic and Congressional strategy for achieving these objectives, including options for sustaining the negotiating track. ~~(C)~~

The Eastern Mediterranean:

7. A Presidential emissary to both Greece and Turkey should deliver a strong message to each country warning that recent incidents, and the overall increase in Greek-Turkish military tensions, risk leading to serious erosion of U.S. support for both countries. The envoy's message should be specific, with sticks and carrots for each country. Action: State to draft concept and talking points. ~~(S)~~

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2015-0682-M

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8. The new U.S. Special Coordinator for Cyprus should be identified and announced as soon as possible. It should be someone perceived by all sides as impartial. Action: State to recommend candidates. ~~(C).~~

9. On Macedonia, the previously tasked study of reinforcing UNPROFOR there should be completed, concurrent with the completion of the arms embargo lift paper. Further attention is required to economic assistance to Macedonia as well. Action: OSD and JCS to develop options for UNPROFOR-Macedonia reinforcement planning by end of August. State to develop options for increased economic assistance. ~~(C)~~

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RECORD ID: 9421029
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TO: LAKE

FROM: FUERTH, L

DOC DATE: 17 AUG 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
SANCTIONS
MEDITERRANEAN
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: VP DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 17 AUG PC MTG ON BOSNIA & EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN RE SANCTIONS ISSUES

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 05 SEP 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE LOGREF: 9420963 9420967

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0095 CODES: BOS MED:

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

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001		X	94081816	NOTED BY LAKE

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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON, DC

August 17, 1994

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

TO: Tony Lake

SUBJECT: Sanctions Paper for Today's PC

Here is Leon's input for today's Bosnia PC. We could not complete it earlier because of the need to incorporate the results of last night's Perm Reps' meeting in New York.

Leon may try to call you before the meeting.

RS

Rick Saunders

Secretariat: 12/13
Pls file
"for the record"

3 separate docs attached

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. memo	Leon Fuerth to Principals Committee Members re: Sanctions Issues for August 17 Principals Committee Meeting (3 pages)	08/17/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0095 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and the Eastern Mediterranean, August 17, 1994 [1]

2010-0533-M
rs624

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
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FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 27 AUG 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
MEDITERRANEAN

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 17 AUG PC MTG ON BOSNIA & EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 20 AUG 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: STEPHENS LOGREF: 9420963 9420967

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0095 CODES: BOS MED

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DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
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001	940827	MCALEER, R	
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 16, 1994

Exec Sec:

Kathy Stephens, per a request from Mr. Lake, would like this paper washfaxed to agencies attending the 8/17 Principals meeting.

SUBJECT: Discussion Paper for 8/17 PC Meeting: Topic: Eastern Mediterranean

Many thanks.

Nancy



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 17, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDEFURTH
Office of the Representative of
the U.S. to the United Nations
Department of State

MR. LEON E. PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President
of the United States

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Discussion Paper for Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, and Eastern Mediterranean, August 17, 1994 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Principals the discussion paper attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Discussion paper

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MM NARA, Date 6/11/10

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The Eastern Mediterranean: A Region of Crisis

Introduction and Goals

Greece and Turkey are the focus of a region of crisis extending from the Balkans and Macedonia through the Middle East and into Central Asia. The overriding United States interest in this area is stability and the absence of conflict, especially involving Russia. Our general goals are thus: (1) the relaxation of interstate tensions and avoidance of armed conflict: (2) the development and refinement of democratic regimes that defuse ethnic conflict; (3) the implementation of economic reform to help sustain political and economic development; and (4) the development of regional political and economic cooperation.

Solutions to regional problems are particularly difficult because of the long-standing "zero-sum" nature of regional rivalries. Policies which benefit Turkey risk a downturn in relations with Greece, and vice-versa. The same holds true in any approach to Greece and Albania, the GOG and FYROM, Turkey and Russia, and Armenia and Turkey. Additional USG funding for economic purposes is one of the best ways to help regional states while minimizing "zero-sum" opposition from others, since it is less controversial than political or security support. But additional funding is difficult in a time of budgetary stringency.

Growing strains in Greco-Turk relations and in their relations with the United States threaten a wide range of U.S. interests throughout the region. The upsurge in long-term animosity is increasingly difficult to contain because there is no longer a tight framework of Western Cold War solidarity. The U.S. will have to make a major investment of effort and resources to have an appreciable effect on developments which stem from a major realignment of interests and preoccupations in the region. U.S. interests in Turkey are more extensive than in Greece or other regional nations, and we have elaborated on these interests in Annex A.

TURKEY

Turkey is caught in a web of political and economic problems. A weak coalition government is having difficulty coping with the simultaneous challenges of combatting the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), meeting the needs of a poor and growing population, and reforming an inefficient economy. The deterioration in Turkey's human rights situation is undermining the integrity of its democratic system as well as becoming a serious problem in Ankara's relations with the U.S. and other Western countries. Meanwhile, the post-Cold War decline in Turkey's active military importance has diminished

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Ankara's stock in the West. There has been an appreciable decline in aid levels, military cooperation, support for Turkish integration into the EU, understanding for Turkey's concerns about Russia, and willingness to help Turkey offset the cost of the Iraqi embargo.

Turkey nevertheless stands out as a democratic and secular nation in a region which has few democratic traditions, where Islamic fundamentalism is increasing, and where Christianity and Islam directly confront each other. A committed member of NATO, Turkey both strengthens Western defenses against the possibility of a resurgent Russian threat, and offers the potential to extend the reach of the West into an unstable part of the world which has critical oil resources. There is no doubt that an undemocratic, radical, destabilized, or fundamentalist Turkey would encourage forces in the region that are inimical to U.S. and Western interests.

Ankara is seeking to use improved relations with Israel to strengthen support in the U.S. and extend its influence in Central Asia. The Israeli government views democratic, secular Turkey as a counterweight to Iraq, Syria, Iran, and fundamentalism in general. Common cause between Tel Aviv and Ankara has some limited potential to move Middle Eastern and Central Asian developments in a positive direction.

Final agreement to flush the mothballed Iraqi pipeline has not yet been reached as Turkey is still working to obtain Iraq's agreement. The Turks continue to feel that their economic sacrifices to implement the UN sanctions against Iraq have gone largely unappreciated. This feeling reinforces popular sentiment that Turkey will never be accepted as a full-fledged member of the Western "club," and that Ankara must increasingly pursue its own interests without special deference to the West.

Near to Mid-Term Objectives

Over time, we seek an economically successful, secular and democratic state, with improved human rights performance, capable of acting as a bridge to countries further east, while remaining solidly rooted in the Western security system. In the shorter term, our goals with Turkey include (in priority order):

- An end to any bombing campaign (e.g., Rhodes) against Greece by the Government of Turkey (GOT);
- Continuation of Operation Provide Comfort and the maintenance of the regime of sanctions against Iraq;
- Cooperation in the amelioration of regional conflicts, including the Cyprus dispute, the war in Bosnia, and the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh;

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- Improved human rights performance, including an end to torture and restrictions on freedom of expression; and

- Continuation of the economic reform program enacted in April 1994.

Carrots

In the current political and fiscal environment, U.S. ability to secure these goals is limited. There is nevertheless a range of steps we can take. These are listed below by category, in order of ascending difficulty within each category.

I. Strengthen the USG-GOT dialogue: We have a number of important messages to send to the Government of Turkey on security, political and economic issues which will be difficult to deliver and to receive. They need to be made at the highest possible levels, and they need to be repeated. For this purpose, a series of high level visitors would be useful. If done properly, such visitors could serve the additional function of providing reassurance to the GOT that the USG remains committed to the relationship. Visits could include:

-- A Presidential envoy to warn Prime Minister Ciller of the serious danger to Turkey's Western ties posed by unilateral action against Greece, including covert action, to review our political agenda with Turkey and to reinforce the need for urgent human rights improvements. A senior military officer should accompany the envoy to convey these same considerations to the Turkish military. Possible emissaries include:

  - NSA Tony Lake
  - U/S Tarnoff

  Following the Presidential envoy, senior officials should periodically be used to reiterate the messages that were passed, both in order to maintain the dialogue and to keep the pressure on Ankara to move in a desirable direction. Discussions should also center on regional issues such as Nagorno-Karabakh, Central Asia, Iraq, Russia and the Middle East, in order to emphasize the importance the USG attaches to working with Turkey as an equal partner. Possible emissaries for this task include:

  - New EUR A/S Holbrooke
  - DRL A/S Shattuck
  - NSC Europe Director Vershbow
  - New EUR DAS Frasure.
  - Incoming Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism Wilcox.

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Meanwhile, we should use every possible venue and occasion to reiterate and reinforce the messages that have been passed.

-- In addition to visits by USG officials to Turkey, there will be opportunities to use visits by GOT officials to the U.S. to pursue this high level dialogue:

  - o An early invitation should be extended to the new Turkish MFA Under secretary to visit Washington as soon as he is named, as part of an effort to revitalize the U.S.-Turkey Steering Group.

  - o The UNGA will bring the new Turkish Foreign Minister to New York and possibly to Washington. It would be appropriate for the Secretary to meet with him.

  - o The annual meeting of the U.S.-Turkey Joint Economic Commission will be held in Washington in November or December and will bring a number of senior Turkish economic officials.

II. Expand the dialogue to include key Western allies: While the U.S. has the strongest bilateral relationship with Turkey of any country, other Western nations (eg. UK, Germany, France) can also exercise influence on Turkey. It might be useful to initiate a major review of Turkish-Greek-Western relations with key allies with a view to coordinating long-term political and security policies.

III. Expand the dialogue to include key Middle Eastern countries: Key regional countries such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait have expressed concern over the strains in Turkey and would like to work with us to help alleviate them. It is in our interest to help establish closer ties between these countries and Turkey. We should involve them in our consultations on Turkey, encourage them to work with us in providing assistance to Turkey, and stimulate them to pursue parallel initiatives with Turkey.

IV. Strengthen material incentives to Turkey:

-- Establish a U.S.-Turkish commission to promote cooperative assistance to the Caucasus and Central Asia, and commit a portion of U.S. assistance destined for Central Asia to a tripartite program involving Turkey in such areas as the provision of medical services.

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-- Increase Turkey's duty-free access to the U.S. market, by agreeing to the GOT's request to add specific categories of articles not currently covered under the GSP list.

-- Establish and generously fund a special office in the Commerce Department to promote U.S.-Turkish trade, and create a special interagency committee chaired by the Secretary of Commerce to promote U.S. trade with Turkey (and perhaps other Big Emerging Markets).

-- Organize a USG-GOG trade mission to the Balkans led by Commerce Secretary Brown or Deputy Commerce Secretary Barram.

-- Keep open the possibility of creating a loan guarantee program for Turkey should Turkish interest rekindle.

-- Make best efforts to remove the Congressional hold on FY'94 ESF and to provide additional ESF directed to use in the Turkish southeast, contingent on GOT steps toward a political resolution of the Kurdish problem.

-- Provide funding for cooperative human-rights projects, such as the operation of a "blue-ribbon committee" of senior statesmen to examine Turkey's human rights performance and make appropriate recommendations.

-- Seek additional assistance which could be offered contingent on Turkish-Greek agreement on concrete measures of cooperation, e.g., military debt reduction (for both Turkey and Greece) in exchange for confidence-building measures, including a reduction of military activity, in the Aegean.

-- Seek special bilateral assistance (perhaps $50-100 million grant) to support Turkey's contribution to Provide Comfort.

V. <u>Respond to outstanding Turkish concerns</u>:

-- Assure that USG action on outstanding bilateral economic problems such as Section 301 trade reviews and IIAA petition to remove Turkey from GSP is as favorable to Turkey as possible.

-- Grant Turkey's recent request for swing in several quota categories under the bilateral textile agreement.

-- Reverse DS's decision to draw down personal security for the Turkish Consul General in Los Angeles ($800,000 cost).

-- Ensure that survivors of Turks killed in the downing of the two U.S. helicopters receive adequate compensation.

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-- Impress our European allies with the terrorist nature of the PKK, and encourage them to close down offices with demonstrated PKK affiliations in their countries.

-- Continue pressing the government of Greece to take action against PKK activities.

VI. Strengthen Congressional support for relations with Turkey:

-- Encourage visits to Turkey by Members of Congress, especially those particularly concerned with human rights. Visits might also include Provide Comfort operations, and could be conducted jointly with Turkish parliamentarians.

-- Intensify cooperation with Members of Congress who are supportive of Turkey.

-- Press the case for strong U.S. interests in Turkey with Members of Congress who are hostile to Turkey.

-- Encourage the GOT to take Congressional concerns more seriously, and to devote more attention to Congress, such as by sending senior Turkish statesmen to Washington to meet with Members of Congress.

VII. Increase Military Cooperation:

-- Promote PFP and other peacekeeping exercises in Turkey or involving Turkish troops, including help with planning, the provision of special funding, and pressure on key allies and on the Russians to participate.

-- Conclude the "Arrangement for Transfer" of the Turkish Defense Fund expeditiously and encourage the GOT to conclude the DECA review.

-- Support a Turkish proposal for an interim tanker capability, pending arrival of refurbished tankers in 1997, provided the MOD signs the letter of offer and acceptance for a specific number of refurbished tankers and uses the interim tankers to reduce U.S. operational commitments.

-- Urge the TGS to commit to joint training activities and to pursue common military doctrine.

-- Maintain high levels of security assistance loan credits, if at all possible at preferential rates, and IMET funding.

Sticks

Continued GOT operations against Greece, a stonewall on human rights improvements, or abandonment of the sanctions

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regime against Iraq would justify a resort to stronger measures to change GOT policies. A harder GOT line on Cyprus, in the Balkans or Nagorno-Karabakh also might require a sharper response from us. In such circumstances, the following measures are at our disposal:

-- Suspend allocation of preferential textile quotas.

-- Block any NATO infrastructure funding for tanker support.

-- Slow down or suspend remaining deliveries of equipment cascaded under the CFE Treaty.

-- Suspend the Turkish Defense Fund Transfer.

-- Suspend additional security assistance funding.

-- Put Turkey on the list of countries which support terrorism, based on its involvement in the bombing of Greek Tourist sites.

Greece

Greece views its interests almost exclusively through a regional prism. It perceives its current situation to be much less secure as a result of the end of the Cold War. The Greeks believe that their country and the Greek national identity (Hellenism) are under siege and on a losing trend. Related to this insecurity is Greece's long-standing fear of Turkey, which Greeks see as an even greater threat in the absence of the discipline provided by the Cold War.

Greece's embargo of FYROM and relationship relationship with Serbia have interfered with international efforts to tighten sanctions on Serbia-Montenegro, thus diminishing prospects for resolution of the Balkans conflict. In the face of the blockade to the south, the FYROM has resumed large-scale trading with Serbia as its own economy deteriorates.

The Greeks see the Kurds as Turkey's Achilles heel and are making some use of them to undermine a historical adversary. The PKK is increasingly active in Greece. PKK representatives have met with Greek parliamentarians and some low-level officials. The PKK supports terrorist operations from a facility in Greece, and may have received assistance from Greek intelligence services. We have warned Athens about the danger such activities pose to relations with Turkey, to no noticeable effect. Our conclusion is that the GOG condones but does not necessarily support PKK activity in Greece, although we continue to investigate the matter.

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Long and Short Term Goals

Over the longer term, we seek to persuade Athens to abandon its confrontational approach in regional affairs, in favor of cooperation with us in developing an agenda for the economic and democratic development of the Balkan region. In the shorter term, our goals for Greece include (in priority order):

- o Cease encouragement of PKK terrorism;
- o Lift the embargo on FYROM;
- o Normalize Greek relations with Albania;
- o Tighten enforcement of UN sanctions on Serbia; and
- o Work constructively to help solve the Cyprus situation.

Carrots

As with Turkey, our means to accomplish these goals are circumscribed. Growing nationalism in Greece is both an obstacle to leadership and a result of the lack of strong leadership. Also like Turkey, Greece faces an economic crisis stemming from a misguided statist economic policy and resulting high budget deficits. However, Greece's position in the West is more secure than Turkey's. Its EU membership and a strong Congressional lobby here provide a more secure foundation of political and economic support, thereby reducing the incentives for Greece to moderate its nationalistic policies toward its neighbors. We need to try to establish a "strengthened partnership" with Greece with agreed goals and mutually-supportive definitions of national interest.

Some of the steps we could take at this point include:

I. Strengthen the USG-GOG dialogue:

-- Send the Presidential envoy who visits Turkey on to Greece to review Greek-Turkish relations and to warn Prime Minister Papandreou that Greece's management of its relationships with Turkey, Albania and FYROM are damaging for Greece, the Balkans, the EU, NATO, and the U.S. The message should reiterate the dangers of support for the PKK and call on Papandreou to lift the embargo on FYROM.

-- High-level officials visiting Turkey should also visit Greece to address Greek-Turkish tension and regional developments.

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II. Expand the dialogue to include key Western allies:

-- Initiate a major review of Turkish-Greek-Western relations with key allies with a view to coordinating long-term policy.

III. Enhance economic cooperation

-- Organize a USG-GOG trade mission to the Balkans led by Commerce Secretary Brown or Deputy Commerce Secretary Barram.

-- Encourage the GOG to maintain a dialogue with Turkey on issues other than the Aegean.

-- Form a U.S.-EU-Greek Economic Commission. (The USG would not be in a position to match the economic resources that the EU would bring to the table in such a commission.)

-- Offer technical assistance on organizing a Southern Balkans Trade/Economic Cooperation Project. OPIC already has a cooperation agreement with the GOG that could be a vehicle for action.

IV. Increase military cooperation:

-- Promote PFP exercises involving the U.S., Greece, Albania, FYROM and others, including Turkey. The exercises should be held in these countries. We should appeal to Greece to assume its natural role as NATO and U.S. partner in NATO/PFP activities in the region.

-- Make greater use of the Escess Defense Article Program to build up the Greek military.

Sticks

In the event Athens encourages terrorism against Turkey, a stronger response on our part would be necessary. Tougher GOG policies toward Albania or FYROM would also merit stronger measures by the USG. These could include:

-- Suspend or slow down remaining deliveries of equipment to be cascaded under the CFE Treaty.

-- Start pressuring Greeks on ethnic Muslims' status and rights.

-- Threaten to request additional conditionality on assistance pegged to Greek performance in FYROM, Albania, or against terrorism.

-- Put Greece on the list of countries which support terrorism, based on its involvement in the bombing of Greek Tourist sites.

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Measures To Address Balkan issues:

In his July 13 report to the Secretary on the status of Greece/FYROM talks, Special Envoy Matthew Nimetz noted that both parties felt comfortable postponing further negotiations until after FYROM elections this October. Politically, the FYROM was not prepared to ratify an agreement with Greece until a new parliament had been elected. Macedonian President Gligorov indicated to Nimetz that the FYROM could muddle through the next three to four months, even with the Greek embargo in place. Nimetz noted that the most impatient party right now is the United States. His tentative judgement was that for the next few months we should watch the situation carefully, help the FYROM economically and politically in the short term where we can, but not play an activist role until after the FYROM elections.

In the meantime, however, there are some steps we can take on Balkan issues.

-- While continuing to press both sides to show flexibility, reevaluate our policy to hold off establishing diplomatic relations with the FYROM if the dispute with Greece is not settled by the end of 1994.

-- Shore up the FYROM's sagging economy by:

  o Weighing in at a senior level with the IMF/IBRD on the need to expedite all loans/projects for the FYROM. A "Friends of Macedonia" group could be set up in concert with key European donors to amplify this pressure.

  o Providing leadership for the immediate start of construction of a rail link connecting the FYROM to Bulgaria and Albania. This can be done through the IFI's and direct technical assistance/advisors.

  o Sponsoring a regional Balkan conference on developing East-West road/rail routes through the Balkans.

-- Push for more active CSCE involvement in Greek-Albanian relations, e.g., a monitoring team to look at problems of the Greek minority in Albania, the April 10 attack near the border with Greece, Albanian migrant workers in Greece, and more general concerns about border security.

-- Encourage Turkey to make its Balkan policy -- especially relations with Albania -- as transparent as possible to the Greeks.

-- Explore the upgrade of infrastructure in the FYROM, Albania and Bulgaria, including airport, port, road, and rail links needed for troop deployments.

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-- Work to channel the energies of the Greek and Turkish private sectors into cooperative projects with U.S. firms in the Balkans.

-- Upgrade of the UNPROFOR contingent in FYROM.

ANNEXES

-- A. U.S. Interests in Turkey
-- B. Military Importance of Turkey
-- C. Turkey and Human Rights
-- D. Counter-Terrorism (sent separately)
-- E. Macedonia
-- F. Cyprus

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9420973
RECEIVED: 16 AUG 94 13

TO: LAKE

FROM: KERRICK
STEPHENS

DOC DATE: 16 AUG 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA MEDITERRANEAN
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BRIEFING MEMO FOR 17 AUG PC MTG ON BOSNIA & EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 19 AUG 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9420963 9420967

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0095 CODES: BOS / MED

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		DARBY
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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By RM NARA, Date 6/16/10
2010-0533-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94081621	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	94111011	NOTED BY LAKE

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A = Action (I = Information) D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

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16 AUG 94 21:27

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004a. memo	Don Kerrick/Kathy Stephens to Anthony Lake re: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and the Eastern Mediterranean (5 pages)	08/16/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
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([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0095 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and the Eastern Mediterranean, August 17, 1994 [1]

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004b. paper	re: Interagency Review of Lifting the Arms Embargo (1 page)	08/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
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([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0095 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and the Eastern Mediterranean, August 17, 1994 [1]

2010-0533-M
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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OPTIONS PAPER: LIFTING THE ARMS EMBARGO

This paper examines the possible impact and policy options open to the U.S. if the arms embargo against Bosnia were lifted as the result of a U.S. initiative. The paper assumes that our goal is to provide the Bosnian government with sufficient military capabilities to alter the situation on the battlefield and bring about Bosnian Serb acceptance of the Contact Group map. This would entail a U.S. commitment to support the government to the point it can hold its own and begin to turn the tide on the battlefield. This paper considers various other assumptions shaping our options, the range and mix of options available to us, and complications/issues we will need to address in advance of military engagement, including the need for a clear public rationale.

I. ASSUMPTIONS

Strategic Objectives: Our broader strategic objective is to prevent a broader Balkan war which could draw in Allies, damage our capacity to maintain a strong NATO, and severely strain relations with our closest Allies and Russia. The options we choose in pursuing our objectives in Bosnia must contain the risks to this strategic interest.

Multilateral Lift: Lifting the arms embargo through multilateral action is essential to securing broad-based international support and assistance after lift, including support from our NATO allies. Unilateral lift would create a major rift in the Alliance and damage relations with Russia. Ideally, there would be a provision in any UNSC resolution lifting the embargo that would call on member states/regional organizations to use all necessary means to defend at least Sarajevo and the other safe areas, and secure Bosnian Serb acceptance of the Contact Group Proposal. We should approach key allies early regarding the type of support they might be willing to provide, especially to defend Sarajevo. Without the use of Allied bases, particularly those in Italy, our ability to support the Bosnian government would be severely limited.

Bosnian Serb Reaction: Based on their past behavior, the Bosnian Serbs will likely react aggressively and pre-emptively to any lifting of the arms embargo. The Bosnian Serbs often exaggerate their military capabilities. Their aim would be to bring maximum pressure immediately to bear against the government in the hopes of forcing a settlement on their terms before the military tide could be turned. The eastern enclaves and Sarajevo would be priority targets, though in the case of the latter they might opt for strangulation and shelling rather than outright military take-over. Severing the Tuzla area from government-held lands to the south could be another

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possibility, as would widening the Posavina corridor. Key variables shaping their response include: the state of Belgrade-Pale relations, perceptions of international resolve to counter Bosnian Serb offensives, the willingness of Belgrade to intervene with men and material. With the U.S. perceived as a party to the conflict, acts of terrorism against U.S. interests cannot be ruled out.

Bosnian Government Vulnerabilities: The vulnerability of the eastern enclaves and Sarajevo, combined with the lag between lifting the embargo and increasing Bosnian military capabilities, virtually guarantee that lifting the embargo will require from the outset air support and a continued humanitarian relief effort. This is based on the assumption that while we might be able to tolerate the fall of relatively isolated and difficult to defend enclaves, we politically could not tolerate the fall or strangulation of Sarajevo. This argues strongly against a "lift and leave" option.

That said, Bosnian government forces have improved substantially over the past two years and the Interagency Balkan Task Force (Baseline Assessment Paper: Leveling the Battlefield) believes they can probably hold their own against determined Bosnian Serb assaults on the core Federation areas in central Bosnia so long as Federation unity is maintained. The Interagency Balkan Task Force estimates that Sarajevo, however, currently has only approximately 30 days worth of food supplies on hand.

Fate Of UNPROFOR: Lifting the arms embargo will almost certainly lead to UNPROFOR withdrawal. The British say they need 30 days advance notice to withdraw in an orderly fashion and 72 hours in a hostile situation where troops are extricated (with our help) and equipment is left behind. Among other things, UNPROFOR's departure will seriously complicate both air operations against the Serbs and any humanitarian relief effort. On the other hand, it should give us greater scope for taking robust action without fear of reprisals against UN personnel on the ground. While the idea of an UNPROFOR II deployed only in Federation territory as a stabilizing factor has been put forward, such a force would probably have little impact on the course of the conflict unless it were structured as a real combat force.

II. MILITARY OPTIONS/CAPABILITIES

In determining military support options, we need to consider several factors: what the Bosnians have now, what they need to alter the situation on the ground, whether new infusions of men and material on the Bosnian Serb side will increase those needs, and what we can and should do to invalidate or lessen the impact of negative factors. For

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example, we need to consider ways (such as a Kosovo Christmas-type warning) to reduce the likelihood of Serbian intervention or assistance.

We also need to consider the possibility that a convincing demonstration of force, applied early on and internationally supported, could substantially reduce the level and length of the military support effort needed to bring the Bosnian Serbs around. Similarly, the demonstrated ability of the Bosnian government to absorb weapons and improve its military capabilities over the last two years should be taken into account.

The analysis below views our policy choices in terms of light, medium, and heavy air support/arming options. But it should be noted that an argument can also be made that our real choice centers around a more fundamental question: whether or not we are willing to deploy U.S. ground forces. If we are not, then maximum and early use of air power and a maximum arming option are probably necessary to achieve our objectives. If we are not prepared for such an approach at the outset, then we should be prepared to escalate quickly in response to possible Serb actions.

Option 1: A Minimalist Military Support Option

Without substantial immediate outside support, Bosnian government forces would not be capable of lifting the blockade of Sarajevo or preventing the overrunning of the smaller eastern enclaves. As noted above, they would probably be able to withstand assaults on their core central areas. Needless to say, the capitulation of Sarajevo would be a great blow to the government and a setback to any international efforts to help them. It would also encourage the Bosnian Serbs to continue the conflict and make a negotiated settlement less likely.

Even if the U.S. did not furnish material support to the Bosnian government, weapons and possibly troops provided by friendly Islamic states would still flow into the country, perhaps in substantial numbers. This would be of great concern to Serbia, Macedonia and the rest of Europe. Islamization of the military re-supply effort would have a broad and long-term impact on the Balkan region and Europe. Aid would also arrive from Islamic states not friendly to the U.S., such as Iran. Such an effort would not be comparable to a determined U.S. effort but would over time improve the capability of Bosnian government forces versus the Bosnian Serbs.

The Joint Staff (Annex: Rearming the Federation) and Interagency Balkan Task Force (Baseline Assessment Paper: Leveling the Battlefield) estimate a robust U.S. effort would

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take up to a year to make government forces competitive. Any non-U.S. effort would probably take longer, and might never enable the government to level the playing field, particularly if the FRY increased its own arms supplies to Pale. Any Islamization of the military resupply effort, moreover, could cause the Muslim-Croat rapprochement to fray, itself jeopardizing the resupply effort.

Option 2: Lift With Interim Military Support

U.S. support for the Bosnian government for a limited period in the wake of lifting the embargo would obviously increase the ability of the government to compete with the Bosnian Serbs on more equal terms. How well they could compete would depend directly on the level and nature of support provided.

Sarajevo: Given the importance and vulnerability of Sarajevo, any initial U.S. support should focus on ways to keep humanitarian relief flowing into the city. Although air drops might provide a portion of the needed relief, the ideal solution would be to open up a land corridor running from core Federation territories into Sarajevo. This would at the very least require commitment of U.S. airpower, acting in concert with Bosnian government forces. In this regard, the Joint Staff believes that we should not assume that air power alone can prevent the fall of Sarajevo. Thus, if saving the city is a bottom line objective, we should be prepared to do what is necessary to save the city, up to and including the insertion of U.S. ground forces.

Determining what would work is clearly a priority objective and should be completed well prior to lifting the embargo. The August 9, 1993 NAC airstrike decision would provide adequate authority for NATO airstrikes, assuming NATO agreed to participate. In the wake of the departure of key allies from UNPROFOR, it would be highly questionable whether NATO Allies could reach a consensus on further participation. If NATO were willing to take this on, under the August 9 NAC decision, authorization from UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali for the first strike would still be needed. If the U.S. had to act outside the NATO context, perhaps as head of a coalition of the willing, we would need to decide whether to seek UN authority to undertake the strikes.

The Eastern Enclaves: The U.S. might also wish to help the Bosnian government defend the highly vulnerable eastern enclaves against Bosnian Serb attacks. If NATO were willing to take this on, we anticipate the Allies would require a new NAC decision reflecting the changed circumstances. The Allies would also want UN authority for NATO to act. If the U.S. acted alone, or as head of a coalition, new UN authority would presumably be required.

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Supporting Bosnian Government Forces Elsewhere: Under a limited support option, the U.S. might decide not to risk its aircraft in what might be regarded as an uphill struggle to prevent at least the smaller enclaves from being overrun. The same might hold true for providing air support for Bosnian government forces facing attack in other parts of Bosnia. If we assume that these forces are capable of holding their own, we may wish to intervene only if the situation on a particular battlefront becomes desperate. Any intervention, particularly if it occurred apart from a safe area, could require new NATO authorization (if NATO were involved) and possibly additional UN authority.

Providing Equipment and Training: The U.S. would probably want to provide the Bosnian government with equipment and training as part of lifting the arms embargo. Clearly, the more of each we provided, and the sooner we provided it, the sooner the Bosnian government would be capable of bringing pressure to bear on the Bosnian Serbs to settle, and if necessary, of turning the tide on the battlefield. Viewed in this way, option 2 would behoove us to go all out to provide the necessary materiel and to provide it as soon as possible. Both the Joint Staff (Annex: Rearming the Federation) and the Interagency Balkan Task Force (Baseline Assessment Paper: Leveling the Battlefield) agree that a strong U.S. effort could equip and train Bosnian government forces to this task in no more than a year, although this would be an expensive proposition. The Task Force acknowledges, however, that Bosnian Serb military operations could divert government attention and lengthen this timetable.

The Interagency Balkan Task Force estimates government requirements at 120-200 tanks, 60-100 APCs, 200-350 artillery pieces and 25-40 MRLs. They also estimate 2,000 trucks would be needed, along with communication equipment, ammunition, fuel and other supplies. The Joint Staff estimates the price tag for acquiring such supplies would run over $3 billion.

The alternative to providing the government with the equipment it needed to turn the tide would be to give them less than what they needed. Although less expensive in the short run, this would risk prolonging the war, perhaps indefinitely, resulting in a higher cost in human life and inviting continuing domestic criticism and pressure to do more. In this regard, the Joint Staff outlines two less robust force upgrading initiatives, but they are not considered here since they would perforce not significantly alter the situation on the ground.

Under any approach, we would want to spread the burden as much as possible. Given the high costs of providing weaponry and transporting it, we would presumably want to pass the hat at an early stage to defer our own expenses. This would certainly involve approaching rich Islamic states and

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selected other states such as Japan. We would also want to strongly encourage other (particularly NATO) nations to provide equipment, although avoiding overcomplicating the array of weapons and other materiel that Bosnian government forces are obliged to master is probably a virtue.

Option 3: Lift With Long-term Support

If the Joint Staff and the Interagency Task Force are correct in their estimates, other things being equal, the Bosnian government should be able to begin turning the tide against the Bosnian Serbs after about a year. To the extent we do not frontload our support, the less pressure there will be on the Bosnian Serbs to accept a negotiated settlement, the longer it will take the government to get on equal footing with the Serbs and the longer our active involvement will last. Assuming that the war continues for some time after the playing field has been leveled, the Bosnian government will continue to need our support. The need for airpower will diminish, although the longer it is used the more quickly the government is likely to succeed in gaining its military objectives. Government forces will also need to replace weapons and other materiel lost in combat.

In an important sense, the distinction between options 2 and 3 is an artificial one. The less support we provide at the outset, the longer our involvement is likely to last. If we are going to provide the government with military equipment and air support, we should try to give them the ability to take the initiative as soon as they possibly can. We will in any event need to continue to support them until they are able to take the initiative, and on a contingency basis, in the event of unexpected reverses on the ground or FRY intervention. We have good reason to believe that if we can keep them afloat during the first key months--and this also means developing a strategy enabling Sarajevo to survive--we can be fairly confident that they will be able to field an increasingly capable force, bring increasing pressure to bear on the Bosnian Serbs to accept a negotiated settlement, and eventually, if necessary, begin to turn the tide. In seeking to lift the arms embargo, this should be our primary goal.

III. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS/ISSUES

NATO and UN Support

Clearly, the U.S. would have an interest in internationalizing the effort in Bosnia to the maximum extent possible. It would be very much in our interest politically to make this a NATO operation and to seek UN, and therefore, Russian support. To do this, we must, as a first step, get the

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arms embargo lifted multilaterally. A robust diplomatic initiative would be required to bring the allies on board. To the extent we have to go it alone we sacrifice key equities in NATO and in our relations with the Russians and the UN. Unilateral lift would rupture consensus within NATO on a key European security issue and could create a serious, long-term rift in the alliance. The military and economic burden would also fall more squarely on our shoulders. Without NATO, basing for air operations could become a serious problem.

Dealing with Reversals on the Ground

We must be prepared to deal with setbacks at each step of the escalatory ladder. At each stage, if a given mix of air power and arming options is not working, we will need to reach a judgment as to whether the setback is temporary and tactical or a reflection of a more fundamental problem. If the latter, we will need to decide whether to go in more deeply or conclude it is time to cut our losses. We need to recognize going in that air power will be impotent to stop the fighting once it enters major populated areas.

Preventing Spillover

Bosnia does not exist in a vacuum. We have a goal of preventing the conflict from spilling over into other parts of the region. Lifting the arms embargo could have a serious destabilizing impact on neighboring Krajina, in Kosovo, and in Macedonia.

Krajina: Although UNPROFOR may have departed from Bosnia, we have a strong interest in seeing it remain in both Croatia and Macedonia. UNPROFOR departure from the former could lead to new fighting in Krajina and to renewed conflict between Croatia and Serbia. We would need in any event to persuade Zagreb not to take advantage of events in Bosnia by seeking an outcome in Krajina which might only make things worse.

We will also need to confront how to handle the arms embargo against Croatia. Croatia is essential as a port of entry and conduit for sending equipment into Bosnia. Presumably we would need to either lift the arms embargo against Croatia or provide for right of transit. Either alternative would probably result in a substantial increase in Croatian military capabilities and alarm both the Krajina Serbs and Belgrade. This would need to be carefully managed.

Macedonia/Kosovo: Although a Serbian adventure in Macedonia may seem unlikely, our forces there are performing an important deterrent function and, if anything, should be strengthened. We should consider reiterating our Christmas warning to the Serbs that we would be prepared to employ

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military force against them in Kosovo and in Serbia proper in the event of a conflict in Kosovo caused by Serb action. UNPROFOR troops that remain near the Serbian border might be targets of retaliation.

Serbia: Lifting the embargo would probably not lead directly to Belgrade's intervention. The more successful the Bosnian government is on the ground, however, the greater the pressure will be on Serbia to intervene. This is something we should consider warning them about at an early stage. Should they nonetheless overtly intervene with men and materiel, we would need to consider whether to take military action against them. This would presumably require new authorities from both NATO (if this is a NATO operation) and the UN, unless we sought an omnibus authority in conjunction with lifting the embargo at the beginning of the process that dealt with all such contingencies.

Impact on the Federation

The impact of lifting the arms embargo on the Federation will depend on the course of events on the ground. The more prolonged the conflict and the more arms that flow to government forces, the more strain there will be on the Federation and the greater the risk to its survival. Success on the ground which leads the Bosnians to escalate their war aims could also prove a source of tension. On the other hand, the strategic reasons underlying Muslim-Croat cooperation vis-a-vis the Serbs will remain a positive factor and Zagreb's continued support for the Federation will be critical.

Keeping the Negotiating Track Going

Our primary goal in lifting the arms embargo is to pressure the Bosnian Serbs into accepting the Contact Group map, and failing this, to give the Bosnian government the means to begin to turn the tide. Any decision to lift the arms embargo, therefore, should go hand in hand with continuing efforts to obtain a negotiated settlement. As the pressure increases against the Bosnian Serbs, we should continue our efforts to get them to accept a negotiated settlement. As time passes, the international community (the Contact Group if it is still in place) may decide to alter the offer on the table. It is also possible that the Bosnian government will prove increasingly resistant to a negotiated settlement as its prospects on the battlefield improve. This will require careful management.

Need for Public Rationale

We need to develop an easily understood rationale for any U.S. military action in Bosnia in order to ensure we can sustain our involvement long enough to get the job done. Our

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public affairs strategy will need to dampen Kuwait-type expectations of an easy and relatively painless success, with no real setbacks along the way, as well as Somalia-type situation, where public reaction to media images of an American soldier being dragged through the streets led to a collapse of support for our effort and early withdrawal. Apart from the fact that we are dealing with the Balkans and not Somalia, the likelihood of this kind of atrocity being perpetrated will be reduced if we do not have a troop presence. We would, however, need to be prepared for the shooting down of U.S. planes and for captured and possibly tortured U.S. pilots.

Our most immediate public affairs concern, however, given the vulnerability of the enclaves and the time lag between lift and its impact on Bosnian ability to defend themselves and turn the tide, will likely be to ensure the public understands that there will be no quick military fix and the situation is likely to get worse before it gets better. To the extent that early and decisive use of air power neutralizes the Serbs' offensive capabilities and buys time for the Bosnians to level the playing field, our military support effort will be able to concentrate on less controversial training and supply functions. This should simplify the public affairs task and help prepare us for low-level, low-risk involvement for the longer haul, if that proves necessary.

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004d. paper	re: Leveling the Battlefield in the Bosnian Conflict (6 pages)	07/29/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
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FOLDER TITLE:
PC0095 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and the Eastern Mediterranean, August 17, 1994 [1]

2010-0533-M
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004e. paper	re: Lifting the Arms Embargo on Bosnia [partial] (6 pages)	08/03/1994	P1/b(1)

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[004e]

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Lifting the Arms Embargo on Bosnia (U)

1. ~~(C)~~ Background. Should the Contact Group fail to agree to a significant disincentive program, to be applied as a result of the Serb rejection of the proposed map, the US may be forced to consider lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian government. The objective of such a course of action would be to enhance the capabilities of the Federation military so that the situation on the battlefield can be altered enough to force the Serbs to agree to a negotiated political settlement.

2. (U) Courses of Action. There are three general Courses of Action (COAs) for rearming Bosnian forces: light, medium, and heavy.

a. ~~(S)~~ **COA 1. Level the playing field.** Provide the Bosnian Federation army with a strong offensive capability by arming it to the same level as the Bosnian Serbs, including small arms, mortars, light anti-armor weapons, AT mines, comm gear, tanks, APCs, heavy mortars, rocket launchers, counter-battery radar, etc. (Heavy option)

- This option would cost approximately $3+ billion dollars to accomplish and could require up to a year to accomplish.

EO 13526 1.4b

b. ~~(S)~~ **COA 2. Upgrade existing forces and add maneuver/counterattack capability.** Provide the Bosnian army an increased offensive capability by providing small arms, mortars, light anti-armor weapons, AT mines, comm gear, etc. to properly outfit the Bosnian army, plus tanks, APCs, heavy mortars, rocket launchers, artillery and counter-battery radars to protect safe areas. (Medium option)

- This option would cost approximately $1.7 billion dollars and take 6-8 months to accomplish.

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[004e]

c. ~~(S)~~ COA 3. Upgrade existing light forces. Provide small arms, mortars, light anti-armor weapons, AT mines, comm gear, etc. to properly outfit 30-50,000 troops, plus limited counter-battery radar/counter-fire artillery capability. (Light option).

- COA 3 would cost approximately $170-$200 million dollars. Light arms could be delivered and absorbed in as little as 2-4 four months. Heavier, more complex systems could require up to 8 months until operationally effective.

EO 13526 1.4a, 1.4b

3. ~~(S)~~ Strike Options. There are three general "strike" scenarios which could be coupled with the "lift" strategy: no support, interim support, and long-term support. Additionally, the applicability of current NATO obligations needs to be considered as well.

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4. ~~(S)~~ Analysis. The following is a comparison of potential COAs and strike options, aimed at evaluating each combination's likelihood of success.

EO 13526 1.4a, 1.4b

Evaluation:

- Significantly altering the battlefield situation requires robust rearmament and air support. These are long-term, high-cost options.

EO 13526 1.4a, 1.4b

5. ~~(S)~~ Unilateral vs Multilateral. The COAs and air strike options remain the same, regardless of whether lifting the arms embargo unilaterally or multilaterally. The following variables, however, are germane:

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[0046]

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b. ~~(S)~~ **Equipment Availability.** Under a multilateral approach, the number of potential donors/suppliers would be greater. Embarking on a unilateral program, the US would assume primary responsibility for identifying, acquiring, funding, and supporting a rearmament effort.

EO 13526 1.4a, 1.4b

d. ~~(S)~~ **Training.** Under a unilateral approach, the US would be one of the few available sources of high-quality training. This would require putting troops on the

EO 13526 1.4a, 1.4b

6. (U) Mechanics of arming and training

a. ~~(S)~~ **Equipment sources:** Although limited stocks of required items are available (tanks, APCs, heavy mortars, artillery, and rocket launchers), the US may be required to identify other sources in order to meet Bosnia's requirements for items such as heavy artillery. COA 3, the light option, could be accomplished primarily on the international arms market.

b. ~~(S)~~ **Transportation means and routes:** The Federation agreement makes supply through Croatia the most cost effective option, although Croatia would probably demand significant percentage of the supplies and might balk at heavy weapons shipments.

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c. ~~(S)~~ **Route protection:**

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EO 13526 1.4a, 1.4b

d. ~~(S)~~ **Training:** Training will probably require some US military presence in theater and thereby risk direct USG confrontation with the BSA. Time estimates vary from 2 months (very rudimentary level) for training of B-H forces in place, to a year or more if the USG attempts to level the playing field (COA 1).

- SF could provide in-country training for COA 3.
- COA 1 would require extensive use of training ranges to establish proficiency, plus significant maintenance training.

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SYMMETRICAL RESPONSES

- LOCs through which arms must flow could be interdicted.
- The eastern enclaves could be seized or Sarajevo cutoff.

ASYMMETRICAL RESPONSES

- UN/NGO personnel could be taken hostage should those organizations attempt to withdraw.
- Utilities/support structures could be destroyed making Sarajevo or other urban areas uninhabitable.
- Terrorist attacks could be initiated outside the Balkan region.

4. (U) Conclusions

a. ~~(S)~~ If this strategy is pursued, the greatest likelihood for success derives from an approach which combines a robust rearmament effort and a complementary, long-term air operation. Dedicated TACPs are a must.

- This option is long-term and high cost.
- The strategy could require significant dedication of US assets, especially if pursued unilaterally.

b. ~~(S)~~ In pursuing a unilateral approach, the USG may undermine NATO solidarity and damage the credibility of the UN.

EO 13526 1.4a, 1.4b

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The Eastern Mediterranean: A Region of Crisis

Introduction and Goals

Greece and Turkey are the focus of a region of crisis extending from the Balkans and Macedonia through the Middle East and into Central Asia. The overriding United States interest in this area is stability and the absence of conflict, especially involving Russia. Our general goals are thus: (1) the relaxation of interstate tensions and avoidance of armed conflict: (2) the development and refinement of democratic regimes that defuse ethnic conflict; (3) the implementation of economic reform to help sustain political and economic development; and (4) the development of regional political and economic cooperation.

Solutions to regional problems are particularly difficult because of the long-standing "zero-sum" nature of regional rivalries. Policies which benefit Turkey risk a downturn in relations with Greece, and vice-versa. The same holds true in any approach to Greece and Albania, the GOG and FYROM, Turkey and Russia, and Armenia and Turkey. Additional USG funding for economic purposes is one of the best ways to help regional states while minimizing "zero-sum" opposition from others, since it is less controversial than political or security support. But additional funding is difficult in a time of budgetary stringency.

Growing strains in Greco-Turk relations and in their relations with the United States threaten a wide range of U.S. interests throughout the region. The upsurge in long-term animosity is increasingly difficult to contain because there is no longer a tight framework of Western Cold War solidarity. The U.S. will have to make a major investment of effort and resources to have an appreciable effect on developments which stem from a major realignment of interests and preoccupations in the region. U.S. interests in Turkey are more extensive than in Greece or other regional nations, and we have elaborated on these interests in Annex A.

TURKEY

Turkey is caught in a web of political and economic problems. A weak coalition government is having difficulty coping with the simultaneous challenges of combatting the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), meeting the needs of a poor and growing population, and reforming an inefficient economy. The deterioration in Turkey's human rights situation is undermining the integrity of its democratic system as well as becoming a serious problem in Ankara's relations with the U.S. and other Western countries. Meanwhile, the post-Cold War decline in Turkey's active military importance has diminished

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Ankara's stock in the West. There has been an appreciable decline in aid levels, military cooperation, support for Turkish integration into the EU, understanding for Turkey's concerns about Russia, and willingness to help Turkey offset the cost of the Iraqi embargo.

Turkey nevertheless stands out as a democratic and secular nation in a region which has few democratic traditions, where Islamic fundamentalism is increasing, and where Christianity and Islam directly confront each other. A committed member of NATO, Turkey both strengthens Western defenses against the possibility of a resurgent Russian threat, and offers the potential to extend the reach of the West into an unstable part of the world which has critical oil resources. There is no doubt that an undemocratic, radical, destabilized, or fundamentalist Turkey would encourage forces in the region that are inimical to U.S. and Western interests.

Ankara is seeking to use improved relations with Israel to strengthen support in the U.S. and extend its influence in Central Asia. The Israeli government views democratic, secular Turkey as a counterweight to Iraq, Syria, Iran, and fundamentalism in general. Common cause between Tel Aviv and Ankara has some limited potential to move Middle Eastern and Central Asian developments in a positive direction.

Final agreement to flush the mothballed Iraqi pipeline has not yet been reached as Turkey is still working to obtain Iraq's agreement. The Turks continue to feel that their economic sacrifices to implement the UN sanctions against Iraq have gone largely unappreciated. This feeling reinforces popular sentiment that Turkey will never be accepted as a full-fledged member of the Western "club," and that Ankara must increasingly pursue its own interests without special deference to the West.

Near to Mid-Term Objectives

Over time, we seek an economically successful, secular and democratic state, with improved human rights performance, capable of acting as a bridge to countries further east, while remaining solidly rooted in the Western security system. In the shorter term, our goals with Turkey include (in priority order):

- An end to any bombing campaign (e.g., Rhodes) against Greece by the Government of Turkey (GOT);
- Continuation of Operation Provide Comfort and the maintenance of the regime of sanctions against Iraq;
- Cooperation in the amelioration of regional conflicts, including the Cyprus dispute, the war in Bosnia, and the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh;

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- Improved human rights performance, including an end to torture and restrictions on freedom of expression; and

- Continuation of the economic reform program enacted in April 1994.

Carrots

In the current political and fiscal environment, U.S. ability to secure these goals is limited. There is nevertheless a range of steps we can take. These are listed below by category, in order of ascending difficulty within each category.

I. Strengthen the USG-GOT dialogue: We have a number of important messages to send to the Government of Turkey on security, political and economic issues which will be difficult to deliver and to receive. They need to be made at the highest possible levels, and they need to be repeated. For this purpose, a series of high level visitors would be useful. If done properly, such visitors could serve the additional function of providing reassurance to the GOT that the USG remains committed to the relationship. Visits could include:

-- A Presidential envoy to warn Prime Minister Ciller of the serious danger to Turkey's Western ties posed by unilateral action against Greece, including covert action, to review our political agenda with Turkey and to reinforce the need for urgent human rights improvements. A senior military officer should accompany the envoy to convey these same considerations to the Turkish military. Possible emissaries include:

  - NSA Tony Lake
  - U/S Tarnoff

  Following the Presidential envoy, senior officials should periodically be used to reiterate the messages that were passed, both in order to maintain the dialogue and to keep the pressure on Ankara to move in a desirable direction. Discussions should also center on regional issues such as Nagorno-Karabakh, Central Asia, Iraq, Russia and the Middle East, in order to emphasize the importance the USG attaches to working with Turkey as an equal partner. Possible emissaries for this task include:

  - New EUR A/S Holbrooke
  - DRL A/S Shattuck
  - NSC Europe Director Vershbow
  - New EUR DAS Frasure.
  - Incoming Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism Wilcox.

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Meanwhile, we should use every possible venue and occasion to reiterate and reinforce the messages that have been passed.

-- In addition to visits by USG officials to Turkey, there will be opportunities to use visits by GOT officials to the U.S. to pursue this high level dialogue:

  - o An early invitation should be extended to the new Turkish MFA Under secretary to visit Washington as soon as he is named, as part of an effort to revitalize the U.S.-Turkey Steering Group.

  - o The UNGA will bring the new Turkish Foreign Minister to New York and possibly to Washington. It would be appropriate for the Secretary to meet with him.

  - o The annual meeting of the U.S.-Turkey Joint Economic Commission will be held in Washington in November or December and will bring a number of senior Turkish economic officials.

II. Expand the dialogue to include key Western allies: While the U.S. has the strongest bilateral relationship with Turkey of any country, other Western nations (eg. UK, Germany, France) can also exercise influence on Turkey. It might be useful to initiate a major review of Turkish-Greek-Western relations with key allies with a view to coordinating long-term political and security policies.

III. Expand the dialogue to include key Middle Eastern countries: Key regional countries such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait have expressed concern over the strains in Turkey and would like to work with us to help alleviate them. It is in our interest to help establish closer ties between these countries and Turkey. We should involve them in our consultations on Turkey, encourage them to work with us in providing assistance to Turkey, and stimulate them to pursue parallel initiatives with Turkey.

IV. Strengthen material incentives to Turkey:

-- Establish a U.S.-Turkish commission to promote cooperative assistance to the Caucasus and Central Asia, and commit a portion of U.S. assistance destined for Central Asia to a tripartite program involving Turkey in such areas as the provision of medical services.

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-- Increase Turkey's duty-free access to the U.S. market, by agreeing to the GOT's request to add specific categories of articles not currently covered under the GSP list.

-- Establish and generously fund a special office in the Commerce Department to promote U.S.-Turkish trade, and create a special interagency committee chaired by the Secretary of Commerce to promote U.S. trade with Turkey (and perhaps other Big Emerging Markets).

-- Organize a USG-GOG trade mission to the Balkans led by Commerce Secretary Brown or Deputy Commerce Secretary Barram.

-- Keep open the possibility of creating a loan guarantee program for Turkey should Turkish interest rekindle.

-- Make best efforts to remove the Congressional hold on FY'94 ESF and to provide additional ESF directed to use in the Turkish southeast, contingent on GOT steps toward a political resolution of the Kurdish problem.

-- Provide funding for cooperative human-rights projects, such as the operation of a "blue-ribbon committee" of senior statesmen to examine Turkey's human rights performance and make appropriate recommendations.

-- Seek additional assistance which could be offered contingent on Turkish-Greek agreement on concrete measures of cooperation, e.g., military debt reduction (for both Turkey and Greece) in exchange for confidence-building measures, including a reduction of military activity, in the Aegean.

-- Seek special bilateral assistance (perhaps $50-100 million grant) to support Turkey's contribution to Provide Comfort.

V. <u>Respond to outstanding Turkish concerns</u>:

-- Assure that USG action on outstanding bilateral economic problems such as Section 301 trade reviews and IIAA petition to remove Turkey from GSP is as favorable to Turkey as possible.

-- Grant Turkey's recent request for swing in several quota categories under the bilateral textile agreement.

-- Reverse DS's decision to draw down personal security for the Turkish Consul General in Los Angeles ($800,000 cost).

-- Ensure that survivors of Turks killed in the downing of the two U.S. helicopters receive adequate compensation.

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-- Impress our European allies with the terrorist nature of the PKK, and encourage them to close down offices with demonstrated PKK affiliations in their countries.

-- Continue pressing the government of Greece to take action against PKK activities.

VI. Strengthen Congressional support for relations with Turkey:

-- Encourage visits to Turkey by Members of Congress, especially those particularly concerned with human rights. Visits might also include Provide Comfort operations, and could be conducted jointly with Turkish parliamentarians.

-- Intensify cooperation with Members of Congress who are supportive of Turkey.

-- Press the case for strong U.S. interests in Turkey with Members of Congress who are hostile to Turkey.

-- Encourage the GOT to take Congressional concerns more seriously, and to devote more attention to Congress, such as by sending senior Turkish statesmen to Washington to meet with Members of Congress.

VII. Increase Military Cooperation:

-- Promote PFP and other peacekeeping exercises in Turkey or involving Turkish troops, including help with planning, the provision of special funding, and pressure on key allies and on the Russians to participate.

-- Conclude the "Arrangement for Transfer" of the Turkish Defense Fund expeditiously and encourage the GOT to conclude the DECA review.

-- Support a Turkish proposal for an interim tanker capability, pending arrival of refurbished tankers in 1997, provided the MOD signs the letter of offer and acceptance for a specific number of refurbished tankers and uses the interim tankers to reduce U.S. operational commitments.

-- Urge the TGS to commit to joint training activities and to pursue common military doctrine.

-- Maintain high levels of security assistance loan credits, if at all possible at preferential rates, and IMET funding.

Sticks

Continued GOT operations against Greece, a stonewall on human rights improvements, or abandonment of the sanctions

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regime against Iraq would justify a resort to stronger measures to change GOT policies. A harder GOT line on Cyprus, in the Balkans or Nagorno-Karabakh also might require a sharper response from us. In such circumstances, the following measures are at our disposal:

-- Suspend allocation of preferential textile quotas.

-- Block any NATO infrastructure funding for tanker support.

-- Slow down or suspend remaining deliveries of equipment cascaded under the CFE Treaty.

-- Suspend the Turkish Defense Fund Transfer.

-- Suspend additional security assistance funding.

-- Put Turkey on the list of countries which support terrorism, based on its involvement in the bombing of Greek Tourist sites.

Greece

Greece views its interests almost exclusively through a regional prism. It perceives its current situation to be much less secure as a result of the end of the Cold War. The Greeks believe that their country and the Greek national identity (Hellenism) are under siege and on a losing trend. Related to this insecurity is Greece's long-standing fear of Turkey, which Greeks see as an even greater threat in the absence of the discipline provided by the Cold War.

Greece's embargo of FYROM and relationship relationship with Serbia have interfered with international efforts to tighten sanctions on Serbia-Montenegro, thus diminishing prospects for resolution of the Balkans conflict. In the face of the blockade to the south, the FYROM has resumed large-scale trading with Serbia as its own economy deteriorates.

The Greeks see the Kurds as Turkey's Achilles heel and are making some use of them to undermine a historical adversary. The PKK is increasingly active in Greece. PKK representatives have met with Greek parliamentarians and some low-level officials. The PKK supports terrorist operations from a facility in Greece, and may have received assistance from Greek intelligence services. We have warned Athens about the danger such activities pose to relations with Turkey, to no noticeable effect. Our conclusion is that the GOG condones but does not necessarily support PKK activity in Greece, although we continue to investigate the matter.

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Long and Short Term Goals

Over the longer term, we seek to persuade Athens to abandon its confrontational approach in regional affairs, in favor of cooperation with us in developing an agenda for the economic and democratic development of the Balkan region. In the shorter term, our goals for Greece include (in priority order):

- o Cease encouragement of PKK terrorism;
- o Lift the embargo on FYROM;
- o Normalize Greek relations with Albania;
- o Tighten enforcement of UN sanctions on Serbia; and
- o Work constructively to help solve the Cyprus situation.

Carrots

As with Turkey, our means to accomplish these goals are circumscribed. Growing nationalism in Greece is both an obstacle to leadership and a result of the lack of strong leadership. Also like Turkey, Greece faces an economic crisis stemming from a misguided statist economic policy and resulting high budget deficits. However, Greece's position in the West is more secure than Turkey's. Its EU membership and a strong Congressional lobby here provide a more secure foundation of political and economic support, thereby reducing the incentives for Greece to moderate its nationalistic policies toward its neighbors. We need to try to establish a "strengthened partnership" with Greece with agreed goals and mutually-supportive definitions of national interest.

Some of the steps we could take at this point include:

I. Strengthen the USG-GOG dialogue:

-- Send the Presidential envoy who visits Turkey on to Greece to review Greek-Turkish relations and to warn Prime Minister Papandreou that Greece's management of its relationships with Turkey, Albania and FYROM are damaging for Greece, the Balkans, the EU, NATO, and the U.S. The message should reiterate the dangers of support for the PKK and call on Papandreou to lift the embargo on FYROM.

-- High-level officials visiting Turkey should also visit Greece to address Greek-Turkish tension and regional developments.

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II. Expand the dialogue to include key Western allies:

-- Initiate a major review of Turkish-Greek-Western relations with key allies with a view to coordinating long-term policy.

III. Enhance economic cooperation

-- Organize a USG-GOG trade mission to the Balkans led by Commerce Secretary Brown or Deputy Commerce Secretary Barram.

-- Encourage the GOG to maintain a dialogue with Turkey on issues other than the Aegean.

-- Form a U.S.-EU-Greek Economic Commission. (The USG would not be in a position to match the economic resources that the EU would bring to the table in such a commission.)

-- Offer technical assistance on organizing a Southern Balkans Trade/Economic Cooperation Project. OPIC already has a cooperation agreement with the GOG that could be a vehicle for action.

IV. Increase military cooperation:

-- Promote PFP exercises involving the U.S., Greece, Albania, FYROM and others, including Turkey. The exercises should be held in these countries. We should appeal to Greece to assume its natural role as NATO and U.S. partner in NATO/PFP activities in the region.

-- Make greater use of the Escess Defense Article Program to build up the Greek military.

Sticks

In the event Athens encourages terrorism against Turkey, a stronger response on our part would be necessary. Tougher GOG policies toward Albania or FYROM would also merit stronger measures by the USG. These could include:

-- Suspend or slow down remaining deliveries of equipment to be cascaded under the CFE Treaty.

-- Start pressuring Greeks on ethnic Muslims' status and rights.

-- Threaten to request additional conditionality on assistance pegged to Greek performance in FYROM, Albania, or against terrorism.

-- Put Greece on the list of countries which support terrorism, based on its involvement in the bombing of Greek Tourist sites.

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Measures To Address Balkan issues:

In his July 13 report to the Secretary on the status of Greece/FYROM talks, Special Envoy Matthew Nimetz noted that both parties felt comfortable postponing further negotiations until after FYROM elections this October. Politically, the FYROM was not prepared to ratify an agreement with Greece until a new parliament had been elected. Macedonian President Gligorov indicated to Nimetz that the FYROM could muddle through the next three to four months, even with the Greek embargo in place. Nimetz noted that the most impatient party right now is the United States. His tentative judgement was that for the next few months we should watch the situation carefully, help the FYROM economically and politically in the short term where we can, but not play an activist role until after the FYROM elections.

In the meantime, however, there are some steps we can take on Balkan issues.

-- While continuing to press both sides to show flexibility, reevaluate our policy to hold off establishing diplomatic relations with the FYROM if the dispute with Greece is not settled by the end of 1994.

-- Shore up the FYROM's sagging economy by:

  - o Weighing in at a senior level with the IMF/IBRD on the need to expedite all loans/projects for the FYROM. A "Friends of Macedonia" group could be set up in concert with key European donors to amplify this pressure.

  - o Providing leadership for the immediate start of construction of a rail link connecting the FYROM to Bulgaria and Albania. This can be done through the IFI's and direct technical assistance/advisors.

  - o Sponsoring a regional Balkan conference on developing East-West road/rail routes through the Balkans.

-- Push for more active CSCE involvement in Greek-Albanian relations, e.g., a monitoring team to look at problems of the Greek minority in Albania, the April 10 attack near the border with Greece, Albanian migrant workers in Greece, and more general concerns about border security.

-- Encourage Turkey to make its Balkan policy -- especially relations with Albania -- as transparent as possible to the Greeks.

-- Explore the upgrade of infrastructure in the FYROM, Albania and Bulgaria, including airport, port, road, and rail links needed for troop deployments.

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-- Work to channel the energies of the Greek and Turkish private sectors into cooperative projects with U.S. firms in the Balkans.

-- Upgrade of the UNPROFOR contingent in FYROM.

ANNEXES

-- A. U.S. Interests in Turkey
-- B. Military Importance of Turkey
-- C. Turkey and Human Rights
-- D. Counter-Terrorism (sent separately)
-- E. Macedonia
-- F. Cyprus

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001a. memo	Kathleen Stephens/Donald Kerrick to Anthony Lake re: Principals August 17 Meeting: Revised Paper on the Eastern Mediterranean (1 page)	08/16/1994	P1/b(1)
~~001b. paper~~	~~re: The Eastern Mediterranean: A Region of Crisis (12 pages)~~	~~08/15/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
001c. paper	re: U.S. Interests in Turkey (1 page)	08/15/1994	P1/b(1)
001d. paper	re: Military Importance of Turkey (2 pages)	08/15/1994	P1/b(1)
001e. paper	re: Military Importance of Greece (2 pages)	08/15/1994	P1/b(1)
~~001f. paper~~	~~re: Human Rights in Turkey (2 pages)~~	~~08/15/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~001g. paper~~	~~re: Measures to Enhance Macedonian Stability (5 pages)~~	~~08/15/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~001h. paper~~	~~re: Cyprus (2 pages)~~	~~08/15/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
002a. paper	re: Interagency Review of Lifting the Arms Embargo (1 page)	08/1994	P1/b(1)
~~002b. paper~~	~~re: Options Paper: Lifting the Arms Embargo (9 pages)~~	~~08/15/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020

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RECORD ID: 9420968
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TO: LAKE

FROM: STEPHENS
KERRICK

DOC DATE: 16 AUG 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GREECE
BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
TURKEY
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: REVISED BACKGROUND PAPERS FOR 17 AUG PC MTG ON BOSNIA & EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE

DUE DATE: 19 AUG 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: STEPHENS

LOGREF: 9420963 9420967

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0095

CODES: BOS MED

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Sens	1	ADS	
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Lake	2	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
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West Wing Desk	3	SP 8/17	N
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001a. memo	Kathleen Stephens/Donald Kerrick to Anthony Lake re: Principals August 17 Meeting: Revised Paper on the Eastern Mediterranean (1 page)	08/16/1994	P1/b(1)

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Ellen - add language on M.E. Options

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The Eastern Mediterranean: A Region of Crisis

Introduction and Goals

Greece and Turkey are the focus of a region of crisis extending from the Balkans and Macedonia through the Middle East and into Central Asia. The overriding United States interest in this area is stability and the absence of conflict, especially involving Russia. Our general goals are thus: (1) the relaxation of interstate tensions and avoidance of armed conflict: (2) the development and refinement of democratic regimes that defuse ethnic conflict; (3) the implementation of economic reform to help sustain political and economic development; and (4) the development of regional political and economic cooperation.

Solutions to regional problems are particularly difficult because of the long-standing "zero-sum" nature of regional rivalries. Policies which benefit Turkey risk a downturn in relations with Greece, and vice-versa. The same holds true in any approach to Greece and Albania, the GOG and FYROM, Turkey and Russia, and Armenia and Turkey. Additional USG funding for economic purposes is one of the best ways to help regional states while minimizing "zero-sum" opposition from others, since it is less controversial than political or security support. But additional funding is difficult in a time of budgetary stringency.

Growing strains in Greco-Turk relations and in their relations with the United States threaten a wide range of U.S. interests throughout the region. The upsurge in long-term animosity is increasingly difficult to contain because there is no longer a tight framework of Western Cold War solidarity. The U.S. will have to make a major investment of effort and resources to have an appreciable effect on developments which stem from a major realignment of interests and preoccupations in the region. U.S. interests in Turkey are more extensive than in Greece or other regional nations, and we have elaborated on these interests in Annex A.

Turkey

Turkey is caught in a web of political and economic problems. A weak coalition government is having difficulty coping with the simultaneous challenges of combatting the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), meeting the needs of a poor and growing population, and reforming an inefficient economy. The deterioration in Turkey's human rights situation is undermining the integrity of its democratic system as well as becoming a serious problem in Ankara's relations with the U.S. and other Western countries. Meanwhile, the post-Cold War decline in Turkey's active military importance has diminished

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Ankara's stock in the West. There has been an appreciable decline in aid levels, military cooperation, support for Turkish integration into the EU, understanding for Turkey's concerns about Russia, and willingness to help Turkey offset the cost of the Iraqi embargo.

Turkey nevertheless stands out as a democratic and secular nation in a region which has few democratic traditions, where Islamic fundamentalism is increasing, and where Christianity and Islam directly confront each other. A committed member of NATO, Turkey both strengthens western defenses against the possibility of a resurgent Russian threat, and offers the potential to extend the reach of the West into an unstable part of the world which has critical oil resources. There is no doubt that an undemocratic, radical, destabilized, or fundamentalist Turkey would encourage forces in the region that are inimical to U.S. and Western interests.

Ankara is seeking to use improved relations with Israel to strengthen support in the U.S. and extend its influence in Central Asia. The Israeli government views democratic, secular Turkey as a counterweight to Iraq, Syria, Iran, and fundamentalism in general. Common cause between Tel Aviv and Ankara has some limited potential to move Middle Eastern and Central Asian developments in a positive direction.

Final agreement to flush the mothballed Iraqi pipeline appears close at hand but has not yet been reached. Meanwhile, the Turks continue to feel that their economic sacrifices to implement the UN sanctions against Iraq have gone largely unappreciated. This feeling reinforces popular sentiment that Turkey will never be accepted as a full-fledged member of the Western "club," and that Ankara must increasingly pursue its own interests without special deference to the West.

Goals and Objectives

Over time, we seek an economically successful, secular and democratic state, with improved human rights performance, capable of acting as a bridge to countries further east, while remaining solidly rooted in the Western security system. In the shorter term, our goals with Turkey include (in priority order):

- An end to any bombing campaign (e.g., Rhodes) against Greece by the Government of Turkey (GOT);
- Continuation of Operation Provide Comfort and the maintenance of the regime of sanctions against Iraq;
- Cooperation in the amelioration of regional conflicts, including the Cyprus dispute, the war in Bosnia, and the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh; and

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- o Improved human rights performance, including an end to torture and restrictions on freedom of expression;

- o Continuation of the economic reform/stabilization program enacted in April 1994.

Carrots

In the current political and fiscal environment, U.S. ability to secure these goals is limited. There are nevertheless a range of steps we can take. These are listed below by category, in order of ascending difficulty within each category.

I. Strengthen the USG-GOT dialogue: We have a number of important messages to send to the Government of Turkey on security, political and economic issues which will be difficult to deliver and to receive. They need to be made at the highest possible levels, and they need to be repeated. For this purpose a series of high level visitors would be useful. If done properly, such visitors could serve the additional function of providing reassurance to the GOT that the USG remains committed to the relationship. Visits could include:

-- A Presidential envoy to warn Prime Minister Ciller of the serious danger to Turkey's Western ties posed by unilateral action against Greece, including covert action, and to reinforce the need for urgent human rights improvements.

-- Senior officials to reiterate that message, persuade the Turks to sign on to specific steps to improve the human rights situation, and address other political developments within Turkey. Possible emissaries include:

  - o NSA Tony Lake
  - o U/S Tarnoff
  - o New EUR A/S Holbrooke
  - o DRL A/S Shattuck
  - o NSC Europe Director Vershbow
  - o New EUR DAS Frasure.
  - o Incoming Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism Wilcox.

-- Senior foreign policy officials to expand discussion of U.S.-Turkish policy on regional issues such as Nagorno-Karabakh, Central Asia, Iraq, and Russia, in order to emphasize the importance the USG attaches to working with

Turkey as a equal partner. These could include:

  - o S/NIS head Jim Collins
  - o Nagorno-Karabakh negotiator Pressel.

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- o High-level NEA officers to discuss Iraq, Syria, and the Middle East Peace Process.

-- The annual U.S. Turkish bilateral counter-terrorism consultations could be used to raise U.S.concerns on the human rights elements as well as security elements of the Kurdish issue. The next session will be held in Ankara in the fall.

-- In addition to visits by USG officials to Turkey, there will be opportunities to use visits by GOT officials to the U.S. to pursue this high level dialogue:

- o An early invitation should be extended to the new Turkish MFA Under secretary to visit Washington as soon as he is named, as part of an effort to revitalize the U.S.-Turkey Steering Group.

- o The UNGA will bring the new Turkish Foreign Minister to New York and possibly to Washington. It would be appropriate for the Secretary to meet with him.

- o The annual meeting of the U.S.-Turkey Joint Economic Commission will be held in Washington in November or December and will bring a number of senior Turkish economic officials.

II. Expand the dialogue to include key Western allies: While the U.S. has the strongest bilateral relationship with Turkey of any country, other Western nations (eg. UK, Germany, France) can also exercise influence on Turkey. Turkey particularly values NATO, and it might be useful to initiate a major review of Turkish-Greek-Western relations with key allies with a view to coordinating long-term political and security policies.

III. Expand the dialogue to include key Middle Eastern countries: Key regional countries such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait have expressed concern over the strains in Turkey and would like to work with us to help alleviate them. It is in our interest to help establish closer ties between these countries and Turkey. We should involve them in our consultations on Turkey, encourage them to work with us in providing assistance to Turkey, and stimulate them to pursue parallel initiatives with Turkey.

IV. Strengthen material incentives to Turkey:

-- Commit a portion of U.S. assistance destined for Central Asia to a tripartite program involving Turkey in such areas as the provision of medical services.

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-- Increase Turkey's duty-free access to the U.S. market. (This would require legislation and a GATT waiver).

-- Establish a special interagency committee chaired by the Secretary of Commerce to promote U.S. trade with Turkey (and perhaps other Big Emerging Markets).

-- Establish and generously fund a special office in the Commerce Department to promote U.S.-Turkish trade.

-- Keep open the possibility of creating a loan guarantee program for Turkey should Turkish interest rekindle.

-- Establish a U.S.-Turkish commission to promote cooperative assistance to the Caucasus and Central Asia.

-- Make best efforts to remove the Congressional hold on FY'94 ESF and to provide additional ESF directed to use in the Turkish southeast, contingent on GOT steps toward a political resolution of the Kurdish problem.

-- Provide funding for cooperative human-rights projects.

-- Seek additional assistance which could be offered contingent on Turkish-Greek agreement on concrete measures of cooperation, e.g., military debt reduction (for both Turkey and Greece) in exchange for confidence-building measures, including a reduction of military activity, in the Aegean.

-- Seek special bilateral assistance (perhaps $50-100 million grant) to support Turkey's contribution to Provide Comfort.

V. Respond to outstanding Turkish concerns:

-- Assure that USG action on outstanding bilateral economic problems such as Section 301 trade reviews and IIAA petition to remove Turkey from GSP is as favorable to Turkey as possible..

-- Grant Turkey's recent request for swing in several quota categories under the bilateral textile agreement.

-- Reverse DS's decision to draw down personal security for the Turkish Consul General in Los Angeles ($800,000 cost).

-- Insure that survivors of Turks killed in the downing of the two U.S. helicopters receive adequate compensation.

-- Impress our European allies with the terrorist nature of the PKK, and encourage them to close down offices with demonstrated PKK affiliations in their countries.

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-- Continue pressing the government of Greece to cease all support, material or otherwise, for the PKK.

VI. Strengthen Congressional support for relations with Turkey:

-- Encourage visits to Turkey by Members of Congress, especially those particularly concerned with human rights. Visits might also include Provide Comfort operations, and could be conducted jointly with Turkish parliamentarians.

-- Intensify cooperation with Members of Congress who are supportive of Turkey.

-- Press the case for strong U.S. interests in Turkey with Members of Congress who are hostile to Turkey.

-- Encourage the GOT to take Congressional concerns more seriously, and to devote more attention to Congress, such as by sending senior Turkish statesmen to Washington to meet with Members of Congress.

VII. Increase Military Cooperation:

-- Transfer the Turkish Defense Fund (TDF) to Turkey under terms more favorable than the President outlined in his March letter to PM Ciller.

adhere to $1B.

-- Promote PFP and other peacekeeping exercises in Turkey or involving Turkish troops, including help with planning, the provision of special funding, and pressure on key allies and on the Russians to participate.

-- Conclude the "Arrangement for Transfer" of the Turkish Defense Fund expeditiously and encourage the GOT to conclude the DECA review.

-- Support a Turkish proposal for an interim tanker capability, pending arrival of refurbished tankers in 1997, provided the MOD signs the letter of offer and acceptance for a specific number of refurbished tankers and uses the interim tankers to reduce U.S. operational commitments.

-- Urge the TGS to commit to joint training activities and to pursue common military doctrine.

-- Maintain high levels of security assistance loan credits, if at all possible at preferential rates, and IMET funding.

Sticks

Should they become necessary, there are also stronger measures at our disposal:

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-- Suspend allocation of preferential textile quotas.

-- Threaten to block any NATO infrastructure funding for tanker support.

-- Threaten to slow down or suspend remaining deliveries of equipment cascaded under the CFE Treaty.

-- Suspend the Turkish Defense Fund Transfer.

-- Suspend additional security assistance funding.

-- Put Turkey on the list of countries which support terrorism, based on its involvement in the bombing of Greek tourist sites.

Greece

As in the case of Turkey, growing nationalism in Greece is both an obstacle to leadership and a result of the lack of strong leadership. Also like Turkey, Greece faces an economic crisis stemming from a misguided statist economic policy and resulting high budget deficits. However, Greece's position in the West is more secure than Turkey's. Its EU membership and a strong Congressional lobby here provide a more secure foundation of political and economic support, thereby reducing the incentives for Greece to moderate its nationalistic policies toward its neighbors.

Greece views its interests almost exclusively through a regional prism. It perceives its current situation to be much less secure as a result of the end of the Cold War. The Greeks believe that their country and the Greek national identity (Hellenism) are under siege and on a losing trend. Related to this insecurity is Greece's long-standing fear of Turkey, which Greeks see as an even greater threat in the absence of the discipline provided by the Cold War.

The embargo and Greece's relationship with Serbia have interfered with international efforts to tighten sanctions on Serbia-Montenegro, thus diminishing prospects for resolution of the Balkans conflict. In the face of the blockade to the south, the FYROM has had no choice but to resume large-scale trading with Serbia as its own economy deteriorates.

The Greeks see the Kurds as Turkey's Achilles heel and are making some use of them to undermine a historical adversary. The PKK is increasingly active in Greece. PKK representatives have met with Greek parliamentarians and some low-level officials. The PKK supports terrorist operations from a facility in Greece, and may have received assistance from Greek

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intelligence services. We have warned Athens about the danger such activities pose to relations with Turkey, to no noticeable effect. Our conclusion is that the GOG condones but does not necessarily support PKK activity in Greece, although we continue to investigate the matter.

Long and Short Term Goals

Over the longer term, we seek to persuade Athens to abandon its antagonistic and destructive approach to regional affairs, in favor of cooperation with us in developing an agenda for the economic and democratic development of the Balkan region. In the shorter term, our goals with Greece include (in priority order:

- Lift the embargo on FYROM;
- Cease encouragement of PKK terrorism ~~on Greek soil~~;
- Normalize Greek relations with Albania;
- Tighten enforcement of UN sanctions on Serbia; and
- Work constructively to help solve the Cyprus situation.

Carrots

As with Turkey, our means to accomplish these goals are circumscribed. Growing nationalism in Greece is both an obstacle to leadership and a result of the lack of strong leadership. Also like Turkey, Greece faces an economic crisis stemming from a misguided statist economic policy and resulting high budget deficits. However, Greece's position in the West is more secure than Turkey's. Its EU membership and a strong Congressional lobby here provide a more secure foundation of political and economic support, thereby reducing the incentives for Greece to moderate its nationalistic policies toward its neighbors. To remedy these tendencies, we need to try to establish a "strengthened partnership" with Greece with agreed goals and mutually-supportive definitions of national interest.

Some of the steps we could take at this point include:

I. Strengthen the USG-GOG dialogue:

-- Send the Presidential envoy who visits Turkey on to Greece to review Greek-Turkish relations and to warn Prime Minister Papandreau that Greece's management of its relationships with Turkey, Albania and FYROM are damaging for Greece, the Balkans, the EU, NATO, and the U.S. The message should reiterate the dangers of support for the PKK and call on Papandreau to lift the embargo on FYROM.

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-- High-level officials visiting Turkey should also visit Greece to address Greek-Turkish tension and regional developments.

II. Expand the dialogue to include key Western allies:

-- Initiate a major review of Turkish-Greek-Western relations with key allies with a view to coordinating long-term policy.

III. Enhance economic cooperation

-- Organize a USG-GOG trade mission to the Balkans led by Commerce Secretary Brown or Deputy Commerce Secretary Barram.

-- Encourage the GOG to maintain a dialogue with Turkey on issues other than the Aegean.

-- Form a U.S.-EU-Greek Economic Commission. (The USG would not be in a position to match the economic resources that the EU would bring to the table in such a commission.)

-- Offer technical assistance on organizing a Southern Balkans Trade/Economic Cooperation Project. OPIC already has a cooperation agreement with the GOG that could be a vehicle for action.

IV. Increase military cooperation:

-- Promote PFP exercises involving the U.S., Greece, Albania, FYROM and others, eventually including Turkey. These exercises should be held these countries. We should appeal to Greece to assume its natural role as NATO and U.S. partner in NATO/PFP activities in the region, but not fall off our program if Greece declines.

-- Make greater use of the Escess Defense Article Program to build up the Greek military.

Sticks

Should they become necessary, there are also stronger measures at our disposal:

-- Suspend or slow down remaining deliveries of equipment to be cascaded under the CFE Treaty.

-- Start pressuring Greeks on ethnic Muslims' status and rights.

-- Threaten to request additional conditionality on assistance pegged to Greek performance in FYROM, Albania, or against terrorism.

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Measures To Address Balkan issues:

In his July 13 report to the Secretary on the status of Greece/FYROM talks, Special Envoy Matthew Nimetz noted that both parties felt comfortable postponing further negotiations until after FYROM elections this October. Politically, the FYROM was not prepared to ratify an agreement with Greece until a new parliament had been elected. Macedonian President Gligorov indicated to Nimetz that the FYROM could muddle through the next three to four months, even with the Greek embargo in place. Nimetz noted that the most impatient party right now is the United States. His tentative judgement was that for the next few months we should watch the situation carefully, help the FYROM economically and politically in the short term where we can, but not play an activist role until after the FYROM elections.

In the meantime, however, there are some steps we can take on Balkan issues.

-- President Berisha should be invited to the United States to meet either the President or Vice President to signal U.S. support. A visit would also offer an opportunity to press Albania and the FYROM to take confidence-building steps toward Greece.

-- While continuing to press both sides to show flexibility, reevaluate our policy to hold off establishing diplomatic relations with the FYROM if the dispute with Greece is not settled by the end of 1994.

-- Shore up the FYROM's sagging economy by:

  o Weighing in at a senior level with the IMF/IBRD on the need to expedite all loans/projects for the FYROM. A "Friends of Macedonia" group could be set up in concert with key European donors to amplify this pressure.

  o Providing leadership for the immediate start of construction of a rail link connecting the FYROM to Bulgaria and Albania. This can be done through the IFI's and direct technical assistance/advisors.

  o Sponsoring a regional Balkan conference on developing East-West road/rail routes through the Balkans.

-- Consider CSCE involvement in Greek-Albanian relations, e.g., a monitoring team to look at problems of the Greek minority in Albania, the April 10 attack near the border with Greece, Albanian migrant workers in Greece, and more general concerns about border security.

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-- Encourage Turkey to make its Balkan policy -- especially relations with Albania -- as transparent as possible to the Greeks.

-- Explore the upgrade of infrastructure in the FYROM, Albania and Bulgaria, including airport, port, road, and rail links needed for troop deployments.

-- Work to channel the energies of the Greek and Turkish private sectors into cooperative projects with U.S. firms in the Balkans.

-- ~~Consider the~~ Upgrade of the UNPROFOR contingent in FYROM.

ANNEXES

-- A. U.S. Interests in Turkey
-- B. Military Importance of Turkey
-- C. Turkey and Human Rights
-- D. Counter-Terrorism (sent separately)
-- E. Macedonia
-- F. Cyprus

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drafted:EUR/SE:MPAdams
08/15/94 76112 SESE15296
EUR/SE:JHamilton

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Annex C

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HUMAN RIGHTS IN TURKEY

Turkey will be a stronger, more reliable partner if it has a sound democratic government and respects human rights. We must recognize that one of the most dangerous threats to Turkish democracy is that government's serious and worsening record of human rights abuses. USG reluctance to press more strongly for improvement in this area undermines our own foreign policy goals in three ways. First, Congress will respond to increasing human rights abuses and anti-democratic trends in Turkey with further restrictions on assistance, thus reducing our ability to influence GOT policy. Second, a democratic Turkey is essential to our goal of anchoring Turkey firmly in the West and to its acceptance as part of the western community. Third, unwillingness to press the GOT strongly for improvement creates questions about our broader agenda of human rights and democracy promotion as a baseline for our foreign policy.

Ankara's deteriorating human rights record includes widespread and increasing torture of detainees, repression of freedom of expression, denial of participation in the democratic process to Kurdish political parties and their elected parliamentarians, harassment of human rights lawyers and NGOs, security force abuses of civilians in the southeast, and allegations of government death squads. We can use pragmatic arguments to persuade Ankara that its human rights record demands immediate and concerted attention to improve the situation. Ankara's perpetuation of these abuses actually undermines the GOT's primary goals to protect internal security, defeat terrorism, maintain a close relationship with the U.S., and achieve closer integration with Europe.

Actions We Can Reasonably Expect the GOT To Take:

Cooperate with an international human rights mission. This could take one of three forms: a CSCE mission, an ICRC presence, or a "blue-ribbon" international delegation.

Protect the rights of pro-Kurdish parties to participate in the democratic process. The upcoming trial of the former DEP parliamentarians must be fair, transparent, and open to international observation.

Reform laws which are undemocratic or discriminatory. The GOT should repeal laws which strip duly elected representatives of their seats in Parliament without due process and which permit incommunicado detention of detainees in security cases. The GOT should revise laws which make peaceful speech a crime.

Stop torture and prosecute officials who continue the practice.

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Stop government-sponsored disappearances.

Actions the USG Can Take:

Intensify the political dialogue with Turkey on human rights issues. Every high level visitor should frankly address our democracy and human rights concerns.

Make use of senior levels of the U.S. military to engage their Turkish counterparts in a dialogue on human rights.

Make it clear to the GOT that while we strongly opposed congressional language in the Foreign Ops bill, we will not whitewash any compliance report we submit to Congress.

Make it clear to the GOT that failure to improve its human rights performance can only cause further deterioration in its relations with long-time European allies and its standing with Congress.

Initiate reports on the end-use of U.S. equipment so we can assure Congress of the proper use of U.S. assistance.

Attempt to forge a productive relationship on this issue with new Foreign Minister Soysal, a leading advocate of increased human rights in Turkey and himself a victim of torture.

Engage the segments of Turkish society opposed to the continued use of torture and the treatment of DEP, and humiliated by the allegations of Turkish government death squads in the southeast, so they can demand a better accounting from their government.

In the event Turkey refuses to cooperate with either the CSCE, the ICRC or a blue ribbon panel, support invoking the Moscow mechanism.

In the event Turkey fails to take demonstrable steps to address security force abuses of civilians in the southeast, put a hold on selected transfers of military equipment.

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Annex E

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MEASURES TO ENHANCE MACEDONIAN STABILITY

In considering steps we could take to further both long- and short-term policy objectives for bolstering The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, our primary goal is to reduce the risk of further instability in the Balkans, including the possibility of a wider war. In our attempts to facilitate Greece/FYROM negotiations, our ability to influence either side to settle the dispute is limited. Both countries' positions are dictated by internal politics over which we have no influence. Additionally, we have little practical leverage on Greece to persuade it to lift its embargo or settle the FYROM name issue responsibly, and we have few resources to offer the FYROM to alleviate its current economic difficulties.

President Gligorov has dominated FYROM politics since his election in 1991. He is a moderating force in the FYROM and to date has been personally responsible for keeping peace and stability in the FYROM in the face of mounting external and internal pressures. This fall he faces elections under extremely difficult conditions. The convergence of rapidly deteriorating economic conditions and rising international pressure on the FYROM to plug its sanctions leaks may stir popular unrest that could be exploited by the extreme nationalist opposition. Greece's embargo on the FYROM is contributing heavily to its economic implosion, with losses reaching at least $200 million.

Within the limits of existing restraints, there are some steps we could take that would bolster the FYROM's position. A relatively modest infusion of assistance now may well turn out to be critical to this effort. We should not wait to act until after a genuine crisis erupts. We must also strive to balance steps to achieve regional stability with domestic concern that we not undermine our relationship with Greece.

Short-term Objectives and Steps

Diplomatic Support

Both the U.S. and the FYROM have reaped positive results from the recent visits of Secretary of Defense Perry and Under Secretary Davis to Skopje. Gligorv's August 10 meeting with the Vice President offers another opportunity to send a strong signal of support. We should continue to seek more such high-level contacts between our countries.

Lift Greek Embargo

One of our immediate goals should be the lifting of the embargo unilaterally imposed by Greece last February. Getting

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the embargo lifted would relieve rising tension over layoffs in the FYROM's heavy industry sector. Removing the embargo would also facilitate our efforts to tighten sanctions on Serbia and eliminate a major source of tension and instability. To require the FYROM to enforce the sanctions more strictly, while the Greece/FYROM border remains closed, would critically destabilize the country and the region.

Recognizing that no single message will sway the Greeks, a constant stream of demarches from us and from willing EU partners may eventually have some effect, although the Greeks will expect to receive a gesture from Skopje in return. One or more calls from the President to Papandreou during this period would help emphasize the seriousness with which the USG views the issue. We should urge other EU members to make similar demarches. In the final analysis, Papandreou is likely to make any decision on lifting the embargo on the basis of domestic political calculations. Nonetheless, actively pressing will in itself reassure Skopje that we are looking after its interests. As Macedonian elections approach in the fall , we should seek opportunities to quietly discuss with Gligorov, through Special Envoy Matthew Nimetz, what gesture the FYROM could make in order to facilitate lifting the embargo.

Sanctions Enforcement and Immediate Assistance

In the past, when we have pressed for stricter sanctions enforcement, FYROM leaders have said they could stop the leaks if the Greek embargo were lifted or if some compensation were forthcoming. Thus, if the U.S. could offer immediate tangible economic assistance to at least partially offset the strain of tightening sanctions with the Greek embargo still on, we would strengthen the GOFYROM's political will and ability to take such a step.

The Macedonians have indicated to our Skopje Liaison Office (USLO) that two types of immediate assistance would help the FYROM stave off economic disaster: adequate oil supplies for the winter, and financial support for its failing social security and unemployment fund. If the Greeks cannot be convinced to lift the embargo, they should be pressed to allow rail shipment of petroleum on humanitarian grounds. We could tell Gligorov that we will talk to the GOG about this. USLO Skopje estimates that additional social security assistance would amount to $4.1 million per month. A relatively small contribution of $10-$15 million would counter the impact of rapidly increasing embargo/sanctions-related unemployment, and would buy 3-4 months of time while we press for a solution later this fall. While we naturally would prefer channelling assistance into job-creation activities, the impact may be too long-term and not adequate to address the immediate economic and social pressures undermining Macedonian stability. We

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should identify undisbursed ESF funds and consider reallocating them to the FYROM to help with job creation, the social safety net, or a mix of the two.

Activating the IFI's

Another immediate step that would stimulate an influx of badly needed funds into the FYROM would be to press the World Bank and IMF at senior levels to underscore the priority we place on the FYROM's economic survival (EU balance-of-payments support, which is important in moving these IFI programs forward, has been blocked by Greece). The Bank and IMF need to hear this forcefully from us at a very high level. Despite reasonable efforts toward macro-economic stabilization, negotiations for the FYROM's IMF Stand-By Arrangement and $60 million World Bank Adjustment Loan could well be difficult, especially in light of upcoming elections. Under current circumstances, structural reform may have to be undertaken slowly, if not postponed entirely, until the embargo is lifted. EB believes that IFIs cannot be expected to prop up economies suffering from external political factors. The IFIs need to consider the arguments for flexibility and must avoid getting mired in election politics; fundamental adjustment principles cannot be abandoned.

Energize East-West Infrastructure Projects

We should also move quickly to lessen the FYROM's dependency on Serbia for trade and transportation routes by energizing the rapid development of planned East-West road/rail links with Albania and Bulgaria. In the short term this could be initiated by providing a transport advisor to Skopje and funding expansion of the border crossing at Novo Selo in the south, to speed transport and processing of winter oil imports. Currently, tanker trucks carrying the FYROM's oil imports experience long and costly delays as they traverse mountain roads and queue up at overcrowded customs facilities. As an immediate sign of support, our thinly-staffed USAID mission in Skopje could be expanded to accelerate lagging disbursement of funds for current SEED programs.

Serbia Corridor

While the Greek embargo remains in place, we should reconsider our opposition to strictly-controlled transshipments of critical imports through Serbia. The FYROM's heavy industry sector is being devastated as a result of import starvation, or through high cost alternate transport routes. This would offer some help on the employment -- as well as the political -- front, by keeping factories in operation. The "Balkan Beltway" infrastructure projects now underway can only offer partial relief. The corridor idea should be negotiated in exchange for

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much stricter sanctions compliance. Serbian cooperation would be necessary, but this could perhaps be handled in the context of any loosening that might flow from verified Serb efforts to seal the Bosnia/Serbia border. EB and the Sanctions Task Force object to the idea of reconsidering this corridor proposal and believe that developing alternate routes is the appropriate way to address these transport problems. We should not advocate easing the way the sanctions are applied, or granting some countries "exceptions." Were we to allow an exception for the FYROM, we would immediately face intense pressure from Bulgaria, Romania and others. Sanctions enforcement would be seriously compromised and the current Contact Group initiative would be undercut.

Full Diplomatic Relations

Establishing full diplomatic relations with the FYROM at this time remains the most significant sign of support the FYROM seeks in the face of its neighbors' doubts about its viability. As important as establishing relations is, there is little point in taking that step unless it will produce a net gain for us in the region. If the Greece/FYROM negotiations break down without resolving their outstanding differences, we will need to carefully consider whether the risks of not establishing relations outweigh Greece's probable negative reaction. We have already told Greece we cannot wait indefinitely to establish relations with Skopje. If the dispute drags on, a strong argument can be made that Greece's long-term interest in regional stability will be served by such a U.S. move.

Increase Military Presence

We should also consider whether increasing the presence of UNPROFOR troops in the FYROM would further our goal of bringing peace to Bosnia, or whether such a move would create more problems in the region. If the purpose of increasing the force would be to seal the border with Serbia, UNPROFOR's mandate would have to be revised by the Security Council. The UNSC may not agree to expand UNPROFOR at this point, given the UNSYG's inclination to shut it down. The Serb invasion in the current context is considered unlikely. Merely increasing the size of the force will not necessarily enhance its self-defense capabilities or its deterrent effect. We would have to consider whether putting more troops in the FYROM may encourage an uprising or exodus from Kosovo. Given Milosevic's new willingness to apply pressure to the Bosnian Serbs, such a move may send the wrong signal to Belgrade.

Military Assistance/Mil-to-Mil Ties

We should move forward with planned military assistance

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programs (such as a $125,000 FY 95 IMET program) and Secretary of Defense Perry's proposal for a Bilateral Working Group. Expanding military ties with the nascent FYROM army and increasing U.S. military assistance would allow us to influence the positive development of the Macedonian armed forces.

Congressional Reaction

Any or all of the above carrots for the FYROM could provoke significant opposition in Congress if they do not form part of an overall settlement of the Greece-FYROM dispute. Some Members, notably Senator Sarbanes, may strongly oppose any additional assistance to FYROM unless it is tied to concessions from Skopje in the negotiations. While reinforcing modestly the U.S. contingent in the UNPROFOR force in the FYROM would be problematic in the Congress, careful consultations in advance, especially by DOD and especially with the Republican leadership, could secure adequate bipartisan support.

Long-term Objectives and Steps

Economic Long-Term Measures

Our long-term policy in the FYROM and the southern Balkans should seek to solidify economic ties between Greece and its less-developed neighbors and to expand and complete embryonic East-West trade routes. In the long term, the FYROM can become a major hub in the regional transport net, at the confluence of East-West and (when reopened) North-South routes. Lessening dependence on Serbia for trade and trade routes will counteract Serbia's ability to use its monopoly on current trade routes as a destabilizing foreign policy tool. In the FYROM, continuing the processes of privatization, transition to a market economy and reforming the tax system and social safety net should be carried out by significantly expanding the SEED program and by assuring IFIs meaningful contributions to the FYROM's development.

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Annex F

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CYPRUS

STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS

On March 21, the United Nations issued a paper detailing UN-proposed confidence-building measures (CBMs), which included substantial changes from the original May 1993 document. These changes were mostly in favor of the Greek Cypriots. Greek-Cypriot leader Clerides immediately announced that he accepted the paper. Turkish-Cypriot leader Denktash withheld acceptance based on further clarifications.

On May 14, the Turkish Cypriots joined UN Deputy representative Gustave Feissel and SCC Robert Lamb in Vienna. A number of clarifications on the benefits which the CBMs would provide the Turkish Cypriots were agreed to. On June 4, Denktash announced that he accepted the package of CBMs based on these clarifications. Clerides, however, declared that the clarifications were not binding as the Greek Cypriots were not part of the Vienna discussions.

On July 29, the UN Security Council passed a resolution stating that both sides have accepted the CBMs in principle, and that implementation should begin. The resolution also linked implementation to immediate discussion on the overall Cyprus problem and called for movement forward. In addition, the resolution requested the Secretary General to prepare a plan of action and to report to the Security Council by the end of October. Both sides appear to have accepted this compromise.

U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus Richard Boucher met separately with Clerides and Denktash on August 11 and 12. Both leaders expressed their willingness to engage in face-to-face meetings. Boucher believes that UN-sponsored procedural meetings between the two could take place during September in Nicosia, to be followed by an October or November meeting on the substance in New York.

U.S. Interest in a Settlement

From a foreign policy perspective, there are three main reasons to solve the Cyprus problem:

-- Cyprus is a major irritant in relations between Greece and Turkey. A solution which is perceived as fair would lessen tensions between them;

-- Cyprus is strategically located in the eastern Mediterranean. A solution to the Cyprus problem would help promote security in this volatile region;

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-- A solution could help ensure continued British control of the "Sovereign Base Areas" and thus U.S. access to these important military facilities.

From a domestic political perspective, a settlement of the Cyprus problem is a major issue for the Greek-American community which has traditionally made it more difficult to carve out a constructive policy toward Turkey.

Next Steps for U.S. Policy

There are two general options for U.S. action over the next three months.

Option 1

Take an activist role, with the U.S. aggressively pushing both sides to make compromises which would lead to quick implementation of the CBMs and follow-up discussion of an overall settlement. This could include a meeting between the two leaders sponsored by the Secretary in Washington or overseas.

Option 2

Allow the UN to take the lead. This option would dovetail with the July 29 UN Security Council Resolution which called for the Secretary General to prepare a plan of action. The U.S. would maintain a supportive role. Under this option, implementation of the CBM package would remain an immediate goal, but greater emphasis would be placed on discussions on an overall solution.

Special Cyprus Coordinator

It is crucial to have a U.S. Special Cyprus Coordinator appointed immediately to help implement either option. The absence of a coordinator is diminishing U.S. influence and is creating a vacuum. The Russians are stepping in. Over the last ten days, the Russians have proposed a Security Council meeting in Geneva on Cyprus and have suggested increased involvement on the part of their Special Coordinator.

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MESSAGE NO. 1585 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 11

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (202) 456-2585 West Wing Desk
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION OPTIONS PAPER FOR 17 AUG PC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 20967

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

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REMARKS:

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
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FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (202) 456-2585 West Wing Desk
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION OPTIONS PAPER FOR 17 AUG PC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 20967

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(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION OPTIONS PAPER FOR 17 AUG PC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 20967

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DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
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FROM: National Security Council (NM) PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting PAGES: 11

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

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USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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20967

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 16, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of
the U.S. to the United Nations

MR. MAX ROBINSON
Acting Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Paper for Use at the Principals Committee Meeting on August 17 (S)

An issues-for-discussion sheet forwarding the revised Interagency (State drafted) paper on lifting the arms embargo is provided at Tab A. The issues were derived from NSC, State and Joint Staff discussions on decisions needed to facilitate further planning on lifting the arms embargo. (S)

for William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Interagency Review of Lifting the Arms Embargo forwarding a revised paper entitled "Options Paper: Lifting the Arms Embargo" (Annexes forwarded with original paper)

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
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TAB A

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. paper	re: Interagency Review of Lifting the Arms Embargo (1 page)	08/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0085 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and the Eastern Mediterranean, August 17, 1994 [2]

2010-0533-M
rs1017

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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OPTIONS PAPER: LIFTING THE ARMS EMBARGO

This paper examines the possible impact and policy options open to the U.S. if the arms embargo against Bosnia were lifted as the result of a U.S. initiative. The paper assumes that our goal is to provide the Bosnian government with sufficient military capabilities to alter the situation on the battlefield and bring about Bosnian Serb acceptance of the Contact Group map. This would entail a U.S. commitment to support the government to the point it can hold its own and begin to turn the tide on the battlefield. This paper considers various other assumptions shaping our options, the range and mix of options available to us, and complications/issues we will need to address in advance of military engagement, including the need for a clear public rationale.

I. ASSUMPTIONS

Strategic Objectives: Our broader strategic objective is to prevent a broader Balkan war which could draw in Allies, damage our capacity to maintain a strong NATO, and severely strain relations with our closest Allies and Russia. The options we choose in pursuing our objectives in Bosnia must contain the risks to this strategic interest.

Multilateral Lift: Lifting the arms embargo through multilateral action is essential to securing broad-based international support and assistance after lift, including support from our NATO allies. Unilateral lift would create a major rift in the Alliance and damage relations with Russia. Ideally, there would be a provision in any UNSC resolution lifting the embargo that would call on member states/regional organizations to use all necessary means to defend at least Sarajevo and the other safe areas, and secure Bosnian Serb acceptance of the Contact Group Proposal. We should approach key allies early regarding the type of support they might be willing to provide, especially to defend Sarajevo. Without the use of Allied bases, particularly those in Italy, our ability to support the Bosnian government would be severely limited.

Bosnian Serb Reaction: Based on their past behavior, the Bosnian Serbs will likely react aggressively and pre-emptively to any lifting of the arms embargo. The Bosnian Serbs often exaggerate their military capabilities. Their aim would be to bring maximum pressure immediately to bear against the government in the hopes of forcing a settlement on their terms before the military tide could be turned. The eastern enclaves and Sarajevo would be priority targets, though in the case of the latter they might opt for strangulation and shelling rather than outright military take-over. Severing the Tuzla area from government-held lands to the south could be another

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possibility, as would widening the Posavina corridor. Key variables shaping their response include: the state of Belgrade-Pale relations, perceptions of international resolve to counter Bosnian Serb offensives, the willingness of Belgrade to intervene with men and material. With the U.S. perceived as a party to the conflict, acts of terrorism against U.S. interests cannot be ruled out.

Bosnian Government Vulnerabilities: The vulnerability of the eastern enclaves and Sarajevo, combined with the lag between lifting the embargo and increasing Bosnian military capabilities, virtually guarantee that lifting the embargo will require from the outset air support and a continued humanitarian relief effort. This is based on the assumption that while we might be able to tolerate the fall of relatively isolated and difficult to defend enclaves, we politically could not tolerate the fall or strangulation of Sarajevo. This argues strongly against a "lift and leave" option.

That said, Bosnian government forces have improved substantially over the past two years and the Interagency Balkan Task Force (Baseline Assessment Paper: Leveling the Battlefield) believes they can probably hold their own against determined Bosnian Serb assaults on the core Federation areas in central Bosnia so long as Federation unity is maintained. The Interagency Balkan Task Force estimates that Sarajevo, however, currently has only approximately 30 days worth of food supplies on hand.

Fate Of UNPROFOR: Lifting the arms embargo will almost certainly lead to UNPROFOR withdrawal. The British say they need 30 days advance notice to withdraw in an orderly fashion and 72 hours in a hostile situation where troops are extricated (with our help) and equipment is left behind. Among other things, UNPROFOR's departure will seriously complicate both air operations against the Serbs and any humanitarian relief effort. On the other hand, it should give us greater scope for taking robust action without fear of reprisals against UN personnel on the ground. While the idea of an UNPROFOR II deployed only in Federation territory as a stabilizing factor has been put forward, such a force would probably have little impact on the course of the conflict unless it were structured as a real combat force.

II. MILITARY OPTIONS/CAPABILITIES

In determining military support options, we need to consider several factors: what the Bosnians have now, what they need to alter the situation on the ground, whether new infusions of men and material on the Bosnian Serb side will increase those needs, and what we can and should do to invalidate or lessen the impact of negative factors. For

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example, we need to consider ways (such as a Kosovo Christmas-type warning) to reduce the likelihood of Serbian intervention or assistance.

We also need to consider the possibility that a convincing demonstration of force, applied early on and internationally supported, could substantially reduce the level and length of the military support effort needed to bring the Bosnian Serbs around. Similarly, the demonstrated ability of the Bosnian government to absorb weapons and improve its military capabilities over the last two years should be taken into account.

The analysis below views our policy choices in terms of light, medium, and heavy air support/arming options. But it should be noted that an argument can also be made that our real choice centers around a more fundamental question: whether or not we are willing to deploy U.S. ground forces. If we are not, then maximum and early use of air power and a maximum arming option are probably necessary to achieve our objectives. If we are not prepared for such an approach at the outset, then we should be prepared to escalate quickly in response to possible Serb actions.

Option 1: A Minimalist Military Support Option

Without substantial immediate outside support, Bosnian government forces would not be capable of lifting the blockade of Sarajevo or preventing the overrunning of the smaller eastern enclaves. As noted above, they would probably be able to withstand assaults on their core central areas. Needless to say, the capitulation of Sarajevo would be a great blow to the government and a setback to any international efforts to help them. It would also encourage the Bosnian Serbs to continue the conflict and make a negotiated settlement less likely.

Even if the U.S. did not furnish material support to the Bosnian government, weapons and possibly troops provided by friendly Islamic states would still flow into the country, perhaps in substantial numbers. This would be of great concern to Serbia, Macedonia and the rest of Europe. Islamization of the military re-supply effort would have a broad and long-term impact on the Balkan region and Europe. Aid would also arrive from Islamic states not friendly to the U.S., such as Iran. Such an effort would not be comparable to a determined U.S. effort but would over time improve the capability of Bosnian government forces versus the Bosnian Serbs.

The Joint Staff (Annex: Rearming the Federation) and Interagency Balkan Task Force (Baseline Assessment Paper: Leveling the Battlefield) estimate a robust U.S. effort would

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take up to a year to make government forces competitive. Any non-U.S. effort would probably take longer, and might never enable the government to level the playing field, particularly if the FRY increased its own arms supplies to Pale. Any Islamization of the military resupply effort, moreover, could cause the Muslim-Croat rapprochement to fray, itself jeopardizing the resupply effort.

Option 2: Lift With Interim Military Support

U.S. support for the Bosnian government for a limited period in the wake of lifting the embargo would obviously increase the ability of the government to compete with the Bosnian Serbs on more equal terms. How well they could compete would depend directly on the level and nature of support provided.

Sarajevo: Given the importance and vulnerability of Sarajevo, any initial U.S. support should focus on ways to keep humanitarian relief flowing into the city. Although air drops might provide a portion of the needed relief, the ideal solution would be to open up a land corridor running from core Federation territories into Sarajevo. This would at the very least require commitment of U.S. airpower, acting in concert with Bosnian government forces. In this regard, the Joint Staff believes that we should not assume that air power alone can prevent the fall of Sarajevo. Thus, if saving the city is a bottom line objective, we should be prepared to do what is necessary to save the city, up to and including the insertion of U.S. ground forces.

Determining what would work is clearly a priority objective and should be completed well prior to lifting the embargo. The August 9, 1993 NAC airstrike decision would provide adequate authority for NATO airstrikes, assuming NATO agreed to participate. In the wake of the departure of key allies from UNPROFOR, it would be highly questionable whether NATO Allies could reach a consensus on further participation. If NATO were willing to take this on, under the August 9 NAC decision, authorization from UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali for the first strike would still be needed. If the U.S. had to act outside the NATO context, perhaps as head of a coalition of the willing, we would need to decide whether to seek UN authority to undertake the strikes.

The Eastern Enclaves: The U.S. might also wish to help the Bosnian government defend the highly vulnerable eastern enclaves against Bosnian Serb attacks. If NATO were willing to take this on, we anticipate the Allies would require a new NAC decision reflecting the changed circumstances. The Allies would also want UN authority for NATO to act. If the U.S. acted alone, or as head of a coalition, new UN authority would presumably be required.

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Supporting Bosnian Government Forces Elsewhere: Under a limited support option, the U.S. might decide not to risk its aircraft in what might be regarded as an uphill struggle to prevent at least the smaller enclaves from being overrun. The same might hold true for providing air support for Bosnian government forces facing attack in other parts of Bosnia. If we assume that these forces are capable of holding their own, we may wish to intervene only if the situation on a particular battlefront becomes desperate. Any intervention, particularly if it occurred apart from a safe area, could require new NATO authorization (if NATO were involved) and possibly additional UN authority.

Providing Equipment and Training: The U.S. would probably want to provide the Bosnian government with equipment and training as part of lifting the arms embargo. Clearly, the more of each we provided, and the sooner we provided it, the sooner the Bosnian government would be capable of bringing pressure to bear on the Bosnian Serbs to settle, and if necessary, of turning the tide on the battlefield. Viewed in this way, option 2 would behoove us to go all out to provide the necessary materiel and to provide it as soon as possible. Both the Joint Staff (Annex: Rearming the Federation) and the Interagency Balkan Task Force (Baseline Assessment Paper: Leveling the Battlefield) agree that a strong U.S. effort could equip and train Bosnian government forces to this task in no more than a year, although this would be an expensive proposition. The Task Force acknowledges, however, that Bosnian Serb military operations could divert government attention and lengthen this timetable.

The Interagency Balkan Task Force estimates government requirements at 120-200 tanks, 60-100 APCs, 200-350 artillery pieces and 25-40 MRLs. They also estimate 2,000 trucks would be needed, along with communication equipment, ammunition, fuel and other supplies. The Joint Staff estimates the price tag for acquiring such supplies would run over $3 billion.

The alternative to providing the government with the equipment it needed to turn the tide would be to give them less than what they needed. Although less expensive in the short run, this would risk prolonging the war, perhaps indefinitely, resulting in a higher cost in human life and inviting continuing domestic criticism and pressure to do more. In this regard, the Joint Staff outlines two less robust force upgrading initiatives, but they are not considered here since they would perforce not significantly alter the situation on the ground.

Under any approach, we would want to spread the burden as much as possible. Given the high costs of providing weaponry and transporting it, we would presumably want to pass the hat at an early stage to defer our own expenses. This would certainly involve approaching rich Islamic states and

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selected other states such as Japan. We would also want to strongly encourage other (particularly NATO) nations to provide equipment, although avoiding overcomplicating the array of weapons and other materiel that Bosnian government forces are obliged to master is probably a virtue.

Option 3: Lift With Long-term Support

If the Joint Staff and the Interagency Task Force are correct in their estimates, other things being equal, the Bosnian government should be able to begin turning the tide against the Bosnian Serbs after about a year. To the extent we do not frontload our support, the less pressure there will be on the Bosnian Serbs to accept a negotiated settlement, the longer it will take the government to get on equal footing with the Serbs and the longer our active involvement will last. Assuming that the war continues for some time after the playing field has been leveled, the Bosnian government will continue to need our support. The need for airpower will diminish, although the longer it is used the more quickly the government is likely to succeed in gaining its military objectives. Government forces will also need to replace weapons and other materiel lost in combat.

In an important sense, the distinction between options 2 and 3 is an artificial one. The less support we provide at the outset, the longer our involvement is likely to last. If we are going to provide the government with military equipment and air support, we should try to give them the ability to take the initiative as soon as they possibly can. We will in any event need to continue to support them until they are able to take the initiative, and on a contingency basis, in the event of unexpected reverses on the ground or FRY intervention. We have good reason to believe that if we can keep them afloat during the first key months--and this also means developing a strategy enabling Sarajevo to survive--we can be fairly confident that they will be able to field an increasingly capable force, bring increasing pressure to bear on the Bosnian Serbs to accept a negotiated settlement, and eventually, if necessary, begin to turn the tide. In seeking to lift the arms embargo, this should be our primary goal.

III. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS/ISSUES

NATO and UN Support

Clearly, the U.S. would have an interest in internationalizing the effort in Bosnia to the maximum extent possible. It would be very much in our interest politically to make this a NATO operation and to seek UN, and therefore, Russian support. To do this, we must, as a first step, get the

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arms embargo lifted multilaterally. A robust diplomatic initiative would be required to bring the allies on board. To the extent we have to go it alone we sacrifice key equities in NATO and in our relations with the Russians and the UN. Unilateral lift would rupture consensus within NATO on a key European security issue and could create a serious, long-term rift in the alliance. The military and economic burden would also fall more squarely on our shoulders. Without NATO, basing for air operations could become a serious problem.

Dealing with Reversals on the Ground

We must be prepared to deal with setbacks at each step of the escalatory ladder. At each stage, if a given mix of air power and arming options is not working, we will need to reach a judgment as to whether the setback is temporary and tactical or a reflection of a more fundamental problem. If the latter, we will need to decide whether to go in more deeply or conclude it is time to cut our losses. We need to recognize going in that air power will be impotent to stop the fighting once it enters major populated areas.

Preventing Spillover

Bosnia does not exist in a vacuum. We have a goal of preventing the conflict from spilling over into other parts of the region. Lifting the arms embargo could have a serious destabilizing impact on neighboring Krajina, in Kosovo, and in Macedonia.

Krajina: Although UNPROFOR may have departed from Bosnia, we have a strong interest in seeing it remain in both Croatia and Macedonia. UNPROFOR departure from the former could lead to new fighting in Krajina and to renewed conflict between Croatia and Serbia. We would need in any event to persuade Zagreb not to take advantage of events in Bosnia by seeking an outcome in Krajina which might only make things worse.

We will also need to confront how to handle the arms embargo against Croatia. Croatia is essential as a port of entry and conduit for sending equipment into Bosnia. Presumably we would need to either lift the arms embargo against Croatia or provide for right of transit. Either alternative would probably result in a substantial increase in Croatian military capabilities and alarm both the Krajina Serbs and Belgrade. This would need to be carefully managed.

Macedonia/Kosovo: Although a Serbian adventure in Macedonia may seem unlikely, our forces there are performing an important deterrent function and, if anything, should be strengthened. We should consider reiterating our Christmas warning to the Serbs that we would be prepared to employ

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military force against them in Kosovo and in Serbia proper in the event of a conflict in Kosovo caused by Serb action. UNPROFOR troops that remain near the Serbian border might be targets of retaliation.

Serbia: Lifting the embargo would probably not lead directly to Belgrade's intervention. The more successful the Bosnian government is on the ground, however, the greater the pressure will be on Serbia to intervene. This is something we should consider warning them about at an early stage. Should they nonetheless overtly intervene with men and materiel, we would need to consider whether to take military action against them. This would presumably require new authorities from both NATO (if this is a NATO operation) and the UN, unless we sought an omnibus authority in conjunction with lifting the embargo at the beginning of the process that dealt with all such contingencies.

Impact on the Federation

The impact of lifting the arms embargo on the Federation will depend on the course of events on the ground. The more prolonged the conflict and the more arms that flow to government forces, the more strain there will be on the Federation and the greater the risk to its survival. Success on the ground which leads the Bosnians to escalate their war aims could also prove a source of tension. On the other hand, the strategic reasons underlying Muslim-Croat cooperation vis-a-vis the Serbs will remain a positive factor and Zagreb's continued support for the Federation will be critical.

Keeping the Negotiating Track Going

Our primary goal in lifting the arms embargo is to pressure the Bosnian Serbs into accepting the Contact Group map, and failing this, to give the Bosnian government the means to begin to turn the tide. Any decision to lift the arms embargo, therefore, should go hand in hand with continuing efforts to obtain a negotiated settlement. As the pressure increases against the Bosnian Serbs, we should continue our efforts to get them to accept a negotiated settlement. As time passes, the international community (the Contact Group if it is still in place) may decide to alter the offer on the table. It is also possible that the Bosnian government will prove increasingly resistant to a negotiated settlement as its prospects on the battlefield improve. This will require careful management.

Need for Public Rationale

We need to develop an easily understood rationale for any U.S. military action in Bosnia in order to ensure we can sustain our involvement long enough to get the job done. Our

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public affairs strategy will need to dampen Kuwait-type expectations of an easy and relatively painless success, with no real setbacks along the way, as well as Somalia-type situation, where public reaction to media images of an American soldier being dragged through the streets led to a collapse of support for our effort and early withdrawal. Apart from the fact that we are dealing with the Balkans and not Somalia, the likelihood of this kind of atrocity being perpetrated will be reduced if we do not have a troop presence. We would, however, need to be prepared for the shooting down of U.S. planes and for captured and possibly tortured U.S. pilots.

Our most immediate public affairs concern, however, given the vulnerability of the enclaves and the time lag between lift and its impact on Bosnian ability to defend themselves and turn the tide, will likely be to ensure the public understands that there will be no quick military fix and the situation is likely to get worse before it gets better. To the extent that early and decisive use of air power neutralizes the Serbs' offensive capabilities and buys time for the Bosnians to level the playing field, our military support effort will be able to concentrate on less controversial training and supply functions. This should simplify the public affairs task and help prepare us for low-level, low-risk involvement for the longer haul, if that proves necessary.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 16, 1994



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: DON KERRICK

SUBJECT: Lifting the Arms Embargo Paper for the August 17 Bosnia PC.

The revised Interagency (State drafted) paper for use at the PC on Bosnia is attached for your release to Principals. An issues-for-discussion sheet forwards the paper. The issues were derived from NSC, State and Joint Staff discussions on decisions needed to facilitate further planning on lifting the arms embargo.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Interagency Review of Lifting the Arms Embargo forwarding a revised paper entitled "Options paper: Lifting the Arms Embargo" (Annexes forwarded with original paper)

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By AM NARA, Date 6/14/10

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TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 15 AUG 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
AGENDA
MEDITERRANEAN
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 17 AUG PC MTG ON BOSNIA & EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 18 AUG 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9420967 9420968

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0095 CODES: BOS MED

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		DARBY
		HALL
		KERRICK
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		STEPHENS
		WOLIN
		WRIGHT

COMMENTS: _____

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DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94081523	FOR DECISION
001		X	94081523	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
002		X	94081523	SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	940815	FUERTH, L	PANETTA, L
002	940815	ROBINSON, M	
002	940815	MCALEER, R	
002	940815	INDERFURTH, K	
002	940815	GARTHOFF, D	
002	940815	PATRICK, T	

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Reed			
Sens	1	AOS	
Itoh			
Soderberg			
Berger		Copy Nat'l Sec Advisor has seen	
Lake	2		
~~Situation Room~~	3	AOS	Tab I
West Wing Desk			
NSC Secretariat	4	SP 8/15	D

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

15 Aug cc: 4 6 5 28 _____ _____

COMMENTS: HANDED CY TO LARRY BRANSCUM

PC mtg NOM Aug 17

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

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WASHINGTON, DC 20506

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COPY: 1

8/16 3:44P S. McElhaney

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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WASHINGTON, DC 20520

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

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PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE / PRIORITY / ROUTINE

RELEASER: J. G.

DTG:

MESSAGE NO. 1579 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PC Mtg on Bosnia and Eastern Mediterranean NSC LOG # 20963

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

BNDN

REMARKS:

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE / PRIORITY / ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO. 1579 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PC Mtg on Bosnia and Eastern Mediterranean NSC LOG # 20963

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

BBNDA

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16 AUG 94 00 39
NMCC/JCS

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: S. G. [signature]

DTG:

MESSAGE NO. 1579 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PC Mtg on Bosnia and Eastern Mediterranean NSC LOG # 20963

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

BNDN

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PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE / PRIORITY / ROUTINE

RELEASER: S. G.

DTG:

MESSAGE NO. 1579 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PC Mtg on Bosnia and Eastern Mediterranean NSC LOG # 20963

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

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PRECEDENCE
- ☐ FLASH
- ☐ IMMEDIATE
- ☐ PRIORITY
- ☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC LOG # 20963

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting PC on Bosnia PAGES: 2

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 15, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of
the U.S. to the United Nations

MR. MAX ROBINSON
Acting Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and the Eastern Mediterranean ~~(S)~~

There will be a Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and the Eastern Mediterranean on Wednesday, August 17, 4:30 - 6pm in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Principals plus one. The agenda for the meeting is attached at Tab A. Supporting papers will be circulated by the lead agency. ~~(S)~~

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

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By NS NARA, Date 6/16/10

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PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA
AND THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

DATE: August 17, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 4:30 - 6:00 p.m.

AGENDA

I. Contact Group Next Steps.....State

II. Sanctions Strategy Update.....OVP

III. Update on Verifying and Responding to Milosevic's Cutoff of the Bosnian Serbs.....State/OVP

IV. Strategy for Lifting the Arms Embargo.....NSC/All

V. Review of U.S. Policy Toward the Eastern Mediterranean.....State/NSC

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 15, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: DONALD L. KERRICK/KATHLEEN STEPHENS

SUBJECT: Principals Meeting on Bosnia and the Eastern Mediterranean, August 17, 1994

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Principals Meeting on Bosnia to be held on August 17, 1994. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

Concurrence by: Leon Fuerth and Martin Indyk

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)~~	~~09/13/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RDS 04/17/2015
~~001b. memo~~	~~[Duplicate of 001a] [incomplete copy] (1 page)~~	~~09/13/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
002a. memo	Ronald Noble to William Itoh re: Customs Service Participation in Sanctions Assistance Missions (2 pages)	10/18/1994	P1/b(1)
002b. memo	William Itoh to Kenneth Brill; Re: Coordinaition of U.S. Participation in Monitoring Mission (1 page)	10/05/1994	P1/b(1)
002c. memo	William Itoh to Kenneth Brill et al. re: U.S. Participation in Monitoring Mission (2 pages)	10/01/1994	P1/b(1)
~~003. memo~~	~~Robert McAleer to Executive Secretary NSC re: U.S. Observers (1 page)~~	~~10/18/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KDE 05/26/2016
004a. memo	[Duplicate of 002c] (2 pages)	10/01/1994	P1/b(1)
004b. memo	Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake re: U.S. Participation in the Serbian Border Monitoring Mission (2 pages)	09/29/1994	P1/b(1)
004c. memo	Leon Feurth to Anthony Lake re: U.S. Participation in the Serbian Border (2 pages)	09/27/1994	P1/b(1)
005a. memo	[Duplicate of 002b] (1 page)	10/05/1994	P1/b(1)
005b. memo	[Duplicate of 002c] (2 pages)	10/01/1994	P1/b(1)

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2010-0533-M
rs625

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005c. memo	Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake; Re: Implementing the Decision (1 page)	10/04/1994	P1/b(1)
~~006. memo~~	~~Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Principals Committee Review of Bosnia Policy (1 page)~~	~~09/14/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~007. paper~~	~~re: Diplomatic Strategy on Bosnia: Short and Mid-Term (8 pages)~~	~~09/08/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020

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TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 18 SEP 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 13 SEP PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 19 SEP 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9421055 9421067

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0098 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		DARBY
		KERRICK
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		TL WGH
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		WOLIN
		WRIGHT

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001		X	94091908	WOLIN APPROVED RECOM
002		X	94091908	SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	940918	FUERTH, L	
002	940918	BRILL, K	
002	940918	MCALEER, R	
002	940918	INDERFURTH, K	
002	940918	PANETTA, L	
002	940918	GARTHOFF, D	
002	940918	PATRICK, T	

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Sens	1/4	AD S	
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Soderberg			
Berger	2	ok	ok w/ chg
Lake	3	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	9/18	Fwded only
NSC Secretariat			

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cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS: Please cc: A. Kroczko

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needs hard cpy dist to NSC & close out

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Sens	1/4	AD S	
Itoh			
Soderberg			
Berger	2		
Lake	3	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	OK w/chg
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	9/18	D Faxed
NSC Secretariat			

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	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: 1		
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET , N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	9/19/94	AM 11:15	Courtney Tagg
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WASHINGTON, DC 20506

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COPY: 1

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET , N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

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DATE 18 SEP 94

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 13 SEP PC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE TIME SIGNATURE

MR. LEON FUERTH
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
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ROOM 290, OEOB
WASHINGTON, DC 20506

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9/19 2PM S McE

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET , N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

PRINT LAST NAME: McElhaney

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PRECEDENCE: (IMMEDIATE) PRIORITY ROUTINE

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DTG:

MESSAGE NO. 1829 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 3

FROM: WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SOC PC ON BOSNIA 13 SEP

NSC LOG # 21085

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
N	DEFENSE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B	USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY, JCS		

REMARKS:

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SEP 18 4 16 PM '94

A

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM '94 SEP 18 PM 4:37

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE / PRIORITY / ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 1829 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ _____ PAGES 3

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

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B	USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY, JCS		

REMARKS:

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TIME OF RECEIPT

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

B

PRECEDENCE: (IMMEDIATE) PRIORITY ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO. 1829 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 3

FROM: WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

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B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
N	DEFENSE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B	USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY, JCS		

REMARKS:

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18 SEP 94 16 38
NMCC/JCS

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE / PRIORITY / ROUTINE

RreleaseR:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO. 1829 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 3

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SOC PC ON BOSNIA 13 SEP

NSC LOG # 21085

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
N	DEFENSE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B	USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY, JCS		

REMARKS:

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- ☐ PRIORITY
- ☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC LOG # 21088

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting - SOC PC ON BOSNIA PAGES: 3

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

CLINTON

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MC NARA, Date 6/16/12

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 18, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

MR. LEON E. PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President of the United States

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia September 13, 1994 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MW NARA, Date 6/16/10
2012-0533-M

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~~SECRET~~ SECRET 21088

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions
Meeting of NSC Principals Committee
DATE: September 13, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 - 4:10pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Anthony Lake

OVP
Leon Fuerth
Rick Saunders

State
Secretary Warren Christopher
Richard Holbrooke
David Gergen

DOD
Secretary William Perry
Walter Slocombe

UN
Ambassador Madeleine Albright
Dave Scheffer

CIA
Director James Woolsey
Norman Schindler

JCS
GEN John Shalikashvili
LTG Wesley Clark

White House
Samuel Berger

NSC
Alexander Vershbow
Donald Kerrick

Summary of Conclusions

Policy:

1. The Principals reaffirmed the current U.S. strategy on Bosnia, agreeing to press forward with our efforts aimed at maximizing pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to accept the Contact Group proposal. In addition to encouraging Milosevic's steps to isolate the Bosnian Serbs with limited sanctions relief, we will make an all-out effort to implement the disincentives agreed earlier by the Contact Group, in particular to carry out air strikes in response to violations of the exclusion zones. (S)

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0533-M
9/30/14 (1.28)

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Lifting the Arms Embargo:

2. The Principals reviewed the preliminary results of the interagency study on options for lifting the arms embargo and directed that planning continue, pointing to completion of a detailed planning document by DoD. Outstanding issues with alternatives and specific options should be promptly identified for subsequent Principal's consideration. Action: Joint Staff and OSD.

3. The Principals requested an operational and legal analysis of the impact of the Nunn language on NATO operations in the Balkans. Action: Joint Staff.

Sanctions:

4. The Principals confirmed current U.S. strategy to proceed with sanctions resolutions as discussed by the Contact Group in Geneva, but stressed the importance of early and thorough interagency coordination. Action: NSC and State.

5. The Principals agreed the U.S. should participate in the ICFY sanctions monitoring mission by providing personnel and resources. Action: OVP prepare options.

6. The Principals affirmed the importance of maintaining the effectiveness of the existing sanctions regime, but recognized the necessity not to appear to be tightening sanctions on Serbia at this time. Action: OVP to develop initiatives for improving the enforcement of existing sanctions.

7. The Principals decided that the U.S. should not present specific proposals on additional sanctions relief in return for additional steps by the FRY at this time, pending creation of an acceptable border monitoring regime and implementation of "phase 1" sanctions relief.

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~~SECRET~~

21088

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 15, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW FOR

FROM: DON KERRICK

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, September 13, 1994

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia held September 13, 1994.

Concurrence by: Rick Saunders FOR

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve [signature] Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 6/16/10
2010-0533-M

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3. The Principals requested an operational and legal analysis of the impact of the Nunn language on NATO operations in the Balkans. Action: Joint Staff. (C)

Sanctions:

4. The Principals confirmed current U.S. strategy to proceed with sanctions resolutions as discussed by the Contact Group in Geneva, but stressed the importance of early and thorough interagency coordination. Action: NSC and State. (S)

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6. The Principals affirmed the importance of maintaining the effectiveness of the existing sanctions regime, but recognized the necessity not to appear to be tightening sanctions on Serbia at this time. Action: OVP to develop initiatives for improving the enforcement of existing sanctions. (S)

7. The Principals decided that the U.S. should not present specific proposals on additional sanctions relief in return for additional steps by the FRY at this time, pending creation of an acceptable border monitoring regime and implementation of "phase 1" sanctions relief. (S)

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KC 2/6/2020 (5.7N)

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9421224
RECEIVED: 19 OCT 94 19

TO: ITOH

FROM: NOBLE, R

DOC DATE: 18 OCT 94
SOURCE REF: 94138565

KEYWORDS: SERBIA
UN
BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
ARMY

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TREASURY RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR US OBSERVERS TO SERBIAN / BOSNIAN BORDER MONITORING MISSION

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE DATE: 22 OCT 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FRIED LOGREF: 9421055 9421067

FILES: IFG O NSCP: PC0098 CODES: BOS SER

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BEERS
CLARKE
KERRICK
NSC CHRON
RICE
SEATON
VERSHBOW

these IF6's should be changed to IFM's

COMMENTS: RESPONSE TO LOG #21133 - F/U PAPER TO AGENCIES FOR PC0098

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001		X	94101919	FOR RECORD PURPOSES
002		X	94102115	FOR RECORD PURPOSES

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	Ronald Noble to William Itoh re: Customs Service Participation in Sanctions Assistance Missions (2 pages)	10/18/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0098 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, September 13, 1994 [1]

2010-0533-M
rs625

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. memo	William Itoh to Kenneth Brill; Re: Coordinaition of U.S. Participation in Monitoring Mission (1 page)	10/05/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0098 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, September 13, 1994 [1]

2010-0533-M
rs625

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002c. memo	William Itoh to Kenneth Brill et al. re: U.S. Participation in Monitoring Mission (2 pages)	10/01/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0098 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, September 13, 1994 [1]

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rs625

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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RECEIVED: 19 OCT 94 19

TO: ITOH

FROM: MCALEER, R

DOC DATE: 18 OCT 94
SOURCE REF: 72246

KEYWORDS: SERBIA
UN
BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
ARMY

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DOD RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR US OBSERVERS FOR SERBIAN / BOSNIAN BORDER MONITORING MISSION

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE DATE: 22 OCT 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FRIED LOGREF: 9421055 9421067

FILES: IFG O NSCP: PC0098 CODES: BOS SER

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		CLARKE
		HAHN
		KERRICK
		NSC CHRON
		SEATON
		STEPHENS
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: RESPONSE TO 21133 - F/U PAPER TO AGENCIES FOR PC0098.

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001		X	94101919	FOR RECORD PURPOSES
002		X	94102115	FOR RECORD PURPOSES

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21133

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

18 OCT 1994

X72131

MEMORANDUM FOR EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

FROM: EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Prepared by T Walton, OSD Yugo. Task Force, x56516

SUBJECT: U.S. Observers for Serbian/Bosnian Border

In response to your memorandum of October 1, 1994, on U.S. Participation in the Serbian Border Monitoring Mission, USDP Slocombe has requested the Secretary of the Army to act on this matter. Any further queries or instructions should be referred to his office.

We have already begun a search for qualified personnel for this important mission and hope to deploy them as soon as possible.

The Yugoslav Task Force in the Office of the Secretary of Defense will continue their regular contacts with the NSC on the observer mission and monitor its progress. The Department of the Army point of contact is COL Gibson, Army Materiel Command, (703) 274-8195.

Robert P. McAleer

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PER E.O. 13526
2013-0682-M
05/26/16 KDE (S.74)

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Sec Def Cont Nr. X72246

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RECORD ID: 9421133
RECEIVED: 28 SEP 94 16

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 01 OCT 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SERBIA
PC

BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FOLLOW UP PAPER TO 13 SEP PC MTG ON BOSNIA - US PARTICIPATION IN SERBIAN BORDER MONITORING MISSION

ACTION: REED SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 01 OCT 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9421055 9421067

FILES: IFG O NSCP: PC0098 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		KERRICK
		NSC CHRON
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

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2012-0533-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94092918	FOR DECISION
001		X	94100113	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
002		X	94100113	REED SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	941001	BRILL, K	INDERFURTH, K
002	941001	MCALEER, R	PANETTA, L
002	941001	KNIGHT, E	GARTHOFF, D
002	941001	SCRUGGS, R	PATRICK, T

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9421133
RECEIVED: 28 SEP 94 16

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 01 OCT 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SERBIA
PC
BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FOLLOW UP PAPER TO 13 SEP PC MTG ON BOSNIA - US PARTICIPATION IN SERBIAN BORDER MONITORING MISSION

ACTION: REED SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES
DUE DATE: 01 OCT 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK
LOGREF: 9421055 9421067

FILES: IFG O
NSCP: PC0098
CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		KERRICK
		NSC CHRON
		VERSHBOW

CONFUSING DISTRO — TALK TO JDA:

① RECEIPT FOR STATE ONLY — NOT PANETTA (WHO IS A CC:) — DID HE GET ONE?

② DISTRO ONLY SAYS STATE (NO OTHERS)

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB CLOSED BY: NSJDA DOC 2 OF 2

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MS NARA, Date 6/16/10
2010-0533-M

— recd 9/30 12:10pm

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 21133

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Sens	7	ADS	A
Itoh			
Soderberg			
Berger	8		
Lake	9	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room	10		Tab I
West Wing Desk	11		D
NSC Secretariat	12		

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette YES

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rec'd 9/30 7:50a rec'd 9-29 ~~6:50PM~~

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: MBN LOG # 21133

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG MBN A/O _____

once

SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed		
Sens 1	AOS	A
Itoh		
Soderberg		
Berger 2	srb	NOTE to Don Kerrick (make change re note on blue slip!)
Vh Lake 3		
Situation Room		
West Wing Desk 4		
NSC Secretariat 5		
Kerrick 6		

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS:

cc: NES

Exec Sec Office has diskette YES

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ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

1] SB TO PL Date:

I believe the memo should specify that DoD personnel are non-military @

2] _____ TO _____ Date:

3] _____ TO _____ Date:

4] _____ TO _____ Date:

5] _____ TO _____ Date:

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9421133
DATE 01 OCT 94

SUBJECT: US PARTICIPATION IN SERBIAN BORDER MONITORING MISSION
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET , N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

DATE TIME SIGNATURE

10/1 7:45 Charles V. Hegarde

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: ORIGINAL

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By IV NARA, Date 6/16/15
2014-0533-M

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9421133
DATE 01 OCT 94

SUBJECT: US PARTICIPATION IN SERBIAN BORDER MONITORING MISSION
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

DATE TIME SIGNATURE

10/1 7:45 Charles W. Alexander

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: ORIGINAL

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NARA, Date 6/16/10
2010-0533-M

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION US participation in Serbia

NSC LOG # 21133

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
State	Kenneth C Brill		
Treasury	Edward Knight		
DOD	Col Robert McAleer		
Justice	Richard Scruggs		
CIA	Douglass Gartoff		
JCS	Col T.R. Patrick		
US/UN	Amb Rick Inderfurth		

REMARKS:

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MS NARA, Date 6/16/10
2010-0533-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004a. memo	[Duplicate of 002c] (2 pages)	10/01/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0098 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, September 13, 1994 [1]

2010-0533-M
rs625

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004b. memo	Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake re: U.S. Participation in the Serbian Border Monitoring Mission (2 pages)	09/29/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0098 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, September 13, 1994 [1]

2010-0533-M
rs625

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004c. memo	Leon Feurth to Anthony Lake re: U.S. Participation in the Serbian Border (2 pages)	09/27/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0098 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, September 13, 1994 [1]

2010-0533-M
rs625

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9421143
RECEIVED: 03 OCT 94 10

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 05 OCT 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SERBIA
BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
PEACEKEEPING
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: COORDINATION OF US PARTICIPATION ON SERBIAN BORDER MONITORING MISSION - TASKING FM 13 SEP PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 07 OCT 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9421055 9421067

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0098 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		KERRICK
		NSC CHRON
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP CLOSED BY: NSASK DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 6/16/10
2018-0573-M

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~~SECRET~~ RECORD ID: 9421143

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94100608	FOR DECISION
002		X	94100608	SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	941005	BRILL, K	
002	941005	KNIGHT, E	
002	941005	MCALEER, R	
002	941005	SCRUGGS, R	

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Rec'd 10/5 2:18pm

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: [illegible] LOG # 21143

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM ~~PRS~~ NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG [illegible] A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Sens	1/5	AD S	
Itoh			
Soderberg			
Berger	2	Copy Nat'l Sec Advisor has seen	
Lake	3		
~~Situation Room~~ Sens	4		Tab I
West Wing Desk	6		D
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

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PC 009

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9421143
DATE 05 OCT 94

SUBJECT: COORDINATION OF US PARTICIPATION ON SERBIAN BORDER MONITERING
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET , N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	10/6/94	10:45	Wms, MC

PRINT LAST NAME: Williams

COPY: 1

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MM NARA, Date 6/16/10

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9421143
DATE 05 OCT 94

SUBJECT: COORDINATION OF US PARTICIPATION ON SERBIAN BORDER MONITERING
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET , N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

DATE: 10/6/94 TIME: 10:45 SIGNATURE: Wms, DC

PRINT LAST NAME: WILLIAMS

COPY: 1

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By hs NARA, Date 6/16/10
2010-0573-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM '94 OCT -5 P9:15

TIME OF RECEIPT

RECEIVED DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE '94 OCT -5 P9:22

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE PRIORITY (ROUTINE)

RELEASER: S.G. Brooks

DTG: _____

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE NO. 1996 CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES 3

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH DRB (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION U.S. Participation on Serbian Border Mission

NSC LOG # _____

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE Secretary		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
Treasury	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
Justice	Acting Counsel for Intel. Pol		

REMARKS:

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MS NARA, Date 6/16/98
210-0533-~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

-2028634527- -2028634413- NLWJC-94-10-05-21-URG-1001

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM OCT -5 PM 2:15

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE PRIORITY (ROUTINE)

05 10 21 20 L

RELEASER: S.G.

DTG:

MESSAGE NO. 1996 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 3

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH DRB (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION U.S. Participation on Serbian Border Mission

NSC LOG #

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE Secretary		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
Treasury	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
Justice	Acting Counsel for Intel. Pol.		

B N H R

REMARKS:

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MJ NARA, Date 6/16/00
NLJ-00-533-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
OCT -5 PM 2:15

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF RECEIPT

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE / PRIORITY / (ROUTINE)

RELEASER: S.G.

DTG:

SECRET

MESSAGE NO. 1996 CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES 3

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH DRS (202) 456-2585 West Wing Desk
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION U.S. Participation on Serbian Border Mission

NSC LOG # _____

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE Secretary		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
Treasury	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
Justice	Acting Counsel for Intel Pol		

REMARKS:

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NARA, Date 6/16/15
200-0533-F

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM OCT -5 PM 2:15

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

B

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE PRIORITY (ROUTINE)

RELEASER: S.G. Zinsmeister

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 1996 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 3

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH DRB (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION U.S. Participation on Serbian Border Mission

NSC LOG #

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE Secretary		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
Treasury	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
Justice	Acting Counsel for Intel Pol		

B
N
K
R

REMARKS:

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 6/16/00
2003-0553-c

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005a. memo	[Duplicate of 002b] (1 page)	10/05/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0098 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, September 13, 1994 [1]

2010-0533-M
rs625

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005b. memo	[Duplicate of 002c] (2 pages)	10/01/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0098 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, September 13, 1994 [1]

2010-0533-M
rs625

RESTRICTION CODES

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Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005c. memo	Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake; Re: Implementing the Decision (1 page)	10/04/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0098 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, September 13, 1994 [1]

2010-0533-M
rs625

RESTRICTION CODES

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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9421083
RECEIVED: 14 SEP 94 11

TO: LAKE

FROM: VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 14 SEP 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FOLLOW UP PAPER TO PRES RE 13 SEP PC MTG ON BOSNIA POLICY

ACTION: PRES NOTED W/ COMMENT DUE DATE: 17 SEP 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9421055 9421067

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0098 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		DARBY
		HALL
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		WOLIN
		WRIGHT

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSASK CLOSED BY: NSGP DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By AP NARA, Date 6/11/10
200-0533-~

~~SECRET~~ RECORD ID: 9421083

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	PRESIDENT	Z	94091621	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	94091621	PRES NOTED W/ COMMENT

~~SECRET~~

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National Security Council
The White House

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Berger	3		
Lake	4		
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West Wing Desk	5	9/18	N
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

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National Security Council
The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
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NSC Secretariat			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

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COMMENTS: CC: NES

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 9/16

21083

WE NEED TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER AT NEXT NSC MEETING

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

September 14, 1994

94SEP 14 P8:41

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Review of Bosnia Policy

Principals met Tuesday afternoon to review planning for lifting of the arms embargo and our political strategy from now until mid-October, after which you have pledged to introduce a UN Security Council resolution to lift the embargo.

Principals agreed we should press forward with our current strategy aimed at maximizing pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to accept the Contact Group proposal. In addition to encouraging Milosevic's steps to isolate the Bosnian Serbs with limited sanctions relief, we will make an all-out effort to implement the disincentives agreed earlier by the Contact Group, in particular to carry out air strikes in response to violations of the exclusion zones. This will require pressuring Boutros-Ghali and reluctant allies (especially the UK) to override the objections of the UNPROFOR commanders to any use of air power.

Principals continue to see major risks in lifting the embargo, even if done multilaterally. They recognized that there may be factors arguing for delay when the October 15 deadline (now established in the DoD Authorization Bill) rolls around: Allies and the Russians may argue that more time is needed for other Contact Group measures to play out, and thus oppose a lift resolution in the Security Council in November; and the Bosnians themselves may prefer to wait till spring if there is no way to persuade UNPROFOR to remain after lift. Indeed, the JCS military planners have concluded that the rearmament program and air campaign that must accompany lift could be more effectively pursued if we delayed for 4-6 months.

Nevertheless, Principals agreed that we had to uphold our commitment to the Congress to act on multilateral lift after October 15, and that the prospect of lift provides important leverage vis-a-vis the Serbs and our Contact Group partners. If the Contact Group strategy shows promise in mid-October, we may be able to gain some flexibility on timing of lift from the Congress. (We will not, however, have much flexibility in implementing the Nunn amendment provision that DoD cease funding of enforcement of the arms embargo after November 15; but that is a far more limited action than unilateral lift in that we would at most be restricted from participating in aspects of NATO's sanctions enforcement in the Adriatic.)

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 14, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Review of Bosnia Policy

Attached at Tab A is a memorandum for the President regarding the situation in Bosnia.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab A to the President.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to the President

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By M NARA, Date 6/16/12

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9421068
RECEIVED: 12 SEP 94 15

TO: ITOH

FROM: BRILL, K

DOC DATE: 09 SEP 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
SANCTIONS
SERBIA
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF DIPLOMATIC & CONGRESSIONAL STRATEGY PAPER ON LIFTING ARMS EMBARGOFOR DISCUSSION AT 13 SEP PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: SEE 9421067 FOR FINAL ACTION
DUE DATE: 15 SEP 94
STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK
LOGREF: 9421055 9421067

FILES: IFM O
NSCP: PC0098
CODES: BOS

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FOR ACTION
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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MT NARA, Date 6/16/10
2012-0533-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	KERRICK	Z	94091215	PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE
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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9421068
RECEIVED: 12 SEP 94 15

TO: ITOH

FROM: BRILL, K

DOC DATE: 09 SEP 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
SANCTIONS
SERBIA
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF DIPLOMATIC & CONGRESSIONAL STRATEGY PAPER ON LIFTING ARMS EMKBARGO

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE
DUE DATE: 15 SEP 94 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK
LOGREF:

FILES: IFG
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CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
KERRICK

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
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COMMENTS: Superseded by later edition. Memo to Lake provided in 21067.

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 9, 1994

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DECL: OADR

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM H. ITOH
Executive Secretary
National Security Council

COL. ROBERT MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. LEON FEURTH
Special Assistant to the Vice President
Office of the Vice President

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T.R. PATRICK
SECRETARY
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Diplomatic and Congressional Strategy Paper On Lifting the Arms Embargo

Attached is the paper on diplomatic and congressional strategy on lifting the arms embargo tasked at the August 17 Principals' Committee meeting and for discussion at the September 13 Principals' Committee meeting.

for Kenneth C. Brill
Executive Secretary

Attachment: as discussed.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended,
Department of State Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MS NARA, Date 6/16/10
2012-0533-F

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Diplomatic Strategy on Bosnia: Short and Mid-Term

SUMMARY: This paper sets forth considerations for American strategy towards the Bosnian conflict in the short and mid-term. The short term is defined as the period leading up to the October 15 date for commencement of discussions on a multilateral lift resolution, as set out in President Clinton's August 10 letter to Nunn and in the Nunn-Mitchell amendment. Mid-term is defined as the period following October 15 until the end of 1994. This is the period in which the question of whether the United States moves towards unilateral lift is likely to be decided.

The analysis considers steps in all important aspects of our efforts, i.e. within the Contact Group and in NATO; with the parties to the conflict; with Congress and with the press. It concludes with an agenda for near and mid-term action. END SUMMARY

THE CURRENT SITUATION

The current situation is characterized by an uneasy and oft-broken military truce with considerable political maneuvering behind the scenes. There are several untested assumptions, including the intentions of the Russians and other Contact Group members, the sincerity of Milosevic and the ability of the Sarajevo government to maintain its position.

While the Contact Group remains the best means for avoiding a breakdown of current efforts and preventing a situation from arising in which the U.S. could be forced to assume sole responsibility for the crisis, its internal cohesion could be tested severely in coming weeks. Both Russia and France appear to be pushing alternative visions for a peace process based on support for Milosevic, while the UK and others remain adamantly opposed to moving to strict enforcement of the exclusion zones out of fear for the safety of their UNPROFOR forces.

It must also be assumed that adoption of the Nunn-Mitchell amendment has not ended the debate over lift. Although the House has passed the conference committee report on the Defense Authorization Bill containing Nunn-Mitchell and the Senate should follow suit as soon as it reconvenes, additional attempts to legislate unilateral lift, such as the Dole amendment, could surface before Congress recesses. The election campaign will ensure further debate. Our integrated strategy must include provisions for participating in and directing this debate.

Among the important events which have taken place in the Bosnian conflict since the Geneva III ministerial are:

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-- A Bosnian Serb referendum supporting rejection of the the Contact Group proposals and stepped up harassment of the humanitarian relief effort by Pale;

-- Adoption of the Nunn-Mitchell amendment containing strong hortatory language calling for Administration action in support of multilateral lift and calling for the submission of a plan and consultations for unilateral lift if multilateral lift fails;

-- A decision by Milosevic to close his borders and cut other links with Pale as a means to force acceptance of the Contact Group proposals;

-- A growing belief on the part of the Bosnian Muslims that they can prevail if widespread hostilities return, combined with difficulties in making a go of the Federation;

-- Statements by the leading participants in UNPROFOR that they will leave Bosnia if the arms embargo is lifted;

-- Efforts by Kozyrev to paint Milosevic's steps as constituting a qualitatively new situation which requires abandonment of the July 30 Contact Group commitments and a major readjustment of Contact Group strategy.

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. STRATEGY

These events have strengthened the impression that the Bosnian Serbs will not accept the Contact Group plan in the near or medium term and that there is an inevitability to a lifting of the arms embargo and a widening of the war.

The dangers for the American position in such a situation are several:

-- A tendency by other players to assume that if a firm solution is not achieved by October 15, political efforts will be swamped by renewed hostilities, as the U.S. pushes for multilateral lift, and failing that, moves to lift the arms embargo unilaterally. This could lead both to major conflicts with important partners and to an image that the United States was now responsible for a wider war.

-- As October 15 approaches, difficulties in maintaining unity in the Contact Group and within NATO which could undermine efforts to push towards a political settlement. In particular, erosion of the consensus that the Contact Group must be firm with both Belgrade and Pale could lead to considerable disarray. Such a development could lead to conflicts in the Group. Equally devastating could be renewed hostilities and loss of momentum on the ground.

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-- If pressure for a political settlement is undermined by the above two developments, we could find ourselves isolated both diplomatically and militarily. Our only options would be either to stand by as the war expanded or to ourselves enter the conflict.

Avoiding the diplomatic and military isolation and the crisis for our relations with major partners which could result from such a development must be a major goal of short term American strategy.

AN INTEGRATED APPROACH

The large number of elements in play require continuous oversight to ensure an integration of important factors and opportunities for influence. Our approach should focus on three basic goals:

-- To preserve a common political strategy within the Contact Group which helps avoid American isolation by incorporating our internal political debate as a legitimate aspect of management of the crisis. We have from the beginnning accepted the political needs of the Europeans and the Russians as important elements of a common strategy. We should make clear to Contact Group members and other allies that the Administration's political decision to work with proponents of lift was taken after careful deliberation and that it will not be possible to remove this element from the equation.

Indeed, the pressure of lift can work in our favor if we do not break ranks with each other. Our task should be to use all the tools at our disposal to create conditions which make lift both politically and factually unnecessary. Mere warnings by the others of the consequences of lift will not serve this purpose.

-- On the basis of the above, to convince other Contact Group members that continuation of the incentives/disincentives strategy towards Belgrade as well as Pale is strongly in our joint interest. We should make clear that unless it maintains this foundation, agreed at the Naples summit, the Contact Group will be in danger of being whipsawed by each new short term development. There is enough flexibility in this approach to allow us to utilize various elements of the incentives/disincentives strategy to bring the greatest possible pressure to bear towards a political settlement, while at the same time taking care of the often conflicting political needs of the major members.

-- With Congress and with the press, to make clear how these various steps are integrated into a negotiating strategy

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which should be given time to work. At the same time, to continue planning for various post-lift scenarios and discuss the political and military implications of lift with Congress on the basis of this planning. Congress should accept that it shares responsibility with the Administration for successful implementation of our strategy. There should be no finger pointing once the going gets rough.

IMMEDIATE STEPS

Despite Pale's intransigence, the situation is not stalemated. Russian diplomatic efforts, NATO planning both for enforcement of exclusion zones and UNPROFOR redeployment and events on the ground provide elements for a dynamic situation. We are not yet clear about Milosevic's intentions, for example. Our Charge in Belgrade argues convincingly that he will probably play his hand for all that it is worth, with any sign of decisive action coming later in the process.

More than five weeks remain until the October 15 date set by President Clinton and echoed in the Nunn-Mitchell amendment for commencing action in the UN. Even then, we will have two weeks or more to organize the debate. The goal of our immediate steps should be to inject as much dynamism into our efforts as possible. Establishing a dynamic process, which demonstrates clearly understandable elements of progress, is the best means of dealing successfully with the debate over lift.

In particular, we should seek to ensure that the Bosnian Serbs are not allowed to create a de facto stalemate. Application of the tools agreed by the Contact Group, combined with strong diplomatic pressure, can meet this danger. The question now is finding the right mix.

There is, for example, general agreement that an important goal is to isolate Pale diplomatically and logistically as a means of increasing pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to accept the Contact Group plan.

But despite the results of the recent Contact Group meeting in Berlin, there is no consensus on how to achieve this goal:

-- the Russians wish to reward Milosevic for his blockade of Pale with progressive stages of sanctions relief. Their approach would be to accept Milosevic's promises at face value and remove him from the disincentive portion of the Contact Group strategy.

-- the European Contact Group members seem willing to go along with this approach. They have hopes that it might work and see it as a means of preserving unity with the Russians.

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Above all, they see it as an alternative to lifting the arms embargo, which they hope to avoid at all costs. The French and British in particular are watching events closely for implications of the future of their deployments in UNPROFOR.

-- the United States is willing to consider relief for Belgrade, on the condition that Milosevic demonstrate his good intentions by accepting a border monitoring mechanism and by taking political steps with other former Yugoslav Republics, such as recognizing their borders.

The agreement worked out in Berlin on September 6 and 7 meets our core needs in providing for a credible monitoring effort without giving too much away to Belgrade. At the same time, it provides the Russians with Contact Group recognition for the steps that Milosevic has taken that they can use effectively with their domestic audience. Although the Russians may press for even greater recognition as events unfold, the Berlin agreement represents a genuine desire by all parties to maintain Contact Group unity. This should stand us in good stead as we move to implement the other more controversial elements of our fundamental strategy.

We should now move ahead with the following steps:

-- a strong presentation in NATO and with the Russians on the need to underline the determination of the Contact Group with increased enforcement of exclusion zone violations, particularly by NATO air strikes undertaken in coordination with UNPROFOR.

-- careful discussion in NATO, with the UN and bilaterally on future prospects for UNPROFOR. In particular we should utilize apparent French willingness to consider redeployments to construct a plan for a longer term role in support of a peace process.

-- a concerted effort with individual members of Congress to explain our strategy and seek to involve them in the debate from the beginning.

-- a systematic press strategy which adopts clearly-understandable themes and seeks to ensure that they are reflected in both news articles and sympathetic commentary.

-- work in individual capitals. Our Ambassadors in Contact Group countries should be encouraged to enter the frankest possible dialogue with host governments. We should improve our backgrounding of other posts to ensure detailed presentation of our views by other Ambassadors as well.

-- stepped up consideration within the USG of the military and financial implications of various steps related to the

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possible withdrawal of UNPROFOR and lifting of the arms embargo. Possibilities of responding positively to continued strong British and French pressure for an American ground role, even in a support capacity, must be explored carefully.

-- more detailed consideration of the economic and political measures the United States could support on the ground to help ease the crisis and push towards a solution. Such measures should be focussed on all players in the conflict.

-- more active press background which describes the interrelated nature of US strategy and which builds the lift aspect into our strategy, explaining what the possible U.S. role might be. We should take pains to counteract any sense of conflict or rift with Russia and our major allies.

TOWARDS OCTOBER 15

As October 15 approaches, we should be able to describe a package of strategies and measures which is focussing maximum pressure towards a negotiated settlement. Assuming that a settlement has not yet been reached, we should begin to incorporate UN discussion of a multilateral lift resolution into our strategy in a self-confident and pragmatic way:

-- With other members of the Contact Group, we should gain agreement that the UN debate should be a time to review all aspects of the conflict and the efforts undertaken so far. The goal of this review should be to gain agreement within the Security Council on specific, firm steps which can be taken to demonstrate the precariousness of further delay. These conclusions should include a judgement on the growing political support for lift in the U.S., but also should focus again on efforts to pressure recalcitrant parties.

This would be the point to decide whether new negotiating efforts with new objectives might be considered or not. It would also be the time to be ready with ideas for a future role for UNPROFOR, including possible enhanced American support. If we are to have a card to play with our allies on UNPROFOR, it would probably be wise to play it at this point.

-- With Belgrade, our approach will depend on how honestly Milosevic has cooperated with us. The week or two prior to October 15 might be a time for a high level U.S. envoy who could make clear to Belgrade the consequences and opportunities in various courses of action.

-- With Congress and the press, we should describe carefully the goals of the UN debate, seek congressional agreement on tactics and possible outcomes. With both Congress

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and the press, this period should mark an intensification of dialogue which prepares the way for probable failure of a multilateral lift resolution. The ongoing U.S. election campaign is likely to play an important role in this debate.

At this point, we should be talking frankly with Congress about the political, military and legal implications of unilateral lift. We should be clear with major proponents of lift what the joint political responsibility will be.

-- With Sarajevo, we should intensify our dialogue on possible options and encourage the Bosnians to support a joint approach with us in public and with contacts in the United States.

-- During this period, we should also be exploring more carefully steps which can be taken in the broader context to stabilize the situation. These include a more systematic approach to the problems of Kosovo; strategies in international organizations and longer term projects such as a regional arms control scheme for the region.

OCTOBER 15 AND BEYOND

All these strands will come together as we make good on the commitment made by President Clinton to introduce a lift resolution in the Security Council within the two weeks following October 15. By this time, we should have a fair view of the positions of all the key parties and the possibilities for further action.

-- We will have a much better idea of the prospects for passage of a lift resolution in the Security Council. The attitudes of the British, French and Russians will be key.

-- We will have briefed Congress in detail on what we believe we would need to do militarily to assist the Bosnian government after lift and have a much better understanding of how much pressure or support we can expect from the Hill.

-- The Bosnian government will itself have a better appreciation for what could happen after lift, and this too will influence our calculations.

-- Finally, there will be developments on the ground in Bosnia--the fighting situation and the humanitarian relief effort, the position of UNPROFOR and the possible implementation of strict enforcement, and the results of Milosevic's campaign against Pale.

We will need to weigh all these elements in deciding whether to press the lift resolution forward to a vote or to

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propose alternative approaches. If our assessment points in the direction of pressing the lift resolution, then we can move forward. On the other hand, if we decide that Milosevic's campaign is working and needs more time to succeed, this may argue for holding off on the lift resolution, particularly if support for lift is lacking among key players. Other alternatives are also possible. If strict enforcement has been implemented by this time, we may want to continue with this for a longer period before moving for agreement on lift. Or, our conversations with Congress may convince us (or convince them) that they are unwilling to support the military action we believe necessary to assist the Bosnian government under a lift scenario.

Other possibilities may also emerge depending on how events unfold. If we decide for any reason, however, not to press forward with a lift resolution, or if we do but fail to secure its passage, then we are committed, by the President's letter to Nunn, to consult with the Congress on the possibility of unilateral lift. Given the timing, it is likely that any serious consultations on unilateral lift will need to await the convening of the new Congress in January. We will also need to respond appropriately to the other provisions of the Nunn-Mitchell amendment, particularly those cutting off funds for U.S. enforcement of the arms embargo.

By that time, there will likely be new elements to factor into our equations as we make clear to Congress the extremely damaging effect that unilateral lift could have on many of our key foreign policy equities, as well as the additional demands it would place on our military responsibility for the conflict in Bosnia.

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See also 2013-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake re: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (4 pages)	09/12/1994	P1/b(1)
001b. agenda	Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)	09/13/1994	P1/b(1)
~~001c. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Eastern Mediterranean (3 pages)~~	~~08/17/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
001d. paper	re: Executive Summary-Joint Staff Analysis of Lifting the Arms Embargo on Bosnia (5 pages)	09/12/1994	P1/b(1)
001e. paper	re: Bosnian Army Weapons Requirements (2 pages)	08/29/1994	P1/b(1)
~~001f. letter~~	~~From Alija Izetbegovic re: [Military Requirements] (5 pages)~~	~~08/26/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~001g. paper~~	~~re: Options for Improving the Military Capabilities of the Bosnian Federation (3 pages)~~	~~09/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~001h. paper~~	~~re: UNPROFOR II After Lifting the Arms Embargo (4 pages)~~	~~08/31/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
001i. paper	re: Ending US Compliance With the Bosnian Arms Embargo (4 pages)	08/1994	P1/b(1)
001j. paper	re: Options for Continuing Humanitarian Relief in Bosnia [partial] (1 page)	09/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 6/11/2020
~~001k. paper~~	~~re: Lifting the Arms Embargo: The Policy Context (1 page)~~	~~09/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 08/03/2015
~~001l. paper~~	~~re: Diplomatic Strategy on Bosnia: Short and Mid-Term (8 pages)~~	~~09/12/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020

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2010-0533-M
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P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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001m. paper	re: Military Situation in Bihac [partial] (2 pages)	09/09/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 08/03/2015
~~001n. paper~~	~~re: Bihac: Possible Exclusion Zone Fighting (2 pages)~~	~~09/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
001o. memo	Leon Feurth for Anthony Lake re: Serbian Sanctions-Related Issues for Decision at September 13 PC (2 pages)	09/12/1994	P1/b(1)
~~001p. paper~~	~~re: Sustaining the Bosnian Federation (5 pages)~~	~~09/09/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~001q. cable~~	~~re: Izetbegovic Re-Assesses Lifting Arms Embargo (3 pages)~~	~~09/12/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~001r. paper~~	~~[Duplicate of 001l] (8 pages)~~	~~09/09/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~001s. paper~~	~~[Duplicate of 001p] (5 pages)~~	~~09/09/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
001t. paper	re: The Serb Mindset (4 pages)	09/13/1994	P1/b(1)
001u. email	Alexander Vershbow to Lake re: Bosnia PC-Update (1 page)	09/13/1994	P1/b(1)
001v. email	Vershbow to Neal Wolin re: Bosnia PC-One More Thing (1 page)	09/13/1994	P1/b(1)
001w. map	re: Weapons Positions (1 page)	09/1994	P1/b(1)
001x. chart	re: Additional Forms of Sanctions Relief for Belegrade (1 page)	09/1994	P1/b(1)

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PC0098 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, September 13, 1994 [2]

2010-0533-M
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002. agenda	[Duplicate of 001b] (1 page)	09/13/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9421067
RECEIVED: 12 SEP 94 13

TO: LAKE

FROM: KERRICK

DOC DATE: 12 SEP 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MTG BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 13 SEP PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: LAKE NOTED W/ COMMENT DUE DATE: 15 SEP 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9421055 9421068

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0098 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		KERRICK
		NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJEB CLOSED BY: NSGP DOC 1 OF 1

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NARA, Date 6/16/20
2010-0553-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94091520	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	94091520	LAKE NOTED W/ COMMENT

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National Security Council
The White House

rec'd 9/12 7:10pm

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 21067

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG SP A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Sens	1	AOS	
Itoh			
Soderberg		copy	
Berger	2	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	SP 9/15	N
NSC Secretariat	Pls	File this cpy w/ TL NOTES	

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS: PC Mtg on Bosnia, 9/13

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

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9/10

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Tony

Final version of State's Strategy paper for PC, plus new paper on measures to support Federation, many of which are already being implemented.

Sandy V.

cc: Sandy B.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake re: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (4 pages)	09/12/1994	P1/b(1)

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001b. agenda	Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)	09/13/1994	P1/b(1)

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OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions
Meeting of NSC Principals Committee
DATE: August 17, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 4:30 - 6:10pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and the Eastern Mediterranean ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Anthony Lake

OVP
Bill Wise
Rick Saunders

State
Secretary Warren Christopher
Peter Tarnoff
Charles Redman
John Kornblum
Charles Thomas
David Gergen

DOD
Secretary William Perry
Walter Slocombe

USUN
Ambassador Madeleine Albright
Dave Scheffer

CIA
William Studeman
Norman Schindler

JCS
Admiral William Owens
LTG Wesley Clark

White House
Leon Panetta
George Stephanopoulos

OMB
Alice Rivlin
Gordon Adams

NSC
Donald Kerrick
Kathleen Stephens

Summary of Conclusions

Sanctions:

1. The Principals agreed to continue to push for completion of the easing and tightening resolutions in New York and to continue to insist on Krajina linkage in the easing resolution. Secretary Christopher will consult with allies on options for moving forward with sanctions. ~~(C)~~

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2/6/2020 (S.82)
2013-0682-M

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2. Regarding Milosevic's closure of his border with Bosnian Serb territory, the Principals agreed that an effective international monitoring system was essential if the UNSC were to be able to determine whether to extend the delay in imposition of new sanctions or to take other sanctions measures in response to Serbian enforcement of the embargo. ~~(C)~~

one clause deleted (C)

Lifting the Arms Embargo:

3. Principals agreed the goal in seeking a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo on the Federation is to provide the Bosnians with a defensive capability to ensure the inherent right of self-defense. A detailed planning document developing a concept of how arms might be provided, and including a range of options, should be developed within two weeks time. Action: OSD and JCS to develop comprehensive plan. ~~(S)~~

4. The U.S. should be prepared to provide air support, but not ground troops, to the Bosnian government in connection with the arms embargo lifting in the likely event of increased Bosnian Serb military action against the Federation. Planning should focus on the development of robust air options, including the use of air power for tactical, punitive, deterrent, or other purposes. Planning should include options for responses to Bosnian Serb action against the eastern enclaves, Sarajevo, Tuzla, and elsewhere. Scenarios considered should include: 1) air options following complete UNPROFOR withdrawal, and 2) air strike options within the context of a remaining, reconfigured UNPROFOR presence following lift. Planning should assume action in the NATO context, or within a coalition of willing allies. Action: OSD and JCS. ~~(S)~~

5. On the future of UNPROFOR, Principals agreed to review options for a new role for UNPROFOR. The options should include at a minimum, a defense of Sarajevo model, and a humanitarian aid escort mission through Federation territory. Once the options are developed and reviewed by the Principals, they will be presented to the allies. Action: OSD and JCS to develop options. ~~(C)~~

6. The U.S. will seek multilateral support for the lifting of the arms embargo against the Bosnian government. NATO should remain engaged as we move toward a more robust use of air power. Action: State develop a paper outlining a diplomatic and Congressional strategy for achieving these objectives, including options for sustaining the negotiating track. ~~(C)~~

The Eastern Mediterranean:

7. A Presidential emissary to both Greece and Turkey should deliver a strong message to each country warning that recent incidents, and the overall increase in Greek-Turkish military tensions, risk leading to serious erosion of U.S. support for both countries. The envoy's message should be specific, with sticks and carrots for each country. Action: State to draft concept and talking points. ~~(S)~~

8. The new U.S. Special Coordinator for Cyprus should be identified and announced as soon as possible. It should be someone perceived by all sides as impartial. Action: State to recommend candidates. ~~(C)~~

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9. On Macedonia, the previously tasked study of reinforcing UNPROFOR there should be completed, concurrent with the completion of the arms embargo lift paper. Further attention is required to economic assistance to Macedonia as well. Action: OSD and JCS to develop options for UNPROFOR-Macedonia reinforcement planning by end of August. State to develop options for increased economic assistance. ~~(C)~~

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001d. paper	re: Executive Summary-Joint Staff Analysis of Lifting the Arms Embargo on Bosnia (5 pages)	09/12/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
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([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001e. paper	re: Bosnian Army Weapons Requirements (2 pages)	08/29/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
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NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
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TAB B

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
PRESIDENT OF THE PRESIDENCY

Sarajevo, August 26, 1994

Dear Sirs,

As enclosure to this letter will you please find the list of military requirements of our Army in the period to come. As you may see from the enclosed list, required equipment is mainly for the needs of defence.

With best regards,

Yours faithfully,

A. Izetbegović

Alija Izetbegović

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Republika Bosna i Hercegovina
PREDSJEDNIK PREDSJEDNIŠTVA

List of necessary tehnical means for the use of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina

1. Infantry armament	
- AK-47	30.000
- Antiaircraft machine gun 12,7 mm	500
- Heavy machine gun 14,5 (15 mm)	200
- Antiaircraft gun (fieldpiece) 20,30 or 40 mm (pulled or self-propelled	50
- Bullet 7,62 x 39	30.000.000
- Bullet 12,7 mm (different)	5.000.000
- Bullet 14,5 (15 mm)	2.000.000
- Bullet 20 (30 or 40) mm	1.000.000
2. Artillery armament	
- Howitzer 155 mm (FH - 70 or SP-70)	72
- Self.propelled gun (fieldpiece) 175 mm	36
- Multitube rocket launcher ("MLRS")	36
- Ammunition for the above artillery weapons and fieldpieces	10 b/k
3. Antiaircraft armament	
- Polo Tow (Launcher)	50
- Rocket Tow	20 b/k
4. Armored-mechanized means	
- Tank M-60	30
- Ammunition for tanks	10 b/k

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19

5. Combat air force and antiaircraft defence means:

- Combat helicopters with 10 b/k (ammunition for armament) 6
- Antiaircraft rockets of middle and long range, in case the lifting of the ban on flying over Bosnia is invisiged. (No-fly zone)

In case the PA rockets are not necessary, to deliver communication means in the value of 25 million US dollars (according to the attached specification

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Enclosure:

Necessary Communication means

1. KT device (JRC1 45, JRC 245 or KENWOOD TS059sdx complet)	5
2. KT device (JRC 135, JRC 145, KENWOOD TS850, TS690 with opt)	50
3. PC NOTEBOOK (386/486SX1 34MB, 80HD, MONO,AS/1P, and reserve batt.	120
4. If under 1. and 1. KENWOOD is purchased, the IF 232 should be taken in the same quantity	
5. Internal FAX modem for NB (item 3)	50
6. Modem ZyXEL U149E (plus)	50
7. Packet FAX MODEM 9624	100
8. SONY ICF-SW55	5
9. SONY DAT complet with MIC. and receivers	15
10. Packet Modem Pk-900	40
11. Packet Modem KAM	35
12. Fax Panasonic KX 50	20
13. UPS 1200VA, 220V standby	60
14. UPS 1200VA, 220V online	5
15. Repeater MOTOROLA 2M/25 W	17
16. Minipower receiver Rhode-Shwartz	2
17. Metalic cable tester Tektronix 1502c	2
18. Metalic cable teste Tektronix 1503c	2
19. Spectrum analyzer 10KHz-21GHz (HP, TEK or similar))	4
20. Digitalazing oscilloscope 500 Mhz	
21. Notebook PC colour lcd 486/120MB/4Mb	3
22. Microwave receiver GIGARUNE Rhode-Schwartz	1
23. Ni Cd different batteries	30.000
24. H1-8 cassettes for Sony camcorder 90"	300

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25. H1-8 cassettes for Sony camcorder 60"	300
26. DAT cassettes 120"	150
27. Photo films 135-36 100 ASA	2.000
28. NiCd battery chargers for batteries under 23.	300
29. Floppy discs DSHD 5.25"/1.2MB	4.000
30. Floppy discs DSHD 3,5"/1.44B	3.000
31. Toner for Hp II laser jet	25
32. Toner for Hp III laser jet	20
33. RotatorHam 4	30
34. Rotator Hirschmann RO 280	20
35. Rotator Elevation KR500	10
36. Coaxial cable RG213U	10.000
37. Coaxial cable RG21 4	2.000
38. Coaxial cable RG58U	2.000
39. Solar panel 12V3A	70
40. Thode-Schwartz antenna RX	2
41. Motorola battery NTN5521B	200
42. PTC controlers	100
43. BAYCOM modem	100
44. TNC2C	30
45. Battery bubble jet printers	20
46. Spare casettes for 45	100
47. Programmers and software for GP 300	2
48. Antenna YAGI VHF 8-12dB (145-174 Mhz)	40
49. Antenna Yagi UHF 10dB	40

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Tab C

Options for Improving the Military Capabilities of the Bosnian Federation

The US Government has three basic option for improving the military capabilities of the Bosnian Federation by organizing, training, and equipping its forces. These options apply to the main components of such a program--funding, acquisition, and delivery. The options are: (a) the United States sponsors the lifting of the arms embargo, steps aside, and lets the international arms market provide whatever the Federation can afford, (b) the United States contributes part of the funding, weapons, training, and transport in conjunction with its NATO Allies and others, and (c) the United States alone provides the bulk of what is needed by the Federation.

Options for funding. The JCS estimates that roughly from $100-300 million would be needed to enable the Federation to improve meaningfully its ability to wage war against the Bosnian Serbs, depending upon whether the United States went with a light or a heavy option. Although loans to the Federation are a possible option, the Bosnian government's ability to repay large sums anytime soon is subject to doubt. Moreover, it is virtually certain that the international financial institutions would not provide loans for acquiring weapons.

- **No US funding.** The Federation already has funds set aside for acquiring arms, has received weapons from Iran, and gets financial support from sympathetic Muslim countries, such as Saudi Arabia. Allowing these established mechanisms to function without hindrance would be the least expensive option for the United States but would also open the way to increased influence in Bosnia for Muslim countries, including Iran and other radical states.

- **Multilateral funding.** This option requires a new grouping of countries, hopefully predominantly Western, that would provide funding. In lieu of cash contributions, Allies could assist by providing in kind assistance, such as weapons, transport, or training sites. Multilateral funding would make it possible to tap into potential sources of major contributions (such as the Saudis) without giving up control of the operation. The advantages of this option are that it spreads the burden and gives Western countries first claim on whatever influence is derived by funding the operation. The disadvantage is that this option is likely to be difficult to implement because most West European countries are already complaining about the costs of their operations in Bosnia and are unlikely to come up with significant amounts of money.

- **US funding.** By unilaterally providing most or perhaps all of the funds necessary, the United States maximizes its control over the operation and stands to gain the most influence with the Federation. The disadvantages are that this is the most expensive option and the United States will bear sole responsibility for any difficulties

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encountered. The outlay of cash could be significantly reduced by providing weapons from US stocks (see below).

Options for sources of weapons. Bosnian forces are most capable of quickly absorbing equipment which resembles Warsaw Pact models with which Federation troops are already familiar. Federation officials have requested modest amounts of weapons--including small arms, artillery, helicopters, tanks, anti-tank rockets, and air defense equipment--but this may not be their entire shopping list. Training would also be necessary, especially for any heavy or non-Warsaw pact equipment. Options for training include: (a) non-US personnel conducting training in Bosnia, (b) US and non-US personnel conducting training in Europe, and (c) US personnel conducting training in the United States.

- **International arms market.** Plenty of Soviet bloc weapons are readily available at reasonable prices. Allowing the Federation to make purchases on the open market would reduce the administrative burden on the United States. On the other hand, the United States would lose a degree of control (such as over the amount of offensive weapons) and open market purchases would also increase the potential for corruption and problems with quality control.

- **East European or NATO stocks.** Purchasing from Eastern Europe would provide weapons that would require the least training for Federation troops and would provide welcome income for countries that are bearing much of the burden of enforcing sanctions. The US Government would have to determine whether sufficient trainers are available from US or East European sources. Material and training from NATO sources would be less appropriate, and providing such weapons might generate objections and delays from some of the Allies, such as Greece.

- **US stocks.** Providing weapons from US stocks would reduce the cash outlay and maximize US control by, for example, limiting the amount of offensive weapons provided. US weapons would also be available quickly during the period of Federation vulnerability to Serb attack immediately after a lifting of the embargo is announced. However, considerable training (six to twelve months) would be necessary before large amounts of US equipment could be used effectively. Moreover, providing weapons changes the United States from a neutral outsider to an active belligerent clearly taking sides in the conflict. Providing large amounts of weapons will increase the scope and intensity of the fighting, which in turn will exacerbate the humanitarian crisis.

Options for delivery. Transporting weapons to the Federation forces involves two distinct problems: (a) shipping the weapons from their source to the border of land-locked Bosnia, which will require cooperation from Croatia, and (b) moving the weapons

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from the border to training areas or the front, which will require transport through a conflict zone. Supplies can be deliver by sea, air, or land. Although sea routes provide the most capacity, ultimately land routes will be necessary to move large amounts of cargo quickly to the Bosnian forces. Bottlenecks are likely to develop because of the shortage of suitable ports (Split and Ploce), the limited number of airfields capable of handling large cargo aircraft, and the poor condition of many roads. Considerable amounts probably will have to be delivered by air drops, which are the most expensive option. Weapons shipments will also have to compete with relief supplies for scarce transport capacity. Federation forces, with limited resources and the distractions of conducting a war, are unlikely to be of much assistance in assuring transport across Bosnian territory.

- **Private transportation.** Although it will add to the costs, private entrepreneurs could arrange shipment to sites adjacent to Bosnia. It is unlikely, however, that they would take responsibility for delivery all the way to Federation forces.

- **Multilateral participation.** Contribution of funds or transport from others, such as NATO or a coalition of the willing, would spread the burden. The UN or other international organizations are unlikely, however, to support sending weapons to Bosnia. A coalition of the willing will be difficult to arrange. Other countries' heavy lift resources are limited. Even if they have the resources, other countries are likely to be hesitant about making deliveries through a conflict zone.

- **US transport.** Under the guidelines provided by the NSC, this would be limited, on the ground, to providing transport only as far as the border, with no US forces in Bosnia. Providing transport for all or part of the way will add to the cost for the United States and increase the risk of US involvement in the fighting, especially through attacks on US aircraft. The large amounts of supplies required and the vulnerability of many Bosnian airfields to Serb artillery mean that it will impossible to deliver what is needed by air. Large numbers of aircraft would be needed, especially for the final leg, and with Bosnian airfields likely to be threatened, much of the delivery probably would have to be made by air drops.

Drafted by ISA/ENP, TWalton, x56516

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TAB D

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31 August 1994

INFORMATION PAPER

SUBJECT: UNPROFOR II After Lifting the Arms Embargo (U)

1. (U) Purpose. To examine establishing an effective force, a new UNPROFOR II in Bosnian Federation Territory, with missions to protect Sarajevo and to maintain the flow of humanitarian aid following the decision to lift the arms embargo.

2. ~~(S)~~ Background. 17 August PC tasked DOD to examine options for new UNPROFOR roles to include defense of Sarajevo and maintenance of the humanitarian aid escort mission. Some hope expressed that these options could be used to gain the UK and FR.

3. (U) Assumptions. Creation of an UNPROFOR II requires the following assumptions and conditions be met.

a. ~~(S)~~ Whether multilateral or unilateral lifting of the arms embargo occurs, UNPROFOR will be placed in a hostile environment. Current UNPROFOR forces are not equipped, trained or mandated to conduct peace making military operations required to effect a withdrawal from a hostile environment.

b. ~~(S)~~ If the arms embargo is lifted, intelligence assessments indicate UNPROFOR will be threatened by Bosnian Serbs and Muslims alike. Withdrawal planning under benign and hostile conditions are underway. NATO will agree to provide augmenting forces to assist UNPROFOR in its withdrawal in a non-permissive environment. Successful withdrawal of UNPROFOR includes no hostages held in country by any of the warring factions.

c. ~~(S)~~ Since the current UNPROFOR is not equipped, or with a mandate to conduct peace making operations, the next UNPROFOR element will require a new mandate and a significant improvement in combat, combat support, and combat service support equipment (fighting vehicles, transportation vehicles, logistics, engineers, communication, intelligence, etc.). The UN or another source will agree to field this equipment for UNPROFOR to protect itself and conduct its mission.

d. ~~(S)~~ Before UNPROFOR withdraws, especially under hostile conditions, the new, and heavier-equipped UNPROFOR II will be reconstituted and mission capable to handle a more hostile role of peacemaking.

e. ~~(S)~~ **UNPROFOR II will need a robust Chapter VII ROE and a redefined mission of defending Bosnian government territory.** The new UN mandate will clearly state the need for a continued UNPROFOR/UNHCR presence outside of Bosnia given the implicit acceptance of the risks of a widened conflict after lifting the arms embargo. UNSYG Boutros-Ghali will order the current

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UNPROFOR be withdrawn from all of the former Yugoslavia.

f. ~~(S)~~ **Air support, whether NATO, multinational, or US, will be necessary to protect Sarajevo and UN humanitarian aid.** UNPROFOR's presence is necessary for NATO to support any UNSCR. Even the reconstitution of UNPROFOR for the more robust mission will likely require a new NAC decision. Having forced western Europeans from UNPROFOR, it may be difficult to obtain a NAC decision to provide air support to the reconstituted UNPROFOR or to BH. Without NATO support, the US will need to develop a coalition to provide this air support.

g. ~~(S)~~ US or NATO air support will require necessary basing, logistics support, overflight rights, intelligence and C2 agreements. If UNPROFOR stays in any configuration, current NATO support will continue. If, however, the US develops a coalition air force, much diplomatic action will be required to either renew current support or find new support.

h. ~~(S)~~ All UN agencies and associated organizations will likely withdraw under the protection of UNPROFOR. Continued UN humanitarian operations for Bosnia will cease. UN funding will be provided for contracted PVOs to provide further necessary aid. UNPROFOR II will accept the mission of protecting deliveries to the Bosnian government.

i. ~~(S)~~ State will seek continued Croatian permission to support both UNPROFOR resupply and humanitarian aid efforts via their rail heads and POEs. Breakdown of the Federation will require significant follow-on UN support to supply and/or rescue their UNPROFOR II force isolated in central Bosnia. Additional combat troops may then be required to open LOCs into Bosnia.

4. (U) Situation

a. ~~(S)~~ **Sarajevo.** Muslim and Serb factions have clearly established areas of control in the city and local environs. Frontlines are complicated given the previous ethnically intermingled neighborhoods. The Bosnian Army consists of up to 28,500 troops in their areas of Sarajevo with another 10-15,000 between Mt. Igman, Visoko, and Vares. Total 38,500-43,000. BSA forces around Sarajevo city total around 9,000 with 6-7,000 near Olovo-Vares. Current UNPROFOR presence has provided a general cessation of shellings. With a non-belligerent UNPROFOR I gone, a larger UNPROFOR II replacement force will be required to fill this defensive void.

b. ~~(S)~~ **Neretva Valley.** The Bosnians and HVO control the key LOC from Mostar to Jablanica with 10-15,000 troops. The Croat HVO controls south of Mostar and in a central enclave near Konjic with 14,000 troops. The BSA control areas generally away from the LOC except near Konjic and Sarajevo. Forces are relatively smaller in these areas (just over 6,000) of rugged

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terrain. Closing traffic flow through the LOC requires only cutting one of 72 individual choke points.

5. (U) Discussion

UNPROFOR I

a. (U) At present there are a little over 20,000 UNPROFOR troops in BH, of which 14,200 are from the ten NATO contributing countries. France (5000), UK (3600), Netherlands (1900), and Spain (1400) contribute 11,900 of the total NATO contributing force to UNPROFOR. All of these nations have indicated they will withdraw if the arms embargo is lifted.

b. (U) Canada (800) has also indicated it would leave. The withdrawal of Belgium (400), Denmark (300), Norway (300), and Portugal (71) would most likely follow since these nations gain much of their service support from the aforementioned Big 4. Turkey, with approximately 1500, would probably consider staying.

c. (U) Of the remaining troop contributors in BH, Malaysia has approximately 1500, Ukraine 550, Russia 500, Egypt 400, Sweden 1000, Pakistan 1100, and Jordan 100. It is likely Russia, Ukraine, and Sweden would also follow NATO nations in UNPROFOR withdrawal. That leaves Turkey, Pakistan, Malaysia, Egypt and Jordan with approximately 6650 troops.

d. (U) The UN, under the current peacekeeping mission, has been unable to find adequate troop contributions to meet current UNPROFOR missions. It should prove ~~equally~~ even more difficult to find contributors for the more dangerous mission following a lifting of the arms embargo.

e. (U) All non-NATO forces required significant equipment assistance and training before they were able to assume their current mission. With the withdrawal of the NATO contributing countries, the support structure to UNPROFOR in BH would disappear.

UNPROFOR II

a. ~~(C)~~ Although there are countries ~~who~~ which would like to come to the assistance of BH, it is unlikely they would participate in UNPROFOR II without the participation of a major first world power, such as the US, UK, or France.

b. ~~(C)~~ If UNPROFOR II could be assembled, there would be significant cost to the UN to enable the forces to reach theater and conduct their mission.

c. ~~(S)~~ Composition of the UNPROFOR II would likely come from, at best, UNPROFOR contingents or Bosnian government

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supporters from Islamic countries already in place. UNPROFOR II will likely be considered belligerents by the Bosnian Serbs and eventually cause disintegration of the US-brokered Bosnian Federation. Already Catholic Bosnian Croats have expressed considerable concern over the "Islamicization" within the GOBH.

d. ~~(C)~~ Creating an UNPROFOR II with the specific mission of protecting Sarajevo will require the same number of troops current preliminary UNPROFOR planning indicates are needed to secure the Sarajevo airport and establish a 15km ground corridor to federation territory in a non-permissive environment:

- **Sarajevo airport**

  - 1 x air mobile brigade
  - 1 x attack helicopter battalion
  - 2 x light infantry brigades to secure suburban areas
  - 1 x air mobile brigade to secure landing corridor

- **15km Ground Corridor (additional forces)**

  - 1 x air mobile brigade
  - 1 x attack helicopter battalion to secure Mt. Igman
  - 1 x mech battalion to secure Hadzici
  - 1 x light infantry brigade for northern corridor

e. ~~(S)~~ UNPROFOR II would have to overcome the very situation - increased combat activity - that prompted the UNPROFOR I's withdrawal in the first place. In effect, without adequate forces, to include support, UNPROFOR II would be expected to survive, a la Dien Bien Phu, with land routes interdicted, the air field probably closed, and water, electricity, and gas turned off. Even with planned force levels, UNPROFOR II's mission of providing humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo would be extremely difficult under the situations created by strict enforcement of the exclusion zones or lifting the arms embargo regardless of US or NATO air support.

f. ~~(S)~~ As the current UNPROFOR withdraws under hostile conditions, occupying the limited road networks (FC UNPROFOR BH estimates one to three months to accomplish), the remaining UNPROFOR contingent will remain without the necessary equipment and infrastructure, essentially unprotected and vulnerable. Even if the UN wished to continue humanitarian assistance, the movement of troops and equipment to the south would seriously impede humanitarian convoys.

g. ~~(S)~~ Under hostile conditions, NATO estimates a division equivalent force will be necessary to secure the Sarajevo airport and area around Sarajevo. UNPROFOR withdrawal planning also estimates a division equivalent would be required to secure the major lines of communication from the Adriatic into central Bosnia and a reinforced battalion equivalent to

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001i. paper	re: Ending US Compliance With the Bosnian Arms Embargo (4 pages)	08/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0098 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, September 13, 1994 [2]

2010-0533-M
rs1018

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
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b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001j. paper	re: Options for Continuing Humanitarian Relief in Bosnia [partial] (1 page)	09/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0098 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, September 13, 1994 [2]

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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Tab F

Options for Continuing Humanitarian Relief in Bosnia

Planning for dealing with the humanitarian crisis in Bosnia will have to take into account two likely scenarios: (a) the UN dramatically restructures UNPROFOR (with a different mix of contributors if the West Europeans follow through on their threats to leave), and (b) the UN orders UNPROFOR and UN relief agencies to withdraw (most other private agencies also leave). The onset of winter, the effects of which will be felt as early as October, will complicate US options under both scenarios. Continuation of the status quo is unlikely, given the dissatisfaction of the major West European contributors. Indeed, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali has announced that UNPROFOR will be withdrawn if the arms embargo is lifted.

Options with a restructured UNPROFOR. A restructured UNPROFOR would probably be smaller and almost certainly would be less capable after the West Europeans withdraw their logistics networks, which have been supported many other contingents. It will also have a less neutral appearance, 3.3(b)(6) EO13526 3.3(b)(6) 3.3(b)(6) These factors will complicate UNPROFOR's ability to protect humanitarian aid shipments and may increase pressure on the United States to play a greater role in humanitarian relief. The remaining contingents will also press for assurances that the United States will evacuate them if the situation deteriorates.

- Mission. A smaller UNPROFOR will have difficulty fulfilling all of its previous missions and probably will have to reduce its geographic scope by pulling out of the eastern enclaves (Gorazde, Zepa, and Srebrenica) and/or Bihac, in the northwest. The options for the United States will be (a) let these outlying areas fall to the Bosnian Serbs, (b) assist in evacuating UN personnel and perhaps even local residents (c) try to hold the outlying areas and use air power to deter Bosnian Serb attacks or strike back if attacks occur.

- Transport. Land transport will almost certainly become difficult during the surge in fighting that is expected to follow lifting the arms embargo. Vulnerable airports, such as Sarajevo, are also likely to be unavailable for considerable periods. With the Federation's limited resources and many other problems, it is far from certain that the Bosnian Government could assure the security of transport routes, especially to vulnerable areas such as Sarajevo, Bihac, and the eastern enclaves. Options for the United States will be (a) provide vastly more air drops to isolated areas and (b) use air power to protect convoys and major population centers. If these prove inadequate, pressure will

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increase for the United States to deploy ground forces to forestall a humanitarian disaster.

Options if UNPROFOR leaves. A withdrawal of UNPROFOR is likely to unfold under one of two scenarios. (a) Withdrawal takes place in a permissive environment, in which UN forces have the time and freedom from harassment to withdraw their personnel and equipment. This scenario is likely to preclude calls for US protection of UNPROFOR but will open the issue of how to assure delivery of aid. (b) Withdrawal takes place in a non-permissive environment, with guerrilla-style attacks and/or civilian blockades. If this scenario takes place, the United States will be faced not only with requests to help in providing protection for aid deliveries but also demands to assist in rescuing UNPROFOR.

UNHCR officials have said they will leave if the arms embargo is lifted. Activities by the remaining non-government organizations (NGOs) would probably be restricted to more secure areas, which are likely to be the least needy. Without assistance from UNPROFOR, the options for protection are (a) to depend on the Federation to protect convoys, (b) to try to protect with air power, and (c) to let convoys fend for themselves. None of these are likely to be sufficient. Utilities (water, electricity, natural gas) for major population centers in Bosnia could be cut immediately; food and medicine could be in short supply within as soon as 30 days in some vulnerable areas, such as the eastern enclaves.

If funds, supplies, and transport (including aircraft) from the international community continue to be available, the key elements will be providing both delivery and protection in Bosnia. The US Government will have three options:

- **Decline to provide protection.** Since delivery of aid, especially to vulnerable outlying areas, would be impossible without some force on the ground to assure security, the departure of UN forces and a US refusal to deploy troops on the ground would mean an end to the humanitarian relief mission for sizable numbers of Bosnian citizens. Sarajevo, Bihac, and the eastern enclaves are the areas where this is most likely to happen. A humanitarian disaster, with attendant press coverage, would be all but inevitable.

- **Work with others to provide protection through air power.** Even if they have pulled out their troops, our European Allies still have an interest in continuing a relief effort in Bosnia, if for no other reason than to forestall another wave of refugees from flowing into Western Europe. The United States would have to convince Allied governments to try to use NATO air power to protect airfields and convoy routes associated with the relief effort.

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The disadvantage of this option is that air power alone is likely to prove insufficient to assure security for humanitarian relief.

- **US assumes responsibility for protection.** If air power alone does not assure delivery of humanitarian relief, the United States will have to reconsider sending ground forces to protect deliverers. To succeed in such a mission, it potentially would be necessary to deploy large numbers of troops and to expose them to considerable risk. Previous NATO studies have estimated, for example, that 100,000 or more troops would be required to control a corridor from the port of Ploce to Sarajevo.

Drafted by ISA/ENP, TWalton, x56516

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LIFTING THE ARMS EMBARGO: THE POLICY CONTEXT

The principal objective of proceeding down the path of incentives/disincentives toward lifting the arms embargo is to get Pale to reconsider its position and accept the Map--in other words, it is designed to bring about a negotiated peace settlement. Specifically, lifting the arms embargo is intended to provide B-H with the self-defense capability necessary to defend the proposed Federation territory outlined by the CG Map. This translates into an ability to hold current territory, take enough of the high ground around Sarajevo to make it defensible, be able to ensure that humanitarian aid gets in, and conduct limited other offensive operations to seize lands proposed to be under Federation control by the Map but currently in the hands of the Bosnian Serbs. *It is a course of action fraught with peril.*

The U.S. will insert no ground troops, advisors, or logisticians into B-H. Even so, whether as a unilateral lifting or as part of an orchestrated, multilateral effort, lifting will be perceived as dramatically raising U.S. involvement and the stakes. We will be perceived as *having chosen to side with the Bosnian Govt.* We will be ever more responsible for training and equipping the Bosnian Govt. forces, most likely in the U.S. and for at least a year so that the effect can play out on the battlefield. Even given that increased level of involvement (including a transition period during which U.S. air power will be used to help equalize the battlefield), there is no guarantee of success. In fact, absent committed U.S. ground forces, no amount of air power can prevent the BSA from overrunning the eastern enclaves and strangling Sarajevo.

We do not want to act alone, but acting multilaterally will be a difficult proposition, as each of the actors tends to see things from its unique vantage point. UNPROFOR will withdraw in a nightmare scenario of hostages seized and the potential for heavy casualties. Moreover, without an intense diplomatic effort and logistical and military support, we will sour relations with our NATO and UN allies as well as undermine the partnership we are trying to build with Russia and our efforts to enforce UN embargoes that we support.

It is the purpose of the sections that follow to identify the key concerns of the other nations that have interests in the outcome of the current conflict. Containing and then ending the conflict while not fracturing the current (albeit fragile) consensus for action is paramount to the success of our planning. What we need to do is balance carefully the at times competing objectives of maintaining the unity of the CG and getting the Bosnian Serbs to reverse their position and accept the Map. Going too far too quickly down the path of extension followed by more robust enforcement of the Exclusion Zones and then lifting the arms embargo is certain to fracture the unity of the CG. It is an awful idea. On the other hand, not proceeding down the path of incentives/disincentives is likely to perpetuate the status quo--continuing war and frustration. Yet there may be reason to consider a course of action that does not include the major outside powers imposing a solution or thrashing the Serbs militarily. The history of the Balkan Wars suggests that ultimately Serbia may extend itself territorially beyond the means of its military power, thus inviting its many neighbors with territorial claims--Bosnia, Croatia, Hungary , and Albania--to pile on, regain lost lands, and restore a more natural equilibrium.

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Diplomatic Strategy on Bosnia: Short and Mid-Term

SUMMARY: This paper sets forth considerations for American strategy towards the Bosnian conflict in the short and mid-term. The short term is defined as the period leading up to the October 15 date for commencement of discussions on a multilateral lift resolution, as set out in President Clinton's August 10 letter to Nunn and in the Nunn-Mitchell amendment. Mid-term is defined as the period following October 15 until the end of 1994. This is the period in which the question of whether the United States moves towards unilateral lift is likely to be decided.

The analysis considers steps in all important aspects of our efforts, i.e. within the Contact Group and in NATO; with the parties to the conflict; with Congress and with the press. It concludes with an agenda for near and mid-term action. END SUMMARY

THE CURRENT SITUATION

The current situation is characterized by an uneasy and oft-broken military truce with considerable political maneuvering behind the scenes. There are several untested assumptions, including the intentions of the Russians and other Contact Group members, the sincerity of Milosevic and the ability of the Sarajevo government to maintain its position.

While the Contact Group remains the best means for avoiding a breakdown of current efforts and preventing a situation from arising in which the U.S. could be forced to assume sole responsibility for the crisis, its internal cohesion could be tested severely in coming weeks. Both Russia and France appear to be pushing alternative visions for a peace process based on support for Milosevic, while the UK and others remain opposed to moving to strict enforcement of the exclusion zones out of fear for the safety of their UNPROFOR forces. Expansion of the exclusion zones appear to be a dead letter.

It must also be assumed that adoption of the Nunn-Mitchell amendment has not ended the debate over lift. Although the House has passed the conference committee report on the Defense Authorization Bill containing Nunn-Mitchell and the Senate should follow suit as soon as it reconvenes, additional attempts to legislate unilateral lift, such as the Dole amendment, could surface before Congress recesses. The election campaign will ensure further debate. Our integrated strategy must include provisions for participating in and directing this debate.

Among the important events which have taken place in the Bosnian conflict since the Geneva III ministerial are:

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-- A Bosnian Serb referendum supporting rejection of the the Contact Group proposals and stepped up harassment of the humanitarian relief effort by Pale;

-- Adoption of the Nunn-Mitchell amendment containing strong hortatory language calling for Administration action in support of multilateral lift and calling for the submission of a plan and consultations for unilateral lift if multilateral lift fails;

-- A decision by Milosevic to close his borders and cut other links with Pale as a means to force acceptance of the Contact Group proposals;

-- A growing belief on the part of the Bosnian Muslims that they can prevail if widespread hostilities return, combined with difficulties in making a go of the Federation;

-- Statements by the leading participants in UNPROFOR that they will leave Bosnia if the arms embargo is lifted;

-- Efforts by Kozyrev to paint Milosevic's steps as constituting a qualitatively new situation which requires abandonment of the July 30 Contact Group commitments and a major readjustment of Contact Group strategy.

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. STRATEGY

These events have strengthened the impression that the Bosnian Serbs will not accept the Contact Group plan in the near or medium term and that there is an inevitability to a lifting of the arms embargo and a widening of the war.

The dangers for the American position in such a situation are several:

-- A tendency by other players to assume that if a firm solution is not achieved by October 15, political efforts will be swamped by renewed hostilities, as the U.S. pushes for multilateral lift, and failing that, moves to lift the arms embargo unilaterally. This could lead both to major conflicts with important partners and to an image that the United States was now responsible for a wider war.

-- As October 15 approaches, difficulties in maintaining unity in the Contact Group and within NATO which could undermine efforts to push towards a political settlement. In particular, erosion of the consensus that the Contact Group must be firm with both Belgrade and Pale could lead to considerable disarray. Such a development could lead to conflicts in the Group. Equally devastating could be renewed hostilities and loss of momentum on the ground.

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-- If pressure for a political settlement is undermined by the above two developments, we could find ourselves isolated both diplomatically and militarily. Our only options would be either to stand by as the war expanded or to ourselves enter the conflict.

Avoiding the diplomatic and military isolation and the crisis for our relations with major partners which could result from such a development must be a major goal of short term American strategy.

AN INTEGRATED APPROACH

The large number of elements in play require continuous oversight to ensure an integration of important factors and opportunities for influence. Our approach should focus on three basic goals:

-- To preserve a common political strategy within the Contact Group which helps avoid American isolation by incorporating our internal political debate as a legitimate aspect of management of the crisis. We have from the beginnning accepted the political needs of the Europeans and the Russians as important elements of a common strategy. We should make clear to Contact Group members and other allies that the Administration's political decision to work with proponents of lift was taken after careful deliberation and that it will not be possible to remove this element from the equation.

Indeed, the pressure of lift can work in our favor if we do not break ranks with each other. Our task should be to use all the tools at our disposal to create conditions which make lift both politically and factually unnecessary. Mere warnings by the others of the consequences of lift will not serve this purpose.

-- On the basis of the above, to convince other Contact Group members that continuation of the incentives/disincentives strategy to keep pressure on Belgrade and to isolate Pale is strongly in our joint interest. We should make clear that unless it maintains this foundation, agreed at the Naples summit, the Contact Group will be in danger of being whipsawed by each new short term development. There is enough flexibility in this approach to allow us to utilize various elements of the incentives/disincentives strategy to bring the greatest possible pressure to bear towards a political settlement, while at the same time taking care of the often conflicting political needs of the major members.

-- With Congress and with the press, to make clear how these various steps are integrated into a negotiating strategy

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which should be given time to work. At the same time, to continue planning for various post-lift scenarios and discuss the political and military implications of lift with Congress on the basis of this planning. Congress should accept that it shares responsibility with the Administration for successful implementation of our strategy. There should be no finger pointing once the going gets rough.

IMMEDIATE STEPS

Despite Pale's intransigence, the situation is not stalemated. Russian diplomatic efforts, NATO planning both for enforcement of exclusion zones and UNPROFOR redeployment and events on the ground provide elements for a dynamic situation. We are not yet clear about Milosevic's intentions, for example. Our Charge in Belgrade argues convincingly that he will probably play his hand for all that it is worth, with any sign of decisive action coming later in the process.

More than five weeks remain until the October 15 date set by President Clinton and echoed in the Nunn-Mitchell amendment for commencing action in the UN. Even then, we will have two weeks or more to organize the debate. The goal of our immediate steps should be to inject as much dynamism into our efforts as possible. Establishing a dynamic process, which demonstrates clearly understandable elements of progress, is the best means of dealing successfully with the debate over lift.

In particular, we should seek to ensure that the Bosnian Serbs are not allowed to create a de facto stalemate. Application of the tools agreed by the Contact Group, combined with strong diplomatic pressure, can meet this danger. The question now is finding the right mix.

There is, for example, general agreement that an important goal is to isolate Pale diplomatically and logistically as a means of increasing pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to accept the Contact Group plan.

But despite the results of the recent Contact Group meeting in Berlin, there is no consensus on a design to achieve this goal:

-- the Russians claim Milosevic is taking a big political risk in blockading Pale. Their approach would be to accept Milosevic's promises at face value, provide sanctions relief and be quick to remove him from the disincentive portion of the Contact Group strategy.

-- the European Contact Group members are sympathetic to the Russian assessment of the domestic political danger of Milosevic's move. They have hopes that sanctions relief might work and see it as a means of preserving unity with the Russians.

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Above all, they see it as an alternative to lifting the arms embargo, which they hope to avoid. The French and British in particular are watching events closely for implications of the future of their deployments in UNPROFOR.

-- the United States is willing to consider an initial phase of sanctions relief for Belgrade, on the condition that Milosevic demonstrate his good intentions by accepting a border monitoring mechanism. Further relief would require political steps with other former Yugoslav Republics, such as recognizing their borders.

The agreement worked out in Berlin on September 6 and 7 meets our core needs in providing for a credible monitoring effort while making a gesture to Belgrade. At the same time, it provides the Russians with Contact Group recognition for the steps that Milosevic has taken that they can use effectively with their domestic audience. Although the Russians will press for even greater recognition as events unfold, the Berlin agreement represents a genuine desire by all parties to maintain Contact Group unity. This should stand us in good stead as we move to implement the other more controversial elements of our fundamental strategy.

We should now move ahead with the following steps:

-- a strong presentation in NATO and with the Russians on the need to underline the resolve of the Contact Group with increased enforcement of exclusion zone violations, particularly by NATO air strikes against exclusion zone violations, undertaken in coordination with UNPROFOR.

-- careful discussion in NATO, with the UN, and bilaterally on future prospects for UNPROFOR. In particular we should encourage the French and UK to consider redeployments as part of a plan for a longer term role in support of a peace process.

-- a concerted effort with individual members of Congress to explain our strategy and seek to involve them in the debate from the beginning.

-- a systematic press strategy which adopts clearly-understandable themes and seeks to ensure that they are reflected in both news articles and sympathetic commentary.

-- work in individual capitals. Our Ambassadors in Contact Group countries should be encouraged to enter the frankest possible dialogue with host governments. We should improve our backgrounding of other posts to ensure detailed presentation of our views by other Ambassadors as well.

-- stepped up consideration within the USG of the military and financial implications of various steps related to the

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possible withdrawal of UNPROFOR and lifting of the arms embargo. Possibilities of responding positively to continued strong British and French pressure for an American ground role, even in a support capacity, must be explored carefully.

-- more detailed consideration of the economic and political measures the United States could support on the ground to help ease the crisis and push towards a solution. Such measures should be focussed on all players in the conflict.

-- more active press background which describes the interrelated nature of US strategy and which builds the lift aspect into our strategy, explaining what the possible U.S. role might be. We should take pains to counteract any sense of conflict or rift with Russia and our major allies.

TOWARDS OCTOBER 15

As October 15 approaches, we should be able to describe a package of strategies and measures which is focussing maximum pressure towards a negotiated settlement. Assuming that a settlement has not yet been reached, we should begin to incorporate UN discussion of a multilateral lift resolution into our strategy in a self-confident and pragmatic way:

-- With other members of the Contact Group, we should gain agreement that the UN debate should be a time to review all aspects of the conflict and the efforts undertaken so far. The goal of this review should be to gain agreement within the Security Council on specific, firm steps which can be taken to demonstrate the precariousness of further delay. These conclusions should include a judgement on the growing political support for lift in the U.S., but also should focus again on efforts to pressure recalcitrant parties.

This would be the point to decide whether new negotiating efforts with new objectives might be considered or not. It would also be the time to be ready with ideas for a future role for UNPROFOR, including possible enhanced American support. If we are to have a card to play with our allies on UNPROFOR, it would probably be wise to play it at this point.

-- With Belgrade, our approach will depend on how honestly Milosevic has cooperated with us. The week or two prior to October 15 might be a time for a high level U.S. envoy who could make clear to Belgrade the consequences and opportunities in various courses of action.

-- With Congress and the press, we should describe carefully the goals of the UN debate, seek congressional agreement on tactics and possible outcomes. With both Congress

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and the press, this period should mark an intensification of dialogue which prepares the way for probable failure of a multilateral lift resolution. The ongoing U.S. election campaign is likely to play an important role in this debate.

At this point, we should be talking frankly with Congress about the political, military and legal implications of unilateral lift. We should be clear with major proponents of lift what the joint political responsibility will be.

-- With Sarajevo, we should intensify our dialogue on possible options and encourage the Bosnians to support a joint approach with us in public and with contacts in the United States.

-- During this period, we should also be exploring more carefully steps which can be taken in the broader context to stabilize the situation. These include a more systematic approach to the problems of Kosovo; strategies in international organizations and longer term projects such as a regional arms control scheme for the region.

OCTOBER 15 AND BEYOND

All these strands will come together as we make good on the commitment made by President Clinton to introduce a lift resolution in the Security Council within the two weeks following October 15. By this time, we should have a fair view of the positions of all the key parties and the possibilities for further action.

-- We will have a much better idea of the prospects for passage of a lift resolution in the Security Council. The attitudes of the British, French and Russians will be key.

-- We will have briefed Congress in detail on what we believe we would need to do militarily to assist the Bosnian government after lift and have a much better understanding of how much pressure or support we can expect from the Hill.

-- The Bosnian government will itself have a better appreciation for what could happen after lift, and this too will influence our calculations.

-- Finally, there will be developments on the ground in Bosnia--the fighting situation and the humanitarian relief effort, the position of UNPROFOR and the possible implementation of strict enforcement, and the results of Contact Group and Milosevic's campaign to isolate Pale.

We will need to weigh all these elements in deciding whether to press the lift resolution forward to a vote or to

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propose alternative approaches. If our assessment points in the direction of pressing the lift resolution, then we can move forward. On the other hand, if we decide that Milosevic's campaign is working and needs more time to succeed, this may argue for holding off on the lift resolution, particularly if support for lift is lacking among key players. Other alternatives are also possible. If strict enforcement has been implemented by this time, we may want to continue with this for a longer period before moving for agreement on lift. Or, our conversations with Congress may convince us (or convince them) that they are unwilling to support the military action we believe necessary to assist the Bosnian government under a lift scenario.

Other possibilities may also emerge depending on how events unfold. If we decide for any reason, however, not to press forward with a lift resolution, or if we do but fail to secure its passage, then we are committed, by the President's letter to Nunn, to consult with the Congress on the possibility of unilateral lift. Given the timing, it is likely that any serious consultations on unilateral lift will need to await the convening of the new Congress in January. We will also need to respond appropriately to the other provisions of the Nunn-Mitchell amendment, particularly those cutting off funds for U.S. enforcement of the arms embargo.

By that time, there will likely be new elements to factor into our equations as we make clear to Congress the extremely damaging effect that unilateral lift could have on many of our key foreign policy equities, as well as the additional demands it would place on our military responsibility for the conflict in Bosnia.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001m. paper	re: Military Situation in Bihac [partial] (2 pages)	09/09/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0098 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, September 13, 1994 [2]

2010-0533-M
rs1018

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force
9 September 1994

Military Situation in Bihac

Fighting in the Bihac enclave has intensified between Government and Serb forces since the collapse of Abdic's Muslim separtist forces in August.

Bosnian and Krajina Serb forces have launched attacks--possibly coordinated--on Bosnian government forces and have concentrated on seizing key lines of communication along the southern edge of the enclave and maintaining a demilitarized zone between Krajina Serb and Bosnian government territory in the northeastern corner of the enclave.

Shelling of Bihac city, which is the actual safe area, has been negligible, but shelling of the Muslim cities of Cazin and Buzim has increased. If the UN declared a 20-km exclusion zone around Bihac city, Cazin would fall within and Buzim would fall outside. (See map.) 3.5c

Bosnian Serb forces have deployed as many as 6,000 troops around the Bihac enclave. 1.4c Krajina Serb forces have reinforced their forces around Bihac with additional troops, tanks, and artillery--primarily near the demilitarized zone--and may have as many as 2,000 troops deployed in the area. Bosnian government V Corps forces number at least 6,000, deployed throughout the enclave. 3.5c

The fiercest fighting in recent weeks has continued to be for control of the Grabez Plateau, the high ground five kilometers west of Bihac city. **The Bosnian Serbs apparently are attempting to control key lines of communication connecting Serb-held territories in Bosnia and the Krajina.**

-- 1.4c

-- 1.4c

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-- 1.4c at least eight probable Bosnian Serb artillery deployment areas containing 22 pieces of artillery or mortars within 20 kilometers of Bihac city, primarily near the Grabez plateau. 3.5c

Clashes between the Government V Corps and Krajina Serb forces have been escalating in the northeastern section of the enclave, near the demilitarized zone. Bosnian forces have made numerous probing attacks which have resulted in the Krajina Serbs reinforcing this area.

-- On 8 September, at least 500 Krajina Serb troops supported by at least eight tanks attacked Bosnian government positions near the DMZ, according to Radio Sarajevo.

-- 1.4c

-- 1.4c the Krajina Serbs had established a fire support base three kilometers north of the DMZ. Equipment at the base included four M-87 multiple rocket launcher vehicles. 3.5c

1.4c, 3.5c

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Bihac Enclave



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BIHAC: POSSIBLE EXCLUSION ZONE

Bosnian and Krajina Serbs have attacked the Bosnian Government's V Corps in the northwest area of the Bihac pocket. The Bosnian and Krajina Serbs appear to be attempting to gain control over rail and road links between their territories which they used when the area was under the Abdic regime. Reducing or eliminating the V Corps would also allow the Bosnian Serbs to free forces for use elsewhere.

Gen. Delic has suggested that a 25 km. exclusion zone be created around Bihac. Gen. Rose is considering a 3 km. zone, if the fighting moves closer to Bihac city.

The NAC's April 22 decision provided that exclusion zones will be created around the remaining safe areas not so protected [Zepa, Srebrenica, Tuzla and Bihac] if they are: attacked by heavy weapons; or threatened by a concentration of heavy weapons. In neither case is further NAC action required.

The decision clearly states UNPROFOR and NATO commanders must reach a "common understanding" regarding threatening concentrations of heavy weapons, but requires no UNPROFOR pre-approval for NATO commanders to declare a new exclusion zone in response to an attack by heavy weapons on a safe area. NATO military authorities are authorized by the NAC to declare an existing safe area an exclusion zone if it is attacked by heavy weapons simply by giving "due public notice" of the fact. UNPROFOR would be needed to help delineate the boundaries of the exclusion zone and assist in its enforcement. Since Bihac is bordered by Croatian and Bosnian Serb territory, the boundaries of the zone must be carefully considered. The Bosnian Government reports that the Croats would accept an exclusion zone covering Croat territory near Bihac.

Implementation of the April 22 decision is complicated by the lack of precise boundaries for the safe areas. UNPROFOR assumes the safe areas are the population centers, not the confrontation lines. Hence Gen. Rose's position that the fighting must move closer to Bihac city to trigger the creation of an exclusion zone. Consultations with the Allies on the margins of the Sept. 9 NAC indicated a distinct lack of enthusiasm to create another exclusion zone.

In addition, the UN wrote to NATO on September 9 and requested that close air support be extended in situations in which the security of UNPROFOR personnel in Bihac and other regions is jeopardized by military actions emanating from Croatia. The NAC will consider this request on Sept. 14. While the extension of close air support for UNPROFOR throughout Croatia is stalled due, inter alia, to questions of managing air traffic in Croat airspace, it should be possible to honor this more limited UN request.

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If the fighting moves closer to Bihac city, there are compelling reasons to establish an exclusion zone around Bihac. It could head off terrible suffering by civilians and avoid destruction in the city -- as occurred when the Bosnian Serbs attacked Gorazde. The establishment and enforcement of a Bihac exclusion zone, and the extension of CAS to parts of Croatia from which attacks could be launched on Bosnia, would send a signal to the Bosnian Serbs of NATO's continued resolve to press for an end to the fighting in Bosnia. This would dovetail with our strategy pressing the Bosnian Serbs hard over the next few weeks to accept the Contact Group map.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001o. memo	Leon Feurth for Anthony Lake re: Serbian Sanctions-Related Issues for Decision at September 13 PC (2 pages)	09/12/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0098 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, September 13, 1994 [2]

2010-0533-M
rs1018

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9/9/94

SUSTAINING THE BOSNIAN FEDERATION

WHY WE NEED THE FEDERATION

Attempting to preserve the Federation should be a key U.S. objective in any Bosnian scenario for several reasons. First, the Federation is the linchpin of Muslim-Croat rapprochement. Second, the Federation provides a strategic counterweight to Serb domination in the region. Third, it could serve as the basis for a viable settlement along the lines of the Contact Group plan. Thus, quite apart from our "godfather" role in brokering the Federation agreement, we have an interest in helping the Federation manage strains stemming from the legacy of Muslim-Croat fighting and intensified conflict with the Serbs.

WHAT WE MIGHT CONSIDER IF FIGHTING INTENSIFIES

If the military situation in Bosnia heats up as a result of the lifting of the arms embargo, and particularly if UNPROFOR leaves, the Federation will come under unprecedented pressure. Federation positions including Sarajevo, the eastern enclaves, Brcko, the region between Olovo and Ribnica, and Bihac will remain vulnerable until peace is achieved, and are likely to be among the first targets of stepped up Serb attacks. Should we decide to try to sustain the Federation if fighting increases, we will need to consider the extent to which we wish to continue to provide, or increase provision of, support of the following types:

- o diplomatic and political support, including in the most extreme case support for a government forced to leave Sarajevo for a temporary location in the heartland of the Federation;

- o military assistance, including continued advice on integration of government and HVO units, provision of air support, training and provision of goods not covered by the arms embargo, and if the arms embargo is lifted, weapons and military equipment.

- o democratization and institution-building assistance to shore up the Federation at local levels;

- o economic and humanitarian aid. In the event of expanded war, this would naturally mean assistance toward maintaining a subsistence level, not actual reconstruction aid.

It is important to bear in mind that the UN, through UNPROFOR and UNHCR, and private international organizations including the ICRC, are already providing significant indirect support to the Federation. If the UN and NGOs were to withdraw entirely, it would be exceedingly difficult to keep the Federation alive.

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DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT

In a situation of all-out war that results in further territorial gains by the Serbs, the Bosnian government and Federation will need all the diplomatic and political support the international community can provide, both in multilateral organizations and bilaterally. Continued recognition of the Bosnian government would help prevent a collapse of confidence, a leadership vacuum, and a total breakdown of order. Should Sarajevo fall and the government be forced to move to core areas of the Federation in order to survive, we would need to consider whether and how to help with an evacuation, whether to provide logistical support for an exiled-in-place regime, and whether to use U.S. ground forces in large numbers to move the government or defend what was left of its territory.

Three projects suggested by Embassy Bosnia that provide diplomatic and political support for the Federation under any scenario are already being undertaken. They are as follows:

-- Organizing a training course for aspiring Federation diplomats: USIA and USAID have both expressed an interest in funding such a course; Ambassador Jackovich is discussing logistics and course-content with retired U.S. diplomats who might teach the course.

-- Visits to the U.S. by local Federation officials: Embassy Sarajevo is working with USIA to arrange visits by appropriate individuals.

-- Periodic high-level U.S. visits to Bosnia. Assistant Secretary Holbrooke, who said at his Senate confirmation hearings that the Balkans would be the site of his first official travel, has recently returned from a trip that included Bosnia.

MILITARY SUPPORT

An intensification of fighting with the Bosnian Serbs would subject the fragile military accord between the Bosnian government army and the HVO militia to increased strain. Whether or not the embargo is lifted, we will need to work for military integration of the two forces and to overcome deep-seated suspicions hindering that process. General Galvin, who spearheaded negotiations on the military aspects of the Federation, has visited Federation leaders and made suggestions. He may have further thoughts in this regard.

In a lift situation, provision of U.S. weapons to the Bosnian government per se will likely fuel suspicions of many Bosnian Croats, who will fear that the weapons might ultimately be used against the HVO. Bosnian Croat leaders might accordingly press Croatia to step up arms deliveries to HVO units. Thus if we pursue lift, we will need to consider carefully how to provide weapons, which types of weapons to supply, and whether and how to offer training in their use.

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Regardless of whether we pursue lift, we need to address the Bosnian government's outstanding request for non-lethal assistance, including uniforms, tents, and supplies such as canteens, to the Federation. (These requests are endorsed by Embassy Bosnia.) State has included Bosnia in its 1996 request for IMET funds; this should facilitate military-to-military contacts and discussions of non-lethal assistance in any circumstances, and decisionmaking on strategic assistance should the arms embargo be lifted.

We earlier told our Allies we would help expedite the withdrawal of UNPROFOR troops should this become necessary for security reasons. The UK has said it "fully intends to cash the check" if the arms embargo is lifted; thus after October 15 we may face a decision on whether to provide military support to assist with UNPROFOR evacuation or redeployment from both government and HVO-controlled territory. In some cases UNPROFOR troops have helped quell disturbances between government and HVO units; the departure of UNPROFOR may allow Muslim-Croat resentment to resurface in some areas.

It goes almost without waying that if the eastern enclaves or Sarajevo are threatened, strangled, or overrun as a result of increased fighting, pressure to step up the level of U.S. (and/or NATO) involvement will rise dramatically.

DEMOCRATICIZATION AND INSTITUTION-BUILDING

In early July Prime Minister Silajdzic discussed with Ambassador Redman the idea of a US commission that would help jump-start implementation of the Federation constitution and recommend ways to build support for the Federation at the municipal and cantonal levels. Even in the context of expanded war, we should do whatever we can to strengthen Federation institutions and public confidence in the Federation.

Working with Embassy Bosnia, Brian Atwood recently approved a proposal by USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives to use up to $1 million to explore Federation-strengthening options. Provided the security situation permits, a Task Force comprised of economists, dispute resolution practitioners, governance experts and civil engineers will travel to Bosnia in November/December to strengthen local efforts at reconciliation, particularly through Federation institutions, and to identify opportunities for U.S.-supported projects in municipal government, housing rehabilitation and the private sector, including, tangible, immediate support to the extent possible. The survey will look specifically at small, central Bosnian communities, including some of those most affected by Croat-Muslim fighting and refugee movements, such as Vitez, Travnik, Bugugno and Gorni Vakuf. The experts will also look at cities where different ethnic groups continue to live and work together to examine ways in which U.S. support could reinforce their positive example. Another team will look at ways to implement the March Federation constitution.

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CSCE has a mandate to appoint ombudsmen; and a representative of the CSCE chairman went to Sarajevo in August to try to get the Bosnian government to nominate acceptable ombudsmen and prepare for the opening of CSCE's Sarajevo office. Through the Commission that Silajdzic proposed and otherwise, we should encourage CSCE efforts.

ECONOMIC AND HUMANITARIAN AID

A return to anything approaching full-scale war would almost certainly halt rehabilitation efforts. Thus the focus of any U.S. aid program in a post-lift situation would be on sustaining a subsistance level of existence for the Bosnian people. The likely withdrawal or redeployment of UNPROFOR under lift would complicate an already difficult humanitarian effort, particularly during winter months.

If fighting intensifies, the U.S. must be ready to address the most pressing humanitarian needs in short order, especially in Sarajevo, where in the absence of Bosnian Serb agreement to let supplies through, the city could quickly be surrounded and cut off from relief deliveries. The situation would be even more acute in the beleaguered and vulnerable eastern enclaves. We will need to take opportunities for provision of assistance where they occur and remain flexible and prepared to act quickly to meet needs such as repair of water distribution networks, repair and maintenance of electrical power and telecommunication sources, provision of health care, and so on.

Under the assumption that the hostility level in Bosnia will remain high, USAID is planning to commit $1 million to the UN Trust Fund for Sarajevo and up to $9 million in its FY 1994 Bosnia budget for urgent, Sarajevo-related activities such as rehabilitating the city's gas distribution and heating systems; and airlifting $3 million worth of pharmaceutical supplies and medical equipment to the city; and advising city managers directly responsible for the city's rehabilitation.

Embassy Bosnia has proposed three humanitarian relief projects to help shore up the Federation that are already being carried out in whole or in part. Specifically, they are:

-- Support for the Bosnian Croat Monastery/Hospital at Nova Bila: At Ambassador Jackovich's request, USAID has agreed to assist in this effort.

-- Replacement of Mostar's "Masala" Bridge: This has been undertaken by the British, the UN and the EU administration.

-- Refugee registration and pre-fabricated housing: At the suggestion of Assistant Secretary Oakley of PRM, Ambassador Jackovich will work with the International Rescue Committee on its UNHCR-sponsored refugee

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registration effort in central Bosnia. USAID will study the feasibility of housing rehabilitation as part of long-term reconstruction efforts. But given the cost and logistical problems of a pre-fabricated housing program, USAID has said it is unlikely to fund direct housing construction.

Embassy Bosnia has also suggested that the road around Mount Igman be repaired. The route, which is unpaved and therefore closed during most of the winter, is the government's sole life-line to the capital. In recent weeks, the Igman route has been placed under virtual Bosnian Serb control through use of sniper fire. As any project would require the unlikely cooperation of the Bosnian Serbs, we do not plan to go forward for the time being.

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SECDEF FOR GENERAL RYAN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
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SUBJECT: IZETBEGOVIC RE-ASSESSES LIFTING ARMS EMBARGO

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. IZETBEGOVIC APPEARED TO BE RE-ASSESSING THE CONSEQUENCES OF LIFTING THE ARMS EMBARGO. FOLLOWING AN INTERVIEW IN THE PRESS A FEW WEEKS AGO WHICH HINTED AT A POSSIBLE SHIFT IN THINKING, IZETBEGOVIC REVEALED TO US ELEMENTS OF WHAT COULD EMERGE AS A NEW BOSNIAN STRATEGY ON THE EMBARGO. THE PRESIDENT MIGHT PROPOSE A SIX-MONTH "MORATORIUM" ON LIFTING, THUS GIVING THE CONTACT GROUP MORE TIME TO NEGOTIATE AND CONTINUE PRESSURE ON THE SERBS. SOME MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WOULD BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE TO IMPORT ARMS INTO BOSNIA DURING THE MORATORIUM. IN ADDITION, DURING THE SIX-MONTH PERIOD: UNPROFOR WOULD REMAIN IN PLACE; NATO/U.S. WOULD DEFEND "EXCLUSION ZONES" AND "SAFE AREAS"; THE FEDERATION, INCLUDING ITS ARMED FORCES, WOULD BE STRENGTHENED; AND, THE CONTACT GROUP WOULD CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS. IT APPEARED TO US THAT IZETBEGOVIC HAD YET TO REFINE THE DETAILS OF THIS STRATEGY BUT COULD BE EXPECTED TO DO SO IN FURTHER TALKS WITH BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT AND FEDERATION OFFICIALS. HE CAN ALSO BE EXPECTED TO BROACH THIS ISSUE WITH USG OFFICIALS WHEN HE TRAVELS TO THE U.S. AT THE END OF THIS MONTH END SUMMARY.

3. IN MEETINGS WITH THE AMBASSADOR IN SARAJEVO SEPTEMBER 8-10, BOSNIAN PRESIDENT ALIJA IZETBEGOVIC REVEALED NEW ELEMENTS IN BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT THINKING ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF LIFTING THE ARMS EMBARGO.

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A CAMPAIGN TO GET THE EMBARGO LIFTED HAS BEEN A PIVOTAL BOSNIAN FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVE SINCE THE WAR BEGAN. PUBLIC REMARKS AND COMMENTS IN DISCUSSIONS WITH HIGH-LEVEL VISITORS HAVE TENDED TO REINFORCE THIS RHETORIC. HOWEVER, BEHIND THE SCENES, THERE APPEARSTO BE AN ONGOING HIGH-LEVEL DEBATE ABOUT THE ADVISABILITY OF LIFTING THE EMBARGO.

4. WE CAUTION THAT IZETBEGOVIC'S THINING DOES NOT/NOT REPRESENT SOME NEW COORDINATED BOSNIAN "FALL STRATEGY." RATHER, THIS APPEARS TO US TO BE AN INITIAL ATTEMPT TO DIGEST MISGIVINGS EXPRESSED BY UNPROFOR AND OTHERS ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF LIFTING, AS WELL AS CONTINUED GRAPPLING WITH AN ATTEMPT TO CHART A PLAN FOR THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS, WHICH WOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT A VARIETY OF FACTORS. THESE WOULD INCLUDE THE APPARENT STALEMATE ON THE CONTACT GROUP PLAN, THE STALLED BOSNIAN ARMY OFFENSIVE AND ANTICIPATED PROBLEMS WITH THE DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO A VULNERABLE POPULATION DURING A THIRD WINTER OF WARFARE.

5. THE FOUNDATION FOR THE NEW STRATEGY IS IZETBEGOVIC'S RE-ASSESSMENT OF THE WISDOM OF LIFTING THE ARMS EMBARGO. IN ORDER TO REVISE THE CALENDAR, HE IS EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF PROPOSING A SIX-MONTH MORATORIUM (FROM OCTOBER 15/NOVEMBER 15 TO APRIL 15/MAY 15), MOVING THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF POSSIBLE LIFTING AHEAD TO THE SPRING OF 1995. IZETBEGOVIC BELIEVES THAT, DURING THIS SIX-MONTH PERIOD, FOUR ESSENTIAL THINGS SHOULD HAPPEN: 1) UNPROFOR WOULD REMAIN IN PLACE; 2) NATO, AND THE USG, WOULD VIGOROUSLY ENFORCE "EXCLUSION ZONES" AND "SAFE AREAS"; 3) THE FEDERATION, INCLUDING ITS ARMED FORCES, WOULD BE ASSISTED AND STRENGTHENED; AND, 4) THE CONTACT GROUP WOULD BE ABLE TO CONTINUE PEACE TALKS. HE ALSO THINKS THAT SOME MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD, DURING THE SIX-MONTH PERIOD, CONTINUE TO IMPORT ARMS "VIA COVERT CHANNELS" INTO BOSNIA.

6. DURING DISCUSSIONS, IZETBEGOVIC ALSO ELABORATED ON OTHER POINTS ABOVE. HE SAID HE THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT THAT UNPROFOR REMAIN IN PLACE AT LEAST THROUGH WINTER, THEREBY ALSO FACILITATING RELIEF EFFORTS. HE WANTED UNPROFOR TO REMAIN IN THE EASTERN ENCLAVES, WHICH WOULD THEN BE MORE VIGOROUSLY DEFENDED ALSO BY NATO (AND THE USG) FROM THE AIR. IN THIS REGARD, HE NOTED THAT THE INFAMOUS "BLUE ROUTE" INTO SARAJEVO, CLOSED SINCE THE END OF JULY, IS LOCATED WITHIN THE SARAJEVO "TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE." HE RECOMMENDED THAT IT BE OPENED THROUGH STRONGER AND MORE COORDINATED EFFORTS BETWEEN UNPROFOR AND NATO. DE-MILITARIZATION OF SARAJEVO -- OR OF OTHER AREAS -- COULD ONLY TAKE PLACE IF UNPROFOR STAYED, IZETBEGOVIC SAID IN REFERENCE TO UNPROFOR GEN. ROSE'S PROPOSALS FOR DE-MILITARIZATION OF THE CAPITAL.

7. IN ADDITION TO OUR CONVERSATIONS WITH IZETBEGOVIC, WE HAVE DISCUSSED IN DETAIL CONSEQUENCES OF LIFTING THE ARMS EMBARGO ALSO WITH FEDERATION PRESIDENT KRESMIR ZUBAK AND EJUP GANIC, WHO PLAYS A PIVOTAL DUAL ROLE AS FEDERATION VICE PRESIDENT AND MEMBER OF THE BOSNIAN REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT'S COLLECTIVE PRESIDENCY. (FEDERATION/REPUBLIC PRIME MINISTER HARIS SILAJDZIC

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HAS BEEN OUT OF THE COUNTRY ON A TOUR OF ISLAMIC COUNTRIES.) ODDLY, WE HAVE NO INDICATIONS THAT THESE KEY FIGURES HAVE MET ALL TOGETHER THEMSELVES IN ORDER TO COORDINATE A STRATEGY, ALTHOUGH THE OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO MAY PRESENT ITSELF IN THE DAYS BEFORE IZETBEGOVIC'S TRAVEL TO THE U.S.

8. IN PUBLIC REMARKS AND COMMENTS TO HIGH-LEVEL VISITORS, BOTH ZUBAK AND GANIC WOULD APPEAR AS WEDDED TO LIFTING THE EMBARGO AS IS IZETBEGOVIC HIMSELF. HOWEVER, IN OUR DISCUSSIONS, BOTH DISPLAYED HINTS OF FLEXIBILITY IN THEIR POSITIONS, PERHAPS AS THE RESULT OF RE-ASSESSING THE CONSEQUENCES OF LIFTING, THE MIX OF FACTORS INVOLVED AND THE DESIRE TO MAINTAIN AN INTERNATIONAL PEACE PROCESS THAT WOULD CONTINUE TO EXERT PRESSURE ON THE KARADZIC SERBS.

9. COMMENT: OUR INITIAL READING IS THERE IS MUCH THAT IS SEEMINGLY IRRECONCILABLE IN THIS STRATEGY, PARTICULARLY IZETBEGOVIC'S VIEW THAT ARMS COULD CONTINUE TO BE IMPORTED DURING A FORMAL "MORATORIUM." IN ADDITION, THE PRESIDENT APPEARED TO BELIEVE THAT UNPROFOR COULD REMAIN WITH ITS PRECISE CURRENT DEPLOYMENT, IN SPITE OF INDICATIONS FROM OUR ALLIES TO THE CONTRARY. BUT, AT ANY RATE, HE SEEMED DETERMINE TO DEVELOP A STRATEGY THAT WOULD MAINTAIN INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN BOSNIA, BUT AVOID PRECIPITOUS ACTIONS -- SUCH AS TOTAL UNPROFOR WITHDRAWAL – THAT COULD HAVE CALAMITOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE BOSNIANS. IZETBEGOVIC'S SHIFT IN EMPHASIS FROM THE BOSNIAN REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT TO THE CROATO-BOSNIAK FEDERATION IS ALSO SIGNIFICANT. FOR HIS PART, FEDERATION PRESIDENT ZUBAK APPEARED TO BE MORE CONCERNED THAT, IF THE EMBARGO IS LIFTED, IT NOT BE TO THE BENEFIT OF THE BOSNIAN ARMY ALONE, BUT OF THE COMBINED CROATO-BOSNIAK FEDERAL ARMED FORCES. WE WERE, IN ANY CASE, IMPRESSED THAT THE BOSNIANS APPEAR NOW TO BE SERIOUSLY RETHINKING A FORMERLY SACRED PLATFORM IN THEIR FOREIGN POLICY: GETTING THE ARMS EMBARGO IMMEDIATELY LIFTED. WE CAN EXPECT THAT IZETBEGOVIC WILL HAVE MORE TO SAY ON THIS WHEN HE COMES TO THE U.S. AT THE END OF THE MONTH. JACKOVICH

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Diplomatic Strategy on Bosnia: Short and Mid-Term

SUMMARY: This paper sets forth considerations for American strategy towards the Bosnian conflict in the short and mid-term. The short term is defined as the period leading up to the October 15 date for commencement of discussions on a multilateral lift resolution, as set out in President Clinton's August 10 letter to Nunn and in the Nunn-Mitchell amendment. Mid-term is defined as the period following October 15 until the end of 1994. This is the period in which the question of whether the United States moves towards unilateral lift is likely to be decided.

The analysis considers steps in all important aspects of our efforts, i.e. within the Contact Group and in NATO; with the parties to the conflict; with Congress and with the press. It concludes with an agenda for near and mid-term action. END SUMMARY

THE CURRENT SITUATION

The current situation is characterized by an uneasy and oft-broken military truce with considerable political maneuvering behind the scenes. There are several untested assumptions, including the intentions of the Russians and other Contact Group members, the sincerity of Milosevic and the ability of the Sarajevo government to maintain its position.

While the Contact Group remains the best means for avoiding a breakdown of current efforts and preventing a situation from arising in which the U.S. could be forced to assume sole responsibility for the crisis, its internal cohesion could be tested severely in coming weeks. Both Russia and France appear to be pushing alternative visions for a peace process based on support for Milosevic, while the UK and others remain adamantly opposed to moving to strict enforcement of the exclusion zones out of fear for the safety of their UNPROFOR forces.

It must also be assumed that adoption of the Nunn-Mitchell amendment has not ended the debate over lift. Although the House has passed the conference committee report on the Defense Authorization Bill containing Nunn-Mitchell and the Senate should follow suit as soon as it reconvenes, additional attempts to legislate unilateral lift, such as the Dole amendment, could surface before Congress recesses. The election campaign will ensure further debate. Our integrated strategy must include provisions for participating in and directing this debate.

Among the important events which have taken place in the Bosnian conflict since the Geneva III ministerial are:

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-- A Bosnian Serb referendum supporting rejection of the the Contact Group proposals and stepped up harassment of the humanitarian relief effort by Pale;

-- Adoption of the Nunn-Mitchell amendment containing strong hortatory language calling for Administration action in support of multilateral lift and calling for the submission of a plan and consultations for unilateral lift if multilateral lift fails;

-- A decision by Milosevic to close his borders and cut other links with Pale as a means to force acceptance of the Contact Group proposals;

-- A growing belief on the part of the Bosnian Muslims that they can prevail if widespread hostilities return, combined with difficulties in making a go of the Federation;

-- Statements by the leading participants in UNPROFOR that they will leave Bosnia if the arms embargo is lifted;

-- Efforts by Kozyrev to paint Milosevic's steps as constituting a qualitatively new situation which requires abandonment of the July 30 Contact Group commitments and a major readjustment of Contact Group strategy.

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. STRATEGY

These events have strengthened the impression that the Bosnian Serbs will not accept the Contact Group plan in the near or medium term and that there is an inevitability to a lifting of the arms embargo and a widening of the war.

The dangers for the American position in such a situation are several:

-- A tendency by other players to assume that if a firm solution is not achieved by October 15, political efforts will be swamped by renewed hostilities, as the U.S. pushes for multilateral lift, and failing that, moves to lift the arms embargo unilaterally. This could lead both to major conflicts with important partners and to an image that the United States was now responsible for a wider war.

-- As October 15 approaches, difficulties in maintaining unity in the Contact Group and within NATO which could undermine efforts to push towards a political settlement. In particular, erosion of the consensus that the Contact Group must be firm with both Belgrade and Pale could lead to considerable disarray. Such a development could lead to conflicts in the Group. Equally devastating could be renewed hostilities and loss of momentum on the ground.

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-- If pressure for a political settlement is undermined by the above two developments, we could find ourselves isolated both diplomatically and militarily. Our only options would be either to stand by as the war expanded or to ourselves enter the conflict.

Avoiding the diplomatic and military isolation and the crisis for our relations with major partners which could result from such a development must be a major goal of short term American strategy.

AN INTEGRATED APPROACH

The large number of elements in play require continuous oversight to ensure an integration of important factors and opportunities for influence. Our approach should focus on three basic goals:

-- To preserve a common political strategy within the Contact Group which helps avoid American isolation by incorporating our internal political debate as a legitimate aspect of management of the crisis. We have from the beginnning accepted the political needs of the Europeans and the Russians as important elements of a common strategy. We should make clear to Contact Group members and other allies that the Administration's political decision to work with proponents of lift was taken after careful deliberation and that it will not be possible to remove this element from the equation.

Indeed, the pressure of lift can work in our favor if we do not break ranks with each other. Our task should be to use all the tools at our disposal to create conditions which make lift both politically and factually unnecessary. Mere warnings by the others of the consequences of lift will not serve this purpose.

-- On the basis of the above, to convince other Contact Group members that continuation of the incentives/disincentives strategy towards Belgrade as well as Pale is strongly in our joint interest. We should make clear that unless it maintains this foundation, agreed at the Naples summit, the Contact Group will be in danger of being whipsawed by each new short term development. There is enough flexibility in this approach to allow us to utilize various elements of the incentives/disincentives strategy to bring the greatest possible pressure to bear towards a political settlement, while at the same time taking care of the often conflicting political needs of the major members.

-- With Congress and with the press, to make clear how these various steps are integrated into a negotiating strategy

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which should be given time to work. At the same time, to continue planning for various post-lift scenarios and discuss the political and military implications of lift with Congress on the basis of this planning. Congress should accept that it shares responsibility with the Administration for successful implementation of our strategy. There should be no finger pointing once the going gets rough.

IMMEDIATE STEPS

Despite Pale's intransigence, the situation is not stalemated. Russian diplomatic efforts, NATO planning both for enforcement of exclusion zones and UNPROFOR redeployment and events on the ground provide elements for a dynamic situation. We are not yet clear about Milosevic's intentions, for example. Our Charge in Belgrade argues convincingly that he will probably play his hand for all that it is worth, with any sign of decisive action coming later in the process.

More than five weeks remain until the October 15 date set by President Clinton and echoed in the Nunn-Mitchell amendment for commencing action in the UN. Even then, we will have two weeks or more to organize the debate. The goal of our immediate steps should be to inject as much dynamism into our efforts as possible. Establishing a dynamic process, which demonstrates clearly understandable elements of progress, is the best means of dealing successfully with the debate over lift.

In particular, we should seek to ensure that the Bosnian Serbs are not allowed to create a de facto stalemate. Application of the tools agreed by the Contact Group, combined with strong diplomatic pressure, can meet this danger. The question now is finding the right mix.

There is, for example, general agreement that an important goal is to isolate Pale diplomatically and logistically as a means of increasing pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to accept the Contact Group plan.

But despite the results of the recent Contact Group meeting in Berlin, there is no consensus on how to achieve this goal:

-- the Russians wish to reward Milosevic for his blockade of Pale with progressive stages of sanctions relief. Their approach would be to accept Milosevic's promises at face value and remove him from the disincentive portion of the Contact Group strategy.

-- the European Contact Group members seem willing to go along with this approach. They have hopes that it might work and see it as a means of preserving unity with the Russians.

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Above all, they see it as an alternative to lifting the arms embargo, which they hope to avoid at all costs. The French and British in particular are watching events closely for implications of the future of their deployments in UNPROFOR.

-- the United States is willing to consider relief for Belgrade, on the condition that Milosevic demonstrate his good intentions by accepting a border monitoring mechanism and by taking political steps with other former Yugoslav Republics, such as recognizing their borders.

The agreement worked out in Berlin on September 6 and 7 meets our core needs in providing for a credible monitoring effort without giving too much away to Belgrade. At the same time, it provides the Russians with Contact Group recognition for the steps that Milosevic has taken that they can use effectively with their domestic audience. Although the Russians may press for even greater recognition as events unfold, the Berlin agreement represents a genuine desire by all parties to maintain Contact Group unity. This should stand us in good stead as we move to implement the other more controversial elements of our fundamental strategy.

We should now move ahead with the following steps:

-- a strong presentation in NATO and with the Russians on the need to underline the determination of the Contact Group with increased enforcement of exclusion zone violations, particularly by NATO air strikes undertaken in coordination with UNPROFOR.

-- careful discussion in NATO, with the UN and bilaterally on future prospects for UNPROFOR. In particular we should utilize apparent French willingness to consider redeployments to construct a plan for a longer term role in support of a peace process.

-- a concerted effort with individual members of Congress to explain our strategy and seek to involve them in the debate from the beginning.

-- a systematic press strategy which adopts clearly-understandable themes and seeks to ensure that they are reflected in both news articles and sympathetic commentary.

-- work in individual capitals. Our Ambassadors in Contact Group countries should be encouraged to enter the frankest possible dialogue with host governments. We should improve our backgrounding of other posts to ensure detailed presentation of our views by other Ambassadors as well.

-- stepped up consideration within the USG of the military and financial implications of various steps related to the

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possible withdrawal of UNPROFOR and lifting of the arms embargo. Possibilities of responding positively to continued strong British and French pressure for an American ground role, even in a support capacity, must be explored carefully.

-- more detailed consideration of the economic and political measures the United States could support on the ground to help ease the crisis and push towards a solution. Such measures should be focussed on all players in the conflict.

-- more active press background which describes the interrelated nature of US strategy and which builds the lift aspect into our strategy, explaining what the possible U.S. role might be. We should take pains to counteract any sense of conflict or rift with Russia and our major allies.

TOWARDS OCTOBER 15

As October 15 approaches, we should be able to describe a package of strategies and measures which is focussing maximum pressure towards a negotiated settlement. Assuming that a settlement has not yet been reached, we should begin to incorporate UN discussion of a multilateral lift resolution into our strategy in a self-confident and pragmatic way:

-- With other members of the Contact Group, we should gain agreement that the UN debate should be a time to review all aspects of the conflict and the efforts undertaken so far. The goal of this review should be to gain agreement within the Security Council on specific, firm steps which can be taken to demonstrate the precariousness of further delay. These conclusions should include a judgement on the growing political support for lift in the U.S., but also should focus again on efforts to pressure recalcitrant parties.

This would be the point to decide whether new negotiating efforts with new objectives might be considered or not. It would also be the time to be ready with ideas for a future role for UNPROFOR, including possible enhanced American support. If we are to have a card to play with our allies on UNPROFOR, it would probably be wise to play it at this point.

-- With Belgrade, our approach will depend on how honestly Milosevic has cooperated with us. The week or two prior to October 15 might be a time for a high level U.S. envoy who could make clear to Belgrade the consequences and opportunities in various courses of action.

-- With Congress and the press, we should describe carefully the goals of the UN debate, seek congressional agreement on tactics and possible outcomes. With both Congress

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and the press, this period should mark an intensification of dialogue which prepares the way for probable failure of a multilateral lift resolution. The ongoing U.S. election campaign is likely to play an important role in this debate.

At this point, we should be talking frankly with Congress about the political, military and legal implications of unilateral lift. We should be clear with major proponents of lift what the joint political responsibility will be.

-- With Sarajevo, we should intensify our dialogue on possible options and encourage the Bosnians to support a joint approach with us in public and with contacts in the United States.

-- During this period, we should also be exploring more carefully steps which can be taken in the broader context to stabilize the situation. These include a more systematic approach to the problems of Kosovo; strategies in international organizations and longer term projects such as a regional arms control scheme for the region.

OCTOBER 15 AND BEYOND

All these strands will come together as we make good on the commitment made by President Clinton to introduce a lift resolution in the Security Council within the two weeks following October 15. By this time, we should have a fair view of the positions of all the key parties and the possibilities for further action.

-- We will have a much better idea of the prospects for passage of a lift resolution in the Security Council. The attitudes of the British, French and Russians will be key.

-- We will have briefed Congress in detail on what we believe we would need to do militarily to assist the Bosnian government after lift and have a much better understanding of how much pressure or support we can expect from the Hill.

-- The Bosnian government will itself have a better appreciation for what could happen after lift, and this too will influence our calculations.

-- Finally, there will be developments on the ground in Bosnia--the fighting situation and the humanitarian relief effort, the position of UNPROFOR and the possible implementation of strict enforcement, and the results of Milosevic's campaign against Pale.

We will need to weigh all these elements in deciding whether to press the lift resolution forward to a vote or to

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propose alternative approaches. If our assessment points in the direction of pressing the lift resolution, then we can move forward. On the other hand, if we decide that Milosevic's campaign is working and needs more time to succeed, this may argue for holding off on the lift resolution, particularly if support for lift is lacking among key players. Other alternatives are also possible. If strict enforcement has been implemented by this time, we may want to continue with this for a longer period before moving for agreement on lift. Or, our conversations with Congress may convince us (or convince them) that they are unwilling to support the military action we believe necessary to assist the Bosnian government under a lift scenario.

Other possibilities may also emerge depending on how events unfold. If we decide for any reason, however, not to press forward with a lift resolution, or if we do but fail to secure its passage, then we are committed, by the President's letter to Nunn, to consult with the Congress on the possibility of unilateral lift. Given the timing, it is likely that any serious consultations on unilateral lift will need to await the convening of the new Congress in January. We will also need to respond appropriately to the other provisions of the Nunn-Mitchell amendment, particularly those cutting off funds for U.S. enforcement of the arms embargo.

By that time, there will likely be new elements to factor into our equations as we make clear to Congress the extremely damaging effect that unilateral lift could have on many of our key foreign policy equities, as well as the additional demands it would place on our military responsibility for the conflict in Bosnia.

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SUSTAINING THE BOSNIAN FEDERATION

WHY WE NEED THE FEDERATION

Attempting to preserve the Federation should be a key U.S. objective in any Bosnian scenario for several reasons. First, the Federation is the linchpin of Muslim-Croat rapprochement. Second, the Federation provides a strategic counterweight to Serb domination in the region. Third, it could serve as the basis for a viable settlement along the lines of the Contact Group plan. Thus, quite apart from our "godfather" role in brokering the Federation agreement, we have an interest in helping the Federation manage strains stemming from the legacy of Muslim-Croat fighting and intensified conflict with the Serbs.

WHAT WE MIGHT CONSIDER IF FIGHTING INTENSIFIES

If the military situation in Bosnia heats up as a result of the lifting of the arms embargo, and particularly if UNPROFOR leaves, the Federation will come under unprecedented pressure. Federation positions including Sarajevo, the eastern enclaves, Brcko, the region between Olovo and Ribnica, and Bihac will remain vulnerable until peace is achieved, and are likely to be among the first targets of stepped up Serb attacks. Should we decide to try to sustain the Federation if fighting increases, we will need to consider the extent to which we wish to continue to provide, or increase provision of, support of the following types:

- o diplomatic and political support, including in the most extreme case support for a government forced to leave Sarajevo for a temporary location in the heartland of the Federation;

- o military assistance, including continued advice on integration of government and HVO units, provision of air support, training and provision of goods not covered by the arms embargo, and if the arms embargo is lifted, weapons and military equipment.

- o democratization and institution-building assistance to shore up the Federation at local levels;

- o economic and humanitarian aid. In the event of expanded war, this would naturally mean assistance toward maintaining a subsistence level, not actual reconstruction aid.

It is important to bear in mind that the UN, through UNPROFOR and UNHCR, and private international organizations including the ICRC, are already providing significant indirect support to the Federation. If the UN and NGOs were to withdraw entirely, it would be exceedingly difficult to keep the Federation alive.

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DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT

In a situation of all-out war that results in further territorial gains by the Serbs, the Bosnian government and Federation will need all the diplomatic and political support the international community can provide, both in multilateral organizations and bilaterally. Continued recognition of the Bosnian government would help prevent a collapse of confidence, a leadership vacuum, and a total breakdown of order. Should Sarajevo fall and the government be forced to move to core areas of the Federation in order to survive, we would need to consider whether and how to help with an evacuation, whether to provide logistical support for an exiled-in-place regime, and whether to use U.S. ground forces in large numbers to move the government or defend what was left of its territory.

Three projects suggested by Embassy Bosnia that provide diplomatic and political support for the Federation under any scenario are already being undertaken. They are as follows:

-- Organizing a training course for aspiring Federation diplomats: USIA and USAID have both expressed an interest in funding such a course; Ambassador Jackovich is discussing logistics and course-content with retired U.S. diplomats who might teach the course.

-- Visits to the U.S. by local Federation officials: Embassy Sarajevo is working with USIA to arrange visits by appropriate individuals.

-- Periodic high-level U.S. visits to Bosnia. Assistant Secretary Holbrooke, who said at his Senate confirmation hearings that the Balkans would be the site of his first official travel, has recently returned from a trip that included Bosnia.

MILITARY SUPPORT

An intensification of fighting with the Bosnian Serbs would subject the fragile military accord between the Bosnian government army and the HVO militia to increased strain. Whether or not the embargo is lifted, we will need to work for military integration of the two forces and to overcome deep-seated suspicions hindering that process. General Galvin, who spearheaded negotiations on the military aspects of the Federation, has visited Federation leaders and made suggestions. He may have further thoughts in this regard.

In a lift situation, provision of U.S. weapons to the Bosnian government per se will likely fuel suspicions of many Bosnian Croats, who will fear that the weapons might ultimately be used against the HVO. Bosnian Croat leaders might accordingly press Croatia to step up arms deliveries to HVO units. Thus if we pursue lift, we will need to consider carefully how to provide weapons, which types of weapons to supply, and whether and how to offer training in their use.

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Regardless of whether we pursue lift, we need to address the Bosnian government's outstanding request for non-lethal assistance, including uniforms, tents, and supplies such as canteens, to the Federation. (These requests are endorsed by Embassy Bosnia.) State has included Bosnia in its 1996 request for IMET funds; this should facilitate military-to-military contacts and discussions of non-lethal assistance in any circumstances, and decisionmaking on strategic assistance should the arms embargo be lifted.

We earlier told our Allies we would help expedite the withdrawal of UNPROFOR troops should this become necessary for security reasons. The UK has said it "fully intends to cash the check" if the arms embargo is lifted; thus after October 15 we may face a decision on whether to provide military support to assist with UNPROFOR evacuation or redeployment from both government and HVO-controlled territory. In some cases UNPROFOR troops have helped quell disturbances between government and HVO units; the departure of UNPROFOR may allow Muslim-Croat resentment to resurface in some areas.

It goes almost without waying that if the eastern enclaves or Sarajevo are threatened, strangled, or overrun as a result of increased fighting, pressure to step up the level of U.S. (and/or NATO) involvement will rise dramatically.

DEMOCRATICIZATION AND INSTITUTION-BUILDING

In early July Prime Minister Silajdzic discussed with Ambassador Redman the idea of a US commission that would help jump-start implementation of the Federation constitution and recommend ways to build support for the Federation at the municipal and cantonal levels. Even in the context of expanded war, we should do whatever we can to strengthen Federation institutions and public confidence in the Federation.

Working with Embassy Bosnia, Brian Atwood recently approved a proposal by USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives to use up to $1 million to explore Federation-strengthening options. Provided the security situation permits, a Task Force comprised of economists, dispute resolution practitioners, governance experts and civil engineers will travel to Bosnia in November/December to strengthen local efforts at reconciliation, particularly through Federation institutions, and to identify opportunities for U.S.-supported projects in municipal government, housing rehabilitation and the private sector, including, tangible, immediate support to the extent possible. The survey will look specifically at small, central Bosnian communities, including some of those most affected by Croat-Muslim fighting and refugee movements, such as Vitez, Travnik, Bugugno and Gorni Vakuf. The experts will also look at cities where different ethnic groups continue to live and work together to examine ways in which U.S. support could reinforce their positive example. Another team will look at ways to implement the March Federation constitution.

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CSCE has a mandate to appoint ombudsmen; and a representative of the CSCE chairman went to Sarajevo in August to try to get the Bosnian government to nominate acceptable ombudsmen and prepare for the opening of CSCE's Sarajevo office. Through the Commission that Silajdzic proposed and otherwise, we should encourage CSCE efforts.

ECONOMIC AND HUMANITARIAN AID

A return to anything approaching full-scale war would almost certainly halt rehabilitation efforts. Thus the focus of any U.S. aid program in a post-lift situation would be on sustaining a subsistance level of existence for the Bosnian people. The likely withdrawal or redeployment of UNPROFOR under lift would complicate an already difficult humanitarian effort, particularly during winter months.

If fighting intensifies, the U.S. must be ready to address the most pressing humanitarian needs in short order, especially in Sarajevo, where in the absence of Bosnian Serb agreement to let supplies through, the city could quickly be surrounded and cut off from relief deliveries. The situation would be even more acute in the beleaguered and vulnerable eastern enclaves. We will need to take opportunities for provision of assistance where they occur and remain flexible and prepared to act quickly to meet needs such as repair of water distribution networks, repair and maintenance of electrical power and telecommunication sources, provision of health care, and so on.

Under the assumption that the hostility level in Bosnia will remain high, USAID is planning to commit $1 million to the UN Trust Fund for Sarajevo and up to $9 million in its FY 1994 Bosnia budget for urgent, Sarajevo-related activities such as rehabilitating the city's gas distribution and heating systems; and airlifting $3 million worth of pharmaceutical supplies and medical equipment to the city; and advising city managers directly responsible for the city's rehabilitation.

Embassy Bosnia has proposed three humanitarian relief projects to help shore up the Federation that are already being carried out in whole or in part. Specifically, they are:

-- Support for the Bosnian Croat Monastery/Hospital at Nova Bila: At Ambassador Jackovich's request, USAID has agreed to assist in this effort.

-- Replacement of Mostar's "Masala" Bridge: This has been undertaken by the British, the UN and the EU administration.

-- Refugee registration and pre-fabricated housing: At the suggestion of Assistant Secretary Oakley of PRM, Ambassador Jackovich will work with the International Rescue Committee on its UNHCR-sponsored refugee

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registration effort in central Bosnia. USAID will study the feasibility of housing rehabilitation as part of long-term reconstruction efforts. But given the cost and logistical problems of a pre-fabricated housing program, USAID has said it is unlikely to fund direct housing construction.

Embassy Bosnia has also suggested that the road around Mount Igman be repaired. The route, which is unpaved and therefore closed during most of the winter, is the government's sole life-line to the capital. In recent weeks, the Igman route has been placed under virtual Bosnian Serb control through use of sniper fire. As any project would require the unlikely cooperation of the Bosnian Serbs, we do not plan to go forward for the time being.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001t. paper	re: The Serb Mindset (4 pages)	09/13/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0098 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, September 13, 1994 [2]

2010-0533-M
rs1018

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001u. email	Alexander Vershbow to Lake re: Bosnia PC-Update (1 page)	09/13/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0098 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, September 13, 1994 [2]

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001v. email	Vershbow to Neal Wolin re: Bosnia PC-One More Thing (1 page)	09/13/1994	P1/b(1)

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001w. map	re: Weapons Positions (1 page)	09/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
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FOLDER TITLE:
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001x. chart	re: Additional Forms of Sanctions Relief for Belegrade (1 page)	09/1994	P1/b(1)

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([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

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PC0098 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, September 13, 1994 [2]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9421055
RECEIVED: 09 SEP 94 07

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 12 SEP 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
PC
YUGOSLAVIA
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 13 SEP PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 13 SEP 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9421067 9421068

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0098 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		DARBY
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW
		WRIGHT

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSASK CLOSED BY: NSJEB DOC 2 OF 2

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94090915	FOR DECISION
001		X	94091213	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
002		X	94091213	SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	940912	FUERTH, L	
002	940912	BRILL, K	
002	940912	MCALEER, R	
002	940912	INDERFURTH, K	
002	940912	PANETTA, L	
002	940912	GARTHOFF, D	
002	940912	PATRICK, T	

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National Security Council
The White House

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7:30 PM

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 21055

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (PA) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed	(4)		
Sens	4		
Itoh	1		
Soderberg			
Berger	2		
Lake	3	Natl Sec Advisor has seen 9/12	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5		
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS: Cc: ~sl

9 AM 94 [illegible]

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DATE 12 SEP 94

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION OF PC MTG ON BOSNIA 13 SEP
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	13 Sep	0700	L H Branscum
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: 1		
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET , N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: 1		
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	13 Sep	1750	J Palmieri
	PRINT LAST NAME:	Palmieri	
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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET , N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520			
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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET , N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	9/12/94	1722	Wms, NMC
		PRINT LAST NAME:	
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B

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE / PRIORITY / ROUTINE

RELEASER: [signature]

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 1765 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (202) 456-2585 West Wing Desk
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NOTIFICATION OF PC MTG ON BOSNIA 13 SEP NSC LOG # 21055

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

B
N
D
A

REMARKS:

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
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TIME OF RECEIPT
DELTA
12 SEP 94 13 45
NMCC/JCS

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE / PRIORITY / ROUTINE

RELEASER: [signature]

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 1765 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NOTIFICATION OF PC MTG ON BOSNIA 13 SEP NSC LOG # 21055

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

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1994 SEP 12 13: 1:44

TIME OF RECEIPT

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B&N
9/12/94
13:55

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE / PRIORITY / ROUTINE

RELEASER: Lynn Sagell

DTG:

MESSAGE NO. 1765 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 2

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(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NOTIFICATION OF PC MTG ON BOSNIA 13 SEP NSC LOG # 21055

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
[redacted]			
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

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1994 SEP 12 P. 1:44

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PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE / PRIORITY / ROUTINE

RELEASER: T Wyn Siguell

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 1765 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NOTIFICATION OF PC MTG ON BOSNIA 13 SEP NSC LOG # 21055

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

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TIME OF RECEIPT

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12 17 50Z

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- ☑ IMMEDIATE
- ☐ PRIORITY
- ☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: [signature]

DATE/TIME: 121740Z SEP 94

MESSAGE #: 23

NSC LOG #: 21055

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting -PC on Bosnia 13 SEP PAGES: 2

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

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If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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~~SECRET~~ SECRET 21055

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 12, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

Mr. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President of the United States

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T.R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

AMBASSADOR RICK INDEFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the UN

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

There will be a Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia on Tuesday, September 13, 2:30-3:30 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Principals plus one. The agenda for the meeting is attached at Tab A. (S)

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MI NARA, Date 6/16/10
2010-0533-M

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. agenda	[Duplicate of 001b] (1 page)	09/13/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
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([PC and Bosnia...])
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FOLDER TITLE:
PC0098 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, September 13, 1994 [2]

2010-0533-M
rs1018

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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

September 9, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

SUBJECT: Principals Meeting on Bosnia, September 13, 1994

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Principals Meeting on Bosnia to be held on September 13, 1994. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NARA, Date 6/16/10

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See also 2013-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia [partial] (2 pages)	10/18/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 04/17/2015
002a. memo	Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake re: Supplement to Briefer on Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)	10/18/1994	P1/b(1)
002b. letter	Janet Reno to Anthony Lake re: [Monitoring Mission] (2 pages)	10/17/1994	P1/b(1)
~~002c. cable~~	~~From Ambassador Thomas (5 pages)~~	~~10/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
003a. memo	Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake re: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (4 pages)	10/17/1994	P1/b(1)
~~003b. agenda~~	~~Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)~~	~~10/18/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003c. paper~~	~~re: UNSC Resolution to Lift the Arms Embargo (1 page)~~	~~10/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003d. cable~~	~~re: USCINCEUR Operational Assessment (4 pages)~~	~~10/13/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KDE 05/26/2016
003e. memo	Leon Fuerth to Principals Committee Members (1 page)	10/17/1994	P1/b(1)
003f. paper	re: Issues Associated with Lifting the Arms Embargo [partial] (1 page)	10/12/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 6/11/2020
~~003g. paper~~	~~re: Bosnia Strategy (3 pages)~~	~~10/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003h. paper~~	~~Congressional Strategy (1 page)~~	~~00/00/0000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020

COLLECTION:
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NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0103 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, October 18, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs626

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~003i. paper~~	~~Supporting the Bosnia Federation (1 page)~~	~~00/00/0000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003j. paper~~	~~re: Strict Enforcement Update (3 pages)~~	~~10/18/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
004a. memo	Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake re: Principals Discussion of Bosnia (7 pages)	10/06/1994	P1/b(1)
004b. paper	re: Next Steps on Bosnia (4 pages)	10/03/1994	P1/b(1)
004c. memo	Alexander Vershbow to Anthony Lake re: Six-Month Strategy on Bosnia (3 pages)	09/29/1994	P1/b(1)
~~005a. agenda~~	~~[Duplicate of 003b] (1 page)~~	~~10/18/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~005b. agenda~~	~~[Draft version of 003b] (1 page)~~	~~10/18/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
005c. memo	[Duplicate of 004a] [incomplete, page 1 only] (1 page)	10/06/1994	P1/b(1)

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RECORD ID: 9421228
RECEIVED: 20 OCT 94 09

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 24 OCT 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 18 OCT PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 24 OCT 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9420963 9420967

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0103 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		DARBY
		KERRICK
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW
		WOLIN
		WRIGHT

COMMENTS: _____

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94102015	FOR DECISION
001		X	94102412	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
001	ITOH	Z	94102412	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	94102414	SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
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002	941024	BRILL, K	
002	941024	MCALEER, R	
002	941024	INDERFURTH, K	
002	941024	PANETTA, L	
002	941024	GARTHOFF, D	
002	941024	PATRICK, T	

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RECORD ID: 9421228
RECEIVED: 20 OCT 94 09

TO: LAKE

FROM: KERRICK
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 20 OCT 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 18 OCT PC MTG ON BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE DUE DATE: 24 OCT 94 STATUS: X

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF:

FILES: IFG NSCP: CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
LAKE		

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Sens	1/4	AD	
Itoh		AD	
Soderberg			
MJW Berger	2		
Lake	3	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	(5)	10/24	D
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

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COMMENTS:

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG MBN A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Sens	1/4	AD	
Itoh		ND	
Soderberg			
Berger	2		
Lake	3	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	(5)	10/24	D
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

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3 MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET , N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	10/24	22:52	[signature] Reaves PRINT LAST NAME: Reaves COPY: 1
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SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 18 OCT PC MTG ON BOSNIA
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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET , N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	10/24	11:05pm	Charlee Wood PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
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MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: PANETTA COPY: 1
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 24, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to
the United Nations

MR. LEON E. PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President
of the United States

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia
October 18, 1994 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By AS NARA, Date 6/16/1
2010-0533-M

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia [partial] (2 pages)	10/18/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0103 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, October 18, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs626

RESTRICTION CODES

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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions
Meeting of NSC Principals Committee
DATE: October 18, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 - 3:30pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Anthony Lake

OVP
Leon Fuerth

State
Secretary Warren Christopher
David Gergen
Charles Thomas

DOD
Deputy Secretary John Deutch

UN
Ambassador Madeleine Albright

CIA
Director James Woolsey

JCS
ADM William Owens

White House
Samuel Berger
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
Alexander Vershbow

Summary of Conclusions

Strategy:

1. The Principals affirmed our goal to use the next six months in an intensive effort to achieve a political settlement based on the Contact Group proposal. They agreed to press forward with the "Bold Approach" and the Zagreb-Four plan to induce Milosevic to effect a total cut-off of the Krajina Serbs and recognize borders, with a view to further isolating the Bosnian Serbs. Principals requested a short paper within forty-eight hours summarizing key issues encompassing the bold approach and how we would relate those to sanctions relief. Action: State.

2. The Principals agreed that the U.S. will circulate a draft UNSC resolution on or about October 29 calling for a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo by a date certain in the spring (hard-trigger). The resolution should include a "build-down" strategy, if possible. The

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further agreed to consult closely along the way with the Bosnians and the Congress. Principals will review progress and consider next steps in early November.
Action: State/USUN.

Lifting the Arms Embargo:

3. The Principals reviewed the progress of military planning and directed that the Departments of Defense and State continue their efforts, consulting with Congress on outstanding issues relating to lift with a view to resolving issues by January 1. The Principals recognized that allies expect the U.S. to provide ground forces, if necessary, to assist with UNPROFOR withdrawal, although we have made no specific commitment to do so. Action: Joint Staff and OSD.

4. The Principals agreed we will implement the Nunn-Mitchell amendment requirement to cease funding for enforcing the arms embargo and requested a briefing by November 1 on the modifications necessary and the operational implications of U.S. limitations of enforcing the arms embargo. The Principals also requested companion papers on how to deal with this issue at the United Nations and NATO. EO 13526 1.4c EO 13526 1.4c Action: Briefing - Joint Staff. Papers - State/ OSD 1.4(c)

Sanctions:

5. The Principals stressed the importance of fulfilling commitments and for rapid deployment of the U.S. monitors participating in the ICFY sanctions monitoring mission in Serbia. DoD agreed to provide 20 to complement the 20 being provided by State. Action: OVP.

6. The Principals discussed the effectiveness of the border closure and directed the interagency working group on Bosnia to review the status of Serbian compliance prior to each 30-day review with a view to determining if action should be taken to terminate sanctions relief. The IWG should coordinate demarches to Serbia and other capitals based on available evidence. Action: OVP, NSC, and State.

Strict Enforcement

7. The Principals reviewed the progress of efforts underway to improve strict enforcement of exclusion zones and directed that efforts be taken with the British and French at the United nations with a view to obtaining a more positive UN response on the new NATO airstrike standards. Action: State.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 20, 1994

Natl Sec Advisor has seen
NOTED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

FROM: DON KERRICK DK

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, October 18, 1994

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia held October 18, 1994.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By AW, NARA, Date 6/16/10
2010-0533-M

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9421209
RECEIVED: 18 OCT 94 12

TO: LAKE

FROM: KERRICK

DOC DATE: 18 OCT 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BRIEFING SUPPLEMENT FOR 18 OCT PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 21 OCT 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9421169 9421178

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0103 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		KERRICK
		NSC CHRON
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS:

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2012 0533-N

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
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001		X	94101917	NOTED BY LAKE

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National Security Council
The White House

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Itoh			
Soderberg	2	LY	A
Berger	3	LY	
Lake	4	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5	MBN 10/19	N
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake re: Supplement to Briefer on Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)	10/18/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0103 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, October 18, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs626

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. letter	Janet Reno to Anthony Lake re: [Monitoring Mission] (2 pages)	10/17/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0103 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, October 18, 1994

2010-0533-M
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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From Ambassador Thomas

1. ~~Confidential~~ -entire text

2. Summary. At the October 17 Contact Group Meeting the Brits launched an EU-3 proposal for "Plan B" (aka the "comprehensive approach" or "The Way Ahead") that essentially feeds back the agreed U.S. initiative. Russian CG Rep-designate Zotov said his personal reaction was "positive." Zotov had not had the benefit of a readout of the Secretary's meeting with Kozyrev this morning, nor is he fully read-in on CG issues. Thus, his positive reaction must be seen in that light. Nevertheless, in pitching Plan B, the UK and GE made an effective case as to how this idea helps Milosevic out of the box in which he has been left by the intransigent Pale Serbs.

3. I also laid down a marker, as we have already done bilaterally with the CG nations, that we fully intend to present a lift resolution that meets the President's commitment to Congress. I noted that we hoped to avoid a squabble with our allies. Launching the comprehensive approach at the same time would deflect attention from lift and properly return it to a new dynamic initiative for resolving the conflict in former Yugoslavia. After some grumbling, the Allies responded positively to our willingness to consult with them in the usual UN fashion after tabling the resolution. They agreed, that although they would be constrained to publicly oppose the U.S. resolution, they could do so in language that minimizes fallout. At the same time, they accepted enthusiastically our concept of molding the comprehensive approach into the lift resolution. end summary

4. The Contact Group met for 2.5 hours at USUN on Oct. 17. At Russian request, only Contact Group representatives attended. Russian Rep Nikiforov was accompanied by Rep-designate Zotov. Today's agenda was devoted to the "lift" resolution and "The Way Ahead." The CG will meet again tomorrow, October 18 at 9:30 a.m.

Lift
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5. Paralleling what we had explained bilaterally to the CG countries, I reviewed our firm intention to lay down, at the end of the month, a lift resolution which meets the President's commitment to Congress and the GOBH. I underscored our strong intention to avoid a public squabble with the allies but pointed out again that given the choice of a noisy dispute with allies and not meeting the President's commitment we would opt for the former. I noted our willingness to provide an advance copy of our proposed resolution and to discuss the wording. I warned, however, that we would not accept dilution of what had been stated in the President's letter to Congress. I then pointed out

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VL 2/6/2020 (6.09)
2013-0682-M

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE (MO) 10.17. '94 23:43 NO. 14601207O7 PAGE 3

that after the resolution had been tabled, we would expect to consult, especially with the CG countries, as we normally would do with any UN resolution. We would hope to work out language that was acceptable to us and them.

6. I then emphasized the importance of melding in the comprehensive" negotiating track. This would serve to move the issue from the increasingly sterile debate over lift to the more productive area of a broad peace plan for the most neuralgic issues in the former Yugoslavia. I commented that such a plan could be in parallel or could be embedded in the lift resolution.

7. We concluded the discussion of lift with general agreement that everybody wished to avoid acrimony over the lift resolution and that the Europeans could make public their reaction to our lift approach without generating the sense of a breakown in the cohesiveness of the Contact group or a great row between the U.S. and the troop providers. I suggested that careful advance planning and consultations could find the right words to shift the focus from "lift" to the "way ahead."

The Way Ahead aka "Plan B" or The Comprehensive Approach

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8. The UK then presented their proposed version of "Plan B (attached)." They said it had been approved by the EU-3 and would no doubt be readily approved by the rest of the 12. Their Plan B is essentially what we had brainstormed about in the CG and what the PC agreed to on Oct. 7. In presenting the plan, the UK and Germany directed their comments to the Russians. They forcefully laid out the advantages of the plan for Milosevic. The UK rep pointed out that Plan B was an escape hatch for Milosevic, who was now at the mercy of the intransigent Bosnian Serbs when it came to further sanctions relief. German Rep Steiner commented that, if accepted, Plan B could provide swift sanctions relief to Milosevic, the issue on which Kozyrev had been so insistent.

9. Initially, the Russians were suspicious that Plan B would simply add another set of demands to those already contained in the CG Peace Plan. We corrected this misunderstanding. Zotov responded that his "initial reaction was positive, speaking personally." Nikiforov has always been supportive of this approach so his agreement was to be expected. It should be noted that Zotov is attending his first CG meeting since leaving his Syrian posting two weeks ago. Thus, he is not up to speed on CG theology. Furthermore, neither Zotov nor Nikiforov had been briefed on the Secretary's discussions today with Kozyrev.

10. In this regard I had in hand, from one of the contact group members (strictly protect), Lord Owen's report to the EU on his

line missing

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was still not prepared to make any formal link of sanctions to a Croatian solution.

Next Steps

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11. The UK and Germany hoped that at the reinforced CG meeting on Wednesday there would be agreement "in principle" on Plan B. I responded that from the U.S. standpont we would welcome the opportunity to move fast on this initiative. We agreed that alot of work would be necessary to flesh out the proposal and make it acceptable. (For example, the EU language on equal rights won't fly with the US.) If something is to be ready in time for the lift resolution we would need to meet early next week to flesh out the Plan B initiative.

Sanctions

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12. Sanctions will be discussed tomorrow at the October 18 meeting.

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EU-3 First Draft

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MULTI-TRACK APPROACH

The existing Contact Group plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina is termed Plan A and all elements of it remain valid. Plan B offers an additional, wider approach.

PLAN B: A WIDER APPROACH

Requirements on Milosevic:

(i) Recognition of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia within their internationally accepted borders.

(ii) Maintenance of Milosevic's acceptance of the Contact Group plan for Bosnia (with the Contact Group making clear that there will be equality of rights for the Bosnian-Croat and Bosnian Serb Entities provided this is not inconsistent with the integrity of the Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina; and also making clear that mutually agreed land swaps are possible once the Contact Group map has been accepted in principle).

(iii) A solution to the Krajinas on the basis of acceptance of the ICFY plan.

(iv) Maintenance of the regime whereby exports from the FRY to the Bosnian Serbs are restricted to humanitarian assistance until the Contact Group plan is accepted by Pale; and maintenance of the FRY policy that exports to the Krajina Serbs are similarly restricted, until the ICFY Krajinas plan is accepted (monitoring arrangements may need to be considered).

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PLAN A	PLAN B	
Requirement	Requirement	Reward
Bosnian Serb acceptance of Contact Group plan and withdrawal to lines on Contact Group Map.	Milosevic's acceptance of Plan B (i.e. Milosevic implements what is in his power)	All except "strategic" trade sanctions (as defined in the EU Action Plan) suspended.
Bosnian Serb acceptance of Contact Group plan and withdrawal, and Croatia modus vivendi implemented.	Bosnian Serb acceptance of Contact Group plan and withdrawal, or Knin acceptance of the Krajinas plan.	All sanctions suspended.
Recognition of Bosnia and Croatia within their accepted borders by FRY and negotiated settlements being implemented in both.	Implementation of both the Bosnia and Krajinas plans.	All sanctions lifted.

effectively the same in Plan A & Plan B

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE (MO) 10.17.94 23:44 NO. 14601207O7 PAGE 7

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9421199
RECEIVED: 17 OCT 94 11

TO: LAKE

FROM: KERRICK

DOC DATE: 17 OCT 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND MATERIALS FOR 18 OCT PC MTG RE BOSNIA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 20 OCT 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9421169 9421178

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0103 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		KERRICK
		NSC CHRON
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MM NARA, Date 6/16/15
2012-0533-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

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A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS: PC Mtg memo (Bosnia) 10/18

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. memo	Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake re: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (4 pages)	10/17/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0103 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, October 18, 1994

2010-0533-M
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: October 18, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 - 4:30pm

AGENDA

I. Bosnia Policy Review/Next Steps

A. Near-term Issues

(1) UNSC Resolution on Lift.....State

(2) Legal implications of Nunn/Mitchell.....NSC

(3) Sanctions: Enforcing remaining sanctions; Monitoring FRY/Bosnia border closure.....OVP

(4) Strict Enforcement.....State

(5) Measures to Support the Federation: Progress Report/Next Steps.....State

B. Longer-term strategy

(1) Diplomatic approach.....State

(2) Lifting the Arms Embargo Alternatives..... JCS

C. Congressional Strategy.....State

(1) Near-term

(2) Longer-term

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 2/6/2020
2013-0682-m

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UNSC RESOLUTION TO LIFT THE ARMS EMBARGO

The resolution we introduce on or about October 28 should be a straight-forward call for the rescinding of the arms embargo effective April 1. If our efforts to pass this resolution are successful, we will have met the President's commitments to both the Hill and to President Izetbegovic regarding lift while, at the same time, getting our partners to agree to a broader strategy approach.

The Council is more likely to accept a resolution incorporating a comprehensive approach to peace than one that simply calls for lifting the embargo. The British and French already have signalled their willingness to support a resolution that proposes a broader, longer-term strategy.

- Still, every government represented in the Council has deep reservations about any resolution incorporating lift.

- Foreign Secretary Hurd has stated behind closed doors that "the only party that wants to lift the embargo now is the US Congress, and the American Administration should be able to control the Congress."

- We cannot allow such rifts to destroy the Contact Group's effectiveness.

In New York, other Council members will be looking for us to move quickly to fallback positions once we are faced with objections to various aspects of our proposal. Their objections will include:

- It is wrong at this stage to wed ourselves to automatic lift at some set future date. The overall situation may have changed by then and a decision with such potentially drastic repercussions should be reviewed again in the light of changed conditions.

- By setting any future date for lift, we could be giving the signal to the Bosnian Serbs to attack exposed UNPROFOR positions.

- A decision on lift now would force UNPROFOR to plan for redeployment and withdrawal; these plans would almost certainly include pullout from the Eastern enclaves well before the actual date of lift. Such a pullout would lead quickly to an escalation of violence and a flood of refugees.

One other important consideration to keep in mind before negotiations begin in the Council is that any draft resolution tabled in New York could be -- and usually is -- leaked to the media.

- If the press sees an aggressively worded draft agenda proposed by the USG and later compares it to a resolution we might be compelled to accept that is less assertive than we would like, then we would face significant public and congressional criticism.

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KEY BOSNIA DATES

October 13	Received USEUCOM Operational Description (Undergoing legal review)
October 15	Two-week Nunn-Mitchell Clock starts.
October 17-19	Contact Group Meets in New York
October 18	Principals Only PC
NLT October 29	U.S. Action "called for" at UN
November 5	30 day border closure report due.
November 13	U.S. prohibited from enforcing arms embargo in Adriatic.
	Submit plan and consult Congress concerning training for Bosnian forces
	Submit plan and consult Congress concerning unilateral lift
November 29	House in session one day (GATT)
November 30 - Dec. 1	Senate in Session (GATT)
December 1	UNSC Resolution must lift sanctions by this date to avoid Nunn-Mitchell requirements.
December 5	30-day border closure report due
January 3	House/Senate in session one day
January 5	30-day border closure report due.
January 15	UNSC decision on extension of sanctions suspension.
January (Late TBD)	Congress in session.
March 31	UNPROFOR Mandate expires.

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October 14, 1994

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Nunn-Mitchell Amendment on Lifting Bosnia Arms Embargo

This memorandum contains agreed inter-agency guidance on the interpretation of the Nunn-Mitchell Amendment (§1404) of the FY-95 DOD Authorization Act. As described in greater detail below, its provisions fall into three categories: (1) a series of hortatory provisions, which have no legally binding effect; (2) requirements to report to and consult with Congress; and (3) most important, a prohibition on funding that would preclude us from participating in activities in the Adriatic to enforce the Bosnia embargo against other countries.

1. Hortatory provisions. Subsections (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) and (g) of the Nunn-Mitchell Amendment are hortatory.*/ While these provisions may be important politically, they create no legal obligation for the Executive branch to act or to refrain from acting.

2. Reporting and Consultation Requirements. Subsection (f)(1) of the Nunn-Mitchell Amendment requires the President to submit two plans to (and consult with) Congress if -- by the earlier of November 15 or 15 days from the time that we introduce a lift resolution -- the UNSC has not agreed to such a resolution and the Bosnian Serbs have not accepted the Contact Group proposal.

Subsection (f)(1)(C) would require the President to submit a plan "regarding the unilateral termination by the United

---

*/ This category includes the provisions that state that the President should formally introduce and support resolutions in the United Nations Security Council:

-- to terminate the Bosnia arms embargo, unless the Bosnian Serbs accept the Contact Group proposal by October 15 or 10 days after the Act is signed, whichever is later (subsection (e)); and

-- to authorize selective lifting of the arms embargo to allow provision of defensive weapons to Bosnia if Bosnian Serb factions attack safe areas (subsection (g)).

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States of compliance with the Bosnia arms embargo". The content of the plan is left virtually entirely to the President's discretion. For instance, depending upon what the President considers appropriate at the time, he could advocate unilateral termination in only very limited circumstances or upon the occurrence of developments very unlikely to occur, or he could refrain from advocating unilateral termination at all -- so long as ihe submits an underlying plan "regarding" unilateral termination. In addition, whatever plan is submitted, there is no requirement that the President proceed to implement the plan if he subsequently considers it unwise to do so.

Subsection (f)(1)(B) would require the President to submit a plan "on the manner in which United States Armed Forces and the military forces of friendly states would provide training" to the Bosnians outside of Bosnia. Again, the content of the plan is left virtually entirely to the President's discretion, and the provision does not require that the President proceed to implement the plan, or otherwise to provide training.

3. Termination of funds for enforcing the embargo. The same circumstances that would trigger the reporting and consultation requirements described above would also trigger the funding prohibition contained in subsection (f)(2).

Under subsection (f)(2), appropriated funds would be unavailable--

> "for the purpose of participation in, support for, or assistance to the enforcement of the Bosnia arms embargo by any Department, agency or other entity of the United States (or by any officer or employee of the United States or member of the Armed Forces of the United States) other than as required of all United Nations member states under [UNSC Resolution 713] and the Charter of the United Nations."

The statement of managers that accompanied the conference report for the bill indicates the intent of the conferees to distinguish between what is mandatory under UNSC Resolution 713 and what is voluntary. The conferees state, for example, that the United States may enforce the embargo by using its Customs agents and other law enforcement powers to stop the export of defense articles and services from the United States. On the other hand, the conferees state, it is voluntary for any state to join the naval and air "picket line" that enforces the embargo in the Adriatic and the air over the Balkans, or to provide assistance or support to other states to help them do so.

Subsection (f)(3) indicates two important exceptions to the funding restriction contained in subsection (f)(2):

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-- Subparagraph (A) states that the President may waive the funding prohibition "in the case of United States military personnel serving in NATO headquarters." We interpret the President's waiver authority under this subparagraph, consistent with statement of managers language that accompanied the conference report, as applying to United States military personnel serving in headquarters positions for NATO's Supreme Allied Commander and the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe, as well as to subordinate headquarters staffs, such as those for the Commander, Joint Task Force Provide Promise and his subordinate headquarters staffs.

-- Subparagraph (B) states that nothing in the prohibition "is intended to impede enforcement of sanctions against Serbia". We interpret this subparagraph to mean that, if an activity is of a nature that failure to undertake it would impede enforcement of sanctions against Serbia, the Nunn-Mitchell Amendment does not prohibit the President from undertaking it.

By its terms, subsection (f)(2) would apply to the use of funds only if used "for the purpose" described therein. Accordingly, we interpret subsection (f)(2) not to prohibit activities undertaken for other purposes, even if such activities provide indirect, incidental or collateral support or assistance for the Bosnia embargo.

Finally, there is an important constitutional issue connected with the language applying the restriction to all United States departments, agencies, and entities, and to all United States officers and employees. Insofar as such language could be construed to require the President or other Executive branch officers or employees to espouse or refrain from espousing certain substantive positions, either within the United States or in the course of dealing with foreign officials, it would impermissibly infringe on the authorities and responsibilities of the President and the Executive branch under the Constitution. Accordingly, the President will interpret subsection (f)(2) as not restricting his ability, or the ability of other Executive branch officers or employees, from freely espousing (or refraining from espousing) any substantive views on these matters, and as not restricting any activity that is diplomatic in nature. A signing statement reiterating these concerns has been prepared for the President's use at enactment of the FY-95 DOD Authorization Act.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L
SUBJ/USCINCEUR OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTS OF THE NUNN-MITCHELL AMENDMENT//(U)
REF/A/MSG/JOINT STAFF/062325ZOCT94 (S)//
AMPN/ (U) MESSAGE TASKING USCINCEUR TO PERFORM OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NUNN-MITCHELL AMENDMENT. USCINCEUR IS DIRECTED TO CONSIDER THE LANGUAGE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENT IN THE ANALYSIS.//
REF/B/NUNN-MITCHELL AMENDMENT//
REF/C/STATEMENT/PRESIDENT CLINTON/05OCT94//
AMPN/ (U) PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENT//
REF/D/MEMORANDUM/SECSTATE/12OCT94//
AMPN/ (U) SECSTATE ANALYSIS OF THE NUNN-MITCHELL AMENDMENT//
NARR/
1. (U) IN ACCORDANCE WITH JOINT STAFF DIRECTION (REF A), FOLLOWING IS USCINCEUR'S OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF THE NUNN-MITCHELL AMENDMENT (REF B) ON MILITARY SUPPORT TO SHARP GUARD, DENY FLIGHT, AND RELATED OPERATIONS. THE LANGUAGE IN THE AMENDMENT LEAVES LATITUDE FOR INTERPRETATION AND WHEN COMBINED WITH THE PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENT AND SECSTATE ANALYSIS, LEAVES ROOM FOR BROAD FLEXIBILITY.
2. (S) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. IT IS OPERATIONALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO DISTINGUISH OPERATIONS SUPPORTING THE BOSNIA ARMS EMBARGO FROM THOSE ENFORCING SANCTIONS AGAINST SERBIA. OUR OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS INDICATES THAT OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF SHARP GUARD, DENY FLIGHT, TASK FORCE ABLE SENTRY, AND PROVIDE PROMISE WOULD CONTINUE UNHINDERED. EXCEPTIONS WOULD OCCUR UNDER VERY NARROW SETS OF CIRCUMSTANCES, PARTICULARLY DENY FLIGHT NO-FLY ZONE ENFORCEMENT AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED AIR SHIPMENTS, BUT THESE WOULD BE RARE AND WOULD NOT SIGNIFICANTLY IMPACT OPERATIONS. IN THE EVENT THIS INTERPRETATION IS INCORRECT, THE CONSEQUENCES COULD BE FAR REACHING AND COULD IMPACT ON VIRTUALLY ALL OPERATIONS IN THE AREA.
3. (U) ANALYSIS. THE PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENT (REF C) AND SECSTATE ANALYSIS (REF D) BOTH MAKE A KEY INTERPRETATION OF THE AMENDMENT REGARDING SUBSECTION (F)(3)(B). THE PRESIDENT STATES "I SIGN THE BILL WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT IT THEREFORE WOULD NOT AFFECT THE UNITED STATES ABILITY TO PARTICIPATE IN ACTIVITIES IN THE ADRIATIC THAT ARE NEEDED IN ORDER TO AVOID IMPEDING ENFORCEMENT OF SANCTIONS AGAINST SERBIA...EVEN IF DOING SO PROVIDES INDIRECT OR INCIDENTAL SUPPORT OR ASSISTANCE FOR THE BOSNIA ARMS EMBARGO". THE SECSTATE ANALYSIS CONCURS: "IF AN ACTIVITY IS OF A NATURE THAT FAILURE TO UNDERTAKE IT WOULD IMPEDE ENFORCEMENT OF SANCTIONS AGAINST SERBIA, THE NUNN-MITCHELL AMENDMENT DOES NOT PROHIBIT THE PRESIDENT FROM UNDERTAKING IT".
4. (S) THE AMENDMENT STATES THAT "NO FUNDS...MAY BE USED FOR THE PURPOSE OF PARTICIPATION IN, SUPPORT FOR, OR ASSISTANCE TO THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE BOSNIA ARMS EMBARGO... [BUT] NOTHING IN [THIS LANGUAGE] IS INTENDED TO IMPEDE ENFORCEMENT OF SANCTIONS AGAINST

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SERBIA". NONE REPEAT NONE OF THE OPERATIONS IN THE REGION EXIST SOLELY TO ENFORCE THE ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST BOSNIA. OPERATIONS SHARP GUARD AND DENY FLIGHT ENFORCE UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS EQUALLY AMONG ALL TARGET NATIONS, INCLUDING THE ARMS EMBARGO AND SERBIAN SANCTION ENFORCEMENT. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO SEPARATE ONE FROM THE OTHER. TERMINATING U.S. MILITARY SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS ENFORCING THE EMBARGO WOULD NECESSARILY IMPEDE ENFORCEMENT OF SANCTIONS AGAINST SERBIA, THEREBY VIOLATING THE CLEAR INTENT OF SUBSECTION (F)(3)(B). AS SUCH, IT IS OUR ANALYSIS, AS SET FORTH BELOW, THAT OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF SHARP GUARD AND DENY FLIGHT WILL BE ABLE TO CONTINUE UNCONSTRAINED (EXCEPT AS SET FORTH IN PARAGRAPH 8 BELOW).

5. (S) CERTAIN MILITARY OPERATIONS WOULD NOT BE AFFECTED IN ANY CASE SINCE THEY DO NOT CONTRIBUTE TO ENFORCING THE ARMS EMBARGO, EVEN INDIRECTLY. THEY INCLUDE THE 60 BED HOSPITAL IN ZAGREB, COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE EFFORTS, TASK FORCE ABLE SENTRY OPERATIONS, AND CLOSE AIR SUPPORT AND AIRSTRIKE OPERATIONS FOR DENY FLIGHT.

6. (S) TASKS SUPPORTING OPERATION SHARP GUARD. TASKS BELOW SUPPORT OPERATION SHARP GUARD AND ITS MISSION TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS TO MONITOR AND ENFORCE COMPLIANCE WITH U.N. SANCTIONS (RESOLUTIONS 713, 757, 787, AND 820). PREVENTING ALL UNAUTHORIZED SHIPPING FROM ENTERING THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO) AND ALL ARMS FROM ENTERING THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA.

6A. (S) TWO DESTROYERS UNDER NATO OPCON/TACON CONDUCT MARITIME INTERDICTION OPERATIONS (MIO). SPECIFICALLY, THEY:

6A1. (S) PATROL ASSIGNED AREAS.

6A2. (S) STOP ALL MERCHANT SHIPS ENTERING THE ADRIATIC SEA.

6A3. (S) BOARD SUSPECT SHIPS IF REQUIRED TO OBTAIN NECESSARY INFORMATION.

6A4. (S) DIVERT SHIPS TO PORTS FOR FURTHER INSPECTION, AS REQUIRED.

6B. (S) ONE SUBMARINE UNDER U.S. OPCON AND NATO TACON, PROVIDES DIRECT SURVEILLANCE SUPPORT. IT IS ASSIGNED TO NATO COMMANDER SUBMARINE FORCES MED.

6B1. (S) THE SUBMARINE CREW PROVIDES INTELLIGENCE AND WARNING INFORMATION TO COMMANDER TASK FORCE 440, WHO IS DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR ENFORCEMENT OF THE OPERATION.

6C. (S) EIGHT P-3C AIRCRAFT PROVIDE 24 HOUR SURVEILLANCE AND SUCAP COVERAGE FOR OPERATION SHARP GUARD FORCES. FOUR OF THE AIRCRAFT OPERATE UNDER DIRECT NATO CONTROL.

6C1. (S) THE AIRCRAFT PROVIDE CRITICAL SHIPPING INFORMATION TO COMMANDER TF40 TO ALLOW SURFACE SHIP INTERCEPTION OF MERCHANT SHIPS.

6D. (S) ONE U.S. CRUISER REMAINS UNDER U.S. OPCON, BUT DIRECTLY SUPPORTS SHARP GUARD.

6D1. (S) ACTS AS THE ANTI-AIR WARFARE COORDINATOR (AAWC).

6D2. (S) ACTS AS THE NAVAL TACTICAL DATA SYSTEM (NTDS) COORDINATOR (CALLED REDCROWN).

6D3. (S) PROVIDES NTDS LINK WITH NATO AWACS.

6E. (S) U.S. CARRIER BATTLE GROUP OR MARG PERIODICALLY ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY FOR SEVERAL SHARP GUARD TASKS.

6E1. (S) SURFACE/SUBSURFACE SURVEILLANCE AND CONTROL.

6E2. (S) ELECTRONIC WARFARE AND ELECTRONIC SUPPORT MEASURES.

6E3. (S) AIRBORNE COMMAND AND CONTROL.

6E4. (S) COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE.

6E5. (S) COORDINATES WITH JFACC AND NATO CAOC FOR DENY FLIGHT OPERATIONS, AND WITH COMMANDER TF440 FOR SHARP GUARD.

6E6. (S) SHARES INFORMATION WITH SHARP GUARD FORCES ON SHIPPING CONTACTS AND HIGH INTEREST MERCHANT VESSELS. THIS HELPS FORCES MAINTAIN AN ACCURATE AND COMPLETE SURFACE PICTURE WHICH IS ESSENTIAL TO THE OVERALL SANCTION EFFORT.

7. (S) TASKS SUPPORTING OPERATION DENY FLIGHT. TASKS BELOW SUPPORT OPERATION DENY FLIGHT AND ITS THREE MISSIONS TO: CONDUCT UNDER A [illegible] AERIAL MONITORING AND ENFORCE COMPLIANCE WITH UNSCR 816 WHICH [illegible]

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FLIGHTS BY FIXED AND ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT IN THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA NO FLY ZONE, TO PROVIDE PROTECTIVE AIR COVER (CAS) AT THE REQUEST OF AND CONTROLLED BY UNPROFOR UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF UNSCR 836, AND TO--ON ORDER AND IN COORDINATION WITH THE U.N.--CONDUCT APPROVED AIR STRIKES AGAINST DESIGNATED TARGETS THREATENING THE SECURITY OF THE U.N. SAFE AREAS OF BIHAC, GORAZDE, SARAJEVO, SREBENICA, TUSLA, AND ZEPA.

7A. (S) OUR ANALYSIS INDICATES NUNN-MITCHELL WOULD HAVE LITTLE IMPACT ON ENFORCEMENT OF UNSCR 836, WHICH AUTHORIZES CAS AND AIRSTRIKE MISSIONS, SINCE THOSE ARE RELATED TO ENFORCEMENT OF THE EXCLUSION ZONES, AND TO SAFETY OF U.N. PERSONNEL AND DO NOT AFFECT EMBARGO OPERATIONS.

7B. (S) ANALYSING THE IMPACT ON ENFORCEMENT OF THE NO-FLY ZONE IS PROBLEMATIC. ENFORCEMENT OF THE NO-FLY ZONE PROTECTS U.N. PERSONNEL FROM AIR ATTACKS, MONITORS AND ENFORCES EXCLUSION ZONES, AND PREVENTS UNAUTHORIZED SHIPMENTS FROM ENTERING BOSNIA- HERCEGOVINA. ONLY THOSE FLIGHTS SPECIFICALLY PROHIBITING UNAUTHORIZED SHIPMENTS WOULD BE AFFECTED BY THE AMENDMENT. IN PRACTICE, DENY FLIGHT NO-FLY ZONE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY SUPPORT THE PROTECTION AND EXCLUSION ZONE ASPECTS OF THE MISSION. AS SUCH, IT IS OUR ANALYSIS THAT WHILE A FEW FLIGHTS MAY BE AFFECTED, THE PRACTICAL IMPACT WILL BE NEGLIGIBLE. SPECIFIC TASKS IN SUPPORT OF ALL ASPECTS OF DENY FLIGHT FOLLOW.

7C. (C) COMBAT AIRCRAFT, OPERATING WITHIN A NATO C2 STRUCTURE, WORK UNDER COMMANDER ALLIED FORCES SOUTHERN EUROPE (COMAIRSOUTH), WITH DAY TO DAY OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF MISSION TASKING DELEGATED TO COMMANDER 5TH ALLIED TACTICAL AIR FORCE (5ATAF).

7C1. (C) FORCES SUPPORTING CAS AND NO-FLY ZONE (NFZ) ENFORCEMENT INCLUDE EIGHT USMC F/A-18D AND TWELVE USAF F-16C.

7C2. (S) TWELVE USN F/A-18C (OR F-14) SUPPORT ONLY THE NFZ.

7C3. (S) CAS OPERATIONS ARE CONDUCTED BY EIGHT USAF F-15E, TWELVE USAF O/A-10, SIX USN F/A-18C (OR A-6E).

7C4. (S) THREE USAF AC-130 PROVIDE GUNSHIP SUPPORT, AS REQUIRED.

7D. (C) COMBAT SUPPORT AIRCRAFT.

7D1. (S) THREE USAF EC-130 AND TEN USAF KC-135 PROVIDE C2 AND REFUELING SUPPORT TO DENY FLIGHT AIRCRAFT.

7D2. (S) USAF CREWMEN ARE ASSIGNED TO THE NATO AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING FORCE, PROVIDING SURVEILLANCE, C2, AND FIGHTER DIRECTION.

7E. (C) OTHER SUPPORT FORCES PROVIDE FUEL, ORDNANCE, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND LIFE SUPPORT AS REQUIRED FOR AIR OPERATIONS.

7F. (S) U.S. SURFACE SHIPS IN THE ADRIATIC OPERATING UNDER U.S. OPCON PROVIDE DIRECT AND INDIRECT SUPPORT TO DENY FLIGHT OPS.

7F1. (S) SERVE AS LAUNCH PLATFORMS FOR CARRIER BASED AIRCRAFT.

7F2. (S) PROVIDE DATA LINKS TO NATO AEW AIRCRAFT.

7G. (C) RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT.

7G1. (S) RC-135'S AND EP-3'S PROVIDE THREAT WARNING, NOT ONLY TO DENY FLIGHT AIRCRAFT, BUT TO OPERATION PROVIDE PROMISE HUMANITARIAN AIRLIFT OPERATIONS AS WELL.

7G3. (S) U-2'S OFFER LIMITED THREAT WARNING AND INTELLIGENCE DATA, AND PROVIDE IMAGERY TO SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT OF THE EXCLUSION ZONES.

7H. (C) SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES CONDUCT:

7H1. (C) COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE.

7H2. (C) NIGHT ATTACK MISSIONS, AS REQUIRED.

7H3. (C) RECONNAISSANCE SUPPORT.

7I. (C) INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT IS PROVIDED FOR A VARIETY OF MISSIONS. IMPLEMENTATION OF NUNN-MITCHELL WOULD CURTAIL INTELLIGENCE WHICH WAS STRICTLY LIMITED TO KNOWLEDGE OF ILLEGAL ARMS SHIPMENTS TO BOSNIA. THIS REPRESENTS ONLY A SMALL PART OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION AND DISSEMINATION, BUT A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF THE NATO INTELLIGENCE EFFORT.

8. (S) UNDER A VERY NARROW SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES, IT IS CONCEIVABLE THE AMENDMENT WOULD IMPACT ON OPERATIONS. THE CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRE PERFECT KNOWLEDGE OF AN INBOUND ARMS SHIPMENT TO BOSNIA, WITH ONLY

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U.S. INTERDICTION RESOURCES READILY AVAILABLE. IN THAT EVENT, A U.S. MILITARY OFFICER OCCUPYING A NATO LEADERSHIP POSITION WOULD BE PLACED IN THE IMPOSSIBLE SITUATION OF BEING REQUIRED BY NUNN-MITCHELL NOT TO ORDER U.S. FORCES TO BOARD AND DIVERT THE SHIP, BUT REQUIRED BY NATO RULES TO DO EXACTLY THE OPPOSITE. THE U.S. SHIP COMMANDER RECEIVING SUCH AN ORDER WOULD BE PLACED IN A SIMILARLY IMPOSSIBLE SITUATION.

9. (S) THE FORGOING ANALYSIS CLEARLY FORCASTS ONLY MINIMAL IMPACT ON OPERATIONS, PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF THE FLEXIBILITY ALLOWED BY THE LANGUAGE OF THE AMENDMENT. IF, HOWEVER, THE ANALYSIS IS INCORRECT, AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE AMENDMENT ARE STRICTLY INTERPRETED, WITH THE CAVEAT IN SUBSECTION (F)(3)(B) MINIMIZED, THE RESULTS WOULD BE FAR REACHING AND WOULD AFFECT NEARLY ALL OPERATIONS, EVEN THOSE NOT SUPPORTING THE EMBARGO. 9A. (C) U.S. MILITARY SUPPORT TO OPERATION SHARP GUARD WOULD EFFECTIVELY SHUT DOWN. OPERATIONS DENY FLIGHT, PROVIDE PROMISE, AND TASK FORCE ABLE SENTRY WOULD ALSO BE NEGATIVELY IMPACTED. AND EVEN THOUGH MEMBERS OF NATO STAFFS ARE EXCLUDED FROM THE PROVISIONS OF THE AMENDMENT, THEY WOULD BE PLACED IN AN UNTENABLE COMMAND AND CONTROL RELATIONSHIP. NUMEROUS U.S. PERSONNEL, INCLUDING CINCSOUTH AND COMAIRSOUTH, WORK WITH AFSOUTH AND SUBORDINATE NATO STAFFS TO PROVIDE OPERATIONAL DIRECTION AND ADMINISTRATION. BECAUSE OF THIS RELATIONSHIP, STRICT NUNN-MITCHELL IMPLEMENTATION COULD UNDERMINE THE COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE AND THE CREDIBILITY OF THE LEADERSHIP BY PLACING THE OFFICERS IN UNTENABLE POSITIONS.

9B. (U) OPERATION PROVIDE PROMISE. ALTHOUGH OPERATION PROVIDE PROMISE DOES NOT SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT OF THE ARMS EMBARGO, ITS HUMANITARIAN AIRLIFT MISSIONS COULD ALSO BE AFFECTED. BOTH AIRLAND AND AIRDROP MISSIONS CURRENTLY REQUIRE THE AVAILABILITY OF THREAT WARNING, C2, FIGHTER CAP, AND CSAR FOR EXECUTION. IF THESE ACTIONS WERE NOT CONTINUED, AIRLAND AND AIRDROP MISSIONS WOULD EITHER BE TERMINATED OR CURTAILED IN THE ABSENCE OF ROE OR MISSION CHANGES.

10. (C) OTHER IMPORTANT IMPACT. IT IS DIFFICULT TO PREDICT WITH CERTAINTY THE REACTION OF THE BOSNIAN SERBS OR OTHER WARRING FACTIONS TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NUNN-MITCHELL. OUR INITIAL ASSESSMENT IS THAT IT WILL LIKELY CAUSE THEM TO TAKE AN OPENLY HOSTILE STANCE TOWARD U.S. OPERATIONS, SINCE IT WOULD BE VIEWED AS ABANDONING OUR IMPARTIALITY. OPEN HOSTILITIES WOULD JEOPARDIZE THE U.N. HUMANITARIAN MISSION AND PRESENT A THREAT TO U.S. AIRCRAFT, AIRCREWS, SHIPS, AND SAILORS IN THE REGION.

11. (U) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. ASIDE FROM THE PRECONDITIONS FOR AIRLAND AND AIRDROP MISSIONS, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT NECESSARY CHANGES TO ROE IN THE ABSENCE OF A STRICT LEGAL INTERPRETATION OF PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES AND THE INHERENT SUBSEQUENT MISSION CHANGES.

12. (S) SUMMARY. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO DISTINGUISH OPERATIONS SUPPORTING THE ARMS EMBARGO FROM THOSE ENFORCING SANCTIONS AGAINST SERBIA. OUR OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS INDICATES THAT OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF SHARP GUARD, DENY FLIGHT, TASK FORCE ABLE SENTRY, AND PROVIDE PROMISE WOULD CONTINUE UNHINDERED. EXCEPTIONS WOULD OCCUR UNDER VERY NARROW SETS OF CIRCUMSTANCES, PARTICULARLY DENY FLIGHT NO-FLY ZONE ENFORCEMENT AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED AIR SHIPMENTS, BUT THESE WOULD BE RARE AND WOULD NOT SIGNIFICANTLY IMPACT OPERATIONS.

13. (U) POC FOR THIS ANALYSIS IS LT COL KID CURRY, DSN 430-4120.//

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BOB DOLE
KANSAS

8355

United States Senate

OFFICE OF THE REPUBLICAN LEADER
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-7020

October 8, 1994

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing to express our serious concern over recent reports that your administration may have decided to delay introducing and supporting a U.N. Security Council resolution to terminate the illegal and unjust embargo on Bosnia and Herzegovina. Not only would such a decision put in question the commitment you personally made to the Congress in August, it would also place the United States squarely on the side of those countries that have appeased the Serb aggressors. Therefore, we urge you to act on your commitment and lead the international community to support Bosnia and Herzegovina's fundamental and sovereign right to self-defense.

Last week the Bosnian Government, in a good-faith effort, proposed a compromise that would seek a vote in the U.N. Security Council in October on a resolution that would immediately terminate the arms embargo in legal terms, but would delay implementation to a date certain six months from the time of the resolution's adoption. Some of our allies seem to be deliberately misinterpreting this compromise, describing it as a request to deter any action on the embargo for six months. It is clear that any resolution which is not passed promptly and which does not contain a date certain for the automatic lifting of the arms embargo would not meet the Bosnian Government's criteria.

During Senate consideration of the FY 1995 defense appropriations bill, you wrote to Senator Sam Nunn reaffirming your administration's support for lifting the international arms embargo on Bosnia and Herzegovina that has "penalized the victim in this conflict." Moreover, you stated that if by October 15 the Bosnian Serbs have not agreed to the Contact Group proposal of July, it would be your intention to support a resolution in the U.N. Security Council to terminate the arms embargo. It was this personal commitment that also provided the basis for a compromise in the House-Senate conference on the FY 1995 defense authorization bill and forestalled -- at the administration's request -- a termination of the U.S. arms embargo at a future date.

As supporters of Bosnia's right to self-defense, we believe that any U.S.-sponsored resolution that falls short of the

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Bosnian Government's compromise position -- immediate action to lift, but implementation delayed for six months -- would not meet your commitment to the Congress.

Mr. President, your administration has an historic opportunity to end the policies of appeasement that have characterized the international community's approach to the brutal war of aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina. Both the House and the Senate have voted to terminate the arms embargo on Bosnia and Herzegovina unilaterally if a multilateral termination is not forthcoming. We expect the administration to argue energetically for U.N. Security Council adoption of a new resolution lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia. Should such a resolution fail or should a non-binding resolution be adopted, we will pursue further efforts to terminate the U.S. embargo upon our return next session.

We hope to hear from you soon on this critical issue.

Sincerely,



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

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([PC and Bosnia...])
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FOLDER TITLE:
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2010-0533-M
rs626

RESTRICTION CODES

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P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
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003f. paper	re: Issues Associated with Lifting the Arms Embargo [partial] (1 page)	10/12/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0103 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, October 18, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs626

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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12 October 1994

ISSUES PAPER

Subject: Issues Associated With Lifting the Arms Embargo (U)

1. LIFTING THE ARMS EMBARGO:

WHAT WEAPONS PACKAGE SHOULD BE PROVIDED TO THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT?

OPTIONS:

a. Use the intelligence community assessment as the basis for the weapons package to be provided to the Bosnian army.

b. Use the Bosnian government request as the basis for the weapons package provided to the Bosnian army.

c. Discuss US assessments with the Bosnian government and develop a hybrid package.

RECOMMENDATION: Use the US assessment as the basis for continued planning purposes, but work with the Bosnian government to develop a hybrid package. Any package developed must include the support needed to employ and maintain it (C2, transport, sustainment, maintenance and training).

WHAT ROLE SHOULD THE USG PLAY IN PROVIDING WEAPONS?

OPTIONS:

a. Seek Congressional support for supplemental DOD funding to support specific US contributions to a hybrid package.

b. Ask Congress to provide funding for non-US portions of a hybrid package.

c. Seek voluntary funding and/or equipment from other nations.

d. Ask Congress to provide financial assistance to the Bosnian government which would allow them to purchase the assets identified in the hybrid package.

RECOMMENDATION: The USG should provide limited funding and act as a facilitator in order to ensure that the Bosnian army is provided with the assets identified in the hybrid package. This would require Congressional funding for the US contribution, coordinating foreign donations (financial or material), and, possibly, purchasing foreign equipment. In order to support such an effort a Defense Cooperation Account (DCA), with requisite legislative authority, should be established.

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 02/06/2020 (6.14)
2013-0682-M

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Classified by: Multiple Sources
Declassify on: OADR

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HOW DO WE LIMIT THE EXTENT AND DURATION OF OUR SUPPORT RELATIONSHIP WITH THE BOSNIAN MILITARY?

OPTIONS:

a. Set no limit, tie US credibility to Bosnian success.

b. Establish a clear limit (1-2 years) to US support.

c. Set a more ambiguous limit, such as the Bosnian capability to defend themselves.

RECOMMENDATION: Set a more ambiguous limit for US support. A time frame for reviewing this limit, say a year, should be established. US commitment should be for air support only, no ground troops. Any training should take place outside Bosnia.

HOW CAN THE USG MINIMIZE THE PERIOD OF VULNERABILITY BEFORE THE BOSNIAN ARMY IS REARMED AND TRAINED?

OPTIONS:

[redacted] EO 13526 1.4a, 1.4(c)

c. Assuming the Serbian border can be kept closed, delay initiation of lift 6 months in order to force BSA to deplete fuel and ammunition reserves.

RECOMMENDATION: [redacted] EO 13526 1.4a, 1.4(c) [redacted] Although not operationally necessary, theater air capabilities could be strengthened as a deterrent (show of force). Use diplomacy and suasion to limit Serbian support for the BSA. Encourage detailed Bosnian-UNPROFOR cooperative transition planning as part of the UN withdrawal.

HOW DO WE DEAL WITH REVERSALS ON THE BATTLEFIELD, RECOGNIZING THAT WE WILL NOT COMMIT GROUND FORCES?

OPTIONS:

a. Escalate air operations in support of Bosnian defensive efforts.

b. Increase offensive strike operations against Bosnian Serb targets.

c. If Serbia intervenes directly, conduct strike operations against targets in the FRY.

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d. Offer further incentives for Serbia to tighten its cut off of the Bosnian Serbs. This isolation of the battlefield could have a significant effect on BSA military capabilities.

RECOMMENDATION: Escalate air operations, but limit additional support to air only, maintaining the Administration commitment of no US ground forces. This limitation in USG support should be made clear to Bosnian government officials during the September/October consultations. Unfortunately, Bosnian officials think air power will force the Bosnian Serbs into submission. NOTE: Strangulation/impending loss of Sarajevo might necessitate reconsideration of this policy.

2. US SUPPORT FOR DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN AID

IS THE USG PREPARED TO ASSUME PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT, TO INCLUDE OPENING A GROUND CORRIDOR TO SARAJEVO, IF NATO AIR AND BOSNIAN GROUND EFFORTS ARE UNSUCCESSFUL?

NOTE: Airdrop operations would likely continue and be accelerated as necessary to help meet humanitarian needs. Providing Sarajevo airport remains open, airlift might continue to be used to provide aid to the capital. Threats to US aircraft would certainly increase and losses should be anticipated. Air efforts alone, however, will not be capable of dealing with Bosnian humanitarian needs. Providing the minimum food, water, fuel, and medical supplies needed by the estimated 1.4 million in need (UNHCR estimate) requires ground convoys.

OPTIONS:

a. Encourage a stay behind UNPROFOR to deliver aid in the core Federation territory, including Sarajevo.

b. Contribute additional equipment (trucks, engineering gear, water purification equipment, etc.) to the Bosnian government (or a stay behind UNPROFOR) to assist the humanitarian effort.

c. Escalate air operations in support of Bosnian efforts to deliver aid, to include possible use of attack helicopters.

RECOMMENDATION: US/NATO commitments should be restricted to air support. Additional equipment contributions could be provided on an as needed basis. We must make it clear to the Bosnian government that this is the limit of our humanitarian effort. They must understand that a cost of lifting is that the burden of opening and maintaining ground LOCs rests with Federation forces. However, public opinion may drive a reconsideration under the worst circumstances.

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3. US SUPPORT FOR UNPROFOR WITHDRAWAL

WHAT IS THE USG WILLING TO PROVIDE AS PART OF A NATO OPERATION TO ASSIST UNPROFOR WITHDRAWAL IN A NON-PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT?

a. Contribute US unique capabilities--attack helos, tac air, hostage rescue teams, lift (but no ground troops)--to the NATO extraction effort.

b. Inform our allies we will fully participate in a NATO led UNPROFOR extraction effort and contribute ground troops, if necessary.

RECOMMENDATION: We will need to conduct exploratory discussions at NATO on both military and political levels, as well as bilateral talks, to attempt to limit the level of US ground participation. However, US support for UNPROFOR withdrawal is essential to alliance solidarity. The United States must be prepared, as a last resort, to contribute its fair share to the extraction effort.

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BOSNIA STRATEGY

Concept: The Bold Option

In the coming six months our goal remains to

- get Bosnia through the winter, in particular by ensuring that UNPROFOR stays and Bosnian Serbs efforts to disrupt humanitarian shipments are minimized;
- gain Bosnian Serb acceptance of the Contact Group Plan;
- lay the groundwork for establishing a broader stability in the region into which a Bosnian settlement could be encapsulated, i.e. "Bosnia only" will not work.

Our strategy should be based on a comprehensive approach, which if necessary allows us to by-pass the Bosnian Serbs while we establish incentives -- including second-phase sanctions relief -- for Belgrade to relinquish its drive for a greater Serbia. Our "bold approach" aims to assemble "modules" which can be utlized separately, alone or in various combinations, or as an integrated package:

- In by-passing an intransigent Pale the Contact Group would work with Izetbegovic, Tudjman and Milosevic to negotiate a comprehensive agreement including Sector East, Krajina -- and the Bosnian Serbs.
- The "Zagreb Four" plan would be launched as part of a comprehensive approach. It could also be proposed separately, although given the centrality of the Serb-Croat it should be encompassed in the larger package.
- Enhancing the coordination of the contact group members and achieving a better consensus in developing short and long term strategies.
- Offering Belgrade full sanctions suspension in return for
  - -- Recognition of all its neighbors -- including FYROM.
  - -- Maintaining a total cut-off of assistance to the Bosnian and Krajinan Serbs if they refuse to accept the Contact Group and Zagreb Four plans.
  - -- Permitting the redeployment of CSCE monitor missions in Kosovo and developing a longterm process of negotiations with the Albanian community whose aim will be the eventual restoration of Kosovo's autonomous status.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
NLC-2/16/3-70 (6.15)
By kbd NARA, Date 7-11-11

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- Stabilizing the Bosnian Federation. We must move quickly in the next six months to make good on our aid commitments and work to develop the political institutions of the Federation through development assistance funding and through a coordinated approach to ongoing EU efforts on the ground. We must also stress the Federation in our public policy toward Bosnia.

  -- We should seek ESF money in a supplemental appropriation to provide the Federation with budgetary relief thereby allowing more money to go to defense. We should explore all possibilities within the limits of existing UN resultions and US law to assist the Federation's military.

Pressure on Pale

- As we develop incentives for Belgrade to continue its reorientation, we must also maintain maximum pressure on Pale through robust enforcement of NATO exclusion zone decisions.

- We should reverse the salami slicing process by which the Bosnian Serbs have steadily reduced the UNPROFOR's scope of action. At the same time we should be more assertive about protecting US and NATO assets. Specific actions which might be worth exploring include:

  -- A no radar zone over Bosnia. Any air defense radar transmitting should be attacked with anti-radiation missiles.

  -- Missile sites that fire at NATO aircraft should be taken out. USNATO 3695 suggests we could get French support for such an initiative.

  -- We should make clear we will not accept any interference with US humanitarian flights. We should assess whether this might be done under Article 51. We should retaliate immediately if somebody shoots at our cargo aircraft.

  -- More generally, we should capitalize on the strong positive reaction to our deployments in Haiti and Iraq to send a similarly tough message to the Bosnian Serbs.

  We may also want to reiterate that acceptance of the Contact Group plan opens the door to negotiations among the parties to rectify aspects with which they have problems including access to the sea, constitutional principles, and possible exchanges of territory.

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Lift

- Lift remains our stated option As we develop our lift resolution we must

  -- table a comprehensive resolution on or about October 28 with a hard trigger which establishes clearly our position favoring lift.

  -- prepare to negotiate within the Contact Group and the UNSC on the trigger mechanism to avoid a public split which could ultimately embolden the Bosnian Serbs or undermine Belgrade's incentive to break with Pale and Knin.

Nunn-Mitchell

We should take advantage of Nunn-Mitchell to separate ourselves from the NATO Adriatic operation enforcing the embargo against Bosnia and Croatia. In particular, we should stop the intelligence support that has been an important factor in preventing the shipment of arms to the Bosnians. We should inform NATO that we must redeploy our contingent southward off the Montenegrin coast to enforce the embargo against Serbia.

Public Policy

- As we move to lift we must develop a public consensus on the meaning and implications of lift beyond just the moral dimension. In particular, does it inevitably mean USG strike along with lift?

- Initial sounds from Congress on our bold approach have been positive. We must strengthen the public and congressional understanding of our approach. Above all, we must develop strong bipartisaniship on our policy, with the understandin that thousands of lives depend on our steadiness and purposefulness.

Looking Ahead: Avoiding Spill-Over, Stabilizing the Region

- We need to engage the CSCE especially in Kosovo where the absence of its monitoring missions has worsened the human rights situation and undermined moderate elements in the Albanian community.

- We need to stabilize other major players in the region. FYROM is most at risk. We must aim before the hard winter sets in to make an all-out effort to settle Greece's dispute with its tiny neighbor.

- The EU should consider a plan which holds open the possibility that states of the former Yugoslavia could join, thereby allowing European integration to outpace Serb nationalism.

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Congressional Strategy: Short-term:

Congressional interest in our diplomatic activities in Bosnia remains high despite the fact that Congress is in recess. Press reports questioning our resolve in introducing a UNSC resolution on lift prompted 50 senators to send a letter October 8 to the President demanding that we go forward with the resolution and putting a marker down that the Senate will revisit this issue when it reconvenes next year if no resolution or a non-binding resolution is passed.

We should continue regular briefings throughout the recess to assure Congressional staffers that we are serious about moving on all diplomatic fronts. EUR DAS Bob Frasure briefed key SFRC and HFAC staffers October 11. We will have Ralph Johnson and Dan Serwer brief on our assistance efforts in Bosnia by the end of the month. Further briefings by Frasure and/or Charlie Thomas should be done as our negotiations on the UNSC resolution come to an end and we introduce our resolution. Once ICFY monitor Dick Erdman returns, we can take him up to the Hill as well to brief on the situation on the Serb-Bosnian Serb border.

Longer Term: Beyond November 15

Our longer term Congressional strategy will depend on the situation on the ground as well as our success in implementing a robust UNSC resolution. If we are able to get UN agreement to stricter enforcement, and are able to act accordingly, we will want to brief key staffers as those strikes go forward. Further, after November 15 we will have to brief staffers on our operations in the Adriatic to assure them that we are in compliance with Nunn-Mitchell in taking no action to enforce the Bosnian arms embargo.

If serious fighting involving either NATO or UNPROFOR breaks out, or the Serbs succeed in taking steps to strangle off Sarajevo or the other exclusion/safe zones, we will want to make calls on key Senators and Congressmen to explain our responses. If the situation on the ground continues to deteriorate, we will have to address further Congressional attempts to force unilateral lift on us early in the new year.

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SUPPORTING THE BOSNIAN FEDERATION

Objectives

As the President has indicated, significant, tangible support for Bosnia is a key component of U.S. policy toward former Yugoslavia. Our immediate objective is to minimize harm to the general population from the ongoing conflict and its consequences. At the same time, we can advance the longer-term goal of creating a viable state, politically and economically, based on the Federation. We have made a good start down this road, but need to do more.

Principal Elements

Our expanded assistance program would include the following:

Humanitarian assistance: Building on the more than $681 million in "survival" aid provided in FY 1993 and 1994, we can start channeling food, medicine, and services through Federation institutions.

Community reconciliation and Federation-building: A major focus of the $20 million package announced at the Clinton-Izetbegovic summit, Ralph Johnson's mission is developing specific programs. We should seek to energize EU and especially CSCE efforts toward this end, as well as do more through USIS IV and other outreach programs.

Economic support and reconstruction: We need to move quickly on the $10 million committed for Sarajevo reconstruction and $6 million for private-sector support. All these assistance efforts require adequate support facilities with ready access to Bosnia and to PVOs, so we should establish the necessary offices in Sarajevo, Split, and Zagreb as soon as possible.

Security assistance: With or without some lifting of the arms embargo, we should provide the maximum amount of non-lethal aid consistent with UN resolutions and U.S. law.

Political and diplomatic support: We should exploit Izetbegovic's suggestion for an "International Commission for the Federation" as a vehicle for coordinating and promoting assistance and helping resolve ethnic conflict. Possible members include the U.S., Germany, Croatia, and one or two others. We should seek greater international support for and recognition of the Federation, particularly in Western Europe.

Public affairs: We should make sure that American NGO's, Congress, the press and other interested parties are aware of these efforts. This will have a multiplier effect, as well as help sustain our support over the long haul.

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(m/o 18 OCT 93

STRICT ENFORCEMENT UPDATE

Current Status: In spite of the July 30 Contact Group decision to step up enforcement of exclusion zones, the UN has requested that NATO respond to violations on only a few occasions. On October 7, as a follow-up to action by NATO Defense Ministers in Seville, the NAC approved new standards for strikes (see Tab 1) designed to raise the stakes by speeding response time, expanding the range of targets, and doing away with advance warnings. Boutros-Ghali's reaction to the new standards -- that they pose "problems" for the UN -- suggests high-level approaches may be required if we are to move ahead on this key "disincentive".

Boutros-Ghali's Problems: In discussions October 10 with Madeleine Albright, Boutros complained that decisions on the use of air power and the number of targets would have to remain with the UN. As NATO's new standards specify that the "dual key" arrangement will continue -- and thus the UN will retain its ability to decide on strikes -- Boutros' comment is puzzling and indicates his basic disagreement with NATO strikes.

Boutros also noted that advance warnings might have to be provided in some cases to avoid collateral damage. The new NATO standards, by contrast, say "strikes will be conducted without tactical warning." (One reason for this is to protect NATO planes.) It might be possible to prevent NATO and the UN from coming to loggerheads by selecting targets where strikes could cause little or no collateral damage; this would be coordinated between NATO and UNPROFOR.

The Real Issue: Above and beyond stated objections to the new standards, Boutros, Rose and Akashi basically oppose strict enforcement because they believe it compromises UNPROFOR's neutrality, endangers its safety, and jeopardizes the goal of a negotiated settlement. In meetings October 17, a NATO team sent to New York talked its way through the new standards in a manner designed to reassure UN staff and make clear that the standards preserve UN decisionmaking power and do not presage a shift away from internationally agreed goals. But preliminary reports suggested the team found UN officials uncompromising.

Diplomatic Options: After the NAC is briefed formally October 19 on the team's New York meetings, we will need to deliver a demarche to Boutros, and get the British and French to do the same, to the effect that the UN should not undermine enforcement of Security Council resolutions and Contact Group commitments and should put the NATO standards into operation. There may be ways to use diplomatic suasion to get Boutros to pressure UN officials on the ground; Rose and Akashi may be more willing to turn their dual key if Boutros is insistent that doing so is what he expects in response to violations. Eventually, we may have to decide whether to compromise on the principle of "no advance warning". The UK seems to be leaning in this direction in spite of its NAC support for unannounced strikes (only the Canadians raised objections).

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PER E.O. 13526
NR 2/6/2020 (L.16)
2013-0682-M

NATO Self-defense Actions: NATO military staff is seeking to determine whether NATO planes can undertake some air strikes without UN say-so. NATO self-defense rules of engagement appear to allow immediate counter-attacks when NATO aircraft come under fire; thus the UN's dual key might not have to turn for NATO planes to defend themselves. Self-defense strikes under NATO-only ROE could not be used to respond to exclusion zone violations where NATO itself is not attacked. Still, we might wish to explore this way around the dual key, even though it could grieviously harm relations in New York and Moscow, if the UN continues to oppose strict enforcement.

A Note on Expansion of Exclusion Zones: With the agreement of the Principals Committee, the July 30 Ministerial call for an increase in the number of exclusion zones has gone unanswered largely because the UN says UNPROFOR lacks troops to cover new zones. Although exclusion zones are defended by NATO, they are defined by UNPROFOR troops, who notify NATO when violations occur. The UN (with UK and French support) has made clear that unless the number of UNPROFOR troops increases, establishing new zones and maintaining existing ones cannot occur simultaneously.

Redeployment: We have advocated UNPROFOR redeployment as a means of both carving out new exclusion zones and allowing strict enforcement to commence, but the UN has been slow to move. This is because two key requirements for peacekeeping are mutually exclusive: on the one hand, UNPROFOR's mandate is to protect the most threatened areas; on the other, the UN (and all members) want UNPROFOR to be safe. When pressed to move UNPROFOR to defensible areas so strict enforcement can begin, the UN expresses the fear that surrounded enclaves will fall should UNPROFOR leave. When pressed to move UNPROFOR to cities like Maglaj and Doboj, where new exclusion zones might quell persistent fighting, the UN says the areas are too unsafe. In short, the vulnerability of much of the Bosnian government's territory, and the limited capacity of NATO and UNPROFOR in their current configurations to make a difference, check the effectiveness of strict enforcement as a pressure tactic.

Russian Angle: An additional constraint on our ability to move ahead on strict enforcement is Russia's enormous sensitivity about NATO in general. On October 11 we shared the NATO decision sheet containing the new air strike standards with the Russians. We have yet to receive a formal response, but Lord Owen's read-out of his October 13 lunch with Kozyrev makes clear that Russia is not happy. Like Boutros, the Russians apparently plan to make advance warning a bone of contention; they are claiming that NATO's new standards were devised behind their backs and need further (i.e., drawn-out) review. A non-paper delivered to Peter Tarnoff October 7 emphasized that "disporportionate and sudden strikes" would bring about the same outcome as lifting the arms embargo.

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NEW NATO AIR STRIKE STANDARDS

On October 7 the NAC adopted new standards for NATO air strikes in Bosnia as follows:

- strikes will be conducted in accordance with existing NATO mandates and procedures, including dual-key arrangements and the principle of proportionality;
- strikes will be conducted on a timely basis -- that is, as soon as possible after a violation or any other event giving rise to the need for a strike;
- strikes will be conducted without tactical warning to the offending party;
- before any use of air power, target sets will be agreed by CINCSOUTH and UNPROFOR; and
- for each use of air power, a minimum of four targets will be authorized by CINCSOUTH and the Force Commander UNPROFOR, with the agreed target set, and respecting the principle of proportionality, for attack by NATO aircraft; which of these targets are actually attacked will be determined by the NATO air component commander according to tactical consideration.

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9421169
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TO: LAKE

FROM: KERRICK
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 06 OCT 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MTG DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 18 OCT PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 10 OCT 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9421178 9421199

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0103 CODES: BOS

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By KBJ NARA, Date 6/16/12
2012-0533-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94111011	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	94111011	NOTED BY LAKE

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COMMENTS: PC - Discussion Paper for Mr Lake

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004a. memo	Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake re: Principals Discussion of Bosnia (7 pages)	10/06/1994	P1/b(1)

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TAB A

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: October 5, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 10:15 - 11:30am

AGENDA

I. Bosnia Policy Review/Next Steps.....All

A. Near-term Issues (UNSC resolution on lift; implementation of Nunn amendment; strict enforcement, etc.)

B. Longer-term strategy

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 6/14/12

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TAB B

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004b. paper	re: Next Steps on Bosnia (4 pages)	10/03/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

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b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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TAB C

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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[illegible]
JAMES EXON NEBRASKA
CARL LEVIN MICHIGAN
EDWARD M KENNEDY MASSACHUSETTS
JEFF BINGAMAN NEW MEXICO
JOHN GLENN OHIO
RICHARD C SHELBY ALABAMA
ROBERT C BYRD WEST VIRGINIA
BOB GRAHAM FLORIDA
CHARLES S ROBB VIRGINIA
JOSEPH I LIEBERMAN CONNECTICUT
RICHARD H BRYAN NEVADA
STROM THURMOND SOUTH CAROLINA
JOHN W WARNER VIRGINIA
WILLIAM S COHEN MAINE
JOHN MCCAIN ARIZONA
[illegible]
DAN COATS INDIANA
BOB SMITH NEW HAMPSHIRE
DIRK KEMPTHORNE IDAHO
[illegible]
[illegible]
ARNOLD L PUNARO STAFF DIRECTOR
[illegible] STAFF DIRECTOR FOR THE MINORITY

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6050

The Honorable William J. Perry
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington D.C. 20301

September 30, 1994

Dear Bill:

We are writing to ask you to conduct an expedited policy review of the military impact of a build down strategy as an alternative to the lifting of the United Nations Arms Embargo on the government of Bosnia Herzegovina.

As you know, there is strong support in the Congress for reducing the disparities in defense capability among the parties involved in the conflict in Bosnia. Some members of Congress have supported a unilateral lifting of the embargo, others have favored a multilateral lifting that would involve our NATO allies who have troops on the ground with the UNPROFOR forces.

All versions of the lift strategy have the downside that the introduction of more arms, especially heavy armament, could increase the level of violence in Bosnia and thus run counter to the widely shared objective of ending the military conflict. Our allies have been particularly concerned about this prospect, and have stated their intention to withdraw their troops from UNPROFOR if the arms embargo on the Bosnian government is lifted. They are convinced that such a move would lead to a significant increase in violence in Bosnia including Serbian attacks on allied troops.

The recent change of policy by the government of Bosnia Herzegovina regarding the timing of a lift of the arms embargo, and the recent closing of the Serbian-Bosnian border has provided the opportunity for a new US approach which could lead to the leveling of the field in Bosnia we have sought, while also leading to a reduction in violence. This new approach would be to eliminate the heavy equipment held by all sides in Bosnia in a step by step process. We feel this approach warrants a serious and comprehensive review at the highest levels within the Department of Defense.

The build down concept is the flip side of the idea of lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian government. The idea would be to level the ground by eliminating all or most of the heavy equipment on both sides by either destroying it or removing it from Bosnia. This could apply to all tanks, artillery, and

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This strategy, like the strategy of lifting the arms embargo raises serious questions which merit your review. How would our NATO allies react to such a proposal? How would the factions in Bosnia likely react? Would such an approach be enforceable? Could we find economic incentives to make the proposal attractive to the factions?

If feasible, we believe a proposal along these lines could garner broad support in the Congress and could set the stage for renewed efforts to develop a negotiated settlement of the Bosnian crisis. We know that the lifting of the arms embargo has met with significant implementation obstacles. A build-down policy may have similar disadvantages. We therefore urge you to conduct an immediate policy review of such a strategy to assess its merit.

As you consider this alternative approach to the current legal requirement for the President to request a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo, we would also appreciate your assessment of the outcome of compliance with current law, in view of the recent changes of policy by the governments of Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Sincerely,

Richard C. Lugar
U.S. Senator

Sam Nunn
U.S. Senator

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

TAB D

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004c. memo	Alexander Vershbow to Anthony Lake re: Six-Month Strategy on Bosnia (3 pages)	09/29/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0103 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, October 18, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs626

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9421178
RECEIVED: 11 OCT 94 09

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 13 OCT 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 18 OCT PC MTG RE BOSNIA

ACTION: ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 14 OCT 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9421169 9421199

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0103 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		DARBY
		HALL
		KERRICK
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW
		WOLIN
		WRIGHT

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA CLOSED BY: NSJDA DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By C NARA, Date 6/16/10
2010-0533-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94101310	FOR DECISION
001		X	94101310	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
002		X	94101310	ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	941013	FUERTH, L	
002	941013	BRILL, K	
002	941013	PANETTA, L	
002	941013	INDERFURTH, K	
002	941013	MCALEER, R	
002	941013	PATRICK, T	
002	941013	GARTHOFF, D	

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~recd 10/12 11:15am~~

National Security Council recd 10/13
The White House 7:30am

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 21178

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Sens	1	ADS	
Itoh	4	W	A
Soderberg			
Berger	2	Copy	done
Lake	3	Pls redo & CHG TIME AND DATE TO 2:30-4:00 pm, TUES, OCT 18	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5		
NSC Secretariat	6		

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS: SEE TL CHG AT TAB A

94 OCT 94 A 11 25

Exec Sec Office has diskette ~~yes~~ yes

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9421178
DATE 13 OCT 94

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA OF BOSNIA PC MTG ON 18 OCT
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

MR. LEON FUERTH
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
VIA LARRY BRANSCUM
ROOM 290, OEOB
WASHINGTON, DC 20506

DATE 10/13 TIME [illegible] SIGNATURE SITROOM BOX
PRINT LAST NAME: KERR
COPY: 1

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET , N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

DATE 10-13-94 TIME 3:20 PM SIGNATURE [illegible]
PRINT LAST NAME:
COPY: 1

MR. LEON E. PANETTA
WHITE HOUSE
1ST FLOOR, WEST WING
WASHINGTON, DC 20500

DATE 10/13 TIME [illegible] SIGNATURE SITROOM BOX
PRINT LAST NAME: KERR
COPY: 1

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MM NARA, Date 6/11/12
2012-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9421178
DATE 13 OCT 94

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA OF BOSNIA PC MTG ON 18 OCT
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	14 Oct	0700	L A Branscum PRINT LAST NAME: BRANSCUM COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET , N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: 1
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: 1

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PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NARA, Date 6/16/10

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9421178
DATE 13 OCT 94

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA OF BOSNIA PC MTG ON 18 OCT
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET , N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	10/13/94	1715	Wm., MC PRINT LAST NAME: Williams COPY: 1
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1

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PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NARA, Date 6/16/00

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH for (202) 456-2585 West Wing Desk
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21178

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NS NARA, Date 6/16/10
2010-0537-M

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

21178

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
October 13, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the
President of the
United States

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T.R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

AMBASSADOR RICK INDEFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia on Tuesday, October 18, 2:30-4:30 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Principals only. The agenda is attached at Tab A. Papers will be circulated by the lead agency. ~~(S)~~

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MS NARA, Date 2/16/18

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

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2012-0532-M

PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: October 18, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 - 4:30pm

AGENDA

I. Bosnia Policy Review/Next Steps

A. Near-term Issues

(1) UNSC Resolution on Lift.....State

(2) Legal implications of Nunn/Mitchell.....NSC

(3) Sanctions: Enforcing remaining sanctions; Monitoring FRY/Bosnia border closure.....OVP

(4) Strict Enforcement.....State

(5) Measures to Support the Federation: Progress Report/Next Steps.....State

B. Longer-term strategy

(1) Diplomatic approach.....State

(2) Lifting the Arms Embargo Alternatives..... JCS

C. Congressional Strategy.....State

(1) Near-term

(2) Longer-term

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VB NARA, Date 2/6/2020
2013-0682-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 11, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: DON KERRICK

SUBJECT: Principals Meeting on Bosnia, October 14, 1994

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Principals Meeting on Bosnia to be held on October 18, 1994. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By DJ NARA, Date 6/16/10

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96-118-0533-M

PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: October 18, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 - 4:30pm

AGENDA

I. Bosnia Policy Review/Next Steps

A. Near-term Issues

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(2) Legal implications of Nunn/Mitchell.....NSC

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(4) Strict Enforcement.....State

(5) Measures to Support the Federation; Progress Report/Next Steps.....State

B. Longer-term strategy

(1) Diplomatic approach.....State

(2) Lifting the Arms Embargo Alternatives..... JCS

C. Congressional Strategy.....State

(1) Near-term

(2) Longer-term

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 2/6/2020
2013-0682-M

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005c. memo	[Duplicate of 004a] [incomplete, page 1 only] (1 page)	10/06/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0103 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, October 18, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs626

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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See also 2013-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title: PC0106 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, November 7, 1994
Staff Office-Individual: Records Management
Original OA/ID Number: 4008

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
43	6	7	1	V

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia [partial] (1 page)	11/07/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 04/17/2015
001b. memo	[Duplicate of 001a] [incomplete copy] [partial] (1 page)	11/07/1994	P1/b(1) KC 6/11/2020
002a. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Principals Committee Review of Bosnia Policy (2 pages)	11/08/1994	P1/b(1)
002b. memo	[Duplicate of 001a] [partial] (1 page)	11/07/1994	P1/b(1) KC 6/11/2020
003a. email	Alexander Vershbow to Anthony Lake re: Bosnia UNSCR (3 pages)	11/07/1994	P1/b(1)
003b. memo	Don Kerrick/Alan Kreczko to Anthony Lake re: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (6 pages)	11/04/1994	P1/b(1)
003c. email	Donald Kerrick to APNSA Special Assistants re: The Heat is On in Bosnia! (1 page)	11/04/1994	P1/b(1)
003d. paper	re: Operational Changes for US Forces Required by Implementation of the Nunn-Mitchell Amendment [partial] (3 pages)	11/04/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 6/11/2020
003e. report	re: Nunn-Mitchell Amendment [partial] (5 pages)	11/04/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 08/03/2015
~~003f. paper~~	~~re: Implementing Nunn-Mitchell: Congressional Strategy (2 pages)~~	~~11/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003g. paper~~	~~re: UNSC Lift Resolution: Progress Report (1 page)~~	~~11/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003h. paper~~	~~re: Inter-Serb Sanctions: An Assessment Strategy (4 pages)~~	~~11/01/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0106 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, November 7, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs627

RESTRICTION CODES

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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003i. report	re: Implications of the Bihac Offensive [partial] (3 pages)	11/02/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 08/03/2015
004. agenda	re: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)	11/07/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0106 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, November 7, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs627

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9421316
RECEIVED: 08 NOV 94 09

TO: LAKE

FROM: KERRICK

DOC DATE: 08 NOV 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA SOC
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 7 NOV PC MTG RE BOSNIA

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 11 NOV 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9421284 9421302

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0106 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		DARBY
		HALL
		KERRICK
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW
		WOLIN
		WRIGHT

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSJEB CLOSED BY: DOC 1 OF 1

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001		X	94110920	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
001		X	94110920	SENS SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
001	941108	FUERTH, L	
001	941108	BRILL, K	
001	941108	MCALEER, R	
001	941108	INDERFURTH, K	
001	941108	PANETTA, L	
001	941108	GARTHOFF, D	
001	941108	PATRICK, T	

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed	1/5	FYI	A
Sens			
Itoh			
Soderberg	2	[redacted]	
Berger	3	cc	
Lake	4	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	6	MBN 11/9	D
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

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COMMENTS:

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed	1/5	FYR	A
Sens			
Itoh			
Soderberg	2	[redacted]	
Berger	3	cc	
Lake	4	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	6	MBN 11/9	Ø
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

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DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9421316
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SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 7 NOV PC MTG RE BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	10 NOV	0700	L Branscum PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET , N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
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MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
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2012-0533-M

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SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 7 NOV PC MTG RE BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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COL. T. R. PATRICK JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 7 NOV PC MTG RE BOSNIA
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MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	10 NOV	0700	L. Branscum PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET , N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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LOG 9421316
DATE 08 NOV 94

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 7 NOV PC MTG RE BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET , N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	11/9/94	11:38pm	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: Wood COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE / PRIORITY / ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO. 2310 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 4

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Summary of Conclusions for 7 Nov PC Mtg Re Bosnia NSC LOG # 21316

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

BBNDA

REMARKS:

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
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By [illegible] NARA, Date 6/15/98
2018-0533-M

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TIME OF RECEIPT WASHPAX

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

-9 NOV 94 21 15

NMCC/JCS

PRECEDENCE: (IMMEDIATE) PRIORITY ROUTINE

RELEASER: S. G. Brady

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 2310 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 4

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

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TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

BBNDA

REMARKS:

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2010-0533-M

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PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO. 2310 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 4

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Summary of Conclusions for 7 Nov PC Mtg Re Bosnia NSC LOG # 21316

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

BNDA

REMARKS:

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: S. G. Hadley

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 2310 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 4

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Summary of Conclusions for 7 Nov PC Mtg Re Bosnia NSC LOG # 21316

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

BBNDA

REMARKS:

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MH NARA, Date 2/16/10
NLJ-05-33-A

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 9, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President of the United States

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, November 7, 1994 (S)

Please pass eyes only to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. (S)

for James W. Rubin
William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MS NARA, Date 2/16/10
2010-0033-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions
Meeting of NSC Principals Committee
DATE: November 7, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 - 4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Anthony Lake

OVP
Leon Fuerth

State
Strobe Talbott
Richard Holbrooke

DOD
Secretary William Perry
Joseph Nye

UN
Ambassador Madeleine Albright

CIA
Director James Woolsey
Norman Schindler

JCS
ADM William Owens
LTG Wesley Clark

White House
Samuel Berger
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
Alexander Vershbow
Donald Kerrick

Summary of Conclusions

UNSCR on Lifting the Arms Embargo

1. The Principals briefly reviewed the status of the U.S.-circulated UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) proposing multilateral lifting of the arms embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina and deferred decisions on next steps until further consultations are completed later in the week.

Implementing Nunn-Mitchell

2. The Principals agreed we will implement modifications to operations to comply fully with the Nunn-Mitchell amendment requirement that the U.S. cease enforcement of the arms embargo against the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina and directed that modifications to military and intelligence operations be

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2010-0533-M
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4/17/2015

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia [partial] (1 page)	11/07/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0106 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, November 7, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs627

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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presented to Senator Nunn on an urgent basis. Secretary Perry agreed to call Senator Nunn requesting a meeting for Thursday, November 10. Action: DoD will set up the meeting and lead a team to brief Senator Nunn.

Military Operations

3. The Principals decided that as of midnight November 12, 1994, U.S. forces may no longer take part in actions whose purpose is to enforce the arms embargo against the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina. U.S. forces may no longer divert or deliberately delay vessels containing only arms bound for the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina unless those weapons present a threat to NATO forces. Mixed cargo shipments may be diverted. EO 13526 1.4c EO 13526 1.4c Action: State/DoD prepare appropriate guidance.

EO 13526 1.4c

Consultations with Congress

5. The Principals agreed that additional calls to key Senate and House members would be made on Friday, November 11 following consultations with Senator Nunn. Action: State to develop a call list and talking points.

6. The Principals discussed options for submitting plans and consulting with Congress on training Bosnian forces and unilateral lifting of the arms embargo. They directed that an interagency team with representation from State, DoD and CIA orally present generic plans on training and unilateral lift early in the week of November 14, and that preparations be undertaken for serious consultations with Congress on the issues associated with multilateral lift to begin soon thereafter and to be continued with the new Congress in early 1995. Action: State/DoD/CIA

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7. The Principals requested that the CIA prepare a Special National Intelligence Estimate on the implications of multilateral lifting of the arms embargo for use during Congressional consultations. Action: CIA.

Consultations with Allies

8. The Principals directed that appropriate consultations be conducted at the UN and NATO on Friday, November 11 to inform allies of U.S. intentions and actions associated with compliance with Nunn-Mitchell. A briefing should also be provided to the Russians. Action: State to draft appropriate guidance cables.

Public Affairs

9. The Principals requested that a press background briefing be held Friday at the Pentagon with State and NSC representation to discuss the modifications to military operations necessary to comply with Nunn-Mitchell. (It was subsequently agreed to do press calls only, not a background briefing). Action: OSD/Joint Staff.

Sanctions:

10. The Principals took note of the actions taken by the interagency working group to develop a strategy to monitor the Inter-Serbian border closure and received an update on the deployment of U.S. border monitors. Action: State will examine options for replacing the State contingent of border monitors after 90 days.

Bihac and Overall Level of Conflict in the Region

11. The Principals discussed the serious situation in Bihac and the intensified fighting throughout Bosnia and directed that the interagency working group continue to monitor events closely with a view to taking action to defuse the situation where possible. Action: CIA increase intelligence watch. State and DoD develop appropriate diplomatic and military options to ease the impending humanitarian crisis in Bihac. Interagency working group consider options for deterring a widening of the Bosnian conflict to other regions and for dealing with renewed shelling of Sarajevo.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 8, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

FROM: DON KERRICK DK

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, November 7, 1994

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia held November 7, 1994.

Concurrence by: Alan Kreczko AK

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

as amended

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

TL -
thought you
should see.

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MM NARA, Date 6/14/10

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. memo	[Duplicate of 001a] [incomplete copy] [partial] (1 page)	11/07/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0106 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, November 7, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs627

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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[0016]

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Military Operations

3. The Principals decided that as of midnight November 12, 1994, U.S. forces may no longer take part in actions ~~which serve~~ whose purpose is to enforce the arms embargo against the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina. U.S. forces may no longer divert or deliberately delay vessels containing only arms bound for the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina unless those weapons present a threat to NATO forces. Mixed cargo shipments may be diverted.

EO 13526 1.4c

EO 13526 1.4c

Action: State/DoD prepare appropriate guidance.

EO 13526 1.4c

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RECORD ID: 9421322
RECEIVED: 08 NOV 94 15

TO: LAKE

FROM: KERRICK
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 08 NOV 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LAKE BRIEFING PAPER FOR PRES RE 7 NOV PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: OBE PER APNSA OFFICE DUE DATE: 11 NOV 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9421284 9421302

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0106 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		KERRICK
		NSC CHRON
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: LAKE BRIEFED POTUS ORALLY 11/9.

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001	LAKE	Z	94111011	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
001		X	94111011	OBE PER APNSA OFFICE

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Sens			
Itoh			
Soderberg	2	~~copy~~ OVS	
Berger	3	cc Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
HRJ Lake	4		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5		NFA
NSC Secretariat		see TL note on tab I	

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette MBN

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 8, 1994



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: DON KERRICK

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Review of Bosnia Policy

Attached at Tab I is an information memorandum to the President regarding Principals discussion on the situation in Bosnia.

Concurrences by: ~~Alan Kreczko~~ and ~~Bill Danvers~~

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum for the President

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MS NARA, Date 6/11/10

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Principals Committee Review of Bosnia Policy (2 pages)	11/08/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0106 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, November 7, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs627

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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PC 0106

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9421316
DATE 08 NOV 94

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 7 NOV PC MTG RE BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET , N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	PANETTA HAS SEEN PRIOR TO	12/2/94	1811 SPOKE TO PANETTAS OFFICE ABOUT SIGNING RECIEPTS IN THE FUTURE. PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MS NARA, Date 6/6/12
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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LOG 9421316
DATE 08 NOV 94

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 7 NOV PC MTG RE BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NARA, Date 6/16/10
2018-0533-N

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 9, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President of the United States

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, November 7, 1994 ~~(S)~~

Please pass eyes only to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

James W. Rubin for
William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By tms NARA, Date 6/16/10
2010-0533-F

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: ~~OADR~~

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions
Meeting of NSC Principals Committee
DATE: November 7, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 - 4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Anthony Lake

CIA
Director James Woolsey
Norman Schindler

OVP
Leon Fuerth

JCS
ADM William Owens
LTG Wesley Clark

State
Strobe Talbott
Richard Holbrooke

White House
Samuel Berger
Nancy Soderberg

DOD
Secretary William Perry
Joseph Nye

NSC
Alexander Vershbow
Donald Kerrick

UN
Ambassador Madeleine Albright

Summary of Conclusions

UNSCR on Lifting the Arms Embargo

1. The Principals briefly reviewed the status of the U.S.-circulated UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) proposing multilateral lifting of the arms embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina and deferred decisions on next steps until further consultations are completed later in the week.

Implementing Nunn-Mitchell

2. The Principals agreed we will implement modifications to operations to comply fully with the Nunn-Mitchell amendment requirement that the U.S. cease enforcement of the arms embargo against the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina and directed that modifications to military and intelligence operations be

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PER E.O. 13526
KC 2/6/2020 (6.26)
2013-0682-M

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. memo	[Duplicate of 001a] [partial] (3 pages)	11/07/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0106 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, November 7, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs627

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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[0026]

presented to Senator Nunn on an urgent basis. Secretary Perry agreed to call Senator Nunn requesting a meeting for Thursday, November 10. Action: DoD will set up the meeting and lead a team to brief Senator Nunn.

Military Operations

3. The Principals decided that as of midnight November 12, 1994, U.S. forces may no longer take part in actions whose purpose is to enforce the arms embargo against the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina. U.S. forces may no longer divert or deliberately delay vessels containing only arms bound for the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina unless those weapons present a threat to NATO forces. Mixed cargo shipments may be diverted. EO 13526 1.4c EO 13526 1.4c Action: State/DoD prepare appropriate guidance.

EO 13526 1.4c

Consultations with Congress

5. The Principals agreed that additional calls to key Senate and House members would be made on Friday, November 11 following consultations with Senator Nunn. Action: State to develop a call list and talking points.

6. The Principals discussed options for submitting plans and consulting with Congress on training Bosnian forces and unilateral lifting of the arms embargo. They directed that an interagency team with representation from State, DoD and CIA orally present generic plans on training and unilateral lift early in the week of November 14, and that preparations be undertaken for serious consultations with Congress on the issues associated with multilateral lift to begin soon thereafter and to be continued with the new Congress in early 1995. Action: State/DoD/CIA

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7. The Principals requested that the CIA prepare a Special National Intelligence Estimate on the implications of multilateral lifting of the arms embargo for use during Congressional consultations. Action: CIA.

Consultations with Allies

8. The Principals directed that appropriate consultations be conducted at the UN and NATO on Friday, November 11 to inform allies of U.S. intentions and actions associated with compliance with Nunn-Mitchell. A briefing should also be provided to the Russians. Action: State to draft appropriate guidance cables.

Public Affairs

9. The Principals requested that a press background briefing be held Friday at the Pentagon with State and NSC representation to discuss the modifications to military operations necessary to comply with Nunn-Mitchell. (It was subsequently agreed to do press calls only, not a background briefing). Action: OSD/Joint Staff.

Sanctions:

10. The Principals took note of the actions taken by the interagency working group to develop a strategy to monitor the Inter-Serbian border closure and received an update on the deployment of U.S. border monitors. Action: State will examine options for replacing the State contingent of border monitors after 90 days.

Bihac and Overall Level of Conflict in the Region

11. The Principals discussed the serious situation in Bihac and the intensified fighting throughout Bosnia and directed that the interagency working group continue to monitor events closely with a view to taking action to defuse the situation where possible. Action: CIA increase intelligence watch. State and DoD develop appropriate diplomatic and military options to ease the impending humanitarian crisis in Bihac. Interagency working group consider options for deterring a widening of the Bosnian conflict to other regions and for dealing with renewed shelling of Sarajevo.

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~~TOP SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9421302
RECEIVED: 04 NOV 94 12

TO: LAKE

FROM: KERRICK
KRECZKO
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 04 NOV 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA UN
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 7 NOV PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 08 NOV 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9421284 9421316

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0106 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		DARBY
		KERRICK
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW
		WRIGHT

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJEB CLOSED BY: NSJEB DOC 1 OF 1

~~TOP SECRET~~

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MJ NARA, Date 6/14/10
2010-0533-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94110808	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	94110808	NOTED BY LAKE

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rec'd 11-4 8am

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 21302

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed	4		
Sens			
Itoh			
Soderberg	Copy		
Berger		Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2	11/8	N
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS: PC mtg 11/7

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. email	Alexander Vershbow to Anthony Lake re: Bosnia UNSCR (3 pages)	11/07/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0106 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, November 7, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs627

RESTRICTION CODES

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. memo	Don Kerrick/Alan Kreczko to Anthony Lake re: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (6 pages)	11/04/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0106 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, November 7, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs627

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003c. email	Donald Kerrick to APNSA Special Assistants re: The Heat is On in Bosnia! (1 page)	11/04/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0106 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, November 7, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs627

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003d. paper	re: Operational Changes for US Forces Required by Implementation of the Nunn-Mitchell Amendment [partial] (3 pages)	11/04/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0106 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, November 7, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs627

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4 November 1994

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Operational Changes for US Forces Required by Implementation of the Nunn-Mitchell Amendment (U)

1. (U) Background. Following the 18 Oct 94 Principal's Committee meeting the Joint Staff was tasked to provide a detailed explanation of the operational modifications necessary for US forces participating in sanctions enforcement operations. As a result, the Joint staff directed USEUCOM to conduct a detailed analysis of current operational directives and rules of engagement (ROE). The EUCOM response provides the basis for recommended changes to operational procedures for US forces.

2. ~~(C)~~ General.

a. ~~(C)~~ In accordance with the provisions of the Nunn-Mitchell Amendment current procedures have been reviewed and will be adjusted so as to comply with the legislation.

b. ~~(C)~~ Applicability. Based on previous analysis it has been determined that the provisions of Nunn-Mitchell will only directly apply to Operation SHARP GUARD and associated supporting activities. Operations DENY FLIGHT, Task Force ABLE SENTRY, JTF PROVIDE PROMISE [redacted] 1.4(c) 1.4(d)

[redacted] EO 13526 1.4c, 1.4(d)

c. Mission Instructions. Mission orders to US forces participating in enforcement operations are issued through NATO command channels. Accordingly, NATO command authority will issue modified mission instructions to participating US forces after being advised of US national restrictions to the use of US contributed forces. Following final approval of mission changes by the Joint Staff, USEUCOM will be directed to issue instructions to US forces which explain national restrictions on their employment and to clarify the provisions of the US law.

3. Operational Changes. Effective 12 Nov 94, US forces may no longer take part in actions which serve to enforce the arms embargo against the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

a. ~~(C)~~ Prohibited actions. US forces may no longer divert or deliberately delay vessels containing only arms

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Per E.O. 13526
VZ 02/06/2020 (6.33)
2013-0682-M

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known to be destined for the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Vessels containing the following shipments are excepted:

(1) ~~(C)~~ Arms which present a threat to NATO forces (regardless of destination). These weapons are defined as air-to-air, ground-to-air, air-to-ground, and anti-naval force weapons, and weapons of mass destruction. This position is derived from the inherent right of self defense and mutual protection of coalition forces. Issues include:

(a) ~~(C)~~ No warring factions may fly in the airspace over the conflict area, therefore weapons designed to attack aircraft cannot be intended to affect the outcome of the conflict, but only to threaten coalition aircraft.

(b) ~~(C)~~ Air-to-ground weapons are excepted because their are no aircraft authorized to fly to deliver them.

(c) ~~(C)~~ Anti-naval weapons can only be perceived as a threat because the only combat naval vessels afloat are not a party to the conflict.

(d) ~~(C)~~ Weapons of mass destruction would introduce a new dimension to the conflict and clearly threaten coalition forces.

(2) ~~(C)~~ Prohibited cargo other than arms destined for the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

(3) ~~(C)~~ All prohibited cargo, to include arms, destined for other than the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

b. ~~(C)~~ Permissible actions. US forces in all situations:

(1) ~~(C)~~ May continue to board and inspect vessels to determine or verify cargo and destination.

(2) ~~(C)~~ May continue to submit reports IAW Annex D (Definitions and Explanation of terms for Boarding and Searching Operations), to the Combined NATO/WEU Concept of operations for the Implementation of UNSCR 820 in the Adriatic - Operation SHARP GUARD.

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(3) EO 13526 1.4c, 1.4(d) EO 13526 1.4c, 1.4(d) to track vessels containing arms for the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to ensure destination and cargo dispensation claims are met. They may not report on the location of those vessels unless the destination or cargo dispensation claims are changed.

c. ~~(C)~~ Intelligence.

(1) ~~(C)~~ Intelligence organizations under USEUCOM control will adhere to instructions EO 13526 1.4c

(2) ~~(C)~~ Upon implementation of the law on 12 Nov 94, information relating solely to the knowledge of arms destined for the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina must be marked and treated as NOFORN. Exceptions will apply to those arms which present a threat to NATO/UN forces, or those which may be airborne and reportable pursuant to Operation DENY FLIGHT.

EO 13526 1.4g

4. ~~(C)~~ ROE. No US ROE need to be modified, since US forces operating in SHARP GUARD do so under NATO/WEU ROE. Adherence by US forces to several of the NATO/WEU ROE will have to be modified with respect to their applicability to enforcement of the arms embargo against the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

a. ~~(C)~~ These ROE found in Annex F, of the Concept of Operations include:

(1) ~~(C)~~ ROE 108. Acting as necessary to cause ships to heave to and submit to boarding and inspection. (Caveat - causing physical damage to the vessel, the firing of warning shots, non disabling fire and disabling fire may be used as qualified by ROE 135, 136, and 137.)

(2) ~~(C)~~ ROE 109. Acting as necessary against non military units to implement NATO direction of merchant/fishing vessels. (Caveat - causing physical damage

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to the vessel, the firing of non disabling fire and disabling fire are prohibited.)

(3) ~~(C)~~ ROE 134. Taking military control of a merchant vessel violating the UN embargo of the former Yugoslavia is permitted.

(4) ~~(C)~~ ROE 139. Forces may act as necessary to cause ships to divert. Causing physical damage to the vessel, the firing warning shots, non disabling fire and disabling fire may be used as qualified by ROE 135, 136, and 137.

(5) ~~(C)~~ ROE 135, 136, and 137. All specify the use of inert ordnance.

b. ~~(C)~~ EUCOM has recommended a change in the form of a note be submitted to the NATO/WEU Concept of Operations to accommodate implementation of Nunn-Mitchell. Such a note would be similar in form to the note included in Annex F, ROE, of the Concept of Operations regarding rules governing Hellenic ships. It would also be consistent with the rules governing control of national forces as outlined in paragraph 18 of the NATO/WEU Concept. Recommended change would read,

"Except for US personnel acting at designated NATO headquarters staff positions on NATO or NATO subordinate staffs, US officers participating in SHARP GUARD will not apply ROE 108,109, 134, and 139 if they encounter a vessel containing arms exclusively intended for the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, unless the arms or the vessel pose a threat to NATO/WEU forces."

5. ~~(C)~~ Concerns.

a. ~~(C)~~ Regardless of the adjustments made to permit continued US force participation in Operation SHARP GUARD, the effect of Nunn-Mitchell will be to undermine NATO command and control relationships. NATO led UNSCR enforcement operations will be commanded by US officers dual hatted as NATO officers with national instructions inconsistent with those agreed to by NATO. This will undermine the credibility of US officers and weaken US leadership in the alliance.

b. ~~(C)~~ Implementation of the Nunn-Mitchell Amendment sets a bad precedent for NATO operations. Although other nations have imposed national restrictions on their forces,

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there are serious implications for the US doing so. It will open the door for other nations to follow suit, due to their favoring one faction over another. Not all of these will favor the US position. This policy, coming from the alliance's leading power will serve to weaken the alliances ability to establish and maintain common positions.



6. (U) USEUCOM Issues.

a. ~~(C)~~ USEUCOM does not raise any significant operational issues;



b.

7. Recommendation. Upon approval by the Principal's Committee of a common position forward changes to US NATO and USEUCOM.

Prepared by: Bill Pennypacker, LTC, USA
J-3/JOD, 52538/41
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003e. report	re: Nunn-Mitchell Amendment [partial] (5 pages)	11/04/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
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NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0106 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, November 7, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs627

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
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b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force
4 November 1994

NUNN-MITCHELL AMENDMENT AND INTELLIGENCE SHARING ABOUT BOSNIAN ARMS EMBARGO

I. Legal Analysis

As of November 12, 1994, the Nunn-Mitchell provision of the DOD authorization act will prohibit the expenditure of appropriated funds for intelligence support in those limited circumstances where the purpose of that support is participation in, support for, or assistance to voluntary aspects of the Bosnian arms embargo.

The effect of the funding prohibition is limited. It does not prohibit collection activities, but restricts passage of intelligence information on the arms flows to Bosnia where the information is provided solely to enforce the Bosnian embargo:

-- Congress intended to continue support under UN Resolution 713 and to preclude voluntary enforcement of the Bosnian arms embargo unless it would impede the enforcement of the Serbian economic and arms embargo.

-- The President indicated in a signing statement that the provision applies only when appropriated funds are used "for the purpose of" enforcing the arms embargo.

-- The prohibition would not affect the ability of the US to participate in activities that are necessary to avoid impeding the enforcement of the Serbian embargo or other authorized purposes, even if indirect, consequential or incidental support to enforcement of the Bosnian embargo results.

The US is not required to cease providing information concerning violations of US law or relating to other arms shipments, or information which supports the Serbian embargo but which may also support enforcement of the Bosnian embargo. Moreover, the US Government may continue to provide information about arms shipments to Bosnia where the purpose for that support is driven by concerns other than enforcement of the Bosnian embargo.

-- Examples include passage of intelligence necessary for the defense of allied forces or facilities, or necessary to maintain intelligence liaison relationships.

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Caveat: Although a strict reading of the statute's "purpose" test would permit the continuation of a number of activities that support voluntary enforcement of the embargo, activity that reasonably can be expected to result in enforcement may raise questions about compliance with the spirit as well as the letter of the law.

-- Dissemination of intelligence from joint collection sites, information for liaison enhancement, and other activities should not be undertaken without senior review even if not strictly intended for enforcement where there is a significant potential an enforcement action will result. Passage of strategic rather than tactical intelligence is less likely to raise such a concern, and activities that are necessary for other purposes and that actually are beyond US control may proceed.

II. Intelligence Activities Under Nunn-Mitchell

A. Intelligence support can be divided into several different categories for purposes of assessing the impact of the funding prohibition:

Intelligence Collection. The funding prohibition would not affect the actual collection of intelligence. A joint collection activity not directed solely at enforcement of the Bosnian embargo with allied countries may continue where its cessation would impede the enforcement of the Serbian embargo.

Intelligence Support Concerning Illegal Arms Shipments to Bosnia.

-- Defense articles and services exported from the US or with another US nexus and destined for Bosnia. Intelligence support may continue concerning these activities, which are required by U.N. Security Council Resolution No. 713, and which are also a violation of US law.

-- Arms shipments destined for Bosnia in violation of the U.N. arms embargo that has no US nexus. Intelligence support concerning these types of shipments solely for the purpose of enforcing the Bosnian arms embargo must cease as of 12 November 1994.

-- OPERATION SHARP GUARD actions exclusively taken to effect the arms embargo against the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina are affected.

-- Actionable information relating solely to the knowledge of arms destined for the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina must be marked and treated as NOFORN--not to be disseminated to foreign nationals without prior review. It also may not be used in any US Government action to enforce the Bosnian arms embargo unless a violation of US law is involved.

-- It may be possible to delay dissemination of actionable intelligence on Bosnian arms shipments until it can no longer support an enforcement action. However, this approach should be carefully reviewed, as even "after the fact" intelligence can be used in support of long-range enforcement efforts.

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B. Determining the Purpose of the Activity:

-- Where the purpose for providing such intelligence support is other than to enforce the arms embargo--such as the enforcement of the no-fly zone (Operation DENY FLIGHT); enforcement of the myriad of actions authorized by other U.N. resolutions in this area, including the Serbian arms and economic embargo and force protection for US or cooperating country forces; intelligence liaison enhancement; or any other authorized purposes -- the intelligence support may continue to be provided even if an incidental or indirect support to enforcement of the Bosnian arms embargo results.

-- Arms Shipments to Serbia and Other Countries Except Bosnia. Intelligence support may continue to be provided to enforce the Serbian embargo or the requirements of other U.N. sanctions, as may intelligence support concerning arms shipments to destinations except for Bosnia.

-- Other Intelligence. Intelligence support not related to the "deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Bosnia," see U.N. Security Council Resolution No. 713, may continue to be provided in accordance with existing authorities and established procedures.

-- Finished Intelligence. Finished intelligence which contains no information upon which an enforcement action could be based may continue to be provided.

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

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IMPLEMENTING NUNN-MITCHELL: CONGRESSIONAL STRATEGY

Nunn-Mitchell will obligate the Administration to do three things:

(1) end use of funds "for the purpose" of participation in, support for, or assistance to the enforcement of the arms embargo against Bosnia;

(2) submit a plan to Congress and consult on the "manner in which US Armed Forces would provide training" to the Bosnian military; and

(3) submit a plan to Congress and consult "regarding the unilateral termination" by the US of compliance with the embargo.

The funding cutoff is effective November 12. While there is some ambiguity about when the two plans must be submitted to Congress, we should submit them promptly on November 14 (and should begin our consultations on that date) if we want to avoid controversy with Congress on this point.

Implementation of the funding cutoff: As indicated above, Nunn-Mitchell prohibits use of funds for the purpose of participating in, supporting, or assisting enforcement of the arms embargo against Bosnia. As a legal matter, and consistent with the President's signing statement, we interpret the Amendment as not prohibiting activities undertaken for other purposes --- e.g., for enforcing the arms embargo against Croatia -- even if doing so provides indirect or incidental support or assistance for the embargo. This interpretation allows for more flexibility in continuing activities in the area than some on the Hill will want. As an example, under this approach, US forces could interdict shipments carrying weapons destined for both Croatia and Bosnia, on the theory that doing so is need to continue enforcement against Croatia. But since most shipments of arms for Bosnia would also contain arms for Croatia (as they would in most cases need to transit Croatia), Nunn-Mitchell would have significantly less impact on US operations under this interpretation than some on the Hill would want or expect.

BK - I agree w/ more w/ Hill than we do

JCS has prepared draft plans for implementing the cutoff as described above (attached). The Administration will need to decide as a policy matter whether it wishes to take additional steps in order to avoid arguments with Congress that we are not in keeping with the spirit of Nunn-Mitchell. We also need to make similar decisions about the extent to which we will limit intelligence sharing under the Amendment (CIA prepared an initial draft paper on this, but is reportedly re-working it).

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The Hill will continue to monitor closely how we implement the Amendment. We understand that a Staffdel is already considering a visit as early as November 14 to NATO's Southern Command to investigate our implementation.

Submission of plans and consultation: JCS/OSD are now working on the plan for training the Bosnians. EUR is putting together a plan regarding unilateral lift, using EUCOM data and projections. On November 14, the President will need to submit these plans (unless he authorizes you or Secretary Perry to do so). We will also need to again make calls on key members on both sides of the aisle, while at the same time doing comprehensive briefings for staffers. Briefings should begin as quickly as possible and should include strong representation from JCS, DOD, and CIA.

Having submitted our plan and done those briefings (and implemented the funding cutoff), we will not be required legally to take further action unless Congress forces us to do so, probably when it returns in full session in February. It is likely that the new Congress will be even less supportive of our views on lift than the current one, particularly if Republicans take the Senate. In fact, if Senator Dole becomes majority leader, we cannot exclude the possibility that he may press hard to revisit the lift issue in December with the lame-duck Congress.

That said, laying out the considerable costs and risks of unilateral lift at this time may discourage some Members from forcing us down that course when they regroup in February. In any case, we will have won some time to try to get Bosnia through the winter and to let our Contact Group strategy work against the Pale Serbs.

Waiver for NATO Headquarters Personnel: There remains one technical aspect of implementing Nunn-Mitchell: The President may have to exercise the waiver authority in the Amendment for U.S. military personnel serving in NATO headquarters positions. Even though a limited number of such personnel are working exclusively on this issue (perhaps even none), this has already been the source of some contentious questions on the Hill. We told Senate staffers last Thursday that we would discuss this issue with them before exercising the waiver. JCS is already preparing the waiver; we need to make sure that it is coordinated with us, so that we are in a position to keep the Hill apprised in advance and avoid needless controversy.

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UNSC LIFT RESOLUTION: PROGRESS REPORT

Ambassador Albright circulated our draft resolution to an informal meeting of the Council on October 28. The responses in that meeting and to our demarches in Council-member capitals have produced no surprises: the UK, France, and Russia oppose and will abstain, but would veto if they felt it necessary; China is negative, though not actively engaged, and will abstain; Spain is opposed and will abstain or vote no; New Zealand, the Czech Republic, Argentina, and Brazil are only slightly less negative than the foregoing, but will almost certainly abstain (New Zealand has said it will abstain) or vote no; Rwanda, Djibouti, Oman, and Pakistan favor the resolution and will vote yes. Nigeria has been ambivalent but will probably vote yes.

The UNGA resolution on Bosnia passed November 3, but with 12 fewer yeas and four more abstentions than last year. Of SC members, UK, France, Russia, China, Spain, Czech Republic, New Zealand, Brazil, Argentina, and Nigeria abstained. Pakistan, Djibouti, Oman, and Rwanda joined the U.S. in favor. Since a call to the Council to lift the arms embargo was the most prominent part of this non-binding resolution, the vote gives a strong indication of relative support for the arms lift resolution.

In her bilateral consultations with other members on assuming the Council presidency, Ambassador Albright discussed the arms lift resolution, as one of many issues facing the Council in November.

The mission plans to continue lobbying for the resolution early in the week of November 7-11, once pressing and potentially distracting Council business on Somalia and Rwanda is cleared away. Ambassador Albright intends to schedule open Council debate on Bosnia for Tuesday-Wednesday, November 8-9 to give non-Council members a chance to weigh in on the arms lift question.

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Inter-Serb Sanctions -- An Assessment Strategy

On October 4, 1994, an initial, 100-day period of Serbian sanctions relief went into effect. Prior to January 15, the Security Council will have to act to extend that sanctions relief. At that point, the U.S. Government will need to have an opinion on whether to support the extension. At their October 17 meeting on Bosnia, the Principals tasked the IWG to form a preliminary judgment, prior to the 100th day, whether FRY authorities have effectively implemented Milosevic's decision to close the border with Bosnian Serb-held territory. This memorandum lays out a proposed strategy for carrying out that task, based on ideas generated by a Special Working Group made up of representatives of the IWG and Serbia Sanctions Task Force. The SWG will be responsible for implementing the strategy and submitting recommendations and analysis to the IWG for forwarding to Principals.

The strategy is designed to help ensure that the border closure/monitoring process, and our decisions relative to it, collectively have enough integrity to withstand public and Congressional scrutiny. To do this, we propose to use intelligence and other sources of information to identify shortcomings and to convert these into "litmus tests" to be considered in Belgrade and elsewhere. We will use the litmus tests to identify serious gaps in the border closure/monitoring regime and will take into account the degree to which our concerns have been addressed as we formulate our position on the 100th day.

ASSESSING COMPLIANCE

There is no clear standard for what constitutes "effective closure" in either the UN resolution relaxing sanctions or in Contact Group negotiations. Therefore, it is up to U.S. policy-makers to decide what is meant by the term "effective" as a foundation for our own position on the 100th day and for supportive diplomacy between now and then. There are several elements to consider, including:

- ICFY Mission Director Pellnaes's own reporting, both as submitted through formal channels and as obtained through intelligence sources.

- Our full intelligence take on cross-border traffic, ICFY mission operations, ICFY-FRY cooperation, the impact of the closure in Bosnia, and other relevant indicators.

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- How countries other than the FRY are carrying out responsibilities inherent in phase 1 sanctions relief, including support for ICFY border monitoring mission and enforcement of modified sanctions provisions, e.g.: the degree to which countries are fulfilling their responsibility to monitor and report on air and ferry service to the FRY originating in their territory.

Even under the best of circumstances, our information will present an incomplete picture. It is unlikely that there will be so much evidence of cheating that ICFY will declare that the border is not closed in one of their 30-day interim reports. Instead, a mixed pattern will persist throughout the 100-day period. At the end, we will be faced with a value judgment.

ESTABLISHING "LITMUS TESTS"

Given the lack of a precise standard for border closure, the best strategy is to use available information to identify weaknesses in Belgrade's enforcement efforts and demand corrective action. This approach keeps the burden of proof on Belgrade. Our tactic should be to make the FRY want to satisfy us by addressing problem areas that we have identified. The goal is to lay down markers establishing measurable performance standards to which Belgrade can be held accountable. In addition, we should also call attention to weaknesses in the ICFY monitoring system and failure on the part of other countries to meet reporting and monitoring obligations in implementing phase 1 sanctions relief. In the process, we will create a record of healthy skepticism about Belgrade's performance as well as uncertainty as to whether we will support extension of sanctions relief at the 100th day. Further, if properly coordinated with the ICFY mission, our demands will help reinforce Pellnaes's efforts.

Our initial analysis produced the following list of litmus tests:

1. Demand permanent physical obstruction of all border crossings not monitored on 24-hour basis. Pellnaes has too few monitors to cover all border crossings on a 24-hour basis. The Serbs insist that all crossings remain open during the day. Temporary barriers are erected at night. However, unless someone observes the crossings through the night, there is no way to be sure that these barriers effectively halt night-time traffic. Banning all cross-border traffic at some of these sites and erecting permanent barriers would reduce the mission's workload and would ease verification since any observed crossing at such a site would constitute a violation.

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2. Stopping the "tractor trade." Large numbers of tractors and other vehicles are crossing the border daily near Badovinci in Montenegro. ICFY monitors report that up to 70% carry add-on fuel tanks used to smuggle gasoline and diesel across the border. Stopping this trade would eliminate a significant source of fuel for the Bosnian Serbs.

3. 24-hour presence at the factory near Priboj. Pellnaes has been having trouble gaining access to this facility which sits on the inter-Serb border and is suspected to be the site of military-related smuggling. Recent reports, however, indicate that ICFY now has a 24-hour access. Nonetheless, the factory remains a sensitive site, and we should give special attention to the level of ICFY-FRY cooperation there.

4. Effective controls on the Montenegro-to-Serbia rail line. The Bar-to-Serbia rail line cuts through Bosnian territory at one point. This raises the possibility that goods -- or even entire rail cars -- might be dropped off the trains as they pass through Bosnia. The ICFY mission is trying to establish effective controls, including inspection and sealing of rail cars and prohibiting stops inside Bosnia. We should demand FRY cooperation in setting up and implementing these controls.

5. Ending shipment of goods from Serbia to Krajina via Bosnian Serb territory. Owen has apparently directed the ICFY mission to allow the Serbs to transship humanitarian goods to the Krajina via Bosnian Serb territory. Pellnaes has said that such shipments are necessary to avoid a humanitarian crisis in Krajina over the winter. The problem is that there is no effective control over the convoys once they enter Bosnian Serb territory and the supplies that do reach the Krajina can leak back into Bosnia. We should register our concern and demand that the convoys be halted.

6. Stopping Cross-border helicopter flights. ICFY monitors and other observers have reported helicopter flights between Serbia and Bosnia. Pellnaes has been trying to put monitors at FRY airfields to ensure that helicopters are not being used to resupply Bosnian Serb forces. We should insist that these flights stop.

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7. Insisting on effective reporting and monitoring. At some point, we should seek a UN assessment of whether countries have instituted the reporting and monitoring procedures necessary to ensure that only authorized cargoes are being carried on air and ferry service to the FRY. If these procedures are not in place, a substantial sanctions loophole exists, calling into question the efficacy of partial sanctions relief.

SPECIAL WORKING GROUP ACTIONS

The SWG is preparing a series of demarches and instructions for use with Belgrade, ICFY headquarters and the mission in Belgrade, other Contact Group members, and at the UN. These cables will lay out our litmus-test strategy and give our views of the border closure and the effectiveness of the ICFY mission. IWG members will see these cables as part of the normal clearance and crosshatch process.

In addition, the SWG will, at each 30-day report point, provide an evaluation of the situation on the border and the FRY's responses to our demands. This will establish the context for our policy decision prior to the 100-day mark as well as identify the need for mid-course corrections to our strategy.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003i. report	re: Implications of the Bihac Offensive [partial] (3 pages)	11/02/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
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FOLDER TITLE:
PC0106 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, November 7, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs627

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DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force
2 November 1994

Implications of the Bihac Offensive

The Bosnian Army launched its most successful offensive of the war on 24 October around Bihac in northwestern Bosnia, capturing some 250 to 300 square kilometers of territory. **We anticipate a further escalation of the fighting, although Government forces remain incapable of decisively altering the current distribution of territory. Bosnian Government successes may induce Zagreb to launch an attack against the Krajina Serbs. Meanwhile, the food situation is critical for 200,000 people in the Bihac enclave; Serb obstruction of aid there and elsewhere could put many at risk.** 3.5c

The Bihac Offensive

Increasingly effective leadership, growing tactical skill, and high morale--combined with an improved logistics situation--were key to the Bosnian Army's Fifth Corps success. The operation was also directed at what is widely perceived to be the weakest Bosnian Serb forces.

-- The Army's high command successfully coordinated the Bihac operation with attacks near Doboj, Gradacac, and Kupres in order to tie down Bosnian Serb forces. 3.5c

Bosnian Serb forces already have retaken some territory in counterattacks. The Bosnian Government Fifth Corps is spread thin and is awkwardly deployed after its rapid advance, which probably exceeded initial goals.

-- Local Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) troops--reinforced by units from as far away as the Posavina corridor--have forced a government withdrawal from Kulen Vakuf and about 50 square kilometers of recently captured territory, according to [illegible] press reports. 1.4c

-- The Krajina Serbs are supporting the Bosnian Serb counterattack by shelling some Government positions and supplying troops, according to a variety of reports. They are also reportedly mobilizing additional forces. 3.5c

3.5c

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3.5c [illegible]

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Bosnian Croats Join the Conflict

Bosnian Croat forces are actively supporting the Government offensives near Bihac and Kupres--their first major joint offensive with government troops since 1992. Zagreb almost certainly had to approve of the Bosnian Croat participation in the Kupres attack.

-- The joint operations at Kupres, long advocated by the Muslims, almost certainly will help to ease Muslim-Croat tensions elsewhere in Bosnia.

Bosnian Forces Potential Gains Limited

Despite the recent successes, the Bosnian Army remains incapable of decisively defeating the Serbs or even seizing all the territory given it under the Contact Group plan.

-- Sarajevo is now able to coordinate multiple operations that maximize their manpower advantage and its infantry formations--especially its special assault units--are increasingly effective.

-- Government forces will have difficulty making similar gains elsewhere where they generally face larger numbers of more mobile and better trained and equipped Serb troops.

Fighting Will Continue to Intensify

Recent Government successes probably will lead to a major increase in fighting.

-- Bosnian Croat attacks have reignited fronts quiet since 1992. Government forces are likely to continue launching multiple attacks throughout the country to stretch the Serbs thin.

-- Meanwhile, the BSA will respond vigorously and rapidly--especially if key Serb areas are threatened.

Possible Spillover of Fighting

Government successes could cause fighting to spillover into Croatia or draw "Yugoslav" and possibly Croatian forces into combat in Bosnia.

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-- 1.4c Serbian "volunteers" could cross into Bosnia if the government advances continue. Yugoslav Army elements almost certainly will try to increase covert support to the Bosnian Serbs, especially if they continue to lose ground.

-- 1.4c **A prompt Croatian attack could take advantage of the Krajina and Bosnian Serb preoccupation with the Bihac offensive.** 3.5c

Grave Humanitarian Conditions Loom

1.4c **the food situation for 200,000 people in the Bihac enclave is critical** and some could face starvation by mid-winter. Bosnian Serb retaliation against aid deliveries could cause a deterioration of conditions in Bihac and elsewhere in Bosnia.

-- An additional 30,000 people, Bosnian refugees from the enclave who fled after rebel Muslim leader Abdic's fall, are ill-prepared for winter and depend on UN food and water deliveries. Meanwhile, Bosnian Government offensives south of Bihac have forced 10,000 Serbs from their homes, 1.4c

-- Last week, Serb officials linked authorization for UN fuel deliveries to a suspension of the Bihac offensive and have since denied most UN fuel convoy requests. Serb authorities are going to require 24-hours advance notification for using the Sarajevo airport road, significantly complicating airlift deliveries. 3.5c

3.5c

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SEC. 1404. BOSNIA AND HERCEGOVINA.

(a) PURPOSE.—It is the purpose of this section—

(1) to express the sense of Congress concerning the international efforts to end the conflict in Bosnia and Hercegovina; and

(2) to establish a process to end the arms embargo on the Government of Bosnia and Hercegovina.

(b) STATEMENT OF SUPPORT.—The Congress supports the efforts of the Contact Group to bring about a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Bosnia and Hercegovina based upon the Contact Group proposal.

(c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that:

(1) The United States should work with the member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and with other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council to bring about a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Bosnia and Hercegovina which maintains the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Hercegovina.

(2) A peaceful settlement of the conflict must preserve an economically, politically, and militarily viable Bosnian state capable of exercising its rights under the Charter of the United Nations as part of a peaceful settlement, which rights include the inherent right of a sovereign state to self defense.

(3) The acceptance of the Contact Group proposal by the Government of Bosnia and Hercegovina should lead to the lifting of the Bosnia arms embargo.

(4) In providing weapons to the Bosnian Government or taking other actions, care should be taken to provide for the safety of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and the civilian personnel working for the United Nations or nongovernmental volunteer organizations.

(5) The United States should immediately seek to organize an international effort to provide assistance to the states bordering Serbia and Montenegro to bring about more effective enforcement by those states of the international economic sanctions on the Government of Serbia and Montenegro.

(d) GENERAL UNITED STATES POLICY.—The United States should exercise leadership within the international community to cause the Bosnian Serb faction to accept the Contact Group proposal. Such action should be taken on separate but complementary international and unilateral tracks, as set forth in subsections (e), (f), and (g).

(e) INTERNATIONAL POLICY.—If the Bosnian Serbs do not accept the Contact Group proposal by the date that is the later of October 15, 1994, or the end of the 10-day period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act, the President (or his representative) should, not later than 14 days thereafter, formally introduce and support in the United Nations Security Council a resolution to terminate the Bosnia arms embargo. The resolution should provide for the termination of the arms embargo no later than December 1, 1994 (and may allow for the termination to be accomplished in stages ending no later than that date).

(f) UNILATERAL UNITED STATES POLICY.—(1) If by the earlier of November 15, 1994, or the end of the 15-day period beginning on the date on which a resolution described in subsection (e) (or a similar resolution) is formally introduced, the United Nations Security Council has not agreed to such a resolution and the Bosnian Serbs have not accepted the Contact Group proposal—

(A) the funding limitation specified in paragraph (2) shall be in effect;

(B) the President shall submit a plan to, and shall consult with, Congress on the manner in which United States Armed Forces and the military forces of friendly states would provide training to the armed forces of the Government of Bosnia and Hercegovina outside of the territory of Bosnia and Hercegovina; and

(C) the President shall submit a plan to, and shall consult with, Congress regarding the unilateral termination by the United States of compliance with the Bosnia arms embargo and the implications thereof.

(2) If the funding limitation specified in this paragraph is in effect pursuant to paragraph (1)(A), then no funds appropriated by any provision of law may be used for the purpose of participation in, support for, or assistance to the enforcement of the Bosnia arms embargo by any Department, agency or other entity of the United States (or by any officer or employee of the United States or member of the Armed Forces of the United States) other than as required of all United Nations member states under the United Nations Security Council resolution referred to in subsection (h)(3) and the Charter of the United Nations.

(3)(A) The President may waive the limitation in paragraph (2) in the case of United States military personnel serving in NATO headquarters positions.

(B) Nothing in paragraph (2) is intended to impede enforcement of sanctions against Serbia.

(g) INTERIM POLICY.—If the Bosnian Serb faction attacks any area within those areas that have been designated by the United Nations as "safe areas", the President (or his representative) should promptly formally introduce and support in the United Nations Security Council a resolution that authorizes a selective lifting of the Bosnia arms embargo in order to allow the provision of defensive weapons (such as anti-tank weapons, counter-battery radars, and mortars) to enable the forces of the Government of Bosnia and Hercegovina to defend the safe areas.

(h) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this section:

(1) The term "Contact Group" means the group composed of representatives of the United States, Russia, France, Britain, and Germany seeking to bring about a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Bosnia and Hercegovina.

(2) The term "Contact Group proposal" means the peace proposal of the Contact Group that has been agreed to by the Government of Bosnia and Hercegovina and rejected by the Bosnian Serb faction.

(3) The term "Bosnia arms embargo" means application to the Government of Bosnia and Hercegovina of the arms embargo imposed by United Nations Security Council resolution 713, of September 25, 1991.

Subtitle B—Assistance Activities

SEC. 1411. OVERSEAS HUMANITARIAN, DISASTER, AND CIVIC AID PROGRAMS.

(a) OHDACA PROGRAMS.—For purposes of section 301 and other provisions of this Act, programs of the Department of Defense designated as Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) programs are the programs provided by—

(1) sections 401, 402, 2547, and 2551 of title 10, United States Code;

(2) section 404 of title 10, United States Code, as added by section 1412; and

(3) section 1413 of this Act.

(b) LIMITATION.—Not more than one-half of the amount authorized to be appropriated in section 301 for those programs may be obligated until the regulations required to be prescribed by subsection (a) of section 1504 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-160; 107 Stat. 1839) have been prescribed.

SEC. 1412. FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE.

(a) AUTHORITY.—Subchapter I of chapter 20 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

"§404. Foreign disaster assistance

"(a) IN GENERAL.—The President may direct the Secretary of Defense to provide disaster assistance outside the United States to respond to manmade or natural disasters when necessary to prevent loss of lives.

"(b) FORMS OF ASSISTANCE.—Assistance provided under this section may include transportation, supplies, services, and equipment.

"(c) NOTIFICATION REQUIRED.—Not later than 48 hours after the commencement of disaster assistance activities to provide assistance under this section, the President shall transmit to Congress a report containing notification of the assistance provided, and proposed to be provided, under this section and a description of so much of the following as is then available:

"(1) The manmade or natural disaster for which disaster assistance is necessary.

"(2) The threat to human lives presented by the disaster.

"(3) The United States military personnel and material resources that are involved or expected to be involved.

"(4) The disaster assistance that is being provided or is expected to be provided by other nations or public or private relief organizations.

"(5) The anticipated duration of the disaster assistance activities.

"(d) ORGANIZING POLICIES AND PROGRAMS.—Amounts appropriated to the Department of Defense for any fiscal year for Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) programs of the Department shall be available for organizing general policies and programs for disaster relief programs for disasters occurring outside the United States.".

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections at the beginning of such subchapter is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

"404. Foreign disaster assistance.".

SEC. 1413. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR CLEARING LANDMINES.

(a) PROGRAM AUTHORIZED.—The Secretary of Defense shall carry out a program for humanitarian purposes to provide assistance to other nations in the detection and clearance of landmines. Such assistance shall be provided through instruction, education, training, and advising of personnel of those nations in the various procedures that have been determined effective for detecting and clearing landmines.

(b) FORMS OF ASSISTANCE.—The Secretary may provide assistance under subsection (a) by—

(1) providing Department of Defense personnel to conduct the instruction, education, or training or to furnish advice; or

(2) providing financial assistance or in-kind assistance in support of such instruction, education, or training.

(c) LIMITATION ON UNITED STATES MILITARY PERSONNEL.—The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that no member of the Armed Forces of the United States—

(1) while providing assistance under subsection (a), engages in the physical detection, lifting, or destroying of landmines (unless the member does so for the concurrent purpose of supporting a United States military operation); or

(2) provides such assistance as part of a military operation that does not involve the Armed Forces of the United States.

(d) USE OF FUNDS.—Of the amount authorized to be appropriated by section 301 for Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) programs of the Department of Defense, not more than $20,000,000 shall be available for the program under subsection (a). Such amount may be used—

(1) for activities to support the clearing of landmines for humanitarian purposes, including activities relating to the furnishing of education, training, and technical assistance;

(2) for the provision of equipment and technology by transfer or lease to a foreign government that is participating in a landmine clearing program under this section; and

(3) for contributions to nongovernmental organizations that have experience in the clearing of landmines to support activities described in subsection (a).

(e) NOTICE TO CONGRESS.—The Secretary of Defense shall provide notice to Congress of any activity carried out under this section.

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TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 04 NOV 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 7 NOV PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: REED SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 07 NOV 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9421302 9421316

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0106 CODES: BOS

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001		X	94110420	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
002		X	94110420	REED SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

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DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PC meeting on Bosnia Nov. 7

NSC LOG # 21284

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PC meeting on Bosnia Nov. 7

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 4, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

LEON E. PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President of the United States

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T.R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

AMBASSADOR RICK INDEFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the UN

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia on Monday, November 7, 2:30-3:30pm in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Principals plus one. The agenda is attached at Tab A. Papers will be circulated by the lead agency ~~(S)~~

James W. Reed
for William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 6/16/10
2010-0533-M

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. agenda	re: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)	11/07/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
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FOLDER TITLE:
PC0106 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, November 7, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs627

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 3, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: DON KERRICK (K)

SUBJECT: Principals Meeting on Bosnia, November 7, 1994

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Principals Meeting on Bosnia to be held on November 7, 1994. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
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See also 2013-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)~~	~~11/17/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RDS 04/017/2015
~~002a. memo~~	~~Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake re: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)~~	~~11/17/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002b. agenda~~	~~Informal Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)~~	~~11/18/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002c. memo~~	~~Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake; Re: Messages to PM Major and President Mitterand (1 page)~~	~~11/17/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002d. memo~~	~~Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Messages to PM Major and President Mitterrand (2 pages)~~	~~11/17/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002e. letter~~	~~President Clinton to PM Major (2 pages)~~	~~11/17/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002f. letter~~	~~President Clinton to President Mitterrand (2 pages)~~	~~11/17/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002g. cable~~	~~re: Contact Group Nov. 17 Meeting: Results (4 pages)~~	~~11/17/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003. agenda~~	~~[Duplicate of 002b] (1 page)~~	~~11/18/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0108 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, November 17, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs628

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9421385
RECEIVED: 23 NOV 94 18

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 29 NOV 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 17 NOV PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 26 NOV 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9421361 9421363

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0108 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		DARBY
		HALL
		JOSHI
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW
		WOLIN

COMMENTS:

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94112309	FOR DECISION
001		X	94112819	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
002		X	94112909	SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	941129	FUERTH, L	
002	941129	BRILL, K	
002	941129	MCALEER, R	
002	941129	INDERFURTH, K	
002	941129	PANETTA, L	
002	941129	GARTHOFF, D	
002	941129	PATRICK, T	

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
KS Reed			
Sens	1	AJS	
Itoh			
Soderberg	2	N	
Berger	~~2~~		
LN Lake	3	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
~~Sens~~ Situation Room	4	AJS	Tab I
West Wing Desk	5	OPS 11/29	D via Fax
NSC Secretariat	6		N

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS:

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National Security Council
The White House

8:49 am

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Sens	1	AJS	
Itoh			
Soderberg	2	N	
Berger	NA		
Lake	3	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
~~Situation Room~~	4	AJS	Tab I
West Wing Desk	5	OPS 11/2a	D
NSC Secretariat	6		N

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

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LOG 9421385
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SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FM PC MTG ON BOSNIA 17 NOV
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EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	29 Nov	245pm	[signature]
	PRINT LAST NAME: BRANSCUM		
	COPY: 1		
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET , N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
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COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
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MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	30 Nov	0830	[signature]
	PRINT LAST NAME: Palmieri		
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MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			
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DATE 29 NOV 94

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COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
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MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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RELEASER: Thomas E. Donilon

DTG: _____

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MESSAGE NO. 2433 CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES 3

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-9461 (PHONE NUMBER) WEST WING (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SOC of PC Meeting on Bosnia 17 Nov.

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
B	State	Executive Secretary		
N	DoD	Executive Secretary		
B	USUN/State	Offic of Rep. to UN		
A	CIA	Executive Secretary		
D	JCS	Secretary		

REMARKS:

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PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE / PRIORITY / (ROUTINE)

RELEASER: Thomas E. Ruggill

DTG: _____

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MESSAGE NO. 2433 CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES 3

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NSC) (202) 456-9461 WEST WING
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SOC of PC Meeting on Bosnia
17 Nov.

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
B	State	Executive Secretary		
N	DoD	Executive Secretary		
B	USUN/State	Office of Rep. to UN		
A	CIA	Executive Secretary		
D	JCS	Secretary		

REMARKS:

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RELEASER: Thomas E. Ragsdill

DTG:

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MESSAGE NO. 2433 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 3

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NSC) (202) 456-9461 WEST WING
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SOC of PC Meeting on Bosnia 17 Nov.

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
B	State	Executive Secretary		
N	DoD	Executive Secretary		
B	USUN/State	Office of Rep. to UN		
A	CIA	Executive Secretary		
D	JCS	Secretary		

REMARKS:

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
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PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE PRIORITY (ROUTINE)

RELEASER: [signature]

DTG: _____

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MESSAGE NO. 2433 CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES 3

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH DPC (NAME) (202) 456-9461 (PHONE NUMBER) WEST WING (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SOC of PC Meeting on Bosnia 17 Nov.

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
B	State	Executive Secretary		
N	DoD	Executive Secretary		
B	USUN/State	Office of Rep. to UN		
A	CIA	Executive Secretary		
D	JCS	Secretary		

REMARKS:

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2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 29, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to
the United Nations

MR. LEON E. PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President
of the United States

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, November 17, 1994 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 2/16/11

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions
Meeting of NSC Principals Committee
DATE: November 17, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 9:00 - 10:30am

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Anthony Lake

OVP
Leon Fuerth

State
Peter Tarnoff
Robert Frasure

DOD
John Deutch
William Slocombe

UN
Ambassador Madeleine Albright
David Scheffer

CIA
Admiral William Studeman
Norman Schindler

JCS
General John Shalikashili
LTG Wesley Clark

White House
Leon Panetta
Samuel Berger
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
Alexander Vershbow

Summary of Conclusions

Measures to Deal with the Bihac Situation

1. The Principals agreed on the need to move forward in an expeditious but deliberate manner to gain support for actions to prevent Bihac from being overrun and to stabilize the situation, in order to return the focus to obtaining a negotiated settlement.

2. Principals approved the following set of triggers (action-forcing mechanisms) and potential responses as a basis for bilateral discussions with the British and French before taking further action in the NAC.

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0533-M
BY 9/30/14 (1.33)
4/17/2015

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TRIGGERS

- o Serb offensive captures more territory in the Bihac area than held prior to the Bosnian Government offensives.
- o Serious artillery attacks on Bihac City.
- o Serious attacks against the Bangladeshi Battalion.
- o Bihac City suffers strangulation.

MENU OF OPTIONS

- o Establish exclusion zone (Dimensions negotiable).
- o Close Air Support in defense of UNPROFOR (Requires TACP insertion -- no new UN or NAC decisions required).
- o Close air support in response to artillery attacks from Croatia (NAC has approved; requires Croatian approval).
- o Extend Deny Flight ROE to permit attacking air defense assets in Croatia displaying hostile intent (Requires decisions at UN and NATO).
- o Modify existing authorities to authorize "hot pursuit" of aircraft attacking targets in Bosnia from Croatian airfields.

Implementing Nunn-Mitchell

3. The Principals reviewed progress on implementing Nunn-Mitchell and directed that efforts continue with Congressional members after refinement of the briefing by DoD to ensure that Congressional lift advocates fully understand the implications of lift. Our aim is to ensure that they are prepared to provide the required political and financial support if and when multilateral lift becomes necessary. Principals agreed that we remain opposed to unilateral lift.

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DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ _____ PAGES 3

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NSC) (202) 456-9461 WEST WING

(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SOC of PC Meeting on Bosnia 17 Nov.

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
State	Executive Secretary		
DoD	Executive Secretary		
USUN/State	Office of Rep. to UN		
CIA	Executive Secretary		
JCS	Secretary		

REMARKS:

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2012-0533-M

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- ☐ IMMEDIATE
- ☐ PRIORITY
- ☑ ROUTINE

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DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC LOG # 21385

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: ~~Notice of Meeting~~ SOC - PC Mtg on Bosnia PAGES: 3

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NNS NARA, Date 2/16/10
2012-0573-M

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 23, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, November 17, 1994

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia held November 17, 1994.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By ___ NARA, Date 6/16/11

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9421363
RECEIVED: 17 NOV 94 19

TO: LAKE

FROM: KERRICK
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 17 NOV 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPERS FOR 17 NOV PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 21 NOV 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9421361 9421385

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0108 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS CLOSED BY: NSJDA DOC 1 OF 1

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NLWJC NARA, Date 6/11/04

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2012-0533-M

~~SECRET~~ RECORD ID: 9421363

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94120316	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	94120316	NOTED BY LAKE

~~SECRET~~

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National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 21363

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG DS A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
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Itoh			
Soderberg		~~Natl Sec Advisor~~	
Berger	2	has seen – Per TL –	
Lake	RETURN TO VERSHBOW for		
Situation Room	REDO		
West Wing Desk	3		
NSC Secretariat			
Vershbow	4		

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COM Secretariat For your files. Thanks. nancy

Exec Sec Office has diskette No

WWS - I have logged this in to staff Dee 11/18

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~~SECRET~~ 21363

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 17, 1994

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

FROM: DON KERRICK (K)

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, November 18, 1994.

PURPOSE OF MEETING

Principals need to agree on an approach to the Bihac problem and review progress on implementing Nunn-Mitchell and decide next steps on both. Agenda at Tab I.

I. *Bihac*

With limited time, ask the CIA to briefly update the current situation and give their assessment of what the likely outcome will be, including the prospects for Croatian intervention. State should review the progress of ongoing diplomatic efforts. Key issues:

0 Strategy: Goal is to defuse and contain. Deter Croatian intervention. Prevent humanitarian disaster and collapse of Contact Group and peace process.

-- **Need to agree on approach.** Agencies differ. DoD reluctant to press for the unachievable. Fears further rejection only makes it worse. State wants aggressive action for domestic political reasons and given strategic risks of inaction. Fears inaction will lead to collapse of peace process and wider war.

-- **What are the next steps?** Call for NAC to push exclusion zone? Other military options? Ride it out?

-- **Do we engage the President now?** Views differ on when to engage and for what purpose. Draft letters to Major/Mitterrand at Tab II.

Pls letter

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PER E.O. 13526
VZ 2/6/2020 (6.41)
2003-0682-M

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II. *UNSC Lift Resolution*

Resolution remains on the table at the UN. **Next steps: compromise resolution or push to vote?** No resolution may be better than weak resolution.

III. *Managing Nunn-Mitchell Implementation*

Ask JCS to provide a brief update on the progress of implementing the modifications to military operations. Reaction calming down, but can expect hearings, etc.

IV. *Next Steps with Allies and Congress*

Allied reaction stabilizing, although much public play about status of alliance. **Emphasize need to consult ahead of time on Hill activities regarding lift.**

First round of briefings went as well as could be expected. Proponents of unilateral lift critical, others say fine. **Secretary Perry directed rewrite of Hill briefing to showcase lift implications.** Next version due next week. We will need to ensure it doesn't come down too hard against multilateral lift. Next round of member briefings likely in conjunction with GATT session. Issue: *How to deal with Dole and others over next sixty days?* Have proposed SECDEF/CJCS host members privately in December. Dole response at Tab III.

V. Contact Group Status Report

Contact Group met yesterday. Not much progress. May have stepped back on sanctions relief in Plan B, with EU advocating total relief in Phase II. Agreed on political goals for December 2 Ministerial. Reporting cable at Tab IV.

Attachment
Tab I Agenda
Tab II Draft Letters to Major/Mitterrand
Tab III Response to Dole
Tab IV Contact Group Reporting Cable

0.1 shipments into Croatia

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

TAB

I.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

INFORMAL PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: November 18, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 9 - 10am

AGENDA

I. Bihac

A. Situation Assessment.....CIA

B. Strategy to Contain.....State

II. Other issues

A. UNSC Lift Resolution: Status/Next Steps.....State

B. Managing Nunn-Mitchell Implementation

-- Status of Operational Modifications.....JCS

-- Next Steps with Allies/Congress.....State/OSD

C. Contact Group Status Report.....State

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KG, NARA, Date 2/6/2020
2013-0682-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

TAB

II

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~ 9231

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 17, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

FROM: DON KERRICK (DK)

SUBJECT: Messages to Prime Minister Major and President Mitterrand on Bihac

Attached are Presidential messages to Prime Minister Major and President Mitterrand.

Concurrence by: Leon Fuerth see note. (LF)

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Message to Prime Minister Major
Tab B Message to President Mitterrand

1555 pm

TONY -

Letter cleared in substance with OVP, but the Vice President recommends waiting till after P.C. before getting President engaged. (Memo would have to be changed if you sent it tonight)

Sandy V.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 2/6/2070
2013-0682-M

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Messages to Prime Minister Major and President Mitterrand on Bihac

Purpose

To urge British and French Support for establishing an Exclusion Zone Around Bihac

Background

The situation in Bihac is grim and continuing to deteriorate. Efforts at NATO to establish an exclusion zone around Bihac are stalled, with little prospects for approval unless direction from capitals is received. The UN and UNPROFOR are reluctant to act even with a Bangladeshi battalion trapped in Bihac, ill-equipped and without adequate supplies. Ambassador Albright convoked an emergency session of the Security Council to underscore the urgency of the situation.

The British and the French have been skeptical of an exclusion zone, citing lack of UNPROFOR troops. They believe the Bosnian Government is getting its comeuppance for the recent offensives. High-level pressure is needed if we are to convince them to address the consequences of inaction and to work with us for strong action at the UN and NATO.

The Vice President, Secretary Christopher, and Ambassadors Albright and Hunter, agree that your intervention is needed if there is to be any further progress.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message to Prime Minister Major at Tab A and President Mitterrand at Tab B.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0808-M

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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[2013-0682-M 6.42]

Attachments
Tab A Message to Major
Tab B Message to Mitterrand

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRIME MINISTER MAJOR.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR JOHN:

I WRITE TO EXPRESS MY DEEP CONCERN ABOUT THE RAPIDLY DETERIORATING SITUATION IN THE BIHAC AREA OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA AND TO URGE YOUR SUPPORT FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION TO HALT THE BOSNIAN SERB OFFENSIVE.

AS YOU KNOW, THE BIHAC SITUATION IS GRIM. WE CANNOT RULE OUT THE COLLAPSE OF THE ENTIRE BIHAC POCKET, WHICH COULD EVOLVE INTO A WORST-CASE SCENARIO THAT COULD REIGNITE THE WAR IN CROATIA. THE COLLAPSE OF BIHAC WOULD MARK A DANGEROUS TURNING POINT IN THE WAR, JEOPARDIZING PROSPECTS FOR ANY AGREEMENT BASED ON THE CONTACT GROUP PROPOSAL, WHILE POSSIBLY LEADING TO CROATIAN INTERVENTION AND A WIDENING OF THE WAR. ALL PREVIOUS PROGRESS, INCLUDING THE BOSNIAN-CROAT FEDERATION ITSELF, COULD QUICKLY UNRAVEL, LEAVING A MUCH MORE SERIOUS PROBLEM TO BE RESOLVED.

THEREFORE, I AM ASKING YOU TO JOIN US AT THE UN AND IN NATO IN OBTAINING AGREEMENT ON DECISIVE STEPS TO ADDRESS THE BIHAC SITUATION. WE HAVE PROPOSED THE RAPID ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EXCLUSION ZONE AROUND BIHAC BASED ON NATO'S APRIL DECISION ON PROTECTING THE SAFE AREAS. THIS WOULD CREATE A FIREWALL TO END THE FIGHTING AND SEND A SIGNAL TO THE CIVILIANS IN BIHAC THAT WE WILL NOT ALLOW THEIR CITY TO BE OVERRUN. ESTABLISHMENT OF SUCH A ZONE WOULD, OF COURSE, REQUIRE THAT THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT AGREE TO GIVE UP WEAPONS HELD WITHIN THE ZONE AND TO DESIST FROM USING THE BIHAC AREA AS A BASE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE AREA. WE BELIEVE A 10-KILOMETER ZONE WOULD BE FEASIBLE WITH A MODEST REDEPLOYMENT OF UNPROFOR TROOPS. IF YOU HAVE OTHER IDEAS FOR HANDLING THE SITUATION, HOWEVER, WE ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THEM. BUT WE MUST TAKE FIRM ACTION NOW. FAILURE TO ACT COULD HAVE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES.

BY ACTING NOW, WE WILL PRESERVE THE OPPORTUNITY THAT WE AND OUR CONTACT GROUP PARTNERS HAVE CREATED FOR A BROADER APPROACH TO THE SEARCH FOR A REGIONAL SETTLEMENT. IT IS CLEARLY IMPORTANT THAT WE MOVE PROMPTLY TO CONTAIN THE FIGHTING IN BIHAC AND RETURN THE FOCUS TO OBTAINING A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. THE ALTERNATIVES SEEM

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

MUCH WORSE AND THAT IS WHY I BELIEVE WE MUST ACT TOGETHER NOW. I LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR SUPPORT AND TO SEEING YOU SOON IN BUDAPEST.

SINCERELY,

BILL CLINTON

END TEXT

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO FRENCH PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I WRITE TO EXPRESS MY DEEP CONCERN ABOUT THE RAPIDLY DETERIORATING SITUATION IN THE BIHAC AREA OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA AND TO URGE YOUR SUPPORT FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION TO HALT THE BOSNIAN SERB OFFENSIVE.

AS YOU KNOW, THE BIHAC SITUATION IS GRIM. WE CANNOT RULE OUT THE COLLAPSE OF THE ENTIRE BIHAC POCKET, WHICH COULD EVOLVE INTO A WORST-CASE SCENARIO THAT COULD REIGNITE THE WAR IN CROATIA. THE COLLAPSE OF BIHAC WOULD MARK A DANGEROUS TURNING POINT IN THE WAR, JEOPARDIZING PROSPECTS FOR ANY AGREEMENT BASED ON THE CONTACT GROUP PROPOSAL, WHILE POSSIBLY LEADING TO CROATIAN INTERVENTION AND A WIDENING OF THE WAR. ALL PREVIOUS PROGRESS, INCLUDING THE BOSNIAN-CROAT FEDERATION ITSELF, COULD QUICKLY UNRAVEL, LEAVING A MUCH MORE SERIOUS PROBLEM TO BE RESOLVED.

THEREFORE, I AM ASKING YOU TO JOIN US AT THE UN AND IN NATO IN OBTAINING AGREEMENT ON DECISIVE STEPS TO ADDRESS THE BIHAC SITUATION. WE HAVE PROPOSED THE RAPID ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EXCLUSION ZONE AROUND BIHAC BASED ON NATO'S APRIL DECISION ON PROTECTING THE SAFE AREAS. THIS WOULD CREATE A FIREWALL TO END THE FIGHTING AND SEND A SIGNAL TO THE CIVILIANS IN BIHAC THAT WE WILL NOT ALLOW THEIR CITY TO BE OVERRUN. ESTABLISHMENT OF SUCH A ZONE WOULD, OF COURSE, REQUIRE THAT THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT AGREE TO GIVE UP WEAPONS HELD WITHIN THE ZONE AND TO DESIST FROM USING THE BIHAC AREA AS A BASE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE AREA. WE BELIEVE A 10-KILOMETER ZONE WOULD BE FEASIBLE WITH A MODEST REDEPLOYMENT OF UNPROFOR TROOPS. IF YOU HAVE OTHER IDEAS FOR HANDLING THE SITUATION, HOWEVER, WE ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THEM. BUT WE MUST TAKE FIRM ACTION NOW. FAILURE TO ACT COULD HAVE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES.

BY ACTING NOW, WE WILL PRESERVE THE OPPORTUNITY THAT WE AND OUR CONTACT GROUP PARTNERS HAVE CREATED FOR A BROADER APPROACH TO THE SEARCH FOR A REGIONAL SETTLEMENT. IT IS CLEARLY IMPORTANT THAT WE MOVE PROMPTLY TO CONTAIN THE FIGHTING IN BIHAC AND RETURN THE FOCUS TO OBTAINING A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. THE ALTERNATIVES SEEM

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

MUCH WORSE AND THAT IS WHY I BELIEVE WE MUST ACT TOGETHER NOW. I LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR SUPPORT AND TO SEEING YOU SOON IN BUDAPEST.

SINCERELY,

BILL CLINTON

END TEXT

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

TAB

II

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Dear Mr. Leader:

I share your deep concern about the deteriorating situation in and around the town of Bihac in northwest Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the last few days, Bosnian Serb forces have rolled back most of the Bosnian Government's recent gains, and they appear bent on overrunning other areas that have been under Government control. We are particularly disturbed at the large-scale involvement of Serb forces from the Krajina region of Croatia.

As the Bihac crisis began to escalate over the weekend, we took action on a number of fronts. In an emergency session of the UN Security Council on Sunday, Ambassador Albright won agreement to a Presidential statement condemning the Serb offensive and the cross-border actions of the so-called Krajina Serbs. She also began consultations with the UN on possible steps that could be taken in response, including the possible establishment of an exclusion zone around Bihac. On Sunday, our Ambassadors in NATO capitals raised our concerns with our NATO allies. They called for establishment of an exclusion zone based on the earlier NATO decisions authorizing air strikes to defend against heavy weapons attacks on the safe areas. This proposal was taken up in the North Atlantic Council on Tuesday, and Allies agreed that the NATO Military Authorities should consult with their UN counterparts on creating an exclusion zone around Bihac. At the same time, we have been consulting with the government of Croatia

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on NATO's behalf in order to obtain its approval for NATO to conduct close air support, if requested by the UN, against artillery and other targets in the Krajina region that have been involved in the assault on Bihac.

We are continuing to press our Allies on establishing an exclusion zone. Ambassador Albright is convening the Security Council Thursday afternoon to underscore the seriousness of the situation and to urge action by the UN in coordination with NATO.

I hope you will stay in touch on this issue. I will always welcome your ideas as we work to resolve it.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Robert Dole
Minority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

TAB

IV

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: FUERTH, SIT, BRANSCUM, KERRICK, NSC, SAUNDERS, SUM, SUM2, VERSHBOW

PREC: IMMEDIATE **CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~** **DTG:**172221Z NOV 94

FM: AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO:RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 4494
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0022
RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 5179
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB IMMEDIATE 1120
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 2207
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 5509
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 8333
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0481
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0893

////

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ LONDON 018166

EXDIS
VIENNA FOR BOSNIA

S/S PASS SECDEL
USUN FOR AMB ALBRIGHT
EUR FOR HOLBROOKE
OVP FOR FUERTH
NSC FOR VERSHBOW

FROM AMB THOMAS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL BK HR SR ETTC
SUBJECT: CONTACT GROUP NOV. 17 MEETING: RESULTS

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THE CONTACT GROUP AGREED THAT THE DECEMBER 2 MINISTERIAL MUST ACHIEVE CONCRETE RESULTS THAT WOULD DEMONSTRATE CONTACT GROUP UNITY AND PROVIDE A DYNAMIC IMPETUS TO THE PEACE PROCESS. THE NON-U.S. MEMBERS READILY ACCEPTED THE SUBSTANCE OF A PROPOSED U.S. GAME PLAN FOR THE MINISTERIAL. THAT PLAN WOULD CALL ON THE MINISTERS TO REAFFIRM THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE CONTACT GROUP PLAN FOR BOSNIA. IN ORDER TO COUNTERACT POSSIBLE PALE MISUNDERSTANDING OF PLAN A, MINISTERS COULD LAY OUT A CHRONOLOGY OF EXACTLY WHAT WOULD HAPPEN FOLLOWING PALE SERB ACCEPTANCE OF THE MAP. IN ADDITION, MINISTERS COULD PROVIDE A RINGING ENDORSEMENT OF PLAN B.

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VL 2/6/2020 (6,45)
2013-0682-M

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3. IN CONSIDERING SANCTIONS RELIEF UNDER PLAN B, WE RAN INTO STRONG RUSSIAN AND EU INSISTENCE ON FULL SANCTIONS RELIEF IN PHASE II. THEY ARGUED VEHEMENTLY THAT A BOLD DECISION BY MILOSEVIC REQUIRED A BOLD RESPONSE BY THE CONTACT GROUP. IN THIS CONTEXT, WE WERE ABLE TO GET EUROPEAN AGREEMENT TO ADDING THE INCENTIVE ELEMENTS FROM THE EU ACTION PLAN TO PLAN B. THESE ELEMENTS WOULD HELP ENSURE THAT MILOSEVIC MAINTAINED HIS ADHERENCE TO COMMITMENTS UNDER PLAN B. WE WILL NEED FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ON THE QUESTION OF SANCTIONS RELIEF.

4. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE CONTACT GROUP SHOULD VISIT ZAGREB, SARAJEVO AND BELGRADE DURING THE WEEK PRECEEDING THE CG MINISTERIAL. THE CG (MINUS THE RUSSIANS WHO HAD ALREADY DEPARTED) ALSO DECIDED TO MEET ON DECEMBER 1 AND WILL RECOMMEND A CONTACT GROUP MEETING REINFORCED BY POLITICAL DIRECTORS ON DECEMBER 2, THE MORNING BEFORE THE MINISTERIAL. END SUMMARY

CONTACT GROUP MINISTERIAL GAME PLAN AGREED

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5. ALL MEMBERS OF THE CONTACT GROUP STRONGLY CONCURRED ON THE NEED FOR THE DEC. 2 CONTACT GROUP MINISTERIAL TO PRODUCE CONCRETE RESULTS WHICH DEMONSTRATED CONTACT GROUP UNITY AND COHESION. IN ADDITION, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE RUSSIANS WHO STILL HAVE TO CONSULT WITH KOZYREV, ALL AGREED WITH THE PROPOSED U.S. GAME PLAN FOR THE MINISTERIAL. THE COMPONENTS OF THE GAME PLAN ARE AS FOLLOWS:

– PLAN A: THE MINISTERIAL SHOULD PRODUCE A DECLARATION THAT CLARIFIES WHAT HAPPENS IF THE CONTACT GROUP MAP IS ACCEPTED BY THE PALE SERBS. THE NEED FOR THIS IS BASED ON CONTACT GROUP DISCUSSIONS WITH MILOSEVIC, RUSSIAN CG REPRESENTATIVE ZOTOV'S MEETING WITH MILOSEVIC YESTERDAY, AND RECENT INTEL INDICATING THAT THE PALE SERBS MAY INDEED MISUNDERSTAND THE CONTACT GROUP PROPOSAL. WE SUGGESTED THAT THE MINISTERIAL PAPER LAY OUT IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER EXACTLY WHAT STEPS WOULD FOLLOW PALE SERB ACCEPTANCE OF THE MAP. IT SHOULD PARTICULARLY EMPHASIZE THAT THE PALE SERBS WOULD HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO NEGOTIATE ON CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES AND POSSIBLE LAND SWAPS BEFORE THE INITIATION OF WITHDRAWALS. IT WOULD ALSO PROVIDE FOR GUARANTEES OF THE NEW DEMARCATION LINES.

–PLAN B: THE MINISTERIAL SHOULD ALSO PROVIDE A RINGING ENDORSEMENT OF PLAN B, EMPHASIZING THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF SERBIAN RECOGNITION OF ALL THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLICS AND ITS SUPPORT FOR THE Z-4 PROPOSAL.

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EQUAL RIGHTS ISSUE RESOLVED

6. THE PROPOSED EU LANGUAGE TO RESOLVE THE "EQUAL RIGHTS" QUESTION WAS ACCEPTED BY ALL CONTACT GROUP MEMBERS, ALTHOUGH ONCE AGAIN THE RUSSIANS WILL HAVE TO RAISE IT WITH KOZYREV. WE DON'T EXPECT THAT WILL BE A PROBLEM. WE BELIEVE THE NEW LANGUAGE IS A BIG IMPROVEMENT OVER WHAT THE RUSSIANS, BRITISH AND FRENCH HAVE BEEN SAYING IN PUBLIC. IT IS ALSO AN IMPROVEMENT OVER THE GENEVA III FORMULATION. THE OPERATIVE LANGUAGE OF THE NEW FORMULATION IS AS FOLLOWS: " IN THE CONTEXT OF BOSNIAN SERB ACCEPTANCE OF THE CONTACT GROUP PLAN, BALANCED TREATMENT FOR THE BOSNIAC-CROAT AND BOSNIAN SERB ENTITIES WILL BE ENSURED, INCLUDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PARALLEL SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES, PROVIDED THIS IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THE INTEGRITY OF BOSNIA HERCEGOVINA." THE BRITISH NOTED IN THIS REGARD, THAT IN THEIR DISCUSSIONS WITH BOSNIAN PRIME MINISTER SILAJDZIC YESTERDAY HE WAS FORWARD LEANING ON THE SUBJECT OF LINKAGES BETWEEN THE PALE SERBS AND SERBIA AND HAD ASKED THAT WE PASS HIS POSITION ON TO MILOSEVIC.

SANCTIONS RELIEF IN PLAN B

7. EU MINISTERS HAVE AGREED ON A REVISED PLAN B UNDER WHICH ALL UN SANCTIONS WOULD BE SUSPENDED, REPEAT SUSPENDED, WHEN SERBIA RECOGNIZES BOSNIA AND CROATIA AND ACCEPTS AND SUPPORTS THE ZAGREB 4 PLAN. (TODAY WE INSISTED THAT PLAN B MUST INCLUDE RECOGNITION OF SLOVENIA AND MACEDONIA AS WELL. THE EUROPEANS, AND APPARENTLY THE RUSSIANS, INDICATED THEY COULD AGREE TO THIS IN THE CONTEXT OF U.S. ACCEPTANCE OF THE EU'S PLAN B PROPOSAL.)

8. WE ARGUED AGAINST FULL SANCTIONS RELIEF IN PHASE II BUT THE EUROPEANS WERE ADAMANT ON THE NEED FOR A TRULY BOLD RESPONSE TO A BOLD GESTURE BY MILOSEVIC. THE RUSSIANS, OF COURSE, WOULD BE PREPARED TO OFFER SANCTIONS RELIEF WITH NO FURTHER STEPS BY THE SERBS. WE AGREED TO CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS ON THIS ISSUE.

9. EU REPS AGREED WITH US ON THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF INCLUDING A MECHANISM IN THE PLAN FOR REIMPOSING SANCTIONS SHOULD MILOSEVIC FAIL TO CONTINUE TO MEET HIS COMMITMENTS, I.E., PERIODIC SECURITY COUNCIL REVIEW AND POSITIVE ACTION TO CONTINUE SANCTIONS RELIEF. (THE RUSSIANS HAD ALREADY DEPARTED WHEN THIS WAS DISCUSSED.)

10. EU REPS INSISTED THAT SUSPENSION OF FINANCIAL SANCTIONS COULD NOT BE SEPARATED FROM TRADE SANCTIONS

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BUT NOTED THAT RELEASE OF FROZEN ASSETS WOULD NEED TO BE CONSIDERED IN LIGHT OF "SUCCESSOR STATE" CONCERNS. THE EU CONSIDERED THE DEFINITION OF "STRATEGIC GOODS" (UNSCR 787 VERSUS EU ACTION PLAN) A MOOT ISSUE FOR PLAN B BECAUSE THEY WOULD NOT HOLD BACK SANCTIONS RELIEF ON TRADE IN STRATEGIC GOODS.

11. AT U.S. REQUEST, THE EUROPEANS AGREED TO INSERT THE INCENTIVE MEASURES CONTAINED INTHE EUROPEAN ACTION PLAN AS PART OF THE OVERALL PLAN B PACKAGE. THESE MEASURES WOULD BE HELD BACK TO HELP ENSURE FULL COMPLIANCE BY MILOSEVIC WITH THE PLAN. AMONG OTHER THINGS, THE MEASURES INCLUDE SPECIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS WITH THE EU (MUCH DESIRED BY MILOSEVIC) AND ACCESS TO THE IFI'S.

GAS FOR SERBIA

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12. THE RUSSIANS AGAIN MADE A STRONG PITCH TO SEND "HUMANITARIAN" GAS TO SERBIA. WE RESPONDED THAT THIS WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE AS LONG AS SARAJEVO WAS NOT RECEIVING GAS SUPPLIES AND WE WOULD CONSIDER IT ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NEW YORK SANCTIONS GROUP.

CONTACT GROUP VISIT TO THE CAPITALS

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13. THE CONTACT GROUP DECIDED IT SHOULD VISIT BELGRADE, SARAJEVO AND ZAGREB DURING THE WEEK PRECEEDING THE CONTACT GROUP MINISTERIAL. WE NOTED THAT CONSULTATIONS WITH MILOSEVIC REGARDING HANDLING OF THE PALE SERBS WOULD BE ESSENTIAL IF WE WERE TO ADVANCE THE CONTACT GROUP PLAN AT THE CG MINISTERIAL. MORE IMPORTANTLY, THE CG HAD NOT BEEN TO SARAJEVO FOR THREE MONTHS AND THE GOBH WAS COMPLAINING THAT IT HAD NOT BEEN ADEQUATELY CONSULTED BY THE CONTACT GROUP. THE CONTACT GROUP WILL MEET IN PARIS ON NOVEMBER 27, BEFORE UNDERTAKING THE TRIP TO CAPITALS. THE CONTACT GROUP (MINUS THE RUSSIANS, WHO HAD ALREADY DEPARTED) ALSO AGREED TO A DECEMBER 1 MEETING AND RECOMMENDED A CG MEETING REINFORCED BY POLITICAL DIRECTORS ON THE MORNING OF DECEMBER 2. THE PURPOSE OF THESE MEETINGS WOULD BE TO FINALIZE PREPARATION FOR THE CG MINISTERIAL ON DECEMBER 2.
CROWE
BT

FROM:
SITREPRT

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9421361
RECEIVED: 17 NOV 94 16

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 17 NOV 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 17 NOV PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 21 NOV 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9421363 9421385

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0108 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
KERRICK
NSC CHRON
VERSHBOW

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94111720	FOR DECISION
001		X	94111720	SENS APPROVED RECOM
002		X	94111720	SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	941117	FUERTH, L	
002	941117	BRILL, K	
002	941117	MCALEER, R	
002	941117	INDERFURTH, K	
002	941117	PANETTA, L	
002	941117	GARTHOFF, D	
002	941117	PATRICK, T	

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Sens	1	DS	A
Itoh			
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	DPS 11/17	D
NSC Secretariat	4		

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____

CC: WHO

COMMENTS:

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LOG 9421361
DATE 17 NOV 94

SUBJECT: PC MTG ON BOSNIA 18 NOV
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EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	18 Nov	0900	L A Branscum PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET , N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
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AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

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PRECEDENCE: (IMMEDIATE) PRIORITY ROUTINE

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DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH for DPS (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia Nov. 18 NSC LOG # 21361

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC LOG # 21361

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting PAGES: 2

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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21361

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 17, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. LEON E. PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the
President of the
United States

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T.R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

AMBASSADOR RICK INDEFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia on Friday, November 18, at 9am in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Principals plus one. The agenda is attached at Tab A. No paper will be circulated.

for William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By: MI NARA, Date 6/16/10
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INFORMAL PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: November 18, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 9 - 10am

AGENDA

I. Bihac

A. Situation Assessment.....CIA

B. Strategy to Contain.....State

II. Other issues

A. UNSC Lift Resolution: Status/Next Steps.....State

B. Managing Nunn-Mitchell Implementation

-- Status of Operational Modifications.....JCS

-- Next Steps with Allies/Congress.....State/OSD

C. Contact Group Status Report.....State

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 2/6/20
2018-0682-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 17, 1994



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: DON KERRICK

SUBJECT: Principals Meeting on Bosnia, November 18, 1994

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Principals Meeting on Bosnia to be held on November 18, 1994. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve AL Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET , N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
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AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	11/17	8:45 am	g Palmieri PRINT LAST NAME: Palmieri COPY: 1
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX

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2012-0533-M

See also 2013-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (4 pages)~~	~~11/28/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RDS 04/17/2015
~~001b. memo~~	~~[Duplicate of 001a] [incomplete copy] (1 page)~~	~~11/28/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
002a. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Principals Committee Review of Bihac and Bosnia Policy (4 pages)	11/29/1994	P1/b(1)
002b. memo	[Duplicate of 002a] [incomplete copy] (3 pages)	11/29/1994	P1/b(1)
003a. memo	Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake re: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (4 pages)	11/26/1994	P1/b(1)
~~003b. cable~~	~~Prime Mininster John Major to President Clinton (2 pages)~~	~~11/23/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
003c. letter	President Clinton to Prime Minister John Major (2 pages)	11/1994	P1/b(1)
004a. memo	William Itoh to Leon Fuerth, et al.; Re: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)	11/26/1994	P1/b(1)
004b. agenda	Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)	11/28/1994	P1/b(1)
004c. memo	Don Kerrick to Samuel Berger; Re: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, November 29, 1994 (1 page)	11/25/1994	P1/b(1)
004d. memo	[Duplicate of 004a] [with Annotation] (1 page)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)
004e. memo	[Duplicate of 004a] (1 page)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)

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2010-0533-M
rs629

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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rs629

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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RECORD ID: 9421404
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TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 02 DEC 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 28 NOV PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 01 DEC 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9421389 9421396

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0110 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		DARBY
		HALL
		JOSHI
		KERRICK
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

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DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94120313	FOR DECISION
001		X	94120313	SODERBERG APPROVED RECOM
002		X	94120313	SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
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002	941202	BRILL, K	
002	941202	PANETTA, L	
002	941202	MCALEER, R	
002	941202	INDERFURTH, K	
002	941202	GARTHOFF, D	
002	941202	PATRICK, T	

Rcvd 11/30 7:20am

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Reed			
Sens	1	AS	
Itoh			
Soderberg	2/4		
Berger	CC		
Lake	3		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5		
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COMMENTS:

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Itoh			
Soderberg	2/4		
Berger	cc		
Lake	3		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5	11/30 12/3	D
NSC Secretariat			N

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SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR PC MTG ON BOSNIA ON 28 NOV
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MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	5 Dec	0700	[signature]
	PRINT LAST NAME:		Branscum
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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET , N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	12-3-94	1717	[signature]
	PRINT LAST NAME:		Allen
	COPY: 1		
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	12/5/94	1130	[signature]
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MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET , N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	12/3	7:29	Charles Watson PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1

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SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR PC MTG ON BOSNIA ON 28 NOV
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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET , N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: PANETTA COPY: 1

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 2, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of
the U.S. to the United Nations

MR. LEON E. PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President
of the United States

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia
November 28, 1994 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MM NARA, Date 4/14/15

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions
Meeting of NSC Principals Committee
DATE: November 28, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 3:30 - 6:00pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Anthony Lake

OVP
Leon Fuerth

State
Secretary Warren Christopher
Peter Tarnoff

DOD
Secretary William Perry
Walter Slocombe

UN
Ambassador Madeleine Albright
David Scheffer

CIA
Director James Woolsey
Norman Schindler

JCS
GEN. John Shalikashvili
LTG Dan Christman

White House
Samuel Berger
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
Alexander Vershbow
Donald Kerrick

Summary of Conclusions

Next Steps on Bihac

1. The Principals discussed the current situation in the Bihac region and agreed that our main goals should be to end the fighting and support efforts to negotiate measures to permit humanitarian aid to reach the besieged population. The Principals agreed not to press further for strategic air strikes to roll back Serb forces. They affirmed that the U.S. will stand by its commitment through NATO to provide Close Air Support or air strikes if requested by UNPROFOR with the proviso that appropriate action is available to NATO to deal with the Serb air defense threat.

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0533-M
ls 9/30/14 (1.34)

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Short-Term Strategy

2. The Principals agreed to press for a broadened diplomatic strategy based upon the following elements:

- Country-wide cessation of hostilities for at least three months, and preferably six months, tied to a reinvigorated diplomatic effort.

- Demilitarization of the Bihac safe area within its established limits, to be enforced by existing UNPROFOR troops, possibly with limited augmentation by Dutch or other NATO-country elements with TACP capabilities.

- Bosnian Serb agreement to provide unimpeded access for humanitarian relief convoys to all safe areas and other hard-pressed areas of Bosnia, including opening the "blue route" for commercial access to Sarajevo.

- Bosnian Government agreement to comply with previous demilitarization agreements around Sarajevo.

- Renewed diplomatic contacts with all parties by the Contact Group (and/or through the convening of an international conference).

  -- While we would end the freeze on contacts with the Bosnian Serbs, the Contact Group map would remain as the starting point for negotiations on territory; nevertheless, the Contact Group could explore informally possible land swaps on the basis of mutual consent among the parties.

  -- The Contact Group would make clear that constitutional principles and the question of links to neighboring states would be on the table, on the basis of "balanced" treatment for the Bosniac-Croat Federation and the Bosnian Serb entity.

- A modified "Plan B" should still be offered to Milosevic.

  -- However, in return for U.S. agreement to the EU's front-loaded approach to sanctions relief, we should insist on more stringent conditions, possibly to include Bosnian Serb compliance with cessation of hostilities and humanitarian access agreements, as well as steps purely in Milosevic's control (mutual recognition, support for Z-4 plan, etc.).

  -- We will also insist on short periods for sanctions suspension and a credible mechanism for reimposing the sanctions if Milosevic ceases to comply with the conditions.

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- We will also press Milosevic to cut off support for the Krajina Serbs, including closing the Serbian-Croatian border in Sector East, with the sanctioning of international monitors.

- Final litmus tests should be laid down by Contact Group as the basis for a decision in January (at the end of 100-day period) on whether to extend the limited sanctions relief that is now in effect for Serbia. We should demand much stricter compliance than currently being demonstrated, including "zero option" for fuel and military shipments to the Bosnian Serbs, physical closure of most crossings, and perhaps agreement to increase the number of monitors.

- We should warn Milosevic that sanctions tightening, and not just an end to sanctions suspension, will occur if we are not satisfied at the 100-day mark.

- We should press forward with efforts to contain spillover: push Z-4 plan, press for Belgrade dialogue with Kosovo Albanians, strengthen support for Macedonia.

Longer-Term Strategy

3. The Principals deferred decision on steps to take should the short-term approach fail to produce desired progress. The Principals were asked to consider the following elements, or a combination thereof, of a longer-term strategy as a basis for discussion at a future meeting:

- Multilateral lift and strike, preceded by an orderly (NATO-assisted) departure of UNPROFOR. U.S. would set time limit for its military support and air involvement (1-2 years), after which Bosnians would be on their own. Diplomatic efforts would continue in the hope that lift would bring Bosnian Serbs to their senses.

- Reinforcement of UNPROFOR and redefinition of its mission so that NATO air power can be used more aggressively on the basis of its current mandates. (This might have to include a U.S. ground force commitment, unless we would want a largely Islamic-country force).

- U.S. disengagement from diplomatic efforts, focus on containment of spillover to Croatia and Kosovo. Plan for maintaining sanctions against Serbia and Bosnian Serbs for the long term, with international community refusing to recognize Serb territorial conquests. UNPROFOR would remain in a purely humanitarian role, to the extent possible.

Dealing with NATO and Allies

U.S. - NATO Relationship

4. The Principals discussed the impact of recent events in Bosnia on NATO and strongly reaffirmed the importance of the alliance to the United States, recognizing that future U.S. involvement in Bosnia should be conducted in concert with our allies.

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Impact of Nunn-Mitchell on NATO

Principals acknowledged allied concerns that Nunn-Mitchell was the first step leading to unilateral lifting of the arms embargo which could have serious consequences on the alliance. They agreed to make strong statements opposing unilateral lift in the upcoming Ministerials and in public.

U.S. Participation in NATO Ground Operations in Bosnia

The Principals reviewed the state of planning at NATO and within UNPROFOR for the withdrawal of UNPROFOR forces from Bosnia should that be required. They recognized that uncertainty surrounding U.S. ground forces participation in a NATO operation to assist UNPROFOR withdrawal required clarification. They agreed to recommend to the President that he authorize Secretaries Christopher and Perry to inform the allies that the U.S. agreed to participate in such an operation in principle, to include ground forces, pending review of the plan, alternatives and Congressional consultants. Action: OSD/JCS to prepare paper summarizing current state of NATO/UNPROFOR military planning and framing degree of U.S. commitment as a basis for decision memo for the President.

Dealing with Congress and the Public

5. The Principals agreed that efforts should continue to raise the awareness in Congress about the implications of unilateral lifting of the arms embargo and to strongly oppose unilateral lift in public and in Congressional consultations. Secretary Perry will begin the next round of consultations this week using his weekly breakfast with key members. The Principals further agreed to DoD hosting private sessions with key members. The Principals directed that talking points be prepared outlining next steps in Bosnia. Action: NSC to develop talking points.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 29, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: DON KERRICK

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, November 28, 1994

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia held November 28, 1994.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

TL - 11/29
This has no mention of possible concessions to Serbs -- if nothing re today's stories flip / flop.
NS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDY NARA, Date 10/7/2019
2010-0533-M

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

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2013-0077-M (1) KC 7/16/2013

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9421411
RECEIVED: 29 NOV 94 10

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 30 NOV 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
UN
PC
SERBIA
NATO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FOLLOW UP PAPER TO PRES FM 28 NOV PC MTG ON BIHAC & BOSNIA POLICY

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT DUE DATE: 02 DEC 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9421389 9421396

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0110 CODES: BOS YUG

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		DARBY
		HALL
		JOSHI
		KERRICK
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW
		WOLIN

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSDRS CLOSED BY: NSASK DOC 2 OF 2

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NARA, Date 6/14/12
2010-0533-M

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~~SECRET~~ RECORD ID: 9421411

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94113008	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
002	PRESIDENT	Z	94113008	FOR INFORMATION
002		X	94113008	NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	941130		VICE PRESIDENT
002	941130		WH CHIEF OF STAFF

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National Security Council
The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
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Berger	2		
Lake	3		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	MBN 11/29	D To Pres
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS: cc: NS ✓

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Principals Committee Review of Bihac and Bosnia Policy (4 pages)	11/29/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0110 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, November 28, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs629

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 29, 1994



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

FROM: DON KERRICK DK

SUBJECT: Memorandum for the President on Bosnia

Attached is your memorandum for the President on Bosnia Policy following the November 28 Principals meeting.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum for the President

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CAD, NARA, Date 6/14/12
2012-0573-M

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. memo	[Duplicate of 002a] [incomplete copy] (3 pages)	11/29/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0110 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, November 28, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs629

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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RECORD ID: 9421396
RECEIVED: 26 NOV 94 11

TO: LAKE

FROM: KERRICK
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 26 NOV 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPERS FOR 28 NOV PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 30 NOV 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9421389 9421404

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0110 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		KERRICK
		NSC CHRON
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 6/14/12
2012-0577-M

~~SECRET~~ RECORD ID: 9421396

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94112615	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	94113017	NOTED BY LAKE

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National Security Council
The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Sens			
Itoh	1	copy	
Soderberg			
Berger	2	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	MBV 11/30	N
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette NO

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. memo	Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake re: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (4 pages)	11/26/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0110 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, November 28, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs629

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PREC: IMMEDIATE **CLASS: ~~SECRET~~** **DTG:**232336Z NOV 94

FM: CABINET OFFICE

TO:WHITE HOUSE

////

~~S E C R E T~~ HANDLE VIA CABO CHANNELS
QQQQ
MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINITSTER
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT CLINTON

DEAR BILL
BIHAC HAS UNDERLINED THE PROBLEMS WE ALL FACE IN OUR EFFORTS TO MOVE BOSNIA TOWARDS PEACE. MORE THAN EVER, WE NEED TO BE CLEAR ABOUT THE ROAD AHEAD AND HOW WE CAN BEST WORK TOGETHER.
THE NATO STRIKE ON UDBINA AIRFIELD WAS THE RIGHT RESPONSE TO THE AIR ATTACKS BY THE CROATIAN SERBS. THE TARGETING TODAY BY NATO OF SAM SITES INCLUDING THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR ATTACKS ON BRITISH HARRIERS WAS ALSO RIGHT. I WORRY OF COURSE THAT, DAY BY DAY, NATO IS BEING DRAWN FURTHER INTO THIS CIVIL WAR. BUT WE HAVE GIVEN UN AND NATO COMMANDERS THE AUTHORITY TO CALL ON AIR STRIKES IF THEY BELIEVE THESE ARE NEEDED FOR UNPROFOR TO FULFIL ITS MANDATE FOR BIHAC AND OTHER SAFE AREAS. IF THEY DO SO, I SHALL FULLY SUPPORT THEIR DECISION.

YOU AND I KNOW THAT THERE WILL NOT BE A MILITARY SOLUTION IN BOSNIA AND WE HAVE BOTH SAID SO IN PUBLIC. WE SHOULD DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO REINFORCE THIS MESSAGE. UNPROFOR IS NOT EQUIPPED, STRUCTURED OR MANDATED TO IMPOSE PEACE, PARTICULARLY WHEN THE PARTIES THEMSELVES SEEM TO WANT WAR. NOR CAN ONE FORCE GROUND TROOPS TO WITHDRAW BY BOMBING THEM FROM THE AIR. WE MUST URGENTLY REDOUBLE OUR EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. WARREN CHRISTOPHER, DOUGLAS HURD AND OTHER CONTACT GROUP FOREIGN MINISTERS WILL HAVE TO FINALISE HOW TO DO THIS WHEN THEY MEET NEXT WEEK. THE CONTACT GROUP HAS MESSED AROUND FOR TOO LONG. IT MUST RE-ENGAGE WITH THE WARRING PARTIES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE CANNOT LET THEM STRING US ALONG INDEFINITELY. BUT WE MUST ALLOW ENOUGH TIME TO SEE IF A POLITICAL SOLUTION CAN BE FOUND BEFORE THE SPRING.

I SYMPATHISE WITH YOUR DIFFICULTIES WITH CONGRESS. I SHALL SEE SENATOR DOLE NEXT WEEK, AND MAKE SURE HE UNDERSTANDS OUR CONCERNS ABOUT THE APPROACH HE ADVOCATES. I WILL TELL HIM, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THAT NATO IS NOT AVAILABLE FOR WAGING WAR ON BEHALF OF THE BOSNIAN MUSLIMS.

I SEE TWO VERY SERIOUS RISKS IN THE WAY MATTERS ARE DEVELOPING. FIRST, THE PRESSURE FROM CONGRESS FOR UNILATERAL LIFT IS ENCOURAGING MILITANCY ON THE GROUND. THIS MAY IN ITSELF FORCE UNPROFOR TO WITHDRAW. THAT WOULD BE A DIFFICULT MILITARY OPERATION. ALLIANCE PLANNING IS BASED ON HAVING US FORCES ON THE GROUND TO EXECUTE IT AT ACCEPTABLE RISK. THE DAMAGE TO BOSNIA WOULD BE INCALCULABLE. THE WAR WOULD ESCALATE AND THE GAINS OF THE LAST YEAR WOULD BE LOST. I ALSO FEAR THAT WAR WOULD REIGNITE IN CROATIA.

THE SECOND RISK IS EVEN MORE FAR-REACHING. WE HAVE WORKED HARD IN LONDON, DRAWING ON THE STATEMENTS FROM THE US ADMINISTRATION, TO LIMIT THE STRAIN WITHIN THE ALLIANCE CAUSED BY THE US DECISION TO WITHDRAW FROM OPERATION SHARP GUARD. WE HAVE POINTED TO THE

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PER E.O. 13526
NL 2/6/2020 (6.51)
NLV-0682-m

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LIMITED PRACTICAL EFFECT OF THIS DECISION AND THE CONTINUED COOPERATION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE ON OTHER ASPECTS OF BOSNIA POLICY. BUT EUROPEAN MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE REMAIN DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE DIVERGENCE OVER BOSNIA.

WE IN BRITAIN ARE ACUTELY AWARE OF WHAT THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP HAS MEANT TO US FOR GENERATIONS.

WE HAVE ALSO STRONGLY SUPPORTED US POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA, WHICH MAY BE LOST ALTOGETHER IF OUR COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA OVER BOSNIA COLLAPSES AND YOU AND THE RUSSIANS BACK DIFFERENT SIDES IN THE WAR.

WE MUST FIND WAYS OF ENSURING THAT BOSNIA DOES NOT PREJUDICE OUR WIDER COMMON AND STRATEGIC INTERESTS.

I AM NOW CONSIDERING HOW WE SHOULD BEST PROCEED. AT THE MOMENT WE ARE BEING DRIVEN TOO MUCH BY EVENTS AND EXTERNAL FORCES. SIMPLY RATCHETING UP THE AIRSTRIKES WILL NOT MOVE THE SITUATION FORWARD, BUT COULD FORCE UNPROFORS WITHDRAWAL. IT IS HIGH TIME THE CONTACT GROUP REGAINED THE INITIATIVE AND CONFRONTED THE PARTIES WITH THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR ACTIONS. NEXT WEEKS MEETING IS AN OPPORTUNITY WE MUST TAKE.

I SHALL BE CONSULTING CABINET COLLEAGUES EARLY NEXT WEEK, AND WOULD WELCOME YOUR VIEWS BEFORE THEN. DO YOU SEE A WAY OF BREAKING THE DOWNWARD SPIRAL?

YOURS EVER

JOHN

BT
#0001
<^TOR>941123192540 M1378839

FROM:
SITREPRT

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003c. letter	President Clinton to Prime Minister John Major (2 pages)	11/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0110 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, November 28, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs629

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9421389
RECEIVED: 25 NOV 94 11

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 26 NOV 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 28 NOV PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 29 NOV 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9421396 9421404

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0110 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		CICIO
		DARBY
		JOSHI
		KERRICK
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSASK CLOSED BY: NSKDB DOC 2 OF 2

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	94112514	FOR DECISION
001	KERRICK	Z	94112515	FOR REDO
001	BERGER	Z	94112517	FOR DECISION
001		X	94112612	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
001	ITOH	Z	94112612	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	94112614	ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	941126	FUERTH, L	
002	941126	BRILL, K	
002	941126	MCALEER, R	
002	941126	INDERFURTH, K	
002	941126	PANETTA, L	
002	941126	GARTHOFF, D	
002	941126	PATRICK, T	

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9421389
RECEIVED: 25 NOV 94 11

TO: BERGER

FROM: KERRICK
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 25 NOV 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 29 NOV PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: FOR DECISION DUE DATE: 29 NOV 94 STATUS: X

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF:

FILES: IFG NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
BERGER		

COMMENTS: _____

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2012-0533-M

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National Security Council
The White House

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Sens			
Itoh	4	WS	
Soderberg			
Berger	5		
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	6	11/26	D
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS: PC - Bosnia Nov 28, 94

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

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National Security Council
The White House

rec'd 11/25
330pm

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 21389

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG JM A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Sens	1	DDS	
Itoh			
Soderberg			
Berger	2		
Lake			
Situation Room			N
West Wing Desk	3		FILE
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____

redo
done

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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LOG 9421389
DATE 26 NOV 94

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 28 NOV PC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	28 Nov	0600	L Branscum PRINT LAST NAME: Branscum COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET , N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	11-26-94	2133	B. Allen PRINT LAST NAME: Allen COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	11/29/94	0900	J. Palmieri PRINT LAST NAME: Palmieri COPY: 1
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX

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SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 28 NOV PC MTG ON BOSNIA
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COL. T. R. PATRICK
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ROOM 2E865
PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001

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MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	28 Nov	0700	L H Branscum PRINT LAST NAME: BRANSCUM COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET , N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: 1
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MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: 1
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX

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By MJ NARA, Date 6/14/00
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MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET , N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	26Nov94	2230	[signature] PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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2012-0573-M

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DATE 26 NOV 94

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 28 NOV PC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET , N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	1 DEC 94	17:33	COPY RETURNED TO NSC AND DESTROYED. RECEIPT RETURNED UNSIGNED. PRINT LAST NAME: K - Bell COPY: 1
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
1994 NOV 26 PM 2:45

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE / PRIORITY / ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 2419 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NOTIFICATION OF 28 NOV PC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21389

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

BNDA

REMARKS:

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MI NARA, Date 6/14/12
2012-0533-M

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WASHFAX

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

NOV 94 14 45

NMCC/JCS

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

1994 NOV 26 PM 2:45

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE / PRIORITY / ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 2419 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 2

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STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

BRNDA

REMARKS:

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By MI NARA, Date 6/14/12
2012-0533-M

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Nov 26 2 56 PM '96

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

1996 NOV 26 PM 2 Nov 26 2 56 PM '96

A

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE / PRIORITY / ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 2419 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 2

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NOTIFICATION OF 28 NOV PC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21389

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

BRNDA

REMARKS:

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NI NARA, Date 5/14/10
2012-0533-M

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
1994 NOV 26 PM 2:45

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

'94 NOV 26 P2:45

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE / PRIORITY / ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 2419 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NOTIFICATION OF 28 NOV PC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21389

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

BRNDA

REMARKS:

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NJ NARA, Date 6/14/10
2010-0533-M

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE
- ☐ FLASH
- ☐ IMMEDIATE
- ☒ PRIORITY
- ☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC LOG # 21389

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting PAGES: 2

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

~~SECRET~~
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004a. memo	William Itoh to Leon Fuerth, et al.; Re: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)	11/26/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0110 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, November 28, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs629

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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TAB

A.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004b. agenda	Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)	11/28/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0110 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, November 28, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs629

RESTRICTION CODES

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21389
REDO

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 25, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW/AV

FROM: DON KERRICK (DK)

SUBJECT: Principals Meeting on Bosnia, November 28, 1994

With Contact Group Ministers to meet next week, Principals should review the Bosnia situation and agree to next steps prior to the Ministerials. Attached at Tab A is a proposed agenda. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you schedule a Principals meeting on Bosnia for Monday, November 28, and authorize Will Itoh to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve for SRB Disapprove _____

11/26/94

w/changes

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MS NARA, Date 6/14/10

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004c. memo	Don Kerrick to Samuel Berger; Re: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, November 29, 1994 (1 page)	11/25/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0110 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, November 28, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs629

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004d. memo	[Duplicate of 004a] [with Annotation] (1 page)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004e. memo	[Duplicate of 004a] (1 page)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0110 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, November 28, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs629

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004f. agenda	[Duplicate of 004b] (1 page)	11/29/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0110 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, November 28, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs629

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

See also 2013-0152-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title: PC0111 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, 1994				
Staff Office-Individual: Records Management				
Original OA/ID Number: 4008				
Row: 43	Section: 6	Shelf: 7	Position: 1	Stack: V

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake re: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (3 pages)	12/02/1994	P1/b(1)
001b. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS re: U.S. Participation in UNPROFOR Withdrawal Operations (3 pages)	12/1994	P1/b(1)
~~001c. memo~~	~~Williamy Perry to Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs re: US Participation in UNPROFOR Withdrawal Operations (1 page)~~	~~11/29/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KDE 05/26/2016
001d. memo	re: Bosnia Policy After the Fall of Bihac (4 pages)	11/28/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0111 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, [December 2,] 1994

2010-0533-M
rs1019

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Bakke, Kyle D.

From: Joshi, M. Kay
To: @EUROPE - European Affairs
Cc: /R, Record at A1; Bakke, Kyle D.; Baldwin, Kenneth; Sens, Andrew D.; @CROSS - Cross Hatches; @LEGAL - Legal Advisor; @LEGISLAT-Legaslative Affairs; @UP - APNSA Special Assistants
Subject: PC Mtg on Bosnia ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~
Date: Thursday, December 01, 1994 5:12PM

Mr. Lake will be holding a PC Meeting on Bosnia tomorrow, December 2 from 2:30 - 3:30 in the Situation Room. Attendance is principals only. Agency attendance will be as follows (using the attendance from previous meetings):

OVP
State
Defense
USUN
CIA
JCS
Chief of Staff

Please let me know if any changes need to be made. I am notifying agencies now.

Thank you.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 6/14/12
2012-0533-F

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9421425
RECEIVED: 01 DEC 94 18

TO: LAKE

FROM: KERRICK
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 01 DEC 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
NATO UN

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPERS FOR 2 DEC PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 05 DEC 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF:

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0111 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		KERRICK
		NSC CHRON
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMBN CLOSED BY: NSJDA DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By DV NARA, Date 2/14/12
2012-0533-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~ RECORD ID: 9421425

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94120209	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	94120316	NOTED BY LAKE

~~SECRET~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

rec'd 12/2 11:10a

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 21425

URGENT NOT PROOFED: ✓ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 18M A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed	1	JWR	
Sens			
Itoh			
Soderberg	2	copy ✓	
Berger	3	Copy	
Lake	4	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5		N
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake re: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (3 pages)	12/02/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0111 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, [December 2,] 1994

2010-0533-M
rs1019

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS re: U.S. Participation in UNPROFOR Withdrawal Operations (3 pages)	12/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0111 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, [December 2,] 1994

2010-0533-M
rs1019

RESTRICTION CODES

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

29 November 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: US Participation in UNPROFOR Withdrawal Operations (U)

~~(S-NF)~~ NATO's detailed planning for the withdrawal of UNPROFOR will not be complete until mid-December. However, the emerging concept is as follows: NATO will assume command of the theater, including operational command of UNPROFOR within Bosnia-Herzegovina. Forward command posts from NATO, including a corps, a subordinate division, and several brigade level headquarters, will deploy to Bosnia. Although the actual level of NATO forces required will be based on intelligence estimates and political conditions at the time of mission execution, this operation could require heavy support, including four to five additional brigades. Some or all of the NATO forces and supporting elements would be pre-positioned into the theater or inside Bosnia before the actual withdrawal commences in order to deter resistance from warring elements.

~~(S-NF)~~ Up to now, we have declined to commit to participation in this proposed operation. Now, in view of the frictions that have developed within the Alliance, it is important at the upcoming series of meetings with NATO that the Secretary of State, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I be authorized to tell our counterparts that the United States agrees in principle to participate in a NATO-led operation to support UNPROFOR's withdrawal, including committing ground forces, subject to our review of the detailed plans and consultations with Congress.

Bill Perry

NOT RELEASABLE TO
FOREIGN NATIONALS

Classified by:
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2013-0682-M
05/26/16 KDE (6455)

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001d. memo	re: Bosnia Policy After the Fall of Bihac (4 pages)	11/28/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0111 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, [December 2,] 1994

2010-0533-M
rs1019

RESTRICTION CODES

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See also 2013-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title: PC0112 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, December 12, 1994				
Staff Office-Individual: Records Management				
Original OA/ID Number: 4008				
Row: 43	Section: 6	Shelf: 7	Position: 1	Stack: V

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (3 pages)~~	~~12/12/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RDS 04/17/2015
~~002a. memo~~	~~Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Principals Review of Bosnia Policy (2 pages)~~	~~12/13/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002b. memo~~	~~[Duplicate of 002a] (2 pages)~~	~~12/13/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002c. memo~~	~~[Duplicate of 002a] (2 pages)~~	~~12/13/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
003a. memo	Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake re: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (5 pages)	12/10/1994	P1/b(1)
~~003b. agenda~~	~~Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)~~	~~12/12/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~004a. schedule~~	~~[Partial Duplicate of 004b] [page 1 only] (1 page)~~	~~12/08/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~004b. schedule~~	~~Drop-By Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)~~	~~12/08/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~005. agenda~~	~~[Duplicate of 003b] (1 page)~~	~~12/12/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0112 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, December 12, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs630

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9421467
RECEIVED: 13 DEC 94 08

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 14 DEC 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 12 DEC PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 16 DEC 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9421440 9421444

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0112 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		DARBY
		HALL
		JOSHI
		KERRICK
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW
		WOLIN

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSASK CLOSED BY: NSASK DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By mn NARA, Date 6/14/10
2012-0533-F

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94121315	FOR DECISION
001		X	94121408	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
002		X	94121408	ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	941214	FUERTH, L	
002	941214	BRILL, K	
002	941214	MCALEER, R	
002	941214	INDERFURTH, K	
002	941214	PANETTA, L	
002	941214	GARTHOFF, D	
002	941214	PATRICK, T	

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 21467

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (W) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Sens	1/3	DDS	
Itoh			
Soderberg	2	DDS per VCS	
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	JSH 12/14	D
NSC Secretariat			N

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 21467

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (M) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Sens	1/3	DDS	
Itoh			
Soderberg	2	DDS per VCS.	
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	JSH 12/14	D
NSC Secretariat			N

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9421467
DATE 14 DEC 94

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR PC ON BOSNIA 12 DEC
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	12/14	11:15	A. KERR SITROOM BOX PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET , N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	12/14/94	2:30 PM	Anthony Tapp PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: FAX
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	12/14/94	3:35	PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: FAX

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

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By MS NARA, Date 6/14/10
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DATE 14 DEC 94

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DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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	COPY: 1		
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET , N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
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COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
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AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: FAX		
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: 1		
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			
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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET , N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	12/14	1510	D McMillan PRINT LAST NAME: McMillan COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: FAX
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: 1
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: FAX

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
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TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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RELEASER: S.G.

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 2562 **CLASSIFICATION:** ~~SECRET~~ **TOTAL :** 5 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM : NSC WEST WING DESK (WH) (NAME) | (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) | WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 12 DEC PC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21467

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
	USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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TIME OF RECEIPT

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- ☐ IMMEDIATE
- ☑ PRIORITY
- ☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC LOG # 21467

FROM: National Security Council NSC PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting SOC FOR PC ON BOSNIA PAGES: _____

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

~~SECRET~~

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
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2012-0533-M

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21467

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 13, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

LEON E. PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the
President of the
United States

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T.R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

AMBASSADOR RICK INDEFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia December 12, 1994 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MS NARA, Date 6/14/10
2010-0533-M

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21467

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions
Meeting of NSC Principals Committee
DATE: December 12, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:00 - 3:20pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Anthony Lake

CIA
Director James Woolsey

OVP
Leon Fuerth

JCS
ADM. William Owens

State
Secretary Warren Christopher
David Gergen
Charles Thomas

White House
Samuel Berger
Nancy Soderberg

DOD
Secretary William Perry

NSC
Alexander Vershbow

UN
Ambassador Madeleine Albright

Summary of Conclusions

Diplomatic Strategy

1. The Principals reviewed the status of diplomatic efforts. Noting the importance of showing progress before the Congress convenes in January, the Principals agreed to press for a cease-fire and an early meeting of the parties, under Contact Group direction, that builds on the December 2 Contact Group Ministerial decisions. State will discuss this with Contact Group partners and invite the parties to attend. Action: State.

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2010-0533-M
RS ~~9/30/14~~
4/7/2015 (1.35)

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Status of UNPROFOR

2. The Principals discussed the status of NATO planning for the withdrawal of UNPROFOR, noting that the NATO planning should be completed within a week and would be followed by a request to capitals to identify specific force contributions.

3. The Principals agreed to encourage UNPROFOR to stay and to look for ways that would contribute to a permissive withdrawal, should withdrawal become necessary, and to identify measures to improve the effectiveness of UNPROFOR in response to recent Bosnian Serb actions. Should withdrawal from Bosnia become inevitable, the Principals agreed that efforts should be made to retain UNPROFOR in Croatia and Macedonia. Action: DoD develop UNPROFOR options.

4. The Principals agreed that further discussions should be held with the French and other Allies on the possibility of reopening Sarajevo airport and a humanitarian corridor from the coast to Sarajevo (Blue Route). The U.S. approach will be to support the route opening as a French initiative to preclude the perception that we might be pressing for action which we are unwilling to support with ground forces. Further consideration should also be given to the option of disabling Serb weapons at collection sites around Sarajevo and then withdrawing UNPROFOR personnel from the sites. Action: DoD and State develop options and strategy.

5. The Principals discussed strategy following UNPROFOR withdrawal and agreed that we will continue to support a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo as the option of last resort should the Bosnian Serbs continue to reject a cease-fire and negotiations based on the Contact Group proposal. The Principals requested a round-up of the responses to last week's State cable to NATO and capitals regarding our post-withdrawal strategy. Action: State provide summary of responses by COB December 14.

Sanctions

6. The Principals discussed the upcoming 100-day decision point on extending sanctions relief for the Serbian border closure. They agreed that while the U.S. position should be based upon the facts available at the time, they do not favor an open-ended extension, preferring at most a 100-day extension.

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Congressional Strategy

7. The Principals reaffirmed their desire for continued efforts to raise the awareness in Congress about the implications of a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo and to strongly oppose unilateral lift in public and in Congressional consultations. The Principals noted the possible need to use the veto to counter unilateral lift efforts.

8. The Principals discussed whether it would be politically prudent to seek or encourage Congressional authorization for U.S. participation in a NATO-led operation to support UNPROFOR withdrawal, without compromising the President's legal prerogatives to act without such authorization. They agreed to defer a decision on a recommendation to the President until further consultations with both the outgoing and incoming leadership are completed. The Principals requested an informal head-count be conducted to better understand Congressional thinking about U.S. participation in UNPROFOR withdrawal. Action: NSC and State provide summary of Congressional thinking.

9. The Principals agreed that efforts should continue to raise the awareness in Congress about our Bosnia policy and the implications of a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo. They reaffirmed that our policy will be to strongly oppose unilateral lift in public and in Congressional consultations, and to draw a distinction between unilateral and multilateral lift. It was agreed that traveling teams should offer briefings to members during the Congressional recess. Action: OSD, JCS, State and NSC to organize briefings.

Deputies Committee Meetings

10. The Principals agreed to the convening of periodic Deputies Committee meetings on Bosnia.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 13, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: DON KERRICK

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, December 12, 1994

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia held December 12, 1994.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By ~~NARA~~ NARA, Date 6/14/10
NLC-10-053-2-N

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TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 13 DEC 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FOLLOW UP PAPER TO PRES RE 12 DEC PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT DUE DATE: 16 DEC 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9421440 9421444

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0112 CODES: BOS

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FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		DARBY
		HALL
		KERRICK
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW
		WOLIN

COMMENTS: _____

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94121315	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
002	PRESIDENT	Z	94121321	FOR INFORMATION
002		X	94121416	NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
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002	941213		WH CHIEF OF STAFF

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9421469
RECEIVED: 13 DEC 94 12

TO: LAKE

FROM: VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 13 DEC 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FOLLOW UP PAPER TO PRES RE 12 DEC PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION DUE DATE: 16 DEC 94 STATUS: X

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF:

FILES: IFG NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
LAKE		

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Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	(A) 12/13	D PODESTA
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

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rec'd 12/13 6:15pm

National Security Council
The White House

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Itoh			
Soderberg			
Berger	2		
Lake			
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West Wing Desk			
NSC Secretariat			

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cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS:

13 DEC 94 2:41

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w/ TL CHANGES.

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

diskette requested 12/13

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21469

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 13, 1994 94 DEC 13 P9:09

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Principals' Review of Bosnia Policy

Principals met on Monday afternoon to review our Bosnia policy in the wake of your decision in principle to commit U.S. ground forces to assist in UNPROFOR withdrawal and Chris's December 2 meeting with his Contact Group counterparts.

Focus on Diplomacy: Everyone agreed that it was critical to use the weeks between now and the arrival of the new Congress to show concrete progress toward a diplomatic settlement. Absent such progress, it will be much harder to fend off legislation mandating a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo. (Whether you should threaten to veto any such legislation was discussed briefly; it is the subject of a separate memorandum.)

Chris will be contacting his Contact Group counterparts in the next few days to coordinate efforts to convene a meeting of the parties under Contact Group aegis before year's end. Our special envoy, Ambassador Charles Thomas, believes both sides are eager to negotiate territorial trade-offs once a time-limited ceasefire is agreed. The challenge will be to persuade the Bosnian Serbs to accept a 3-4 month ceasefire now that they feel they have successfully intimidated the international community from taking decisive action against them. While Milosevic has put some pressure on the Bosnian Serbs through his closure of the border, Chris feels we cannot rely solely on the Serbian leader, who -- despite his personal grudge against Karadzic -- has not abandoned his Greater Serbia ambitions.

Restoring UNPROFOR's Credibility: Principals noted that, in the wake of your decision to support UNPROFOR withdrawal and with the specter of lifting the arms embargo post-withdrawal, allies have reaffirmed their desire to keep UNPROFOR in place. Following up on Bill Perry's and my encouraging talks with French Defense Minister Léotard, we will explore at NATO several options for increasing UNPROFOR's effectiveness: redeploying or reconfiguring UNPROFOR so that it can better defend itself against Serb attacks; opening a humanitarian corridor from the coast to Sarajevo; and (once again) disabling Serb heavy weapons at collection sites around Sarajevo as a basis for withdrawing

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~~SECRET~~ cc: Vice President
Declassify on: OADR Chief of Staff

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UNPROFOR personnel from these vulnerable sites. We will continue to take the position that if, despite our best efforts, UNPROFOR withdrawal cannot be avoided, then our strategy should be to lift the arms embargo multilaterally.

Dealing with the Congress: Principals weighed the pros and cons of seeking or encouraging a Congressional authorization in the event we have to deploy ground forces to support UNPROFOR withdrawal. No one suggested conceding Presidential prerogatives as a legal matter. But opinion was divided on whether it would be politically prudent to seek an authorization given the risk of American casualties and the need for bipartisanship, or whether this would simply be an invitation to amendments tying U.S. participation to unilateral lift. It was agreed to revisit this question after we have a clearer sense of Congressional attitudes toward U.S. participation in a withdrawal operation.

In any event, we will step up our consultations on Bosnia with the incoming Congressional leadership in the coming weeks. The aim will be to build support for our diplomatic approach and to highlight the dangers of unilateral lift -- in terms of damaging NATO and making the U.S. solely responsible for the conflict. In pursuing these consultations, we will be careful to distinguish between unilateral and multilateral lift, given the potential need for Congressional support for a lift-and-strike strategy if diplomatic efforts fail.

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21469

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 13, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

SUBJECT: Memorandum to the President on Principals' Review of Bosnia Policy

Attached is a memo to the President on Monday's PC discussion of Bosnia.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign that attached memorandum to the President.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to the President

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NARA, Date 6/14/13
NSC 0533-96

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Marshall, Betty A.

From: Hall, Wilma G.
To: Vershbow, Alexander R.; @NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor
Cc: /R, Record at A1; Marshall, Betty A.
Subject: RE: Memo to President on Bosnia [~~SECRET~~]
Date: Tuesday, December 13, 1994 5:36PM

Mr. Lake has reviewed your E-mail and noted:

PLEASE MAKE CHANGES, GIVE ME ORIGINAL FOR SIGNATURE.

TL changes:

Paragraph beginning "Restoring UNPROFOR's Credibility:

Line 5, after "...on Bill Perry's..." , insert words "and my".

Line 6, after "...several options" delete word "from" and insert "for"

If you have a question, please call.

From: Vershbow, Alexander R.
To: @NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor
CC: /R, Record at A1
Subject: Memo to President on Bosnia [~~SECRET~~]
Date: Tuesday, December 13, 1994 02:56 PM

<<Attached File: 21469PRE.DOC>>

Version signed by me and being put into system now.

WEST WING DESK —
pls provide SANDY BERGER
w/ TL signed version of
memo to Pres.

THANKS,
WILMA

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/7/2019
2010-0533-M

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Hall, Wilma G.

From: Vershbow, Alexander R.
To: @NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor
Cc: /R, Record at A1
Subject: Memo to President on Bosnia ~~[SECRET]~~
Date: Tuesday, December 13, 1994 2:56PM

Version signed by me and being put into system now.
<<File Attachment: 21469PRE.DOC>>

Please make changes
& give me signed
for signature.

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By LMS NARA, Date 6/19/20
2018-0533-M

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~~SECRET~~ 21469

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Principals' Review of Bosnia Policy

Principals met on Monday afternoon to review our Bosnia policy in the wake of your decision in principle to commit U.S. ground forces to assist in UNPROFOR withdrawal and Chris's December 2 meeting with his Contact Group counterparts.

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(continued)

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NLWJC 2/4/2008 (Lake)

~~SECRET~~ cc: Vice President
Declassify on: OADR Chief of Staff

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2013-0682-M

We will continue to take the position that if, despite our best efforts, UNPROFOR withdrawal cannot be avoided, then our strategy should be to lift the arms embargo multilaterally.

Dealing with the Congress: Principals weighed the pros and cons of seeking or encouraging a Congressional authorization in the event we have to deploy ground forces to support UNPROFOR withdrawal. No one suggested conceding Presidential prerogatives as a legal matter. But opinion was divided on whether it would be politically prudent to seek an authorization given the risk of American casualties and the need for bipartisanship, or whether this would simply be an invitation to amendments tying U.S. participation to unilateral lift. It was agreed to revisit this question after we have a clearer sense of Congressional attitudes toward U.S. participation in a withdrawal operation.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 13, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

SUBJECT: Memorandum to the President on Principals' Review of Bosnia Policy

Attached is a memo to the President on Monday's PC discussion of Bosnia.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign that attached memorandum to the President.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to the President

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MJ NARA, Date 6/14/10
2014-0533-M

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

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~~SECRET~~ 21469

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Principals' Review of Bosnia Policy

Principals met on Monday afternoon to review our Bosnia policy in the wake of your decision in principle to commit U.S. ground forces to assist in UNPROFOR withdrawal and Chris's December 2 meeting with his Contact Group counterparts.

Focus on Diplomacy: Everyone agreed that it was critical to use the weeks between now and the arrival of the new Congress to show concrete progress toward a diplomatic settlement. Absent such progress, it will be much harder to fend off legislation mandating a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo. (Whether you should threaten to veto any such legislation was discussed briefly; it is the subject of a separate memorandum.)

Chris will be contacting his Contact Group counterparts in the next few days to coordinate efforts to convene a meeting of the parties under Contact Group aegis before year's end. Our special envoy, Ambassador Charles Thomas, believes both sides are eager to negotiate territorial trade-offs once a time-limited ceasefire is agreed. The challenge will be to persuade the Bosnian Serbs to accept a 3-4 month ceasefire now that they feel they have successfully intimidated the international community from taking decisive action against them. While Milosevic has put some pressure on the Bosnian Serbs through his closure of the border, Chris feels we cannot rely solely on the Serbian leader, who -- despite his personal grudge against Karadzic -- has not abandoned his Greater Serbia ambitions.

Restoring UNPROFOR's Credibility: Principals noted that, in the wake of your decision to support UNPROFOR withdrawal and with the specter of lifting the arms embargo post-withdrawal, allies have reaffirmed their desire to keep UNPROFOR in place. Following up on Bill Perry's encouraging talks with French Defense Minister Léotard, we will explore at NATO several options from increasing UNPROFOR's effectiveness: redeploying or reconfiguring UNPROFOR so that it can better defend itself against Serb attacks; opening a humanitarian corridor from the coast to Sarajevo; and disabling Serb heavy weapons at collection sites around Sarajevo as a basis for withdrawing UNPROFOR personnel from these vulnerable sites.

~~SECRET~~
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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2/6/2020 (7,00)
2013-0682-M
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We will continue to take the position that if, despite our best efforts, UNPROFOR withdrawal cannot be avoided, then our strategy should be to lift the arms embargo multilaterally.

Dealing with the Congress: Principals weighed the pros and cons of seeking or encouraging a Congressional authorization in the event we have to deploy ground forces to support UNPROFOR withdrawal. No one suggested conceding Presidential prerogatives as a legal matter. But opinion was divided on whether it would be politically prudent to seek an authorization given the risk of American casualties and the need for bipartisanship, or whether this would simply be an invitation to amendments tying U.S. participation to unilateral lift. It was agreed to revisit this question after we have a clearer sense of Congressional attitudes toward U.S. participation in a withdrawal operation.

In any event, we will step up our consultations on Bosnia with the incoming Congressional leadership in the coming weeks. The aim will be to build support for our diplomatic approach and to highlight the dangers of unilateral lift -- in terms of damaging NATO and making the U.S. solely responsible for the conflict. In pursuing these consultations, we will be careful to distinguish between unilateral and multilateral lift, given the potential need for Congressional support for a lift-and-strike strategy if diplomatic efforts fail.

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9421451
RECEIVED: 09 DEC 94 15

TO: LAKE

FROM: STEPHENS
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 10 DEC 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPERS FOR 12 DEC PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 13 DEC 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: STEPHENS LOGREF: 9421440 9421444

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0112 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		DARBY
		HALL
		JOSHI
		KERRICK
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW
		WOLIN

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB CLOSED BY: NSKDB DOC 1 OF 1

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 6/11/12
2010-0533-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94121207	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	94121220	NOTED BY LAKE

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RCCd 12/12
7:30am

National Security Council
The White House

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West Wing Desk	5	12/12	
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette NO

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. memo	Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake re: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (5 pages)	12/10/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0112 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, December 12, 1994

2010-0533-M
rs630

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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Proposed Congressional Strategy

During the month of December, we should continue with Hill briefings and principal-to-principal conversations on our overall Bosnia policy. We will have to adjust our message as a result of the recent decision to commit U.S. forces for the withdrawal of UNPROFOR. We should also consider whether and when a Presidential meeting with key Congressional leaders would be appropriate as urged by both Rep. Hamilton and Sen. Lugar.

Before beginning briefings, we must also consider whether or not to seek Congressional authorization for U.S. participation in the NATO led operation. The problem with seeking an authorization is that we could fail to get Congressional approval. We would then have to decide whether or not to move forward with our decision to participate in any case. In addition, it is important to understand any authorization will likely be loaded up with amendments that would attempt to dictate the terms of our Bosnia policy (time limits, command and control, rules of engagement, prohibition on a dual key, etc.). While these provisions may be acceptable in substance, it would set a precedent for seeking an authorization on any future operations of this kind.

The benefit for seeking an authorization is putting Congress on record in support of a potentially dangerous mission. In addition, if we secure Congressional support we put ourselves in a much stronger position to fend off troubling legislative initiatives that might cut off funds or call for a date certain for the withdrawal of our troops. Finally, by seeking Congressional support, we are sending a strong signal to the Hill that we are making every effort to work with them.

We recommend undertaking further discussions with the Hill regarding our decision to participate in the operation before making a final decision. If the response is favorable, we then need to judge whether the conditions likely to be imposed in the authorization are tolerable. If they are not, then we will have to reconsider our options. We need to gear our Hill discussions over the coming weeks with this in mind.

We recommend that both DoD and State work together in discussing our overall Bosnia policy with the Hill and our specific decision to participate in principle in a NATO-led operation to facilitate the withdrawal of UNPROFOR should that become necessary. It is crucial that we speak with one voice on this issue.

We will also continue to work with the relevant committees to set up briefings and hearings in January. Should we decide to seek an authorization and should such an authorization become

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necessary, we will step up efforts considerably in working with and briefing the Hill on the importance of our participation in the NATO operation.

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Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515

94 DEC 1 P5:15

November 30, 1994

The President
The White House
Room 102 East Wing
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We support a change in U.S. policy toward Bosnia. Current policy has been on a path of encouraging increased violence and assuming greater U.S. responsibility for the outcome of the conflict. The net effect of current policy is to embolden the Bosnian Muslim-Croat forces to continue the fighting indefinitely, believing the United States is their ally against the Bosnian Serbs.

Last week, we completed a fact-finding trip to Europe consulting with several U.S. and European diplomats and military officials closest to this conflict. Most of those officials believe that current U.S. policy needs reconsideration. We agree. The view we bring to you represents a consensus opinion calling for a redirection in U.S. policy.

No one challenges U.S. intentions. But the complexity of the Bosnian conflict defies understanding. We found that no nation or international organization has a complete picture of the situation. Each is working hard to find a solution, but without collective unity of effort...it could be described as a "Tower of Babel" situation.

The UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) has not been given sufficient credit, particulary in the media, for successfully providing humanitarian relief and controlling violence. The continued presence of UNPROFOR in the region is critical to achieving a cease fire and any future political solution.

NATO unity is jeopardized by recent U.S. unilateral action concerning Bosnia. Our proposed unilateral lift of the arms embargo and robust use of air power threatens the safety of our allies' troops on the ground. We are convinced that the strength and unity of NATO is more important than pursuing short-sighted and expedient policies in Bosnia. Independent U.S. action undermines U.S. leadership and influence which most NATO members regard as key to effective security and stability in Europe.

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We urge that U.S. policy be modified to reflect a realistic appraisal of the political, social, and military conditions in Bosnia. Despite its repugnant picture, the lines are drawn in Bosnia...we cannot roll back the clock. All parties are resolved to defend their ground and are blinded by irrationality, hatred, and deep distrust.

Unfortunately, it is clear that many Americans have a simplistic view of the conflict. The most obvious misconception is that the Serbs are the "bad guys" while the Muslim-Croats are the "good guys." However, the tragic record of loathsome behavior and willful violations of civility show that all parties have very dirty hands in this conflict.

Recognizing these difficulties, we believe a consensus éxists within UNPROFOR, NATO, and among our friends in Europe that negotiations can bring about agreement in Bosnia. Accordingly, we support a change in U.S. policy that follows these themes:

- Harmonize U.S. Bosnian policy with NATO's long-term aims for unity and European security.
- Contain the conflict to Bosnia.
- Do not take sides. Support UNPROFOR's impartial task of humanitarian relief and peacekeeping.
- Get a cease fire as soon as possible.
- Talk to the Bosnian Serbs and the Muslim-Croat Government. Bring all parties to the negotiating table.
- Work through the Contact Group to redraw the map, negotiate a settlement, and establish security guarantees for all sides.

We believe a window of opportunity exists to end widespread violence in the region. Bosnians are tired of war. A military stalemate exists that prevents either side from gaining meaningful results. Now is the time to start negotiating an attainable settlement.

Sincerely,

IKE SKELTON
Member of Congress

JIM CHAPMAN
Member of Congress

CHET EDWARDS
Member of Congress

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94 DEC 5 A9:10

SAM NUNN, GEORGIA, CHAIRMAN
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RICHARD L. REYNARD, STAFF DIRECTOR FOR THE MINORITY

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6050

December 1, 1994

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

As we discussed on the telephone yesterday, I believe that there is strong sentiment in the Congress that something must be done to establish rough military parity in Bosnia by eliminating the current Serb advantage in heavy weapons, thereby allowing the Bosnians to defend themselves and thus accelerating a negotiated end to the Bosnia conflict. Some members of Congress favor accomplishing this through a unilateral U.S. lifting of the arms embargo on Bosnia. Others support lifting the embargo multilaterally. Unfortunately, there is little hope that this latter approach will be agreed upon by NATO or by the U.N. Security Council.

I believe that the cohesion of NATO will be seriously threatened if the United States pursues a unilateral lift of the arms embargo. This will lead to our allies basically saying to us that Bosnia is now the responsibility of the United States.

Senator Lugar and I have asked Secretary Perry to review an alternative strategy. With the cohesion of NATO at issue if the U.S. undertakes a unilateral lift, we suggest the following three-prong approach.

(1) The zones in Bosnia from which all heavy weapons are excluded would be expanded step by step.

(2) Any heavy weapon detected in a proscribed area would be subject to NATO air attack.

(3) In areas where air attack is not adequate, we and our NATO allies would undertake partial lifting of the embargo by providing the Bosnians with a carefully selected package of defensive arms (anti-tank weapons, mortars).

Enclosed is a copy of the letter we sent to Secretary Perry, setting forth this basic approach. I am also enclosing a copy of Secretary Perry's reply.

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Our NATO allies may have serious concerns with this approach, particularly while UNPROFOR is deployed throughout Bosnia. There is no doubt that our strategy involving enforcement from the air will be very difficult as long as UN forces remain on the ground in Bosnia. However, if our allies will not agree to a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo, a multilateral "build-down" of heavy weapons would be much preferable to a unilateral U.S. arms build-up in Bosnia. It could be discussed with our allies as a policy option that would meet Congressional concerns while avoiding the grave problems for U.S.-European relations associated with a unilateral lift.

I hope you will give this idea careful consideration.

Sincerely,

Sam Nunn
Chairman

Enclosures

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RICHARD L. REYNARD, STAFF DIRECTOR FOR THE MINORITY

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6050

The Honorable William J. Perry
Secretary of Defense,
The Pentagon
Washington D.C. 20301

September 30, 1994

Dear Bill:

We are writing to ask you to conduct an expedited policy review of the military impact of a build down strategy as an alternative to the lifting of the United Nations Arms Embargo on the government of Bosnia Herzegovina.

As you know, there is strong support in the Congress for reducing the disparities in defense capability among the parties involved in the conflict in Bosnia. Some members of Congress have supported a unilateral lifting of the embargo, others have favored a multilateral lifting that would involve our NATO allies who have troops on the ground with the UNPROFOR forces.

All versions of the lift strategy have the downside that the introduction of more arms, especially heavy armament, could increase the level of violence in Bosnia and thus run counter to the widely shared objective of ending the military conflict. Our allies have been particularly concerned about this prospect, and have stated their intention to withdraw their troops from UNPROFOR if the arms embargo on the Bosnian government is lifted. They are convinced that such a move would lead to a significant increase in violence in Bosnia including Serbian attacks on allied troops.

The recent change of policy by the government of Bosnia Herzegovina regarding the timing of a lift of the arms embargo, and the recent closing of the Serbian-Bosnian border has provided the opportunity for a new US approach which could lead to the leveling of the field in Bosnia we have sought, while also leading to a reduction in violence. This new approach would be to eliminate the heavy equipment held by all sides in Bosnia in a step by step process. We feel this approach warrants a serious and comprehensive review at the highest levels within the Department of Defense.

The build down concept is the flip side of the idea of lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian government. The idea would be to level the ground by eliminating all or most of the heavy equipment on both sides by either destroying it or removing it from Bosnia. This could apply to all tanks, artillery, and heavy mortars.

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This strategy, like the strategy of lifting the arms embargo raises serious questions which merit your review. How would our NATO allies react to such a proposal? How would the factions in Bosnia likely react? Would such an approach be enforceable? Could we find economic incentives to make the proposal attractive to the factions?

If feasible, we believe a proposal along these lines could garner broad support in the Congress and could set the stage for renewed efforts to develop a negotiated settlement of the Bosnian crisis. We know that the lifting of the arms embargo has met with significant implementation obstacles. A build-down policy may have similar disadvantages. We therefore urge you to conduct an immediate policy review of such a strategy to assess its merit.

As you consider this alternative approach to the current legal requirement for the President to request a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo, we would also appreciate your assessment of the outcome of compliance with current law, in view of the recent changes of policy by the governments of Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Sincerely,

Richard C. Lugar
U.S. Senator

Sam Nunn
U.S. Senator

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

37E

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

7 October 1994

The Honorable Sam Nunn
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, SROB Room 228
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-6050

Dear Sam:

I am pleased to respond to your letter of September 30, 1994 asking me to review the military impact of a build down strategy.

You present an intriguing concept. Bosnia build down is a conceptual breakthrough that captures the moral high ground on this issue--namely, that there is another way to level the battlefield. Rather than increase arms through lifting the embargo, we may be able to reduce the number of available weapons through a regulated process.

Indeed our current Bosnia policy might be seen as the first phase of a build down strategy. Our commitment to robust enforcement of the exclusion zones and our effort to seal the border between Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina represent the first steps in an arms reduction process. An interagency team is working to develop a phased strategy that would move from these early steps to a more comprehensive build down of all heavy weapons, including tanks, artillery, and heavy mortars. Obviously, we will need to address a number of difficult questions about verification, enforcement, assurances against circumvention, and economic incentives that might make the proposal more attractive. We are confident that we can find solutions to these problems, and we will keep you informed as we proceed. We are extremely grateful to you and Dick Lugar for developing the concept and bringing it to our attention.

You asked for our assessment of the outcome of compliance with the current law. We intend to abide fully by the intent of the law. If the Bosnians Serbs have not accepted the Contact Group's proposal by October 15, the President intends within two weeks of that date to introduce and support a UN Security Council Resolution to terminate the arms embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina. We are considering various formulations of the lift resolution that would delay implementation for six months, as President Izetbegovic proposed at the United Nations last week.

With respect to the limitation on the use of funds in Section 1404(f)(2), we are reviewing our rules of engagement and will make any changes necessary to comply with the law. We also intend fully to maintain the arms embargo on Serbia and to that end will continue our operations in the Adriatic. In his statement on signing the bill the President noted that it would not affect the

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US government's ability to participate in activities in the Adriatic needed to enforce sanctions against Serbia.

The President has also agreed that if no UN resolution on multilateral lift is passed within a reasonable period of time, he will consult with the Congress on next steps, to include the possibility of unilaterally lifting the embargo. In our view, this step should be considered after all other remedies are exhausted. The consequences of unilateral lift are perilous: Americanizing the conflict, as well as prolonging and intensifying it; precipitating an arms race; souring relations with our NATO and UN allies; undermining the partnership we are building with Russia; causing retaliatory attacks on UNPROFOR and the collapse of its mission; and in the end not offering any guarantee of ultimate success on the battlefield.

We appreciate your willingness to work with us in finding a solution to the complex and seemingly intractable problem of bringing peace to Bosnia. You have my assurance that we will consult regularly and work with you at every opportunity.

Sincerely,

Bill Perry

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ RECORD ID: 9421444
NSC/RMO PROFILE RECEIVED: 08 DEC 94 09

TO: WEBSTER, B

FROM: LAKE DOC DATE: 08 DEC 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
SP

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SP FOR PRES DROP-BY AT 12 DEC PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: LAKE SGD SP DUE DATE: 12 DEC 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9421440 9421451

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0112 CODES: BOS

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		DARBY
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		JOSHI
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COMMENTS: _____

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By DJ NARA, Date 4/14/12
2012-0533-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94120808	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	94120818	LAKE SGD SP
003		X	95010517	RECD WEBSTER SP REPLY / PENDING

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	941208	WEBSTER, B	

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RECORD ID: 9421444
RECEIVED: 08 DEC 94 09

TO: LAKE

FROM: KERRICK
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 08 DEC 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
SP

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SP FOR PRES DROP-BY AT 12 DEC PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE DUE DATE: 12 DEC 94 STATUS: X

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF:

FILES: IFG NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
LAKE		

COMMENTS:

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By ~~CDN~~ NARA, Date 6/14/10
2010-0533-M

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National Security Council
The White House

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Soderberg	2		
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	@ 12/8	
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: Hilliard Soderberg Daley Joshi

COMMENTS: SP-Presidential Dropby PC Mtg 12/12

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

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ROUTING SLIP

DATE: 1/12/94

FROM: Billy Webster
Director of Scheduling and Advance

SUBJECT: Drop-By Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia

Joan Baggett	____	Mack McLarty	____
Rebecca Cameron	✓	Dee Dee Myers	____
Abner J. Mikva	____	Leon Panetta	____
Rahm Emanuel	____	John Podesta	____
Mark Gearan	____	Jack Quinn	____
Don Baer	____	Carol Rasco	____
Jack Gibbons	____	Bob Rubin	____
Cindy Gire	____	Patti Solis	____
Pat Griffin	____	G. Stephanopoulos	____
Marcia Hale	____	Ann Stock	____
Alexis Herman	____	Stephanie Streett	✓
Nancy Hernreich	____	Steve Silverman	____
Harold Ickes	____	Joe Velasquez	____
Erskine Bowles	✓	Melanne Verveer	____
Anthony Lake	✓	Anne Walley	____
Bruce Lindsey	____	Maggie Williams	____
Anne McGuire	____	Kris Van Giesen	____

FILE: ✓ Ptcon

FYI ✓ ____ **ADVICE** ____ **ACTION** ____

COMMENTS: The President may drop by.

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ROUTING SLIP

DATE: 12/8/94

FROM: Billy Webster
Director of Scheduling and Advance

Dec 12th for 15 min.

SUBJECT: DROP-BY PRINCIPAL'S COMMITTEE MTG ON BOSNIA.

Joan Baggett		Mack McLarty	
Rebecca Cameron		Dee Dee Myers	
Abner J. Mikva		Leon Panetta	
Rahm Emanuel		John Podesta	
Mark Gearan		Jack Quinn	
Don Baer		Carol Rasco	
Jack Gibbons		Bob Rubin	
Cindy Gire		Patti Solis	
Pat Griffin		G. Stephanopoulos	
Marcia Hale		Ann Stock	
Alexis Herman		Stephanie Streett	X
Nancy Hernreich		Steve Silverman	
Harold Ickes		Joe Velasquez	
Erskine Bowles	X	Melanne Verveer	
Anthony Lake	X	Anne Walley	X
Bruce Lindsey		Maggie Williams	
Anne McGuire		Kris Van Giesen	
		Will Iton	X
FILE:			

FYI X **ADVICE** _____ **ACTION** _____

12/8/94

COMMENTS: Will, Billy would like to review w/you.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: December 12, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:00 - 3:30PM

AGENDA

I. Bosnia Policy Review/Next Steps

A. Diplomatic Strategy/Prospects..... State

B. Status of Military Planning (NATO/U.S.) for UNPROFOR withdrawal.....JCS

C. Strategy Post-withdrawal.....All

II. Congressional Strategy

A. Deflecting Unilateral Lift

(1) Next Steps on Submitting Plan and Consulting on Lifting the Arms Embargo.....State/OSD/JCS

(2) Preview of DoD Revised Briefing.....OSD/JCS

B. Gaining Congressional support for U.S. participation in NATO operations to withdraw UNPROFOR.....State/OSD

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 3/4/2020
2013-0617-M

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Schedule Proposal 94 DEC 9 A9:53 date 12 / 8 / 94

_____ACCEPT _____REGRET _____PENDING

TO: Billy Webster
Director of Scheduling and Advance

FROM: Will need to speak w/ BW Anthony Lake

REQUEST Drop-by Principals' Committee Meeting on Bosnia.

PURPOSE: Provide POTUS latest Principals' recommendations on U.S. Bosnia policy, and to visibly demonstrate Presidential participation in the policy process.

BACKGROUND: U.S. Bosnia Policy under intense public and Congressional scrutiny following recent Dole/Gingrich calls for UNPROFOR withdrawal and lifting the arms embargo supported by U.S./NATO air strikes. NATO planning for UNPROFOR withdrawal nearing completion now that POTUS has approved, in principle, U.S. ground forces participation.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: Regularly, by briefings and memorandum.

DATE AND TIME: December 12, 3:00-3:30pm (10-15 minutes near end of 2:00-3:30pm Principals meeting)

DURATION: 10-15 minutes

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

PARTICIPANTS: Anthony Lake and Principals

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Short discussion of Bosnia with Principals.

REMARKS REQUIRED: To be provided, as necessary, by NSC.

MEDIA COVERAGE: Not required

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ cc: Stephanie Streett
Declassify on: OADR

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2013-0692-M

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Schedule Proposal date 12 / 8 / 94

_____ACCEPT _____REGRET _____PENDING

TO:	Billy Webster Director of Scheduling and Advance
FROM:	Anthony Lake
REQUEST	Drop-by Principals' Committee Meeting on Bosnia.
PURPOSE:	Provide POTUS latest Principals' recommendations on U.S. Bosnia policy, and to visibly demonstrate Presidential participation in the policy process.
BACKGROUND:	U.S. Bosnia Policy under intense public and Congressional scrutiny following recent Dole/Gingrich calls for UNPROFOR withdrawal and lifting the arms embargo supported by U.S./NATO air strikes. NATO planning for UNPROFOR withdrawal nearing completion now that POTUS has approved, in principle, U.S. ground forces participation.
PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION:	Regularly, by briefings and memorandum.
DATE AND TIME:	December 12, 3:00-3:30pm (10-15 minutes near end of 2:00-3:30pm Principals meeting)
DURATION:	10-15 minutes
LOCATION:	White House Situation Room
PARTICIPANTS:	Anthony Lake and Principals
OUTLINE OF EVENTS:	Short discussion of Bosnia with Principals.
REMARKS REQUIRED:	To be provided, as necessary, by NSC
MEDIA COVERAGE:	Not required

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2013-0682-M

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FIRST LADY'S ATTENDANCE: Not required

VICE PRESIDENT'S ATTENDANCE: If available

SECOND LADY'S ATTENDANCE: Not required

RECOMMENDED BY: NSC

CONTACT: Don Kerrick, X69151

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 21444

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 8, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

FROM: DON KERRICK DK

SUBJECT: Schedule request for Presidential Drop-by Principals' Meeting on Bosnia.

The schedule request for a Presidential drop-by at the December 12, 1994 Principals' Committee Meeting on Bosnia is at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the schedule request at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Schedule Request

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NARA, Date 6/14/10
2010-0573-~

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9421440
RECEIVED: 07 DEC 94 13

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 08 DEC 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 12 DEC PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 10 DEC 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9421444 9421451

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0112 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		DARBY
		HALL
		JOSHI
		KERRICK
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW
		WOLIN

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA CLOSED BY: NSKDB DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

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2012-0533-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94120816	FOR DECISION
001		X	94120818	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
001	ITOH	Z	94120818	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	94120819	ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	941208	FUERTH, L	
002	941208	BRILL, K	
002	941208	MCALEER, R	
002	941208	INDERFURTH, K	
002	941208	PANETTA, L	
002	941208	GARTHOFF, D	
002	941208	PATRICK, T	

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9421440
RECEIVED: 07 DEC 94 13

TO: LAKE

FROM: KERRICK
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 08 DEC 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 12 DEC PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: FOR DECISION DUE DATE: 10 DEC 94 STATUS: X

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF:

FILES: IFG NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
LAKE		

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA CLOSED BY: DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

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2012-0533-

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 21440

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (CR) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
~~Reed~~			
Sens			
Itoh	1	✓	
Soderberg			
Berger	2	CC ✓	
Lake	3	✓	
~~Situation Room~~ Etoh	4	✓	Tab I
West Wing Desk	~~5~~ 5		
NSC Secretariat	6	(MR) 12/6	D

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS: NOM: PC on Bosnia
12/12

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

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LOG 9421440
DATE 08 DEC 94

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 12 DEC PC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	12/9	3:30	[signature]
	PRINT LAST NAME: SULLIVAN		
	COPY: 1		
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE RCOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET , N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	12-8-94	2310	[signature]
	PRINT LAST NAME: ALBRIGHT		
	COPY: 1		
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: VIA FAX		
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: VIA FAX		
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	12-9-94	8:35	[signature]
	PRINT LAST NAME: Kiesel		
	COPY: 1		
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: VIA FAX		

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

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DATE 08 DEC 94

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 12 DEC PC MTG ON BOSNIA
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EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
COL. T. R. PATRICK JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

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DATE 08 DEC 94

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 12 DEC PC MTG ON BOSNIA
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EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	12 Dec	0900	J H Branscum PRINT LAST NAME: BRANSCUM COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET , N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: 1
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

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DATE 08 DEC 94

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 12 DEC PC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET , N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	12/8	11:25PM	Charlie Wood PRINT LAST NAME: Wood COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

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LOG 9421440
DATE 08 DEC 94

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 12 DEC PC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE RCOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET , N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	14 DEC 94	1718	COPY & RECEIPT RETURNED WITH NO SIGNATURE - COPY DESTROYED. 12/14 K. [illegible] PRINT LAST NAME: BAKER COPY: 1
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO. 2531 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (202) 456-2585 West Wing Desk
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NOTICE & AGENDA FOR 12 DEC PC MEETING ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21440

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

BNDA

REMARKS:

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TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
~~ROUTINE~~

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO. 2531 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (202) 456-2585 West Wing Desk
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NOTICE & AGENDA FOR 12 DEC PC MEETING ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21440

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

B B N D A

REMARKS:

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2010-0553-M

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-8 DEC 94 22 46

NMCC/JCS

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO. 2531 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (202) 456-2585 West Wing Desk
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NOTICE & AGENDA FOR 12 DEC PC MEETING ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21440

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

BNDA

REMARKS:

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO. 2531 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NOTICE & AGENDA FOR 12 DEC PC MEETING ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21440

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

B B N D A

REMARKS:

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE
- ☐ FLASH
- ☐ IMMEDIATE
- ☐ PRIORITY
- ☒ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC LOG # 21440

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting PC MTG ON BOSNIA PAGES: 2

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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~~SECRET~~

21440

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 8, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the United States to
the United Nations

MR. LEON E. PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the
President

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T.R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia on Monday, December 12, 2:00-3:30 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Principals only plus Ambassador Thomas. The agenda is attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By AM NARA, Date 6/14/12

~~SECRET~~
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NLC-10-053-M

~~SECRET~~

TAB A

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: December 12, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:00 - 3:30 p.m.

AGENDA

I. Bosnia Policy Review/Next Steps

A. Diplomatic Strategy/Prospects..... State

B. Status of Military Planning (NATO/U.S.) for UNPROFOR withdrawal.....JCS

C. Strategy Post-withdrawal.....All

II. Congressional Strategy

A. Deflecting Unilateral Lift

(1) Next Steps on Submitting Plan and Consulting on Lifting the Arms Embargo.....State/OSD/JCS

(2) Preview of DoD Revised Briefing.....OSD/JCS

B. Gaining Congressional support for U.S. participation in NATO operations to withdraw UNPROFOR.....State/OSD

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
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21440

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 8, 1994



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

FROM: DON KERRICK (K)

SUBJECT: Principals Meeting on Bosnia, December 12, 1994

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Principals Meeting on Bosnia to be held on December 12, 1994. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve (V) Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MS NARA, Date 6/14/10
2010-0533-M

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Case Number: 2010-0533-M

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Folder Title:
PC0114 PC Meeting on Chechnya (Russia) and Bosnia-Hercegovina, January 20, 1995
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~~001. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions Meeting of NSC Principals (3 pages)~~	~~01/20/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 9/30/14

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NSC Records Management
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FOLDER TITLE:
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2010-0533-M
rs631

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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RECORD ID: 9520089
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TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 24 JAN 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA
PC
BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
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PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 20 JAN PC MTG ON CHECHNYA & BOSNIA

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 26 JAN 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BEYRLE LOGREF: 9520076 9520078

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0114 CODES: BOS RUS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		AOKI
		BEYRLE
		BURNS
		DARBY
		JOSHI
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		NSC CHRON
		PONEMAN
		SODERBERG
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COMMENTS: PART ONE OF TWO PART MTG. THIS PART CONVENED 2:30PM - 3:30PM.

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

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001		X	95012415	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
001	ITOH	Z	95012415	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	95012416	SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

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DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
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002	950124	BRILL, K	
002	950124	MCALEER, R	
002	950124	INDERFURTH, K	
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002	950124	PATRICK, T	

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Itoh			
Soderberg	2	copy	
Berger	3	cc	
VSW Lake	4	~~Natl Sec Advisor~~ has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5	(KB) 1/24	D
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

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MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	1/24	7:32	[signature]
	PRINT LAST NAME: Kreisel		
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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	1/24	10:50	Charles W. Alexander
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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 20 JAN PC MEETING ON CHECHNYA AND BOSNIA NSC LOG #: 20089

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

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MESSAGE NO.: 0150 CLASSIFICATION: SECRET TOTAL: 5 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (202) 456-9425 WH SITROOM
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 20 JAN PC MEETING ON CHECHNYA AND BOSNIA NSC LOG # 20089

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 20 JAN PC MEETING ON CHECHNYA AND BOSNIA NSC LOG # 20089

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 20 JAN PC MEETING ON CHECHNYA AND BOSNIA NSC LOG # 20089

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DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 24, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. LEON E. PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President of the United States

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T.R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the UN

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Chechnya and Bosnia on January 20, 1995

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. A separate memorandum will summarize conclusions from the discussion of North Korea. ~~(S)~~

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 6/14/12
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Tab A

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20089

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions
Meeting of NSC Principals Committee
DATE: January 20, 1994 [5].
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:35 - 4:00 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Anthony Lake

State
Peter Tarnoff

UN
Ambassador Madeleine Albright

JCS
ADM William Owens

OVP
Leon Fuerth

DOD
Secretary William Perry

CIA
Acting Director William Studeman

White House
Samuel Berger
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
Alexander Vershbow
John Beyrle

Summary of Conclusions

RUSSIA/CHECHNYA

1. The Principals reviewed the situation on the ground in and around Grozny and discussed the likelihood that Russian forces will continue to face opposition from irregular forces, perhaps augmented by outside mercenaries. The CIA was requested to produce a short (2 pg) paper analyzing the implications of the Chechnya affair for surrounding ethnic regions (e.g., Ingushetia, Dagestan, Abkhazia) and actions those regions may be taking in reaction to Chechnya. **Action: CIA.** (S)

2. The Principals agreed on the need for a careful line of public comment that welcomed positive developments, like the prospect of eventual free elections in Chechnya, while not seeming to cheerlead blindly for what might prove an unacceptable solution, e.g., installation of a puppet regime. Press guidance

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prepared for the President's use was circulated to ensure that comments by Principals or their spokespersons would be consistent. (S)

3. Principals discussed the need to identify points of leverage we may be able to use to influence Yeltsin and other Russian officials to make the right choices on reform issues and in further steps in Chechnya. Such points could include the scheduling of the next summit, or the nature of Russian participation in Halifax G-7 meeting. **Action: NSC and State to develop a game plan.** (S)

4. Ambassador Albright discussed persistent problems with Russian positions at the U.N. which directly counter or challenge our interests, most notably the UNMIH mandate issue. Principals agreed that if attempts over the coming week to convince the Russians to support the U.S. position are unsuccessful, the President should seek Yeltsin's support in a letter. **Action: State to continue diplomatic efforts; NSC to draft letter, if needed.** (S)

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Bosnia:

1. Principals reviewed the status of the cease-fire and cessation of hostilities agreement and Contact Group efforts to renew negotiations on a political settlement. They agreed that Deputies should review territorial and constitutional issues that will arise in the negotiations but that the USG must be careful to avoid any appearance of departing from its commitment to the Contact Group plan. Recognizing the possibility of a continuing impasse in the negotiations, Principals directed that a mid-term diplomatic strategy paper be prepared for Deputies' review as preparation for a future discussion by Principals. **Action: State.** (S)

2. Principals discussed the upcoming Washington visit of Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic and the impact it could have on Congressional support for unilateral lifting of the arms embargo. State undertook to circulate a paper outlining a strategy for handling the Silajdzic visit. **Action: State.** (S)

Croatia:

3. Principals reviewed options available for responding to President Tudjman's decision to terminate UNPROFOR's mandate in Croatia when it expires on March 31. Recognizing the important strategic interests that the U.S. has in Croatia, the Principals

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directed that talking points prepared for USDP Slocombe's meeting with President Tudjman be appropriately modified to focus on the risks of the decision on the ground, our commitment to a reinvigorated diplomatic effort aimed at reintegration of the occupied areas, and our support for retention of at least part of the UNPROFOR contingent. **Action: OSD/State** (S)

4. Principals discussed the potential difficulties of withdrawing UNPROFOR from Croatia, in the event withdrawal takes place, and asked the Deputies to promptly review the political and military aspects of supporting UNPROFOR withdrawal. **Action: State and JCS prepare papers on political and military aspects of U.S./NATO support for withdrawal of UNPROFOR/Croatia.** (S)

Congressional and Public Affairs Strategy:

5. Principals discussed next steps in dealing with Congress following the previous week's interagency briefings and asked that an unclassified version of LTG Clark's testimony on unilateral lifting of the arms embargo be prepared for follow-up briefings on the Hill. Principals agreed on the importance of defeating a vote on unilateral lift rather than allowing the Congress to put the President in the position of having to use the veto. They also agreed to defer a decision on the timing for publishing Secretary Perry's op-ed. (S)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 23, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: NICHOLAS BURNS/ALEXANDER VERSHBOW/DANIEL PONEMAN

FROM: JOHN BEYRLE

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting, January 20, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting held January 20, 1995. This summary covers the discussion on Chechnya and Bosnia. A separate memorandum will summarize conclusions from the discussion on North Korea, for distribution to the wider group of agencies represented in that part of the meeting.

Concurrence by: Donald Kerrick; Steve Aoki

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
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DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	1/20/95		J. Graves
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002a. memo	BG Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake re: February 7 Principals Meeting on Bosnia/Croatia (6 pages)	02/06/1995	P1/b(1)
~~002b. agenda~~	~~Principals Committee Meeting (1 page)~~	~~02/07/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002c. paper~~	~~re: Mutual Recognition (1 page)~~	~~02/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002d. paper~~	~~re: Croatia Strategy Follow-Up (3 pages)~~	~~02/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
002e. paper	re: POTUS Decision on U.S. Participation in NATO Operations (1 page)	02/1995	P1/b(1)
002f. paper	re: Pre-positioning for Bosnia Contingencies [partial] (4 pages)	02/01/1995	P1/b(1) KDE 05/26/2016
~~002g. paper~~	~~re: The Balkans Options for the Worst Case (3 pages)~~	~~02/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002h. paper~~	~~re: If the Process Breaks Down (2 pages)~~	~~02/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
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FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 10 FEB 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
PC
CROATIA
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PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 7 FEB PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 11 FEB 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9520142 9520154

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0118 CODES: BOS CRO

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		KERRICK
		KRECZKO
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001		X	95021019	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
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002		X	95021020	SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

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002	950210	BRILL, K	
002	950210	MCALEER, R	
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DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

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FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS PAGES: 6

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USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 10, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

AMBASSADOR RICK INDEFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T.R. PATRICK
Executive Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, February 7, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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By NARA, Date 6/14/13
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TAB A

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee
DATE: February 7, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 - 4:00pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Anthony Lake

CIA
William Studeman

OVP
Leon Fuerth

JCS
General John Shalikashvili

State
Warren Christopher
Charles Thomas (Special Envoy)

White House
Samuel Berger
Nancy Soderberg

DOD
Dr. William Perry

NSC
Alexander Vershbow

USUN
Ambassador Madeleine Albright

Summary of Conclusions

1. Principals reviewed the progress of efforts to renew negotiations on a political settlement, options for responding to the French proposal for an international conference, and prospects for achieving mutual recognition of all former Yugoslav Republics as a means of further isolating the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs. They agreed that recognition by Belgrade of Bosnia and Croatia, if genuine, would be a positive step toward resolving the Balkans conflict, although not a panacea. Principals approved a renewed effort with Milosevic aimed at achieving meaningful mutual recognition of all former Yugoslav Republics. **(Action: State)** ~~(S)~~

2. Principals discussed options for handling the French proposal for an international conference to promote cross-recognition and launch new negotiations. They agreed that a

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conference would only be useful if it is well prepared and produces positive results. Principals agreed that State should engage Contact Group partners to shape the conference agenda, making clear the conditions for U.S. support and participation. **(Action: State)** ~~(S)~~

3. Principals reviewed options for suspending sanctions against Belgrade in return for cross-recognition of all former Yugoslav Republics, continued endorsement of the Contact Group plan, continued closure of the FRY border to all but humanitarian supplies for Pale and Knin, and support for the Zagreb-4 plan. They authorized discussions with Contact Group partners aimed at developing a common position on the degree of sanctions relief we would be willing to trade for recognition. Principals approved the Plan B alternative in the OVP paper as the starting position for achieving a common position, with flexibility to accept further compromises short of the full EU position. **(Action: OVP/State)** ~~(S)~~

4. Principals reviewed the status of NATO military planning to support UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia and Croatia. They agreed that, while we should continue to press Croatia to retain at least a reduced UNPROFOR presence, our planning should assume that the Croatian decision will not be reversed. Therefore, Principals agreed to support NATO's Phase I prepositioning of communications equipment to establish a theater communications architecture that will support UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia or Croatia, as well as implementation of a peace plan should a peace agreement be reached. Principals directed that talking points be prepared for calls to appropriate Congressional staff informing them of the Administration's support for Phase I prepositioning. **(Action: State and NSC)** ~~(S)~~

5. Principals also agreed that the U.S. could inform NATO Military Authorities of the forces the U.S. would provide to an UNPROFOR withdrawal operation from Bosnia, while reaffirming that their actual deployment would be contingent on a final review of the plans and consultations with Congress. **(Action: JCS)** ~~(S)~~

6. Principals discussed extending to Croatia the President's decision, in principle, to commit U.S. ground forces to a NATO operation supporting UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia. They agreed to recommend to the President that he authorize U.S. participation in a NATO operation to support UNPROFOR withdrawal from Croatia should it become necessary. They directed that a decision memorandum for the President be prepared that includes the concept, rough size, and duration of the mission. **(Action: NSC with JCS input)** They also directed that a legislative strategy be prepared for consulting with the Congress if the

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President approves the recommendation. **(Action: State and NSC)** ~~(S)~~

7. Principals discussed the status of efforts at the United Nations to strengthen UNPROFOR in Bosnia. Reiterating their support for the strengthening measures adopted at the December Chiefs of Defense meeting in The Hague, they requested that the Deputies review the issue and make a formal recommendation on next steps. **(Action: JCS)** ~~(S)~~

8. Principals discussed a longer-term strategy in the event diplomacy fails to achieve a negotiated settlement and UNPROFOR withdraws from Bosnia and Croatia. They requested more comprehensive planning on options to contain the conflict should fighting rekindle, with special emphasis on strengthening forces in Macedonia to deter expansion of the war. **(Action: OSD)** Principals also requested an analysis of the impact on the region should current UN forces in Macedonia be reinforced or replaced. **(Action: CIA)** ~~(S)~~

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 8, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

FROM: DON KERRICK (D)

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, February 7, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia held February 7, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve (V) Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520142 9520164

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West Wing Desk	3	[redacted] 2/7	N
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A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	BG Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake re: February 7 Principals Meeting on Bosnia/Croatia (6 pages)	02/06/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0118 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, February 7, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs632

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING
DATE: February 7, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30pm - 4:00pm

Agenda

I. Diplomatic Strategy:

A. Promoting Mutual Recognition/Handling of French Proposal for International Conference.....State
(State to circulate paper)

B. Sanctions Relief for Recognition.....OVP
(OVP to circulate paper/chart)

II. Croatia Strategy

A. Responding to Tudjman's UNPROFOR Decision.....State
(State to circulate paper)

B. UNPROFOR (Croatia) Withdrawal Planning.....JCS
(NSC to circulate papers)

III. Longer-Term Strategy if Diplomatic Efforts Fail.....All
(State and OSD to circulate papers)

- process.
- State papers.
what if we and not other?

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By UC NARA Date 3/4/2020
2013-0682-M

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TAB A

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TAB 3

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MUTUAL RECOGNITION

Pros:

- Serbia's recognition of its neighbors offers the chance to put the Serb leadership on the record in opposing a greater Serbia. As such recognition would be a major step.

- Serbia's recognition of Croatia and Bosnia also puts pressure on Knin and Pale to reach agreement on autonomy before their leverage begins to dissipate.

- Assuming recognition also includes Macedonia -- a step we must insist on -- it would help stabilize the political situation in Skopje and give Gligorov a major and much needed boost. As it would be accompanied by some sanctions relief, recognition would be a tremendous help to the beleaguered Macedonian economy which is suffering from the effects of enforcing sanctions against Serbia and the embargo imposed by Greece.

- Recognition also offers Serbia a chance to reenter the international community, a development which might help arrest the ominous centralization and trend toward a more brutal Milosevic dictatorship.

Cons

- It will be difficult for the international community to develop consensus on the meaning of recognition. Milosevic, as his foreign minister has already done, may offer recognition by the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," a formulation which some of our Contact Group partners will accept, but which would not forswear a greater Serbia.

- Any approach to Milosevic for recognizing his neighbors will likely require a steep price in sanctions relief. We can expect serious disagreements within the Contact Group on how far to go. Sensing a lack of international resolve Milosevic may well hold out for a maximum position.

- Milosevic may recognize the borders of his neighbors, but he is unlikely to include relations with Izetbegovic, and will try to show within Serbia that his decision was not made at the price of Serb interests. We must therefore seek more than a one-line TANJUG release and look for ways to link recognition with UN membership for Serbia.

- Recognition would also need to be made in tandem with a strengthened Serb commitment to closing the inner Serb border and in breaking the ties between the Bosnian Serb army and the JNA. Ultimately, the Bosnians may have to defeat the BSA on the field to recapture territory while Milosevic endures the unendurable by blocking military assistance.

- Finally, sanctions relief for recognition implies a slide from the CG plan.

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VC 2/6/2020 (7.07)
2013-0892-M

TAB C

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TAB J

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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CROATIA STRATEGY FOLLOW-UP

DRAFT

U.S. Goals

- Using UNPROFOR, minimize chance of Serbo-Croat hostilities and support peace efforts in Bosnia;

-- Promote a settlement between Croatia and Serbs, testing parties' willingness to negotiate;

-- Limit damage if hostilities erupt.

Where we are

-- Presidential letter asked Tudjman to leave UNPROFOR intact, but he was determined to expel it from UNPAs.

-- U.S. laid down marker on 5 essential UNPROFOR elements:

1. Monitor Serbo-Croat separation zones;

2. Maintain liaison with Knin;

3. Help implement confidence-building measures;

4. Support Bosnia/Macedonia, including relief convoys;

5. Operate Zagreb headquarters.

-- Croats have not closed door on these five, but only agree to Bosnia-related measures so far.

-- They have put out feelers about other monitors (WEU, NATO, OSCE, EU), and we are probing their thinking without compromising our insistence on continued UN presence.

-- Threat of UNPROFOR pull-out is high risk:

o puts pressure on Serbs to settle;

o could spark brutal war.

-- Because Tudjman wants time to let his threat work on Serbs, a visible approach on a compromise now would meet another rebuff.

-- Also, time lets our displeasure work on Tudjman, particularly if his threats bear little fruit.

-- Serious bargaining on a reduced UNPROFOR mandate is unlikely until the March 31 deadline approaches.

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VL 2013-0682-M (7.08)
2013-0682-M

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DRAFT

Framework for action

-- In run-up to mandate renewal, U.S. should:

  - o lay groundwork for those negotiations;
  - o try to launch political talks, making clear that progress is up to parties, not us;
  - o prepare to limit human and diplomatic casualties if war erupts.

-- Best way to maximize possibilities for UNPROFOR retention is to promote Serbo-Croat talks:

  - o Further progress on economic confidence-building creates additional agreed tasks for UNPROFOR;
  - o Progress toward political talks would give Tudjman cover in explaining any "compromise" on UNPROFOR.
  - o Much depends on Zagreb's (false?) hopes for mutual recognition from Belgrade.

-- Immediate approach to Tudjman should be limited to NATO contingency planning;

  - o emphasizing withdrawal from Bosnia rather than Croatia;
  - o but recognizing that the two are virtually inseparable.

-- We should argue that separation zone monitoring must remain integrated with UN operations, pending further probing on Croatian thinking by Portuguese WEU Presidency.

-- The redefined UNPROFOR mandate would include at least the five essential elements identified by U.S.

  - o UNSC Resolution could require language for new tasks UNPROFOR assumed under cease-fire and ECBM agreements.
  - o Although many Vance Plan mandates remain unimplemented (demilitarization, refugee return), formally eliminating them would send wrong signal.

-- We would urge UNPROFOR to start redeploying quietly to minimize possibilities for troops being taken hostage or getting caught in cross-fire.

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DRAFT

NOTIONAL TIMETABLE

UNPROFOR MANDATE	SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS	CONTINGENCY PLANNING
Right away (within 1 week)		
Consult w/ UN End talk of moving UNPROFOR HQ Consult w/ key partners Warn against UNPROFOR hostages	Invite parties to settlement talks Stand by Z-4 model	Accelerate NATO planning for UNPROFOR w/drawl Approach Croatia about supporting w/drawl
Short term (2 - 7 weeks)		
Give Zagreb and Knin time to reconsider	Link Krajina seat to acceptance of Croat sovereignty Insist parties make own proposals Z-4 demarche to Serbs Clarify sanctions-recognition linkage	Lay down markers on protecting peacekeepers Warn Serbia and Croatia of war's consequences Urge UNPROFOR redeployment
UNPROFOR mandate renewal end-game (late March)		
Mediate among Croatia, UNPROFOR & UNSC Get 5 essentials	Make "last chance" invitation to talks	Pre-position NATO forces for rescue operations if warranted

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002e. paper	re: POTUS Decision on U.S. Participation in NATO Operations (1 page)	02/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0118 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, February 7, 1995

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RESTRICTION CODES

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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TAB F

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002f. paper	re: Pre-positioning for Bosnia Contingencies (4 pages) [Partial] KDE 05/26/2016	02/01/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0118 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, February 7, 1995

2010-0533-M
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1 February 1995

DECISION PAPER

Subject: Pre-positioning for Bosnia Contingencies (U)

1. (~~C~~) Purpose. To provide information for Interagency decision on the early commitment of US communications personnel and assets when SACEUR requests, and the NAC approves, the early deployment of the initial C3 package and other Phase 1 actions prior to NAC approval of OPLAN 40104 and a NAC decision to execute the remaining phases of the withdrawal operation.

2. (U) Background.

a. (~~C~~) There is general consensus that negotiations have stalled and renewed warfare in Bosnia (and Croatia) this Spring is likely. This is not to detract from the importance of continuing to pursue negotiations as the only means of preventing a resumption of fighting, but reflects the realities of the situation. Since the same pre-positioning is required for either peace plan implementation or withdrawal support, NATO military authorities desire to take prudent military measures to support either eventuality.

b. (~~C~~) The following confluence of factors supports the need to be ready to conduct an UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia in April/May 1995: the expiration of the UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia (31 March), the expiration of the four month cessation of hostilities agreement (30 April), the Bosnian government push to give the Bosnian Serbs a 2 month deadline to start negotiations or return to open warfare, the next sanctions renewal review (late April), and the return of good weather when Spring arrives.

c. (~~C~~) Final MC and NAC approval of OPLAN 40104 could take several weeks. If approval is unduly delayed SACEUR may request the NAC to authorize the deployment of the C3 package and other Phase 1 actions in advance of OPLAN approval and a decision to actually commence the withdrawal operation.

d. (~~C~~) SACEUR has established the following planning timelines for an UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia: (derived from a combination of OPLAN 40104 and information provided by SACEUR)

PHASE 1 (PREPARATION) (Duration: 4 weeks, commencing 6-8 weeks prior to a NAC decision to execute the withdrawal)

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2013-01082-M 05126/11 KDE
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- SACEUR would request NAC approval of the OPLAN or a separate NAC decision to implement Phase 1.
- Logistic/Movement Control actions must be initiated. Deployment of pre-positioned assets provided by the US required, date uncertain.
- Installation of C3 architecture commences. Includes deployment of pre-positioned assets provided by the US.

PHASE 2 (DEPLOYMENT OF MAIN BODY OF TROOPS BEFORE ACTUAL WITHDRAWAL OPERATIONS BEGIN) (Duration 2-4 weeks)

- The NAC decision to execute the withdrawal starts Phase 2.
- Two to four weeks are required before the initial 3 NATO brigades (2-US, 1.4d begin operations in Bosnia.

The OPLAN estimates a decision not to deploy prepositioned C3 assets would delay the operation by about 10 days. SACEUR is reexamining this timeline and attempting to implement actions which shorten the time required for Phase 1.

3. (U) Pre-positioned C3 Package Details.

a. (~~C~~) The C3 package, consisting of about 800 personnel and equipment EO 13526 1.4d , provides a full, secure military communications system with ties to theater tactical systems, NATO systems, national military systems, commercial phone systems, and the UNPROFOR system. Personnel would EO 13526 1.4d No personnel would be deployed to Bosnia or the Krajina as part of the initial C3 package. The number of C3 nodes to be activated during pre-positioning, the number of soldiers, and their nationalities are still being refined, as is the number of support and security troops.

b. (~~C~~) Included in the four week Phase 1 preparation period is the time to finalize national contributions, prepare personnel and equipment for movement, negotiate appropriate contracts for the use of civilian communications lines and satellite frequencies, and purchase off-the-shelf communications equipment to supplement the military system. It actually

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c. (~~C~~) The initial cost of deploying this C3 package is under $2 million. Once deployed and operational, the manpower can be reduced by about half, and it will cost about $500,000 per month to maintain operational. There is currently $14 million in the NATO peacekeeping fund. Although funding decisions have not been agreed at NATO or between NATO and the UN, it is anticipated no additional funding would be required at this time.

d. (~~C~~) The CINCSOUTH OPLAN 40104 C3 package supplements and interfaces with that already established for DENY FLIGHT and SHARP GUARD, and provides the dedicated communications circuits necessary to support an UNPROFOR withdrawal from both Bosnia and Croatia. The existing communications systems are not adequate for a significant ground operation.

4. (~~C~~) Discussion. The issues for consideration are: (a) the probability of UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia this Spring, (b) the balance between the political signals this deployment sends and the military preparations needed to carry out a successful operation, and (c) the US leadership role in NATO.

a. (~~C~~) There is a pessimistic consensus that the cessation of hostilities is likely to collapse and war will return to Bosnia this Spring.

b. (~~C~~) Tudjman is serious about not renewing the UNPROFOR mandate. UNPROFOR withdrawal from Croatia will probably lead to Croat-Krajina Serb fighting, which could spill over into Bosnia.

c. (~~C~~) Pre-positioning the C3 package is a prudent military action to prepare for a timely UNPROFOR withdrawal operation. Should a peace agreement be reached, NATO is better prepared for peace plan implementation. If the status quo continues, the C3 package is small enough that it can be repositioned and the experience factored into future planning.

d. (~~C~~) A significant military concern is the deployment of US signal, logistic, transport, and engineering assets for a NATO operation prior to NAC approval of the OPLAN and determination of D-Day. These assets would be unavailable for other contingencies while committed to NATO. The effect on readiness must be weighed against the risks involved in lengthening the OPLAN's deployment schedule. The requirement to pre-position logistical, transportation, movement control, and engineer assets during Phase 1 has not been determined.

e. (~~C~~) Pre-positioning will send several signals: NATO is serious about taking meaningful action, NATO supports UNPROFOR, and that UNPROFOR is serious about leaving if war breaks out. Careful control of these signals is

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required to ensure the proper message is sent. These signals could prompt the warring parties to get serious about coming to a negotiated settlement, or precipitate action by one or both sides.

f. (C) Other options short of pre-positioning to speed implementation after a NAC decision to execute include:

- **Pre-stage** required assets for prepositioning at home bases.

EO 13526 1.4d

g. (C) Since the President has already committed to US participation in an UNPROFOR withdrawal, including the use of ground troops, the deployment of several hundred communications personnel outside the high threat area is a low profile, low risk, high gain decision. It would show US leadership in the Alliance and send a signal that NATO is serious about supporting UNPROFOR.

5. (U) Recommendations.

a. (C) Inform SACEUR that the US government will approve the concept of pre-positioning the initial C3 package, including US personnel, and other Phase 1 actions prior to final NAC decisions on OPLAN 40104 approval and execution of the remaining phases of the withdrawal operation when the issue is formally raised and approved at the NAC.

b. (C) Provide guidance to the US Mission to NATO to support discussions on prepositioning with Croatian authorities to ensure NATO access to required facilities.

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TAB G

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The Balkans--Options for the Worst Case

UNPROFOR Withdrawal.

Pressure is growing for a general withdrawal of UN military forces from the Balkans. The Croatians demand that UNPROFOR begin leaving Croatia at the end of March; European contributors will pull out of UNPROFOR in Bosnia if the US passes a unilateral lift law, and Congressional support for US funding for UNPROFOR is in doubt . In addition to a general frustration with UNPROFOR and the lack of progress toward a peace settlement, any one of the above actions could generate the momentum to end the UNPROFOR operations in the Balkans. This paper addresses the implications of a total UN withdrawal and options to support US security interests in the region without UNPROFOR.

Scenario:

- UNPROFOR withdraws from Croatia and Bosnia; considers withdrawal from Macedonia;
- U.S. Congress passes the unilateral lift legislation;
- Fighting intensifies in Bosnia and breaks out between Croats and Krajina Serbs.
- Islamic nations increase their deliveries of military equipment to Bosnia; Islamic UNPROFOR troop contributors remain in Bosnia through bilateral arrangements;
- Milosevic increases assistance to the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs; Serbs seek support from Russia.
- Humanitarian assistance becomes far more difficult in Bosnia; new humanitarian requirements develop in Croatia; some NGOs remain, but deliveries of aid will be severely disrupted;

Assumptions:

- NATO forces successfully extract UNPROFOR from Bosnia and Croatia and leave no residual forces in either area.
- Operations DENY FLIGHT and SHARP GUARD will end with UNPROFOR withdrawal.
- Once lifted from Bosnia, the arms embargo will be lifted from Macedonia and Slovenia as well.

Not Releasible to Foreign Nationals

Classified by: Multiple Sources
Declassified by OADR

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2/26/2020 (7.11)
2013-0682-M

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Implications for the U.S.:

The scenario above constitutes the path to a wider Balkan War and the breakdown of the current diplomatic and military containment policy in the region. Such a scenario raises the stakes and involves U.S. vital interests in preventing the spread of the conflict in Southern Europe. Thus, the new problem is re-establishing containment of the conflict within the new bounds.

The greatest spillover threat is to the south where Greece and Turkey could be engaged as combatants on opposite sides of a conflict. While Slovenia might be destabilized by a war in Croatia, Austria and Hungary provide a stable buffer on the north of the conflict area. In the south, Macedonia is key to stability. If UNPROFOR withdraws from Croatia and Bosnia, a stability force is still mandatory in Macedonia.

Stability Options for Macedonia.

- Command and Control:
  -UN retains responsibility under a rump UNPROFOR or a new organization.
  -A European organization (WEU or EU) creates a military structure for Macedonia.
  -NATO assumes the mission in Macedonia.
  -US takes unilateral responsibility for containment of the conflict;

- Deploy additional US/NATO combat forces to Macedonia;

- Deploy conventional ground forces Albania, naval forces in the Adriatic and air forces to the region, possibly in Macedonia and Albania.

- Expand operations DENY FLIGHT and SHARP GUARD over Croatia, Macedonia and Albania.

- Conduct defensive military training and force development programs in Macedonia.

- Promote political and economic programs to supplement military stability measures.

Discussion:

The UN option retains an overly cumbersome command structure with a confusing mandate and a tarnished track record. Nor is it in the U.S. interests to act unilaterally in any conflict with implications just as vital if not more vital for Europe than the U.S. Unilateral US action risks damage to NATO, PFP, and our emerging partnership with Russia. Moreover, the American people would likely be particularly hesitant to support

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any U.S. involvement of ground combat forces without a similar commitment from our NATO allies. Finally, it would be logistically difficult if not impossible to get so involved without the direct support of our NATO allies.

A NATO-run containment strategy has intrinsic merit. Containment of the conflict is a European problem first and foremost, and NATO has the existing political and military infrastructure to support such activities. An exclusively NATO-led operation would not be plagued by the dual-key, chain-of-command difficulties that have characterized the current state of affairs in Bosnia to date.

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TAB H

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If The Process Breaks Down

Since the signing of the Washington Accords last spring, we have had almost a year of relative--if unhappy--stability in the former Yugoslavia. But we are now heading into a dangerously fluid period.

By May, three scenarios, broadly speaking, seem possible:

A. An exploding and interconnecting war beginning in the Krajina and then spreading to Central Bosnia. Milosevic may intervene. The UNPROFOR position in Bosnia could become untenable and a NATO-led extraction effort will be increasingly difficult.

B. A Serb/Croat accommodation could suddenly emerge after much huffing and puffing which could include some kind of Zagreb assurances on the Krajina and leads into a brutal carve up of Bosnia with Greater Serbia, an enlarged Croatia, and a rump Muslim reservation wedged between the two states. UNPROFOR would leave or serve disgracefully as the custodian. The Croatians stated publicly in Munich that this will never happen, but...

C. Enhanced stabilization in the region as a result of broader acceptance of borders, the maintenance of the current cessations of hostilities and movement into negotiations that would protect Serb rights/autonomy in both Bosnia and Croatia.

Obviously we want to move toward the third possibility and avoid the other two. This requires a vigorous diplomatic effort as well as strong support for the Federation.

We must frankly admit that our chances of nudging the situation into a mutual recognition track are no better than one in five. We are probably not able to offer Milosevic enough to draw him forward, considering nationalist pressures in Belgrade. Thus we are likely to face a crisis of some sort--war or bloody carve-up of Bosnia--and soon.

Assuming that disengagement is not feasible, our position during that period should have the following elements:

-- Contain the conflict if at all possible. Even if UNPROFOR disintegrates we should keep forces in Macedonia with a NATO flag if need be.

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-- Hold the Contact Group together, partly for possible future use, partly to inhibit the members from leaning to one side or another.

-- Do all we can to hold the Federation together as noted above.

-- Keep the pressure via sanctions on Milosevic as the man who said no to recognition and the arch villain in the drama.

-- Continue to oppose lift pressures in Washington unless some of our allies begin to see some virtue in multilateral lift.

With the next conflagration, if it is to occur, this war may burn itself out. There may be some possibility of a settlement that we can help put in place, if we are near at hand.

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520142
RECEIVED: 02 FEB 95 10

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 06 FEB 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 7 FEB PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 06 FEB 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520154 9520164

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0118 CODES: BOS CRO

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		JOSHI
		KERRICK
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By DLC NARA, Date 6/16/2
2010-0533-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95020319	FOR DECISION
001		X	95020614	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
001	ITOH	Z	95020614	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	95020615	SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950206	FUERTH, L	
002	950206	BRILL, K	
002	950206	MCALEER, R	
002	950206	INDERFURTH, K	
002	950206	PANETTA, L	
002	950206	GARTHOFF, D	
002	950206	PATRICK, T	

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RECORD ID: 9520142
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TO: LAKE

FROM: KERRICK
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 03 FEB 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 7 FEB PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: FOR DECISION DUE DATE: 06 FEB 95 STATUS: X

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF:

FILES: IFM NSCP: CODES: BOS CRO

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
LAKE		

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Sens	6 9		A
Itoh			
Soderberg			
Berger	7 8	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
KR Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	FYI 11	ASK 2/6	D
NSC Secretariat		2/6	D

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS:

NOM - 2/7 - PC Mtg.

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Tab I on g:\epersec\20142.I

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

Sandy V. —

Per discussions w/ Chris and VL, please add to PC Bosnia agenda for TUES the international conference idea

@

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Itoh			
Soderberg	2	copy	
Berger	3		
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4		
NSC Secretariat			
Vershbow	5	AV	FFA

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COMMENTS: PC NOM + Agenda
Bosnia/Croatia 2/7

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MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	7 Feb	0610	[signature]
	PRINT LAST NAME:		BRANSCUM
	COPY:		1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	2/6	11:08PM	[signature] Karla Wood
	PRINT LAST NAME:		Wood
	COPY:		1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY:		VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY:		VIA FAX
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	2/7/95	9:00AM	SITROOM Box
	PRINT LAST NAME:		RM
	COPY:		1
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			
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	PRINT LAST NAME:		BRANSCUM
	COPY: 1		
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520			
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	PRINT LAST NAME:		
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MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: 1		
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			
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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	2/6	11:20PM	C Fuerth Wall PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 0256 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: TC ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

7 FEB

NSC LOG #: 20142

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
N DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D JCS	SECRETARY		
A CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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PRIORITY
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DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 0256 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 3
(PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (202) 456-9425 WH SITROOM
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: PC ON BOSNIA & CROATIA
7 FEB

NSC LOG #: 20142

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
	USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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2002-0553-M

202863442 13 [illegible]

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PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
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ROUTINE

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DTG:

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FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: PC ON BOSNIA & CROATIA 7 FEB

NSC LOG #: 20142

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
	USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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B STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
N DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D JCS	SECRETARY		
A CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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- ☒ IMMEDIATE
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DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC LOG # 20142

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting PC ON BOSNIA 7 FEB PAGES: 3

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
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20142

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 6, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting ~~(S)~~

A Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia has been scheduled for Tuesday, February 7 from 2:30 to 4:00pm in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Principals only. The agenda is attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 6/14/10
2010-0533-M

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PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING
DATE: February 7, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30pm - 4:00pm

Agenda

I. Diplomatic Strategy:

A. Promoting Mutual Recognition/Handling of French Proposal for International Conference.....State
(State to circulate paper)

B. Sanctions Relief for Recognition.....OVP
(OVP to circulate paper/chart)

II. Croatia Strategy

A. Responding to Tudjman's UNPROFOR Decision.....State
(State to circulate paper)

B. UNPROFOR (Croatia) Withdrawal Planning.....JCS
(NSC to circulate papers)

III. Longer-Term Strategy if Diplomatic Efforts Fail.....All
(State and OSD to circulate papers)

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 3/4/2020
2013-0682-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 3, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: BG DON KERRICK

SUBJECT: Principals Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia
February 7, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Principals Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia to be held on February 7, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memorandum to agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove ____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to Agencies
Tab A Agenda

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
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COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (3 pages)~~	~~02/13/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
002a. memo	Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake re: February 13 Principals Meeting on Bosnia/Croatia (3 pages)	02/13/1995	P1/b(1)
002b. paper	re: Mutual Recognition and Sanctions Relief (2 pages)	02/1995	P1/b(1)
~~002c. cable~~	~~re: "Double-Tracking" Contact Group Consultations in Sar[a]jevo (9 pages)~~	~~02/12/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
002d. email	Alexander Vershbow to Tyler Beardsley et al. re: PC Update: Revised Sanctions "terms of reference" (1 page)	02/13/1995	P1/b(1)
~~002e. cable~~	~~re: GOF Outlines Steps Towards Bosnia Conference (3 pages)~~ 5	~~02/13/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
002f. email	Alexander Vershbow to Kristen Cicio re: Sanctions (1 page)	02/10/1995	P1/b(1)
~~002g. list~~	~~re: State's Terms of Reference for CG Mtg. (1 page)~~	~~02/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
002h. memo	Leon Fuerth to Anthony Lake re: PC on Bosnia (2 pages)	02/10/1995	P1/b(1)
002i. memo	Leon Feurth to Sandy Berger re: Plan B Fallback Position (3 pages)	02/10/1995	P1/b(1)
003. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Principals Decision on Bosnia and Sanctions Relief (3 pages)	02/15/1995	P1/b(1)

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P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 21 FEB 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
SOC
CROATIA
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 13 FEB PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: REED SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 17 FEB 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9520184 9520192

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0119 CODES: BOS CRO

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		JOSHI
		KERRICK
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

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DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95022109	FOR DECISION
002		X	95022109	REED SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950221	FUERTH, L	
002	950221	BRILL, K	
002	950221	MCALEER, R	
002	950221	INDERFURTH, K	
002	950221	PANETTA, L	
002	950221	GARTHOFF, D	
002	950221	PATRICK, T	

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed	1	JWR	
Dohse			
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Berger		Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Lake	3		
~~Sandy Berger~~ Reed	4	JWR	Tab I
West Wing Desk	5		
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

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16 Feb

Don,

Please see note from Nancy Soderberg. I believe it reads as follows:

"Please ask Don to add point on press points and Congressional consultations agreed to at end of meeting. There was some disagreement and we need it for record."

VR/Fred Dohse

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Sens			
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Berger	2		
Lake	3		
Situation Room	4		
West Wing Desk			
NSC Secretariat			
Kerrick	5	(R)	FEA

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COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

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Sens			
Soderberg	2	ks	
Berger		Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Lake	3		
~~Reed~~	4	JWR	Tab I
West Wing Desk	5		
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

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Please see note from Nancy Soderberg. I believe it reads as follows:

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
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Dohse	1/#3	D	
Sens			
Soderberg	~~cc~~ 2		
Berger	2		
Lake	3		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4		
NSC Secretariat			
Kerrick	5	R	FEA

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COMMENTS:

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	PRINT LAST NAME: BRANSCUM		
	COPY: 1		
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	2/21/95	2:20 PM	Anthony Tufo
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
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COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			
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	PRINT LAST NAME:		
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MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	2/21	14:15	Strobe Box
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: 1		
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AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
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MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX

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	COPY: 1		
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	2/21/95	1512	Wms, NSC
	PRINT LAST NAME:		WILLIAMS
	COPY: 1		
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			
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MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500			
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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	2/22/95	12:00	J. Gull PRINT LAST NAME: Angell COPY: 1
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX

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ROUTINE

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DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: _____ CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 5 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC OF BOSNIA & CROATIA PC

NSC LOG # 20198

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MM NARA, Date 6/14/10
2010-0533-M

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TIME OF RECEIPT

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- ☐ IMMEDIATE
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- ☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC LOG # 20198

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting SOC BOSNIA & CROATIA PC PAGES: 4

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 6/14/02

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 21, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. LEON E. PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President of the United States

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Executive Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, February 13, 1995 (S)

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. (S)

James W. Rud
for Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MSS NARA, Date 6/14/10
2014-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee
DATE: February 13, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 6:00 - 7:00pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Anthony Lake

OVP
Leon Fuerth

State
Peter Tarnoff

DOD
Dr. William Perry

USUN
Ambassador Madeleine Albright

CIA
Douglas MacEachin

JCS
Admiral William Owens

White House
Samuel Berger
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
Alexander Vershbow

Summary of Conclusions

1. Principals met to review the U.S. position on additional sanctions relief for Milosevic in return for Serbian recognition of Bosnia, Croatia and other former Yugoslav republics within their existing borders. While they agreed that mutual recognition, in itself, will not lead to political settlements, the possibility that recognition might alter the strategic equation and head off a new war in Croatia justified the risks of our support. Therefore, Principals authorized our Contact Group representative to agree to offer a total suspension of sanctions on the FRY in return for mutual recognition, subject to the following conditions:

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0533-M
RS 9/30/14 (1.41)

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A. Conditions proposed by State:

-- that Milosevic's recognition of Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia and Slovenia in their internationally recognized borders be genuine and unequivocal;

-- that sanctions be suspended for 2-month periods, with a positive vote by the UN Security Council required to renew each time;

-- that the sanctions enforcement regime against the FRY remain in place, so that sanctions can be reimposed on short notice;

-- that the "outer wall" of sanctions be kept in place, i.e. measures going beyond UNSC resolutions: no assistance from the IFIs or the EU; no granting of a UN seat to the FRY; and no readmission to OSCE (for our part, we would not recognize the FRY at this time);

-- that there be a significant toughening up of the monitoring regime on the Bosnia/Serbia and Croatia/Serbia borders, including several hundred more monitors plus equipment such as radars to help deal with the helicopter problem;

-- that there be continued firm adherence by Milosevic to the Contact Group plan for Bosnia;

-- that Milosevic endorse the principles in the Zagreb-4 peace plan for Croatia, i.e. the reintegration of the occupied areas under Croatian sovereignty, with autonomy for historically Serb-majority areas; and

-- that nothing be done to in any way affect the commitment to the War Crimes Tribunal.

B. Additional conditions added by Principals:

-- that before we pursue Milosevic's recognition of Croatia, we insist that Tudjman agree to extend UNPROFOR's mandate in return for recognition.

-- that the sanctions relief not go into effect until after the inter-Serbian border is more tightly closed and the Europeans have deployed the additional monitors required; and

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-- that we secure Tudjman's agreement to terminate economic relations with the Krajina Serbs, since this could undermine the effects of Milosevic's cut-off of support to the Krajina and permit the Bosnian Serbs to receive support through the back door.

2. Principals directed our Contact Group representative to put down a marker that, if this initiative fails and the war resumes, our partners will reciprocate our flexibility by supporting the kinds of coercive measures against the Bosnian Serbs that they agreed to previously but never implemented. We would not, however, make their commitment to such measures a quid pro quo.

3. Principals directed that talking points be prepared for dealing with the press and for briefings on the Hill. **(Action: State/NSC)**

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 14, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

FROM: DON KERRICK (K)

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, February 13, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia held February 13, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve AL Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By K NARA, Date 6/14/10

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520184
RECEIVED: 13 FEB 95 12

TO: LAKE

FROM: KERRICK
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 13 FEB 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA CROATIA
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPERS FOR 13 FEB PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 16 FEB 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520192 9520198

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0119 CODES: BOS CRO

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		KERRICK
		NSC CHRON
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSJDA CLOSED BY: NSJDA DOC 1 OF 1

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95021508	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	95021508	NOTED BY LAKE

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3:32p

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~~Sens~~ Dohse	1	D	
~~Hohr~~ Sens	2	NDS	
Soderberg			
Berger	3		
RBN Lake	4	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room	5		
West Wing Desk			
NSC Secretariat			

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cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS: pls add attachments to file cy.

Exec Sec Office has diskette no

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake re: February 13 Principals Meeting on Bosnia/Croatia (3 pages)	02/13/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0119 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, February 13, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs633

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING
February 13, 1995
6:00 - 6:30 p.m.
Situation Room

Chair
Anthony Lake

OVP
Leon Fuerth

State
Peter Tarnoff

DOD
Dr. William Perry

USUN
Ambassador Madeleine Albright

COS
Leon Panetta

CIA
Douglas MacEachin

JCS
William Owens

White House
Sandy Berger
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
Sandy Vershbow

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002b. paper	re: Mutual Recognition and Sanctions Relief (2 pages)	02/1995	P1/b(1)

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Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0119 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, February 13, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs633

RESTRICTION CODES

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P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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FM: AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO

TO:SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0034

////

~~S E C R E T~~ SARAJEVO 0024

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, BK
SUBJECT: "DOUBLE-TRACKING" CONTACT GROUP CONSULTATIONS IN SARJEVO: HIGH-LEVEL BOSNIAN VIEWS

REFTELCON AND REFFAX - JACKOVICH-FRASURE 2/10/95

1. ~~SECRET~~ EXDIS - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. UNDER INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE DEPARTMENT, AMBASSADOR JACKOVICH MET IN SARAJEVO WITH IZETBEGOVIC, GANIC AND SILAJDZIC FEB. 10-12 IN ORDER TO "DOUBLE-TRACK" CONVERSATIONS HELD JUST A FEW DAYS EARLIER BY GERMAN CONTACT GROUP MEMBER STEINER, WHO OUTLINED A PACKAGE OF LIFTING OF SANCTIONS IN EXCHANGE FOR RECOGNITION OF BOSNIA AND CROATIA BY SERBIA. THE BOSNIANS WERE GENERALLY "ON BOARD," THOUGH THEY STRESSED THE NECESSITY FOR COMPLETE SEALING OF THE SERBIAN BORDER AND INDICATED THAT LIFTING THE ARMS EMBARGO WOULD REMAIN AT LEAST A CONTINGENCY OPTION IN CASE THE PACKAGE FAILED. THEY ALSO CAUTIONED THAT A TRIPARTITE SUMMIT AMONG PRESIDENTS OF BOSNIA, CROATIA AND SERBIA WOULD HAVE TO BE WELL ORGANIZED IN ADVANCE WITH THE QUESTION OF RECOGNITION BEING AN ABSOLUTE PRE-REQUISITE. THE BOSNIANS FORESEE NO PROBLEMS WITH THE RUSSIANS BUT PREDICTED THAT THE FRENCH AND BRITISH WOULD PROVE TO BE MAJOR OBSTACLES. PRIME MINISTER SILAJDZIC IN PARTICULAR OUTLINED A SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT APPROACH. HE SAID THAT RECOGNITION OF BOSNIA SHOULD BE LINKED TO A BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF SERBS IN BOSNIA, WHILE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS ON BELGRADE SHOULD BE LINKED WITH CLOSING OF THE SERBIAN BORDER. HE ALSO PUSHED FOR ENDORSEMENT OF THE CONTACT GROUP MAP BY THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, AN ACT WHICH WOULD -- AMONG OTHER THINGS -- ASSURE SOME IN WASHINGTON THAT THE BOSNIANS WOULD NOT ATTEMPT TO RETRIEVE MORE THAN 51 PERCENT OF BOSNIAN TERRITORY IN THE

(STEINER'S ACCOUNT ATTACHED →)

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VR 2/6/2020 (7.16)

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~~SECRET~~

2013-0682-M

EVENT OF "LIFT." END SUMMARY

3. THE AMBASSADOR REVIEWED THE ENTIRE GERMAN PACKAGE, AS PRESENTED BY GERMAN CONTACT GROUP MEMBER MICHAEL STEINER IN SARAJEVO EARLIER IN THE WEEK, WITH THE TOP BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT LEADERSHIP. HE HELD SEPARATE MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT ALIJA IZETBEGOVIC, VICE PRESIDENT EJUP GANIC AND PRIME MINISTER HARIS SILAJDZIC. THE IZETBEGOVIC AND GANIC MEETINGS WERE HELD IMMEDIATELY UPON THE AMBASSADOR'S RETURN TO SARAJEVO ON FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 10, WHILE THE SILAJDZIC CONVERSATION WAS DELAYED UNTIL SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 12, DUE TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S ILLNESS (FLU).

4. IN THE MAIN (AS REPORTED BY REFTELCON), THE TOP BOSNIAN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP APPEARED TO SUPPORT THE GERMAN PACKAGE. THE PURPOSE OF OUR MEETING, AS INSTRUCTED BY THE DEPARTMENT WAS TO "DOUBLE-TRACK" THE GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE AND TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE WERE NUANCES OR SLIPPAGE IN THE APPARENT ENDORSEMENT DELIVERED TO STEINER. ALL THREE BOSNIAN LEADERS APPEARED TO BE "ON BOARD," ALTHOUGH SILAJDZIC'S POSITION (AS REPORTED PREVIOUSLY) IS THE MOST DIFFICULT TO PIN DOWN.

5. AS AN INTRODUCTION, WE TOLD ALL THREE THAT THE MEETINGS WITH STEINER AND THE FOLLOW-UP BY THE AMBASSADOR WERE DESIGNED TO ASSUAGE APPREHENSION IN SARAJEVO THAT INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION EFFORTS WERE MOVING APACE WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION OF THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT, SOMETHING SARAJEVO HAD COMPLAINED ABOUT FREQUENTLY IN THE PAST.

6. (NB: IN ADDITION TO THREE SEPARATE CONVERSATIONS, WE WERE GIVEN ACCESS BY BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT STAFFERS -- STRICTLY PROTECT -- TO "MEMCONS" PREPARED FOLLOWING BOSNIAN MEETINGS WITH STEINER. WHERE RELEVANT, WE MAKE REFERENCE IN THIS MESSAGE TO THIS SOURCE, WHICH SOMETIMES PROVIDED ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TO THAT PROVIDED BY THE BOSNIAN LEADERS. END NB.)

TRIPARTITE SUMMIT

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7. ALL THREE AGREED ON THE GENERAL CONCEPT OF HOLDING A TRIPARTITE SUMMIT, WITH PRE-ARRANGED CONCLUSIONS ALONG THE LINES OF THE GERMAN PACKAGE. IZETBEGOVIC SPECIFICALLY PROPOSED A TIMEFRAME IN LATE MARCH, TO FOLLOW HIS MARCH 17 VISIT TO BONN AND MEETING WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL.

8. GANIC SAID THAT THE BOSNIANS INTENDED TO MEET WITH TUDJMAN SEPARATELY PRIOR TO THE TRIPARTITE SUMMIT, IN ORDER TO PRESENT A UNITED FRONT WITH THE CROATIANS AND IN ORDER TO PRE-EMPT ANY ATTEPT BY ZAGREB TO CUT A SEPARATE DEAL WITH XBELGRADE AT BOSNIA'S EXPENSE. GANIC ALSO INSISTED THAT THE TRIPARTITE SUMMIT BE HELD IN THE PRESENCE OF U.S. AND GERMAN REPRESENTATIVES, "IF ONLY AS NOTE-TAKERS." IT WOULD BE

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ACCEPTABLE TO USE THE CONTACT GROUP AS A "COVER," HE SAID, BUT "ESSENTIAL TO HAVE AMERICANS AND GERMANS IN THE ROOM."

9. ALL THREE -- ESPECIALLY SILAJDZIC -- INSISTED THAT THERE COULD BE NO MEETING WITHOUT PRIOR AGREEMENT ON RECOGNITION, AS THE LEAST THAT COULD BE OBTAINED FROM SUCH A SUMMIT. (THE INTERNAL GOBH MEMCON NOTED THAT STEINER LISTED THREE COUNTRIES FOR WHICH RECOGNITION WOULD BE SOUGHT: BOSNIA, CROATIA AND MACEDONIA. RECOGNITION OF CROATIA WAS LINKED BY STEINER TO ZAGREB RETAINING SOME FORM OF UNPROFOR PRESENCE. STEINER ALSO REPORTEDLY TOLD THE BOSNIANS THAT BONN ASSESSED THE CHANCES OF MILOSEVIC SIGNING ON TO THE ENTIRE PACKAGE AT NO MORE THAN 50-50.)

LIFTING SANCTIONS AGAINST BELGRADE

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10. BOTH IZETBEGOVIC (WITH RELUCTANCE) AND GANIC (AFTER DISCUSSION) WERE WILLING TO COUNTENANCE FULL LIFTING OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST BELGRADE. SILAJDZIC DEMURRED, AND PRESENTED AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT DYNAMIC FOR THE TALKS, AS DESCRIBED BELOW.

11. IZETBEGOVIC SAID HE HAD PUSHED AT FIRST WITH STEINER FOR ONLY PARTIAL LIFTING OF SANCTIONS, BUT THEN HAD AGREED WITH THE GERMAN ON FULL SANCTIONS RELIEF, IF RPT IF A COMPLETE SEALING OF THE BORDER WITH SERBIA COULD BE ASSURED. THE PRESIDENT ALSO WANTED U.S. OR NATO TECHNICAL AND AERIAL MEANS TO BE EMPLOYED AS PART OF AN ENHANCED BORDER MONITORING OPERATION. HE SAID THE TWO-MONTH REVIEWING MECHANISM SHOULD BE SERIOUS AND THAT SANCTIONS SHOULD BE RE-INSTITUTED IF THE BORDER IS NOT SEALED.

12. ON THIS SAME SUBJECT, GANIC BEGAN TO DEMUR AND EVEN STATED THAT SANCTIONS SHOULD BE LIFTED ONLY "TO A GREAT EXTENT." AFTER SOME THOUGHT, HOWEVER, (AS IF RECALLING A STANCE PREVIOUSLY COORDINATED WITH IZETBEGOVIC), HE FINALLY SAID THAT FULL LIFTING COULD BE DONE "IF THE BORDER IS COMPLETELY CLOSED."

13. ACCORDING TO THE INTERNAL GOBH MEMCON, STEINER ALSO EMPHASIZED ENHANCED SANCTIONS ON THE KARADZIC SERBS AS PART OF A POLICY OF ENHANCED ISOLATION OF PALE. IN THIS REGARD, THE GERMAN IS CITED AS SUGGESTING THAT TELECOMMUNICATIONS LINKS COULD BE CUT AND STATING THAT "THE AMERICANS AND GERMANS WOULD FAVOR THIS, WHILE THE FRENCH AND BRITISH ARE OPPOSED." ACCORDING TO THIS ACCOUNT, STEINER EVEN SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS FAVOR CUTTING RADIO/TELEVISION TRANSMISSIONS, WHILE THE GERMANS THEMSELVES ARE NOT IN FAVOR OF THIS MOVE.

14. SILAJDZIC'S APPROACH ESSENTIALLY RE-ASSESSES THE ENTIRE DYNAMIC OF THE TALKS. THE PRIME MINISTER SUGGESTED THAT MILOSEVIC SHOULD ONLY BE OFFERED A GOBH DECLARATION ABOUT

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SERB RIGHTS IN BOSNIA IN EXCHANGE FOR RECOGNITION OF BOSNIA. SUSPENSION OF SANCTIONS, HE CONTINUED, SHOULD ONLY BE OFFERED IN EXCHANGE FOR SEALING THE BORDER. THE FIRST TWO ITEMS ARE "FIXED," HE EXPLAINED, WHILE THE NEXT TWO ARE "VARIABLE." "THE SANCTIONS SHOULD ONLY BE LIFTED IN CORRESPONDENCE TO THE EXTENT OF REAL CLOSING OF THE BORDER," SILAJDZIC SAID, INDICATING A SORT OF PARALLEL CALIBRATING OF BOTH EFFORTS. HE DEFINITELY FAVORED ONLY PARTIAL LIFTING OF SANCTIONS, BASED ON THIS EVENTUAL CALIBRATION.

15. FURTHER, SILAJDZIC SAID MILOSEVIC SHOULD BE LED INTO "DEMANDING" A BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT DECLARATION ON SERB RIGHTS (AND IMPLIED HE WOULD GET IT), BUT SHOULD BE TOLD BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY PUBLICLY THAT HE WOULD "GET NOTHING" IN EXCHANGE FOR EXTENDING RECOGNITION. LIKEWISE, HE SAID THAT A MILOSEVIC REQUEST FOR FULL LIFTING OF SANCTIONS SHOULD BE CONTRIVED, TO WHICH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WOULD RESPOND WITH AN OFFER OF PARTIAL SUSPENSION.

16. AS NOTED IN PREVIOUS REPORTING, SILAJDZIC ALSO FAVORED TAKING THE CONTACT GROUP PLAN AND MAP TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR ENDORSEMENT. HE CLAIMED TO HAVE OBTAINED RUSSIAN SUPPORT FOR THIS IDEA DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO MOSCOW, BUT WAS DISAPPOINTED AT THE "LUKE-WARM" RESPONSE IN WASHINGTON. IN OUTLINING WHAT HE SAW AS ADVANTAGES TO SUCH AN APPROACH, SILAJDZIC SAID: A) THE CG PLAN THEN BECOMES IMMUTABLE; B) THE MODERATES (AMONG BOTH RUSSIANS AND SERBS) ARE HELPED; AND, C) THE HAWKS (AMONG BOTH RUSSIANS AND SERBS) ARE HELPED (PRESUMABLY BECAUSE THE APPROACH WOULD PROVIDE A FACE-SAVING EXIT). IN ADDITION, ENDORSEMENT BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD HELP DISPEL FEARS IN WASHINGTON THAT THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT, IN THE EVENT OF A LIFTING OF THE ARMS EMBARGO, WOULD STRIVE TO RETRIEVE TERRITORY BEYOND THE 51 PERCENT ALLOCATED IT UNDER THE CONTACT GROUP MAP. (COMMENT: WE UNDERSTAND THIS LATTER POINT WAS THE SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION BETWEEN SILAJDZIC AND SENATOR BIDEN DURING THE PRIME MINISTER'S RECENT VISIT TO WASHINGTON. END COMMENT)

17. MOST OF ALL, SILAJDZIC APPEARED TO LAMENT THE ABSENCE OF A CLEAR TIMETABLE OF DEADLINES WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE MET BY THE SERBS BEFORE HARSHER MEASURES WOULD BE APPLIED (SUCH AS "LIFT"). INDEED, THE INSTITUTION OF A TWO-MONTH REVIEW MECHANISM WAS VIEWED BY SILAJDZIC ESSENTIALLY AS A MEANS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO AVOID SETTING MORE MEANINGFUL DEADLINES.

LIFTING THE ARMS EMBARGO

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18. ALL THREE BOSNIANS ADHERED TO THE POLICY OF PURSUING "LIFT" AS A FINAL CONTINGENCY OPTION, IN THE EVENT THAT THE ENTIRE GERMAN PACKAGE FAILED. GANIC REVEALED THAT HE INTENDED TO TRAVEL TO THE U.S. ON ANOTHER "LIFT"-ADVOCACY

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TOUR, PROBABLY IN APRIL. BUT THE VICE PRESIDENT ALSO WAS QUICK TO NOTE THE REAL VALUE OF "LIFT" AS A "NEGOTIATING PLOY" AND A "THREAT" TO HOLD OVER THE SERBS, RATHER THAN AS AN IMPLEMENTABLE REALITY. "BUT IF WAR COMES AGAIN," HE SAID, "WE MUST CONTINUE WORKING ON 'LIFT' WITH OUR FRIENDS AND WITH CONGRESS."

19. SILAJDZIC TOLD US THAT STEINER PUSHED FOR A BOSNIAN RETREAT FROM INSISTENCE ON "LIFT," AND THAT HE -- SILAJDZIC -- HAD REBUFFED HIM. THE PRIME MINISTER INDICATED THAT "LIFT" HAD BECOME SUCH A POLITICAL PILLAR WITH THE BOSNIANS THAT YIELDING ON THIS POINT WAS ESSENTIALLY A NON-STARTER. THE INTERNAL BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT MEMCON ACCOUNT CITED STEINER AS URGING THE BOSNIANS TO COMMUNICATE TO U.S. CONGRESS THAT INSISTENCE ON "LIFT" WAS NO LONGER AN IMMEDIATE NECESSITY. THE BOSNIANS EVIDENTLY TURNED HIM DOWN.

COORDINATION AMONG ALLIES

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20. ALL THE BOSNIAN LEADERS ENVISIONED THE PACKAGE AS A JOINT U.S. AND GERMAN INITIATIVE. THEY BELIEVED THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD BE AMENABLE, BUT FORESAW CONSIDERABLE OBSTACLES IN THE BRITISH AND FRENCH. GANIC EVEN REFERRED TO A "GERMAN-AMERICAN ALLIANCE" AND PROPOSED THAT THE AMERICANS WORK ON THE BRITISH WHILE THE GERMANS SHOULD PRESSURE THE FRENCH.

21. PREDICTABLY, SILAJDZIC EVINCED MORE BITTERNESS ABOUT COORDINATION AMONG ELEMENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. HE SAID THAT ONE REASON WHY HE HAD TRAVELED TO THE COUNTRIES OF THREE CONTACT GROUP MEMBERS IN A MATTER OF DAYS (U.S., RUSSIA, GERMANY) WAS TO FACILITATE COORDINATION AMONG THESE COUNTRIES' GOVERNMENTS. "I HAVE TO TELL THE SAME THING THREE TIMES IN THREE CAPITALS, BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF COORDINATION," HE SAID.

COMMENT

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22. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO PROVIDE WASHINGTON WITH A MORE DETAILED AND NUANCED READ-OUT OF BOSNIAN VIEWS, AS A FOLLOW-ON TO STEINER'S MEETINGS WITH SARAJEVO AUTHORITIES. WE WERE STRUCK BY THE APPARENT ADHERENCE TO THE GENERAL PACKAGE BY IZETBEGOVIC AND GANIC, AS WELL AS BY THE DIFFERENT APPROACH PROPOSED BY SILAJDZIC. WE CAUTION THAT SOME OF THE NUANCES AIRED BY THE BOSNIANS COULD MASK MORE PROFOUND PROBLEMS WITH THE PACKAGE, ALTHOUGH THIS IS SOMETHING THAT WILL PRESUMABLY ONLY EMERGE AT A LATER DATE, IF EVER. JACKOVICH

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002d. email	Alexander Vershbow to Tyler Beardsley et al. re: PC Update: Revised Sanctions "terms of reference" (1 page)	02/13/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0119 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, February 13, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs633

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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Hall, Wilma G.

From:	Vershbow, Alexander R.
To:	@NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor
Cc:	/R, Record at A1; Beardsley, Tyler S.; Fuerth, Leon S.; Kerrick, Donald L.; Saunders, Richard M.
Subject:	PC update ~~[SECRET]~~
Date:	Monday, February 13, 1995 3:27PM

For TL and SRB (cc LF)

Following cable from Paris details French thinking on conditions for sanctions relief and for holding of international conference. Note French would insist that Tudjman agree to extension of UNPROFOR's mandate as part of deal with Belgrade. (Also note French admonishment to Owen -- he just doesn't get it). SV

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~SECRET~~ DTG:131842Z FEB 95

FM: AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO:SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7211

~~S E C R E T~~ PARIS 03811

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, BK, FR
SUBJECT: GOF OUTLINES STEPS TOWARDS BOSNIA CONFERENCE

REF: HILL-BELLAMY TELCON 2/13/95

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. AS DEPARTMENT IS AWARE, THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT HAS DISCUSSED WITH GERMAN CG REP STEINER A PACKAGE WHICH COULD FORM THE BASIS OF SARAJEVO-BELGRADE AND ZAGREB-BELGRADE MUTUAL RECOGNITION ACCORDS. THE FRENCH SEE PROMISE IN THIS AND WILL PROPOSE THAT THE CG WORK INTENSIVELY AND DISCREETLY TO NAIL DOWN THESE ACCORDS BEFORE ANNOUNCING AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE IN PARIS. END SUMMARY.

3. FOREIGN MINISTER JUPPE'S NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER BRUNO RACINE SUMMONED US ON SHORT NOTICE FEBRUARY 13 TO EXPLAIN GOF VIEWS GOING INTO THE FEBRUARY 14 CG MEETING IN PARIS.

4. RACINE NOTED THAT KOHL HAD GIVEN MITTERRAND AN UNEQUIVOCAL COMMITMENT TO WORK TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BOSNIA. GERMAN CG REP STEINER HAD RETURNED OVER THE WEEKEND FROM SARAJEVO WHERE, RACINE SAID, HE HAD OBTAINED "VERY PRECISE PROPOSALS" FROM THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT. THESE PROPOSALS WERE IN LINE WITH WHAT THE FRENCH, BRITISH AND GERMANS HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING AMONG THEMSELVES OVER THE PAST WEEK.

5. NOTING THAT THE U.S. MAY ALREADY HAVE THIS INFORMATION (RACINE HAD BEEN BRIEFED BY STEINER THE EVENING OF FEBRUARY 12), RACINE DESCRIBED THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT'S "PRINCIPLES" AS FOLLOWS:

A. RECOGNITION BY BELGRADE OF ALL YUGOSLAV SUCCESSOR

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STATES, INCLUDING MACEDONIA.

B. IF THE BOSNIAN SERBS CONTINUE THEIR REFUSAL TO ACCEPT THE CG PLAN, BELGRADE WILL TIGHTEN CLOSURE OF ITS BORDER WITH BOSNIA.

C. ALL/ALL SANCTIONS ON BELGRADE SUSPENDED FOR A FIXED, BUT RENEWABLE, TIME PERIOD.

D. A CONTINUING CEASEFIRE, RENEWABLE EACH TIME THE SANCTIONS SUSPENSION IS RENEWED.

E. BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES OF THE "EQUAL RIGHTS" OF THE BOSNIAN SERBS PER THE CONTACT GROUP'S LANGUAGE LAST DECEMBER.

F. INCREASED ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THE BOSNIA FEDERATION, WITH A PROVISION TO EXTEND THIS AID TO THE BOSNIAN SERBS ONCE THEY ACCEPT THE CG PLAN.

G. A BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT UNDERTAKING TO TELL TO THE U.S. CONGRESS PRIVATELY -- NO/NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT -- THAT THE TIMING IS NOT RIGHT FOR LIFTING THE ARMS EMBARGO.

6. THE GOF WILL PROPOSE AT THE FEBRUARY 14 CG MEETING THAT THE CG CAPITALIZE QUICKLY ON THIS OPENING. THE FRENCH WILL SUGGEST THAT A U.S./GERMAN CG TEAM TRAVEL TO SARAJEVO TO CONFIRM THE PRINCIPLES LISTED ABOVE. A FRENCH/BRITISH CG TEAM WOULD SIMULTANEOUSLY VISIT BELGRADE TO SOUND OUT MILOSEVIC IN GENERAL TERMS. THESE VISITS WOULD HAVE TO BE ACCOMPLISHED WITH THE UTMOST DISCRETION, WITHOUT PUBLICITY OF ANY KIND. A VISIT TO ZAGREB WOULD FOLLOW SOME TIME LATER.

7. JUPPE SPOKE TO KOZYREV FEBRUARY 13 BUT DID NOT GET INTO MANY OF THE DETAILS ABOVE. THE FRENCH RECOGNIZE THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL PROBABLY WANT TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH THIS EFFORT BUT PREFER THAT THEY NOT BE INCLUDED ON THE MISSION TO BELGRADE AT THIS STAGE.

8. ADDING AT LEAST ONE NEW DIMENSION TO THE QUESTION OF MUTUAL RECOGNITION, RACINE SAID THE FRENCH BELIEVE THAT THE CG SHOULD INSIST, AS PART OF THE ZAGREB-BELGRADE PACKAGE, THAT ZAGREB AGREE TO THE EXTENSION OF UNPROFOR IN CROATIA. RACINE REPORTED THAT STEINER PERSONALLY WAS DETERMINED ON THIS POINT.

9. RACINE ALSO INDICATED THAT THE FRENCH ARE THINKING ABOUT RAISING THE "LEVEL" OF THE CG REPS SENT TO BELGRADE AND SARAJEVO. HE IMPLIED THAT FRENCH REP DE SEDOUY WOULD NOT BE THE GOF'S CHOICE FOR SUCH A MISSION.

10. THE GOF'S PLAN IS FOR THE CG TO WORK INTENSIVELY, PERHAPS DIVIDING ITS LABORS AMONG MEMBER STATES, TO NAIL DOWN "99 PERCENT" OF SEPARATE BELGRADE-SARAJEVO AND BELGRADE-ZAGREB ACCORDS BEFORE ANNOUNCING AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE IN PARIS. THERE IS NO POINT IN DISCUSSING THE LEVEL OF ATTENDANCE AT THIS CONFERENCE, RACINE SAID, BEFORE WE KNOW WHAT RESULTS WE CAN EXPECT FROM IT.

11. IN A FINAL NOTE, RACINE MENTIONED RECENT GOF CONTACTS WITH LORD OWEN IN WHICH THE FRENCH HAD

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INFORMED OWEN BLUNTLY OF THE LOW ESTEEM IN WHICH HE IS HELD IN THE U.S. OWEN ATTRIBUTED THIS ENTIRELY, SAID RACINE, TO AMBASSADOR GALBRAITH, TO WHICH THE FRENCH REPLIED THAT HE HAD FENCES TO MEND IN WASHINGTON IN ANY CASE. RACINE SAID THE FRENCH, IN THEIR EU PRESIDENCY CAPACITY, ARE THINKING ABOUT TASKING OWEN TO CONCENTRATE FOR THE TIME BEING ON KEEPING THE KRAJINA SERBS IN LINE. THIS COULD HELP TO MINIMIZE THE RISK OF OWEN LAUNCHING PRIVATE INITIATIVES WHICH CONFLICT WITH THE CG EFFORTS.

HARRIMAN

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002f. email	Alexander Vershbow to Kristen Cicio re: Sanctions (1 page)	02/10/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0119 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, February 13, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs633

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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FOR SANDY BERGER

-- We would be willing in Paris to agree with the Europeans--and Izetbegovic--on full sanctions relief, if our views on the following points are fully taken into consideration.

-- We should insist that the sanctions regime remains in place with a strong positive renewal clause on relief, i.e. the UNSC would have to agree each two months

-- We should also insist that an outer wall of "sanctions" be kept in place including nothing from the IFI's, the EU, no UN seat, nothing on OSCE, etc. (hold back)

-- We would also insist on genuine recognition of Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia and Slovenia in their internationally accepted borders. (In return we could agree to recognize the FRY.)] WHY?

-- There must be a significant toughening up of the ICFY line on the Bosnia/Serbia and Croatia/Serbia borders, including several hundred more monitors plus equipment such as radars. (Resources could be drawn from the SAM teams currently operating in the outer ring.)] NO (per LF)

given up leverage of sanctions to implement

suspension vs. lifting

STATE'S "TERMS OF REFERENCE" FOR CG MTG.

Bosnian Serbs accept Krajina "

change dynamic w/ MLADIC?
⇒ K renounces claims to Krajina
⇒ K Serbs under pressure to negotiate

and implement peace plans

• Apt linkage w/ allies - if "peace strategy" fails we'll join us on

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002h. memo	Leon Fuerth to Anthony Lake re: PC on Bosnia (2 pages)	02/10/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

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b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002i. memo	Leon Feurth to Sandy Berger re: Plan B Fallback Position (3 pages)	02/10/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0119 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, February 13, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs633

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520192
RECEIVED: 13 FEB 95 19

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 15 FEB 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA CROATIA
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FOLLOW UP PAPER TO PRES RE 13 FEB PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT DUE DATE: 16 FEB 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9520184 9520198

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0119 CODES: BOS CRO

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		JOSHI
		KERRICK
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW
		WOLIN

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP CLOSED BY: NSMBN DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By tm NARA, Date 6/14/12
2010-0533-M

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~~SECRET~~ RECORD ID: 9520192

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95021507	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
002	PRESIDENT	Z	95021507	FOR INFORMATION
002		X	95021508	NOTED BY PRESIDENT

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Principals Decision on Bosnia and Sanctions Relief (3 pages)	02/15/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0119 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, February 13, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs633

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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~~SECRET~~ 20192

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 13, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

SUBJECT: Memorandum to the President on Bosnia and Sanctions Relief

Attached is your memorandum to the President on today's Principals' Committee decision on sanctions relief in the context of mutual recognition. Madeleine Albright has cleared on the description of her position.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to the President

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/7/2019
2010-0533-M

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

See also 2013-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title: PC0120 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, February 21, 1995				
Staff Office-Individual: Records Management				
Original OA/ID Number: 4008				
Row: 43	Section: 6	Shelf: 7	Position: 1	Stack: V

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (2 pages)~~	~~02/21/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
002a. memo	Leon Fuerth to Tony Lake re: A Premature Funeral for Plan B? (1 page)	02/21/1995	P1/b(1)
002b. memo	BG Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake re: February 21 Principals Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)	02/21/1995	P1/b(1)
002c. agenda	Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (1 page)	02/22/1995	P1/b(1)
~~002d. cable~~	~~re: CG Western Caucus-The Europeans Will Come (2 pages)~~	~~02/20/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002e. cable~~	~~re: Milosevic Stiffs the Contact Group (3 pages)~~	~~02/19/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002f. cable~~	~~re: Luncheon with Milosevic-He Didn't Say No (4 pages)~~	~~02/17/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002g. memo~~	~~Leon Fuerth to Tony Lake re: Controlling Release of FRY Frozen Assets under Plan B (2 pages)~~	~~02/17/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002h. paper~~	~~Controlling Release of FRY Frozen Assets under Plan B (1 page)~~	~~02/20/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002i. list~~	~~Implementing Plan B (1 page)~~	~~00/00/0000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0120 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, February 21, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs634

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520235
RECEIVED: 22 FEB 95 12

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 24 FEB 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
SOC
CROATIA
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS OF 21 FEB PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 25 FEB 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520218 9520230

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0120 CODES: BOS CRO

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BAKER JANE
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		STEPHENS
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSASK CLOSED BY: NSASK DOC 2 OF 2

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MM NARA, Date 6/4/10
2015 0538

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	95022514	FOR DECISION
002		X	95022514	DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950224	FUERTH, L	
002	950224	BRILL, K	
002	950224	MCALEER, R	
002	950224	INDERFURTH, K	
002	950224	GARTHOFF, D	
002	950224	PATRICK, T	
002	950224	ADAMS, G	

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recd 2/23 7:00am

National Security Council
The White House

20235

PROOFED BY: _____ *LOG #* _____

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ *SYSTEM* PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ *DOCLOG* _____ *A/O* _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Dohse	1	D	
Sens			
Soderberg	2	ms	
Berger		cc	
Lake	3		
~~Situation Room~~ Dohse	4	Nat'l Sec Advisor ~~has seen~~	Tab D
West Wing Desk	5	DPS 2/24	D Pkg
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 20235

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM ~~PRS~~ (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Dohse	1	D	
Sens			
Soderberg	2	~~m~~	
Berger		cc	
Lake	3		
~~Situation Room~~ Dohse	4	Natl Sec Advisor ~~has seen~~	Tab I
West Wing Desk	5	[illegible] 1/24	D plea
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette [illegible]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9520235
DATE 24 FEB 95

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS OF 21 FEB DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506		1545	Stroom Box 2/25 PRINT LAST NAME: ABL COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	2/27/95	1045	Wms. NC PRINT LAST NAME: WILLIAMS COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MS NARA, Date 6/14/10
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9520235
DATE 24 FEB 95

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS OF 21 FEB DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET
ROOM 238
OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG
WASHINGTON, DC 20503

DATE: 2/27/95 TIME: 10:15 SIGNATURE: J. Lyons

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

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LOG 9520235
DATE 24 FEB 95

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DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	2/27/95	0740	J. Hilty PRINT LAST NAME: HILTY COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
COL. T. R. PATRICK JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX

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By [illegible] NARA, Date 6/14/12
2000-0533-F

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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LOG 9520235
DATE 24 FEB 95

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS OF 21 FEB DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506			
		PRINT LAST NAME:	
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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	2/27/95	1045	MC Williams
		PRINT LAST NAME:	WILLIAMS
			COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			
		PRINT LAST NAME:	
			COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			
		PRINT LAST NAME:	
			COPY: VIA FAX
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			
		PRINT LAST NAME:	
			COPY: VIA FAX
COL. T. R. PATRICK JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001			
		PRINT LAST NAME:	
			COPY: VIA FAX

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 02 PAGES

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NM NARA, Date 6/14/12
2012-0533-M

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9520235
DATE 24 FEB 95

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS OF 21 FEB DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

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OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET
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WASHINGTON, DC 20503

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1995 FEB 24 [illegible]

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FEB 21 [illegible]

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

RELEASER: Kevin B Wroth

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 402 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 4 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC of 21 Feb. PC meeting on Bosnia & Croatia NSC LOG # 20235

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

BOSNIA

REMARKS:

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NARA, Date 5/4/05

2000533-m

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WHITE HOUSE

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

1995 FEB 24 [illegible] PM

TIME OF RECEIPT

95 FEB 24 P10:42

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE / PRIORITY / ROUTINE

RELEASER: Kevin B Wooten

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 402 **CLASSIFICATION:** ~~SECRET~~ **TOTAL:** 4 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC of 21 Feb. PC meeting on Bosnia & Croatia NSC LOG # 2 0235

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

B B 2 V A

REMARKS:

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MM NARA, Date 6/14/12
2012-0533-M

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NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER (FRI) 02. 24. 95 22:02 NO. 7400017934 PAGE 1

WHITE HOUSE WASHFAX

TIME OF TRANSMISSION 24 FEB 95 21 45

1995 FEB 24 [illegible] PM

NMCC/JCS

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE / (PRIORITY) / ROUTINE

RELEASER: Kevin B Wooten

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 402 **CLASSIFICATION:** ~~SECRET~~ **TOTAL:** 4 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC of 21 Feb. PC meeting on Bosnia & Croatia NSC LOG # 20235

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

DECLASSIFIED
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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 6/14/12
2012-0533-F

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WHITE HOUSE

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

1995 FEB 24 [illegible]

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE / (PRIORITY) / ROUTINE

RELEASER: Keir B Worth

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 402 **CLASSIFICATION:** ~~SECRET~~ **TOTAL:** 4 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC of 21 Feb. PC meeting on Bosnia & Croatia NSC LOG # 20235

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

B B N D A

REMARKS:

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MI NARA, Date 4/14/10
2010-0533-M

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE
- ☐ FLASH
- ☐ ~~IMMEDIATE~~
- ☑ PRIORITY
- ☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC LOG # 20235

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: ~~Notice of Meeting~~ SOC ag 21 Feb PC on Bosnia PAGES: 3

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MW NARA, Date 6/14/12

2010-0535-M

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~~SECRET~~

20235

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 24, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

AMBASSADOR RICK INDEFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T.R. PATRICK
Executive Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, February 21, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

for
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MM NARA, Date 2/14/20

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee
DATE: February 21, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 3:00 - 3:40pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Anthony Lake

OVP
Leon Fuerth

State
Secretary Christopher

DOD
Secretary Perry

USUN
Ambassador Madeleine Albright

CIA
Admiral William Studeman

JCS
General John Shalikashvili

White House
Samuel Berger
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
Alexander Vershbow

Summary of Conclusions

1. Principals discussed the recent increase in reports of violations of the no-fly zone. They recognized that investigations by the UN and NATO have been unable to confirm the reported activity. Concerned that reporting has indicated that NATO is no longer enforcing the no-fly zone, Principals requested a detailed documentation of recent helicopter and fixed wing activity and a recap of NATO procedures to enforce the no-fly zone, with a view to NATO using the information to correct the public record. **(Action: JCS)** (S)

2. Principals discussed efforts to obtain Serbian recognition of Bosnia, Croatia, and other former Yugoslav republics within their existing borders in exchange for sanctions relief (Plan B). Principals agreed that while prospects for success were remote, we should not agree to any further sanctions relief or other

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0533-M
R 9/30/14 (7.24)
(1.42)
SECRET

measures that would "sweeten" the offer now under consideration. They directed that our Contact Group partners be informed of our seriousness before their meeting with Milosevic later this week. **(Action: State)** Principals also requested that Deputies consider how long the Plan B proposal should remain on the table. **(Action: Deputies)** (S)

3. Principals discussed the impact on the War Crimes Tribunal of the present Plan B proposal. They decided not to add Serbian cooperation with the War Crimes Tribunal as an additional condition for sanctions relief in the context of mutual recognition. Principals agreed, however, that further relief from the "outer wall" of sanctions would still be subject to many additional conditions including cooperation with the War Crimes Tribunal. (S)

4. Principals discussed options for the longer term should diplomatic efforts fail to achieve a negotiated settlement. They requested that the Deputies undertake a review of potential scenarios to frame policy choices likely to be faced in the next 2-3 months. The review should include estimated time-lines for events on the ground in Bosnia, Croatia and neighboring areas, an analysis of the likely evolution of allied and Congressional attitudes, and U.S. policy options. **(Action: Deputies/ Interagency)** (S)

5. Principals discussed a request from Milosevic, channeled through a private U.S. citizen, for a one-time meeting with Congressman Bill Richardson. They agreed that Richardson should be informed that we oppose such a meeting as Milosevic already has direct high-level access to the U.S. Government. (S)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 22, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: DON KERRICK

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, February 21, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia held February 21, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MS NARA, Date 6/14/10

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

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~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520230
RECEIVED: 21 FEB 95 20

TO: LAKE

FROM: FUERTH, L

DOC DATE: 21 FEB 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA CROATIA
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: OVP FOLLOW UP PAPER TO 21 FEB PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA - PREMATURE FUNERAL FOR PLAN B

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE DATE: 24 FEB 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE LOGREF: 9520218 9520235

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0120 CODES: BOS CRO

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		KERRICK
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		STEPHENS
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS CLOSED BY: NSDRS DOC 1 OF 1

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 6/14/00
2018-0533-M

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~ RECORD ID: 9520230

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001		X	95022120	FOR RECORD PURPOSES

~~SECRET~~

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	Leon Fuerth to Tony Lake re: A Premature Funeral for Plan B? (1 page)	02/21/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0120 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, February 21, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs634

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520218
RECEIVED: 21 FEB 95 08

TO: LAKE

FROM: KERRICK

DOC DATE: 21 FEB 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
CROATIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 21 FEB PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 24 FEB 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520230 9520235

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0120 CODES: BOS CRO

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		JOSHI
		KERRICK
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSASK CLOSED BY: NSDRS DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By KWH NARA, Date 6/14/12

210-0533-M

~~SECRET~~ RECORD ID: 9520218

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95022110	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	95022119	NOTED BY LAKE

~~SECRET~~

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rec'd 2/21 10:34

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: JBM LOG # 20218

URGENT NOT PROOFED: ✓ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG JBM A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Dohse	1	D	
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger	2	c	
Lake	3	~~Natl Sec Advisor~~ has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4		N
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS: PC - Bosnia
2/21

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. memo	BG Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake re: February 21 Principals Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)	02/21/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0120 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, February 21, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs634

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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TAB

A.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002c. agenda	Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (1 page)	02/22/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0120 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, February 21, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs634

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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TAB B.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: BERGER, DOHSE, FUERTH, LAKE, REED, SENS, SIT, SODERBERG, WOLIN, BRANSCUM, GARDNER, KERRICK, STEPHENS, SUM, SUM2, VERSHBOW, WHSR_SPECIAL

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~SECRET~~ DTG:201431Z FEB 95

FM: AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

TO:
SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4842

////

~~SECRET~~ BELGRADE 000825

FROM AMBASSADOR FRASURE

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, SR
SUBJECT: CG WESTERN CAUCUS--THE EUROPEANS WILL COME BACK ON THURSDAY

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. UK/US/FRENCH CONTACT GROUP MEMBERS CAUCUSED THIS MORNING (FEBRUARY 20) IN BELGRADE. THE FRENCH REPORTED THAT THERE IS A MEETING WITH MILOSEVIC TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED FOR THURSDAY AFTERNOON. IT IN THEORY COULD BE A CONTACT GROUP SESSION OR A EUROPEAN "SOUNDING", AS WE DISCUSSED IN PARIS ON TUESDAY.

3. WE QUICKLY AGREED THAT THE THURSDAY SESSION SHOULD BE A EUROPEAN SESSION FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

-- AS US REP ARGUED STRONGLY, OUR EUROPEAN COLLEAGUES NEED TO MAKE IT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR TO MILOSEVIC THAT THE U.S. BAG OF CARROTS IS EMPTY AND WASHINGTON IS FED UP WITH MILOSEVIC'S GAMES. IT WILL OBVIOUSLY BE A LOT EASIER TO DO THIS IN A COLORFUL WAY IF THE AMERICANS ARE NOT IN THE ROOM.

-- MILOSEVIC'S ATTITUDE SEEMS TO BE HARDENING GIVEN THE EVOLUTION FROM FRASURE'S MEETING TO KOZYREV'S. TUS A HIGHLY VISIBLE, FULL CG SESSION ON THURSDAY COULD LEAD US TO A PUBLIC BREAKDOWN AND THE END OF THE GAME ABRUPTLY.

-- FINALLY THE RUSSIANS ARE CLEARLY WAY OFF THE CG

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VZ 2/6/2020 (7.27)

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RESERVATION AND WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO TAKE PART IN THE THURSDAY SESSION. IN HIS PUBLIC REMARKS HERE YESTERDAY, KOZYREV REFERRED TO THE CG'S ACTIONS AS INADEQUATE. (IT IS ALSO NOT CLEAR WHERE THE ABSENT GERMANS STAND ON THIS ENTERPRISE. DEJAMMET SAID HE WOULD INSIST THEY JOIN THE FRENCH/BRITISH EFFORT ON THURSDAY.)

4. ASIDE FORM THE POINTS ABOVE, IT WAS VERY CLEAR THAT, AFTER THE SEPARATE US AND RUSSIAN MEETINGS WITH MILOSEVIC THAT NEVILLE-JONES AND DEJAMMET WANTED A SEPARATE EUROPEAN BITE OF THE BITTER APPLE. THEY WERE ALSO CONCERNED BY PERCEPTIONS (IN THE PRESS AND AMONG FELLOW EUROPEANS) THAT THE CG CAME TO TOWN BUT ONLY THE AMERICANS AND KOZYREV SAW MILOSEVIC. A PUBLIC LINE WAS AGREED THAT THE WEEKEND CONSISTED OF CONSULTATIONS AND SOUNDINGS AT VARIOUS LEVELS BUT NO SPECIFICS ON WHO SAW WHOM.

5. WE FURTHER AGREED ON THESE POINTS:

-- THE EUROPEANS WILL GIVE US AN IMMEDIATE READOUT ON THURSDAY. THERE SHOULD BE A CG MEETING IN PARIS NEXT WEEK TO CONSIDER NEXT STEPS.

-- WE SHOULD ALL GO BACK TO THE RUSSIANS VERY STRONGLY ON KOZYREV'S BELGRADE PERFORMANCE. IN THAT REGARD ZOTOV STRESSED YESTERDAY THAT MOSCOW CONTINUES TO REJECT PLAN B. THUS, NO MATTER WHAT MILOSEVIC SAYS, WE ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO DRAW UP AN AGREED PROPOSAL ON RECOGNITION/SANCTIONS SUSPENSION.

6. MILOSEVIC APPEARS TO HAVE MADE HIS POINT BY STIFFING THE CG YESTERDAY. BUT WE MAY NOT SEE ANY MORE SIGNS OF FLEXIBILITY. PERINA
BT
#0825

NNNN
<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01
<^SSN>0825
<^TOR>950220100317 M1524008

FROM:
SITREPRT

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~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: BERGER, DOHSE, FUERTH, LAKE, REED, SENS, SIT, SODERBERG, WOLIN, CLARKER, KERRICK, NSC, RICE, SAUNDERS, STEPHENS, SUM, SUM2, VERSHBOW

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~SECRET~~ DTG:191750Z FEB 95

FM: AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4840

RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0137
RUCNTXF/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO IMMEDIATE 0001
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB IMMEDIATE 1830
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 9877
RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 3354
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0885
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 1391

~~S E C R E T~~ BELGRADE 000824

FROM AMBASSADOR FRASURE

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, SR
SUBJECT: MILOSEVIC STIFFS THE CONTACT GROUP

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. BEGIN SUMMARY: IN THE WAKE OF KOZYREV'S VISIT TO BELGRADE, MILOSEVIC HAS REFUSED TO SEE THE CONTACT GROUP ASSEMBLED IN TOWN TODAY TO DISCUSS THE RECOGNITION/SANCTIONS SUSPENSION INITIATIVE. BRITISH AND FRENCH POLITICAL DIRECTORS ARE FURIOUS. THE RUSSIANS ARE GOING BACK TO MILOSEVIC TODAY TO URGE HIM TO SEE THE CG. THE FALLBACK FOR THE EUROPEANS IS A BILATERAL OR JOINT MEETING WITH THE SERBIAN PRESIDENT. THE BRITISH/FRENCH HAVE FORCEFULLY TOLD THE RUSSIANS THAT, IF MILOSEVIC'S DECISION STANDS, IT WILL HAVE VERY SUBSTANTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE CG AND RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW IN GENERAL AS SUPPOSEDLY KOZYREV HAD COME TO TOWN TO BOLSTER CG PEACE EFFORTS AT A VERY DIFFICULT TIME. END SUMMARY.

3. CG MEMBERS ASSEMBLED IN BELGRADE THIS MORNING WITH NEVILLE-JONES REPRESENTING LONDON AND DEJAMMET FROM THE QUAI. FRASURE RETURNED OVERLAND FROM ZAGREB. ZOTOV REMAINED AFTER THE KOZYREV VISIT. (THE GERMANS WERE

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NARA 2/6/2020 (T.28)
2013-0682-M

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REPRESENTED BY THEIR CHARGE; STEINER IS APPARENTLY ILL.)

4. AT A CG LUNCH TODAY, ZOTOV DEBRIEFED ON THE KOZYREV/MILOSEVIC MEETINGS REPORTING THAT, DESPITE URGING FROM THE RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, THE SERBIAN PRESIDENT SAID HE WOULD NOT MEET WITH THE CG; THEY COULD TALK TO HIS FOREIGN MINISTER. THAT SET OFF A FIRESTORM WITH THE BRITISH AND FRENCH. (THE FRENCH ARE ALSO UNHAPPY ABOUT FRASURE'S FRIDAY MEETING WITH MILOSEVIC BUT THE FOCUS WAS CLEARLY ON KOZYREV WHO WAS SUPPOSEDLY COMING HERE TO PAVE THE WAY FOR THE CG.) AFTER LENGTHY DISCUSSION, THE HAPLESS ZOTOV AGREED TO GET BACK TO MILOSEVIC TO INSIST UPON A CG MEETING. THE FALLBACK IS A FRENCH/BRITISH SESSION. THE FEELING HERE IS THAT MILOSEVIC WILL NOT BE WILLING TO RECONSIDER ON THE CG BUT MAY SEE THE FRENCH/BRITISH. FRENCH/BRITISH REPS PLAN TO LEAVE MONDAY AFTERNOON, ASSUMING THE SITUATION IS NOT RESOLVED.

5. IN HIS READ-OUT ON THE KOZYREV VISIT, ZOTOV CHARACTERIZED MILOSEVIC AS REACTING NEGATIVELY TO THE CG PROPOSAL BUT NOT EXPLICITLY REJECTING IT. ZOTOV SAID THAT MILOSEVIC SEEMED ALMOST "OFFENDED" BY SUSPENSION RATHER THAN LIFTING OF SANCTIONS AND INDICATED TO KOZYREV THAT HE WOULD REFUSE TO SEE THE CONTACT GROUP BECAUSE THE PROPOSAL WAS "NOT SERIOUS." MILOSEVIC APPEARED TO ARGUE FOR "BOLDER STEPS" BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN RETURN FOR BIGGER GAINS, WHILE NOT CLEARLY LAYING OUT WHAT HE WANTS APART FROM LIFTING OF SANCTIONS.

6. POINTS RAISED BY MILOSEVIC DURING THE DISCUSSION WITH KOZYREV INCLUDED THAT:

-- ANY SUMMIT MEETING WOULD HAVE TO BE WELL-PREPARED WITH NO AMBIGUITY ON WHAT BELGRADE RECEIVES;

-- THERE WAS A PROBLEM WITH WHAT SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED, I.E. STATES, BORDERS ETC.

-- THE ECONOMIC AGREEMENT IN CROATIA WAS WORKING WELL BUT BEING ENDANGERED BY TUDJMAN'S TACTICS. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MUST PRESSURE TUDJMAN TO BRING HIM TO HIS SENSES, AND NOT APPLY PRESSURE ONLY TO BELGRADE;

-- HE (MILOSEVIC) WAS WORKING ON THE PEACE OPTION IN BOTH BOSNIA AND CROATIA AND WOULD CONTINUE DOING SO REGARDLESS OF WHAT THE CG DID OR OFFERED; AND

-- MLADIC AND THE BANJA LUKA REGION OF BOSNIA WERE ON MILOSEVIC'S SIDE AND HE WOULD EVENTUALLY PREVAIL, THOUGH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY COULD HELP BY STRENGTHENING HIS HAND THROUGH SANCTIONS RELIEF.

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7. ZOTOV ADMITTED THAT "FRANKLY, THERE WAS LITTLE NEW" IN MILOSEVIC'S COMMENTS, THOUGH IT APPEARED THAT HE WANTED TO CONTINUE THE PROCESS. KOZYREV REPORTEDLY ARGUED THAT THE CASE FOR THE CG PROPOSAL AND "APPLIED PRESSURE" FOR MILOSEVIC TO BE FORTHCOMING. NONETHELESS, ZOTOV SEEMED NOT SURPRISED BY MILOSEVIC'S REFUSAL TO MEET THE CONTACT GROUP, SAYING THAT THIS REFLECTED HIS OVERALL DISAPPOINTMENT WITH THE CURRENT PROPOSAL.

COMMENT:
---

8. AS WE REPORTED AFTER OUR LUNCH WITH MILOSEVIC, THE SERBIAN PRESIDENT IS IN A TOUGH, SELF-CONFIDENT, INDEED ARROGANT, MOOD AND BELIEVES HE IS BASICALLY IN CONTROL OF EVENTS. HE MAY BE PREPARED TO DEAL BUT APPARENTLY NOT ON THE TERMS THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO OFFER, AND CERTAINLY NOT IN THE FOUR/SIX WEEKS TIMEFRAME WE HAVE IN MIND.

9. IN A BRITISH/FRENCH/US/GERMAN CAUCUS AFTER THE LUNCH, THERE WAS A FEELING THAT KOZYREV HAD CLUCKED ALL TOO SYMPATHETICALLY TO THE KIND OF CONCERNS THAT MILOSEVIC RAISED AND, AS A RESULT, THE SERBIAN PRESIDENT HAD BEEN EMBOLDENED TO STIFF THE CG. IN A PART OF THE WORLD WHERE OVERPLAYING YOUR CARDS IS A STANDARD PRACTICE--I HAD THAT SENSE OF TUDJMAN YESTERDAY AS WELL--MILOSEVIC MAY NOW THINK THAT SOMEHOW THE CG WILL TRUDGE BACK TO THE GREENGROCER AND COME UP WITH A LOT MORE CARROTS. THAT IS OF COURSE NOT LIKELY TO HAPPEN, NOR SHOULD IT HAPPEN. (MILOSEVIC'S HUBRIS IS NOT DISSIMILAR TO KARADZIC'S STIFFING OF THE CG WHEN LOGIC MIGHT HAVE DICTATED THAT HE SHOULD ENTER INTO A PLAN/MAP NEGOTIATION AND THEN TRY TO MAKE IT ENDLESS AS THE CEASEFIRE SOLIDIFIED TO HIS BENEFIT.)

10. IN A PERVERSE WAY, THIS OUTCOME--IF IT STANDS--VALIDATES OUR DECISION TO AGREE TO FULL REPEAT FULL SANCTIONS SUSPENSION AS PART OF A HYPOTHETICAL PACKAGE. THERE IS THUS NO WAY WE CAN BE BLAMED BY OUR EUROPEAN COLLEAGUES FOR THE OUTCOME OF THIS GAMBIT, AS MIGHT HAVE BEEN THE CASE IF WE HAD INSISTED ON HOLDING BACK CRUCIAL CARROTS. THAT PROVIDES LITTLE COMFORT, HOWEVER, IN A SITUATION IN WHICH OUR SELF-DESCRIBED "LAST CHANCE" CG DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE APPEARS TO BE SLIDING TOWARD THE SERBIAN ROCKS. PERINA

FROM:
SITREPRT

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: BERGER, DOHSE, FUERTH, LAKE, REED, SENS, SIT, SODERBERG, WOLIN, CLARKER, KERRICK, RICE, SAUNDERS, STEPHENS, SUM, SUM2, VERSHBOW, WHSR_SPECIAL

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~SECRET~~ DTG:172155Z FEB 95

FM: AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

TO:SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4838

////

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 000823

NODIS

FROM AMBASSADOR FRASURE

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, SR, HR, BK
SUBJECT: LUNCHEON WITH MILOSEVIC--HE DIDN'T SAY NO

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: ALONG WITH THE CHARGE, I HAD A THREE HOUR PRIVATE LUNCH WITH MILOSEVIC AT,ONE OF TITO'S HUNTING LODGES WEST OF BELGRADE. THE SERBIAN PRESIDENT WAS ENERGETIC, AVUNCULAR, AND SELF CONFIDENT. AFTER HE WENT OVER SOME RECENT HISTORY, I OUTLINED THE LATEST CONTACT GROUP PLAN ON RECOGNITION/SANCTIONS SUSPENSION, TERMING IT PERHAPS A LAST CHANCE FOR PEACE. MILOSEVIC SHOWED VERY FEW CARDS, HAD SOME POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE COMMENTS, AND DIDN'T SAY NO. I THINK HE WANTS TO NEGOTIATE, BUT IT WILL BE A VERY TOUGH NEGOTIATION BECAUSE, ASIDE FROM THE BURDEN OF SANCTIONS, HE FEELS HE IS OPERATING FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH. DESPITE THIS, IT MAY BE THAT "THERE IS A LOT OF POSSIBILITIES," AS MILOSEVIC CONCLUDED. END SUMMARY.

3. I TOLD MILOSEVIC I THOUGHT WE ARE AT A FUNDAMENTAL FORK IN THE ROAD. ONE ROAD WILL TAKE US TO A RENEWED WAR THIS SPRING PROBABLY STARTING IN CROATIA AND THEN CONNECTING INTO BOSNIA. ASKED FOR HIS VIEWS, MILOSEVIC LAUNCHED INTO A FAIRLY FAMILIAR HISTORICAL EXEGISIS BLAMING THE GERMANS AND OTHERS FOR THE COLLAPSE OF YUGOSLAVIA.

4. I TOLD MILOSEVIC I HAD NOT COME TO NEGOTIATE BUT I KNEW HE WOULD BE SEEING KOZYREV LATER TODAY. IT MIGHT BE USEFUL IF I OUTLINED SOME OF THE KEY ASPECTS IN THE CONTACT GROUP APPROACH. MILOSEVIC LISTENED INTENTLY TO

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MY DESCRIPTION OF THE SANCTIONS SUSPENSION/RECOGNITION PACKAGE. I PARTICULARLY NOTED THE NEED FOR BORDER CLOSURE AND COVERED THE NECESSITY FOR HIM TO CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE CG PLAN FOR BOSNIA. I EXPLAINED OUR EVOLUTION FROM FULL Z-4 PLAN TO Z-4 PRINCIPLES. MILOSEVIC'S RESPONSES ARE NOTED BELOW.

CROATIA--"IF THE SERBS NEED HELP..."
---

5. INDICATING THAT HE SPOKE REGULARLY WITH TUDJMAN, MILOSEVIC MADE IT CLEAR HE FELT THE CROATIANS ARE OVERPLAYING THEIR CARDS. TUDJMAN HAD TOLD HIM HIS GENERALS BELIEVE THEY CAN TAKE THE UN SECTORS BACK IN FOUR DAYS. "I TOLD HIM NOT TO TRUST GENERALS -- I FIRED EIGHTY OF THEM." ACCORDING TO MILOSEVIC, THE CROATIAN ARMY HAS ONLY EIGHT GOOD BRIGADES; ONLY 10 PERCENT OF DRAFTEES SHOW UP FOR SERVICE. IN CONTRAST, KRAJINA SERBS HAVE 80,000 OF THE BEST FIGHTING MEN IN EUROPE. "KRAJINA SERBS WOULD RATHER FIGHT THAN WORK."

6. MILOSEVIC DID NOT SAY HE WOULD RECOGNIZE CROATIA, BUT IT WAS CLEARLY LESS OF A PROBLEM THAN RECOGNIZING BOSNIA. ASKED WHETHER SECTOR EAST COULD BE INCLUDED IN A DEAL, MILOSEVIC RESPONDED POSTIVELY BUT POINTED TO THE NEED FOR A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, PERHAPS TWO YEARS. HE WAS CONTEMPTUOUS OF THE Z-4 PLAN, ARGUING THAT A PHASED APPROACH BEGINNING WITH ECONOMIC MEASURES WAS PREFERABLE. IN THAT REGARD, OWEN IS RIGHT, MILOSEVIC REMARKED. THE SERBIAN PRESIDENT SAW MERIT IN OUR REVISED APPROACH OF ENDORSEMENT OF Z-4 PRINCIPLES, WITHOUT BUYING INTO IT. HE FLARED UP, HOWEVER, WHEN I SUGGESTED THAT ENDORSEMENT OF Z-4 PRINCIPLES WOULD PROTECT HIM FROM CHARGES OF SELLING OUT THE KRAJINA SERBS: "DON'T TRY TO PRESS MY EGO BUTTON!"

7. ASKED DIRECTLY IF HE WOULD INTERVENE IN CROATIA IF HIS PREDICTIONS WERE WRONG AND THINGS GO BADLY FOR THE KRAJINA SERBS MILITARILY, MILOSEVIC IMMEDIATELY RESPONDED: "IF THEY NEED OUR HELP, THEY WILL GET IT." MILOSEVIC CONCLUDED HOWEVER, THAT WOULD NOT HAPPEN. "I WARNED TUDJMAN THEY WILL BE SHELLING YOUR BEACHES FOR YEARS, NO TOURISTS, " HE EXCLAIMED. "TUDJMAN WILL RENEW A DIFFERENT MANDATE."

BOSNIA -- WAR WHEN THE SNOW MELTS
---

8. MILOSEVIC WAS CERTAIN THAT THE WAR WOULD BEGIN AGAIN THIS SPRING -- "THE MUSLIMS WILL START IT." HE FELT IT WOULD SOON TURN INTO A CROAT/MUSLIM CONFLICT. MILOSEVIC RECALLED THAT THE ONLY REASON TUDJMAN HAD AGREED TO THE FEDERATION WAS TO SAVE

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THE ISOLATED CROAT POCKETS UP IN CENTRAL BOSNIA. WOULD THE SERBS NEED OUTSIDE HELP? MILOSEVIC WHO SAID HE HAD MET YESTERDAY WITH MLADIC FELT THE BOSNIAN SERBS COULD HOLD THEIR OWN.

9. ON KARADZIC AND HIS SUPPORTERS -- "CRAZY, MIDDLE-AGED IGNORANTS" - MILOSEVIC REPEATED HIS EARLY PREDICTIONS THAT IN THE END HE WOULD OVERCOME THEM. MLADIC IS NOW LIKELY TO BE THE NEXT ELECTED LEADER OF SERBIAN BOSNIA. THE WESTERN BOSNIAN SERBS ARE WILLING TO GIVE UP SARAJEVO TO GET A SETTLEMENT; KARADZIC IS NOT. THAT IS A KEY WEAKNESS FOR HIM. MILOSEVIC SUGGESTED THAT THE DIVISIONS WITHIN THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT ARE WIDENING, NOTABLY THOSE BETWEEN IZETBEGOVIC AND GANIC ON THE ONE HAND AND SILAJDZIC ("ONE TOUGH GUY.") PREDICTING AN INCREASING ISLAMIC SOCIETY -- "BETTER NOT TO MAKE EXCURSION INTO THAT" -- MILOSEVIC NONETHELESS SUGGESTED THAT OVER YEARS THE PARTS OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA WILL GROW BACK TOGETHER.

WILL THERE BE A NEGOTIATION?
---

10. I TOLD MILOSEVIC THAT A LOT OF PEOPLE THINK WE ARE ON A FOOL'S ERRAND, TRYING TO ARRANGE A DEAL BASED ON THE SANCTIONS RELIEF/RECOGNITION PACKAGE. ARE THEY CORRECT? MILOSEVIC SAID HE IS FAVORABLE TO THE CONFERENCE IDEA SO LONG AS THERE IS EQUAL TREATMENT. WE MUST BE TREATED FAIRLY. BUT HE MUST GET FULL SANCTIONS RELIEF, NOT JUST SUSPENSION. I TOLD HIM THAT POSSIBILITY SIMPLY DOESN'T EXIST. HE RETORTED BITTERLY THAT HE HAD BEEN "TRICKED" ON THE GAS ISSUE. KOZYREV HAD SHOWN HIM A LETTER IN NOVEMBER FROM CHRISTOPHER THAT PROMISED IT. THE CONTACT GROUP HAD SAID IT WOULD HAPPEN. "NOW WINTER IS ALMOST OVER." I TOLD HIM I DIDN'T COME TO ARGUE OVER GAS. BUT PERHAPS THE EPISODE SHOWED THAT FULL SUSPENSION OF ALL SANCTIONS WAS THE WAY FORWARD. THEN WE WOULDN'T ARGUE OVER EACH DETAIL. US REFUSAL TO FOLLOW THROUGH ON THE GAS PROMISE SHOWED "AN ABSENCE OF STYLE," MILOSEVIC SNEERED.

11. I TOLD MILOSEVIC THAT PART OF THE DEAL WOULD HAVE TO BE A SIGNIFICANT TIGHTENING UP OF THE BORDER WITH BOSNIA. THE HELICOPTER CAPER RAISED PRETTY SERIOUS QUESTIONS. MILOSEVIC SAID IT WAS "ARTIFICIALLY CREATED." MLADIC DOESN'T HAVE TWENTY HELICOPTERS. (MILOSEVIC DIDN'T ADD THAT HE HAS MANY MORE THAN TWENTY HELICOPTERS.) HE DIDN'T KNOW WHAT HAD HAPPENED. I CONTINUED THAT, IF A PACKAGE COULD BE PUT TOGETHER, IT WOULD MEAN SENDING SEVERAL HUNDRED MORE MONITORS TO THE BORDER PLUS

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RADAR TO MONITOR IT. COULD HE LIVE WITH THAT? "OF COURSE. YES. IF YOU LIFT SANCTIONS, YOU CAN SEND U.S. OFFICERS TO THE BORDERS. BUT YOU WILL HAVE TO PAY FOR THEM."

12. I CONCLUDED BY ASKING AGAIN WHETHER THERE IS ANY POINT IN US PURSUING A NEGOTIATION AT THIS TIME? WHAT YOU ARE TELLING ME IS THAT WE ARE NOT JUST WASTING OUR TIME? NO, REPLIED MILOSEVIC, YOU ARE NOT. BUT IT MUST BE A PHASED PROGRESSION, AN EVOLUTION. HE CONCLUDED: "THERE IS A LOT OF POSSIBILITIES."

KOSOVO
---

13. AT THE END WE ASKED BRIEFLY ABOUT KOSOVO. MILOSEVIC WAS ESPECIALLY COCKY, CLAIMING THAT THE SITUATION IS QUIET AND NORMAL. DENYING THAT HE IS A SERB NATIONALIST, MILOSEVIC SAID THAT ALBANIANS IN KOSOVO WHO SEE THEMSELVES AS CITIZENS OF SERBIA HAVE NO PROBLEMS, COMPARING THEM TO HISPANICS IN TEXAS. MILOSEVIC STRESSED SERB DOMINANCE IN THE REGION, BUT THERE IS A NEED FOR REINTEGRATION AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION. (THROUGHOUT THE SESSION, WE FOUND OURSELVES DEALING WITH THE "NEW" MILOSEVIC -- A MODERATE, A MAN WHO REJECTS RABID NATIONALISM AND SUPPORTS INTEGRATION OF THE REGION INTO EUROPE.)

A COMMENT ON RUSSIA
---

14. THROUGHOUT THE CONVERSATION, MILOSEVIC REPEATEDLY REMARKED,"DON'T KEEP PUSHING US INTO THE ARMS OF THE RUSSIANS." ON THE WAY OUT, HE SAID HE WAS ON HIS WAY TO MEET KOZYREV, A MAN WITH A LOT OF PROBLEMS. I TOLD HIM CHECHNYA IS A CANCER IN THEIR SYSTEM IN MY VIEW. MILOSEVIC DREW ME ASIDE AND CONSPIRATORIALLY REMARKED THAT THE SOLUTION FOR THE CHECHEN PROBLEM WILL BE CHECHEN INDEPENDENCE.
PERINA

FROM:
SITREPRT

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TAB C

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CC: Sandy Vershbow

~~SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

February 17, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR TONY LAKE

FROM: LEON FUERTH

SUBJECT: Controlling Release of FRY Frozen Assets under Plan B

One of the most important implementation issues underlying the Contact Group's Plan B offer to Milosevic is how to manage release of frozen assets. If the international community fails to handle this issue properly, Milosevic could get a massive infusion of cash that he can use to rectify his economy's most pressing problems or -- if the worst happens in Croatia or Bosnia -- finance a Serbian spring offensive. In the longer term, a maladroit release of assets will also give Milosevic significant advantage over the other Yugoslav successor states by helping him increase his creditworthiness while saddling others with a disproportionate share of outstanding Yugoslav debt.

Blocked assets include bank deposits, credits, debts, real estate and tangible property. We have a good idea of what is frozen in the U.S., but it is less clear how much is held by other governments as many were not as rigorous as we were in seizing assets in the first place and some have since allowed the Serbs to draw on frozen accounts to buy humanitarian goods.

Issues to address in releasing blocked assets include

- determining ownership (successor state issues are not yet settled)

- paying depositors, creditors, and other claimants (the Yugoslav institutions and firms whose assets were frozen owed a lot of money to a lot of people -- including numerous U.S. citizens and firms; those creditors have valid claims for payment if assets are unfrozen)

- payment of war reparations and other penalties

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PER E.O. 13526
CIA HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS
DIVISION AR 70-14 10/1/2013
(2013-0682-M (7.30))

The U.S. Government should seek a thorough international inventory of frozen assets as a first step to their orderly distribution. Then, there should be a meeting of financial and banking experts to discuss how to unblock assets with due provision for the rights of successor states and creditors. We should continue to insist on resolution language mandating that assets not be released until ownership is resolved and legal rights of successor states, creditors, and other claimants are protected.

Remember that Milosevic is a banker. He will find it hard to object to such a process, while he certainly will be quick to take advantage of any openings we give him. So long as our approach requires that claims of others be adjudicated, the time frame for releasing frozen assets is relatively long, which tends to deny Milosevic short-term access for purposes we might find objectionable and preserves some leverage for settling other issues.

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TAB D.

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~~SECRET~~

February 20, 1995

SUBJECT: Controlling Release of FRY Frozen Assets under Plan B

One of the most important implementation issues underlying the Contact Group's Plan B offer to Milosevic is how to manage release of frozen assets. If the international community fails to handle this issue properly, Milosevic could get a massive infusion of cash that he can use to rectify his economy's most pressing problems or -- if the worst happens in Croatia or Bosnia -- finance a Serbian spring offensive. In the longer term, a maladroit release of assets will also give Milosevic significant advantage over the other Yugoslav successor states by helping him increase his creditworthiness while saddling others with a disproportionate share of outstanding Yugoslav debt.

Blocked assets include bank deposits, credits, debts, real estate and tangible property. We have a good idea of what is frozen in the U.S., but it is less clear how much is held by other governments. Issues to address in releasing blocked assets include determining ownership (successor state issues are not yet settled; paying depositors, creditors, and other claimants (there are numerous clains against blocked Yugoslav assets -- including by U.S. citizens and firms); and payment of war reparations and other penalties.

The U.S. Government should continue to insist that any UN resolution that unblocks assets mandate that these assets not be released until ownership is resolved and legal rights of successor states, creditors, and other claimants are protected. The U.S. should seek a thorough international inventory of frozen assets as a first step to their orderly distribution. Then, financial and banking experts should discuss how to unblock assets with due provision for the rights of successor states and creditors.

Remember that Milosevic is a banker. He will find it hard to object to such a process, while he certainly will be quick to take advantage of any openings we give him. So long as we require that claims be adjudicated, the time frame for releasing frozen assets is relatively long, which limits Milosevic's short-term access for purposes we might find objectionable and preserves some leverage for settling other issues.

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CIA Historical Collations Division
NR 10-14 10/1/2013
(2013-0682-M (7.21))

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Declassify on: OADR

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Implementing Plan B

Conditions for sanctions relief	Requirements to enforce conditions
Addressed in 2/15 CG Proposal	
FRY recognition... must be genuine and unequivocal	• Clear definition of "genuine and unequivocal" recognition • Link definition to SC procedures for suspending and reimposing sanctions
Sanctions suspension for 2 month periods, positive SC vote needed for renewal each time	Unambiguous language in SC resolution suspending sanctions
Sanctions enforcement regime against FRY(S&M) must remain in place to allow quick reimposition of full sanctions	• SAMs structure remains in place • Front-line states retain enforcement mechanisms
Restrictions beyond UNSC resolutions to remain in force (no IFI assistance, no UN seat, no readmission to OSCE)	Agreement among CG that these items should be held back as long-term leverage against settlement of region's underlying security problems (e.g.: Kosovo, War Crimes Tribunal)
Significant toughening of monitoring regime on FRY borders with Bosnia and Croatia (more monitors and more equipment)	European agreement to deploy additional monitors and equipment
Sanctions relief to go into effect only after border is more tightly closed and Europeans have deployed additional monitors	Agreed definition of "acceptable" level of closure and monitoring
FRY continues to support CG plan for Bosnia	Links to reimposition and extension language in resolution
FRY endorses principles of Z-4 plan	Links to reimposition and extension language in resolution
NOT Addressed 2/15 CG Proposal	
Mechanism for immediate revocation of sanctions relief if FRY reneges	Unambiguous language in SC resolution stipulating conditions under which sanctions relief would be revoked
Closing the "Back Door:" Goods reaching Pale via Croatian and GOBH territory threaten to make FRY border closure irrelevant	• GOC and GOBH commitment to control trade with Pale Serbs; plus CG/international agreement to control trade on Croatia/Bosnia border (or to cut off both Pale and Knin Serbs) • Support (monitors, technical assistance) for GOC and GOBH • Clarify UNPROFOR role
Protecting interests of successor states and other claimants as financial sanctions are suspended	Agreement that assets will not be released until successor state, creditor, and other claimants concerns have been addressed
Prohibiting trade facilitation agreements with the FRY	Trade preferences and other agreements should be included in the list of non-UNSC sanctions cited above

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See 2013-0682-M
Also

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title: PC0123 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, March 3, 1995				
Staff Office-Individual: Records Management				
Original OA/ID Number: 4008				
Row: 43	Section: 6	Shelf: 7	Position: 1	Stack: V

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (2 pages)~~	~~03/03/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
~~001b. memo~~	~~[Duplicate of 001a] [incomplete copy] (1 page)~~	~~03/03/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
~~002a. note~~	~~Todd Stern to POTUS re: [Decision Memo] (1 page)~~	~~03/09/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002b. memo~~	~~[Duplicate of 002c] [incomplete copy, page 1 only] (1 page)~~	~~03/06/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002c. memo~~	~~Anthony Lake to POTUS re: U.S. Participation in Step Two of NATO Prepositioning for UNPROFOR Withdrawal (3 pages~~)	~~03/06/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002d. memo~~	~~[Duplicate of 002c] [incomplete copy] (1 page)~~	~~03/06/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
003a. memo	BG Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake re: March 3 Principals Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (5 pages)	03/03/1995	P1/b(1)
~~003b. cable~~	~~re: Milosevic's March Meeting with European CG Members (4 pages)~~	~~03/02/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003c. talking points~~	~~re: Approach to Tudjman (1 page)~~	~~03/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003d. talking points~~	~~re: Talking Points: Holbrooke-Tudjman (1 page)~~	~~03/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003e. list~~	~~re: Punitive Bilateral Steps-Sticks (7 pages)~~	~~03/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003f. paper~~	~~re: Decision Paper (4 pages)~~	~~03/03/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia…])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0123 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, March 3, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs635

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~003g. paper~~	~~re: Former Yugoslavia Policy Review (11 pages)~~	~~02/27/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003h. report~~	~~re: The Balkans: The Next Three Months [partial] (6 pages)~~	~~02/24/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003i. chart~~	~~re: [Timeline] (1 page)~~	~~03/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
003j. paper	re: Balkans Policy Review Issues/Decisions (2 pages)	02/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520280
RECEIVED: 03 MAR 95 16

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 06 MAR 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
SOC
CROATIA
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 3 MAR PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 07 MAR 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9520261 9520269

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0123 CODES: BOS CRO

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BAKER JANE
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By AC NARA, Date 6/14/12
2010-0533-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95030609	FOR DECISION
002		X	95030609	SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950306	FUERTH, L	
002	950306	BRILL, K	
002	950306	MCALEER, R	
002	950306	ADAMS, G	
002	950306	INDERFURTH, K	
002	950306	GARTHOFF, D	
002	950306	PATRICK, T	

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National Security Council
The White House

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Reed			
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WW Berger	2	Nat Sec Advisor has seen	NOTE
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West Wing Desk	4		D
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COMMENTS:

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memo to agencies. ready for signature

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COMMENTS:

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MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	STROOM	BOX 3/6	11:54 18K
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: 1		
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	3/6/95	4:20 P.M	Christine Tirpak
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: 1		
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: VIA FAX		
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	3/8/95	12:45	J. Lyons
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: 1		
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: VIA FAX		
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			
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MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	3/8/95	_____	[signature] PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC OF PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

NSC LOG # 20280

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

B B N D A

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PRIORITY
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DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 0473 CLASSIFICATION: SECRET TOTAL: 4 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC OF PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

NSC LOG # 20280

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

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PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: [signature]

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 0473 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 4 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC OF PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

NSC LOG # 20280

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

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JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

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NSC LOG # 20280

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting SOC OF PC ON BOSNIA PAGES: 3

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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20280

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 6, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T.R. PATRICK
Executive Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DR. GORDON ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, March 3, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

for
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NW NARA, Date 6/14/10

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee
DATE: March 3, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 - 4:00pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Anthony Lake

CIA
Admiral William Studeman

OVP
Leon Fuerth

JCS
General John Shalikashvili

State
Secretary Christopher

White House
Samuel Berger

DOD
John Deutch

NSC
Alexander Vershbow

USUN
Ambassador Rick Inderfurth

Summary of Conclusions

Croatian Decision to Eject UNPROFOR

1. Principals discussed strategy for convincing President Tudjman to reconsider his decision to terminate UNPROFOR's mandate, focusing on the approach that Assistant Secretary Holbrooke should take in his March 6 meeting with Tudjman. They approved the overall approach set forth in the State Department paper and draft talking points: on the one hand, a tough message insisting that Tudjman allow interpositional forces to remain in the separation zone between Croatian and Krajina Serb forces, and raising the prospect of punitive measures if Tudjman remains intransigent; on the other hand, an understanding of his difficult political environment and a willingness to work with him on a new mandate for a force to replace UNPROFOR.

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2010-0533-M
RS 9/30/14 (1.43)

2. In response to Tudjman's demand for peacekeeping forces or observers along Croatia's international border, Principals agreed that Holbrooke should unequivocally rule out the possibility that the U.S. would contribute to such a force. If Tudjman is prepared to agree to retaining the interpositional force in the separation zone, Holbrooke may indicate a readiness to take this up with U.S. Allies, but without encouraging him to believe there is a significant likelihood of NATO assuming this mission.

3. Principals agreed that the possibility of a visit by Tudjman to the U.S. in mid-March for the first anniversary of the Bosniac-Croat Federation could provide an inducement for Tudjman to compromise on UNPROFOR. They affirmed the Deputies' recommendation that Holbrooke should make clear that the minimum requirement for such a visit would be a three-month extension of UNPROFOR's mandate and Tudjman's agreement to retain interpositional forces as part of any UNPROFOR successor force.

4. Principals agreed that, following Holbrooke's meeting with Tudjman, we would seek German agreement on a joint demarche to Tudjman by the President and Chancellor Kohl.

5. Principals requested an analysis of the potential impact on Tudjman's policies and support for the Federation in the event the U.S. carried out punitive measures in the event he remained intransigent on ejecting UNPROFOR. **(Action: CIA)**

Step Two of NATO Prepositioning

6. To sustain our leadership of the Alliance, principals decided to recommend to the President that he authorize U.S. representatives to support a decision at NATO to implement Step Two prepositioning in Croatia of communications systems and personnel needed to support a possible UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia or Croatia. This decision would be subject to prior Congressional consultations early in the week of March 6. (Based on subsequent discussion among Principals, it was agreed to delay implementation of these steps for one week.) **(Action: NSC)**

7. Principals agreed that, in the Congressional consultations, we would characterize this as a limited, precautionary move that is being taken without prejudice to a possible future decision to deploy U.S. forces as part of a NATO-led withdrawal of UNPROFOR. We would also state that we intend to consult closely with the Congress on the latter, if and when a decision is taken to withdraw UNPROFOR, and that we will seek prior Congressional approval of the necessary funding. **(Action State and DOD, in coordination with NSC)**

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20280

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 4 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, March 3, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia held March 3, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve R Disapprove _____

Attachments as amended
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 06 MAR 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
DEFENSE POLICY
PC
CROATIA
UN

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FOLLOW UP TO 3 MAR PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA - US PARTICIPATION IN STEP II OF NATO PREPOSITIONING FOR UNPROFOR WITHDRAWAL

ACTION: PRES APPROVED W/ COMMENT DUE DATE: 07 MAR 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520261 9520269

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0123 CODES: BOS CRO

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001	KERRICK	Z	95030412	FOR REDO
002	LAKE	Z	95030616	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR DECISION
003	PRESIDENT	Z	95030621	FOR DECISION
003		X	95031117	PRES APPROVED W/ COMMENT

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003	950306		WH CHIEF OF STAFF

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Soderberg	copy		
Berger	7	Nat Sec Advisor has seen	
Lake	8		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	9	3/6	PODESTA
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Berger	2	AL	~~NOTE~~ NOTE
Lake	3		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4		
NSC Secretariat			
Vershbow	5		

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____

COMMENTS:

Send to Sandy Vershbow

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

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ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

1] SB TO RZ Date:

① I think this makes too much of "subsequent decision" on actual deployment (mentions 3x);

2] _____ TO _____ Date:

What will be different in 2 weeks?

② Doesn't really make clear to President risks:

3] _____ TO _____ Date:

→ That Yeltsin welcomes NATO presence and views this will make him more intransigent;

→ That it moves us an important

4] _____ TO _____ Date:

step closer to commitment of extraction, one dimensions of which are substantial but which we do not have

5] _____ TO _____ Date:

clear picture of until there is a plan (in less than 2 weeks)

R

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~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 9, 1995

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
3/11/95

MR. PRESIDENT

Attached is a decision memo from Tony Lake on U.S. participation in NATO's "Step Two" prepositioning of communications systems for use in possible withdrawal of UNPROFOR troops from Croatia. Step Two would involve agreement to deploy some 450 U.S. military personnel in Europe, 320 of them in Croatia -- though actual deployment would be subject to a further decision of the NAC.

Pros: Our participation would send the right signal about U.S. leadership in NATO. Our allies' forces on the ground are in danger and we must not be seen obstructing NATO military planning needed to protect them. Cons: prepositioning could embolden Tudjman to keep refusing any UNPROFOR successor force, moving us toward commitment of a large-scale ground force to help extract UNPROFOR, and in turn leading to a wider war.

Our allies would prefer to keep UNPROFOR in place and are reluctant to proceed with Step Two deployment at this time, fearing this could hasten UNPROFOR's departure and open the way for air strikes and lifting the arms embargo. But deployment may become unavoidable.

While recognizing the real risks, NSC Principals recommend approval of U.S. participation in Step Two. Leon and George concur, though George is concerned that this might trigger a War Powers debate. We have forwarded a copy of the memo to the Vice President. If you approve, State and Defense will consult with Congress next week before informing NATO of our decision.

John Podesta
Todd Stern

~~SECRET~~

Tony

I want to review when the V.P returns fr. trip — view of Tudjman

BC

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PER E.O. 13526
NL 2/6/20 (7.34)
2013-0682-M
[CIA Historical Collections Division]

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WJC HANDWRITING

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: U.S. Participation in Step Two of NATO Prepositioning for UNPROFOR Withdrawal

Purpose

To obtain your agreement for U.S. forces' participation in Step Two of NATO prepositioning for UNPROFOR withdrawal.

Background

Principals met Friday to discuss U.S. participation in Step Two of NATO's ongoing efforts to prepare to support a possible UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia or Croatia. We are seeking your approval to inform NATO that the United States agrees to support Step Two of NATO's efforts to preposition communications systems and operators in Croatia. Step Two includes deployment of approximately 450 U.S. military personnel within Europe, including 320 to government-controlled areas of Croatia, although the timing of the actual deployment of the prepositioning force will be subject to a subsequent NAC decision in the next few weeks.

NATO and UNPROFOR military planning for UNPROFOR's possible withdrawal from Bosnia has been underway for several months. With UNPROFOR withdrawal a possibility this spring, NATO began to take action in February by executing Step One which initiated the process of establishing an enhanced theater communications system. No U.S. forces were involved. With Step One well underway, NATO is seeking approval to execute Step Two which will deploy military personnel to set up and operate the communications system.

Prepositioning is a necessary step to support a large operation. Nearly 1,800 personnel are involved, including the 450 Americans. The total NATO cost for prepositioning is estimated at $11.3M and comes from existing NATO funds (the U.S. pays 25 percent), although we will pay our own transportation and sustainment costs. An orderly withdrawal of UNPROFOR cannot begin until eight weeks after the prepositioning occurs; thus Shali argues that delaying a decision will put Allied forces at risk.

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 6, 1995

95 MAR 6 P9:26

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: U.S. Participation in Step Two of NATO Prepositioning for UNPROFOR Withdrawal

Purpose

To obtain your agreement for U.S. forces' participation in Step Two of NATO prepositioning for UNPROFOR withdrawal.

Background

Principals met Friday to discuss U.S. participation in Step Two of NATO's ongoing efforts to prepare to support a possible UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia or Croatia. We are seeking your approval to inform NATO that the United States agrees to support Step Two of NATO's efforts to preposition communications systems and operators in Croatia. Step Two includes deployment of approximately 450 U.S. military personnel within Europe, including 320 to government-controlled areas of Croatia, although the timing of the actual deployment of the prepositioning force will be subject to a subsequent NAC decision.

NATO and UNPROFOR military planning for UNPROFOR's possible withdrawal from Bosnia has been underway for several months. With UNPROFOR withdrawal a possibility this spring, NATO began to take action in February by executing Step One, which initiated the process of establishing an enhanced theater communications system. No U.S. forces were involved. With Step One well underway, NATO is seeking approval to execute Step Two, which will deploy military personnel to set up and operate the communications system.

Prepositioning is a necessary step to support a large operation. Nearly 1800 personnel are involved, including the 450 Americans. The total NATO cost for prepositioning is estimated at $11.3M and comes from existing NATO funds (the U.S. pays 25 percent), although we will pay our own transportation and sustainment costs. An orderly withdrawal of UNPROFOR cannot begin until

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GIA, Historical Collections Division
NARA Date 1/2013
(2013-0682-M (7.34))

~~SECRET~~ cc: Vice President

Declassify on: OADR Chief of Staff

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eight weeks after the prepositioning occurs; thus Shali argues that delaying a decision will put Allied forces at risk.

This decision would carry significant risks, even though it would send the right signal about U.S. leadership in NATO, support our military leaders and maximize military preparedness. In the worst case, it could set in motion a series of events leading to UNPROFOR's withdrawal and renewed fighting, with NATO and U.S. forces left on the ground to deal with the aftermath. Tudjman might welcome the NATO deployment as a stepping stone to a larger NATO and U.S. ground role as UNPROFOR's replacement. Emboldened by NATO and U.S. forces in Croatia, Tudjman could become even more intransigent on accepting an UNPROFOR successor force. This could move us closer to an actual commitment of ground forces for a large-scale operation to extract UNPROFOR, the exact dimensions of which will remain unknown until the plan is completed in about two weeks. With NATO on the ground, or positioned to extract UNPROFOR, the decision to withdraw UNPROFOR will be easier for the UN and troop contributors to make. If they withdraw, renewed fighting is a certainty and the wider war we feared will have been facilitated by NATO's deployment into Croatia. While we anticipate a subsequent NAC decision will be taken to deploy the forces into Croatia, with each incremental step, it becomes more unlikely that our decision will be reversible. In fact, if NATO decides to conduct the operation, large-scale U.S. participation is inevitable.

Not all Allies support prepositioning, so our decision may prove academic for the time being. The French have been the most adamant, calling for a delay on the grounds that putting NATO personnel on the ground in Croatia would undermine efforts to change Tudjman's mind. Other Allies have voiced similar concerns and fear that NATO prepositioning will set in train the steps described above, leading to UNPROFOR's withdrawal and the wider war that diplomatic efforts aim to prevent. They also see UNPROFOR's departure as the opening to lifting the arms embargo and accompanying air strikes. Allies prefer to keep UNPROFOR in place and muddle through.

After balancing the risks against the military requirements, Principals decided that, because of the danger to our Allies who have forces on the ground and to sustain our leadership of the Alliance, we should make the commitment to support Step Two. This will permit the personnel to be organized and trained, with their actual deployment subject to a further decision by the NAC. Principals agreed that we will not press those Allies who are reluctant to execute Step Two but that it is important that the U.S. not be seen as obstructing NATO military planning needed to reduce the risks to Allied forces.

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Principals also concluded that, in view of the Congressional interest that the deployment of 320 U.S. military personnel to Croatia will generate, consultations must be completed before informing NATO of our decision. We would seek to cast this as a limited, precautionary move that is being taken without prejudice to a possible future decision to help in a NATO-led withdrawal of UNPROFOR. We would make clear that we intend to consult closely with the Congress on the latter (more formidable) undertaking and seek prior Congressional approval of the necessary funding. If you agree, State and Defense will brief leadership and key committee chairs early next week.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize U.S. representatives at NATO to support Step Two prepositioning, subject to consultations with Congress, and with the actual deployment of U.S. personnel to Croatia subject to a subsequent NAC and Principals' decision.

Approve 

Disapprove _____

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WJC HANDWRITING

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~~SECRET~~

20282 REDO

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 6, 1995

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

SIGNED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: BG DON KERRICK

SUBJECT: Memorandum to the President on U.S. Support for Step Two of NATO Prepositioning

Attached at Tab A is a memorandum to the President seeking his approval to support Step Two Prepositioning at NATO. Have reworked per Sandy Berger's request.

Concurrences by: Alan Kreczko, Bill Danvers

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab A.

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum to the President

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NARA, Date 6/14/10
Dop-0533-m

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

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~~SECRET~~

20282

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 3, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

FROM: BG DON KERRICK (DK)

SUBJECT: Memorandum to the President on U.S. Support for Step Two of NATO Prepositioning.

Attached at Tab A is a memorandum to the President seeking his approval to support Step Two Prepositioning at NATO.

Concurrences by: (DK) Alan Kreczko, Bill Danvers
N/A N/A
cc

Have new draft per Sandy Berger's request.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab A.

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum to the President

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MI NARA, Date 6/14/12
2012-0533-M

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

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Not all Allies support prepositioning, so our decision may prove academic for the time being. The French have been the most adamant, calling for a delay on the grounds that putting NATO personnel on the ground in Croatia would undermine efforts to change Tudjman's mind. Other Allies have voiced similar concerns and fear that NATO prepositioning will set in train steps that will make UNPROFOR withdrawal more likely and lead to the wider war diplomatic efforts aim to prevent. They also see UNPROFOR's departure as the opening to lifting the arms embargo and accompanying air strikes. Allies prefer to keep UNPROFOR in place and muddle through. Principals agree that while we will not press the Alliance to execute Step Two, it is important that the U.S. not be seen as obstructing NATO military planning needed to reduce the risks to Allied forces.

In considering this issue, we weighed the political risks to diplomatic efforts to reverse Tudjman's UNPROFOR decision against the military risks of delaying NATO's readiness to support withdrawal should it become necessary. The Principals decided, in balance, because of the danger to our Allies who have forces on the ground, and to sustain our leadership of the Alliance, we should make the commitment to support Step Two. This will permit the personnel to be organized and trained, with their actual deployment subject to a further decision by Principals and the NAC.

Principals also concluded that, in view of the Congressional interest that the deployment of 320 U.S. military personnel to Croatia will generate, consultations must be completed before informing NATO of our decision. We would seek to cast this as a limited, precautionary move that is being taken without prejudice to a possible future decision to help in a NATO-led withdrawal of UNPROFOR. We would make clear that we intend to consult closely with the Congress on the latter (more formidable) undertaking, and seek prior Congressional approval of the necessary funding. If you agree, an Interagency team will brief leadership and key committees on Monday and Tuesday. Principals will reconvene on Tuesday to evaluate Congressional reaction.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize U.S. representatives at NATO to support Step Two prepositioning, subject to consultations with Congress, and with a subsequent decision required before the U.S. personnel are deployed to Croatia.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

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NR 16-14 10/1/2013
(2013-0682-M (7.36))

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520269
RECEIVED: 02 MAR 95 14

TO: LAKE

FROM: KERRICK
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 02 MAR 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA CROATIA
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 3 MAR PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 06 MAR 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520261 9520280

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0123 CODES: BOS CRO

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		JOSHI
		KERRICK
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW
		WOLIN

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB CLOSED BY: NSJDA DOC 1 OF 1

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 6/14/12
2012-0533-F

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~~SECRET~~ RECORD ID: 9520269

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95030413	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	95030413	NOTED BY LAKE

~~SECRET~~

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recd 3/3
10:05am

National Security Council
The White House

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG JOH A/O _____

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Soderberg	copy		
Berger	2	cc	
VTV Lake	5	~~Natl Sec Advisor~~ has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4		
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS:

Mtg at 2:30 today

Exec Sec Office has diskette NO

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. memo	BG Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake re: March 3 Principals Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (5 pages)	03/03/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0123 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, March 3, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs635

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA AND CROATIA

DATE: March 3, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30pm - 4:00pm

Agenda

I. Near-Term Croatia Strategy.....State

II. NATO Prepositioning - Step Two.....JCS

III. Former Yugoslavia Policy Review.....NSC/All

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 6/14/10
2010-0533-M

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: BERGER, DOHSE, FUERTH, LAKE, REED, SENS, SIT, SODERBERG, WOLIN, CLARKER, KERRICK, RICE, SAUNDERS, STEPHENS, SUM, SUM2, VERSHBOW, WHSR_SPECIAL

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~SECRET~~ DTG:021511Z MAR 95

FM: AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

TO:
SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDITE 4949

////

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 001004

NODIS

S/S-O: PLEASE PASS TO EUR/DAS FRASURE IN PARIS ASAP

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, SR
SUBECT: MILOSEVIC'S MARCH MEETING WITH
- EUROPEAN CG MEMBERS

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: UK CHARGE HAS PROVIDED COM WITH A READ-OUT OF THE FOUR-HOUR MEETING AND DINNER WHICH MILOSEVIC HAD WITH EUROPEAN CG MEMBERS ON THE EVENING OF MARCH 1. ACCORDING TO ROBERTS, MILOSEVIC PUT FORTH A PROPOSAL WHICH WOULD PROVIDE FOR LIFTING OF SANCTIONS AGAINST THE "FRY" A PARIS CONFERENCE AS PROPOSED BY JUPPE BY THE END OF MARCH, AND THE DRAFTING OF A DOCUMENT BETWEEN THESE TWO STEPS WHICH WOULD BE ADOPTED BY ALL PARTIES AT THE PARIS MEETING. THIS DOCUMENT WOULD CONTAIN, INTER ALIA, A SERIES OF AGREEMETS TO PROMOTE THE PEACE PROCESS IN BOSNIA AND CROATIA, INCLUDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES FOR BOSNIA AND AN ACCELERATED VERSION OF THE VANCE AGREEMENT FOR CROATIA. MILOSEVIC MADE CLEAR THAT RECOGNITION OF CROATIA WOULD COME ONLY TOWARD THE END OF THIS PROCESS, I.E. AFTER ANY MEETING IN PARIS. HE SEEMED TO SHOW GREATER READINESS TO RECOGNIZE BOSNIA, BUT REMAINED UNCLEAR ON WHETHER RECOGNITION WOULD COME AT THE PARIS MEETING. MILOSEVIC PROMISED TO PROVIDE TO THE EUROPEANS BY MARCH 3 SOME

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2013-0682-m

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SUGGESTED DRAFT LANGUAGE FOR THE DOCUMENT. NOTE: FRG CONTACT GROUP MEMBER STEINER (PLEASE PROTECT) ASKED TO MEET WTH COM BEFORE LEAVING BELGRADE TO PROVIDE HIS VIEW OF SOME POINTS WHICH WERE DIFFERENTLY INTERPRETED AT THE EU MEMBERS' CAUCUS FOLLOWING THE MEETING. STEINER'S VIEWS ARE IDENTIFIED BELOW WHEN DIFFERENT FROM UK READ-OUT. END SUMMARY

3. MILOSEVIC BEGAN HIS PRESENTATION BY SAYING THAT HE WANTED TO PROPOSE AN APPROACH THAT HE WAS "CONVINCED" WOULD BRING PEACE TO THE REGION BY THE SUMMER. THE APPROACH CONSISTED OF TWO STEPS PLUS SOME INTERVENING ACTION. THE FIRST STEP WOULD BE THE LIFTING OF ALL SANCTIONS AGAINST THE "FRY." THE SECOND STEP WOULD BE THE CONVENING OF A PARIS CONFERENCE, AS PROPOSED BY JUPPE, BY THE END OF MARCH. THE INTERVENING ACTION WOULD BE THE DRAFTING OF A DOCUMENT TO BE ACCEPTED BY ALL PARTICIPANTS IN PARIS.

4. THE DOCUMENT PREPARED FOR PARIS WOULD CONSIST OF THREE PARTS. THE FIRST PART WOULD BE LANGUAGE COMMITTING ALL SIDES TO SOLVING PROBLEMS THROUGH PEACEFUL MEANS, WITH AGREEMENT TO IMPOSE "SEVERE SANCTIONS" ON ANY SIDE CHOOSING THE WAR OPTION.

5. THE SECOND PART OF THE DOCUMENT WOULD REITERATE SUPPORT FOR THE CONTACT GROUP PLAN FOR BOSNIA AND SPELL OUT THREE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES FOR BOSNIA. THESE THREE PRINCIPLES WOULD BE: A) THAT BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA WOULD BE A UNION OF THE FEDERATION AND THE REPUBLIKA SRPSKA; B) THAT THESE TWO ENTITIES WOULD BE EQUAL AND HAVE EQUAL RIGHTS; AND C) THAT BOTH SIDES WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO CONFEDERATE OR HAVE A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH CROATIA OR THE "FRY," RESPECTIVELY.

6. MILOSEVIC SAID THAT THIS PART OF THE DOCUMENT WOULD ALSO HAVE AGREEMENT TO EXTEND THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. WITH THIS IN PLACE, THE "FRY" AND BOSNIA WOULD AGREE UPON MUTUAL RECOGNITION. MILOSEVIC SAID THAT THE DOCUMENT COULD THUS BY-PASS NEGOTIATIONS ON CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES AND LEAVE ONLY TERRITORIAL MATTERS UNSETTLED. HE SUGGESTED THAT AFTER THE PARIS MEETING, THE CONTACT GROUP COULD INVITE THE WARRING PARTIES IN BOSNIA TO A MEETING TO SETTLE TERRITORIAL ISSUES, WHICH SHOULD NOT BE PROBLEMATIC GIVEN THE ABOVE FOUNDATION. (NOTE: ACCORDING TO STEINER, THE EUROPEANS FAILED TO GET A CLEAR ANSWER FROM MILOSEVIC ON WHETHER RECOGNITION OF BOSNIA WOULD BE PART OF THE PARIS SCENARIO OR COME AFTERWARD.)

7. THE THIRD PART OF THE DOCUMENT WOULD CONCERN CROATIA. THE DOCUMENT WOULD CALL UPON BOTH KNIN AND ZAGREB TO BEGIN DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS ON A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT "IN PARALLEL" WITH FINALIZATION OF THE ECONOMIC AGREEMENT. ZAGREB WOULD ALSO AGREE TO CONTINUE

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ALONG THE PATH OF THE
VANCE PLAN (I.E. MAINTAIN THE
UNPROFOR MANDATE) UNTIL A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WAS
REACHED. THE DOCUMENT WOULD FURTHER COMMIT MILOSEVIC
AND TUDJMAN TO BEGIN A SERIES OF BILATERAL
MEETINGS--PERHAPS ALTERNATING IN ZAGREB AND BELGRADE--TO
"NORMALIZE" THEIR BILATERAL RELATIONS. MILOSEVIC
SPECULATED THAT THIS NORMALIZATION WOULD PROCEED
QUICKLY. HE MADE CLEAR UNDER QUESTIONING, HOWEVER, THAT
RECOGNITION WOULD COME TOWARD THE END OF THIS PROCESS,
AND THUS CLEARLY AFTER THE PARIS MEETING. (ACCORDING TO
STEINER, WHEN PRESSED ON THIS POINT HE SAID THAT IT
WOULD SURELY COME "BY THE END OF THE YEAR.")

8. MILOSEVIC CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT THIS APPROACH WAS
SIMILAR TO THE CG PLAN, ALTHOUGH IT INCLUDED LIFTING

NODIS

S/S-O: PLEASE PASS TO EUR/DAS FRASURE IN PARIS ASAP

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, SR
SUBJECT: MILOSEVIC'S MARCH 1 MEETING WITH
- EUROPEAN CG MEMBERS

RATHER THAN SUSPENSION OF SANCTIONS AND A DIFFERENT
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS. HE SAID THAT IN THE CASE OF BOSNIA,
BOTH WARRING SIDES WOULD BE "DISAPPOINTED," THE MUSLIMS
BECAUSE THEY DID NOT HAVE A UNITARY STATE AND THE
BOSNIAN SERBS BECAUSE THEY DID NOT HAVE A SOVEREIGN
STATE. IT WOULD NOT, HOWEVER, BE A BAD OUTCOME TO HAVE
"EQUAL DISAPPOINTMENT."

9. FOLLOWING MILOSEVIC'S PRESENTATION, THERE WAS
LENGTHY DISCUSSION IN TRYING TO ELUCIDATE PARTS OF THIS
PACKAGE. THERE WAS NOT TOTAL CLARITY ON WHAT WOULD BE
RECOGNIZED IN THE CASE OF BOSNIA, THOUGH AT ONE POINT
MILOSEVIC SAID HE WOULD RECOGNIZE "THE UNION."
MILOSEVIC WAS ALSO PRESSED ON WHY HE COULD NOT RECOGNIZE
CROATIA EARLIER, AS PART OF THE PARIS MEETING. HE
ARGUED THAT IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO RECOGNIZE CROATIA
"OVERNIGHT." PUBLIC OPINION HAD TO BE PREPARED FOR
THIS, AND THERE WERE BILATERAL ISSUES AT STAKE, SUCH AS
PREVLAKA AND THE OIL PIPELINE. HE REJECTED A SUGGESTION
FROM THE EUROPEANS THAT "PRINCIPLES" COULD BE AGREED IN
PARIS (AS IN THE CASE OF BOSNIA) THAT COULD HASTEN
RECOGNITION. HE SAID THE PROCESS HAD TO "MATURE" AND
THAT THE CG WAS UNDERESTIMATING THE SENSITIVITIES IN THE
"FRY" ON SERB-CROAT RELATIONS.

10. ON OTHER POINTS, MILOSEVIC SAID HE HAD NO OBJECTION
TO ENLARGEMENT OF THE ICFY BORDER MONITORING MISSION BY

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AS MUCH AS THE CG WANTED. ON SANCTIONS RELIEF, HOWEVER, HE REPEATED FAMILIAR ARGUMENTS THAT LIFT RATHER THAN SUSPENSION WAS NECESSARY. HE SAID SUSPENSION WAS HUMILIATING AND REPEATED THAT IT COULD BE REVERSED BY ANOTHER FABRICATED HELICOPTER INCIDENT. LATER IN THE DISCUSSION, HE SAID THAT IN THE EVENT OF CLEAR VIOLATION OF AGREEMENTS ON HIS SIDE, THE SECURITY COUNCIL ALWAYS HAD THE OPTION TO RE-IMPOSE SANCTIONS.

11. THE MEETING CONCLUDED WITH THE EUROPEANS AGREEING TO STUDY MILOSEVIC'S PROPOSAL BUT STRESSING THAT THE GAP BETWEEN HIM AND THE CG REMAINED WIDE. MILOSEVIC SAID THAT TO MAKE HIS PROPOSAL CLEARER HE WOULD PROVIDE SOME DRAFT DOCUMENT LANGUAGE TO THE EUROPEANS BY MARCH 3. HE ASKED THAT PRESS ACCOUNTS OF THE MEETING NOT DIVULGE DETAILS AND MAKE REFERENCE ONLY TO GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THE PEACE PROCESS.

12. STEINER TOLD US IN CONFIDENCE THAT IN THE EUROPEAN CG CAUCUS AFTER THE MEETING, THE UK TOOK A MUCH MORE POSITIVE VIEW OF MILOSEVIC'S SUGGESTIONS THAN EITHER THE FRENCH OR THE GERMANS. TO THE SURPRISE OF THE EUROPEAN, MILOSEVIC DID NOT RAISE THE SUCCESSOR STATE ISSUE, UN MEMBERSHIP, OR INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION FOR THE "FRY."

13. WE ARE SENDING THIS INFORMATION VIA NIACT IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE BECAUSE IT CONVEYS INFORMATION RELEVANT TO MARCH 2 MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON AND PARIS. AN ORAL SUMMARY OF THE ABOVE WAS CONVEYED TO AMBASSADOR FRASURE VIA TELCON WITH COM PERINA. PERINA
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APPROACH TO TUDJMAN

Attached are suggested talking points for Dick Holbrooke to use with President Tudjman on Monday. The approach, which must be calibrated to Tudjman's side of the conversation, proposes:

-- A tough message insisting that Tudjman allow the interpositional force to remain, coupled with

-- Understanding of his difficult political environment and our willingness to work with him on a new mandate/name for the force.

If Tudjman proves intransigent, Holbrooke may outline some sticks while hinting at carrots, or incentives, if he comes around. These carrots could also include our willingness to discuss with the allies the creation of an international force on Croatia's borders. At the same time, we would make clear that agreement on maintaining the interpositional force is a precondition for any consideration of a border force.

Attached: Suggested Talking Points

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DECL: OADR

TALKING POINTS: HOLBROOKE-TUDJMAN

-- Mr. President, the United States appreciates the role you and your country have played over the past year. You have demonstrated wise and courageous leadership on many issues of war and peace.

-- You know how much we value your help in making the Bosnian Federation possible as we look towards the first anniversary of the Washington Accords.

-- Despite what we have accomplished, we now find ourselves at a crossroads in our relationship with your country.

-- We know the pressures you face from your public to settle the problem of the so-called "Krajina." It is a problem which has remained unresolved for too long.

-- We realize the frustration your public has felt about UNPROFOR's role. We are therefore ready to talk about an alternative to the UN Force in Croatia.

-- However, we absolutely insist that an essential element of any new or re-named force must be the maintenance of interpositional troops between your forces and the Krajina Serbs. Unless this happens, I want to be very clear with you: the full range of our relations and those of the EU will come into question.

(Note: The discussion at this point will be adjusted, based on Tudjman's response, using general references, as needed, to the kinds of carrots and sticks prepared for yesterday's DC meeting).

-- Mr. President, the withdrawal of the interpositional force would be a grave mistake, with grave consequences. In response, we would have to consider a range of specific responses, from such measures as closing diplomatic missions, opposing Croatia in the international financial institutions, and seeking UN sanctions. These would only isolate Croatia.

-- If war were to break out, we would have no choice but to hold you responsible.

-- Mr. President, we are prepared to work with you on finding a solution to the problem of restoring Croatian sovereignty in the so-called Krajina. Specifically, we are prepared to discuss with our allies the creation of an international border monitoring force. But we need your absolute assurances that the interpositional force will remain. If you cannot do so, it will endanger the full range of our bilateral relationship.

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(1)

Punitive Bilateral Steps -- Sticks (ascending order of severity)

1. Suspend "Memorandum of Cooperation on Defense Relations" — Comment: limited practical result.

2. Revoke permission to open consulates in LA, Pitts, Cleveland — Comment: symbolic significance, No GOC plans to open these immediately.

3. Cut Cultural/Educational Exchanges — Comment: range of options from suspending applications for future exchanges to revoking visas for current visitors. High visibility if we wish.

4. Science/Technology: Suspend coop, freeze Jt Fund projects — Comment: requires advance notice to renounce agreement

5. Curtail Democracy and Rule of Law Programs — Comment: options range from refusing to fund new projects to shutting down existing ones.

6. Cut SEED economic programs for Croatia (not refugees or displaced Croatian population) such as new banking sector project

7. Commercial Treaties - cut off/hold up negotiations on Bilateral Investment, Intellectual Property Rights, Double Taxation Treaties. — Comment: Are in early stages of discussions, Croats studying U.S. models

8. Suspend negotiations now underway on PL-480 $5 million for commodity purchase (cotton).

9. Halt Defense Cooperation. — Comment: We have already suspended programs that would expand bilateral defense cooperation, e.g. IMET, Marshall Center

10. Close recently-opened consulate in New York.

11. Look into ending private military exchange (MPRI).

Positive Bilateral Steps - Carrots (ascending order of value)

1. Serbian Sanctions Linkage
-- Reaffirm U.S. commitment to keep significant sanctions on Belgrade until there is real progress toward reintegrating the Serb-held areas — Comment: if not public and high-level it's nothing new

2. Looser Interpretation of Arms Embargo — Comment: allow sales of grey area items. e.g. parachutes, trucks

3. Croatian Economic Sanctions Veto
-- Pledge to oppose sanctions on Zagreb if Croatia acts responsibly, e.g. peacekeeping essentials, no hostile acts

4. Presidential Meeting
-- Offer Tudjman meeting with the President during Federation commemoration or other suitable occasion

5. Additional U.S. aid.

6. U.S. support for Croatian participation in PFP — Comment: Requires NATO consensus to be achieved

7. Limited number of U.S. troops to participate in restructured and different mandate in Krajina.

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(2)

Punitive Multilateral Steps (Ascending order of severity)

1. EU to drop/suspend/end negotiations for Cooperation Agreement

2. UN arms embargo
-- Enforce vigorously

(Note: Very tricky not to disadvantage Bosnia supply; we must be in compliance with Nunn-Mitchell re Bosnia)

3. International Financial Institutions
-- Freeze Croatia programs in EBRD, IBRD

(Note: Cut-off of IMF program inadvisable given Zagreb's excellent economic stabilization progress)

4. UN Economic Sanctions on Croatia

Positive Multilateral Steps (ascending order of value)

1. WTO Accession
Support Croatian accession to the World Trade Organization

2. Highway/Pipeline Security
-- "UNPROFOR Heavy" or NATO deployment to secure highway and oil pipeline.

Comment: both sides have already agreed on desirability of re-opening pipeline and highway

3. International Border Control
-- Organize force (largely symbolic) along lines Zagreb proposes
-- Requires Serb consent
-- Could build up from existing mandates in Vance Plan (JNA withdrawal monitoring), ICFY Mission (Krajina transshipments), and/or UNPROFOR (Highway checkpoints)

Comment: helping separate Krajina and Serbia accelerates Krajina reintegration

4. Air strikes
-- UN/NATO attacks on RSK positions in event of provocations

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(3)

Option I - UNPROFOR Reconfigured and Re-named, UNPROFOR "Lite"

Essential elements of UNPROFOR Lite proposal and address other Tudjman concerns. Bottom line: must maintain force in cease-fire lines.

Possible Mission Elements:

-- A new name. e.g. International Monitor Force.

-- New Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG). Akashi would retain responsibility only for Bosnia and Macedonia.

-- Reduced troop presence of about 5,000 - 7,000 would continue to monitor the force separation line.

-- Small (less than 200) observer force would symbolically monitor the international border (more robust mandate would only set up mission for failure). This aspect of mission could be non-UN.

-- CIVPOL or civilian component might be retained to help implement economic confidence building measures (ECBM's), help protect minorities in the UNPA's and facilitate transitional arrangements in UNPA West.

PRO:

- o Perhaps only realistic alternative to current UNPROFOR.
- o British, French support concept.
- o Continued UN involvement facilitates broader international support.
- o Continuity and cost limitation by using existing forces and logistic infrastructure.
- o Gives Tudjman symbolic recognition of his borders and the start of an effort toward transition in UNPA West. Akashi is replaced in Croatia. Knin gets a force on the separation line in return for border monitoring force.
- o Better able to coordinate its actions with UNPROFOR Bosnia than non-UN force.
- o Less costly than current operation. Funding mechanism exists.
- o If we felt desirable as carrot for Tujdman, could include US contingent.

CON:

- o Unity of command lost with two SRSG's.
- o Still UN command, maybe not enough coverage for Tudjman.
- o Knin, the Bosnian Serbs, and the Bosniacs could all veto the border monitors.
- o Border monitors and effort to begin transition in UNPA West might prove ineffective. Having to pull border monitors out under pressure could have serious political costs.

(4)

Option II - Retaining UNPROFOR "As Is", "UNPROFOR Stout"

UNPROFOR would continue roughly at current manpower levels, with a presence in the UNPAs and along the ceasefire lines, and possibly an added presence along the international border. It would pursue its mandate in theory but not necessarily with the agreement of the parties, but with the warning that interference by the parties would invite a response.

PRO:

- o Continuity
- o Proven effectiveness
- o Maximize coordination of overall ex-Yugo policy

CON:

- o UNPROFOR (esp. Akashi) has no credibility with GOC
- o Requires Tudjman to back all the way down
- o Without Croatian agreement, would be in difficult political position
- o Difficult to secure UNSC, NAC agreement on vigorous response.

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Option III - WEU Force

There has been discussion in European governments of the WEU providing the interpositional force. They might also be able to provide just border monitors, or other elements of the mandates sketched out above. WEU would be NATO in all but name, and no US troops.

PRO:

- "NATO Standard" troops could operate under more robust ROE if the political will was present.
- Would hand lead for solving the problem in Croatia back to the Europeans.
- Might involve very little cost to the U.S.

CON:

- Europeans have already said they are skeptical.
- Has never been tried. No precedent for success. Could be totally ineffective and lead to greater conflict.
- In practice unlikely to be much more assertive than UNPROFOR has been, which could erode both WEU and NATO credibility.
- Discontinuity with current UN operations.
- Russia and Islamic countries might feel marginalized.
- Europeans would expect cash contributions from the U.S. We have no effective way to contribute the large sums that would be expected.

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Option IV - OSCE Force

The OSCE has limited experience with peacekeeping and is enmeshed in plans for an operation in Nagorno Karabakh. Doesn't yet have infrastructure to run a large operation. Probably could not do both in Croatia and NK. Might be better suited to perform just the border monitoring mission.

PRO:

- Would involve a credible, broad-based regional organization to which the U.S. belongs. Russia is also a member.
- Unless the U.S. were to contribute large numbers of troops or logistical support our costs might be very low. (8.3% of common costs)
- We would remain important players at a political level.
- Planning done for deployment to NK give the organization some experience in planning a large scale operation.

CON:

- Not clear who would contribute troops. Might result in offers primarily from Eastern European countries. Might not get enough troops.
- OSCE is a consensus organization. Anyone can veto.
- Unity of command in ex-Yugo would be compromised.
- OSCE has even more restrictive ROE than the UN.
- OSCE lacks peace-keeping experience and is tied up with Nagorno-Karabakh.
- No money budgeted for this. Cost sharing mechanism unclear and untested.

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Option V - Multinational Force

A multinational coalition would probably act under authority of a UN mandate. Any combination of participants would require strong leadership. The U.S. is the only country that has effectively led a multinational military effort. England and France might be capable, but would probably have to rely heavily on our diplomatic capital.

PRO:

- Has potential to be the most robust option, by far.
- Although many countries may contribute token forces, the leaders of the coalition usually retain much tighter political control over the force.

CON:

- Most likely to require some U.S. troop presence on the ground.
- Increased risk of embroiling troop contributing nations directly in the conflict. Attacks on troops acting in national capacity may require retaliation.
- Not budgetted and no mechanism to share costs. US could be stuck with the bill.
- Unless the MNF troops were prepared to intervene militarily to stop aggression it could undermine credibility of the troop contributing nations.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ March 3, 1995

DECISION PAPER

ISSUE FOR DECISION: Should the U.S. support continued military preparations for UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia, and possibly Croatia, by approving the NATO proposal to commence Step Two prepositioning, which includes deployment of approximately 450 U.S. military personnel within Europe, including 320 to Croatia?

KEY POINTS

- No UN formal decision to withdraw UNPROFOR from either Bosnia or Croatia. Intelligence community assesses fighting will resume in Bosnia this spring with no immediate prospect for a negotiated settlement.

- Croatian President Tudjman insists UNPROFOR withdraw from the UNPAs between March 31 and June 30. Will likely result in fighting between the Croats and Krajina Serbs, with significant possibility of spillover into Bosnia.

- NATO planning to support UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia is contained in OPLAN 40104, which is continuously being updated. Initial NATO planning to support UNPROFOR withdrawal from Croatia should be complete by mid-March.

- Once Step 2 is authorized, it will take two weeks to assemble the force with two additional weeks to set up the communications system. It will take an additional 4-6 weeks until all forces are in theater ready to conduct withdrawal operations.

- Prepositioning is a necessary, but reversible, step to support a large military operation. The total number of personnel involved is approximately 1736, including 450 U.S. military personnel (320 in Croatia). The total NATO cost for prepositioning is estimated at $11.3M ($5M already authorized for step 1), to be paid out of existing NATO funds. (Countries pay own transport/sustainment costs.)

- When the NAC authorizes prepositioning step 2 it will issue a combined ACTWARN/ACTREQ officially notifying member states of the potential operation and requesting specific troop contributions. It will also issue three ACTWARNs, notifying nations of the potential requirements for: (1) logistics, movement, and reserve forces, (2) maritime and air forces, and (3) main body forces. Each subsequent step will require formal approval by the NAC.

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PROs:

- **Prudent preparation** for a likely major military operation. **Reduces lead-time** from notification to execution.
- **Demonstrates U.S. leadership** in NATO alliance, reducing potential embarrassment to U.S. and NATO by preparing for a likely call for NATO assistance. An unplanned withdrawal could result in calls for U.S. unilateral support, or participation in a "coalition-of-the-capable" (U.S., UK, FR.), seriously damaging NATO.
- U.S. troops deploying to Croatia will be stationed in Zagreb and various seaports, not the UNPAs.
- This is a **low-cost, potentially, reversible step.** Actual expense to USG is movement of U.S. personnel within Europe.
- NATO deployment could sober Tudjman into adopting a reasonable approach to accepting an UNPROFOR alternative.

CONs:

- Tudjman could view NATO deployment as **stepping stone to larger NATO and U.S. ground role** as UNPROFOR replacement and become less willing to deal in current negotiations.
- Could be viewed as the U.S. supporting a step that leads to the withdrawal of UNPROFOR and the wider war we have been trying to avoid.
- **Could make for easier UN decision to withdraw UNPROFOR** from Croatia, and subsequently Bosnia.
- **Places U.S. personnel on the ground** in Croatia, apparently reversing long-standing policy, although U.S. forces now support UNPROFOR in Zagreb.
- Postures U.S. and NATO for a military operation with **indeterminate start and end dates.**
- **First installment** for an operation that could eventually require 20,000-30,000 **U.S. military personnel** and cost the USG about **$1B.** (U.S. incremental plus UN assessed costs.)
- Although arguably reversible, it will be **difficult to withdraw from the operation** once 450 U.S. personnel have deployed.
- **Tough sell to a Congress, especially before the plan is understood:** another UN peacekeeping operation, raises command and control of U.S. forces, requires significant

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funding or reprogramming, eventually puts U.S. troops on the ground in Bosnia and reopens issue of Congressional role in military operations.

o No apparent American public support.

ANALYSIS

Political risk versus military risk - how much is acceptable? If we preposition now, we have to weigh the unknown impact of NATO forces deploying into Croatia on the diplomatic efforts to reverse Tudjman's decision against the real costs of delay in NATO's readiness to support withdrawal should it become necessary.

The driving force for a decision now is related to retaining a strong leadership role within the Alliance so that NATO will be properly postured to conduct a successful military operation. **If the only issue was military preparedness, the decision would be an easy one.** Other factors complicate the decision making process.

There is no certainty as to how regional actors will react. The CIA estimates that **Tudjman and hard-liners would probably welcome NATO involvement and encourage the NATO mission to expand and will look for ways to make NATO useful to him. The Knin Serbs may begin to take UNPROFOR hostages** if they believe the initial NATO deployment is the forerunner of a larger NATO force to protect an UNPROFOR withdrawing from the Krajina.

It is unclear how a NATO deployment will impact on diplomatic efforts to turn Tudjman to a more accommodating stance. Proponents of delaying a decision argue that there are significant political risks to prepositioning. **Prepositioning would fracture diplomatic efforts just getting underway and would be viewed by many as the first step to a much wider war.** Others argue that **Tudjman is manipulating the U.S. and others, and the more we implore him to deal, the more his power grows. Prepositioning married with a package of tough sanctions proposals and a commitment to work for a border force as long as he retains interpositional forces will puncture his balloon.**

With the final push beginning next week and actual deployment of Step Two forces weeks away, it is **unlikely that a Step Two decision will be a deal breaker or maker.** The fog should clear some after next week's meetings with Tudjman.

When the NATO infrastructure is completed, some decision makers in capitals and at the UN could make a decision to withdraw easier to make, knowing NATO stands ready to support if things go awry.

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THE CONGRESSIONAL FACTOR

While Congressional reaction is rarely predictable, **the Hill can probably be convinced to go along with a Step Two prepositioning** as long as the Hill is **consulted in advance,** apprising them of the costs, substance and length of time of the mission. There will also be interest in the command and control issue, i.e. they will want a U.S. commander for U.S. troops.

Depending on the costs and magnitude of U.S. troops committed, it is possible there **may be a convergence of support on the Hill for UNPROFOR withdrawal among opponents and proponents of unilateral lift.** The lift and strikers see UNPROFOR as the main hurdle for the enactment of their policy. On the other hand, those who support continued UNPROFOR presence do understand the need for the U.S. to assist its NATO allies.

Nonetheless, any time American forces deploy abroad in harms way, heavy lifting is needed on the Hill. This is ultimately a winnable battle, but nothing can be taken for granted.

OPTIONS:

A. **Approve prepositioning Step 2 without prejudice. Make clear decision to support Step 2 does not commit U.S. to overall operation.** Inform Congress, and make subsequent decisions on timing of later steps and contribution of U.S. forces based on the status of negotiations and the evolving situation on the ground.

OR:

B. **Defer a final decision on prepositioning** until OPLAN 40104 is updated for UNPROFOR withdrawal from Croatia (mid-March at the earliest), the President has been briefed on the completed plan, Congress has been consulted, grants authorization, and a supplemental budget request has been approved **or until circumstances on the ground require withdrawal** to begin.

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~~SECRET~~ February 27, 1995

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA POLICY REVIEW

Introduction

As we approach a potentially critical period in the Balkans over the next three months, now is the time to review the fundamental principles guiding our policy. U.S. policy has, in fact, had some success over the past two years in containing the spread of the war, reducing the level of violence, keeping relief supplies flowing to most areas, and maintaining cohesion with Allies and Russia. What we have been unable to produce is a political settlement in Bosnia or Croatia that rolls back Serb gains sufficiently to be acceptable to the Bosnians and Croats, and to be perceived as "fair" (much less "just") in moral terms.

The fundamental problem has been a lack of leverage: sanctions and political pressure have been insufficient to sway the Serbs, and our efforts to bring NATO air power to bear have come to naught. In Bosnia, after almost a year of effort, the Contact Group is becoming a spent force, with its unity increasingly strained. In Croatia, the Z-4 plan for a political solution is, for all intents and purposes, stillborn, and Tudjman's decision to eject UNPROFOR threatens to destroy even the limited economic confidence-building measures developed over the past year.

As the CIA paper makes clear, there is no "peace faction" among any of the parties, and Milosevic's willingness to pressure his Serb cousins is limited. If we stay on our present course, the prospects are for an escalation of the war in Bosnia and a new war in Croatia, with the potential unraveling of our limited achievements to date, and increased pressures for U.S. involvement. The differences between the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios are largely ones of timing and degree. And as the risk of war increases in Bosnia and Croatia, the dangers of spillover to other areas grow as well.

If the war escalates, the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Croatia, Bosnia or both will become increasingly likely -- creating the prospect of U.S. troops on the ground in former Yugoslavia in a hostile environment, the outcome we have most sought to avoid. As international efforts founder, the Bosnians will be able to make an increasingly convincing case for lifting the arms embargo; yet the odds of bringing our Allies and, especially, the Russians along will remain low. Moreover, lifting the arms embargo, to be effective, entails the United States taking other actions that increase our involvement and responsibility.

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Interests and Objectives

Throughout the conflict, we have sought to protect several core U.S. interests: maintaining our strategic relationship with key Allies and protecting the credibility of NATO; avoiding a conflict with Russia that could undermine our efforts to promote reform and international cooperation; preventing the spread of the Bosnian conflict into a wider Balkan war that could destabilize southeastern Europe and draw in U.S. allies; and ensuring that the use of force to change borders and acts of genocide do not become legitimate forms of behavior in post-Cold War Europe.

Along with these core interests, we have pursued a range of more specific objectives, but have never set clear priorities among them:

- To stop or limit the fighting.
- To maintain relief supplies and reduce human suffering.
- To prevent the establishment by force of a Greater Serbia.
- To achieve a negotiated settlement acceptable to all parties that reverses at least some Serb territorial conquests and preserves the territorial integrity and international identity of Bosnia, Croatia and other ex-Yugoslav states.
- To prevent the spread of conflict to Kosovo, Macedonia, Albania and beyond.
- To keep U.S. ground forces out except in the context of implementing a political settlement.

The tools we have applied have varied over time in response to events, and as our priorities have shifted: Until the end of 1994, we sought to use NATO military power to enforce UNSC resolutions and to put pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to settle on terms that provided a better deal for the Bosnian Government ("air power in the service of diplomacy"). After Bihac, however, we consciously shifted the emphasis to maintaining NATO cohesion, recognizing that this would erode U.S. and Alliance credibility and reduce further our negotiating leverage. Yet we did not scale back our political objectives to match our reduced leverage -- leading to the present diplomatic impasse.

The result has been charges of fecklessness and an erosion of confidence in U.S. leadership on other issues. Therefore, we now need to step back and confront these inherent contradictions:

- On the one hand, our own principles, as well as public and Congressional pressures, make it difficult to disengage and effectively abandon the Bosnians.

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- On the other hand, we do not presently have the means to attain the political goal we have set -- negotiated settlements that deprive the Serbs of some of their ill-gotten gains -- and we have not been prepared to commit those means. Moreover, there is limited public support in the U.S. or in Europe for doing so.

Basic Strategic Choices

Many of our decisions over the next 2-3 months will be driven by events on the ground. But some of our choices will depend on where we want to go in the longer term. Therefore, before considering specific options, Principals need to decide our overall strategic direction and whether the course chosen is politically sustainable. This, in turn, requires deciding what are our priority interests and sticking with that decision in terms of committing the resources needed to attain our goals. The following, in broad terms, are basic approaches to be considered:

1. Continue our present policy; muddle through while supporting the Bosnians: Maintain the Contact Group and continue to seek a political solution that provides a better deal for the Bosnians, but not commit to increased military pressure on their behalf; rely for leverage on sanctions and efforts to isolate the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs (recognizing that these will be inadequate to the task). Seek to contain the fighting and humanitarian suffering to the extent possible, while maintaining Alliance cohesion. Keep UNPROFOR in place in essentially its present form (improve its effectiveness, but don't press it to take a more confrontational stance against the Serbs). Seek to postpone any lifting of the arms embargo and don't push for use of NATO air power, since this would precipitate UNPROFOR's withdrawal. Continue to sustain the Federation. Take additional measures in the front-line states to contain spillover of the conflict, such as beefing up UNPROFOR/Macedonia.

   - This would maintain European and Russian support, reduce the risks of deeper U.S. military involvement, and recognize that, absent such involvement, political settlements are not achievable in the foreseeable future.

   - The gap between our goal of a "fair" settlement and our unwillingness to provide the means to that end, however, would leave us vulnerable to charges of diplomatic fecklessness. It would be difficult to persuade the public and pro-Bosnian elements in the Congress that, over time, the maintenance of sanctions, a continued stalemate on the ground, and the solidity of the Federation will bring the Bosnian Serbs to accept a settlement along the lines of the

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Contact Group plan, and the Krajina Serbs to accept autonomy within Croatia.

- The main weakness of this approach, however, is that the Bosnians and the Croatians are not prepared to play along: Both are ready to pursue the military option with renewed vigor over the coming months, putting UNPROFOR's presence in doubt. And the Bosnians will campaign for lift when the ceasefire ends. Our continued rhetorical support for their cause would make it difficult for us to oppose.

2. Adopt a policy of neutrality toward the terms of a settlement and focus on active containment of the conflict: Openly acknowledge that achieving a better solution for the Bosnians is not possible without U.S. actions that it is not in our interest to take. Apart from this shift in approach to the diplomatic track, take essentially the same actions as under the previous approach. Make clear we do not believe multilateral lift is politically attainable and strongly oppose Congressional pressures to lift unilaterally. Abandon Contact Group or suspend its activities, making clear that it is up to the parties, not the international community, to find a mutually acceptable solution. Promote periodic ceasefire agreements. Advise the Bosnians of the need to be realistic about the facts on the ground and agree to terms that acknowledge Serb preeminence (accept territorial outcomes short of 51:49, Serb Confederation with Belgrade; seek protection through links to Croatia, etc.).

   - This course would also maintain good relations with the Europeans, avoid a confrontation with Russia, and reduce the potential for U.S. military involvement. We would concentrate our efforts in areas where we have been able to achieve some success: reducing the violence, delivering humanitarian relief, maintaining the Muslim-Croat ceasefire and the Federation, and preventing the spread of the conflict outside of Bosnia and possibly Croatia. By distancing ourselves from the Bosnians' political agenda, we might have greater success in keeping UNPROFOR in place.

   - We would suffer harsh criticism from some quarters in the Congress and the public for abandoning the Bosnians and performing another flip-flop. We would need to make the case that it is not in U.S. interests to intervene unilaterally to ensure Bosnian victory, that we cannot gain European or Russian support for firmer measures to help the Bosnians, and that lift alone would probably make things worse for them in any case. We would want to appeal to the significant number of Congressmen whose support for lift is soft, and who are not keen on the deeper military involvement that a credible lift-and-strike policy would require.

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- Assuming we can ride out the initial storm, this approach would lower expectations and adjust public opinion to the reality of a continued conflict for which there may be no immediate solution. It would put the onus on the parties to negotiate directly with one another, rather than forcing us to explain repeated failed diplomatic initiatives backed by empty threats. It would force the Bosnians to accept the reality of defeat and the fact that they are destined to live surrounded by Serbs. It might even lead to a de facto indefinite cessation of serious hostilities, reducing both human suffering and public pressures for action.

- The problem with this approach, like the first, is that we may not be able to ride out the storm: the Bosnians may succeed in getting Congress to lift unilaterally, possibly with sufficient votes to override a Presidential veto. Moreover, we would, effectively, be acquiescing in Serb aggression, setting a dangerous precedent for the future.

3. Containment of Conflict and Long-Term Quarantine of Greater Serbia: Abandon efforts to negotiate a political settlement and reimpose full sanctions against Serbia for the long haul. Make clear we will refuse to recognize Serb conquests in Bosnia and Croatia and we will continue to treat Serbia as a pariah state until Serbs accept settlements that restore territorial integrity of Bosnia and Croatia. Refrain from military intervention, take laissez-faire approach to continued fighting among the parties. Concentrate on humanitarian aid, bolstering the Federation politically and economically, and containing spillover to other parts of the region. If UNPROFOR were to withdraw, this could be combined with a lift-and-leave strategy.

   - This approach would be analogous to our approach to Soviet domination of Central and Eastern Europe during the Cold War, in which we were prepared to wait for decades for a just outcome -- isolating one party while promoting free-market development in the other. It would be based, again, on a recognition that there is no available political solution, and avoid perpetuating false expectations that the international community can impose a settlement. But in contrast to the previous approach, it would be based as well on a judgment that Milosevic remains the problem rather than the solution, despite his recent attempts to play the peacemaker -- distinguishing the victim from the victimizer.

   - It is doubtful Russia would agree if we reimposed the sanctions noose around Serbia, however. We might agree with the Russians to disagree about Serbia, perhaps lifting or suspending some or all multilateral sanctions against the FRY -- but maintaining U.S. sanctions -- in exchange for agreement on continued, tightened sanctions against the Pale

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and Knin Serbs (but recognizing that Milosevic will try to undermine these to the extent he can get away with it).

- The front-line states' enforcement of sanctions would be difficult to sustain absent substantial financial compensation. Without such compensation, long-term continuation of the sanctions could actually have a destabilizing effect on the region overall. Moreover, this long-term approach could result in further Serb territorial expansion and prolong the humanitarian and refugee crisis for years to come.

- As with approaches 1 and 2, it is not clear we could sustain this course in the face of pressure from the Congress and the Bosnians.

4. Increased U.S. commitment in support of Bosnians, apply military pressure to compel Serb acceptance of a settlement: In theory, this could involve either: (a) returning to our 1994 approach: press for a more robust UNPROFOR that is prepared to use force against Serbs and make active use of NATO close air support; resume NATO enforcement of exclusion zones, and possibly establish additional exclusion zones; if these measures prove insufficient, withdraw UNPROFOR and implement a multilateral lift-and-strike strategy; or (b) proceeding directly to lift and strike, after helping UNPROFOR to withdraw. In practice, only (b) is feasible, since Allies will not agree to robust military actions while their vulnerable UNPROFOR forces remain in place.

- This would align our policy with Congressional rhetoric and provide the means to back up our declared goals of helping the Bosnians and thwarting Serb ambitions. It would lead to increased fighting, at least in the short term, but might in time give the Bosnians the capability to recover territory and, by altering the situation on the battlefield, convince the Serbs to agree to an equitable political settlement.

- It would, however, create significant strains in our relations with our Allies and the Russians. Our readiness to participate in NATO extraction of UNPROFOR could provide the leverage to win Allied support in the UNSC for multilateral lift. But preventing a Russian veto would be more difficult. It would, at a minimum, require lifting sanctions against Serbia at the same time (although this may be necessary in any event to encourage Milosevic not to resume military support to his Serb cousins).

- Moreover, withdrawing UNPROFOR and explicitly committing to produce a Bosnian success would hasten the onset of the situation we have sought most to avoid, the deployment of U.S. ground forces, leaving us with the responsibility for organizing relief supplies and protecting the enclaves. And

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lift - whether unilateral or multilateral -- would commit us to arming and training the Bosnians for an indefinite period, as well as providing air cover, even if we tried to set a time limit on our support. In short, it could Americanize the war, with little likelihood of hastening a political settlement.

Near-Term Decisions

The foregoing choices pertain mainly to the decisions we will need to take in the coming months on Bosnia. In Croatia, the situation may be more urgent, and our goal more straightforward: to prevent a new war over the Krajina. To this end, we need to be clear at the outset that we do not support Croatian military action to reassert control over the Krajina Serbs, and increase pressure on Tudjman to retain at least some portion of UNPROFOR interposed between the warring parties in the separation zone. We cannot go too far in imposing punitive measures on Tudjman, however, given the importance of Tudjman's support for the Federation and our need to use Croatian territory to support any UN/NATO/U.S. operation in Bosnia. We must above all avoid driving Tudjman into an unholy alliance with Milosevic to carve up Bosnia.

Finally, to the extent that we decide to focus more on containment of spillover, beefing up or replacing UNPROFOR in Macedonia would take on greater urgency alongside the decisions that we will need to make with respect to Bosnia and Croatia.

With these considerations in mind, the following is a sketch of the options on which decisions will be needed over the next three months.

Options: Croatia

Near Term:

- Make renewed push (in tandem with Germans and other Allies) within next 10 days to convince Tudjman to extend UNPROFOR with reduced mandate (UNPROFOR Lite).
- Fallback: Press for one-time extension of March 31/June 30 deadlines to allow more time for negotiations.

  Issue: Whether to threaten limited punitive actions at this stage? Or should we offer Tudjman a carrot?

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If these initial efforts fail:

- Begin Step Two prepositioning for UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia or Croatia no later than March 8 (will require Congressional consultations and decisions on funding).
- Offer new, high-level international negotiator to negotiate Croatian settlement, in tandem with final push for acceptance of UNPROFOR Lite.
- Agree in principle to Croatian proposal for international task force (ITF) to replace UNPROFOR that would monitor Croatian-Bosnian border *on condition that* Tudjman agrees to extend ceasefire, agrees the force will also police the separation zone, and agrees to negotiate with Krajina Serbs on basis of principles in Z-4 plan.

  Issues: Is ITF feasible? (Border force would be highly vulnerable to attack or hostage-taking by Bosnian and Krajina Serb forces, who have traditionally viewed such a force as threat to their survival, and whose acceptance would be a *sine qua non*. Allies would look to U.S. to join the force. But some token presence on the border may be the fig leaf Tudjman needs to back down on ejection of UNPROFOR; Krajina Serbs may accept if it is only way to keep international forces in separation zone.)

  Who would comprise the force? (Unarmed civilian monitors? Joint international-Croatian-Krajina Serb police force? NATO? WEU, backed by U.S. air support -- but recognizing that effectiveness would be limited without TACPs?)

Medium Term:

- Withdraw UNPROFOR from Croatia

  Issues: Nature of U.S. participation?

  How to discourage Tudjman from using NATO forces as cover for early offensive (sanctions or other punitive steps? carrots?).

  How to deter Krajina Serbs from seizing vacated UNPROFOR positions or threatening NATO forces (air strike threat?)

- Introduce civilian monitors to replace UNPROFOR (e.g. OSCE)

Long Term (post-UNPROFOR withdrawal):

- Contain fighting: Establish no-fly zone in Croatia? Other measures?

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- Decide whether to let Tudjman fend for himself (allowing possible Serb victory) or to provide limited support, despite our warnings that he will be on his own.

Options: Bosnia

Near Term:

- Keep Plan B on the table.

  Issues: If so, for how long? Possible modifications/ extensions that aren't sweeteners -- e.g. put forward detailed proposal on constitutional arrangements for future Bosnian Union?)

- Consider staged or scaled-back Plan B -- i.e. ask Milosevic to identify the steps he would take in "partial recognition" of Bosnia and Croatia, determine whether they could be linked to limited sanctions relief.

  Issues: What could Milosevic do beyond tightening border closure to justify sanctions relief? (We could not justify additional relief for tightening a border that should be sealed already. *Possibilities*: close the "back door" to Croatia; cooperate with the War Crimes Tribunal; recognize Bosnia's border and territorial integrity but not the Sarajevo Government.)

  Should we take parallel steps in support of Bosnians to reduce Bosnian/Congressional criticism -- e.g. IMET, other training for Bosnians?

- Continue efforts to isolate Pale irrespective of Plan B: increase border monitors; close Krajina back door.

- Consider whether to reduce or end the activity of the Contact Group as such, in order to emphasize the need for the parties themselves to undertake territorial and constitutional discussions. (This would permit private or individual mediators to operate.) Or agree to French international conference without prior agreement on mutual recognition?

- Explore efforts to increase international support for the Federation: material assistance and political support (envoys to and from, participation in international conferences, agreements such as our proposed 505 agreement, etc.)

- Approach the UN to reconsider its decision not to expand UNPROFOR with the troops already offered (i.e. urge UN to increase UNPROFOR numerically to enable it to deliver humanitarian assistance more effectively, especially along the Blue Route, as opposed to changing its ROE).

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Medium Term:

Decision depends on the choice of overall strategic approach as described above:

- Muddle through, continue to support Bosnians rhetorically, continue diplomatic efforts, but focus on containment.
- Shift to policy of neutrality toward terms of settlement and active containment of conflict; end or suspend Contact Group activities, acknowledge we cannot produce better deal for Bosnians.
- Containment of conflict and long-term quarantine of Greater Serbia.
- Renewed push for military measures in support of Bosnians: withdraw UNPROFOR, multilateral lift and strike

Long Term:

- Maintain support for Federation to forestall Muslim-Croat splits. Intensify isolation of Pale and Knin Serbs.
- Maintain support for War Crimes Tribunal.
- Withdraw UNPROFOR, lift the arms embargo, with lift possibly implemented in stages (beginning with defensive weapons) and tied to "final offer" to accept Contact Group plan.

  Issue: Are we prepared to lift unilaterally if Allies support us in UNSC but Russians veto? Alternatives to lift?
- Abandon support for lift, take tough line with Congress and Bosnians, stick with one of the containment options.

Options: Containing Spillover

- Beef up or replace UNPROFOR/Macedonia

  Issues: When and how? (Enlarge existing force under UN command? Replace with NATO division?)
- Continue efforts to defuse Greece/FYROM dispute.
- Shore up outer wall of sanctions against Serbia.
- Expand bilateral aid/infrastructure programs in south Balkans.
- Expand bilateral military cooperation and economic cooperation with Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia.
- High-level visits to front-line states.

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Decision Timeline

See chart

Attachments:

CIA paper - The Balkans: The Next Three Months
Decision Timeline

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003h. report	re: The Balkans: The Next Three Months [partial] (6 pages)	02/24/1995	P1/b(1)

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Intelligence Report

DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force *24 February 1995*

The Balkans: The Next Three Months 3.5c

Fighting is likely to resume this spring because Croatia and Bosnia do not accept the status quo, believe that they can gain political and territorial concessions from Serbs only through military force, and are highly skeptical of the international community's efforts to forge an equitable peace. Fighting is more likely to break out first in Bosnia in March with the collapse of the cessation of hostilities agreement. The scope and intensity of this could influence President Tudjman's calculations on regaining the Krajina by force, but Tudjman's decision on the renewal of conflict there will be taken independently of fighting in Bosnia. Clashes are likely by April or May in conjunction with the UNPROFOR pullout. In a second, less likely scenario, a combination of factors could postpone the fighting until later this year but not alter the deep clashes of interest. In a third scenario, all the warring factions would have to make fundamental changes to their political positions--even less likely in the near to mid term--in order for there to be real movement toward a stable peace in the region. 3.5c

Current Balkans leaders are pursuing irreconcilable demands that make even the beginning of a meaningful peace process in the next three months unlikely. At most, one or more of the key actors in the two major zones of conflict might be convinced to postpone military action. Postponement, however, is not necessarily a way station on the road to peace. Only a reordering of demands or a significant shift in the military situation on the ground would set the stage for a renewed effort to forge a lasting peace in the region. 3.5c

The Key Actors: What Drives Them?

Croatia: Guided by a vision of his personal historical role, mounting nationalist/political pressures which he has helped generate, and frustration with the international community, President Tudjman is now prepared to initiate large-scale military action to reintegrate the Krajina into Croatia. He is encouraged by claims of military superiority from his generals and his own belief that Serbian President Milosevic will not intervene. We do not have evidence Tudjman is working with a specific time schedule; however, having taken the bit in his teeth, it is unlikely he will stall for long or accept merely paper changes in UNPROFOR's mandate. There is no significant peace faction in the Croatian leadership. 3.5c

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Krajina Serbs: Despite fractious personal differences, the Krajina Serb leadership adamantly refuses any form of reintegration, including the limited "autonomy" Zagreb is willing to offer. They will fight fiercely to protect their homeland and could escalate localized Croatian attacks by shelling major Croatian cities. If attacked, they expect help from the Bosnian Serbs and, in extremis, from Belgrade. There is no significant peace faction in Knin. 3.5c

Bosnian Government: Bosnian leaders firmly believe that they can regain territory from the Bosnian Serbs and preserve the concept of a unified Bosnia within its internationally recognized boundaries only by military pressure. They are increasingly confident of their own military capabilities and see the tide swinging in their favor as they look out several years. There is no significant politically organized opposition within the Muslim community to this vision. The Bosnian Croats are largely satisfied with the territory they now control and take their guidance from Zagreb, not Sarajevo. The Herzegovinian hardliners leading the Bosnian Croats ultimately hope to be integrated into a Greater Croatia, a vision that Tudjman does not discourage. 3.5c

Bosnian Serbs: Bosnian Serb leaders will accept nothing less than an independent state as an interim measure toward the creation of an ill-defined "Greater Serbia." They are willing to give up some of the territory they now control to reach an agreement, but until then will fight to keep what they have. They are committed to helping the Krajina Serbs. If pressed by Bosnian Government forces, they might also consider a major military campaign aimed at dealing the Bosnian Government a severe defeat. Although some divisions among leaders are now being publicized, even those advocating acceptance of the Contact Group plan agree with Karadzic on driving a hard bargain on territory and independence for a Bosnian Serb state. Army Commander Mladic despises Karadzic but also shares his goal for an independent Serbian Bosnia with ties to Serbia. 3.5c

Serbia: President Milosevic continues to be a cornerstone to a settlement but at the same time is only a secondary player with limited influence on those he helped into power in Pale and Knin. Milosevic is driven by a strong personal desire to remain in power. He seeks to end sanctions but not at the cost of important political values. He continues to support--for political if not necessarily personal reasons--the concept of a "Greater Serbia," which makes it unlikely he could recognize Croatia and Bosnia or refuse help to the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs if they appeared to be on the verge of serious setbacks. In the short run, he is unable, not just unwilling, to compel either the Krajina Serb or Bosnian Serb leaders to make compromises that they believe are not in their interest. There is no significant peace party in Serbia. 3.5c

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This memorandum was prepared by EO 13526 3.5(c) Office of European Analysis with contributions from 3.5c Office of European Analysis, and EO 13526 3.5(c) EO 13526 3.5(c) Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force on EO 13526 3.5(c)

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Russia: Moscow's overall objectives will be to maintain an influential role in the international decision-making process on the Balkans as the Contact Group process wanes, while trying to keep the conflict contained and minimizing NATO's role. Tactically, Russian leaders will want to increase Russian leverage and head off all domestic criticism by pressing for full sanctions relief for Serbia. Moscow has limited influence with Belgrade--and even less with Pale--but the Russians have the capacity to play a spoiler role. They may pose obstacles to any international actions if they believe that the West is not accounting for Russian interests. 3.5c

EU Contact Group Members: Fearing renewed violence and a broader Balkan conflict, the European Union members of the Contact Group are desperate to keep the negotiating process alive but are increasingly frustrated with the intransigence of the feuding parties. Germany, Britain, and France--which holds the EU presidency and has the largest troop contingent in the former Yugoslavia--will focus on offering incentives for peace, wooing Zagreb with the prospect of EU aid and Belgrade with the promise of lifting sanctions. The EU members so far do not have a unified strategy for dealing with the renewal of full-scale war in Bosnia, according to various sources. Despite differing views, European Contact Group members agree on the need for Contact Group unity and are likely to maintain a coordinated position among themselves under French leadership. 3.5c

Three Scenarios

Renewed Fighting

It is likely that fighting will resume in Bosnia in the next two months, and clashes could then follow quickly in Croatia.

- The Bosnian Government has clearly focused on resupplying, reequipping and reorganizing its forces during the four-month cessation of hostilities (COH) in preparation for launching additional attacks to retake territory in central Bosnia. The Bosnian Serbs also believe that fighting will resume and are taking steps to increase military pressure on the Bihac enclave.

- The Bihac enclave will be the likely focal point of fighting for most of March as the Government V Corps clashes with Krajina Serb and rebel Muslim forces--which did not sign the COH agreement--supported by the Bosnian Serbs. Major gains by either faction around Bihac would probably cause the fighting to spread elsewhere in Bosnia, as the losing faction would attempt to pressure the other by attacking at other points.

- Fighting will probably increase in the rest of Bosnia by late March or early April as the weather improves--temperatures rise into the mid-50s--and the warring factions begin to jockey for military advantage prior to the end of the COH on 30 April. In 1994, fighting picked up substantially in April as

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the government launched a series of attacks in central Bosnia and the Serbs responded by assaulting Gorazde.

- The Bosnian Serbs will probably make a push for new talks in late April and call for an extension of the COH agreement in an attempt to preempt a government attack. The Bosnian Government may accept additional talks under international pressure but will probably reject any extension of the COH agreement.

- The return of warmer, drier weather by May will probably lead to general fighting throughout Bosnia. Government forces will probably launch a series of local attacks--following their strategy of last year--especially in central and northern Bosnia. Government forces will probably make some territorial gains, as the Bosnian Serbs are stretched thin and essentially remain cut off from Serbia. Serb strategy has been to respond to any government attack with an overwhelming offensive--preferably against an isolated or poorly defended enclave--to press the government to abandon its offensive. The Bosnian Serbs, however, will be reluctant to commit their forces fully to a Bosnian offensive, because some may be needed to reinforce the Krajina Serbs in Croatia.

- The resumption of fighting will spark renewed discussion of the need to remove UNPROFOR from Bosnia. Heavy fighting in Bosnia at the same time as an UNPROFOR pullout from Croatia in May and June will spark calls in Paris and London to move toward a withdrawal before winter.

- A major resumption of hostilities in Bosnia, which included an all-out Bosnian Serb effort to take the eastern enclaves, could put at risk nearly 120,000 Muslims who would try to flee to the nearest Muslim-controlled territory. 3.5c

The fighting in Bosnia could influence the prospects for renewed clashes in Croatia, but Tudjman's decision on a renewal of the conflict there will be taken independently of the fighting in Bosnia.

- President Tudjman has ordered the UN to begin withdrawing from Croatia after 31 March and complete withdrawal by 30 June. The Croatians expect to come under increasingly heavy international pressure in the coming month to extend the UN mandate. They appear prepared to stand firm and exact a high price: an international monitoring force--possibly including forces from NATO or Contact Group states--on the Croatian border with Bosnia and Serbia, recognition of Croatia's international border by Belgrade, and demonstrable progress on reintegration of Serb-held territory. In late March or early April, Tudjman may make a push for new talks with the Krajina Serbs, in hopes that the UN pullout will pressure the Serbs to make additional concessions.

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Postponed Fighting

While the differences between the warring factions in Croatia and Bosnia make another round of fighting likely in the next three months, a combination of factors could postpone the fighting until later this year.

- Introduction of a follow-on peacekeeping force could delay renewed fighting in Croatia. Zagreb will only accept a new force that will take control of Croatia's border with Serbia and Bosnia. The Krajina Serbs are unlikely to accept such a force unless it also is charged with patrolling the current cease-fire line. If both factions compromised on this issue and some minimal international force--probably from the WEU or NATO--were in place in April before UNPROFOR begins withdrawing, fighting could be forestalled while a new round of negotiations took place.

- Zagreb will be reluctant to launch a major attack while substantial UN forces are still in Serb-held territories. If the UN withdrawal in April and May is particularly slow and a large number of peacekeepers remain in the region, Croatia may opt to postpone major military action until the fall, after the tourist season.

- If Croatia is seriously threatened with major economic sanctions in response to military attacks on the Krajina Serbs, Zagreb may delay military action until the international community's focus wanes or until Croatia can point to a serious Serb "provocation" to justify further military operations. 3.5c

Heavy fighting would be postponed in Bosnia if the Bosnian Government decided to delay its likely spring offensives.

- Heavy spring rains could impede resupply and movement of government forces, and they may wait until the drier months of June or July before launching major attacks.

- Government forces may wish to take advantage of the impact on the Serbs of renewed fighting in Croatia. Under such a scenario, they might postpone their attacks until the Bosnian Serbs are heavily engaged in the fighting in the Krajina, probably in June or later.

- The government could rethink its plans for military operations if serious negotiations were about to take place. These would require true concessions from the Bosnian Serbs prior to the start of talks, including removal of forces from key areas such as Sarajevo, and some form of acceptance of the original contact group plan. 3.5c

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Movement Towards Peace

Despite five years of effort, the international community has not been able to affect the fundamental clashes of interests in the region. Unless the UN, NATO or some other outside actor is prepared for a massive long-term infusion of economic and military resources into the region, such changes are not likely in the near term. If all the warring factions made fundamental changes to their political positions, we would expect to see some of the following signs of movement towards agreement during the next three months.

- Croatia would have to accept the extension of the UNPROFOR mandate or the deployment of a new force that monitored the current cease-fire line by April in order to prevent renewed clashes--especially in the zone of separation this spring.

- By late spring, a new round of negotiations would have to begin, with both sides making major concessions. Croatia and the Krajina Serbs would have to be prepared to redraw existing international borders allowing the Serbs to live outside Croatian control. Alternatively, the complete Krajina Serb leadership would have to be replaced, and probably a substantial portion of the local Serb population removed to Bosnia or Serbia, leaving the Krajina inside Croatia.

- Negotiations could be based on a slightly less extreme scenario if Zagreb accepted significantly more "autonomy" for the Krajina Serbs than is contained in the Z-4 plan and the Krajina Serbs gave up the idea of any "special links" with Belgrade. 3.5c

Movement towards a solution in Bosnia would almost certainly be tied to developments in Croatia, but any movement towards peace there would also rely on a number of unprecedented developments.

- Initially, the Bosnian Government and Bosnian Serbs would have to accept an extension of the current cessation of hostilities accord after 30 April and begin implementing all of its measures, including the separation of forces and the deployment of peacekeepers between the warring factions.

- To support the talks, the Bosnian Government would have to abandon its goal of maintaining a unified Bosnia. The Serbs would have to back down from their plans for association with Serbia.

- Effective enforcement of the arms embargo, especially the cut-off of Iranian arms deliveries, could make Sarajevo more receptive to a diplomatic settlement.

- As stated earlier, Belgrade's recognition of Croatia and Bosnia is likely to lead to an increase in fighting in the short term. If the Krajina Serbs and

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95030214	FOR DECISION
001		X	95030216	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
001	SENS	Z	95030216	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	95030217	DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950302	FUERTH, L	
002	950302	BRILL, K	
002	950302	MCALEER, R	
002	950302	INDERFURTH, K	
002	950302	PANETTA, L	
002	950302	GARTHOFF, D	
002	950302	PATRICK, T	

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RECORD ID: 9520261
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TO: LAKE

FROM: KERRICK
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 02 MAR 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
PC
CROATIA
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 3 MAR PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE DUE DATE: 04 MAR 95 STATUS: X

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF:

FILES: IFM NSCP: CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
LAKE		

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

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The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Dohse	1	D	
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger	2		
Lake	3	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
~~Situation Room~~ Dohse	4		Tab I
West Wing Desk		3/2	please
NSC Secretariat	5	3/2	D

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

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	PRINT LAST NAME:		Branscum
	COPY: 1		
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	3/2/95	2215	S. Reaves
	PRINT LAST NAME:		Reaves
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AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: VIA FAX		
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	3/2	7:05	Adam Greisel
	PRINT LAST NAME:		Greisel
	COPY: 1		
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			
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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
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WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001

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	PRINT LAST NAME:		
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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	3/2	11:00pm	Harley Ward PRINT LAST NAME: Ward COPY: 1
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AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	3/3/95	6:00 p.m.	J. C. Gill PRINT LAST NAME: Angell COPY: 1
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

1995 MAR -2 PM 5:36

TIME OF RECEIPT

MAR 2 5

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 455 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (202) 456-9425 WH SITROOM
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTICE OF 3 MAR PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

NSC LOG # 20261

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

BBNDA

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 455 CLASSIFICATION: SECRET TOTAL: 3
(PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (202) 456-9425 WH SITROOM
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTICE OF 3 MAR PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

NSC LOG # 20261

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

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-2 MAR 95 18 27

NMCC/JCS

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 455 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (202) 456-9425 WH SITROOM
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTICE OF 3 MAR PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

NSC LOG #: 20261

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

BRNDA

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WHITE HOUSE

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

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TIME OF RECEIPT

17:58

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 455 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (202) 456-9425 WH SITROOM
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTICE OF 3 MAR PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

NSC LOG # 20261

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
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USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

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TIME OF RECEIPT

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PRECEDENCE
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- ☐ IMMEDIATE
- ☒ PRIORITY
- ☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC LOG # 20261

FROM: National Security Council (MR) PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting 3 MAR PC MTG ON BOSNIA/CROATIA PAGES: 3

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 2, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the
President

MR. DOUGLAS GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia on Friday, March 3, 1995, 2:30 - 4:00 p.m., in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Principals only. The agenda is attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

for Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

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TAB A

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PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING
ON BOSNIA AND CROATIA
DATE: Friday, March 3, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 - 4:00 p.m.

Agenda

I. Near-Term Croatia Strategy.....State

II. NATO Prepositioning - Step Two.....JCS

III. Former Yugoslavia Policy Review.....NSC/All

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 2, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: DON KERRICK

SUBJECT: Principals Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, March 3, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Principals Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia to be held March 3, 1995. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

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See also 2013-0682-M

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~~001. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (3 pages)~~	~~03/17/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
~~002a. memo~~	~~Anthony Lake to POTUS re: U.S. Participation in Step Two Prepositioning for UNPROFOR Withdrawal from Bosnia (2 pages)~~	~~03/18/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
~~002b. note~~	~~Todd Stern to POTUS re: [Decision Memo] (1 page)~~	~~03/09/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002c. memo~~	~~Anthony Lake to POTUS re: U.S. Participation in Step Two of NATO Prepositioning for UNPROFOR Withdrawal (3 pages)~~	~~03/06/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002d. memo~~	~~[Duplicate of 002a] (2 pages)~~	~~03/18/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002e. memo~~	~~[Duplicate of 002a] (2 pages)~~	~~03/18/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
003a. email	Update for Today's PC on Bosnia (1 page)	03/17/1995	P1/b(1)
~~003b. cable~~	~~re: Bosnia-Izetbegovic Rejects Ceasefire Extension During Bonn Visit (2 pages)~~	~~03/17/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003c. cable~~	~~Key NATO Ambassadors Discuss OPLAN 40104, NATO Expansion Russia (3 pages)~~	~~03/17/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003d. memo~~	~~Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake re: March 17 Principals Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (6 pages)~~	~~03/16/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003e. agenda~~	~~Principles Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (1 page)~~	~~03/17/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003f. paper~~	~~re: Former Yugoslavia Policy Review: Update for Principals (4 pages)~~	~~03/16/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020

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RESTRICTION CODES

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P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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~~003g. paper~~	~~re: Steps to Prevent Renewed War in Bosnia (1 page)~~	~~03/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003h. paper~~	~~re: Croatia Strategy (2 pages)~~	~~03/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003i. paper~~	~~re: Issue Paper [Should the Executive Branch...] (3 pages)~~	~~03/17/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003j. paper~~	~~re: Issue Paper [Should the US...] (2 pages)~~	~~03/16/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
003k. chart	re: NATO Prepositioning Step 2 [NATO] (2 pages)	03/1995	P1/b(1)
003l. letter	Sven Alkalaj to President Clinton (1 page)	01/17/1994	P1/b(1)
~~003m. paper~~	~~re: Issue Paper: Training the Pro-Government Forces in Bosnia (2 pages)~~	~~03/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003n. paper~~	~~re: Support for the Federation 505 Agreement (3 pages)~~	~~03/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
003o. email	Alan Kreczko to Donald Kerrick re: Bosnia DC Briefer II (1 page)	02/21/1995	P1/b(1)
003p. email	Kreczko to Kerrick re: Bosnia (1 page)	03/09/1995	P1/b(1)

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P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520361
RECEIVED: 20 MAR 95 07

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 23 MAR 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
UN
SOC
CROATIA
NATO
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 17 MAR PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 23 MAR 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520327 9520345

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0124 CODES: BOS CRO

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		JOSHI
		KERRICK
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
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		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95032308	FOR DECISION
001		X	95032308	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
002		X	95032308	SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950323	FUERTH, L	
002	950323	BRILL, K	
002	950323	MCALEER, R	
002	950323	ADAMS, G	
002	950323	INDERFURTH, K	
002	950323	GARTHOFF, D	
002	950323	PATRICK, T	

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Reed	1/4	JWR	Sign Tab I please
Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg	2	~~COPY~~	
Berger	3 2	has seen	
Lake	3	~~Natl Sec Advisor~~ has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5		
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

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Reed	1/4	JR	Sean take please
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Berger	3 2	has seen	
Lake	3	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5		
NSC Secretariat			

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	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: 1		
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	3/23/95	11:25 AM	Anthony Tafft
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: 1		
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: VIA FAX		
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	3/23/95	2:55	J. Lyons
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: 1		
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: VIA FAX		
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: VIA FAX		

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COL. T. R. PATRICK
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ROOM 2E865
PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: 1
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AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
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TIME OF RECEIPT

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PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE / PRIORITY / ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 0621 CLASSIFICATION: SECRET TOTAL: 5 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC PC MTG ON BOSNIA CROATIA 17 MARCH NSC LOG # 20361

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B	USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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23 MAR 95 08 01
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
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RELEASER: [signature]

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 0621 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 5 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC PC MTG ON BOSNIA CROATIA 17 MARCH NSC LOG # 20361

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B	USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION
MAR 23 7:56

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 0621 CLASSIFICATION: SECRET TOTAL: 5 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC: WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC PC MTG ON BOSNIA CROATIA 17 MARCH NSC LOG # 20361

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B	USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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SITUATION ROOM
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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: Luke Scott

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 0621 CLASSIFICATION: SECRET TOTAL: 5 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC PC MTG ON BOSNIA CROATIA 17 MARCH NSC LOG # 20361

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B	USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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TIME OF RECEIPT

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PRECEDENCE
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- ☑ IMMEDIATE
- ☐ PRIORITY
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RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC LOG # 20361

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting SOC. PC ON BOSNIA & CROATIA PAGES: 4

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright. If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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20361

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

AMBASSADOR RICK INDEFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T.R. PATRICK
Executive Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DR. GORDON ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, March 17, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

James W. Rudd
for Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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By NARA, Date 6/14/12
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20361

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee
DATE: March 17, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 - 4:00pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Anthony Lake

OVP
Leon Fuerth

State
Secretary Christopher
Robert Frasure

DOD
Secretary Perry

OMB
Alice Rivlin

USUN
Madeleine Albright

CIA
Douglas MacEachin

JCS
General John Shalikashvili

White House
Samuel Berger

NSC
Alexander Vershbow

Summary of Conclusions

Former Yugoslavia Policy Review

1. Principals discussed overall U.S. strategy toward the former Yugoslavia and steps to prevent or contain renewed war in Bosnia this spring. They agreed that, in view of our limited leverage and the importance of maintaining the cohesion of NATO, we should maintain our current approach of diplomatic engagement, provision of humanitarian relief, keeping UNPROFOR in place, and measures to contain the conflict. Principals agreed that we should continue to support the Bosnian Government's goal of a political settlement consistent with the Contact Group proposal, but that we should seek to lower public expectations of immediate success; we should also avoid nurturing any illusions on the part of the

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Bosnian Government that we can deliver a settlement or that the U.S. or NATO will intervene militarily on their behalf. (S)

2. As a means to revive diplomatic efforts, Principals agreed that the U.S. Contact Group representative should explore the possibility of an agreement on constitutional arrangements for the future Bosnian union as a basis for securing Milosevic's recognition of Bosnia. **(Action: State)** They also agreed that additional options should be developed for using sanctions to increase the isolation of the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs. **(Action: OVP)** In the meantime, the Contact Group offer of sanctions relief in return for mutual recognition of Bosnia and Croatia should remain on the table, notwithstanding Milosevic's negative response to date. (S)

3. Principals agreed that we should seek to prevent or contain a reescalation of fighting in Bosnia as the end of the cessation of hostilities approaches. To this end, we should urge the Bosnians to exercise restraint by arguing that we see little prospect that they will improve their situation on the battlefield, that diplomatic efforts have not yet run their course, and that we remain committed to the goal of a political settlement that preserves Bosnia as a single state within its existing borders. We should, at the same time, give them incentives toward restraint by continuing to support the Bosniac-Croat Federation politically and economically. (S)

4. Principals discussed ways to restore UN and NATO credibility in order to deter new Bosnian Serb military attacks on the eastern enclaves and other areas. They agreed that the Interagency Working Group should look at the possibility of using NATO air power against Serb air defense sites around Bihac, both to enable the U.S. and NATO to conduct humanitarian air drops in that region and to discourage Serb efforts to strangle Srebrenica and other safe areas. The IWG should also consider options for enhancing the protection of other safe areas, such as the establishment of exclusion zones. These options should be developed with a view toward the possible launch of a U.S. initiative in the second week of April. **(Action: IWG)** (S)

Next Steps on Croatia

5. Principals discussed the follow-up to President Tudjman's March 12 agreement with the Vice President to work on the mandate for a new UN peacekeeping force in Croatia. They agreed that efforts should continue to complete negotiations by the end of the month on a UNSC mandate for the new force. They noted the continuing difficulties reported by Ambassador Albright with the Croatians on defining a realistic understanding of the mission of "controlling" the international borders. (S)

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Step Two of NATO Prepositioning

6. Principals discussed the scaled-back or "mini" prepositioning option that had been developed by the NATO Military Authorities in response to some Allies' reluctance to support a larger prepositioning force. The scaled-back option consists of 80 personnel, including up to 20 Americans, who would be deployed to Croatia to set up a communications system to support UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia or Croatia, should it become necessary. Principals decided to recommend to the President that he authorize U.S. representatives to support a decision at NATO to implement the scaled-back prepositioning option, including the deployment of up to 20 U.S. personnel to Croatia, following notification of Congress on Monday, March 20. They further agreed to provide Congress fuller briefings on March 22 by an interagency team. Principals agreed that, in informing Congress, we would characterize this as a limited, precautionary move that is being taken even though we oppose UNPROFOR withdrawal. **(Action: NSC/DOD)** (S)

7. Noting that the larger prepositioning option (1800 total personnel, 440 U.S., 310 of which would be in Croatia) is still an active option at NATO, Principals also agreed to recommend to the President that he authorize U.S. representatives to agree to form the larger prepositioning force and to conduct training in Germany. The actual deployment of these additional U.S. personnel to Croatia would be subject to another Principals and NAC decision. **(Action: NSC)** (S)

OPLAN 40104 Approval Process

8. Principals agreed to seek time on the President's schedule to brief him on NATO OPLAN 40104 that covers U.S. participation in UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia or Croatia. **(Action: NSC)** They discussed the difficulties we will face in obtaining Congressional authorization and funding for the operation, as reflected in the recent letter from Senators Dole, Helms et al. on the subject. They agreed that, in spite of the difficulties, the scope of the operation argues in favor of seeking Congressional authorization and funding prior to making a commitment of U.S. troops to the operation. (S)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 18 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

FROM: DON KERRICK (R)

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, March 17, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia held March 17, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve for Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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RECORD ID: 9520359
RECEIVED: 17 MAR 95 17

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 18 MAR 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
UN
PC
CROATIA
NATO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DECISION MEMO TO PRES FM 17 MAR PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA - US PARTICIPATION IN STEP II PREPOSITIONING FOR UNPROFOR WITHDRAWAL

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT DUE DATE: 21 MAR 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520327 9520345

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0124 CODES: BOS CRO

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
KERRICK
NSC CHRON
VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS CLOSED BY: NSASK DOC 2 OF 2

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MS NARA, Date 6/14/10
2010-0533-M

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~~SECRET~~ RECORD ID: 9520359

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95031719	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR DECISION
002	PRESIDENT	Z	95031814	FOR DECISION
002		X	95032013	NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950318		VICE PRESIDENT
002	950318		WH CHIEF OF STAFF

~~SECRET~~

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Rec'd 9:25 am 3/18

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 20359

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG OPS A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Dohse	1	D	
Sens			
Soderberg	copy	SNV	See notes
Berger	2		
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	OPS 3/18	D to podesta
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS:

17 MAR 95 7:20

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

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20359

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
3/20

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 18, 1995

95 MAR 18 PM2:33

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: U.S. Participation in Step Two Prepositioning for UNPROFOR Withdrawal from Bosnia.

Purpose

To obtain your agreement for U.S. forces to deploy to Croatia as part of NATO Step Two Prepositioning.

Background

Principals met Friday afternoon to discuss next steps in NATO prepositioning following this week's activities at NATO. Last week, you tentatively approved U.S. participation in a Step Two option that involved nearly 1800 personnel, including 450 Americans, 320 of which would deploy to Croatia. This was subject to completion of Congressional consultations and a subsequent decision by Principals before actual deployment of U.S. personnel to Croatia.

Facing criticism from some Allies, NATO military authorities this week developed a scaled-back prepositioning option involving only 80 personnel, including up to 20 Americans, who will deploy to Croatia to set up a communications system. NATO is seeking our agreement to identify and deploy the forces to support this step. Even with the smaller option, not all Allies support prepositioning, so our decision may not result in the immediate deployment of U.S. personnel to Croatia. But we should be prepared to deploy the 20 in any case.

The larger option you previously approved is still an active option and NATO is seeking our agreement to identify the forces (450 Americans) and to authorize training in Germany. A subsequent decision by the NAC will be required, however, before the larger force deploys to Croatia. Shali believes the decision is many weeks away.

After considering the impact of the Tudjman decision and the deteriorating situation in Bosnia, Principals agreed that we should agree to participate in this precautionary step. The Tudjman decision reduces the threat to the U.S. forces who will deploy to Croatia. But the ever-increasing likelihood that

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PER E.O. 13526
2/6/2020 (7.09)
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WJC HANDWRITING

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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large-scale fighting will resume in Bosnia this spring necessitates the continuation of prudent military steps to prepare for UNPROFOR withdrawal should it become unavoidable.

If you agree, we will inform Congress on Monday of our intention to participate in the small NATO prepositioning step and follow with fuller briefings on Wednesday. We will cast this as a limited, precautionary move that is being taken even though we oppose UNPROFOR withdrawal. We will inform NATO of our decision on Tuesday.

We do not expect this step will provoke much controversy on the Hill, since the deal with President Tudjman makes UNPROFOR withdrawal unlikely, at least in the short term. But a new letter to you from Senators Dole, Helms et al. (attached) makes clear that we will face tough sledding if and when a decision to withdraw is made. The letter insists on full NATO command, without any UN dual-key, and robust rules of engagement as preconditions for U.S. participation in any NATO extraction operation (which are fully consistent with our position). But more importantly, the letter demands that Allies commit to support multilateral lifting of the arms embargo post-withdrawal as the *quid pro quo* for U.S. participation.

We are seeking time on your schedule to fully brief you on the NATO plan (OPLAN 40104) that covers U.S. participation in UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia. Principals agree that, notwithstanding the difficulties we will face on the Hill, the scope of the operation argues in favor of seeking Congressional authorization and funding in advance of committing U.S. troops to the operation.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize U.S. representatives at NATO to support the scaled-back option, including the deployment of up to 20 U.S. personnel to Croatia, following notification of Congress.

Approve ✓ Disapprove_____

That you authorize U.S. representatives at NATO to agree to form the larger force (450 Americans) and conduct training in Germany, with the actual deployment of U.S. personnel to Croatia subject to a subsequent NAC and Principals decision.

Approve ✓ Disapprove_____

Attachment
Tab A President's Decision Memo
Tab B Letter from Senators Dole, Helms, Thurmond et al.

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SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
3/11/95

WASHINGTON
March 9, 1995

MR. PRESIDENT

Attached is a decision memo from Tony Lake on U.S. participation in NATO's "Step Two" prepositioning of communications systems for use in possible withdrawal of UNPROFOR troops from Croatia. Step Two would involve agreement to deploy some 450 U.S. military personnel in Europe, 320 of them in Croatia -- though actual deployment would be subject to a further decision of the NAC.

Pros: Our participation would send the right signal about U.S. leadership in NATO. Our allies' forces on the ground are in danger and we must not be seen obstructing NATO military planning needed to protect them. Cons: prepositioning could embolden Tudjman to keep refusing any UNPROFOR successor force, moving us toward commitment of a large-scale ground force to help extract UNPROFOR, and in turn leading to a wider war.

Our allies would prefer to keep UNPROFOR in place and are reluctant to proceed with Step Two deployment at this time, fearing this could hasten UNPROFOR's departure and open the way for air strikes and lifting the arms embargo. But deployment may become unavoidable.

While recognizing the real risks, NSC Principals recommend approval of U.S. participation in Step Two. Leon and George concur, though George is concerned that this might trigger a War Powers debate. We have forwarded a copy of the memo to the Vice President. If you approve, State and Defense will consult with Congress next week before informing NATO of our decision.

John Podesta
Todd Stern

Tony

I want to review with the V President his trip - visit of Tudjman

BC

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CIA Historical Collections Division
AR 70-14 10/1/2013
(2013-0682-m (7.50))

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 6, 1995

95 MAR 6 P9:26

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: U.S. Participation in Step Two of NATO Prepositioning for UNPROFOR Withdrawal

Purpose

To obtain your agreement for U.S. forces' participation in Step Two of NATO prepositioning for UNPROFOR withdrawal.

Background

Principals met Friday to discuss U.S. participation in Step Two of NATO's ongoing efforts to prepare to support a possible UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia or Croatia. We are seeking your approval to inform NATO that the United States agrees to support Step Two of NATO's efforts to preposition communications systems and operators in Croatia. Step Two includes deployment of approximately 450 U.S. military personnel within Europe, including 320 to government-controlled areas of Croatia, although the timing of the actual deployment of the prepositioning force will be subject to a subsequent NAC decision.

NATO and UNPROFOR military planning for UNPROFOR's possible withdrawal from Bosnia has been underway for several months. With UNPROFOR withdrawal a possibility this spring, NATO began to take action in February by executing Step One, which initiated the process of establishing an enhanced theater communications system. No U.S. forces were involved. With Step One well underway, NATO is seeking approval to execute Step Two, which will deploy military personnel to set up and operate the communications system.

Prepositioning is a necessary step to support a large operation. Nearly 1800 personnel are involved, including the 450 Americans. The total NATO cost for prepositioning is estimated at $11.3M and comes from existing NATO funds (the U.S. pays 25 percent), although we will pay our own transportation and sustainment costs. An orderly withdrawal of UNPROFOR cannot begin until

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Clinton Presidential Records
NARA Date 6/1/2015
(2013-0682-M(7.51))

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Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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eight weeks after the prepositioning occurs; thus Shali argues that delaying a decision will put Allied forces at risk.

This decision would carry significant risks, even though it would send the right signal about U.S. leadership in NATO, support our military leaders and maximize military preparedness. In the worst case, it could set in motion a series of events leading to UNPROFOR's withdrawal and renewed fighting, with NATO and U.S. forces left on the ground to deal with the aftermath. Tudjman might welcome the NATO deployment as a stepping stone to a larger NATO and U.S. ground role as UNPROFOR's replacement. Emboldened by NATO and U.S. forces in Croatia, Tudjman could become even more intransigent on accepting an UNPROFOR successor force. This could move us closer to an actual commitment of ground forces for a large-scale operation to extract UNPROFOR, the exact dimensions of which will remain unknown until the plan is completed in about two weeks. With NATO on the ground, or positioned to extract UNPROFOR, the decision to withdraw UNPROFOR will be easier for the UN and troop contributors to make. If they withdraw, renewed fighting is a certainty and the wider war we feared will have been facilitated by NATO's deployment into Croatia. While we anticipate a subsequent NAC decision will be taken to deploy the forces into Croatia, with each incremental step, it becomes more unlikely that our decision will be reversible. In fact, if NATO decides to conduct the operation, large-scale U.S. participation is inevitable.

Not all Allies support prepositioning, so our decision may prove academic for the time being. The French have been the most adamant, calling for a delay on the grounds that putting NATO personnel on the ground in Croatia would undermine efforts to change Tudjman's mind. Other Allies have voiced similar concerns and fear that NATO prepositioning will set in train the steps described above, leading to UNPROFOR's withdrawal and the wider war that diplomatic efforts aim to prevent. They also see UNPROFOR's departure as the opening to lifting the arms embargo and accompanying air strikes. Allies prefer to keep UNPROFOR in place and muddle through.

After balancing the risks against the military requirements, Principals decided that, because of the danger to our Allies who have forces on the ground and to sustain our leadership of the Alliance, we should make the commitment to support Step Two. This will permit the personnel to be organized and trained, with their actual deployment subject to a further decision by the NAC. Principals agreed that we will not press those Allies who are reluctant to execute Step Two but that it is important that the U.S. not be seen as obstructing NATO military planning needed to reduce the risks to Allied forces.

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Principals also concluded that, in view of the Congressional interest that the deployment of 320 U.S. military personnel to Croatia will generate, consultations must be completed before informing NATO of our decision. We would seek to cast this as a limited, precautionary move that is being taken without prejudice to a possible future decision to help in a NATO-led withdrawal of UNPROFOR. We would make clear that we intend to consult closely with the Congress on the latter (more formidable) undertaking and seek prior Congressional approval of the necessary funding. If you agree, State and Defense will brief leadership and key committee chairs early next week.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize U.S. representatives at NATO to support Step Two prepositioning, subject to consultations with Congress, and with the actual deployment of U.S. personnel to Croatia subject to a subsequent NAC and Principals' decision.

Approve 

Disapprove _____

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2119

BOB DOLE
KANSAS

United States Senate

OFFICE OF THE MAJORITY LEADER
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-7010

March 15, 1995

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing in regard to commitments made by your administration to assist in the withdrawal of U.N. troops from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is our understanding that the recent compromise with the Croatian government may require only a partial withdrawal of U.N. forces from Croatia -- that is if the militant Serbs agree -- and that U.S. involvement is likely to be very limited in such an operation. However, we are aware that you have already committed to providing U.S. military assistance, to include U.S. combat troops, to participate in the withdrawal of U.N. troops from Bosnia and Herzegovina should such a decision be made by either nations participating in UNPROFOR or the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

While we have consistently opposed your policy toward the former Yugoslavia, and have been critical of the inability and unwillingness of the U.N. forces to fulfill their mandate there, we recognize that U.S. participation to assist the withdrawal of U.N. forces may be necessary. However, we believe that such assistance should not be offered without strict conditions.

The first condition is that the entire withdrawal operation be under unified NATO command -- from start to finish. The "dual-key" arrangement under which NATO currently operates and is subordinate to the United Nations has been a military and political fiasco. Should such an arrangement be extended to any component of the withdrawal operation -- even under peaceful circumstances -- we would <u>strongly</u> oppose U.S. participation.

It is critical that the United States establish concretely and in advance that NATO command is a prerequisite to U.S. participation. As such, we would strongly recommend that this decision be explicitly stated in a U.N. Security Council resolution on the matter. A letter from the U.N. Secretary General in our view would be wholly insufficient; a binding commitment from the countries in the Security Council who are the largest troop contributors to UNPROFOR should be a minimum requirement.

Second, the rules of engagement must be robust. There must be no question that self-defense includes the right of retaliation -- at the discretion of the NATO commander. Those forces that may consider interfering with the withdrawal of U.N.

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forces must know in no uncertain terms that if any U.N. or NATO troops are provoked or attacked that they will face massive and disproportionate retaliation, to include all their military assets, not just their immediately-engaged forces.

Third, there must be a common sense rule applied to the withdrawal of heavy equipment belonging to the U.N. protection forces. We understand that those of our allies participating in UNPROFOR would like to remove all of their equipment when they depart. If the environment is calm and peaceful, we would not object to using American forces to facilitate the withdrawal of equipment. Should we be faced with a hostile environment, however, we believe that American lives should not be endangered to rescue equipment.

Finally, U.S. assistance should be premised on an understanding with our allies that UNPROFOR's withdrawal clears the way for lifting the U.N. arms embargo on the Bosnian Government. To date, allied objections to lifting the arms embargo have centered on concerns about the safety of allied troops deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. If the United States assists in the withdrawal of U.N. forces, the allies must know that we will not tolerate equivocation on the matter of terminating the arms embargo. For three years the Bosnians have been denied their fundamental and inherent right to self-defense and watched as U.N. forces provided cover to the aggressor Serb forces. In sum, U.S. assistance in the withdrawal of UNPROFOR should be explicitly conditioned on the support of those nations for terminating the arms embargo.

Mr. President, we believe that these military and political conditions -- NATO command, robust rules of engagement, limitations on withdrawal of equipment, and allied agreement on next steps -- are not only essential to securing support from the U.S. Congress, but essential to the success of such a potentially dangerous operation. We look forward to hearing from you soon.

Sincerely,

Strom Thurmond Bob Dole

Jesse Helms

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20359

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 17, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

FROM: BG DON KERRICK (K)

SUBJECT: Memorandum to the President on U.S. Support for Step Two of NATO Prepositioning.

Attached at Tab A is a memorandum to the President seeking his approval to support Step Two Prepositioning at NATO.

Concurrences by: FOR (K) Alan Kreczko, (K) Bill Danvers

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab A.

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum to the President
Tab A President's Decision Memo

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NLS NARA, Date 6/14/05
2018-0533-M

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: U.S. Participation in Step Two Prepositioning for UNPROFOR Withdrawal from Bosnia.

Purpose

To obtain your agreement for U.S. forces to deploy to Croatia as part of NATO Step Two Prepositioning.

Background

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Facing criticism from some Allies, NATO military authorities this week developed a scaled-back prepositioning option involving only 80 personnel, including up to 20 Americans, who will deploy to Croatia to set up a communications system. NATO is seeking our agreement to identify and deploy the forces to support this step. Even with the smaller option, not all Allies support prepositioning, so our decision may not result in the immediate deployment of U.S. personnel to Croatia. But we should be prepared to deploy the 20 in any case.

The larger option you previously approved is still an active option and NATO is seeking our agreement to identify the forces (450 Americans) and to authorize training in Germany. A subsequent decision by the NAC will be required, however, before the larger force deploys to Croatia. Shali believes the decision is many weeks away.

After considering the impact of the Tudjman decision and the deteriorating situation in Bosnia, Principals agreed that we should agree to participate in this precautionary step. The Tudjman decision reduces the threat to the U.S. forces who will deploy to Croatia. But the ever-increasing likelihood that large-scale fighting will resume in Bosnia this spring

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NR 70-14 10/1/2013
(2013-0682-m (7.52))
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necessitates the continuation of prudent military steps to prepare for UNPROFOR withdrawal should it become unavoidable.

If you agree, we will inform Congress on Monday of our intention to participate in the small NATO prepositioning step and follow with fuller briefings on Wednesday. We will cast this as a limited, precautionary move that is being taken even though we oppose UNPROFOR withdrawal. We will inform NATO of our decision on Tuesday.

We don't expect this step will provoke much controversy on the Hill, since the deal with President Tudjman makes UNPROFOR withdrawal unlikely, at least in the short term. But a new letter to you from Senators Dole, Helms et al. (attached) makes clear that we will face tough sledding if and when a decision to withdraw is made. The letter insists on full NATO command, without any UN dual-key, and robust rules of engagement as preconditions for U.S. participation in any NATO extraction operation (which are fully consistent with our position). But more importantly, the letter demands that Allies commit to support multilateral lifting of the arms embargo post-withdrawal as the *quid pro quo* for U.S. participation.

We ~~will be~~ seeking time on your schedule to fully brief you on the NATO plan (OPLAN 40104) that covers U.S. participation in UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia. Principals agree that, notwithstanding the difficulties we will face on the Hill, the scope of the operation argues in favor of seeking Congressional authorization and funding in advance of committing U.S. troops to the operation.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize U.S. representatives at NATO to support the scaled-back option, including the deployment of up to 20 U.S. personnel to Croatia, following notification of Congress.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

That you authorize U.S. representatives at NATO to agree to form the larger force (450 Americans) and conduct training in Germany, with the actual deployment of U.S. personnel to Croatia subject to a subsequent NAC and Principals decision.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

Attachment
Tab A President's Decision Memo
Tab B Letter from Senators Dole, Helms, Thurmond et al.

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~~SECRET~~ 20359

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: U.S. Participation in Step Two Prepositioning for UNPROFOR Withdrawal from Bosnia

Purpose

To obtain your agreement for U.S. forces to deploy to Croatia as part of NATO Step Two Prepositioning.

Background

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Facing criticism from some Allies, NATO military authorities this week developed a scaled-back prepositioning option involving only 80 personnel, including up to 20 Americans, who will deploy to Croatia to set up a communications system. NATO is seeking our agreement to identify and deploy the forces to support this step. Even with the smaller option, not all Allies support prepositioning, so our decision may not result in the immediate deployment of U.S. personnel to Croatia, but we should be prepared to deploy the 20 in any case.

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CIA Historical Collections Division
AR 70-14 10/1/2013

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Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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After considering the impact of the Tudjman decision and the deteriorating situation in Bosnia, Principals agreed that we should agree to participate in this precautionary step. The Tudjman decision reduces the threat to the U.S. forces who will deploy to Croatia. However, ever-increasing likelihood that large-scale fighting will resume in Bosnia this spring necessitates the continuation of prudent military steps to prepare for UNPROFOR withdrawal should it become unavoidable.

If you agree, we will inform Congress on Monday of our intention to participate in the small NATO prepositioning step and follow with fuller briefings on Wednesday. We will cast this as a limited, precautionary move that is being taken even though we oppose UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia. We will inform NATO of our decision on Tuesday.

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RECOMMENDATION

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Approve _____

Disapprove _____

That you authorize U.S. representatives at NATO to agree to form the larger force (450 Americans) and conduct training in Germany, with the actual deployment of U.S. personnel to Croatia subject to a subsequent NAC and Principals decision.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab A President's Decision Memo
Tab B letter

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520347
RECEIVED: 16 MAR 95 14

TO: LAKE

FROM: KERRICK
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 16 MAR 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
NATO
PC
CROATIA
UN

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPERS FOR 17 MAR PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 20 MAR 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520327 9520345

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0124 CODES: BOS CRO

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		DANVERS
		JOSHI
		KERRICK
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		SIMON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMBN CLOSED BY: NSDRS DOC 1 OF 1

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By DNS NARA, Date 6/14/12

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2018-0533-M

~~SECRET~~ RECORD ID: 9520347

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95031619	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	95031719	NOTED BY LAKE

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National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: MBN LOG # 20347

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG MBN A/O _____

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Sens			
Soderberg	2	copy	
Berger	3	cc	
Lake	4	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5		N
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS: Lake Mtg package for Bosnia/Croatia PR

16 MAR 95 08:33

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. email	Update for Today's PC on Bosnia (1 page)	03/17/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0124 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, March 17, 1995 [1]

2010-0533-M
rs636

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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Hall, Wilma G.

From: Vershbow, Alexander R.
To: @NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor
Cc: /R, Record at A1
Subject: Izetbegovic in Bonn ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~
Date: Friday, March 17, 1995 12:58PM

For Tony and Sandy:
In talks in Bonn, Izzy confirmed his unwillingness to extend ceasefire if Serbs haven't accepted Contact Group plan, but he did tell Kohl the Bosnians would not launch new offensives. The latter point, unfortunately, doesn't square with our intel assessments.

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~SECRET~~ DTG:171736Z MAR 95

FM: AMEMBASSY BONN
TO:RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7536

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 05559

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, BK, GM
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - IZETBEGOVIC REJECTS CEASEFIRE EXTENSION DURING BONN VISIT

1. ~~(S)~~ SUMMARY: PRESIDENT IZETBEGOVIC WARNED THAT BOSNIA WOULD NOT APPROVE EXTENSION OF THE CEASEFIRE UNLESS THE SERBS AGREED TO THE CONTACT GROUP PLAN. ON HIS MARCH 16-17 VISIT TO BONN, IZETBEGOVIC TOLD CHANCELLOR KOHL AND FM KINKEL THAT PRESSURE MUST BE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON MILOSEVIC TO ISOLATE KARADZIC AND AGREE TO MUTUAL RECOGNITION, BUT HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT MILOSEVIC WAS NOT YET READY TO TAKE SUCH STEPS. IZETBEGOVIC EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT NEW ARMS DELIVERIES TO THE BOSNIAN SERBS, WHICH GERMAN INTELLIGENCE CAN REPORTEDLY CORROBORATE. HE SAID PUBLICLY THAT HE WOULD WELCOME SCHWARZ-SCHILLING AS "CO-ARBITRATOR" FOR THE FEDERATION, FOLLOWING DISCUSSIONS WITH THE CHANCELLOR. END SUMMARY.

2. (U) DURING A MARCH 16-17 VISIT TO BONN, BOSNIAN PRESIDENT IZETBEGOVIC WARNED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT APPROVE EXTENSION OF THE CEASEFIRE UNLESS THE SERBS AGREED TO THE CONTACT GROUP PEACE PLAN. "IF WE HAVE TO, WE ARE READY TO FIGHT," HE SAID, WHILE STRESSING BOSNIA'S CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. HE CALLED UPON THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO INCREASE ITS PRESSURE ON MILOSEVIC AND NOT ENTER INTO "LONG-DRAWN NEGOTIATIONS" UNTIL MILOSEVIC ACCEPTS THE PEACE PLAN. ANY WAVERING WOULD ONLY ENCOURAGE THE SERBS TO DREAM "GREAT POWER DREAMS."

3. ~~(C)~~ IZETBEGOVIC TOLD FM KINKEL PRIVATELY THAT PRESSURE MUST BE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON MILOSEVIC TO ISOLATE THE BOSNIAN SERBS AND AGREE TO MUTUAL RECOGNITION, ACCORDING TO BOSNIA CONTACT GROUP REP STEINER. IZETBEGOVIC ACKNOWLEDGED, HOWEVER, THAT MILOSEVIC WAS NOT READY TO TAKE SUCH STEPS. IZETBEGOVIC SAID THAT CONTINUATION OF THE CEASEFIRE ONLY PLAYED INTO THE HANDS OF KARADZIC AND CREATED A "CYPRUS" SOLUTION FOR BOSNIA THAT WAS UNACCEPTABLE.

4. ~~(S)~~ IZETBEGOVIC TOLD KINKEL THAT THE BOSNIAN SERBS CONTINUE TO RECEIVE ARMS AND SUPPLIES, AND THE BORDER MUST BE TRULY SEALED. STEINER SAID HE HAD JUST RECEIVED A TWO-PAGE

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REPORT FROM THE GERMAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (BND) PROVIDING SPECIFIC INFORMATION, INCLUDING QUANTITIES AND DATES, OF WEAPONS DELIVERIES TO THE BOSNIAN SERBS. HE SAID ONE ENTRY INDICATED THE DELIVERY OF FIFTY TANKS. STEINER SAID HE WOULD PROVIDE THE BND REPORT TO THE EMBASSY, BUT WANTED FIRST TO VERIFY ITS SOURCING.

5. ~~(C)~~ IN HIS MEETING WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL MARCH 17, IZETBEGOVIC SAID THAT BOSNIA WOULD NOT TAKE OFFENSIVE MILITARY ACTION AGAINST THE SERBS. STEINER SAID KOHL PRESSED IZETBEGOVIC ON THIS ISSUE AND, AFTER THE MEETING, CHARACTERIZED IZETBEGOVIC'S COMMENTS AS "HELPFUL." IZETBEGOVIC EXPRESSED STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE FEDERATION.

6. ~~(C)~~ THE CHANCELLOR RAISED WITH IZETBEGOVIC THE POSSIBLE APPOINTMENT OF CDU BUNDESTAG MEMBER SCHWARZ-SCHILLING AS A "CO-ARBITRATOR" FOR THE FEDERATION WITH ROBERTS OWEN. STEINER SAID IZETBEGOVIC ONCE AGAIN ENDORSED SCHWARZ-SCHILLING AND AGREED TO RAISE THE ISSUE WITH WASHINGTON. AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE FOLLOWING THE MEETING, IZEBEGOVIC STATED THAT BOSNIA WOULD WELCOME SCHWARZ-SCHILLING AS A "CO-ARBITRATOR."

7. ~~(C)~~ IZETBEGOVIC MET FOR NEARLY TWO HOURS WITH SPD OPPOSITION LEADER RUDOLF SCHARPING AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE BUNDESTAG. HE SPECIFICALLY APPEALED TO GERMANY AS A "GREAT MORAL POWER IN THE WORLD" TO USE ITS INFLUENCE, WARNING GERMANY NOT TO MAKE ANY CONCESSIONS UNTIL MILOSEVIC RECOGNIZED B-H AND CROATIA. STEINER SAID SCHARPING AND OTHERS WERE "ASTONISHED" THAT IZETBEGOVIC DID NOT RAISE THE ISSUE OF THE ARMS EMBARGO DURING THE MEETING.

8. ~~(C)~~ COMMENT: THE SCHWARZ-SCHILLING ISSUE REMAINS OF CONTINUING CONCERN TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND CHANCELLERY (SEPTEL). BONN IS ALSO WORRIED THAT CONFLICTING APPROACHES AMONG CONTACT GROUP MEMBERS HAVE SENT CONFUSING SIGNALS TO MILOSEVIC AND OTHERS IN THE REGION. FOLLOWING IZETBEGOVIC'S VISIT, KINKEL BELIEVES IT IS TIME TO REASSESS NEXT STEPS ON THE BOSNIA PEACE PROCESS.
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FROM:
SITREPRT

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Hall, Wilma G.

From: Vershbow, Alexander R.
To: @NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor
Cc: /R, Record at A1; Kerrick, Donald L.; Saunders, Richard M.
Subject: USNATO cable ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~
Date: Friday, March 17, 1995 9:50AM

Pass to Sandy Berger and Tony Lake -- relates to PC agenda

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG:171349Z MAR 95

FM: USMISSION USNATO

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ USNATO 001088

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL : OADR
TAGS: NATO, MARR, XH, RS, FR, GM, UK, BK, HR, SR
SUBJECT: KEY NATO AMBASSADORS DISCUSS OPLAN 40104, NATO EXPANSION, RUSSIA

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. AT A MARCH 16 MEETING OF THE U.S., GERMAN, AND FRENCH PERMREPS AND THE BRITISH CHARGE, FRANCE COMPLAINED THAT THE MILITARY COMMITTEE IS FAILING TO DO ITS JOB ON OPLAN 40104, THAT THE NAC MUST REVIEW THE OPLAN TO ENSURE THAT IT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE POLITICAL MANDATE, AND THAT SOME POL-MIL ISSUES (E.G., RULES OF ENGAGEMENT) MUST BE CONSIDERED BY THE NAC. THE FOUR CONSIDERED THE POSSIBILITY OF A PARALLEL "PLAN B" OF SMALLER SIZE AND SHORTER TIME-LINE. THIS PARALLEL PLANNING -- SUPPRTED BY SYG CLAES AS AN ANSWER TO NATO'S PREPOSITIONING DILEMMA -- WOULD NEED TO BE MANDATED BY THE NAC AND INCLUDE CONSULTATIONS WITH TROOP CONTRIBUTING NATIONS. FRANCE WILL NOT JOIN THE U.S.-UK-GERMANY-ITALY JOINT DEMARCHE TO GREECE AND TURKEY. FRANCE AND GERMANY WANT TO TELL RUSSIA NOW THAT IT CAN NEVER JOIN NATO; THE UK AND US OPPOSED MAKING ANY SUCH STATEMENT. ALL AGREED THAT THE PROCEDURAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NATO EXPANSION AND DEVELOPING THE NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP NEEDS TO BE WORKED OUT SOON; GERMANY AND FRANCE ARGUED THAT DECIDING ON THE NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP FIRST WOULD GIVE MOSCOW LEVERAGE ON EXPANSION. GERMANY ARGUED FOR BEGINNING DISCUSSIONS SOON ON WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT EXPANSION FROM DECEMBER ONWARD. GERMANY, FRANCE, AND BRITAIN FAVORED BRIEFING PARTNER STATES ON THE EXPANSION STUDY IN BRUSSELS, WITH POSSIBLE LATER BRIEFINGS IN CAPITALS. THE U.S. FAVORED BRIEFINGS IN CAPITALS. IT WAS AGREED THAT DCM'S WOULD REVIEW A U.S.-PROPOSED REORDERING OF THE EXPANSION STUDY. IT WAS AGREED THAT SYG CLAES DOES NOT NEED A PRE-DEBRIEF IN GENEVA ON THE CHRISTOPHER-KOZYREV MEETING, PROVIDED THERE IS A FULL COLLINS-KORNBLUM BRIEFING OF THE NAC. END SUMMARY.

3. AMBASSADOR VON RICHTHOFEN (GERMANY), AMBASADOR BLOT (FRANCE), AMBASSADOR HUNTER, AND BRITISH CHARGE SMITH MET MORNING OF MARCH 16.

4. REFERRING TO DISCUSSION AT THE MARCH 15 NAC, GERMANY OPPOSED ANY INTENSIVE REVIEW OR REWRITING OF OPLAN 40104 BY THE NAC. THE U.S. AND UK AGREED. (NOTE. THIS VIEW HAS

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GAINED BROAD CURRENCY AMONG PERMREPS, AND SYG CLAES HAS MADE THIS POINT STRONGLY TO AMBASSADOR HUNTER. END NOTE). FRANCE ARGUED THAT THE MILITARY COMMITTEE HAS FAILED TO DO ITS JOB AND MERELY SENDS LISTS OF NATIONAL QUESTIONS BACK TO SHAPE; THAT THE NAC MUST MEASURE THE OPLAN AGAINST ITS MANDATE TO SEE WHETHER IT IS COMPLETE AND CONSISTENT WITH POLITICAL DIRECTIVES (GERMANY SUPPORTED THIS VIEW); AND THAT SOME POL-MIL ISSUES, SUCH AS RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND CHAIN OF COMMAND, CANNOT BE LEFT TO THE MILITARY. THE SPC/R SHOULD PREPARE THESE ISSUES FOR NAC DISCUSSION. OPERATIONAL MATTERS SHOULD BE THE EXCLUSIVE PURVIEW OF THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES.

5. THE THREE PERMREPS AND THE UK CHARGE AGREED THAT A MAJOR POLITICAL PROBLEM HAS EMERGED WITH THE OPLAN. THE SIZE AND LENGTHY TIME-LINE OF OPLAN 40104 FOR BOSNIA MEAN THAT EACH WEEK'S DELAY IN TAKING PRACTICAL STEPS IN PREPOSITIONING MEAN A WEEK'S DELAY IN BEGINNING A WITHDRAWAL OPERATION, NOW BEYOND THE NOTIONAL END OF THE BOSNIAN CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. THESE FOUR COUNTRIES THUS NOW FIND THEMSELVES SEPARATED FROM SEVERAL OF THE SMALLER TROOP CONTRIBUTING NATIONS (BELGIUM IS NOW SLIGHTLY LESS CONCERNED, FOLLOWING THE TUDJMAN ANNOUNCEMENT ON UN FORCES IN CROATIA). IT WAS SUGGESTED THAT NATO SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER A "PLAN B" THAT WOULD FOCUS MORE ON AN "EMERGENCY" SITUATION, WITH A SMALLER SIZE AND SHORTER TIME-LINE. FRANCE ARGUED THAT THE EXISTING OPLAN SHOULD HAVE SUCH FLEXIBILITY BUILT INTO IT. THE UK CAUTIONED ABOUT THE POLITICAL RISKS IF IT WERE KNOWN NATO WAS PREPARED TO BACK AWAY FROM THE EXISTING PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS. THE FOUR AGREED TO MEET AGAINST MARCH 20 ON THIS ISSUE. (COMMENT. LATER ON MARCH 16, VON RICHTHOFEN TOLD AMBASSADOR HUNTER HE HAD BEEN CALLED BY GERMAN CHOD NAUMANN, WHO SUPPORTS DEVELOPMENT OF A "PLAN B" ALONG THE ABOVE LINES. ON MARCH 15, SYG CLAES ALSO STRONGLY SUPPORTED THIS APPROACH IN CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR HUNTER. IN MISSION'S JUDGMENT, ANY SUCH PARALLEL PLANNING WOULD NEED TO BE MANDATED BY THE NAC AND INCLUDE PRIOR CONSULTATIONS WITH NATO TCN'S. END COMMENT).

6. FRANCE CONFIRMED THAT IT WOULD NOT JOIN THE DEMARCHE (U.S.-UK-GERMANY-ITALY) TO GREECE AND TURKEY. IT WAS NOTED THAT GREECE HAS NOW OPPOSED SYG'S PROPOSED LETTER TO WEU ON CJTFS, WHICH WOULD HAVE DEALT WITH TURKEY'S DESIRE FOR ASSURANCES OF BEING ABLE TO TAKE PART IN WEU OPERATIONS INVOLVING CJTF'S.

7. GERMANY, FRANCE, AND THE UK FAVORED MAKING PRESENTATIONS OF THE NATO ENLARGEMENT STUDY TO PARTNERS IN A GROUP IN BRUSSELS, IN ORDER TO ENSURE EQUAL BRIEFINGS, WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF FOLLOW-UP MISSIONS TO INTERESTED CAPITALS. THE U.S. STRONGLY SUPPORTED HAVING JUST MISSIONS TO CAPITALS.

8. GERMANY SAID NATO NEEDS TO DECIDE WHAT TO DO ABOUT ENLARGEMENT FROM DECEMBER ONWARD, INCLUDING THE RELATIONSHIP TO THE RUSSIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. THE U.S. SAID THAT, IN ANY EVENT, THE NATO PROCESS MUST BE KEPT SEPARATE FROM DEVELOPMENTS IN RUSSIA. THE UK SUGGESTED A DILEMMA: A DESIRE TO BYPASS 1996 ALTOGETHER, WHILE RECOGNIZING THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO DO THIS. GERMANY AND FRANCE AGREED THAT IT WAS NOT CLEAR HOW THAT COULD BE DONE.

9. FRANCE AND GERMANY BOTH ARGUED FOR TELLING RUSSIA NOW

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THAT IT CAN NEVER JOIN NATO. THE UK SAID MOST BRITISH OFFICIALS THINK THAT RUSSIAN MEMBERSHIP CANNOT HAPPEN, BUT ARE CONSCIOUS OF THE DISADVANTAGES OF SAYING SO. THE U.S. AGREED. FRANCE ARGUED STRONGLY THAT THERE NEEDED TO BE TWO PILLARS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY -- NATO AND RUSSIA, INCLUDING ANY CIS STATES THAT WANTED TO JOIN WITH RUSSIA; AND THAT IF THIS WERE NOT RECOGNIZED, RUSSIA (WHICH WANTS TO DESTROY NATO) WOULD WANT TO JOIN NATO, WHICH WOULD REQUIRE CHANGING THE ALLIANCE, WHICH IS UNACCEPTABLE. GERMANY SAID THAT THE KEY WEST MEETING HAD AGREED NOT TO ADVERTISE AN ALLIED VIEW IN PUBLIC, AND THAT GERMANY FAVORED NATO'S NOT PUTTING INTO ANY COMMUNICATIONS THE IDEA THAT RUSSIA IS NOT EXCLUDED. THE U.S. SUGGESTED THAT EVEN SILENCE WOULD BE BETTER THAN EXCLUDING RUSSIA NOW -- WHY STIFF THE RUSSIAN REFORM LEADERSHIP?

10. GERMANY SAID THAT THE NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP SHOULD NOT BE FORMALIZED BEFORE EXPANSION DECISIONS, OTHERWISE MOSCOW COULD RAISE THE STAKES ON EXPANSION. FRANCE AGREED, BECAUSE "THE RUSSIANS ARE RUSSIANS" AND WOULD POCKET ANY CONCESSIONS AND ASK FOR MORE.

11. THE THREE PERMREPS AND THE UK CHARGE AGREED THAT NATO NEEDS TO WORK OUT SOON THE PROCEDURAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEVELOPMENT OF NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS AND EXPANSION. ALL CITED INCIDENTS TO INDICATE THAT RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR TO BELGIUM CHURKIN IS NOT "IN THE LOOP" IN MOSCOW. THE UK CHARGE CITED AS EVIDENCE OF EMERGING PARALLELISM THE REMARKS BY CHERNOMYRDIN IN BUDAPEST THAT BILATERAL RUSSIAN-HUNGARIAN RELATIONS WOULD NOT BE AFFECTED IF HUNGARY JOINED NATO.

12. GERMANY SUGGESTED THAT THE I.S. NOW SHORTEN THE EXPANSION STUDY, PERHAPS WITH GUIDANCE FROM KEY AMBASSADORS, WITH DETAILS PUT IN ANNEXES. THE U.S. SUGGESTED A RESTRUCTURING BASED ON U.S. PROPOSALS, TO ELIMINATE REPETITION, FILL IN GAPS, AND EASE DRAFTING. THE OTHERS WERE RELUCTANT TO TAMPER WITH THE EXISTING UK-PROPOSED STRUCTURE, BUT AGREED THAT DCM'S COULD REVIEW THE U.S. PROPOSAL

13. GERMANY AND THE UK THOUGHT THERE WAS NO NEED FOR SYG CLAES TO GET A DEBRIEF IN GENEVA ON NEXT WEEK'S CHRISTOPHER-KOZYREV TALKS, PROVIDED THAT THERE IS A FULL NAC READ-OUT ON MARCH 24 BY COLLINS-KORNBLUM.

HUNTER

FROM:
SITREPRT

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Border Crossing Points Between
Croatia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina



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20347

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 16, 1995

Natl Sec Advisor has seen
NOTED

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

FROM: DON KERRICK (DK)

SUBJECT: March 17 Principals Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia

Agenda at Tab A. **Decisions needed on Prepositioning, OPLAN 40104 approval process, and manner in which to respond to Dole request to train Bosnians.** One hour for Bosnia is insufficient to have in-depth discussion on policy review and other items on agenda.

I. FORMER YUGOSLAVIA POLICY REVIEW

Steps to Prevent Renewed War in Bosnia Sandy Vershbow's paper at Tab B. State was asked to provide a paper on steps to prevent renewed war in Bosnia (Tab C).

Interagency views: Deputies have not reached firm conclusions on Policy Review. **State** favors option one (continue to advocate better deal for Bosnians, but lower expectations of early progress and concentrate on shoring up Federation and containment). **Leon** takes similar view, but emphasizes squeezing Pale and Knin through better sanctions enforcement. **DoD** favors option two (shift towards neutrality and disengage from Bosnian objectives, with containment as only real option). **No one has advocated return to military pressure (air strikes or lift and strike), although events could push us in that direction.**

Analysis of views: State and DoD approaches point to roughly same policy options and ignore fact Bosnians would rather fight than accept status quo. CIA believes prospects for preventing renewed war are bleak. For discussion:

- Is there any hope we can prevent renewed fighting in Bosnia?
- How can we leverage our Croatia success in Bosnia?
- How much are we willing to pressure the Bosnians to agree to extend the ceasefire?

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- What are the positive incentives we can offer the Bosnians in return for their restraint?

- What negative incentives can we invoke to force the Bosnians to extend the ceasefire?

II. NEAR-TERM DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY

Next Steps with Tudjman: State was asked to provide a paper (Tab D). With limited time, key item is to follow-up the Croatia deal. Already signs of trouble in NY in translating the Copenhagen announcement into a UNSC resolution. Russians want the new force to enforce the arms embargo and police the interior of the UNPAs. **Ask Chris and Madeleine to lead the discussion on next steps.**

The key element in Tudjman's agreement is that it **buys us valuable time** (perhaps as many as six months, since Tudjman won't want to eject UNPROFOR in the middle of the tourist season); **but it also puts the onus on us and our partners to get the new mandate agreed, the new force established, and political negotiations started between Zagreb and Knin.** For discussion:

- Now that we have a deal with Tudjman on a new UN force in line with what we sought, what are the prospects for implementation?

- Is the 90-day extension for today's UNPROFOR firm no matter what the outcome of efforts at the UN on a new resolution?

- How do we bring Knin along?

- What are our next steps? How do we get political negotiations going between Zagreb and Knin? What is the basis -- the Z-4 plan or its principles?

- Should we press for "closing the back door" in conjunction with our strategy to get UNPROFOR renewal and to squeeze Pale? (OVP NOTE: to close the back door, we need to pursue some or all of the following steps: convince Tudjman to cooperate in controlling the flow of goods into the UNPAs and across the Croatian border into Bosnia; support deployment of additional SAMs to Croatia to help monitor the Belgrade-Zagreb highway and cross-border trade; and give UNFIC at least an "observe and report" mission on the Croatia-Bosnia border).

- Are there decisions we will need from the Principals or the President?

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Next Steps with Contact Group and Milosevic: Principals should address where we go with the Contact Group sanctions relief-for-recognition proposal. **Ask State for a status report.** Milosevic continues to defend his insistence on immediate, unconditional lifting of sanctions on grounds that this would bring peace by vitiating the Muslim's will to fight. He told the UK and France that he would recognize Bosnia as a single union within its existing borders made up of the Federation and the Serb Republic, but not recognize the Sarajevo government. He claims this would encourage both sides to negotiate. **We view the Milosevic counteroffer as inadequate, but the French and British are unable to let go. Chris is thinking of sending Bob Frasure to Belgrade next week to ensure Milosevic understands our position and to see if there is any more give. We have no word yet from Bill Richardson.** For discussion:

- Where are we in efforts to get Milosevic to agree?
- What is our response to Milosevic's counter-proposal to lift sanctions against the FRY as a prelude to a Paris conference to draft a series of agreements between the parties?
- Where do the Europeans come out on Milosevic's proposal?
- Are we prepared to offer partial sanctions relief if Milosevic recognizes Bosnia but not Croatia?
- Is it time to increase the pressure on Milosevic by threatening to withdraw our support for Plan B? Should we go further (e.g. terminate the present sanctions relief and increase enforcement of existing sanctions)?

III. OPLAN 40104 APPROVAL PROCESS

Step Two Prepositioning: Prepositioning still unresolved at NATO. SACEUR is pressing to proceed just in case withdrawal from Bosnia becomes necessary. Military authorities have developed a scaled-back ("mini") option for 80 C3 personnel (12 American). JCS paper on "mini" option at Tab E. The larger option (1700, including 450 Americans (320 in Croatia) is still an active option. JCS paper on "maxi" option at Tab F.

The NAC authorized SHAPE to issue an ACTWARN requesting forces for prepositioning. The ACTWARN may request support for both the "mini" and "maxi" packages. Decision to deploy may also be requested. **Ask the CJCS to brief the Step Two decision timeline.** If we must respond by next week's NAC, calls to the Hill will need to be completed in time for another Principals' review on Tuesday, March 21. Walt Slocombe may be briefing the SASC on

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March 21 and could use that session to brief on prepositioning. If the Principals agree, we will notify NATO of our support for Step Two that same day. Principals should review the DoD-drafted talking points (Tab G) and authorize the calls and consultations with the Hill. For discussion:

- Where does the decision-making process stand in NATO on Step Two?
- Should we proceed with our decision to consult with Congress and notify NATO of our support for Step Two prepositioning? (We recommend calls and briefing by Slocombe, et al.)
- Are there changes to the talking points that were drafted by OSD?
- Who will be making the calls and when should they begin? (We suggest Principals or Deputies begin making the calls on Monday if the Principals are to gauge Congressional reaction on Tuesday.)

OPLAN 40104 Approval Process: OSD and JCS were asked to develop a decision timeline (Tab H) for the complete OPLAN 40104 approval process so we might be better able to synchronize supporting U.S. decisions. **Ask Shali to review the NATO decision making process.** Our objective is to develop a clearer picture of when key U.S. decisions will be needed on the military issues related to withdrawal operations. The SECDEF was to have been briefed on the OPLAN just prior to the PC. OSD staff reports they are attempting to get smaller options incorporated into the plan. Regardless, if we are serious about obtaining Congressional appropriation for the operation, we need to get on with the consultation process. The new letter from Dole, Helms et al. (Tab I) illustrates the amount of skepticism we will need to overcome. For discussion:

- What is the NATO timeline for decisions on OPLAN 40104?
- What U.S. decisions are needed, and when?
- What does it really mean when we vote to approve OPLAN 40104 at NATO? (We see it as merely NATO approving the plan that will be used to execute withdrawal operations should the NAC subsequently decide to do so.)
- Will the NAC approve the entire OPLAN 40104 or parts? Will it include the Croatia piece? Can we approve a Croatia plan without the President's decision to participate?

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- Do we have enough information about the plan to support it in the NAC?

- Should we make our support for 40104 conditional? (We suggest that we support 40104 as the plan that NATO will use to execute the operation, but condition that support on agreement on funding before the operation is executed. We will also need undiluted NATO command and control and robust ROE.)

- Shouldn't the Principals, the President, and Congress be briefed before we take action in the NAC? When will DoD be ready to brief Principals and the President on the plan? (An open-date schedule proposal has been sent to you.)

- If we agree that we want Congressional authorization and funding for the operation, do we need to brief them before agreeing in the NAC? (Our preference is to do single presentations on all aspects of the plan rather than a series of phone calls on individual pieces.)

- Step Two Decision Memo to the President said Principals agreed we would seek Congressional approval for funding of the operation. What is our strategy for gaining Congressional and public support?

IV. RESPONDING TO DOLE/BOSNIAN REQUESTS FOR MILITARY TRAINING

Letters (Tab J) from the Bosnians and Senator Dole requesting the President to train pro-government forces are now one month old. Deputies deferred discussion on the training issue until the policy review was completed. We can continue to defer and risk hearing more from both the Bosnians and the Hill, or we can respond now, informing them that we are prepared to move ahead with IMET training for the Federation. OSD and JCS were asked to prepare options (Tab K).

State is seeking approval to proceed with a broad 505 agreement so that IMET to support the Federation can begin (paper at Tab L). DoD opposes broad agreement, citing concerns that it will put us on the slippery slope to greater U.S. involvement. Deputies should discuss whether we should respond now and how, or continue to defer. We would support the broad 505 agreement, but limiting IMET to non-lethal areas (option 2 in OSD paper at Tab K). **Ask OSD to lead the discussion.** For discussion:

- Should we respond to the Dole letter now, provide a non-substantive response, or defer?

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- Should we provide the training the Bosnians and Senator Dole have asked the President to support?

- What are the legal implications of providing training? (See Alan Kreczko E-mail Tab M.)

- What is our rationale for saying no or providing limited IMET in view of stalled negotiations and the likelihood of renewed hostilities?

- If we were to provide some training, how would that impact on efforts to prevent renewed war or negotiations on a settlement?

Concurrences by: Alan Kreczko, Steve Simon, Bill Danvers

Attachment
Tab A Agenda
Tab B NSC Policy Review Paper
Tab C State Bosnia Strategy Paper
Tab D State Croatia Strategy Paper
Tab E JCS Prepo Issue Paper - Mini Option
Tab F JCS Prepo Issue paper - Maxi Option
Tab G Step Two Prepo Talking Points
Tab H OPLAN 40104 Decision Timeline
Tab I Dole/Helms letter on UNPROFOR Withdrawal
Tab J Dole and Bosnian Letters on Training
Tab K OSD paper on Training Options
Tab L State IMET Paper
Tab M Alan Kreczko E-mail

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A

PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA AND CROATIA
DATE: March 17, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30-4:00pm

Agenda

I. Former Yugoslavia Policy Review.....NSC/All**

-- Steps to Prevent Renewed War in Bosnia.....State**

II. Near-Term Diplomatic Strategy.....State**

B. Croatia Strategy (Next Steps)

C. Contact Group Prospects/Response to the Milosevic Proposal

III. OPLAN 40104 Approval Process

A. Next Steps on NATO Prepositioning - Step Two and Beyond.....OSD/JCS**

(1) Talking Points for Congressional Calls

(2) Notifying NATO

B. NATO/U.S. Decision Timeline for OPLAN 40104...OSD/JCS**

-- Strategy for Gaining Congressional Authorization and Appropriation.....OSD/ALL

IV. Responding to Dole/Bosnian Government Requests for Military Training (Implementing 505 Agreement).....OSD/JCS**

** - Paper Due 12 noon March 16.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KD NARA, Date 3/5/2020
2013-0682-M

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~~SECRET~~ March 16, 1995

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA POLICY REVIEW: UPDATE FOR PRINCIPALS

The Setting: Tudjman's March 12 announcement has reduced the chances of a renewed war in Croatia and a widening of the Balkan conflict. But an escalation of the war in Bosnia remains likely as the end of the cessation of hostilities approaches with no movement on the diplomatic track. The ceasefire is already showing signs of unraveling and both sides seem confident of success in a new round of fighting. Silajdzic has declared that the Bosnian Government will not extend the ceasefire beyond April 30 and that Western emphasis on containment amounts to an unacceptable attempt to freeze the status quo. Milosevic's response to the offer of sanctions relief for mutual recognition has been utterly inadequate and Serbian enforcement of the border closure with Bosnia has fallen off markedly since the second 100-day period began in January. The Contact Group is on its last legs and advocates of a lifting of the arms embargo are beginning to stir in both houses of the Congress.

The Gap Between Ends and Means: The NSC paper of February 27 noted that the U.S. has pursued a range of important, but not always compatible, objectives in trying to deal with the Bosnian conflict over the past two years. Moreover, the tools we have applied have varied in response to events and as our priorities have shifted. Since Bihac, we have backed away from attempts to bring NATO air power to bear to enforce UNSC resolutions and pressure the Bosnian Serbs to settle on terms more favorable to the Bosnian Government. Yet we did not scale back our political objectives to match our reduced leverage -- contributing to the present diplomatic impasse.

Broad Strategic Choices: The NSC paper set forth four basic strategic options:

1. Stick with present policy: continue to support Bosnians rhetorically, continue diplomatic efforts with reduced expectations of success, focus on containment.
2. Shift to a policy of neutrality regarding terms of settlement and active containment of conflict; end or suspend Contact Group activities; acknowledge we cannot produce a better deal for Bosnians.
3. Containment of conflict and long-term quarantine of Greater Serbia, including reinforced sanctions on Belgrade for the long haul.
4. Renewed push for military measures in support of Bosnians: withdraw UNPROFOR, multilateral lift and strike.

Deputies did not arrive at any firm conclusions in their one discussion of the NSC paper, but agreed with the thrust of the paper that now is the time to review our overall policy.

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They agreed we do not presently have the means to attain the political goals we have set. Discussion tended to favor the first two options.

State argued in favor of option 1, a continuation of our current policy, with the **highest priority attached to preventing a major upsurge in fighting** that could lead to the departure of UNPROFOR, greater human suffering, and increased pressure for U.S. military involvement. An underlying assumption is that we would put larger equities at risk if we tried to win Allied or Russian agreement to increased military pressure on the Serbs; that an accommodation among the parties will only happen after more fighting and/or a gradual recognition of the need for compromise; and that prolonging today's "relative peace" is better than the alternatives. We would not, however, take the politically and morally questionable step of pressing the Bosnians to accept more "unjust" terms, although we would try to lower Bosnian and public perceptions that the international community has the ability to deliver a "fair" settlement. This strategy could encompass the following:

- continued efforts to engage Milosevic in negotiations over cross-recognition and to gain his support for political settlements in Bosnia and Croatia, using sanctions relief as a carrot;
- follow-up on the agreement with Tudjman on new UN force by seeking to launch political negotiations based on Z-4 principles;
- reinforced efforts to isolate Pale and Knin by strengthening Serbian/Bosnian border closure, closing "back door" that permits Serbian goods to reach Bosnian Serbs through Krajina;
- strengthening the outer ring of sanctions by increasing West European support for sanctions enforcement and working with the front-line states;
- continued efforts to enhance UNPROFOR equipment and rules of engagement in Bosnia, but without pressuring UNPROFOR to adopt a belligerent anti-Serb posture;
- maintaining the structure of the Contact Group even if its effectiveness is limited, so as to deter diplomatic breakouts by Russia or others;
- consideration of selected U.S.-only or U.S.-European diplomatic initiatives;
- increased support for the Bosniac-Croat Federation;
- beefing up UNPROFOR in Macedonia.

In addition, we would strongly warn the Bosnian Government of the need to extend the ceasefire and refrain from initiating large-scale hostilities, since this could force the departure of UNPROFOR and jeopardize our readiness to provide assistance to the Federation. We would fight Congressional efforts to lift the embargo unilaterally and seek to persuade the Bosnians that they are better off militarily by making do with a leaky arms embargo rather than forcing the issue of a formal lift.

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OVP advocated a similar approach, focusing on the **long-term isolation of the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs and the strengthening of the outer ring of sanctions, while providing economic and other assistance to the Federation**. For the isolation strategy to be effective, there would have to be increased resources and political commitment by us and the Europeans -- to field additional sanctions monitors on the Serbian-Bosnian border and in Croatia, and to induce better enforcement of sanctions against Serbia by the front-line states.

DOD favored shifting toward option 2, a more open posture of neutrality. While we would pursue many of the same steps as State proposes to contain the conflict, we would openly acknowledge that a settlement along the lines of the Contact Group plan is not attainable without U.S. actions that it is not in our interest to take. We would thus distance ourselves from the goal of achieving a better deal for the Bosnians and abandon or downgrade the importance of the Contact Group, making clear that it is up to the parties, not the international community, to find a mutually acceptable solution.

The **U.S. Contact Group representative** suggested an evolutionary approach, shifting gradually from option 1 to option 2. While we would not disavow the Contact Group plan or impose unfair terms on the Bosnians, we would attempt over time to bring them to the realization that they will have to settle for less. We would, however, seek to "**maximize the minimum**," i.e. try to get the Bosnians the best terms that the Bosnian Serbs will accept.

None of the Deputies advocated options 3 or 4: a long-term quarantine of Serbia would be difficult to sell to the Russians and Europeans; and renewed military pressure on the Serbs through lift and strike would likely lead to an Americanization of the conflict, even if pursued multilaterally.

The **Director of Strategic Plans and Policy of the Joint Staff and the NSC staff**, however, suggested that a **staged multilateral lifting of the arms embargo (beginning with defensive weapons), in tandem with a last-chance effort to secure Bosnian Serb acceptance of the Contact Group plan**, should remain under consideration in the event that UNPROFOR withdrawal and/or Congressional pressures push us toward option 4. Our Allies' interest in U.S. participation in UNPROFOR withdrawal gives us leverage to secure their acquiescence in multilateral lift. (The Russians would need to be bought off by means of extending additional sanctions relief to Milosevic.)

Another **variant of Option 4** might also be considered: **a *threat* by the U.S. and its Allies to withdraw UNPROFOR and lift the arms embargo multilaterally** as a means of shocking the Serbs into negotiating on the basis of the Contact Group plan. In light of the hollowness of past Contact Group threats, however, we would have to demonstrate more convincingly our readiness to make good on the threat.

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Can Containment Work? As noted, options 1 and 2 point to roughly the same concrete policy actions. They would make prevention of a new war and containment, rather than achieving a political settlement, our priority goal. **They also have the same flaw: they ignore the fact that the Bosnians would rather fight than settle for the status quo, and they will not readily cooperate with a containment strategy**. If the war escalates and Bosnian suffering once again dominates the headlines and CNN, Hill pressures to lift the arms embargo could become hard to manage.

If we are to prevent a new round of fighting and avoid a serious break with the Bosnians, **we need to find additional positive incentives for the Bosnians to exercise restraint**. These could include:

- massive economic assistance and political support to the Federation;
- measures to persuade the Bosnians that UNPROFOR is worth keeping, even if it means deferring a lifting of the arms embargo once again (e.g. deployment of additional troops to forcibly open the Blue Route to Sarajevo; a more aggressive effort to get our allies to toughen up UNPROFOR's rules of engagement throughout Bosnia; a return to NATO enforcement of the exclusion zones, etc.); and
- other steps to encourage a deferral of lift, such as a more robust program of military training (albeit one consistent with the arms embargo), intelligence support, etc.

Financial incentives alone will not likely sway the Bosnians, even if we are able to come up with serious money. The latter steps, however, would mean renewed frictions with our Allies and may be unattainable without, in the end, precipitating UNPROFOR's withdrawal. Threatening the Bosnians with punitive actions, on the other hand, would be politically indefensible.

In the final analysis, therefore, we may not be able to prevent the Bosnians from going on the offensive in the spring. The best case may be that the renewed fighting does not lead to any major Bosnian reverses and the current stalemate remains when winter returns. The worst case is that the Serbs respond by overrunning the eastern enclaves and strangling Sarajevo again. Although UNPROFOR countries may hunker down and not decide to withdraw even in the latter scenario, Congress may force the issue with unilateral lift.

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STEPS TO PREVENT RENEWED WAR IN BOSNIA

Despite our considerable diplomatic success in convincing Tudjman to maintain a UN presence in Croatia, which avoids for the moment the threat of widened war in the Balkans, a renewal of full-scale hostilities in Bosnia could begin soon. Cease-fire violations have increased markedly in past weeks. Military commanders on both sides are balanced between a desire to take advantage of good weather and break out of their current positions and their need for a bit more time to regroup and rearm.

Izetbegovic said in Bonn on March 16 that the Bosnians will renew the war this spring if Karadzic does not accept the Contact Group plan and map. We should take this statement very seriously.

In fact, it is likely this summer that we will be faced with either a "big war" or a "small war" in Bosnia. The latter is preferred, notably because UNPROFOR could hunker down and ride out the storm, i.e., no expensive, difficult NATO extraction. Some credible diplomacy would help edge the situation toward a smaller war, e.g. pre-Bihac levels.

With Milosevic's cool reaction to our "big bang" recognition/sanctions suspension gambit, we are perforce back in a "Bosnia only" strategy for the moment. This may be acceptable for the following reasons:

- o our Croatia success hopefully has defused that bomb, which was one of the reasons in the first place for the "big bang" idea,
- o Milosevic seems more willing to recognize Bosnia. Indeed, his proffered constitutional principles are not dissimilar to what we have had in mind, and,
- o finally, it will be easier to reengage the Russians in Contact Group work if our efforts are focused on Bosnia.

We will need to explore the the Contact Group a "Bosnia only" package with three elements:

- o extension of the cessation of hostilities,
- o constitutional principles that can accept including: Milosevic (for recognition purposes) and Karadzic and the Bosnians as the basis for a further negotiation, and,
- o acceptance of the 51/49 map by Pale with some kind of proviso on swaps (Pale is passing around a map that looks like 55/45).

As we firm up the Croatia deal, we will need to explore this package in the Contact Group. We will also have to sort out how much sanctions suspension would go with this half-loaf strategy.

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CROATIA STRATEGY

With Tudjman's announcement that he will seek a mandate for continued UN forces in Croatia, the focus of immediate activity shifts to New York. While some difficult issues remain to be worked out, the parameters of an eventual UNSC resolution mandating the new force are now defined. In the near term, we need to keep this process on track, aiming to have a UNSC resolution adopted by April 1 or shortly thereafter and the new force established on the ground by mid-June.

Status Report

Following his meeting with Vice President Gore on Sunday in Copenhagen, President Tudjman announced his agreement to allow UN troops to stay in Croatia. The text was as previously negotiated by A/S Holbrooke in Zagreb. The quid pro quo to keep troops patrolling the buffer zone between Croatian and Serb forces was our agreement to seek a mandate for a new force that "prohibits" Serb military supply into Croatia.

The deal has won praise, e.g. from troop contributors, whom John Kornblum briefed in Washington Monday. Paris is concerned about the implications of a separate Croatia mandate for the French commander of UNPROFOR. The Russians were initially positive, but have since begun to raise numerous questions about the mandate and seem to want to raise Knin to the status of a UN negotiating partner.

Next steps

Activity has shifted to the UN, where we showed draft resolutions to the Contact Group plus Italy on Monday. The approach would be a separate resolution with a separate mandate to create the new UN force in Croatia. In the UNPROFOR rollover resolution, devoted mostly to Bosnia and Macedonia, we include language authorizing UNPROFOR personnel to continue essential functions in Croatia until the new force is established on the ground. Some CG members and troop contributors are uncomfortable with the lack of legal clarity in this approach. But the alternative -- explicit continuation of UNPROFOR in Croatia -- is unacceptable to Zagreb.

UNSC action will determine the eventual disposition of the new UN force. Questions abound regarding the extent of UN monitoring on Croatia's borders, the make-up of the new force (i.e. which contingents get to pack up and go home), and command and control arrangements. The UN Secretariat will have difficulty beginning to sort these out until it has a clear UNSC mandate to work from. So it is important to try to get a resolution quickly. The deadline of March 31, when UNPROFOR's current mandate expires, will help accelerate this work.

In addition, the Secretariat and troop-contributing capitals will need considerable time to reconfigure the existing UNPROFOR/Croatia contingents. So it is important to press ahead on the authorizing resolution if we expect

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demonstrable changes on the ground before June 30, when Croatia's current consent expires for UNPROFOR to continue existing operations.

Political talks

While pressing ahead on measures to maintain a UN troop presence in Croatia, we will need to work to invigorate the diplomatic track. The Krajina Serbs indicated a willingness to start political talks once it was clear that UNPROFOR would remain. The have recently announced that the "RSK" has no reason to fear negotiations. We will work with the other Z-4 members (EU, Russia, UN) to pursue this opening and attempt to launch talks.

At a minimum, we should insist on resumption of work on the economic confidence-building measures. This track has been important to Belgrade, presumably as part of an effort to accustom the Krajina Serbs accustomed to closer integration with Croatia. Whether political talks can be launched soon remains to be seen. We need to be careful, however, not to allow economic agreements between Zagreb and Knin cause any loosening of the sanctions-related isolation of Pale.

We must be clear on what Tudjman's announcement accomplished. It is a band-aid that buys time -- crucial time to be sure but probably no more than twelve. Without movement toward a political settlement, he may well decide to launch military action before national elections in 1996.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 17 March 1995

ISSUE PAPER

ISSUE: Should the Executive Branch (1) ***approve designation of forces for minimum Step 2, (2) agree today that we will support the deployment of minimum Step 2 forces when requested, (3) and begin consultations*** with Congress regarding a minimum Step 2 communications prepositioning architecture in preparation for UNPROFOR withdrawal by briefing key Congressional members and staffers on the preparations for implementing this step? **(NOTE: President has made the decision to support Step 2 prepositioning.** Approval for deployment is subject to consultations with Congress and subsequent NAC decision to deploy forces.) **SACEUR PREPARING TO RELEASE REQUEST FOR STEP 2 FORCES TODAY!** Likely request for deploying minimum Step 2 forces will occur next week.

KEY POINTS:

- SHAPE recommends minimum Step 2 communications architecture only if decision to implement full Step 2 is not taken now.

- Minimum Step 2 prepositioning architecture includes:

  - **Deployment of a Transportable Ground Satellite Terminal** (TSGT) to Pleso (~20 NATO personnel). Provides secure strategic communications.

  - **Deployment of Communications Coordination Detachments** to Zagreb, Pleso, and Split (~20 NATO personnel at each site).

  - **Conduct of equipment interoperability tests** for comm units required for full Step 2 (primarily in Germany).

  - **Total of 80 personnel.** SHAPE estimates that **12 US troops** would be among the 80.

- By comparison, full Step 2 implementation calls for deployment of 310 US personnel to Zagreb, Pleso, and along Adriatic coastal ports (Rijeka, Zadar, Split, Ploce). Total NATO full Step 2 package consists of ~1526 NATO personnel of which 960 deploy into Croatia.

- 15 March NAC:

  - **Approved sending Activation Warning Messages (ACTWARN)** officially notifying nations of the potential operation and

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requesting specific troop contributions for (1) manning and preparations for the deployment of the TSGT to Pleso, (2) manning and preparations for the deployment of the Communications Coordination Detachments to Zagreb, Pleso, and Split, (3) preparation of remaining step 2 forces.

- **Noted that a separate NAC decision approving an Activation Request (ACTREQ) is required to authorize deployment of personnel.**

- Approved Step 2 forces to conduct interoperability tests in the Central region (principally Germany).

- Agreed that NATO personnel deployed in theater will operate under UNPROFOR ROE until OPLAN 40104 TOA.

PROS:

- Demonstrates US leadership in the Alliance by supporting actions designed to protect interests of NATO nations with troops in UNPROFOR.

- **Increases NATO's readiness to respond** - prudent military measure for a possible major military operation.

- Provides NATO with a low-cost, reversible step that improves "on the ground" capability. Funds are available within NATO budget for prepositioning.

- Limited scope of deployment not likely to prejudice on-going diplomatic initiatives in the region.

- Communications architecture would be tested and validated before it may be needed on short notice.

- Congress less likely to oppose an approach that does not involve significant numbers of US troops.

CONS:

- Possibly perceived as the US supporting a step that leads to the withdrawal of UNPROFOR and the wider war we have been trying to avoid.

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- Postures US and NATO for a military operation with an indeterminate start and end dates.

- Places more US troops on the ground.

Recommendation:
(1) *approve designation of forces for minimum Step 2,*
(2) agree today that we will support the deployment of minimum Step 2 forces when requested,
(3) and begin consultations initial State/OSD/JCS approach to Congress using Talking Points attached for minimum Step 2 prepositioning measures.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DRAFT 16 March, 1995

ISSUE PAPER

ISSUE: Should the US (1) approve designation of forces for full Step 2 prepositioning, (2) agree today that we will support deployment of full Step 2 forces when requested? By approving the NATO proposal to commence Step Two of prepositioning, we are in a better position to react to either a deliberate or emergency extraction. This deployment includes 440 U.S. troops of which 310 would deploy into Croatia. **(NOTE: President has made the decision to support Step 2 prepositioning.** Approval for deployment is subject to consultations with Congress and subsequent NAC decision to deploy forces.) **SACEUR PREPARING TO RELEASE REQUEST FOR STEP 2 FORCES TODAY!**

KEY POINTS:

- The UN has not yet made a formal decision to withdraw UNPROFOR from either Bosnia or Croatia. The intelligence community assesses that fighting will resume in Bosnia this spring and there is no immediate prospect of concluding a negotiated settlement.
- Although Pres. Tudjman has agreed to permit the continuation of an international force in Croatia along the cease-fire line, the issue remains unresolved. GOC and Krajina Serbs have not agreed to the language supporting the changes to proposed Security Council Resolutions and mission of new UN force.
- NATO planning to support UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia is contained in OPLAN 40104, which is continuously being updated.
- Once Step 2 is authorized, it will take ~2-3 weeks to assemble, deploy, and establish the communications system.
- Prepositioning is a necessary, but reversible, step to support a large military operation. The total number of personnel involved is approximately 1526, including 440 US military personnel (310 in Croatia). The total NATO cost for prepositioning is estimated at $11.3M ($5M already authorized for step 1), to be paid out of existing NATO funds. (Countries pay own transport/sustainment costs.)
- The NAC authorized ACTWARNS for prepositioning step 2 on 15 Mar. SACEUR is preparing to issue a ACTWARN officially notifying member states of the potential operation and requesting specific troop contributions.

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PROs:

- **Prudent preparation** for a likely major military operation. **Reduces lead-time** by ~two weeks from notification to execution.
- **Demonstrates US leadership** in NATO alliance, reducing potential embarrassment to US and NATO by preparing for a likely call for NATO assistance. An unplanned withdrawal could result in calls for US unilateral support, or participation in a "coalition-of-the-capable" (US, UK, FR), mortally damaging NATO.
- US troops deploying to Croatia will be stationed in Zagreb and various seaports, **not the UNPAs.**
- This is a **low-cost, reversible step.** Only actual expense to USG is movement of US personnel within Europe.
- Should the Holbrooke-Tudjman agreement be reversed, NATO will be in a better position to execute withdrawal operations from the former Yugoslavia.

CONs:

- Could be viewed as the US supporting a step that leads to the withdrawal of UNPROFOR in the wider war we have been trying to avoid.
- Postures US and NATO for a military operation with **indeterminate start and end dates.**
- **First installment** for an operation that could eventually require **20,000-30,000 US military personnel** and cost the USG about **$1B.** (US incremental plus UN assessed costs)
- **Tough sell to a Congress:** another UN peacekeeping operation, requires significant funding or reprogramming, eventually puts US troops on the ground in Bosnia.

RECOMMENDATION:

(1) approve designation of forces for full Step 2 prepositioning,
(2) agree today that we will support deployment of full Step 2 forces when requested.

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TALKING POINTS FOR CALLS TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Support for Step Two of NATO Prepositioning for UNPROFOR Withdrawal

- As you know, in early December the President informed our Allies that the U.S. would be prepared, in principle, to commit U.S. ground forces to a NATO operation to help UNPROFOR withdraw from *Bosnia*.

- Assisting UN forces in Bosnia, in particular those of our closest Allies, would be an essential demonstration of Alliance solidarity. Failure to offer such support would risk grave damage to NATO.

- We do not want UNPROFOR to depart; it performs a critical function in Bosnia. Our decision to assist an UNPROFOR withdrawal was a decision in principle.

- The Administration has no intention of keeping U.S. ground forces in Bosnia or Croatia following a withdrawal operation. The sole purpose of deploying troops would be to participate as a NATO-member nation in support of UNPROFOR withdrawal.

- I hasten to note that the UN has not made a formal decision to withdraw UNPROFOR from either Bosnia or Croatia. Fighting, however, could resume in Bosnia later this spring. Heavy fighting could well prompt a UN decision to withdraw.

- It could take as much as 8-12 weeks after a UN request for help and a NATO decision to implement the OP Plan before preparations are complete and forces are in place to commence a withdrawal of UNPROFOR, our senior military commanders recommend that we act now to ensure that the essential first prepositioning steps are taken to ensure the communications network is ready to support a likely major military operation.

- **Accordingly, I am asking for your support for a Presidential decision in principle to preposition up to 15 U.S. DOD personnel in Croatia -- to execute the preliminary communications steps associated with NATO's operational plan for extraction of UNPROFOR from Bosnia.**

- We will consult with you if further prepositioning steps are required and before any final decision is reached on implementation of the actual withdrawal plan.

- In the interim, NATO's Operational Plan is being updated continuously; and NATO is still working such key issues as final numbers of troops that would be provided from

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among the various NATO allies, how the overall operation would be funded, and when precisely the actual prepositioning of communications personnel would begin.

IF ASKED

- Funding for the prepositioning steps would come from existing NATO funds (about $11 million).

- In light of Tudjman's agreement, we see no requirement for U.S. or NATO combat units to assist in the change of UN forces in Croatia.

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United States Senate

OFFICE OF THE MAJORITY LEADER
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-7010

March 15, 1995

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing in regard to commitments made by your administration to assist in the withdrawal of U.N. troops from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is our understanding that the recent compromise with the Croatian government may require only a partial withdrawal of U.N. forces from Croatia -- that is if the militant Serbs agree -- and that U.S. involvement is likely to be very limited in such an operation. However, we are aware that you have already committed to providing U.S. military assistance, to include U.S. combat troops, to participate in the withdrawal of U.N. troops from Bosnia and Herzegovina should such a decision be made by either nations participating in UNPROFOR or the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

While we have consistently opposed your policy toward the former Yugoslavia, and have been critical of the inability and unwillingness of the U.N. forces to fulfill their mandate there, we recognize that U.S. participation to assist the withdrawal of U.N. forces may be necessary. However, we believe that such assistance should not be offered without strict conditions.

The first condition is that the entire withdrawal operation be under unified NATO command -- from start to finish. The "dual-key" arrangement under which NATO currently operates and is subordinate to the United Nations has been a military and political fiasco. Should such an arrangement be extended to any component of the withdrawal operation -- even under peaceful circumstances -- we would <u>strongly</u> oppose U.S. participation.

It is critical that the United States establish concretely and in advance that NATO command is a prerequisite to U.S. participation. As such, we would strongly recommend that this decision be explicitly stated in a U.N. Security Council resolution on the matter. A letter from the U.N. Secretary General in our view would be wholly insufficient; a binding commitment from the countries in the Security Council who are the largest troop contributors to UNPROFOR should be a minimum requirement.

Second, the rules of engagement must be robust. There must be no question that self-defense includes the right of retaliation -- at the discretion of the NATO commander. Those forces that may consider interfering with the withdrawal of U.N.

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forces must know in no uncertain terms that if any U.N. or NATO troops are provoked or attacked that they will face massive and disproportionate retaliation, to include all their military assets, not just their immediately-engaged forces.

Third, there must be a common sense rule applied to the withdrawal of heavy equipment belonging to the U.N. protection forces. We understand that those of our allies participating in UNPROFOR would like to remove all of their equipment when they depart. If the environment is calm and peaceful, we would not object to using American forces to facilitate the withdrawal of equipment. Should we be faced with a hostile environment, however, we believe that American lives should not be endangered to rescue equipment.

Finally, U.S. assistance should be premised on an understanding with our allies that UNPROFOR's withdrawal clears the way for lifting the U.N. arms embargo on the Bosnian Government. To date, allied objections to lifting the arms embargo have centered on concerns about the safety of allied troops deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. If the United States assists in the withdrawal of U.N. forces, the allies must know that we will not tolerate equivocation on the matter of terminating the arms embargo. For three years the Bosnians have been denied their fundamental and inherent right to self-defense and watched as U.N. forces provided cover to the aggressor Serb forces. In sum, U.S. assistance in the withdrawal of UNPROFOR should be explicitly conditioned on the support of those nations for terminating the arms embargo.

Mr. President, we believe that these military and political conditions -- NATO command, robust rules of engagement, limitations on withdrawal of equipment, and allied agreement on next steps -- are not only essential to securing support from the U.S. Congress, but essential to the success of such a potentially dangerous operation. We look forward to hearing from you soon.

Sincerely,

Strom Thurmond Bob Dole

Ted Stevens

Jesse Helms

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Congress of the United States

Washington, DC 20515

February 17, 1995

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing to urge immediate action by you on the war in Bosnia. While diplomats talk in the wake of former President Carter's visit to the region, there is strong reason to believe that the Bosnian Serbs will continue to reject peace. If the war in Bosnia resumes full scale, we do not believe the situation will continue as it has for the last three years. UNPROFOR's already weakened position will become even more untenable, and pressure for its withdrawal will increase.

In the event of either significant Serbian escalation or of UNPROFOR withdrawal, the case for ending the international arms embargo of Bosnia becomes even more compelling. We trust that, in such circumstances, your Administration would move expeditiously to end the United Nations embargo. Should that not be possible, however, we would expect the Congress to vote to unilaterally end participation by the United States in the embargo.

In any event, the United States has an obligation to prepare for the most likely scenarios in Bosnia. If the embargo is to be ended, either multilaterally or unilaterally, we will want to see direct U.S. involvement in the conflict held to a minimum. The surest way to minimize direct U.S. involvement after the embargo is ended is to act now to train the pro-government forces in strategy and tactics and the use of some of the weapons they are likely to obtain.

Such training would reduce the risk to the pro-government forces of any preemptive Serbian offensive, and would be an alternative to sending U.S. forces into Bosnia to provide training after the embargo is ended. Such training should be provided outside of Bosnia in order to avoid any risk to U.S. trainers. We understand that such training can be provided at a small fraction of the cost we currently are paying for the U.N. peacekeeping operation in Bosnia, and that it could be completed in less than six months. We also understand that the government of Bosnia and Hercegovina would welcome such training, and indeed already has submitted a formal request to you in this regard.

There can be no question about your authority to direct the provision of such training. Section 1404 of the 1995 Defense Department Authorization Act (the so-called Nunn-Mitchell provision) required the Administration to present options to the Congress for training the pro-government forces in Bosnia. Other provisions of law, including section 503 of the National Security Act of 1947, give you authority to deliver such training. Further, the provision of such training by the United States would not violate existing Security Council resolutions or relevant principles of international law.

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We believe you should take this step in order to be better prepared for the likely next phase of the war in Bosnia and in order to reduce the likelihood that U.S. forces will become directly involved in that war. It is important to note, however, that a program of training the pro-government forces in Bosnia would give the United States additional leverage in the ongoing negotiations with the Bosnian Serbs. Beginning a training program now would make clear to the Bosnian Serbs our determination to bring about a just and sustainable peace, and would underscore to them the probable cost of prolonging the conflict.

In other words, in the hands of able diplomats, a policy of training the pro-government forces for war could prove to be a powerful instrument for bringing about peace.

For all these reasons, we urge you to initiate promptly a program of military training for the pro-government forces in Bosnia and Hercegovina.

Sincerely,

BOB DOLE

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN

JOSEPH LIEBERMAN

HENRY J. HYDE

SUSAN MOLINARI

MICHAEL R. MCNULTY

JIM MORAN

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
0031. letter	Sven Alkalaj to President Clinton (1 page)	01/17/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0124 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, March 17, 1995 [1]

2010-0533-M
rs636

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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DRAFT
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ISSUE PAPER:
TRAINING THE PRO-GOVERNMENT FORCES IN BOSNIA

Background: Senator Dole, Rep. Gilman, and others wrote the President on February 17, 1995, to urge him to "act now to train the pro-government forces in strategy and tactics and the use of some of the weapons they are likely to obtain." The Members argued that the surest way to minimize direct U.S. involvement is to train the pro-government forces now so as to reduce their risk from any preemptive Serbian offensive.

Ambassador Alkalaj of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (B-H) also wrote President Clinton on January 17, 1995, to request that the U.S. review the means by which training for the B-H Army personnel could begin outside of the borders of B-H. He argued that such training "can be most decisive in preparing B-H for continuing its defense against aggression, or, in the event of a negotiated settlement, for an effective deterrent and source of stability as peace is secured...."

An interagency General Counsels' (OGC) group in February recommended that only a "narrow" IMET be concluded for reasons of neutrality and force protection. OGC posited the negative consequences associated with violating the spirit and intent of UNSCRs and losing the protections afforded by "experts on mission" status. They believe, however, that adequate domestic legal authority exists to provide the training contemplated by Senator Dole.

Issue: The type of training, if any, that the USG should provide to the pro-government forces in B-H; where that training should be provided; and when such training should begin.

Options:

1. *Limit training at this time to that outlined in a narrow Section 505 of the Foreign Assistance Act agreement*--The U.S. has $70,000 available for IMET should such an agreement be signed. However, moving forward with the narrow agreement would require finessing the issue of the broader draft 505 agreement which was provided to the government of B-H earlier. Such training would not violate the spirit and intent of UNSCRs regarding the arms embargo. It would be limited to IMET training for only a few senior Federation officers at our senior professional military schools and some English language training. The training would not affect USG neutrality regarding this conflict. Providing this limited training would avoid the appearance of totally abandoning B-H but would have negligible affect on the battlefield.
2. *Expand IMET training beyond the few senior Federation officers attending war colleges or receiving English language training.* Courses would be "non-lethal" technical training courses and could include courses in computer programming, finance, and health care. Training would be at the individual level. This would have little practical effect on the battlefield but might placate some who felt the USG had a moral obligation to do something.

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3. *Provide some limited individual tactical and operational training for weapons likely to be used.* Individual training would be conducted at U.S. facilities and schools. Such training could also include enrollment of junior and mid-level officers in professional development and leadership courses. This would prolong the conflict by encouraging B-H to fight on but would likely have minimal effect on the battlefield. It is unclear how unit commanders could be rotated through this training without a detrimental effect on the battlefield for B-H. It would, however, partially meet the demands of those who posit that the USG has a moral responsibility to assist B-H in its self-defense.
4. *Train the pro-government forces in accordance with the plan outlined by Senator Dole.* This would be unit level training and would need to be accomplished in a neighboring country, most likely Croatia. Such training would respond fully to the moral arguments that demand the USG assist B-H. It would also relieve some pressure from Congress. However, it directly contradicts the spirit and intent of UNSCRs and would clearly remove our forces from the protections of their current "experts on mission" status and make the U.S. a co-belligerent in the conflict.

Discussion: The effects of training the pro-government forces of B-H are problematic. However, there are other more likely and less favorable results from the training than those outlined by Ambassador Alkalaj and Senator Dole.

- Training is virtually synonymous with arming. Once the U.S. begins a significant training effort, the U.S. becomes an ally of B-H and, by extension, Croatia. The U.S. would become a co-belligerent.
- Once a decision to train is made, but before the training is complete, defines a period of enhanced vulnerability for B-H. Many will interpret such a decision to train as a harbinger of lifting the arms embargo. That, in turn may trigger UNPROFOR's withdrawal.
- UNPROFOR"s imminent withdrawal means that UN related humanitarian assistance programs will terminate. The humanitarian crisis will worsen.
- Training is a signal to all the Federation (including the HVO) that the U.S. is preparing the pro-government forces for a return to war.
- The Bosnian Serbs are likely to react to the above with preemptive action against B-H. Probable targets are the isolated enclaves. Almost all analysts project they would fall quickly.
- Others might feel compelled to take similar action on the side of the Serbs.
- The negative consequences outlined by the OGC are compelling--training as contemplated by Senator Dole puts USG neutrality in question and would destroy the fabric of even-handedness upon which UNPROFOR and NATO operations in support thereof are based.
- The March 4, 1995, Deputies' discussion focused on the reality of accepting a minimalist outcome for B-H and that its longer-term prospect was absorption by Croatia and Serbia.

Recommendation: Approve Option 1--narrow 505 agreement--as the basis of the President's response to Senator Dole.

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position 1
4/12 J Jones

SUPPORT FOR THE FEDERATION - 505 AGREEMENT

I. PURPOSES FOR DEPUTIES COMMITTEE

- Decide if the Government of Bosnia Herzegovina (GoBH) can sign the broad 505 agreement they now have so that international military and educational training (IMET) to support the Federation may begin.

- Approve the strategy to win support for this decision from our NATO and Contact Group allies.

II. OPTIONS

Option 1 (Recommended): Ask Prime Minister Siladjic to confirm the GoBH notification to our embassy that the Bosnians are ready to sign the broad draft 505 given them so that already-approved IMET training can commence.

PRO: A broad 505 agreement would give the EUR military consultant (replacing General Galvin as Special Representative to the Bosnian Federation armed forces) a tool he can use in negotiations trying to bring two mutually suspicious armed forces closer together. His capacity to get anything done will depend on being able to draw on a full range of DoD programs, consistent with the clear understanding that, after a Presidential determination is signed, we will not transfer anything that violates the embargo.

Signing a broad agreement would signal our support without committing us to furnish excess defense articles (EDA) at this time; a Presidential determination is required to make a country eligible for transfers of defense articles (enforced by policy precedent) and the UN arms embargo limits EDA. (We are awaiting a GoBH short list of items they need in order to obtain an interagency legal opinion on which items could be furnished under the arms embargo.)

Asking the GoBH to limit the 505 agreement to IMET only after they have been given a broad draft could be perceived as a diminuation of USG support for the Federation, our current policy and could anger Congress which sees support for the Federation as vital to Balkan peace efforts.

CON: NATO and Contact Group allies may perceive signing this broad 505 agreement as a USG move toward unilaterally lifting the arms embargo, particularly if the singular nature of the agreement is publicized. We would need to carefully explain our position to counter this perception.

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NL 2/6/2020 (7.67)
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Option 2: Ask Prime Minister Siladjic to sign a revised 505 agreement limited to IMET only, explaining the draft which he was shown was in error and we intended to be consistent with agreements presented to Slovenia, FYROM, and Croatia.

PRO: Broad 505 agreements are, in general, not concluded until such time as we have identified specific defence articles we want to transfer to a given country.

Allies are worried, with Congressional legislation still to prohibit most types of military assistance, arms to the GoBH, and singling out the GoBH to sign an agreement including all military equipment sales, lease or draw-down which was refused to other Eastern European countries could be misinterpreted.

Providing IMET signals support for the Federation; we should be honest and tell the GoBH we mistakenly gave the wrong legal document needed to make this training happen.

CON: We cannot risk signalling any withdrawal of support for the Federation at this crucial time in negotiations. It is both easier and less risky to quietly allow the GoBH to sign the agreement they have already been given, and explain, if Allies ask, that nothing more than IMET can be given without further steps such as a Presidential determination which we do not intend to take at this time.

III. BACKGROUND

Before any military assistance (defense articles or related training or other defense services) may be furnished to a foreign country, Section 505 of the Foreign Assistance Act requires that certain assurances from the recipient country be obtained concerning use, retransfer and security of any articles, training, or services provided. These assurances are contained in an exchange of diplomatic notes which constitute an international agreement between the U.S. and the "potential recipient country." These assurances normally cover the full range of military assistance. However, throughout Central Europe and the FSU, we have initiated IMET programs before progressing to other levels of military assistance. In such cases, we have limited our 505 agreement with a given country to cover only IMET. Broader 505 agreements are, in general, not concluded until such time as we have identified specific defence articles we want to transfer to a given country. It is important to note that a 505 agreement does not commit the U.S. to providing military assistance either in general or in a specific form. Rather, it is only done in order to meet a statutory precondition to providing such assistance.

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For Bosnia, we need a 505 agreement before we can begin the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program approved as one of a number of things that can be done within current U.S. law and policy (in particular compliance with the UN arms embargo) to be supportive of the development of the armed forces of the Bosnian Federation. A Presidential determination that furnishing military assistance to a particular country will strengthen the security of the U.S. and promote worldwide peace is an additional statutory precondition to providing most types of military assistance.

While for legal reasons this 505 agreement would be signed by the Government of Bosnia Herzegovina (GoBH) as well as by the Federation, the cooperation would be intended for the Federation armed forces. (Note: The 505 agreement itself has no means to enforce this intention to provide support to the Federation but agreements to transfer specific equipment can be written to limit the use of the goods or services to the Federation armed forces rather than the GoBH national army.)

Broad 505 Agreement Given to GoBH

Limited 505 agreements for IMET only have been signed with Slovenia and Macedonia, and is pending with Croatia (as well as initially with all other CE states). We have also signed a broad non-binding defense cooperation agreement with Croatia (as well as several other CE states). A broad draft 505 agreement (sufficient for provision of IMET, lethal, and *non-lethal EDA) was given* to the GoBH; it was made clear that transfers under the agreement would be limited by the UN arms embargo.

IV. CONSULTATIONS WITH ALLIES

We must consult closely with allies to explain that signing a broad 505 agreement, while needed for any EDA transfers or military sales, does not change our opposition to unilateral lift. We will undertake nothing beyond the provision of IMET without obtaining a Presidential determination requiring Congressional notification for Bosnia. We do not plan to ask *for this determination at this time.*

We should portray the agreement as a necessary but not sufficient bureaucratic hurdle. While it momentarily singles out the Federation from among former Yugoslav countries (and even some Eastern European ones) as being more "worthy" of U.S. support, we would not object should others demand the same agreement with the same limitations.

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003o. email	Alan Kreczko to Donald Kerrick re: Bosnia DC Briefer II (1 page)	02/21/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0124 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, March 17, 1995 [1]

2010-0533-M
rs636

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003p. email	Kreczko to Kerrick re: Bosnia (1 page)	03/09/1995	P1/b(1)

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
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~~001a. paper~~	~~re: Former Yugoslavia Policy Review: Update for Principals (4 pages)~~	~~03/16/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~001b. paper~~	~~re: Former Yugoslavia Policy Review (11 pages)~~	~~02/27/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
001c. report	re: The Balkans: The Next Three Months [partial] (6 pages)	02/24/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 6/11/2020
~~002. agenda~~	~~Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (1 page)~~	~~03/17/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003a. note~~	~~Todd Stern to POTUS re: [Decision Memo] (1 page)~~	~~03/09/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003b. note~~	~~[Duplicate of 002a] (1 page)~~	~~03/08/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003c. memo~~	~~Anthony Lake to POTUS re: U.S. Participation in Step Two of NATO Prepositioning for UNPROFOR Withdrawal (3 pages)~~	~~03/06/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020

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FOLDER TITLE:
PC0124 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, March 17, 1995 [2]

2010-0533-M
rs1020

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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
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001		X	95031619	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
002		X	95031619	SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950316	FUERTH, L	
002	950316	PANETTA, L	
002	950316	BRILL, K	
002	950316	ADAMS, G	
002	950316	MCALEER, R	
002	950316	INDERFURTH, K	
002	950316	GARTHOFF, D	
002	950316	PATRICK, T	

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 16, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

MR. DOUGLAS GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Discussion Paper for March 17 Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (S)

Attached is an NSC staff paper for discussion under agenda item I at the March 17 Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia. It should be read in conjunction with the February 27 NSC paper, "Former Yugoslavia Policy Review." A copy of the earlier paper is also attached for your convenience. (S)

James W. Rudd
for Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachments
Tab A March 16 NSC paper
Tab B February 27 NSC paper

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FORMER YUGOSLAVIA POLICY REVIEW: UPDATE FOR PRINCIPALS

The Setting: Tudjman's March 12 announcement has reduced the chances of a renewed war in Croatia and a widening of the Balkan conflict. But an escalation of the war in Bosnia remains likely as the end of the cessation of hostilities approaches with no movement on the diplomatic track. The ceasefire is already showing signs of unraveling and both sides seem confident of success in a new round of fighting. Silajdzic has declared that the Bosnian Government will not extend the ceasefire beyond April 30 and that Western emphasis on containment amounts to an unacceptable attempt to freeze the status quo. Milosevic's response to the offer of sanctions relief for mutual recognition has been utterly inadequate and Serbian enforcement of the border closure with Bosnia has fallen off markedly since the second 100-day period began in January. The Contact Group is on its last legs and advocates of a lifting of the arms embargo are beginning to stir in both houses of the Congress.

The Gap Between Ends and Means: The NSC paper of February 27 noted that the U.S. has pursued a range of important, but not always compatible, objectives in trying to deal with the Bosnian conflict over the past two years. Moreover, the tools we have applied have varied in response to events and as our priorities have shifted. Since Bihac, we have backed away from attempts to bring NATO air power to bear to enforce UNSC resolutions and pressure the Bosnian Serbs to settle on terms more favorable to the Bosnian Government. Yet we did not scale back our political objectives to match our reduced leverage -- contributing to the present diplomatic impasse.

Broad Strategic Choices: The NSC paper set forth four basic strategic options:

1. Stick with present policy: continue to support Bosnians rhetorically, continue diplomatic efforts with reduced expectations of success, focus on containment.
2. Shift to a policy of neutrality regarding terms of settlement and active containment of conflict; end or suspend Contact Group activities; acknowledge we cannot produce a better deal for Bosnians.
3. Containment of conflict and long-term quarantine of Greater Serbia, including reinforced sanctions on Belgrade for the long haul.
4. Renewed push for military measures in support of Bosnians: withdraw UNPROFOR, multilateral lift and strike.

Deputies did not arrive at any firm conclusions in their one discussion of the NSC paper, but agreed with the thrust of the paper that now is the time to review our overall policy.

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They agreed we do not presently have the means to attain the political goals we have set. Discussion tended to favor the first two options.

State argued in favor of option 1, a continuation of our current policy, with the **highest priority attached to preventing a major upsurge in fighting** that could lead to the departure of UNPROFOR, greater human suffering, and increased pressure for U.S. military involvement. An underlying assumption is that we would put larger equities at risk if we tried to win Allied or Russian agreement to increased military pressure on the Serbs; that an accommodation among the parties will only happen after more fighting and/or a gradual recognition of the need for compromise; and that prolonging today's "relative peace" is better than the alternatives. We would not, however, take the politically and morally questionable step of pressing the Bosnians to accept more "unjust" terms, although we would try to lower Bosnian and public perceptions that the international community has the ability to deliver a "fair" settlement. This strategy could encompass the following:

- continued efforts to engage Milosevic in negotiations over cross-recognition and to gain his support for political settlements in Bosnia and Croatia, using sanctions relief as a carrot;
- follow-up on the agreement with Tudjman on new UN force by seeking to launch political negotiations based on Z-4 principles;
- reinforced efforts to isolate Pale and Knin by strengthening Serbian/Bosnian border closure, closing "back door" that permits Serbian goods to reach Bosnian Serbs through Krajina;
- strengthening the outer ring of sanctions by increasing West European support for sanctions enforcement and working with the front-line states;
- continued efforts to enhance UNPROFOR equipment and rules of engagement in Bosnia, but without pressuring UNPROFOR to adopt a belligerent anti-Serb posture;
- maintaining the structure of the Contact Group even if its effectiveness is limited, so as to deter diplomatic breakouts by Russia or others;
- consideration of selected U.S.-only or U.S.-European diplomatic initiatives;
- increased support for the Bosniac-Croat Federation;
- beefing up UNPROFOR in Macedonia.

In addition, we would strongly warn the Bosnian Government of the need to extend the ceasefire and refrain from initiating large-scale hostilities, since this could force the departure of UNPROFOR and jeopardize our readiness to provide assistance to the Federation. We would fight Congressional efforts to lift the embargo unilaterally and seek to persuade the Bosnians that they are better off militarily by making do with a leaky arms embargo rather than forcing the issue of a formal lift.

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OVP advocated a similar approach, focusing on the **long-term isolation of the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs and the strengthening of the outer ring of sanctions, while providing economic and other assistance to the Federation**. For the isolation strategy to be effective, there would have to be increased resources and political commitment by us and the Europeans -- to field additional sanctions monitors on the Serbian-Bosnian border and in Croatia, and to induce better enforcement of sanctions against Serbia by the front-line states.

DOD favored shifting toward option 2, a more open posture of neutrality. While we would pursue many of the same steps as State proposes to contain the conflict, we would openly acknowledge that a settlement along the lines of the Contact Group plan is not attainable without U.S. actions that it is not in our interest to take. We would thus distance ourselves from the goal of achieving a better deal for the Bosnians and abandon or downgrade the importance of the Contact Group, making clear that it is up to the parties, not the international community, to find a mutually acceptable solution.

The **U.S. Contact Group representative** suggested an evolutionary approach, shifting gradually from option 1 to option 2. While we would not disavow the Contact Group plan or impose unfair terms on the Bosnians, we would attempt over time to bring them to the realization that they will have to settle for less. We would, however, seek to "**maximize the minimum**," i.e. try to get the Bosnians the best terms that the Bosnian Serbs will accept.

None of the Deputies advocated options 3 or 4: a long-term quarantine of Serbia would be difficult to sell to the Russians and Europeans; and renewed military pressure on the Serbs through lift and strike would likely lead to an Americanization of the conflict, even if pursued multilaterally.

The **Director of Strategic Plans and Policy of the Joint Staff and the NSC staff**, however, suggested that a **staged multilateral lifting of the arms embargo (beginning with defensive weapons), in tandem with a last-chance effort to secure Bosnian Serb acceptance of the Contact Group plan**, should remain under consideration in the event that UNPROFOR withdrawal and/or Congressional pressures push us toward option 4. Our Allies' interest in U.S. participation in UNPROFOR withdrawal gives us leverage to secure their acquiescence in multilateral lift. (The Russians would need to be bought off by means of extending additional sanctions relief to Milosevic.)

Another **variant of Option 4** might also be considered: **a *threat* by the U.S. and its Allies to withdraw UNPROFOR and lift the arms embargo multilaterally** as a means of shocking the Serbs into negotiating on the basis of the Contact Group plan. In light of the hollowness of past Contact Group threats, however, we would have to demonstrate more convincingly our readiness to make good on the threat.

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Can Containment Work? As noted, options 1 and 2 point to roughly the same concrete policy actions. They would make prevention of a new war and containment, rather than achieving a political settlement, our priority goal. **They also have the same flaw: they ignore the fact that the Bosnians would rather fight than settle for the status quo, and they will not readily cooperate with a containment strategy**. If the war escalates and Bosnian suffering once again dominates the headlines and CNN, Hill pressures to lift the arms embargo could become hard to manage.

If we are to prevent a new round of fighting and avoid a serious break with the Bosnians, **we need to find additional positive incentives for the Bosnians to exercise restraint**. These could include:

- massive economic assistance and political support to the Federation;
- measures to persuade the Bosnians that UNPROFOR is worth keeping, even if it means deferring a lifting of the arms embargo once again (e.g. deployment of additional troops to forcibly open the Blue Route to Sarajevo; a more aggressive effort to get our allies to toughen up UNPROFOR's rules of engagement throughout Bosnia; a return to NATO enforcement of the exclusion zones, etc.); and
- other steps to encourage a deferral of lift, such as a more robust program of military training (albeit one consistent with the arms embargo), intelligence support, etc.

Financial incentives alone will not likely sway the Bosnians, even if we are able to come up with serious money. The latter steps, however, would mean renewed frictions with our Allies and may be unattainable without, in the end, precipitating UNPROFOR's withdrawal. Threatening the Bosnians with punitive actions, on the other hand, would be politically indefensible.

In the final analysis, therefore, we may not be able to prevent the Bosnians from going on the offensive in the spring. The best case may be that the renewed fighting does not lead to any major Bosnian reverses and the current stalemate remains when winter returns. The worst case is that the Serbs respond by overrunning the eastern enclaves and strangling Sarajevo again. Although UNPROFOR countries may hunker down and not decide to withdraw even in the latter scenario, Congress may force the issue with unilateral lift.

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FORMER YUGOSLAVIA POLICY REVIEW

Introduction

As we approach a potentially critical period in the Balkans over the next three months, now is the time to review the fundamental principles guiding our policy. U.S. policy has, in fact, had some success over the past two years in containing the spread of the war, reducing the level of violence, keeping relief supplies flowing to most areas, and maintaining cohesion with Allies and Russia. What we have been unable to produce is a political settlement in Bosnia or Croatia that rolls back Serb gains sufficiently to be acceptable to the Bosnians and Croats, and to be perceived as "fair" (much less "just") in moral terms.

The fundamental problem has been a lack of leverage: sanctions and political pressure have been insufficient to sway the Serbs, and our efforts to bring NATO air power to bear have come to naught. In Bosnia, after almost a year of effort, the Contact Group is becoming a spent force, with its unity increasingly strained. In Croatia, the Z-4 plan for a political solution is, for all intents and purposes, stillborn, and Tudjman's decision to eject UNPROFOR threatens to destroy even the limited economic confidence-building measures developed over the past year.

As the CIA paper makes clear, there is no "peace faction" among any of the parties, and Milosevic's willingness to pressure his Serb cousins is limited. If we stay on our present course, the prospects are for an escalation of the war in Bosnia and a new war in Croatia, with the potential unraveling of our limited achievements to date, and increased pressures for U.S. involvement. The differences between the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios are largely ones of timing and degree. And as the risk of war increases in Bosnia and Croatia, the dangers of spillover to other areas grow as well.

If the war escalates, the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Croatia, Bosnia or both will become increasingly likely -- creating the prospect of U.S. troops on the ground in former Yugoslavia in a hostile environment, the outcome we have most sought to avoid. As international efforts founder, the Bosnians will be able to make an increasingly convincing case for lifting the arms embargo; yet the odds of bringing our Allies and, especially, the Russians along will remain low. Moreover, lifting the arms embargo, to be effective, entails the United States taking other actions that increase our involvement and responsibility.

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Interests and Objectives

Throughout the conflict, we have sought to protect several core U.S. interests: maintaining our strategic relationship with key Allies and protecting the credibility of NATO; avoiding a conflict with Russia that could undermine our efforts to promote reform and international cooperation; preventing the spread of the Bosnian conflict into a wider Balkan war that could destabilize southeastern Europe and draw in U.S. allies; and ensuring that the use of force to change borders and acts of genocide do not become legitimate forms of behavior in post-Cold War Europe.

Along with these core interests, we have pursued a range of more specific objectives, but have never set clear priorities among them:

- To stop or limit the fighting.
- To maintain relief supplies and reduce human suffering.
- To prevent the establishment by force of a Greater Serbia.
- To achieve a negotiated settlement acceptable to all parties that reverses at least some Serb territorial conquests and preserves the territorial integrity and international identity of Bosnia, Croatia and other ex-Yugoslav states.
- To prevent the spread of conflict to Kosovo, Macedonia, Albania and beyond.
- To keep U.S. ground forces out except in the context of implementing a political settlement.

The tools we have applied have varied over time in response to events, and as our priorities have shifted: Until the end of 1994, we sought to use NATO military power to enforce UNSC resolutions and to put pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to settle on terms that provided a better deal for the Bosnian Government ("air power in the service of diplomacy"). After Bihac, however, we consciously shifted the emphasis to maintaining NATO cohesion, recognizing that this would erode U.S. and Alliance credibility and reduce further our negotiating leverage. Yet we did not scale back our political objectives to match our reduced leverage -- leading to the present diplomatic impasse.

The result has been charges of fecklessness and an erosion of confidence in U.S. leadership on other issues. Therefore, we now need to step back and confront these inherent contradictions:

- On the one hand, our own principles, as well as public and Congressional pressures, make it difficult to disengage and effectively abandon the Bosnians.

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- On the other hand, we do not presently have the means to attain the political goal we have set -- negotiated settlements that deprive the Serbs of some of their ill-gotten gains -- and we have not been prepared to commit those means. Moreover, there is limited public support in the U.S. or in Europe for doing so.

Basic Strategic Choices

Many of our decisions over the next 2-3 months will be driven by events on the ground. But some of our choices will depend on where we want to go in the longer term. Therefore, before considering specific options, Principals need to decide our overall strategic direction and whether the course chosen is politically sustainable. This, in turn, requires deciding what are our priority interests and sticking with that decision in terms of committing the resources needed to attain our goals. The following, in broad terms, are basic approaches to be considered:

1. Continue our present policy: muddle through while supporting the Bosnians: Maintain the Contact Group and continue to seek a political solution that provides a better deal for the Bosnians, but not commit to increased military pressure on their behalf; rely for leverage on sanctions and efforts to isolate the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs (recognizing that these will be inadequate to the task). Seek to contain the fighting and humanitarian suffering to the extent possible, while maintaining Alliance cohesion. Keep UNPROFOR in place in essentially its present form (improve its effectiveness, but don't press it to take a more confrontational stance against the Serbs). Seek to postpone any lifting of the arms embargo and don't push for use of NATO air power, since this would precipitate UNPROFOR's withdrawal. Continue to sustain the Federation. Take additional measures in the front-line states to contain spillover of the conflict, such as beefing up UNPROFOR/Macedonia.

   - This would maintain European and Russian support, reduce the risks of deeper U.S. military involvement, and recognize that, absent such involvement, political settlements are not achievable in the foreseeable future.

   - The gap between our goal of a "fair" settlement and our unwillingness to provide the means to that end, however, would leave us vulnerable to charges of diplomatic fecklessness. It would be difficult to persuade the public and pro-Bosnian elements in the Congress that, over time, the maintenance of sanctions, a continued stalemate on the ground, and the solidity of the Federation will bring the Bosnian Serbs to accept a settlement along the lines of the

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Contact Group plan, and the Krajina Serbs to accept autonomy within Croatia.

- The main weakness of this approach, however, is that the Bosnians and the Croatians are not prepared to play along: Both are ready to pursue the military option with renewed vigor over the coming months, putting UNPROFOR's presence in doubt. And the Bosnians will campaign for lift when the ceasefire ends. Our continued rhetorical support for their cause would make it difficult for us to oppose.

2. Adopt a policy of neutrality toward the terms of a settlement and focus on active containment of the conflict: Openly acknowledge that achieving a better solution for the Bosnians is not possible without U.S. actions that it is not in our interest to take. Apart from this shift in approach to the diplomatic track, take essentially the same actions as under the previous approach. Make clear we do not believe multilateral lift is politically attainable and strongly oppose Congressional pressures to lift unilaterally. Abandon Contact Group or suspend its activities, making clear that it is up to the parties, not the international community, to find a mutually acceptable solution. Promote periodic ceasefire agreements. Advise the Bosnians of the need to be realistic about the facts on the ground and agree to terms that acknowledge Serb preeminence (accept territorial outcomes short of 51:49, Serb Confederation with Belgrade; seek protection through links to Croatia, etc.).

   - This course would also maintain good relations with the Europeans, avoid a confrontation with Russia, and reduce the potential for U.S. military involvement. We would concentrate our efforts in areas where we have been able to achieve some success: reducing the violence, delivering humanitarian relief, maintaining the Muslim-Croat ceasefire and the Federation, and preventing the spread of the conflict outside of Bosnia and possibly Croatia. By distancing ourselves from the Bosnians' political agenda, we might have greater success in keeping UNPROFOR in place.

   - We would suffer harsh criticism from some quarters in the Congress and the public for abandoning the Bosnians and performing another flip-flop. We would need to make the case that it is not in U.S. interests to intervene unilaterally to ensure Bosnian victory, that we cannot gain European or Russian support for firmer measures to help the Bosnians, and that lift alone would probably make things worse for them in any case. We would want to appeal to the significant number of Congressmen whose support for lift is soft, and who are not keen on the deeper military involvement that a credible lift-and-strike policy would require.

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- Assuming we can ride out the initial storm, this approach would lower expectations and adjust public opinion to the reality of a continued conflict for which there may be no immediate solution. It would put the onus on the parties to negotiate directly with one another, rather than forcing us to explain repeated failed diplomatic initiatives backed by empty threats. It would force the Bosnians to accept the reality of defeat and the fact that they are destined to live surrounded by Serbs. It might even lead to a de facto indefinite cessation of serious hostilities, reducing both human suffering and public pressures for action.

- The problem with this approach, like the first, is that we may not be able to ride out the storm: the Bosnians may succeed in getting Congress to lift unilaterally, possibly with sufficient votes to override a Presidential veto. Moreover, we would, effectively, be acquiescing in Serb aggression, setting a dangerous precedent for the future.

3. Containment of Conflict and Long-Term Quarantine of Greater Serbia: Abandon efforts to negotiate a political settlement and reimpose full sanctions against Serbia for the long haul. Make clear we will refuse to recognize Serb conquests in Bosnia and Croatia and we will continue to treat Serbia as a pariah state until Serbs accept settlements that restore territorial integrity of Bosnia and Croatia. Refrain from military intervention, take laissez-faire approach to continued fighting among the parties. Concentrate on humanitarian aid, bolstering the Federation politically and economically, and containing spillover to other parts of the region. If UNPROFOR were to withdraw, this could be combined with a lift-and-leave strategy.

   - This approach would be analogous to our approach to Soviet domination of Central and Eastern Europe during the Cold War, in which we were prepared to wait for decades for a just outcome -- isolating one party while promoting free-market development in the other. It would be based, again, on a recognition that there is no available political solution, and avoid perpetuating false expectations that the international community can impose a settlement. But in contrast to the previous approach, it would be based as well on a judgment that Milosevic remains the problem rather than the solution, despite his recent attempts to play the peacemaker -- distinguishing the victim from the victimizer.

   - It is doubtful Russia would agree if we reimposed the sanctions noose around Serbia, however. We might agree with the Russians to disagree about Serbia, perhaps lifting or suspending some or all multilateral sanctions against the FRY -- but maintaining U.S. sanctions -- in exchange for agreement on continued, tightened sanctions against the Pale

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and Knin Serbs (but recognizing that Milosevic will try to undermine these to the extent he can get away with it).

- The front-line states' enforcement of sanctions would be difficult to sustain absent substantial financial compensation. Without such compensation, long-term continuation of the sanctions could actually have a destabilizing effect on the region overall. Moreover, this long-term approach could result in further Serb territorial expansion and prolong the humanitarian and refugee crisis for years to come.

- As with approaches 1 and 2, it is not clear we could sustain this course in the face of pressure from the Congress and the Bosnians.

4. Increased U.S. commitment in support of Bosnians, apply military pressure to compel Serb acceptance of a settlement: In theory, this could involve either: (a) returning to our 1994 approach: press for a more robust UNPROFOR that is prepared to use force against Serbs and make active use of NATO close air support; resume NATO enforcement of exclusion zones, and possibly establish additional exclusion zones; if these measures prove insufficient, withdraw UNPROFOR and implement a multilateral lift-and-strike strategy; or (b) proceeding directly to lift and strike, after helping UNPROFOR to withdraw. In practice, only (b) is feasible, since Allies will not agree to robust military actions while their vulnerable UNPROFOR forces remain in place.

   - This would align our policy with Congressional rhetoric and provide the means to back up our declared goals of helping the Bosnians and thwarting Serb ambitions. It would lead to increased fighting, at least in the short term, but might in time give the Bosnians the capability to recover territory and, by altering the situation on the battlefield, convince the Serbs to agree to an equitable political settlement.

   - It would, however, create significant strains in our relations with our Allies and the Russians. Our readiness to participate in NATO extraction of UNPROFOR could provide the leverage to win Allied support in the UNSC for multilateral lift. But preventing a Russian veto would be more difficult. It would, at a minimum, require lifting sanctions against Serbia at the same time (although this may be necessary in any event to encourage Milosevic not to resume military support to his Serb cousins).

   - Moreover, withdrawing UNPROFOR and explicitly committing to produce a Bosnian success would hasten the onset of the situation we have sought most to avoid, the deployment of U.S. ground forces, leaving us with the responsibility for organizing relief supplies and protecting the enclaves. And

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lift - whether unilateral or multilateral -- would commit us to arming and training the Bosnians for an indefinite period, as well as providing air cover, even if we tried to set a time limit on our support. In short, it could Americanize the war, with little likelihood of hastening a political settlement.

Near-Term Decisions

The foregoing choices pertain mainly to the decisions we will need to take in the coming months on Bosnia. In Croatia, the situation may be more urgent, and our goal more straightforward: to prevent a new war over the Krajina. To this end, we need to be clear at the outset that we do not support Croatian military action to reassert control over the Krajina Serbs, and increase pressure on Tudjman to retain at least some portion of UNPROFOR interposed between the warring parties in the separation zone. We cannot go too far in imposing punitive measures on Tudjman, however, given the importance of Tudjman's support for the Federation and our need to use Croatian territory to support any UN/NATO/U.S. operation in Bosnia. We must above all avoid driving Tudjman into an unholy alliance with Milosevic to carve up Bosnia.

Finally, to the extent that we decide to focus more on containment of spillover, beefing up or replacing UNPROFOR in Macedonia would take on greater urgency alongside the decisions that we will need to make with respect to Bosnia and Croatia.

With these considerations in mind, the following is a sketch of the options on which decisions will be needed over the next three months.

Options: Croatia

Near Term:

- Make renewed push (in tandem with Germans and other Allies) within next 10 days to convince Tudjman to extend UNPROFOR with reduced mandate (UNPROFOR Lite).
- Fallback: Press for one-time extension of March 31/June 30 deadlines to allow more time for negotiations.

  Issue: Whether to threaten limited punitive actions at this stage? Or should we offer Tudjman a carrot?

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If these initial efforts fail:

- Begin Step Two prepositioning for UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia or Croatia no later than March 8 (will require Congressional consultations and decisions on funding).
- Offer new, high-level international negotiator to negotiate Croatian settlement, in tandem with final push for acceptance of UNPROFOR Lite.
- Agree in principle to Croatian proposal for international task force (ITF) to replace UNPROFOR that would monitor Croatian-Bosnian border *on condition that* Tudjman agrees to extend ceasefire, agrees the force will also police the separation zone, and agrees to negotiate with Krajina Serbs on basis of principles in Z-4 plan.

  Issues: Is ITF feasible? (Border force would be highly vulnerable to attack or hostage-taking by Bosnian and Krajina Serb forces, who have traditionally viewed such a force as threat to their survival, and whose acceptance would be a *sine qua non*. Allies would look to U.S. to join the force. But some token presence on the border may be the fig leaf Tudjman needs to back down on ejection of UNPROFOR; Krajina Serbs may accept if it is only way to keep international forces in separation zone.)

  Who would comprise the force? (Unarmed civilian monitors? Joint international-Croatian-Krajina Serb police force? NATO? WEU, backed by U.S. air support -- but recognizing that effectiveness would be limited without TACPs?)

Medium Term:

- Withdraw UNPROFOR from Croatia

  Issues: Nature of U.S. participation?

  How to discourage Tudjman from using NATO forces as cover for early offensive (sanctions or other punitive steps? carrots?).

  How to deter Krajina Serbs from seizing vacated UNPROFOR positions or threatening NATO forces (air strike threat?)

- Introduce civilian monitors to replace UNPROFOR (e.g. OSCE)

Long Term (post-UNPROFOR withdrawal):

- Contain fighting: Establish no-fly zone in Croatia? Other measures?

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- Decide whether to let Tudjman fend for himself (allowing possible Serb victory) or to provide limited support, despite our warnings that he will be on his own.

Options: Bosnia

Near Term:

- Keep Plan B on the table.

  Issues: If so, for how long? Possible modifications/ extensions that aren't sweeteners -- e.g. put forward detailed proposal on constitutional arrangements for future Bosnian Union?)

- Consider staged or scaled-back Plan B -- i.e. ask Milosevic to identify the steps he would take in "partial recognition" of Bosnia and Croatia, determine whether they could be linked to limited sanctions relief.

  Issues: What could Milosevic do beyond tightening border closure to justify sanctions relief? (We could not justify additional relief for tightening a border that should be sealed already. *Possibilities*: close the "back door" to Croatia; cooperate with the War Crimes Tribunal; recognize Bosnia's border and territorial integrity but not the Sarajevo Government.)

  Should we take parallel steps in support of Bosnians to reduce Bosnian/Congressional criticism -- e.g. IMET, other training for Bosnians?

- Continue efforts to isolate Pale irrespective of Plan B: increase border monitors; close Krajina back door.

- Consider whether to reduce or end the activity of the Contact Group as such, in order to emphasize the need for the parties themselves to undertake territorial and constitutional discussions. (This would permit private or individual mediators to operate.) Or agree to French international conference without prior agreement on mutual recognition?

- Explore efforts to increase international support for the Federation: material assistance and political support (envoys to and from, participation in international conferences, agreements such as our proposed 505 agreement, etc.)

- Approach the UN to reconsider its decision not to expand UNPROFOR with the troops already offered (i.e. urge UN to increase UNPROFOR numerically to enable it to deliver humanitarian assistance more effectively, especially along the Blue Route, as opposed to changing its ROE).

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Medium Term:

Decision depends on the choice of overall strategic approach as described above:

- Muddle through, continue to support Bosnians rhetorically, continue diplomatic efforts, but focus on containment.
- Shift to policy of neutrality toward terms of settlement and active containment of conflict; end or suspend Contact Group activities, acknowledge we cannot produce better deal for Bosnians.
- Containment of conflict and long-term quarantine of Greater Serbia.
- Renewed push for military measures in support of Bosnians: withdraw UNPROFOR, multilateral lift and strike

Long Term:

- Maintain support for Federation to forestall Muslim-Croat splits. Intensify isolation of Pale and Knin Serbs.
- Maintain support for War Crimes Tribunal.
- Withdraw UNPROFOR, lift the arms embargo, with lift possibly implemented in stages (beginning with defensive weapons) and tied to "final offer" to accept Contact Group plan.

  Issue: Are we prepared to lift unilaterally if Allies support us in UNSC but Russians veto? Alternatives to lift?

- Abandon support for lift, take tough line with Congress and Bosnians, stick with one of the containment options.

Options: Containing Spillover

- Beef up or replace UNPROFOR/Macedonia

  Issues: When and how? (Enlarge existing force under UN command? Replace with NATO division?)

- Continue efforts to defuse Greece/FYROM dispute.
- Shore up outer wall of sanctions against Serbia.
- Expand bilateral aid/infrastructure programs in south Balkans.
- Expand bilateral military cooperation and economic cooperation with Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia.
- High-level visits to front-line states.

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Decision Timeline

See chart

Attachments:

CIA paper - The Balkans: The Next Three Months
Decision Timeline

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Intelligence Report

DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force — *24 February 1995*

The Balkans: The Next Three Months 3.5c

Fighting is likely to resume this spring because Croatia and Bosnia do not accept the status quo, believe that they can gain political and territorial concessions from Serbs only through military force, and are highly skeptical of the international community's efforts to forge an equitable peace. Fighting is more likely to break out first in Bosnia in March with the collapse of the cessation of hostilities agreement. The scope and intensity of this could influence President Tudjman's calculations on regaining the Krajina by force, but Tudjman's decision on the renewal of conflict there will be taken independently of fighting in Bosnia. Clashes are likely by April or May in conjunction with the UNPROFOR pullout. In a second, less likely scenario, a combination of factors could postpone the fighting until later this year but not alter the deep clashes of interest. In a third scenario, all the warring factions would have to make fundamental changes to their political positions--even less likely in the near to mid term--in order for there to be real movement toward a stable peace in the region. 3.5c

Current Balkans leaders are pursuing irreconcilable demands that make even the beginning of a meaningful peace process in the next three months unlikely. At most, one or more of the key actors in the two major zones of conflict might be convinced to postpone military action. Postponement, however, is not necessarily a way station on the road to peace. Only a reordering of demands or a significant shift in the military situation on the ground would set the stage for a renewed effort to forge a lasting peace in the region. 3.5c

The Key Actors: What Drives Them?

Croatia: Guided by a vision of his personal historical role, mounting nationalist/political pressures which he has helped generate, and frustration with the international community, President Tudjman is now prepared to initiate large-scale military action to reintegrate the Krajina into Croatia. He is encouraged by claims of military superiority from his generals and his own belief that Serbian President Milosevic will not intervene. We do not have evidence Tudjman is working with a specific time schedule; however, having taken the bit in his teeth, it is unlikely he will stall for long or accept merely paper changes in UNPROFOR's mandate. There is no significant peace faction in the Croatian leadership. 3.5c

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Krajina Serbs: Despite fractious personal differences, the Krajina Serb leadership adamantly refuses any form of reintegration, including the limited "autonomy" Zagreb is willing to offer. They will fight fiercely to protect their homeland and could escalate localized Croatian attacks by shelling major Croatian cities. If attacked, they expect help from the Bosnian Serbs and, in extremis, from Belgrade. There is no significant peace faction in Knin. 3.5c

Bosnian Government: Bosnian leaders firmly believe that they can regain territory from the Bosnian Serbs and preserve the concept of a unified Bosnia within its internationally recognized boundaries only by military pressure. They are increasingly confident of their own military capabilities and see the tide swinging in their favor as they look out several years. There is no significant politically organized opposition within the Muslim community to this vision. The Bosnian Croats are largely satisfied with the territory they now control and take their guidance from Zagreb, not Sarajevo. The Herzegovinian hardliners leading the Bosnian Croats ultimately hope to be integrated into a Greater Croatia, a vision that Tudjman does not discourage. 3.5c

Bosnian Serbs: Bosnian Serb leaders will accept nothing less than an independent state as an interim measure toward the creation of an ill-defined "Greater Serbia." They are willing to give up some of the territory they now control to reach an agreement, but until then will fight to keep what they have. They are committed to helping the Krajina Serbs. If pressed by Bosnian Government forces, they might also consider a major military campaign aimed at dealing the Bosnian Government a severe defeat. Although some divisions among leaders are now being publicized, even those advocating acceptance of the Contact Group plan agree with Karadzic on driving a hard bargain on territory and independence for a Bosnian Serb state. Army Commander Mladic despises Karadzic but also shares his goal for an independent Serbian Bosnia with ties to Serbia. 3.5c

Serbia: President Milosevic continues to be a cornerstone to a settlement but at the same time is only a secondary player with limited influence on those he helped into power in Pale and Knin. Milosevic is driven by a strong personal desire to remain in power. He seeks to end sanctions but not at the cost of important political values. He continues to support--for political if not necessarily personal reasons--the concept of a "Greater Serbia," which makes it unlikely he could recognize Croatia and Bosnia or refuse help to the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs if they appeared to be on the verge of serious setbacks. In the short run, he is unable, not just unwilling, to compel either the Krajina Serb or Bosnian Serb leaders to make compromises that they believe are not in their interest. There is no significant peace party in Serbia. 3.5c

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This memorandum was prepared by EO 13526 3.5(c) Office of European Analysis with contributions from 3.5c Office of European Analysis, and EO 13526 3.5(c) EO 13526 3.5(c) Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force on EO 13526 3.5(c)

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Russia: Moscow's overall objectives will be to maintain an influential role in the international decision-making process on the Balkans as the Contact Group process wanes, while trying to keep the conflict contained and minimizing NATO's role. Tactically, Russian leaders will want to increase Russian leverage and head off all domestic criticism by pressing for full sanctions relief for Serbia. Moscow has limited influence with Belgrade--and even less with Pale--but the Russians have the capacity to play a spoiler role. They may pose obstacles to any international actions if they believe that the West is not accounting for Russian interests. 3.5c

EU Contact Group Members: Fearing renewed violence and a broader Balkan conflict, the European Union members of the Contact Group are desperate to keep the negotiating process alive but are increasingly frustrated with the intransigence of the feuding parties. Germany, Britain, and France--which holds the EU presidency and has the largest troop contingent in the former Yugoslavia--will focus on offering incentives for peace, wooing Zagreb with the prospect of EU aid and Belgrade with the promise of lifting sanctions. The EU members so far do not have a unified strategy for dealing with the renewal of full-scale war in Bosnia, according to various sources. Despite differing views, European Contact Group members agree on the need for Contact Group unity and are likely to maintain a coordinated position among themselves under French leadership. 3.5c

Three Scenarios

Renewed Fighting

It is likely that fighting will resume in Bosnia in the next two months, and clashes could then follow quickly in Croatia.

- The Bosnian Government has clearly focused on resupplying, reequipping and reorganizing its forces during the four-month cessation of hostilities (COH) in preparation for launching additional attacks to retake territory in central Bosnia. The Bosnian Serbs also believe that fighting will resume and are taking steps to increase military pressure on the Bihac enclave.

- The Bihac enclave will be the likely focal point of fighting for most of March as the Government V Corps clashes with Krajina Serb and rebel Muslim forces--which did not sign the COH agreement--supported by the Bosnian Serbs. Major gains by either faction around Bihac would probably cause the fighting to spread elsewhere in Bosnia, as the losing faction would attempt to pressure the other by attacking at other points.

- Fighting will probably increase in the rest of Bosnia by late March or early April as the weather improves--temperatures rise into the mid-50s--and the warring factions begin to jockey for military advantage prior to the end of the COH on 30 April. In 1994, fighting picked up substantially in April as

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the government launched a series of attacks in central Bosnia and the Serbs responded by assaulting Gorazde.

- The Bosnian Serbs will probably make a push for new talks in late April and call for an extension of the COH agreement in an attempt to preempt a government attack. The Bosnian Government may accept additional talks under international pressure but will probably reject any extension of the COH agreement.

- The return of warmer, drier weather by May will probably lead to general fighting throughout Bosnia. Government forces will probably launch a series of local attacks--following their strategy of last year--especially in central and northern Bosnia. Government forces will probably make some territorial gains, as the Bosnian Serbs are stretched thin and essentially remain cut off from Serbia. Serb strategy has been to respond to any government attack with an overwhelming offensive--preferably against an isolated or poorly defended enclave--to press the government to abandon its offensive. The Bosnian Serbs, however, will be reluctant to commit their forces fully to a Bosnian offensive, because some may be needed to reinforce the Krajina Serbs in Croatia.

- The resumption of fighting will spark renewed discussion of the need to remove UNPROFOR from Bosnia. Heavy fighting in Bosnia at the same time as an UNPROFOR pullout from Croatia in May and June will spark calls in Paris and London to move toward a withdrawal before winter.

- A major resumption of hostilities in Bosnia, which included an all-out Bosnian Serb effort to take the eastern enclaves, could put at risk nearly 120,000 Muslims who would try to flee to the nearest Muslim-controlled territory. 3.5c

The fighting in Bosnia could influence the prospects for renewed clashes in Croatia, but Tudjman's decision on a renewal of the conflict there will be taken independently of the fighting in Bosnia.

- President Tudjman has ordered the UN to begin withdrawing from Croatia after 31 March and complete withdrawal by 30 June. The Croatians expect to come under increasingly heavy international pressure in the coming month to extend the UN mandate. They appear prepared to stand firm and exact a high price: an international monitoring force--possibly including forces from NATO or Contact Group states--on the Croatian border with Bosnia and Serbia, recognition of Croatia's international border by Belgrade, and demonstrable progress on reintegration of Serb-held territory. In late March or early April, Tudjman may make a push for new talks with the Krajina Serbs, in hopes that the UN pullout will pressure the Serbs to make additional concessions.

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Postponed Fighting

While the differences between the warring factions in Croatia and Bosnia make another round of fighting likely in the next three months, a combination of factors could postpone the fighting until later this year.

- Introduction of a follow-on peacekeeping force could delay renewed fighting in Croatia. Zagreb will only accept a new force that will take control of Croatia's border with Serbia and Bosnia. The Krajina Serbs are unlikely to accept such a force unless it also is charged with patrolling the current cease-fire line. If both factions compromised on this issue and some minimal international force--probably from the WEU or NATO--were in place in April before UNPROFOR begins withdrawing, fighting could be forestalled while a new round of negotiations took place.

- Zagreb will be reluctant to launch a major attack while substantial UN forces are still in Serb-held territories. If the UN withdrawal in April and May is particularly slow and a large number of peacekeepers remain in the region, Croatia may opt to postpone major military action until the fall, after the tourist season.

- If Croatia is seriously threatened with major economic sanctions in response to military attacks on the Krajina Serbs, Zagreb may delay military action until the international community's focus wanes or until Croatia can point to a serious Serb "provocation" to justify further military operations. 3.5c

Heavy fighting would be postponed in Bosnia if the Bosnian Government decided to delay its likely spring offensives.

- Heavy spring rains could impede resupply and movement of government forces, and they may wait until the drier months of June or July before launching major attacks.

- Government forces may wish to take advantage of the impact on the Serbs of renewed fighting in Croatia. Under such a scenario, they might postpone their attacks until the Bosnian Serbs are heavily engaged in the fighting in the Krajina, probably in June or later.

- The government could rethink its plans for military operations if serious negotiations were about to take place. These would require true concessions from the Bosnian Serbs prior to the start of talks, including removal of forces from key areas such as Sarajevo, and some form of acceptance of the original contact group plan. 3.5c

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Movement Towards Peace

Despite five years of effort, the international community has not been able to affect the fundamental clashes of interests in the region. Unless the UN, NATO or some other outside actor is prepared for a massive long-term infusion of economic and military resources into the region, such changes are not likely in the near term. If all the warring factions made fundamental changes to their political positions, we would expect to see some of the following signs of movement towards agreement during the next three months.

- Croatia would have to accept the extension of the UNPROFOR mandate or the deployment of a new force that monitored the current cease-fire line by April in order to prevent renewed clashes--especially in the zone of separation this spring.

- By late spring, a new round of negotiations would have to begin, with both sides making major concessions. Croatia and the Krajina Serbs would have to be prepared to redraw existing international borders allowing the Serbs to live outside Croatian control. Alternatively, the complete Krajina Serb leadership would have to be replaced, and probably a substantial portion of the local Serb population removed to Bosnia or Serbia, leaving the Krajina inside Croatia.

- Negotiations could be based on a slightly less extreme scenario if Zagreb accepted significantly more "autonomy" for the Krajina Serbs than is contained in the Z-4 plan and the Krajina Serbs gave up the idea of any "special links" with Belgrade. 3.5c

Movement towards a solution in Bosnia would almost certainly be tied to developments in Croatia, but any movement towards peace there would also rely on a number of unprecedented developments.

- Initially, the Bosnian Government and Bosnian Serbs would have to accept an extension of the current cessation of hostilities accord after 30 April and begin implementing all of its measures, including the separation of forces and the deployment of peacekeepers between the warring factions.

- To support the talks, the Bosnian Government would have to abandon its goal of maintaining a unified Bosnia. The Serbs would have to back down from their plans for association with Serbia.

- Effective enforcement of the arms embargo, especially the cut-off of Iranian arms deliveries, could make Sarajevo more receptive to a diplomatic settlement.

- As stated earlier, Belgrade's recognition of Croatia and Bosnia is likely to lead to an increase in fighting in the short term. If the Krajina Serbs and

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 16, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

SUBJECT: Principals Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, March 17, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the discussion paper for the Principals Meeting on March 17. The paper, which reflects preliminary interagency input, has been reviewed by Sandy Berger.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve ___ Disapprove ___

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A March 16 NSC paper
Tab B February 27 NSC paper

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NS NARA, Date 6/14/10

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LOG 9520327
DATE 15 MAR 95

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 17 MAR PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520327
RECEIVED: 14 MAR 95 14

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 15 MAR 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
UN
AGENDA
CROATIA
NATO
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 17 MAR PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: REED SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 17 MAR 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520345 9520347

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0124 CODES: BOS CRO

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		JOSHI
		KERRICK
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		VERSHBOW
		WOLIN

COMMENTS: _____

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95031511	FOR DECISION
001		X	95031511	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
002		X	95031511	REED SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950315	-UERTH, L	
002	950315	BRILL, K	
002	950315	ADAMS, G	
002	950315	MCALEER, R	
002	950315	INDERFURTH, K	
002	950315	GARTHOFF, D	
002	950315	PATRICK, T	
002	950315	PANETTA, L	

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RECD 3/15 8:00am

National Security Council
The White House

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Reed	1/5	JWR	A
Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg	2	COPY	
Berger	3	cc	
Lake	4	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	* TAB A IS REVISED AGENDA
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk			
NSC Secretariat			D N
TONY LAKE - CYPLS		3/15	
SANDY BERGER - CY/PLS			

OBW

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS:

* CYS NEED TO BE REPLACED IN ALL CYS OF THIS PKG

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

R - Do you want to WAIT until later today and add Korea (assuming the paper comes in as I believe it will)?

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SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 17 MAR PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA
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EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	3/15/95	PM 2:35	Kathy Tighe PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: 1
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	3/15/95	5:30	L Graves PRINT LAST NAME: GRAVES COPY: 1

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MR. LEON E. PANETTA
WHITE HOUSE
1ST FLOOR, WEST WING
WASHINGTON, DC 20500

DATE 3/16 TIME 10:55 SIGNATURE [signature]

PRINT LAST NAME: Kreisel

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: 1
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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	3/15/95	1513	Wms., MC
	PRINT LAST NAME:		Williams
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DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503			
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MR. LEON E. PANETTA
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WASHINGTON, DC 20500

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3/17/95	10:30	

PRINT LAST NAME: Angell

COPY: 1

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

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DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: _____ CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Notification & Agenda on 17 March PC Mtg on Bosnia & Croatia NSC LOG # 20327

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 6/14/10
2010-0573-F

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

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TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE
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- ☐ IMMEDIATE
- ☐ PRIORITY
- ☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC LOG # 20327

FROM: National Security Council (9pm) PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting PAGES: 3

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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20327

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 14, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: DON KERRICK

SUBJECT: Principals Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, March 17, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Principals Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia to be held March 17, 1995. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the meeting and authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MS NARA, Date 6/14/10
2012-0533-M

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20327

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 15, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the UN

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia on March 17, 1995, 2:30pm - 4:00pm, in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be principals only. The agenda is attached at Tab A. Papers should be circulated by the designated Agency by 12:00pm, March 16. ~~(S)~~

for James W. Rudy
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By RS NARA, Date 6/11/10
NLWJC-05??-?

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PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA AND CROATIA

DATE: March 17, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30-4:00pm

Agenda

I. Former Yugoslavia Policy Review.....NSC/All**

-- Steps to Prevent Renewed War in Bosnia.....State**

II. Near-Term Diplomatic Strategy.....State**

B. Croatia Strategy (Next Steps)

C. Contact Group Prospects/Response to the Milosevic Proposal

III. OPLAN 40104 Approval Process

A. Next Steps on NATO Prepositioning - Step Two and Beyond.....OSD/JCS**

(1) Talking Points for Congressional Calls

(2) Notifying NATO

B. NATO/U.S. Decision Timeline for OPLAN 40104...OSD/JCS**

-- Strategy for Gaining Congressional Authorization and Appropriation.....OSD/ALL

IV. Responding to Dole/Bosnian Government Requests for Military Training (Implementing 505 Agreement).....OSD/JCS**

** - Paper Due 12 noon March 16.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 3/5/2020
2013-0682-m

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RECORD ID: 9520282
RECEIVED: 03 MAR 95 18

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 06 MAR 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
DEFENSE POLICY
PC
CROATIA
UN

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FOLLOW UP TO 3 MAR PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA - US PARTICIPATION IN STEP II OF NATO PREPOSITIONING FOR UNPROFOR WITHDRAWAL

ACTION: ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/S DUE DATE: 07 MAR 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520261 9520269

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0123 CODES: BOS CRO

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		DANVERS
		KERRICK
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95030319	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR DECISION
001	KERRICK	Z	95030412	FOR REDO
002	LAKE	Z	95030616	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR DECISION
003	PRESIDENT	Z	95030621	FOR DECISION
003		Z	95031117	PRES APPROVED W/ COMMENT
003		X	95032209	ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/S

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
003	950306		VICE PRESIDENT
003	950306		WH CHIEF OF STAFF

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WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 3-7 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 3-7 COB

SUBJECT: STEP TWO NATO PREPOSITIONING FOR UNPROFOR WITHDRAWAL: CROATIA

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
VICE PRESIDENT	☐	☑	QUINN	☐	☐
PANETTA OK	☑	☐	RASCO	☐	☐
McLARTY	☐	☐	RUBIN	☐	☐
ICKES	☐	☐	SEGAL	☐	☐
BOWLES	☐	☐	STEPHANOPOULOS (see note)	☑	☐
RIVLIN	☐	☐	TYSON	☐	☐
EMANUEL	☐	☐	WEBSTER	☐	☐
GEARAN	☐	☐	WILLIAMS	☐	☐
GIBBONS	☐	☐ 3/8	Fourth cmt due COB 3-8	☐	☐
GRIFFIN	☑	☐		☐	☐
HALE	☐	☐		☐	☐
HERMAN	☐	☐		☐	☐
LAKE	☐	☐		☐	☐
LINDSEY	☐	☐		☐	☐
MIKVA	☐	☐		☐	☐
McCURRY	☐	☐		☐	☐
McGINTY	☐	☐		☐	☐

REMARKS:

RESPONSE:

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
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NSD-0533-m

JOHN D. PODESTA
Assistant to the President
and Staff Secretary
Ext. 2702

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Document No. 100300SS

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 3-7 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 3-7 COB

SUBJECT: STEP TWO NATO PREPOSITIONING FOR UNPROFOR WITHDRAWAL: CROATIA

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
VICE PRESIDENT	☐	☑	QUINN	☐	☐
PANETTA	☑	☐	RASCO	☐	☐
McLARTY	☐	☐	RUBIN	☐	☐
ICKES	☐	☐	SEGAL	☐	☐
BOWLES	☐	☐	STEPHANOPOULOS	☑	☐
RIVLIN	☐	☐	TYSON	☐	☐
EMANUEL	☐	☐	WEBSTER	☐	☐
GEARAN	☐	☐	WILLIAMS	☐	☐
GIBBONS	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐
GRIFFIN	☑	☐	_____	☐	☐
HALE	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐
HERMAN	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐
LAKE	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐
LINDSEY	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐
MIKVA	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐
McCURRY	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐
McGINTY	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐

REMARKS:

RESPONSE:

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2012-0533-M

JOHN D. PODESTA
Assistant to the President
and Staff Secretary
Ext. 2702

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Document No. 100300SS

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 3-7 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 3-7 COB

SUBJECT: STEP TWO NATO PREPOSITIONING FOR UNPROFOR WITHDRAWAL: CROATIA

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
VICE PRESIDENT	☐	☑	QUINN	☐	☐
PANETTA	☑	☐	RASCO	☐	☐
McLARTY	☐	☐	RUBIN	☐	☐
ICKES	☐	☐	SEGAL	☐	☐
BOWLES	☐	☐	STEPHANOPOULOS	☑	☐
RIVLIN	☐	☐	TYSON	☐	☐
EMANUEL	☐	☐	WEBSTER	☐	☐
GEARAN	☐	☐	WILLIAMS	☐	☐
GIBBONS	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐
GRIFFIN	☑	☐	_____	☐	☐
HALE	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐
HERMAN	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐
LAKE	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐
LINDSEY	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐
MIKVA	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐
McCURRY	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐
McGINTY	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐

REMARKS:

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MA NARA Date 6/14/12
2012-0533-N

RESPONSE:

To: John
Fr. GS
I don't think we have an option
on this, but it's a tough call.
The trigger a War Powers
Resolution violation in Congress?

JOHN D. PODESTA
Assistant to the President
and Staff Secretary
Ext. 2702

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON
March 9, 1995

MR. PRESIDENT

Attached is a decision memo from Tony Lake on U.S. participation in NATO's "Step Two" prepositioning of communications systems for use in possible withdrawal of UNPROFOR troops from Croatia. Step Two would involve agreement to deploy some 450 U.S. military personnel in Europe, 320 of them in Croatia -- though actual deployment would be subject to a further decision of the NAC.

Pros: Our participation would send the right signal about U.S. leadership in NATO. Our allies' forces on the ground are in danger and we must not be seen obstructing NATO military planning needed to protect them. Cons: prepositioning could embolden Tudjman to keep refusing any UNPROFOR successor force, moving us toward commitment of a large-scale ground force to help extract UNPROFOR, and in turn leading to a wider war.

Our allies would prefer to keep UNPROFOR in place and are reluctant to proceed with Step Two deployment at this time, fearing this could hasten UNPROFOR's departure and open the way for air strikes and lifting the arms embargo. But deployment may become unavoidable.

While recognizing the real risks, NSC Principals recommend approval of U.S. participation in Step Two. Leon and George concur, though George is concerned that this might trigger a War Powers debate. We have forwarded a copy of the memo to the Vice President. If you approve, State and Defense will consult with Congress next week before informing NATO of our decision.

John Podesta
Todd Stern

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PER E.O. 13526
CIA HISTORICAL COLLATIONS
DIVISION AR 70-14 (0/1/2013
(2013-0682-M, 7.73)

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TOD DRAFT

March 8, 1995

MR. PRESIDENT

Attached is a decision memo from Tony Lake on U.S. participation in NATO's "Step Two" prepositioning of communications systems for possible withdrawal of UNPROFOR troops from Croatia. Step Two would involve agreement to deploy some 450 U.S. military personnel in Europe, 320 of them in Croatia -- though actual deployment would be subject to a further decision of the NAC. (Our allies, worried that Step Two could provoke UNPROFOR's withdrawal, are reluctant for now to go ahead with deployment. But deployment may become unavoidable.)

Pros: Our participation would send the right signal about U.S. leadership in NATO. Our allies' forces on the ground are in danger and we must support NATO military planning needed to protect them. Cons: Prepositioning could embolden Tudjman to continue refusing any UNPROFOR successor force, moving us toward commitment of a large-scale ground force to help extract UNPROFOR, which in turn would open the way to a wider war.

While recognizing the serious risks involved, NSC Principals recommend that we agree to U.S. participation in Step Two. Leon concurs, as does George, though George is concerned about whether this move could trigger a War Powers debate in Congress. If you agree, State and Defense will begin consultations with Congress next week, before informing NATO of our decision.

Approve___ Disapprove___ Discuss___

John Podesta
Todd Stern

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 6, 1995

95 MAR 6 P9:26

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: U.S. Participation in Step Two of NATO Prepositioning for UNPROFOR Withdrawal

Purpose

To obtain your agreement for U.S. forces' participation in Step Two of NATO prepositioning for UNPROFOR withdrawal.

Background

Principals met Friday to discuss U.S. participation in Step Two of NATO's ongoing efforts to prepare to support a possible UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia or Croatia. We are seeking your approval to inform NATO that the United States agrees to support Step Two of NATO's efforts to preposition communications systems and operators in Croatia. Step Two includes deployment of approximately 450 U.S. military personnel within Europe, including 320 to government-controlled areas of Croatia, although the timing of the actual deployment of the prepositioning force will be subject to a subsequent NAC decision.

NATO and UNPROFOR military planning for UNPROFOR's possible withdrawal from Bosnia has been underway for several months. With UNPROFOR withdrawal a possibility this spring, NATO began to take action in February by executing Step One, which initiated the process of establishing an enhanced theater communications system. No U.S. forces were involved. With Step One well underway, NATO is seeking approval to execute Step Two, which will deploy military personnel to set up and operate the communications system.

Prepositioning is a necessary step to support a large operation. Nearly 1800 personnel are involved, including the 450 Americans. The total NATO cost for prepositioning is estimated at $11.3M and comes from existing NATO funds (the U.S. pays 25 percent), although we will pay our own transportation and sustainment costs. An orderly withdrawal of UNPROFOR cannot begin until

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eight weeks after the prepositioning occurs; thus Shali argues that delaying a decision will put Allied forces at risk.

This decision would carry significant risks, even though it would send the right signal about U.S. leadership in NATO, support our military leaders and maximize military preparedness. In the worst case, it could set in motion a series of events leading to UNPROFOR's withdrawal and renewed fighting, with NATO and U.S. forces left on the ground to deal with the aftermath. Tudjman might welcome the NATO deployment as a stepping stone to a larger NATO and U.S. ground role as UNPROFOR's replacement. Emboldened by NATO and U.S. forces in Croatia, Tudjman could become even more intransigent on accepting an UNPROFOR successor force. This could move us closer to an actual commitment of ground forces for a large-scale operation to extract UNPROFOR, the exact dimensions of which will remain unknown until the plan is completed in about two weeks. With NATO on the ground, or positioned to extract UNPROFOR, the decision to withdraw UNPROFOR will be easier for the UN and troop contributors to make. If they withdraw, renewed fighting is a certainty and the wider war we feared will have been facilitated by NATO's deployment into Croatia. While we anticipate a subsequent NAC decision will be taken to deploy the forces into Croatia, with each incremental step, it becomes more unlikely that our decision will be reversible. In fact, if NATO decides to conduct the operation, large-scale U.S. participation is inevitable.

Not all Allies support prepositioning, so our decision may prove academic for the time being. The French have been the most adamant, calling for a delay on the grounds that putting NATO personnel on the ground in Croatia would undermine efforts to change Tudjman's mind. Other Allies have voiced similar concerns and fear that NATO prepositioning will set in train the steps described above, leading to UNPROFOR's withdrawal and the wider war that diplomatic efforts aim to prevent. They also see UNPROFOR's departure as the opening to lifting the arms embargo and accompanying air strikes. Allies prefer to keep UNPROFOR in place and muddle through.

After balancing the risks against the military requirements, Principals decided that, because of the danger to our Allies who have forces on the ground and to sustain our leadership of the Alliance, we should make the commitment to support Step Two. This will permit the personnel to be organized and trained, with their actual deployment subject to a further decision by the NAC. Principals agreed that we will not press those Allies who are reluctant to execute Step Two but that it is important that the U.S. not be seen as obstructing NATO military planning needed to reduce the risks to Allied forces.

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Principals also concluded that, in view of the Congressional interest that the deployment of 320 U.S. military personnel to Croatia will generate, consultations must be completed before informing NATO of our decision. We would seek to cast this as a limited, precautionary move that is being taken without prejudice to a possible future decision to help in a NATO-led withdrawal of UNPROFOR. We would make clear that we intend to consult closely with the Congress on the latter (more formidable) undertaking and seek prior Congressional approval of the necessary funding. If you agree, State and Defense will brief leadership and key committee chairs early next week.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize U.S. representatives at NATO to support Step Two prepositioning, subject to consultations with Congress, and with the actual deployment of U.S. personnel to Croatia subject to a subsequent NAC and Principals' decision.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

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JE 0150 C015-006

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MR MARKER

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (2 pages)~~	~~03/28/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
002a. memo	Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake re: March 28 Principals Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (5 pages)	03/27/1995	P1/b(1)
~~002b. cable~~	~~re: March 24: Contact Group Plus Italy Informally Circulates Tests of the Three Resolutions (10 pages)~~	~~03/25/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002c. letter~~	~~Dr. Mate Granic to UN Secretary General (3 pages)~~	~~03/27/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ
~~002d. cable~~	~~re: Contact Group Meeting-A Final Effort to Head Off a Bosnia War (4 pages)~~	~~03/27/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ
~~002e. cable~~	~~re: Meeting with Milosevic-Assurances on Croatia, Different Game Plans on Bosnia (6 pages)~~	~~03/24/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ
~~002f. report~~	~~re: Richardson's Conversations with Milosevic (13 pages)~~	~~03/24/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ
~~002g. memo~~	~~Leon Fuerth to Members of the Principals Committee re: Sanctions Policy (6 pages)~~	~~03/27/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ
~~002h. letter~~	~~Alija Izetbegovic to UN Secretary General (1 page)~~	~~03/22/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ
~~002i. paper~~	~~re: Options for Bosnia Fighting Escalates in the Spring (3 pages)~~	~~03/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ
~~002j. paper~~	~~re: A Possible Strategy to Extend the Cease-fire (2 pages)~~	~~03/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ

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P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 01 APR 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
UN
PC
CROATIA
NATO
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 28 MAR PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: REED SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 01 APR 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520393 9520396

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0126 CODES: BOS CRO

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002	950401	FUERTH, L	
002	950401	BRILL, K	
002	950401	MCALEER, R	
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002	950401	GARTHOFF, D	
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WASHINGTON, DC 20506

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COPY: 1

[redacted]
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions For PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA 28 MAR NSC LOG # 20407

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USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
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109 # 20407

FROM: National Security Council (NSC) PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: SOC ~~Notice~~ of Meeting FOR BOSNIA & CROATIA PAGES: 4

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20407

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 1, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

AMBASSADOR RICK INDEFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T.R. PATRICK
Executive Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, March 28, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

James W. Reed
for Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By RNS NARA, Date 6/14/20

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20407

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee
DATE: March 28, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 3:20 - 4:25pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Anthony Lake

OVP
Leon Fuerth

State
Warren Christopher
Robert Frasure

DOD
William Perry

USUN
Madeleine Albright

Chief of Staff
No representative

CIA
Admiral William Studeman

JCS
General John Shalikashvili

NSC
Alexander Vershbow

Summary of Conclusions

Croatia: Mandate for a New UN Peacekeeping Force

1. Principals reviewed the progress of efforts underway at the United Nations to enact a UN Security Council resolution containing the mandate for a new UN peacekeeping force in Croatia, as well as companion resolutions on peacekeeping forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Principals agreed that Ambassador Albright should be provided flexibility to secure passage of a framework resolution for the new Croatian force before UNPROFOR's mandate expires on March 31, recognizing that the UN will need to conduct further consultations with the parties during the first weeks of April to iron out the details of implementation. Principals discussed the value of meetings at the UN involving the Krajina Serbs and the

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2010-0533-M
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Contact Group, as proposed by Russia, and agreed that such meetings would be counterproductive to ongoing efforts. **(Action: USUN/State)** (S)

Bosnia: Preventing Renewed Fighting

2. Principals agreed that we should continue our efforts to prevent or contain a reescalation of fighting in Bosnia as the end of the cessation of hostilities approaches. Noting the Bosnian Government's request for a more robust UNPROFOR posture before agreeing to extend its mandate, Principals agreed that we should immediately approach the British and the French on measures to make UNPROFOR more robust. To this end, Principals requested that a strategy be developed to begin immediate consultations with the British and the French, using the menu of options in the OSD paper "Options for Bosnia -- Fighting Escalates in the Spring." **(Action: State with DoD input)** Principals also directed that the Bosnian Government be informed of our efforts with Allies to encourage a more robust UNPROFOR posture, in order to help secure passage of a new UNPROFOR mandate in Bosnia. **(Action USUN/State)** (S)

Sanctions

3. Principals discussed options to tighten the "outer ring" of sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro and the "inner ring" of sanctions against the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs. They decided not to press at this time for a general tightening of the "outer ring" of sanctions, given the need to focus allied attention on measures to make UNPROFOR more robust, and taking into account Bosnian President Izetbegovic's request that we extend phase-one sanctions relief for a third 100-day period. They did agree, however, that we should explore steps necessary for NATO and WEU naval forces to assist in enforcing a pre-verification system on Albanian oil imports, in order to reduce the transshipment of oil to Serbia-Montenegro through Albania. **(Action: State/OVP)** (S)

4. Principals decided that we should tighten the "inner ring" of sanctions by strengthening sanctions enforcement against the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs and by working with Croatia to close the "back door." This effort should be delayed for one week, however, while we attempt to persuade Allies to make UNPROFOR more robust. **(Action: State/OVP)** (S)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 29, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: DON KERRICK

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, March 28, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia held March 28, 1995.

Concurrence by: Rick Saunders for

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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FROM: KERRICK
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 27 MAR 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
NATO
PC
CROATIA
UN

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 28 MAR PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 30 MAR 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520393 9520407

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0126 CODES: BOS CRO

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FROM: KERRICK
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PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 28 MAR PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION DUE DATE: 30 MAR 95 STATUS: IX

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF:

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The White House

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Dohse	1	W	
Sens	2	MS	
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake	3		
Situation Room		Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
West Wing Desk	4		
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS: Lake's Paper for Bosnia/Croatia PC 3/28

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake re: March 28 Principals Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (5 pages)	03/27/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4008

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0126 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, March 28, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs637

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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Subgroup/Office of Origin	[PC and Bosnia ...]	Subseries			
Folder Title	PC 0126 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovi	OA Number	4008	Box Number	8 of 10
Description of Item(s)	Map of Border and Zone Crossings Around Bosnia and Herzegovina				

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PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING
March 28, 1995
3:15 - 4:45 p.m.
SVTS Room

Chair
Anthony Lake

OVP
Leon Fuerth

State
Secretary Christopher
Robert Frasure

DOD
Secretary Perry

USUN
Ambassador Albright

COS
Leon Panetta

CIA
Admiral William Studeman

JCS
General Shalikashvili

White House
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
Sandy Vershbow

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Meeting of NSC Principals Committee
on Bosnia and Croatia
Tuesday, March 28, 1995
3:15-4:45 p.m.
White House SVTS Conference Room

AGENDA

I. Croatia: Mandate for New UN Peacekeeping Force...State/USUN

II. Diplomatic Strategy

A. Contact Group Status/Next Steps.....State

B. Sanctions Options.....OVP

III. Preventing or containing renewed fighting in Bosnia

A. Options for Tougher UN/NATO Action...,.....OSD

B. Diplomatic Strategy.....State

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By RN1 NARA, Date 6/14/10
2012-0533-M

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EXDIS

WHITE HOUSE PASS TO NSC: JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, CHAIRMAN, VIENNA FOR BOSNIA

E.0.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UNSC, BK, HR, SR,
SUBJECT: MARCH 24: CONTACT GROUP PLUS ITALY INFORMALLY
-- CIRCULATES TEXTS OF THREE RESOLUTIONS TO OTHER
-- MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, SYG'S REPORT
-- CIRCULATED TO COUNCIL MEMBERS, CROATS GIVE US
-- PROPOSALS FOR CHANGES TO THE RESOLUTIONS

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. COUNSELORS FROM THE CONTACT GROUP PLUS ITALY MET MORNING OF MARCH 24 TO CONTINUE THEIR DISCUSSION OF THE THREE RESOLUTIONS ON THE UN PEACEKEEPING PRESENCE IN CROATIA, BOSNIA AND FYROM. SOME PROGRESS WAS MADE IN RESOLVING THE REMAINING BRACKETS. THE GERMANS PRESENTED A NEW OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH FOR THE RESOLUTIONS ON CROATIA AND BOSNIA CALLING ON MEMBER STATES TO RESPOND FAVORABLY TO REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE FROM THE SECRETARY GENERAL. (OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 9 IN THE FIRST TEXT BELOW AND OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 8 IN THE SECOND.) THIS WAS A SIGNIFICANT WEAKENING OF EARLIER GERMAN LANGUAGE WHICH CALLED ON STATES TO RESPOND FAVORABLY FOR REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE WITH WITHDRAWAL, AND CONTAINED LANGUAGE USED IN PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS TO IMPLY ASSISTANCE FROM NATO. THE GERMANS

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ADMITTED THAT THEY NEEDED A PARAGRAPH CALLING ON STATES TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE IN ORDER TO COUNTER DOMESTIC OPPOSITION TO GERMAN MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN ANY NATO FORCE SENT TO HELP THE UN WITHDRAW FROM CROATIA OR BOSNIA.

3. THE FRENCH CONTINUED TO INSIST THAT THE RESOLUTIONS CONTAIN A REFERENCE TO RESOLUTION 958. AFTER THE RUSSIANS OBJECTED TO A DIRECT REFERENCE, THE FRENCH AGREED TO INQUIRE WHETHER PARIS COULD ACCEPT INCLUDING A REFERENCE TO RESOLUTION 958 IN PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE SECOND RESOLUTION.

4. LATER THAT AFTERNOON MEMBERS OF THE CONTACT GROUP PLUS ITALY CIRCULATED TEXTS OF THE THREE RESOLUTIONS FOUND BELOW TO ALL OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL. AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT REVIEWED THE KEY POINTS OF THE TEXTS ON CROATIA AND BOSNIA. SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE TEXTS WILL LIKELY BEGIN ON MARCH 27 WHEN THE CONTACT GROUP WILL LIKELY MEET WITH THE NON-ALIGNED CAUCUS. THE CZECHS INDICATED THAT THEY WERE ANXIOUS TO CO-SPONSOR ALL THREE DRAFTS.

5. THE SYG'S REPORT WAS GIVEN TO MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL DURING THE AFTERNOON OF MARCH 24. THE REPORT STATES THAT AN AGREEMENT ON THE DETAILS OF A NEW MANDATE AND THE MODALITIES OF THE UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATION REQUIRES ADDITIONAL WORK. THE GAP BETWEEN THE GOC AND KNIN SERBS ON THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE NEW FORCE IN CROATIA REMAINS WIDE AND THE SYG WAS THEREFORE NOT IN A POSITION TO ADVISE THE COUNCIL THAT KNIN WOULD OFFER THEIR PRACTICAL COOPERATION WITH THE FORCE. NEVERTHELESS, THE REPORT STATES THAT THE BASIS EXISTS FOR AN AGREEMENT THAT THE MANDATE OF THE NEW FORCE WOULD BE BASED ON THE FOLLOWING FUNCTIONS:

-- SUPPORT FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MARCH 29 CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT AND THE DECEMBER 2 ECONOMIC AGREEMENT, AND;

-- IMPLEMENTATION OF THOSE ELEMENTS OF THE VANCE PLAN WHICH ARE ACCEPTED BY BOTH PARTIES AS HAVING CONTINUING RELEVANCE. THESE WOULD INCLUDE A UN PRESENCE ALONG CROATIA'S INTERNATIONAL BORDERS, ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS, PROTECTION OF MINORITIES, MINE CLEARANCE, AND CONVOY ASSISTANCE.

6. THE REPORT EMPHASIZES THAT CRUCIAL DIFFERENCES REMAIN BETWEEN ZAGREB AND KNIN REGARDING DETAILS OF THE MANDATE. IT RECOMMENDS THAT UNPROFOR BE REPLACED BY THREE SEPARATE BUT INTERLINKED PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS TO BE KNOWN AS UN PEACE FORCE - 1 FOR CROATIA, UN PEACE FORCE -2 FOR BOSNIA, AND UN PEACE FORCE - 3 FOR FYROM. EACH WOULD HAVE THEIR OWN COMMANDER AND CIVILIAN CHIEF OF MISSION WHO WOULD REPORT TO A SINGLE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND THEATER FORCE COMMANDER.

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7. CROATIAN PERMREP NOBILO ASKED FOR A MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT TO PRESENT A LIST OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE RESOLUTION ESTABLISHING A NEW PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN CROATIA. NOBILO SAID THE GOC WOULD INSIST THAT THE NAME OF THE NEW FORCE CONTAIN THE WORD "CROATIA", AND THAT THE RESOLUTION CONTAIN A REFERENCE TO RESOLUTION 820. FURTHER, CHANGES IN PARAGRAPH 3 (D) WERE "ESSENTIAL". AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT SAID THAT WE WOULD STUDY THE CROATIAN PROPOSALS. SHE EMPHASIZED THAT WE WANTED TO WORK WITH THE CROATS, BUT THAT OPPOSITION FROM OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL MADE SOME OF THEM NON-STARTERS.

8. COMMENT: THE COUNCIL WILL DISCUSS THE SYG'S REPORT ON MARCH 27. THE CONTACT GROUP PLUS ITALY WILL LIKELY RECONVENE TO CONTINUE DISCUSSING THE TEXT AND MEET WITH THE NON-ALIGNED CAUCUS FOR AN INITIAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. END COMMENT.

9. BEGIN TEXTS OF RESOLUTIONS:

RESOLUTION I: CREATING A NEW UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN CROATIA

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

RECALLING ALL ITS PREVIOUS RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS ON THE CONFLICTS IN THE TERRITORY OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA,

HAVING CONSIDERED THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF (S/1995/....)

AFFIRMING ITS COMMITMENT TO THE SEARCH FOR AN OVERALL NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICTS IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA ENSURING THE SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ALL THE STATES THERE WITHIN THEIR INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED BORDERS, AND STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE IT ATTACHES TO THE MUTUAL RECOGNITION THEREOF,

WELCOMING ALSO THE CONTINUING EFFORTS OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED NATIONS, THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO FACILITATE A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA,

RECOGNIZING THAT MAJOR PROVISIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING PLAN FOR THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA (S/23280 ANNEX III) AND RELEVANT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS RELATED TO THE CONFLICT IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA, IN PARTICULAR RESOLUTIONS 871/1993 AND 947(1994), STILL REMAIN TO BE IMPLEMENTED,

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NOTING THAT UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE'S MANDATE IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA EXPIRES ON 31 MARCH 1995 IN CONFORMITY WITH RESOLUTION 947 (1994).

NOTING ALSO THE LETTERS FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA OF 17 MARCH (S/1995/206) AND QDATE) (S/1995/....) REGARDING HIS GOVERNMENT'S VIEWS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA,

REAFFIRMING ITS DETERMINATION TO ENSURE THE SECURITY AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF PERSONNEL OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN THE TERRITORY OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, AND, TO THESE ENDS, ACTING UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS,

1. WELCOMES THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF (S/1995/....), AND IN PARTICULAR APPROVES THE ARRANGEMENTS IN PARAGRAPH Y (COMMAND AND CONTROL).

2. DECIDES TO ESTABLISH UNDER ITS AUTHORITY THE QUNITED NATIONS CONFIDENCE RESTORATION OPERATION (UNCRO) IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH X OF THE ABOVE MENTIONED REPORT FOR A PERIOD TERMINATING ON 31 MARCH 1996 AND REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO TAKE THE MEASURES NECESSARY TO ENSURE ITS EARLIEST POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENT;

3. DECIDES THAT IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH X OF THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, (/1995....

[UNCRO'S] MANDATE SHALL INCLUDE:

(A) PERFORMING FULLY THE FUNCTIONS ENVISAGED IN THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT OF 29 MARCH 1994 BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA AND THE LOCAL SERB AUTHORITIES,

(B) FACILITATING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ECONOMIC AGREEMENT OF 2 DECEMBER 1994 CONCLUDED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE CO-CHAIRMEN OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA,

(C) FACILITATING IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL RELEVANT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS,

[(D) ASSISTING IN CONTROLLING, BY MONITORING AND REPORTING, THE CROSSING OF MILITARY PERSONNEL, MILITARY EQUIPMENT, SUPPLIES AND WEAPONS, OVER THE INTERNATIONAL BORDERS BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA AND THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, AND THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO) AT THE BORDER CROSSINGS FOR WHICH QUNCROQ IS RESPONSIBLE, AS SPECIFIED IN THE UNITED

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NATIONS PEACEKEEPING PLAN FOR THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA (S/23280 ANNEX III)]

(E) FACILITATING THE DELIVERY OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA THROUGH TERRITORY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA,

(F) MONITORING THE DEMILITARIZATION OF THE PREVLAKA PENINSULA IN ACCORDANCE WITH RESOLUTION 779 (1992);

4. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONTINUE HIS CONSULTATIONS WITH ALL CONCERNED ON THE DETAILED IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MANDATE OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE, AND TO REPORT TO THE COUNCIL NOT LATER THAN ..... 1995 FOR ITS APPROVAL;

5. DECIDES THAT [UNCRO] SHALL BE AN INTERIM ARRANGEMENT TO CREATE THE CONDITIONS THAT WILL LEAD TO A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT CONSISTENT WITH THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA AND WHICH GUARANTEES THE SECURITY AND RIGHTS OF ALL COMMUNITIES LIVING IN A PARTICULAR AREA, IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER THEY CONSTITUTE IN THIS AREA A MAJORITY OR MINORITY;

6. EMPHASIZES THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PARTIES AND OTHERS CONCERNED IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA FOR THE SECURITY AND SAFETY OF [UNCRO] AND IN THIS CONTEXT DEMANDS THAT ALL PARTIES AND OTHERS CONCERNED REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTS OF INTIMIDATION OR VIOLENCE AGAINST [UNCRO];

7. INVITES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT AS APPROPRIATE AND NOT LESS THAN EVERY FOUR MONTHS ON PROGRESS TOWARDS A PEACEFUL POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND INCLUDING [UNCRO'S] ABILITY TO IMPLEMENT ITS MANDATE AS DESCRIBED ABOVE, AND UNDERTAKES IN THIS CONNECTION TO EXAMINE WITHOUT DELAY ANY RECOMMENDATIONS THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL MAY MAKE IN HIS REPORTS AND ADOPT APPROPRIATE DECISIONS;

8. CALLS UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA AND LOCAL SERB AUTHORITIES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT, OR USE, OF FORCE;

9.CALLS UPON MEMBER STATES TO CONSIDER FAVORABLY REQUESTS BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR NECESSARY ASSISTANCE TO UNCRO IN THE PERFORMANCE OF ITS MANDATE.

10. STRESSES THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS, INCLUDING AGREEMENTS ON THE STATUS OF FORCES AND OTHER PERSONNEL, BEING CONCLUDED BY THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA, AND CALLS UPON IT TO AGREE TO SUCH ARRANGEMENTV WITHOUT DELAY;

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11. DECIDES THAT MEMBER STATES, ACTING NATIONALLY OR THROUGH REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OR ARRANGEMENTS, MAY TAKE, UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND SUBJECT TO CLOSE COORDINATION WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND THE UN THEATER FORCE COMMANDER, USING THE EXISTING PROCEDURES WHICH HAVE BEEN AGREED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, ALL NECESSARY MEASURES, TO EXTEND CLOSE AIR SUPPORT TO THE TERRITORY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA IN DEFENSE OF [UNCRO] PERSONNEL IN THE PERFORMANCE OF [UNCRO]'S MANDATE, AND REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONTINUE TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON ANY USE OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT;

12. DECIDES TO REMAIN SEIZED OF THE MATTER.

<u>RESOLUTION II: EXTENDING UNPROFOR'S MANDATE IN BOSNIA</u>

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

RECALLING ALL ITS PREVIOUS RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS ON THE CONFLICTS IN THE TERRITORY OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA [INCLUDING RESOLUTION 958 (1994) AND REAFFIRMING IN THIS CONTEXT ITS RESOLUTION 947 (1994 OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1994, ON THE MANDATE OF THE UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE (UNPROFOR) AND SUBSEQUENT RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS, HAVING CONSIDERED THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF (S/1995/....),

AFFIRMING ITS COMMITMENT TO THE SEARCH FOR AN OVERALL NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICTS IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, ENSURING THE SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ALL THE STATES THERE WITHIN THEIR INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED BORDERS, AND STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE IT ATTACHES TO THE MUTUAL RECOGNITION THEREOF,

WELCOMING THE CONTINUING EFFORTS OF THE CO-CHAIRMEN OF THE STEERING COMMITTEE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA,

WELCOMING ALSO THE EFFORTS OF MEMBERS STATES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CONTACT GROUP, AND EMPHASIZING THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE OF THE WORK OF THE CONTACT GROUP AND ITS ROLE IN THE OVERALL PEACE PROCESS IN THE AREA,

RECOGNIZING THAT MAJOR PROVISIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING PLAN FOR THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA (S/23280, ANNEX III) AND RELEVANT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS STILL REMAIN TO BE IMPLEMENTED,

WELCOMING THE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE BOSNIAN PARTIES ON A CEASE-FIRE AND ON THE COMPLETE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

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CONCLUDED ON 23 DECEMBER 1994 AND 31 DECEMBER 1994 (S/1995/8), AND THE ESSENTIAL ROLE UNPROFOR PLAYS IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE AGREEMENTS, AND STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE IT PLACES THEREWITH,

REITERATING THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING SARAJEVO, THE CAPITAL OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA AS A UNITED CITY AND A MULTICULTURAL, MULTI-ETHNIC AND PLURI-RELIGIOUS CENTER, AND NOTING IN THIS CONTEXT THE POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION THAT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES ON THE DEMILITARIZATION OF SARAJEVO COULD MAKE TO THIS END, TO THE RESTORATION OF NORMAL LIFE IN SARAJEVO, AND TO ACHIEVING AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT, CONSISTENT WITH THE CONTACT GROUP PEACE PLAN,

NOTING THAT UNPROFOR PLAYS AN ESSENTIAL ROLE IN PREVENTING AND CONTAINING HOSTILITIES THUS CREATING THE CONDITIONS FOR ACHIEVING AN OVERALL POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, AND PAYING TRIBUTE TO ALL UNPROFOR PERSONNEL, ESPECIALLY THOSE WHO HAVE GIVEN THEIR LIVES FOR THE CAUSE OF PEACE,

NOTING ALSO THAT THE UNPROFOR MANDATE EXPIRES ON 31 MARCH 1995, IN CONFORMITY WITH RESOLUTION 947 (1994),

NOTING ALSO THE LETTERS OM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA OF 17 MARCH (S/1995/206) AND {DATE) (S/1995/....) REGARDING HIS GOVERNMENT'S VIEWS ON THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF UNPROFOR IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA,

PAYING TRIBUTE TO THE UNPROFOR PERSONNEL IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THE MANDATE OF UNPROFOR, IN PARTICULAR IN ASSISTING THE DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND MONITORING THE CEASE-FIRES,

REAFFIRMING ITS DETERMINATION TO ENSURE THE SECURITY OF UNPROFOR AND ITS FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR ALL ITS MISSIONS, AND TO THESE ENDS, ACTING UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, AS REGARDS UNPROFOR IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA AND IN THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA,

1. APPROVES THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF (S/1995/....), AND IN PARTICILAR THE ARRANGEMENTS CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH Y (COMMAND AND CONTROL);

2. DECIDES TO EXTEND QUNPROFOR'SQ MANDATE IN THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA FOR AN ADDITIONAL PERIOD TERMINATING ON 30 SEPTEMBER 1995;

3. AUTHORIZES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REDEPLOY BEFORE 30 JUNE 1995 ALL QUNPROFORQ PERSONNEL AND ASSETS FROM THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THOSE

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WHOSE CONTINUED PRESENCE IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA IS REQUIRED FOR THE [UNITED NATIONS CONFIDENCE RESTORATION OPERATION (UNCRO)] OR FOR THE FUNCTIONS REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPHS 4 AND 5 BELOW;

4. DECIDES THAT [UNPROFOR] SHALL CONTINUE TO PERFORM FULLY THE FUNCTIONS ENVISAGED IN THE IMPLEMENTION OF THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT OF 29 MARCH 1994 AND ECONOMIC AGREEMENT OF 2 DECEMBER 1994 BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA AND THE LOCAL SERB AUTHORITIES AND ALL RELEVANT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS AND TO FACILITATE THE DELIVERY OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA THROUGH TERRITORY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA UNTIL THE EFFECTIVE DEPLOYMENT OF [UNCRO] OR 30 JUNE 1995, WHICHEVER IS SOONER;

5. DECIDES THAT [UNPROFOR] SHALL RETAIN ITS EXISTING SUPPORT STRUCTURES IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA INCLUDING THE OPERATION OF ITS HEADQUARTERS;

6. EMPHASIZES THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PARTIES AND OTHERS CONCERNED IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA, THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, AND THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA FOR THE SECURITY AND SAFETY OF [UNPROFOR] AND IN THIS CONTEXT DEMANDS THAT ALL PARTIES AND OTHERS CONCERNED REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTS OF INTIMIDATION OR VIOLENCE AGAINST [UNPROFOR];

7. REITERATES THE IMPORTANCE IT ATTACHES TO FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE BOSNIAN PARTIES ON A CEASE-FIRE AND ON A COMPLETE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA AND CALLS UPON THEM TO AGREE TO A FURTHER EXTENSION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE AGREEMENTS BEYOND 30 APRIL 1995 AND TO USE THAT PERIOD TO NEGOTIATE AN OVERALL PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE CONTACT GROUP PROPOSAL AS A STARTING POINT,

8. CALLS UPON MEMBER STATES TO CONSIDER FAVORABLY REQUESTS BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR NECESSARY ASSISTANCE TO [UNPROFOR] IN THE PERFORMANCE OF ITS MANDATE;

9. CALLS ON ALL PARTIES AND OTHERS CONCERNED TO COMPLY FULLY WITH ALL SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS REGARDING THE SITUATION IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA TO CREATE THE CONDITIONS THAT WOULD FACILITATE THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF [UNPROFOR'S] MANDATE;

10. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO KEEP THE COUNCIL REGULARLY INFORMED ON PROGRESS WITH REGARD TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF [UNPROFOR'S]Q MANDATE AND TO REPORT, AS NECESSARY, ON ANY DEVELOPMENTS ON THE GROUND AND

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OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING THE MANDATE OF THE FORCE;

11. DECIDES TO REMAIN SEIZED OF THE MATTER.

RESOLUTION III: UN PRESENCE IN FYROM:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

A: RECALLING ITS RESOLUTION 795 (1992) AND ALL SUBSEQUENT RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS,

B: AFFIRMING ITS COMMITMENT TO THE SEARCH FOR AN OVERALL NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICTS IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA ENSURING THE SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ALL THE STATES THERE WITHIN THEIR INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED BORDERS, AND STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE IT ATTACHES TO THE MUTUAL RECOGNITION THEREOF,

C: RECALLING ITS CONCERN ABOUT POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS WHICH COULD UNDERMINE CONFIDENCE AND STABILITY IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA OR THREATEN ITS TERRITORY,

D: WELCOMING THE POSITIVE ROE PLAYED BY THE UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE (UNPROFOR) IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA, AND PAYING TRIBUTE TO THE PERSONNEL OF UNPROFOR IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR MANDATE IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA,
E: NOTING THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF ... MARCH 1995 (S/1995/...),

- 1. WELCOMES THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF ... MARCH 1995, AND IN PARTICULAR APPROVES THE ARRANGEMENTS CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH X (COMMAND AND CONTROL);

- 2. DECIDES THAT UNPROFOR WITHIN THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA SHALL BE KNOWN AS [THE UNITED NATIONS PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT FORCE (UNPREDEP)] WITH THE MANDATE SET OUT IN PARAGRAPH X OF THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF ... MARCH 1995, AND THAT THE MANDATE OF QUNPREDEPQ SHALL CONTINUE FOR A PERIOD TERMINATING ON 30 SEPTEMBER 1995;

- 3. URGES THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA TO CONCLUDE WITH THE UNITED NATIONS THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS INCLUDING AN AGREEMENT ON THE STATUS OF FORCES AND OTHER PERSONNEL;

- 4. ALSO URGES QUNPREDEPQ TO CONTINUE THE CURRENT COOPERATION BETWEEN UNPROFOR AND THE MISSION OF THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE;

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- 5. CALLS UPON MEMBER STATES TO CONSIDER FAVOURABLY REQUESTS BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR NECESSARY ASSISTANCE TO [UNPREDEP] IN THE PERFORMANCE OF ITS MANDATE;

- 6. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO KEEP THE COUNCIL REGULARLY INFORMED OF ANY DEVELOPMENTS ON THE GROUND AND OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING THE MANDATE OF [UNPREDEP];

- 7. DECIDES TO REMAIN SEIZED OF THE MATTER.

END TEXT OF RESOLUTIONS

ALBRIGHT

FROM:
SITREPRT

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REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MINISTER

COPY

H. E. Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali
Secretary General

UNITED NATIONS
New York

Your Excellency,

I have to draw your attention to the latest in a series of grave incidents in the occupied territories of Croatia in Eastern Slavonia. According to the information available, the military forces of the "Army of Yugoslavia (AJ)" have made an incursion deep into the territory of Croatia by crossing the Danube bridge in Batina, close to the Croatian-Hungarian border, from the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)". The troops of BELGBAT of UNPROFOR in the area attempted to "persuade and negotiate" with the Serbian paramilitary forces in order to prevent this movement, but failed and were forced to withdraw and were kept in detention during the transport of military equipment.

Since the end of January 1995 one armoured company of the "AJ" has been deployed in Eastern Slavonia close to the confrontation line. Moreover, on a later date further deployments took place, including - but not limited to - one mechanized company, one platoon of tanks and one platoon of self-propelled artillery, backed with an infantry company (totalling over 900 troops). The most recent incident saw the transportation of 25 tanks, one artillery battery and one "Luna-M" ground-to-ground tactical missile battery, and their deployment east of Beli Manastir and north of Tovarnik. Furthermore, according to available information, part of the 11th and 12th corps of the "AJ" have been mobilized and placed on alert within the territory of the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)", including the 453rd Mechanized Brigade in Sid. These developments pose a serious threat to the security of the Republic of Croatia, and serve as an additional example of the inefficiency of the present United Nations peace-keeping operation and a proof of direct involvement of the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" in Croatia.

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All of this once again confirms that the mechanisms of control of the international borders of Croatia - those presently outside of the effective control of the Croatian Government -are not sufficient. Furthermore, the above-mentioned grave violations of the relevant UNSC resolutions serve to focus our attention on your report to the Security Council on the implementation of a peace-keeping mandate (S/1995/222), which proposes the continuation of the existing insufficient mechanisms.

On behalf of the Government of the Republic of Croatia, I thus have to express deep dissatisfaction and grave concern with the assessments and recommendations contained in your report S/1995/222, and in particular with the following:

1. the report is unbalanced - it overestimates the achievements and underestimates the shortcomings of UNPROFOR's activity in Croatia - and does not realistically reflect the situation of Croatia;

2. the report repeatedly refers to documents that are several years old, but fails to draw the attention and to take into proper consideration more recent developments, such as Security Council resolutions 820 and 871, and General Assembly resolution 49/43;

3. the report draws attention to various elements of the so called Vance Plan, but apparently deliberately fails to address the most important element - the immediate disarming and disbandment of the Serbian paramilitary forces on the occupied territories; further, the report minimizes the validity of the need for the return of refugees and displaced persons, which is of paramount importance not only to a quarter of a million displaced persons but to the entire Croatian society as well;

4. it would appear that in the eyes of the Secretariat the newly proposed mandate would not differ substantially from the expiring one;

5. the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the local insurgent authorities on the occupied territories have *implicite* been placed on equal footing, since for every step of the deployment of a new mandate and force, their consent is implied;

6. the name of the new operation, as proposed in your latest report, does not include the reference to Croatia, which was one of our clearly stated requests; this is contrary to the established practise in the UN since only three UN operations (UNTSO, UNDOF and UNPROFOR) have hitherto been established without a clear geographic determination; the Government of the Republic of Croatia thus deems this to be highly inappropriate and unacceptable.

7. the report does not provide for, or even suggest, the reliable control of Croatia's internationally recognized borders and therefore does not fulfil the preconditions for Croatia's acceptance of the new mandate as agreed upon in Copenhagen and Washington; furthermore, the provisions in this regard, as set forth in you report, do not reflect adequately the spirit and content of Your Excellency's recent talks with the President of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tudman, and the subsequent statements as well.

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Taking into account the above, on behalf of the Republic of Croatia, I have the duty to inform you and the members of the Security Council that the Republic of Croatia shall not accept the new mandate of the new peace-keeping force on its territory after the present mandate of UNPROFOR in Croatia terminates in accordance with our letters S/1995/28 and S/1995/56 unless the following conditions are met:

1. the name of the new operations contains the word Croatia; explicitly confirming the fact that the new operation is to be carried out in its entirety on the sovereign territory of the Republic of Croatia.

2. the mechanisms of the active control of the international borders of the Republic of Croatia in the parts that are not at this moment accessible to the Croatian authorities by the new force are negotiated in detail on the basis of relevant Security Council resolutions and have gained the prior formal approval of the Government of Croatia.; thus the mechanisms for active control of the Croatia's international borders under the new mandate must be clearly established in respect of imports, exports and all transhipments, consistent with paragraph 12 of Resolution 820 (1993).

In this regard, and in order to facilitate the negotiations, I have the honour to draw your attention to the letter dated 23 March 1995 from the President of the Republic of Croatia addressed to your Excellency.

Please accept, your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Zagreb, 27 March 1995.

Dr. Mate Granić

M. Granić

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: NSC, BERGER, DOHSE, FUERTH, LAKE, REED, SENS, SIT, SODERBERG, WOLIN, CLARKER, CRESSEY, KERRICK, LAKEA, SAUNDERS, STEPHENS, SUM, SUM2, VERSHBOW

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~SECRET~~ DTG:271728Z MAR 95

FM: AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO:RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6687

RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 3097
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 6389
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0632
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 8620
RUEHXQ/ALL EUROPEAN UNION POST COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 004593

VIENNA FOR BOSNIA

E.O. 12356: DECL: 3/27/2003
TAGS: PREL SR BK HR
SUBJECT: CONTACT GROUP MEETING - A FINAL EFFORT TO HEAD OFF A BOSNIA WAR

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THE CONTACT GROUP MET IN LONDON ON MARCH 27 TO REVIEW THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA AND CROATIA. WHILE THERE WAS A GENERAL FEELING THAT THE SITUATION IN CROATIA WAS STABILIZED IN THE WAKE OF THE COPENHAGEN AGREEMENT, ALL REPS EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE RAPIDLY DETERIORATING SITUATION ON THE GROUND IN BOSNIA.

3. AGREEING THAT MILOSEVIC APPEARS TO BE EVER INCREASINGLY CONFIDENT AND UNWILLING TO COMPROMISE, THE GROUP REACHED CONSENSUS ON A TWO STAGE WORK PLAN OVER THE NEXT MONTH INTO THE SUMMER:

-- A LAST DITCH CG EFFORT ON BOSNIA RECOGNITION VIS-A-VIS MILOSEVIC AND IZETBEGOVIC, AS PROPOSED BY THE FRENCH.

-- PLANNING TO RIDE OUT THE STORM, IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, WHEN THIS EFFORT FALTERS AS IT IS LIKELY TO DO. THIS ASPECT AS SUGGESTED BY U.S. REP FRASURE WOULD BE AIMED AT LIMITING THE SCALE OF THE WAR AND KEEPING UNPROFOR IN PLACE IN BOSNIA.

4. REFLECTING BRITISH CONCERN OVER THE ISSUE, FOREIGN SECRETARY HURD SAT IN ON THE LAST PART OF THE SESSION.

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HURD SAID THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WOULD INSIST ON AT LEAST ONE FINAL EFFORT BEFORE THE STORM BROKE. THAT MIGHT INCLUDE A MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE ALTHOUGH HE WAS AWARE THAT SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER HAD RESERVATIONS ABOUT THAT APPROACH. BUT FURTHER DETERIORATION IS NOW CLEARLY THE MOST LIKELY SITUATION. END SUMMARY.

FOCUS ON MILOSEVIC - IN THE CATBIRD SEAT

5. AFTER A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE MILITARY SITUATION, UK, US, AND RUSSIAN REPS BRIEFED THE GROUP ON RECENT BILATERAL CONTACTS WITH BELGRADE. THE COMMON THEME WAS THAT MILOSEVIC IS CONFIDENT TO THE POINT OF BEING COCKY AND IS UNWILLING TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY ON RECOGNITION OR MUCH OF ANYTHING ELSE..

6. UK REP NEVILLE-JONES RECOUNTED DISCUSSIONS LAST WEEK BETWEEN THE SERBIAN PRESIDENT AND THE BRITISH CHARGE IN WHICH MILOSEVIC REJECTED ANY FORMULATIONS THAT MEANT ACCEPTANCE OF THE BOSNIAN STATE AS IT NOW EXISTS.

7. U.S. REP REPORTED ON HIS THREE HOURS OF CONVERSATION WITH MILOSEVIC ON MARCH 24. HE NOTED IN PARTICULAR THAT MILOSEVIC SEEMS TO BE IN SEARCH OF A POLITICAL EXIT STRATEGY, A SYSTEM OF LOCAL ACCOMMODATIONS ON CROATIA AND BOSNIA THAT WILL ALLOW HIM TO KEEP MOST OF HIS ILL-GOTTEN GAINS, GET OUT FROM UNDER SANCTIONS, AND EVEN GAIN SOME RESPECTABILITY OVER TIME. BUT THE SERBIAN PRESIDENT SEES HIMSELF OPERATING FROM A POSITION OF CONSIDERABLE STRENGTH AND SEEMS UNWILLING TO MODIFY HIS STRATEGY IN ANY SUBSTANTIAL MANNER THAT WOULD MEET OUR IMMEDIATE NEEDS. MILOSEVIC APPEARS TO BE COOPERATIVE ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COPENHAGEN ACCORD, BUT ONLY BECAUSE IT IS IN LINE WITH HIS OWN PHASED, GRADUAL APPROACH ON CROATIA. HE IS FLATLY UNWILLING TO RECOGNIZE THE CURRENT BOSNIAN STATE.

8. IN A REMARKABLY SIMILAR VEIN, RUSSIAN REP ZOTOV REPORTED THAT FORMER CG REP NIKIFOROV HAD RECENTLY VISITED BELGRADE AT THE BEHEST OF KOZYREV. NIKIFOROV CAME AWAY VERY PESSIMISTIC, REPORTING THAT MILOSEVIC EXPECTS TO BE APPROACHED AGAIN AND AGAIN BY THE CG WITH EVER IMPROVING OFFERS. THE REAL OFFER WILL COME LATER ON, AND THIS IS NOT THE TIME TO PUT HIS CARDS ON THE TABLE. MILOSEVIC PREFERS TO TRY TO DEAL DIRECTLY WITH SARAJEVO AND ZAGREB. AND IN MOSCOW'S VIEW, THIS MEANS THAT MILOSEVIC IS SIMPLY NOT PREPARED TO DEAL SERIOUSLY AT THIS TIME. ACCORDINGLY KOZYREV BELIEVES WE CAN TAKE ONLY VERY SMALL STEPS AT BEST.

A LAST DITCH EFFORT NONETHELESS

9. DESPITE THESE ASSESSMENTS, FRENCH REP DEJAMMET IMPLORED THE OTHERS TO MAKE ONE FINAL EFFORT ON

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RECOGNITION. NEVILLE-JONES WAS FUNDAMENTALLY SYMPATHETIC TO THAT VIEW, DESPITE PERSONAL MISGIVINGS, SAYING THAT BRITAIN AND THE OTHER TROOPS CONTRIBUTORS ARE GOING TO BE FACED WITH A "FIGHT AND STAY" SCENARIO THIS SUMMER AND THAT IS JUST AS UNPALATABLE AS "LIFT AND STAY." WE ARE MOVING EVER CLOSER TO THE NATO EXTRACTION REALITY.

10. U.S. REP ARGUED THAT WE ARE VIRTUALLY CERTAIN TO GET NOTHING FROM MILOSEVIC ON RECOGNITION OF BOSNIA. THE REAL CHALLENGE WILL BE TO CONCERT ON A "RIDE OUT THE STORM" STRATEGY, AS DIFFICULT AS THAT SOUNDS. WE MUST HOPE TO KEEP THE WAR AS SMALL AS POSSIBLE, KEEP UNPROFOR ON THE GROUND, CONTROL THE BOSNIA/SERBIA BORDER MORE RIGOROUSLY, HOLD THE CG TOGETHER, AND AIM TO REENGAGE DIPLOMACY WHEN WE GET THE CHANCE. THIS KIND OF DAMAGE LIMITATION WOULD REQUIRE BILATERAL EFFORTS VIS-A-VIS THE PARTIES AS APPROPRIATE. IF WE CANNOT GET A FORMAL EXTENSION OF THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, WE SHOULD AIM FOR A FUNCTIONAL, LESS FORMAL EQUIVALENT FROM ALL SIDES.

CONSENSUS ON A LAST EFFORT

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11. AFTER EXTENDED DISCUSSION, IT WAS AGREED THAT THE GROUP AS THE FIVE WILL PLAN TO MEET IN LONDON ON APRIL 3 AND TRAVEL TO SARAJEVO AND BELGRADE WITH A MUTUAL RECOGNITION PROPOSAL IN LINE WITH THE CG DECEMBER MINISTERIAL AGREEMENT. THE EXACT TERMS OF THAT PROPOSAL WILL BE WORKED OUT OVER THE REST OF THIS WEEK.

12. IN FINAL COMMENTS, U.S. REP NOTED THAT THERE IS NO DOUBT THIS MUST BE GENUINE RECOGNITION OF THE EXISTING BOSNIAN STATE WITHIN ITS INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED BORDERS. THERE CAN BE NO QUESTION OF A PROMISSARY NOTE ON RECOGNITION OF A "FUTURE" BOSNIAN UNION. ANY SANCTIONS RELIEF WOULD BE OBVIOUSLY LIMITED. GERMAN REP STEINER NOTED KINKEL'S RESERVE ON ANY SANCTIONS RELIEF WHATSOEVER ON ANY PROPOSAL THAT DOES NOT INCLUDE RECOGNITION FOR CROATIA.

PRESS STATEMENT

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13. THE GROUP AGREED ON THE FOLLOWING PRESS STATEMENT:

-- THE GROUP MET IN LONDON ON MARCH 27. ALL MEMBERS OF THE GROUP WERE VERY CONCERNED AT THE DETERIORATING SITUATION ON THE GROUND IN BOSNIA. THEY CALL ON ALL PARTIES TO RESPECT THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AGREEMENT AND TO AGREE TO EXTEND IT. THE CONTACT GROUP WILL CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT EARLY NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING BOSNIA, AND CALLS ON THE BOSNIAN SERBS TO ACCEPT THE CONTACT GROUP PLAN AS A STARTING POINT.

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-- THE GROUP WELCOMES THE AGREEMENT WHEREBY UN FORCES WILL CONTINUE TO BE PRESENT IN CROATIA. AGREEMENT ON THE MANDATE FOR THESE FORCES SHOULD BE IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWED BY THE CONTINUED NORMALIZATION OF ECONOMIC RELATIONS AND THE START OF NEGOTIATIONS ON A FINAL POLITICAL SETTLEMENT BETWEEN ZAGREB AND KNIN.

-- THE CONTACT GROUP EMPHASIZES THE IMPORTANCE IT ATTACHES TO EARLY MUTUAL RECOGNITION BETWEEN THE STATES OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, AND IT WILL CONTINUE TO WORK TOWARDS THIS END.

CROWE
BT

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: BERGER, DOHSE, FUERTH, LAKE, REED, SENS, SIT, SODERBERG, WOLIN, CLARKER, CRESSEY, KERRICK, LAKEA, SAUNDERS, STEPHENS, SUM, SUM2, VERSHBOW, WHSR_SPECIAL

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~SECRET~~ DTG:241239Z MAR 95

FM: AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

TO:SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5240

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 001418

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR FRASURE

E.O. 12356:DECL:OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, BK, HR, SR
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH MILOSEVIC -- ASSURANCES ON
- CROATIA, DIFFERENT GAME PLANS ON BOSNIA

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY
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2. ALONG WITH OUR CHARGE, I MET WITH MILOSEVIC ON MARCH 23 FOR THREE HOURS AT THE PRESIDENCY IN BELGRADE. OVER STRONG COFFEE AND SCOTCH ON THE ROCKS, THE MAIN POINTS WERE:

-- MILOSEVIC WILL MAKE SURE THE KNIN SERBS HONOR THE GORE/TUDJMAN COPENHAGEN AGREEMENT. THIS IS IN LINE WITH HIS OWN PHASED APPROACH ON CROATIA. HOWEVER, AS HE TOLD OWEN AND STOLTENBERG EARLIER IN THE DAY, HE WANTS SEVERAL CHANGES IN THE DRAFT RESOLUTION.

-- ON BOSNIA, HE IS NOT PREPARED TO RECOGNIZE THE PRESENT BOSNIAN STATE -- "A CARTOON STATE" -- IN THE CONTEXT OF A SANCTIONS SUSPENSION DEAL. IN LINE WITH HIS PROFESSED SUPPORT FOR THE CONTACT GROUP PLAN, HE IS PREPARED DOWN THE ROAD TO RECOGNIZE A BOSNIAN "UNION." OF THE CURRENT BOSNIA, MILOSEVIC REMARKED: "I CANNOT RECOGNIZE A NON-EXISTING STATE."

-- MILOSEVIC OBVIOUSLY HAS A LOT OF DIRECT CONTACT WITH ZAGREB AND SARAJEVO -- MOST RECENTLY THE FILIPOVIC VISIT ON BEHALF OF IZETBEGOVIC -- AND ACCORDINGLY BELIEVES THERE MUST BE "BALKAN SOLUTIONS" TO THE PROBLEMS, ALBEIT

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WITH INTERNATIONAL HELP.

-- AFTER MY EXPLANATION OF AMERICAN POLITICAL REALITY, MILOSEVIC NOW SEEMS TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS IS NOT IN THE CARDS. BUT HE WOULD STILL LIKE TO DEAL: "O.K. WHAT ABOUT SUSPENSION?"

-- MILOSEVIC IS NOW WELL AWARE OF OUR CONCERNS ABOUT CHEATING ON THE SERBIA/BOSNIA BORDER AND UNDERSTANDS WE MAY NOT BE PREPARED FOR ANOTHER ONE HUNDRED DAYS OF SANCTIONS SUSPENSION.

-- BELGRADE IS CLEARLY IN THE MIDDLE OF THE SKOPJE/ATHENS MINUET, AND MILOSEVIC SEES IT AS A WAY TO TEAR A HUGE HOLE IN SANCTIONS.

3. MILOSEVIC CONTINUES TO SEEM TO ME TO BE IN SEARCH OF AN EXIT STRATEGY, A SYSTEM OF LOCAL ACCOMMODATIONS ON CROATIA AND BOSNIA THAT WILL ALLOW HIM TO KEEP MOST OF HIS ILL-GOTTEN GAINS, GET OUT FROM UNDER SANCTIONS, AND EVEN GAIN RESPECTABILITY OVER TIME. BUT THE SERBIAN PRESIDENT SEES HIMSELF OPERATING FROM A POSITION OF VERY CONSIDERABLE STRENGTH AND SEEMS UNWILLING TO MODIFY HIS APPROACHES IN ANY SUBSTANTIAL MANNER THAT WOULD MEET OUR IMMEDIATE NEEDS.

4. AFTER THE MILOSEVIC SESSIONS, I HAD DINNER WITH LORD OWEN WHO HAD A SECRET SESSION WITH KARADZIC EARLIER IN THE DAY IN ZVORNIK. OWEN'S COMMENTS ARE INCLUDED BELOW. END SUMMARY.

CROATIA AFTER COPENHAGEN

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5. RESPONDING TO MY DESCRIPTION OF OUR RECENT CROATIA INITIATIVE, AND THE GORE/TUDJMAN RESULTS, MILOSEVIC SAID THAT COPENHAGEN WAS "A TURNING POINT ON THE ROAD FROM ESCALATION TOWARDS PEACE." BUT HE HAD ALWAYS THOUGHT -- AS HE TOLD ME IN OUR LAST MEETING -- THAT TUDJMAN WOULD FIND A WAY OUT FROM HIS JANUARY ULTIMATUM. ON HIS OWN ROLE NOW, MILOSEVIC SAID: "I INSISTED THAT THE KNIN LEADERS NOT REJECT IT. I TOLD THEM TUDJMAN NEEDS IT AS A FACE-SAVING DEVICE. 'YOU WANT US TO HELP TUDJMAN?', THEY ASKED. I SAID YES."

6. MILOSEVIC SAID IT WAS GOOD THAT STOLTENBERG HAD REPLACED AKASHI, WHO IS NOT LIKED BY TUDJMAN. HE FELT STOLTENBERG COULD GET A DEAL, EVEN BEFORE MARCH 31, BUT THE KNIN SERBS HAD TO BE CONSULTED AND THERE HAD TO BE SEVERAL CHANGES IN THE DRAFT RESOLUTION. IN PARTICULAR THE TITLE SHOULD BE CHANGED; "PEACEKEEPING" SHOULD BE ADDED AND WE CANNOT CALL IT UNFIC. MORE IMPORTANTLY THE "INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED BORDERS" PHRASE SHOULD BE

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DROPPED. REFER TO THE VANCE PLAN OR USE THE VANCE PLAN LANGUAGE, ADVISED MILOSEVIC. "THE RESULT IS THE SAME. THE U.N. TROOPS ARE AUTHORIZED TO BE EVERYWHERE." WILL KNIN ACCEPT MORE ON THE BORDER? MILOSEVIC SAID YES, BUT "IT DEPENDS UPON THE ACTUAL MEASURES AND AGGRESSIVE LANGUAGE MUST BE AVOIDED."

7. MAKING IT CLEAR HE HAD NO INTEREST IN BIG BANG DIPLOMACY ON CROATIA, I.E. RECOGNITION/SANCTIONS RELIEF, MILOSEVIC AGAIN ARGUED THE VIRTUES OF A QUIET, GRADUAL SEQUENCED APPROACH, BEGINNING WITH MORE ECONOMIC MEASURES, LEADING INTO KNIN/ZAGREB POLITICAL TALKS AND CULMINATING IN MUTUAL RECOGNITION BY ZAGREB AND BELGRADE, "100 PERCENT SUCCESS WITHIN THIS YEAR. BUT KRAJINA MUST BE ATTRACTED BY PEACE." (I AM FAIRLY CONFIDENT THAT MILOSEVIC FOR HIS OWN PURPOSES WILL FORCE KNIN AT LEAST SUFFICIENTLY TO ADHERE TO THE COPENHAGEN DEAL. INDEED OWEN REMARKED TO ME THAT MILOSEVIC HAD "STIFFENED UP" STOLTENBERG IN DEALING WITH KNIN. WHETHER HIS OVERALL STRATEGY WILL WORK IS ANOTHER STORY, ALTHOUGH, INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH, MILOSEVIC SPOKE BY PHONE TO MARTIC AND MIKELIC DURING OUR MEETING ABOUT THE NEED TO SIGN THE OIL PIPELINE ACCORD.)

BOSNIA -- DIFFERENT GAME PLANS

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8. I TOLD MILOSEVIC THERE IS A LOT OF CONFUSION ABOUT WHAT HE IS PREPARED TO DO ON BOSNIA, NOTABLY ON THE RECOGNITION ISSUE. MILOSEVIC REPLIED THAT THE CENTRAL POINT ON BOSNIA MUST BE THE CONTACT GROUP PLAN INCLUDING THE CONSTITUTION PRINCIPLES AND "THE RIGHTS OF CONFEDERATION." HE IS READY FOR MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF THE "UNION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CONTACT GROUP PLAN. HE IS NOT PREPARED TO RECOGNIZE THE CURRENT BOSNIAN STATE, "A CARTOON STATE." WE NEED TO DEFINE BOSNIA "AS A UNION OF TWO EQUAL ENTITIES -- THE SERB REPUBLIC AND THE FEDERATION -- THAT WILL FORCE KARADZIC TOWARD A TERRITORIAL DELIMITATION."

9. MILOSEVIC DESCRIBED THE RECENT VISIT TO BELGRADE BY BOSNIAN AMBASSADOR FILIPOVIC AS "VERY HELPFUL." "BUT THEY ARE STILL THINKING ABOUT INCLUDING THE SERBS IN THEIR FEDERATION." MILOSEVIC STRESSED THAT IT IS PEACE THAT WILL BRING ABOUT A NATURAL REINTEGRATION OF BOSNIA. MILOSEVIC SAID HE DISCUSSED WITH FILIPOVIC A POSSIBLE SECRET MEETING WITH IZETBEGOVIC UNDER SWISS AUSPICES. BUT THERE ARE DIVISIONS IN SARAJEVO. FEEDING INTO ONE OF HIS FAVORITE THEMES -- SUSPICION OF BONN -- MILOSEVIC GLOATED: "DID YOU KNOW THE GERMANS PROHIBITED IZETBEGOVIC FROM GOING TO WASHINGTON FOR YOUR FEDERATION MEETING? AND THEN THEY EVEN PROHIBITED SILAJDZIC FROM TAKING IZETBEGOVIC'S PLACE? THE GERMANS WANT SPECIAL

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RELATIONS HERE WITH THE CROATS AND THE MUSLIMS."

10. I TOLD MILOSEVIC WE ARE VERY WORRIED ABOUT A WIDER WAR IN BOSNIA THIS SUMMER. "IT COULD BE. IT IS A VERY UNSTABLE SITUATION. ANY CORPS COMMANDER CAN START THE WAR." I TOLD MILOSEVIC THAT IF A LARGER WAR DEVELOPED, WE WOULD HAVE TO MOUNT A SUBSTANTIAL NATO OPERATION INCLUDING THE U.S. FIRST ARMORED DIVISION TO TAKE UNPROFOR OUT BEFORE WINTER RETURNS.. THOUSANDS OF NATO TROOPS ON THE GROUND IN BOSNIA WOULD CHANGE THE SITUATION IN UNPREDICTABLE WAYS. I COULD SEE HOW WE GO IN; I'M LESS SURE HOW WE LEAVE. MILOSEVIC RESPONDED THAT "THE U.N. TROOPS MUST STAY IN BOSNIA. IT WILL BE A DISASTER, IF THEY HAVE TO LEAVE, AND HARD TO GET THEM OUT ALTHOUGH THE SERBS WILL NOT IMPEDE THEIR DEPARTURE." (IF MILOSEVIC IS WORRIED ABOUT A NATO OPERATION IN BOSNIA -- AS HE SHOULD BE -- HE SHOWED ME NO CARDS OF DEEP CONCERN ON THE ISSUE.)

11. LATER THAT EVENING, OWEN TOLD ME HE IS VERY WORRIED ABOUT BOSNIA. KARADZIC WAS ON HIS WAY TO TUZLA WHERE A STRONG BOSNIAN SERB ATTACK COULD TAKE PLACE SOON. THE SERBS MAY WANT TO TEACH THE MUSLIMS A LESSON AND TAKE MORE LAND, EVEN THOUGH THEY KNOW THEY WILL HAVE TO GIVE IT BACK IN A SETTLEMENT. A BIHAC SITUATION COULD DEVELOP IN TUZLA. OWEN SAID KARADZIC WANTS TO TALK, BUT ADAMANTLY REFUSES TO "ACCEPT" THE CG PLAN AND IS LOOKING FOR AN ALTERNATIVE FORMULATION. OWEN SAID THEY DISCUSSED SOME OF THE DECEMBER/JANUARY PHRASEOLOGIES, E.G. "ACCEPT THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS PROPOSED BY THE CG." OWEN CONCLUDED THAT KARADZIC SEEMED MORE WILLING TO CONCEDE THAT GREATER SARAJEVO WILL GO TO THE MUSLIMS AND SEEMS PREPARED TO ACCEPT A ROUGHLY 50/50 LAND DEAL. HE ALSO INSISTS THAT THE CORRIDOR IN THE NORTH BE WIDER. (OWEN HAS HIS OWN IDEAS ON THE MAP INCLUDING PREVLAKA AND A CORRIDOR UP TO BIHAC.)

NOT ON THE SAME TRACK

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12. SUMMING UP ON CROATIA AND BOSNIA I TOLD MILOSEVIC THAT, WHILE WE MIGHT BE HEADING IN THE SAME GENERAL DIRECTION, I WAS NOT AT ALL CONVINCED THAT WE COULD WORK TOGETHER NOTABLY ON A RECOGNITION/SANCTIONS RELIEF FORMULA, EVEN ON BOSNIA. MILOSEVIC SAID WE HAVE THE WRONG APPROACH. "YOU NEED TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH SERBIA. THEN LIFT THE SANCTIONS. THAT WILL TURN THESE WARS INTO LITTLE LOCAL WARS. PRESS THAT BUTTON! HERE IS THE WATER TO THROW ON THE FIRE. WE CAN ACHIEVE PEACE IN A COUPLE OF MONTHS -- BALKAN SOLUTIONS WITH INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT." MILOSEVIC CONCLUDED: "DON'T GIVE IN TO GERMAN PRESSURES."

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13. I TOLD MILOSEVIC THAT WE CANNOT JUST LIFT SANCTIONS. THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO SUPPORT IN THE U.S. FOR THAT APPROACH. "IF THE NEW YORK TIMES IS MAKING YOUR POLICY, MAYBE I SHOULD BE TALKING TO THEM AND NOT TO YOU," MILOSEVIC SNEERED. I AGREED ENTHUSIASTICALLY, BUT ADDED THAT ONLY SUSPENSION OF SANCTIONS IS A POSSIBILITY AND ONLY IF WE GET SOMETHING UP FRONT. "YOU PREFER SANCTIONS TO PEACE. IF YOU WANT TO MAKE THINGS IMPOSSIBLE, TRY TO HUMILIATE SERBS." AT THE END, HOWEVER, MILOSEVIC GRUMPED: "O.K. SUSPEND SANCTIONS. IT MEANS ZERO TO ME, BUT DO IT. BUT I WON'T RECOGNIZE ANYONE UNTIL YOU LIFT SANCTIONS."

PROBLEMS ON THE BORDER

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14. I TOLD MILOSEVIC THAT, IN THE SPIRIT OF OUR FRANK EXCHANGES AND TO AVOID ANY MISUNDERSTANDINGS LATER ON, I WANTED TO TELL HIM THAT WE ARE INCREASINGLY CONCERNED BY INDICATIONS OF GROWING CROSS BORDER MILITARY SUPPORT FOR THE BOSNIA SERBS. THERE WOULD BE A SERIOUS DEBATE IN WASHINGTON OVER WHETHER WE WOULD AGREE TO ANOTHER HUNDRED DAYS OF PHASE ONE SANCTIONS RELIEF IN APRIL. I THEN HANDED OVER A NON-PAPER ILLUSTRATING THE PROBLEM.

15. MILOSEVIC READ IT THROUGH CAREFULLY, EXCLAIMING FROM TIME TO TIME: "BALONEY. THAT'S BULLSHIT! THAT IS NOTHING! NOTHING!" MILOSEVIC DISPUTED A NUMBER OF THE POINTS, NOTABLY ON TROOPS IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES CROSSING THE BORDER. ASKED FOR A SPECIFIC ACCUSATION, I TOLD MILOSEVIC THAT WE HAD VISUAL PROOF THAT SEVEN 155 MM HOWITZERS HAD BEEN MOVED FROM BELGRADE INTO SECTOR EAST IN MARCH. SOMEWHAT TAKEN ABACK MILOSEVIC SAID HE WOULD HAVE HIS POLICE LOOK INTO IT. "IF IT HAPPENED, I KNOW WHO DID IT." MILOSEVIC NEVERTHELESS CURIOUSLY REMARKED: "I WILL NOT DE-BLOCK THE RS, WHATEVER YOU DO ON SANCTIONS."

GREECE/FYROM

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16. ON ANOTHER SUBJECT, MILOSEVIC SAID THERE MAY BE A SUMMIT IN BELGRADE IN THE NEAR FUTURE TO CONSUMMATE THE SKOPJE/ATHENS DEAL. MILOSEVIC WAS CLEARLY WELL AWARE OF THE LATEST EXCHANGES ON THE EMBARGO, FLAG, ETC. HE FELT STRONGLY THAT THE NAME ISSUE IS EVER INCREASINGLY AN IMPOSSIBILITY FOR MACEDONIANS, AND HAS SAID AS MUCH TO THE GREEKS. MILOSEVIC INDICATED THAT HIS INTEREST IN THE DEAL IS TO PROVIDE A MACEDONIAN CORRIDOR DIRECT TO EUROPE IN EXCHANGE FOR A GREEK CORRIDOR THROUGH MACEDONIA.

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A CONCLUDING THOUGHT
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17. MILOSEVIC CHEERFULLY SAID THAT HE LOOKED FORWARD TO MY NEXT VISIT TO BELGRADE, WHENEVER THAT IS. BUT I AM YET TO BE CONVINCED THAT WE CAN DEVELOP OVERLAPPING AGENDAS AND TOLD HIM SO. WHATEVER HIS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, MILOSEVIC BELIEVES HE IS OPERATING FROM A POSITION OF VERY CONSIDERABLE STRENGTH AND THE WORLD MUST RECOGNIZE THAT FACT AND WORK ON THE BASIS OF HIS AGENDA. AS LORD OWEN REMARKED SOMEWHAT SELF-CONSCIOUSLY TO ME AFTER DINNER: "I KNOW I AM SEEN AS SOMETHING OF A MILOSEVIC MAN. BUT I NEED SOMEONE TO DO A DEAL WITH." AND AT THE CONCLUSION OF OUR SOUND AND FURY OVER SANCTIONS, MILOSEVIC SLYLY REMARKED TO ME: "I WILL WAIT. YOU WILL GET BACK TO ME JUST LIKE TUDJMAN AND IZETBEGOVIC."
PERINA

FROM:
SITREPRT

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Conversations with Milosevic
March 17 & 18, 1995

Prepared by the Honorable Bill Richardson
March 24, 1995

As a Member of the Helsinki Commission, I visited Karadjordjivo (Tito's old hunting lodge) and Belgrade at the invitation of President Slobodan Milosevic on March 17 and 18, 1995. My discussions with Slobodan Milosevic at Karadjordjevo totalled close to eighteen hours, including meetings, walks, meals, and corridor conversations. Our sessions included Chris Spirou, his informal American advisor, his Foreign Minister to be Milutinovic (currently Ambassador to Greece) and his Chief of Staff, Goran Milinovic. Milosevic and I spoke about two hours privately during long walks around his estate with his aides trailing behind.

In this report, I will exclude any comments about the Krajina Serb issue as I have reported previously on this matter. I will include the text that Milosevic personally submitted to me upon my departure on the Krajina matter although it has been overtaken by events.

I have not covered some of the topics I cabled back to Washington from Embassy Belgrade on March 18.

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A - Main Points and Quotes Made by Milosevic

B - Main Points Made by Richardson

C - Text of Milosevic Comprehensive Peace Plan (as submitted to Richardson on March 18, 1995 and altered by FAX March 23)

D - Richardson Observations and Recommendations

E - Text of Krajina Serb Statement by Slobodan Milosevic and press article sent to me by Milosevic ratifying out agreement

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PER E.O. 13526
VL 2/6/2020 (7.82)
2013-0682-M

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A

Main Points Made by Milosevic (please see my observations before reaching conclusions)

1. April 23rd (when the 100 day period of limited sanctions relief approved by UN expires) is a critical date for Milosevic

It is my view that Milosevic will find it difficult to accept another round of partial embargo lifting and might go for broke and expel the observers. He does not want to appear to change his position toward Karadzic and his "extreme entourage and leadership" should he decide to end the "observers" mission on April 23rd. Beyond that, Milosevic hinted that he might be forced to shut down several of the missions. Milosevic feels that he has gone the distance both in terms of "patience" and the ability to "sustain public support" for his position to promote every peace initiative to date. He toned down these claims at the end of my visit.

2. SM told me that in early March he had secret meetings with special representatives of both Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia and Franjo Tudjman of Croatia. SM received a "written personal communication proposal of "Let's do it ourselves and not the foreigners" from Tudjman through his alter ego and National Security advisor, Mr. Hrvoje Saranic. SM added that Izetbegovic didn't attend the Washington celebration because he was "told by the Germans not to attend," adding that Izetbegovic "would be visiting Germany," just so he and Germany could "rub the nose of the U.S." a bit.

SM said that all the "leaders" are catching on that the U.S. is starting to ease tensions with Serbia to solve the Balkan crisis. So in the great Balkan tradition these leaders are now calling for cooperation with the strongest, claiming that the "foreigners" are not capable of solving the area's problems.

SM sees the Tudjman UN PROFOR move and the recent public threats and aggressiveness by Izetbegovic and Karadijk as clear indications that none of them want the U.S. to team up with Slobodan Milosevic for peace. SM feels that this means that when peace and success come that all of warlords political careers will end.

The keypoint of SM's overtures to us is that the "quickest way to bring peace", is the "normalization of relations between the United States and Yugoslavia," and the lifting of sanctions. SM said that the partial lifting of the embargo like sports and education was more "humiliating than helpful."

Milosevic wants to make one comprehensive Balkan deal with the United States on all outstanding issues with an overall strategy and plan arrived at jointly, bilaterally. He also made it clear that he has both the willingness and ability to get things done. But he said he cannot and will not do it with "his hands tied" and his "legs in chains". SM stressed that time was short, that we had perhaps thirty days to work these things out. Several times he said it was 11:59, with just one minute left before the ball game is over.

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SM believes that lifting the embargo will isolate those who have an interest in continuing the war by "narrowing the field". He said that Karadjic believes that the sanctions will weaken Serbia internally "making it possible for the 2 million Muslims now living in Serbia to rebel and join the Bosnian Muslims in a "victorious campaign". Both are pipe dreams in reality, but "reality is the last measure anyone, including the U.S. policymakers, have used to make decisions in the Balkans." "We both need an exit strategy. I am the key, and you need to start dealing with me instead of dumping on me. Just tell me what you want me to do and I will do it. I want to be treated as a colleague, not as a servant or supplicant."

3. Milosevic said he is working extremely hard on Yeltsin and his Parliament for Russia to lift their embargo on Serbia. Soon Yeltsin will face a law in his Parliament making it "illegal for Russia to have an embargo against Serbia". Yeltsin according to SM, can never oppose that law if it gets to his desk, and it will -. "That will put strains on the relations between the U.S. and Russia," said SM.

4. SM said he is working on putting together a summit with Papandreou and the President of Macedonia (see telegram no. 7) Greece would lift their embargo on Macedonia and Macedonia in turn would recognize Serbia and Montenegro.

5. SM several times criticized the Germans. He said they control Tudjman and believes that "Germany and the United States will clash strongly in the future. Your interests do not coincide with theirs." He says that he called Mitterand a liar to his face when he met him last. "He doublecrossed me on the embargo."

6. Several times he expressed his affection and support for Cyrus Vance. "He was always honest and truthful."

7. He wants "businesslike, commercial, economic relations with the United States, not aid or hand-outs. Even though they cut me off, I know I need the World Bank and the IMF."

8. SM believes that Yeltsin will make it despite his present troubles. "His drinking problem is getting worse. The biggest danger comes from his armed forces and his police."

9. SM, visibly agitated, said "lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian Serbs would surely cause war."

10. SM told me he would attend a tripartite summit as proposed by the French if "you all gave me proper diplomatic recognition. I am not recognized and the two other invitees are."

11. SM said he would re-open the three OSCE offices closed previously, or "locate them where OSCE wants to put them" as long as he is re-admitted to the OSCE. (see tab C for further details)

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12. SM was extremely upset at Holbrooke statement on Kosovo before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. "Kosovo is our Jerusalem. It is an internal Serb matter."

13. SM kept telling me at several intervals that the European Contact Group Members keep telling him they want a more realistic policy towards Milosevic like "lifting the embargo" but "it's the U.S. that is the problem.:

14. SM expressed irritation at U.S. efforts to enforce the embargo. He particularly referred to instances where the U.S. was trying to shut down one of Serbia's business enterprises in Russia. ("I have 10,000 of them! Why do you think shutting one down makes a difference?") He also told me that Clerides of Cyprus had told him that Christopher in a handwritten note had asked Clerides to shut down a Serbian Bank in Cyprus. "Why does the U.S. treat me this way? I have been a loyal ally! I have supported the Contact Group!" He said that Clerides was sticking with SM on this one and would not close the bank.

15. Milosevic said he believes Karadijk would probably extend the ceasefire beyond the end of April. "If he extends it, he is a big shot again. He is the war option advocate and it makes him important. If there is peace he is meaningless and out of business. His power and Izetbegovic's will fall apart. All Karadijk wants to do is be on television. He even lost weight to look better."

16. When I told him his human rights actions and image were indefensible and awful, he replied, "I don't read history. History has never been kind to me and Serbia. We can only look toward the future. I don't worry about my image. Who cares? I'll still be here. My people support me. I've won the last three elections by 65%."

"I don't know what you Americans want? What is your policy towards the Balkans? I can't answer that! All you want to do is beat up on me as if I'm the only villain. What do you want me to do?"

17. He said he received a box of cigars from Fidel Castro with a note inscribed "welcome to the elite group of embargoed states by the U.S. We all survive!"

18. To those that say that I want to create a Greater Serbia, I say "bullshit."

19. SM treats the press with disdain. "There are maybe twenty editorials per day against me. The Serbian press attacks me relentlessly every day. They are petty and irrelevant people. Vanity Fair did an eight page negative article on me and I only gave that woman two minutes! How can she possibly write so much garbage about me when I only spoke to her for two minutes. My wife got tricked on that article! I don't watch television and I no longer read newspapers."

20. On recognizing Bosnia and Croatia - "It would be committing political suicide for me. Recognize me like you do with Bosnia and Croatia, put an ambassador here and maybe I can be more helpful to you."

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"I have nothing against your representatives here in Belgrade. I like Butler (whom he had just met) because he is a banker just like me. It is just not appropriate for me as a President to deal with a charge d'affaires. I know it was a mistake for me to refuse to see Zimmerman for a year. He used that to badmouth me fiercely in the United States. I won't make that mistake again."

"You are the first eminent American to come to see me since Cyrus Vance. I appreciate that. I like Frasure. He is a professional, and is honest and trustworthy. Redman, Bartholemew, and Thomas were just doing their jobs and wanting to leave for their next assignment."

21. Milosevic several times said he liked President Clinton and hoped he would be re-elected. He claims that at one point Milan Panic approached him before the '92 election with a Balkan deal that would help George Bush get re-elected. "Go to hell. I want Clinton to get elected!" he told Panic. "I want Bush to lose because he put this embargo on Serbia which has hurt us."

"Clinton is young and optimistic. He is being ill served on the Balkan issue. It appears he is not that personally interested in our problems. I know I am just a small peanut in America's overall interests. But he should know that I am key to peace in the Balkans and I am ready to work with you. Just tell me what you want me to do and we can solve it together."

22. SM several times told me he wanted us to test his resolve by watching him convene the Krajina Serbs to accept the Gore-Tudjman plan, even though he didn't control them like "you think I do".

"This was a stupid plan just to help Tudjman with his domestic difficulties. But I know it's important to Gore, and I will do it for Gore, without asking for anything in return. But I'll do it for Gore because he put his prestige on the line by going to Copenhagen. I will let you know when the deal is done so that Gore can announce it and claim credit. And he doesn't need to give me credit."

23. When he handed me his peace outline (in the handwriting of one of his aides) before I left, he said, "Please show this to Clinton and Gore and Christopher. I am willing to negotiate. I am flexible."

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B

Main Points Made by Richardson

1. Per my pre-trip briefing with Bob Frasure, I continuously stressed the importance of SM convincing the Krajina Serbs to accept the Gore-Copenhagen plan.

2. U.S. and Serbia are at a crossroads in the region. You need an exit strategy, and you cannot continue to stonewall and sit back without making any moves thinking that you can benefit from divisions within the Contact Group.

3. It is extremely difficult and politically impossible for the U.S. to lift the sanctions. The reaction in Congress would be negative and it might provoke lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnians ~~Serbs~~ which we oppose. Republican victories in Congress have weakened Serbia's standing in the U.S. body politic.

4. Many Serb complaints about their status in the old Yugoslavia are legitimate, as were some of their concerns about the prospective break-up of that country, although they were greatly exaggerated. From the U.S. perspective, the central reason for blaming Serbia for this is that the use of force with the claim of protecting Serb rights is unacceptable, and that is what happened. By resorting to aggression, for whatever reason, international support for Serb concerns evaporated.

5. While Belgrade has succeeded in getting the international community to tolerate what has since happened, the current situation will never be legitimized and cannot be sustained forever as a result. The best that can be accomplished is the Vance plan for Croatia and the Contact Group plan for Bosnia. That is the reality.

6. Few people believe that Belgrade, which supports both plans, cannot get the Bosnian and Croatian Serbs to accept them as well and implement them. There is widespread agreement that Belgrade organized their efforts, and is therefore responsible for getting them to agree. The place to start is to recognize both of Serbia's neighbors within their official borders and with all their territories unified.

7. Serbia must be more convincing if it is to get sanctions lifted.
A greater likelihood, like it or not, is for the U.S. Congress to press for a lifting of the arms embargo on the Bosnians.

8. In addition, the OSCE MIssions must be returned to Kosovo, Sandzak and Vojvodina without condition. There is no chance for the Yugoslav federation to be fully admitted into the OSCE given the situation in Bosnia and Croatia, let alone these three regions.

9. Kicking the missions out only worsened the situation for Serbia. If anything, having the missions there served Serbian interests as much as the interests of the local non-Serb populations, and the downturn in the human rights situation in Kosovo and Sandzak in particular since the missions left has to be condemned.

10. Permitting the missions to return would be an indicator that Serbia is willing to deal seriously with the international community in wishing to restore peace to the Balkan region.

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11. SM can probably stay in power if he continues to stonewall. But the U.S. will make life miserable for him by continuing to isolate him as a pariah and denying him any entree into the international community. "You can become a peacemaker if you plan this right and are sincere about peace." (I tried to say this with a straight face.)

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A POTENTIAL COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND PRESIDENT SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC

Item: Recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia supports the peace plan of the contact group on Bosnia and Herzegovina and in accordance with that plan understands;

I. A) That Bosnia and Herzegovina should be a Union of the Bosnian - Croatian Federation and the Republica of Srpska

B) That both entities are equal regarding their status and in every other respect and

C) That the Republica of Srpska has the right to enter into a confederation with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, while the Bosnian - Croatian Federation has the right to enter into a confederation with the Republic of Croatia.

II. The U.S. with the full support of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will convene the two parties, the Bosnian - Croatian Federation and the Republica of Srpska, to negotiate the final delineation of borders on the basis of the contact group peace plan as a starting point for negotiations.

III. The U.S. and Yugoslavia will assist the contact group to develop the constitutional framework for the union of the two entities the Bosnian - Croatian Federation and the Republica of Srpska.

Item: Croatia

I. The United States and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will cooperate fully to define and implement the Copenhagen Agreement regarding the United Nations peacekeeping forces in Croatia in accordance with the Vance Peace Plan, formally known as the United Nations Peacekeeping Plan for the Republic of Croatia.

II. The United States and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will co-sponsor negotiations between Sagreb [sic] and Knin to facilitate a final political arrangement.

Item: The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

I. The United States will convene a "Resolution Conference" between Greece, Yugoslavia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) to facilitate an agreement between Greece and FYROM and between Yugoslavia and FYROM.

II. Prior to the U.S. sponsored "Resolution Conference" Yugoslavia will work to finalize an agreement acceptable by all three parties, Greece, FYROM and Yugoslavia which allows for the lifting of the economic embargo imposed by Greece against FYROM and for the recognition of FYROM by the Republic of Yugoslavia

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and by Greece.

III. The United States and Yugoslavia will serve as facilitators for the resolution of any outstanding issues not resolved prior to the recognition of FYROM by Yugoslavia and Greece.

Item: The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the OSCE

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will reinstate all of the missions of the OSCE to its sovereign territory upon being reinstated as a full and equal member of the OSCE.

Item: Normalization of Relations and Lifting of Embargo

The United States will normalize relations with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and lift the embargo against it upon the official signing of this agreement between the United States and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

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D

Suggestions and Recommendations

1. Future policy initiatives towards SM need to take into account his massive ego and self importance. I believe he will make big concessions if he is treated like a major player by the United States. While his word and promises have been worthless in the past, I believe that in his own mind he has decided that the time is ripe to cut a deal, a comprehensive arrangement that could bring him better ties with the U.S. and international respectability. While the odds are that I am wrong given past performance, I do think that we should give working out a comprehensive approach with him more validity. Treating him with some degree of respect (however appalling) might open some doors that have been closed before.

2. Despite my optimism, I do not believe we should lift sanctions and then expect him to deliver on other items. I support a carrot and stick approach that involves the sustained lifting of sanctions in exchange for some concessions on his part (recognition of Bosnia and Croatia). Interestingly, by keeping the sanctions pressure on and by building up Tudjman as we did in Washington, this has pissed him off but I believe has intensified his appetite for a deal.

3. Milosevic would like nothing better than to cut a comprehensive Balkan deal with the United States and Serbia as the guarantors. SM will be only mildly influenced by what the Contact Group wants to do. He only uses Contact Group divisions to his advantage. Therefore, the U.S. needs to take the lead in devising an exit strategy policy.

4. I must say that our policy, whatever it might be under the present circumstances, seems to be working. If I knew what we are considering next, I might be able to be more expansive.

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E

Saturday, March 18, 1995

PRESIDENT MILOSEVIC HAS PLEDGED TO CONGRESSMAN RICHARDSON

1) To do everything in his power to insure that the material things in the Copenhagen Agreement are preserved providing the appropriate and "swallable" [sic] language is included in the new United Nations Peacekeeping Resolution for Croatia.

2) To meet and talk Monday morning March 20, 1995 with Krajina Serb President Milan Martic and Krajina Serb Foreign Minister Milan Babic urging them to work closely with the U.N. envoy to the region Mr. Akashi to develop the framework and language necessary for an acceptable new United Nations Peacekeeping Resolution for Croatia.

3) To meet with Mr. Akashi at 1:00 p.m. Monday, March 20, 1995.

4) To arrange a meeting between Mr. Akashi and the leaders Mr. Martic and Mr. Babic of the Krajina Serbs for Monday afternoon March 20, 1995 following his meetings with them and with Mr. Akashi.

It must be noted here that prior to Congressman Richardson's visit President Milosevic was prepared to only meet are [sic] a curtesy with Mr. Akashi and tell him that he had no interest what so ever to be involved in anyway with the "Copenhagen Agreement" since he is fully satisfied and supports the Vance United Nations Peace Plan for Croatia.

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THE COPENHAGEN AGREEMENT ANNOUNCED BY VICE PRESIDENT GORE

Last week the Vice President of the United States, Al Gore, announced in Copenhagen an "agreement" with the President of Croatia, Franjco Tudjman, which allows the United Nations peacekeeping forces to remain in Croatia beyond March 31, 1995.

That "agreement" in Copenhagen was reached with only one of the two parties involved in the conflict namely the Croats. Absent from the "agreement" were the Krajina Serbs the second entity to the conflict.

In order to implement the Copenhagen "Agreement" a new United Nations resolution regarding United Nations peacekeeping forces in Croatia must be drafted, agreed upon by both parties tot he conflict namely the Croats of Zagreb and Krajina Serbs of Knin and adopted by the United Nations Security Council.

The draft of the new United Nations Resolution prepared for discussion by the parties involved provides language that if maintained in the final version of the plan will make it impossible for the Krajina Serbs to accept it.

In the discussions with President Milosevic he indicated what he believes to be possible issues of contention and what he views as potential resolutions.

Item: The reduction of the size of the U.N. Peace Keeping forces from 14,000 to 5,000.

President Milosevic believes that this issue can ultimately be accepted even though it substantively changes the original UNited Nations mandate for Croatia.

Item: The name of the peace keeping force.

The Draft resolution proposes to rename the UNPROFOR. The new name will be the "United Nations Forces". The title of the draft resolution however states that it is a resolution "Creating U.N. peacekeeping in Croatia." Therefore the name of the new United Nations Units in Croatia should be called United Nations peacekeeping forces in keeping both with their proposed mission (mandate) and with the title of the new United Nations Resolution.

Item: Article 3 of the Draft Resolution

Article 3 of the draft United Nations resolution regarding the "Copenhagen Agreement" talks about the purpose of the new United Nations mandate and the United Nations force whatever name it is finally given.

It is it says established for "monitoring the international borders between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and the Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

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President Milosevic believes that it will be impossible for the Krajina Serbs to agree to a United Nations resolution which de facto makes them recognize "the international recognized borders" of Croatia and Bosnia.

President Milosevic believes that the Copenhagen Agreement can be fully implemented utilizing language such as "monitoring of the borders in accordance with the Vance Plan for Croatia" which was officially signed by the Republic of Croatia and the Krajina Serbs.

Item: Article 3^2

President Milosevic believes that additional language is needed clarifying the mandate: for instance language can be added to State that the Security Council of the U.N. guarantees the agreement of the secession of hostilities between Zagreb and Knin.

In other words if the United Nations peacekeeping forces are to monitor "the agreement of March 29" they must also commit to enforcing the provision of the cessation of hostilities.

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REPUBLIC OF SERB KRAJINA

SERB KRAJINA PRESIDENT: WE ARE NOT OPPOSED TO CHANGING SIZE OF UNPROFOR

B E L G R A D E, MARCH 21 (TANJUG) - SERB KRAJINA PRESIDENT MILAN MARTIC SAID TUESDAY THAT THE REPUBLIC OF SERB KRAJINA IS NOT OPPOSED TO CHANGING THE NUMBER OF U.N. PEACEKEEPERS IN THE SAFE AREAS, BUT HE DEMANDED THAT THEIR MANDATE REMAINS THE SAME. 'THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD DECIDE ABOUT THE OPTIMUM SIZE OF THE U.N. PROTECTION FORCE,' MARTIC SAID FOLLOWING THE SECOND ROUND OF TALKS WITH U.N. MEDIATOR THORWALD STOLTENBERG IN BELGRADE. MARTIC SAID THAT THE 12,000 PEACEKEEPERS CURRENTLY DEPLOYED IN SERB KRAJINA AND CROATIA 'COULD BE REDUCED TO 5,000, 6,000 OR 7,000.'

MARTIC SAID THAT UNPROFOR'S SIZE COULD BE BIGGER OR SMALLER THAN THE CURRENT ONE, BUT SHOULD BE SUCH TO 'ENABLE IT TO SECURE PEACE ALONG THE SEPARATION LINES.'

SERB KRAJINA DEMANDS THAT UNPROFOR REMAINS IN ITS TERRITORY, MARTIC SAID AND ADDED THAT HE HAD INSISTED ON THIS DURING THE FIRST ROUND OF TALKS WITH STOLTENBERG IN BELGRADE ON MONDAY.

'WE HOPE THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL OBJECTIVELY CONSIDER ALL POSITIVE ASPECTS OF THE VANCE PLAN AND THAT THE PEACEKEEPERS WILL REMAIN IN THE TERRITORY OF SERB KRAJINA WITH THE SAME MANDATE, AS A PROTECTION FORCE,' MARTIC SAID. MARTIC SAID HE HAD DEMANDED FROM STOLTENBERG THAT A SERB KRAJINA REPRESENTATIVE BE PRESENT WHEN THE SECURITY COUNCIL DISCUSSES THIS ISSUE.

MARTIC SAID THAT CURRENTLY THE KNIN-ZAGREB TALKS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DEC. 2 ECONOMIC AGREEMENT HAD BEEN FROZEN UNTIL UNPROFOR'S MANDATE IS RESOLVED. 'IF THE SERB KRAJINA DEMAND FOR AN UNCHANGED UNPROFOR MANDATE IS MET, I BELIEVE THE TALKS WILL RESUME,' MARTIC SAID.

ASKED TO COMMENT THE POSSIBILITY OF DEPLOYING UNPROFOR ON THE BORDER BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF SERB KRAJINA AND THE BOSNIAN SERB REPUBLIC, MARTIC SAID THE VANCE PLAN HAD EMPOWERED THE PEACEKEEPERS TO MONITOR THE BORDER BETWEEN THE BOSNIAN SERB REPUBLIC AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA, BUT UNDERSCORED THAT 'REGARDING THE CONTROL (OF BORDERS) - WE CANNOT AGREE.'

STOLTENBERG SAID HE WOULD SUBMIT A REPORT TO THE U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL ABOUT HIS TALKS IN BELGRADE AND ZAGREB. IN ZAGREB STOLTENBERGMET ON MONDAY EVENING WITH THE CROATIAN PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL ADVISOR, HRVOJE SARINIC. 'MY TASK IS IN FACT TO FIND THE COMMON DENOMINATOR FOR A PLAN WHICH COULD BE BEST IMPLEMENTED TO THE GOOD OF ALL THE PEOPLE IN THE REGION. I AM LOOKING FOR ALL THE COMMON POINTS WHICH COULD RESULT IN A NEW MANDATE FOR THE U.N. TROOPS,' STOLTENBERG SAID.

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March 27, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE

FROM: LEON FUERTH

SUBJECT: Sanctions Policy

Sanctions enforcement is gradually degenerating. It is possible to combat this trend, but to do so requires commitment of assets. The attached paper provides a rundown of areas of slippage and proposed countermeasures.

More effective enforcement of sanctions within existing authorities can further isolate Pale and Knin and may help convince Milosevic that sanctions will continue to bite unless he can help bring about negotiated settlements in Bosnia and the Krajina. On the other hand, Russia and the EU seem to be more interested in trading sanctions for incremental steps towards peace, and the Front Line States are increasingly unwilling to bear the burden of sanctions.

The key question for the Principals to address, therefore, is whether, in terms of our overall strategy in the region, it makes sense for the U.S. Government to press the Western Europeans, Russia, and the Front Line States to strengthen sanctions enforcement as a way to push Milosevic and the Pale and Knin Serbs towards the sorts of negotiated settlements we seek.

The Principals could also review the specific points in the attached paper if there is time. If not, I recommend that the Principals remand those issues to the Deputies for decision and implementation.

Attachment:

Sanctions Options Paper

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PER E.O. 13526
VZ 2/6/2020 (783)
CIA HISTORICAL DIVISION
NR 70-14 10/1/2013

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SUBJECT: Sanctions Improvements -- Practical Steps

Sanctions fatigue has set in but in an unexpected way. Fatigue is most evident in the West where political will is flagging and the focus is on trading sanctions for incremental, often reversible, progress in negotiations. Front-line states are maintaining enforcement in proportion to the degree of cohesion they perceive in the West and the West's pressure on them to maintain effective sanctions enforcement. Unfortunately, even the U.S. Government's message has been inconsistent, with too little emphasis on the continued importance of sanctions.

Sanctions can still provide significant leverage by isolating Pale and Knin (the "Inner Ring" of sanctions) and convincing Milosevic (the "Outer Ring") that sanctions will continue to bite unless he can help bring about negotiated settlements in Bosnia and the Krajina. By making effective sanctions a priority and devoting increased resources to enforcement programs, the U.S. and the Western Europeans can increase pressure on Pale, Knin, and Belgrade within existing sanctions authority.

This memorandum lays out the components of a program for enhanced sanctions enforcement. Many of the steps should be matters of routine sanctions maintenance. However, given flagging Western European support for sanctions and extremely lax enforcement in certain key countries, significant progress is impossible unless the USG puts political weight behind its efforts.

I. Main Problem Areas

A. *General*

1. Flagging Western European support for the sanctions effort is our main obstacle. The EU has not made sanctions a priority in its relations with the front-line states. EU members have sought to weaken sanctions in the UN Yugoslavia Sanctions Committee, leaving the U.S. isolated. Greece and Italy are unwilling to comply with mandatory UN resolutions or even EU directives on sanctions. European governments are also slow to provide necessary resources and support for the sanctions program. (See item II. A.)

B. *Outer Ring*

1. Fuel, the most critical commodity in both the outer and inner sanctions rings, continues to reach the FRY and the Bosnian Serbs. The main source of leakage is fuel from Italy and Greece entering the FRY from Albania. Significant smuggling also takes

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place across the Danube from Romania and from Greece and Bulgaria through FYROM. Romania has not fulfilled commitments to limit the amount of jet fuel supplied to empty Yugoslav airline (JAT) aircraft shuttling between Timisoara and Belgrade. Hungary has not controlled the "ant trade" of fuel smuggling in private cars and buses and auxiliary tanks on trucks. (See items II. B, C, and G.)

2. Cypriot, Russian, and Greek attitudes towards sanctions continue to create problems. Serbian firms in Cyprus, Russia, and Greece conduct business virtually unimpeded by sanctions, earning hard currency and arranging sanctions-busting trade. Cyprus has proven unwilling to take effective enforcement measures. Russia has yet to pass laws necessary to bring sanctions into effect, and existing decrees are not meaningfully enforced. Russian trade and economic cooperation with Serbia continues. Russia has also taken positions in the Sanctions Committee that prevent closing loopholes. (For example, several of the front-line states will not take stronger steps to control cross border traffic without instructions from the Sanctions Committee, but Russia has blocked Committee action.) Serbian activities in Greece, especially Thessaloniki, continue to flourish. (See item II. D.)

3. Serbian exports through Macedonia of manufactured and agricultural products earn hard currency and support barter trade. Imports via FYROM keep key industries moving. The Macedonian government has no meaningful controls in place at the border with Serbia, and Serb-origin shipments regularly receive false documentation as Macedonian products. FYROM's neighbors -- Albania, Bulgaria, and Greece -- shrug off responsibility for FYROM's trade with Serbia, even though the bulk of goods involved transit, and often originate on, their territory. (See item II. C.)

C. *Inner Ring*

1. FRY implementation of its border closure with Bosnian Serb-held territory has declined significantly since its high point before renewal of limited sanctions relief in January. At the same time, the ICFY monitoring mission is in financial crisis. ICFY has already cut staffing, and Owen and Stoltenberg threaten to shut down the mission altogether if financial problems are not solved. The U.S. and EU must provide the resources necessary to restore ICFY effectiveness. However, these resources will be wasted, and the ICFY mission's hard work will have no meaning, unless the international community is willing to take a hard line in response to clear Serbian testing at the inter-Serb border. On the other hand, revocation of Phase

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I sanctions relief could cause Milosevic to end his embargo of the Bosnian Serbs altogether. (See item II. E.)

2. The "back door" remains a major source of supply for Pale and Knin Serb forces. Fuel, military supplies and other goods transiting the Dalmatian coast reach Bosnian Serbs through Croat-controlled (and maybe even Muslim-controlled) territory in Bosnia. Diversions to and exports from the Bosnian Serbs through the UNPAS could become a major loophole if economic confidence building measures between Zagreb and the Krajina Serbs are not accompanied by requisite sanctions control. Already there is evidence that goods shipped on the Zagreb-Belgrade highway are diverted to/from Bosnian Serb-held territory. There are only seven Sanctions Assistance Monitors (SAMs) in Croatia -- not enough to cover the Zagreb-Belgrade highway on a 24-hour basis or to monitor commerce through Dalmatia. (See item II. F.)

II. Proposed Actions

A. *Establish a united front with Western Europeans on both inner and outer ring sanctions.* Take joint and bilateral action to maintain and improve sanctions enforcement. Ensure that front-line state governments understand that sanctions remain an important part of the West's strategy toward the former Yugoslavia and that their performance on sanctions matters to us.

- U.S. officials at every level should stress the importance of sanctions in all appropriate fora. Failure to do so sends the message that sanctions no longer count.

- The USG should press for a U.S.-EU mission to the front-line states to discuss the need for strict implementation and recognize instances of good performance. U.S. Ambassadors to EU and front-line countries should regularly brief host governments on sanctions issues.

B. *Control oil smuggling through Albania to the FRY.*

- Get the EU to join in pressing Italy and Greece to control oil shipments to Albania through a pre-verification system that allows shipments to legitimate Albanian end users only.

- Jointly press Albania to do a better job.

- Have the NATO-WEU force (SHARP GUARD) cooperate with Albania in stopping oil tankers that have not been pre-verified (may require a change in the current UN mandate).

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C. *Persuade FYROM to limit trade with Serbia, and get other countries to control shipments to and from FYROM.*

- Press Albania and Bulgaria to cooperate with SAMs to help monitor their trade with FYROM, since much of the FYROM-Serbia trade enters or exists via Albania and Bulgaria.

- Press the EU to do a better job of controlling its trade with FYROM since a substantial portion of FYROM "exports" actually comes from Serbia. (This complements the action above and helps alleviate the burden on Albania and Bulgaria. Serbian exports can be identified, tracked, and caught at the final destination.)

D. *We and the EU press Russia, Cyprus, and Greece to control FRY-interest firms operating in their territory and to stop other practices that violate sanctions regulations*. We and the EU press Russia and Greece to desist from taking positions in the UN and EU that undermine the effectiveness of the sanctions regime.

E. *Decide whether and how specifically to signal that the USG might might oppose continuation of Phase I sanctions relief after the current UN resolution expires on April 22.*

- Decide whether the U.S. should seek immediate revocation of Phase I sanctions relief if the ICFY mission ceases operation because of financial problems.

- Decide how strongly to protest specific violations of the border closure.

F. *Close the "back door" to Pale*, starting small by building on what the SAMs have already accomplished in Croatia and on their good relations with the GOC.

- Re-deploy 10-12 U.S. SAMs to Croatia so that the SAM-Croatia can cover the Zagreb-Belgrade highway 24-hours a day.

- Press other SAM donors to bring SAM-Croatia up to 30-35 monitors to cover loading of humanitarian supplies in Zagreb and to re-institute cooperation with Croatian customs on the Dalmatian coast to help prevent shipments of goods to the Bosnian Serbs via Federation territory.

- Provide training and technical assistance for Croatian and Federation Customs. (By helping the GOC and Federation to create the wherewithal to control trade on their borders, we

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are also contributing to an important aspect of their national sovereignty.)

G. *Tighten enforcement of cross-border trade at the outer ring.*

- Press Hungary to control the ant trade and to limit the amount of fuel that trucks can carry into Serbia. Prevent empty trucks from entering Serbia (a major source of smuggled fuel).

- Obtain agreement of EU governments to inspect and seal -- at loading -- UN authorized shipments bound for the FRY. (Almost all authorized shipments for the FRY originating in Western Europe cross at two sites in Hungary. A pre-inspection system would greatly reduce the burden on Hungarian customs and SAMs, thus freeing resources needed to counter smuggling.)

- Press Romania to control the ant trade in fuel, stop the FRY from importing aviation fuel via flights of empty JAT airliners to Timisoara, and stop supplying electricity to the FRY.

H. *Resolve outstanding sanctions issues in ways that reinforce the overall sanctions regime.*

- Seek front-line state cooperation on implementing a transit route for perishable agricultural products around Serbia as an alternative to pending requests for transit corridors through Serbia. Work with Bulgaria and other front-line States to address overall land transit issues as part of a comprehensive approach that identifies needed enforcement improvements as tradeoffs.

- Identify conditions under which Serb-owned vessels engaged in cabotage (internal trade) can use the Romanian side of the Iron Gates locks while the Serb locks are under repair. Conditions might include ending illegal Danube tolls and other interference with Danube shipping.

I. *Decide whether the U.S. should modify its own sanctions regulations to implement Phase I sanctions relief* through the sale of repair parts for U.S.-built aircraft being flown by JAT and/or allowing U.S.-FRY sports and cultural contacts.

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REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PRESIDENCY
SARAJEVO

22 March, 1995

H.E. Dr. Boutros Boutros - Ghali
Secretary - General
United Nations
New York

Excellency:

There is a steadily growing gap between the UNPROFOR mandate as provided for by the Security Council and the actual implementation of that mandate. In view of the fact that it was actually always necessary to strengthen those mechanisms, including the UNPROFOR mandate, that promote the cause of peace and humanitarian efforts, this negative tendency toward the erosion of the mandate is most disconcerting at this time.

Therefore, it is imperative that a thorough review be undertaken of both the current Security Council mandate with respect to UNPROFOR and its actual implementation before it is extended beyond March 31, 1995. There are numerous factors as well as developing events that should be considered in this review, including: the changes for UNPROFOR in Croatia and Macedonia; the expiration of the cease - fire in Bosnia and Herzegovina; the reluctant peace process; Serbia and Montenegro's failure to recognize its neighbors; the deteriorating humanitarian situation; the failure to lift the siege of Sarajevo or even to assure the "Blue Routes"; the harassment of the operations at Sarajevo airport and access routes therefrom; the violation of the exclusion zone around Sarajevo and Gorazde as well as the continuing incursions into the other "safe areas"; the persistent onslaught against Bihac, especially through the violation of our international border with the Republic of Croatia; impeding of humanitarian aid convoys; continuing ethnic cleansing in areas under Serbian occupation; and escalating violations of the "no - fly" zone.

Because the expiration of the current UNPROFOR mandate on March 31, 1995 is a relatively short time away, we would be willing to favorably consider extending the existing mandate for a period of no more than 30 days to accomplish this comprehensive review. We look forward to contributing positively in this review and are prepared to endorse measures designed to promote the peace process, improve effectiveness and the humanitarian situation, and secure the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Please accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

Alija Izetbegovic
President

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Options for Bosnia--Fighting Escalates in the Spring

Purpose: To identify military options that can deter or restrain potential Bosnian Serb military action as fighting intensifies after the expiration of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement on April 30, 1995. The overall objectives are to contain the conflict, reduce the level of violence, ensure the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies and create an environment that will promote a settlement by all the warring parties

Current Dilemma: The current 70/30 territorial split is satisfactory to the Bosnian Serbs but not satisfactory to the Bosnian Government, whose territorial aspirations will not be satisfied by anything less than the Contact Group division of 51/49. The government has used the winter to improve its military capability. Thus the key to the level of fighting over the summer is Bosnian Government forces who have already begun to initiate military action against the Bosnian Serbs. *The BSA has a number of response options beyond direct military confrontation, including attacking or threatening non-combatants in populated areas like Sarajevo, disrupting humanitarian relief operations, or attacking UNPROFOR directly.* Increased hostilities have already aggravated the humanitarian problem in Bihac. Renewed/increased hostilities are also likely to threaten Sarajevo and/or the eastern enclaves. UNPROFOR could be caught in the middle.

Assumptions:

- The U.S. will neither provide direct military support to Bosnian Government initiated action to reverse the current territorial situation .
- Bosnia Government military activity will not threaten non-combatants, disrupt humanitarian relief operations, nor target UNPROFOR.
- NATO will agree to U.S. initiatives. The options listed below require the willingness of many actors. Several of the options have been proposed before but have lacked any consensus for action.

Issues: (1) U.S./NATO military options to limit the violence. (2) Actions UNPROFOR can take to convince the warring parties that a negotiated solution is the preferred course of action. (3) NATO and U.S. options to pressure the UN to be more aggressive.

General Response: *The willingness of UNPROFOR to modify its current status is the critical element in any response strategy for Bosnia.* The US has no direct leverage on the situation in Bosnia without the cooperation and desire for support from UNPROFOR and NATO.

The options below are designed to make UNPROFOR more capable and willing to employ available forces to meet military requirements over the summer. The options are first described generally and then broken down into specific actions under three threat categories. General options are:

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- Follow through on the December 1994 CHOD initiative at The Hague. On December 20, 1994, the NATO countries developed a range of options for a more robust approach. The early momentum of pledges to augment UNPROFOR with men and equipment has dissipated.

- Follow through on process to create safe areas/exclusion zones and/or turn existing safe areas into exclusion zones (EZs); The UN Secretary General report in December 1994 was critical of the ineffectual implementation of safe areas and EZs. This could be the first step in a build down approach as advocated by Senator Nunn;

- Assign UNPROFOR units departing Croatia to B-H. Approximately five-ten thousand troops may be leaving as a result of the new UN force structure in Croatia. Many contributing nations may be willing to continue their presence in Bosnia. This would be a ready source of manpower for augmentation.

- Use additional manpower either to force land convoys through, to guard more effectively the weapons control locations, or to strengthen presence in the enclaves. These ideas were proposed by the UK in December 1994 at the CHOD. They are consistent with the UN mandate, but require deterrent airpower to be effective;

- More rigorously enforce the exclusion zones; use air power to eliminate violations. Appropriate authorization already exists with UNSCRs 836, 908, and 958 as well as NAC decisions reached on November 10, 19, & 24, 1994. The difficulty has been with dual key (and at times triple key) implementation procedures. ROE are in place but may not be sufficiently robust;

- Suppress enemy air defenses (SEAD) to facilitate humanitarian airlift/airdrop when reinforced land convoys are not practical. UNSCRs 836 and 958 and NAC decision of November 22, 1994, authorize these operations with the same dual key problems as above.

- Rigorously enforce Deny Flight with SEAD operations, airstrikes, and CAS as appropriate. Again, the NAC and UNSCR authorizations are in place. The difficulties are the practical ones of reaching consensus for action in a timely manner under the constraints of dual and triple key arrangements.

SPECIFIC MILITARY OPTIONS:

Attacks on non-combatants:

1. Safe Area/EZ focus--clearly define the safe areas; create small EZs and expand them. Concentrate UNPROFOR more heavily in these areas. Use military force to defend the people within, including the use of airpower to destroy heavy weapons violating the EZs; requires improved C2 and more and better equipped UNPROFOR.

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2. Central Based Rapid Reaction Force--create viable, mechanized reaction force to respond with ground combat power and air support to defend populations under attack or to break a siege; requires improved C3I, combat equipment, and logistical support.
3. Consolidate populations in UNPROFOR protected safe areas; requires support of the people displaced and greater resources to address their humanitarian needs.

Attacks on UNPROFOR:

1. Increase size and capabilities of UNPROFOR units; give them the manpower and equipment to deter or repel attacks; consolidate UNPROFOR to provide economy of force and efficiency; might require pulling back some of the UNMOs and closing isolated weapons storage sites.
2. Strengthen UNPROFOR escorting humanitarian convoys; develop tougher ROE;
3. Strengthen UNPROFOR at any remaining weapons storage sites; develop appropriate ROE to resist any attempts to seize weapons from the sites.

Disruption of humanitarian relief operations:

1. Secure the Sarajevo airport--requires more and better equipped troops; likely requires the use of SEAD operations , airstrikes, and CAS to keep the air routes safe for the airlift missions; probably requires the establishment and enforcement of a DMZ.
2. Strengthen UNPROFOR escorting the land convoys; idea is to force way through if necessary with adequate ground forces and air cover.
3. Secure a land route to Sarajevo (and perhaps other locations); requires more and better equipped UNPROFOR (armed escort plus rapid reaction force); weather may be a concern, particularly in the winter.
4. Secure Tuzla airport--requires redeployment of UNPROFOR.
5. Consolidate UNPROFOR relief operations activities.

Conclusion: The level of violence and humanitarian suffering in Bosnia this spring and summer will be determined by three factors which provide the US three primary points of influence to affect the situation. First, the nature and scope of Bosnian Government military operation and their degree of success likely will set the overall tone in renewed fighting in Bosnia over the next few months. Second, the Serbs have several response options to government military actions, including attacks on population centers and humanitarian relief efforts. The third factor, and the one most significant to US and international response planning, is the willingness of UNPROFOR to take the necessary organizational and procedural measures to enable aggressive action to respond to an increase in violence. These conditions suggest that the first steps in dealing with the summer violence in Bosnia are to determine if the US will seek to limit government military actions and to determine if UNPROFOR can be persuaded to modify its structures and procedures to deter or restrain Serb attacks. ~~If the former cannot be attained, the latter is not possible.~~
One is probably not attainable without the other.

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A Possible Strategy to Extend The Cease-fire

Our goal over the next few weeks should be to extend the cessation agreement in Bosnia beyond May 1, thus holding down the fighting ("small war") and avoiding the need for a US-assisted withdrawal of UNPROFOR. Because Sarajevo has consistently refused to extend the cessation in a vacuum, we have sought -- with Sarajevo's concurrence -- to create a political/diplomatic process with Belgrade. But after our own face-to-face meetings with Milosevic, and a series of Allied and Russian meetings, it is clear to all that he is not prepared to recognize Bosnia.

With the cessation agreement beginning to unravel and the Milosevic card all but played out (the Contact Group plans one last attempt next week), we need urgently to consider other ways to convince Sarajevo to extend the agreement -- and to send a message to Pale that their intransigence will not be rewarded. There are two approaches we might consider: strengthening the UNPROFOR mandate and enhancing the ICFY border monitoring effort.

UNPROFOR Mandate

Last week, the GOBH announced that the UNPROFOR mandate in Bosnia would not be renewed past March 31, 1995 unless the UN undertakes a complete review of the "growing gap" between the mandate and its implementation. Taking a page from Tudjman's playbook, Izetbegovic is gambling that Bosnia can win a better deal from the international community through brinksmanship. In a March 25 press conference, Izetbegovic described his conditions for an extended mandate:

-- Protect the protected zones, in line with Resolutions 824 and 836;

-- Implement the mandate on the basis of the NATO ultimatum of February 9, 1994 concerning the Sarajevo heavy weapons exclusion zone;

-- Push Karadzic's forces from the Srebrenica demilitarized zone;

-- Take protective measures against snipers in Sarajevo; and

-- Open the Blue Routes.

We should consider ways to meet Izetbegovic's concerns on renewing UNPROFOR's mandate in return for which we would ask him for an extension of the cessation agreement. Some of what Sarajevo wants could fit in with the OSD paper on strengthening UN actions in Bosnia (Tab 3). Some are also consistent with concepts previously discussed during the CHOD meetings in the Hague in December.

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With our allies increasingly concerned about the outbreak of fighting, we can use the UNPROFOR mandate renewal to support UNPROFOR strengthening measures as the best remaining option for preventing a "big war" this Spring. Similarly, we must drive home to Sarajevo the importance we attach to securing an extension to the cessation of hostilities beyond May 1. This approach allows us to work with our allies, not the Serbs, giving us a correspondingly higher chance of success. Moreover, if we are successful, we would not only be able to extend the cease-fire but also have an UNPROFOR configured and equipped in a way that more closely corresponds to the situation on the ground.

ICFY Monitoring

We should also use the issue of mandate renewal to increase the effectiveness of the ICFY Border monitoring mission. In a fit of pique over the question of monitoring recently, Milosevic told Bob Frasure that he is willing to increase monitoring -- as long as we pay for it. We ought to call his bluff and offer to put as many people (and as much equipment) as possible on the border. This, combined with a strengthened UNPROFOR, would further isolate Pale.

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MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 28 MAR DC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
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AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	3/28/95	09:00	[signature] PRINT LAST NAME: [signature] COPY: 1
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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1995 MAR 27 PM 5:21

6 15 PM 96

WASHFAX
27 MAR 95 17 - 32
NMCC/JCS
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
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ROUTINE

RELEASER: [signature]

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 654 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTICE/AGENDA FOR 28 MAR PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

NSC LOG # 20393

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

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PRIORITY
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RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 654 CLASSIFICATION: SECRET TOTAL: 3
(PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (202) 456-9425 WH SITROOM
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTICE/AGENDA FOR 28 MAR PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

NSC LOG # 20393

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
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DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

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MESSAGE NO.: 654 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTICE/AGENDA FOR 28 MAR PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

NSC LOG # 20393

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

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PRIORITY
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DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 664 CLASSIFICATION: SECRET TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

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NSC LOG # 20393

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DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 27, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the
President

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia on March 28, 1995, 3:15 - 4:45 p.m., in the White House SVTS Room. Attendance will be Principals only. The agenda is attached at Tab A. (S)

for
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

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Meeting of NSC Principals Committee
on Bosnia and Croatia
Tuesday, March 28, 1995
3:15-4:45 p.m.
White House SVTS Conference Room

AGENDA

I. Croatia: Mandate for New UN Peacekeeping Force...State/USUN

II. Diplomatic Strategy

A. Contact Group Status/Next Steps.....State

B. Sanctions Options.....OVP

III. Preventing or containing renewed fighting in Bosnia

A. Options for Tougher UN/NATO Action.....OSD

B. Diplomatic Strategy.....State

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20393

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 27, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: DON KERRICK

SUBJECT: Principals Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, March 28, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Principals' meeting on Bosnia and Croatia to be held March 28, 1995. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the meeting and authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

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Case Number: 2010-0533-M

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (4 pages)~~	~~04/14/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
~~002a. memo~~	~~Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake re: Issue Sheet: Extending Sanctions Relief for FRY (3 pages)~~	~~04/14/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
002b. report	re: Inter-Serbian Sanctions [partial] (11 pages)	04/13/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 08/03/2015
~~002c. paper~~	~~re: The End of the Second Hundred Days: Strategy and Options (4 pages)~~	~~04/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
003a. memo	BG Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake re: April 14 Principals Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (6 pages)	04/13/1995	P1/b(1)
~~003b. agenda~~	~~Meeting of NSC Principals Committee on Bosnia and Croatia (1 page)~~	~~04/14/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003c. cable~~	~~re: Milosevic on Bonsia Recognition: No (5 pages)~~	~~04/12/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ
~~003d. cable~~	~~re: Contact Group Meeting with President Tudjman (2 pages)~~	~~04/12/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ
~~003e. paper~~	~~re: Croatia (1 page)~~	~~04/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC
~~003f. memo~~	~~re: Information Paper to Provide Interagency Information on the Status of the OPLAN 40104 (1 page)~~	~~04/13/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ
~~003g. memo~~	~~re: Information Paper to Provide Information on the Status of Decisions Concerning the OPLAN 40104 (1 page)~~	~~04/13/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ
~~003h. memo~~	~~re: Information Paper to Provide the CJCS Information on the Status of Decisions Concering OPLAN 40104 (2 pages)~~	~~04/12/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ

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P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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~~003i. memo~~	~~re: Information Paper to Provide Options and a Strategy to Strenghten UNPROFOR (2 pages)~~	~~04/13/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
003j. chart	re: OPLAN 40104-UNPROFOR Withdrawal (1 page)	04/1995	P1/b(1)
003k. memo	re: Information Paper to Provide CJCS Definitions of the NATO Reporting System [partial] (1 page)	04/05/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 02/27/2017
~~003l. paper~~	~~re: Bosnia: Going for a Small War (2 pages)~~	~~04/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
003m. memo	re: Information Paper to Provide to the Interagency Options and a Strategy to Stregthen UNPROFOR [partial] (2 pages)	04/10/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 02/27/2017
~~004. agenda~~	~~[Duplicate of 003b] (1 page)~~	~~04/14/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020

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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 19 APR 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
PC
CROATIA
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 14 APR PC MTG RE BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 20 APR 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520423 9520470

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0129 CODES: BOS CRO

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FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
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		KERRICK
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DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
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001		X	95041918	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
002		X	95041918	SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950419	FUERTH, L	
002	950419	BRILL, K	
002	950419	ADAMS, G	
002	950419	MCALEER, R	
002	950419	INDERFURTH, K	
002	950419	GARTHOFF, D	
002	950419	PATRICK, T	

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Lake		Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
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Dohse	1		
Sens			
Soderberg	copy		
Berger	2		
Lake		Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
~~Dohse Situation Room~~	3		Tab I
West Wing Desk	4	MBN 4/19	D
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DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
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COL. T. R. PATRICK
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ROOM 2E865
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WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001

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DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Summary ~~Notice of Meeting~~ PC 14 Apr Re Bosnia PAGES: 6

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

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If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC of PC Re Bosnia & Croatia 14 Apr

NSC LOG # 9520487

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20487

April 19, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

AMBASSADOR RICK INDEFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T.R. PATRICK
Executive Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DR. GORDON ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, April 14, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

for
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee
DATE: April 14, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 - 3:45 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Anthony Lake

OVP
Leon Fuerth

State
Strobe Talbott
Robert Frasure

DOD
William Perry

OMB
Gordon Adams

USUN
Madeleine Albright

Chief of Staff
No Representative

CIA
Admiral William Studeman

JCS
General John Shalikashvili

White House
Samuel Berger

NSC
Alexander Vershbow
Brigadier General Don Kerrick

Summary of Conclusions

Sanctions

1. Principals discussed whether and under what conditions to support extension of limited sanctions relief for the FRY beyond the second 100-day period that ends on April 22. Principals agreed that while the border closure has proven less effective than desired, other variables, including the situation on the ground and views of Allies and the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, must be taken into account. (S)

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Duration of Sanctions Relief

2. Principals agreed to support a conditioned extension of sanctions relief for less then 100 days, with the exact timeframe to be determined after consultations with the Bosnian Government. Principals agreed that State should seek definitive views from the Bosnian Government **(Action: State)** and that Ambassador Albright should incorporate those views in negotiations with Allies on the length of additional sanctions relief. **(Action: USUN)** (S)

Conditions for Sanctions Relief

3. Principals agreed that additional conditions must be included in any new extension of sanctions relief. Those conditions could include, but are not limited to, an end to all cross-border helicopter flights, the termination of telecommunication links between Serbia-Montenegro and Serb-controlled areas of Bosnia, an end to exports from Serbia-Montenegro to Serb-controlled areas of Bosnia under the auspices of the Yugoslav Red Cross and an end to bus transit of Serb soldiers across the border. The U.S. will also pursue measures aimed at closing the "back door," the transshipment of FRY goods through Croatia to Bosnian Serb territory. Principals authorized Ambassador Albright to discuss conditions that should be applied to sanctions relief extension. **(Action: USUN)** (S)

Tactics

4. Principals discussed the difficulties that will be encountered in crafting an acceptable resolution extending sanctions relief and authorized Ambassador Albright to negotiate with Allies and the Government of Bosnia in the drafting of the resolution. They also agreed that Ambassador Albright should use the threat of a veto in order to ensure the resolution meets U.S. conditions. (S)

Sanctions Tightening Measures

5. Principals deferred discussion of additional sanctions issues and remanded to the Deputies Committee approval of measures to close the "back door" and reduce the transshipment of oil to Serbia-Montenegro through Albania. Principals also asked Deputies to continue efforts to resolve ICFY related funding issues that are hindering ICFY operations. **(Action: OVP/State)**

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Contact Group Status and Prospects

6. Principals reviewed the lack of progress in the Contact Group's latest efforts to gain Milosevic's recognition of Bosnia and the other former Yugoslav Republics in exchange for additional sanctions relief. They agreed that the Contact Group was nearing its useful end as a negotiating body but that we would continue to support the Contact Group plan as the basis for a negotiated settlement, noting that Bosnian Serb continued rejection of the plan remains the primary obstacle to peace. Principals authorized Ambassador Frasure to discuss with the Bosnians the importance of reducing the level of violence in any renewed fighting in order to keep UNPROFOR in Bosnia. **(Action: State)** (S)

OPLAN 40104 Approval Process

OPLAN 40104

7. Principals reviewed the status of OPLAN 40104 that covers NATO participation in UNPROFOR's withdrawal from Bosnia. Noting that unanswered policy questions remain, they directed the IWG to develop a list of unanswered policy questions and answers relating to the plan for Deputies' review before briefing the plan to the President and Congress. **(Action: NSC with input from State/OSD/JCS)** Principals agreed that Congressional consultations should be completed before voting to approve the plan in the NAC or identifying specific U.S. units that will participate in the operation. (S)

Command and Control

8. Principals reaffirmed that U.S. participation in UNPROFOR withdrawal is possible only if the operation is under full NATO command and control. They agreed that Ambassador Albright should remind the UNSYG of the requirement for NATO command and control. **(Action: USUN)** Principals further directed that clear guidance be provided to our representatives at NATO concerning the approval process within the USG. **(Action: State/JCS)** (S)

NATO Prepositioning

9. Principals reviewed the progress of NATO prepositioning efforts, noting that the SACEUR had been given the authority by the North Atlantic Council to deploy the Step Two mini-propositioning force (80 personnel, including 20 U.S.). Deployment is expected in late April or early May. Principals agreed that because the NATO operation has not begun, the deploying mini-prepositioning forces will be under national command, NATO operational control and UN tactical control. These

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command arrangements are similar to those in place for the other U.S. military personnel already serving in Croatia. Principals agreed that concerned Congressional Staff and members should be briefed on these arrangements before the deployment begins. **(Action: JCS)** Subsequent decisions will be required before deploying the maxi-prepositioning force to Croatia and regarding the appropriate command and control arrangements at that stage. (S)

Options for Strengthening UNPROFOR

10. Principals briefly reviewed the progress of ongoing efforts with the British and the French to strengthen UNPROFOR. Noting that Allies remain very reluctant to undertake meaningful strengthening measures, Principals agreed that the CJCS would report on further progress following his meetings with his counterparts during the week of April 24 in Brussels. **(Action: JCS)** (S)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20487

April 17, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: DON KERRICK

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, April 14, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia held April 14, 1995.

Concurrence by: Leon Fuerth

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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FROM: KERRICK
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 14 APR 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA CROATIA
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: ADDL BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 14 APR PC MTG ON BOSNIA CROATIA - ISSUE SHEET RE EXTENDING SANCTIONS RELIEF FOR FRY

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 18 APR 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520423 9520470

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0129 CODES:

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 14, 1995



Natl Sec Advisor has seen
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INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: DON KERRICK

SUBJECT: Issue Sheet: Extending Sanctions Relief for FRY.

ISSUE FOR DECISION: *Whether and under what conditions to support extension of sanctions relief for the FRY beyond second 100-day period (April 22).*

BACKGROUND: UNSCR 943 gave limited sanctions relief to FRY for initial 100-day period (ended January 13) for verified effective closure of "inter-Serb border" to all goods except foodstuffs, medicine and clothing. UNSCR 970 extended sanctions relief for second 100-day period ending April 22.

EVALUATING BELGRADE'S PERFORMANCE: CIA assessment at Tab A. Draft options paper at Tab B. Overall, performance remained constant or marginally better with numerous reports of violations. In terms of trends, however, performance deteriorated somewhat over second 100-day period. ICFY co-chairmen certified FRY met commitment to close border on the ground, but acknowledges that numerous helicopter flights occurred and that airspace is not closed. (Our view: will be difficult to explain reports of helicopter border violations coupled with other reported violations equal real border closure). **Performance standard is verified effective border closure, not Contact Group map acceptance.**

LACK OF MONEY HAMPERS ICFY: ICFY limping along — nearly broke. U.S. $300K delivered April 11. No new funds on horizon. ICFY needs quick cash infusion to operate beyond June 1.

OVERALL ASSESSMENT: Border closure and cease-fire have not brought acceptance of Contact Group plan as hoped. Border closure affects Pale, but has not completely severed Serbian lifeline nor dampened political will. Contact Group partners and Russia favor extension. Izetbegovic believed to support

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conditional extension rather than risking complete border reopening if sanctions reimposed.

OPTIONS:

A. Extend sanctions relief on current basis.

ASSESSMENT: Perpetuates regime where violations will continue to grow in number. Hard to justify to Congress.

B. Extend sanctions relief for another 100 days, but with additional conditions and, possibly, a hair-trigger termination mechanism if specific violations occur.

ASSESSMENT: Maintains existing limited leverage vis-à-vis Pale but increases pressure on Milosevic to improve performance. **Bosnian Government reportedly favors this approach** in order to maintain Pale isolation. Somewhat easier to justify to Hill.

Additional conditions could include declaration that this will be last extension unless all helicopter flights are ended, telecommunications links cut, exports ended to Bosnian Serb-controlled areas using cover of Yugoslav Red Cross, and steps taken to end circumvention of border closure through back door. Hair-trigger would terminate sanctions relief in the event of a single helicopter flight or flagrant violations on the ground.

C. Determine Milosevic fails test – terminate sanctions relief, press for sanctions tightening.

ASSESSMENT: U.S. would be isolated. Dramatic admission of Contact Group failure. Undermine whatever positive influence Milosevic brings to process. Strengthen Karadzic without progress in peace process. On other hand, would be easiest option to justify to Congress.

D. Terminate sanctions relief, but delay tightening to give Milosevic chance to improve performance and regain relief.

ASSESSMENT: Same as above and not likely to bring about improved performance.

RECOMMENDATION: Option B. Conditioned extension for another 100 days with new vote needed to extend again. Suggest Principals authorize Ambassador Albright to negotiate best conditioned extension possible. Hair-trigger may be hardest to sell, but could be bargained away in exchange for measures to close back door, increase ICFY monitors, and tighten other loopholes in enforcement against FRY. Direct calls could be made next week to inform Hill of decision. Principals should also direct State to press Allies for new ICFY funding.

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Attachments
Tab A CIA Assessment
Tab B Draft Options Paper

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. report	re: Inter-Serbian Sanctions [partial] (11 pages)	04/13/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
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([PC and Bosnia...])
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FOLDER TITLE:
PC0129 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Extending Sanctions, April 14, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs638

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P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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3.5c

Intelligence Report

DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

13 April 1995

Inter-Serbian Sanctions: Assessment #6 3.5c

Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic continues to support sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs in hopes of isolating Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic and of getting sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro (FRY) lifted. Milosevic apparently is allowing limited resupply to the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) so the BSA is not prevented from holding its own against the Bosnian Army. 3.5c

Activity since mid-January at internationally monitored border crossings suggests that the embargo and winter weather have held shipments across the Serbia-Bosnia border to below pre-August levels, when the embargo was imposed. Since mid-February enforcement overall has deteriorated from the levels noted in late December, which suggests that the Bosnian Serbs are increasingly obtaining embargoed goods and that the VJ is supplying the BSA. In addition to those crossing the Serbia-Bosnia border, other goods are reaching the Bosnian Serbs through Croatia, ***a large potential loophole that probably is the largest conduit for fuel to the Bosnian Serbs.*** 3.5c

Because the embargo has reduced the amount of goods crossing the Serbia-Bosnia border, it has imposed some pain on Pale's civilian economy, particularly its financial and industrial sectors. There are no indications that the embargo has had a serious impact on the BSA's capabilities, even with some spot shortages reported. ***The BSA seems largely self-sufficient in logistics capability, except for fuel and some munitions.*** 1.4c the Bosnian Serb network to acquire critical munitions is still in operation, ***and Pale probably has used the current cease-fire to resupply its forces.*** 3.5c

3.5c

3.5c

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Milosevic Keeping Pressure on Karadzic With Sanctions

Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic continues to support sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs. He probably has determined that he has few other means for pressuring and isolating Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic. Milosevic also hopes that the West will respond by dropping sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro (FRY). Another former source of political pressure, the dissident group of Bosnian Serb assembly members who are aligned with Milosevic, apparently has lost its impetus to pressure Karadzic. 1.4c ***So far, Milosevic has not forced Karadzic to accept a peace plan Belgrade likes, nor has he significantly weakened him with sanctions. Nevertheless, Karadzic may now be feeling some pressure after eight months of sanctions.*** Milosevic's pressure will continue to grow, as will internal pressure from the constant shortage of essentials. 3.5c

Milosevic probably does not intend for the embargo to prevent the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) from holding its own against the Bosnian Army. Moreover, his allowing some assistance to the BSA appeases the leadership of the Yugoslav Army, which generally opposes Milosevic's blockade of the Bosnian Serbs. ***As a consequence, he is apparently allowing limited resupply to the BSA so long as it serves Serbian political aims and the activity can be plausibly denied.***

1.4c, 3.5c

This memorandum was prepared by analysts of the DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force. The report was requested by Leon Fuerth, Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs, to provide information on Serbia's sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force 3.5c

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Shipments Across FRY-Bosnia Border Remain Restricted

1.4c

suggests that Belgrade's embargo and winter weather have held shipments across the Serbia-Bosnia border to levels below those observed before the embargo was imposed in August. ***The presence of the monitors from the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) at most of the border crossings capable of handling large quantities of goods has inhibited major violations of the embargo.*** In particular, only one large-scale fuel shipment attempted since 30 December, suggesting that Belgrade has largely shut off such shipments across the Bosnian border. 3.5c

In response to ICFY requests since January, FRY officials implemented measures that have helped restrict shipments. ***As it did in late December 1994, Belgrade recently addressed major problems with an eye toward the United Nations review on lifting sanctions on the FRY scheduled for April.***

- Customs officers increased the number and thoroughness of bus inspections at many of the major border crossings, but implementation has been inconsistent, 1.4c As a result of their auto and bus inspections, Yugoslav officials at the border have regularly confiscated or turned back unauthorized shipments of fuel, construction materials, agricultural supplies, clothing, and livestock. During February, for example, officials confiscated 26 tons of fuel and 19 tons of fertilizer, but suggests that similar amounts of fuel were turned back from the border but not confiscated. In March, a patrol reportedly confiscated about 80 tons of fuel from four trucks using hidden tanks.

- Yugoslav officials have taken steps to reduce the use of some minor crossings and bypasses discovered by ICFY monitors. 1.4c

- On 13 March, ICFY protested to FRY officials about buses loaded with soldiers transiting the border. 1.4c Belgrade promised to take immediate action, and there have been no subsequent confirmed transits of troops.

- ICFY 1.4c stopped 24-hour monitoring at the Jamena ferry crossing after the FRY had erected barricades in response to ICFY's request.

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- Serbia also has cooperated with ICFY at Priboj and Uzice in inspecting and sealing Yugoslav trains that transit Bosnia, including freight cars on passenger trains.

- In March, Serbian postal officials were checking packages for prohibited goods, 1.4c

- On 27 March, Customs Director Kertes agreed to improve controls on loading Yugoslav Red Cross (YRC) trucks to ensure that only approved goods were included in the shipments. 1.4c unidentified FRY officials were pressuring them to allow YRC vehicles to be used to move unauthorized goods into Bosnia. 3.5c

Belgrade also has imposed more penalties on smugglers. Yugoslav customs initiated action in 215 cases of sanctions violations in February and imposed fines of 127,000 dinars. 1.4c this was a marked improvement over the August 1994 to January 1995 period when 138 cases were initiated and 341,450 dinars in fines were meted out. 3.5c

Widespread Problems at the Border Indicate Enforcement Deteriorating

Although Belgrade has addressed some ICFY concerns and no large shipments have been observed, the nature and frequency of enforcement shortcomings since mid-February indicate enforcement overall has deteriorated from the levels noted in late December. The deteriorating enforcement suggests that the Bosnian Serbs are increasingly obtaining embargoed goods and that the VJ is supplying the BSA across the Bosnia border. 1.4c

we cannot determine if the enforcement deficiencies have allowed enough shipments to compensate for quantities lost from the cutoff in August 1994 of large trucks.

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3.5c

1.4c

Moreover, 1.4c Belgrade is shipping large quantities of fuel and other goods to the Bosnian Serbs through Croatia via the Belgrade-Zagreb highway. *Large-scale use of this route could have permitted Belgrade to shift cargo trucks away from the inter-Serb border, accounting for the apparent cessation of transits at those crossings. In addition, the information on the detected cross-border helicopter flights is insufficient to confirm that any have been used to resupply the BSA.* 3.5c

Deteriorating Enforcement Against "Ant Trade"

ICFY has had few indications of transits by large cargo trucks or tankers across the border, but the flow of truck, bus, automobile, farm tractor, and pedestrian traffic, which composes the "ant trade," appears to have been relatively steady through March at ICFY-manned crossings. Monitors have noted significant enforcement deficiencies by FRY officials against this traffic since mid-February. In particular, ICFY patrols in March detected an increasing number unauthorized truck transits. 3.5c

Yugoslav officials have not responded to monitors' requests to improve enforcement procedures, have not halted repeated violations, and have attempted to circumvent ICFY controls. 1.4c, 3.5c

3.5c

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Gaps in ICFY Coverage Leave Loopholes

Smuggling activity 1.4c *suggests that goods are crossing the border where international monitoring is irregular or nonexistent.* As of 31 March, ICFY is monitoring 19 border crossings--down from 21 around the clock--and is deploying fewer patrols. The remainder of the approximately 130 Serbia-Bosnia border crossings are monitored solely by the VJ, FRY customs, or police. 1.4c, 3.5c

[redacted] funding constraints have forced personnel reductions, which in turn has reduced the number of crossings monitored full time and the number of patrols. [redacted] detailed several incidents in March touching on monitor security, *which could lead the monitors to be more cautious in patrolling away from the manned posts and less inclined to press Serbian officials to improve enforcement.* 3.5c

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1.4c *inadequate coverage by FRY patrols, inadequate personnel and facilities to support inspections, and insufficient guidance on enforcement regulations also have hampered enforcement.* 1.4c, 3.5c

Pressure on FRY officials from Serbs living and trading along the border also may contribute to lax enforcement. 1.4c

A confrontation on 14 March between police and Bosnian Serb civilians at Krstac escalated into an exchange of gunfire and grenades. At the Nudo Valley checkpoint, on 10 March that a customs officer was reluctant to inspect most of the vehicles because he claimed that the local people knew him. 3.5c

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Unauthorized Helicopter Activity Continuing

Since January, there have been several incidents reported of helicopters apparently crossing between Serbia and Bosnia. Since January, 1.4c 50 cross-border violations of the No-Fly Zone. Most flights detected originate in Bosnia and cross into Serbia because the flights entering Bosnia probably fit the profile of clandestine arms supply flights flown singly and primarily at night. 3.5c

The largest suspected cross-border violation occurred on 3 February when 1.4c around the eastern enclave of Srebrenica reported 15 helicopters flying approximately 10 kilometers north of the enclave traveling in a westerly direction. Because of the flight direction and proximity to the border, reported that the aircraft were crossing the border into Bosnia. At the same time, UN observers stationed at the Surcin radar facility, which is used to monitor the border for illegal cross-border flight activity, were denied access to the facility. In response to UN inquiries, Belgrade claimed that no helicopters crossed the border. The United Nations subsequently dropped its investigation for lack of evidence. The UN observers have been allowed to reenter the Surcin radar facility and have continued to monitor the radar for cross-border flight activity. 3.5c

Military-Related Activity Increasing Along the Border

Since late January, reports of military vehicles, aircraft, and troops crossing the border have increased. ***The reports reinforce*** 1.4c ***that Belgrade is providing some support to the BSA despite the embargo.***

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1.4c

Belgrade Using Croatian "Back Door" to Get Around Embargo

In addition to goods transiting the Serbia-Bosnia border because of deteriorating enforcement, fuel and other products from the FRY are reaching the Bosnian Serbs through Croatia. Insufficient information is available to determine how long this route has been used to evade the blockade, the volume of the shipments, and Belgrade's involvement, but the traffic appears to be increasing. This represents a large potential loophole in the embargo and probably already is the largest conduit for fuel shipments to the Bosnian Serbs. 1.4c [redacted] in early March that tanker trucks were supplying fuel to Serb-controlled areas of Bosnia via the Zagreb-Belgrade Highway. [redacted] the flow of goods from Serbia to Bosnia through Croatia has steadily increased since the highway was reopened in December 1994. [redacted] lumber, consumer goods, and food destined for Bosnia also have crossed into Croatia at Lipovac, with 50-60 trucks believed transiting the border in each direction during each eight-hour period when monitors are present. From 7 February to 23 March, [redacted] 1,109 trucks may have transited west while monitors were at Lipovac. [redacted] Russian battalion soldiers and Croatian police do not stop vehicles from entering Croatia when they are not present. [redacted] the shipments travel the highway west to Okucani and turn south to deliver to Banja Luka and elsewhere in Bosnia. 3.5c

More Impact on Civilian Than Military Sector

Because the embargo apparently has reduced goods transiting the Serbia-Bosnia border, it has imposed some pain on Pale's civilian economy. There is insufficient data available to distinguish the extent of the embargo's impact from that caused by the fighting

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and the spillover from UN sanctions against the FRY. ***The limited data suggests, however, that the greatest damage from all the external factors, including Belgrade's embargo, has been to Pale's financial and industrial sectors.***

- Bosnian Serb banks have been cut off from the Serbian financial system, with no electronic funds transfers operating. Trade transactions take place on a cash basis, either in German marks or with the few Serbian dinars Pale acquired while part of the Serbian monetary union in 1994. Due to its lack of hard currency, Pale has tried with little success to provide liquidity by using various types of fiat money, including commodity coupons and checks, but the German mark remains the principal medium of exchange.

- The non-military industrial sector reportedly is operating at 10 to 15 percent of capacity, with the timber industry the only significant export sector, 1.4c for example, reported that 457 trucks containing Bosnian lumber were detected bound for Serbia during a 45-day period, and lumber trucks have crossed the Serbia-Bosnia border. 3.5c

The blockade also appears to have caused additional shortages of fuel, electricity, and basic foodstuffs, such as meat and cooking oil. 1.4c all goods are rationed in Bosnian Serb areas, with fuel two to five times more expensive than in Serbia. As a consequence, farming has shifted from mechanized to labor intensive methods, possibly employing locally conscripted labor. Even the BSA faces constant spot shortages of food, clothing, and fuel, which could result from internal distribution delays. 3.5c

Despite the spot shortages for the BSA, there are no indications the embargo has had a serious impact on its capabilities. Reporting on recent fighting indicates Bosnian Serb forces have been able to counter Bosnian Government attacks in the Majevica Mountains and Travnik area. Similarly, Bosnian Serb forces conducted a successful counteroffensive last November to regain territory in northwest Bosnia, south of Bihac. 3.5c

The BSA remains largely self-sufficient in logistic capability, except for fuel and certain munitions. Available reporting indicates the Bosnian Serb network to acquire critical munitions inside Serbia is still in operation:

- 1.4c A press report on 24 March identified four of these supply links and revealed two additional FRY firms, the

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Sloboda and Milan Blagovevic Factories, that are associated with Bosnian Serb ammunition suppliers.

- 1.4c the BSA had no problems receiving military supplies from factories inside Serbia, suggesting Pale is confident it can continue receiving supplies from Serbia.

In addition, Bosnian Serb officials continue to attempt to acquire military supplies and other goods through Cyprus. ***Bosnian Serbs probably have used the current cease-fire to resupply their forces.*** 3.5c

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STATE DRAFT

The End of the Second Hundred Days: Strategy and Options

Suspension of certain sanctions on Serbia-Montenegro (FRY), based on verified closure of the FRY/Bosnia border, ends on 22 April unless the UN Security Council (UNSC) acts before that date. This can provide a useful point of leverage.

Decision Factors

Deciding our position on renewal of sanctions suspension should take into account several factors:

BORDER CLOSURE: The standard for sanctions relief in UNSC resolutions 943 and 970 is whether the FRY is effectively implementing its commitment to effectively close the border to all but food, medicine and clothing for humanitarian needs. Smuggling persists but the border is more closed than we might have expected because an open "back door" allows supply by other routes. Fuel reaches Pale from Croatia - traded by Bosnian Croats, supplied to Krajina Serbs by the GOC under CBMs, and smuggled from Sector East along the Zagreb-Belgrade highway (opened by CBMs). FRY enforcement has declined somewhat since the January extension. Milosevic thinks pressure is off and is increasingly arrogant. The Yugoslav Army (VJ) continues to support and supply the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA), including by helicopter. Despite indications of fuel shortages and financial difficulties, border closure continues to have limited impact on the increasingly-integrated BSA and Krajina Serb Army.

POLITICAL GOALS: We must consider whether terminating limited sanctions suspension, a slap in Milosevic's face, would support or undermine efforts toward negotiated settlements in Bosnia and Croatia. After eight months, Milosevic's isolation of Pale, motivated mainly by rivalry with Karadzic, has not achieved Pale acceptance of the Contact Group's map. Milosevic rejected Plan B (sanctions relief for mutual recognition). He just gave a clear no to a last ditch Contact Group "Bosnia-only" proposal.

ALLIES/CONTACT GROUP UNITY: Our partners may insist border closure is the sole criterion for sanctions suspension and seek extension. Russia may again argue for expanded sanctions relief and lifting rather than suspension. However, with Milosevic's "no" to the "Bosnia-only" proposal the Contact Group is at a dead end limiting the impact that termination of sanctions suspension will have on group "unity".

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Impact of Termination

Milosevic sees no political will in the West, thinks that he can get better and better deals by holding out and is not expecting sanctions suspension to be terminated. Termination would be a cold shower for him. He would likely expel the ICFY Mission (if it did not leave on its own). Milosevic could pursue his own interests by maintaining border closure to keep pressure on Karadzic. Without ICFY monitoring, the VJ would likely increase supplies to the BSA despite any political orders. But even continued monitoring would have little practical impact on Pale and Knin if Croatian CBMs and Bosnian Croat smuggling keep them supplied with fuel and other needs. Some military equipment can always be smuggled through.

GOBH Position

We will need to factor the GOBH position -- as yet unknown -- into our decision.

Strategy

Our response to ICFY's March 31 report on border closure continued our strategy of emphasizing areas of concern and raising doubts of our willingness to extend sanctions suspension beyond April 22. Having kept our options open, we must now choose one of three options: A) extend sanctions suspension on the current basis, B) extend sanctions suspension with conditions, C) terminate sanctions suspension.

Option A: Extension on the Current Basis

Extension on the current basis would perpetuate a regime in which violations, such as supply by helicopter, could continue. Supplementing this with "closing the back door" would increase pressure on Karadzic but even this combination might not bring the Bosnian Serbs to the table. Milosevic, who expects better, would complain but it would be only a mild disappointment which would serve to strengthen his belief that time is on his side.

Option B: Conditional Extension

This would be predicated on a judgement that the effects of border closure can be enhanced to the point that they are significant pressure on Pale. This would be a resolution including a zero-tolerance policy on helicopters (one helo sighting or track would trigger the five day termination period). Other requirements would be closure of the border with Sector East, full inspection of buses, closer inspections of "humanitarian" goods at loading, larger and immovable barriers at crossings not covered 24-hours, and an end to the ant trade, etc.

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Milosevic could be put on the spot by if we incorporated a hair trigger. (While it would be difficult to get Owen and Stoltenberg ever to submit a negative report, we could press the UN to report separately on the basis of any helicopter flights detected by military observers.) Milosevic would then be responsible for termination rather than we if he chose to not stop supply to the Bosnian Serbs. This would have to be accompanied by "closing the back door" to make the extension meaningful.

Option C: Terminate Sanctions Suspension

Milosevic is not expecting sanctions suspension to be terminated. This would be a cold shower to show him that he has misjudged and is not in the driver's seat. This option (or the others) would be most effective if accompanied by a thrust to improve enforcement of sanctions against the FRY and the Bosnian Serbs.

Whatever decision we ultimately reach, our position should be explained to allies as much as possible in terms of border closure standards, not broader political factors. We will also need to explain our position to Congress and the press, both of which have questioned closure of the FRY/Bosnia border.

Recommendations

- If we are willing to continue sanctions suspension, we should insist the resolution include language clarifying the extent of sanctions suspension. We are in a strong position - non-action by UNSC results in termination. Negotiating tactics require an entry position with bells and whistles in the resolution.

- In particular, non-negotiable resolution provisions should:

  -- Extend sanctions relief at most for another (100) days, with a positive vote needed to extend again;

  - A strengthened termination mechanism which incorporates a zero-tolerance on violations by aircraft and any military movement, including of personnel;

  -- confirm that aviation fuel, spare parts and other equipment intended for Belgrade flights cannot be shipped to the FRY (by air or otherwise) without case-by-case sanctions committee authorization; we should insist on Sanctions Committee confirmation that any fuel in excess of the immediate needs of a conveyance is a violation (for aircraft, this means enough for the flight plus the recognized safety margin);

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-- require each state which allows flights to and from Belgrade to receive sanctions committee approval for its controls on goods and funds on these flights as a condition of continuing these flights;

-- impose a similar condition on Italy with respect to Bari-Bar ferries.

o We should seriously push for other added requirements, such as the following:

-- Demand verified closure of the FRY/Croatia border at Sector East in the North (the major diversion route) and at the Prevlaka peninsula in the South.

-- Demand that the FRY reimpose the telecommunications cut-off of the Bosnian Serbs which Milosevic imposed last September and ended in December.

-- Demand that Serbia cease collecting any tolls on international shipping on the Danube.

o A third level of negotiating positions could be:

-- Reducing the level of sanctions relief for the FRY, for example by reimposing the ban on FRY participation in sporting events.

-- Sanctions suspension for less than 100 day period.

-- Call for tighter sanctions to automatically go into force if sanctions suspension is terminated.

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520470
RECEIVED: 13 APR 95 11

TO: LAKE

FROM: KERRICK
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 13 APR 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA CROATIA
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 14 APR PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 17 APR 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520423 9520483

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0129 CODES: BOS CRO

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		JOSHI
		KERRICK
		KRECZKO
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		SODERBERG
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COMMENTS: _____

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MD NARA, Date 6/14/12

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001		X	95042016	NOTED BY LAKE

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National Security Council
The White House

rec'd 4/13 2:45pm

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003a. memo	BG Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake re: April 14 Principals Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (6 pages)	04/13/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4009

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0129 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Extending Sanctions, April 14, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs638

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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Meeting of NSC Principals Committee
on Bosnia and Croatia
Friday, April 14, 1995
2:30-4:00p.m.
White House Situation Room

AGENDA

I. Diplomatic Strategy

A. Contact Group Status/Next Steps.....State

B. Next Steps following Passage of UNSC Resolutions on UNPROFOR.....State*

II. OPLAN 40104 Approval Process

A. Next Steps on NATO Prepositioning - Step Two (Mini/Maxi Options) and Beyond.....JCS*

B. NATO/U.S. Decision Timeline for OPLAN 40104.....JCS*

-- Strategy for Briefing President and Gaining Congressional Authorization for Appropriation.....State*/OSD*/JCS

III. Preventing or Containing Renewed Fighting in Bosnia

A. Diplomatic Strategy.....State*

B. Strategy/Options for Strengthening UNPROFOR.....JCS*/OSD/State

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 3/5/2020
2013-0682-M

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PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~SECRET~~ DTG:121236Z APR 95

FM: AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

TO:
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5483

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NODIS

EUR FOR FRASURE AND EUR/SCE
NSC FOR VERSHBOW

FROM CHRIS HILL

E.O. 12356:DECL
TAGS:
SUBJECT: MILOSEVIC ON BOSNIA RECOGNITION: NO

REF: STATE 86669

1. ~~SECRET~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: MILOSEVIC REPLIED TO THE CONTACT GROUP PROPOSAL ON RECOGNIZING BOSNIA (REFTEL) WITH A CLEAR NO, AN ASSESSMENT SHARED BY ALL MEMBERS OF THE CONTACT GROUP AFTER AN APRIL 11 FIVE-HOUR MEETING/DINNER WHICH STARTED AT 6:00 P.M. HE EXPLAINED THAT TO RECOGNIZE THE CURRENT STATE OF BOSNIA (AS OPPOSED TO THE FUTURE UNION OF BOSNIA) WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO RECOGNITION OF THE IZETBEGOVIC GOVERNMENT, A MOVE WHICH WOULD BE "COUNTERPRODUCTIVE" AS IT WOULD DRIVE THE BOSNIAN SERBS INTO A WAR FEVER FED BY A SENSE OF ABANDONMENT AND BETRAYAL.

3. MILOSEVIC INSISTED THAT THE ONLY WAY TO CONVINCE THE BOSNIAN SERBS THAT THEY ARE ON THE WRONG TRACK IS TO OFFER BELGRADE "FULL SANCTIONS RELIEF IMMEDIATELY." MILOSEVIC DID NOT SHARE THE SENSE OF URGENCY ABOUT THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND IN BOSNIA. ALL SIDES HE BELIEVES -- INCLUDING IZETBEGOVIC -- ARE INTERESTED IN EXTENDING THE CEASE-FIRE. THE ONLY GLIMMER OF HOE FOR THE RECOGNITION PACKAGE WAS WHEN AFTER FIVE HOURS,

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[2013-0682-M, 7.93]

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MILOSEVIC LOOKED DOWN AT THE TWO PAGE PROPOSAL LYING FACE DOWN ON THE TABLE IN FRONT OF HIM, AND SAID: "OKAY, I'LL READ IT." FOLLOWING THE MILOSEVIC MEETING, THE CG MET BRIEFLY AT THE FRENCH EMBASSY TO COMPARE NOTES AND TO CHASTISE RUSSIAN REP ZOTOV FOR HIS REFUSAL TO ENDORSE THE PROPOSAL IN FRONT OF MILOSEVIC AND FOR HIS COMMENTS TO THE PRESS CALLING FOR FULL SANCTIONS RELIEF. END SUMMARY.

4. BRITISH UK REP EHRMAN OPENED THE MARATHON MEETING WITH A 15 MINUTE POINT BY POINT DESCRIPTION OF THE CONTACT GROUP PROPOSAL EXPLAINING ALONG THE WAY THAT THE CONTACT GROUP WAS INCREASINGLY CONCERNED BY THE DETERIORATION OF THE CEASEFIRE AND THE POTENTIAL FOR ALL OUT WAR. MILOSEVIC STARED AT EHRMAN WITH A LOOK OF RAPT FASCINATION AND AT THE CONCLUSION ASKED: "IS THAT IT? THAT'S ALL?"

5. VISIBLY ANNOYED, MILOSEVIC SAID THAT HE HAD HEARD MOST OF THE ELEMENTS BEFORE, THAT THERE WAS NOTHING NEW. HE THEN SAID: "ON THE BASIS OF MY COUNTRY'S EARNEST EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF PEACE I EXPECT THAT YOU, THE CONTACT GROUP MEMBERS, WILL RECOMMEND UNANIMOUSLY THAT THE SANCTIONS AGAINST THE FRY BE LIFTED. WE HAVE, I BELIEVE, SERVED OUR PROBATIONARY PERIOD WITH FULL COOPERATION. NOW IS THE TIME FOR YOU TO RESPOND ACCORDINGLY." HE LOOKED OVER TO HIS SECRETARY, ASKED IF HE HAD GOTTEN IT ALL DOWN AND TOLD HIM TO TYPE IT UP AND DISTRIBUTE IT TO THE CONTACT GROUP. "THAT'S MY REPLY," HE EXPLAINED.

6. ASKED TO ELABORATE, MILOSEVIC SAID THAT HE HAS DISCUSSED THESE ISSUES "ENDLESSLY" WITH ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE CONTACT GROUP IN THE PAST. THE BOSNIAN SERBS ARE BECOMING MORE DIFFICULT TO REASON WITH. THIS IS DUE TO THE FAILURE OF THE CONTACT GROUP TO LIFT SANCTIONS AND HELP HIS POSITION AGAINST THE BOSNIAN SERBS WHO STUBBORNLY BELIEVE THAT THE CONTACT GROUP MUST BE ANTI-SERB. HE ADMONISHED HIS INTERLOCUTORS FOR "NOT SEEING THE SITUATION CLEARLY" AND FOR PAYING EXCESSIVE ATTENTION TO "MARGINAL GUYS" SUCH AS IZETBEGOVIC AND KARADZIC.

7. MILOSEVIC GLANCED AT THE PROPOSAL, ALLOWED THAT IT MIGHT BE AN EXPRESSION OF GOOD WILL BUT THAT IT MISSED THE POINT. "YOU KNOW WE HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH THAT WAR" HE DECLARED. "IF YOU WANT TO SUPPORT PEACE IT IS LOGICAL TO SUPPORT THE ONLY RELIABLE FACTOR FIGHTING FOR PEACE, SERBIA." MILOSEVIC ADMITTED THAT HIS EFFORTS WITH THE PALE ASSEMBLY HAD GONE VERY SLOWLY, BUT EXPLAINED THAT THEY WOULD HAVE BORNE FRUIT HAD SERBIA BEEN GRANTED MORE SANCTIONS RELIEF WHEN HE MADE THE IMPORTANT DECISION TO SUPPORT THE CONTACT GROUP PLAN.

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8. MILOSEVIC PROFESSED DISBELIEF AT THE FAILURE OF THE CONTACT GROUP TO SEE HIS SIDE OF THINGS. "MAYBE YOU WANT TO KEEP THE WAR ON" HE THEORIZED. MILOSEVIC RACED THROUGH SOME RECENT HISTORY OF THE PEACE PROCESS, STARTING WITH THE VANCE-OWEN PLAN AND INSISTED THAT NOTHING SHORT OF FULL SANCTIONS RELIEF IS APPROPRIATE. "PARTIAL SUSPENSION MEANS NOTHING FOR US." GERMAN REP STEINER TRIED TO EXPLAIN THE ORIGINS OF PLAN "A" AND PLAN "B" BUT MILOSEVIC WAVED HIM OFF DECLARING: "WE HAVE PASSED

NODIS

EUR FOR FRASURE AJD EUR/SCE
NSC FOR VERSHBOW

FROM CHRIS HILL

E.O. 12356:DECL
TAGS:
SUBJECT: MILOSEVIC ON BOSNIA RECOGNITION: NO

THE PROBATIONARY PERIOD: FIRST TWO MONTHS THEN 100 DAYS THEN ANOTHER 100 DAYS." SUSPENSION, HE EXPLAINED, IS A HUMILIATION, AND HE CITED THE CONTACT GROUP'S PROMISE TO GET NATURAL GAS INTO SERBIA, A DELIVERY WHICH NEVER CAME AND WHICH IN MILOSEVIC'S VIEW SHOWED " AN ABSENCE OF STYLE." HE ALSO MENTIONED THE HELICOPTER FLIGHTS AS A FIGMENT OF SOMEONE'S IMAGINATION. "THEY ARE PROBABLY MUSLIM OR TURKISH. BESIDES, THEY WERE HEARD GOING FROM BOSNIA INTO SERBIA. WHAT WOULD THEY BE CARRYING? WOOD AND POTATOES?"

9. MILOSEVIC INSISTED THAT HIS WILLINGNESS TO RECOGNIZE THE "BOSNIAN UNION" WAS A FAIR OFFER, BASED ENTIRELY ON THE CONTACT GROUP PLAN. US REP TOLD HIM WE WERE NOT INTERESTED IN A PROMISSORY NOTE. TO BE MEANINGFUL, RECOGNITION MUST BE OF THE EXISTING STATE OF BOSNIA. MILOSEVIC INSISTED THAT HIS 7ILLINGNESS TO RECOGNIZE THE FUTURE UNION WAS FIRM, AND SHOULD BE SEEN AS "RECOGNITION NOW" OF A FUTURE UNION. MILOSEVIC INSISTED THAT RECOGNITION OF THE UNION WOULD "BYPASS" KARADZIC AND PUT ALL THE PRESSURE NEEDED ON HIM, WITHOUT BEING COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. MILOSEVIC INSISTED THAT BOSNIA TODAY IS NOT A STATE, "IT'S A BATTLEFIELD." NONE OF THE CONTACT GROUP MEMBERS SHOWED ANY INTEREST IN PURSUING OTHER RECOGNITION CONCEPTS. THE FRENCH REP ALONE TRIED TO BE HELPFUL BY ADDING: "YOU CAN SAY YOU ONLY RECOGNIZE BOSNIA, NOT THE IZETBEGOVIC GOVERNMENT."

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10. NOR DID ANY OF THE CONTACT GROUP ENGAGE MILOSEVIC WHEN HE TURNED TO THE SUBJECT OF THE FRY AS A SUCCESSOR STATE. NONE OF THE OTHER REPUBLICS OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA DISPUTE THE FRY'S STATUS AS SUCH, HE ARGUED. STEINER AND HILL TOLD HIM THEY WERE NOT INTERESTED IN PURSUING THIS ISSUE AT THIS TIME AND MILOSEVIC DROPPED IT.

11. MILOSEVIC SAID THAT THE WEST WILL EVENTUALLY HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO DROP SANCTIONS. "YOU CANNOT KEEP SOMETHING IN PLACE WHICH IS HARMING 150 MILLION PEOPLE." IF RUSSIA WANTS TO LIFT THE SANCTIONS THAT WILL BE ENOUGH FOR SERBIA, HE ARGUED.

12. MILOSEVIC IS CONVINCED THAT CARTER WILL COME AND THAT KARADZIC WILL WELCOME HIM, AS THE FORMER PRESIDENT IS HIS TICKET TO RESPECTABILITY. "KARADZIC WILL LIE AGAIN TO CARTER. HE WILL NOT FOLLOW THROUGH ON ANY COMMITMENTS." HE WAS DERISIVE ABOUT THE BOSNIAN SERB LEADERSHIP, CALLING THEM ALL "LIARS". "KOLJEVIC IS DRUNK EVERY DAY BY 10:00 AM." AS FOR KARADZIC, "HE'S NOT A PSYCHIATRIST, HE'S A PATIENT!" MILOSEVIC SEES SOME POSSIBILITY THAT MLADIC WILL BREAK WITH HIS CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP. THE BOSNIAN SERB LEADERS, MILOSEVIC BELIEVES, ARE OBSESSED BY THE IDEA THAT IF THEY ACCEPT THE CONTACT GROUP PLAN WITH ITS MAP, THEY MAY BE STUCK WITH IT IF THEY ARE UNABLE TO WORK OUT THE SWAPS THAT THEY FEEL HAVE TO BE MADE, SUCH AS A 16 KM BRCZKO CORRIDOR. MILOSEVIC BELIEVES THE CONTACT GROUP MAY WANT TO HAVE CONTACTS WITH THE BANJA LUKA LEADERSHIP WHICH HE CLAIMS IS MUCH MORE ENLIGHTENED THAN THE CROWD FROM PALE. "BUT FIRST I'LL HAVE TO CHECK THIS OUT."

13. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE EVENING, MILOSEVIC LOOKED DOWN AT THE CONTACT GROUP PROPOSAL AND SAID HE WOULD READ IT AND GET BACK TO THE GROUP WITH HIS COMMENTS. HE ACKNOWLEDGED, HOWEVER, THAT HIS DIFFERENCES ARE FUNDAMENTAL: HE WILL NOT RECOGNIZE THE EXISTING STATE OF BOSNIA, AND HE WILL ACCEPT NO LESS THAN FULL SANCTIONS RELIEF.

14. COMMENT: THE CONTACT GROUP MET BRIEFLY AT MIDNIGHT AT THE FRENCH EMBASSY TO COMPARE NOTES. EVERYONE AGREED THAT DESPITE HIS WILLINGNESS TO STUDY THE PROPOSAL, MILOSEVIC HAD GIVEN THE GROUP A FIRM NO. THE MEMBERS AGREED THAT HE ACTED AS THOUGH HE WAS UNDER LITTLE PRESSURE, AND DID NOT EVEN SHARE THE VIEW THAT THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND IN BOSNIA WAS GETTING OUT OF HAND.

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15. AT THE END OF THE POST-MORTEM, THE GROUP PUT ZOTOV IN THE HOT SEAT FOR HIS COMMENTS TO THE BELGRADE PRESS EARLIER IN THE DAY TO THE EFFECT THAT MOSCOW SUPPORTS FULL SANCTIONS RELIEF. STEINER, LOOKING INTENTLY OVER HIS WIRE RIMMED
~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 BELGRADE 001773

NODIS

EUR FOR FRASURE AND EUR/SCE
NSC FOR VERSHBOW

FROM CHRIS HILL

E.O. 12356:DECL
TAGS:
SUBJECT: MILOSEVIC ON BOSNIA RECOGNITION: NO

GLASSES, HELD UP THE CG PROPOSAL IN HIS HAND AND ASKED ZOTOV WHETHER HIS GOVERNMENT SUPPORTED IT. ZOTOV, VISIBLY PERSPIRING AND TUGGING AT HIS COLLAR, EXPLAINED THAT HE CONSIDERED IT NOT AS A CONTACT GROUP PROPOSAL, BUT RATHER AS SOMETHING "WORKED OUT IN THE CONTACT GROUP." ZOTOV PLEADED: "IT WAS THE BEST I COULD DO." PERINA
BT
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<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03
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PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~SECRET~~ DTG:121603Z APR 95

FM: AMEMBASSY ZAGREB

TO:
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5453

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~~S E C R E T~~ ZAGREB 001531

NODIS

EUR FOR AMB. FRASURE

ALSO FOR EUR/SCE

FROM CHRIS HILL

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, HR
SUBJECT: CONTACT GROUP MEETING WITH PRESIDENT TUDJMAN

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ON APRIL 12, THE CONTACT GROUP STOPPED IN ZAGREB TO BRIEF PRESIDENT TUDJMAN ON THE DISCUSSIONS THE PREVIOUS EVENING IN BELGRADE WITH MILOSEVIC. U.S. REP TOOK THE LEAD IN PRESENTING TO TUDJMAN THE CONTACT GROUP IDEAS FOR SEEKING MUTUAL RECOGNITION AMONG ALL THE FORMER REPUBLICS OF YUGOSLAVIA IN RETURN FOR SANCTIONS SUSPENSION FOR SERBIA. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE PACKAGE INCLUDED A BOSNIA-ONLY VERSION IN WHICH MILOSEVIC WAS OFFERED PARTIAL BUT MEANINGFUL SUSPENSION. MILOSEVIC, THE U.S. REP EXPLAINED, WAS NOT READY TO RECOGNIZE THE CURRENT BOSNIAN STATE PRIOR TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONTACT GROUP PLAN IN WHICH BOSNIA WOULD BECOME A UNION. MILOSEVIC HAD ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT HE WOULD REQUIRE SANCTIONS LIFTING RATHER THAN SUSPENSION IN CONSIDERING ANY SUCH RECOGNITION.
3. TUDJMAN LISTENED INTENTLY AND AFTER HEARING THE RUSSIAN REPRESENTATIVE'S EXPLANATION THAT THE CONTACT GROUP PROPOSAL WAS REALLY NOT A CONTACT GROUP PROPOSAL, BUT RATHER "A PROPOSAL WORKED OUT WITHIN THE CONTACT GROUP," SHOOK HIS HEAD AND COMMENTED "ALL

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THESE NEGOTIATIONS ARE RUNNING IN CIRCLES. THE SERBS ARE TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE LACK OF UNITY IN THE CONTACT GROUP." REFERRING TO THE BOSNIAN SERB REFUSAL TO GRANT TIMELY CLEARANCE FOR THE CG AIRCRAFT TO VISIT SARAJEVO IN THE MORNING, TUDJMAN EXPRESSED DISBELIEF THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ALLOWS ITSELF TO BE PUSHED AROUND IN THAT WAY BY THE SERBS.

4. ONCE SATISFIED THAT THERE WAS NOTHING NEW IN MILOSEVIC'S APPROACH TO RECOGNIZING CROATIA, TUDJMAN COMMENTED ON THE SUCCESSOR STATE ISSUE NOTING THAT IF THIS WERE THE ONLY PROBLEM PREVENTING RECOGNITION THAT HE WOULD BE IN FAVOR OF GRANTING THAT STATUS TO THE SERBS. FOREIGN MINISTER GRANIC QUICKLY INTERVENED TO DRAW A DISTINCTION BETWEEN HIS PRESIDENT'S VIEW AND MILOSEVIC'S CONCEPT THAT CROATIA AND THE OTHERS HAD BEEN SECESSIONIST STATES WHILE SERBIA REMAINED A PART OF YUGOSLAVIA. GRANIC FELT THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT YUGOSLAVIA HAD BEEN DISSOLVED.

5. TURNING BACK TO THE DISCUSSION IN BELGRADE, TUDJMAN SAID THAT HE BELIEVES THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY NEEDS TO DO MORE TO FOSTER RECOGNITION BETWEEN BOSNIA AND SERBIA. HE BELIEVES THAT SOME WAY SHOULD BE FOUND TO GAIN MILOSEVIC'S IMMEDIATE RECOGNITION OF BOSNIA IN A WAY THAT WOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT BOSNIA WOULD IN THE PROCESS BECOME A UNION ACCORDING TO THE CONTACT GROUP CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS.

6. DESPITE THE IMPORTANCE OF RECOGNITION, TUDJMAN SAID THAT MILOSEVIC IS ONLY PART OF THE PROBLEM, AND THAT THE REAL ISSUES IN BOSNIA ARE AMONG THE WARRING PARTIES. EVEN IF HE WERE TO RECOGNIZE BOSNIA, IT WOULD DO LITTLE TO REDUCE THE FIGHTING THERE. TUDJMAN BELIEVES THE CONTACT GROUP NEEDS TO BE MORE ACTIVE IN PRESSING THE PARTIES IN BOSNIA TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT ON THE CONTACT GROUP MAP AND PLAN. TUDJMAN DREW A SHARP DISTINCTION OF WHAT HE FELT TO BE MILOSEVIC'S MARGINAL ROLE IN BOSNIA, AND HIS POSITION AS "THE SOLE FACTOR IN KRAJINA."

7. AT THE END OF THE BRIEF MEETING, TUDJMAN TOLD THE CONTACT GROUP MEMBERS THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ALSO NEEDS TO BE VERY ACTIVE IN FINDING A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS IN CROATIA. TUDJMAN NOTED THAT THE NEW UN MANDATE EXPIRES IN EIGHT MONTHS AT WHICH TIME THE CROATIANS WILL HAVE TO ASSESS WHETHER THEY ARE MAKING PROGRESS IN REGAINING SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE UNPAS AND WHETHER THEY WILL NEED TO EMPLOY NEW MEANS TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM.

GALBRAITH

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CROATIA

UN efforts to develop operational plans for UNCRO are lagging, and the situation on the ground in Croatia remains uncertain and tense. This presents two dangers for limiting the Balkan conflict to a small war in Bosnia. First, hostilities could result as both sides flex their muscle with clashes, cease-fire violations, exercises, and other provocations. The most serious of these has been the Croatian advance west from Bosnia toward Croatian Serb headquarters in Knin.

The second danger is that international energy will be consumed by getting UNCRO deployed, instead of using the limited time UNCRO buys us to push for settlement talks. Without progress toward reintegration and reconciliation in Croatia, we will have a much harder time keeping Zagreb on the path of peaceful means in dealing with the Serbs.

The parties remain far apart on what they will agree to publicly regarding UNCRO's presence and operations. The UN Secretariat therefore plans to propose a general, "implementable" plan for UNCRO next week and ask the UNSC to approve it irrespective of whether the parties embrace it entirely. This approach reflects the reality that important details of UNCRO's operations will only be defined in day-to-day operations on the ground. Ambassador Albright emphasized to UN representatives Akashi and Stoltenberg Wednesday that time is limited and the plan they present to the UNSC must be in line with the Gore-Tudjman Copenhagen announcement.

We must try to meet minimum Croatian expectations that Zagreb gets something out of all the recent fuss besides a name change. GOC anxiety that Tudjman will be seen at home as having sold out is real. This is reflected in Croatia's latest letter to Boutros Ghali, which is tough in putting demands on UNCRO that are not entirely reasonable. From our viewpoint, UN redeployment out of the UNPA's and onto their periphery, i.e. the separation zone and the international border, is important. What the border force actually does is less important, provided it at least puts more soldiers at checkpoints that UNPROFOR did.

At the same time, we should try to launch direct talks between Knin and Zagreb. We would start by approaching the other Z-4 members (EU, Russia, UN) and encouraging them to support such an effort. While pushing for political talks in order to start people on both sides thinking about the prospect of serious negotiations, we could at first focus on the economic confidence-building measures, implementation of which has bogged down in some cases.

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13/4/95 19:22

INFORMATION PAPER

1. (U) Purpose. To provide the interagency information on the status of the OPLAN 40104 NATO/US decision timeline approval process.

2. ~~(C)~~ Key Points

- While the NATO alliance fully supports a diplomatic solution to the crisis, the fact remains a withdrawal from Bosnia is still a real possibility.

- On 29 March SACEUR updated the NAC on the status of OPLAN 40104 and the flexibility of the OPLAN to respond to an emergency withdrawal. In response to SACEUR request, the Military Committee forwarded a memorandum recommending directing/authorizing SACEUR the following:

  - be prepared to execute on order from NAC, OPLAN 40104 in full for a withdrawal of UNPROFOR from either B-H or Croatia or both.
  - be prepared to execute on order from NAC, limited operations either in B-H or Croatia or both based on OPLAN 40104
  - * to request the assembly and training, and the deployment of forces in respect of Step 2 Minimum Measures.
  - * to request national identification of remaining Step 2 forces
  - * to request national identification of Military-Civilian Relations, Maritime and Air Forces
  - * to request identification of Main forces

* French broke silence; but finally agreed to deployment of Minimum Step 2.

- France's decision will delay the next step of 40104 by approximately three weeks. An informal MC will meet weekly, to consider national comments to 40104.

- Once NAC approves OPLAN, for emergency withdrawal SACEUR will need:
  - authority to request assembly and training of remaining Step 2 forces
  - authority to request identification, assembly and training for MCR, Maritime and Air Forces
  - authority to request identification, assembly and training for Main forces

Prepared by: John E. Roberti, LCDR, USN, EURDIV, 49435
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13-Apr-95 8:07

INFORMATION PAPER

1. (U) Purpose. To provide information on the status of decisions concerning the OPLAN 40104 (withdrawal from Former Yugoslavia) approval process. Specifically, the next steps on NATO prepositioning -- Step 2.

2. ~~(C)~~ Key Points

- While NATO supports a diplomatic solution to the crisis in the Former Yugoslavia, withdrawal from Bosnia and/or Croatia remains a real possibility. NATO must take the necessary military measures to prepare for the worst case.

- On 29 March SACEUR updated the NAC on the status of OPLAN 40104 and the flexibility to respond to an emergency withdrawal. In response, the NAC directed/authorized SACEUR the following:
  - authorized deployment of Minimum Step 2, including:
    a) Manning and preparations for the deployment of the Tactical Ground Satellite Terminal to Camp Pleso
    b) Manning and preparations for the deployment of Communications Coordination Detachments to Zagreb, Pleso and Split

- Deployment of Mini Step 2 prepositioning involves approximately 80 communicators into the Former Yugoslavia (approx. 12-15 US in Croatia). Deployment of Full Step 2 involves the deployment of approximately 1526 communicators (approx. 450 US/310 US in Croatia)

- We presently have a Principals Committee and a Presidential decision to:
  - support the deployment of Minimum Step 2 prepositioning
  - agreed to the assembly and training for Full Step 2 prepositioning
  - consult with Congress on Step 2 prepositioning (consultations completed for both Mini and Full Step 2)
  - require a PC/NAC decision to deploy the Full Step 2 prepositioning forces into the Former Yugoslavia theater of operations.

- Deployment of an advance party of Mini Step 2 could occur as early as the week of 17 April with the main element of Step 2 deploying NET 30 April.

- SACEUR currently requires further NAC approval for assembly, training and deployment of Full Step 2 forces.

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INFORMATION PAPER

1. (U) Purpose. To provide the CJCS information on the status of decisions concerning OPLAN 40104 -- the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from the Former Yugoslavia.

2. ~~(C)~~ Key Points

- A new mandate for the UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO) appears to take some of the pressure off plans for a UN withdrawal from the Former Yugoslavia. The NATO alliance fully supports a diplomatic solution to the crisis, but the fact remains a withdrawal from Bosnia is still a real possibility and we (NATO) must take the necessary measures to prepare for the worst case.

- On 29 March SACEUR updated the NAC on the status of OPLAN 40104 and the flexibility of the OPLAN to respond to an emergency withdrawal. To conduct a contingency operation SACEUR requested timely political guidance from the NAC. In response, a Military Committee forwarded a memorandum to the 5 April NAC, directing/authorizing SACEUR the following:
  - be prepared to execute on order from NAC, OPLAN 40104 in full for a withdrawal of UNPROFOR from either B-H or Croatia or both.
  - be prepared to execute on order from NAC, limited operations either in B-H or Croatia or both based on OPLAN 40104
  - **authorize the sending of ACTREQ and ACTORD messages in respect of:**
    - **a) Manning and preparations for the deployment of the TGST to Camp Pleso**
    - **b) Manning and preparations for the deployment of Communications Coordination Detachments to Zagreb, Pleso and Split**
  - **authorize ACTREQ to complete preparation of remaining Step 2 forces**
  - **authorize ACTWARN for Theater-Enabling, MCR, Maritime and Air Forces**
  - **authorize ACTWARN for Main forces**

  Note: The French broke silence on the above items in bold. France subsequently agreed to the ACTREQ/ACTORD for Minimum Step 2. France will not agree to any further movement on the implementation of the withdrawal operation until OPLAN 40104 is fully approved by the NAC.

- We presently have a Principals Committee and a Presidential decision to:

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- support the ACTWARN/ACTREQ/ACTORD for the minimum necessary measures of Step 2 prepositioning
- agreed to the ACTWARN/ACTREQ for the Full Step 2 prepositioning
- consult with Congress on Step 2 prepositioning (subsequently completed)
- require a PC/NAC decision to deploy the Full Step 2 prepositioning forces into the Former Yugoslavia theater of operations.

• An ACTORD for the Full Step 2 prepositioning of theater communications architecture involves the deployment of approximately 1526 communicators into the former Yugoslavia (approx. 450 US/310 US in Croatia)

• ACTWARN for Enabling forces and Main Forces involves the identification of forces and requires a national response in the FORCEPREP. The total force to support OPLAN 40104 involves the approximately 16,614 US personnel in place for Provide Promise, Able Sentry, Deny Flight, and Sharp Guard, and an additional 24,355 US personnel, with 42,126 Non-US NATO personnel involved. Of the additional 24,355 US personnel, 14,900 will be ground combat forces.

• SACEUR still requires NAC approval of the following phases to implement OPLAN 40104 in full:

- ACTREQ/ACTORD for the deployment of remaining Step 2 forces.
- ACTWARN/ACTREQ/ACTORD for Enabling Forces
- ACTWARN/ACTREQ/ACTORD for Main Forces

• France's decision not to support any further movement on OPLAN 40104 until its approval by the NAC will delay the next step in implementing 40104, unless an emergency withdrawal is warranted, for at least three weeks. An informal Military Committee will meet two or three times weekly to consider national comments to the OPLAN. At the end of the process, the resultant documents will be forwarded to the NAC for approval. This means by the end of April we will need a Presidential decision to support the ACTORD authorizing deployment of the Full Step 2 and possibly ACTWARNs/ACTREQs/ACTORDs for both Enabling and Main Forces. Congressional consultations/briefings will be required subsequent to the President's decision.

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NOTIONAL LEGISLATIVE STRATEGY
'LIFT AND EXTRACT'

Key Dates

April 14:	Principals Committee Meeting
April 21:	UN vote on extension of limited sanctions relief
April 24:	Senate resumes
April 30:	Cessation of Hostilities ends
May 1:	House Resumes
May 9:	Moscow Summit

Already planned or scheduled events

April 19:	SecState lunch with Rep. Livingston
April 29:	SecDef breakfast with Gingrich
May 2/3: (Tentative)	House: Consultative Group (SecState, SecDef, CJCS, NSA, USUNAmb) Possible Senate also.

Individual Contacts:

Senate

Republicans
Sen. Stevens
Sen. Bond
Sen. Coverdell
Sen. Coats
Sen. Burns
Sen. Hutchison

Democrats
Sen. Boxer
Sen. Bryan
Sen. Kerry
Sen. Levin
Sen. Moseley-Braun
Sen. Robb
Sen. Simon
Sen. Wellstone
Sen. Lieberman
Sen. Bradley

House

Rep. Gingrich
Rep. Armey (voted against lift last year)
Rep. DeLay (")
Rep. Hyde

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Potential group briefings:

Senate Freshmen (Senators Snowe, Santorum, Grams, Kyl, Thomas and Inhofe supported unilateral lift in the House)
Sen. Lugar (SFRC Subcommittee on Europe)
Sen. Warner (Armed Services Subcommittee on AirLand Forces)
Sen. Hatfield (Appropriations Committee)
Sen. Thurmond (Armed Services) (voted for lift)
Sen. Daschle (DPC)
Key Senate opponents of lift (Sens. Nunn, Lugar, Sarbanes, Kerry, Kerrey)

Rep. Livingston (Appropriations) (voted for lift)
Rep. Spence (National Security)
Rep. Hamilton (HIRC Democrats)
Rep. Combest (HPSCI)
Democratic Freshmen and Sophomores
Reps. Peterson, Reed, and Spratt (House Democratic Task Force on National Security)

Schedule:

Week of April 17: Staff calls to interested Members re sanctions vote (Leadership, DOD Big Eight, State Big Twelve plus Levin, Biden, Lugar, Lieberman)

Week of April 24:

--Individual briefings for Senators on lift and ops plan.

--Possible briefing for key Members of Armed Services at Pentagon

--Perry meeting with Gingrich

--Placement of lift and extract op eds

Week of May 1:

--Formal presentation of ops plan to funding and authorizing committees; Group briefing team plus budgeteers

--Consultative Group for House leadership (possibly also Senate)

--Individual and Group briefings for House Members (can slip depending on planned House consideration of Gilman bill)

Week of May 8:

--Continuation of and follow up on previous week activities.

Briefing Teams*:

Group briefings: Tarnoff, Slocombe, Clark

Individual briefings: Holbrooke, Kruzel, JCS rep

*Should include Budget people (S/RPP, DoD Comptroller) as appropriate for Appropriations committees.

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INFORMATION PAPER

1. (U) Purpose. To provide options, and a strategy, to strengthen UNPROFOR.

2. (U) Background. The Principals Committee met 28 March 1995 and agreed the US should immediately approach the British and French to explore measures to strengthen UNPROFOR in Bosnia.

3. ~~(C)~~ Assessment. At the 11 April Troop Contributors Meeting (TCM), Mr. Akashi and GEN Janvier recounted UNPROFOR's successes, most of which they feel are not recognized. Additionally, they indicated the equipment and manpower previously offered by nations, and subsequently accepted by the UN, is all that is needed. This is a clear indication of UNPROFOR priorities and the likelihood that they would not accept any new initiatives.

CJCS's lengthy discussion with the British CHOD indicated great reluctance on the part of the British. However, the CJCS and his British and French counterparts have agreed to discuss these options at a flag officer/staff level meeting next week. The British, French, and the UN will likely resist all efforts to move UNPROFOR beyond a current Chapter VI impartial posture. Our major leverage is their concern in preventing US Congressional action on unilateral lift. We should use this leverage to encourage UNPROFOR to act with a stronger hand to enforce the current mandate.

4. ~~(C)~~ Options. There are specific options that may strengthen UNPROFOR ability to perform within its mandate. These include:

- **Securing Sarajevo and Tuzla Airports.** The focal points of international interest in the conflict. Measures would include securing the perimeter, approaches, high terrain, and buildings. Establish a safe zone with increased armored patrols, and airborne immediate response capability.

- **Establishing a ground corridor between Konjic and Sarajevo.** Would ensure the free flow of aid into Sarajevo. This would require forces trained in crowd control, armored self-protection of convoys, combat engineers, TACPs moving with convoys, and a "quick reaction force."

- **Establish ground corridors between Sarajevo and eastern enclaves.** Same as above, would ensure free flow of aid to enclaves.

- **Create cease fire lines.** UNPROFOR, without use of force, can not physically separate the warring factions. This initiative must be one fought

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on the political front, and decided among the warring parties. A cessation of hostilities or peace agreement is required to define cease fire lines.

- **Increase the number of, and consolidate UNPROFOR into, safe areas and exclusion zones.** Protects the civilian population and ensures access for aid. Not compatible with the use of the safe areas for military activities. Enforcing demilitarization requires increases in UNPROFOR's capability. Need to provide ground and air mobility assets, and a "quick reaction force" securing the safe areas. Will require secure lines of communication to safe areas to ensure delivery of aid.

- **Enhance capabilities within UNPROFOR.** Provide heavy lift helicopters, engineer battalions, UNMOs, civilian police, TACPs, counter battery radars, and mobility assets.

5. ~~(C)~~ Execution Strategy. To execute this initiative the following steps are necessary:

- CJCS contact British and French CHODs proposing new initiative. (Complete)
- Expand US proposals (shown above), study options for effectiveness and risk. Provide to British and French on 18 April.
- Convene a tri-lateral flag/staff working group 19-20 April in Washington. (Scheduled)
- Brief tri-lateral proposal to CHODs (possibly off line at the MC/CS) and refer to capitals by end of April.
- Brief to President 1 May. Consult with Congress, if necessary, on 2-5 May.
- Introduce initiative to UNSYG, SRSG, UNPROFOR Commanders by 8 May.

6. ~~(C)~~ Summary. Proactive actions to deliver humanitarian aid and permit freedom of movement for UNPROFOR must be carefully weighed against the associated risks and benefits. Strict enforcement of these measures may place UNPROFOR at odds with both the GOBH and the SRBH. Impartiality and the delivery of humanitarian assistance are UNPROFOR's first priorities.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003j. chart	re: OPLAN 40104-UNPROFOR Withdrawal (1 page)	04/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4009

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0129 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Extending Sanctions, April 14, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs638

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003k. memo	re: Information Paper to Provide CJCS Definitions of the NATO Reporting System [partial] (1 page)	04/05/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4009

FOLDER TITLE:
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[0035]

5 April 95

INFORMATION PAPER

1. Purpose. To provide the CJCS definitions of the NATO reporting system as it relates to OPLAN 40104.

2. Key Points

EO 13526 1.4b

Prepared by: (b)(6) LCDR, USN
European Division, J-5, (b)(6)
N:EUR/EURCENEA/BOSNIA/PRINCIPALS/NATOREPT.ISS

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PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE STRATEGY
'LIFT AND EXTRACT'

Key Dates

April 14:	Principals Committee Meeting
April 21:	UN vote on extension of limited sanctions relief
April 24:	Senate resumes
April 30:	Cessation of Hostilities ends
May 1:	House Resumes
May 9:	Moscow Summit

Already planned or scheduled events

April 19:	SecState lunch with Rep. Livingston
April 29:	SecDef breakfast with Gingrich
May 2/3:	House: Consultative Group (SecState, SecDef, CJCS, NSA, USUNAmb)

Individual Briefings:

Senate

Republicans

Sen. Thompson
Sen. Snowe
(Other Freshmen?) (Santorum, Grams, Kyl, Thomas, Inhofe voted for lift in House)

Sen. Bond
Sen. Coverdell
Sen. Coats
Sen. Burns
Sen. Hutchison
Sen. Stevens

Democrats
Sen. Boxer
Sen. Bryan
Sen. Kerry
Sen. Levin
Sen. Moseley-Braun
Sen. Robb
Sen. Simon
Sen. Wellstone
Sen. Nunn

House

Rep. Gingrich
Rep. Armey (voted against lift last year)
Rep. DeLay (")

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Potential group briefings:

Sen. Lugar (SFRC Subcommittee on Europe)
Sen. Warner (Armed Services Subcommittee on AirLand Forces)
Sen. Hatfield (Appropriations Committee)
Sen. Thurmond (Armed Services) (voted for lift)
Sen. Daschle (DPC)

Rep. Livingston (Appropriations) (voted for lift)
Rep. Spence (National Security)
Rep. Hamilton (HIRC Democrats)
Rep. Combest (HPSCI)
Democratic Freshmen and Sophomores

Reps. Peterson, Reed (House Democratic Task Force on National Security)

Schedule:

Week of April 17: Staff calls to interested members re sanctions vote (Leadership, DOD Big Eight, State Big Twelve plus Levin, Biden, Lugar)

Week of April 24:

--Individual briefings for Senators on lift and ops plan.

--Possible briefing for key Members of Armed Services at Pentagon

--Perry meeting with Gingrich

--Placement of lift and extract op eds

Week of May 1:

--Formal presentation of ops plan to funding and authorizing committees; Group briefing team plus budgeteers

--Consultative Group for House leadership.

--Individual and Group for House Members (can slip depending on planned House consideration of Gilman bill)

Week of May 8:

--Continuation of and follow up on previous week activities.

Briefing Teams*:

Group briefings: Tarnoff, Slocombe, Clark

Individual briefings: Holbrooke, Kruzel, ?

*Should include Budget people (S/RPP, DoD Comptroller) as appropriate for Appropriations committees.

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BOSNIA: GOING FOR A SMALL WAR

Milosevic's firm and final "no" to the Contact Group on April 11 leaves international diplomatic efforts on Bosnia at a dead-end. Meanwhile, the Bosnian Government is understandably distrustful of a Carter mission and we expect nothing to come from the initiative. Senior Carter Center officials say the former President is unlikely to re-enter the fray without both sides' concurrence. These developments have ended any realistic chance that Izetbegovic's conditions for extending the cease-fire -- Milosevic's recognition of Bosnia or Karadzic's acceptance of the Contact Group plan -- will be met.

For purposes of Allied solidarity and in the hope that it can be revived at a later date, we should keep the Contact Group in mothballs, ready to be used should events on the ground merit. Representatives can and should continue to meet, as they will next Wednesday in Vienna. At the same time, we should not portray the Group as alive and well -- and working on ideas to bring the conflict to an end. This would only damage our credibility, both in the region and with our public and press.

With the diplomatic track exhausted, we must now focus on keeping the fighting to the lowest possible levels. This means convincing an extremely reluctant Bosnian Government that this is in its interest. Bob Frasure will travel to Sarajevo next week to sound out Bosnian leaders. He will press for private assurances that the stakes will not be raised in the fighting to come, particularly in and around Sarajevo. The Bosnians, however, feeling they have no choice, may decide that a dramatic gesture -- either an attempt to open a corridor to Sarajevo or asking for UNPROFOR withdrawal -- is their only hope for creating movement towards a settlement. We should therefore be prepared to offer incentives for keeping the fighting to a minimum.

With diplomacy at a dead-end, there are two possible incentives for use in approaching the Bosnians: 1) working for a robust UNPROFOR and 2) introducing a UN resolution that blesses the Contact Group map.

General Joulwan believes that UNPROFOR Commander Rupert Smith views the latest Serb outrages in Sarajevo and Gorazde as tests of his mettle. While we do not necessarily share General Joulwan's optimism, a more robust UNPROFOR (as opposed to a beefed up UNPROFOR) is one of the few remaining carrots to offer the Bosnians in return for moderation on the battlefront. In addition, a robust UNPROFOR, which in essence means an UNPROFOR ready to enforce the exclusion zones, would help deflate pressure on the Hill for lifting the arms embargo. If the political will exists on our side, we should continue pressuring the British and French to accept this point. If not, the option holds little prospect for success.

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U.S. Dept of State Case # 0-2013-04186
3/19/13
Doc# C05323090

Another point of leverage worth exploring is a UN resolution that blesses the Contact Group plan and map, something Silajdzic has sought for several months. The idea is to tie a UNSC resolution to continuation of the cease-fire or a private commitment to limit fighting. Bosnian doubts about Allied and Russian resolve in sticking to the map might lead them to pursue such a trade-off. However, whether this is enough to convince the Bosnians to delay action on a matter of supreme national interest is highly questionable.

Any other options we may have -- e.g., further isolating Karadzic, reimposing sanctions on Milosevic -- are long-term strategies with little chance for putting off new fighting. In fact, in the short-term more pressure on the Serbs is likely to exacerbate fighting.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003m. memo	re: Information Paper to Provide to the Interagency Options and a Strategy to Stregthen UNPROFOR [partial] (2 pages)	04/10/1995	P1/b(1)

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([PC and Bosnia...])
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H

10 April 1995 9:10 PM [003M]

INFORMATION PAPER

1. (U) Purpose. To provide to the interagency options, and a strategy, to strengthen UNPROFOR.

2. (U) Background. The Principals Committee met 28 March 1995 and agreed the US should immediately approach the British and French to explore measures to strengthen UNPROFOR in Bosnia. These initiatives must stay within the current mandate -- to bolster UNPROFOR's ability to protect the delivery of humanitarian aid, and to enhance/improve UNPROFOR's ability to protect itself.

3. ~~(C-REL UK/FR)~~ Options. There are specific options that may strengthen UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate. These include:

- **Securing Sarajevo and Tuzla Airports.** The focal points of international interest in the conflict. [redacted]

  EO 13526 1.4a

- **Establishing a ground corridor between Konjic and Sarajevo.** Would ensure the free flow of aid into Sarajevo. [redacted]

  EO 13526 1.4a

- **Establish ground corridors between Sarajevo and eastern enclaves.** Would ensure free flow of aid to enclaves.

- **Create cease fire lines.** UNPROFOR, without the use of force, can not physically separate the warring factions, without their consent. This initiative must be one fought on the political front, decided among the warring parties, in conjunction with a cessation of hostilities or peace agreement which define demilitarized areas.

- **Increase the number of, and consolidate UNPROFOR into, safe areas and exclusion zones.** The safe area concept is to protect the civilian population and to ensure access for aid. This is not compatible with the use of the safe areas for military activities. Enforcing demilitarization requires increases in UNPROFOR's capability. [redacted]

  EO 13526 1.4a

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003 M

EO 13526 1.4a

- **Enhance capabilities within UNPROFOR.** Provide additional capabilities in order to enhance UNPROFOR's effectiveness. Provide heavy lift

EO 13526 1.4a

4. ~~(C-REL UK/FR)~~ Execution Strategy. The Principals Committee decision and the President Clinton/Prime Minister Major meetings provided a rejuvenated effort to strengthen UNPROFOR. To execute this initiative the following steps are necessary:

- CJCS contact British and French CHODs proposing new initiative. Agree to staff level planning, culminating in exchange of proposals by 14 April.
- Expand US proposals (shown above), study options for effectiveness and risk. Provide to British and French on 14 April.
- Convene a tri-lateral staff working group 21-24 April. Refer tri-lateral proposal to capitals on 25 April. Briefing to tri-lateral CHOD meeting on 28 April.
- Brief to President 1 May. Consult Congress 2-5 May.
- Introduce initiative at the UN on 8 May to UNSYG, SRSG, UNPROFOR Commanders.

5. ~~(C-REL UK/FR)~~ Summary. Each proposal must be carefully weighed. Staff working groups should study factors which include, but are not limited to, the risk to UNPROFOR, the cost (financial, personnel, equipment, and readiness), the will of UNPROFOR and contributing nations to achieve the objective, and visibility within the international community to achieve support. Strict enforcement of these measures would lift the pretense of the neutrality of UN and NATO forces. These actions, while neutral to one warring party, are seen as belligerent to the other. Without the complete cooperation of all warring parties, these measures essentially change the character of UNPROFOR operations from peacekeeping to peace enforcement. UNPROFOR is not currently tasked with peace enforcement. Impartiality and the delivery of humanitarian assistance is their first priority. It is not equipped, nor intended to be, to impose a solution. Peacekeeping forces can operate effectively only with the consent and full cooperation of the parties. Proactive actions to force through aid must be carefully weighed against the associated risks and benefits. UNPROFOR must be careful to balance all these divergent factors. Enforcement of these measures can not be seen as a disincentive, but a step towards peace implementation.

Prepared by: (b)(6) LCDR, USN
European Division, J-5, Ext (b)(6)
N:EUR\EUCENEA\UNPROFOR\7APRSTRG.ISS

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DOC DATE: 06 APR 95
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KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
PC
CROATIA
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA OF 14 APR PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 07 APR 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520470 9520483

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0129 CODES: BOS CRO

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
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001		X	95040610	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
002		X	95040610	DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

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DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950406	FUERTH, L	
002	950406	BRILL, K	
002	950406	ADAMS, G	
002	950406	PANETTA, L	
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TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
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USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
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2010-0533-2

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 6, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the UN

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia on Friday, April 14, 1995, 2:30 - 4:00 p.m., in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Principals only. The agenda is attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

for
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
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2012-0533-r

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Meeting of NSC Principals Committee
on Bosnia and Croatia
Friday, April 14, 1995
2:30-4:00 p.m.
White House Situation Room

AGENDA

I. Diplomatic Strategy

A. Contact Group Status/Next Steps.....State

B. Next Steps following Passage of UNSC Resolutions on UNPROFOR.....State*

II. OPLAN 40104 Approval Process

A. Next Steps on NATO Prepositioning - Step Two (Mini/Maxi Options) and Beyond.....State*

B. NATO/U.S. Decision Timeline for OPLAN 40104.....JCS*

-- Strategy for Briefing President and Gaining Congressional Authorization for Appropriation.....OSD*/JCS

III. Preventing or Containing Renewed Fighting in Bosnia

A. Diplomatic Strategy.....State*

B. Strategy/Options for Strengthening UNPROFOR.....JCS*/OSD/State

* **Paper Due 12:00 Noon April 13.**

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20423

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 4, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

FROM: DON KERRICK (D)

SUBJECT: Principals Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, ~~April 7, 1995~~ April 14, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Principals' meeting on Bosnia and Croatia to be held ~~April 7,~~ 1995. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I. April 14, 1995

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the meeting and authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve AV Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

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MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	4/7/95	16:30	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: Angevine COPY: 1

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	4/6	4:50PM	Karen Wood PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
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SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION FOR PC MTG RE BOSNIA & CROATIA 14 APR
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COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 06 APR 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
PC
CROATIA
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA OF 14 APR PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 07 APR 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520470 9520483

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0129 CODES: BOS CRO

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FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
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		JOSHI
		KERRICK
		KRECZKO
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		NSC CHRON
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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95040419	FOR DECISION
001		X	95040610	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
002		X	95040610	DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950406	FUERTH, L	
002	950406	BRILL, K	
002	950406	ADAMS, G	
002	950406	PANETTA, L	
002	950406	MCALEER, R	
002	950406	INDERFURTH, K	
002	950406	GARTHOFF, D	
002	950406	PATRICK, T	

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)~~	~~04/28/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002. paper~~	~~re: Bosnia Diplomatic Strategy: Sarajevo Airport (4 pages)~~	~~05/04/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003. memo~~	~~Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Principals Review of Bosnia, April 28, 1995 (3 pages)~~	~~05/02/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~004a. memo~~	~~Andrew Sens to Leon Fuerth et al. re: Principals Tasking (1 page)~~	~~05/04/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~004b. memo~~	~~Don Kerr to Anthony Lake; Re: Additional Principals Taskings (1 page)~~	~~05/02/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~004c. memo~~	~~Andrew Sens to Leon Fuerth, et al; Re: Additional Principals Taskings (1 page)~~	~~00/00/0000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~005. memo~~	~~Andrew Sens to Leon Fuerth, et al; Re: Principals Taskings (2 pages)~~	~~04/30/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
006a. memo	Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake re: April 28 Principals Meeting on Bosnia (4 pages)	04/27/1995	P1/b(1)
006b. cable	re: Milosevic's April 26 Meeting with UK Charge [partial] (3 pages)	04/26/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 6/11/2020
~~006c. cable~~	~~re: Milosevic's Reponse to Contact Group Paper on Recognition (4 pages)~~	~~04/17/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
006d. paper	re: Unanswered Policy Questions on NATO Support for UNPROFOR Withdrawal (4 pages)	05/1995	P1/b(1)

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DOC DATE: 02 MAY 95
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KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
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CROATIA
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 28 APR PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 04 MAY 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520525 9520557

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0135 CODES: BOS CRO

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001	LAKE	Z	95050117	FOR DECISION
001		X	95050213	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
002		X	95050213	DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950502	FUERTH, L	
002	950502	BRILL, K	
002	950502	ADAMS, G	
002	950502	PANETTA, L	
002	950502	MCALEER, R	
002	950502	INDERFURTH, K	
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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	5/2/95	2:30 pm	Anthony Lake PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: 1
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	5/2/95	5:45	J. Graves PRINT LAST NAME: GRAVES COPY: 1
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	5/2/95	6:10	A Kreisel PRINT LAST NAME: Kreisel COPY: 1

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MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	5/4/95	12:00	J. Gill PRINT LAST NAME: ANGELL COPY: 1

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 6/14/00
2000-0533-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

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PRECEDENCE: ~~IMMEDIATE~~ PRIORITY ROUTINE

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MESSAGE NO.: 930 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 4 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK for (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions for 28 April PC MTG on Bosnia & Croatia NSC LOG # 20562

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
3	State	Executive Secretary		
N	DOD	Executive Secretary		
B	US/UN/State	Amb. Rick Inderfurth		
A	CIA	Executive Secretary		
D	JCS	Col T.R. Patrick		

REMARKS:

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
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RELEASER:

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MESSAGE NO.: 930 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 4 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK for (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions for 28 April PC MTG on Bosnia & Croatia NSC LOG # 20562

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	State	Executive Secretary		
N	DOD	Executive Secretary		
B	US/UN/State	Amb. Rick Inderfurth		
A	CIA	Executive Secretary		
D	JCS	Col T.R. Patrick		

REMARKS:

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
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13:47

PRECEDENCE: ~~IMMEDIATE~~ PRIORITY ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 930 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 4 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (for) (202) 456-9425 WH SITROOM
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions for 28 April PC MTG on Bosnia & Croatia NSC LOG # 20552

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
3	State	Executive Secretary		
N	DOD	Executive Secretary		
B	US/UN/State	~~Amb. Rick Inderfurth~~		
A	CIA	Executive Secretary		
D	JCS	Col. T.R. Patrick		

REMARKS:

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MESSAGE NO.: 930 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 4 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions for 28 April PC MTG on Bosnia & Croatia NSC LOG # 20562

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
S	State	Executive Secretary		
N	DOD	Executive Secretary		
B	US/UN/State	Amb. Rick Inderfurth		
A	CIA	Executive Secretary		
D	JCS	Col. T.R. Patrick		

REMARKS:

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- ☐ ROUTINE

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DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

FROM: National Security Council (for SOC) PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: ~~Notice~~ of Meeting PC on Bosnia & Croatia PAGES: 4

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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20562

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 2, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

AMBASSADOR RICK INDEFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

DR. GORDON ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, April 28, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

for
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By LOS NARA, Date 6/14/10
2012-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee
DATE: April 28, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 4:30 - 5:45 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Anthony Lake

OVP
Leon Fuerth

State
Warren Christopher

DOD
William Perry

OMB
Alice Rivlin

USUN
Rick Inderfurth

Chief of Staff
No Representative

CIA
Admiral William Studeman

JCS
General John Shalikashvili

White House
Samuel Berger
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
Alexander Vershbow
Brigadier General Don Kerrick

Summary of Conclusions

1. Principals reviewed the Deputies recommendations on next steps in the Contact Group's efforts to gain recognition of Bosnia by Milosevic. They agreed that we should offer to suspend some additional sanctions if Milosevic unambiguously recognizes Bosnia within its internationally-recognized borders. They agreed, however, that this offer should be contingent on a commitment by our Contact Group partners to tighten the closure of the Serbian-Bosnian border and to take similar measures to seal Croatia's border with Bosnian Serb areas, the "back door" through which significant circumvention has occurred. (S)

2. Principals discussed the deteriorating situation in Sarajevo and agreed on the unacceptability of recent Serb actions to

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assert control over Sarajevo airport and to prohibit the use of UN flights by our Ambassador and Contact Group representative. They were concerned at signs that the UN is prepared to accede to Serb dictates, which would further erode UN credibility. Principals agreed that, while there is no immediate humanitarian crisis in the Bosnian capital, the Serbs' actions amount to an attempt at the "strangulation" of Sarajevo, which NATO and the UN have pledged to prevent. Therefore, Principals asked the Interagency Working Group to develop options for NATO action to reopen Sarajevo airport, together with a diplomatic strategy for gaining Allied and UN support. **(Action: IWG. Taskings provided by separate memorandum)** (S)

3. Principals discussed the status of NATO OPLAN 40104 for supporting UNPROFOR withdrawal and agreed that, in purely military terms, the plan should continue to receive U.S. support at NATO as the plan that NATO will use should the Alliance agree to participate in an UNPROFOR withdrawal operation. Accordingly, they authorized our representatives at NATO to support the plan as long as support did not entail actual commitment of U.S. forces to the operation. They further authorized the CJCS to identify U.S. forces that would be involved in the operation. Principals emphasized that actual commitment of U.S. forces to the operation would require another Principals and Presidential decision and consultations with Congress. **(Action: State/JCS)** (S)

4. Principals agreed that the sensitive political questions relating to OPLAN 40104 must be answered before the plan can be presented to the President for approval. Principals directed that a post-UNPROFOR withdrawal strategy be developed to facilitate answering the unanswered policy questions relating to the actual operation. **(Action: State)** In the meantime, Principals asked that a senior interagency team brief key members and committees of Congress on the concept of OPLAN 40104, seeking their views on the unanswered policy questions, as part of our efforts to encourage opposition to a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo. **(Action: State, OSD, JCS, CIA)** (S)

5. Principals briefly discussed the situation of Jonathan Knapp, the American relief worker captured March 4, 1995, along with four French colleagues by the Bosnian Serbs. They reaffirmed the use of quiet diplomacy as the preferred strategy, working through the French and the UN, to secure his release. However, with the Serbs threatening to put Knapp on trial, Principals asked State to consider the possibility of a direct message to one of the Bosnian Serb leaders from a middle-level USG official, based on indications that this may be the face-saver the Serbs are looking for to release Knapp. **(Action: State)** (S)

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20562

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 1, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

FROM: DON KERRICK DK

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, April 28, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia held April 28, 1995..

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve AL Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NWB NARA, Date 6/14/10

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520587
RECEIVED: 05 MAY 95 07

TO: SENS

FROM: BRILL, K

DOC DATE: 04 MAY 95
SOURCE REF: 9508516

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
UN
NATO
CROATIA
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: STATE REPLY ON SARAJEVO SITUATIONS FM 28 APR PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: NFAR PER KERRICK DUE DATE: 09 MAY 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520525 9520557

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0135 CODES: BOS CRO

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

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NSC CHRON

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	KERRICK	Z	95050507	PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE
001		X	95050517	NFAR PER KERRICK

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RECORD ID: 9520587
RECEIVED: 05 MAY 95 07

TO: SENS

FROM: BRILL, K

DOC DATE: 04 MAY 95
SOURCE REF: 9508516

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA NATO
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PC TASKINGS ON SARAJEVO SITUATIONS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE DUE DATE: 09 MAY 95 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF:

FILES: IFM NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
KERRICK	WITKOWSKY	CLARKE
		JOSHI
		SESTAK
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: NFAR. (K) 5/5

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2012-0533-M

9508516 20587

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

May 4, 1995

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MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW D. SENS
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Subject: Principals Taskings on Sarajevo Situation

Attached are papers tasked to State as a result of the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia held on April 28, 1995.

Kenneth C. Brill
Executive Secretary

Attachments:
1. Bosnia Diplomatic Strategy: Sarajevo Airport.
2. Existing Authority for NATO Air Activity Around Sarajevo Airport.

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Bosnia Diplomatic Strategy: Sarajevo Airport

The Problem

After their successful challenge to the French at the illegal Sierra-4 checkpoint and their even more humiliating treatment of Contact Group representatives at Sarajevo airport, the Bosnian Serbs know they can keep bullying the United Nations and get whatever they want. The UN has no fall-back position for its talks with Karadzic; it long-ago ruled out the option of enforcing its control of the airport and the environs of Sarajevo. In his initial report on the situation, the Secretary General made it clear that the airport could be kept open only with the parties' agreement.

Referring to nonexistent precedents and claiming that the airport is Serb territory merely managed by the UN, Karadzic and his minions have threatened to fire on UN aircraft carrying anything but UNPROFOR military personnel. On April 27, the Serb commander overseeing the airport turned back a plane with civilians aboard and Karadzic announced that he will never allow foreign diplomats to land at Sarajevo, "especially diplomats from hostile nations, like Iran and the United States."

Prognosis: Humiliation and Strangulation

In the end, the UN may be able to maintain the airport as a logistical base for its own severely limited activities, but unless the UN can persuade the Bosnian Serbs otherwise, Sarajevo will lose its air link to the outside world. The GOBH will be isolated and the city will be strangled by closure of land routes.

And the Serbs may go further. In recent weeks, the Bosnian Serb Army has made obvious preparations for a massive attack on Sarajevo -- digging tank emplacements, replacing wooden and sandbag revetments encircling the city with reinforced concrete, etc. General Smith has said he expects the Serbs to "pick off the enclaves one-by-one" and then go for "the real prize enclave -- Sarajevo itself."

In response to these moves, the GOBH is certain to take into its own hands the future of its capital city. The B-H Army has already engaged in probing actions north and south of the city -- possibly setting the stage for an all-out offensive to punch one or two corridors into Sarajevo from nearby government-controlled territory. As Bosnian Vice President Ganic has stated, "We want UNPROFOR to stay in Bosnia and do its job while the Serbs want UNPROFOR to stay in Bosnia and not do its job." In the case of Sarajevo, the Bosnians will not long accept an UNPROFOR that is powerless to counter the Serbs.

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(2013-0682-M, 8105)

Our Limited Options

The key to keeping UNPROFOR on the ground and to avoiding the deployment of U.S. ground troops in Bosnia is to take aggressive and decisive measures to keep Sarajevo Airport open for all traffic. The legal authority exists to do so and military options are being prepared.* But if we are truly serious, we must begin immediately to build a consensus among our allies and at the UN, threatening realistic consequences for inaction.

Among our options are the following:

-- Using existing authority to permit NATO air activity of the following sorts:

1) Close air support in defense of UNPROFOR troops at the airport, who have in recent days been shelled by the Bosnian Serbs;

2) Air strikes based on the fact that Sarajevo is being strangled;

3) Air strikes based on the fact that the exclusion zone is being violated.

Diplomatically, we could begin with the following steps:

-- Consulting immediately with allies bilaterally, at NATO and at the UN on Serb non-compliance with relevant UNSC resolutions, which call for unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance including "safe and secure access" to Sarajevo Airport, and provide for the use of force to protect the Sarajevo safe area. The UN Security Council is to act Wednesday to issue a Presidential Statement on the airport that will call for its re-opening in accordance with the 1992 Airport Agreement.

-- Convening a meeting of the NAC to discuss military measures to ensure compliance with relevant UNSC resolutions.

-- Arranging calls by the Secretary to Hurd, Juppe and Kozyrev, letting them know that a failure to open the airport on acceptable terms will make a Ministerial impossible.

-- Raising the issue at the May 5 Contact Group meeting in Paris.

*See accompanying papers

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EXISTING AUTHORITY FOR NATO AIR ACTIVITY
AROUND SARAJEVO AIRPORT

Within limitations, the UN and NATO have the authority to use air power in response to restrictions placed on the use of Sarajevo Airport, based on the following:

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (CAS)

NATO Authority: Based on paragraph 1.1 of the Athens Ministerial Decision Sheet (June 10, 1993), which reads in part:

> "Ministers decided ... to offer NATO's protective air power in case of attack against UNPROFOR"

NATO may respond to a UN request for NATO air power, without further action, to support UNPROFOR.

UN Authority: UNSC 836 Res. (June 4, 1993), reaffirmed by UNSC Res. 844 (June 18, 1993) provides that:

> "... member states, acting ... through regional organizations, ... may take all necessary measures, through the use of air power, ... in and around safe areas, ... to support UNPROFOR in the performance of [certain aspects of] its mandate ..."

That mandate includes deterring attacks on the safe areas, and replying to obstruction of movement of UNPROFOR or humanitarian convoys throughout Bosnia. In addition, under UNSC Res. 770, the UN may request NATO to use force to facilitate delivery of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo. These resolutions require that actions by member states and regional organizations be taken in "close cooperation" or in "coordination" with the UN, respectively.

AIR STRIKES IN RESPONSE TO STRANGULATION

NATO Authority: Based on NAC decisions of August 2 and 9, 1993, which read in part:

> "...that the Alliance will make immediate preparations for undertaking, in the event of strangulation of Sarajevo and other areas ..., measures including air strikes ..."

NATO may conduct air strikes in response to the "strangulation" of safe areas.

The NAC decision also makes clear that "the first use of air power shall be authorized by the UN Secretary General." This has been termed the "dual key" arrangement.

UN Authority: As with CAS, implementing UN resolutions are 770, 836 and 844.

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AIR STRIKES IN RESPONSE TO VIOLATIONS OF THE SARAJEVO EXCLUSION ZONE

NATO Authority: Based on the NAC decision of February 9, 1994, which reads in part that NATO:

"... accepts ... the request of the UN Secretary General to launch air strikes, ... at the request of the United Nations, against artillery or mortar positions in or around Sarajevo ... which are determined by UNPROFOR to be responsible for attacks against civilians, ... and ... in response to artillery or mortar attacks on Sarajevo, ... and ... in response to the identification of any heavy weapons [inside] the exclusion zone [and not under UNPROFOR control] ..."

NATO may conduct air strikes, at the UN's request, if the Sarajevo exclusion zone is violated.

UN Authority: As with CAS, implementing UN resolutions are 770, 836 and 844.

NOTE: UN and NATO authority to use air power, as noted above, does NOT apply to restrictions on the use of Sarajevo Airport by diplomats or official delegations.

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RECORD ID: 9520558
RECEIVED: 29 APR 95 11

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 02 MAY 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
PC
CROATIA
NATO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PRES INFO MEMO ON RESULTS OF 28 APR PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT W/ COMMENT DUE DATE: 03 MAY 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9520525 9520557

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0135 CODES: BOS CRO

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NSC CHRON

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DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95050217	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
002	PRESIDENT	Z	95050217	FOR INFORMATION
002		X	95050414	NOTED BY PRESIDENT W/ COMMENT

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002	950502		VICE PRESIDENT
002	950502		WH CHIEF OF STAFF

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National Security Council
The White House

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Harmon			
Dohse	1	D	
Sens			
Soderberg	copy		
Berger	2	2r	
Lake	3	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	DRS 5/2	D To Podesta
NSC/Rm			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Agree on Knapp be mindful of need to distinguish from other outstanding issues Lets discuss — done

BC

Special Dispatch Instructions:

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
5.3.95

20558

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

95 MAY 2 P5:19

INFORMATION

May 2, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Principals' Review of Bosnia, April 28, 1995

Principals met on Friday to review three aspects of our Bosnia policy: (1) ongoing Contact Group efforts to gain Milosevic's recognition of Bosnia, isolate the Bosnian Serbs and extend the cessation of hostilities; (2) measures to deal with Serb attempts to control access to Sarajevo airport; and (3) NATO contingency planning for a possible UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia.

Contact Group: Principals agreed that we should offer to suspend some additional sanctions if Milosevic unambiguously recognizes Bosnia within its internationally-recognized borders. They agreed, however, that this offer should be contingent on a commitment by our Contact Group partners to tighten the closure of the Serbian-Bosnian border and to take similar measures to seal Croatia's border with Bosnian Serb areas -- the "back door" through which significant circumvention has occurred. This approach is strongly backed by the Bosnians; indeed, they have said they will extend the cessation of hostilities if there is progress on recognition and sealing of the border. At Friday's Contact Group meeting, our partners reacted positively on closure of the border but, as usual, argued for a more generous package of sanctions relief than we and the Bosnians consider prudent.

In any event, the chances of securing genuine Serbian recognition of Bosnia are low, since Milosevic continues to demand a lifting of all the sanctions (which the Contact Group has conditioned on recognition of all the former Yugoslav states). Nevertheless, if allies make good on sealing the border, it can -- over time -- increase the economic squeeze on the Bosnian Serbs and pressure them to accept the Contact Group plan. The Croatians, for their part, seem prepared to cooperate in closing the "back door."

Sarajevo Airport: Principals agreed on the unacceptability of recent Serb actions to assert control over Sarajevo airport and to prohibit the use of UN flights by our Ambassador and Contact Group representative. They were deeply concerned at signs that the UN is prepared to accede to Serb dictates, which would destroy what little UN credibility remains. Principals agreed that, while there is no immediate humanitarian crisis in the

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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Bosnian capital, the Serbs' actions amount to an attempt at the "strangulation" of Sarajevo, which NATO and the UN have pledged to prevent. Therefore, Principals asked the Interagency Working Group to develop options for NATO action to reopen Sarajevo airport, together with a diplomatic strategy for gaining Allied and UN support. Chris stressed that, if we decide to pursue NATO action, we will need to ask you to go to John Major and the new French President to overcome their objections. Bill Perry noted the need to consider how to respond if the Serbs retaliate in other areas, such as by attacking the eastern enclaves. We will, of course, seek your approval before going down this road.

UNPROFOR Withdrawal Planning: Shali briefed Principals on the NATO OPLAN for UNPROFOR withdrawal. The plan involves roughly 70,000 NATO troops, including 25,000 from the U.S. and will cost between $1.5 and $2 billion dollars (for the U.S., an additional $600 million beyond the cost of ongoing operations). Under the plan, in the first two weeks UK- and French-led units would secure the routes from the Adriatic to Sarajevo, opening the way for U.S. troops to push through to Tuzla and on to the eastern enclaves. The withdrawal of UNPROFOR troops would then unfold over the subsequent 2-3 months. Because of the length of the operation and the eight-week lead-time involved, the OPLAN also includes rapid response capabilities to extract individual UNPROFOR units in emergency situations.

Principals agreed that, in purely military terms, the OPLAN was sound and should receive continued U.S. support at NATO. They agreed that Shali should identify the U.S. forces that would be involved, while making clear that the actual commitment of those forces will require a further decision by you and consultations with the Congress. At the same time, Principals felt that there were many sensitive political questions to be answered before seeking your approval of the plan, including: Is our post-withdrawal policy still to lift the arms embargo and, if so, how will that affect NATO's posture during withdrawal? How to deal with Serb attacks on the eastern enclaves during and after the operation? Will NATO enforce the exclusion zones? How to deal with civilians seeking NATO protection or evacuation and with refugees? What is NATO's role in delivering humanitarian aid?

Principals agreed that, as we grapple with these questions within the Administration, we should pose them to members of Congress in consultations on Bosnia in the coming weeks. The scale of the withdrawal operation and the policy dilemmas involved should help dampen support for unilateral lift and build support for our efforts to contain the fighting and keep UNPROFOR in place.

If you have any problems with the OPLAN's approach we can discuss it further with you or provide you an early briefing on it.

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U.S. Hostage: Principals briefly discussed the situation of Jonathan Knapp, the American relief worker captured two months ago along with four French colleagues by the Bosnian Serbs. At Knapp's request, we have been working through the French and the UN to secure his release. His family is becoming more anxious as the Serbs threaten to put Knapp on trial, and they may soon abandon quiet diplomacy in favor of a media campaign. Chris will consider the possibility of a direct message to Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic from a middle-level USG official based on indications that this may be the face-saver the Serbs are looking for to release Knapp.

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20558

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 29, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

SUBJECT: Memorandum to the President on April 28 Principals' Committee Discussion of Bosnia

Attached is a memorandum to the President reviewing the issues discussed at Friday's PC: ongoing Contact Group efforts; measures to deal with Sarajevo airport; and NATO OPLAN 40104. I have also included a paragraph on the Jonathan Knapp situation.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum to the President.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to the President

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 6/14/13
2012-0533-M

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520564
RECEIVED: 01 MAY 95 18

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 04 MAY 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
CROATIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: ADDL PRINCIPALS TASKING ON UNANSWERED POLICY QUESTIONS RELATING TO OPLAN 40104 FM 28 APR PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 04 MAY 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520525 9520557

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0135 CODES: BOS CRO

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BASS
		BERGER
		KERRICK
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB CLOSED BY: NSJDA DOC 2 OF 2

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NLJ NARA, Date 6/14/10
2013-0533-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95050120	FOR DECISION
001		X	95050507	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
002		X	95050507	DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950504	FUERTH, L	
002	950504	BRILL, K	
002	950504	ADAMS, G	
002	950504	MCALEER, R	
002	950504	INDERFURTH, K	
002	950504	PATRICK, T	
002	950504	GARTHOFF, D	

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Recd 5/1 9:30am

National Security Council
The White House

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____ LOG # 20564 A/O _____

DOCLOG MC SYSTEM: PRS (NSC) INT

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL /DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1	D	
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger	2	DN	
Lake	3	D	
~~Situation Room~~ Dohse	4	D	Tab I
West Wing Desk	5	MB 5/4	D
NSC/Rm			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: WWD — give Kernick comeback cy ASAP

When has this been before deadline

Special Dispatch Instructions:

Tab I on g:\execsec\20564as.doc

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

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DATE 04 MAY 95

SUBJECT: ADDL PRINCIPALS TASKING ON UNANSWERED POLICY QUESTIONS RELATING TO
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	5/5/95	1035	J. Hilty PRINT LAST NAME: HILTY COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	5/5/95	1500	Wms. MC PRINT LAST NAME: WILLIAMS COPY: 1
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	5/5/95	10:35	J. Graves PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: 1
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By MNJ NARA, Date 6/14/10
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DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
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2010-0533-M

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SUBJECT: ADDL PRINCIPALS TASKING ON UNANSWERED POLICY QUESTIONS RELATING TO
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	5/5/95	_____	J. Graves PRINT LAST NAME: GRAVES COPY: 1

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 6/14/12
2010-0533-M

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FILE COPY WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF TRANSMISSION 1995 MAY -4 PM 9:05

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

N EPR 00:16

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE / (PRIORITY) / ROUTINE

RELEASER: Kevin B Wooten

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 0960 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 2 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: ADDITIONAL PRINCIPALS TASKING ON UNANSWERED POLICY QUESTIONS RELATING TO OPLAN 40104 NSC LOG # 20564

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

BBNDA

REMARKS:

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MM NARA, Date 6/14/10
2010-0573-M

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WASHFAX

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

4 MAY 95 21 29

NMCC/JCS

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: Kevin B Wilson

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 0960 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 2 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: ADDITIONAL PRINCIPALS TASKING ON UNANSWERED POLICY QUESTIONS RELATING TO OPLAN 40104 NSC LOG # 20564

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

BBNDA

REMARKS:

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By mc NARA, Date 6/14/00
2010-0533-M

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MAY 5 04 PM '95

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: Kevin B Wooten

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 0960 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 2 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: ADDITIONAL PRINCIPALS TASKING ON UNANSWERED POLICY QUESTIONS RELATING TO OPLAN 40104 NSC LOG # 20564

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

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REMARKS:

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MS NARA, Date 6/14/10
2005-0573-M

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

(TH) 05.04. '95 21:18 NO. 1460120955 PAGE 1

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TIME OF RECEIPT

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: Kevin B Wooten

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 0960 CLASSIFICATION: SECRET TOTAL: 2 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: ADDITIONAL PRINCIPALS TASKING ON UNANSWERED POLICY QUESTIONS RELATING TO OPLAN 40104 NSC LOG # 20564

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

BBNDA

REMARKS:

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NLJ NARA, Date 6/14/10
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- ☒ PRIORITY
- ☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC LOG # 20564

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting ADDITIONAL TASKING PAGES: 2

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MJ NARA, Date 6/14/02

2000-0533-M

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20564

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 4, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National
Security & International
Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Additional Principals Tasking on Unanswered Policy Questions Relating to OPLAN 40104 ~~(S)~~

Following a preliminary review at the Principals Meeting on April 28 of the list of unanswered policy questions relating to OPLAN 40104, Principals have provided additional guidance to further focus IWG efforts. ~~(S)~~

Principals have requested that a post-UNPROFOR withdrawal strategy be developed to guide the IWG's drafting of answers to the policy questions. Accordingly, State Department is requested to draft a post-UNPROFOR withdrawal political and diplomatic strategy and circulate it to the Interagency by COB, Monday, May 8. State is further requested to provide options for answers to the policy questions by Tuesday, May 9. Principals will review the strategy and answers after the Moscow Summit. ~~(S)~~

for
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By NARA, Date 3/6/2020
2013-0612-M

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20564

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 2, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: DON KERRICK (K)

SUBJECT: Additional Principals Tasking on OPLAN 40104 Unanswered Policy Questions

The Bosnia IWG is continuing to develop answers to the unanswered policy questions relating to OPLAN 40104. Attached memorandum formalizes Principals request for a post-UNPROFOR political and diplomatic strategy to focus IWG efforts.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve (AL) Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to Agency Counterparts

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 3/6/2020
2013-0682-M

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20564

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the UN

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Additional Principals Tasking on Unanswered Policy Questions Relating to OPLAN 40104 ~~(S)~~

Following a preliminary review at the Principals Meeting on April 28 of the list of unanswered policy questions relating to OPLAN 40104, Principals have provided additional guidance to further focus IWG efforts. ~~(S)~~

Principals have requested that a post-UNPROFOR withdrawal strategy be developed to guide the IWG's drafting of answers to the policy questions. Accordingly, State Department is requested to draft a post-UNPROFOR withdrawal political and diplomatic strategy and circulate it to the Interagency by COB, ~~Friday,~~ Monday, May 8. State is further requested to provide options for answers to the policy questions by Tuesday, May 9. Principals will review the strategy and answers after the Moscow Summit. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 3/6/2020
2013-0682-M

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PC 0135

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9520557
DATE 20 APR 95

SUBJECT: PC TASKING ON SARAJEVO SITUATION
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

MR. LEON FUERTH
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
VIA LARRY BRANSCUM
ROOM 290, OEOB
WASHINGTON, DC 20506

DATE: 1 May TIME: 0945 SIGNATURE: [signature]
PRINT LAST NAME: BRANSCUM
COPY: 1

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

DATE: _____ TIME: _____ SIGNATURE: _____
PRINT LAST NAME: _____
COPY: 1

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET
ROOM 238
OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG
WASHINGTON, DC 20503

DATE: _____ TIME: _____ SIGNATURE: _____
PRINT LAST NAME: _____
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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
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2012-0533-M

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RECORD ID: 9520557
RECEIVED: 29 APR 95 10

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 20 APR 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
CROATIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TASKER FOR AGENCY POSITIONS ON 28 APR PC MTG RE BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 03 MAY 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520525 9520558

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0135 CODES: BOS CRO

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BASS
		BERGER
		KERRICK
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSGP CLOSED BY: NSJDA DOC 2 OF 2

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MM NARA, Date 2/14/12
2010-0533-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95050107	FOR DECISION
002		X	95050107	SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950420	FUERTH, L	
002	950420	BRILL, K	
002	950420	ADAMS, G	
002	950420	MCALEER, R	
002	950420	INDERFURTH, K	
002	950420	GARTHOFF, D	
002	950420	PATRICK, T	

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National Security Council
The White House

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DOCLOG MBN SYSTEM: PRS (NSC) INT

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL /DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1		
Sens			
Soderberg	copy ✓		
Berger	copy		
Lake	2		
Situation Room		KBW	signed and sent out
West Wing Desk			
NSC/Rm			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Special Dispatch Instructions:

20557
Approved by
Lake
Per Dohse, signed by SDO for Sens and sent out to addressees.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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DATE 20 APR 95

SUBJECT: PC TASKING ON SARAJEVO SITUATION
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

MR. LEON FUERTH
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
VIA LARRY BRANSCUM
ROOM 290, OEOB
WASHINGTON, DC 20506

DATE 1 May TIME 0945 SIGNATURE L. Branscum
PRINT LAST NAME: BRANSCUM
COPY: 1

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

Another Receipt
PRINT LAST NAME:
COPY: 1

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET
ROOM 238
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
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B	STATE	Kenneth Bill	Exec Sec	
N	DoD	Col Robert McAleer	Exec Sec	
A	CIA	Douglas F. Garthoff	Exec Sec	
D	JCS	Col T.R. Patrick	Secretary, Joint Staff	
	US UN	Ambassador Rick Inderfurth		

REMARKS:

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N	DoD	Col Robert McAleer	Exec Sec	
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D	JCS	Col T.R. Patrick	Secretary, Joint Staff	
	USUN	Ambassador Rick Inderfurth		

REMARKS:

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A	CIA	Douglas F. Garthoff	Exec Sec	
D	JCS	Col T.R. Patrick	Secretary, Joint Staff	
	USUN	Ambassador Rick Inderfurth		

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A	CIA	Douglas F. Garthoff	Exec Sec	
D	JCS	Col T.R. Patrick	Secretary, Joint Staff	
	US UN	Ambassador Rick Inderfurth		

REMARKS:

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
April 30, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the UN

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Tasking on Sarajevo Situation ~~(S)~~

Principals met Friday, April 28, 1995 and directed the Bosnia Interagency Working Group to immediately conduct a review of the current situation in Sarajevo -- where violations of the exclusion zone have increased and where the Bosnian Serbs have closed the Sarajevo airport to diplomatic and humanitarian relief flights in violation of the 1992 agreement. Accordingly, the following taskings are assigned:

Intelligence Assessment of Situation: Assessment should include, but need not be limited to, the current situation within the Sarajevo Exclusion Zone, Bosnian Serb intentions and goals; humanitarian relief situation; threats and anticipated reaction to efforts to fly into Sarajevo without Serb authorization; Serb response to a NATO ultimatum threatening airstrikes if Sarajevo airport is not reopened under the terms of the 1992 agreement; and Bosnian Government and other views and reactions. **(Action: CIA, Suspense: COB May 1)** ~~(S)~~

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Review of Existing UN and NATO Mandates: Assessment of existing UN and NATO mandates that would permit the use of military force to reopen Sarajevo Airport, end the strangulation of Sarajevo, or escort flights into Sarajevo. **(Action: State, with OSD/JCS input, Suspense: COB May 2)** ~~(S)~~

Military Options: Options to reopen Sarajevo airport; options to escort flights into Sarajevo; options to deter interference with airfield operations; options to deter or counter horizontal escalation in response to forced flights into Sarajevo or to punitive air strikes under NATO's August 1993 decision. **(Action: JCS with OSD input, Suspense: COB May 2)** ~~(S)~~

Diplomatic Strategy: Political and diplomatic strategy to reopen Sarajevo airport under provisions of 1992 agreement; steps to gain Allied and UN support for tougher measures including forced entry should it become necessary or issuance of a NATO ultimatum under the August 1993 air strikes decision. **(Action: State with OSD/JCS input, Suspense: COB May 2)** ~~(S)~~

Kevin B. Wooten
for Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 29, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: DON KERRICK

SUBJECT: Principals Tasking on Sarajevo Situation

In response to Principals tasking, the Bosnia IWG has begun to review the situation in Sarajevo. Agencies have been informally tasked. Goal is to complete review by Wednesday. Attached memorandum formalizes tasking. Request release by OOB Monday.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to Agency Counterparts

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RECORD ID: 9520525
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TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 25 APR 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
AGENDA
CROATIA
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 28 APR PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 28 APR 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520557 9520558

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0135 CODES: BOS CRO

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		JOSHI
		KERRICK
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
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DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
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002		X	95042607	SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950425	FUERTH, L	
002	950425	BRILL, K	
002	950425	MCALEER, R	
002	950425	INDERFURTH, K	
002	950425	ADAMS, G	
002	950425	PANETTA, L	
002	950425	GARTHOFF, D	
002	950425	PATRICK, T	

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Lake	3	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5	MeC 4/25	D
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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Notification & Agenda for 28 Apr PC Meeting on Bosnia & Croatia NSC LOG # 20525

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DoD	Executive Secretary		
USUN	Ofc. of the Rep. of the U.S.		
CIA	Executive Secretary		
JCS	Secretary, Joint Staff		

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SUBJECT: **Notice of Meeting**: 28 Apr PC on Bosnia PAGES: Cover + 2

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USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By Tm NARA, Date 6/14/12

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20525

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 25, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the UN

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia on April 28, 1995, 4:30-6:00 p.m., in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be principals only. The agenda is attached at Tab A. Papers should be circulated by the designated Agency by 9:00 a.m., April 27. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NARA, Date 6/14/11
NLC-95-33-2-2-5

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PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA AND CROATIA

DATE: April 28, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 4:30-6:00 p.m.

Agenda

I. Near-Term Diplomatic Strategy

A. Contact Group Prospects/Response to the Milosevic Proposal.....State**

B. Sanctions Options for Recognition.....OVP**

II. OPLAN 40104 Briefing.....JCS

** - Paper Due 9:00 a.m., April 27.

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By DNS NARA, Date 6/14/10
2012-0533-M

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20525

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 25, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

FROM: DON KERRICK (K)

SUBJECT: Principals Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, April 28, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Principals' Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia to be held April 28, 1995. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve R Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By JNR NARA, Date 6/14/00

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520545
RECEIVED: 27 APR 95 14

TO: LAKE

FROM: KERRICK
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 27 APR 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 28 APR PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 01 MAY 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520525 9520557

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0135 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		JOSHI
		KERRICK
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSASK CLOSED BY: NSDRS DOC 1 OF 1

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By TNS NARA, Date 6/14/10

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2mp 0533-m

~~SECRET~~ RECORD ID: 9520545

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95042719	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	95060118	NOTED BY LAKE

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National Security Council
The White House

4/27 6:46

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes LOG # 20545 A/O

DOCLOG MEC SYSTEM: PRS (NSC) INT

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL /DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1	D	
Sens	E		
Soderberg	copy		
Berger	2	copy	
Lake	3	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	WPS 5/1	R
NSC/Rm			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

97 APR 25 5:3 [illegible]

Special Dispatch Instructions:

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006a. memo	Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake re: April 28 Principals Meeting on Bosnia (4 pages)	04/27/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4009

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0135 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, April 28, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs639

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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A

PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA AND CROATIA

DATE: April 28, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 4:30-6:00pm

Agenda

I. Near-Term Diplomatic Strategy

A. Contact Group Prospects/Response to the Milosevic Proposal.....State**

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II. OPLAN 40104 Briefing.....JCS

** - Paper Due 9:00am April 27.

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By [illegible] NARA, Date 6/14/10
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006b. cable	re: Milosevic's April 26 Meeting with UK Charge [partial] (3 pages)	04/26/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4009

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0135 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, April 28, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs639

RESTRICTION CODES

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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: SIT, CLARKER, CRESSEY, KERRICK, SAUNDERS, STEPHENS, SUM, SUM2, VERSHBOW, WHSR_SPECIAL

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~SECRET~~ DTG:261652Z APR 95

FM: AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

TO:SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5644

////

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 002048

NODIS

OP CENTER PLS PASS EUR A/S HOLBROOKE AND DAS FRASURE
NSC FOR VERSHBOW

E.O. 12356: DECL
TAGS: PREL, SR
SUBJECT: MILOSEVIC'S APRIL 26 MEETING WITH UK CHARGE

REF: BELGRADE 1868 → follows this cable →

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. UK CHARGE ROBERTS HAS GIVEN US A BRIEF READ-OUT OF HIS APRIL 26 MEETING WITH MILOSEVIC, AT WHICH ROBERTS WAS INSTRUCTED BY LONDON TO SEEK CONFIRMATION OF MILOSEVIC'S INTERPRETATION OF THE PAPER RECEIVED ON APRIL 17 (REFTEL).

3. ROBERTS SAID THAT HE WROTE OUT HIS SPEAKING NOTES (AND PASSED THE PAPER TO MILOSEVIC) SO THAT THERE WOULD BE NO MISUNDERSTANDING BY MILOSEVIC OF WHAT THE UK WAS ASKING. THE FULL TEXT OF THESE SPEAKING NOTES IS TRANSMITTED IN PARA 7 BELOW.

4. ACCORDING TO ROBERTS, MILOSEVIC READ THE PAPER CAREFULLY AND THEN RESPONDED THAT HE WAS PUZZLED BY THIS NEED FOR CLARIFICATION, SINCE THE PAPER WAS FULLY CONSISTENT WITH HIS OWN PROPOSAL OF APRIL 17. IN THE DISCUSSION OF MODALITIES, MILOSEVIC SAID HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY EVERYTHING COULD NOT BE HANDLED BY ONE PAPER, BUT DID NOT SEE THIS ISSUE AS A LARGE PROBLEM.

5. THE CONTENTIOUS DISCUSSION CENTERED AROUND HOW MUCH SANCTIONS RELIEF WOULD BE PROVIDED BY THE CONTACT GROUP, WITH MILOSEVIC CONTINUING TO INSIST ON "LIFTING" OF ALL SANCTIONS. ROBERTS REPORTEDLY ARGUED THAT THIS WAS NOT

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POSSIBLE, AS HE HAD ALREADY EXPLAINED LAST TIME, BUT THAT SANCTIONS RELIEF COULD BE "SUBSTANTIAL." HE EO 13526 1.4b EO 13526 1.4d (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4b EO 13526 1.4d (b)(1) MILOSEVIC DID NOT RESPOND POSITIVELY BUT INSTEAD ARGUED THAT OIL AND FUEL WERE IN HIS VIEW NON-STRATEGIC, AND THAT SUSPENSION RATHER THAN LIFT WAS IN ANY CASE HUMILIATING AND SUBJECT TO REVERSAL THROUGH FABRICATIONS SUCH AS THE HELICOPTER CHARGES. HE STRONGLY COMPLAINED IN THIS CONTEXT ABOUT UNSCR 988 AND HOW IT AGAIN SHOWED THE UNWILLINGNESS OF THE CONTACT GROUP COUNTRIES TO WORK WITH HIM CONSTRUCTIVELY.

6. IN SUMMING UP THE DISCUSSION, ROBERTS SAID THAT MILOSEVIC CONFIRMED ALL ASPECTS OF THE PROPOSAL AS OUTLINED ON APRIL 17 BUT MADE CLEAR THAT THE DEGREE OF SANCTIONS RELIEF REMAINED AN UNRESOLVED ISSUE, WITH TOUGH NEGOTIATIONS AHEAD TO FIND COMMON GROUND.

7. BEGIN TEXT OF UK SPEAKING NOTES:



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

PERINA

FROM:
SITREPRT

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TAB 3

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PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~SECRET~~ DTG:171806Z APR 95

FM: AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

TO:SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5540

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 001868

NODIS

OP CENTER PLS PASS SOONEST TO EUR/DAS FRASURE

E.O. 12356: DECL
TAGS: PREL, SR
SUBJECT: MILOSEVIC'S RESPONSE TO CONTACT GROUP PAPER ON RECOGNITION

REFS: A) BELGRADE 1773, B) STATE 86669

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AS HE HAD PROMISED THE CONTACT GROUP ON APRIL 11 (REF A), MILOSEVIC ON APRIL 17 PASSED TO THE UK CHARGE IN BELGRADE A FORMAL RESPONSE TO THE CONTACT GROUP'S PAPER ON RECOGNITION (REF B). THE FULL TEXT OF THE MILOSEVIC PAPER IS TRANSMITTED IN PARA 6 BELOW.

3. MILOSEVIC'S PAPER INCORPORATES MUCH OF THE LANGUAGE FROM THE CG PAPER BUT CHANGES THE ORDERING OF SOME PARAGRAPHS AND HAS SOME SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES OF TEXT, CHIEF AMONG WHICH ARE THE FOLLOWING:

-- THE SECOND PARAGRAPH DROPS ALL REFERENCES TO CROATIA SINCE, ACCORDING TO UK CHARGE ROBERTS, MILOSEVIC INSISTED THAT CROATIA IS NOT RELEVANT TO UN RESOLUTIONS IMPOSING SANCTIONS;

-- THE SAME PARAGRAPH SPEAKS OF "LIFTING OF ALL UN SANCTIONS" (RATHER THAN MEANINGFUL SUSPENSION OF SANCTIONS) AND SPECIFIES THAT THIS SHOULD OCCUR "SIMULTANEOUSLY" WITH RECOGNITION; ROBERTS SAID HE TOLD MILOSEVIC THAT "MEANINGFUL SUSPENSION" WAS THE MOST HE COULD GET HERE, AND MILOSEVIC REPORTEDLY REMAINED SILENT;

-- THE THIRD PARAGRAPH HAS A FOOTNOTE ACKNOWLEDGING THE STATE CONTINUITY OF YUGOSLAVIA AND STATES THAT BOSNIA/HERCEGOVINA WOULD BE RECOGNIZED "AS A UNION" RATHER THAN "AS A STATE." ACCORDING TO ROBERTS,

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MILOSEVIC SAID HE COULD ACCEPT BOTH OF THESE PHRASES BEING DROPPED AND THE PARAGRAPH ENDING WITH THE WORD "BORDERS";

-- THE CG PARAGRAPH REGARDING THE FRY/BOSNIAN BORDER CLOSURE IS MOVED TO THE END OF MILOSEVIC'S PAPER, A POINT WHICH MILOSEVIC SAID WAS A CONCESSION BECAUSE HE FELT THE ENTIRE PARAGRAPH WAS INAPPROPRIATE IN A PAPER TO WHICH HE WOULD BE A PARTY;

-- PARA 5 OF THE CG PAPER IS OMITTED ENTIRELY IN MILOSEVIC'S TEXT BECAUSE (AS MILOSEVIC ARGUED) HE WOULD NOT BE A PARTY TO THE BOSNIAN NEGOTIATIONS AND THUS SAW NO REASON TO REFER TO THEM. THE RESULT, HOWEVER, IS THAT THE MILOSEVIC PAPER CARRIES NO REFERENCE TO THE CONTACT GROUP PLAN AND MAKES THE SUBSEQUENT CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES APPEAR MUCH MORE TO BE A FAIT ACCOMPLI OF THE CONTACT GROUP RATHER THAN A RESULT OF NEGOTIATIONS AMONG BOSNIAN PARTIES;

-- THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AGAIN SPEAK OF A "UNION" OF BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA RATHER THAN A "STATE."

4) ACCORDING TO ROBERTS, MILOSEVIC WHILE HANDING OVER THE PAPER GAVE EVERY INDICATION OF BEING READY TO MEET IZETBEGOVIC AT A SUMMIT MEETING ON THE BASIS OF THE TEXT. HE CAUTIONED ONLY THAT THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE FURTHER DISCUSSION OF "MODALITIES" SINCE HE (MILOSEVIC) WAS NOT AUTHORIZED AS PRESIDENT OF SERBIA TO RECOGNIZE ANOTHER STATE. THIS COULD BE DONE, HOWEVER, "WITHIN TEN MINUTES" BY FEDERAL PRIME MINISTER KONTIC ISSUING A DECLARATION OF THE FRY'S INTENTION TO RECOGNIZE BOSNIA.

5) IN OTHER DISCUSSIONS, MILOSEVIC REPORTEDLY COMPLAINED STRONGLY TO ROBERTS ABOUT THE INABILITY OF THE CONTACT GROUP TO DECIDE ON WHETHER IT WISHED TO ENGAGE IN "COOPERATION" OR "CONFRONTATION" WITH HIM. HE PARTICULARLY THREATENED THAT IF PHASE I SANCTIONS WERE NOT RENEWED BECAUSE OF THE "FALSE" HELICOPTER CHARGES HE WOULD EXPEL THE ICFY MISSION FROM THE FRY AND NOT ENGAGE IN ANY FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH THE CONTACT GROUP.

6) BEGIN TEXT OF MILOSEVIC PAPER:

(1) CONTACT GROUP MINISTERS CALLED IN DECEMBER 1994 FOR EARLY MUTUAL RECOGNITION BETWEEN THE STATES OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA WITHIN THEIR INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNISED BORDERS. THEY SAW THIS AS KEY TO THE FUTURE STABILITY OF THE REGION.

(2) IN THE CONTEXT OF MUTUAL RECOGNITION BETWEEN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA AND BOSNIA AND HERCEGOVINA, AND PROVIDED THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA RESPECTIVELY SUPPORTS OR IMPLEMENTS THE OTHER

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PROVISIONS BELOW, THE CONTACT GROUP GOVERNMENTS ARE PREPARED TO RECOMMEND TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL THE LIFTING OF ALL UN SANCTIONS ON THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA, TO TAKE EFFECT SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE RECOGNITION.

(3) THE CONTACT GROUP PROPOSES THAT IN AN ACT OF MUTUAL RECOGNITION (ASTERISK) BETWEEN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA AND BOSNIA AND HERCEGOVINA, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA SHOULD RECOGNIZE BOSNIA AND HERCEGOVINA WITHIN ITS INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED BORDERS [AS A UNION.]

Milosevic will delete this

A) BOSNIA AND HERCEGOVINA WOULD BE A UNION OF TWO ENTITIES, THE FEDERATION OF BOSNIA AND HERCEGOVINA AND THE REPUBLIKA SRPSKA.

B) THERE WOULD BE BALANCED AND EQUAL TREATMENT OF THE FEDERATION OF BOSNIA AND HERCEGOVINA AND THE REPUBLIKA SRPSKA.

C) BOTH ENTITIES WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO ESTABLISH PARALLEL SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES, CONSISTENT WITH THE INTEGRITY OF THE UNION OF BOSNIA AND HERCEGOVINA.

D) THE 51:49 PARAMETER OF THE TERRITORIAL PROPOSAL OF THE CONTACT GROUP WOULD REMAIN THE BASIS FOR A SETTLEMENT. THIS TERRITORIAL PROPOSAL WOULD BE OPEN FOR ADJUSTMENT BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT.
E) THERE WOULD BE PROVISION IN THE SETTLEMENT FOR REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS TO BE ABLE TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES OF ORIGIN.

F. REDEPLOYMENT TO THE LINES AGREED WOULD TAKE PLACE AS SOON AS THERE WAS AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES ON ANY TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENTS AND ON CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS.

G. THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AGREEMENT SHOULD BE EXTENDED BY FOUR MONTHS FROM 30 APRIL TO ENABLE COMPLETION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

H. AS REGARDS CROATIA. FOLLOWING THE PASSAGE OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 981, THERE SHOULD NOW IMMEDIATELY BE FURTHER NORMALIZATION OF ECONOMIC RELATIONS AND THE START OF NEGOTIATIONS ON A FINAL POLITICAL SETTLEMENT BETWEEN ZAGREB AND KNIN.

I. THE CONTACT GROUP UNDERLINES THE NEED FOR MAINTENANCE BY THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA OF THE BORDER CLOSURE EXCEPT FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. THE ICFY MONITORING MISSION WILL BE REINFORCED AS NECESSARY.

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ASTERISK: MUTUAL RECOGNITION IMPLIES THE STATE CONTINUITY OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA.
END TEXT.

PERINA

FROM:
SITREPRT

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D

The UK-FR "Proposal"

Possible FRY Actions		Sanctions Levers
Continued support for Contact Group plan		Extend Phase 1 sanctions suspension
Maintain closure of "Inter-Serb" Border		**Lift Phase 1 sanctions**
FRY recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina (contingent on constitutional arrangements)	UK-FR Proposal	**Suspend sanctions against scientific and technical cooperation**
Cessation of all support for Pale; full enforcement of all UN resolutions with respect to Pale		**Suspend sanctions against trade and transshipment of non-strategic goods and commodities**
Continued support for the principles of the Z-4 plan		**Release FRY vessels and conveyances**
Recognition of the Republic of Croatia		**Suspend sanctions against financial transactions and services**
FRY recognition of Slovenia and FYROM		**Release all blocked financial and real assets**
Full implementation of a Bosnia settlement		**Suspend sanctions against trade and transshipment of strategic goods**
Full implementation of a Krajina settlement		**Lift all UNSCR sanctions; disband enforcement structures**
Progress towards settlement of other regional security issues, including Kosovo, cooperation with War Crimes Tribunal, regional arms control, etc.		Lift objections to IFI loans, full participation in international organizations, trade preferences, etc.

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Sanctions Relief in Return for Tighter Border Closure and Bosnian Recognition



[1] All suspensions are for successive, limited periods. UNSC action required to extend suspensions. Continuation of suspensions to depend on continued progress toward negotiated settlement of the conflicts.

[2] Strategic goods include crude oil, petroleum products, coal, energy-related equipment, iron, steel, other metals, chemicals, rubber, tires, vehicles, aircraft, and motors of all types.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006d. paper	re: Unanswered Policy Questions on NATO Support for UNPROFOR Withdrawal (4 pages)	05/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4009

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0135 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, April 28, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs639

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See also 2013-0165-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia [partial] (1 page)	05/19/1995	P1/b(1) KC 6/11/2020
~~002. memo~~	~~Ambassador Madeleine K. Albright to Anthony Lake re: The FRY and the Outer Wall of Sanctions (2 pages)~~	~~05/25/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
003a. memo	Nelson Drew to Anthony Lake re: May 19 Principals Meeting on Bosnia (3 pages)	05/18/1995	P1/b(1)
~~003b. agenda~~	~~NSC Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)~~	~~05/19/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003c. paper~~	~~re: Bosnia: Strategic Choices (4 pages)~~	~~05/17/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003d. paper~~	~~re: Future of UNPROFOR's Mandate Options Review (2 pages)~~	~~05/17/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 08/03/2015
~~003e. paper~~	~~re: Unanswered Policy Questions Relating to OPLAN 40104 (4 pages)~~	~~05/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~004a. agenda~~	~~[Duplicate of 003b] (1 page)~~	~~05/19/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~004b. paper~~	~~[Duplicate of 003c] (4 pages)~~	~~05/17/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~004c. agenda~~	~~[Duplicate of 003b] (1 page)~~	~~05/19/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~004d. paper~~	~~[Duplicate of 003c] (4 pages)~~	~~05/17/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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RECORD ID: 9520662
RECEIVED: 22 MAY 95 08

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 24 MAY 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
PC
CROATIA
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 19 MAY PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 25 MAY 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DREW LOGREF: 9520653 9520655

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0136 CODES: BOS CRO

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DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950524	FUERTH, L	
002	950524	BRILL, K	
002	950524	MCALEER, R	
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Dohse	1		
Sens			
Soderberg	Copy	✓	
Berger	2		
Lake	3	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5	5/24	D
Records Mgt.			

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EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
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AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
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PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 1087 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: ~~10~~9
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FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA NSC LOG # 20662

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

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PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 1087 CLASSIFICATION: SECRET TOTAL: 10
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FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA NSC LOG # 20662

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B	USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

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PRECEDENCE: (IMMEDIATE) PRIORITY ROUTINE

RELEASER: [signature]

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 1087 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: ~~10~~ 9 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA NSC LOG # 20662

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B	USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
J	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		
4	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

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NMCC/JCS

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: [signature]

DTG: _____

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FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA NSC LOG # 20662

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B	USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
J	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

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NSC # 20662

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting SOC PC MTG BOSNIA/CROATIA PAGES: 9

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 24, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

AMBASSADOR RICK INDEFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DR. GORDON ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, May 19, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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By JNS NARA, Date 6/14/10

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20662

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee
DATE: May 19, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 - 4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Anthony Lake

OVP
Leon Fuerth

State
Warren Christopher
Richard Holbrooke

DOD
Walter Slocombe

OMB
Alice Rivlin

USUN
Madeleine Albright

CIA
John Deutch

JCS
Admiral William Owens

NSC
Alexander Vershbow
Colonel Nelson Drew

Summary of Conclusions

Negotiations with Milosevic

1. Principals discussed progress made to date in ongoing negotiations between Ambassador Frasure and Milosevic regarding the recognition/sanctions relief package. They agreed on the contents of an instruction cable to Frasure outlining key problem areas in Milosevic's counterproposal and authorizing further negotiations to close the gap **(Action: State)**. The cable will provide goals but retain flexibility for Frasure in the negotiations. (S)

2. Principals agreed on the following guidance on the most sensitive issues:

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- Successor State Status: Principals agreed to maintain our existing position that Serbia/Montenegro could be treated as "a" successor state but not "the" successor state to Yugoslavia. (S)

- Timing of Serbian Admission to OSCE: Principals agreed that Serbia's admission to OSCE should be simultaneous with restoration of the long-duration missions to Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina. (S)

- Sanctions Relief: Principals agreed on the need to avoid "front-end loading" of sanctions relief or lifting. Milosevic's proposed automatic mechanism for continuing extension of sanctions suspension without a UNSC vote was unacceptable. Principals agreed to counter his oil relief proposal of 500,000 MT per month with an offer of 125,000 MT, and to try to limit imports through a single point of entry. OVP provided an outline chart linking specific sanctions relief actions to specific progress toward a political settlement involving Pale (attached); Principals agreed that this should be provided to Frasure as a guide rather than as detailed negotiating instructions. They agreed that some lifting of sanctions should be tied to recognition of Croatia. They reaffirmed that any lifting of the "outer wall" of sanctions (access to IFIs, full participation in international organizations) should be tied to cooperation with the War Crimes Tribunal and progress toward a broader regional settlement, including restoration of autonomy to Kosovo. (S)

Future Options for UNPROFOR

3. Principals reaffirmed that retention of UNPROFOR in Bosnia was critical to U.S. interests and agreed to support the conclusions of the CHODs meeting with UNPROFOR Commanders calling for enhancement of UNPROFOR's ability to fulfill its existing mandate. The CHODs' proposal included agreement that the UNPROFOR Ground Commanders would develop an enhanced air supply plan for the eastern enclaves on an urgent basis and that unhindered use of Sarajevo airport was imperative. (Other options considered but rejected by the CHODs included continuation of the existing situation, retrenchment and reduced UN presence, UNPROFOR withdrawal and military intervention.) CJCS will be instructed to take this window of opportunity to press allies for as robust an enhancement of UNPROFOR as possible **(Action: JCS)** and USUN will work to ensure that options presented for agreement in New York reflect the CHODs' decisions **(Action: USUN)**. (S)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia [partial] ~~(8~~ 1 page)	05/19/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4009

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0136 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, May 19, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs640

RESTRICTION CODES

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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[001]

4. Principals agreed that there was little likelihood that the CHODs' proposals would lead to more robust use of force by UNPROFOR in pursuit of fulfilling its mandate or increased willingness to employ NATO airpower under the dual key approach. If an opportunity arose to support rotation of the UNSYG Special Representative to someone more likely to support UN requests for the use of NATO airstrikes, the U.S. would be supportive but not initiate such an effort. **(Action: USUN).** (S)

5. At the same time, Principals agreed that if the French found enhancing UNPROFOR in its existing areas and mandates acceptable, and the UK was willing to let this go forward, the U.S. should not press for UNPROFOR retrenchment at this time. Principals also noted that success in the Frasure-Milosevic negotiations could help satisfy French requirements for progress toward a political settlement. (S)

OPLAN 40104

6. Principals noted that briefings to the SFRC earlier in the day had flagged serious concerns regarding preparing the Congress and the public for U.S. participation in a possible withdrawal operation, lack of clarity about a post-withdrawal strategy and funding. Principals agreed that a strong effort would be needed to secure Congressional approval. (C)

7. Principals agreed to meet again on Tuesday, May 23, to address (1) post-withdrawal strategy **(Action: State)**; (2) remaining unanswered questions associated with EO 13526 1.4a implementation **(Action: State, OSD)**; (3) the remaining steps associated with EO 13526 1.4a **(Action: JCS, OSD)**; and (4) a legislative strategy **(Action: All)**. (C)

Attachment

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May 12 Contact Group Agreement
(The plan offered to Milosevic on May 18)

If the FRY:

- Recognizes Bosnia
- Tightens closure of the inter-Serb border, allows transfer of border mission to OSCE and OSCE monitors to Kosovo

→

FRY gets in return:

- Suspension of sanctions on non-strategic trade (notes 1 and 2)
- Suspension of financial sanctions (notes 1 and 3)
- OSCE membership

If Pale then:

- Accepts the CG package.

→

FRY gets in return:

- Lift of all Phase 1 sanctions

And if Pale then:

- Fully implements Contact Group plan

→

FRY and Pale get in return:

- "Lift of remaining sanctions (plus release of frozen assets) calibrated to implementation in a way to be developed later."

NOTES:

1. All "suspensions" are for a six-month period and can be renewed only by positive vote by the Security Council.

2. The agreed definition of "strategic goods" includes oil, petroleum products, coal, iron, steel, and other metals *plus energy-related equipment and petro-chemicals.*

3. All financial sanctions are suspended, including credits. Frozen assets are not released. The resolution relaxing sanctions is to contain prohibitions against using frozen assets to secure or otherwise support loans and credits.

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Milosevic's May 18 Counter Offer

If the FRY:

- Recognizes Bosnia
- Allows reinforcement of the inter-Serb border-monitoring mission

FRY gets in return:

- Suspension of sanctions on non-strategic trade (UN definition)
- Import of 500,000 MT of oil a month
- Suspension of all financial sanctions
- Lift of sports sanctions
- Entry into OSCE

If Pale then:

- Accepts the CG plan as a starting point for negotiations

FRY gets in return:

- Lift of phase 1 sanctions (air and ferry service.

Then:

- When a cessation of hostilities is in place, and
- The Bosnian parties have begun negotiations on implementation of the CG plan

FRY gets in return:

- Lift of non-strategic trade and financial sanctions
- Suspension of strategic trade sanctions (oil import quota remains in place)

When

- The CG plan is fully implemented on the ground
- Respective forces have withdrawn to the agreed territorial limits

FRY gets in return:

- Lift of remaining sanctions (presumably including release of frozen assets)

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NOTES:

1. All "suspensions" are for an indefinite time period. The Security Council would "review" the situation in the former Yugoslavia, to include the sanctions suspension arrangements.

2. UNSC Resolutions define strategic goods as including crude oil, petroleum products, coal, energy-related equipment, iron, steel, other metals, chemicals, rubber, tires, vehicles, aircraft, and motors of all types.

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DRAFT

Countering Milosevic's Counter Offer

If the FRY:

- Recognizes Bosnia
- Allows reinforcement of the inter-Serb border-monitoring mission
- Ends support for Pale and Knin

FRY gets in return:

- Suspension of sanctions on non-strategic trade (UN definition)
- Import of up to 100,000 MT of oil a month
- Suspension of all financial sanctions
- Entry into OSCE

If Pale then:

- Accepts the CG plan as a starting point for negotiations and begins negotiations

FRY gets in return:

- Partial lift of phase 1 sanctions
- CG agreement to change terms of sanctions relief extension (eg: longer than six month periods, revise extension conditionality, etc.)

Then when:

- The Bosnian parties have reached agreement, and
- They have begun implementation of the CG plan (to include starting withdrawals)

FRY gets in return:

- Lift of non-strategic trade and financial sanctions
- Suspension of strategic trade sanctions (oil import quota remains in place)

And when

- The CG plan is fully implemented on the ground, and
- Respective forces have withdrawn to the agreed territorial limits
- (And if the FRY has recognized Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia)

FRY gets in return:

- Lift of remaining sanctions (presumably including release of frozen assets)
- End of oil quota system

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NOTES:

1. Initial suspensions are for six months. The Security Council would have to vote to to extend sanctions relief.

2. UNSC Resolutions define strategic goods as including crude oil, petroleum products, coal, energy-related equipment, iron, steel, other metals, chemicals, rubber, tires, vehicles, aircraft, and motors of all types.

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20662

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 22, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: NELSON DREW

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, May 19, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia held May 19, 1995.

Concurrence by: Leon Fuerth

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NLS NARA, Date 6/14/10

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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DATE 24 MAY 95

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS OF PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA 19 MAY
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
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AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
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RECORD ID: 9520686
RECEIVED: 26 MAY 95 13

TO: LAKE

FROM: ALBRIGHT, M

DOC DATE: 25 MAY 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
UN
CM
SERBIA
SANCTIONS
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FOLLOW UP MEMO FM DISCUSSION AT 19 MAY PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA - FORMER REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA / FRY / & OUTER WALL OF SANCTIONS

ACTION: NFAR PER BREMNER DUE DATE: 30 MAY 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520653 9520655

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0136 CODES: BOS

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001		X	95091811	NFAR PER BREMNER

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FROM: ALBRIGHT, M

DOC DATE: 25 MAY 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
UN
CM
SERBIA
SANCTIONS
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FOLLOW UP MEMO FM DISCUSSION AT 19 MAY PC MTG ON FRY & OUTER WALL OF SANCTIONS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE DUE DATE: 30 MAY 95 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520633 9520662

FILES: IFM NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
KERRICK	BEERS	BASS
	CLARKE	BERGER
	SHEEHAN	DANVERS
		JOSHI
		LAKE
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: NO response necessary/OBE/ Has been discussed at Principals, copies circulated /S.B

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MW NARA, Date 6/14/12
2012-0533-M

STAFF
CC: LAKE
BERGER
20686

THE REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TO THE
UNITED NATIONS

May 25, 1995

~~SECRET~~
DECL:OADR

TO: Anthony Lake

FROM: Ambassador Madeleine K. Albright MKA

SUBJECT: The FRY and the Outer Wall of Sanctions

I wanted to follow up on our discussion at May 18's Principals' Meeting concerning conditions for the FRY to join the international community.

I remain concerned that any change from our announced policy will expose the President to considerable criticism and erode our credibility in negotiations for peace settlement. On March 13, the President told Representative Hoyer that the Serbs should not expect to join the international community -- exemplified by membership in international organizations, attendance at international conferences, and access to financing from the international financial institutions -- until they affirmatively comply with requests of the International Tribunal. (I have attached his letter.) Chris and I are also on record with strong statements of support for the Tribunal.

I continue to believe that keeping the Tribunal as a condition for the "outer wall" of sanctions is the right thing to do. The victims of atrocities deserve justice. Removing persons who would foment violence will reduce causes of future conflict. Finally, the Tribunal is one aspect of our Balkans policy that has received consistent public and congressional praise.

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(2013-0682-MR, 8.14)

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Interestingly, the Tribunal has become important to domestic politics in the former Yugoslavia. Over the last eighteen months, Milosevic has used accusations of atrocities to undermine his political rivals. The Government of Croatia has made clear that its cooperation with the Tribunal will demonstrate its commitment to western ideals. The Constitution of the Bosniac-Croat Federation forbids war crimes suspects from holding political office; this provision was included with the intention of marginalizing revanchist Bosnian Croats who are now impeding the Federation's development. And Haris Silajdzic has strongly urged sustained U.S. support for the Tribunal, with the possible intention of using it to support his domestic aspirations. After working to place the Tribunal and the law it supports on the combatants' agenda, we should not back away now.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 13, 1995

Dear Representative Hoyer:

Thank you for your letter on the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. As you know, the United States is the War Crimes Tribunal's strongest advocate. I remain personally committed to it and firmly believe that successful completion of its mission is critical to long-term peace prospects in the former Yugoslavia. That is why, in the latest proposal put forward by the Contact Group, we emphasized that nothing should be done to affect our commitment to the Tribunal and that all parties should cooperate in its efforts. In particular, the Serbs should not interfere with its operations and should not expect to fully rejoin the international community until they affirmatively comply with the Tribunal's requests.

I agree that the United States must play a leading role with regard to the Tribunal's funding. We will continue to be active in urging the United Nations to provide adequate budgets for the Tribunal. U.S. experts have closely reviewed the proposed budget and have provided their assessment and advice to the UN. The results so far have been encouraging. In December 1994, the Tribunal received the full amount it had requested through March 1995 and reports on the ongoing UN budget review are promising. At the same time, we are continuing to press other states to support the Tribunal's budget.

To further demonstrate our commitment, the United States also contributed over twenty prosecutors, investigators and other experts at U.S. expense. As you note, the United States made a $3 million cash contribution to the Tribunal last year and we are currently considering whether to make additional voluntary contributions in light of the UN budget.

Let me also assure you of our support for implementing legislation to enable us to comply with orders of the Tribunal. As you are aware, such legislation was transmitted at the end of the last congressional session, but there was insufficient time for the Congress to act upon it. Since then, we have had to make adjustments to encompass the Rwanda Tribunal. Legislation will be presented to the Congress shortly, and I look forward to your help in moving it along.

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Once again, thank you for sharing your views on this important matter.

Sincerely,

Bill Clinton

The Honorable Steny H. Hoyer
Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe
234 Ford House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

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TO: LAKE

FROM: DREW
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DOC DATE: 18 MAY 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA CROATIA
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 19 MAY PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 22 MAY 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DREW LOGREF: 9520653 9520662

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0136 CODES: BOS CRO

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

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		JOSHI
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
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001		X	95052318	NOTED BY LAKE

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cc:

COMMENTS: Lake's Mtg. package for Bosnia PC 5/19

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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA
DATE: May 19, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 - 4:30 p.m.

Agenda

I. Future of UNPROFOR

A. Options.....JCS/ALL

B. Diplomatic Strategy Leading to a New UNPROFOR.....State

II. OPLAN 40104 In-Progress Review

A. Post-UNPROFOR Withdrawal Strategy.....State

B. Unanswered Policy Questions.....State

C. Alternatives to NATO-Led Withdrawal.....All

D. Roadmap of remaining OPLAN 40104 requirements...JCS/OSD

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 3/6/2020
2013-0682-M

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~~SECRET~~ May 17, 1995

BOSNIA: STRATEGIC CHOICES

NSC DISCUSSION PAPER

Introduction:

We are in a critical period for U.S. policy toward Bosnia that could see the withdrawal of UNPROFOR and the introduction of NATO/U.S. ground forces for a mission whose outcome is uncertain. Now is the time to review the fundamental principles guiding our policy and to determine the steps necessary to shape events before strategic choices are completely dictated by the situation on the ground.

Fundamental U.S. policy objectives for Bosnia:

- Obtain a political settlement that satisfies basic Bosnian government requirements and rolls back some Serb aggression
- End or reduce the fighting
- Prevent spread of conflict to other parts of region
- Maintain relief supplies
- Maintain cohesion with Allies
- Avoid American entanglement in fighting on the ground in the Balkans

Key Strategic Choices:

I. **Whither UNPROFOR:** U.S. support for continued UNPROFOR presence has been based upon an assessment that this course remains the avenue best suited to the majority of our fundamental objectives -- and that, for all of its problems, the alternatives are worse.

- In the current environment, the viability of UNPROFOR is increasingly being called into question.
  - ♦ UNPROFOR is unable to ensure that humanitarian assistance is delivered to UN-protected areas/safe areas.
  - ♦ Fighting among the warring parties is no longer deterred by UNPROFOR presence.
  - ♦ UNPROFOR itself is frequently the subject of attack, and UNPROFOR forces are neither in a position to defend themselves effectively nor to withstand the possible consequences of calling in NATO airpower.
  - ♦ UNPROFOR credibility is thereby undermined with all parties, and NATO credibility in turn eroded as well.

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(2013-0682-M, 8.16)

- Under these circumstances, we must ask whether linking U.S. objectives to continued UNPROFOR presence remains valid in the current environment.
  - There still do not appear to be any alternatives to UNPROFOR that provide better support for U.S. objectives.
  - Withdrawal followed by unilateral or predominantly U.S. lift (and strike) risks "Americanizing" the Balkan conflict; even multilateral lift risks widening the scope of the conflict as more external parties move to support regional clients.
  - Replacement of UNPROFOR with another international presence (NATO? WEU? Coalition of the willing?) would either require U.S. participation on the ground or prove equally ineffective -- and require additional political and financial capital to initiate.
  - U.S. interests are thus best served by finding a way to restore credibility to the UNPROFOR mission in a manner that permits existing troop contributors to sustain their continued presence and the Bosnian government to agree to retain that presence.
- Options other than withdrawal available for UNPROFOR under the present circumstances:
  - **Muddle through with the status quo:** French have already indicated likely pullout if current conditions remain unchanged -- may be the thread that unravels the whole fabric of UNPROFOR.
  - **"Restabilization" of existing UNPROFOR mission with more robust enforcement of existing mandate:** UK avoidance of a confrontational approach in B-H must be overcome if this option is to become viable; additional resources needed to enhance military capabilities of existing UNPROFOR forces not likely to be forthcoming.
  - **"Retrench and reinvigorate" UNPROFOR mission** by withdrawing from untenable positions/missions while pursuing more robust enforcement of remaining mandates: could be seen as a trade of the eastern enclaves for more effective mission performance around Sarajevo -- implications for eastern enclaves could be very serious; however, this option could satisfy both the French and UK; by retrenching, could also alleviate some to the problems associated with resources to enhance capabilities.
  - **"Retrench and retreat" by withdrawing and pursuing an even less vigorous approach to mandate enforcement:** the least costly approach, this might be used as a bargaining chip to get the Bosnian Serbs to accede to the conditions for French

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forces remaining in UNPROFOR; UK likely to support; however, potentially as damaging to UNPROFOR credibility as the status quo, with the additional public image/moral costs of not only "abandoning" the eastern enclaves, but also "capitulating" in cases where UNPROFOR remains; least likely to be acceptable to Bosnians, who could then refuse to allow continued UNPROFOR presence.

Comment: Only realistic choice may be to seek Allied support to "retrench and reinvigorate". Trade U.S. support for retrenchment for allied and UN pledge to pursue more robust enforcement of remaining mandate, including NATO airstrikes. Fall back to "retrench and retreat" only if no other way to prevent withdrawal.

II. **Whither OPLAN 40104**, given U.S. objective of sustaining UNPROFOR and commitment to assist withdrawal if required?

- There are no guarantees that a viable solution to retaining UNPROFOR in theater can be agreed.
- Withdrawal remains a real, and increasingly likely, option if there is no agreement on a more viable UNPROFOR role.
- Nevertheless, several key issues remain to be resolved before a decision to proceed with withdrawal implementation could be taken with confidence:
  - **What is the end state we want to leave behind following UNPROFOR withdrawal?** What to avoid may be clearer than what to achieve: avoid merely replacing UN with NATO forces and being unable to leave; avoid debacle of U.S./NATO-led withdrawal being depicted as precursor to brutal ethnic cleansing; avoid loss of NATO credibility to the same extent there has been a loss of UN credibility.
  - **How does NATO deal with unintended consequences of withdrawal operations?** Massive refugee flow; use of NATO forces as shields by civilians or by warring factions; hostage-taking by warring factions; withdrawal of humanitarian aid providers as a result of UNPROFOR withdrawal.
  - **Under what conditions could withdrawal or partial withdrawal take place without requiring implementation of OPLAN 40104?** If nations determine that they will accomplish *de facto* withdrawal by merely failing to replace units during normal rotation, no NATO assistance may be necessary. If this resulted in enclaves being left unprotected, would the last forces out require NATO assistance, or could the UN accomplish this on its own?

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- The way ahead for OPLAN 40104 is also complicated by a dilemma: we must ensure that our actions in preparation for possible UNPROFOR withdrawal do not precipitate the withdrawal itself.

  - Key is not allowing the existence of a "NATO withdrawal force" to prompt either UN troop contributors to seek early withdrawal or Bosnians to act to cause UNPROFOR withdrawal in the hopes that NATO will replace the UN. **A clear "firebreak" is required between completion of NATO preparation for OPLAN 40104 and initiation of OPLAN implementation.** We must be confident that we understand exactly what steps will be required to get from the present state of NATO planning to this firebreak, and what steps take us beyond it.

  - NATO credibility requires that forces must be trained sufficiently to ensure mission success. ACTREQ requested by SACEUR this week will facilitate identification of forces and training shortfalls, and allow SACEUR to initiate action to rectify those shortfalls. Training in place to NATO standards should be an acceptable alternative to assembling in Europe for training, and send a more restrained signal.

  - Training in place would also permit completion of Congressional consultations prior to movement of any US forces. We may need to lay down marker in NATO that assembly of forces in Europe will require a further political decision.

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20655

FUTURE OF UNPROFOR'S MANDATE OPTIONS REVIEW

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2013-0682-M
8/3/15 KBH
(8.17)

BACKGROUND

UNSYG Proposed Options. The UNSYG reported to the UNSC on proposals regarding a needed fundamental review of UNPROFOR's mandate. In light of the deteriorating conditions in Bosnia, UNSYG presented four options:

(1) Maintenance of the status quo;

(2) A more aggressive military posture, including sustained use of air power, with the resulting possibility of a more direct UNPROFOR-BSA confrontation;

(3) Withdrawal from Bosnia

(4) Redeployment and reduction in the number of troops, with necessary modifications to the UNPROFOR mandate.

Boutros Ghali has said publicly that he wants UNPROFOR reduced and redeployed (option 4 above), but advanced these four options. They are assessed below from the perspective of USG policy for AMB Albright in New York.

OPTIONS

(1) ***Maintenance of Status Quo.*** Boutros Ghali's call for a redeployment and reduction shows the UN's frustration with the status quo, both politically and militarily. But changing the mandates is not the answer. The French and British are tired of being involved in a failed mission. But both know triggering a withdrawal could lead to an UNPROFOR exodus. There is no good "end state" after UNPROFOR leaves. This would be the worst case for the US.

The best case would be a political settlement. Making UNPROFOR more effective is an achievable intermediate step that could eventually create conditions more conducive for the warring parties to reach a settlement.

We don't want the situation to unravel in Bosnia. Supporting changes to the UN mandates would only increase the possibility of an UNPROFOR withdrawal. We need to work with the present mandates and regain the initiative.

Indicators of progress from all warring parties will be needed over the next few months: e. g., progress toward cease-fire, discussion on the CG map, freedom of movement, improvement of resupply, reduction of hostilities, improved communication with the UN, BiH self-restraint in using safe areas, pressure on Bosnia, and Pale more involved in discussions. On the ground we need a more effective UNPROFOR, more liberal ROE, and air attacks.

The French want increased efforts to reach a ceasefire, obtain mutual recognition, and make progress on agreement to the Contact Group plan. The USG may have to begin

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reconsidering somewhat tilting its position in helping to stop the fighting and to promote conditions conducive to a negotiated settlement. The UK has said they are not going to propose withdrawal, nor political maneuvers that would lead us to slip into withdrawal. There are no good "end states" after withdrawal. The French realize this.

US troops should not become involved in Bosnia. That is why UNPROFOR must remain. We must support maintaining the political status quo to avoid triggering withdrawal. An even-handed approach may likely be required. If the choice is between UNPROFOR withdrawing and satisfying Bosnian government desires, the US must support UNPROFOR.

(2) ***More Aggressive Military Posture.*** Sustained use of air power against the Bosnian Serbs would rapidly expand the conflict, with UNPROFOR viewed as a belligerent. This goes far beyond the CHOD initiative and no UNPROFOR contributor would accept. Not a prudent option.

(3) ***Withdrawal from Bosnia.*** The US opposes. There is no good answer to an "end state" if UNPROFOR withdraws. UNPROFOR must remain in Bosnia.

(4) ***Redeployment and Troop Reduction.*** This is the UNSYG's real recommendation. The scope of this option is wide. While this option may appear attractive to changing a disintegrating situation in Bosnia, the greatest danger comes from signalling the start of the UNPROFOR withdrawal. Worse case for the US is a Bosnia without UNPROFOR.

The Bosnian government's reaction is likely to be negative to any troop drawdown, especially from the eastern enclaves. When the Dutch replaced the Canadians in Srebrenica, the local population held the Canadians hostage to ensure a one-for-one swap. A related concern for any drawdown is the logistics, movement, and perception problems created during any partial withdrawal. The threat to UN personnel redeploying out of isolated areas could result in the UN requesting a multilateral assisted withdrawal. NATO OPLAN 40104 could come into question.

The risks are too high and the gains too uncertain. The US should support the status quo supporting UNPROFOR under existing mandates. The 19 May CHOD's meeting in The Netherlands willaddress several options for enhancing UNPROFOR's situation **under the existing mandates**. The USG should support the outcome of this meeting.

CONCLUSION

The USG should support UNPROFOR under the existing mandates. Maintain the status quo while regaining the intitiative. UNPROFOR must pressure both sides in the conflict. This will require US support. We don't want to present the opportunity that could trigger UNPROFOR withdrawal. There is no good "end state" in a post-withdrawal Bosnia. UNPROFOR must remain in Bosnia.

Prepared by: LtCol Tom White, USMC, J-5, EURDIV, X49431, un\unoption.doc

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UNANSWERED POLICY QUESTIONS RELATING TO OPLAN 40104

U.S. INTERESTS/OBJECTIVES:

- Improve regional peace and stability; contain the conflict.

[• Help ensure Bosnia's survival as a state.]--JCS/OSD
Continue to support a negotiated settlement recognizing B-H within its internationally-accepted boundaries.

- Honor U.S. bilateral and NATO commitments to assist in a NATO-led withdrawal should one become necessary.

ASSUMPTIONS:

- A continued UN presence in the region would attenuate the fighting and alleviate human suffering.

- The United Nations has decided to withdraw UNPROFOR from Bosnia and/or Croatia, and has requested NATO's assistance.

- The situation will permit UN forces to remain in Macedonia.

- NATO has decided to assist an emergency, partial, or total withdrawal from Bosnia and/or Croatia, and to execute OPLAN 40104. NATO's mission and priority for commitment of forces, including airpower, is to conduct the withdrawal of UN forces. Its mission is not to defend the Bosnian population, nor to support Bosnian Government forces.

- NATO's intent is not to assume UN missions and responsibilities; the UN would continue to direct and be responsible for any remaining UN operations.

- NATO (and the U.S.) will conduct a limited-duration withdrawal operation, then depart.

- To the extent it can without adversely impacting the withdrawal effort, NATO forces will continue to conduct other NATO-authorized operations as applicable, including SHARP GUARD, DENY FLIGHT, CAS, TEZ, and protection of safe areas, in support of the UN humanitarian mission.

- Local governments, NGOs, PVOs, and possibly UN organizations if they stay, will have responsibility for humanitarian assistance after UN forces have been withdrawn.

- NATO (and the U.S.) will oppose any effort to lift the arms embargo before the withdrawal operation has been completed.

[• Post UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia, the U.S. policy is "lift and strike," which does not include the employment of U.S. ground troops.]--JCS/OSD

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PROPOSED U.S. POLICY AND PRINCIPLES (DURING WITHDRAWAL)

- The United States is willing to commit its forces, including U.S. ground troops, as part of a NATO-led operation to withdraw UN forces and American citizens from the former Yugoslavia.

- Apart from the withdrawal operation, the United States will continue to meet its NATO and national obligations in support of any remaining relevant UN mandates for humanitarian assistance to the extent the situation permits.

- During the withdrawal operation the forces of the United States, its Allies, and the UN will be expected to conduct themselves with impartiality and neutrality to the maximum extent practical.

- Any force, regardless of warring-party faction, detected attacking civilians in any area where withdrawal operations are being conducted, is subject to a NATO response.

- Any force, regardless of warring-party faction and of location within the theater of operations, that is determined to be a threat to the withdrawal operation, is subject to a NATO response.

- NATO forces are authorized to take the necessary self-defense measures against any attacker, regardless of location, to protect themselves and those being withdrawn.

  - Lethal force would only be used against civilians as a last resort for self-defense purposes.

- The withdrawal priority will be for NATO forces to remove designated personnel first, then UN weapons, and finally, UN equipment.

  - NATO forces will, to the best of their ability, withdraw all personnel who are supposed to be withdrawn.

  - If, in the judgment of the on-scene commander, removing UN weapons or equipment poses unacceptable risks, NATO forces will leave such weapons/equipment behind, possibly destroying or disabling it, as the situation dictates.

  - If civilians request relocation assistance, and in the judgment of the on-scene commander this assistance would not jeopardize the withdrawal effort, then such assistance should be provided.

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- **Dealing with Civilians.** NATO will assist civilians not designated for evacuation to the extent doing so will not adversely impact on the withdrawal operation. NATO will withdraw only those personnel designated for withdrawal under OPLAN 40104, including NATO nations' citizens. Lethal force would only be used against civilians as a last resort for self-defense purposes. NATO forces will be authorized to respond to attacks against civilians in any area where withdrawal operations are being conducted.

- **Humanitarian Aid.** NATO will provide support for humanitarian assistance to the extent doing so will not place the withdrawal operation at further risk.

- **Dealing with Warring Parties.** NATO is authorized to use lethal force, as necessary, to protect its forces and UN evacuees, and to secure the return of NATO/UN hostages, if any. Every effort will be made to ensure that all NATO forces and designated evacuees are safely withdrawn from the region. NATO will take action to attenuate/halt fighting between the warring parties only as necessary to facilitate the withdrawal. NATO will respond impartially against any outside lethal support effort that could adversely impact the withdrawal operation.

- **Safe Areas, Exclusion Zones, and Other Areas.** NATO would be expected to respond to safe area and exclusion zone violations only to the extent practical without adversely impacting on withdrawal operations. In those areas where UN forces are being withdrawn, NATO's response to safe area and exclusion zone violations would be as required to facilitate the withdrawal operation.

  If a concentration or movement of heavy weapons in any area, even an area not designated as a safe area or exclusion zone, were determined to be capable of threatening the withdrawal operation, such weapons would be subject to a NATO response. NATO forces would have authority to destroy/neutralize weapons in collection sites that could be reasonably expected to fall into the hands of those who would attempt to use them against the withdrawal effort. Dual-key procedures would not apply in these situations.

  Apart from the withdrawal operation, NATO would continue to meet its obligations in support of UN elements as the situation might permit and according to existing arrangements. In areas (safe areas, exclusion zones, or otherwise) where no withdrawal operations are being conducted, NATO could respond to heavy weapons violations if doing so, in the NATO Commander's judgment, would not adversely impact the withdrawal operation. In these areas, which would be outside the NATO Commander's area of control, the dual-key arrangement would remain in effect. Responses in areas not previously addressed (i.e., those outside the safe areas and exclusion zones) would require further NAC approval.

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- **Warring-faction Weapons/Equipment/Territorial Disputes.** NATO on-scene commanders will deal with warring-faction territorial and weapons/equipment issues in the way that, in their judgment, best supports and minimizes risk to the withdrawal operation. As general rules, warring-faction weapons/equipment will be destroyed, and territory will be withdrawn from expeditiously and its hand-over to warring factions avoided. Engaging in territorial issues could delay the withdrawal and compromise NATO's neutrality, both of which would make the operation riskier.

- **Command and Control.**

##STATE COMMENT: It is our understanding that the formulation that follows does not call for transfer of theater command to NATO under every UNPROFOR withdrawal scenario. For example, under a permissive environment or under a limited extraction scenario, if UNPROFOR did not ask for NATO assistance other than that already agreed in support of existing UN mandates (e.g., DENY FLIGHT, SHARP GUARD, CAS, TEZ, and protection of safe areas), then UNPROFOR could attempt to make its own way out. If, however, the Alliance were asked to provide any withdrawal assistance beyond present agreements (e.g., provide NATO ground troops), then NATO would assume command of the operation as laid out below.##

The Alliance will have the flexibility to fully support a partial or complete withdrawal if must, but also to remain in a supporting role if not asked and not needed. NATO will continue to support UNPROFOR operations under existing UN mandates. Once the UN asks for NATO help in withdrawal anywhere in the theater and, prior to the withdrawal actually commencing, NATO will assume command and control of all current UNPROFOR units throughout the former Yugoslavia to conduct emergency, partial, or total withdrawal operations. NATO will delegate local authority to UN commanders in areas not being withdrawn.

Dual Key. After TOA, NATO theater command is in effect and dual-key arrangements will not apply to NATO forces in theater, nor to countries in which NATO-led withdrawal operations are authorized, nor to areas within the theater from which attacks on NATO-led withdrawal operations are launched or threatened. Except as noted above, dual-key arrangements will remain in place for areas from which UN forces are not being withdrawn as delimited by the NATO theater commander. (Note: Dual-key should not be considered as the final USG policy position until agreed upon at the NAC.)

- **NATO's Mission.** NATO's mission is to withdraw UNPROFOR and depart. However, to the extent it can without adversely impacting the withdrawal effort, NATO will continue to conduct other NATO-authorized operations, as applicable, in the region in support of the UN humanitarian mission.

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NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA
DATE: May 19, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 - 4:30 p.m.

Agenda

I. Future of UNPROFOR

A. Options.....JCS/ALL

B. Diplomatic Strategy Leading to a New UNPROFOR.....State

II. OPLAN 40104 In-Progress Review

A. Post-UNPROFOR Withdrawal Strategy.....State

B. Unanswered Policy Questions.....State

C. Alternatives to NATO-Led Withdrawal.....All

D. Roadmap of remaining OPLAN 40104 requirements...JCS/OSD

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Notification / Agenda & Discussion paper for 19 May PC Meeting on Bosnia NSC LOG # 20653

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A	CIA	Executive Secretary		
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REMARKS:

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REMARKS:

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REMARKS:

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20653

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 18, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National
Security and International
Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia on May 19, 1995, 2:30 p.m. - 4:30 p.m., in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Principals only. The agenda is attached at Tab A. An NSC Discussion Paper is at Tab B. ~~(S)~~

for
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachments
Tab A Agenda
Tab B NSC Discussion Paper

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~~SECRET~~ May 17, 1995

BOSNIA: STRATEGIC CHOICES

NSC DISCUSSION PAPER

Introduction:

We are in a critical period for U.S. policy toward Bosnia that could see the withdrawal of UNPROFOR and the introduction of NATO/U.S. ground forces for a mission whose outcome is uncertain. Now is the time to review the fundamental principles guiding our policy and to determine the steps necessary to shape events before strategic choices are completely dictated by the situation on the ground.

Fundamental U.S. policy objectives for Bosnia:

- Obtain a political settlement that satisfies basic Bosnian government requirements and rolls back some Serb aggression
- End or reduce the fighting
- Prevent spread of conflict to other parts of region
- Maintain relief supplies
- Maintain cohesion with Allies
- Avoid American entanglement in fighting on the ground in the Balkans

Key Strategic Choices:

I. Whither UNPROFOR: U.S. support for continued UNPROFOR presence has been based upon an assessment that this course remains the avenue best suited to the majority of our fundamental objectives -- and that, for all of its problems, the alternatives are worse.

- In the current environment, the viability of UNPROFOR is increasingly being called into question.
  - ♦ UNPROFOR is unable to ensure that humanitarian assistance is delivered to UN-protected areas/safe areas.
  - ♦ Fighting among the warring parties is no longer deterred by UNPROFOR presence.
  - ♦ UNPROFOR itself is frequently the subject of attack, and UNPROFOR forces are neither in a position to defend themselves effectively nor to withstand the possible consequences of calling in NATO airpower.
  - ♦ UNPROFOR credibility is thereby undermined with all parties, and NATO credibility in turn eroded as well.

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(2013-0682-M, 8.19)

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- Under these circumstances, we must ask whether linking U.S. objectives to continued UNPROFOR presence remains valid in the current environment.
  - There still do not appear to be any alternatives to UNPROFOR that provide better support for U.S. objectives.
  - Withdrawal followed by unilateral or predominantly U.S. lift (and strike) risks "Americanizing" the Balkan conflict; even multilateral lift risks widening the scope of the conflict as more external parties move to support regional clients.
  - Replacement of UNPROFOR with another international presence (NATO? WEU? Coalition of the willing?) would either require U.S. participation on the ground or prove equally ineffective -- and require additional political and financial capital to initiate.
  - U.S. interests are thus best served by finding a way to restore credibility to the UNPROFOR mission in a manner that permits existing troop contributors to sustain their continued presence and the Bosnian government to agree to retain that presence.
- Options other than withdrawal available for UNPROFOR under the present circumstances:
  - **Muddle through with the status quo:** French have already indicated likely pullout if current conditions remain unchanged -- may be the thread that unravels the whole fabric of UNPROFOR.
  - **"Restabilization" of existing UNPROFOR mission with more robust enforcement of existing mandate:** UK avoidance of a confrontational approach in B-H must be overcome if this option is to become viable; additional resources needed to enhance military capabilities of existing UNPROFOR forces not likely to be forthcoming.
  - **"Retrench and reinvigorate" UNPROFOR mission** by withdrawing from untenable positions/missions while pursuing more robust enforcement of remaining mandates: could be seen as a trade of the eastern enclaves for more effective mission performance around Sarajevo -- implications for eastern enclaves could be very serious; however, this option could satisfy both the French and UK; by retrenching, could also alleviate some to the problems associated with resources to enhance capabilities.
  - **"Retrench and retreat" by withdrawing and pursuing an even less vigorous approach to mandate enforcement:** the least costly approach, this might be used as a bargaining chip to get the Bosnian Serbs to accede to the conditions for French

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forces remaining in UNPROFOR; UK likely to support; however, potentially as damaging to UNPROFOR credibility as the status quo, with the additional public image/moral costs of not only "abandoning" the eastern enclaves, but also "capitulating" in cases where UNPROFOR remains; least likely to be acceptable to Bosnians, who could then refuse to allow continued UNPROFOR presence.

Comment: **Only realistic choice may be to seek Allied support to "retrench and reinvigorate."** Trade U.S. support for retrenchment for allied and UN pledge to pursue more robust enforcement of remaining mandate, including NATO airstrikes. Fall back to "retrench and retreat" only if no other way to prevent withdrawal.

II. **Whither OPLAN 40104**, given U.S. objective of sustaining UNPROFOR and commitment to assist withdrawal if required?

- There are no guarantees that a viable solution to retaining UNPROFOR in theater can be agreed.
- Withdrawal remains a real, and increasingly likely, option if there is no agreement on a more viable UNPROFOR role.
- Nevertheless, several key issues remain to be resolved before a decision to proceed with withdrawal implementation could be taken with confidence:
  - **What is the end state we want to leave behind following UNPROFOR withdrawal?** What to avoid may be clearer than what to achieve: avoid merely replacing UN with NATO forces and being unable to leave; avoid debacle of U.S./NATO-led withdrawal being depicted as precursor to brutal ethnic cleansing; avoid loss of NATO credibility to the same extent there has been a loss of UN credibility.
  - **How does NATO deal with unintended consequences of withdrawal operations?** Massive refugee flow; use of NATO forces as shields by civilians or by warring factions; hostage-taking by warring factions; withdrawal of humanitarian aid providers as a result of UNPROFOR withdrawal.
  - **Under what conditions could withdrawal or partial withdrawal take place without requiring implementation of OPLAN 40104?** If nations determine that they will accomplish *de facto* withdrawal by merely failing to replace units during normal rotation, no NATO assistance may be necessary. If this resulted in enclaves being left unprotected, would the last forces out require NATO assistance, or could the UN accomplish this on its own?

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- The way ahead for OPLAN 40104 is also complicated by a dilemma: we must ensure that our actions in preparation for possible UNPROFOR withdrawal do not precipitate the withdrawal itself.

  - Key is not allowing the existence of a "NATO withdrawal force" to prompt either UN troop contributors to seek early withdrawal or Bosnians to act to cause UNPROFOR withdrawal in the hopes that NATO will replace the UN. **A clear "firebreak" is required between completion of NATO preparation for OPLAN 40104 and initiation of OPLAN implementation.** We must be confident that we understand exactly what steps will be required to get from the present state of NATO planning to this firebreak, and what steps take us beyond it.

  - NATO credibility requires that forces must be trained sufficiently to ensure mission success. ACTREQ requested by SACEUR this week will facilitate identification of forces and training shortfalls, and allow SACEUR to initiate action to rectify those shortfalls. Training in place to NATO standards should be an acceptable alternative to assembling in Europe for training, and send a more restrained signal.

  - Training in place would also permit completion of Congressional consultations prior to movement of any US forces. We may need to lay down marker in NATO that assembly of forces in Europe will require a further political decision.

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MESSAGE #: _____

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting: 19 May PC on Bosnia PAGES: Cover + 6

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Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
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2010-0533-M

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20653

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 18, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
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for
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachments
Tab A Agenda
Tab B NSC Discussion Paper

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
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NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: May 19, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 - 4:30 p.m.

Agenda

I. Future of UNPROFOR

A. Options.....JCS/ALL

B. Diplomatic Strategy Leading to a New UNPROFOR.....State

II. OPLAN 40104 In-Progress Review

A. Post-UNPROFOR Withdrawal Strategy.....State

B. Unanswered Policy Questions.....State

C. Alternatives to NATO-Led Withdrawal.....All

D. Roadmap of remaining OPLAN 40104 requirements...JCS/OSD

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 3/6/2020
2017-0082-M

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BOSNIA: STRATEGIC CHOICES

NSC DISCUSSION PAPER

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
May 18, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

FROM: DON KERRICK/NELSON DREW DK ND

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, May 19, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Principals meeting on Bosnia to be held May 19, 1995. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve AV Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda
Tab B NSC Discussion Paper

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E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By DJS NARA, Date 6/14/10
2012-0533-M

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Case Number: 2010-0533-M

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002a. memo	Nelson Drew to Anthony Lake re: Update for May 23 Principals Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)	05/23/1995	P1/b(1)
002b. memo	Nelson Drew to Anthony Lake re: May 23 Principals Meeting on Bosnia (4 pages)	05/22/1995	P1/b(1)
~~002c. agenda~~	~~NSC Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)~~	~~05/23/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002d. paper~~	~~re: Unanswered Policy Questions Relating to OPLAN 40104 (4 pages)~~	~~05/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
002e. paper	re: Unaswered Policy Questions on NATO Support for UNPROFOR Withdrawal (4 pages)	05/1995	P1/b(1)
~~002f. paper~~	~~re: UN Forces in the Former Yugoslavia (1 page)~~	~~05/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 08/03/2015
~~002g. paper~~	~~re: Roadmap of remaining OPLAN 40144 Requirements (2 pages)~~	~~05/17/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KDE 05/26/2016
~~002h. cable~~	~~re: Milosevic Discussions No Deal (4 pages)~~	~~05/22/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
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P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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RECORD ID: 9520676
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TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 26 MAY 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
SOC
CROATIA
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 23 MAY PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 27 MAY 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DREW LOGREF: 9520661 9520665

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0137 CODES: BOS CRO

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		DREW
		JOSHI
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

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By RDS NARA, Date 10/8/2019
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001		X	95052615	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
001	SENS	Z	95052615	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	95052616	SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950526	FUERTH, L	
002	950526	BRILL, K	
002	950526	MCALEER, R	
002	950526	ADAMS, G	
002	950526	INDERFURTH, K	
002	950526	GARTHOFF, D	
002	950526	WILSON, F	

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Harmon			
Dohse			
Sens	1/3	NOS/ADP	
Soderberg	copy	C	
Berger	2	BNV	
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	EB 5/26	D
Records Mgt.	5		

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

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COMMENTS:

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Harmon	~~1~~		
Dohse			
Sens	1/3	NOS/ADC	
Soderberg	copy	C	
Berger	2	BNV	
Lake			
Situation Room	4		
West Wing Desk		(KB) 5/26	D
Records Mgt.	5		

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COMMENTS:

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LOG 9520676
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SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 23 MAY PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	31 May	0700	[signature]
	PRINT LAST NAME: BRANSCUM		
	COPY: 1		
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	5/30/95	AM 11:15	[signature]
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: VIA FAX +1		
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: VIA FAX		
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	5/30/95	11:05	[signature]
	PRINT LAST NAME: GRAVES		
	COPY: 1		
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: VIA FAX		
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			
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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX +1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: 1
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX

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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
VIA LARRY BRANSCUM
ROOM 290, OEOB
WASHINGTON, DC 20506

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: 1

5/30 8:10P S. McEel

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

PRINT LAST NAME: McEel

COPY: VIA FAX +1

COL ROBERT P. MCALEER
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ROOM 3E880
PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: VIA FAX

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET
ROOM 238
OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG
WASHINGTON, DC 20503

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

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AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
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USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER
ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
2201 C STREET NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: VIA FAX

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS
WASHINGTON, DC 20505

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2010-0533-M

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

A

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 11141 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 6 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 23 MAY PC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 20676

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
	USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
W	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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Initials: RDS Date: 10/8/2019
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TIME OF RECEIPT

B 19:15

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: BK

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 1114 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 6 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 23 MAY PC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 20676

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
	USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
W	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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Initials: RDS Date: 10/8/2019
2010-0533-M

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

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TIME OF RECEIPT
25 MAY 95 19 [illegible] 20
NMCC/JCS

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: [signature]

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 11141 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 6 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 23 MAY PC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 20676

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
	USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
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D	JCS	SECRETARY		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

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TIME OF RECEIPT

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 11141 CLASSIFICATION: SECRET TOTAL: 6 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 23 MAY PC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 20676

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

N, PLEASE RECEIPT, THANKS, C

REMARKS:

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE
- ☐ FLASH
- ☐ IMMEDIATE
- ☐ PRIORITY
- ☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC LOG # 20676

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: **Notice of Meeting** SOC OF 23 MAY PC MTG PAGES: 6

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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Initials: RDS Date: 10/8/2019
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20676

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 26, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

AMBASSADOR RICK INDEFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DR. GORDON ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, May 23, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/8/2019
2010-0533-M

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TAB

A.

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20676

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee
DATE: May 23, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 - 4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair Anthony Lake	CIA John Deutch
State Secretary Christopher	JCS Admiral William Owens
DOD Secretary Perry	White House Sandy Berger
USUN Madeleine Albright	OMB Gordon Adams
OVP Leon Fuerth	NSC Alexander Vershbow Colonel Nelson Drew

Summary of Conclusions

Frasure-Milosevic Negotiations:

1. Principals noted that several areas remain unresolved following Ambassador Frasure's talks in Belgrade. While the sanction reimposition mechanism is the key, others include: securing a clear recognition formula and commitment to cut off support for the Bosnian Serbs; demands for 500,000 MT oil/month; maintaining some linkage of sanctions-lifting to normalization of relations with Croatia; and deflecting the successor state issue. Principals noted the French and British pressure to "cut a deal," and conflicting reports as to whether the French were bluffing or serious about withdrawing their UNPROFOR troops if no agreement was forthcoming. They also noted the problem of uncoordinated

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RE 70-14 10/1/2013

Russian diplomatic approaches to Milosevic. Principals agreed to let process simmer for now with Milosevic, and to approach the French, British and Russians to stiffen resolve and restore Contact Group solidarity. **(Action: State.)** (S)

Post-Withdrawal Strategy:

2. Principals agreed that U.S. policy following UNPROFOR withdrawal would be to seek multilateral lift of the arms embargo, limited support for arming and training the Bosnian forces, but no commitment to air strikes. Principals agreed that U.S. security assistance should largely be limited to the provision of financing for Bosnian arms purchases from other suppliers, and that training should be by a third party if possible; they ruled out training by the U.S. on Bosnian territory. Principals agreed that this option also imposed a need to strengthen efforts to contain the fighting within current bounds, and that we would maintain peacekeepers in Macedonia, reinforced if necessary. They further agreed that this approach should be put forward in a decision memorandum for the President. **(Action: NSC.)** (S)

3. Principals agreed on the need for an intelligence reappraisal of the relative capabilities of the warring factions -- current, and projected against the likely situation after withdrawal if the agreed U.S. policy option is carried out. **(Action: CIA.)** They tasked OSD/JCS to review Bosnian training requirements in light of the forthcoming CIA reappraisal. **(Action: OSD/JCS.)** They also tasked the Bosnia IWG to study several unanswered questions associated with the agreed option:

- If Russia (or others) won't support full multilateral lift in the UNSC, will the U.S. pursue limited multilateral lift and/or unilateral lift?
- What if the Russians make good on their threat to arm the Serbs if lift occurs?
- What current efforts would remain in place: the No-Fly-Zone? NATO air strike decisions? Any relief efforts? If so, how and why?
- What military posture should a NATO or an allied coalition of the willing adopt to contain the fighting if withdrawal occurs? (S)

Unanswered Questions for OPLAN 40104:

4. The Principals noted that several questions still remain unanswered regarding implementation of OPLAN 40104. They tasked

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the Bosnia IWG to continue efforts to answer questions associated with:

- Possible civilian use of NATO forces for protection;
- Assisting movement of refugees from the enclaves;
- Possible breakdown of humanitarian efforts while NATO is in place;
- How NATO would react if Serbia enters the war while NATO is in place;
- What to do about prisoners or released POWs that fall into NATO hands; and
- How to determine to whom NATO would return disputed areas. (S)

5. Principals agreed that the magnitude of the problems associated with both OPLAN 40104 implementation and post-withdrawal strategy made it imperative to keep UNPROFOR in place, and agreed to urgently approach the French to get them to reconsider their possible withdrawal from UNPROFOR. (S)

Alternatives to NATO-led UNPROFOR Withdrawal:

6. Principals noted the OSD and JCS assessments that even a limited attempt at withdrawal from the enclaves ran the risk of provoking a level of opposition from the warring parties that could rapidly escalate beyond the ability of individual national units or UNPROFOR to handle. They expressed concerns about the ability of OPLAN 40104 to deal with very limited withdrawal or repositioning efforts without provoking an all-out withdrawal operation. They agreed that, politically, it would be extremely difficult to reject a call from a troop contributing state for NATO assistance in withdrawal. They agreed that SecDef would raise these concerns in discussions this week with SACEUR. **(Action: OSD.)** (S)

Remaining Decisions and "Firebreak Point" for OPLAN 40104:

7. Principals noted that the U.S. Execution Order (EXORD) responding to the force Activation Request (ACTREQ) issued by NATO would be released sometime during the second week in June, and agreed that it would not commit U.S. troops to deploy outside of the U.S. **(Action: JCS.)** They noted that the NAC would conduct a review of the OPLAN on May 31, and that it would be asked to approve the OPLAN on June 14. They agreed that the U.S. could join consensus to approve the OPLAN without crossing a firebreak making execution of the plan inevitable. They agreed that the firebreak that we were not prepared to cross would come when the NAC considered a decision authorizing deployment of

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forces to Europe for assembly and training, probably no earlier than the third week in June. In this light, they agreed that the U.S. would not support a decision to deploy forces into Europe in support of the OPLAN until UNPROFOR withdrawal was clearly inevitable. (Note: JCS understands that SACEUR will not request any deployment of the force in Europe unless and until there is a UN decision authorizing UNPROFOR withdrawal.) (S)

8. They agreed that SecDef would convey this position to SACEUR in discussions this week, and would ask SACEUR to clarify where and how he envisions training of the withdrawal force taking place. **(Action: OSD.)** (S)

Legislative Strategy:

9. Principals noted that the next briefing on the OPLAN was scheduled to go to the SASC on Thursday, May 25, and tasked JCS and OSD to revise the briefing in light of the critique from Senator Dole's staff following the May 19 briefing to the SFRC. **(Action: OSD/JCS.)** They agreed that, lacking a time in which full committees could be briefed before the Memorial Day break, the OSD/JCS/State briefing team should continue efforts to provide the briefing to key Congressional leaders (e.g. Dellums, Smith) before week's end. **(Action: OSD/JCS/State.)** (C)

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20676

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 22, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: NELSON DREW

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, May 23, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia held May 23, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/8/2019
2010-0533-M

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RECORD ID: 9520665
RECEIVED: 22 MAY 95 14

TO: LAKE

FROM: DREW
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 22 MAY 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
CROATIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 23 MAY PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 25 MAY 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DREW LOGREF: 9520661 9520676

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0137 CODES: BOS CRO

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		DREW
		JOSHI
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

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001		X	95052508	NOTED BY LAKE

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National Security Council
The White House

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Dohse	1	D	
Sens			
Soderberg	copy	~~Natl Sec Adviser~~ has seen	
Berger	2		
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	Mce 5/24	A
Records Mgt.			

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cc:

COMMENTS: May 23 Bosnia PC for Lake

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

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#20665 ADD-ON

Dohse, Fred J.

From: Vershbow, Alexander R.
To: @UP - APNSA Special Assistants; @LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs
Cc: /R, Record at A1; Drew, Samuel N.
Subject: Bad reviews for OPLAN briefing [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Monday, May 22, 1995 6:55PM

For Tony, Sandy, Nancy (cc: Bill Danvers, Mike Andricos)

Mira Baratta phoned to say that, in the opinion of the Senators and staffers present for last Friday's SFRC briefing on OPLAN 40104, the briefing was a"joke" and an "insult to their intelligence." The JCS briefers gave no details on the actual operation, but just told the committee there will be a preparation phase, an implementation phase and a conclusion. The only information of any value, according to Mira, was elicited during the Q and A. She felt it was a tendentious effort to explain why UNPROFOR withdrawal would be a disaster, rather than an effort to build understanding and support for the withdrawal operation should it become necessary.

I'll talk to Wes Clark, but Tony should raise this at the PC

r

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WEST WING DESK -

PLS ADD ATTACHED TO # 20665 AS AN ADD-ON.

THANKS - Wilma

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	Nelson Drew to Anthony Lake re: Update for May 23 Principals Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)	05/23/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4009

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0137 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, May 23, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs641

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. memo	Nelson Drew to Anthony Lake re: May 23 Principals Meeting on Bosnia (4 pages)	05/22/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4009

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0137 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, May 23, 1995

2010-0533-M
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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A

NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA
DATE: May 23, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 - 4:00 p.m.

Agenda

I. OPLAN 40104 In-Progress Review

A. Post-UNPROFOR Withdrawal Strategy.....State

B. Unanswered Policy Questions.....State

C. Alternatives to NATO-Led Withdrawal.....OSD

D. Roadmap of remaining OPLAN 40104 requirements.....JCS

E. Legislative Strategy for OPLAN 40104 Approval.....NSC

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 3/6/2020
2013-0682-M

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DRAFT

Post-UN Peace Forces Withdrawal Strategy

While U.S. strategy continues to be based on the premise that UN Peace Forces should remain in Bosnia, Croatia, and Macedonia, pressure is mounting for withdrawal before the next winter should attempts to strengthen UN Peace Forces militarily and to reach a political settlement with Milosevic fail. That potential withdrawal could occur in an environment ranging from completely hostile to totally benign. While post-withdrawal strategy would certainly be affected by the environment in which withdrawal were to be conducted, five broad alternatives appear to cover the range of strategic options:

1. U.S. unilateral support for Bosnia;
2. Multilateral support for Bosnia;
3. Support for a follow-on multilateral peacekeeping force;
4. Continued/Enhanced Peace Forces Mission in Macedonia; and
5. Benign neglect.

U.S. Unilateral Support for Bosnia: This is a variation of *lift, train, arm, and/or strike.* The objective would be to protect and preserve the territorial integrity of Bosnia through direct military and political assistance. Interest in lifting the arms embargo would certainly grow following a withdrawal of UN Peace Forces. Training and arming the Bosnian Government forces would constitute a major commitment on the part of the U.S. to level the battlefield and would likely be based on the premise that such a step was a prerequisite to reaching a negotiated settlement. The conflict's fighting would likely intensify in the near-term. Taking the next step--strike--unequivocally Americanizes the war and could easily lead to a significant U.S. combat ground force commitment.

Multilateral Support for Bosnia: Includes efforts on the part of the U.S. to achieve a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo. This course of action would be far less divisive among our NATO allies than the go-it-alone approach above but would be difficult to cobble. Part of that difficulty stems from different evaluations of the warring parties and the strategic and moral interests at stake.. Part is also due to a certain war weariness stemming not only from the current four years of war but also from the Balkans long history of hatred and conflict and the cost in lives and material of continued international involvement in an apparently never-ending struggle.

Support for a Multilateral Peacekeeping Force: This follow-on force to UN Peace Forces could either be a NATO-based force that remained in place after UN Peace Forces withdrawal or it could be an Islamic-dominated force. In either case what is implied is that some of the existing force structures do not depart. In the former, NATO

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elects to remain after effecting or during withdrawal. Such a force would be under NATO command and control and and ROE. Thus, the problems of dual-key would be eliminated. The opportunity for more robust use of international force would increase, provided that NATO could reach consensus for action-a proviso of considerable importance. The latter would imply that some UN Peace Force contributing countries (most likely Islamic countries) elected to remain in place. A force composed principally of Islamic nations would likely not be even-handed in its approach to the conflict.

Continued/Enhanced Peace Forces Mission in Macedonia: Objective is to contain the conflict and prevent its spillover to areas outside Bosnia and Croatia. While it would be difficult to ignore the humanitarian tragedies associated with war in Croatia and/or Bosnia, this course of action would focus attention on the principal strategic interest in the region--containment of the conflict. Mission in Macedonia may or may not suffice to contain the conflict at all its possible flashpoints. Finding the right force mix and sustaining it over time to the benefit of the region's and Macedonia's stability is problematic.

Benign Neglect: This option implies total withdrawal of the international peacekeeping community from the region. Such a walk-away would be difficult given the current level of international involvement. To argue that what was going on did not matter anymore--that it was not worth the cost--would be a tough sell to many domestic markets. Ethnic cleansing, genocide, and cross-border aggression have all been labels used to describe events in the Balkans. To walk-away strategy implies appeasement.

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STATE PAPER TO BE PROVIDED

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UNANSWERED POLICY QUESTIONS RELATING TO OPLAN 40104

U.S. INTERESTS/OBJECTIVES:

- Improve regional peace and stability; contain the conflict.

[• Help ensure Bosnia's survival as a state.]--JCS/OSD Continue to support a negotiated settlement recognizing B-H within its internationally-accepted boundaries.

- Honor U.S. bilateral and NATO commitments to assist in a NATO-led withdrawal should one become necessary.

ASSUMPTIONS:

- A continued UN presence in the region would attenuate the fighting and alleviate human suffering.

- The United Nations has decided to withdraw UNPROFOR from Bosnia and/or Croatia, and has requested NATO's assistance.

- The situation will permit UN forces to remain in Macedonia.

- NATO has decided to assist an emergency, partial, or total withdrawal from Bosnia and/or Croatia, and to execute OPLAN 40104. NATO's mission and priority for commitment of forces, including airpower, is to conduct the withdrawal of UN forces. Its mission is not to defend the Bosnian population, nor to support Bosnian Government forces.

- NATO's intent is not to assume UN missions and responsibilities; the UN would continue to direct and be responsible for any remaining UN operations.

- NATO (and the U.S.) will conduct a limited-duration withdrawal operation, then depart.

- To the extent it can without adversely impacting the withdrawal effort, NATO forces will continue to conduct other NATO-authorized operations as applicable, including SHARP GUARD, DENY FLIGHT, CAS, TEZ, and protection of safe areas, in support of the UN humanitarian mission.

- Local governments, NGOs, PVOs, and possibly UN organizations if they stay, will have responsibility for humanitarian assistance after UN forces have been withdrawn.

- NATO (and the U.S.) will oppose any effort to lift the arms embargo before the withdrawal operation has been completed.

[• Post UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia, the U.S. policy is "lift and strike," which does not include the employment of U.S. ground troops.]--JCS/OSD

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NL 2/6/2020 (8.25)

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PROPOSED U.S. POLICY AND PRINCIPLES (DURING WITHDRAWAL)

- The United States is willing to commit its forces, including U.S. ground troops, as part of a NATO-led operation to withdraw UN forces and American citizens from the former Yugoslavia.

- Apart from the withdrawal operation, the United States will continue to meet its NATO and national obligations in support of any remaining relevant UN mandates for humanitarian assistance to the extent the situation permits.

- During the withdrawal operation the forces of the United States, its Allies, and the UN will be expected to conduct themselves with impartiality and neutrality to the maximum extent practical.

- Any force, regardless of warring-party faction, detected attacking civilians in any area where withdrawal operations are being conducted, is subject to a NATO response.

- Any force, regardless of warring-party faction and of location within the theater of operations, that is determined to be a threat to the withdrawal operation, is subject to a NATO response.

- NATO forces are authorized to take the necessary self-defense measures against any attacker, regardless of location, to protect themselves and those being withdrawn.

  - Lethal force would only be used against civilians as a last resort for self-defense purposes.

- The withdrawal priority will be for NATO forces to remove designated personnel first, then UN weapons, and finally, UN equipment.

  - NATO forces will, to the best of their ability, withdraw all personnel who are supposed to be withdrawn.

  - If, in the judgment of the on-scene commander, removing UN weapons or equipment poses unacceptable risks, NATO forces will leave such weapons/equipment behind, possibly destroying or disabling it, as the situation dictates.

  - If civilians request relocation assistance, and in the judgment of the on-scene commander this assistance would not jeopardize the withdrawal effort, then such assistance should be provided.

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- **Dealing with Civilians.** NATO will assist civilians not designated for evacuation to the extent doing so will not adversely impact on the withdrawal operation. NATO will withdraw only those personnel designated for withdrawal under OPLAN 40104, including NATO nations' citizens. Lethal force would only be used against civilians as a last resort for self-defense purposes. NATO forces will be authorized to respond to attacks against civilians in any area where withdrawal operations are being conducted.

- **Humanitarian Aid.** NATO will provide support for humanitarian assistance to the extent doing so will not place the withdrawal operation at further risk.

- **Dealing with Warring Parties.** NATO is authorized to use lethal force, as necessary, to protect its forces and UN evacuees, and to secure the return of NATO/UN hostages, if any. Every effort will be made to ensure that all NATO forces and designated evacuees are safely withdrawn from the region. NATO will take action to attenuate/halt fighting between the warring parties only as necessary to facilitate the withdrawal. NATO will respond impartially against any outside lethal support effort that could adversely impact the withdrawal operation.

- **Safe Areas, Exclusion Zones, and Other Areas.** NATO would be expected to respond to safe area and exclusion zone violations only to the extent practical without adversely impacting on withdrawal operations. In those areas where UN forces are being withdrawn, NATO's response to safe area and exclusion zone violations would be as required to facilitate the withdrawal operation.

  If a concentration or movement of heavy weapons in any area, even an area not designated as a safe area or exclusion zone, were determined to be capable of threatening the withdrawal operation, such weapons would be subject to a NATO response. NATO forces would have authority to destroy/neutralize weapons in collection sites that could be reasonably expected to fall into the hands of those who would attempt to use them against the withdrawal effort. Dual-key procedures would not apply in these situations.

  Apart from the withdrawal operation, NATO would continue to meet its obligations in support of UN elements as the situation might permit and according to existing arrangements. In areas (safe areas, exclusion zones, or otherwise) where no withdrawal operations are being conducted, NATO could respond to heavy weapons violations if doing so, in the NATO Commander's judgment, would not adversely impact the withdrawal operation. In these areas, which would be outside the NATO Commander's area of control, the dual-key arrangement would remain in effect. Responses in areas not previously addressed (i.e., those outside the safe areas and exclusion zones) would require further NAC approval.

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- **Warring-faction Weapons/Equipment/Territorial Disputes.** NATO on-scene commanders will deal with warring-faction territorial and weapons/equipment issues in the way that, in their judgment, best supports and minimizes risk to the withdrawal operation. As general rules, warring-faction weapons/equipment will be destroyed, and territory will be withdrawn from expeditiously and its hand-over to warring factions avoided. Engaging in territorial issues could delay the withdrawal and compromise NATO's neutrality, both of which would make the operation riskier.

- **Command and Control.**

##STATE COMMENT: It is our understanding that the formulation that follows does not call for transfer of theater command to NATO under every UNPROFOR withdrawal scenario. For example, under a permissive environment or under a limited extraction scenario, if UNPROFOR did not ask for NATO assistance other than that already agreed in support of existing UN mandates (e.g., DENY FLIGHT, SHARP GUARD, CAS, TEZ, and protection of safe areas), then UNPROFOR could attempt to make its own way out. If, however, the Alliance were asked to provide any withdrawal assistance beyond present agreements (e.g., provide NATO ground troops), then NATO would assume command of the operation as laid out below.##

The Alliance will have the flexibility to fully support a partial or complete withdrawal if must, but also to remain in a supporting role if not asked and not needed. NATO will continue to support UNPROFOR operations under existing UN mandates. Once the UN asks for NATO help in withdrawal anywhere in the theater and, prior to the withdrawal actually commencing, NATO will assume command and control of all current UNPROFOR units throughout the former Yugoslavia to conduct emergency, partial, or total withdrawal operations. NATO will delegate local authority to UN commanders in areas not being withdrawn.

Dual Key. After TOA, NATO theater command is in effect and dual-key arrangements will not apply to NATO forces in theater, nor to countries in which NATO-led withdrawal operations are authorized, nor to areas within the theater from which attacks on NATO-led withdrawal operations are launched or threatened. Except as noted above, dual-key arrangements will remain in place for areas from which UN forces are not being withdrawn as delimited by the NATO theater commander. (Note: Dual-key should not be considered as the final USG policy position until agreed upon at the NAC.)

- **NATO's Mission.** NATO's mission is to withdraw UNPROFOR and depart. However, to the extent it can without adversely impacting the withdrawal effort, NATO will continue to conduct other NATO-authorized operations, as applicable, in the region in support of the UN humanitarian mission.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002e. paper	re: Unaswered Policy Questions on NATO Support for UNPROFOR Withdrawal (4 pages)	05/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4009

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0137 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, May 23, 1995

2010-0533-M
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OSD

E

UN FORCES IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: ALTERNATIVES TO NATO-LED WITHDRAWAL (C)

ISSUE (C): Given that the preferred option is to have UNPROFOR/UNCRO remain in place and succeed in their mission, what alternatives to a NATO-led withdrawal exist if the forces must be withdrawn?

OPTIONS (S):

- "**40104**": NATO-led withdrawal, as envisioned in OPLAN 40104
- "**Coalition**": Non-NATO, coalition-led withdrawal (WEU, UN troop contributors, or other ad hoc coalition)
- "**Unilateral**": Capable single nation (UK, FR?) withdraws own forces without coordination with allies or UN
- "**Backup**": UN-led, NATO (or other coalition)-supported, withdrawal
- "**Unassisted**": Withdrawal en masse, directed and conducted by UN
- "**Attrition**": Gradual drawdown of UN forces, managed by UN and tied to rotation dates of contributing nations tempered by tactical situation

KEY FACTORS (S):

- Practicality: Are the resources available to do it?
- Safety/security of UN forces during and after withdrawal
- Impact on military/political situation among the warring factions
- Humanitarian concerns
- NATO solidarity, US leadership of the alliance

DISCUSSION (S):

- Risk of Casualties: Withdrawal of UN forces without the ability to militarily dominate the warring factions during the withdrawal risks aggression against the forces and potential heavy casualties, especially in the most hotly contested areas (enclaves, pockets, corridors and lines of confrontation). Avoiding UN casualties will require a force perceived by the combatants as willing and capable of protecting the withdrawing forces.
- UN Limitations: UN military command structure, rules of engagement, mission, and force capabilities do not admit the robust self-defense needed to withdraw safely. Strengthening the force is likely to remain politically elusive.
- Lighter Options: Both SACEUR and CJCS have considered lighter, quicker, on-call options to provide backup support for an unassisted withdrawal. Both have rejected the approach as lacking unity of command, providing insufficient force to deter aggression and lacking responsiveness to protect the withdrawing forces.
- Longer View: While we have few US troops at risk, the future of NATO as the alliance of record in Europe and, especially, the US position as the leader of NATO and a central player in European security will be badly damaged if we decline to lead in this instance. If this operation happens without the US or NATO, we lose.

CONCLUSION (S): If UN withdraws, NATO-led "40104" is the least bad approach.

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8/3/15 KBM (8.27)

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F

TALKING PAPER

Subject: Roadmap of remaining OPLAN 40104 requirements (U)

1. (U) Purpose To provide VCJCS with information and talking points concerning the "firebreak" required between completion of NATO preparation for OPLAN 40104 and initiation of OPLAN implementation.

2. ~~(S)~~ Background. At the 23 May PC, NSC may ask for a recommendation on defining the "firebreak" between OPLAN 40104 planning and preparation and a UN request necessitating implementation of OPLAN 40104.

3. ~~(C)~~ Discussion. OPLAN 40104 assumes a new UNSCR requesting NATO support, followed by NAC approval, changing UNPROFOR's mission from peacekeeping to withdrawal. The roadmap of remaining steps to implement 40104 may help define the "firebreak":

- ACTREQ and for all remaining forces (approved 19 May). This step requests the administrative preparation and training of all remaining forces under national control.

- National responses to ACTREQs (in the US an Execution Order (EXORD)) formally commits and identifies specific units, and administratively prepare and train those forces. Transfer and deployment of forces are not authorized until the NAC approves/SACEUR releases an ACTORD.

- ACTORD Full Step 2 communications element -- UN request could precipitate this step, however there are situations where Full Step 2 would be prepositioned in the operational theater. This would most likely be in preparation for an emergency withdrawal in anticipation of a UN request.

- Activation Order (ACTORD) Enabling and Main Body Forces -- UN request would most likely precipitate this step.

- Implementation of OPLAN 40104

The existence of a NATO withdrawal force in or near the theater may be a signal to either UN troop contributors to seek early withdrawal or for the Bosnians to act to cause a UNPROFOR withdrawal in hopes that NATO will replace the UN. However, NATO's need to be ready, on order, to implement an emergency, partial or full withdrawal of UNPROFOR requires forces to be trained to the highest state possible

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4. ~~(C)~~ Conclusion. Actual force deployment of forces to the operational theater could create the conditions that may precipitate a UN request for a withdrawal of UNPROFOR. The US response to the ACTREQ for all remaining forces will allow SACEUR to prepare and train the forces (within the conditions and timeframe offered by the nations for such preparation) necessary to implement OPLAN 40104, without sending the signal prompting a UN withdrawal. Depending on the situation, any deployment or troop positioning that might risk the UN requesting UNPROFOR withdrawal must be considered on a case by case basis.

5. ~~(C)~~ Recommendation. The PC should decide:

- To approve OPLAN 40104 in the NAC. All scenarios, including an emergency, partial, or full NATO-led withdrawals of UNPF, are based on OPLAN 40104.

- Complete the Congressional consultations necessary for the US to join consensus in approving the OPLAN in the NAC (calls and presentations to staff began 18 May).

- Any actual deployment of forces should require further NAC authorization, and should be on a case by case basis based on the situation on the ground in the Former Yugoslavia.

Prepared by Balkans Working Group
J-5, EURDIV
eur/eurcenea/nato/oplan40104/newfire.doc

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PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~SECRET~~ DTG:221719Z MAY 95

FM: AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

TO:SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5931

~~SECRET~~ BELGRADE 002468

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR FRASURE

EUR FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLBROOKE

E.O. 12356:DECL: 5/22/05
TAGS: PREL, SR, BK
SUBJECT: MILOSEVIC DISCUSSIONS -- NO DEAL

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN A DIFFICULT FIVE HOUR SESSION WITH MILOSEVIC TODAY (MAY 22), WE WERE UNABLE TO CLOSE THE GAP BETWEEN US ON THE BOSNIA RECOGNITON/BORDER/SANCTIONS RELIEF PACKAGE. A NUMBER OF ISSUES REMAIN UNRESOLVED BUT THE MOST INTRACTABLE POINT IS WHETHER THE USG WOULD BE IN A POSITION IN THE UNSC IN THE SANCTIONS SUSPENSION PHASE OF THE PROCESS TO PULL THE PLUG IF BELGRADE VIOLATES THE ASSORTED ACCORDS. IN OTHER WORDS, MILOSEVIC INSISTS ON A SITUATION IN WHICH A RUSSIAN VETO IS POTENTIALLY INTERPOSED BETWEEN HIMSELF AND SANCTIONS REVOCATION IN THE EVENT OF NONPERFORMANCE. I SAID THAT WAS UNACCEPTABLE AND NON-NEGOTIABLE IN SUBSTANCE.

3. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF OTHER DIFFICULT AND UNRESOLVED POINTS, E.G., THE CROATIA FACTOR IN ACTUAL SANCTIONS LIFT. BUT THEY ALL PALE IN COMPARISON TO THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE OF AN ASSURED USG POSITION TO ACT TO REIMPOSE SANCTIONS IF BELGRADE DOES NOT LIVE UP TO ITS COMMITMENTS.

4. I TOLD MILOSEVIC THAT I WOULD BE LEAVING BELGRADE AT NOON TOMORROW TO RETURN TO WASHINGTON. I DO NOT EXPECT TO HEAR FROM HIM BEFORE I DEPART. I THINK HE REALLY DOES WANT A DEAL -- HIS KIND OF DEAL -- AND HE MAY HOPE NOW THAT THE BRITISH AND FRENCH WILL PUT PRESSURE ON US. END SUMMARY.

5. TODAY I TABLED SEVERAL NEW DRAFT PAPERS (ALL FAXED

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VR 2/6/2020 (8:29)

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2013-0682-M

TO EUR/SCE) WITH MILOSEVIC THAT REFLECT WASHINGTON'S CONCERNS, NOTABLY ON OUR ABILITY TO ACT IN THE UN IN THE EVENT BELGRADE DOES NOT LIVE UP TO ITS COMMITMENTS IN REGARD TO THE PACKAGE. IN PARTICULAR, I PUT DOWN THE FOLLOWING REPLACEMENT TEXT FOR PARA FOUR IN THE SANCTIONS RELIEF ANNEX:

> SANCTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN SUSPENDED CAN BE REIMPOSED BY THE UNSC IF THE SECRETARY GENERAL FORMALLY REPORTS TO THE UNSC THAT THE FRY IS NO LONGER IMPLEMENTING THE DECISION TO CLOSE THE BORDER WITH BOSNIA EXCEPT FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, OR IT NO LONGER SUPPORTS THE CONTACT GROUP PLAN FOR BOSNIA, OR IT IS IN VIOLATION OF THE RELEVANT RESOLUTION ON THE SUSPENSION OF SANCTIONS. SIMILARLY A PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE UNSC CAN CALL FOR AN AFFIRMATIVE VOTE TO CONTINUE THE SUSPENSION.

6. MILOSEVIC FULMINATED AT GREAT LENGTH ABOUT THE ABSOLUTE UNACCEPTABILITY OF THE LAST SENTENCE WHICH WAS THE NEW ELEMENT IN THE TEXT. I EXPLAINED THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL FOR US. HE SAID IT WILL PUT "POWER INTO THE HANDS OF THE MUSLIM AND GERMAN LOBBIES IN WASHINGTON." I SAID NONSENSE, BUT WE NEED AN ASSURED PROCESS WHERE WE CAN ACT IF THE ACCORDS ARE NOT FULFILLED, AND WITHOUT REFERENCE TO A POSSIBLE RUSSIAN VETO.

7. MILOSEVIC COMPLAINED BITTERLY THAT HE WAS NOT TRUSTED BY WASHINGTON AFTER HAVING MADE ENDLESS CONCESSIONS INCLUDING NO LIFT UNTIL PALE ACCEPTS, NOTHING ON STATE CONTINUITY, ETC., ETC. HE IS THE LAST HOSTAGE OF THE COLD WAR. "THIS SHOWS A VERY NEGATIVE ATTITUDE ON YOUR PART." MILOSEVIC PROOSED DROPPING THE LAST SENTENCE AND ADDING THE PHRASE "OR A PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE UNSC" AFTER SECRETARY GENERAL. I SAID WE WOULD CONSIDER IT IF THE OPERATIVE VERB IS CHANGED FROM "CAN BE REIMPOSED" TO "WILL BE REIMPOSED." HE REPLIED"IMPOSSIBLE." WE AGREED WE FACE A FUNDAMENTAL SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEM THAT CANNOT -- AND SHOULD NOT -- BE BRIDGED BY ARTFUL SEMANTICAL FORMULATIONS. WE AGREED THAT WE ARE NOT JUST ONE VERB AWAY FROM AGREEMENT.

REVISITING STRATEGIC SANCTIONS

---

8. AT THAT POINT MILOSEVIC TURNED HIS ATTENTION TO THE ENUMERATION OF UN MANDATED STRATEGIC SANCTIONS THAT I HAD INCLUDED--AT HIS SUGGESTION--AS A FOOTNOTE TO THE SANCTIONS RELIEF ANNEX PARA ONE. HE SAID HE WAS NOT AWARE THAT IT WAS SO EXTENSIVE

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AND REMARKED THAT HE FELT WE WERE TALKING ABOUT A SHORTER LIST. I REVIEWED FOR HIM THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE UN AND THE EU LISTS. IN MAKING OUR MAJOR CONCESSION ON THE OIL REGIME, WE HAD DONE SO WITH THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE UN LIST WAS OPERATIVE FOR THIS AGREEMENT. TO REOPEN ALL OF THIS AT THIS TIME WAS SIMPLY NOT POSSIBLE. MILOSEVIC EVEN SUGGESTED THAT THE EU LIST COULD "BE A LITTLE BIT IMPROVED." IF THIS NEGOTIATION EVER CONTINUES, WE WILL HEAR MORE OF THIS.

OIL REGIME

---

9. I SAID WE FELT THAT IN ORDER TO GET AN AGREEMENT WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO DEFER FOR EXPERT CONSIDERATION THE DEFINING OF AN ACTUAL MTS OIL AMOUNT. WE FELT HIS PROPOSED 500,000 MTS WAS TOO LARGE. WE STILL THOUGHT IN TERMS OF SOMETHING MORE THAN 100,000 MTS. PERHAPS WE COULD AGREE ON THAT APPROACH AND HOPE TO AGREE ON A PRECISE FIGURE VERY SOON. MILOSEVIC FELT THE 500,000 MTS FIGURE WAS VALID AND WE SHOULD DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM NOW. BUT FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THIS POINT WAS SUBMERGED INTO THE INCREASINGLY NEGATIVE ATMOSPHERE.

CROATIA/REGIONAL ISSUES/ACTUAL LIFT

---

11. I REVIEWED OUR CONTINUING CONCERN ON THESE ISSUES, CROATIA IN PARTICULAR, AND SUGGESTED TWO POINTS THAT COULD PERHAPS DEAL WITH THE ISSUE:

-- AFTER IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONTACT GROUP PLAN IN BOSNIA, FROZEN ASSETS ASSOCIATED WITH STATE SUCCESSION ISSUES WOULD REMAIN FROZEN.

-- THERE WOULD BE A USG/FRY SIDE AGREEMENT THAT THE OIL REGIME WILL REMAIN IN EFFECT UNTIL SECTOR EAST STATUS IS RESOLVED, I.E., UNTIL RELATIONS BETWEEN BELGRADE AND ZAGREB ARE NORMALIZED.

12. MILOSEVIC FORCEFULLY REJECTED THE CROATIA ASPECT, INSISTING THAT SANCTIONS HAD BEEN IMPOSED BECAUSE OF EVENTS IN BOSNIA. "IF YOU HAVE A CROATIA PROBLEM, IT IS YOUR PROBLEM." HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT, HOWEVER, MENTION OF CENTRAL BANK ASSETS REMAINING FROZEN IN THIS REGARD AT THE END OF THE ANNEX. BUT HE COULD GO NO FURTHER. HE COULD NEVER ACCEPT MENTION OF CROATIA OR SECTOR EAST IN THE SANCTIONS RELIEF CONTEXT AND WAS NOT COMFORTABLE WITH HAVING CROATIA MENTIONED EVEN IN

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THE FRAMEWORK PAPER.

STATE CONTINUITY/SPORTS SANCTIONS
---

13. I TOLD MILOSEVIC THAT WASHINGTON IS NOT REALLY INTERESTED IN HAVING SIDE UNDERSTANDINGS ON THESE POINTS. HE INSISTED ON THEIR IMPORTANCE AND MUTTERED ABOUT PUTTING THEM BACK IN THE MAIN PAPERS.

OTHER ISSUES
---

14. THERE ARE SEVERAL OTHER MINOR POINTS OF CONTENTION IN THESE LATEST DRAFTS. I AGAIN ASSERTED OUR DESIRE TO HAVE A NEGOTIATIONS CHAPEAU AT THE START OF PARAGRAPH FOUR OF THE FRAMEWORK PAPER, I.E., CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES. MILOSEVIC AGAIN STRONGLY OPPOSED THAT INTRODUCTORY PHRASEOLOGY.

SILENCE OF THE LAMBS
---

15. OVER YET ANOTHER LUNCH OF ROAST SPRING LAMB AND RED WINE -- THE LAMBS OF SERBIA AT LEAST WILL BE GLAD TO SEE ME LEAVE TOWN -- WE AGREED THAT VERY SUBSTANTIAL GAPS REMAIN NOTABLY ON THE UN SUSPENSION FRAMEWORK. I SAID I WOULD LEAVE FOR WASHINGTON ON TUESDAY. WE AGREED TO STAY IN TOUCH. BUT I DID NOT SENSE HE WOULD BE GETTING BACK TO ME BEFORE I DEPARTED.

16. I STILL THINK MILOSEVIC WANTS A DEAL--HE CANNOT BE LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING TUDJMAN IN SLOVAKIA NEXT SATURDAY IN THE AFTERMATH OF A FLOPPED NEGOTIATION WITH THE AMERICANS. BUT MY GUESS IS THAT MILOSEVIC MAY BE MISCALCULATING OR JUST OVERPLAYING HIS CARDS -- HE IS PRONE TO THAT KIND OF THING. HE MAY BE EXPECTING THAT THE EUROPEANS WHO ARE DESPERATE FOR A DEAL WILL NOW ROLL US ON THESE ASSORTED ISSUES. I WOULD HOPE THAT WE WILL IMMEDIATELY MAKE KNOWN OUR STRONG VIEWS TO LONDON, PARIS, AND BONN ON THESE POINTS.
PERINA

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RECORD ID: 9520661
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TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 22 MAY 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
PC
CROATIA
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 23 MAY PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 23 MAY 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DREW LOGREF: 9520665 9520676

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0137 CODES: BOS CRO

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
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		BERGER
		DREW
		JOSHI
		KRECZKO
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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95051921	FOR DECISION
002		X	95052210	DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950522	FUERTH, L	
002	950522	BRILL, K	
002	950522	MCALEER, R	
002	950522	INDERFURTH, K	
002	950522	ADAMS, G	
002	950522	PANETTA, L	
002	950522	GARTHOFF, D	
002	950522	WILSON, F	

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Lake	3		
Situation Room			
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COMMENTS: Bosnia PC 5/23
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WASHINGTON, DC 20505 COPY: VIA FAX

COL. F. C. PATRICK _____ _____ _____
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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

NSC LOG # 20661

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REMARKS:

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NSC # 20661

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting BOSNIA & CROATIA PAGES: 2

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

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SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20661

May 22, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National
Security and International
Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia on May 23, 1995, 2:30 p.m. - 4:00 p.m., in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Principals only. The agenda is attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

for
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/8/2019
2010-0533-M

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NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: May 23, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 - 4:00 p.m.

Agenda

I. OPLAN 40104 In-Progress Review

A. Post-UNPROFOR Withdrawal Strategy.....State

B. Unanswered Policy Questions.....State

C. Alternatives to NATO-Led Withdrawal.....OSD

D. Roadmap of remaining OPLAN 40104 requirements.....JCS

E. Legislative Strategy for OPLAN 40104 Approval.....NSC

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By YL NARA, Date 3/6/2020
2013-0687-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
May 19, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

FROM: NELSON DREW ND

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, May 23, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Principals meeting on Bosnia to be held May 23, 1995. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the meeting and authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

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~~002. memo~~	~~Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Policy for Bosnia-Use of U.S. Ground Forces to Support NATO (3 pages)~~	~~05/29/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020

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P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
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b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520709
RECEIVED: 05 JUN 95 09

TO: LAKE

FROM: DREW
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 05 JUN 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
SOC

CROATIA
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 28 MAY PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: LAKE DISAPPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 08 JUN 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DREW LOGREF:

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0138 CODES: BOS CRO

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		DREW
		JOSHI
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
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		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSASK CLOSED BY: NSKDB DOC 1 OF 1

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By [illegible] NARA, Date 8/8/2019
2010-0533-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95060517	FOR DECISION
001		X	95061320	LAKE DISAPPROVED RECOM

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rec'd 6/5
6:15pm

National Security Council
The White House

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG M&C A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1	D	
Sens			
Soderberg	copy		
Berger	2	~~Natl Sec Adviser~~ has seen	
Lake	3		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	6/13	file only per Lake
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette

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National Security Council
The White House

6:15pm

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URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1	D	
Sens			
Soderberg	copy		
Berger	2	~~Natl Sec Adviser~~ has seen	
Lake	3		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	6/13	file only per Lake
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

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COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette

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20709

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 5, 1995

Natl Sec Advisor has seen
NOTED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: NELSON DREW

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, May 28, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia held May 28, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove R

file

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/8/2019
2010-0533-M

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20709

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee
DATE: May 28, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 1:00 - 3:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Samuel Berger

OVP
Leon Fuerth

State
Secretary Christopher
John Kornblum
Robert Frasure

DOD
Secretary Perry
Walter Slocombe

USUN
Madeleine Albright

CIA
William Studeman

JCS
General Shalikashvili
LTG Wesley Clark

NSC
Alexander Vershbow
Colonel Nelson Drew

Summary of Conclusions

1. Principals met on May 28 to consider a range of policy options in light of the recent developments in Bosnia. They agreed on the following basic points for U.S. policy. (U)

2. **Prospects of additional airstrikes.** The U.S. will not press allies with troops on the ground for further strikes now, but: (a) the possibility of further strikes will not be ruled out; (b) should strikes again become necessary, a more robust approach permitting the UN and NATO to respond at the time and place of their own choosing should be followed rather than continuing to limit options on the basis of "strict proportionality" (**Action: JCS**); (c) privately we will accept a pause, but make no public statement to that effect; and (d) the Secretary of State will seek allied reactions to planning a substantial contingency strike option if Serb behavior, such as killing hostages, warranted a major attack (**Action: State**). (S)

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0533-M
NSC 3/30/14 (1.55)

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3. **Diplomatic efforts at the UN and Contact Group.** We will: (a) seek a formula with the French and UK on a sanctions reimposition mechanism based on an independent investigative panel and re-engage Milosevic on that basis to seek to conclude a Bosnian-Serb recognition package (**Action: State**); (b) press Milosevic in the context of such an agreement to push the Bosnian Serbs to release the hostages (**Action: State**); (c) explore the prospects for Russian assistance in control of Bosnian Serb heavy weapons (**Action: State**); and (d) renew efforts to gain UN condemnation of Bosnian Serb leadership as the principal obstacle to peace in the region based on recent events (**Action: State**). (S)

4. **Options and prospects for emergency withdrawal.** Principals noted: (a) no one is calling for withdrawal now, but that the situation could arise quickly; (b) NATO OPLAN 40104 would cover emergency withdrawal; (c) U.S. participation requires an immediate effort to complete consultations with Congress, starting with calls to key members and staff the following day (**Action: NSC**); and (d) non-NATO withdrawal using UK, French and U.S. assets was a possibility, but raised serious problems for NATO and for command and control of the operation (putting stress on the need to complete Congressional consultations on 40104). (S)

5. **The future of UNPROFOR.** It was agreed that UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia under the present circumstances would be seen as capitulation to Bosnian-Serb blackmail and should be avoided. Instead, Principals agreed the U.S. strongly should support French efforts to enhance UNPROFOR's ability to perform its mandate by: (a) bolstering its capabilities (short of providing U.S. ground forces, but including provision of U.S. equipment if necessary -- including an offer of both U.S. airlift and equipment, if requested, to the British and French) (**Action: OSD**); (b) application of more robust ROE; and (c) "regrouping" UNPROFOR to reduce the risk. (Principals also agreed to a re-evaluation of the roles and missions of UNPROFOR to support future decisions on regrouping.) (**Action: JCS, OSD**). (S)

6. **Assistance in UNPROFOR redeployment:** Principals agreed that, while the U.S. was not in favor of an UNPROFOR redeployment that pulled out from the eastern enclaves, U.S. credibility among NATO Allies would be seriously damaged if we were to turn down a request to NATO for assistance in relocating them from positions that had become untenable. It was agreed that the existing U.S. agreement in principle to provide ground troops as part of NATO led operations to assist UNPROFOR withdrawal should apply equally to an UNPROFOR request for assistance to NATO to relocate from positions that have become untenable to a safer area. They agreed that this decision required the approval of the President and consultations with Congress on this option. **(Action: NSC)** (S)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE
Executive Secretary
Department of Treasury

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

AMBASSADOR RICK INDEFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F.C. WILSON
Executive Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, May 28, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/18/2019
2010-0533-M

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520780
RECEIVED: 20 JUN 95 09

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 29 MAY 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
NATO
UN
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FOLLOW UP MEMO FM 28 MAY PC MTG ON BOSNIA - USE OF US GROUND FORCES TO SUPPORT NATO ASSISTANCE FOR REDEPLOYMENT OF UNPROFOR W/ IN BOSNIA

ACTION: PRESIDENT APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 23 JUN 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF:

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0138 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		DREW
		JOSHI
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

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2010-0533-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	PRESIDENT	Z	95052910	FOR DECISION
001		X	95053018	PRESIDENT APPROVED RECOM

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PER E.O. 13526
~~2010-0533-M~~
~~RS 9/30/14~~
2013-0652-M
KC 2/6/2020 (8,32)

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 5/30

20780

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 29, 1995

ACTION

95 MAY 29 A10 : 32

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Policy for Bosnia -- Use of U.S. Ground Forces to Support NATO Assistance for Redeployment of UNPROFOR Within Bosnia

Purpose

To provide a summary of policy conclusions reached by Principals at their meeting on Bosnia on May 28, and obtain your decision on whether agreement in principle to provide U.S. forces to assist in UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia also extends to assistance in redeployment of UNPROFOR units from the eastern enclaves to more defensible positions elsewhere within Bosnia.

Background

Principals met on May 28 to consider a range of policy options in light of the recent developments in Bosnia. They agreed on the following basic points for U.S. policy:

- **Prospects of additional airstrikes:** The U.S. will not press allies with troops on the ground for further strikes now, but (1) the possibility of further strikes will not be ruled out, (2) should strikes again become necessary, a more robust approach permitting the UN and NATO to respond at the time and place of their own choosing should be followed rather than continuing to limit options on the basis of "strict proportionality," (3) privately we will accept a pause, but make no public statement to that effect, and (4) the Secretary of State will seek allied reactions to planning a substantial contingency strike option if Serb behavior, such as killing hostages, warranted a major attack.

- **Diplomatic efforts at the UN and Contact Group:** We will (1) seek a formula with the French and UK on a sanctions suspension termination mechanism and re-engage Milosevic on that basis to seek to conclude a Bosnian-Serb recognition package, (2) press Milosevic in the context of such an agreement to push the Bosnian Serbs to release the hostages (in order to create the conditions making such an agreement workable), (3) explore the prospects for Russian assistance in control of Bosnian Serb heavy weapons, and (4) renew efforts to gain UN condemnation of Bosnian Serb leadership as the

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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principal obstacle to peace in the region based on recent events. (Per our conversation last night, Chris will be working with Hurd and others today to support the stronger U.K. position, including a private U.K./French/U.S. message to Karadzic. Shali and I just spoke with Chris and suggested he offer both U.S. airlift and equipment, if requested, to the Brits and French.)

- **Options and prospects for emergency withdrawal:** Principals noted that (1) no one is calling for that now, but that the situation could arise quickly, (2) NATO OPLAN 40104 would cover emergency withdrawal, (3) U.S. participation requires that a serious effort to complete consultations with Congress must begin at once, starting with calls to key members and staff today, and (4) non-NATO withdrawal using UK, French and U.S. assets was a possibility, but raises serious problems for NATO and for command and control of the operation (putting greater stress on the need for Congressional consultations on 40104).

- **The future of UNPROFOR:** It was agreed that UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia under the present circumstances would be seen as capitulation to Bosnian-Serb blackmail and should be avoided. Instead, Principals agreed the U.S. strongly should support French efforts to enhance UNPROFOR's ability to perform its mandate by (1) bolstering its capabilities (short of providing U.S. ground forces, but including provision of U.S. equipment if necessary), (2) application of more robust ROE and (3) "regrouping" UNPROFOR to reduce the risk. (Principals also agreed to a re-evaluation of the roles and missions of UNPROFOR to support future decisions on regrouping.)

Although the French are not at this time calling for UNPROFOR withdrawal from the eastern enclaves as part of their regrouping proposal, it is conceivable that, should the situation on the ground continue to worsen, some of our NATO allies with forces on the ground in the enclaves might make such a request.

OSD and JCS propose that such a request should be treated as a subset of NATO OPLAN 40104 withdrawal efforts, and that the **U.S. commitment in principle to provide troops for a withdrawal of UNPROFOR should be extended to apply to assistance in relocation if required to safely extract allied UNPROFOR units.** They note that, since redeployment of UNPROFOR to more defensible positions within Bosnia could be seen as more threatening to the Bosnian Serbs than withdrawal *in toto,* there is an increased likelihood that units attempting to redeploy would feel the need for NATO assistance. Should NATO be asked to assist, the United States could find itself facing the choice of temporarily deploying ground forces into Bosnia as part of such a NATO effort or

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telling our allies that, while we are prepared to assist them leave Bosnia altogether, we are unwilling to assist them in moving to safer positions from which UNPROFOR would be more capable of performing its missions. Allies may press the U.S. on this at the Contact Group and NAC Ministerial meetings this week.

We would prefer not to see a withdrawal from the eastern enclaves, with the associated potential for a humanitarian nightmare for the civilians in the safe areas currently under the promise of UN protection. Moreover, Congressional support and approval for U.S. participation in a redeployment operation may be more difficult to obtain than for an UNPROFOR rescue and extraction. As noted above, a redeployment may meet more Serbian resistance. Moreover, many in Congress (e.g. Dole) have linked U.S. participation in UNPROFOR extraction to subsequent lift of the arms embargo; in the context of assisted redeployment we would be compelled to resist lift, which will make Congressional approval harder. A hard sell would be required based on agreement that the redeployment was a precursor to far more aggressive action against the Bosnian Serbs.

Such difficulties notwithstanding, U.S. credibility among NATO Allies would be seriously damaged if we were to turn down a request for assistance in extracting themselves from positions that had become untenable in the eastern enclaves and redeploying to central Bosnia. This would be especially so since such a redeployment would be presented as supporting of two U.S. goals: maintaining an UNPROFOR presence in Bosnia, and making that presence more robust in its ability and willingness to confront Bosnian Serb violations.

RECOMMENDATION

That since it is not in our interests to see the eastern enclaves abandoned, and since we would be hard pressed to turn down a request for assistance if it came to NATO, we should work bilaterally with the French and other troop contributing nations to ensure that adequate forces remain available to sustain a UNPROFOR presence in the enclaves, and discourage them from seeking NATO assistance for redeployment;

But since I agree with Bill and Shali that we should provide such assistance if we can bring Congress along, that briefings to Congress on OPLAN 40104 include the option of using the withdrawal plan to redeploy UNPROFOR to more defensible positions, should such redeployment become inevitable.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____ TL POTUS is returning w/new note saying: "I agree as you have set forth." 5/30 8PM

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Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

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Folder Title: PC0140 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, June 6, 1995
Staff Office-Individual: Records Management
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (4 pages)~~	~~06/06/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
~~001b. memo~~	~~[Duplicate of 001a, incomplete copy] (1 page)~~	~~06/06/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
~~002a. memo~~	~~Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Principals Review of Bosnia Policy (2 pages)~~	~~06/07/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
~~002b. memo~~	~~[Duplicate of 002a] (2 pages)~~	~~06/07/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
003a. email	Samuel Drew to National Security Advisor re: Bosnia PC Agenda Additional Items (1 page)	06/06/1995	P1/b(1)
003b. memo	Nelson Drew to Anthony Lake re: June 6 Principals Meeting on Bosnia (4 pages)	06/05/1995	P1/b(1)
003c. agenda	NSC Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia - Revised Agenda (1 page)	06/06/1995	P1/b(1)
003d. email	Alexander Vershbow to National Security Advisor re: FW: Memo on ICFY Monitors (1 page)	06/05/1995	P1/b(1)
~~003e. memo~~	~~re: Disposition of U.S. ICFY Monitors (1 page)~~	~~06/05/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003f. cable~~	~~re: ICFY Head of Mission Intends to Return U.S. ICFY Members to Limited Duty (3 pages)~~	~~06/05/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
004a. agenda	NSC principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)	06/06/1995	P1/b(1)
004b. agenda	[Draft Version of 004a] (1 page)	06/06/1995	P1/b(1)

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2010-0533-M
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P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
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TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 13 JUN 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
PC
CROATIA
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 6 JUN PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: HARMON SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 15 JUN 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DREW LOGREF: 9520708 9520715

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0140 CODES: BOS CRO

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		JOSHI
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

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001		X	95061316	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
001	SENS	Z	95061316	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	95061317	HARMON SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
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002	950613	BRILL, K	
002	950613	MCALEER, R	
002	950613	ADAMS, G	
002	950613	INDERFURTH, R	
002	950613	GARTHOFF, D	
002	950613	WILSON, F	

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RECORD ID: 9520750
RECEIVED: 12 JUN 95 08

TO: LAKE

FROM: DREW
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 10 JUN 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
PC

CROATIA
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 6 JUN PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: FOR DECISION DUE DATE: 15 JUN 95 STATUS: X

STAFF OFFICER: DREW LOGREF:

FILES: IFM NSCP: CODES: BOS CRO

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
LAKE		

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSASK CLOSED BY: DOC 1 OF 1

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By KPV NARA, Date 10/8/2019
2010-0533-M

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National Security Council
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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1/3		
Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger	2		
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	6/13 Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	A
Records Mgt.			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

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COMMENTS:

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VCCU 4116
5:10PM

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

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Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger	2		
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	6/13 Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	A
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COMMENTS:

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9520750
DATE 13 JUN 95

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 6 JUN PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	6/14/95	6:00 AM	PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX +1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 6 JUN PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA
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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX +1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
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AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	6/14	7:15	Holmes
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
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	COPY: VIA FAX		
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503			
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AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: VIA FAX		
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			
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COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
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TIME OF RECEIPT

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PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 1241 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 6 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 6 JUNE PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA NSC LOG # 20750

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B	USUN/STATE	AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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Initials: RDS Date: 10/8/2019
2010-0533-M

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

[illegible] 17:03

TIME OF RECEIPT

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
(ROUTINE)

RELEASER: [signature]

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 1241 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 6 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 6 JUNE PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA NSC LOG # 20750

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B	USUN/STATE	AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/8/2019
2010-0533-M

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DELTA

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13 JUN 95 19 08

NMCC/JCS

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
(ROUTINE)

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 1241 **CLASSIFICATION:** SECRET **TOTAL:** 6 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 6 JUNE PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA NSC LOG # 20750

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B	USUN/STATE	AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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Initials: RDS Date: 10/8/2019
2010-0533-M

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TIME OF RECEIPT

JUN 13 '95 18:58

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
(ROUTINE)

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 1241 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 6 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 6 JUNE PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA NSC LOG # 20750

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B	USUN/STATE	AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
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Initials: RDS Date: 10/8/2019
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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE
- ☐ FLASH
- ☐ IMMEDIATE
- ☐ PRIORITY
- ☒ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC LOG # 20750

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS PAGES: 6

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 13, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

AMBASSADOR RICK INDEFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DR. GORDON ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, June 6, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Joyce A. Stern for
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/8/2015
2010-0533-M

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Declassify on: OADR

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20750

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee
DATE: June 6, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 - 4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Anthony Lake

OVP
Leon Fuerth

State
Secretary Warren Christopher
Peter Tarnoff

DOD
Secretary William Perry
Walter Slocombe

USUN
Ambassador Madeleine Albright

OMB
Gordon Adams

Chief of Staff
Leon Panetta

CIA
John Deutch

JCS
LTG Wesley Clark

White House
Sandy Berger

NSC
Sandy Vershbow
Colonel Nelson Drew

Summary of Conclusions

Negotiations with Milosevic

1. Principals decided to recall Ambassador Frasure from Belgrade meetings with Milosevic for consultations, given the lack of progress on the mutual recognition plan and Milosevic's attempt to up the ante. They agreed that, prior to departing, Frasure should meet with Milosevic to stress (a) the need for Belgrade to be more forthcoming on a workable sanctions

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0533-M
RS 9/30/14 (157)

reimposition mechanism in return for sanctions relief; (b) the need for Milosevic to intercede to secure UNPROFOR access in order to resupply its units in the eastern enclaves; and (c) the need for Milosevic to pledge to take action to increase security of U.S. monitors operating along the Serbian-Bosnian border in light of Bosnian-Serb threats to take U.S. personnel hostage **(Action: State).** (S)

Future of U.S. ICFY Monitors

2. Principals agreed to return U.S. border monitors to duty under the following conditions: (a) they must be informed of the serious nature of the threat directed toward them, based on our intelligence information, and allowed to resign and leave if they do not want to return voluntarily; (b) Frasure should obtain the security commitment from Milosevic cited above; (c) upcoming congressional testimony about the U.S. role and policy for Bosnia should ensure that Congress is aware of the participation of U.S. civilian contractors in the ICFY border monitoring mission. A message would be sent at once to inform the head of the ICFY of our decision **(Action: State).** (S)

Visit of Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic

3. Principals recommended scheduling a meeting of Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic with the Vice President during Silajdzic's visit to Washington June 8-14, with the option of a drop-by by the President **(Action: NSC/OVP).** (S)

4. Principals also agreed that a meeting should be arranged in the near future between the Secretary of State and Muhamed Sacirbey, in his new capacity as Bosnian Foreign Minister **(Action: State).** (C)

Measures to Enhance Protection for Deny Flight Missions

5. Based on a CIA assessment that the current ROE for Deny Flight might not provide adequate protection for NATO/US aircraft in light of recently demonstrated Bosnian-Serb tactics, Principals agreed that CIA will review the nature of the SAM threat in Bosnia, and OSD and JCS will then determine, subject to Principals' review, whether a new definition of "hostile intent" or new ROE are required for further operations **(Action: CIA/JCS/OSD).** (C)

6. In the interim, Principals agreed that Deny Flight operations will continue under existing ROE (considering all of Bosnia to be a high threat area, permitting attack on SAMs demonstrating hostile intent through radar illumination of

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aircraft), but will seek to avoid provocative action **(Action: JCS/OSD)**. (S)

Response to Croat Offensive near Knin

7. Principals agreed that a strong message should be sent to Zagreb and the Croatian Ambassador to the UN urging the Croatians to exercise restraint in their ongoing offensive operations near Knin lest they provoke another major clash with the Krajina Serbs **(Action: USUN/State)**. (C)

U.S. Support to UNPROFOR

8. Principals reviewed the results of the Paris meeting of Defense Ministers. In this regard, they agreed to await clarification from those providing forces to the UN Rapid Reaction Force to determine the exact nature of lift, air support and equipment that the U.S. might be asked to provide **(Action: USUN/OSD)**. They agreed in principle that the U.S. would support a UNSC resolution to be drafted by France and the UK that would use the Paris decisions as the basis for UNPROFOR reconfiguration rather than any of the four options put forward by the UN SYG **(Action: USUN)**. (C)

9. Principals agreed that airdrops to resupply UNPROFOR units isolated in the eastern enclaves would be a high risk option that would be unlikely to provide any long-term resolution to the problem. They agreed on the need to reassess the stocks/supplies available to the Safe Areas **(Action: OVP/CIA)** to provide a baseline for evaluating the requirements for resupply **(Action: JCS)**. (S)

10. Principals agreed on the need to resolve on an urgent basis the issue of how UNPROFOR strengthening and NATO withdrawal planning will be funded. Deputies will be asked to approve a funding strategy at their next meeting, based on proposals vetted through the Peacekeeping Core Group **(Action: OMB/NSC)**. (C)

Policy Coordination

11. Principals expressed concern that recent announcements of military deployments to Italy had not been adequately coordinated in advance through the interagency process or with the Government of Italy. They agreed to elevate the level of participation in the daily video teleconference (VTC) on Bosnia to the level of Deputy Assistant Secretary or equivalent and to ensure that all agencies used the VTC to inform the others of any upcoming activity relating to the former Yugoslavia **(Action: NSC/State/ CIA/OSD/JCS)**. (S)

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Congressional Consultations

12. Principals reviewed requirements for upcoming Congressional testimony on U.S. policy for Bosnia, and agreed that NSC should serve as a clearinghouse to coordinate all formal testimony and Q&A responses -- which should build on the comprehensive list developed by NSC for the President **(Action: NSC/All)**. They agreed that a concerted effort was required to explain strong administration opposition to unilateral lift measures being introduced in both houses **(Action: NSC/All)**. (C)

13. They also agreed that it would be prudent to provide formal 15-day advance contingency 407 notification to Congress of our intent to assist UNPROFOR in Bosnia, in the context of ongoing briefings to Congress on NATO OPLAN 40104 and USG Bosnia policy. This notification should be broad enough to cover NATO withdrawal efforts and support for the UN Rapid Reaction Force, without using potentially provocative funding estimates unless specifically required by law **(Action: State/OMB/NSC)**. (C)

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20750

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 10, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: NELSON DREW

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, June 6, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia held June 6, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove ____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/8/2019
2010-0533-M

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reimposition mechanism in return for sanctions relief; (b) the need for Milosevic to intercede to secure UNPROFOR access in order to resupply its units in the eastern enclaves; and (c) the need for Milosevic to pledge to take action to increase security of U.S. monitors operating along the Serbian-Bosnian border in light of Bosnian-Serb threats to take U.S. personnel hostage **(Action: State).** (S)

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Subject to Principals review

6. In the interim, Principals agreed that Deny Flight operations will continue under existing ROE (considering all of Bosnia to be a high threat area, permitting attack on SAMs demonstrating hostile intent through radar illumination of aircraft), but will seek to avoid provocative action **(Action: JCS/OSD).** (S)

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~~2010-0533-M~~
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2013-0822-MR (8,34)
NC 2/6/2020

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RECORD ID: 9520749
RECEIVED: 09 JUN 95 18

TO: LAKE

FROM: DREW
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 12 JUN 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
PC
CROATIA
CONGRESSIONAL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FOLLOW UP PAPER FOR 6 JUN PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA - PARTIAL 407 NOTIFICATION PACKAGE

ACTION: OBE / STATUS OF ORIGINAL UNKNOWN DUE DATE: 13 JUN 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DREW LOGREF: 9520708 9520715

FILES: IFM C NSCP: PC0140 CODES: BOS CRO

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

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DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
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001		X	96010416	OBE / STATUS OF ORIGINAL UNKNOWN

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 12, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: NELSON DREW

SUBJECT: Partial 407 Notification Package

Per Tuesday's PC decision, State has redrafted the 407 notification to Congress to satisfy the 15-day advance notification requirement regarding possible U.S. assistance to UNPROFOR operations in Bosnia.

It is now split into 2 parts

- The first covers the OPLAN 40104 prepositioning Step 2 full communications package of 1500 personnel (460 U.S.). This has already been approved at NATO through issuance of an ACTREQ (Force Activation Request), but could not actually deploy until after SACEUR gets NAC approval to issue an ACTORD (Activation Order).

- The second covers full implementation of OPLAN 40104 and the prospect of U.S. support, short of ground forces, to the UNPROFOR Quick Reaction Force.

Concurrences by: Bill Danvers and Alan Kreczko

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve State sending the attached 407 notifications forward to Congress.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I 407 notification letter covering 40104 Prepositioning
Tab II 407 notification letter covering full 40104 implementation and U.S. support to the Quick Reaction Force

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REPORT TO CONGRESS OF POSSIBLE PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN SUPPORT OF A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION

Pursuant to section 407(a)(5) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1994-1995, P.L. 103-236, this report provides notification of the possibility that the United States may provide assistance to the United Nations in support of its peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia.

As was briefed to certain members and staff on March 20 and April 21, the Administration has authorized the prepositioning in Croatia of 20 U.S. military communicators as part of a NATO group of 80 persons. Our senior military commanders recommended this action as an essential step to ensure that a communications network is in place to support NATO should a decision be made to assist in the withdrawal of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) from Bosnia. The Department of Defense has informed us that the cost of sustaining these 20 communicators and associated equipment in Croatia for a period of six months will not exceed one million dollars. The cost of this prepositioning did not, therefore, pass the formal notification threshold. The U.S. expense for this deployment will be borne by the Department of Defense.

NATO planning also calls for a follow-on precautionary prepositioning in Croatia of about 1,500 communicators and support staff, of which it is anticipated the U.S. would provide approximately 460 persons. The purpose of this step is to complete the preparations for the communications network begun by the earlier group of 80 persons, to be ready to be used should the decision be made for NATO assistance in the withdrawal of UNPROFOR. We are discussing with our NATO allies how the full cost of the predeployment is to be shared. We are not seeking U.N. reimbursement. We anticipate that the costs to the U.S. government will exceed the notification threshold of $3 million.

The decision to deploy the 1500-person group has not yet been taken.

These precautionary steps do not represent any change in the U.S. position that UNPROFOR should remain in Bosnia. Prudent planning to ensure the efficient and safe withdrawal of UNPROFOR, if necessary, can help convince troop contributors to maintain their commitment to UNPROFOR. NATO's military authorities advise that this repositioning is essential to maintain NATO command and control over a withdrawal operation.

I shall provide notification in a subsequent message of other possible U.S. steps to provide assistance to UN peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia, in light of recent developments.

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REPORT TO CONGRESS OF POSSIBLE PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN SUPPORT OF A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION

Pursuant to section 407 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1994-1995, P.L. 103-236, this report provides notification of the possibility that the United States may provide assistance to the United Nations to support peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia. This could include assistance in connection with either a withdrawal of UN related personnel from Bosnia, or an emergency extraction of UNPROFOR units from positions which have become untenable to positions elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia which are safe, or the establishment of a rapid reaction force.

The Administration has previously discussed possible assistance to UNPROFOR with certain members and staff of the designated Congressional committees in phone calls on March 20, April 21, and May 29. Staff were also briefed on March 31 and Members on May 19 and May 26. On June 9, we submitted a notification with respect to prepositioning of communicators and support staff in Croatia as a precautionary step in case withdrawal became necessary.

NATO planning for a possible withdrawal of UNPROFOR calls in addition for early action involving training and exercises, preparations for a possible deployment of NATO forces, and acquisition of communications equipment that would be NATO owned, but which could be used in a possible evacuation of UN forces. We are discussing with our NATO allies how the full cost of the predeployment is to be shared. We are not seeking reimbursement. We anticipate that the costs to the U.S. government will exceed the notification threshold of $3 million.

As was made clear in the briefings on May 19 and 26, and in the statement released after the May 29 meeting of the Contact Group, the Administration strongly supports UNPROFOR's continued operation in Bosnia. No final decision has been made on U.S. participation in a withdrawal, beyond the initial deployment of 20 personnel. The President informed our Allies last December, however, that the U.S. is prepared, in principle, to commit U.S. ground forces to a NATO operation to assist UN Peace Forces to withdraw from the former Yugoslavia if the UN decides that it can no longer perform its mission and requests NATO's help in withdrawing, and if the North Atlantic Council approves acting on the UN request. This action would also extend to helping in an emergency extraction of UN Peace Forces from positions which have become untenable to positions of safety within the former Yugoslavia.

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Should an UNPROFOR withdrawal or partial withdrawal be necessary, a deployment in which the U.S. would provide a substantial number of troops and other assistance could be authorized. We are discussing with our NATO allies how this cost would be shared. We are also discussing within the Administration how the U.S. will fund its share of the operation.

We have also joined the Contact Group call for a reinforced UNPROFOR. While we do not contemplate any new U.S. role in UNPROFOR, we might join and assist in a NATO effort, if requested, to make UNPROFOR more robust and more defensible.

Our allies in NATO, and in particular France and Britain, which already have troops on the ground in Bosnia and some of whose peacekeeping forces have been taken hostage by the Bosnian Serbs, have proposed the creation of a rapid reaction force that would protect and support the peacekeepers. At this time, it is contemplated that the force would be authorized as part of UNPROFOR by the Security Council in a resolution. The U.S. is prepared to provide appropriate assistance and support, short of ground forces, for such a force. This could logically include, for example, close air support to assist in the defense of the force; transfer or loan of equipment, including attack helicopters, radars, communications gear and night vision equipment; airlift support to move forces and equipment to the theater of operation; and provision of intelligence to local commanders. The modalities for creating and deploying such a force are at a formative stage, and we are now discussing this matter within NATO and bilaterally. At this time, until we have determined the precise elements of the support and the terms on which it would be provided, a reliable estimate of its cost is not available.

The Administration intends to continue to consult with the Congress on assistance to UN peacekeeping efforts in the former Yugoslavia. As the situation develops, we will provide the Congress with more detailed information about U.S. assistance and support through consultations and the monthly reports submitted under section 407.

George F. Ward, Jr.
Acting Assistant Secretary
International Organization Affairs

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~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520727
RECEIVED: 06 JUN 95 19

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 07 JUN 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA CROATIA
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FOLLOW UP MEMO TO PRES FOR 6 JUN PC MTG ON BOSNIA POLICY

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT DUE DATE: 09 JUN 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9520708 9520715

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0140 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		DREW
		JOSHI
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB CLOSED BY: NSKDB DOC 2 OF 2

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By DS/NARA, Date 10/8/2019
2010-0533-M

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~~SECRET~~ RECORD ID: 9520727

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95060620	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
002	PRESIDENT	Z	95060712	FOR INFORMATION
002		X	95061216	NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950607		VICE PRESIDENT
002	950607		WH CHIEF OF STAFF

~~SECRET~~

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520727
RECEIVED: 06 JUN 95 19

TO: LAKE

FROM: DREW
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 06 JUN 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA CROATIA
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FOLLOW UP PAPER TO PRES FOR 6 JUN PC MTG ON BOSNIA POLICY

ACTION: FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION DUE DATE: 09 JUN 95 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF:

FILES: IFM NSCP: CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
LAKE		

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB CLOSED BY: DOC 1 OF 1

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By [illegible] NARA, Date 10/8/2019
2010-0533-M

recd 6/7 6:15am

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 20727

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG MC A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1	D	
Sens			
Soderberg		✓	
Berger	2		
Lake	3	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	BK 6/7	~~D~~ FYES
Records Mgt.	5		N

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette LXR

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
6/12/95

95 JUN 7 P12:34

INFORMATION June 7, 1995

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PER E.O. 13526
~~2010-0537-M~~
RS 9/30/14
2013-0682-M(8.35)
CIA Historical Collections
Division AR 70-14
10/1/2013

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Principals' Review of Bosnia Policy

Principals met Tuesday afternoon to review a range of policy issues associated with the situation in Bosnia. Key decisions included:

1. Recall Bob Frasure from Belgrade for consultations, given the lack of progress on the mutual recognition plan and Milosevic's attempts to up the ante. Prior to departing, Frasure will meet with Milosevic to stress: (a) the need for Belgrade to be more forthcoming on a workable sanctions reimposition mechanism in return for sanctions relief; (b) the need for Milosevic to intercede with the Bosnian Serbs to permit UNPROFOR to resupply its units in the eastern enclaves; and (c) the need for Milosevic to pledge to take action to increase security of U.S. monitors operating along the Serbian-Bosnian border in light of Bosnian Serb threats to take U.S. personnel hostage.

2. Agree to return U.S. border monitors to duty under the following conditions: (a) inform them of the serious nature of the threat directed toward them, based on our intelligence information, and allow them to resign and leave if they do not want to return voluntarily; (b) obtain the security commitment from Milosevic; (c) inform the head of the international mission of our decision; and (d) ensure that Congress is aware of the participation of U.S. civilian contractors in the border monitoring mission.

3. Schedule a meeting of Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic with the Vice President during Silajdzic's visit to Washington beginning on Thursday. Principals thought it would be desirable for you to drop by.

4. Based on a CIA assessment that the current ROE for Deny Flight might not provide adequate protection for NATO/US aircraft in light of recent Bosnian Serb tactics, CIA, OSD and JCS will review the nature of the SAM threat in Bosnia and determine whether a new definition of "hostile intent"

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WJC HANDWRITING

~~SECRET~~ cc: Vice President
Declassify on: OADR Chief of Staff

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or new ROE are required for further operations. In the interim, Deny Flight operations will continue under existing ROE (permitting attacks on SAMs demonstrating hostile intent through radar illumination of aircraft), but we will seek to avoid provocative action. Any proposed changes will be subject to review by Principals. We will ensure that UNPROFOR and Bosnian Serbs are aware that NATO aircraft are authorized to respond to demonstrations of hostile intent.

5. Urge the Croatians to exercise restraint in their ongoing offensive operations near Knin lest they provoke another major clash with the Krajina Serbs.

Principals also reviewed the results of the Paris meeting of Defense Ministers and the kinds of support we will provide to the Quick Reaction Force, depending on the requests of the force contributors. They also agreed that it would be prudent to provide formal notification to Congress of our intent to assist UNPROFOR in Bosnia in the context of ongoing briefings on NATO OPLAN 40104 and USG Bosnia policy.

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~~SECRET~~

20727

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 6, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: NELSON DREW

SUBJECT: Memo to the President on June 6 Principals' Decisions

The attached memorandum to the President summarizes the key decisions of this afternoon's Principals' meeting on Bosnia.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign and forward the memorandum to the President.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to the President

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/8/2019
2010-0533-M

Attachments may have been edited for format
by Exec Sec

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Declassify on: OADR

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~~SECRET~~ 20727

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Principals' Review of Bosnia Policy

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1. Recall Bob Frasure from Belgrade for consultations, given the lack of progress on the mutual recognition plan and Milosevic's attempts to up the ante. Prior to departing, Frasure will meet with Milosevic to stress: (a) the need for Belgrade to be more forthcoming on a workable sanctions reimposition mechanism in return for sanctions relief; (b) the need for Milosevic to intercede with the Bosnian Serbs to permit UNPROFOR to resupply its units in the eastern enclaves; and (c) the need for Milosevic to pledge to take action to increase security of U.S. monitors operating along the Serbian-Bosnian border in light of Bosnian Serb threats to take U.S. personnel hostage.

2. Agree to return U.S. border monitors to duty under the following conditions: (a) inform them of the serious nature of the threat directed toward them, based on our intelligence information, and allow them to resign and leave if they do not want to return voluntarily; (b) obtain the security commitment from Milosevic; (c) inform the head of the international mission of our decision; and (d) ensure that Congress is aware of the participation of U.S. civilian contractors in the border monitoring mission.

3. Schedule a meeting of Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic with the Vice President during Silajdzic's visit to Washington beginning on Thursday. Principals thought it would be ~~politically~~y desirable for you to drop by.

4. Based on a CIA assessment that the current ROE for Deny Flight might not provide adequate protection for NATO/US aircraft in light of recent Bosnian Serb tactics, CIA, OSD and JCS will review the nature of the SAM threat in Bosnia and determine whether a new definition of "hostile intent"

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E.O. 13526
2010-0555-M
RS 9/30/14
2013-0444-MR
NLC-11-28-6-3-2
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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

or new ROE are required for further operations. In the interim, Deny Flight operations will continue under existing ROE (permitting attacks on SAMs demonstrating hostile intent through radar illumination of aircraft), but we will seek to avoid provocative action.

5. Urge the Croatians to exercise restraint in their ongoing offensive operations near Knin lest they provoke another major clash with the Krajina Serbs.

Principals also reviewed the results of the Paris meeting of Defense Ministers and the kinds of support we will provide to the Quick Reaction Force, depending on the requests of the force contributors. They also agreed that it would be prudent to provide formal notification to Congress of our intent to assist UNPROFOR in Bosnia in the context of ongoing briefings on NATO OPLAN 40104 and USG Bosnia policy.

Insert:
Any proposed changes will be subject ~~approval~~ to ~~[illegible]~~ review by Principals. We will ensure that UNPROFOR and Bosnian Serbs are aware that NATO aircraft are ~~authorized~~ authorized to respond to demonstrations of hostile intent.

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520715
RECEIVED: 05 JUN 95 15

TO: LAKE

FROM: DREW
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 05 JUN 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 6 JUN PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 08 JUN 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DREW LOGREF: 9520708 9520727

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0140 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		DREW
		NSC CHRON
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSGP CLOSED BY: NSMEC DOC 1 OF 1

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/18/2019
2010-0533-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95060815	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	95060815	NOTED BY LAKE

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National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 20715

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG MEC A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1	D	
Sens			
Soderberg	copy		
Berger	2	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	MEC 6/8	N
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: June 6 Bosnia PC

Exec Sec Office has diskette UG

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. email	Samuel Drew to National Security Advisor re: Bosnia PC Agenda Additional Items (1 page)	06/06/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4009

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0140 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, June 6, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs643

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. memo	Nelson Drew to Anthony Lake re: June 6 Principals Meeting on Bosnia (4 pages)	06/05/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4009

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0140 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, June 6, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs643

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003c. agenda	NSC Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia - Revised Agenda (1 page)	06/06/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4009

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0140 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, June 6, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs643

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003d. email	Alexander Vershbow to National Security Advisor re: FW: Memo on ICFY Monitors (1 page)	06/05/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4009

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0140 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, June 6, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs643

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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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REPORT TO CONGRESS OF POSSIBLE PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN SUPPORT OF A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION

Pursuant to Section 407 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1994-1995, P.L. 103-236, this report provides notification of the possibility that the United States will provide assistance to the United Nations in support of its peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia.

The Administration has previously discussed possible assistance to UNPROFOR with certain members and staff of the designated Congressional committees in phone calls on March 20, April 21, and May 29. Staff were also briefed on March 31 and Members on May 19 and May 26. Because of the fluidity of the situation on the ground it is not possible at this time to provide detailed information on the type or value of assistance that might be provided.

Assistance might be provided through NATO to assist in the withdrawal of UN-related personnel from Bosnia, should that be necessary. As was discussed in the phone calls to certain members and staff on March 20 and April 21 the Administration did authorize the deployment of 20 U.S. military communicators to Croatia as part of an eighty-person NATO precautionary deployment. Our senior military commanders recommended this action as an essential prepositioning step to ensure a communications network is ready to support NATO should a decision to withdraw UNPROFOR be necessary. The Department of Defense has informed us that the cost of sustaining these 20 communicators and associated equipment in Croatia for a period of six months will not exceed one million dollars. The U.S. expense for this deployment will be borne by the Department of Defense.

NATO planning for a possible withdrawal of UNPROFOR also calls for early action involving training and exercises, preparations for a possible deployment of NATO forces, and acquisition of communications equipment that would be NATO owned, but which could be used in a possible evacuation of UN forces. NATO has budgeted $11.86 million for this, not all of which has been expended. If the full amount is expended the U.S. share would be about 24%, or approximately $2.97 million. These expenses would be paid out of the NATO military budget and the NATO Security Investment Program.

NATO planning calls for a follow-on precautionary deployment of about 1,500 communicators and support staff. It is anticipated that the U.S. would provide about 456 of these troops. Part of the equipment and preparation costs in support of this deployment is covered by the $11.86 million already budgeted by NATO.

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As was made clear in the briefings for Congress on this subject held on May 19 and 26, and in the statement released after the May 29 meeting of the Contact Group, the Administration strongly supports UNPROFOR's continued operation in Bosnia/Herzegovina. No final decision has been made on U.S. participation in a withdrawal, beyond the initial deployment of 20 personnel. However, the President informed our Allies last December that the U.S. is prepared, in principle, to commit U.S. ground forces to a NATO operation to assist UN Peace Forces withdraw from the former Yugoslavia. We have also joined the Contact Group call for a reinforced UNPROFOR. While we do not contemplate any new U.S. role in UNPROFOR, we might join in a NATO effort, if it is requested, to make UNPROFOR more robust and more defensible. This might involve assisting UNPROFOR to redeploy to more defensible positions or providing it some of the tools it needs to defend itself better.

Should UNPROFOR withdrawal be necessary, a NATO deployment in which the U.S. would provide a substantial number of troops and other assistance could be authorized. Depending on the situation on the ground at the time of the operation, the cost of NATO support for a full withdrawal of UN forces from Bosnia could be as much as $2 billion. We are discussing with our NATO allies how this cost would be shared. We are also discussing within the Administration how the U.S. will fund its share of the operation.

The Administration intends to continue to consult with the Congress on this issue. As the situation in Bosnia/Herzegovina develops, information in this report may change. We will provide the Congress with more detailed information about U.S. participation, cost and how the Administration would fund this operation as it becomes available.

George F. Ward, Jr.
Acting Assistant Secretary
International Organization Affairs

May 31, 1995

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June 5, 1995

SUBJECT: Disposition of U.S. ICFY Monitors

U.S. personnel serving with the ICFY monitoring mission on the inter-Serb border have been withdrawn to their sector headquarters in response to intelligence reports that Bosnian Serbs (or FRY sympathizers) may attempt to take American hostages. The FRY government has ordered increased police presence at sector headquarters and at crossings, assigned police to accompany ICFY monitors at the busiest crossings, and added police and army patrols on the border. The extent to which these orders will be carried out and the effect on the monitors' actual security remains to be seen.

ICFY Head of Mission Nieminen correctly asserts that ICFY cannot carry out its mission without American personnel. Further, he worries that other countries will pull out if the U.S. monitors do not return to duty. Nieminen proposes changes in his operating procedures that would better protect Americans while still allowing him to use them in the field.

Nieminen says that he will re-deploy U.S. monitors under these conditions unless we object by June 6. (Embassy Belgrade has been instructed to ask him to wait for the outcome of the June 6 PC.) **Principals should decide whether the USG should acquiesce in Nieminen's proposal to re-deploy U.S. monitors or continue to keep them away from border crossing points.**

This decision requires balancing the risk to U.S. personnel, and the consequences if one or more are taken hostage, against the possibility that keeping U.S. personnel off the border may cause the ICFY mission to collapse and take with it a major component of our diplomatic strategy.

Attachment:

Belgrade 2681

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By: 70-14, 10/1/2013
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FM: AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

TO:RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6052

RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 7307
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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1618
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1151
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0397
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0157
RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 3696

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 002681

VIENNA FOR BOSNIA

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SCE CHILL, JZETKULIC, AND CA/OCS
MHARTY, DS/OP/EUR, DS/ITA AND DS/ICI/PII

E.O. 12356:DECL: 06/03/2005
TAGS: PTER, ASEC, BK, SR
SUBJECT: ICFY HEAD OF MISSION INTENDS TO RETURN U.S.
- ICFY MEMBERS TO LIMITED DUTY

REFS: A) SARAJEVO 0208 B) 94BELGRADE 6641 (NOTAL)

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ACTION REQUEST, PARA 8.

3. SUMMARY: DAS FRASURE, COM PERINA, ACTING DCM AND RSO MET WITH ICFY HEAD OF MISSION TAUNO NIEMINEN AND DEPUTY HEAD OF MISSION SCARLETT ON JUNE 3 TO DISCUSS THE THREAT REPORTED IN REF A. AFTER NIEMINEN (WHO HAD BEEN OUT OF THE COUNTRY) WAS BRIEFED ON THE THREAT, HE EXPRESSED HIS STRONG CONCERN ABOUT BEING ABLE TO CONTINUE THE MISSION WITHOUT DEPLOYING U.S. PERSONNEL, GIVEN ALREADY DIMINISHED RESOURCES. FURTHER, HE ADVISED US OF ANOTHER CONTRIBUTING NATION WHO WISHED TO WITHDRAW ITS PERSONNEL BASED ON A SIMILAR BUT UNDEFINED THREAT; INDICATED THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. PERSONNEL TO REAR AREAS UNDERMINED HIS AUTHORITY; AND PROPOSED THAT MEASURES COULD BE CONSIDERED TO BETTER PROTECT THE AMERICANS WHILE STILL ALLOWING HIM TO UTILIZE THEM. COM REITERATED OUR CONCERNS FOR THE SECURITY OF AMERICAN MEMBERS AND ADVISED NIEMINEN THAT WE WOULD REPORT HIS

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VIEWS TO WASHINGTON. NIEMINEN REQUESTED THAT WE HAVE AN ANSWER AS TO OUR INTENTIONS BY TUESDAY, JUNE 6. HE INDICATED THAT HE WOULD RE-DEPLOY U.S. MONITORS AT THAT TIME UNLESS WE SPECIFICALLY OBJECT. END SUMMARY

4. DAS FRASURE, COM PERINA, ACTING DCM AND RSO BRIEFED ICFY HEAD OF MISSION TAUNO NIEMINEN AND DEPUTY HEAD OF MISSION SCARLETT ON JUNE 3 ABOUT THE THREAT REPORTED IN REF A (SCARLETT HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN INFORMED IN NIEMINEN'S ABSENCE). NIEMINEN EXPRESSED HIS STRONG CONCERN ABOUT BEING ABLE TO CONTINUE THE MISSION WITHOUT U.S. PERSONNEL, GIVEN ALREADY DIMINISHED RESOURCES. NIEMINEN STATED THAT IN THE PAST WEEK ICFY HAS LOST 31 U.S. MEMBERS AND 11 CANADIAN MEMBERS (NOT RELATED TO THE THREAT). ON JUNE 2 ICFY RECEIVED NOTIFICATION FROM THE FRENCH THAT THEY INSISTED THEIR 14 MEMBERS ALSO BE PULLED FROM DUTY, DUE TO A SIMILAR THREAT (WE HAVE NO FURTHER INFORMATION ON THIS THREAT) WHICH THEY HAD RECEIVED EARLIER. ADDITIONALLY, THE FRENCH CHARGE TOLD ACTING HOM SCARLETT THAT PARIS WAS UNHAPPY THAT U.S. MISSION MEMBERS APPEARED TO BE GETTING PREFERENTIAL SECURITY PROTECTION. NIEMINEN STATED THAT IF THE FRENCH MEMBERS WERE SUBTRACTED, THIS WOULD REDUCE THE ICFY MISSION TO 105, WELL BELOW THE MINIMUM NECESSARY TO CONDUCT THE MISSION. NIEMINEN EXPRESSED HIS VIEW THAT DECISIONS ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF ICFY PERSONNEL SHOULD BE MADE BY ICFY ITSELF, AND THAT IF A NATION DID NOT WISH ITS MEMBERS FULLY TO PARTICIPATE, THEY SHOULD BE REMOVED FROM THE MISSION ALTOGETHER. COM EXPRESSED HIS UNDERSTANDING OF ICFY'S PREDICAMENT BUT EMPHASIZED THE CREDIBILITY OF THIS THREAT AND ITS SPECIFIC TARGETING OF AMERICANS ONLY.

5. NIEMINEN REPLIED THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THE SERBIAN PROTECTION IN RESPONSE TO THE THREAT HAD BEEN GOOD, AND THAT ICFY PROTECTION HAS BEEN INCREASED SUBSTANTIALLY. COM INQUIRED, ASSUMING WASHINGTON CONCURRENCE, AS TO WHETHER U.S. MEMBERS COULD BE REDEPLOYED TO LESS ISOLATED AREAS WHERE THERE IS GREATER VISIBILITY AND POLICE PROTECTION, AS OPPOSED TO DUTY IN ISOLATED AREAS. NIEMINEN REPLIED THAT THIS COULD BE CONSIDERED BUT THAT SUCH ACCOMMODATION COULD ONLY BE ON A TEMPORARY BASIS AND COULD NOT CONTINUE FOR A LONG PERIOD OF TIME. SCARLETT ADDED THAT REPORTS FROM THE FIELD INDICATED A DETERIORATION IN MORALE AMONG NON-U.S. MEMBERS OF THE MISSION, WHO ARE CURRENTLY WORKING DOUBLE THEIR NORMAL HOURS TO COVER THE U.S. PULLBACK.

6. TO CONCLUDE THE MEETING, NIEMINEN GAVE US A DEADLINE OF TUESDAY, JUNE 6, TO AUTHORIZE THE RE-DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. PERSONNEL. IN FIRM TONES, HE INDICATED THAT IF U.S. PERSONNEL WERE NOT UNDER HIS DIRECTION, THEY SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN COMPLETELY FROM THE MISSION. HE REQUESTED THAT WE CONTACT HIM BY OPENING OF BUSINESS (LOCAL TIME)

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ON TUESDAY SO THAT HE COULD BEGIN TO RE-DEPLOY. COM ADVISED NIEMINEN THAT HE WOULD PASS ON HIS CONCERNS TO WASHINGTON AND REQUEST AN EXPEDITIOUS REPLY.

7. COMMENT: IT IS CLEAR THAT NIEMINEN IS CONCERNED ABOUT LOSS OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE MEMBERS OF HIS MISSION. WHILE NOT DISMISSING THE SPECIFIC THREAT AGAINST AMERICANS, AND THE NEED TO TAKE SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS, HE IS WORRIED THAT OTHER CAPITALS WILL FOLLOW THE U.S. AND FRENCH LEAD, DIMINISHING HIS AUTHORITY AND LEAVING HIS MISSION IN TATTERS. AS LONG AS THE HOSTAGE CRISIS CONTINUES IN BOSNIA, THE THREAT TO AMERICANS WILL REMAIN. BUT, EVEN AFTER THE HOSTAGE CRISIS IS RESOLVED, THERE IS NO GUARANTEE THAT THE THREAT WILL VANISH. HAVING U.S. MONITORS ON THE DRINA WILL ALWAYS CARRY A DEGREE OF RISK AS STATED IN REF B. POST SUGGESTS THAT ICFY SHOULD ASSIGN U.S. MEMBERS TO THE MOST POPULATED LOCATIONS, WHERE POLICE PRESENCE IS STRONG, AVOIDING ASSIGNMENTS TO ISOLATED POSTS OR ROVING PATROLS AS A FIRST STEP IN REINTEGRATING THE U.S. COMPONENT IN ICFY ACTIVITIES. WE WOULD EXPECT ICFY HQ TO ENSURE THAT THE SERBS PROVIDE VISIBLE AND CONSTANT SECURITY AND THAT ICFY WATCHES CLOSELY OVER THIS SITUATION, MONITORING THE THREAT TO AMERICANS.

8. ACTION REQUEST: PLEASE ADVISE US HOW WE SHOULD INFORM NIEMINEN AS TO THE AVAILABILITY OF U.S. MISSION MEMBERS BY OOB JUNE 6. ABSENT OUR OBJECTION, WE HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT NIEMINEN WILL BEGIN UTILIZING U.S. MONITORS IN LOW THREAT AREAS. PERINA
BT
#2681

NNNN
<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02
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<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02
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FROM:
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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520708
RECEIVED: 02 JUN 95 19

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 03 JUN 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
PC
CROATIA
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 6 JUN PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 06 JUN 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DREW LOGREF: 9520715 9520727

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0140 CODES: BOS CRO

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		DREW
		JOSHI
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95060221	FOR SIGNATURE
001		X	95060316	NOTED BY LAKE
001	SENS	Z	95060316	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	95060318	DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950603	FUERTH, L	
002	950603	BRILL, K	
002	950603	MCALEER, R	
002	950603	INDERFURTH, R	
002	950603	ADAMS, G	
002	950603	PANETTA, L	
002	950603	GARTHOFF, D	
002	950603	WILSON, F	

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The White House

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Sens			
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Berger	2	OV	
Lake	3	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	6/3	D
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: NOM + Agenda for June 6 Bosnia PC

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SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 6 JUN PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA
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EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	5 Jun	0700	[signature]
	PRINT LAST NAME: BRANSCUM		
	COPY: 1		
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	6/5/95	AM 5:55	[signature]
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: VIA FAX +1		
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: VIA FAX		
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: VIA FAX		
BP JANET 14:48 C/S DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	6/6	9:30am	[signature]
	PRINT LAST NAME: ROHDE		
	COPY: 1		
14:49 MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	6/5/95	2:50	[signature]
	PRINT LAST NAME: JEFF DONALDSON		
	COPY: 1		

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MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
COL. F. C. PATRICK JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	5 Jun	0700	L Branscum PRINT LAST NAME: BRANSCUM COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX +1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: 1
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: 1

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX +1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	5/6/95	11:00	J. Gill PRINT LAST NAME: Angell COPY: 1

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX +1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
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DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	6/6/95	_____	J. Graves PRINT LAST NAME: GRAVES COPY: 1
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1

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ROUTINE

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DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 1173 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTICE & AGENDA FOR 6 JUN PC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 20708

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

B N D A

REMARKS:

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: MPM

DTG: _____

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STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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MESSAGE NO.: 1173 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

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(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTICE & AGENDA FOR 6 JUN PC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 20708

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STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

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NSC LOG # 20708

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USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

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REMARKS:

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TIME OF RECEIPT

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MESSAGE #: _____

NSC LOG # 20708

FROM: National Security Council (NP) PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting of PC on 6 June re Bosnia PAGES: 3

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20708

June 3, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National
Security and International
Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia on June 6, 1995, 2:30 p.m. - 4:00 p.m., in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Principals only. The agenda is attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

for
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/8/2019
2010-0533-M

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004a. agenda	NSC principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)	06/06/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4009

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0140 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, June 6, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs643

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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20708

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
June 2, 1995

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

FROM: NELSON DREW ND

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, June 6, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Principals meeting on Bosnia to be held June 6, 1995. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the meeting and authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004b. agenda	[Draft Version of 004a] (1 page)	06/06/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4009

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0140 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, June 6, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs643

RESTRICTION CODES

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See also 2013-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (3 pages)~~	~~07/14/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
~~002. memo~~	~~[Duplicate of 001] (3 pages)~~	~~07/14/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
~~003. agenda~~	~~NSC Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)~~	~~07/14/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
004. memo	Nelson Drew to Anthony Lake; Re: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, July 14, 1995 (1 page)	07/14/1995	P1/b(1)
005a. memo	Nelson Drew to Anthony Lake re: July 14 Principals Meeting on Bosnia (3 pages)	07/14/1995	P1/b(1)
~~005b. agenda~~	~~[Duplicate of 003] (1 page)~~	~~07/14/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~005c. paper~~	~~re: Elements of a Post-UNPROFOR Strategy: Support the Federation; Contain the Conflict (9 pages)~~	~~07/07/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RDS 6/11/2020
~~006a. memo~~	~~Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Principals July 14 Conclusions on Bosnia (3 pages)~~	~~07/15/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~006b. memo~~	~~[Duplicate of 004a, incomplete copy] (1 page)~~	~~07/15/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020

COLLECTION:
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FOLDER TITLE:
PC0141 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, July 14, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs644

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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DATE 27 JUL 95

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DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA NOELLE JENSEN ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
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COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	8/3/95	_____	S. Graves PRINT LAST NAME: GRAVES COPY: 1
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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RECORD ID: 9520873
RECEIVED: 25 JUL 95 08

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 27 JUL 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA SOC
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 14 JUL PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 28 JUL 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DREW LOGREF: 9520841 9520843

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0141 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		DREW
		NSC CHRON
		VERSHBOW

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DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95072618	FOR DECISION
001		X	95072720	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
001	SENS	Z	95072720	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	95072720	DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950727	FUERTH, L	
002	950727	BRILL, K	
002	950727	MCALEER, R	
002	950727	ADAMS, G	
002	950727	INDERFURTH, R	
002	950727	GARTHOFF, D	
002	950727	WILSON, F	

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Dohse	1	D	
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger	2	AT	
Lake	3	D	
~~Situation Room~~ Dohse	4	D	Tab I
West Wing Desk	5	MC 7/27	D
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1	D	
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger	2 3		
Lake			
~~Dohse Situation Room~~	4	D	Tab I
West Wing Desk	5	MC 7/27	D
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

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SUBJECT: SOC PC MTG ON BOSNIA 14 JUL
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA NOELLE JENSEN ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	28 July	0715	Noelle Bujold PRINT LAST NAME: Bujold-Jensen COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	7-28-95	5:45 AM	Anthony Tofft PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX+1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	7/28/95	10:40	S. Graves PRINT LAST NAME: GRAVES COPY: 1
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
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WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX+1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: 1
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	7/28/95	7:30 A.M.	R. Smith PRINT LAST NAME: R. Smith COPY: VIA FAX+1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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MESSAGE NO.: 1557 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 15 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, July 14, 1995 NSC LOG # 20873

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
State	Executive Secretary		
Defense	Executive Secretary		
CIA	Executive Secretary		
JCS	Secretary		
USUN/State	Indefurth RMK		

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REMARKS:

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ROUTINE

RELEASER: [signature]

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MESSAGE NO.: 1557 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 05
(PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

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TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
State	Executive Secretary		
Defense	Executive Secretary		
CIA	Executive Secretary		
JCS	Secretary		
USUN/State	Indefurth RSCK		

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MESSAGE NO.: 1557 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 15
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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, July 14, 1995 NSC LOG # 20873

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
State	Executive Secretary		
Defense	Executive Secretary		
CIA	Executive Secretary		
JCS	Secretary		
USUN/State	Indefurth RXK		

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REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/8/2019
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FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, July 14, 1995 NSC LOG # 20873

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
State	Executive Secretary		
Defense	Executive Secretary		
CIA	Executive Secretary		
JCS	Secretary		
USUN/State	Indefurth RXK		

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE
- ☐ FLASH
- ☐ IMMEDIATE
- ☐ PRIORITY
- ☒ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: ~~Notice of Meeting~~ Summary of Conclusions PAGES: 5

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

SECRET

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/8/2019
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20873

July 27, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

AMBASSADOR RICK INDEFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. F.C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, July 14, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

for Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/8/2019
2010-0533-M

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20873

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee
DATE: July 14, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room/SVTS
TIME: 3:00 - 4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Anthony Lake

OVP
Leon Fuerth
Rick Saunders

State
Secretary Christopher
Peter Tarnoff
Richard Holbrooke

DOD
Secretary Perry
Jan Lodal

USUN
Ambassador Madeleine Albright (via secure video)
Rick Inderfurth (via secure video)

OMB
Alice Rivlin

Chief of Staff
Leon Panetta

CIA
John Deutch
Dennis Blair

JCS
General Shalikashvili
Wesley Clark
Howell Estes

White House
Sandy Berger
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
Alexander Vershbow
Nelson Drew

Summary of Conclusions

1. Principals met on July 14 to consider appropriate responses to the Bosnian Serb assault and occupation of the UN Safe Area at Srebrenica. (U)

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0533-M
RS 9/30/14 (8:43) (1.5s)
CIA Historical Collations Division
NR 70-14 10/1/2013

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

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Response to French Proposal to Reinforce Gorazde:

2. Principals agreed that we should not say "no" to the French on efforts to make UNPROFOR more robust or their specific proposal to reinforce Gorazde. But we must find ways to turn the discussion to options that are militarily feasible. The immediate decision is to send General Shalikashvili to London to meet on Sunday, July 16, with his French and British counterparts for the purpose of reviewing the military options being considered in the aftermath of Srebrenica. He will raise a series of issues about the French Gorazde option (including U.S. helicopter lift for French reinforcements) designed to focus the discussion on what is realistic from a military standpoint. He will return with answers before a decision is made on whether or not to provide U.S. helicopter lift. **(Action: JCS)** (S)

3. Principals agreed that if there was to be a decision to make a stand at Gorazde, it would be a decision for Sarajevo, London, Paris and Kiev to make, with our support. We will not seek to drive such a choice if they are not willing to implement it. We will, however, signal to allies at the meeting in London that we believe such a decision would require robust use of air power and that we stand ready to provide it in conjunction with a NATO effort to restore air supremacy over Bosnia. **(Action: JCS/OSD)** (S)

4. It was agreed that Sarajevo is important to a successful UNPROFOR strategy as is Gorazde. Principals agreed that we should not only support using the RRF to open a secure land route but measures to enable UNPROFOR to counter Serb artillery attacks on the city. The JCS will develop a list of equipment deemed essential to the protection of Sarajevo, such as advanced counter-battery artillery systems that could be provided as part of our planned $50 million in drawdown contributions to the RRF. **(Action: JCS)** (S)

5. Principals determined that the risk of Serbian attempts to take hostages would increase as UNPROFOR adopted a more robust policy of actively defending the remaining enclaves and that therefore we should urge that the UNMO missions be withdrawn from Serb-controlled territory. **(Action: State/USUN)** (S)

Dole Resolution on Lift:

6. Principals agreed that as a strategy for opposing the unilateral lift bill being put forward by Senator Dole, the administration should encourage efforts to amend the language in order to remove the most onerous provisions of the legislation but serve notice that even with amendments, a requirement that the U.S. unilaterally violate binding UNSC resolutions would be

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subject to Presidential veto. Secretary Perry will take the lead in approaching Senator Nunn to seek his assistance in getting amendments to:

- extend the time allowed before lift would take effect from 12 weeks to the 22 weeks necessary to implement OPLAN 40104;
- link any requirement for lifting the arms embargo to its likely consequences by including Congressional authorization for U.S. participation in a NATO-led withdrawal operation;
- ensure that the trigger for implementation of lift is not just a request from the Bosnian government but rather a decision by the UN Security Council; and
- change unilateral lift to multilateral lift.

Secretary Perry will make clear to Nunn that even if he succeeds on the first three points, the bill will be subject to veto as long as it still requires unilateral lift. **(Action: NSC/OSD)** ~~(C)~~

Negotiations with Milosevic:

7. Principals received word of a new agreement that EU mediator Carl Bildt was close to concluding with Milosevic to obtain a mutual recognition package between Bosnia and Serbia. They agreed that the deal would go too far in restricting U.S. ability to reimpose sanctions if Milosevic did not live up to his commitment to seal the border. (It would require a majority among either the five Contact Group members or the five UNSC Permanent members to reimpose sanctions after 9 months.) Ambassador Frasure will meet with Bildt next week to explain our reservations. **(Action: State)** ~~(S)~~

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~~SECRET~~ 20873

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 25, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

FROM: NELSON DREW ND

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, July 14, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia held July 14, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve AV Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/8/2019
2010-0533-M

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Declassify on: OADR

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520873
RECEIVED: 25 JUL 95 08

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 27 JUL 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA SOC
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 14 JUL PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/RMO DUE DATE: 28 JUL 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DREW LOGREF: 9520841 9520843

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0141 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		DREW
		NSC CHRON
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSJDA CLOSED BY: NSMEC DOC 2 OF 2

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/8/2019
2010-0533-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95072618	FOR DECISION
001		X	95072720	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
001	SENS	Z	95072720	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	95072720	DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES
002		X	95082211	ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/RMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950727	FUERTH, L	
002	950727	BRILL, K	
002	950727	MCALEER, R	
002	950727	ADAMS, G	
002	950727	INDERFURTH, R	
002	950727	GARTHOFF, D	
002	950727	WILSON, F	

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee
DATE: July 14, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room/SVTS
TIME: 3:00 - 4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Anthony Lake

OVP
Leon Fuerth
Rick Saunders

State
Secretary Christopher
Peter Tarnoff
Richard Holbrooke

DOD
Secretary Perry
Jan Lodal

USUN
Ambassador Madeleine Albright (via secure video)
Rick Inderfurth (via secure video)

OMB
Alice Rivlin

Chief of Staff
Leon Panetta

CIA
John Deutch
Dennis Blair

JCS
General Shalikashvili
Wesley Clark
Howell Estes

White House
Sandy Berger
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
Alexander Vershbow
Nelson Drew

Summary of Conclusions

1. Principals met on July 14 to consider appropriate responses to the Bosnian Serb assault and occupation of the UN Safe Area at Srebrenica. (U)

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~~2010-0539-M~~
~~RS 9/30/14~~
2013-0682-M (8.44)
CIA Historical Collections Division
NR 70-14
10/1/2013

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Response to French Proposal to Reinforce Gorazde:

2. Principals agreed that we should not ~~be~~ say "no" to the French on efforts to make UNPROFOR more robust or their specific proposal to reinforce Gorazde. But we must find ways to turn the discussion to options that are militarily feasible. The immediate decision is to send General Shalikashvili to London to meet on Sunday, July 16, with his French and British counterparts for the purpose of reviewing the military options being considered in the aftermath of Srebrenica. He will raise a series of issues about the French Gorazde option (including U.S. helicopter lift for French reinforcements) designed to focus the discussion on what is realistic from a military standpoint. He will return with answers before a decision is made on whether or not to provide U.S. helicopter lift. **(Action: JCS)** ~~(S)~~

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4. It was agreed that ~~in the end,~~ Sarajevo is ~~more~~ important to a successful UNPROFOR strategy ~~than~~ Gorazde. Principals agreed that we should not only support using the RRF to open a secure land route but measures to enable UNPROFOR to counter Serb artillery attacks on the city. The JCS will develop a list of equipment deemed essential to the protection of Sarajevo, such as advanced counter-battery artillery systems that could be provided as part of our planned $50 million in drawdown contributions to the RRF. **(Action: JCS)** ~~(S)~~

5. Principals determined that the risk of Serbian attempts to take hostages would ~~dramatically~~ increase ~~if~~ as UNPROFOR adopted a more robust policy of actively defending the remaining enclaves and that therefore ~~it would be necessary for~~ the UNMO missions ~~to~~ be withdrawn from Serb-controlled territory. **(Action: State/USUN)** ~~(S)~~

Dole Resolution on Lift:

6. Principals agreed that as a strategy for opposing the unilateral lift bill being put forward by Senator Dole, the administration should encourage efforts to amend the language in order to remove the most onerous provisions of the legislation but serve notice that even with amendments, a requirement that

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the U.S. unilaterally violate binding UNSC resolutions would be subject to Presidential veto. Secretary Perry will take the lead in approaching Senator Nunn to seek his assistance in getting amendments to:

- extend the time allowed before lift would take effect from 12 weeks to the 22 weeks necessary to implement OPLAN 40104;
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- ensure that the trigger for implementation of lift is not just a request from the Bosnian government but rather a decision by the UN Security Council; and
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7. Principals received word of a new agreement that EU mediator Carl Bildt was close to concluding with Milosevic to obtain a mutual recognition package between Bosnia and Serbia. They agreed that the deal would go too far in restricting U.S. ability to reimpose sanctions if Milosevic did not live up to his commitment to seal the border. (It would require a majority among either the five Contact Group members or the five UNSC Permanent members to reimpose sanctions after 9 months.) Ambassador Frasure will meet with Bildt next week to explain our reservations. **(Action: State)** ~~(S)~~

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520841
RECEIVED: 14 JUL 95 11

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 14 JUL 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA AGENDA
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 14 JUL PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 18 JUL 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DREW LOGREF: 9520843 9520845

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0141 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BASS
		BERGER
		DREW
		JOSHI
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

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By RDS NARA, Date 10/8/2019
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001	LAKE	Z	95071412	FOR DECISION
002		X	95071413	DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950714	FUERTH, L	
002	950714	WH CHIEF OF STAFF	
002	950714	BRILL, K	
002	950714	GARTHOFF, D	
002	950714	MCALEER, R	
002	950714	WILSON, F	
002	950714	INDERFURTH, R	
002	950714	ADAMS, G	

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National Security Council
The White House

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG [illegible] A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1/3	D	A
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger	2		
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	[illegible] 7/14	~~D~~
Records Mgt.			D

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

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COMMENTS: NOM PC 7/14

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DATE 14 JUL 95

SUBJECT: AGENDA FOR 14 JUL PC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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WH CHIEF OF STAFF	1410 & 7/14		OPalmieri PRINT LAST NAME: Palmieri COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	2/14	3:30PM	SMcE PRINT LAST NAME: McElhaney COPY: 1
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
COL. F. C. WILSON JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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Initials: RDS Date: 10/8/2019
2010-0533-M

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AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER
ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
2201 C STREET NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319

DATE _____ TIME _____ SIGNATURE _____

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: VIA FAX

GORDON ADAMS

7/14 2:35 Lara Rotholt

PRINT LAST NAME: Rotholt

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DATE 14 JUL 95

SUBJECT: AGENDA FOR 14 JUL PC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA NOELLE JENSEN ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	7/14	ASK	FOR OVP PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
WH CHIEF OF STAFF	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
COL. F. C. WILSON JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/8/2019
2010-0533-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

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DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9520841
DATE 14 JUL 95

SUBJECT: AGENDA FOR 14 JUL PC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

GORDON ADAMS

7/14/95 _____ J. Graves

PRINT LAST NAME: GRAVES

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

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RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 1420 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: PC MTG ON BOSNIA 1500H 14 JULY

NSC LOG # 20841

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
	USUN	OFFICE OF AMB		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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Initials: BDS Date: 10/8/2019
2010-0533-M

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TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 1420 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: PC MTG ON BOSNIA 1500H 14 JULY

NSC LOG # 20841

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO:	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
	USUN	OFFICE OF AMB		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

URGENT MTG AT 1500 TODAY!!

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/8/2019
2010-0533-M

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TIME OF RECEIPT
14 JUL 95 12 41
NMCC/JCS

PRECEDENCE: (IMMEDIATE) PRIORITY ROUTINE

RELEASER: [signature]

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 1420 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: PC MTG ON BOSNIA 1500H 14 JULY

NSC LOG # 20841

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
	USUN	OFFICE OF AMB		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

URGENT MTG AT 1500 TODAY!!

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: JRDS Date: 10/8/2015
2010-0533-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE / PRIORITY / ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 1420 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: PC MTG ON BOSNIA 1500H 14 JULY

NSC LOG # 20841

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
	USUN	OFFICE OF AMB		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

URGENT MTG AT 1500 TODAY!!

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/8/2019
2010-0533-M

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE
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- ☑ IMMEDIATE
- ☐ PRIORITY
- ☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC # 20841

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting PC MTG ON BOSNIA PAGES: 3

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
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2010-0533-M

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20841

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 14, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia on July 14, 1995, 3:00 p.m. - 4:00 p.m., in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Principals plus one. The agenda is attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/8/2019

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NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA
DATE: July 14, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 3:00 - 4:00 p.m.

Agenda

I. Post-Srebrenica Enclave Strategy

A. French Proposal to Reinforce Gorazde.....OSD/JCS

B. UNPROFOR Reconfiguration/Evacuation of Safe Areas...JCS

II. Reconsideration of Post-UNPROFOR Withdrawal Options

A. Lift & Strike or Just Lift, Arm & Train.....All

B. UN Mandate and NAC Decision Requirements.....State/OSD

III. Legislative Issues

A. Dole Unilateral Lift Opposition Strategy.....All

B 614 Authority Problems.....JCS/State

IV. Negotiations Update.....State

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
July 14, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

FROM: NELSON DREW ND

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, July 14, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Principals meeting on Bosnia to be held July 14, 1995. The item on 614 Authority Problems has been added at JCS request, in response to legal problems raised by Hill staff regarding the ability to use 614 authority to waive the provisions of the Foreign Asistance Act dealing with restrictions on transfer of equipment to Allies. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the meeting and authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve PB for ____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

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RECORD ID: 9520843
RECEIVED: 14 JUL 95 12

TO: LAKE

FROM: DREW
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 14 JUL 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 14 JUL PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 18 JUL 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DREW LOGREF: 9520841 9520845

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0141 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		DREW
		JOSHI
		KRECZKO
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DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
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001		X	95071419	NOTED BY LAKE

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1	D	
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Soderberg			
Berger	2	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3		N
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

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COMMENTS: PC paper for TR
7/14

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005a. memo	Nelson Drew to Anthony Lake re: July 14 Principals Meeting on Bosnia (3 pages)	07/14/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
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FOLDER TITLE:
PC0141 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, July 14, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs644

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: July 14, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 3:00 - 4:00 p.m.

Agenda

I. Post-Srebrenica Enclave Strategy

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Discussion Paper

Elements of a Post-UNPROFOR Strategy:
Support the Federation; Contain the Conflict

Overview

At the May 23 Principals Committee meeting there was a general consensus that U.S. policy following UNPROFOR withdrawal would be to seek multilateral lift of the arms embargo, limited support for arming and training the Bosnian Army, but no commitment to air strikes. Principals also agreed that U.S. security assistance should be largely limited to the provision of financing for Bosnian arms purchases from other suppliers and that training should be conducted by a third party, if possible. There was also agreement that such policies would have to be accompanied by enhanced efforts to contain the fighting within current bounds, including maintaining, and possibly reinforcing, peacekeepers in Macedonia.

Principals agreed that all these elements of a possible post-UNPROFOR strategy need further analysis, as do several other questions including: What relief and other military operations could or should remain in place? How would we work with Allies and friends to contain the fighting? What are Russia's likely responses to our efforts to lift the arms embargo and bolster the security of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

Political/Military Goals

Our principal goals following UNPROFOR's partial or complete withdrawal would be to:

- Preserve the sovereignty of the GOBH over as much of its territory as possible;

  -- We could continue to recognize the borders of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina as of 1992 and not accept the territorial status quo created by Serb military operations and ethnic cleansing, just as we did with Soviet conquest of the Baltics in the 1940s.

- Maintain the Bosniac-Croat Federation and good relations between Zagreb and Sarajevo;

  -- Whether these alliances of convenience can endure remains to be seen. The Federation offers the best prospect for developing a counterweight to extreme nationalism and Serbian regional hegemony. Maintaining some common sense of purpose between Zagreb and Sarajevo is the best way to safeguard the GOBH from a Serb-Croat grand bargain that could leave Bosnia a Balkan Palestine in the middle of Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia.

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[2013-0652-M, 8.47]

-- Croatian support would be essential to success of efforts to arm and train the Bosnian Army, if only to ensure transit of equipment. But Zagreb would surely want some similar security assistance and closer ties to NATO (through PFP) and the EU.

- Prevent a widening of the conflict and bolster regional stability;

  -- This remains our abiding strategic interest. We must prevent the conflict from widening into a general Balkan War that could engage two NATO allies (with very different agenda), threaten the stability of fragile new democracies in the region, and increase the risks of deeper U.S. engagement.

- Deter further aggression by Belgrade, while keeping a line open to Milosevic and his successors.

  -- Threats to Kosovo, Macedonia, and other neighbors would have to be deterred, but moderation of Serb policies is the long-term goal.

General Elements of the Strategy

Security Assistance

We would seek support of all NATO allies, PFP Partners, and moderate Islamic states for a security assistance package for the GOBH. But we should be prepared to proceed with a coalition of the willing.

Allies would balk at supporting lift for fear that it would prolong the war and exacerbate the risks of its widening. We would need to convince them that we only want to give the GOBH a chance to survive and be able to negotiate a viable settlement. A convincing containment strategy would also be essential to enlisting their support.

Security assistance to Bosnian government would be designed to give it sufficient military capacity to defend the territory still under its control and enhance its ability to regain, by force or at the negotiating table, territory now controlled by the BSA. The magnitude of assistance could range from what would be required to defend the status quo, to a more robust package that would allow it to make strategic gains, to an extensive reequipping that would allow it to reestablish its control over territory allotted it under the Contact Group Plan. Clearly cost will be a major factor here, and past estimates of the robust package have exceeded $1 billion.

We and the GOBH would have to balance various goals with the risks of triggering engagement of superior Yugoslav Army (VJ) and Krajina Serb Army (KSA) forces in the fighting in ways that could only be countered by direct U.S. and/or Allied

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military support. All but the first option risk bringing other Serb forces to Pale's defense.

Bosnian/Croat Harmony

Sarajevo has few alternatives other than alliance with Zagreb. Zagreb, on the other hand, may need additional incentives stay with the program. We and other Allies might offer Zagreb certain rewards for cooperation with Sarajevo such as additional technical and military assistance, deeper bilateral economic and political ties, and membership in PFP.

Dealing With Serbia

Deterring further Serb aggression would likely require reinforcing the "Christmas warning" to Milosevic about responding to Serb-triggered violence in Kosovo, and adding threats to take unspecified military actions against Serbia if it escalates its support to the Bosnian Serbs or intimidates Macedonia or other neighbors.

Forging anti-Milosevic coalition could cause divisions within the Alliance and the EU and reinforce Serb nationalism unless we make it clear our efforts are not directed against Serbia proper but at the aggressive nationalism sponsored by the current government. At the same time, we could take steps to support opposition political groups in Serbia who favor more moderate regional policies. We could continue to hold out to Milosevic the promise of further integration if he really breaks with Pale and respects international norms.

Regional Containment

Our regional containment efforts might include:

- Retain some residual UNPROFOR or other peacekeeping presence in the Federation territory to maintain Bosniac-Croat harmony.

- Retain a robust UNCRO to prevent a reeruption of the Serb-Croat war and limit KSA support the BSA.

    -- KSA support was instrumental in the BSA's ability to beat back the Bosnian V Corps offensive in Bihac during the fall of 1994.

    -- There is intelligence suggesting that if the KSA were driven out of UN Sectors North and South by the Croatian Army, they would move into the Posavina corridor and support BSA operations against the Gorazde pocket.

- Maintain and possibly augment UNPREDEP in Macedonia to help stabilize that country and deter a Serb crackdown in Kosovo. In the context of arming the Bosnians, we would

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have to be careful not to give Kosovar Albanians the sense that U.S. or Allied forces would come to the aid of an armed uprising against Serb authorities.

- Deploy some other border monitoring forces like UNPREDEP in Hungary and Albania. This and other actions to prevent spillover could be organized by NATO through PFP.

- Reinforce stability along the periphery by redirecting resources currently used for peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance to promote economic development and cooperation among the front-line Balkan states.

Efforts Prior to Withdrawal

To be effective, elements of this strategy would need to be in place well before extraction of UNPROFOR actually begins. The military imbalance is such that the BSA could readily put pressure on the enclaves and Sarajevo before and during UNPROFOR withdrawal. Also, as the SNIE 95-7 notes, the Bosnian government would be likely to strongly resist a partial or complete withdrawal of UNPROFOR unless the U.S. or NATO commits to military support. This commitment would just as surely trigger BSA actions to preclude complete withdrawal.

- We would need to build consensus among the Allies and other potential partners and secure at least Russian acquiescence for the main goals of this approach.

- To give the GOBH forces a chance, we would need to explore ways to help the Bosnians "creep out" of the restrictions of the arms embargo. This might include:

  -- Providing some intelligence support to GOBH to enhance their ability to organize defenses against BSA actions. For example, we might start providing the GOBH with data from the Predator UAV flights and other sources.

  -- Programs that Gen. Sewell has broached with the Federation for rear area operations, NCO training, etc.

  -- Developing military-to-military contacts between the GOBH and third countries (Croatia, Turkey, or non-front-line CE states such as Poland or the Czech Republic), that would enable rapid launching of the envisioned training programs.

  -- Reconsider the option of allowing UNPROFOR units, on a national basis, to turn their equipment over the GOBH upon withdrawal. In this way the Bosnian Army could also provide some protection to the evacuation force. Our assumption has been that this would trigger hostile Serb action against these forces, but if the extraction environment is hostile in any event this may not be so decisive in the Serb calculus.

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Lifting Options

Multilateral

We would call for an end of the arms embargo because its continuation in the absence of a peacekeeping force or other UNSC action to preserve the peace would deny Bosnia-Herzegovina its right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. It would seem difficult for Russia or other states to justify continuation of the arms embargo in this context. Indeed, Russian Rep Churkin proposed lifting the arms embargo last year as part of the Contact Group's package of incentives and disincentives if Bosnia accepted the CG plan and the Serbs did not. Still, one could expect Russia and even some NATO allies to argue that lifting the embargo would only escalate the violence without altering the outcome fundamentally and run the risk of widening of the conflict. Allies would also be wary of lift because of the inevitable pressures to provide military assistance to the Bosnian government.

NATO/Coalition

If Russia or some another UNSC member (China) appeared to be the principal obstacle to multilateral lift, we might press for a NATO/coalition action to achieve the desired goal. Our argument would hinge on rights to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. However, absent a UNSC action to remove the embargo, we would still be vulnerable to the criticisms we have leveled at proponents of unilateral lift and risk loosing support for compliance with other UN-mandated sanctions regimes.

Lift Only

"Lift and pray" would seem to be a completely indefensible strategy both at home and abroad. Even the most isolationist Republicans are not advocating this approach. While this would end the stigma of supporting UNPROFOR, it would create the impression that we had decided to leave the Bosnian government to fend for itself on the black market or rely on Islamic states.

The GOBH might well resist withdrawal in this context. Indeed, the only advantage of this approach would seem to be that it would decrease the BSA's incentive to complicate or resist withdrawal. However, the BSA would know that the GOBH would receive arms from Islamic and other countries, even if the U.S. and Europe had made no commitments. This outcome would put pressure on the Federation and would risk the ensuing conflict from becoming a clash between Muslims and Christians.

Arming and Training

On the face of it, arming and training by "third countries" has a number of benefits. It would limit the extent of U.S. engagement, making it easier to avoid the "Americanization" of

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the post-withdrawal conflict. In turn, this could help prevent the struggle from becoming a surrogate conflict between Russian-backed Serbs and the U.S.-backed GOBH.

Identifying likely "third countries" is more problematic. As for arming, many West European governments might be reluctant to fuel the conflict due to fears of widening. Some front line Central European governments might have similar fears, and enlisting them in such an enterprise would run contrary to our efforts to continue the demilitarization of these societies. This leaves Turkey, Iran, and/or other Islamic countries, all of whom have lots of capacity and high motivation. But if these states get involved, modulating the flow will become more complicated, not to mention the polarizing impact of making this a clash between Islam and Christianity.

As for training, if the Bosniac/Croat Federation holds, Croatia would offers proximity, high motivation, and an eagerness to cooperate with NATO. The downside risks are that enlisting Croatia so frontally in the conflict against the Bosnian Serbs would risk reopening the Serb-Croat conflict in a bigger way. Clearly, Croatia's cooperation would be essential to any arming and training package for Bosnia. However, its use as a transit and staging area are different than its use as the training ground and launch pad for offensive operations against Serbs.

<u>Robust Lift and Strike</u>

Here the assessment is in many ways unchanged from the early days of the war in 1992. Lifting the arms embargo and beginning some arming and training of the GOBH forces will take time. During that time they would be very vulnerable to BSA military actions. The most effective way to mitigate this would be to conduct supporting air strikes against BSA heavy weapons, military facilities, and operations. If liaison with the Bosnian Army was established, it might be possible to use Bosnian forces as forward air controllers and target designators. At a minimum, we could argue that NATO's August 1993 decisions to undertake airstrikes to prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo and other safe areas remain valid.

An even more robust option, would be designed to limit VJ involvement by threatening to target VJ military installations in the FRY and the Drina River Bridges and other transit points between the FRY and Bosnia if military support continues.

This would give the GOBH the best chance for survival, but it has several significant risks. Such strong action against the Serbs might trigger more direct Russian support. It could also spark an uprising in Kosovo or Vodjvodina provinces that could trigger the wider war we seek to avoid.

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Strike, No Lift

This option, also considered in late 1992, is gaining supporters outside government once again for different reasons. This approach would seek to "level the playing field" by targeting BSA heavy weapons and other military targets. Once UNPROFOR was out, it could be accomplished without fear of hostage taking. Forward air controllers would be required, but it might be possible to train Bosnian government forces to perform that function for NATO forces. Most military assessments have concluded that air strikes alone would be insufficient to save the enclaves and break a siege of Sarajevo. However, air strikes might be successful in achieving other, less demanding goals at the negotiating table.

Humanitarian Relief: Over to the Bosnians

PRM's paper explains in great detail how the withdrawal of UNPROFOR would disrupt relief efforts by international organizations. However, we need to explore the feasibility of turning over management and delivery of relief efforts to the Bosnian government. Our provision of security assistance might free resources and personnel for such efforts and the Bosnians could operate without current restrictions on UN and international agencies. Also, if we can hold the Federation together, these regions and Croatia could remain secure supply bases.

Assessing/Managing the Russian Reaction

In Moscow's fractious political environment, an expanded U.S.-NATO role in Bosnia would appear at first glance to be a tempting target either for Yeltsin's opponents or for Yeltsin himself and others eager to posture in defense of Russian national interests in the run up to parliamentary and presidential elections. While some support to the Serbs and pointed criticism of U.S. moves would be inevitable, the overall impact on elite and popular sentiment may be more manageable and less explosive than generally predicted.

How Strong is Pan-Slavism?

U.S. and Russian polling data routinely highlight the absence of any significant popular Russian support for Serbia or its agenda in the Balkans. Despite constant Russian (and Western) assertions to the contrary, the Russian view of Serbia corresponds roughly with attitudes toward Poland or Turkey (i.e., these states are seen as mildly friendly to Russia at best). Like most foreign policy issues, events in a post-UNPROFOR Bosnia would resonate faintly with a Russian electorate preoccupied with day-to-day socioeconomic concerns. Politicians from across the political spectrum would find it difficult to rouse average Russians out of their indifference or to stir up serious opposition to the Yeltsin government for its reactions to U.S.-NATO policy.

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Moscow has been actively working to retain and expand its political influence in the Balkans (including with Greece) and clearly does not want to be marginalized by Western decisions on Bosnia. But a confrontation with the West over efforts to save the rump Bosnia would not necessarily advance those interests. Moreover, such an stance would also be perceived as anti-Muslim and therefore do damage to Moscow's warming relations with Iran and other Islamic states.

Russia's strategic interests in the Balkans, despite Zhirinovsky's rhetoric, are far from evident to the average Russian. Given the lingering outrage over the war in Chechnya -- much closer to home -- Moscow would have a hard time justifying direct military involvement in Serbia, even advisors/trainers, to the Russian public.

The Duma has gone on record as favoring military support to the Serbs if the arms embargo on Bosnia is lifted. But Russian arms sales now generally operate on a cash basis. It is not clear that Russia has either the resources or the political motivation to provide significant amounts of military assistance on credit to a bankrupt Serbia. The possibility of non-official Russian support to the Serbs, in the form of volunteers and arms, is a real possibility, but the magnitude of such support seems unlikely to be decisive.

Managing Russian Elite Perceptions

To be sure, the Moscow-based elite is likely to bristle at a more muscular U.S.-NATO posture in Bosnia. Although most foreign policy circles have embraced great power rhetoric and bluster on many high-profile issues, there is little fire in the belly left for the Balkans. The elite's Bosnia anxieties reached their high-water mark more than a year ago and were sparked largely by the April 1994 airstrikes around Sarajevo. This growing Bosnia fatigue has also been fed by the actions of the Bosnian Serbs on the ground and by Moscow's high-profile diplomatic forays -- and failures -- in the region, the Contact Group, and the UNSC. Churkin's unproductive visit and gloomy assessment are another example of this frustration.

The steady downgrading of Russian efforts in the Balkans also is linked implicitly to the Russian elite's growing preoccupation with NATO expansion. While Yeltsin and Kozyrev would still be the key players in how the Russian internal debate on post-UNPROFOR Bosnia develops, they will need a clear understanding of the potential costs of opposing international consensus on this issue. Given the Russian leadership's overriding stake in trying to hold the line on NATO expansion and repairing the damage caused by Chechnya, we can expect that Moscow will be far less inclined to fan a new round of crisis in relations with the U.S. and its Allies over Bosnia.

Still, it will be particularly important for the U.S. to engage directly with Russian officials early and try to

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influence elite opinion as our overall direction becomes clearer. In addition to giving Russian officials a sense of engagement in the development of policy, we should also look at face-savers that would make it easier for Moscow to abstain from a UNSC vote on lifting the arms embargo. For example, we could advance a UNSC resolution that would lift the arms embargo on all the Yugoslav successor states. This would have little practical impact on Serbia's military potential.

Shifting Alignments

In the post-UNPROFOR environment, we would likely have to deal with shifting alignments among Contact Group members. While Germany and the UK would probably be supportive of efforts to isolate Serbia, one can imagine Russo-French resistance to this tack and even collusion to cut deals with Belgrade and Pale. The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy would offer countervaling pressures that might limit the depth of such fissures. But maintaining even the limited degree of Western unity we have today would be difficult as old biases and differing geopolitical interests became more pronounced.

Drafted: S/P: SFlanagan
6/14/95, Revised 7/7/95, SPEUR 5169

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RECORD ID: 9520845
RECEIVED: 14 JUL 95 19

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 15 JUL 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FOLLOW UP MEMO TO POTUS FM 14 JUL PC MTG ON BOSNIA - RESPONSE TO FALL OF SREBRENICA

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT DUE DATE: 18 JUL 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DREW LOGREF: 9520841 9520843

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0141 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95071814	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
002	PRESIDENT	Z	95071519	FOR INFORMATION
002		X	95071719	NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950715		VICE PRESIDENT
002	950715		WH CHIEF OF STAFF

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
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Dohse	1	D	
Sens			
Soderberg	copy	✓	
Berger	2	~~Natl Sec Advisor~~ has seen	
Lake			
Situation Room			DOES
West Wing Desk	3	ABK 7/15	D
Records Mgt.			R

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

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~~SECRET~~

P has seen. 7/17

20845

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

95 JUL 15 P1:31

July 15, 1995

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Principals' July 14 Conclusions on Bosnia

Response to Fall of Srebrenica: Principals agreed we should not be seen as saying "no" to the French on efforts to make UNPROFOR more robust or their specific proposal to reinforce Gorazde. But we must find ways to turn the discussion to options that are militarily feasible without falling into the trap of either having to put forces in on the ground or be blamed for the failure of UNPROFOR. The immediate decision is to send General Shali to London to meet on Sunday with his French and British counterparts for the purpose of reviewing the military options being considered in the aftermath of Srebrenica. Shali will raise a series of issues about the French Gorazde option (including U.S. helicopter lift to Gorazde), designed to focus the discussion on what is realistic from a military standpoint:

- the need to ensure the mission makes sense and that the Bosnian government will mount an active defense where UNPROFOR makes its stand;
- the need for preemptive suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) to support an UNPROFOR stand either at Gorazde or Sarajevo;
- the need to eliminate the dual key in enforcing the heavy weapons exclusion zone around Gorazde (and Sarajevo) to bolster the more robust posture on the ground;
- the need for UNPROFOR to act as though under Chapter VII provisions throughout Bosnia to reduce the likelihood of additional hostages being taken in response to tough UNPROFOR action in Gorazde;
- the fact that it will take 10-14 days for a U.S. helicopter lift package to be in place and ready to assist with French redeployments;
- the need for UNPROFOR troops assisting in the defense of Gorazde to be effectively integrated with and supported by Bosnian government forces who would bear the primary responsibility for active defense of the enclave;

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
CIA Historical Collections Div
Auth: NLC-11-4-10-N 2013
[2013-0682-m, 8148]

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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- ensuring a clear line of NATO command and control exists for any U.S. lift and/or logistical support;
- a commitment from the French that if we assist in redeployment of their forces to provide a more robust UNPROFOR posture, they will not turn around and withdraw from UNPROFOR anyway; and
- a clear signal any U.S. assistance is a one-time deal that implies neither any commitment of U.S. ground forces nor willingness to engage in a similar operation again.

Shali will return with the answers to these questions before a decision on providing helicopter lift to Gorazde is made.

Principals agreed that if UNPROFOR is to make a stand at Gorazde, it would be a decision for Sarajevo, London, Paris and Kiev to make. We would not seek to drive such a choice if they are not willing to implement it. We will, however, signal to allies at the meeting in London this weekend that we believe such a decision would require robust use of air power and that we stand ready to provide it in conjunction with a NATO effort to restore air supremacy over Bosnia.

It was agreed that, in the end, Sarajevo is more important to a successful UNPROFOR strategy than Gorazde. Principals agreed that we should not only support using the RRF to open a secure land route, but measures to enable UNPROFOR to counter Serb artillery attacks on the city. The JCS will develop a list of equipment deemed essential to the protection of Sarajevo, such as advanced counter-battery artillery systems, that could be provided as part of our planned $50 million in drawdown contributions to the RRF.

Principals determined that the risk of the Serbs taking more hostages would dramatically increase if UNPROFOR adopted a more robust policy of actively defending the remaining enclaves, and therefore, it would be necessary for the UNMO missions to be withdrawn from Serb-controlled territory.

Dole Resolution on Lift: All of us agreed that, as a strategy for opposing the unilateral lift bill being put forward by Bob Dole, we should encourage efforts to amend the language in order to remove the most onerous provisions of the legislation but serve notice that even with amendments, a requirement that the U.S. would unilaterally violate binding UNSC resolutions would be subject to your veto. Secretary Perry will take the lead in approaching Senator Nunn to seek his assistance in getting amendments to:

- extend the time allowed before lift would take effect from 12 weeks to the 22 weeks necessary to implement OPLAN 40104;

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- link any requirement for lifting the arms embargo to its likely consequences by including Congressional authorization for U.S. participation in a NATO-led withdrawal operation;
- ensure the trigger for implementation of lift is not just a request from the Bosnian government but rather a decision by the UN Security Council; and
- change unilateral lift to multilateral lift.

Secretary Perry will make clear to Senator Nunn that, even if he succeeds on the first three points, the bill will be subject to your veto as long as it still mandated unilateral lift. However, in the event that a veto is overridden, his assistance in gaining the amendments we seek could be instrumental in saving the lives of UNPROFOR troops and the NATO soldiers, including U.S., helping to extract UNPROFOR should the lift bill trigger withdrawal -- as the French have assured us it will.

Negotiations with Milosevic: Finally, we received word of a new agreement EU mediator Carl Bildt is close to concluding with Milosevic to obtain a mutual recognition package between Bosnia and Serbia. The deal would go too far in restricting our ability to reimpose sanctions if Milosevic did not live up to his commitment to seal the border. (It would require a majority among either the five Contact Group members or the five UNSC Permanent members to reimpose sanctions after 9 months, thus giving the Russians, British and French the ability to block.) Ambassador Frasure will meet with Bildt next week to explain our reservations.

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20845

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 14, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: NELSON DREW

SUBJECT: Principals' July 14 Consideration of Responses to the Fall of Srebrenica

Attached at Tab A is the information memorandum to the President summarizing the conclusions of the Principals' Meeting on July 14, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab A.

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum to the President

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/8/2019
2010-0533-M

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

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- ensuring a clear line of NATO command and control exists for any U.S. lift and/or logistical support;
- a commitment from the French that if we assist in redeployment of their forces to provide a more robust UNPROFOR posture, they will not turn around and withdraw from UNPROFOR anyway; and
- a clear signal any U.S. assistance is a one-time deal that implies neither any commitment of U.S. ground forces nor willingness to engage in a similar operation again.

Principals agreed that if ~~there was to be a decision for~~ UNPROFOR to make a stand at Gorazde, it would be a decision for Sarajevo, London, Paris and Kiev to make. We would not seek to drive such a choice if they are not willing to implement it. We will, however, signal to allies at the meeting in London this weekend that we believe such a decision would require robust use of air power and that we stand ready to provide it in conjunction with a NATO effort to restore air supremacy over Bosnia.

It was agreed that, in the end, Sarajevo is more important to a successful UNPROFOR strategy than Gorazde. Principals agreed that we should not only support using the RRF to open a secure land route, but measures to enable UNPROFOR to counter Serb artillery attacks on the city. The JCS will develop a list of equipment deemed essential to the protection of Sarajevo, such as advanced counter-battery artillery systems, that could be provided as part of our planned $50 million in drawdown contributions to the RRF.

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- extend the time allowed before lift would take effect from 12 weeks to the 22 weeks necessary to implement OPLAN 40104;
- link any requirement for lifting the arms embargo to its likely consequences by including Congressional authorization for U.S. participation in a NATO-led withdrawal operation;

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2015-0612-M
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See also [illegible]

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title: PC0142 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, August 1, 1995				
Staff Office-Individual: Records Management				
Original OA/ID Number: 4009				
Row: 43	Section: 6	Shelf: 7	Position: 2	Stack: V

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)~~	~~08/01/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
002. memo	re: Summary of Principals Meeting, August (1 page)	08/02/1995	P1/b(1)
~~003a. memo~~	~~Alexander Vershbow to Anthony Lake re: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, August 1 (3 pages)~~	~~08/01/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003b. agenda~~	~~NSC Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (1 page)~~	~~08/01/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
003c. paper	re: Proposed Council Decisions [NATO] (4 pages)	08/1995	P1/b(1)
~~003d. paper~~	~~re: Options for Responding to the Bildt-Milosevic Package (2 pages)~~	~~07/31/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003e. letter~~	~~re: [Draft Presidentail Letter] (3 pages)~~	~~08/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003f. paper~~	~~re: Lift of Bosnian Arms Embargo (1 page)~~	~~07/31/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 08/03/2015
~~003g. paper~~	~~re: Training the Bosnians (1 page)~~	~~07/31/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KDE 05/26/2016
~~003h. paper~~	~~re: Air Support to Bosnia (1 page)~~	~~07/31/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 08/03/2015
~~004. agenda~~	~~[Duplicate of 003b] (1 page)~~	~~08/01/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia…])
OA/Box Number: 4009

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0142 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, August 1, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs645

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520905
RECEIVED: 02 AUG 95 15

TO: LAKE

FROM: VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 08 SEP 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 1 AUG PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: LAKE APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 05 AUG 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9520893 9520898

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0142 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BASS
		BERGER
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEC CLOSED BY: NSJDA DOC 1 OF 1

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By RDS NARA, Date 10/8/2019
2010-0533-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95090815	FOR DECISION
001		X	95091108	LAKE APPROVED RECOM

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recd 9/8
5pm

National Security Council
The White House

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG MC A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
B Harmon			
Dohse	1	D see comments	
Sens			
Soderberg	copy ✓		
Berger	2	DW	
Lake	3	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	DR 9/9	N
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

9/9 for file only per TL

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

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Log # 20905

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

1) TL/SB to Dohse Date Sep 8

Our efforts in Bosnia have moved well beyond the discussions held on August 1. Recommend we file the conclusions for the record but not distribute to the Principals. Its old news.

VR/Fred

2) ____ to ____ Date ____

Closed in Doc Log. File Soc.

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The White House

5pm

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1	D see comments	
Sens			
Soderberg	copy ✓		
Berger	2	DW	
Lake	3	Natl Sec Adviser has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	DR 9/9	N
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

9/9 for file only per TL

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

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Log # 20905

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VR/Fred

2) _____ to _____ Date _____

closed in
Doc Log.
File Soc.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20905

September 8, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, August 1, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia held August 1, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

~~That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.~~ Ev files.

Approve R Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/8/2019
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee
DATE: August 1, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 - 4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR
Anthony Lake

OVP
Leon Fuerth

STATE
Peter Tarnoff
James Steinberg
Richard Holbrooke

DEFENSE
William Perry
Walter Slocombe

USUN
Madeleine Albright
James O'Brien

CIA
John Deutch
RADM Dennis Blair

JCS
Gen. John Shalikashvili
LTG Wesley Clark

SPECIAL ENVOY
Robert Frasure

White House
Samuel Berger
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
Alexander Vershbow

Summary of Conclusions

NATO Air Strikes Decision: Principals were informed by the CJCS that while the NAC had just approved extension of the Gorazde decision to the other safe areas (Sarajevo, Bihac, Tuzla), many problems were still unresolved regarding implementation of this and the earlier Gorazde decision. In particular, the UN commander had not yet agreed to a large Zone of Action around Gorazde nor to the definition of the Zone of Action for the other safe areas. Principals recommended Presidential letters to Major

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2010-0533-M
RS 9/30/14 (1.61)

and Chirac on this issue (Action: JCS/State) as well as follow up at the UN by USUN. (S)

Bildt-Milosevic Package: Principals agreed we needed to improve the terms of the package negotiated by EU mediator Bildt with Serbian President Milosevic on sanctions relief and mutual recognition. In particular, they agreed we should tie implementation of any new sanctions relief to positive Bosnian Serb actions (de-escalation around the safe areas and agreement to begin new peace negotiations on the basis of the Contact Group plan). Principals acknowledged that we were unlikely to come to closure with Milosevic any time soon and that we should seek to minimize frictions with our Allies in the August 2 meetings with Bildt and Contact Group representatives. They tasked the Deputies to finalize agreement on the U.S. position on the basis of the NSC paper "Bildt Plus" (Action: NSC). (S)

Croatia: Principals noted the likelihood of a large-scale Croatian assault on the Krajina (Sectors North and South) in the coming days, barring Krajina Serb capitulation to President Tudjman's ultimatum on acceptance of the Croatian constitution. They agreed we should continue to warn Tudjman of the dangers of precipitating FRY intervention and stressed the urgency of developing a strategy for containing the spread of the conflict. (S)

Longer-Term Strategy: Principals agreed we needed to look beyond the immediate crises and decide where we want to be in the longer term. Each agency will complete its recommendations by Thursday on the "end state" we should seek to establish if a political settlement cannot be achieved in the near term and if UNPROFOR withdrawal becomes unavoidable. Recommendations to the President should be completed by August 4, as a basis for decisions on a possible U.S. diplomatic initiative. (S)

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~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20905

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, August 1, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/8/2019
2010-0533-M

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520902
RECEIVED: 02 AUG 95 09

TO: MEMO FOR RECORD

FROM: VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 02 AUG 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: UNOFFICIAL SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 1 AUG PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE DATE: 05 AUG 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9520893 9520898

FILES: IFM C NSCP: PC0142 CODES: BOS CRO

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: EXTRACTED FROM 1 AUG FORN POLICY GRP MTG.

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OPENED BY: NSASK CLOSED BY: NSMEC DOC 1 OF 1

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E.O. 13526
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By RDS NARA, Date 10/8/2019
2010-0533-M

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~~SECRET~~ RECORD ID: 9520902

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001		X	95080211	FOR RECORD PURPOSES

~~SECRET~~

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Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. memo	re: Summary of Principals Meeting, August (1 page)	08/02/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4009

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0142 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, August 1, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs645

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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RECORD ID: 9520898
RECEIVED: 01 AUG 95 11

TO: LAKE

FROM: VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 01 AUG 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA CROATIA
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 1 AUG PC MTG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 04 AUG 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9520893 9520902

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0142 CODES: BOS CRO

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSASK CLOSED BY: NSMEC DOC 1 OF 1

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By KDS NARA, Date 10/8/2019
2010-0533-M

~~SECRET~~ RECORD ID: 9520898

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95080113	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	95080418	NOTED BY LAKE

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National Security Council
The White House

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 18K A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1		
Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg		C 9/2	
Berger		C 9/2	
Lake	2	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	RC 9/4	A
Records Mgt.			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20898

CLINTON

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

August 1, 1995

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, August 1, 2:30-4:00 p.m.

I. NAC decision to extend Gorazde air campaign to Bihac and other safe areas: Status and Strategy

The NAC is meeting today. The four key allies met yesterday and this morning with Willy Claes to hammer out a **draft decision sheet** which would clearly extend the Gorazde decision to Bihac and the other safe areas (Tab B). The paper states the obvious fact that the specific application would have to be tailored to the circumstances in each safe area.

At JCS insistence, we have instructed Hunter to amend the decision sheet to make clear that, in the case of Bihac, limited use of air power (options 1 and 2 targets) may be of limited effectiveness, and that it could be necessary to move quickly to country-wide bombing (option 3). This is true in military terms, but will be hard to sell to the British, Germans and other allies. **You should ask for a status report on the NAC, and then ask Shali to explain the JCS position on Option 3. Politically, we should not let this issue of implementation -- important as it is -- to delay the taking of a political decision to extend the authority for massive air strikes to Bihac.**

UNSC ?

II. Response to Bildt-Milosevic package

Ask State to introduce the subject. **All agencies now support Option 1, "Bildt Plus," in the NSC paper** (Tab C). State will likely argue for the fallback listed at the bottom of page 1 -- i.e. not demand that Milosevic deliver the Bosnian Serbs to the table at the outset, but give him a deadline to do so (the end of the 100-120 day grace period), after which sanctions would *automatically* be reimposed. **We can go along with this - although it could run counter to your desire to achieve even faster progress toward a settlement.**

me meeting

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Peter Tarnoff yesterday suggested a **Presidential letter** to Contact Group allies foreshadowing our position on the eve of Bildt's talks in Washington tomorrow. **State's draft (Tab D) is very good, but we don't think this is necessary. The President's letter to Major and phone call to Yeltsin already served this purpose, and a similar message to Kohl was sent this morning. Only Chirac hasn't heard from us.** (FYI: Kohl received Bildt yesterday and apparently did not agree to endorse Bildt's package in full.)

A key issue is to develop the set of verifiable criteria of Serbian performance that would be the basis of the side understanding with the UK and France by which we could accept the five-nation review mechanism. **State and OVP should be tasked with developing the criteria before tomorrow's meetings with Bildt and the UK/French/German representatives.** JCS may press to raise the bar even further with Milosevic by including require-ments that he accept observers at military bases and supply depots, end all communications between the VJ and BSA, etc. While worthy, these ideas may overload the circuits with the Allies.

Finally, we have to decide how to deal with the Bosnian Government. Sacirbey has now written a letter making official their rejection of the Bildt package as it now stands. The Bosnians have, in fact, lost interest in mutual recognition, but are still interested in border closure. **We believe our Bildt Plus approach would be supported by the Bosnians, but Sacirbey's letter makes it doubly important that Bildt work with Sarajevo before re-engaging with Milosevic.**

III. Croatia -- Situation and Strategy

Ask CIA and State to provide the latest on the situation on the ground and diplomatically. Galbraith met Tudjman this morning and made clear the big offensive is likely within a few days; intelligence corroborates this. The Croats plan to lay down an ultimatum to the Krajina Serbs in the Geneva talks today -- open the pipeline and rail links through the Krajina and agree to the application of the Croatian constitution -- or else. Galbraith is going to Belgrade to meet with Krajina Serb FM Babic to urge that they open the pipeline and rail line immediately if they want to avoid a full-scale war.

The key issue for the meeting is to straighten out our policy line vis-à-vis the Croatians and to develop a containment strategy (on the assumption that prevention is neither feasible nor desirable). Yesterday's "go get 'em" message by State to Zuzul may have some merit in strategic terms, but was so un-nuanced as to incite reckless behavior by the Croatians. Moreover, we need to be able to tell Allies and Russians that we have counseled restraint.

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You might task State with a strategy for containing the spread of the fighting and deterring FRY intervention if Tudjman proceeds with his offensive.

IV. Longer-Term Strategy

State and OSD are drafting their options. JCS has sent us some input on lift, train and strike (Tab E) that they hope will be factored into our paper, but it is not clear they will do their own option.

You should lay out where you want to go in terms of another PC on the substance and a memo to the President with recommendations.

V. Unilateral Lift Legislation

If time permits, you may want to review strategy following today's House vote on unilateral lift, including the timing of a veto.

Attachment
Tab A Agenda
Tab B Draft NAC decision sheet
Tab C Response to Bildt Options Paper
Tab D Draft Presidential Letter
Tab E JCS papers on lift, train and strike

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NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA AND CROATIA

DATE: August 1, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 p.m. - 4:00 p.m.

Agenda

I. NAC decision to extend Gorazde air campaign to Bihac and other safe areas: Status and Strategy.....JCS/OSD

II. Response to Bildt-Milosevic package.....State
(NSC Options paper circulated separately)

III. Croatia -- Situation and Strategy.....CIA/State

IV. Longer-Term Strategy.....NSC/All

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 3/6/2020

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Options for Responding to the Bildt-Milosevic package

In an informal meeting July 31, Deputies agreed that we should respond to European pressure to endorse the Bildt-Milosevic package in a way that keeps the diplomatic process moving forward while protecting our key interests. Two options were considered:

Option 1: Bildt Plus: ***Broaden the package to obtain positive steps by the Bosnian Serbs toward de-escalation and initiation of peace negotiations as the precondition for implementing new sanctions relief for the FRY, along with improvements to the terms of the package.***

Concept: In light of Yeltsin's claim that Kozyrev secured commitments by Mladic on the safe areas and an offer for a ceasefire leading to new peace talks on the basis of the Contact Group plan, we might have the makings of a "package deal" for renewed peace talks that could be presented to Contact Group partners as a broadening of the Bildt-Milosevic package. (This would, of course, need to be discussed first with the Bosnians.) The elements would be:

A. **Mutual recognition between the FRY and Bosnia and measures to close the border along the lines of the Bildt package, but modified to remedy the most serious flaws:**

-- Serious commitment to seal the border and cut off all military support to the Bosnian Serbs, backed up by the deployment of 400-500 monitors.

-- A sanctions reimposition mechanism based on the idea of a five-nation review panel, but modified as follows:

- participants would be the five Contact Group members rather than the UNSC Perm Five;
- if the suspension period is to be of indefinite duration, then we would have to have a shorter grace period (e.g. 100 or 120 days) as opposed to 9 months; and
- we would need to have a private side-understanding with the UK and France guaranteeing that they would vote to reimpose sanctions if we presented evidence that Milosevic had failed to meet *any* of a set of criteria that would be specifically agreed in advance by London and Paris;[1]

B. **Implementation of the sanctions suspension would be delayed until:**

- The Bosnian Serbs have halted offensive action against all the safe areas and opened supply routes (as agreed at the July 26 Contact Group meeting); and
- The Bosnian Serbs have agreed to a country-wide 6-month ceasefire in tandem with agreement to begin talks on territorial and constitutional issues using the Contact Group plan as the starting point, but with both sides free to propose changes.
- *As a fallback to the latter condition:* That the Bosnian Serbs agree to the ceasefire and initiation of negotiations by the end of the grace period cited above.

[1] We would need to develop a list of verifiable criteria to minimize the risk of disagreements over the significance of intelligence data --e.g. no tampering with physical barriers to seal off all but a handful of permitted border crossings; shut down all telecommunications and air-traffic-control links; etc.

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In selling this approach to our Allies, we would point out that, if successful, it would reduce the likelihood that NATO would have to implement the decisive air strikes we have already threatened for the defense of Gorazde as well as similar action to protect Bihac and the other safe areas. (We would make clear, however, that there should be no perception of backing away from the commitment to implement the Gorazde decision, and that we believe our negotiating leverage would be enhanced by immediate extension of that decision to Bihac, Tuzla and Sarajevo.)

Analysis: This option would deny Milosevic the rewards of the Bildt package until he has obtained a down payment of positive performance from the Bosnian Serbs. We would thereby have a more defensible basis on which to justify new sanctions relief to Milosevic in the wake of Srebrenica and Zepa, and gain a 6-month window of opportunity for obtaining a final peace settlement. Given the additional "deliverables" required of Milosevic, we could, perhaps, sweeten the pot by suspending more sanctions, as long as we obtained satisfaction on the sanctions reimposition formula. We would be following Kohl's recommendation to the President to "put Milosevic to the test," and testing Yeltsin's claim that Mladic is ready to exercise restraint and negotiate on the basis of the Contact Group plan even if Karadzic is not. We would be building on our Contact Group partners' proposal at the July 26 meeting in London to tie implementation of the Bildt package to Bosnian Serb de-escalation measures on the ground.

The fallback position mentioned under "B" may prove necessary to overcome Contact Group resistance. It may, in fact, be required to gain Milosevic's agreement if he argues that he needs the political cover of substantial sanctions suspension before he can exert real pressure on the Pale leadership to agree to negotiations that use the Contact Group plan as the starting point.

Option 2: Improved Bildt: ***Seek improvements to the package without tying it to Bosnian Serb actions.***

Concept: This option would seek the improvements to the Bildt-Milosevic package listed under "A" above, but without linking implementation of sanctions relief to Bosnian Serb de-escalation or agreement to new peace talks. It would be based on the assumption that our Contact Group partners would reject the linkage and use any such proposal as grounds for charging the U.S. with seeking to torpedo the negotiating track , which they could use as a pretext to withdraw UNPROFOR this year. It reflects the further assumption that, with or without the modifications proposed above, Milosevic is unlikely to come to closure with Bildt, and that therefore there is no need to worry about the defensibility of providing additional sanctions relief.

Analysis: If the above assumptions are correct, then this is the lowest-risk course, ensuring that we maintain Contact Group unity and deny the Allies the ability to charge us with bad faith. If the assumptions are not correct, however, it would put us in a position of having to suspend additional sanctions without any Bosnian Serb down payment, and it would forfeit the opportunity to use the latest developments on the ground to restart negotiations between the parties that could lead to a political settlement over the next six months.

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As you are aware, Carl Bildt arrives in Washington Wednesday to discuss his efforts to negotiate a package which would give sanctions relief to Milosevic in return for recognition of Bosnia and agreement to tighten the closing of the border. His visit will be an important opportunity to advance the peace process, and I wanted to take this occasion to preview some of our thinking on the issues.

I am hopeful that the work Carl Bildt has done could prove to be the catalytic agent that brings the war to a negotiated conclusion. It is therefore vital that we approach his package with the utmost care, understanding that it may be our last best chance to move toward a settlement.

Much has happened in Bosnia since Ambassador Frasure first began to discuss with Milosevic partial sanctions suspension in return for recognition and closing of the border. The brutal Bosnian Serb assaults on Srebrenica and Zepa, the continued problems of humanitarian supply for Sarajevo and other safe areas, and the dangerous fighting around Bihac have dramatically increased the risks of much wider war. In my opinion, we can no longer afford to simply grant Milosevic sanctions relief hoping that, over time, he will bring what influence he has to bear on the Bosnian Serbs. Instead, it is important that any sanctions suspension package have a near-term impact on the situation on the ground.

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Recent statements by various Serb leaders, including statements reported by Foreign Minister Kozyrev, suggest an appropriate way to continue on the path developed by Carl Bildt. According to Kozyrev, Milosevic and Mladic indicated a willingness to halt all offensive action against safe areas, open supply routes, and agree to a country-wide cease-fire. In turn, the cease-fire would be linked to agreement to begin talks on territorial and constitutional issues accepting the Contact Group plan as the starting point, but with both sides free to propose changes, taken together. This would insur that any agreement on these elements would substantially enhance the value of the package negotiated by Mr. Bildt.

At present, the package itself still has some problems, not the least of which is the fact that in its current form it is unacceptable to the Bosnian government (whose country it is desined to stabilize), and also to Croatia. In this regard, I was pleased to learn that Bildt had visited Sarajevo the day after the July 26 Contact Group to discuss the package with President Izetbegovic, especially the issue of sealing the border, which is essential to gain Bosnian government support for the proposals. In my view, Bildt and others should continue to engage with the Bosnian government in order to increase the chances for achieving a negotiations package that is acceptable to President Izetbegovic.

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I still have some specific concerns about other aspects of the plan which Bildt and Milosevic had agreed on. The current package proposes that a five-nation review panel is named to consider sanctions reimposition. I believe that the five nations should be the Contact Group rather than the Perm Five. The package also proposes a nine month grace period during which sanctions could not be reimposed. While I understand the need for an initial grace period, I would prefer that it be in the range of 100-120 days as opposed to nine months. Finally, it is important that we reach a prior understanding with you (as a potential member of the five nation panel) that should we develop credible evidence implicating Milosevic in border violations, or other violations of his commitments under the proposal, that you would agree with us on the need to reimpose sanctions.

Obviously, there is a great deal of further discussion which our resepctive teams will need to pursue this week.

I want you to know, however, that I am determined to have the U.S. work cooperatively with Carl Bildt and with all of the Contact Group governments in an effort to advance the cause of peace through negotiations.

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Lift of Bosnian Arms Embargo

The objective of lifting the embargo on the Bosnian Government forces would be to enable them to defend their core areas and regain some territory lost in the conflict. Initially, improved small arms, anti-tank , counter-battery and additional heavy weapons, and trucks are high priority items for the Bosnians.

We believe the Bosnian Government will have resources available to bring in substantial weaponry over a six month period without our active involvement. We estimate any substantial change in capabilities will require at least six months due to Bosnian organizational problems and inadequacies in Bosnian logistics and the requirements to distribute weapons and support throughout the Bosnian army.

Implications of this lift policy include:

-- Defensive capability would progressively strengthen, but offensive capability will fall short of that required to offset Serbian advantages in heavy weapons, intelligence, airpower, electronic warfare, and command and control.

-- Croatians would exact a heavy price on the Bosnians for permitting the armament and would inevitably prevent, absent active US support, heavy weaponry from augmenting the Bosnian force.

-- During the six month build up, BSA would receive rapid reinforcement from Serbia which would largely offset improvements shown by the Bosnians.

-- The net effect: would be a higher level of intensity of fighting with a virtually unchanged military balance.

-- US Allies would keep pressure to bear to restrain our activities in DENY FLIGHT, SHARP GUARD, and to provide any overt assistance.

-- Russia would provide overt assistance to Serbia, some of which will flow into Bosnia.

-- The radical Muslim presence would be considerably strengthened inside Bosnia.

Overall, lifting the arms embargo is more likely to precipitate a Bosnian defeat than a successful effort to restore legitimate territorial boundaries.

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Training the Bosnians

US forces would conduct training to enhance Bosnian military capabilities to counter Serbian strengths in armor and artillery.

Training would be conducted outside of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Training in advanced infantry/"Ranger Type" skills are envisioned. Arms that require little to no training can be employed upon delivery; training in command and control and for specific arms to offset deficiencies in armor and artillery will require specialized skill training to counter Serbian strengths.

Initial assessment and preparation phase would take one month. To stabilize the situation, increasing weapons density and increasing individual and small unit capabilities, along with specialized skill training in heavy weapons will take at least two months. To improve the military posture, including collective training, battalion staff training, and continued special skill training will take at least four additional months.

US training contingent would consist of a Special Forces Group, which includes specialized Mobile Training Teams and associated Combat Support and Combat Service Support personnel. Approximately 2000 personnel at an approximate cost of $19 million would be required.

Command and control, leadership, communications, and other battlefield systems would require extensive training time. It would be particularly difficult to make personnel available for training at a time when fighting is likely to be increasing.

To counter USG and other support to the Bosnian military the Serbs would likely garner additional support from Serbia and Russia.

Training would be a stop gap measure that would provide the Bosnian Army with some enhanced capabilities. Those capabilities would not seriously begin to approach the capability of the Bosnian Serb Army, especially in the vital battlefield systems of command and control, logistics, intelligence, and integrated air defense. It would take an enormous amount of time to build a Bosnian military force that could significantly affect the tactical or strategic military balance.

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Air Support to Bosnia

This paper assumes that air support will be provided following a UNPF withdrawal to assist Bosnian defense of their core areas without the benefit of Forward Air Controllers (FACs) on the ground.

The air power required to implement this policy is available in theater now and is sustainable provided effective Suppression of Enemy Defenses (SEAD) is conducted and sustained throughout the air operation.

If so directed, air forces can attack to degrade Serb command and control and artillery and impede movement of Serb units, reinforcements, and supplies. However, without ground FACs, air power is likely unable to decisively affect close engagements, offensive or defensive, fought by Bosnian Army.

Wide spread use of airpower for a prolonged period of time will likely invite Serbian and possibly Russian assistance, overt or covert, to strengthen protection against air activity. This assistance could include provision of more capable Surface-to-Air Missile systems, sophisticated electronic equipment to offset US jamming/electronic warfare systems, and increased efforts at camouflage/concealment. Of course this would be accompanied by diplomatic, moral, and public pressure against our use of air power to include exploiting collateral damage.

While this use of air power may raise the costs to the Serbs it is unlikely to be decisive in defeating their force absent strong military action by the Bosnian Government.

It would unmistakably mark the US as a combatant in the operation, and if done unilaterally, would impose additional severe strains on NATO. It would also require us to forego basing in Italy, and require us to develop bases elsewhere in the Balkans or use only Carrier-based assets.

Overall use of air power is a stop gap, temporary measure which could raise Bosnian morale and set back Serb planning and logistics. However, the use of air power is unlikely to decisively effect the outcome on the ground and would most likely provoke a more determined aggression by Serbia.

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX+1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: 1
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX

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LOG 9520893
DATE 31 JUL 95

SUBJECT: PC MTG 1 AUG ON BOSNIA & CROATIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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MESSAGE NO.: _____ CLASSIFICATION: SECRET TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia

NSC LOG #20893

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
State	Executive Secretary		
Defense	Executive Secretary		
USUN/State	Rick Inderfurth		
CIA	Executive Secretary		
JCS	Secretary		

REMARKS:

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FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting PC Mtg on Bosnia/Croatia PAGES: 3

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

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USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20893

July 31, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. DOUGLAS GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F.C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia on August 1, 1995, from 2:30 to 4:00 p.m., in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Principals plus one. The agenda is attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/8/2019
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NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA AND CROATIA

DATE: August 1, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 p.m. - 4:00 p.m.

Agenda

I. NAC decision to extend Gorazde air campaign to Bihac and other safe areas: Status and Strategy.....JCS/OSD

II. Response to Bildt-Milosevic package.....State
(NSC Options paper circulated separately)

III. Croatia -- Situation and Strategy.....CIA/State

IV. Longer-Term Strategy.....NSC/All

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 3/6/2020
2013-0682-M

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20893

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 31, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, August 1, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Principals meeting on Bosnia and Croatia to be held August 1, 1995. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the meeting and authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

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By RDS NARA, Date 10/8/2019
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See also 2013-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)~~	~~08/15/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
~~001b. memo~~	~~[Duplicate of 001a, incomplete copy] (1 page)~~	~~08/15/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
002. agenda	NSC Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)	08/15/1995	P1/b(1)

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2010-0533-M
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
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b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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RECORD ID: 9520971
RECEIVED: 16 AUG 95 14

TO: LAKE

FROM: BREMNER
KERRICK

DOC DATE: 16 AUG 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 15 AUG PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: LAKE DISAPPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 19 AUG 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BREMNER LOGREF: 9520952

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0143 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BREMNER
		JOSHI
		KERRICK
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: LAKE APPROVED SOC FOR FILES ONLY, BUT DISAPPROVED RECOM TO DISPATCH TO AGENCIES.

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001		X	95081714	LAKE DISAPPROVED RECOM

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Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger	2	Copy	
Lake	3	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	Senate
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	N	MP 8/17	N
Records Mgt.			

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COMMENTS:

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Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger	2	Copy	
Lake	3	~~Natl Sec Advisor~~ has seen	Senate
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	(MB) 8/17	N
Records Mgt.			

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COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20971

August 16, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: BG DONALD KERRICK, ACTING (W)

FROM: SUE BREMNER SB

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, August 15, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia held August 15, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to ~~sign the memo to the~~ agencies at Tab I.

Approve AL Disapprove _____

for files as amended

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~
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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/8/2015
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20971

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee Meeting
DATE: August 15, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 3:30 p.m.-4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR
Anthony Lake

OVP
Bill Wise
Richard Wurtz

STATE
Secretary Christopher
Strobe Talbott
James Steinberg

DEFENSE
Secretary Perry
Jan Lodal

USUN
Amb. Madeleine Albright
James O'Brien

OMB
Jack Lew

CIA
John Deutch
VADM Dennis Blair

JCS
General Shalikashvili
BG John Walsh

White House
Sandy Berber
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
BG Donald Kerrick
Sue Bremner

Summary of Conclusions

1. Principals met August 15 to review the diplomatic state of play and discuss next steps on Kosovo.

2. Tony Lake provided a read-out of his trip to European capitals, noting that all governments were broadly supportive of our initiatives and in agreement that a diplomatic solution needed to be reached in the next several weeks. After the completion of the Holbrooke mission, we would consider next steps, which might include a more inclusive Contact Group meeting

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in Geneva at the end of the week. Proposals for informal working groups on military implementation and economic reconstruction needed to be fleshed out, with the EU taking the lead on the latter

3. Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili noted that DoD was working on a paper on NATO implementation, which would be discussed by Deputies August 18. Once ideas on the mission and mandate for the post-settlement implementation force were fleshed out, details of troop numbers could be worked out more easily.

4. On the issue of Kosovo, Principals agreed that refugee flows should not in and of themselves be treated as a casus belli, but Dick Holbrooke should be instructed to remind Milosevic that we had previously warned him of the consequences of Serb-sparked conflict in the province. State agreed to revise language in a demarche to be used by Holbrooke.

5. On the subject of a Congressional and public strategy, Principals agreed to hold off until after the Holbrooke mission was complete. Lake would, however, brief Allied ambassadors in the next day or so to the broad outlines of his trip, and State could brief non-NATO troop contributors at an appropriate level.

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20971

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. AARON S. WILLIAMS
Executive Secretary
Agency for International Development

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, August 15, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/8/2019
2010-0533-M

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FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 15 AUG 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION W/ AGENDA FOR 15 AUG PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 17 AUG 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BREMNER LOGREF: 9520971

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0143 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		JOSHI
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
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002	950815	BRILL, K	
002	950815	MCALEER, R	
002	950815	INDERFURTH, R	
002	950815	ADAMS, G	
002	950815	PANETTA, L	
002	950815	GARTHOFF, D	
002	950815	WILSON, F	

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Sens	1	AS	
Soderberg			
Berger	2		
Lake		Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3		D
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COMMENTS: NOM + Agenda for Bosnia PC Mtg. 8/15

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	8/15	4:30pm	Karlie Wood PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
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MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	8/15	11:13am	Adam Kreisel PRINT LAST NAME: Kreisel COPY: 1

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COL. F. C. WILSON JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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MR. LEON FUERTH
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
VIA NOELLE JENSEN
ROOM 292, OEOB
WASHINGTON, DC 20506

PRINT LAST NAME: Bujold - Jensen
COPY: 1

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

DATE: _____ TIME: _____ SIGNATURE: _____
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COL ROBERT P. MCALEER
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ROOM 3E880
PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

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U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER
ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
2201 C STREET NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319

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DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET
ROOM 238
OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG
WASHINGTON, DC 20503

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WHITE HOUSE
1ST FLOOR, WEST WING
WASHINGTON, DC 20500

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	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
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AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1

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LOG 9520952
DATE 15 AUG 95

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COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	_____	_____	JBurnim PRINT LAST NAME: Burnim COPY: 1
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: [signature] COPY: 1

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NMCC/JCS

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: M. Grant

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 1718 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: PC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 20952

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B	USUN (STATE)	OFFICE OF AMB		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

TODAYS PC MTG

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Initials: RDS Date: 10/8/2019
2010-0533-M

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

N
0930

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: M. Smith

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 1718 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: PC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 20952

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B	USUN (STATE)	OFFICE OF AMB		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

TODAYS PC MTG

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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Initials: RDS Date: 10/8/2019
2010-0533-M

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: N. Burns

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 1718 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: PC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 20952

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B	USUN (STATE)	OFFICE OF AMB		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

(A)

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: T. Duvall

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 1718 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: PC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 20952

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
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REMARKS:

TODAYS PC MTG

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE
- ☐ FLASH
- ☑ IMMEDIATE
- ☐ PRIORITY
- ☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting PC MTG ON BOSN/A PAGES: 2 + COVER

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20952

August 15, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President

MR. DOUGLAS GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia today, August 15, from 3:30 - 4:30 p.m. Attendance is principals plus one. An agenda for the meeting is attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/8/2019
2010-0533-M

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. agenda	NSC Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)	08/15/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4009

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0143 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, August 15, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs646

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20952

August 14, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: SUE BREMNER

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting, August 15, 1995

Attached is an agenda (Tab A) for tomorrow's Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the agenda and authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to Agencies
Tab A Agenda

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See also 2013-0652-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

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Folder Title: PC0145 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, August 22, 1995				
Staff Office-Individual: Records Management				
Original OA/ID Number: 4009				
Row: 43	Section: 6	Shelf: 7	Position: 2	Stack: V

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)~~	~~08/22/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
~~001b. memo~~	~~[Duplicate of 001a, incomplete copy] (1 page)~~	~~08/22/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
002a. memo	BG Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake re: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (3 pages)	08/21/1995	P1/b(1)
~~002b. agenda~~	~~NSC Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)~~	~~08/22/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003. agenda~~	~~[Duplicate of 002b] (1 page)~~	~~08/22/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4009

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0145 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, August 22, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs647

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520997
RECEIVED: 23 AUG 95 08

TO: LAKE

FROM: BREMNER
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 23 AUG 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA SOC
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 22 AUG PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: LAKE APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 26 AUG 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BREMNER LOGREF: 9520986 9520990

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0145 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BREMNER
		NSC CHRON
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: LAKE APPROVED RECOM AS AMMENDED. SOC FILED FOR RECORD AND NOT SENT TO AGENCIES

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSASK CLOSED BY: NSMEC DOC 1 OF 1

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By RDS NARA, Date 8/8/2019
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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95082318	FOR DECISION
001		X	95082419	LAKE APPROVED RECOM

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National Security Council
The White House

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG MC A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1		
Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg	Copy	✓	
Berger	~~Copy~~		
Lake	2	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	MC 8/24	A
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

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National Security Council
The White House

1:30 PM

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 20997

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG MC A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1		
Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg	Copy	✓	
Berger	~~Copy~~		
Lake	2	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	MC 8/24	A
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20997

August 23, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: SUE BREMNER

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, August 22, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia held August 22, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens ~~to sign the memo to the agencies~~ for files at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments as amended
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/18/2019
96-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee
DATE: August 22, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 3:30 p.m. - 5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR
Anthony Lake

OVP
Leon Fuerth
Rick Saunders

STATE
Secretary Christopher
Strobe Talbott
Amb. Holbrooke

DEFENSE
Secretary Perry
John White
Jan Lodal

USUN
Amb. Albright
James O'Brien

OMB
Alice Rivlin
Keith Bickel

CIA
George Tenet
Adm. Dennis Blair

JCS
Adm. Boorda
Gen. Clark

NSC
Alexander Vershbow
BG Donald Kerrick
Sue Bremner

WHITE HOUSE
Samuel Berger
Nancy Soderberg

Summary of Conclusions

1. Principals met August 22 to receive a debrief from Amb. Holbrooke on the recent diplomatic mission to ex-Yugoslav states. Regarding the seven key goals defined in the course of NSA Lake's earlier mission, Principals reached the following conclusions:

a) **Comprehensive nature of settlement:** We will continue to make this our overarching goal.

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2010-0533-M
RS 9/30/14 (1.63)

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b) **Three-way mutual recognition:** While Milosevic remains opposed to recognizing Croatia, we will continue to pursue this goal. It should not, however, be a prerequisite for a Bosnia settlement.

c) **Territorial adjustments:** We will retain as an eventual goal a contiguous landmass for the Bosnian Federation and press the case for defensibility with the GoBH. For the time being, however, we will not insist that the GoBH agree to give up Gorazde, so as to avoid intensifying fears we are unconcerned about the possibility of excessive, Croatian territory in Bosnia proper.

d) **Constitutional Provisions:** Discussions have only begun with the parties.

e) **Sanctions Suspension/Relief:** We will continue to try to avoid being drawn into discussions of intermediate steps. OVP will finalize its paper on when sanctions suspension (to be granted to Belgrade upon signature of a peace accord) could be turned into sanctions lift. OVP's paper should describe the stage in the settlement implementation process at which full lift would come into being.

f) **Sector East:** Although Milosevic told Amb. Holbrooke he privately accepted that Eastern Slavonia was part of Croatia, a negotiated solution will be difficult in the near term. At a minimum, we need to initiate a process based on Z-4 principles. We also need to convince Tudjman that UNCRO must remain in place in Sector East. We will continue to refine our strategy on negotiations with the aim of preventing a military confrontation that would draw in the FRY.

g) **Economic Reconstruction:** Deputies will consider the subject on a priority basis in the course of the meeting on post-settlement implementation scheduled for August 23. At issue are the nature and scope of the assistance program, the size of the U.S. contribution, how to convince Congress the plan deserves support, where the USG contribution will come from, and how much we can expect to see from the Europeans, the Japanese, and moderate Arab states. (S)

2. On the issue of the **UK decision to withdraw from Gorazde,** Principals decided to avoid attempting to change UK minds at this time. (S)

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20997

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the
United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for
National Security &
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

MR. DOUGLAS GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, August 22, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/8/2019
2010-0533-M

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b) **Three-way mutual recognition:** While Milosevic remains opposed to recognizing Croatia, we will continue to pursue this goal. It should not, however, be a prerequisite for a Bosnia settlement.

c) **Territorial adjustments:** We will retain as an eventual goal a contiguous landmass for the Bosnian Federation and press the case for defensibility with the GoBH. For the time being, however, we will not insist that the GoBH agree to give up Gorazde, so as to avoid intensifying fears we are unconcerned about the possibility of excessive Croatian ~~influence~~ territory in Bosnia proper.

d) **Constitutional Provisions:** ~~While~~ Discussions have only begun with the parties. ~~Principals noted that the looser the constitutional arrangements linking the Federation and Bosnian Serb entity, the better the prospects a settlement would work.~~ percentage

e) **Sanctions Suspension/Relief:** We will continue to try to avoid being drawn into discussions of intermediate steps. OVP will finalize its paper on when sanctions suspension (to be granted to Belgrade upon signature of a peace accord) could be turned into sanctions lift. OVP's paper should describe the stage in the settlement implementation process at which full lift would come into being.

f) **Sector East:** Although Milosevic told Amb. Holbrooke he privately accepted that Eastern Slavonia was part of Croatia, a negotiated solution will be difficult in the near term. At a minimum, we need to initiate a process based on Z-4 principles. We also need to convince Tudjman that UNCRO must remain in place in Sector East. We will continue to refine our strategy on negotiations with the aim of preventing a military confrontation that would draw in the FRY.

g) **Economic Reconstruction:** Deputies will consider the subject on a priority basis in the course of the meeting on post-settlement implementation scheduled for August 23. At issue are the nature and scope of the assistance program, the size of the U.S. contribution, how to convince Congress the plan deserves support, where the USG contribution will come from, and how much we can expect to see from the Europeans, the Japanese, and moderate Arab states. ~~(S)~~

2. On the issue of the **UK decision to withdraw from Gorazde,** Principals decided to avoid attempting to change UK minds at this time. ~~(S)~~

3. Principals discussed the Bosnian Serb leadership struggle and related notion of **Belgrade's proxy** for the Bosnian Serbs; no firm conclusions were reached, except to respond to new situations as they arose. ~~(C)~~

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RECORD ID: 9520990
RECEIVED: 21 AUG 95 16

TO: LAKE

FROM: KERRICK

DOC DATE: 21 AUG 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 22 AUG PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 24 AUG 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK LOGREF: 9520986 9520997

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0145 CODES: BOS

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FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

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NSC CHRON

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DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95082120	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	95082515	NOTED BY LAKE

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1	JM	
Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg	Copy	~~Natl Sec Advisor~~ has seen	
Berger	2		
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	MC 8/25	A
Records Mgt.			

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cc:

COMMENTS: Lake Mtg paper for Bosnia PC 8/22

Exec Sec Office has diskette 4/98

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	BG Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake re: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (3 pages)	08/21/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4009

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0145 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, August 22, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs647

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA
DATE: August 22, 1995
LOCATION: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
TIME: 3:30 - 5:00 p.m.

Agenda

I. Diplomatic Read-out of Holbrooke Mission .....State

II. Next Steps .....State/NSC

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 3/6/2020
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TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 21 AUG 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 22 AUG PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 24 AUG 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BREMNER LOGREF: 9520990 9520997

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0145 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BASS
		BERGER
		BREMNER
		JOSHI
		KERRICK
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG

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DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95082116	FOR DECISION
001		X	95082117	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
001	SENS	Z	95082117	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	95082118	DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950821	FUERTH, L	
002	950821	BRILL, K	
002	950821	MCALEER, R	
002	950821	INDERFURTH, R	
002	950821	ADAMS, G	
002	950821	GARTHOFF, D	
002	950821	WILSON, F	

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TO: LAKE

FROM: BREMNER
KERRICK

DOC DATE: 21 AUG 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 22 AUG PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: FOR DECISION DUE DATE: 24 AUG 95 STATUS: X

STAFF OFFICER: BREMNER LOGREF:

FILES: IFM NSCP: CODES: BOS

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FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
LAKE		

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6pm

National Security Council
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Harmon	1		
Dohse	3		A
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake	2	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	8/21	D
Records Mgt.			

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cc:

COMMENTS:

NOM + Agenda Bosnia PC
8/22

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EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
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	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: 1		
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	9-22-95	6:00 AM	Anthony Tagliabue
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: 1		
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: VIA FAX		
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: VIA FAX		
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	8/22/95	9:50	J. Graves
	PRINT LAST NAME:		GRAVES
	COPY: 1		
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			
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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ROOM 2E865
PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: 1
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AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: 1
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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	8/22/95	7:10AM	L. Smith PRINT LAST NAME: Smith COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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2010-0533-M

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LOG 9520986
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SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 22 AUG PC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	8/22/95	_____	J. Graves PRINT LAST NAME: GRAVES COPY: 1
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 1757 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 22 AUG PC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 20986

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE B	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD N	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN B	AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH		
CIA A	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS D	SECRETARY		

REMARKS: OPS CENTERS: PLEASE DISPATCH TO ADDRESSEES AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE.

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FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 22 AUG PC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 20986

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE B	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD N	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN B	AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH		
CIA A	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
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FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FORR22 AUG PC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 20986

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE B	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD N	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
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CIA A	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS D	SECRETARY		

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE (circled)
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: [signature]

DTG:

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FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

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TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE B	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
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USUN B	AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH		
CIA A	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
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~~SECRET~~

20986

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 21, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the
United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for
National Security &
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

MR. DOUGLAS GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia August 22, 1995 from 3:30 p.m. - 5:00 p.m.. Attendance is principals plus one. An agenda for the meeting is attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

for
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/8/2019
2010-0533-M

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NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA
DATE: August 22, 1995
LOCATION: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
TIME: 3:30 - 5:00 p.m.

Agenda

I. Diplomatic Read-out of Holbrooke Mission .....State

II. Next Steps .....State/NSC

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 3/6/2020
2013-0682-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20986

August 21, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: BG DONALD KERRICK

FROM: SUE BREMNER

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, August 22, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Principals meeting on Bosnia to be held August 22, 1995. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the meeting and authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

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By RDS NARA, Date 10/8/2019
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See also 2013-0652-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia [partial] (1 page)	09/05/1995	P1/b(1) KC 6/11/2020
~~002a. agenda~~	~~NSC Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)~~	~~09/05/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002b. agenda~~	~~[Draft Version of 002a] (1 page)~~	~~09/05/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020

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PC0147 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, September 5, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs648

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 09 SEP 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA SOC
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 5 SEP PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: HARMON SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 09 SEP 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9521024

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0147 CODES: BOS

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DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95090620	FOR DECISION
001		X	95090912	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
002		X	95090912	HARMON SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950909	FUERTH, L	
002	950909	BRILL, K	
002	950909	MCALEER, R	
002	950909	INDERFURTH, R	
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Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5	9/9	D
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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions for 5 Sept. PC Meeting on Bosnia NSC LOG # 21032

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	State	Executive Secretary		
N	DOD	Executive Secretary		
	USUN	Ofc. of the Rep. of the U.S.		
N	CIA	Executive Secretary		
D	JCS	Secretary, Joint Staff		

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A	CIA	Executive Secretary		
D	JCS	Secretary, Joint Staff		

REMARKS:

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions for 5 Sept. PC Meeting on Bosnia NSC LOG # 21032

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A	CIA	Executive Secretary		
D	JCS	Secretary, Joint Staff		

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SUBJECT: ~~Notice~~ of Meeting: 5 Sept. PC on Bosnia SOC PAGES: Cover +5

NSC # 21032

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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21032

September 9, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for
National Security &
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

MR. RICK YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~
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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By KBD NARA, Date 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

21032

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee
DATE: September 5, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 p.m. - 3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR
Anthony Lake

OVP
Leon Fuerth

STATE
Strobe Talbott
Peter Tarnoff
John Kornblum

DEFENSE
John White
Walter Slocombe
Jan Lodal

USUN
Rick Inderfurth
David Scheffer

OMB
Alice Rivlin
Gordon Adams

CIA
John Deutch
Dennis Blair

JCS
John Shalikashvili
William Owens
Michael Byron

White House
Sandy Berger
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
Alexander Vershbow
Bill Danvers

Summary of Conclusions

1. Principals met to review the status of the NATO airstrikes in response to the August 27 Bosnian Serb attack on the Sarajevo marketplace, progress of the U.S. diplomatic initiative, and the recommendations of the Deputies Committee on implementation of a Bosnia peace settlement. They agreed to meet again on Monday, September 11 with the Holbrooke delegation in order to review next steps on the diplomatic front. (S)

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COLLECTION:
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NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4009

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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NATO Air Strikes

2. Principals agreed that we will support the continuation of NATO airstrikes, as agreed by the UN and NATO Commanders, as long as the Bosnian Serbs have failed to comply with the UN/NATO conditions. This does not rule out tactical pauses in the operation. Principals noted that a decision to move from option 2 to option 3 targeting will require a new NAC decision and further coordination with the United Nations; we will await a recommendation to this effect on the part of the UN and NATO commanders. Principals also agreed that if the Bosnian Serbs retaliate, we will support further escalation by NATO. ~~(S)~~

3. In order to encourage Bosnian Serb compliance with the UN/NATO conditions, Principals agreed that we will continue to stress the need for restraint on the part of Bosnian government forces. We will convey to the Bosnian Serbs through Milosevic and General Janvier that we are making clear to the Bosnian government that we expect that they will not take advantage of the situation. (b)(1)

(b)(1)

U.S. Diplomatic Initiative

4. Principals discussed the progress of the Holbrooke mission and its negotiations with the Bosnians, Croatians, and Serbian President Milosevic. The Friday meeting of the three Balkan Foreign Ministers in Geneva with the Contact Group will likely produce agreement on general principles for a political settlement and FRY recognition of Bosnia. Representation will be at the political director level on the Contact Group side, along with EU negotiator Bildt. It was agreed that State would consult with Ambassador Holbrooke regarding the possible inclusion as observers of Italy, Canada, Spain and Turkey. (It was subsequently agreed that these countries would not be included in the Geneva meeting, but that they would be invited to an expanded Contact Group meeting the following week.) ~~(S)~~

5. Principals agreed that we would not provide any further sanctions relief for the FRY in return for interim steps such as mutual recognition. Principals agreed, however, that we might provide humanitarian assistance to Serbia to support refugees from the Krajina in response to FRY recognition of Bosnia, but that we would not hold out this possibility in advance of the Geneva meeting, and that we would also insist on Bosnian Serb compliance with the UN/NATO conditions in addition to FRY recognition of Bosnia. ~~(S)~~

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6. Principals approved the approach to sanctions relief outlined in the Deputies Committee's Memorandum for Principals of September 1. OVP noted that we still needed to define what would constitute full implementation of a settlement, which would be the stage at which a full lifting of sanctions would occur, and undertook to product a paper looking at the options for when to lift sanctions **(Action: OVP)**. Principals also noted the importance of maintaining the outer wall of sanctions contingent upon Serbian cooperation with the international War Crimes Tribunal. (S)

Implementation of a Peace Settlement

7. Principals approved the concept for military implementation of peace plan as set forth in the OSD paper. They agreed that the interagency working group would coordinate on a proposed draft NAC decision sheet that could form the basis for tasking to the NATO military authorities. They noted that initial consultations would begin the following day with key allies, to be followed by discussions with all allies in Brussels. (S)

8. Principals agreed that the exit strategy summarized in the Deputies Committee Memorandum should be clarified to state that the peace implementation force (IFOR) will withdraw when the Bosnian Federation is capable of defending itself, but in any case no later than 12 months from its initial deployment. Principals agreed on the urgency of developing a U.S. position on the political framework for implementation of a settlement and requested that Deputies discuss this on a priority basis. **(Action: State to circulate paper for Deputies discussion).** (S)

9. Principals agreed on the importance of early engagement with the Russians on peace plan implementation, noting reports that in Chancellor Kohl's meetings with Yeltsin, the Russians had objected to NATO being in charge of the operation. They agreed that the Deputies should urgently review the modalities of a NATO-plus operation as a basis for engaging with the Russians. **(Action: OSD to circulate paper for Deputies discussion.)** (S)

Equipping and Training for Federation Forces

10. Principals reviewed the concept for equipping and training Federation armed forces in the context of a peace settlement, as set forth in the JCS paper. While they concurred in the recommendation that the U.S. take the lead in coordinating a multinational effort to equip and train Federation forces, they agreed that it may be preferable for the U.S. to play a more modest role in the actual equip/train effort, providing a small level of military assistance and training while leaving other states to provide the bulk of Bosnian needs. Principals agreed we should continue to seek to exclude radical states like Iran

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from equipping and training the Bosnians by making our own support conditional on such exclusion. (S)

11. Principals recognized that the equip and train concept will be especially controversial with allies and the Russians, and agreed that further work on arms control options should be accelerated with a view to avoiding a regional arms race, recognizing that such measures may be difficult to negotiate among the parties **(Action: State to circulate paper for Deputies discussion).** (S)

12. Principals agreed that there were many other issues that could affect our approach to the equip/train issue, and agreed that an interagency task force chaired by the Department of State should be established to address such issues as procurement, recruitment of donors, and modalities of lifting the arms embargo. They also agreed that consultations with key allies should begin through Defense Ministry channels, in coordination with the State-led task force. Principals agreed in principle that an assessment team could make a low-key informal visit to Sarajevo to consult on Federation requirements. They noted that there were potential legal problems involved in an equip/train effort, giving that our assistance would likely go to the Federation rather than to the central government of the future Bosnian union. **(Actions: To be determined after follow-up discussion by Deputies).** (S)

Economic Recommendation

13. Principals briefly reviewed the progress of ongoing consultations with the European Union on post-war economic reconstruction. They agreed on the need for an expanded State concept paper following the return of the U.S. delegation from Europe **(Action: State).** (S)

Congressional Consultations/Funding

14. Principals agreed on immediate Congressional consultations on Bosnia, encompassing NATO airstrikes, the U.S. diplomatic initiative and U.S. planning for implementation of a peace settlement. They endorsed a briefing of the full Senate the following day by a senior interagency team, to be followed by similar briefings for House committees on September 7. They also agreed that, in light of expected Congressional questions about funding for various peace implementation efforts, options should be developed for financing peace plan implementation, equipping and training Federation forces, and U.S. contribution to post-war economic reconstruction for the Balkans **(Action: OMB).** (S)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

21032

September 6, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, September 5, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia held September 5, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to the agencies

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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21032

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for
National Security &
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

MR. DOUGLAS GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Joyce A. Harman
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By DS NARA, Date 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9521024
RECEIVED: 31 AUG 95 18

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 01 SEP 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 5 SEP PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 04 SEP 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BREMNER LOGREF: 9521032

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0147 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BASS
		BERGER
		BREMNER
		JOSHI
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
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001		X	95090120	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
002		X	95090120	SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950901	FUERTH, L	
002	950901	BRILL, K	
002	950901	MCALEER, R	
002	950901	INDERFURTH, R	
002	950901	ADAMS, G	
002	950901	PANETTA, L	
002	950901	GARTHOFF, D	
002	950901	WILSON, F	

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The White House

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	9-5-95	AM 6:00	Anthony Taylor PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX+1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
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WASHINGTON, DC 20506

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

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COL ROBERT P. MCALEER
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
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PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

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U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER
ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319

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DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET
ROOM 238
OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG
WASHINGTON, DC 20503

9/1/95 5:00 Laura Holt

PRINT LAST NAME: ROHOLT

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MR. LEON E. PANETTA
WHITE HOUSE
1ST FLOOR, WEST WING
WASHINGTON, DC 20500

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FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Notification & Agenda for 5 Sept. PC Meeting on Bosnia NSC LOG # 21024

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	State	Executive Secretary		
N	DoD	Executive Secretary		
	USUN	Ofc. of the Rep. of the U.S.		
A	CIA	Executive Secretary		
D	JCS	Secretary, Joint Staff		

REMARKS:

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Notification & Agenda for 5 Sept. PC Meeting on Bosnia NSC LOG # 21024

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	State	Executive Secretary		
N	DOD	Executive Secretary		
	USUN	Ofc. of the Rep. of the U.S.		
A	CIA	Executive Secretary		
D	JCS	Secretary, Joint Staff		

REMARKS:

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Notification & Agenda for 5 Sept. PC Meeting on Bosnia NSC LOG # 21024

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
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N	DoD	Executive Secretary		
	USUN	Ofc. of the Rep. of the U.S.		
A	CIA	Executive Secretary		
D	JCS	Secretary, Joint Staff		

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MESSAGE NO.: 1857 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Notification & Agenda for 5 Sept. PC Meeting on Bosnia NSC LOG # 21024

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	State	Executive Secretary		
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	USUN	Ofc. of the Rep. of the U.S.		
A	CIA	Executive Secretary		
D	JCS	Secretary, Joint Staff		

REMARKS:

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MESSAGE #: _____

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting: 5 Sept. PC on Bosnia PAGES: Cover + 2

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

21024

September 1, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

DR. GORDON ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President

MR. DOUGLAS GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia, Tuesday, September 5, 1995 from 2:30 p.m. - 3:30 p.m. in the Situation Room. Attendance is principals plus one. An agenda for the meeting is attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA
DATE: September 5, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 - 3:30 p.m.

Agenda

I. Status of U.S. Initiative
   A. Update on Holbrooke Mission.....State
   B. Planning for Sanctions Relief/Reimposition.....OVP
   C. End-game Strategy, including Possible Summit.....NSC

II. Military Implementation Planning Update
   A. Approval of Concepts in Deputies Memorandum for Principals.....OSD
   B. Consultation Strategy.....State/OSD

III. Equip and Train Update
   A. Approval of Concepts in Deputies Memorandum for Principals.....JCS
   B. Consultation Strategy.....State/JCS

IV. Status of Reconstruction Assistance Planning
   A. Update on Johnson Mission.....State
   B. Congressional Consultations.....NSC
   C. Funding Strategy.....OMB

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KG NARA, Date 3/9/2020
2013-0682-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

21024

August 31, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: SUE BREMNER

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting, September 5, 1995

Attached is an agenda (Tab A) for the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia for Monday, September 5, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the agenda and authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to Agencies
Tab A Agenda

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA
DATE: September 5, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 - 3:30 p.m.

Agenda

I. Status of U.S. Initiative
   A. Update on Holbrooke Mission.....State
   B. Planning for Sanctions Relief/Reimposition.....OVP
   C. End-game Strategy, including Possible Summit.....NSC

II. Military Implementation Planning Update
   A. Approval of Concepts in Memorandum for Principals....OSD
   B. Consultation Strategy.....State/OSD

III. Equip and Train Update
   A. Approval of Concepts in Memorandum for Principals....JCS
   B. Consultation Strategy.....State/JCS

IV. Status of Reconstruction Assistance Planning
   A. Update on Johnson Mission.....State
   B. Congressional Consultations.....NSC
   C. Funding Strategy.....OMB

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By IR NARA, Date 3/4/22
2013-0682-M

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See also 2013-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

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~~001. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)~~	~~09/11/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
~~002a. memo~~	~~Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Drop-by at the September 11 Principals Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)~~	~~09/11/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC
~~002b. talking points~~	~~re: Points to be Made for Drop-by at Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)~~	~~09/11/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC
~~002c. memo~~	~~Sue Bremner to Anthony Lake, re: Briefing Memorandum for the President's Drop-by at the September 11 Principals Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)~~	~~09/11/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ
~~002d. talking points~~	~~[Duplicate of 002b] (1 page)~~	~~09/11/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4009

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0148 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, September 11, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs649

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9521062
RECEIVED: 12 SEP 95 16

TO: LAKE

FROM: VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 12 SEP 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA SOC
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 11 SEP PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: LAKE APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 15 SEP 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9521050

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0148 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BASS
		BERGER
		JOSHI
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS CLOSED BY: NSJDA DOC 1 OF 1

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By DRS NARA, Date 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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~~SECRET~~ RECORD ID: 9521062

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95092608	FOR DECISION
001		X	95092608	LAKE APPROVED RECOM

~~SECRET~~

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National Security Council
The White House

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2:30pm

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
LB Harmon	1		
Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg	copy ✓		
Berger	2		
Lake	3	Nat'l Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4		N
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette YES ____

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The White House

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URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1		
Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg	copy ✓		
Berger	2		
Lake	3	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4		N
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette YES

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~~SECRET~~

21062

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 25, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, September 11, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia held September 11, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

~~That you authorize~~ Minutes, Andrew Sens to ~~sign the memo to the agencies~~

Approve ✓ Disapprove ____

for files

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

~~SECRET~~

21062

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee
DATE: September 11, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 4:30 p.m. - 6:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

THE PRESIDENT
(5:05 - 5:30 p.m.)

CHAIR
Anthony Lake

OVP
Leon Fuerth

STATE
Secretary Christopher
Strobe Talbott
Peter Tarnoff

DEFENSE
Secretary Perry
Walter Slocombe

USUN
Rick Inderfurth
David Scheffer

OMB
Alice Rivlin
Gordon Adams

Chief of Staff
Leon Panetta

CIA
John Deutch
Norman Schindler

JCS
William Owens
Wesley Clark

Delegation
Richard Holbrooke
Christopher Hill
Roberts Owen
James Pardew
Donald Kerrick

White House
Sandy Berger
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
Alexander Vershbow

Summary of Conclusions

1. Principals, joined by the President for a portion of the meeting, received a briefing by the U.S. negotiating team on the progress of the U.S. diplomatic initiative, including the results of the September 8 meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia. They welcomed the significant progress made to date. They agreed that the NATO air strikes in response to

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0253-M
RS 9/30/14 (1.66)

the Bosnian Serb bombing of the Sarajevo marketplace had thus far given added impetus to the negotiations. While we would not rule out tactical pauses in the bombing, Principals reaffirmed the importance of continuing to demand full Bosnian Serb compliance with the UN/NATO conditions. (C)

2. Principals agreed that, in light of Serbian President Milosevic's support for the peace process to date, the U.S. should support a 180-day extension of phase-one sanctions relief for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia prior to the expiration of the current suspension on September 18. At the same time, they reaffirmed their previous decision that no other sanctions would be suspended until a Bosnia peace settlement had been signed. **(Action: USUN)** (C)

3. Principals noted that, if further diplomatic progress were made toward a Bosnia settlement, a decision would be needed soon on the timing and venue of an international conference, with the participation of the three Balkan Presidents, to resolve the most contentious issues. (S)

4. Principals agreed that, given Italy's importance to the conduct of military operations in Bosnia both now and following a settlement, the U.S. should make a renewed effort to involve the Italians more closely in consultations on our diplomatic efforts. While we would not reopen the agreement among Contact Group members that the next two Contact Group meetings (in Geneva and Moscow) be restricted to the original five members plus EU negotiator Bildt, we would urge that the subsequent expanded meeting in Rome become the model for all further consultative meetings. We should favor the most inclusive participation possible, including other Allies (especially Canada and Spain) as well as representatives of the OIC. **(Action: State)** (C)

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21062

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, September 11, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9521050
RECEIVED: 11 SEP 95 08

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 11 SEP 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND MEMO FOR PRES DROP-BY AT 11 SEP PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: OBE / STATUS OF ORIGINAL UNKNOWN DUE DATE: 14 SEP 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BREMNER LOGREF: 9521062

FILES: IFM C NSCP: PC0148 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSASK CLOSED BY: NSDRS DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By DRS NARA, Date 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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~~SECRET~~ RECORD ID: 9521050

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95091113	FOR DECISION
001		X	95091113	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
002	PRESIDENT	Z	95091113	FOR INFORMATION
002		X	96010416	OBE / STATUS OF ORIGINAL UNKNOWN

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950911		VICE PRESIDENT
002	950911		WH CHIEF OF STAFF

~~SECRET~~

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Recd 9/11 10:30am

National Security Council
The White House

21050

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ *DOCLOG* _____ *A/O* _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse			
Sens	1	DS	
Soderberg	copy		
Berger	2		
Lake	3	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	9/4	D Steve
Records Mgt.			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: PC paper for President
9/11

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

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~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ 21050

95 SEP 11 P1:22

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

September 11, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Drop-by at the September 11 Principals Meeting on Bosnia

You have agreed to stop by the Principals Meeting, thank Dick Holbrooke and his team for their efforts, hear a report on where we stand and what we need to accomplish next, and perhaps discuss the NATO air campaign. You could stay in the meeting for as little as ten minutes or as long as your schedule allows.

Diplomatic Initiative

Geneva Results: Friday's gathering in Geneva of the foreign ministers of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia with Contact Group representatives produced agreement on "Basic Principles" of a settlement in Bosnia, including: preservation of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a single state within its present borders; the 51:49 parameter as the basis for the territorial division between the Federation and the Serb Republic, but with adjustments possible by mutual agreement; rights for both entities to establish "parallel special relationships" with Croatia and Serbia consistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina; and agreement in principle on mechanisms for dealing with displaced persons, human rights abuses and dispute resolution.

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The preservation of Bosnia as a single state represents an important concession on the part of the Bosnian Serbs, who were present at the meeting but operating under Belgrade's proxy. Bosnian Government agreement to the term "Republika Srpska," on the other hand, confers a degree of legitimacy on the Bosnian Serbs that Sarajevo has been reluctant to grant. Additionally significant is the fact that ranking Serbian leaders met for the first time with Bosnian government officials and agreed to statements that come close to recognition of Bosnia.

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Next Steps in Negotiations: Still, the Geneva meeting was important largely for political and symbolic reasons. Many questions remain to be resolved before we have a full-fledged peace agreement. Territorial bargaining has just begun, and negotiations promise to be contentious. Members of Holbrooke's

~~SECRET~~ cc: Vice President
Declassify on: OADR Chief of Staff

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~~SECRET~~

team will be meeting with DOD's mapping experts today to help firm up our own ideas, especially regarding Sarajevo, the Posavina corridor, the Livno Valley corridor to Bihac and the corridor to Gorazde.

In addition to territorial questions, we still have to determine how the constitutional framework, which will link the Federation with the Bosnian Serb republic and specify arrangements with Serbia and Croatia proper, should be handled by our negotiators. Holbrooke may also raise sanctions and the possibility of some early reward for Milosevic prior to signature of a peace agreement. Our new initiative has been premised on no further sanctions relief for interim steps such as mutual recognition.

End-game Conference Possibilities: The Holbrooke team will travel to Geneva mid-week for a Contact Group meeting, followed by another intensive round with the parties. Holbrooke may express views on the need to move fairly soon from shuttle diplomacy to an "endgame" conference, perhaps involving the presidents of the three sides and Contact Group foreign ministers. This could occur in the U.S. at a nearby site such as Williamsburg, which would allow for pep-talks from the Vice President or from you, if necessary. The conference could move to Washington for a final Summit and signing ceremony if all went well.

Next Steps on Air strikes:

As the diplomatic process moves forward, we need to review the bidding on the NATO/UN retaliatory campaign, which as you know continued over the weekend to include Tomahawk missile strikes. Per our discussion last Thursday, we have continued to support the strikes until the Bosnian Serbs comply with the UN/NATO conditions. We (along with the French and British) have sought to convince them to comply by pressing Izetbegovic for clear assurances that Bosnian Government forces will not take advantage of the air campaign to gain ground around Sarajevo. With Mladic still obdurate, we may want to approach the Bosnian government again and call for concrete measures of restraint, such as a "no offensive action commitment" in and around Sarajevo.

Attachment
Tab A Talking Points

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR DROP-BY AT
PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

Diplomatic Initiative

-- Thanks for your fine efforts over past two weeks.

-- Getting sides to sit down face to face, accept the Geneva principles a real achievement.

-- Know you acutely aware much work remains to be done. Like to hear your views on how to achieve final settlement.

-- What do you expect from sides on territory?

-- What will be critical aspects of negotiations on constitutional framework?

-- (If early sanctions relief for Milosevic is raised) Like to have Principals consider that question before we move.

Next Steps on Air Strikes

-- Are we still satisfied with UN/NATO conditions for ending current air strikes?

-- What effect if we continue campaign; what impact of use of Tomahawks over weekend?

-- How can we encourage restraint by Bosnian government?

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2013-0882-M
CIA Historical Collections Division NSC-70-14
10/1/2013

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

21050

September 11, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: SUE BREMNER

SUBJECT: Briefing Memorandum for the President's Drop-by at the September 11 Principals Meeting on Bosnia

Attached is a memorandum containing short talking points for the President's use at today's PC. Issues on which we offer updates include next steps in the negotiations, end-game conference possibilities, and the ongoing UN/NATO air campaign.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Briefing Memo for POTUS
Tab A Talking Points

~~SECRET~~
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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By ____ NARA, Date 3/9/2020
2013-0682-m

~~SECRET~~ 21050

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR DROP-BY AT
PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

Diplomatic Initiative

-- Thanks for your fine efforts over past two weeks.

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-- What effect if we continue campaign; what impact if use of Tomahawks over weekend?

-- How can we encourage restraint by Bosnian government?

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~~2010-0533-M~~
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2013-0682-M
KL 2/6/2020 (8.19)
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See also 2013-0006-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

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Folder Title: PC0149 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, September 21, 1995				
Staff Office-Individual: Records Management				
Original OA/ID Number: 4009				
Row: 43	Section: 6	Shelf: 7	Position: 2	Stack: V

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (3 pages)~~	~~09/21/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
002a. memo	Alexander Vershbow to Anthony Lake re: Checklist for September 21 PC on Bosnia (2 pages)	09/21/1995	P1/b(1)
~~002b. paper~~	~~re: Implementation Structure in a Bosnian Settlement (8 pages)~~	~~09/20/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002c. paper~~	~~re: Confidence-Building/Arms Control Measures to Accompany Political Settlement (2 pages)~~	~~09/19/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003. agenda~~	~~NSC Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)~~	~~09/21/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4009

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0149 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, September 21, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs650

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9521109
RECEIVED: 25 SEP 95 09

TO: LAKE

FROM: VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 25 SEP 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
CROATIA
PC
SERBIA
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 21 SEP PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: LAKE APPROVED FILING IN RECORD ONLY DUE DATE: 28 SEP 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9521094 9521100

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0149 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BASS
		BERGER
		JOSHI
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By [illegible] NARA, Date 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95092514	FOR DECISION
001		X	95092616	LAKE APPROVED FILING IN RECORD ONLY

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National Security Council
The White House

Recd 9/25
4:30pm

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1		
Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg	copy		
Berger	2		
Lake	3		
Situation Room	4		
West Wing Desk			N
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

National Security Council
The White House

4:30pm

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 21109

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1		
Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg	copy ✓		
Berger	2		
Lake	3		
Situation Room	4		
West Wing Desk			N
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~

21009

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 25, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, September 21, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia held September 21, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to ~~sign the memo to the agencies~~ file.

____ approve ____ disapprove

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

21109

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee
DATE: September 21, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 - 4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Anthony Lake

OVP
Leon Fuerth
Rick Saunders

State
Secretary Christopher
Peter Tarnoff

DOD
John White
Walter Slocombe

USUN
Ambassador Albright
David Scheffer

OMB
Alice Rivlin
Gordon Adams

Chief of Staff
Leon Panetta

CIA
John Deutch
Dennis Blair

JCS
General Shalikashvili
Wesley Clark

Delegation
Richard Holbrooke
Christopher Hill
Roberts Owen
James Pardew
Donald Kerrick

White House
Sandy Berger
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
Sandy Vershbow

Summary of Conclusions

1. Principals received a briefing by the U.S. negotiating team on the progress of the U.S. diplomatic initiative since their last meeting on September 11. They welcomed plans to hold a second meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia with the Contact Group on September 26 in New York, at which the three parties would likely endorse further agreed

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RS 9/30/14 (1.67)

principles for a Bosnia settlement. Principals agreed that the New York Foreign Ministers' meeting should be announced by the White House later that day as part of a statement on behalf of the President following his telephone briefing by Secretary Christopher, National Security Advisor Lake and Ambassador Holbrooke. **(Action: NSC)** (C)

2. Principals noted concerns by the U.S. negotiating team about growing tensions within the Federation and between the Governments of Bosnia and Croatia in the wake of their recent territorial gains in western Bosnia. They agreed that a high-level demarche should be made to Croatian President Tudjman warning of the consequences of his failure to support the Federation. It was subsequently agreed that the President would phone German Chancellor Kohl to urge that he make a similar demarche to Tudjman. **(Action: State and NSC)** (S)

3. Principals agreed that the recent territorial shifts in western Bosnia may have improved the chances for a settlement. But they agreed that further offensives could jeopardize this progress, especially if they led to large Serb refugee flows, and that we should place renewed emphasis on the need for all parties to show restraint. Principals agreed that we should encourage the Bosnians to consider a limited-duration country-wide cessation of hostilities that would preserve their recent gains while negotiations on a final settlement proceeded. (S)

4. Principals noted that NATO air strikes had had a positive impact on Serb attitudes toward a peace settlement. They agreed that we should make clear that the bombing would resume if the Serbs did not comply with the UN/NATO conditions and that we should press the UN to allow access for Bosnian civilian traffic into Sarajevo in order to test Milosevic's commitment to ensure complete freedom of movement. **(Action: State/USUN)** (S)

5. Principals agreed it was still premature to take any decision regarding the timing and venue of an international conference. This should be revisited based on the results of the September 26 meeting of the Balkan Foreign Ministers and the next round of shuttle diplomacy by the U.S. negotiating team. (C)

6. Principals reviewed continuing difficulties in persuading our key allies to include the Italians in consultations on the peace process. They agreed we should urge the Italians to organize the expanded Contact Group meeting in Rome that had been discussed previously and that we should also press to include Italy in five-power consultations on military planning for peace plan implementation. **(Action: State)** (C)

7. Principals received an update from General Shalikashvili on NATO planning for the implementation force (IFOR). They agreed

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that we would likely want to follow the Haiti model -- i.e., insert a large and heavily-equipped force at the very outset in order to deter non-compliance by the parties but then phase down the force quickly once stable conditions have been established. They agreed in principle that we should be flexible on modalities for linking Russian forces to the IFOR, so long as the single NATO chain of command was preserved, with no UN dual key. (S)

8. Principals agreed that, in light of increased media speculation about peace plan implementation, we needed to step up consultations with the Congress on our overall Bosnia strategy, while seeking to lower expectations of an immediate breakthrough in the negotiations. Calls to key Members should take place at the beginning of the week of September 25, followed by a Presidential meeting with Senate and House leadership. **(Action: NSC/State)** (S)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

21109

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, September 21, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By KAS NARA, Date 10/9/2015
2010-0533-M

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9521100
RECEIVED: 21 SEP 95 10

TO: LAKE

FROM: VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 21 SEP 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
SERBIA
PC
CROATIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 21 SEP PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: ORIGINAL ROUTE CHIT RTND TO NSC/RMO DUE DATE: 25 SEP 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9521094 9521109

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0149 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		FEELEY
		JOSHI
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95092111	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	95103116	NOTED BY LAKE
001		X	95112015	ORIGINAL ROUTE CHIT RTND TO NSC/RMO

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National Security Council
The White House

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cc:

COMMENTS: Pkg on PC 9/21

TL- [redacted] 11:50 AM 9/21

AMB ALBRIGHT HAS CALLED TO ASK IF SHE CAN PARTICIPATE VIA SVTS — DOESN'T THINK SHE CAN MAKE PLANE TO DC

WIL

Exec Sec Office has diskette YES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	Alexander Vershbow to Anthony Lake re: Checklist for September 21 PC on Bosnia (2 pages)	09/21/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4009

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0148 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, September 21, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs650

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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FURTHER AGREED PRINCIPLES

4. It is the goal that free democratic elections be held in both entities as soon as social conditions permit. In order to maximize the democratic effectiveness of such elections, the following steps will be taken by both entities.

4.1 Both governments will immediately pledge their full support, starting immediately, for (a) freedom of movement, (b) the right of displaced persons to repossess their property (or receive just compensation), (c) freedom of speech and of the press, and (d) protection of all other internationally recognized human rights that enhance and empower the democratic election process.

4.2 As soon as possible the OSCE (or other international organization) will station representatives in all principal towns throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and publish monthly reports as to the degree to which (a) displaced persons are being enabled to regain possession of their homes and other property, and (b) social conditions are being restored to a level at which the election process may be effective.

4.3 As soon as the OSCE delegations have concluded that elections can be properly held in both entities, the governments of the two entities will conduct simultaneous elections and will fully cooperate with an international monitoring program.

5. Following the simultaneous elections, Bosnia and Herzegovina will be headed by a three-person Presidency representing the three principal constituent peoples, with each of the three members being elected by the appropriate newly-elected parliamentary body. The office of Chairman and Head of State will be rotated annually among the three members.

5.1 Among the responsibilities of the Presidency will be foreign relations, foreign trade, customs administration, monetary system administration, and such other activities as the parliamentary bodies of the two entities may agree upon as being mutually beneficial (such as, for example, immigration regulation, international criminal enforcement, establishment and operation of common transportation and communications facilities, utilization of energy resources, air traffic control, and cooperative economic projects). The Presidency may appoint a cabinet of appropriate ministers to assist the Presidency in executing its duties.

5.2 All Presidency decisions will be taken by majority vote, provided, however, that if one member disagrees with a decision taken by the other two and declares that decision to be destructive of a vital interest of the entity from which the dissenting member was elected, the matter will be referred immediately to that entity's parliament, which may determine by a

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two-thirds vote that the challenged decision will not be applicable to that entity.

6. As a result of the elections there will be created a new Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina consisting of 36 members, 24 elected by the newly-elected legislature of the Federation and 12 elected by the newly-elected legislature of Republica Srpska. All parliamentary actions will be by majority vote provided that the majority vote includes at least four votes from each entity.

6.1 The legislature will make such laws as it deems appropriate on subjects within the authority of the Presidency, as indicated in Paragraph 5.1.

7. The government of Bosnia and Herzegovina will be financed by the Federation and the Republica Srpska.

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IMPLEMENTATION STRUCTURE IN A BOSNIAN SETTLEMENT

The Task

Implementing a settlement in all its political, economic, humanitarian, military and other aspects will require a coordinating superstructure with a clear mandate to make the settlement work, as well as mobilization of a variety of organizations, most already active in the Balkans. The task would be to integrate, coordinate and, to a lesser degree, oversee progress on the various political undertakings of a settlement package and the activities of international organizations and activities involved in different aspects of implementation.

"Peace implementation" will require not only a military component -- through the IFOR to ensure a secure environment within which implementation can go forward -- but also a means of ensuring continued facilitation of political negotiations among the parties, promotion of local conflict resolution and monitoring of human rights, coordination of economic reconstruction, delivery of humanitarian assistance, and monitoring of various confidence-building/arms control measures of increasing scope.

An important aspect, yet to be determined, is the extent of direct involvement of the implementation structure in the internal affairs of the Bosnian state. The Bosnian parties may wish to have the least direct involvement by the implementation structure in some fields (e.g., human rights), and the opposite in others (e.g., reconstruction). The international community will expect the structure, nonetheless, to bring about full implementation. The tension between these various parties will have a bearing on the final settlement.

Mandate

The implementation structure should derive its authority from the settlement documents -- including the approval of all parties of the settlement, rather than from UNSC resolutions. The structure would, thus, have a certain autonomous authority. We should seek UNSC blessing (but not creation of) the structure through appropriate language in a Security Council Resolution acknowledging the actual settlement.

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Mission

The mission of the structure will be to coordinate among, rather than to control, the organizations that will play a role in the region after settlement: the NATO-led implementation force (IFOR), EU, ICFY, OSCE, IFIs, UN, UNHCR, ICRC and possibly other NGOs, bilateral players, etc. Some elements might report directly to the Senior Implementation Coordinator (SIC) depending on the terms of the settlement. The implementation structure will serve as a bridge between the international actors and local officials, as appropriate.

Termination

The structure should specifically be maintained as long as required in the view of the Senior Coordination Committee (see below), but in no case less than one year beyond the date of final withdrawal of the IFOR and for a period not to exceed three years.

Funding

The administrative costs (including salaries) of the structure could be funded according to a formula yet to be determined among interested parties. The entity would establish an annual budget for presentation to contributors. Or, less formally, each government or organization contributing resources to the structure could simply pay its own way. The salary of the Senior Implementation Coordinator should be established at the time of the settlement.

Generating International Support

How the United States seeks to define the role, mandate, structure and senior leadership of such an international on-the-ground political component of settlement implementation will directly affect:

-- the credibility of the package that our current negotiating efforts are promoting with the parties in the region;

-- our ability to generate sufficient diplomatic support for a NATO-led military implementation force along the lines we desire;

-- our ability to encourage and ensure continued progress in the various political undertakings of a settlement once launched; and,

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-- the credibility of our exit strategy for the IFOR and the withdrawal of its major U.S. elements no later than 12 months from its initial deployment.

This latter point will be especially critical. While the NATO-led IFOR is intended to be of specific and limited duration, a broader implementation structure will have the opportunity (indeed requirement) to run longer. (Just as an ongoing international presence to support and oversee democratic development within Haiti provided the context within which timely withdrawal of initial intervention forces was politically possible, so too will our announcement of an exit date and strategy for the IFOR need to be accompanied by the sense that an implementation structure for dealing with longer-term problems is in place in Bosnia.)

Senior Implementation Coordinator

The implementation structure would be headed by a respected senior statesman, a strong personality, and possibly an American.

Pros: An American would symbolize U.S. commitment and leadership in brokering the settlement, and underscore the U.S. commitment to successful conclusion of the effort. He would likely enjoy greater effectiveness, and command access to a broader array of resources. He would be more amenable to working toward U.S. goals (e.g., avoiding getting the U.S. trapped into unwanted commitments). Since the peace agreement will be American-negotiated and American-inspired, the parties will want to deal with an American.

Cons: An American might not enjoy the support of a wider group of countries, and might complicate obtaining the active support of France and/or Russia. If the implementation breaks down, the U.S. might be held responsible by Europeans for it and ensuing turmoil on the continent, e.g. "America's war." An American would have to achieve more stature than the likely European candidate, Carl Bildt. An American might prompt a certain Europe versus America competition, and resentment that the EU gets the lead on paying for reconstruction and providing many IFOR units, but the U.S. runs both.

The Senior Implementation Coordinator might be nominated by any settlement group participant and agreed to by consensus. He might have three or four deputies from different countries,

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such as Russia. He would have no formal line authority over the implementation agencies, but would determine the arrangements for coordination in the various functional fields, including designation of the lead coordinating person and/or agency in the implementation structure. He would derive his authority from his mandate, his ability to work with all parties, his selection of committee chairs, his potential to assist with dispute resolution, and his international standing. His commitment would be to the settlement terms, but he would respect the independent authority of each agency working in the country. Specifically, he would work to:

-- ensure that various players do not duplicate tasks, undermine the "sub-contract" work of other agencies, or contravene the general principles of the settlement.

-- establish general parameters for the overall mission by acting as interpreter of the terms of the settlement, and encouraging (but not necessarily dictating) international agencies to adhere to those parameters.

Senior Coordination Committee

This would be the central coordinating authority. The Senior Implementation Coordinator would chair consultative meetings of the senior resident representatives of the main organizations active on the ground in Bosnia. Those agencies would likely include but not be restricted to IFOR, UN, UNHCR, EU/ECMM, OSCE, and IBRD. Additional possibilities include ICFY, remaining elements of UNPF, an international reconstruction mission, UN human rights monitors, Office of the UNSYG, Office of the NATO SYG, and possibly a stabilization-arms control effort. The SIC would have no line authority over any of these agencies, unless a group delegated specific decision-making authority to him.

Major aid donors and/or other governments playing a key bilateral role in the settlement may be included in the Senior Coordination Committee (or other committees, see below) in an appropriate way, if they provide a liaison staff to the SIC headquarters and are accepted by the SIC in that role.

NGOs would not be represented in the Senior Committee. However, an NGO advisory board could be established of representatives of organizations willing to provide liaison officials and attend relevant meetings as determined by the SIC.

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Functions

The SIC would exercise direction by virtue of his free-standing authority and through his staff. As the senior international figure in Bosnia, he would be the locus for contact with the Federation and Serb Republic Governments and would maintain liaison offices in Belgrade, Zagreb, and possibly Skopje and elsewhere.

Functions under specific committees might be the following (and might be expanded or reduced to other fields as needed) under the overall coordination of the Senior Coordination Committee:

-- Military Security

The SIC would have no line authority, but may be able to assist the IFOR commander, who has the lead on military security, with liaison with local political authorities. He would work to ensure that non-IFOR activities do not inadvertently find themselves in conflict zones, and try to coordinate the early transfer of IFOR tasks (e.g., boundary monitoring) to other authorities as necessary.

-- Human Rights

SIC authority would rest with his ability to select a committee chairman (probably OSCE) and coordinate overall efforts in a direction consonant with the settlement. He would work to provide international groups assistance obtaining access to areas requiring monitoring.

-- Humanitarian Operations

UNHCR is the most readily-apparent entity with a claim to leading this effort, including repatriation and return. The SIC would be able to provide liaison support to UNHCR, if needed, and deal with the UNSYG via the UNSYG liaison office. ICRC, however, would have the lead dealing with detainees, missiong persons, etc.

-- Reconstruction

If the EU leads the reconstruction effort, the SIC might be able to promote coordination between EU efforts and local and other international (and bilateral) reconstruction efforts.

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-- Security Stabilization

A comprehensive package of arms control and CBM measures should be included in the settlement agreement, and possibly provide for implementation by an OSCE or other entity. A background paper on this is attached. The Germans have put ideas forward on this, and we may wish to encourage them to work with OSCE to develop their ideas for a package here. The SIC might become operationally involved in coordination of any subsequent negotiation-verification efforts on arms control, though he would have no line authority over this function beyond encouraging efforts within the parameters of the settlement.

-- War Crimes

The efforts of the UN war crimes tribunal will be an important aspect of implementation. Though there may be no need for a specific in-country war crimes structure, it will remain a significant political issue.

-- Democratic Elections and Institutions

Perhaps best situated to chair this effort would be the chief of an OSCE democracy-building entity (or alternatively the UN) that would have to be created at OSCE just prior to settlement. OSCE is best situated to integrate NGO concerns and recruit monitors for elections. The SIC would again achieve his greatest influence in supporting efforts with local officials.

-- Border Control

These responsibilities should be handled by a combination of local authorities and international monitors at an appropriate time. EUMM may be the best candidate to develop a mandate in this area and chair a committee. The SIC would again serve a partial liaison role with local officials, and work to ensure good cooperation with IFOR and the EUMMs. A dispute resolution mechanism, possibly based in the SIC's Legal Office, may address disputes.

-- Legal/Dispute Settlement

The SIC would have under his direct authority a Legal Office for whatever legal issues he determined needed attention. He could employ that expertise as appropriate (both binding and non-binding) to promote the resolution of any

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disputes. The legal office could provide non-binding advice on legal interpretations of the settlement terms, and provide advice as requested by various committees.

The SIC would designate a chairman for each of the above functions requiring (at the discretion of the Senior Coordination Committee) committee attention who could be either the local head of a relevant international agency or a deputy of the SIC. The guiding principle in organizing this structure should be pragmatism. A significant portion of the SIC's authority will derive from his ability to select and replace committee chairmen. To the extent possible, however, the structure should pave the way for Bosnian governmental institutions called for in the settlement, e.g. reconstruction commission, arbitration panel, and might provide a few important jobs to offer to nationals of various governments to help secure their support.

Secretariat

The Senior Implementation Coordinator would have a small secretariat located in or near Sarajevo. The various international agencies should be located in close proximity to the Office of the Senior Implementation Coordinator, with small, full-time liaison staffs (paid by parent agencies) in the same building. The staff should enjoy immunity from the jurisdication of the host countries (established in conjunction with settlement).

Political Liaison Group

This group would be appended to the SIC's office. It would include representatives of the settlement group, as well as the representatives of the UNSYG's office, the NATO SYG's office, and the EU President's office -- all located in the SIC's headquarters. The group would be formally headed by the SIC, but serve as a general advisory/liaison group for the SIC. It would have no direct authority over the SIC, but be available to provide insights on possible differences among the parties. The Russians would be included if they are part of the final settlement group.

Russia

The question of bringing Russia on board is discussed separately. It is worth noting that in addition to the Political Liaison Group, Russian participation in the implementation structure (not necessarily including the IFOR), and especially the arms control entity, might be possible.

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Transition

The announcement of the SIC should be made on the day of actual settlement. Most agencies will already be present in Bosnia with senior representatives on the scene. The SIC will simply need to travel to Sarajevo, take occupancy of a larger (ideally only one) building provided by the Bosnians, begin building his secretariat, and inviting the various international agencies to establish liaison offices under his roof. The transition should not be exceedingly disruptive given that only a small staff is required and most of the contributors to SIC activities will already be physically present in Sarajevo.

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Confidence-Building/Arms Control Measures
To Accompany Political Settlement

Assumption: At the onset, it will be important that the United States include elements of weapons control in connection with any settlement package in order to support the cease-fire and to build political support among allies and partners for the overall U.S. initiative. The second step would be to establish a regime to create something approaching a Federation-Bosnian Serb military balance. Such a military balance can only be created by taking into account Serb and Croation forces in the longer term. Any set of proposals to that effect, however, would have to be phased and flexible, readily adapting to changing circumstances on the ground and open to expansion over time in both scope and application.

Step 1: Conditions Imposed at Settlement: In the first instance, we should concentrate on political/military confidence-building measures geared to specific areas and tactical situations along lines of confrontation within Bosnia itself. Their immediate objective would be to supplement and help stabilize the cease-fire contained in the settlement; accordingly, they would focus on disengagement of the parties, preliminary forms of weapons control, and transparency.

More specifically, this might include (perhaps within the text of any cease-fire component of a settlement):

-- Compliance by all parties with the zones of separation along the frontier. (e.g., 2 km for infantry, 10 km for mortars, 20 km for heavy weapons).

-- Ban on certain (possibly all) military activities in selected areas or region-wide. Ban on military aircraft.

-- If arms embargo is not lifted, or is lifted in phases, maintain Sharp Guard and/or other measures to prevent weapons flows into the region until specifically delineated implementation goals have been met.

-- Establishment of joint liaison/communication links at multiple levels between the IFOR and the Federation and Bosnian Serb Armies.

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-- Establishment of procedures for extensive monitoring all of the above measures by designated elements of OSCE or the Implementation Force, as appropriate.

Step 2: The Military Balance: As progress is made with each of these measures, we would seek to expand them in scope and effect. As some would presumably be intended for a long duration, we would wish to build in the possibility that, as the NATO-led military implementation force draws down with the accomplishment of its basic mission, those monitoring/verification duties assigned to the IFOR will be passed to another body -- perhaps some configuration of UN/OSCE observers. It would be necessary at this point to bring in Serbia and Croatia.

Step 3: Long-Term Perspective: Even as our immediate focus should be on local stabilizing measures within Bosnia proper to support the cease-fire and settlement, the United States should be prepared to offer -- at an appropriate political moment -- a long-term perspective for the region as whole. This would be consistent with an emphasis on a comprehensive approach to the problems of the former Yugoslavia.

The stated objective of such a U.S. initiative for confidence-building/arms control measures would be strengthening stability and security throughout the region, with the specific aim of eliminating disparities and capabilities for launching surprise attack and for initiating, at a regional level, large-scale offensive action. Reductions, limitations and the realization of a more defensive set of force postures might be examined as contributions to a more stable military balance.

Any initial deliberations among parties as to participation and modalities could take place in an informal setting, although the intention should always be to transfer any such negotiations back into a more formal OSCE framework at an appropriate time. Recognizing the many inherent difficulties involved in any move towards a more ambitious arms control regime for the region, the U.S. objective would, in the first instance, be as much to set in place an ongoing process as the expectation of any early progress towards a CFE-like regime.

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Rev 2 9/19/95 08:30

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9521094
RECEIVED: 20 SEP 95 08

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 20 SEP 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
CROATIA
AGENDA
SERBIA
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 21 SEP PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 23 SEP 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9521100 9521109

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0149 CODES: BOS

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By RDS NARA, Date 10/9/2019
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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95092009	FOR DECISION
001		X	95092012	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
002		X	95092012	SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950920	FUERTH, L	
002	950920	BRILL, K	
002	950920	MCALEER, R	
002	950920	INDERFURTH, R	
002	950920	ADAMS, G	
002	950920	PANETTA, L	
002	950920	YANNUZZI, R	
002	950920	WILSON, F	

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1/4	D/W	A-Tab I
Sens			
Soderberg	copy ✓		
Berger	2	NW	
Lake	3		
Situation Room		~~Natl Sec Advisor~~ has seen	
West Wing Desk	5	MC 9/20	D
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: NOMA Agenda
PC Mtg 9/21

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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LOG 9521094
DATE 20 SEP 95

SUBJECT: PC MTG ON BOSNIA 21 SEP
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA NOELLE JENSEN ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	9/20/95	1728	J. Welty PRINT LAST NAME: HICTY COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	9-20-95	6:30 PM	Anthony Taylor PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX+1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	9/20	5:20	S A PRINT LAST NAME: HABER COPY: 1
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	9/20	5:23	Adam Kreisel PRINT LAST NAME: Kreisel COPY: 1

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
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Initials: RDS Date: 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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SUBJECT: PC MTG ON BOSNIA 21 SEP
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MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
COL. F. C. WILSON JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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SUBJECT: PC MTG ON BOSNIA 21 SEP
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EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA NOELLE JENSEN ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	9/21/95	0750	Nelly Bujold PRINT LAST NAME: Bujold-Jensen COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX+1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: 1
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: 1

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MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA NOELLE JENSEN ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	9/20	7:25pm	Farlee Wood PRINT LAST NAME: Wood COPY: VIA FAX+1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX+1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	9/25/95		PRINT LAST NAME: GRAVES COPY: 1
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: 1

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX+1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: Conroy COPY: 1

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NMCC / JCS

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PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 1991 CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOTAL: 3
(PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia

NSC LOG # 9521094

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	State	Executive Secretary		
N	Defense	Executive Secretary		
B	USUN/State	Rick Inderfurth		
A	CIA	Executive Secretary		
D	JCS	Secretary		

REMARKS:

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 1991 CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (202) 456-9425 WH SITROOM

BROADCAST REPORT

(WED) 09. 20. '95 13:09

WHSR#1

DOCUMENT #	TIME STORED	PAGE	NUMBER OF DEST.		
			OK	N. G.	TOTAL
1460024808	09. 20 13:05	3	4	0	4

*** COMPLETED ***

DESTINATION	P.
CIA#1	3
D1. NMCC#1	3

DESTINATION	P.
STATE #2	3
N. OSD/CCC	3

*** END ***

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2010-0533-M

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'95 SEP 20 P1:09

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 1991 CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia

NSC LOG # 9521094

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	State	Executive Secretary		
N	Defense	Executive Secretary		
B	USUN/State	Rick Inderfurth		
A	CIA	Executive Secretary		
D	JCS	Secretary		

REMARKS:

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Initials: RDS Date: 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 1991 CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia

NSC LOG # 9521094

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	State	Executive Secretary		
N	Defense	Executive Secretary		
B	USUN/State	Rick Inderfurth		
A	CIA	Executive Secretary		
D	JCS	Secretary		

REMARKS:

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Initials: RDS Date: 10/9/2019
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RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 1991 CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia

NSC LOG # 9521094

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	State	Executive Secretary		
N	Defense	Executive Secretary		
B	USUN/State	Rick Inderfurth		
A	CIA	Executive Secretary		
D	JCS	Secretary		

REMARKS:

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- ☐ IMMEDIATE
- ☒ PRIORITY
- ☐ ROUTINE

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DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting PC MTG on Bosnia PAGES: 3

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

21094

September 20, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the
United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for
National Security &
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the
President

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(C)~~

There will be a Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia September 21, 1995, from 2:30 - 4:00 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be principals plus one, along with Ambassador Holbrooke and members of his delegation. The agenda is attached at Tab A. ~~(C)~~

for
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/9/2019
2018-0533-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

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NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA
DATE: September 21, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 - 4:00 p.m.

Agenda

I. Status of U.S. Diplomatic Initiative ..... State/All
-- Implications of recent developments on ground
-- Next steps with the parties
-- Timing/venue of international conference
-- Consultation strategy

II. NATO air strikes update..... JCS

III. Status report on settlement implementation planning .... NSC

IV. Congressional Strategy ..... All

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 3/9/2020
2013-0687-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

21094

September 20, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, September 21, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Principals meeting on Bosnia to be held September 21, 1995. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/9/2017
2010-0533-M

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See DOC 2015-0533-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

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Folder Title: PC0150 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, September 25, 1995				
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)~~	~~09/25/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
002a. memo	Alexander Vershbow to Anthony Lake re: Additional Items for September 25 PC on Bosnia (2 pages)	09/25/1994	P1/b(1)
002b. memo	Alexander Vershbow to Anthony Lake re: Checklist for September 25 PC on Bosnia (2 pages)	09/23/1995	P1/b(1)
~~002c. memo~~	~~[Duplicate of 004] (2 pages)~~	~~09/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002d. paper~~	~~re: Implementation Structure in a Bosnian Settlement (8 pages)~~	~~09/20/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002e. paper~~	~~re: Confidence-Building/Arms Control Measures to Accompany Political Settlement (2 pages)~~	~~09/19/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
003a. memo	[Duplicate of 002b] (2 pages)	09/23/1995	P1/b(1)
~~003b. memo~~	~~[Duplicate of 004] (2 pages)~~	~~09/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003c. paper~~	~~[Duplicate of 002d] (8 pages)~~	~~09/20/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003d. paper~~	~~[Duplicate of 002e] (2 pages)~~	~~09/19/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~004. memo~~	~~Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Your Participation in Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)~~	~~09/23/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~005. agenda~~	~~NSC Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)~~	~~09/25/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020

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2010-0533-M
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P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
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b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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RECORD ID: 9620024
RECEIVED: 09 JAN 96 09

TO: LAKE

FROM: VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 09 JAN 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
CROATIA
SOC
SERBIA
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 25 SEP PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: LAKE APPROVED RECOM 2 ONLY DUE DATE: 12 JAN 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9521106 9521107

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0150 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		FEELEY
		JOSHI
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
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001		X	96011015	LAKE APPROVED RECOM 2 ONLY

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Dohse	4		
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger	2		
Lake	3	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5	1/10	N
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

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COMMENTS: no further action required. file for the record.

Dohse
Jan 10

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National Security Council
The White House

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Harmon	1		
Dohse	4		
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger	2		
Lake	3	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5	1/10	N
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: no further action required. file for the record.

Dohse
Jan 10

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

20024

January 9, 1996

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the ~~Principals~~ Committee Meeting on Bosnia, September 25, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia with the President that was held on September 25, 1995. I apologize for the delay.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to the agencies

Approve _____ Disapprove ____

Alternatively, that you approve the Summary of Conclusions for the files without circulation to the other agencies.

Approve ____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: 9/25/15
Reason: 1.5 (a,b,d)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

20024

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee
DATE: September 25, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 - 4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

THE PRESIDENT
THE VICE PRESIDENT

CHAIR
Anthony Lake

OVP
Richard Saunders

State
Warren Christopher
(via SVTS from NY)
Strobe Talbott
Richard Holbrooke
(via SVTS from NY)

DOD
Secretary Perry
Edward Warner

USUN
Amb. Madeleine Albright
(via SVTS from NY)
James O'Brien

OMB
Alice Rivlin
Gordon Adams

Chief of Staff
Leon Panetta

CIA
George Tenet
Dennis Blair

JCS
Charles Krulak
Michael Byron

White House
Sandy Berger
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
Alexander Vershbow
John Feeley

Summary of Conclusions

1. Principals, joined by the President and Vice President for part of the meeting, were briefed by the U.S. delegation on the U.S. diplomatic initiative and discussed next steps in the peace process and preparations for implementation of a possible peace settlement in Bosnia. (U)

~~SECRET~~
Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5 (a,b,d)
Declassify on: 11/22/15 (X4)

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0533-M
RS 9/30/14 (1.68)

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2. New York Foreign Ministers Meeting: Secretary Christopher and Ambassador Holbrooke briefed Principals on the preparations for the next day's meeting in New York of the Foreign Ministers of Bosnia, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. They agreed that, following agreement by the three on "further agreed principles" for a settlement, building on the September 8 Geneva principles, the next priority would be to negotiate a country-wide cessation of hostilities. (C)

3. International Conference: Principals agreed that, following the New York Foreign Ministers' meeting and attainment of a cessation of hostilities, we would need to move beyond shuttle diplomacy to the convening of an international conference in "proximity talks" format. They agreed that Ambassador Holbrooke should seek the parties' agreement to a date for such a conference in mid-to-late October, subject to their acceptance of the following conditions: a) each of the three parties will send representatives with the authority to make decisions; b) the parties will not threaten to walk out of the talks once they have convened; and c) the parties will agree not to talk to the press for the duration of the talks. Principals agreed that the international conference should be held in a location isolated from the media (i.e. not Geneva or New York), but they deferred a decision on a specific venue. They agreed in principle that the international conference would be co-chaired by the U.S. and EU, unless this posed serious difficulties for our relations with the Russians. (S)

4. Military Implementation Planning: The Acting Chairman of the JCS briefed Principals on the status of NATO planning for implementation of a peace agreement. Principals agreed that, in response to the anticipated request from SACEUR for an estimated U.S. force contribution, we should continue to indicate a readiness to provide 20-25,000 ground troops. (C)

5. Civilian Implementation Structure: Principals approved the civilian implementation structure proposed by State, but deferred a decision on whether to seek the appointment of an American national as Senior Coordinator. They agreed that we should seek to reduce the UN's role to the extent possible, with the authority for the civilian coordinator flowing from the peace agreement itself rather than a UNSC resolution. (C)

6. Allied and Congressional Consultations: Principals reviewed plans for upcoming consultations with key Allies, noting the importance of engaging the Italians as well as our Contact Group partners in discussions of implementation planning. The President stressed the importance of early consultations with the Congress on NATO planning in order to defuse potential opposition to U.S. participation in the NATO Implementation Force. (C)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

20024

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MS. MARISA LINO
Acting Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the
United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for
National Security &
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, September 25, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~
Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5 (a,b,d)
Declassify on: 9/25/15 (X4)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RS NARA, Date 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9521108
RECEIVED: 23 SEP 95 13

TO: LAKE

FROM: VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 25 SEP 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
SERBIA
PEACEKEEPING
CROATIA
NATO
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 25 SEP PC MTG ON BOSNIA - ADDL ITEMS

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 27 SEP 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9521106 9521107

FILES: IFM .O NSCP: PC0150 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA CLOSED BY: NSJDA DOC 2 OF 2

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95092608	FOR INFORMATION
002	LAKE	Z	95092608	FOR INFORMATION
002		X	95092608	NOTED BY LAKE

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National Security Council
The White House

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ *DOCLOG* ~~08~~ *A/O* 01

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake	1	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2		N
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	Alexander Vershbow to Anthony Lake re: Additional Items for September 25 PC on Bosnia (2 pages)	09/25/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4009

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0150 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, September 25, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs651

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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9/24

VERZIJA 24.9.95

FURTHER AGREED PRINCIPLES

4. Each of the two entities will honor the international obligations of Bosnia and Herzegovina, so long as the obligation is not a financial obligation incurred by one entity without the consent of the other.

5. It is the goal that free democratic elections be held in both entities as soon as social conditions permit. In order to maximize the democratic effectiveness of such elections, the following steps will be taken by both entities.

5.1 Both governments will immediately pledge their full support, starting immediately, for (a) freedom of movement, (b) the right of refugees and displaced persons to repossess their homes and other property (or receive just compensation), (c) freedom of speech and of the press, and (d) protection of all other internationally recognized human rights in order to enhance and empower the democratic election process.

5.2 As soon as possible the OSCE (or other international organization) will station representatives in all principal towns throughout the Federation and Republika Srpska and publish monthly reports as to the degree which (a) the obligations listed in these Agreed Principles have been fulfilled, and (b) social conditions are being restored to a level at which the election process may be effective.

5.3 Within 30 days after the OSCE delegations have concluded that elections can be properly held in both entities, the governments of the two entities will conduct elections and will fully cooperate with an international monitoring program.

6. Following the elections, Bosnia and Herzegovina will be headed by a three-person Presidency consisting of two members from the Federation and one from the Republika Srpska, with each member being elected by the appropriate newly-elected parliamentary body. The office of Chairman and Head of Bosnia and Herzegovina will be rotated in a manner to be determined by subsequent agreement.

6.1 The Presidency will have responsibility exclusively for (a) foreign policy, the main guidelines of which must be approved by the parliaments of both entities; (b) such international financial matters as are beyond the legal capacity of either entity; and (c) such other activities as the parliamentary bodies of the two entities may agree upon as being mutually beneficial. The Presidency may appoint a cabinet of appropriate ministers to assist the Presidency in executing its duties.

6.2 All Presidency decisions will be taken by a majority vote, provided, however, that if any member disagrees with a decision taken by the other two and declares that decision to be destructive of a vital interest of the entity from which the dissenting member was elected, the matter will immediately be referred to that entity's parliament, which may determine by a two-thirds vote that the challenged decision will not take effect.

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6.3 Either entity may have international relations subject both to the guidelines referred to in Paragraph 6.1 and to the foreign policy prerogatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

6.4 Either entity may engage in any international economic activity so long as participation of the Presidency (on behalf of Bosnia and Herzegovina) is not required by other participants in such activity.

7. Following the elections there will be created a new Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina consisting of 27 members, 18 selected by the newly-elected legislature of the Federation and 9 by the newly-elected legislature of the Republika Srpska. Assembly actions will be by majority vote provided that the majority vote includes at least three votes from each entity.

7.1 The Assembly will make such laws as may be necessary in order to carry out decisions of the Presidency on matters falling within its authority.

8. The Presidency will promptly appoint a five-member Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to be composed of two persons from the Federation, two from Republika Srpska, and one named by the President of the International Court of Justice, with jurisdiction to decide all questions arising under the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina as it will be revised in accordance with these Agreed Principles.

9. The activities and obligations of Bosnia and Herzegovina must be financed by the Federation and the Republika Srpska.

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9/25

FURTHER AGREED PRINCIPLES

4. Each of the two entities will honor the international obligations of Bosnia and Herzegovina, so long as the obligation is not a financial obligation incurred by one entity without the consent of the other.

5. It is the goal that free democratic elections be held in both entities as soon as social conditions permit. In order to maximize the democratic effectiveness of such elections, the following steps will be taken by both entities.

5.1 Both governments will immediately pledge their full support, starting immediately, for (a) freedom of movement, (b) the right of refugees and displaced persons to repossess their homes and other property (or receive just compensation), (c) freedom of speech and of the press, and (d) protection of all other internationally recognized human rights in order to enhance and empower the democratic election process.

5.2 As soon as possible the OSCE (or other international organization) will station representatives in all principal towns throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and publish monthly reports as to the degree which (a) the obligations listed in these Agreed Principles have been fulfilled, and (b) social conditions are being restored to a level at which the election process may be effective.

5.3 Within 30 days after the OSCE delegations have concluded that elections can be properly held in both entities, the governments of the two entities will conduct elections and will fully cooperate with an international monitoring program.

6. Following the elections, the affairs and prerogatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina will be vested in the following institutions, in accordance with the Constitution thereof, as amended in accordance with these Agreed Principles.

6.1 A parliament or assembly, two-thirds of which will be elected by popular vote from the territory of the Federation, and one-third by popular vote from territory of the Republika Srpska. All parliamentary actions will be by majority vote provided that the majority includes at least one-third of the votes from each entity

6.2 A Presidency, two-thirds of which will be elected by popular vote from the territory of Federation, and one-third by popular vote from the territory of Republika Srpska. All Presidency decisions will be taken by majority vote, provided, however, that if one-third or more of the members disagree with a decision taken by the other members and declare that decision to be destructive of a vital interest of the entity or entities from which the dissenting members were elected, the matter will be referred immediately to the appropriate entity's/entities' parliament. If any such parliament confirms the dissenting position by a two-thirds vote, then the challenged decision will not take effect.

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6.3 A cabinet of such ministers as may be appropriate.

6.4 A Constitutional Court with jurisdiction to decide all questions arising under the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina as it will be revised in accordance with these Agreed Principles.

6.5 The parties will negotiate in the immediate future as to further aspects of the management and operation of these institutions.

6.6 Thus far it is agreed that the foregoing institutions will have responsibility for the foreign relations and foreign policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The parties will negotiate further to determine the extent to which these institutions will also have responsibility for foreign trade, customs administration, international financial affairs, currency administration, central bank and budget, international traffic and communications, immigration regulation, international criminal enforcement, utilization of energy and natural resources, citizenship and passports, protection of borders, and other activities as to which the parties may agree that mutual benefits shall be derived through such central administration.

7 The activities and obligations of Bosnia and Herzegovina must be financed by the Federation and the Republika Srpska.

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DRAFT 9/20

FURTHER AGREED PRINCIPLES

4. It is the goal that free democratic elections be held in both entities as soon as social conditions permit. In order to maximize the democratic effectiveness of such elections, the following steps will be taken by both entities.

4.1 Both governments will immediately pledge their full support, starting immediately, for (a) freedom of movement, (b) the right of displaced persons to repossess their property (or receive just compensation), (c) freedom of speech and of the press, and (d) protection of all other internationally recognized human rights that enhance and empower the democratic election process.

4.2 As soon as possible the OSCE (or other international organization) will station representatives in all principal towns throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and publish monthly reports as to the degree to which (a) displaced persons are being enabled to regain possession of their homes and other property, and (b) social conditions are being restored to a level at which the election process may be effective.

4.3 As soon as the OSCE delegations have concluded that elections can be properly held in both entities, the governments of the two entities will conduct simultaneous elections and will fully cooperate with an international monitoring program.

5. Following the simultaneous elections, Bosnia and Herzegovina will be headed by a three-person Presidency representing the three principal constituent peoples, with each of the three members being elected by the appropriate newly-elected parliamentary body. The office of Chairman and Head of State will be rotated annually among the three members.

5.1 Among the responsibilities of the Presidency will be foreign relations, foreign trade, customs administration, monetary system administration, and such other activities as the parliamentary bodies of the two entities may agree upon as being mutually beneficial (such as, for example, immigration regulation, international criminal enforcement, establishment and operation of common transportation and communications facilities, utilization of energy resources, air traffic control, and cooperative economic projects). The Presidency may appoint a cabinet of appropriate ministers to assist the Presidency in executing its duties.

5.2 All Presidency decisions will be taken by majority vote, provided, however, that if one member disagrees with a decision taken by the other two and declares that decision to be destructive of a vital interest of the entity from which the dissenting member was elected, the matter will be referred immediately to that entity's parliament, which may determine by a

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two-thirds vote that the challenged decision will not be applicable to that entity.

6. As a result of the elections there will be created a new Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina consisting of 36 members, 24 elected by the newly-elected legislature of the Federation and 12 elected by the newly-elected legislature of Republica Srpska. All parliamentary actions will be by majority vote provided that the majority vote includes at least four votes from each entity.

6.1 The legislature will make such laws as it deems appropriate on subjects within the authority of the Presidency, as indicated in Paragraph 5.1.

7. The government of Bosnia and Herzegovina will be financed by the Federation and the Republica Srpska.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. memo	Alexander Vershbow to Anthony Lake re: Checklist for September 25 PC on Bosnia (2 pages)	09/23/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4009

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0150 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, September 25, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs651

RESTRICTION CODES

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DRAFT

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Your Participation in Principals' Committee Meeting on Bosnia
September 25, 1995, 2:45-3:15 p.m.

Principals are meeting to review the latest developments in the negotiations on the eve of Tuesday's meeting of the three Balkan Foreign Ministers with the Contact Group, and to discuss planning for implementation of a peace settlement. Chris and Dick Holbrooke will participate in the meeting from New York via video link.

Negotiations: While the Bosnians are still haggling over final details, prospects are good for agreement on Tuesday on a set of "further agreed principles" for a settlement (draft at Tab A). These will round out the text agreed in Geneva on September 8. They set forth the institutions of the central government (rotating three-person presidency, parliament), identify their areas of responsibility, and establish rules for free elections under international supervision. While some points will be controversial, the new principles will help strengthen the case that the peace plan will not partition Bosnia.

Assuming agreement on the principles, the focus of our negotiating team's next round of shuttle diplomacy will be to draft a comprehensive peace agreement based on the principles and to press for agreement on the map. The most sensitive territorial issue will be the status of Sarajevo, which the Bosnians insist must be an undivided city under Federation control.

After another round of shuttling, it will likely be necessary to convene an international conference -- possibly as soon as mid-October -- with the three Balkan Presidents to resolve the most contentious issues and pave the way to a summit where the agreement would be signed. We have not decided whether to hold such a conference in the U.S. or in Europe.

Issues for discussion:

- Will the "further agreed principles" create an effective central government and prevent a formal partition?

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NLC-2013-0602-M
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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

- What are the weak points in the new paper?
- How soon will it be necessary or desirable to move to an international conference?
- Now that the battle lines have stabilized in western Bosnia, is this the time to press for a 1- or 2-month cessation of hostilities?

Implementation Planning: Shali will brief Principals on the status of U.S. and NATO planning for peace plan implementation. The NATO Military Authorities have been tasked to complete a draft OPLAN by the end of the month. This will give a clearer sense of the overall troop requirements -- although, even then, we will need to know the final terms of the settlement before hard figures can be established. Shali told Principals last week that he favors following the Haiti model, i.e. inserting a large and heavily-equipped force at the very outset in order to deter non-compliance by the parties, but then phasing down the force quickly once stable conditions have been established. The NATO-led force would withdraw completely at the end of one year. Still to be worked out are arrangements for associating the Russians and other non-NATO forces with the implementation force (IFOR) while preserving a single chain of command.

Following your departure, Principals will also review planning for implementation of the non-military aspects of a settlement (return of refugees, humanitarian aid, supervising elections, setting up governmental institutions, protecting human rights, etc.). We envisage appointing a senior statesman who would coordinate among the various international agencies involved. He would maintain liaison with the NATO military commander but have no dual key.

Issues for discussion:

- Are we and our Allies in basic agreement on the concept for military implementation of the peace plan? Rules of engagement and command and control?
- When will we need to decide the level of U.S. participation?
- How soon after signature of a peace settlement will we be able to deploy U.S. forces to Bosnia?

Attachment
Tab A Draft of Further Agreed Principles

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4. It is the goal that free democratic elections be held in both entities as soon as social conditions permit. In order to maximize the democratic effectiveness of such elections, the following steps will be taken by both entities.

4.1 Both governments will immediately pledge their full support, starting immediately, for (a) freedom of movement, (b) the right of displaced persons to repossess their property (or receive just compensation), (c) freedom of speech and of the press, and (d) protection of all other internationally recognized human rights that enhance and empower the democratic election process.

4.2 As soon as possible the OSCE (or other international organization) will station representatives in all principal towns throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and publish monthly reports as to the degree to which (a) displaced persons are being enabled to regain possession of their homes and other property, and (b) social conditions are being restored to a level at which the election process may be effective.

4.3 As soon as the OSCE delegations have concluded that elections can be properly held in both entities, the governments of the two entities will conduct simultaneous elections and will fully cooperate with an international monitoring program.

5. Following the simultaneous elections, Bosnia and Herzegovina will be headed by a three-person Presidency representing the three principal constituent peoples, with each of the three members being elected by the appropriate newly-elected parliamentary body. The office of Chairman and Head of State will be rotated annually among the three members.

5.1 Among the responsibilities of the Presidency will be foreign relations, foreign trade, customs administration, monetary system administration, and such other activities as the parliamentary bodies of the two entities may agree upon as being mutually beneficial (such as, for example, immigration regulation, international criminal enforcement, establishment and operation of common transportation and communications facilities, utilization of energy resources, air traffic control, and cooperative economic projects). The Presidency may appoint a cabinet of appropriate ministers to assist the Presidency in executing its duties.

5.2 All Presidency decisions will be taken by majority vote, provided, however, that if one member disagrees with a decision taken by the other two and declares that decision to be destructive of a vital interest of the entity from which the dissenting member was elected, the matter will be referred immediately to that entity's parliament, which may determine by a

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two-thirds vote that the challenged decision will not be applicable to that entity.

6. As a result of the elections there will be created a new Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina consisting of 36 members, 24 elected by the newly-elected legislature of the Federation and 12 elected by the newly-elected legislature of Republica Srpska. All parliamentary actions will be by majority vote provided that the majority vote includes at least four votes from each entity.

6.1 The legislature will make such laws as it deems appropriate on subjects within the authority of the Presidency, as indicated in Paragraph 5.1.

7. The government of Bosnia and Herzegovina will be financed by the Federation and the Republica Srpska.

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IMPLEMENTATION STRUCTURE IN A BOSNIAN SETTLEMENT

The Task

Implementing a settlement in all its political, economic, humanitarian, military and other aspects will require a coordinating superstructure with a clear mandate to make the settlement work, as well as mobilization of a variety of organizations, most already active in the Balkans. The task would be to integrate, coordinate and, to a lesser degree, oversee progress on the various political undertakings of a settlement package and the activities of international organizations and activities involved in different aspects of implementation.

"Peace implementation" will require not only a military component -- through the IFOR to ensure a secure environment within which implementation can go forward -- but also a means of ensuring continued facilitation of political negotiations among the parties, promotion of local conflict resolution and monitoring of human rights, coordination of economic reconstruction, delivery of humanitarian assistance, and monitoring of various confidence-building/arms control measures of increasing scope.

An important aspect, yet to be determined, is the extent of direct involvement of the implementation structure in the internal affairs of the Bosnian state. The Bosnian parties may wish to have the least direct involvement by the implementation structure in some fields (e.g., human rights), and the opposite in others (e.g., reconstruction). The international community will expect the structure, nonetheless, to bring about full implementation. The tension between these various parties will have a bearing on the final settlement.

Mandate

The implementation structure should derive its authority from the settlement documents -- including the approval of all parties of the settlement, rather than from UNSC resolutions. The structure would, thus, have a certain autonomous authority. We should seek UNSC blessing (but not creation of) the structure through appropriate language in a Security Council Resolution acknowledging the actual settlement.

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NL 2/6/2020 (8.79)
2013-0612-M

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Mission

The mission of the structure will be to coordinate among, rather than to control, the organizations that will play a role in the region after settlement: the NATO-led implementation force (IFOR), EU, ICFY, OSCE, IFIs, UN, UNHCR, ICRC and possibly other NGOs, bilateral players, etc. Some elements might report directly to the Senior Implementation Coordinator (SIC) depending on the terms of the settlement. The implementation structure will serve as a bridge between the international actors and local officials, as appropriate.

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The structure should specifically be maintained as long as required in the view of the Senior Coordination Committee (see below), but in no case less than one year beyond the date of final withdrawal of the IFOR and for a period not to exceed three years.

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The administrative costs (including salaries) of the structure could be funded according to a formula yet to be determined among interested parties. The entity would establish an annual budget for presentation to contributors. Or, less formally, each government or organization contributing resources to the structure could simply pay its own way. The salary of the Senior Implementation Coordinator should be established at the time of the settlement.

Generating International Support

How the United States seeks to define the role, mandate, structure and senior leadership of such an international on-the-ground political component of settlement implementation will directly affect:

-- the credibility of the package that our current negotiating efforts are promoting with the parties in the region;

-- our ability to generate sufficient diplomatic support for a NATO-led military implementation force along the lines we desire;

-- our ability to encourage and ensure continued progress in the various political undertakings of a settlement once launched; and,

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-- the credibility of our exit strategy for the IFOR and the withdrawal of its major U.S. elements no later than 12 months from its initial deployment.

This latter point will be especially critical. While the NATO-led IFOR is intended to be of specific and limited duration, a broader implementation structure will have the opportunity (indeed requirement) to run longer. (Just as an ongoing international presence to support and oversee democratic development within Haiti provided the context within which timely withdrawal of initial intervention forces was politically possible, so too will our announcement of an exit date and strategy for the IFOR need to be accompanied by the sense that an implementation structure for dealing with longer-term problems is in place in Bosnia.)

Senior Implementation Coordinator

The implementation structure would be headed by a respected senior statesman, a strong personality, and possibly an American.

Pros: An American would symbolize U.S. commitment and leadership in brokering the settlement, and underscore the U.S. commitment to successful conclusion of the effort. He would likely enjoy greater effectiveness, and command access to a broader array of resources. He would be more amenable to working toward U.S. goals (e.g., avoiding getting the U.S. trapped into unwanted commitments). Since the peace agreement will be American-negotiated and American-inspired, the parties will want to deal with an American.

Cons: An American might not enjoy the support of a wider group of countries, and might complicate obtaining the active support of France and/or Russia. If the implementation breaks down, the U.S. might be held responsible by Europeans for it and ensuing turmoil on the continent, e.g. "America's war." An American would have to achieve more stature than the likely European candidate, Carl Bildt. An American might prompt a certain Europe versus America competition, and resentment that the EU gets the lead on paying for reconstruction and providing many IFOR units, but the U.S. runs both.

The Senior Implementation Coordinator might be nominated by any settlement group participant and agreed to by consensus. He might have three or four deputies from different countries,

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such as Russia. He would have no formal line authority over the implementation agencies, but would determine the arrangements for coordination in the various functional fields, including designation of the lead coordinating person and/or agency in the implementation structure. He would derive his authority from his mandate, his ability to work with all parties, his selection of committee chairs, his potential to assist with dispute resolution, and his international standing. His commitment would be to the settlement terms, but he would respect the independent authority of each agency working in the country. Specifically, he would work to:

-- ensure that various players do not duplicate tasks, undermine the "sub-contract" work of other agencies, or contravene the general principles of the settlement.

-- establish general parameters for the overall mission by acting as interpreter of the terms of the settlement, and encouraging (but not necessarily dictating) international agencies to adhere to those parameters.

Senior Coordination Committee

This would be the central coordinating authority. The Senior Implementation Coordinator would chair consultative meetings of the senior resident representatives of the main organizations active on the ground in Bosnia. Those agencies would likely include but not be restricted to IFOR, UN, UNHCR, EU/ECMM, OSCE, and IBRD. Additional possibilities include ICFY, remaining elements of UNPF, an international reconstruction mission, UN human rights monitors, Office of the UNSYG, Office of the NATO SYG, and possibly a stabilization-arms control effort. The SIC would have no line authority over any of these agencies, unless a group delegated specific decision-making authority to him.

Major aid donors and/or other governments playing a key bilateral role in the settlement may be included in the Senior Coordination Committee (or other committees, see below) in an appropriate way, if they provide a liaison staff to the SIC headquarters and are accepted by the SIC in that role.

NGOs would not be represented in the Senior Committee. However, an NGO advisory board could be established of representatives of organizations willing to provide liaison officials and attend relevant meetings as determined by the SIC.

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Functions

The SIC would exercise direction by virtue of his free-standing authority and through his staff. As the senior international figure in Bosnia, he would be the locus for contact with the Federation and Serb Republic Governments and would maintain liaison offices in Belgrade, Zagreb, and possibly Skopje and elsewhere.

Functions under specific committees might be the following (and might be expanded or reduced to other fields as needed) under the overall coordination of the Senior Coordination Committee:

-- Military Security

The SIC would have no line authority, but may be able to assist the IFOR commander, who has the lead on military security, with liaison with local political authorities. He would work to ensure that non-IFOR activities do not inadvertently find themselves in conflict zones, and try to coordinate the early transfer of IFOR tasks (e.g., boundary monitoring) to other authorities as necessary.

-- Human Rights

SIC authority would rest with his ability to select a committee chairman (probably OSCE) and coordinate overall efforts in a direction consonant with the settlement. He would work to provide international groups assistance obtaining access to areas requiring monitoring.

-- Humanitarian Operations

UNHCR is the most readily-apparent entity with a claim to leading this effort, including repatriation and return. The SIC would be able to provide liaison support to UNHCR, if needed, and deal with the UNSYG via the UNSYG liaison office. ICRC, however, would have the lead dealing with detainees, missiong persons, etc.

-- Reconstruction

If the EU leads the reconstruction effort, the SIC might be able to promote coordination between EU efforts and local and other international (and bilateral) reconstruction efforts.

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-- Security Stabilization

A comprehensive package of arms control and CBM measures should be included in the settlement agreement, and possibly provide for implementation by an OSCE or other entity. A background paper on this is attached. The Germans have put ideas forward on this, and we may wish to encourage them to work with OSCE to develop their ideas for a package here. The SIC might become operationally involved in coordination of any subsequent negotiation-verification efforts on arms control, though he would have no line authority over this function beyond encouraging efforts within the parameters of the settlement.

-- War Crimes

The efforts of the UN war crimes tribunal will be an important aspect of implementation. Though there may be no need for a specific in-country war crimes structure, it will remain a significant political issue.

-- Democratic Elections and Institutions

Perhaps best situated to chair this effort would be the chief of an OSCE democracy-building entity (or alternatively the UN) that would have to be created at OSCE just prior to settlement. OSCE is best situated to integrate NGO concerns and recruit monitors for elections. The SIC would again achieve his greatest influence in supporting efforts with local officials.

-- Border Control

These responsibilities should be handled by a combination of local authorities and international monitors at an appropriate time. EUMM may be the best candidate to develop a mandate in this area and chair a committee. The SIC would again serve a partial liaison role with local officials, and work to ensure good cooperation with IFOR and the EUMMs. A dispute resolution mechanism, possibly based in the SIC's Legal Office, may address disputes.

-- Legal/Dispute Settlement

The SIC would have under his direct authority a Legal Office for whatever legal issues he determined needed attention. He could employ that expertise as appropriate (both binding and non-binding) to promote the resolution of any

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disputes. The legal office could provide non-binding advice on legal interpretations of the settlement terms, and provide advice as requested by various committees.

The SIC would designate a chairman for each of the above functions requiring (at the discretion of the Senior Coordination Committee) committee attention who could be either the local head of a relevant international agency or a deputy of the SIC. The guiding principle in organizing this structure should be pragmatism. A significant portion of the SIC's authority will derive from his ability to select and replace committee chairmen. To the extent possible, however, the structure should pave the way for Bosnian governmental institutions called for in the settlement, e.g. reconstruction commission, arbitration panel, and might provide a few important jobs to offer to nationals of various governments to help secure their support.

Secretariat

The Senior Implementation Coordinator would have a small secretariat located in or near Sarajevo. The various international agencies should be located in close proximity to the Office of the Senior Implementation Coordinator, with small, full-time liaison staffs (paid by parent agencies) in the same building. The staff should enjoy immunity from the jurisdication of the host countries (established in conjunction with settlement).

Political Liaison Group

This group would be appended to the SIC's office. It would include representatives of the settlement group, as well as the representatives of the UNSYG's office, the NATO SYG's office, and the EU President's office -- all located in the SIC's headquarters. The group would be formally headed by the SIC, but serve as a general advisory/liaison group for the SIC. It would have no direct authority over the SIC, but be available to provide insights on possible differences among the parties. The Russians would be included if they are part of the final settlement group.

Russia

The question of bringing Russia on board is discussed separately. It is worth noting that in addition to the Political Liaison Group, Russian participation in the implementation structure (not necessarily including the IFOR), and especially the arms control entity, might be possible.

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Transition

The announcement of the SIC should be made on the day of actual settlement. Most agencies will already be present in Bosnia with senior representatives on the scene. The SIC will simply need to travel to Sarajevo, take occupancy of a larger (ideally only one) building provided by the Bosnians, begin building his secretariat, and inviting the various international agencies to establish liaison offices under his roof. The transition should not be exceedingly disruptive given that only a small staff is required and most of the contributors to SIC activities will already be physically present in Sarajevo.

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Confidence-Building/Arms Control Measures
To Accompany Political Settlement

Assumption: At the onset, it will be important that the United States include elements of weapons control in connection with any settlement package in order to support the cease-fire and to build political support among allies and partners for the overall U.S. initiative. The second step would be to establish a regime to create something approaching a Federation-Bosnian Serb military balance. Such a military balance can only be created by taking into account Serb and Croation forces in the longer term. Any set of proposals to that effect, however, would have to be phased and flexible, readily adapting to changing circumstances on the ground and open to expansion over time in both scope and application.

Step 1: Conditions Imposed at Settlement: In the first instance, we should concentrate on political/military confidence-building measures geared to specific areas and tactical situations along lines of confrontation within Bosnia itself. Their immediate objective would be to supplement and help stabilize the cease-fire contained in the settlement; accordingly, they would focus on disengagement of the parties, preliminary forms of weapons control, and transparency.

More specifically, this might include (perhaps within the text of any cease-fire component of a settlement):

-- Compliance by all parties with the zones of separation along the frontier. (e.g., 2 km for infantry, 10 km for mortars, 20 km for heavy weapons).

-- Ban on certain (possibly all) military activities in selected areas or region-wide. Ban on military aircraft.

-- If arms embargo is not lifted, or is lifted in phases, maintain Sharp Guard and/or other measures to prevent weapons flows into the region until specifically delineated implementation goals have been met.

-- Establishment of joint liaison/communication links at multiple levels between the IFOR and the Federation and Bosnian Serb Armies.

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-- Establishment of procedures for extensive monitoring all of the above measures by designated elements of OSCE or the Implementation Force, as appropriate.

Step 2: The Military Balance: As progress is made with each of these measures, we would seek to expand them in scope and effect. As some would presumably be intended for a long duration, we would wish to build in the possibility that, as the NATO-led military implementation force draws down with the accomplishment of its basic mission, those monitoring/verification duties assigned to the IFOR will be passed to another body -- perhaps some configuration of UN/OSCE observers. It would be necessary at this point to bring in Serbia and Croatia.

Step 3: Long-Term Perspective: Even as our immediate focus should be on local stabilizing measures within Bosnia proper to support the cease-fire and settlement, the United States should be prepared to offer -- at an appropriate political moment -- a long-term perspective for the region as whole. This would be consistent with an emphasis on a comprehensive approach to the problems of the former Yugoslavia.

The stated objective of such a U.S. initiative for confidence-building/arms control measures would be strengthening stability and security throughout the region, with the specific aim of eliminating disparities and capabilities for launching surprise attack and for initiating, at a regional level, large-scale offensive action. Reductions, limitations and the realization of a more defensive set of force postures might be examined as contributions to a more stable military balance.

Any initial deliberations among parties as to participation and modalities could take place in an informal setting, although the intention should always be to transfer any such negotiations back into a more formal OSCE framework at an appropriate time. Recognizing the many inherent difficulties involved in any move towards a more ambitious arms control regime for the region, the U.S. objective would, in the first instance, be as much to set in place an ongoing process as the expectation of any early progress towards a CFE-like regime.

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BOSNIA HILL CALLS

Beginning week of September 25: Principal calls, as part of process of keeping members informed over next few weeks:

State calls: Gilman, Hamilton, Smith, Hoyer, Helms, Pell, Lugar, Biden, Callahan, Livingston, McConnell, Leahy, Wilson, Obey, Rogers, Mollohan, Kassebaum, Dodd, Kerry, Gramm, Hollings, Hyde, Mikulski, Feinstein and Moran.

DoD calls: Spence, Dellums, Young, Murtha, Thurmond, Nunn, Stevens, Inouye, Levin, Lieberman, Cohen, Warner, McCain, Byrd, Exon.

NSC calls: Dole, Daschle, Specter, Kerrey, Gingrich, Gephardt, Armey, Bonior, DeLay, Combest, Dicks.

Suggested List for Leadership Meeting on Bosnia:

Dole, Daschle, Byrd, Hatfield, McConnell, Leahy, Stevens, Inouye, Gramm, Hollings, Helms, Pell, Lugar, Biden, Thurmond, Nunn, Specter, Kerrey

Other Senate possibilities: Exon, Levin

Gingrich, Gephardt, Livingston, Obey, Callahan, Wilson, Young, Murtha, Rogers, Mollohan, Gilman, Hamilton, Spence, Dellums, Combest, Dicks

Other House possibilities: Hoyer, Neumann

Suggested Administration Representatives:

POTUS, VPOTUS, Secretaries of State and Defense, General Shali, Ambassador Albright, Leon Panetta, Tony Lake, Sandy Berger, Leon Fuerth, Pat Griffin, Al Maldon, Bill Danvers, Wendy Sherman and Sandi Stuart.

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9521108
RECEIVED: 23 SEP 95 13

TO: LAKE

FROM: VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 23 SEP 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
SERBIA
PEACEKEEPING
CROATIA
NATO
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 25 SEP PC MTG ON BOSNIA - CHECKLIST

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 27 SEP 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9521106 9521107

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0150 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA CLOSED BY: NSJDA DOC 1 OF 2

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95092308	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	95092312	NOTED BY LAKE
002	LAKE	Z	95092508	FOR INFORMATION
002		X	95092608	NOTED BY LAKE

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National Security Council
The White House

Rec'd 9/23 3:45pm

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 21103

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse			
Sens	1	AOS	
Soderberg			
Berger	2	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	10/31	N
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette NO

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. memo	[Duplicate of 002b] (2 pages)	09/23/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4009

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0150 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, September 25, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs651

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DRAFT

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Your Participation in Principals' Committee Meeting on Bosnia
September 25, 1995, 2:45-3:15 p.m.

Principals are meeting to review the latest developments in the negotiations on the eve of Tuesday's meeting of the three Balkan Foreign Ministers with the Contact Group, and to discuss planning for implementation of a peace settlement. Chris and Dick Holbrooke will participate in the meeting from New York via video link.

Negotiations: While the Bosnians are still haggling over final details, prospects are good for agreement on Tuesday on a set of "further agreed principles" for a settlement (draft at Tab A). These will round out the text agreed in Geneva on September 8. They set forth the institutions of the central government (rotating three-person presidency, parliament), identify their areas of responsibility, and establish rules for free elections under international supervision. While some points will be controversial, the new principles will help strengthen the case that the peace plan will not partition Bosnia.

Assuming agreement on the principles, the focus of our negotiating team's next round of shuttle diplomacy will be to draft a comprehensive peace agreement based on the principles and to press for agreement on the map. The most sensitive territorial issue will be the status of Sarajevo, which the Bosnians insist must be an undivided city under Federation control.

After another round of shuttling, it will likely be necessary to convene an international conference -- possibly as soon as mid-October -- with the three Balkan Presidents to resolve the most contentious issues and pave the way to a summit where the agreement would be signed. We have not decided whether to hold such a conference in the U.S. or in Europe.

Issues for discussion:

- Will the "further agreed principles" create an effective central government and prevent a formal partition?

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Declassify on: DATE Chief of Staff

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- What are the weak points in the new paper?
- How soon will it be necessary or desirable to move to an international conference?
- Now that the battle lines have stabilized in western Bosnia, is this the time to press for a 1- or 2-month cessation of hostilities?

Implementation Planning: Shali will brief Principals on the status of U.S. and NATO planning for peace plan implementation. The NATO Military Authorities have been tasked to complete a draft OPLAN by the end of the month. This will give a clearer sense of the overall troop requirements -- although, even then, we will need to know the final terms of the settlement before hard figures can be established. Shali told Principals last week that he favors following the Haiti model, i.e. inserting a large and heavily-equipped force at the very outset in order to deter non-compliance by the parties, but then phasing down the force quickly once stable conditions have been established. The NATO-led force would withdraw completely at the end of one year. Still to be worked out are arrangements for associating the Russians and other non-NATO forces with the implementation force (IFOR) while preserving a single chain of command.

Following your departure, Principals will also review planning for implementation of the non-military aspects of a settlement (return of refugees, humanitarian aid, supervising elections, setting up governmental institutions, protecting human rights, etc.). We envisage appointing a senior statesman who would coordinate among the various international agencies involved. He would maintain liaison with the NATO military commander but have no dual key.

Issues for discussion:

- Are we and our Allies in basic agreement on the concept for military implementation of the peace plan? Rules of engagement and command and control?
- When will we need to decide the level of U.S. participation?
- How soon after signature of a peace settlement will we be able to deploy U.S. forces to Bosnia?

Attachment
Tab A Draft of Further Agreed Principles

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4. It is the goal that free democratic elections be held in both entities as soon as social conditions permit. In order to maximize the democratic effectiveness of such elections, the following steps will be taken by both entities.

4.1 Both governments will immediately pledge their full support, starting immediately, for (a) freedom of movement, (b) the right of displaced persons to repossess their property (or receive just compensation), (c) freedom of speech and of the press, and (d) protection of all other internationally recognized human rights that enhance and empower the democratic election process.

4.2 As soon as possible the OSCE (or other international organization) will station representatives in all principal towns throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and publish monthly reports as to the degree to which (a) displaced persons are being enabled to regain possession of their homes and other property, and (b) social conditions are being restored to a level at which the election process may be effective.

4.3 As soon as the OSCE delegations have concluded that elections can be properly held in both entities, the governments of the two entities will conduct simultaneous elections and will fully cooperate with an international monitoring program.

5. Following the simultaneous elections, Bosnia and Herzegovina will be headed by a three-person Presidency representing the three principal constituent peoples, with each of the three members being elected by the appropriate newly-elected parliamentary body. The office of Chairman and Head of State will be rotated annually among the three members.

5.1 Among the responsibilities of the Presidency will be foreign relations, foreign trade, customs administration, monetary system administration, and such other activities as the parliamentary bodies of the two entities may agree upon as being mutually beneficial (such as, for example, immigration regulation, international criminal enforcement, establishment and operation of common transportation and communications facilities, utilization of energy resources, air traffic control, and cooperative economic projects). The Presidency may appoint a cabinet of appropriate ministers to assist the Presidency in executing its duties.

5.2 All Presidency decisions will be taken by majority vote, provided, however, that if one member disagrees with a decision taken by the other two and declares that decision to be destructive of a vital interest of the entity from which the dissenting member was elected, the matter will be referred immediately to that entity's parliament, which may determine by a

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two-thirds vote that the challenged decision will not be applicable to that entity.

6. As a result of the elections there will be created a new Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina consisting of 36 members, 24 elected by the newly-elected legislature of the Federation and 12 elected by the newly-elected legislature of Republica Srpska. All parliamentary actions will be by majority vote provided that the majority vote includes at least four votes from each entity.

6.1 The legislature will make such laws as it deems appropriate on subjects within the authority of the Presidency, as indicated in Paragraph 5.1.

7. The government of Bosnia and Herzegovina will be financed by the Federation and the Republica Srpska.

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IMPLEMENTATION STRUCTURE IN A BOSNIAN SETTLEMENT

The Task

Implementing a settlement in all its political, economic, humanitarian, military and other aspects will require a coordinating superstructure with a clear mandate to make the settlement work, as well as mobilization of a variety of organizations, most already active in the Balkans. The task would be to integrate, coordinate and, to a lesser degree, oversee progress on the various political undertakings of a settlement package and the activities of international organizations and activities involved in different aspects of implementation.

"Peace implementation" will require not only a military component -- through the IFOR to ensure a secure environment within which implementation can go forward -- but also a means of ensuring continued facilitation of political negotiations among the parties, promotion of local conflict resolution and monitoring of human rights, coordination of economic reconstruction, delivery of humanitarian assistance, and monitoring of various confidence-building/arms control measures of increasing scope.

An important aspect, yet to be determined, is the extent of direct involvement of the implementation structure in the internal affairs of the Bosnian state. The Bosnian parties may wish to have the least direct involvement by the implementation structure in some fields (e.g., human rights), and the opposite in others (e.g., reconstruction). The international community will expect the structure, nonetheless, to bring about full implementation. The tension between these various parties will have a bearing on the final settlement.

Mandate

The implementation structure should derive its authority from the settlement documents -- including the approval of all parties of the settlement, rather than from UNSC resolutions. The structure would, thus, have a certain autonomous authority. We should seek UNSC blessing (but not creation of) the structure through appropriate language in a Security Council Resolution acknowledging the actual settlement.

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Mission

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This latter point will be especially critical. While the NATO-led IFOR is intended to be of specific and limited duration, a broader implementation structure will have the opportunity (indeed requirement) to run longer. (Just as an ongoing international presence to support and oversee democratic development within Haiti provided the context within which timely withdrawal of initial intervention forces was politically possible, so too will our announcement of an exit date and strategy for the IFOR need to be accompanied by the sense that an implementation structure for dealing with longer-term problems is in place in Bosnia.)

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The implementation structure would be headed by a respected senior statesman, a strong personality, and possibly an American.

Pros: An American would symbolize U.S. commitment and leadership in brokering the settlement, and underscore the U.S. commitment to successful conclusion of the effort. He would likely enjoy greater effectiveness, and command access to a broader array of resources. He would be more amenable to working toward U.S. goals (e.g., avoiding getting the U.S. trapped into unwanted commitments). Since the peace agreement will be American-negotiated and American-inspired, the parties will want to deal with an American.

Cons: An American might not enjoy the support of a wider group of countries, and might complicate obtaining the active support of France and/or Russia. If the implementation breaks down, the U.S. might be held responsible by Europeans for it and ensuing turmoil on the continent, e.g. "America's war." An American would have to achieve more stature than the likely European candidate, Carl Bildt. An American might prompt a certain Europe versus America competition, and resentment that the EU gets the lead on paying for reconstruction and providing many IFOR units, but the U.S. runs both.

The Senior Implementation Coordinator might be nominated by any settlement group participant and agreed to by consensus. He might have three or four deputies from different countries,

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such as Russia. He would have no formal line authority over the implementation agencies, but would determine the arrangements for coordination in the various functional fields, including designation of the lead coordinating person and/or agency in the implementation structure. He would derive his authority from his mandate, his ability to work with all parties, his selection of committee chairs, his potential to assist with dispute resolution, and his international standing. His commitment would be to the settlement terms, but he would respect the independent authority of each agency working in the country. Specifically, he would work to:

-- ensure that various players do not duplicate tasks, undermine the "sub-contract" work of other agencies, or contravene the general principles of the settlement.

-- establish general parameters for the overall mission by acting as interpreter of the terms of the settlement, and encouraging (but not necessarily dictating) international agencies to adhere to those parameters.

Senior Coordination Committee

This would be the central coordinating authority. The Senior Implementation Coordinator would chair consultative meetings of the senior resident representatives of the main organizations active on the ground in Bosnia. Those agencies would likely include but not be restricted to IFOR, UN, UNHCR, EU/ECMM, OSCE, and IBRD. Additional possibilities include ICFY, remaining elements of UNPF, an international reconstruction mission, UN human rights monitors, Office of the UNSYG, Office of the NATO SYG, and possibly a stabilization-arms control effort. The SIC would have no line authority over any of these agencies, unless a group delegated specific decision-making authority to him.

Major aid donors and/or other governments playing a key bilateral role in the settlement may be included in the Senior Coordination Committee (or other committees, see below) in an appropriate way, if they provide a liaison staff to the SIC headquarters and are accepted by the SIC in that role.

NGOs would not be represented in the Senior Committee. However, an NGO advisory board could be established of representatives of organizations willing to provide liaison officials and attend relevant meetings as determined by the SIC.

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Functions

The SIC would exercise direction by virtue of his free-standing authority and through his staff. As the senior international figure in Bosnia, he would be the locus for contact with the Federation and Serb Republic Governments and would maintain liaison offices in Belgrade, Zagreb, and possibly Skopje and elsewhere.

Functions under specific committees might be the following (and might be expanded or reduced to other fields as needed) under the overall coordination of the Senior Coordination Committee:

-- Military Security

The SIC would have no line authority, but may be able to assist the IFOR commander, who has the lead on military security, with liaison with local political authorities. He would work to ensure that non-IFOR activities do not inadvertently find themselves in conflict zones, and try to coordinate the early transfer of IFOR tasks (e.g., boundary monitoring) to other authorities as necessary.

-- Human Rights

SIC authority would rest with his ability to select a committee chairman (probably OSCE) and coordinate overall efforts in a direction consonant with the settlement. He would work to provide international groups assistance obtaining access to areas requiring monitoring.

-- Humanitarian Operations

UNHCR is the most readily-apparent entity with a claim to leading this effort, including repatriation and return. The SIC would be able to provide liaison support to UNHCR, if needed, and deal with the UNSYG via the UNSYG liaison office. ICRC, however, would have the lead dealing with detainees, missiong persons, etc.

-- Reconstruction

If the EU leads the reconstruction effort, the SIC might be able to promote coordination between EU efforts and local and other international (and bilateral) reconstruction efforts.

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-- Security Stabilization

A comprehensive package of arms control and CBM measures should be included in the settlement agreement, and possibly provide for implementation by an OSCE or other entity. A background paper on this is attached. The Germans have put ideas forward on this, and we may wish to encourage them to work with OSCE to develop their ideas for a package here. The SIC might become operationally involved in coordination of any subsequent negotiation-verification efforts on arms control, though he would have no line authority over this function beyond encouraging efforts within the parameters of the settlement.

-- War Crimes

The efforts of the UN war crimes tribunal will be an important aspect of implementation. Though there may be no need for a specific in-country war crimes structure, it will remain a significant political issue.

-- Democratic Elections and Institutions

Perhaps best situated to chair this effort would be the chief of an OSCE democracy-building entity (or alternatively the UN) that would have to be created at OSCE just prior to settlement. OSCE is best situated to integrate NGO concerns and recruit monitors for elections. The SIC would again achieve his greatest influence in supporting efforts with local officials.

-- Border Control

These responsibilities should be handled by a combination of local authorities and international monitors at an appropriate time. EUMM may be the best candidate to develop a mandate in this area and chair a committee. The SIC would again serve a partial liaison role with local officials, and work to ensure good cooperation with IFOR and the EUMMs. A dispute resolution mechanism, possibly based in the SIC's Legal Office, may address disputes.

-- Legal/Dispute Settlement

The SIC would have under his direct authority a Legal Office for whatever legal issues he determined needed attention. He could employ that expertise as appropriate (both binding and non-binding) to promote the resolution of any

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disputes. The legal office could provide non-binding advice on legal interpretations of the settlement terms, and provide advice as requested by various committees.

The SIC would designate a chairman for each of the above functions requiring (at the discretion of the Senior Coordination Committee) committee attention who could be either the local head of a relevant international agency or a deputy of the SIC. The guiding principle in organizing this structure should be pragmatism. A significant portion of the SIC's authority will derive from his ability to select and replace committee chairmen. To the extent possible, however, the structure should pave the way for Bosnian governmental institutions called for in the settlement, e.g. reconstruction commission, arbitration panel, and might provide a few important jobs to offer to nationals of various governments to help secure their support.

Secretariat

The Senior Implementation Coordinator would have a small secretariat located in or near Sarajevo. The various international agencies should be located in close proximity to the Office of the Senior Implementation Coordinator, with small, full-time liaison staffs (paid by parent agencies) in the same building. The staff should enjoy immunity from the jurisdication of the host countries (established in conjunction with settlement).

Political Liaison Group

This group would be appended to the SIC's office. It would include representatives of the settlement group, as well as the representatives of the UNSYG's office, the NATO SYG's office, and the EU President's office -- all located in the SIC's headquarters. The group would be formally headed by the SIC, but serve as a general advisory/liaison group for the SIC. It would have no direct authority over the SIC, but be available to provide insights on possible differences among the parties. The Russians would be included if they are part of the final settlement group.

Russia

The question of bringing Russia on board is discussed separately. It is worth noting that in addition to the Political Liaison Group, Russian participation in the implementation structure (not necessarily including the IFOR), and especially the arms control entity, might be possible.

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Transition

The announcement of the SIC should be made on the day of actual settlement. Most agencies will already be present in Bosnia with senior representatives on the scene. The SIC will simply need to travel to Sarajevo, take occupancy of a larger (ideally only one) building provided by the Bosnians, begin building his secretariat, and inviting the various international agencies to establish liaison offices under his roof. The transition should not be exceedingly disruptive given that only a small staff is required and most of the contributors to SIC activities will already be physically present in Sarajevo.

SERPM2 47
Rev. 5 9/20/95, 17:30

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Confidence-Building/Arms Control Measures
To Accompany Political Settlement

Assumption: At the onset, it will be important that the United States include elements of weapons control in connection with any settlement package in order to support the cease-fire and to build political support among allies and partners for the overall U.S. initiative. The second step would be to establish a regime to create something approaching a Federation-Bosnian Serb military balance. Such a military balance can only be created by taking into account Serb and Croation forces in the longer term. Any set of proposals to that effect, however, would have to be phased and flexible, readily adapting to changing circumstances on the ground and open to expansion over time in both scope and application.

Step 1: Conditions Imposed at Settlement: In the first instance, we should concentrate on political/military confidence-building measures geared to specific areas and tactical situations along lines of confrontation within Bosnia itself. Their immediate objective would be to supplement and help stabilize the cease-fire contained in the settlement; accordingly, they would focus on disengagement of the parties, preliminary forms of weapons control, and transparency.

More specifically, this might include (perhaps within the text of any cease-fire component of a settlement):

-- Compliance by all parties with the zones of separation along the frontier. (e.g., 2 km for infantry, 10 km for mortars, 20 km for heavy weapons).

-- Ban on certain (possibly all) military activities in selected areas or region-wide. Ban on military aircraft.

-- If arms embargo is not lifted, or is lifted in phases, maintain Sharp Guard and/or other measures to prevent weapons flows into the region until specifically delineated implementation goals have been met.

-- Establishment of joint liaison/communication links at multiple levels between the IFOR and the Federation and Bosnian Serb Armies.

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NL 2/6/2020 (8.85)
2013-0682-NL

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-- Establishment of procedures for extensive monitoring all of the above measures by designated elements of OSCE or the Implementation Force, as appropriate.

Step 2: The Military Balance: As progress is made with each of these measures, we would seek to expand them in scope and effect. As some would presumably be intended for a long duration, we would wish to build in the possibility that, as the NATO-led military implementation force draws down with the accomplishment of its basic mission, those monitoring/verification duties assigned to the IFOR will be passed to another body -- perhaps some configuration of UN/OSCE observers. It would be necessary at this point to bring in Serbia and Croatia.

Step 3: Long-Term Perspective: Even as our immediate focus should be on local stabilizing measures within Bosnia proper to support the cease-fire and settlement, the United States should be prepared to offer -- at an appropriate political moment -- a long-term perspective for the region as whole. This would be consistent with an emphasis on a comprehensive approach to the problems of the former Yugoslavia.

The stated objective of such a U.S. initiative for confidence-building/arms control measures would be strengthening stability and security throughout the region, with the specific aim of eliminating disparities and capabilities for launching surprise attack and for initiating, at a regional level, large-scale offensive action. Reductions, limitations and the realization of a more defensive set of force postures might be examined as contributions to a more stable military balance.

Any initial deliberations among parties as to participation and modalities could take place in an informal setting, although the intention should always be to transfer any such negotiations back into a more formal OSCE framework at an appropriate time. Recognizing the many inherent difficulties involved in any move towards a more ambitious arms control regime for the region, the U.S. objective would, in the first instance, be as much to set in place an ongoing process as the expectation of any early progress towards a CFE-like regime.

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Rev 2 9/19/95 08:30

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10

BOSNIA HILL CALLS

Beginning week of September 25: Principal calls, as part of process of keeping members informed over next few weeks:

State calls: Gilman, Hamilton, Smith, Hoyer, Helms, Pell, Lugar, Biden, Callahan, Livingston, McConnell, Leahy, Wilson, Obey, Rogers, Mollohan, Kassebaum, Dodd, Kerry, Gramm, Hollings, Hyde, Mikulski, Feinstein and Moran.

DoD calls: Spence, Dellums, Young, Murtha, Thurmond, Nunn, Stevens, Inouye, Levin, Lieberman, Cohen, Warner, McCain, Byrd, Exon.

NSC calls: Dole, Daschle, Specter, Kerrey, Gingrich, Gephardt, Armey, Bonior, DeLay, Combest, Dicks.

Suggested List for Leadership Meeting on Bosnia:

Dole, Daschle, Byrd, Hatfield, McConnell, Leahy, Stevens, Inouye, Gramm, Hollings, Helms, Pell, Lugar, Biden, Thurmond, Nunn, Specter, Kerrey

Other Senate possibilities: Exon, Levin

Gingrich, Gephardt, Livingston, Obey, Callahan, Wilson, Young, Murtha, Rogers, Mollohan, Gilman, Hamilton, Spence, Dellums, Combest, Dicks

Other House possibilities: Hoyer, Neumann

Suggested Administration Representatives:

POTUS, VPOTUS, Secretaries of State and Defense, General Shali, Ambassador Albright, Leon Panetta, Tony Lake, Sandy Berger, Leon Fuerth, Pat Griffin, Al Maldon, Bill Danvers, Wendy Sherman and Sandi Stuart.

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9521107
RECEIVED: 23 SEP 95 11

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 23 SEP 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
CROATIA
PEACEKEEPING
SERBIA
NATO
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BRIEFING MEMO FOR PRES PARTICIPATION IN 25 SEP PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT DUE DATE: 27 SEP 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9521106 9521108

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0150 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By NLC NARA, Date 10/9/2019
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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95092608	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
002	PRESIDENT	Z	95092608	FOR INFORMATION
002		X	95092608	NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950923		VICE PRESIDENT
002	950923		WH CHIEF OF STAFF

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National Security Council
The White House

rec'd 9/23 3:50pm

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse			
Sens		DDS	
Soderberg	copy		
Berger	2	AW	
Lake			
Situation Room			D PRES
West Wing Desk		9/23	
Records Mgt.			N

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cc:

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
9.25-95

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 23, 1995

95 SEP 23 P6:28

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Your Participation in Principals' Committee Meeting on Bosnia, September 25, 1995, 2:45-3:15 p.m.

Principals are meeting to review the latest developments in the negotiations on the eve of Tuesday's meeting of the three Balkan Foreign Ministers with the Contact Group, and to discuss planning for implementation of a peace settlement. Chris and Dick Holbrooke will participate in the meeting from New York via video link.

Negotiations: While the Bosnians are still haggling over final details, prospects are good for agreement on Tuesday on a set of "further agreed principles" for a settlement (draft at Tab A). These will round out the text agreed in Geneva on September 8. They set forth the institutions of the central government (rotating three-person presidency, parliament), identify their areas of responsibility and establish rules for free elections under international supervision. While some points will be controversial, the new principles will help strengthen the case that the peace plan will not partition Bosnia.

Assuming agreement on the principles, the focus of our negotiating team's next round of shuttle diplomacy will be to draft a comprehensive peace agreement based on the principles and to press for agreement on the map. The most sensitive territorial issue will be the status of Sarajevo, which the Bosnians insist must be an undivided city under Federation control.

After another round of shuttling, it will likely be necessary to convene an international conference -- possibly as soon as mid-October -- with the three Balkan Presidents to resolve the most contentious issues and pave the way to a summit where the agreement would be signed. We have not decided whether to hold such a conference in the U.S. or in Europe.

Issues for discussion:

- Will the "further agreed principles" create an effective central government and prevent a formal partition?

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~~SECRET~~ cc: Vice President
Declassify on: OADR Chief of Staff

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- What are the weak points in the new paper?
- How soon will it be necessary or desirable to move to an international conference?
- Now that the battle lines have stabilized in western Bosnia, is this the time to press for a 1- or 2-month cessation of hostilities?

Implementation Planning: Shali will brief Principals on the status of U.S. and NATO planning for peace plan implementation. The NATO Military Authorities have been tasked to complete a draft OPLAN by the end of the month. This will give a clearer sense of the overall troop requirements -- although, even then, we will need to know the final terms of the settlement before hard figures can be established. Shali told Principals last week that he favors following the Haiti model, i.e. inserting a large and heavily-equipped force at the very outset in order to deter non-compliance by the parties, but then phasing down the force quickly once stable conditions have been established. The NATO-led force would withdraw completely at the end of one year. Still to be worked out are arrangements for associating the Russians and other non-NATO forces with the implementation force (IFOR) while preserving a single chain of command.

Following your departure, Principals will also review planning for implementation of the non-military aspects of a settlement (return of refugees, humanitarian aid, supervising elections, setting up governmental institutions, protecting human rights, etc.). We envisage appointing a senior statesman who would coordinate among the various international agencies involved. He would maintain liaison with the NATO military commander but have no dual key.

Issues for discussion:

- Are we and our Allies in basic agreement on the concept for military implementation of the peace plan? Rules of engagement and command and control?
- When will we need to decide the level of U.S. participation?
- How soon after signature of a peace settlement will we be able to deploy U.S. forces to Bosnia?

Attachment
Tab A Draft of Further Agreed Principles

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DRAFT 9/20

FURTHER AGREED PRINCIPLES

4. It is the goal that free democratic elections be held in both entities as soon as social conditions permit. In order to maximize the democratic effectiveness of such elections, the following steps will be taken by both entities.

4.1 Both governments will immediately pledge their full support, starting immediately, for (a) freedom of movement, (b) the right of displaced persons to repossess their property (or receive just compensation), (c) freedom of speech and of the press, and (d) protection of all other internationally recognized human rights that enhance and empower the democratic election process.

4.2 As soon as possible the OSCE (or other international organization) will station representatives in all principal towns throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and publish monthly reports as to the degree to which (a) displaced persons are being enabled to regain possession of their homes and other property, and (b) social conditions are being restored to a level at which the election process may be effective.

4.3 As soon as the OSCE delegations have concluded that elections can be properly held in both entities, the governments of the two entities will conduct simultaneous elections and will fully cooperate with an international monitoring program.

5. Following the simultaneous elections, Bosnia and Herzegovina will be headed by a three-person Presidency representing the three principal constituent peoples, with each of the three members being elected by the appropriate newly-elected parliamentary body. The office of Chairman and Head of State will be rotated annually among the three members.

5.1 Among the responsibilities of the Presidency will be foreign relations, foreign trade, customs administration, monetary system administration, and such other activities as the parliamentary bodies of the two entities may agree upon as being mutually beneficial (such as, for example, immigration regulation, international criminal enforcement, establishment and operation of common transportation and communications facilities, utilization of energy resources, air traffic control, and cooperative economic projects). The Presidency may appoint a cabinet of appropriate ministers to assist the Presidency in executing its duties.

5.2 All Presidency decisions will be taken by majority vote, provided, however, that if one member disagrees with a decision taken by the other two and declares that decision to be destructive of a vital interest of the entity from which the dissenting member was elected, the matter will be referred immediately to that entity's parliament, which may determine by a

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two-thirds vote that the challenged decision will not be applicable to that entity.

6. As a result of the elections there will be created a new Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina consisting of 36 members, 24 elected by the newly-elected legislature of the Federation and 12 elected by the newly-elected legislature of Republica Srpska. All parliamentary actions will be by majority vote provided that the majority vote includes at least four votes from each entity.

6.1 The legislature will make such laws as it deems appropriate on subjects within the authority of the Presidency, as indicated in Paragraph 5.1.

7. The government of Bosnia and Herzegovina will be financed by the Federation and the Republica Srpska.

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21107

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 23, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

SUBJECT: Memorandum to the President for his Participation in September 25 Principals Committee on Bosnia

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President for his drop-by at Monday's PC on Bosnia.

I suggest that you encourage him to attend the first half of the meeting, when the focus will be on the status of the negotiations and military implementation planning. We understand that Dick Holbrooke will only participate in the first half-hour, since he will be chairing a Contact Group political directors meeting at 3:00.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Further Agreed Principles

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By [illegible] NARA, Date 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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RECORD ID: 9521106
RECEIVED: 23 SEP 95 10

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 23 SEP 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
CROATIA
AGENDA
SERBIA
PEACEKEEPING
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 25 SEP PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 27 SEP 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9521107 9521108

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0150 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BASS
		BERGER
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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95092317	FOR DECISION
001		X	95092317	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
002		X	95092317	SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	950923	FUERTH, L	
002	950923	BRILL, K	
002	950923	ADAMS, G	
002	950923	PANETTA, L	
002	950923	MCALEER, R	
002	950923	INDERFURTH, R	
002	950923	YANNUZZI, R	
002	950923	WILSON, F	

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1:40pm

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Sens	1		
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Berger	2	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Lake	3		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5		D
Records Mgt.			

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

AM
9-25-95 9:45 [signature]
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DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET
ROOM 238
OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG
WASHINGTON, DC 20503

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MR. LEON E. PANETTA
WHITE HOUSE
1ST FLOOR, WEST WING
WASHINGTON, DC 20500

9/25 8:30a [signature]
PRINT LAST NAME: Kessel
COPY: 1

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Initials: RDS Date: 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	9/25/95	10:20	Lyrae PRINT LAST NAME: GRAVES COPY: 1
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	9/25	8:30a	[signature] PRINT LAST NAME: Hessel COPY: 1

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MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA NOELLE JENSEN ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	25sept	1200	Noelle Bryold
	PRINT LAST NAME:		Bryold - Jensen
	COPY: 1		
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: 1		
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: 1		
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: 1		

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Initials: RDS Date: 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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LOG 9521106
DATE 23 SEP 95

SUBJECT: AGENDA & NOTIFICATION FOR 25 SEP PC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA NOELLE JENSEN ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	9/25	1045	S. McElhaney PRINT LAST NAME: McElhaney COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: 1
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: 1
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: 1

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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LOG 9521106
DATE 23 SEP 95

SUBJECT: AGENDA & NOTIFICATION FOR 25 SEP PC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA NOELLE JENSEN ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	9/25/95	_____	J. Graves PRINT LAST NAME: GRAVES COPY: 1
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

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(MO) 09. 25. '95 10:16 NO. 1460018341 PAGE 1

[redacted] OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

SEP 25 '95 10:15

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM 95 SEP 25 A7:07

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: [redacted]

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 2013 CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOTAL: 3
(PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (202) 456-9425 WH SITROOM
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Agnd of PC MTG on BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21106

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	State	EXECSEC		
N	DOD	EXECSEC		
B	USUN/State	Amb. Inderfurth		736-7699
A	CIA	EXECSEC		
D	JCS	Col F.C. Wilson		

REMARKS:

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 2013 CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Agnd of PC MTG on Bosnia

NSC LOG # 21106

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
State	EXECSEC		
DOD	EXECSEC		
USUN/State	Amb. Inderfurth		
CIA	EXECSEC		
JCS	Col F.C. Wilson		

BNBAD

REMARKS:

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER (SA) 09. 23. 95 18:16 NO. 1460017060 PAGE 1

WASHFAX

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

23 SEP 95 18 17

NMCC/JCS

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM 95 SEP 23 AM 8:17

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 2013 CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Agend of PC MTG on BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21106

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
State	EXECSEC		
DOD	EXECSEC		
USUN/State	Amb. Inderfurth		
CIA	EXECSEC		
JCS	Col F.C. Wilson		

3 KBAD

REMARKS:

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Initials: RDS Date: 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

N
23185L

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 2013 CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Agnd of PC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21106

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
State	EXECSEC		
DOD	EXECSEC		
USUN/State	Amb. Inderfurth		
CIA	EXEC SEC		
JCS	Col F.C. Wilson		

BNBAD

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE
- ☐ FLASH
- ☐ IMMEDIATE
- ☐ PRIORITY
- ☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: log# 21106

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting PAGES: 3

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

21106

September 23, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(C)~~

There will be a Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia September 25, 1995 from 2:30 p.m. to 3:30 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Principals only. The agenda is attached at Tab A. ~~(C)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: ~~OADR~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA
DATE: September 25, 1995
LOCATION: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
TIME: 2:30 - 3:30 P.M.

AGENDA

I. Negotiations Update ..... State

II. Status of IFOR Planning ..... JCS

III. Political Implementation Structure ..... State/NSC

IV. Congressional Strategy ..... All

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 3/9/2020
2013-0612-M

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21106

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506



September 22, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, September 25, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Principals meeting on Bosnia to be held September 25, 1995. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove ____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

TL-

FYI

Christopher/Talbrooke/
Albright will be
by SVTS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

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See also 2013-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

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Folder Title: PC0151 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, October 2, 1995				
Staff Office-Individual: Records Management				
Original OA/ID Number: 4009				
Row: 43	Section: 6	Shelf: 7	Position: 2	Stack: V

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9620131
RECEIVED: 07 FEB 96 15

TO: LAKE

FROM: VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 07 FEB 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
CROATIA
SOC
SERBIA
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 2 OCT PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: LAKE APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 10 FEB 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF:

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0151 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BASS
		BERGER
		JOSHI
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB CLOSED BY: NSMEC DOC 1 OF 1

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By tds NARA, Date 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ RECORD ID: 9620131

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	96020719	FOR DECISION
001		X	96021016	LAKE APPROVED RECOM

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Recd 2/8 8:25 OVR

National Security Council
The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse			
Sens	1		
Soderberg			
Berger	2		NOTE
Lake	3		
Situation Room		Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
West Wing Desk	4	2/10	D
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VCS

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

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Log # 20131

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

1) SB to PL Date 2/8

You might remind sr. staff of 48 hour "rule" for PC/DC summaries.

@

2) _____ to _____ Date _____

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KRL ex 9000 OA

National Security Council
The White House

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (NSC) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse			
Sens	1	APS	
Soderberg			
Berger	2	RNT	NOTED
Lake	B		
Situation Room		Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
West Wing Desk	4	2/10	D
Records Mgt.			

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cc: NSC

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette XXX yes

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Log # 20131

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

1) SB to PL Date 2/8

You might remind sr. staff of 48 hour "rule" for PC/DC summaries.

@

2) _____ to _____ Date _____

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

20131

February 7, 1996

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, October 2, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia, October 2, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Summary of Conclusions be filed for the record.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: 02/07/06
Reason: 1.5 (a,b,d)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/9/2019
2016-0533-M

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee
DATE: October 2, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 3:00 - 4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR
Anthony Lake

OVP
Leon Fuerth

STATE
Secretary Christopher

DEFENSE
Dr. William Perry
Walter Slocombe

JCS
General Shalikashvili

USUN
Amb. Madeleine Albright

CIA
John Deutch

White House
Sandy Berger
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
Alexander Vershbow
David Johnson (end of meeting)

Summary of Conclusions

1. Principals discussed the pros and cons of a U.S. venue for the planned proximity talks that would be convened approximately two weeks following the conclusion of a country-wide ceasefire in Bosnia. They deferred a final decision until their October 4 meeting. In the interim, they requested that State and the U.S. negotiating team develop options for venues other than the Washington and New York areas, as well as ideas for alternative events in European capitals and Moscow that could offset concerns of Contact Group partners about a U.S. venue. (C)

2. Principals discussed whether there should be any monitoring of the impending ceasefire and agreed to review this issue and the status of NATO implementation planning at their next meeting. (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5(a)(d)
Declassify on: 10/2/06

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
NSC 9/30/14 (1.6g)
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See also 2013 [illegible]

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

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Folder Title: PC0153 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, October 4, 1995				
Staff Office-Individual: Records Management				
Original OA/ID Number: 4009				
Row: 43	Section: 6	Shelf: 7	Position: 2	Stack: V

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (3 pages)~~	~~10/04/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
001b. memo	[Draft Version of 001a] (3 pages)	10/04/1995	P1/b(1)
002a. memo	Alexander Vershbow and John F. Feeley to Anthony Lake re: Checklist for October 4 PC on Bosnia (3 pages)	10/03/1995	P1/b(1)
~~002b. agenda~~	~~[Duplicate of 003] (1 page)~~	~~10/04/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002c. paper~~	~~re: Stabilization Package in a Bosnian Settlement (7 pages)~~	~~10/03/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002d. paper~~	~~re: Steps Needed Before U.S. Could Provide Defense Articles and Services (2 pages)~~	~~10/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002e. paper~~	~~re: Russian Participation in IFOR-Additional Points (2 pages)~~	~~10/03/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
002f. paper	re: Council Decision on NATO's Role in Implementing a Peace Agreement [NATO] (7 pages)	09/1995	P1/b(1)
~~003. agenda~~	~~NSC Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)~~	~~10/04/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4009

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0153 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, October 4, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs653

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9521164
RECEIVED: 05 OCT 95 14

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 12 OCT 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
PC
NATO
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 4 OCT PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 09 OCT 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9521144 9521151

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0153 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		JOSHI
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS, NARA, Date 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95100517	FOR DECISION
001	VERSHBOW	Z	95100714	FOR REDO
002	LAKE	Z	95100913	FOR DECISION
002		X	95101210	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
003		X	95101210	DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
003	951012	FUERTH, L	
003	951012	BRILL, K	
003	951012	ADAMS, G	
003	951012	PANETTA, L	
003	951012	MCALEER, R	
003	951012	INDERFURTH, R	
003	951012	YANNUZZI, R	
003	951012	WILSON, F	

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National Security Council
The White House

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	6	D	
Sens			
Soderberg	copy		
Berger	7	pm	
Lake			
~~Situation Room~~ Dohse	D	D	Tab I please
West Wing Desk	9	10/12	D
Records Mgt.			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette

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National Security Council
The White House

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6:45PM

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (NP) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1		
Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg	copy		
Berger	2		
Lake	3		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4		
Records Mgt.			
Kitchen	5		

A = Action I = Information D = Dispat

STAFF OFFICER:

PLEASE RETURN THIS ROUTE CHIT AND ALL ORIGINALS WITH READ.

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

R—
I dont recall this agreement about France at PC.
?
R

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National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 21164 Redo

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG [illegible] A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	6	D	
Sens			
Soderberg	copy ✓		
Berger	7	pll	
Lake			
~~Situation Room~~ Dohse	8	D	Tab I please
West Wing Desk	9	10/12	D
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette: NO

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

STAFF OFFICER:

PLEASE RETURN THIS ROUTE CHIT AND ALL ORIGINALS WITH READ.

R—
I dont recall this agreement about France at PC.
?
R

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National Security Council
The White House

6:45PM

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A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

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LOG 9521164
DATE 12 OCT 95

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS ON 4 OCT PC MTG RE BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA NOELLE JENSEN ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	10/12	1735	
	PRINT LAST NAME: BERNSLEY		
	COPY: 1		
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	10-12-95	6:00 AM	
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: 1		
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	10/12/95	17:00	
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MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	10/12	17:35	FAX BOX
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SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS ON 4 OCT PC MTG RE BOSNIA
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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	10/13/95	7:00 A.M.	L. Smith PRINT LAST NAME: Smith COPY: 1
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	10/13/95	_____	L. Graves PRINT LAST NAME: GRAVES COPY: 1
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DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 2133 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 5 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions for PC MTG on Bosnia on 4 OCT NSC LOG # 21164

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	State	ExecSec.		
N	DOD	EXECSEC		
B	US/UN	Amb. Rick Inderfurth		736-7699
A	CIA	EXECSEC		
D	JCS	Col. F.C. Wilson		

REMARKS:

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Initials: RDS Date: 10/9/2019
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DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 2133 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 5 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

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REMARKS:

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Initials: RDS Date: 10/9/2019
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NMCC/JCS

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FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions for PC MTG on Bosnia on 4 OCT NSC LOG # 21164

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	State	ExecSEC,		
N	DOD	EXECSEC		
B	US/UN	Amb. Rick Inderfurth		736-7699
A	CIA	EXECSEC		
D	JCS	Col. F.C. Wilson		

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109 # 21164

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting PAGES: 5

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

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USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

21164

October 12, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, October 4, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee
DATE: October 4, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 8:30 - 9:45 a.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Anthony Lake

OVP
Leon Fuerth

State
Secretary Christopher
Peter Tarnoff

DOD
Dr. William Perry
Walter Slocombe

USUN
Amb. Madeleine Albright

OMB
Alice Rivlin

CIA
John Deutch
Norman Schindler

JCS
General Shalikashvili

White House
Sandy Berger

NSC
Sandy Vershbow
David Johnson (end of meeting)

Summary of Conclusions

No-Fly Zone Violations

1. Principals discussed the U.S. negotiating team's recommendation that action be taken by NATO against Banja Luka airport in view of the recent increase in Bosnian Serb violations of the no-fly zone. Principals decided to defer a decision pending further developments and consultations with the delegation. (S)

Cease-fire/Proximity Talks

2. Principals reviewed the status of negotiations on a cease-fire. They agreed that while we would make an all-out effort to

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achieve a cease-fire, we would not make a cease-fire a precondition for the convening of proximity talks or an international conference. (C)

3. Principals agreed that the venue for proximity talks should be in the United States at a secluded location somewhat removed from Washington or New York, but close enough to permit "drop-ins" by senior USG officials as necessary to give impetus to the negotiations. They requested that a list of possible sites be developed on an urgent basis **(Action: OSD/NSC)**. Principals agreed that, to manage the sensitivities of our Contact Group partners, we should work with the U.S. negotiating team to develop options for possible follow-on events in European capitals and Moscow **(Action: State/NSC)**. They agreed, however, that we should preserve the option of hosting a final signing ceremony at a Summit hosted by the President in the United States. (S)

Russian Participation in IFOR

4. Principals reviewed strategy for incorporating Russian forces in the NATO-led peace implementation force (IFOR), in preparation for the meeting between Secretary of Defense Perry and Russian Defense Minister Grachev. They reaffirmed the importance of ensuring that the IFOR command structure remained militarily sound, with no dual key. They agreed that Secretary Perry should put forward two options:

-- If the Russians are prepared to accept NATO operational control for their forces, a Russian brigade could be integrated into one of the three Allied divisions likely to comprise the IFOR. The Russian brigade commander would report to the division commander. At the political level, Russia (and other non-NATO troop contributing nations) would participate in a planning/coordination group that would advise and consult with the NAC, but not make decisions; decision-making would remain with the NAC. Russian liaison officers could be established at various levels in the NATO chain of command.

-- If the Russians are not prepared to participate on the above basis, then we would suggest that they not engage in the military operation, but instead provide military forces to perform specific civilian tasks that would be under the purview of the Senior Implementation Coordinator. (S)

Military Stabilization

5. Principals reaffirmed that our goal should be to ensure that there is a rough balance of power between the Federation and the Bosnian Serbs by the end of the one-year peace implementation period. They endorsed a military stabilization plan that would

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involve both arms control/confidence-building measures and a program to equip and train Federation armed forces (S)

6. With respect to arms control measures, Principals agreed that we should seek to include in the peace agreement not only limited constraints such as separation zones, military flight bans and transparency measures but, if possible, a commitment by the parties to ceilings on CFE categories of equipment that would provide for a build-down of force. Principals agreed that an arms control package should be developed for the U.S. negotiating team on an urgent basis **(Action: State)**. (S)

7. Recognizing that some arms control measures may not be attainable in the short term, Principals agreed that we need to develop a military assistance package that would provide the Federation with the minimum capability necessary to create a balance of power without stimulating a regional arms race **(Action: OSD)**. This package would be subject to modification following a visit by an assessment team. Principals agreed, however, that the assessment team visit should be deferred until there is a cease-fire, although this decision could be revisited in the event efforts to reach a cease-fire bog down. (S)

8. Principals agreed that the United States should take the lead in organizing the equip-and-train effort so that we can exercise control over the types of weapons provided to the Federation and limit the involvement of Iran and other radical states. Given Allied skepticism about the equip-and-train aspect, however, our coordination should be conducted in a low-profile manner -- e.g., quiet bilateral approaches to potential contributors rather than hosting a multilateral donors' conference. As soon as we have decided on the necessary scope of the equip-and-train program, we should engage in early consultations with key allies **(Action: State/OSD)** (S)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. memo	[Draft Version of 001a] (3 pages)	10/04/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4009

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0153 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, October 4, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs653

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

21164
REDO

October 9, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, October 4, 1995

Attached at Tab A is a revised edition of the Summary of Conclusions from the October 4 Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia. I have taken out the commentary in para 1 and revised the discussion of follow-on conferences in para 3.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve ok Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/19/2019
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

21164

REDO
10/9/95

October 5, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, October 4, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia held October 4, 1995

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

→ Sandy -
R wants less "commentary" and more conclusions.
A
See new version

~~SECRET~~
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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By KDS NARA, Date 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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TO: LAKE

FROM: FEELEY
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 03 OCT 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 4 OCT PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 06 OCT 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9521144 9521164

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0153 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		FEELEY
		JOSHI
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

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Lake	2	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	MR 10/4	N
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COMMENTS: PC on Bosnia

10/4

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	Alexander Vershbow and John F. Feeley to Anthony Lake re: Checklist for October 4 PC on Bosnia (3 pages)	10/03/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4009

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0153 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, October 4, 1995

2010-0533-M
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA
DATE: October 4, 1995
LOCATION: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
TIME: 8:30 a.m. - 9:30 a.m.

AGENDA

I. Negotiations Update.....State

II. Equip and Train/Arms Control.....State/JCS*

III. IFOR Planning.

-- Russian participation in IFOR.....JCS*

-- Relationship to UN.....State/USUN

IV. Ceasefire.....State*

* New paper should be circulated to all agencies by noon on Tuesday, October 3

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 3/5/2012
2012-0082-M

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DRAFT

STABILIZATION PACKAGE IN A BOSNIAN SETTLEMENT

Goals

At the onset, it will be important that the United States include elements of confidence building and possibly later-on arms control in connection with any settlement package in order to support the cease-fire and to build political support among allies and partners for the overall U.S. initiative. We need to

-- establish the settlement agreement as a codification of the peaceful intent of the parties. The agreement should embody clear commitments on confidence-building and arms control. We need to emphasize the importance of a managed internal union and regional balance of power as a key to regional military stability.

-- build international acceptance of the rights of states in the region to have capabilities to defend themselves. Political acceptance of this is fundamental to acceptance of a possible equip and train mission, and might also be built into constitutional or settlement provisions.

-- establish the stabilization package as a controlled response to lift in order to avoid any possibility of an intra-Bosnia or regional arms race.

-- build appropriate linkages to and constraints on the Bosnian military to minimize possible outside destabilizing fundamentalist influence.

These issues will be of interest to allies and the parties as we proceed with consideration of the various aspects of implementation. Given the significant role of OSCE in any CBM/arms control efforts and the earlier OSCE planning for Balkan confidence-building/arms control, we will need to engage primarily OSCE at an early stage of the implementation planning process. German thinking on these issues is already advanced, and they may wish to take the lead on some issues.

Initial Confidence-Building/Stabilization Efforts

Political-military confidence-building measures geared to specific areas and tactical situations along lines of confrontation within Bosnia itself will be required at the outset and should be included in the appropriate settlement agreement annexes. The immediate objective after settlement

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and deployment of IFOR will be to supplement and help stabilize the cease-fire contained in the settlement. Accordingly, early measures would focus on disengagement of the parties and transparency. In practice, many of these will be included in the initial IFOR taskings as specified in the final terms of a cease-fire/cessation of hostilities. They might include:

-- Compliance by all parties with the zones of separation and boundary lines between the opposing Parties (i.e., 1 km).

-- Establishment of a Joint Military Commission and joint liaison/communication links at multiple levels between the IFOR and the Federation and Bosnian Serb Armies.

-- Ban on Bosnian Serb and Federation military-related lethal aircraft (i.e., combat aircraft) activities for at least one year.

-- Declarations of all kinds of military equipment and arms within 20 km of the zones of separation.

-- Exchange of prisoners provisions.

In the first instance, the IFOR will come face to face with the realities of the parties' degree of adherence to these measures. However, at a certain point (depending on safety constraints and at its discretion), IFOR might wish to transfer some of the basic interpositional and monitoring responsibilities to the EUMM or OSCE missions.

Follow-on Confidence-Building Measures

Separate from this first tier of CBM/separation efforts, we should begin to engage the OSCE to re-start planning on specific CBM measures for a more fully-developed and formalized CBM regime for the longer term, emphasizing transparency and communications. Though OSCE is only a vehicle for facilitation, and will require prompting by members, it might be used effectively as a negotiation toolbox for this effort. Language should be included in a stabilization annex to the settlement that commits parties to cooperate with the OSCE to develop and initiate a CBM's regime, including provisions for verification and data exchange. Specific elements of that regime might be drawn from the following:

-- Permanent restrictions on deployments and exercises in certain sensitive areas, particularly within defined border regions;

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-- Annual limits on the number of exercises above a fairly low threshold;

-- Numerical limits on active and reserve personnel and on maneuver units (battalions);

-- Annual limits on call-ups of reservists;

-- Limits on the number, size, and equipment of special operations and/or paramilitary units.

-- Reduction of arms stockpiles.

-- Regional verification inspections.

-- Ban on certain military activities-exercises in selected areas or region-wide, or, a notification regime of such planned activities exceeding a certain threshold.

-- Information exchange categorizing force capabilities, command structures and units down to the company level, providing overall weapons holdings and identifying numbers, locations and types of all major weapons systems.

-- Agreement among the parties to place all armed units operating in their territories under effective, civilian, central control by, among other steps, abolishing all paramilitary units, declaring their deployment illegal, and taking steps to enforce prohibition. (Militia units serving under central control would be allowed.)

EUMM/OSCE missions, upon assumption of any of the above-mentioned CBM tasks in the field, should report findings and progress to the Senior Implementation Coordinator and the IFOR Commander on a regular basis.

Bosnia Weapons Caps

An imbalance in weaponry between Federation and Bosnian Serb forces is apparent in several categories, including personnel. A stable security environment might be assisted later on by establishment of simple CFE-type caps on certain categories of equipment, but only after a certain stabilization and equalization on both sides has been approached. The OSCE again would be the mechanism to move over the longer term toward any kind of negotiation on a caps regime. In this context, consideration might be given to working toward the establishment of the following caps (numbers for illustrative

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purposes only) for each side in Bosnia alone on the following categories of equipment as defined in the CFE agreement:

(1)	Battle Tanks	500
(2)	Armored Combat Vehicles	240
(3)	Artillery	1,800
(4)	Combat Aircraft	32
(5)	Combat Helicopters	17

The settlement stabilization annex might include certain language in which the sides commit themselves to work with OSCE within the context of broader confidence-building efforts, to establish caps on the above categories of equipment.

Theater Balance

The establishment of a theater-wide balance of forces would be much more difficult, given the absence of two clearly-delineated sides. However, once caps are established for the sides applicable to the territory of Bosnia, OSCE might also be pursue caps for such primary equipment pieces for other countries in the region.

Incentives

Despite best efforts to develop CBM's and arms control weapons caps in the region, any possible future attacks by the "FRY" or Croatia on Bosnia or each other, for example, would be treated as "traditional" attacks by one country upon another as a violation of UN international law with all possible repercussions. However, agreement by parties (including inside Bosnia) to specific measures might at some point be linked to financial assistance by OSCE members or others.

Arms Embargo

Lifting of the arms embargo on all parties is likely to ensue shortly after settlement as an action of the UN.

Improving Federation Self-Defense

CBM's and arms control alone will not establish the balance of forces (or enhanced Federation defensive capabilities) necessary to contribute to longer-term stability and peace. Therefore, parallel to these efforts, we should move expeditiously towards a field analysis or assessment of the kinds of needs that might be filled through an equip and train effort for the Federation. The U.S. might dispatch a Balance

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Assessment Team to Bosnia establish a snapshot analysis of the overall balance of forces inside the country. A preliminary assessment might be initiated before settlement. Consideration should be given, however, to whether this can be safely done prior to a cease fire. U.S. definition of equip and train needs should be based on that assessment.

We must continue to distinguish clearly between equip and train packages and the IFOR. Equip and train is a U.S.-led contribution to the goals of the stabilization annex by creating a stable military balance.

U.S. Contribution

The extent of our own contribution may be critical to our asserting the lead role. In addition, we will face some tough decisions on solicitation of contributions. We will have to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable (to the U.S.) contributions. Matching offers of training and equipment to specific requirements may help limit the involvement of radical states, but probably not preclude it entirely. Training inside the U.S. might be the most critical contribution to building bridges to the Federation forces, to the Federation itself, and limiting Federation military reliance on radical states. However, our goal should not be simply to "build-up" in offensive systems to fill any perceived "caps gap," but rather to provide support more of a defensive nature, if possible, to offset imbalances.

High Option

JCS has been working to develop a range of option packages for selection depending on the results of the needs assessment. If Federation needs were deemed significant and the U.S. decided to lead the effort, we might consider organizing a donors' conference at a U.S. location to fill the needs identified by the assessment team. We would invite participants on the basis of their ability and inclination to assist.

For example:

-- Specific NATO (or even PFP) countries might be solicited by the U.S. to contribute expert trainers to programs.

-- Other NATO (or PFP) countries might be approached to provide sites and support facilities for the out-of-Bosnia training. These countries might include France and Poland, or others.

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-- Finally, a select set of other countries from the OIC arena might be able to provide financial or equipment assistance in the effort. Specifically, Egypt might be well-positioned to provide Warsaw Pact equipment, or the OIC might be in a position to organize from members a financial/equipment contribution.

The bottom line should be that participating countries will be invited to assist based on their specific abilities to contribute in a controlled manner to the effort. This would all be done at U.S. suggestion/invitation, through close coordination at NATO, or at least with key allies and possibly Russia, will remain important for maintaining political acceptance.

USCINCEUR might be tasked with the effort. Based on current estimates of force deficits, the high option effort might entail training up to ten mobile brigades, and provision of some 200 tanks and 100 APCs. Given sufficient funding (approximately $440 million), training might entail programs for up to some 20,000 military personnel. This data is notional only.

Low Option

If Federation needs were more modest and the U.S. did not lead, there would be little U.S. ability to shape the actual effort. The U.S. might encourage other countries to assist with building up Federation defensive capabilities. We might provide IMET training to Federation personnel, and include some provision of small arms, antitank weapons, and man-portable air defenses. We might bilaterally encourage donations of equipment from specific countries to address imbalances. Under these conditions, it is unlikely that another NATO country, for example, would assume a lead on this. However, there is a possibility that Iran or some other country would engage in providing arms and training to Muslim Forces, an effort that would not shore up cooperation within the Federation.

Between this low option and the high option are a range of other packages that can be defined. To some degree those packages have to do with the eventual desired outcome of the equip and train effort. Balance of forces can be achieved by providing similar capabilities to those in the hands of the Bosnian Serbs, or by building an enhanced defense capability for the Federation. Neither is mutually exclusive. The goal here is not a precise balance or an absolute deterrent, but

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rather stability. That stability has its best odds through a relative sense of balance/deterrence, a package of active CBM's and arms control efforts, and a training program that minimizes radical influences.

Build-Down

Potential suppliers (i.e., participants in a donors conference) might consider whether to agree to a suppliers consortium (like the Australia Group) to restrict arms sales of offensive-use only kinds of weaponry to the Bosnian sides. It might also insist that recipients of their equipment destroy old/current equipment in amounts equal or greater to new equipment received; this might go in the direction of some build down proposals.

Legal Framework

The legal framework for a possible U.S. contribution is appended to this paper.

Funding

Some preliminary indications of funding possibilities are provided in the appended legal framework paper and OMB paper.

Equip & Train Packages

More specific equip and train package options covering a certain range of assistance are provided in a JCS appendix to this paper.

Re-introduction to Bosnia

The introduction of equipment back into the Federation would be timed to coincide with the development of a secure and relatively stable environment and the 1996 envisioned withdrawal of the IFOR and with the development and success of CBM development within the region.

Attachments:
(1) Legal Framework for Equip and Train
(2) JCS Paper on Equip and Train Packages
(3) OMB Paper

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Steps Needed Before U.S. Could Provide Defense Articles and Services.

- Before furnishing defense articles or defense services to the Government of Bosnia-Hercegovina under the Foreign Assistance Act or the Arms Export Control Act, the President would need to sign a Presidential determination that the furnishing of such assistance "will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace."

- For at least certain forms of assistance, we would need also to conclude a bilateral agreement under which the GOBH provides end-use, retransfer and related assurances (described §505 of the Foreign Assistance Act).

-- The agreement would be similar to the one we have already concluded with the Bosnian Government to cover the IMET program.

-- Our "standard agreement" could be modified to have the Bosnians provide additional assurances tailored to address specific concerns that we might have.

Authorities Under U.S. Law for Making Sales and Providing Assistance

- We have legal authority to supply defense articles and services to foreign countries, either as assistance or through sales.

- To make sales, either Bosnia (or someone else on Bosnia's behalf) would need to furnish funds to cover the costs of the defense articles and services.

- To provide assistance, we could draw on a variety of foreign assistance accounts -- e.g., the Foreign Military Financing and IMET accounts -- though foreign assistance funding is of course tight. We could also provide assistance in the form of nonlethal excess defense articles if we are able to identify appropriate articles

- DOD authorities under Title 10 of the U.S. Code could also be available for at least some forms of support. For example, up to $2 million could be made available for military education and training under the "CINC Initiative Fund".

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- It may also be possible to utilize drawdown authorities -- in particular, the special $50 million drawdown authority for Bosnia contained in §546 of the FY-95 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act. (Similar provisions are included in the House-passed version of this bill for FY-96, and the version of this bill being marked up today by the Senate Appropriations Committee).

Sales and Assistance Programs Are Conducted on a Bilateral Basis

- U.S. security assistance is provided on a bilateral basis (rather than, for example, via USG contributions of funds to a multilateral fund). The U.S. effort to provide security assistance can of course be coordinated with efforts by other countries.

Sales and Assistance Programs Are Conducted On a Government-to-Government Basis

- Under the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act, U.S. defense articles and services must be provided to a "country or international organization." Although this would permit us to proceed with a program for "Bosnia", we could not conduct a program for the "Federation" as such, since the Federation is not a "country or international organization."

- Nevertheless, defense articles and services could be provided to Bosnia for use by the Federation.

- Federation personnel would need to be considered as "officers, employees or agents" of Bosnia in order to proceed in this fashion. (We should be mindful of this requirement as we mold the peace plan.)

Status of US personnel

- There should be some kind of agreement providing status protection for US personnel who may be present in Bosnia (or perhaps neighboring countries) in connection with US sales or assistance.

- Such an agreement could be concluded in the form of a short exchange of diplomatic notes with the host government.

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RESOURCES FOR THE PROVISION OF EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING TO BOSNIAN FEDERATION FORCES

October 2, 1995

Potential Sources of Funding:

Annual Appropriations

- *Foreign Military Financing (FMF)* provides grant and loan financing for the procurement of U.S. defense articles, defense services (such as transportation and training), and design and construction services by friendly countries and international organizations. (Authorized by Section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act)

  Status of FMF Availability in FY 1996:

  - o The Administration requested $3.352 billion in function 150.
  - o No FMF funds were requested for Bosnia.
  - o Congress proposes to cut the request by up to $81 million.
  - o As a result of these cuts, virtually no FMF would be available for other programs after: presidential commitments to the Middle East and Partnership for Peace; the costs of administering the military assistance program; and the subsidy required for $544 million of loans to Greece and Turkey were funded.
  - o The draft Senate Foreign Operations appropriation bill authorizes the transfer of up to $20 million from SEED/NIS economic assistance to FMF.

- *International Military Education and Training (IMET)* provides grant military education and training to military and related civilian personnel of foreign countries. (Authorized under Section 541 of the Foreign Assistance Act)

  Status of IMET Availability in FY 1996:

  - o The Administration requested $39 million in function 150.
  - o $200,000 was for Bosnia.
  - o The House approved $39 million, but the Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittee cut IMET to $19 million in anticipation that the $20 million military training program authorized in Defense legislation would be funded (neither Defense Appropriations committee provided any funds for training).
  - o While some funds may be added back in conference, only part of the $20 million is likely to be restored. If so, limited IMET funds could available to meet training requirements not included in the request.

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- *Partnership for Peace (PFP) (Title 10 Portion)* provides funds to further stability and security in European states by building strong, practical ties with NATO countries and developing strong candidates for NATO partnership through training and joint exercises.

  Status of Availability in FY 1996:

  - o The Administration requested $40 million in function 050.
  - o Congress approved $40 million in the Joint Staff O&M budget.
  - o Bosnia has not joined the PFP and is not likely to do so in the near future.

- *CINC Initiative Fund (CIF)* provides funds to help the CINCs meet emergency and emergent military needs (established in FY 1990). This fund can be used to identify equipment and training requirements.

  Status of Availability in FY 1996:

  - o The Administration requested $25 million in function 050.
  - o Congress has approved $25 million.

Supplemental Appropriations

If clear requirements to equip and train Federation forces were identified in FY 1996 and these could not be covered with FY 1996 FMF or IMET appropriations, supplemental appropriations could be requested. There is a high probability that Congress would require offsetting cuts in other programs to avoid increasing outlays. These could be in budget functions 050 or 150.

Special Authorizing Legislative Initiative (Not scheduled for congressional action)

- *Bosnia-Hercogovina Self Defense Fund.* This legislation would (1) create an international fund to receive funds and military equipment to assist in the self defense of Bosnia, (2) authorize the United States to contribute up to $50 million to that fund to finance the procurement of military equipment, and (3) authorize the drawdown of $50 million of U.S. defense articles and services .

  Status:

  - o Creates legal authority for a new fund and permits U.S. military contributions to it.
  - o Authorizes the transfer of FMF appropriations (discussed above) or duplicates other drawdown authorities (see below).
  - o Does not have a high probability of passage.
  - o Even if passed, **would not create any additional budgetary resources.**

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Potential Sources of Services and Equipment:

Services and Equipment

- *Special Drawdown Authority is contained in Section 540 of the FY 1996 Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill.* When enacted, it will authorize the President to draw down up to $50 million of defense articles and services (principally transportation and training) to enhance the defensive capabilities of Bosnian forces. Use of this authority is contingent on lifting the UN arms embargo.

- *Annual Drawdown Authority (Section 506(A)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act)* authorizes the President to draw down up to $75 million of defense articles and services (principally transportation and training) in FY 1996. The use of this authority is contingent on the President determining that there is (1) an unforseen emergency that requires immediate military assistance (2) which cannot be met from another funding authority.

  Note: Although both drawdown provisions authorize the reimbursement of Defense for articles and services provided, supplemental appropriations would be required for such reimbursement. Recently, Congress has required program cuts to offset supplemental appropriations.

Equipment (only)

- *Excess Defense Articles (EDA):* The kind and limited amount of equipment projected to be available in this program is not likely to match Federation equipment requirements. Given the location and condition of much of this equipment, funds would have to be found to refurbish and transport any equipment provided.

- *U.S.-Held Warsaw Pact Equipment Stocks.* The United States currently holds a limited inventory.

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POSITION PAPER

JF

Subject: Russian Participation in IFOR -- Additional Points

1. ~~(S)~~ Purpose. In response to NSC tasking, this paper expands on the Joint Staff paper, "Russian Participation in IFOR," considered by the Deputies Committee on 29 Sep 95.

2. ~~(S)~~ Major Points.

- On 29 Sep, Deputies agreed that:
  - ◊ IFOR unity of command is to be preserved.
  - ◊ Russian participation in IFOR is desirable.
  - ◊ US preference is for Russian troops to be integrated in IFOR within major allies' AOR.
  - ◊ Next steps are a President Clinton letter to President Yeltsin, followed by a meeting between SecDef and Grachev to determine Russian position regarding IFOR participation.

- Joint Staff was tasked to consider two additional points:
  - ◊ "Functional cut-out" option: Is it feasible to define a role for the Russians that would limit their participation to particular functions?
  - ◊ "UN parallel chain" option: Would it be acceptable to the US for Janvier to be dual-hatted as the Deputy Theater Commander and the UNPF Commander and to command Russian forces in his UN role?

3. ~~(S)~~ Functional Cut-out Option.

Discussion. This alternative would integrate Russian forces in IFOR but constrain them to particular functions. Combat functions place a premium on interoperability, therefore Russian (and other non-NATO) contributions to IFOR would have least adverse impact on IFOR effectiveness if they performed other than combat functions; i.e., other than armor, infantry, artillery, combat aviation. Sample combat support and combat service support functions most appropriate for Russian (non-NATO) elements include:

- military police: traffic control, humanitarian assistance convoy escort.
- engineering: road repair, limited infrastructure repair to support IFOR movement, obstacle clearing, surveying demarcation line.
- theater transportation, including trucks and helicopter lift.
- explosive ordnance disposal (EOD); mine-clearing.

Such non-combat functions may not be attractive to the Russians, however, because they might be perceived as second-class roles.

A variant of this alternative would be to offer Russians non-military functions within Bosnia under the control of the civilian political implementation structure. If Russian participation were limited to non-military

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functions separate from IFOR, NATO's unity of command would not be jeopardized.

Recommendation. US position to integrate Russian forces (OPCON) could be modified to include specifying non-combat functions.

4. ~~(S)~~ UN Parallel Chain Option.

Discussion. This alternative has Russian forces within Bosnia working for Janvier in a UN capacity, rather than being integrated in the IFOR. This clearly violates the principle of unity of command within IFOR's theater; the NATO commander would be unable to count on Russian elements in his theater. In effect, this would constitute a dual-key for the regions or functions assigned to Russia elements. This is unacceptable.

It has been suggested that this arrangement might be tolerable if Janvier's link to the UN could be constrained. Even if constraints acceptable to both the UN and NATO could be agreed, Janvier would still have some degree of independence from the NATO commander. If the political implementation structure is linked to the UN through a UN-approved high representative -- as appears to be increasingly likely, then the UN chain in theater will be even more prominent and more difficult to constrain.

Further, in talks with DoD on 2 Oct, Annan (UN, DPKO) indicated that the UN sees no role for a UN officer within the IFOR chain of command since no UN forces would be in IFOR. The UN, therefore, might resist the proposed Janvier dual-hat arrangement. This is consistent with the UN's intent to begin down-sizing UNPROFOR and decrease overall costs of peacekeeping operations.

In summary, while the Russians would likely favor working for a separate UN chain of command, this alternative:

- violates NATO unity of command.
- would complicate Congressional consultations.
- does not set a favorable precedent for future NATO CJTF operations.
- does not enhance Russian-PFP and NATO-Russian relations beyond PFP.

Recommendation. The US should not accept a UN chain parallel to the IFOR command chain.

5. ~~(S)~~ Summary. Recommendations from the Joint Staff paper, "Russian Participation in IFOR," considered by the Deputies Committee on 29 Sep 95 are still valid and should form the initial offer to the Russians in consultations regarding their participation in IFOR. Once Russia's position is established, alternatives to the US position that preserve IFOR's unity of command can be considered.

Prepared by: Balkans Working Group,
Eur Div, J5, Ext 49431

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AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: 1
MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX

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PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
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DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: _____ CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTIFICATION/AGENDA FOR 4 OCT PC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21144

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
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REMARKS:

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DATE/TIME: _____

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FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting 4 OCT PC MTG ON BOSNIA PAGES: 3

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

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If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

21144

October 2, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(C)~~

There will be a Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia October 4, 1995 from 8:30 a.m. to 9:30 a.m. in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Principals only. The agenda is attached at Tab A. ~~(C)~~

Joyce A. Stern for
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA
DATE: October 4, 1995
LOCATION: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
TIME: 8:30 a.m. - 9:30 a.m.

AGENDA

I. Negotiations Update.....State

II. Equip and Train/Arms Control.....State/JCS*

III. IFOR Planning.

-- Russian participation in IFOR.....JCS*

-- Relationship to UN.....State/USUN

IV. Ceasefire.....State*

* New paper should be circulated to all agencies by noon on Tuesday, October 3

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/9/2020

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

21144

October 2, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: JOHN FEELEY

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, October 4, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Principals meeting on Bosnia to be held October 4, 1995. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve OK Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

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See also 2013-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)~~	~~10/25/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
~~001b. memo~~	~~Memorandum for Principals re: IFOR Issues (10 pages)~~	~~10/24/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
~~001c. memo~~	~~[Partial duplicate of 001a] (1 page)~~	~~10/25/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~001d. memo~~	~~[Partial Draft Version of 001b] (6 pages)~~	~~00/00/0000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
002a. memo	Alexander Vershbow and John F. Feeley to Anthony Lake re: Checklist for October 25 PC on Bosnia (6 pages)	10/24/1995	P1/b(1)
~~002b. agenda~~	~~NSC Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)~~	~~10/25/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002c. memo~~	~~From Deputies Committee to Principals re: IFOR Issues (10 pages)~~	~~10/24/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002d. paper~~	~~re: Information Paper (17 pages)~~	~~10/23/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002e. paper~~	~~re: Sanctions Relief (7 pages)~~	~~10/24/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~002f. paper~~	~~re: Multilateral Framework for IFOR (4 pages)~~	~~10/25/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003. agenda~~	~~[Duplicate of 002b] (1 page)~~	~~10/25/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020

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P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	10/30/95	_____	J. Graves PRINT LAST NAME: GRAVES COPY: 1
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TO: LAKE

FROM: FEELEY
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 03 NOV 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
SERBIA
SOC
CROATIA
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 25 OCT PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/RMO DUE DATE: 01 NOV 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FEELEY LOGREF: 9521239 9521241

FILES: IFM NSCP: PC0155 CODES: BOS

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001	VERSHBOW	Z	95103120	FOR REDO
002	LAKE	Z	95110218	FOR DECISION
002		X	95110721	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
002	SENS	Z	95110721	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	95112015	ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/RMO
003		X	95110721	HARMON SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
003	951107	FUERTH, L	
003	951107	BRILL, K	
003	951107	MCALEER, R	
003	951107	INDERFURTH, R	
003	951107	ADAMS, G	
003	951107	PANETTA, L	
003	951107	YANNUZZI, R	
003	951107	WILSON, F	

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21260
REDO

November 3, 1995

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: JOHN FEELEY

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, October 25, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia held October 25, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to the agencies

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions
Tab B Memo to Principals

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Reason: 1.5(a,b,d)
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Dohse	1		
Sens			
Soderberg	copy 2		
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3		
Records Mgt.			
VERSHBOW	4		see SRB note

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

IL

21260

John/
Sandy —
I think rather than this format, I'd attach the Deputies to Principals paper & simply indicate that principles agreed to those positions.

e Principals
October 25, 1995

pals is the Summary
meeting on Bosnia

emo to the agencies

(position on Agreed pts)

(noting subsequent change on contemplated)

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RECORD ID: 9521260
RECEIVED: 28 OCT 95 15

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 07 NOV 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
SERBIA
SOC
CROATIA
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 25 OCT PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: HARMON SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 01 NOV 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FEELEY LOGREF: 9521239 9521241

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0155 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
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		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
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DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95103016	FOR DECISION
001	VERSHBOW	Z	95103120	FOR REDO
002	LAKE	Z	95110218	FOR DECISION
002		X	95110721	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
002	SENS	Z	95110721	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	95112015	ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/RMO
003		X	95110721	HARMON SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
003	951107	FUERTH, L	
003	951107	BRILL, K	
003	951107	MCALEER, R	
003	951107	INDERFURTH, R	
003	951107	ADAMS, G	
003	951107	PANETTA, L	
003	951107	YANNUZZI, R	
003	951107	WILSON, F	

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Sens			
Soderberg	copy		
Berger	6	DR	
Lake		Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
~~Situation Room~~ Dawson	7		Tab I please
West Wing Desk	8	MC 11/7	D
Records Mgt.			

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COMMENTS:

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Dohse	1		
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Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3		
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Harmon	5		
Dohse		D	Tab I please
Sens			
Soderberg	copy 6		
Berger		DR	
Lake		Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
~~Situation Room~~	7		Tab I please
West Wing Desk	8	MC 11/7	D
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Dohse	1		
Sens			
Soderberg	copy 2		
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3		
Records Mgt.			
VERSHBOW	4		sec SRB note

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

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COMMENTS:

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LOG 9521260
DATE 07 NOV 95

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR BOSNIA PC 25 OCT
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, 25 Oct NSC LOG # 9521260

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2	State	Executive Secretary		
✓	Defense	Executive Secretary		
3	USUN/Stae	Rick Inderfurth		736-7699
4	CIA	Executive Secretary		
)	JCS	Secretary		

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, 25 Oct

NSC LOG # 9521260

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SUBJECT: ~~Notice of Meeting~~ SOC on PC Mtg. on Bosnia PAGES: 14

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21260

November 7, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, October 25, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachments
Tab A Summary of Conclusions
Tab B Memorandum to the Principals

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By ROS NARA, Date 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21260

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee
DATE: October 25, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 4:30 - 6:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Anthony Lake

OVP
Leon Fuerth
Rick Saunders

State
Secretary Christopher
Peter Tarnoff
Richard Holbrooke
Robert Gallucci

DOD
Dr. William Perry
James Pardew

USUN
Amb. Madeleine Albright
(via secure video)
David Scheffer

CIA
Dennis Blair
Raymond Converse

JCS
General Shalikashvili
Wesley Clark

White House
Sandy Berger
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
Sandy Vershbow
John Feeley
Don Kerrick

Summary of Conclusions

Sanctions Relief

1. Principals agreed to postpone until the next PC meeting a final decision on the negotiator's proposal for suspension of sanctions against Serbia during the proximity talks. (S)

IFOR: Unresolved Issues

2. Principals approved the recommendations contained in the Deputies Committee Memorandum to Principals of October 24, 1995

~~SECRET~~
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Reason: 1.5 (a,b,d)
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(Tab B), where Deputies had reached agreement on issues pertaining to the mission of the Bosnia peace implementation force (IFOR).

3. During subsequent discussion about the possibility of establishing cantonment areas for the parties' military forces, the Principals decided to reexamine the issue of a 20-km heavy-weapons-free zone, while reaffirming their approval of a 4-km all-weapons-free zone along the inter-entity boundary (see summary of conclusions for October 27 Principals Committee meeting).

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 24, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR PRINCIPALS

SUBJECT: IFOR Issues

This memorandum summarizes the conclusions of the Deputies Committee on a range of issues pertaining to the mission of the Bosnia peace implementation force (IFOR). It includes issues on which Deputies reached agreement (Section A) and issues for which a Principals' decision is needed (Section B). The numbers in parentheses refer to the questions in the JCS paper "IFOR Issues" of October 23, 1995.

A. AGREED ISSUES

What is the IFOR's mission?

The primary tasks of the IFOR, as set forth in SACEUR's concept of operations, are:

- Assume command of the theater and immediately establish robust C2 capability;
- Establish the IFOR rapidly, building on in-place forces and limited early deployments followed by rapid introduction of substantial follow-on force;
- Control withdrawal of non-transferred UNPROFOR forces in coordination with IFOR deployment;
- Protect the force and ensure self defense and freedom of movement for the IFOR;
- Establish, monitor and enforce compliance with the military terms of the peace agreement in B-H. For now they specifically include:
  - -- establish an immediate reaction force;
  - -- mark the internal lines and areas of separation between the parties, monitor, and if necessary enforce, the withdrawal of forces to their respective territories within an agreed upon period;
  - -- establish and monitor a zone of separation;

Classified by: Samuel R. Berger
Reason: 1.5 (a) (b) (d)
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-- if necessary, assume responsibility for the emergency withdrawal of UNCRO forces;

-- employ NATO air forces as part of the IFOR;

-- employ NATO maritime forces as part of the IFOR.

- These missions are subject to review, revision and/or expansion based on the terms of the peace settlement.

What is our strategy for avoiding mission creep? (Q1)

- Language in the Framework Agreement should clearly state that IFOR's mission is to implement the military aspects of the peace agreement, as defined in the military annex. The IFOR will carry out its mission in coordination with civilian organizations (such as OSCE, EU, and the UN) which will implement the non-military aspects of the agreement.

How does SICOR interact with IFOR if there is a violation? (Q5)

- The Senior Implementation Coordinator (SICOR) has no authority over IFOR. However, to the extent practical, the IFOR commander will maintain liaison with the SICOR. SACEUR, or his designee, can deal directly with civilians heads of each entity concerning military matters and not just with the Chiefs of Defense.

What is the relationship of the IFOR to the civilian police? What violations do the police handle and what violations does IFOR handle? (Q6,8)

- IFOR will not have responsibility for police functions (e.g. crimes, property issues, civil order).

- The Framework Agreement should include authorities to organize a civilian police component of the peace implementation plan to assist governments and populations in developing local police forces.

- *See unresolved issues (Section B) with respect to the U.S. role in organizing civilian police efforts*

Will IFOR stop attacks on UN or other international civilian agencies and their workers? (Q7)

- IFOR will not be responsible for investigating past incidents of attacks on international civilian personnel or atrocities and human rights violations.

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- The IFOR commander is authorized to stop deliberate violence against international civilian agencies where NATO forces are present and have the means and the opportunity, and where it will not adversely affect the IFOR mission.

- IFOR will not provide routine protection for relief convoys and civilian movement, but, if such convoys are attacked, the commander is authorized to stop deliberate violence where NATO forces are present or have a means and opportunity, and where it will not adversely affect the IFOR mission.

- *See unresolved issues (Section B) on whether IFOR should respond to attacks in areas that are "over the horizon."*

What will IFOR do about attacks on indigenous civilians, atrocities and human rights violations? (Q3A, 7A, 9, 9A)

- IFOR will not be responsible for investigating past incidents of attacks, atrocities, or human rights violations.

- The IFOR commander is authorized to stop deliberate violence against indigenous civilians, in situations of urgent and serious humanitarian rights violations and where NATO forces are present and have the means and the opportunity, and where it will not adversely affect the IFOR mission.

- *See unresolved issues (Section B) on whether IFOR should respond to gross violations of human rights in areas that are "over the horizon."*

What, if anything, will IFOR do about election security? (Q12)

- The IFOR will create secure conditions for elections by completing its primary tasks of deploying forces to establish presence and separation between warring factions, and enforcing compliance with military aspects of the peace agreement.

- The OSCE should be enlisted as the lead organization in the electoral component of the overall implementation effort, including the responsibility for an election security plan.

- IFOR will not have specific election security tasks.

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Under what circumstances will IFOR use force against violations of the peace agreement? Who decides whether IFOR is responsible for handling a violation? (Q3, 3A, 4, 27)

- The IFOR commander is to implement and ensure compliance with the military aspects of the peace agreement -- in particular, withdrawal of forces to their respective territories within an agreed period and establishment of agreed zones of separation.

- Forces which fire from one territory to another, into or across the zone of separation, or which probe, patrol, snipe, or violate the separation of forces agreement by moving regular or paramilitary forces into or through the zone, will be deemed in violation of the peace agreement. The IFOR commander will judge when and what force will be used to stop the violation.

- Based upon the advice of the military commanders, the NAC will decide whether there has been a major breakdown in compliance with the agreement. A major breakdown would warrant IFOR withdrawal.

- The U.S. will seek NAC approval of Rules of Engagement that provide the IFOR commander with broad authority for use of force in most contingencies without requiring additional NAC decisions.

- The IFOR commander can seek NAC guidance through SACEUR at key stages not covered by the initial ROE, such as major changes in the pattern of military activity, requests for NATO to assume additional tasks, major breakdowns in compliance, and/or disagreements with non-NATO troop contributors or with other organizations that cannot be resolved in theater.

Who will provide security for inhabitants in the areas where territory changes control under the peace agreement from one warring faction to the other?

- The IFOR will not have responsibility for movement of refugees and displaced persons.

- Where territory is transferred by the peace agreement, IFOR will assure non-interference with population movements by military forces during the transfer, for a finite period of time.

- The UNHCR and other organizations will retain responsibility for: humanitarian assistance for the civilian population; permanent settlement of refugees and assistance for civilian population; permanent resettlement of refugees and displaced

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persons; dissemination of information to the public; and movement of populations across borders.

What is IFOR's responsibility to those indigenous civilians displaced in the past (i.e. before the peace agreement)?

- Although the peace agreement would confirm the right of displaced civilians to return to their homes, IFOR will not have responsibility for movement of these refugee populations.

Should we demand, as a precondition for IFOR deployment, that parties make tangible gestures of good faith ("indicators of seriousness") between initialing and signature of the peace agreement? (Q23)

- We should seek confidence-building measures in the framework agreement that parties should commit to fulfill between initialing and signature of the peace agreement and deployment, but their fulfillment would not be a precondition for rapid deployment of IFOR. These could include:
  - -- continued cessation of hostilities and observance of the cease-fire;
  - -- no patrols forward of friendly force positions;
  - -- no firing of large-caliber weapons;
  - -- shut down of all air-early-warning and air-defense radars within 72 hours of initialing;
  - -- commencement of withdrawal by each party of its forces, military institutions, facilities and weapons from the zone of separation.
- If, however, conditions on the ground have deteriorated significantly by the time of signature, this could represent a withdrawal of strategic consent by the parties.

Does the IFOR remain in Bosnia for only 12 months? (Q28)

- The IFOR mission should have a finite duration. But until we have a final peace agreement and final implementation plan, we will preserve our flexibility on the exact duration of the mission while continuing to use 12 months as the planning figure.

Will the IFOR enforce implementation of the peace agreement evenhandedly (i.e. including the use of force against Federation as well as Bosnian Serb forces in the event of violations of the agreement? (Q10)

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- IFOR will enforce the military aspects of the peace agreement evenhandedly with regard to all parties.

Do we want a 20-km heavy-weapons-free zone of separation and/or a 4-km all-weapons-free zone within the zone of separation? (Q14, 15)

- The framework agreement should include a 20-km heavy-weapons-free zone adjusted to fit the demarcation of territory, and a 4-km all-weapons-free zone of separation.

Should the IFOR Headquarters be in Naples, Sarajevo or Zagreb? (Q20)

- The IFOR HQ will be in Sarajevo. The IFOR commander will determine when it is logistically feasible to locate the HQ in Sarajevo, and he is authorized to establish rear headquarters in Naples and Zagreb.

How will IFOR handle war criminals?

- It is not IFOR's mission to search and find war criminals.
- However, in the course of performing its mission, and where the opportunity presents itself, IFOR may apprehend war criminals.

What is the nature of IFOR presence in Serb territory besides free access? (Q16)

- IFOR will have free access into and within the Bosnian Serb entity, and will conduct regular patrols on the Serb side of the zone of separation.
- *See unresolved issues (Section B) on nature of IFOR presence in Serb territory beyond free access and regular patrols.*

B. UNRESOLVED ISSUES

What does IFOR do about reported "over the horizon" (out of IFOR's immediate presence) violations of the peace agreement or "over the horizon" reports of gross violations of human rights? (Q3A, 4, 7A)

The issue is whether the IFOR commander should have the authority to respond to reported deliberate attacks or gross violations of

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human rights when they occur "over the horizon," i.e. in areas removed from IFOR areas of deployment.

- One view is that to ignore such a report could adversely affect the stability of the peace agreement and undermine IFOR's credibility and public support. This view would authorize the commander to act on the basis of his own judgment, and would include this potential task in the IFOR mission.

- The other view is that the authority to respond to "over the horizon" situations will lead to mission creep and increase force requirements. This view would argue that we should adhere to the line set forth in Section A (NATO Commanders are authorized to act, in situations of urgent and serious humanitarian need and where NATO forces **are present and have the means and the opportunity** to stop deliberate violence to life and persons taking no active part in the hostilities).

What does IFOR do about reported "over the horizon" reports of attacks on international civilian agencies?

The issue is whether the IFOR commander should have the authority to respond to reported deliberate attacks against international civilian agencies when they occur "over the horizon."

- One view is that to fail to act to protect international civilian personnel could undermine IFOR's credibility and public support. This view would argue that an attack on an international agency that is implementing the civilian aspects of the settlement or supporting reconstruction efforts should command an immediate response from IFOR. This view would authorize the commander to act on the basis of his own judgment and would include this potential task in the IFOR mission.

- The other view is that the authority to respond to "over the horizon" situations will lead to mission creep and increase force requirements. This view would argue that we should adhere to the line set forth in Section A (NATO Commanders are authorized to act in situations of urgent and serious humanitarian need and where NATO forces **are present and have the means and opportunity** to stop deliberate violence to life and persons taking no active part in the hostilities).

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Should there be an IFOR symbolic presence on the external borders of Bosnia, particularly the inter-Serb border? (Q11, 11A)

- One view is that the Bosnian Government will demand such a presence, and that a minimal IFOR presence will counter the perception of a partition.

- The other view is that the mission of such forces on the border is unclear, that their presence would increase the size of the force and increase the risk of hostage-taking, and that any border monitoring functions can be handled by civilian agencies.

What is the nature of IFOR presence in Serb territory besides free access and patrols within the zone of separation? (Q16)

The issue is whether the IFOR mission should include being deployed regularly or, to some degree, stationed in Bosnian Serb territory.

- One view is that such deployment or stationing of IFOR troops in Bosnian Serb territory will promote evenhandedness and credibility, deter violations of the agreement within the Serb entity, and create some presence in the Serb entity during elections.

- The other view is that a regular presence will jeopardize the safety of these troops, provide an attractive target for retaliation or hostage-taking, and increase the force requirements for IFOR.

What is the clear and defensible end-state that IFOR seeks to achieve before departing? (Q10, 29)

The issue is what are the expectations for an end-state after one year of IFOR operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We cannot guarantee enduring peace, but we can give the parties a reasonable opportunity to consolidate peace within a finite period as a result of the military and civilian aspects of the implementation plan.

This issue requires further definition and refinement as the peace agreement takes shape and NATO planning proceeds.

The following is an initial list of possible milestones that we would hope to have reached by the end of the 12-month implementation period -- although their accomplishment would not be a precondition for IFOR's withdrawal at that time:

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-- UNPROFOR elements have completed withdrawal from the former Yugoslavia or transferred to NATO command and control;

-- the entity boundary lines have been established, areas of separation and any cantonment areas have been marked and agreed to by the relevant parties;

-- the parties' forces have withdrawn to their respective territories, to include adherence to restrictions on the location, movement, use and reporting of military forces within zones of separation and cantonment areas;

-- the National Independent Electoral Commission, Arbitration Tribunal, Commission on Human Rights, Commission for Refugees and Displaced Persons, Commission to Preserve National Monuments, Joint Pubic Transportation corporation, and all civilian components of the peace implementation effort have been established and allowed freedom of movement to accomplish their mandates;

-- elections for the National Assembly, National Presidency, Local Parliaments have been completed and the Constitutional Structures are seated, to include the appointment of the Constitutional Court.

Should we seek in the Framework Agreement a commitment that, after several months, the parties will be required to withdraw all their military forces (weapons and personnel) to specified cantonment areas?

The issue is whether the peace agreement should require all military forces to pull back further than the zones of separation to enter cantonment areas as a confidence-building measure.

- One view is that, if the parties cooperate, the peace agreement will be more easily enforceable, stability will be enhanced and fewer IFOR troops will be needed to implement the peace agreement.

- The other view is that, if the parties do not cooperate, more troops will be needed to enforce and monitor the cantonment areas, and evenhandedness may be jeopardized.

When do we have to give the order to preposition? What is the timing and sequence for ACTWARNs, ACTREQs, and ACTORDs? How much time between signing and deployment? What kind of decisions need to go to the President? When? (Q21, 22, 24, 26)

The attached notional timeline raises at least three issues:

1) How do we sequence the various international conferences?

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2) *Will prepositioning of troops be undertaken before Congressional approval of the U.S. commitment of troops?*

3) *When is the appropriate time to go to Congress for approval of troop commitments?*

What role should the U.S. play in seeking to establish civilian police and/or international police monitors? (Q6, 8)

As noted above, Deputies agree that IFOR will not have responsibility for police functions. The issue is whether the U.S. should take an active role in creating and/or strengthening a civilian police component (indigenous police and/or international police monitors).

- One view is that the U.S. should take an active role in developing a police force and monitors, with IFOR available as back-up in the case of major civil unrest. The supporting argument is that a viable civilian police component will relieve the pressures on IFOR and facilitate exit at the end of the 12-month period. It is further argued that without active U.S. leadership, the implementation effort (in particular, holding of elections and return of refugees) is unlikely to succeed.

- The other view is that it is sufficient for IFOR generally to provide a secure environment through the accomplishment of its primary tasks. For the U.S. to back up the developing police force will lead to assumption by IFOR of police functions throughout the country.

Samuel R Berg

Samuel R. Berger
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

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REDO

November 3, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: JOHN FEELEY

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, October 25, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia held October 25, 1995.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That Sandy sign the memorandum to the Principals at Tab B.

That Tony authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve AVL Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions
Tab B Memorandum to Principals

~~SECRET~~
Classified by: Alexander Vershbow
Reason: 1.5(a,b,d)
Declassify on: 10/29/15

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21260

October 28, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, October 25, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia held October 25, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to the agencies.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

John/
Sandy —
I think rather than this format, I'd attach the Deputies to Principals paper & simply indicate that Principals agreed to those positions.

(position on Agreed pts)

(noting subsequent change on continuation)

~~SECRET~~
Classified by: Sandy Vershbow
Reason: 1.5(a,b,d)
Declassify On: (x4)

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By [illegible] NARA, Date: 10/15/2019
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21260

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee
DATE: October 25, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 4:30 - 6:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Anthony Lake

OVP
Leon Fuerth
Rick Saunders

State
Secretary Christopher
Peter Tarnoff
Richard Holbrooke
Robert Gallucci

DOD
Dr. William Perry
James Pardew

USUN
Amb. Madeleine Albright
(via secure video)
David Scheffer

CIA
Dennis Blair
Raymond Converse

JCS
General Shalikashvili
Wesley Clark

White House
Sandy Berger
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
Sandy Vershbow
John Feeley
Don Kerrick

Summary of Conclusions

Sanctions Relief

1. Principals agreed to postpone until the next PC meeting a final decision on the negotiator's proposal for suspension of sanctions against Serbia during the proximity talks. ~~(S)~~

IFOR: Unresolved Issues

2. Principals agreed that the primary tasks of the IFOR, as set forth in SACEUR's concept of operations, are:

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Reason: 1.5 (a,b,d)
Declassify on: 10/28/15, 1.6 (x4)

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2013-0422-M
2/6/2020

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- Assume command of the theater and immediately establish robust C2 capability;
- Establish the IFOR rapidly, building on in-place forces and limited early deployments followed by rapid introduction of substantial follow-on force;
- Control withdrawal of non-transferred UNPROFOR forces in coordination with IFOR deployment;
- Protect the force and ensure self defense and freedom of movement for the IFOR;
- Establish, monitor and enforce compliance with the military terms of the peace agreement in B-H. For now they specifically include:
  - -- establish an immediate reaction force
  - -- mark the internal lines and areas of separation between the parties, monitor, and if necessary, enforce the withdrawal of forces to their respective territories within an agreed upon period;
  - -- establish and monitor a zone of separation;
  - -- if necessary, assume responsibility for the emergency withdrawal of UNCRO forces;
  - -- employ NATO air forces as part of the IFOR;
  - -- employ NATO maritime forces as part of the IFOR.
- These missions are subject to review, revision and/or expansion based on the terms of the peace settlement. ~~(S)~~

3. Principals further agreed that:

- Language in the Framework Agreement should clearly state that IFOR's mission is to implement the military aspects of the peace agreement, as defined in the military annex. The IFOR will carry out its mission in coordination with civilian organizations (such as OSCE, EU and the UN), which will implement the non-military aspects of the agreement.
- The Senior Implementation Coordinator (SICOR) has no authority over IFOR. However, to the extent practical, the IFOR commander will maintain liaison with the SICOR. SACEUR, or his designee, can deal directly with civilian heads of each entity concerning military matters and not just with the Chiefs of Defense.
- IFOR will not have responsibility for police functions (e.g., crimes, property issues, civil order).

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[2013-0682-M 898]

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- The Framework Agreement should include authorities to organize a civilian police component of the peace implementation plan to assist governments and populations in developing local police forces.
- IFOR will not be responsible for investigating past incidents of attacks on international civilian personnel or atrocities and human rights violations.
- The IFOR commander is authorized to stop deliberate violence against international civilian agencies where NATO forces are present and have the means and the opportunity and where it will not adversely affect the IFOR mission.
- IFOR will not provide routine protection for relief convoys and civilian movement but if such convoys are attacked, the commander is authorized to stop deliberate violence where NATO forces are present or have a means and opportunity and where it will not adversely affect the IFOR mission.
- IFOR will not be responsible for investigating past incidents of attacks, atrocities or human rights violations.
- The IFOR commander is authorized to stop deliberate violence against indigenous civilians, in situations of urgent and serious humanitarian rights violations and where NATO forces are present and have the means and the opportunity and where it will not adversely affect the IFOR mission.
- The IFOR will create secure conditions for elections by completing its primary tasks of deploying forces to establish presence and separation between warring factions and enforcing compliance with military aspects of the peace agreement.
- The OSCE should be enlisted as the lead organization in the electoral component of the overall implementation effort, including the responsibility for an election security plan.
- IFOR will not have specific election security tasks.
- The IFOR commander is to implement and ensure compliance with the military aspects of the peace agreement -- in particular, withdrawal of forces to their respective territories within an agreed period and establishment of agreed zones of separation.
- Forces that fire from one territory to another, into or across the zone of separation, or which probe, patrol, snipe or violate the separation of forces agreement by moving regular or paramilitary forces into or through the zone, constitute a violation of the peace agreement. The IFOR commander will judge when and what force will be used to stop the violation.
- Based upon the advice of the military commanders, the NAC will decide whether there has been a major breakdown in compliance

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with the agreement. A major breakdown would warrant IFOR withdrawal.

- The U.S. will seek NAC approval of Rules of Engagement that provide the IFOR commander with broad authority for use of force in most contingencies without requiring additional NAC decisions.
- The IFOR commander can seek NAC guidance through SACEUR at key stages not covered by the initial ROE, such as major changes in the pattern of military activity, requests for NATO to assume additional tasks, major breakdowns in compliance and/or disagreements with non-NATO troop contributors or with other organizations that cannot be resolved in theater.
- The IFOR will not have responsibility for movement of refugees and displaced persons.
- Where territory is transferred by the peace agreement, IFOR will assure non-interference with population movements by military forces during the transfer for a finite period of time.
- The UNHCR and other organizations will retain responsibility for: humanitarian assistance for the civilian population; permanent settlement of refugees and assistance for civilian population; permanent resettlement of refugees and displaced persons; dissemination of information to the public; and movement of populations across borders.
- Although the peace agreement would confirm the right of displaced civilians to return to their homes, IFOR will not have responsibility for movement of these refugee populations.
- We should seek confidence-building measures in the framework agreement that parties should commit to fulfill between initialing and signature of the peace agreement and deployment, but their fulfillment would not be a precondition for rapid deployment of IFOR. These could include:
  - -- continued cessation of hostilities and observance of the cease-fire;
  - -- no patrols forward of friendly force positions;
  - -- no firing of large-caliber weapons;
  - -- shut down of all air-early-warning and air-defense radars within 72 hours of initialing;
  - -- commencement of withdrawal by each party of its forces, military institutions, facilities and weapons from the zone of separation.

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Under what circumstances will IFOR use force against violations of the peace agreement? Who decides whether IFOR is responsible for handling a violation? (Q3, 3A, 4, 27)

- The IFOR commander is to implement and ensure compliance with the military aspects of the peace agreement -- in particular, withdrawal of forces to their respective territories within an agreed period and establishment of agreed zones of separation.

- Forces which fire from one territory to another, into or across the zone of separation, or which probe, patrol, snipe, or violate the separation of forces agreement by moving regular or paramilitary forces into or through the zone, will be deemed ~~constitute a~~ violation of the peace agreement. The IFOR commander will judge when and what force will be used to stop the violation.

- Based upon the advice of the military commanders, the NAC will decide whether there has been a major breakdown in compliance with the agreement. A major breakdown would warrant IFOR withdrawal.

- The U.S. will seek NAC approval of Rules of Engagement that provide the IFOR commander with broad authority for use of force in most contingencies without requiring additional NAC decisions.

- The IFOR commander can seek NAC guidance through SACEUR at key stages not covered by the initial ROE, such as major changes in the pattern of military activity, requests for NATO to assume additional tasks, major breakdowns in compliance, and/or disagreements with non-NATO troop contributors or with other organizations that cannot be resolved in theater.

Who will provide security for inhabitants in the areas where territory changes control under the peace agreement from one warring faction to the other?

- The IFOR will not have responsibility for movement of refugees and displaced persons.

- Where territory is transferred by the peace agreement, IFOR will assure non-interference with population movements by military forces during the transfer, for a finite period of time.

- The UNHCR and other organizations will retain responsibility for: humanitarian assistance for the civilian population; permanent settlement of refugees and assistance for civilian population; permanent resettlement of refugees and displaced

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- If, however, conditions on the ground have deteriorated significantly by the time of signature, this could represent a withdrawal of strategic consent by the parties.
- The IFOR mission should have a finite duration. But until we have a final peace agreement and final implementation plan, we will preserve our flexibility on the exact duration of the mission while continuing to use 12 months as the planning figure.
- IFOR will enforce the military aspects of the peace agreement evenhandedly with regard to all parties.
- The framework agreement should include a 20-km heavy-weapons-free zone adjusted to fit the demarcation of territory and a 4-km all-weapons-free zone of separation.
- The IFOR HQ will be in Sarajevo. The IFOR commander will determine when it is logistically feasible to locate the HQ in Sarajevo, and he is authorized to establish rear headquarters in Naples and Zagreb.
- It is not IFOR's mission to search and find war criminals. However, in the course of performing its mission, and where the opportunity presents itself, IFOR may apprehend war criminals.
- IFOR will have free access into and within the Bosnian Serb entity and will conduct regular patrols on the Serb side of the zone of separation. ~~(S)~~

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human rights when they occur "over the horizon," i.e. in areas removed from IFOR areas of deployment.

- One view is that to ignore such a report could adversely affect the stability of the peace agreement and undermine IFOR's credibility and public support. This view would authorize the commander to act on the basis of his own judgment, and would include this potential task in the IFOR mission.

- The other view is that the authority to respond to "over the horizon" situations will lead to mission creep and increase force requirements. This view would argue that we should adhere to the line set forth in Section A (NATO Commanders are authorized to act, in situations of urgent and serious humanitarian need and where NATO forces **are present and have the means and the opportunity** to stop deliberate violence to life and persons taking no active part in the hostilities).

What does IFOR do about reported "over the horizon" reports of attacks on international civilian agencies?

The issue is whether the IFOR commander should have the authority to respond to reported deliberate attacks against international civilian agencies when they occur "over the horizon."

- One view is that to fail to act to protect international civilian personnel could undermine IFOR's credibility and public support. This view ~~argue~~ would that an attack on an international agency that is implementing the civilian aspects of the settlement or supporting reconstruction efforts should command an immediate response from IFOR. This view would authorize the commander to act on the basis of his own judgment and would include this potential task in the IFOR mission.

- The other view is that the authority to respond to "over the horizon" situations will lead to mission creep and increase force requirements. This view would argue that we should adhere to the line set forth in Section A (NATO Commanders are authorized to act in situations of urgent and serious humanitarian need and where NATO forces **are present and have the means and opportunity** to stop deliberate violence to life and persons taking no active part in the hostilities).

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9521241
RECEIVED: 24 OCT 95 18

TO: LAKE

FROM: FEELEY
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 24 OCT 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
CROATIA
SERBIA
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 25 OCT PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 27 OCT 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FEELEY LOGREF: 9521239 9521260

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0155 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		FEELEY
		JOSHI
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

~~SECRET~~ RECORD ID: 9521241

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95102516	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	95103112	NOTED BY LAKE

~~SECRET~~

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	Alexander Vershbow and John F. Feeley to Anthony Lake re: Checklist for October 25 PC on Bosnia (6 pages)	10/24/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4009

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0155 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, October 25, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs654

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA
DATE: October 25, 1995
LOCATION: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
TIME: 4:30 - 5:30 P.m.

AGENDA

I. IFOR/Unresolved Issues.....JCS/NSC*

II. Sanctions Lift .....OVP

* Papers to be provided by OOB October 23

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KG NARA, Date 3/5/2020
2013-0682-m

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12 —
See my annotations / notes.

October 24, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR PRINCIPALS

FROM: DEPUTIES COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: IFOR Issues

This memorandum summarizes the conclusions of the Deputies Committee on a range of issues pertaining to the mission of the Bosnia peace implementation force (IFOR). It includes issues on which Deputies reached agreement (Section A) and issues for which a Principals' decision is needed (Section B). The numbers in parentheses refer to the questions in the JCS paper "IFOR Issues" of October 23, 1995.

A. AGREED ISSUES

What is the IFOR's mission?

The primary tasks of the IFOR, as set forth in SACEUR's concept of operations, are:

- Assume command of the theater and immediately establish robust C2 capability;
- Establish the IFOR rapidly, building on in-place forces and limited early deployments followed by rapid introduction of substantial follow-on force;
- Control withdrawal of non-transferred UNPROFOR forces in coordination with IFOR deployment;
- Protect the force and ensure self defense and freedom of movement for the IFOR;
- Establish, monitor and enforce compliance with the military terms of the peace agreement in B-H. For now they specifically include:
  - -- establish an immediate reaction force
  - -- mark the internal lines and areas of separation between the parties, monitor, and if necessary enforce, the withdrawal of forces to their respective territories within an agreed upon period;
  - -- establish and monitor a zone of separation;

[1] Does not say establish 'secure environment' through B-H, e.g. response to military-military fighting not along separation zone is

~~SECRET~~

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Reason: 1.5 (a)(b)(d)
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NLC AR 72-14 10/1/2013
[2013-0682-M (9.01)]

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-- if necessary, assume responsibility for the emergency withdrawal of UNCRO forces;

-- employ NATO air forces as part of the IFOR;

-- employ NATO maritime forces as part of the IFOR.

- These missions are subject to review, revision and/or expansion based on the terms of the peace settlement.

[e.g. cantonment of military forces / heavy weapons. See p?

What is our strategy for avoiding mission creep? (Q1)

- Language in the Framework Agreement should clearly state that IFOR's mission is to implement the military aspects of the peace agreement, as defined in the military annex. The IFOR will carry out its mission in coordination with civilian organizations (such as OSCE, EU, and the UN) which will implement the non-military aspects of the agreement.

How does SICOR interact with IFOR if there is a violation? (Q5)

- The Senior Implementation Coordinator (SICOR) has no authority over IFOR. However, to the extent practical, the IFOR commander will maintain liaison with the SICOR. SACEUR, or his designee, can deal directly with civilians heads of each entity concerning military matters and not just with the Chiefs of Defense.

What is the relationship of the IFOR to the civilian police? What violations do the police handle and what violations does IFOR handle? (Q6,8)

- IFOR will not have responsibility for police functions (e.g. crimes, property issues, civil order).

- The Framework Agreement should include authorities to organize a civilian police component of the peace implementation plan to assist governments and populations in developing local police forces.

- *See unresolved issues (Section B) with respect to the U.S. role in organizing civilian police efforts*

Will IFOR stop attacks on UN or other international civilian agencies and their workers? (Q7)

- IFOR will not be responsible for investigating past incidents of attacks on international civilian personnel or atrocities and human rights violations.

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- The IFOR commander is authorized to stop deliberate violence against international civilian agencies where NATO forces are present and have the means and the opportunity, and where it will not adversely affect the IFOR mission.
- IFOR will not provide routine protection for relief convoys and civilian movement, but, if such convoys are attacked, the commander is authorized to stop deliberate violence where NATO forces are present ~~or~~ have a means and opportunity, and where it will not adversely affect the IFOR mission.
- *See unresolved issues (Section B) on whether IFOR should respond to attacks in areas that are "over the horizon."*

What will IFOR do about attacks on indigenous civilians, atrocities and human rights violations? (Q3A, 7A, 9, 9A)

- IFOR will not be responsible for investigating past incidents of attacks, atrocities, or human rights violations.
- The IFOR commander is authorized to stop deliberate violence against indigenous civilians, in situations of urgent and serious humanitarian rights violations, ~~and~~ where NATO forces are present and have the means and the opportunity, and where it will not adversely affect the IFOR mission.
- *See unresolved issues (Section B) on whether IFOR should respond to gross violations of human rights in areas that are "over the horizon."*

What, if anything, will IFOR do about election security? (Q12)

- The IFOR will create secure conditions for elections by completing its primary tasks of deploying forces to establish presence and separation between warring factions, and enforcing compliance with military aspects of the peace agreement.
- The OSCE should be enlisted as the lead organization in the electoral component of the overall implementation effort, including the responsibility for an election security plan.
- IFOR will not have specific election security tasks.

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Under what circumstances will IFOR use force against violations of the peace agreement? Who decides whether IFOR is responsible for handling a violation? (Q3, 3A, 4, 27)

- The IFOR commander is to implement and ensure compliance with the military aspects of the peace agreement -- in particular, withdrawal of forces to their respective territories within an agreed period and establishment of agreed zones of separation.
- Forces which fire from one territory to another, into or across the zone of separation, or which probe, patrol, snipe, or violate the separation of forces agreement by moving regular or paramilitary forces into or through the zone, constitute a violation of the peace agreement. The IFOR commander will judge when and what force will be used to stop the violation.
- Based upon the advice of the military commanders, the NAC will decide whether there has been a major breakdown in compliance with the agreement. A major breakdown would warrant IFOR withdrawal.
- The U.S. will seek NAC approval of Rules of Engagement that provide the IFOR commander with broad authority for use of force in most contingencies without requiring additional NAC decisions.
- The IFOR commander can seek NAC guidance through SACEUR at key stages not covered by the initial ROE, such as major changes in the pattern of military activity, requests for NATO to assume additional tasks, major breakdowns in compliance, and/or disagreements with non-NATO troop contributors or with other organizations that cannot be resolved in theater.

Who will provide security for inhabitants in the areas where territory changes control under the peace agreement from one warring faction to the other?

- The IFOR will not have responsibility for movement of refugees and displaced persons.
- Where territory is transferred by the peace agreement, IFOR will assure non-interference with population movements by military forces during the transfer, for a finite period of time.
- The UNHCR and other organizations will retain responsibility for: humanitarian assistance for the civilian population; permanent settlement of refugees and assistance for civilian population; permanent resettlement of refugees and displaced persons; dissemination of information to the public; and movement of populations across borders.

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What is IFOR's responsibility to those indigenous civilians displaced in the past (i.e. before the peace agreement)?

- Although the peace agreement would confirm the right of displaced civilians to return to their homes, IFOR will not have responsibility for movement of these refugee populations.

[and deployment ?

Should we demand, as a precondition for IFOR deployment, that parties make tangible gestures of good faith ("indicators of seriousness") between initialing and signature of the peace agreement? (Q23)

- We should seek confidence-building measures in the framework agreement that parties should commit to fulfill between initialing and signature of the peace agreement and deployment, but their fulfillment would not be a precondition for rapid deployment of IFOR. These could include:
  - -- continued cessation of hostilities and observance of the cease-fire;
  - -- no patrols forward of friendly force positions;
  - -- no firing of large-caliber weapons;
  - -- shut down of all air-early-warning and air-defense radars within 72 hours of initialing;
  - -- commencement of withdrawal by each party of its forces, military institutions, facilities and weapons from the zone of separation.
- If, however, conditions on the ground have deteriorated significantly by the time of signature, this could represent a withdrawal of strategic consent by the parties.

[JCS/DOD addon: doesn't say they are pre-conditions which would be mistake, but recognizes reality we need for Hill, e.g. what if total breakdown of cease-fire before deploy

Does the IFOR remain in Bosnia for only 12 months? (Q28)

- The IFOR mission should have a finite duration. But until we have a final peace agreement and final implementation plan, we will preserve our flexibility on the exact duration of the mission while continuing to use 12 months as the planning figure.

[might focus a second on this]

Will the IFOR enforce implementation of the peace agreement evenhandedly (i.e. including the use of force against Federation as well as Bosnian Serb forces in the event of violations of the agreement? (Q10)

- IFOR will enforce the military aspects of the peace agreement evenhandedly with regard to all parties.

[this is consensus now, but with some uneasiness by Vershbow / Pewitt: Sandy would like an informal "sort of". Don't think we can do that]

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Do we want a 20-km heavy-weapons-free zone of separation and/or a 4-km all-weapons-free zone within the zone of separation? (Q14, 15)

- The framework agreement should include a 20-km heavy-weapons-free zone adjusted to fit the demarcation of territory, and a 4-km all-weapons-free zone of separation.

Should the IFOR Headquarters be in Naples, Sarajevo or Zagreb? (Q20) [George has question on this]

- The IFOR HQ will be in Sarajevo. The IFOR commander will determine when it is logistically feasible to locate the HQ in Sarajevo, and he is authorized to establish rear headquarters in Naples and Zagreb.

How will IFOR handle war criminals? [JCS agrees but very nervous. Worth a second]

- It is not IFOR's mission to search and find war criminals.
- However, in the course of performing its mission, and where the opportunity presents itself, IFOR may apprehend war criminals.

What is the nature of IFOR presence in Serb territory besides free access? (Q16)

- IFOR will have free access into and within the Bosnian Serb entity, and will conduct regular patrols on the Serb side of the zone of separation.
- *See unresolved issues (Section B) on nature of IFOR presence in Serb territory beyond free access and regular patrols.*

B. UNRESOLVED ISSUES

What does IFOR do about reported "over the horizon" (out of IFOR's immediate presence) violations of the peace agreement or "over the horizon" reports of gross violations of human rights? (Q3A, 4, 7A)

The issue is whether the IFOR commander should have the authority to respond to reported deliberate attacks or gross violations of human rights when they occur "over the horizon," i.e. in areas removed from IFOR areas of deployment.

- One view is that to ignore such a report could adversely affect the stability of the peace agreement and undermine IFOR's credibility and public support. This view would authorize the commander to act on the basis of his own judgment, and would include this potential task in the IFOR mission.

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- The other view is that the authority to respond to "over the horizon" situations will lead to mission creep and increase force requirements. This view would argue that we should adhere to the line set forth in Section A (NATO Commanders are authorized to act, in situations of urgent and serious humanitarian need and where NATO forces **are present and have the means and the opportunity** to stop deliberate violence to life and persons taking no active part in the hostilities).

What does IFOR do about reported "over the horizon" reports of attacks on international civilian agencies?

[little more complicated than prior Q and I think more compelling argument for greater authority

The issue is whether the IFOR commander should have the authority to respond to reported deliberate attacks against international civilian agencies when they occur "over the horizon."

- One view is that to fail to act to protect international civilian personnel could undermine IFOR's credibility and public support. This view argue that an attack on an international agency that is implementing the civilian aspects of the settlement or supporting reconstruction efforts should command an immediate response from IFOR. This view would authorize the commander to act on the basis of his own judgment and would include this potential task in the IFOR mission.
- The other view is that the authority to respond to "over the horizon" situations will lead to mission creep and increase force requirements. This view would argue that we should adhere to the line set forth in Section A (NATO Commanders are authorized to act in situations of urgent and serious humanitarian need and where NATO forces **are present and have the means and opportunity** to stop deliberate violence to life and persons taking no active part in the hostilities).

Should there be an IFOR symbolic presence on the external borders of Bosnia, particularly the inter-Serb border? (Q11, 11A)

Holbrooke and negotiating team

- One view is that the Bosnian Government will demand such a presence, and that a minimal IFOR presence will counter the perception of a partition.
- The other view is that the mission of such forces on the border is unclear, that their presence would increase the size of the force and increase the risk of hostage-taking, and that any border monitoring functions can be handled by civilian agencies.

JCS/OSD

What is the nature of IFOR presence in Serb territory besides free access and patrols within the zone of separation? (Q16)

The issue is whether the IFOR mission should include being deployed regularly or, to some degree, stationed in Bosnian Serb territory.

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- One view is that such deployment or stationing of IFOR troops in Bosnian Serb territory will promote evenhandedness and credibility, deter violations of the agreement within the Serb entity, and create some presence in the Serb entity during elections.

- The other view is that a regular presence will jeopardize the safety of these troops, provide an attractive target for retaliation or hostage-taking, and increase the force requirements for IFOR.

What is the clear and defensible end-state that IFOR seeks to achieve before departing? (Q10, 29)

The issue is what are the expectations for an end-state after one year of IFOR operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We cannot guarantee enduring peace, but we can give the parties a reasonable opportunity to consolidate peace within a finite period as a result of the military and civilian aspects of the implementation plan.

This issue requires further definition and refinement as the peace agreement takes shape and NATO planning proceeds.

The following is an initial list of possible milestones that we would hope to have reached by the end of the 12-month implementation period -- although their accomplishment would not be a precondition for IFOR's withdrawal at that time:

-- UNPROFOR elements have completed withdrawal from the former Yugoslavia or transferred to NATO command and control;

-- the entity boundary lines have been established, areas of separation and any cantonment areas have been marked and agreed to by the relevant parties;

-- the parties' forces have withdrawn to their respective territories, to include adherence to restrictions on the location, movement, use and reporting of military forces within zones of separation and cantonment areas;

-- the National Independent Electoral Commission, Arbitration Tribunal, Commission on Human Rights, Commission for Refugees and Displaced Persons, Commission to Preserve National Monuments, Joint Pubic Transportation corporation, and all civilian components of the peace implementation effort have been established and allowed freedom of movement to accomplish their mandates;

-- elections for the National Assembly, National Presidency, Local Parliaments have been completed and the Constitutional Structures are seated, to include the appointment of the Constitutional Court.

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Should we seek in the Framework Agreement a commitment that, after several months, the parties will be required to withdraw all their military forces (weapons and personnel) to specified cantonment areas?

The issue is whether the peace agreement should require all military forces to pull back further than the zones of separation to enter cantonment areas as a confidence-building measure.

[new issue raised this week; needs more work]

- One view is that, if the parties cooperate, the peace agreement will be more easily enforceable, stability will be enhanced and fewer IFOR troops will be needed to implement the peace agreement.
- The other view is that, if the parties do not cooperate, more troops will be needed to enforce and monitor the cantonment areas, and evenhandedness may be jeopardized.

When do we have to give the order to preposition? What is the timing and sequence for ACTWARNs, ACTREQs, and ACTORDs? How much time between signing and deployment? What kind of decisions need to go to the President? When? (Q21, 22, 24, 26)

The attached notional timeline raises at least three issues:

1) *How do we sequence the various international conferences?*
2) *Will prepositioning of troops be undertaken before Congressional approval of the U.S. commitment of troops?*
3) *When is the appropriate time to go to Congress for approval of troop commitments?*

[can be deferred]

What role should the U.S. play in seeking to establish civilian police and/or international police monitors? (Q6, 8)

As noted above, Deputies agree that IFOR will not have responsibility for police functions. The issue is whether the U.S. should take an active role in creating and/or strengthening a civilian police component (indigenous police and/or international police monitors).

- One view is that the U.S. should take an active role in developing a police force and monitors, with IFOR available as back-up in the case of major civil unrest. The supporting argument is that a viable civilian police component will relieve the pressures on IFOR and facilitate exit at the end of the 12-month period. It is further argued that without active U.S. leadership, the implementation effort (in particular, holding of elections and return of refugees) is unlikely to succeed.

[State doing assessment of existing police]

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- The other view is that it is sufficient for IFOR generally to provide a secure environment through the accomplishment of its primary tasks. For the U.S. to back up the developing police force will lead to assumption by IFOR of police functions throughout the country.

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INFORMATION PAPER

1. Purpose. To identify unresolved issues concerning the overall peace implementation effort in Bosnia, to determine the USG position[1] and to delineate the North Atlantic Council (NAC) decisions and provisions of the draft framework agreement for peace (referred to below as the "framework agreement"). This will assist decision makers in identifying inconsistencies between USG positions, NATO positions, and tentative provisions of the framework agreement for peace. Areas in which further NAC guidance initiated by the US would be required, or changes to the framework agreement are required, are identified below in the recommendation sections.

2. Key Points. There were nine main areas of concern discussed during the 20 October 1995 NSC Deputies Committee (DC) meeting (JCS paper dated 20 October attached). They are: mission, non-compliance, election security, deployment, area of operations, timing, exit, Congressional strategy, and public outreach. Issues in which there was consensus at the 20 October DC are listed below as Resolved Issues. Those issues which remain unresolved, or those additional issues that were identified (additional issues are underlined), are listed under the remaining areas of concern.

Resolved Issues

1. What is our strategy for avoiding mission creep?

- USG position is consistent with the NAC decision on 29 September that IFOR would conduct an operation to implement the military aspects of the agreement to ensure compliance, to create safe conditions for the withdrawal of UN forces, and to create secure conditions (within the limits of key military tasks) for the conduct by others of other tasks associated with the peace agreement. To avoid mission creep, the USG must establish tasks and responsible parties for non-military tasks; ensure coordination mechanisms exist between civil and military aspects, and over-watch to prevent migration of tasks. Additionally, language in the framework agreement should clearly state IFOR's mission is to implement the military aspects of the peace agreement. Further, it is clear, a fully developed strategy to implement the civil aspects of the peace agreement is essential to ensure success for the entire peace implementation effort, to achieve the desired end state, and to allow IFOR to be withdrawn within 12 months from its initial deployment. On an urgent basis, the USG must define non-military tasks and assign USG responsibilities with timelines for execution. The implementation of the peace agreement would have many aspects including political, military, civil police, elections, humanitarian assistance,

[1] Unless otherwise noted, IFOR missions, tasks, assumptions or situations are based on the DoD paper "Implementing a Balkan Peace Settlement -- Revision 30"

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human rights, monitoring, and nation building. The USG should assure international organizations such as the UN, EU, OSCE, and the World Bank promptly begin work on the non-military tasks that will complement the work of the IFOR.

2. What is our strategy for coordinating the refinement of the NATO plan and the negotiated settlement?

- To ensure consistency between the USG positions, NATO military planning, and the framework agreement, the draft framework agreement needs to be finalized, and coordinated within the Interagency. State will develop a draft framework agreement based on the 23 October drafting sessions. This draft should be cleared within the interagency on 24 October, and once the details of the military aspects of the peace agreement are finalized they should be shared with the NATO Military Authorities, via the proper channels within NATO. This will allow military planners to conduct the troop-to-task analysis necessary to refine IFOR planning, to include identification of potential changes in required force structure.

3. What constitutes a violation of the peace agreement? What is the response of IFOR to violations?

- The NAC decided on 29 September that the Implementation Force (IFOR) will ensure compliance with the military aspects of the peace agreement, in particular, withdrawal of forces to their respective territories and the establishment of agreed zones of separation. The USG position, and the framework agreement are consistent with the NAC decision. ROE and the good judgment of the IFOR Commander will be the basis of when and what force will be used.

5. How could SICOR interact with IFOR if there was a violation?

- NAC decisions and the framework agreement are clear; the SICOR has no authority over the IFOR. The IFOR Commander has the responsibility for military aspects of the implementation agreement, and within that authority, will coordinate his actions with the SICOR. Routinely, civil-military interaction will be coordinated in a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC). The DC on 20 October also agreed that the IFOR Commander will deal directly with the head of state of each entity and not just with the Chiefs of Defense.

6. What is the relation of the IFOR to the civilian police?

- The NAC decisions, USG position, and framework agreement are consistent. The NAC on 11 October approved SACEUR's concept of operations dated 6 October 1995 in which the establishment of civil-military structures would

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occur during Phase I of the operation. SACEUR's briefing to the President on 18 October identifies a coordination relationship between IFOR and the civilian police representative (through a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) established to coordinate the military and civilian aspects of the implementation of the peace agreement).

7. Will IFOR be used to deter attacks on UN civilian agencies and their workers, or civilians? What will IFOR do about atrocities and human rights violations? Who will decide?

- On 20 October the DC determined IFOR will not be responsible for investigating past incidents of attacks on international civilian personnel or atrocities and human rights violations (additional issues identified are addressed below).

8. What violations do the police handle and what violations does IFOR handle?

- On 20 October, the DC agreed IFOR will not provide for civil order. IFOR's responsibility concerning attacks on international civilians and the indigenous population is discussed below.
- On 20 October, the DC determined that the USG should develop a plan (State lead) for a civilian police component and a lead organization should be solicited. The framework agreement should include authorities to organize a civilian police component of the peace implementation plan to assist local governments and populations in developing local police forces. This should include, at a minimum, authority to assess the present police force, vet the personnel presently assigned, train police, monitor police functions, supplement the police force as necessary, and establish a border patrol.

10. Do we have a "threshold" for use of force against the Federation? Who will decide when the force will be used? How do we define even-handedness? How does the IFOR mission relate to efforts by countries to provide military assistance to the Bosnian Government?

- On 20 October the DC determined this issue relates to sporadic violations of the peace agreement. Since in peace operations, the impartiality (even-handedness) of peace forces and the international organizations is critical to the legitimacy and success of the operation, evenhandedness must be demonstrated at all times, in all dealings, and under all circumstances. Additionally, to sustain IFOR's impartiality, the concurrent "equip and train" program must be completely separate from IFOR. To maintain the legitimacy of the operation, the DC determined that IFOR will enforce implementation of the peace agreement evenhandedly and assume the IFOR

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will be withdrawn in the event of a total breakdown in strategic consent (the issue of total breakdown is discussed below).

12. What, if anything, will we do about election security?

- At the 6 October Deputies Committee meeting there was general agreement with the conclusion in the JCS paper "Election Security -- Implications to the Implementation Force (IFOR)" which was: the IFOR would create secure conditions for elections by completing its primary tasks of deploying forces to establish presence and separation between warring factions, and enforcing compliance with military aspects of the peace agreement. As a part of the peace agreement there should be a civil administrative, police, and electoral component of the overall implementation effort to assist local governments and populations in providing local security for elections. These components would be part of those organizations specifically tasked to monitor the election process, provide assistance to the civilian population and allow governments to draft electoral law, educate voters, register voters, and conduct the election. The DC on 6 October deferred a formal decision, however, pending discussions with the US negotiating team. The DC on 20 October agreed to follow through with the recommendations in the JCS paper and the provisions of the framework agreement, and that OSCE should be solicited as the lead organization in the electoral component of the overall implementation effort, including the responsibility for an election security plan.

13. Can we confirm that IFOR will actually be under NATO command and control during the UNPROFOR-IFOR transition?

- Yes, IFOR will conduct the operation under NATO command and control and ROE, with no UN involvement in military decision making.

17. Where will the Russians be located?

- On 20 October, the DC decided this issue will be treated separately. The US is opposed to a separate AOR or chain of command for the Russian troops.

18. Will IFOR patrols in the Zone of Separation be armed?

- IFOR patrols will be armed and backed up by reserve forces.

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19. What will IFOR's role be in Eastern Slavonia? What will the US role be? What will happen to the Russian battalion there under the UNCRO mandate? What are the IFOR responsibilities for forces in theater but not in Bosnia? What will happen to UNCRO and UNPREDEP responsibilities? Who will be responsible for their mission?

- On 20 October, the DC decided this issue will be treated separately.
- The USG and UN position is that UNCRO and UNPREDEP operations continue under UN control. IFOR Commander is responsible for coordinating with these UN missions.
- Presently there is no role, assigned by NATO, for IFOR in Eastern Slavonia. However, the NAC gave SACEUR the mission to control and secure the withdrawal of UNPROFOR forces not transferred to IFOR, to include if necessary, the emergency withdrawal of UNCRO forces. The NAC on 29 September agreed that SACEUR should submit a concept of operations based on the planning assumption that UNCRO and UNPREDEP operations continue under UN control. If the UNCRO mandate is renewed, we anticipate the Russian battalion would remain in Eastern Slavonia. If required and requested, NATO is still committed to withdrawing UNPF from Bosnia and/or Croatia (Sector East) using OPLAN 40104.
- The framework agreement, as presently written, does not address Eastern Slavonia or FYROM.

23. While we are prepared to enforce the settlement and will not wait for "indicators of seriousness" after signature, should we demand that parties make tangible gestures of good faith in week or so between initialing and signature?

- On 20 October the DC agreed there should be "indicators of seriousness" in the framework agreement to be required between initialing and signature of the peace agreement, but that these would not be preconditions for IFOR deployment. At a minimum, immediately upon initialing the agreement, the parties will continue the cessation of hostilities and observance of the cease-fire in accordance with the Agreement of 5 October, will not patrol forward of friendly force positions, will not fire large caliber weapons, all air early warning or air defense radars will be shutdown within 72 hours and will remain inactive, and each party will begin withdrawing its forces/military institutions/facilities/weapons from the zone of separation immediately (completed within 30 days).

25. How will winter affect the timing of deployment, transition, and operations?

- Winter weather will affect the speed of deployment of forces into the theater. Roughly 60 percent of UNPROFOR's casualties have resulted from vehicular accidents. Deployment in winter conditions will be difficult. In addition to

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treacherous road conditions, location and removal of mines will be extremely difficult during the winter months.

27. What constitutes a total breakdown? Who decides?

- On 20 October, the DC agreed in the event of a major breakdown in compliance, and because this is a NATO-led operation, it is the North Atlantic Council which will ultimately define "total breakdown" based on the situation and advice of military commanders.

28. Does the IFOR remain only 12 months?

- The NAC decision of 29 September directed SACEUR to develop a concept of operations planning on the assumption that the mission of the IFOR would be completed when the military aspects of the peace agreement have been implemented, but no later than 12 months from its initial deployment.
- The President, based on the final peace agreement and the final plan, will determine whether the US position will remain that IFOR withdraws 12 months from its initial deployment.

Unresolved Issues

Mission

3A. Are there restrictions on the deployment and use of military forces in the parties' own entities? What would IFOR's response be to breaches of the cease fire or the use of military force to coerce/intimidate within the two entities?

- Neither the USG position, nor the NAC decisions delineate restrictions on military forces in their own entity. The NAC determined that planning should assume the IFOR will "ensure compliance with the military aspects of an agreement (in particular, withdrawal of forces to their respective territories within an agreed period and the establishment of agreed zones of separation of forces".
- The framework agreement[2] states, within 90 days of the signing of the agreement, all forces will begin to withdraw to Cantonment and barracks areas to be completed no later than 120 days. Subsequent to movement to cantonment areas, no training, military exercises, maneuvers, patrolling, or other such activities outside of the cantonment areas are permitted without approval of the IFOR Commander. Unauthorized activities will constitute

[2] Draft "Framework Agreement for Peace", Annex 1, Revision 2, dated 10/21/95

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hostile intent subjecting those forces to immediate attack from the IFOR. This measure should be seen as an additional demonstration of good faith on the part of the parties, which in principle should reduce the potential for violence and enhance the force protection of the IFOR.

- Recommendation. It is clear from the above language in the draft framework agreement that any unauthorized activities will constitute hostile intent subjecting those forces to immediate attack from the IFOR. Because this is a NATO-led operation, it is the North Atlantic Council which will ultimately determine the overall objectives and rules of engagement for the IFOR. USG should propose a NAC decision based on the above language from the framework agreement and that the two provisions on restrictions to deployment and use of military forces which constitute hostile intent should also be included in the definition of "hostile intent" in the Rules of Engagement Annex of the OPLAN.

4. Who decides if there is a violation? Who decides whether IFOR is responsible for handling the violation?

- The USG position states that on order, CINCSOUTH (the IFOR Commander) will conduct operations to enforce the terms of the peace agreement in B-H.
- On 29 September, the NAC stated CINCSOUTH (the IFOR commander) is to implement the military aspects, and ensure compliance, of the peace agreement. This includes arrangements for NAC guidance and political advice and information to SACEUR, including stages at which additional guidance could be requested. Those stages include, but are not limited to, major changes in the pattern of military activity, requests for NATO to assume additional tasks, major breakdowns in compliance, disagreements with non-NATO troop contributors or other organizations that can not be resolved in theater, and other circumstances prompting requests from the IFOR Commander.
- "Recognizing the need to provide for the effective enforcement of the provisions of this agreement," the framework agreement[3] states the parties will request the deployment of IFOR for that purpose. The framework agreement also establishes a Joint Military Commission, run by the IFOR Commander. In this role, the IFOR Commander would make decisions consistent with IFOR's mandate as necessary to enhance compliance. This commission would also receive reports on compliance with the provisions of the agreement from the parties or from the monitors. In Article XI, the IFOR Commander is noted as the final authority concerning all questions associated with the implementation of the military aspects of the peace agreement.
- Recommendation. None, the USG position, the NAC decisions, and the framework agreement are consistent, the IFOR Commander is noted as the final authority. It is clear the IFOR Commander is assigned the

[3] Draft "Framework Agreement for Peace", Annex 1, Revision 2, dated 10/21/95

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responsibility of completing the military tasks in theater associated with the peace agreement, and as such, in this role and in his role as the Chairman of the Joint Military Commission, would make decisions consistent with the IFOR's mandate as necessary to ensure compliance. If circumstances occur which prompt a request for additional political guidance or advice, he is authorized to request that guidance as per the NAC decision (i.e., total breakdown in strategic consent).

7A. What will IFOR do to stop deliberate violence to life and person against international civilian personnel (i.e., UNHCR personnel)? What will IFOR do to stop deliberate violence to life and person against the indigenous population? When violence is conducted in the presence of IFOR personnel? When reported as it is happening but not observed directly by IFOR personnel? When reported in retrospect?

- On 29 September the NAC decided that within the limits of IFOR's key military tasks, IFOR will deter attacks on UN civilian agencies by creating secure conditions for others organizations conducting tasks associated with the peace agreement. While specific ROE is not yet drafted, the NAC determined guidance under OPLAN 40104 would apply in principle to this operation for handling civilian obstruction and deliberate violence to life and person ("the NATO Commanders are authorized to act, in situations of urgent and serious humanitarian need and where NATO forces are present and have the local means and opportunity, to stop deliberate violence to life and persons taking no active part in the hostilities.").
- The framework agreement does not address IFOR's responsibility in this area.
- Recommendation: On 20 October the DC determined NATO forces should be authorized to stop deliberate violence to life and person against international civilian personnel and indigenous population where NATO forces are present or have the means and opportunity, but IFOR will not be responsible for investigating past incidents of attacks on international civilian personnel or atrocities and human rights violations. Because this is a NATO-led operation, it is the North Atlantic Council which will ultimately determine the overall objectives and rules of engagement for the IFOR. The USG should propose the following NAC decision: "In accordance with the provisions of international law, the NATO Commanders are authorized to act, in situations of urgent and serious humanitarian need and where NATO forces are present ~~and~~ or have the ~~local~~ means and opportunity, to stop deliberate violence to life and persons taking no active part in the hostilities.".

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9. Will the IFOR do anything to help refugees exercise the right to regain their property and return to their homes?

9A. Who will provide security for inhabitants in the areas where the territory changes control from one warring faction to the other? (Note: This may include the impartial establishment and supervision of protected zones, humanitarian assistance for the civilian population, permanent settlement of refugees and displaced persons, guarantee of the security of civilians, dissemination of information to the public, and movement of populations across borders.)

- The USG position is for the IFOR to be prepared to facilitate other organizations (UNHCR) in the accomplishment of its mission.
- NAC agreed on 29 September that the UNHCR and other organizations would retain responsibility for refugees and displaced persons, although the NATO Theater Commander, within capabilities, should be prepared to consider requests for assistance. Additionally the NAC agreed with the key tasks which included the supporting task of observing, securing, and preventing interference with the movement of civilian populations, refugees, displaced persons and their property.
- The framework agreement[4] states that parties to the framework agreement shall facilitate the ability of all refugees and displaced persons to freely decide whether to return to their homes of origin or to make a claim. Additionally, in Article XII, that within 30 days military forces occupying the territory to be transferred from one entity to another will completely vacate and clear the territory to be transferred. In order to provide the civilians in those areas being transferred to a different entity with a period of adjustment, however, opposing military forces of an entity receiving new territory will not occupy this new territory for 90 days or until approval is received by the IFOR Commander. The IFOR Commander is authorized all necessary force to ensure compliance with the article.
- Recommendation: On 20 October the DC determined IFOR forces have no role in such areas as the Krajina, Zepa, Gorazde, etc. where it is clear the UNHCR and other organizations would retain responsibility for refugees and displaced persons. Because this is a NATO-led operation, it is the North Atlantic Council which will ultimately determine the overall objectives and rules of engagement for the IFOR. The USG should propose the following NAC decision: Assign the IFOR the key military task of enforcing the provision that armed forces are precluded from entering the territory to be transferred (as defined in the framework agreement) and that the UNHCR and other organizations would retain responsibility for humanitarian assistance for the civilian population, permanent settlement of refugees and displaced persons, dissemination of information to the public, and movement of populations across borders. The local governments, supported

[4] Draft "Framework Agreement for Peace", Annex 1, Revision 2, dated 10/21/95

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by the civilian police component of the implementation plan, would be responsible for the security of civilians.

Non-Compliance

11. What will IFOR do about protecting or monitoring external borders?

11A. Should there be a symbolic presence on the external borders (particularly the inner-Serb border)?

- The USG position, the NAC decisions, and the framework agreement do not address protection or monitoring of external borders.
- The Constitutional Structures annex of the framework agreement delineates the responsibilities of the Central Government and its exclusive and additional responsibilities. Protection or monitoring of external borders is not expressly assigned. According to the framework agreement, all governmental functions and powers not expressly assigned to the Government of B-H shall be those of the Entities (Federation of B-H and Republic Srpska).
- Recommendation. This question strikes at the heart of the "partitioning" issue. Because the addition of a task for IFOR to protect or monitor the external borders of B-H will significantly increase the force structure requirement the IFOR, the protection and monitoring of the external borders should be left to the two Bosnian entities. If it is determined in the negotiations that a "symbolic presence" is required on the external border, the USG should develop a plan (State lead) for an external border monitoring component and a lead organization (possibly ICFY) should be solicited. The framework agreement should include authorities to organize an external border monitoring component and delineate its mandate.

Deployment

14. What forces of the various parties are to be permitted within the Weapons Free Zone (20 Km wide)?

- The US military planners envision a 10 Km monitored zone (20 Km total) on either side of the boundary line where only IFOR and the respective side's forces will be allowed, and where national representatives (BSA, ABiH, and HVO) co-located in IFOR command posts have control of forces. IFOR would patrol both sides, investigate and respond to violations, monitor ground/air sensors, patrol by helo and block/monitor roads to control high density areas. Heavy weapons would be excluded.
- The NAC directed the IFOR to ensure compliance with the military aspects of an agreement, and in particular, the establishment of agreed zones of

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separation. Current NATO planning has not addressed a 20 Km weapons free zone.

- In the framework agreement there is a provision for a Military Exclusion Buffer Zone of approximately 16 Km on either side of the Military Exclusion Zone (4 Km wide) for a total of a 20 Km zone. No direct fire, armored or mechanized vehicles are permitted.
- Recommendation: The US military planning and the draft framework agreement are consistent. The planned force structure is sufficient to monitor and enforce this provision. Recommend the framework agreement includes a Military Exclusion Buffer Zone. The proposed Military Exclusion Buffer Zone will reduce risk for IFOR. Because current NATO planning has not addressed a 20 Km Military Exclusion Buffer Zone, this provision should be shared with the NATO Military Authorities, via the proper channels within NATO. This will allow military planners to conduct the troop-to-task analysis necessary to refine IFOR planning.

15. Will there be a 2 Km buffer zone?

- US military planners envision a 4 Km wide separation zone (2 Km on either side of the boundary line) established, then monitored and enforced by the IFOR. This will be a weapons-free area. IFOR command post will be established in the zone of separation with IFOR, BSA, ABiH, and HVO components. US envisions IFOR units will direct combined patrols which will investigate violations and resolve disputes at the lowest level. IFOR-only patrols will also be conducted. Combined checkpoints will be established along lines of communication. The decisions on force placement should be made at the operational level by the force commander.
- Neither the NAC decisions, nor the SACEUR concept of operations, specifically address this issue.
- In the framework agreement there is a proposal for a 4 Km Military Exclusion Zone (2 Km on either side of the Entity Boundary Line). No weapons other than those of the IFOR are permitted. This zone is established to prevent any incidents which might lead to a resumption of hostilities.
- Recommendation: The US military planning and the framework agreement are consistent. Recommend the framework agreement include a provision for a 4 Km Military Exclusion Zone (2 Km on either side of the Entity Boundary Line) to be established as a buffer zone to prevent any incidents which might lead to a resumption of hostilities. Because current NATO planning has not addressed a 4 Km zone of separation, this provision should be shared with the NATO Military Authorities, via the proper channels within NATO. This will allow military planners to conduct the troop-to-task analysis necessary to refine IFOR planning.

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16. Will IFOR deploy into Serb areas? Will IFOR zones cover the entire country?

- The USG position is IFOR would operate principally from Federation territory. US military planners envision IFOR will patrol or monitor (both ground and helo) both sides of the boundary line, investigate and respond to violations, monitor ground/air sensors, and monitor/control roads to control high density areas.
- The NAC decisions do not address this issue in detail.
- The framework agreement entitles IFOR to utilize such space within B-H for training, accommodations, and other purposes incident to its presence, and calls upon the parties to ensure that the IFOR has complete freedom of movement. The redeployment of all Serb forces into cantonment areas, monitored by IFOR, will facilitate IFOR's mission accomplishment. The cantonment concept will increase control of military forces, promoting the effectiveness of local police. Particularly during the election process, effective police will complement any IFOR presence in the Serb entity, contributing to a secure environment. On the other hand, if uncontrolled military forces, and ineffective police, complicate the security situation, IFOR's task will be more difficult, perhaps leading to IFOR conducting police functions.
- Recommendation: The NAC decision, USG position and framework agreement are consistent. To complete the military tasks assigned to IFOR in accordance with the latest revision of the framework agreement IFOR can, and is expected to, operate predominately on Federation territory.
- However, if the framework agreement is adjusted to include military tasks in which IFOR must deploy into Bosnian Serb entity to accomplish its mission or further political guidance is provided requiring IFOR to deploy into the Bosnian Serb entity, additional troops will be required for the task assigned. If additional troops are required, the US will face the decision to authorize additional forces or delete such a provision from the framework agreement. Once again, to ensure consistency between the USG positions, NATO military planning, and the framework agreement, the draft framework agreement needs to be finalized, and coordinated within the Interagency. When politically feasible, these details should be shared with the NATO Military Authorities, via the proper political channels within NATO, to allow military planning to conduct the troop-to-task analysis necessary to refine IFOR planning.

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Area of Operations

20. Should IFOR HQ be in Naples, Sarajevo, or Zagreb? Should IFOR HQ be in Sarajevo, and if so, how soon?

- While the NAC decisions do not specifically address this issue, the selection of IFOR HQ is best made by the military commander responsible for the operation.
- SACEUR concept of operations has the IFOR Theater HQ in Zagreb and ARRC HQ (Ground Commander) in Sarajevo. US Division HQ likely to be in Tuzla.
- The framework agreement entitles IFOR to utilize such space within B-H for training, accommodations, and other purposes incident to its presence, and calls upon the parties to ensure that the IFOR has complete freedom of movement.
- Recommendation: If it is decided IFOR must establish a HQ in Sarajevo for political reasons, recommend the IFOR Commander be allowed to determine how soon it is logistically feasible, and that he be authorized to establish rear headquarters in Zagreb and Naples as appropriate.

Timing

21. Some equipment and forces must be prepositioned before signature of the peace agreement. When do we have to give the order to preposition?

- Will be address in Notional Timeline below.

22. What is the sequencing of approvals required for ACTWARNs, ACTREQs, and ACTORDs?

- Will be addressed in Notional Timeline below.

24. How much time between signing and deployment?

- Will be addressed in Notional Timeline below.

26. What kind of decisions need to go to the President? When?

- Will be addressed in Notional Timeline below.

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Exit

29. What is an acceptable end state to the US when IFOR leaves?

- USG -- when the Federation has a reasonable self defense capability.
- The NAC determined end state is when the military aspects of the peace agreement have been implemented.
- The framework agreement defines the military aspects of the peace agreement in the Cessation of Hostilities and Disengagement Annex.
- Recommendation: The framework agreement, as discussed in many of the questions and answers above, will define the military aspects of the peace agreement. IFOR should withdraw when the military aspects of the peace agreement are accomplished. There is, however, an inescapable linkage between the IFOR exit strategy and the parallel civil effort. The true indicators of success of the operation may in fact be the progress made in the civilian aspects of the peace agreement. There must be strong civilian agency support in the overall effort. Of course, the other key to exit strategy is simultaneously completing an equip and train program for the Bosnian Federation to ensure a stable military situation, or rough balance of power, between the two entities. However, it should be noted the key military tasks approved by the NAC and the below success criteria should not be a precondition, or checklist, necessary for IFOR departure:. Possible criteria for success in the overall peace implementation effort include:
    - UNPROFOR elements have completed withdrawal from the former Yugoslavia or transferred to NATO command and control;
    - the establishment of the Entity Boundary Line, areas of separation, and any cantonment areas which have been marked and agreed to by the involved parties;
    - withdrawal of forces to their respective territories, to include adherence to restrictions on the location, movement, use, and reporting of military forces within zones of separation and cantonment areas;
    - the establishment of the National Independent Electoral Commission, Arbitration Tribunal, Commission on Human Rights, Commission for Refugees and Displaced Persons, Commission to Preserve National Monuments, Joint Public Transportation Corporation, and all civilian components of the peace implementation effort are established and allowed freedom of movement to accomplish their mandates;
    - Elections for the National Assembly, National Presidency, Local Parliaments are completed and the Constitutional Structures are seated to include the appointment of the Constitutional Court.

- Essentially, IFOR will give the civilian aspects of the peace implementation and the military stabilization efforts a reasonable opportunity to establish peace. We should continue to assume that the mission of the IFOR would

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be completed when the military aspects of the peace agreement have been implemented, but no later than 12 months from its initial deployment.

Congressional Strategy

30. What is our strategy for addressing congressional concerns? Is it coordinated?

- NSC must either specify the strategy or designate an agency to do so.
- Recommendation: State is probably the appropriate lead agency, OSD will have a large role.

Public Outreach

31. What is our strategy for addressing the public's concern? Is it coordinated?

- Recommendation: OSD recommends a proactive public affairs policy, coordinated by the White House staff with full support from DoD and State. USG should explain the IFOR deployment to the public, actively advocating the USG decision using a common set of talking points.

Notional Timeline

32. What is the notional timeline and what and when are the USG decisions required to support the timeline?

SACEUR's request to confirm forces	12 October
Proximity Talks begin	31 October
Presidential/NCA approval of response to SACEUR's request to confirm forces	3 November
Response to SACEUR's request to confirm forces	3 November
President Clinton approves draft peace agreement	13 November
Peace Agreement initialed	**14 November**
CINCEUR briefing to President on OPLAN	15 November
President Clinton approves OPLAN	15 November
NAC approve OPLAN 40104X	15 November
President Clinton seeks Congressional support	15 November
SHAPE submits ROE request	15 November
NAC approves ROE request	15 November
NAC authorizes deployment of Enabling Forces	15 November
SACEUR issues order for Enabling Forces	15 November

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President/NCA approves issue of deployment order for Enabling Forces	15 November
AFSOUTH prepositions Enabling Forces	15-29 November
Croat/B-H/Serb Parliamentary votes	17 November
London Conference	20-21 November
Moscow Conference	23-24 November
SECURITY COUNCIL Resolution authorizing IFOR	14-24 November
Peace Conference	26 November
~~Agreement signed~~	**26 November**
NAC approves deployment of main force	26 November
SACEUR issues order for Main Forces	26 November
President/NCA approves issue of deployment order for Main Body	26 November
AFSOUTH deploys ARRC HQ/Main Body	27 November
UNPROFOR transfer of authority to IFOR	30 November
AFSOUTH IFOR assumes control in theater	30 November
UNPROFOR Withdrawal	30 Nov - completion
Seek Congressional approval of Supplemental	TBD

Prepared by: John Roberti, LCDR, USN
European Division, J-5, Ext 49431.
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October 24, 1995

SUBJECT: Sanctions Relief

This paper presents three broad proposals[1] for using sanctions relief as part of an "end game:"

1. Stick to the current plan of suspending sanctions only when a peace treaty is signed.

2. Accept Ambassador Holbrooke's proposal of suspending all sanctions at the start of the proximity talks.

3. Pursue a middle course by giving limited sanctions relief at the start of the proximity talks.

In addition, the paper addresses two issues not answered in previous Principals' meetings: when to lift sanctions against the FRY and when to suspend sanctions against the Pale Serbs. Note that the Russians have circulated a draft resolution in New York that would suspend all sanctions against Belgrade and Pale at the start of the proximity talks and lift all sanctions against both when an agreement is signed.

The Three Proposals

Alternative 1: Stick with the current sanctions relief plan

When Principals last discussed sanctions relief in August, they decided that all UN sanctions against the FRY, except for frozen assets, will be suspended upon signature of a peace agreement and that sanctions will be reimposed on the FRY during the suspension period if the FRY or the Bosnian Serbs impede implementation. They further determined that sanctions will be lifted and frozen assets will be released (subject to resolution of claims) upon full implementation of the peace agreement.

PRO:

- The current sanctions relief plan concentrates virtually all sanctions leverage against the critical goal of getting the parties to sign a peace settlement.

- Milosevic has a strong incentive to bring the proximity talks to a successful conclusion, since he would get no sanctions relief if he or the Bosnian Serbs cause the talks to collapse.

[1] All three proposals would lift sanctions and release frozen assets at full implementation of the peace plan.

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(2013-0682-m, 9.03)

- This approach to sanctions relief supports the strategy established in July and August of focusing on relatively rapid movement to an overall settlement in Bosnia by trading major sanctions relief only for a true breakthrough in Bosnia.

- The plan is consistent with the President's assertion to Senator Dole that there will be no easing of existing sanctions until there is a peace settlement.

CON:

- The current plan gives Milosevic nothing in return for intermediate steps on the way to a settlement.

- It offers no relief to Milosevic if he and the Bosnian Serbs negotiate in good faith but agreement is blocked by the other parties (this shortcoming could be rectified by returning in such circumstances to concepts outlined in earlier sanctions relief plans that would give Milosevic limited sanctions relief in the absence of a settlement, provided he continues to support the peace process).

- It does nothing to meet continuing Russian pressure for sanctions relief.

A variation: The UNSC could pass a resolution at the start of the proximity talks which would suspend sanctions against the FRY upon signature of a peace agreement. This would give Milosevic no concrete sanctions relief now -- but would provide him relative certainty on how and when he will get sanctions relief, which has symbolic and political value.

Alternative 2: Suspend all sanctions, except frozen assets, at the start of the proximity talks

Ambassador Holbrooke proposes that all sanctions against the FRY be suspended at the start of the proximity talks and that the suspension last for the duration of the talks. Full sanctions would be reimposed if the FRY or the Bosnian Serbs were responsible for the collapse of the talks. The Security Council would have the option of continuing some or all of the sanctions relief if the Serbs were not the cause of the talks' failure.

PRO:

According to analysis from the negotiating team, granting sanctions relief to the FRY at the start of talks would

- Strengthen Milosevic against Serbian domestic critics and the Bosnian Serbs who oppose any deal.

- Induce Milosevic not to leave Dayton without a deal or sanctions will resume.

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- Signal other parties that sanctions relief could continue if they obstruct a deal.
- Give Milosevic substantial reward for steps he has already taken to support peace.
- Satisfy Russian demands for sanctions relief.
- Place the parties on more equal footing at the start of the negotiations.

CON:

- Sanctions relief at this point may be useful, but not necessary.
  - -- The Intelligence Community believes Milosevic faces remarkably little internal political pressure to achieve immediate sanctions relief. Serbs blame others for sanctions, not Milosevic, thus relieving him from immediate personal pressure to get sanctions relief.
  - -- Milosevic's leverage over the Bosnian Serbs stems from his ability to manipulate their access to fuel and military supplies and from the Bosnian Serb leadership's realization that their long-term survival depends on Milosevic. Milosevic probably modulates his leverage over Pale more in response to his perception of what is in his own best interest than to gain compensatory sanctions relief.
- Sanctions relief may be irrevocable, even if talks collapse.
  - -- A Security Council resolution is necessary to suspend sanctions and establish reimposition mechanisms. It will be extremely difficult to craft definitive reimposition mechanisms and to rally Security Council support for reimposition should it become necessary.
  - -- Even if the sanctions are reimposed, enforcement will lag substantially. The front-line states would undoubtedly be slow to re-activate their enforcement mechanisms, possibly greatly extending the time in which the sanctions ring was effectively down.
  - -- Serbia could blunt the effect of reimposed sanctions by stockpiling fuel and other key materials during the suspension period. In as little as 2-3 weeks, Serbia could import enough fuel to meet most, if not all, of its winter energy requirements. Serbia could also export grain, stockpiled industrial materials, and arms to earn much-needed hard currency.

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- Granting sanctions relief before an agreement is signed may have serious side effects.

  -- This sanctions relief proposal contradicts the President's assurances to Senator Dole in his August 28 letter that there would be no further sanctions relief until there is a peace settlement. Thus, it risks complicating efforts to get Congressional support for IFOR and may lead to passage of amendments to prevent further sanctions relief.

  -- President Tudjman stated that Croatia would be impelled to attack Sector East if a decision were made to ease sanctions on Belgrade before reaching an agreement on Eastern Slavonia. (USUN New York, 004140, 232156z OCT 95, NODIS)

Alternative 3: Offer more limited sanctions relief by allowing trade in certain commodities for a set time period (or until the talks collapse).

Previous Contact Group and USG sanctions relief models envisioned "peeling off" sanctions in several incremental steps. For example, the plan offered by Bildt in July envisioned easing sanctions in four discrete steps:

1. Suspend non-strategic trade and financial sanctions (except frozen assets), establish an oil import quota system

2. Lift "Phase I" sanctions[2]

3. Lift non-strategic trade and financial sanctions, suspend strategic trade sanctions

4. Lift strategic trade sanctions, release frozen assets, end the oil import quota system

As the sanctions community examined this and other incremental sanctions relief plans, it became clear that there are problems in trying to finely sub-divide sanctions:

- Trade and financial sanctions are very difficult to separate.

  -- Legitimate trade cannot start unless restrictions on financial transactions are also loosened.

  -- While it may be theoretically possible to allow only those financial transactions necessary to finance specific trade deals, practical

[2] Phase I sanctions included air service to Belgrade, ferry service to Bar, and sports and cultural contacts -- all of which were suspended in August 1994 in return for the border closure.

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enforcement problems -- especially in non-U.S. banks -- make it all but impossible to separate illegal from legal transactions.

- Discriminating between strategic and non-strategic trade has little impact in the short run -- except for oil.

  -- Fuel is the only strategic commodity that really matters to the FRY in the short run. Serbia cannot meet winter heating requirements without imported heading oil -- too little now gets through the embargo at too high a price.

  -- Allowing non-strategic trade would help ease consumer dissatisfaction marginally, but would do nothing to re-start the industrial base or to keep the population warm this winter.

  -- Allowing trade in other strategic goods, such as ores and metals, will only help industrial recovery in the long term, because of the seriously run-down state of Serbia's heavy industry.

  -- The more different types of goods and commodities allowed in trade, the more difficult the enforcement problem becomes.

A variation: The conclusion the sanctions community has reached is that sanctions cannot be peeled as thinly as earlier proposals assumed. However, the importance of fuel oil in and of itself offers a possible peel-off option: We could offer to allow the FRY to import 50,000 MT of heating oil[3] (worth $7.5 million) a month for the next two months to be financed by export of $7.5 million worth of wheat or corn (about 50,000 MT). The UNSC would retain the option of renewing the grain for oil arrangement at the end of two months if there is substantial progress towards a peace settlement. The arrangement would be canceled immediately if the proximity talks collapse due to Serb intransigence.

PRO:

- Allowing Serbia to swap surplus grain for fuel oil would be of economic and political benefit for Milosevic since it will help him to meet a critical popular demand at home.

- The overall sanctions enforcement system would stay in place to maintain the effectiveness of remaining sanctions, and to monitor oil shipments and cut them off if necessary.

[3]According to CIA estimates, 50K MT of heating oil is about the FRY's monthly winter demand for heating oil over and above domestic production.

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- This approach gives Milosevic something now, while retaining relatively more sanctions leverage for later in the peace process.

CON:

- This plan may not be attractive to Milosevic, who has indicated to negotiators that he wants near-total sanctions relief.

- The plan contradicts the President's letter to Senator Dole.

- It requires a UN resolution.

Other Issues

The following two issues need decision, whether or not interim sanctions relief is offered.

When will UN sanctions against the FRY be lifted?

At issue is how long to preserve the threat of reimposing sanctions as a hedge against Serb backsliding on the peace settlement. Each of the three alternatives proposes lifting UN sanctions against the FRY at full implementation of the peace agreement, but full implementation has never been defined in this context. Possible points after which sanctions could be lifted include

- Successful implementation of the military aspects of the peace agreement and withdrawal of IFOR,

- Achievement of a rough balance of power between the entities to ensure a stable military situation after IFOR withdraws, and/or

- National elections.

Lifting sanctions before IFOR's departure surrenders sanctions leverage while NATO troops are still on the ground, thus reducing options for deterring Serb threats against IFOR's safety or interference with its ability to accomplish its mission. Similarly, sanctions leverage could be used to induce Serb parties to abide by arms control measures in the peace agreement. It may also be desirable to retain the threat of reimposing sanctions in response to Serb misbehavior until after elections, a major political goal. On the other hand, Belgrade and Russia press for early lift of sanctions, arguing that the FRY has met its obligations once the settlement is signed.

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When will sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs be suspended?

Suspension of sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs and opening of the Serbian-Bosnian border could take place at one of three possible times:

1. At signature of the agreement

PRO: Gives the Bosnian Serbs immediate reward for signing the agreement

CON: Uses up sanctions leverage that may be needed in later stages of the implementation process; Belgrade can freely resupply Bosnian Serb military.

2. After Bosnian Serb forces have withdrawn to agreed territories

PRO: Rewards Bosnian Serbs for implementing a critical element of the agreement.

CON: Uses up sanctions leverage that may be needed in later stages of the implementation process.

3. After full implementation

PRO: Retains sanctions leverage for entire implementation period.

CON: The post-settlement economic recovery package and the re-emergence of commerce in the region will make economic sanctions against Pale and the border closure increasingly hard to enforce as the implementation process goes forward.

A sub-issue: What about ICFY? It may be desirable to retain ICFY's monitoring presence on the border between the FRY and Bosnia after economic sanctions and the border closure have been suspended in order to have an international presence on the border and to monitor compliance with any limitations on arms shipments included in the peace agreement.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Jackson, Wyoming
August 28, 1995

Dear Mr. Leader:

I have received your letter expressing your deep concerns about our recent diplomatic initiatives to bring an end to the Balkan conflict. We share a common desire to see a durable peace achieved throughout the Balkans. I launched our new diplomatic initiative out of a conviction that developments on the ground have created real opportunities for us to break the diplomatic stalemate and avoid yet another round of bloodshed.

The team I sent to Europe earlier this month, led by Anthony Lake, found the Europeans firmly supportive of our proposal and our leadership. The Lake team carried a bold new initiative for peace. Building on the results of the Lake mission, I then asked Assistant Secretary Richard Holbrooke to travel to the former Yugoslav states, where he has had encouraging preliminary consultations.

We all are deeply saddened by the death last Saturday of three members of that team, Ambassador Robert Frasure, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Kruzel and Colonel Nelson Drew. Nonetheless, we intend to persevere in our efforts to achieve a just and lasting peace in the Balkans and are exploring with the parties ideas that include carrots and sticks designed to encourage an early settlement consistent with the principles of the Contact Group plan.

As we have briefed your staff, sanctions remain a critical source of leverage with Serbia in achieving a comprehensive settlement. Thus, we are proposing suspension of a broad range of sanctions -- not full lifting as your letter states -- only if there is agreement on a political settlement in Bosnia.

With regard to your concern over Kosovo, we have already expressed to Milosevic our concern that large-scale resettlement of Krajina Serbs in Kosovo would be a provocative act. Moreover, Belgrade is well aware of the U.S. commitment, which I have reaffirmed, to take action against Serbia in response to Serb-inspired violence in Kosovo. While some Krajina Serbs have moved into Kosovo, others are resisting efforts to resettle them in the

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province. We are watching the situation closely. Our position on Kosovo has not changed. We continue to support restoration of autonomy and full respect for the human and civil rights of the people of Kosovo. Furthermore, we will not support full reintegration of Serbia into the international community until a solution for Kosovo is achieved. Our ultimate goal is to achieve a comprehensive settlement that enhances regional stability and provides for economic reconstruction, which is the prerequisite for long-term harmony among states in the region.

I hope this elaboration of our policy makes clear that we have no intention of easing the existing sanctions against Serbia until there is a peace settlement in Bosnia. Our objective here is the achievement of a just peace agreement. While I disagree with your approach of unilateral lift of the arms embargo, I understand that its ultimate purpose is to restore a balance of power that also will lead to negotiations and a peace settlement. I believe we must seize this moment to see if we can achieve a fair and durable settlement now, without another year or more of escalating fighting. I would hope that you will give that effort a full and unencumbered opportunity to be tested and your strong support if it is successful.

Sincerely,

Bill Clinton

The Honorable Robert Dole
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

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MULTILATERAL FRAMEWORK FOR IFOR

In the wake of Hyde Park, the SecDef-Grachev meeting in Geneva, and the Talbott-Slocombe visit to Moscow, it appears that the most realistic possibility for integrating NATO, non-NATO and Russian forces into a NATO-led IFOR operation would be under the rubric of an international coalition -- led by NATO authorities, based on traditional NATO command and control, and without any new institutions. The groundwork has now been laid for Russian participation. A Russian liaison team is in place at SACEUR headquarters.

I. Building the Military Coalition

The IFOR structure would be established as follows:

- The Bosnian Peace Agreement, in the Cessation of Hostilities Annex, calls on NATO to provide a multinational military implementation force (IFOR) to establish boundaries, separate forces, enforce cessation of hostilities, and remove ordnance hazards.

- The UNSC then issues a short resolution which approves the peace agreement and grants authority to "interested member states, acting with appropriate regional organizations or arrangements," to support all aspects of implementation. NATO is not mentioned in the resolution, but is identified in the peace agreement as the organizer/leader of the multinational force.

- NATO organizes the IFOR coalition by contacting all potential troop contributing nations to determine interest (currently underway in Brussels) in participation, and then evaluating individual country contributions on the basis of interoperability and IFOR needs.

- SACEUR then concludes individual MOU's with interested states which would discuss mission, command and control and consultations. Currently being drafted by NATO military authorities, these MOU's would provide a process for determining each individual state's contributions and terms of participation (see Russian Terms of Participation below). Details would be worked out with SACEUR.

- The individual MOU's would include provisions for political and military coordination. These MOU's would establish that coordination would be on an individual basis, but within the framework of a collective body. No new institutions would be established.

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II. Establishing Russian Terms of Participation

The specific Russian MOU would spell out its individual terms of participation. These would be defined jointly by SACEUR and Col.-General Shevtsov at SHAPE. They would include, inter alia, the following elements:

- The Russians would have two battalions in the theater.
- The Russians would engage in non-combat activity referred to as "special operations," such as:
  - -- Construction projects;
  - -- Mine clearing operations;
  - -- Airlift activity.
- The Russian batallion commanders would come under the control of a Russian force commander located in Sarajevo.
- The Russian force commander would have a "coordinated working relationship" with ARRC Commander General Walker.
- The Russian commander would assign elements of the batallions around the four zones to conduct "general support" operations.
  - -- This means that the Russian commander would obtain from Walker a prioritized list of tasks that needed attention.
  - -- The Russian commander would then assign the Russian battalion commanders the tasks; those commanders would determine how best to accomplish them.
- Though the NAC would provide overall political guidance for IFOR, the Russians would be called on to fulfill only the specialized tasks above as needed.

III. Shaping A Multilateral Guidance Framework

NATO is working on modalities for integrating non-NATO contributors in an organized, multilateral framework for participants. The provisions establishing IFOR may include the following:

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- Agreement that each participant would accept the operation plan as a condition for contributions of forces to IFOR. NATO would promise to take account of views, but final judgment would be reserved to the NAC. If a nation did not accept the plan, its only recourse would be to refuse to participate in the force.

- Coalition Council: Discussions on general policy issues with troop contributing countries will be organized in an informal coalition council. A senior NATO official will chair. This body would discuss overall policy issues arising from IFOR's operations. Final political guidance for IFOR would continue to be established exclusively by the NAC.

- A Senior Military Council: This would be composed of senior military representatives from NATO and contributing countries. It would be chaired by SACEUR, or alternatively, by IFOR theater commander Admiral Smith. It's primary purpose would be to maintain a steady flow of information to non-NATO contributing countries. It would assume the duties of the current Ad Hoc Group.

- Command Liaison Arrangements: NATO would provide liaison arrangements with contributing countries at various staff levels. Details could be tailored to individual countries in the MOU's.

<u>"Red Lines" for NATO</u>

There are clear limits to the extent of participation by coalition countries in command and control of IFOR. In order to maintain the integrity of NATO and the IFOR operation, it remains important to establish the following as the foundation of the structure:

-- There will be no interference with the integrity of traditional NATO command and control arrangements.

-- No new institutions will be created.

-- Neither Russia nor any other non-NATO country can establish any semblance of an actual veto over IFOR operations.

-- There will be no "dual keys" by other countries or organizations over NATO activity.

-- Political guidance to SACEUR will come exclusively from the NAC.

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-- The Coalition Council can not impose its will on the NAC or NATO operations.

Meeting Russian Needs

Such an arrangement will help meet the needs of Russian participation as follows:

-- It will include express Russian approval via the UNSC resolution.

-- It will set up an intermediary structure -- the coalition council -- between Russia and NATO which Russia can claim is the "real" IFOR authorizing body.

-- It provides for an individualized Russian agreement, relating Russian participation to NATO, and preserving Russia's desire to be an "equal" partner in IFOR.

-- It provides a non-NATO (though NATO-led) civilian consultative body to give Russia a chance to express its opinions on policy issues.

-- It provides liaison opportunities in the NATO command structure beginning with SACEUR.

-- As a final point for Russia, we could agree informally that major policy issues would continue to be consulted with Contact Group partners in an informal CG forum established either in Brussels or meeting regularly in capitals.

Attachment: Q's/A's on Russian Participation

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KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
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PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 25 OCT PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: HARMON SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 27 OCT 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FEELEY LOGREF: 9521241 9521260

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95102417	FOR DECISION
001		X	95102418	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
001	SENS	Z	95102418	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	95102419	HARMON SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	951024	FUERTH, L	
002	951024	BRILL, K	
002	951024	MCALEER, R	
002	951024	INDERFURTH, R	
002	951024	ADAMS, G	
002	951024	PANETTA, L	
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National Security Council
The White House

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COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	10-25-95	2:10	JG Graves PRINT LAST NAME: GRAVES COPY: 1
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	10-25-95	1902	JPalmieri PRINT LAST NAME: Palmieri COPY: 1

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Initials: RDS Date: 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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DATE 24 OCT 95

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 25 OCT PC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
COL. F. C. WILSON JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA NOELLE JENSEN ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	10/25	7:02	Holmes PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
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MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: Panetta COPY: 1

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2010-0533-M

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

1995 OCT 24 PM 9:38

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF RECEIPT

OCT 24 3 58 PM '95

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE / PRIORITY / ROUTINE

RELEASER: ~~JM BKC~~

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 2248 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTIFICATION OF 25 OCT PC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21239

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

OPS CENTERS: THIS NOTICE IS FOR A 4:30pm MEETING TOMORROW, WEDNESDAY, 25 OCTOBER.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: RDG Date: 10/9/2019

2018-0533-M

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WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

1995 OCT 24 [illegible] 18

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF RECEIPT

'95 OCT 24 P9:00

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: ~~[illegible]~~

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 2248 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTIFICATION OF 25 OCT PC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21239

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

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1995 OCT 24 [illegible] 38

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

NLRR 2034 Mod

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE / PRIORITY / ROUTINE

RELEASER: ~~[illegible]~~

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 2248 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTIFICATION OF 25 OCT PC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21239

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

OPS CENTERS: THIS NOTICE IS FOR A 4:30pm MEETING TOMORROW, WEDNESDAY, 25 OCTOBER.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: RDS Date: 10/9/2019

2010-0533-M

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WHITE HOUSE
TIME OF TRANSMISSION
1995 OCT 24 [illegible]

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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TIME OF RECEIPT
24 OCT 95 20 34
NMCC/JCS

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
(PRIORITY)
ROUTINE

RELEASER: [illegible]

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 2248 CLASSIFICATION: SECRET TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (202) 456-9425 WH SITROOM
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTIFICATION OF 25 OCT PC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21239

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		

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TIME OF RECEIPT

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE
- ☐ FLASH
- ☐ IMMEDIATE
- ☒ PRIORITY
- ☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: [signature]

DATE/TIME: 2500307 OCT 95

MESSAGE #: 54

NSC LOG # 21239

FROM: National Security Council (NSC) PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting 25 OCT PC MTG ON BOSNIA PAGES: 3

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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Initials: RDS Date: 10/9/2019

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE
- ☐ FLASH
- ☐ IMMEDIATE
- ☐ PRIORITY
- ☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC LOG # 21239

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting 25 OCT PC MTG ON BOSNIA PAGES: 3

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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2010-0533-M

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~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

21239

October 24, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia October 25, 1995 from 4:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Principals plus one. The agenda is attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

~~SECRET~~
Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5 (g)
Declassify on: 11/6/95

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/09/2019
2010-0533-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~

NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA
DATE: October 25, 1995
LOCATION: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
TIME: 4:30 - 5:30 P.m.

AGENDA

I. IFOR/Unresolved Issues.....JCS/NSC*

II. Sanctions Lift .....OVP

* Papers to be provided by OOB October 23

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 3/9/2020

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21239

October 24, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: JOHN F. FEELEY, JR.

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, October 25, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Principals meeting on Bosnia to be held October 25, 1995. The Memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve AL Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

~~SECRET~~
Classified by: John Feeley
Reason: (a)
Declassify On: (a)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/09/2019
2010-0533-M

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See also 2013-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)~~	~~10/27/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
~~001b. memo~~	~~[Draft Version of 001a] (3 pages)~~	~~10/27/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
~~002. agenda~~	~~NSC Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)~~	~~10/27/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020

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([PC and Bosnia...])
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FOLDER TITLE:
PC0156 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, October 27, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs655

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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LOG 9521259
DATE 28 OCT 95

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS OF 27 OCT PC ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
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MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX

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RECEIVED: 27 OCT 95 18

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 28 OCT 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
CROATIA
SOC
SERBIA
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 27 OCT PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: HARMON SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 31 OCT 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FEELEY LOGREF: 9521248

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0156 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
JOSHI
KRECZKO
NSC CHRON
SODERBERG
VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By BDS NARA, Date 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95103007	FOR DECISION
002		X	95103007	HARMON SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	951028	FUERTH, L	
002	951028	BRILL, K	
002	951028	MCALEER, R	
002	951028	INDERFURTH, R	
002	951028	ADAMS, G	
002	951028	YANNUZZI, R	
002	951028	WILSON, F	

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National Security Council
The White House

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 10/27 A/O _____

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Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg	Copy		
Berger	Copy		
Lake	2	Nat'l Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4		D
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

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National Security Council
The White House

3PM

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1/3		
Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg	Copy		
Berger	Copy		
Lake	2	Natl Sec Advisor ~~has seen~~	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4		D
Records Mgt.			

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cc:

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	10-30-95	AN 9:20	Anthony Tuth PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	10-30-95	10:35	G. Graves PRINT LAST NAME: GRAVES COPY: 1
MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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PRINT LAST NAME: _____

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DATE 28 OCT 95

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS OF 27 OCT PC ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
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DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503			
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MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			
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LOG 9521259
DATE 28 OCT 95

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS OF 27 OCT PC ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA NOELLE JENSEN ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	10/30	11:00A	S. McElhaney PRINT LAST NAME: McElhaney COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE ~~PRIORITY~~ ROUTINE

RELEASER: ~~BKG~~

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 2280 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 4 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC OF PC ON BOSNIA

27 OCT NSC LOG # 21259

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	S/S EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
	USUN	OFFICE OF AMB		736-7699
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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2010-0533-M

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE ~~PRIORITY~~ ROUTINE

RELEASER: ~~[illegible]~~

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 2280 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 4 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC OF PC ON BOSNIA

27 OCT NSC LOG # 21259

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B	STATE	~~S~~ EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
	USUN	OFFICE OF AMB		736-7699
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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Initials: RDS Date: 10/9/2019
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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

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20 OCT 95 16 12

NMCC/JCS

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE / PRIORITY / ROUTINE

RELEASER: ~~BK~~

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 2280 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 4 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC OF PC ON BOSNIA

27 OCT NSC LOG # 21259

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	S/S EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
	USUN	OFFICE OF AMB		736-7699
4	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
)	JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE ~~PRIORITY~~ ROUTINE

RELEASER: ~~BKG~~

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 2280 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 4 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC OF PC ON BOSNIA

27 OCT NSC LOG # 21259

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	S/ EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
	USUN	OFFICE OF AMB		736-7699
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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Initials: RDS Date: 10/9/2019
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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE
- ☐ FLASH
- ☐ IMMEDIATE
- ☑ PRIORITY
- ☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting SOC PC ON BOSNIA PAGES: 3 + Cover

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21259

October 28, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, October 27, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~
Classified by: Alexander Vershbow
Reason: 1.5(a,b,d)
Declassify on: 10/28/15

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee
DATE: October 27, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:00 - 3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Anthony Lake

OVP
Leon Fuerth
Rick Saunders

State
Secretary Christopher
Robert Gallucci
Richard Holbrooke

DOD
John White
Walter Slocombe
James Pardew

USUN
Amb. Madeleine Albright
David Scheffer

OMB
Gordon Adams
David Morrison

CIA
John Deutch
Dennis Blair

JCS
General Shalikashvili
Wesley Clark

White House
Sandy Berger

NSC
Sandy Vershbow
John Feeley
Don Kerrick

Summary of Conclusions

1. Principals reaffirmed their October 25 agreement with the conclusions of the Deputies Committee on IFOR-resolved issues except the issue of a 20-km heavy-weapons-free zone. (C)

Sanctions Relief

2. Principals agreed that sanctions against Serbia should not be suspended prior to the proximity talks, but agreed they would be prepared to revisit the issue of sanctions relief later, if requested by the negotiator. (S)

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2010-0533-M
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IFOR: Unresolved Issues

3. Principals agreed that, as a minimum, IFOR would enforce a 4-km all-weapons-free zone along the zone of separation. They requested that agencies study further whether IFOR could effectively establish and enforce a 20-km heavy-weapons-free zone, an all-weapons-free zone that would be broader than 4-km in selected areas, and/or cantonment areas for the parties' forces in support of the implementation of a peace settlement. They agreed to have State, JCS, and OSD develop options for Principals' consideration prior to the proximity talks. **(Action: JCS/OSD/State)** (C)

4. Principals agreed that the IFOR commander at the Corps level should have the authority to act, on the basis of his own judgment, against reported "over the horizon" gross violations of human rights and/or attacks on international civilian agencies, in situations of urgent and serious humanitarian needs or attacks, and where NATO forces have the means and opportunity to stop violence to life and persons and where it will not adversely affect the IFOR mission. (S)

5. Principals agreed that the IFOR should provide a presence on the external borders of Bosnia at crossings where heavy traffic in support of the IFOR mission occurs (6 or 7 sites). Principals also agreed that JCS should prepare options for principals' decision about how IFOR can provide a more significant presence early in the operation in Serb territory, such as through regular IFOR patrols that traverse Serb areas. **(Action: JCS)** (S)

5. With regard to developing a clear and defensible end-state that could be reached at the end of the 12-month implementation period, Principals agreed further to define and refine possible milestones as the peace agreement takes shape and NATO planning proceeds. Finally, Principals agreed to remain flexible on the timeline for international conferences, Congressional approval, and Presidential decisions regarding IFOR's mission, pending developments in the negotiations. (S)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21259

October 28, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, October 27, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia held October 27, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to the agencies

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~
Classified by: Sandy Vershbow
Reason: 1.5(a,b,d)
Declassify On: (x4)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21259

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Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee
DATE: October 27, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:00 - 3:30 p.m.

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Anthony Lake

OVP
Leon Fuerth
Rick Saunders

State
Secretary Christopher
Robert Gallucci
Richard Holbrooke

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David Morrison

CIA
John Deutch
Dennis Blair

JCS
General Shalikashvili
Wesley Clark

White House
Sandy Berger

NSC
Sandy Vershbow
John Feeley
Don Kerrick

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Reason: 1.5 (a,b,d)
Declassify on: 10/29/15 (X4)
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TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 26 OCT 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 27 OCT PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: HARMON SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 30 OCT 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FEELEY LOGREF: 9521259

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0156 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		FEELEY
		JOSHI
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

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DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95102609	FOR DECISION
001		X	95102612	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
001	SENS	Z	95102612	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	95102613	HARMON SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	951026	FUERTH, L	
002	951026	BRILL, K	
002	951026	MCALEER, R	
002	951026	INDERFURTH, R	
002	951026	ADAMS, G	
002	951026	PANETTA, L	
002	951026	YANNUZZI, R	
002	951026	WILSON, F	

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TO: LAKE

FROM: FEELEY
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 26 OCT 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 27 OCT PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: FOR DECISION DUE DATE: 30 OCT 95 STATUS: X

STAFF OFFICER: FEELEY LOGREF:

FILES: IFM NSCP: CODES: BOS

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FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
LAKE		

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By RDS NARA, Date 10/9/2019
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National Security Council
The White House

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Sens			
Soderberg	Copy ✓		
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Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	10/26	X
Records Mgt.			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

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COMMENTS: NOM + Agenda
PC 10/27

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

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SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 27 OCT PC MTG ON BOSNIA
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MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA NOELLE JENSEN ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	10/26/95	14:15	GIVEN DIRECTLY TO L. Moa PRINT LAST NAME: OF VP STAFF COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	10-27-95	AM 6:00	Anthony Taylor PRINT LAST NAME: A TAYLOR COPY: VIA FAX +1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: 1
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	10/26/95	7:41pm	PRINT LAST NAME: kreisel COPY: 1

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COL. F. C. WILSON JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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	PRINT LAST NAME:		L. MOORE/VP STAFF
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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY:		VIA FAX +1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			
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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	10/27	703	Holmes PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX +1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1

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Initials: RDS Date: 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 2262 CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (202) 456-9425 WH SITROOM
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTICE/AGENDA FOR 27 OCT PC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21248

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B	USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
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P	JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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2010-0533-M

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PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

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DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 2262 CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

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B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
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B	USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
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D	JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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Initials: RDS Date: 10/9/2019
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WASHFAX

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

26 OCT 95 13 37 TIME OF RECEIPT

NMCC/JCS

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: RDS

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 2262 CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTICE/AGENDA FOR 27 OCT PC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21248

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B	USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
P	JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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2010-0533-M

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[illegible]

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TIME OF RECEIPT
13:38

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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(PRIORITY)
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 2262 CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOTAL: 3
(PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (202) 456-9425 WH SITROOM
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTICE/AGENDA FOR 27 OCT PC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21248

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B	USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
P	JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
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TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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- ☐ IMMEDIATE
- ☒ PRIORITY
- ☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC LOG # 21248

FROM: National Security Council (WH) PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting 27 OCT PC MTG ON BOSNIA PAGES: 3

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21248

October 26, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia October 27, 1995, from 2:00 to 3:30 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. Attendance is Principals plus one. The agenda is attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Joyce A. Akin for
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: John Feeley
Reason: 1.5(g)
Declassify on: 11/6/95

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/15/2019
2010-0533-M

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NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA
DATE: October 27, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:00 - 3:30 p.m.

AGENDA

I. IFOR/Unresolved Issues.....JCS/NSC*

II. Sanctions/Suspension.....OVP

* Papers to be provided by OOB October 27

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: John Feeley
Reason: 1.5(g)
Declassify on: 1.6, X5

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 3/9/2020
2018-0682-m

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21248

October 26, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: JOHN F. FEELEY, JR.

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, October 27, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Principals meeting on Bosnia to be held October 27, 1995. The Memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve AL Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: John Feeley
Reason: (a)
Declassify On: (a)

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By RDS NARA, Date 10/5/2019
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See also 2013-0612-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (3 pages)~~	~~11/07/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
002a. memo	Alexander Vershbow and John F. Feeley to Anthony Lake re: November 7 PC on Bosnia (5 pages)	11/07/1995	P1/b(1)
~~002b. agenda~~	~~[Duplicate of 003] (1 page)~~	~~11/07/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
002c. paper	re: A Grain-for-Oil Swap (4 pages)	11/06/1995	P1/b(1)
002d. memo	Don Kerrick to Tony Lake re: Delegation Sanctions Issues Checklist (2 pages)	11/1995	P1/b(1)
~~002e. paper~~	~~re: Bosnia Assistance Mix of Program Elements (2 pages)~~	~~11/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
002f. paper	re: Sustaining a Peace Agreement in Bosnia, Military Stabilization Measures (16 pages)	10/31/1995	P1/b(1)
002g. paper	re: Elements of Bosnian Arms Control (3 pages)	11/02/1995	P1/b(1)
002h. list	re: Terms of Reference for Military Stabilization Assessment Team (2 pages)	11/04/1995	P1/b(1)
~~003. agenda~~	~~NSC Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)~~	~~11/07/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020

COLLECTION:
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2010-0533-M
rs656

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9521311
RECEIVED: 10 NOV 95 15

TO: LAKE

FROM: VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 10 NOV 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 7 NOV PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: LAKE APPROVED SOC RECORD FILE ONLY DUE DATE: 14 NOV 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9521279

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0157 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		JOSHI
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95111007	FOR DECISION
001	VERSHBOW	Z	95111017	FOR FURTHER ACTION
001	LAKE	Z	95111317	FOR DECISION
001		X	95111411	LAKE APPROVED SOC RECORD FILE ONLY

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National Security Council
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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	5		
Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger	6		
Lake	7	Nat Sec Adviser has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	8		N
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1	D	
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger	2	AVT	Vershbow
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3		
Records Mgt.			
Vershbow	4		FEA

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

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National Security Council
The White House

6 hrs

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	5	JM	
Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger	6	~~Nat Sec Adviser~~ has seen	
Lake	7		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	8		N
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette 4/92

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National Security Council
The White House

11:40AM

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1	D	
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger	2	AVT	Vershbow
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3		
Records Mgt.			
Vershbow	4		FEA

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

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21311

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

11/13 SV

End of first section on sanctions should contain note on subsequent reversion of Principals decision and disposition

November 10, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, November 7, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia held November 7, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to ~~sign the memo to the agencies~~ file/in the record.

Approve ✓ Disapprove ____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~
Classified by: Sandy Vershbow
Reason: 1.5(a,b,d)
Declassify On: (x4)

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee
DATE: November 7, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 - 4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Anthony Lake

OVP
Leon Fuerth

State
Secretary Christopher
Peter Tarnoff
Richard Holbrooke
(via secure video)
Robert Gallucci
(via secure video)

DOD
Dr. John White
Jan Lodal

USUN
Amb. Madeleine Albright
William Woodward

Treasury
Jeff Shafer
Mark Sobel

OMB
Alice Rivlin
Gordon Adams

CIA
John Deutch
Dennis Blair

JCS
General Shalikashvili
Gen. Michael Byron
LTG Wesley Clark
(via secure video)

AID
Brian Atwood
Ted Morse

White House
Sandy Berger
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
Sandy Vershbow
John Feeley
Don Kerrick
(via secure video)

Summary of Conclusions

Humanitarian Sanctions Relief for the FRY

1. Principals considered a recommendation from Ambassador Holbrooke that the U.S. respond favorably to a Milosevic request

~~SECRET~~
Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5 (a,b,d)
Declassify on: 11/7/05

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RS 9/30/14 (1.7d)

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for humanitarian exceptions to the sanctions regime that would allow exports of grain to finance limited imports of natural gas and heating oil for the winter months. They agreed to seek the President's approval of a positive but scaled-back response to the Milosevic proposal (see chart below). They also agreed that, while this plan was aimed at moving the talks forward, any exceptions to the sanctions regime should be defensible as humanitarian in purpose and analogous to exceptions granted last winter. At the same time, they agreed that a level of natural gas higher than our estimate of FRY humanitarian needs could be accepted in view of the support expressed by the Bosnian Government for unrestricted natural gas flows. (S)

2. Principals recommended the following specific levels, which would apply for six months:

	U.S. proposal	FRY request	Est. Requirement
Natural Gas (million cubic meters per month)	36 to 100*	218	15
Heating Oil (tons per month)	28,500	73,000	28,500
Liquefied Natural Gas (tons per month)	588	588	588+

* 36 mcm would give the FRY a monthly allocation of natural gas equivalent to the Bosnians' natural gas requirements; 100 mcm is a figure previously approved by the Bosnian Government as a trade-off for securing Russian gas for Sarajevo through the Serbian pipeline. (S)

3. In addition, Principals agreed that the exceptions should be conditional upon: (a) daily monitoring of gas flows to Sarajevo and the FRY, and of all oil shipments to the FRY, which we would seek to restrict to Danube ports; and (b) FRY provision of data on its heating oil inventories (to discourage stockpiling). Most importantly, they agreed that the whole deal would be terminated if the FRY were responsible for cutting off gas to Sarajevo. (C)

4. With respect to financing of the oil/gas imports, Principals agreed not to permit the FRY to sell grain on the open market. But Principals could agree that the FRY could provide grain to Russian oil/gas suppliers on a barter basis. The value of the grain, however, must be limited to the value of the fuel imports. Finally, Principals agreed that we would review any arrangement and also submit to the Security Council any necessary technical resolution. (C)

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5. Note: Following the President's approval of the above proposal and its presentation in Dayton, Principals, with the President's concurrence, agreed to modify the U.S. position to permit unrestricted flows of natural gas to the FRY for a two-month period in light of strong representations from the Bosnian and Serbian delegations in Dayton. (S)

Implementation Funding

6. Principals agreed that the figures of 20 percent of the total economic reconstruction package and a U.S. share of approximately $600 million could be used as notional figures for planning purposes in developing a U.S. economic reconstruction strategy. (C)

7. Principals agreed in principle that the forthcoming budget "endgame" negotiations with the Congress represented the best option for securing funding for Bosnia peace implementation programs but that further study and review was needed on strategy **(Action: OMB)**. They agreed that during budget negotiations, funding for peace implementation in Bosnia should, to the extent possible, not come at the expense of military readiness or other international affairs programs. (C)

Military Stabilization Program

8. Principals agreed that the equip and train program should be conducted by contractors. They agreed that the terms of reference for the assessment team's meetings in Dayton should be made more clear and that the team should meet only with Federation officials and not the Serbs **(Action: OSD/JCS)**. They agreed to send the assessment team to Bosnia after reviewing the results of the team's discussions in Dayton with the U.S. delegation and with Federation officials. (C)

Eastern Slavonia

9. Principals agreed to defer discussion of a possible U.S. role in implementation of an Eastern Slavonia settlement pending developments in the ongoing negotiations. (C)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21311

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

DR. LAURA D'ANDREA TYSON
Assistant to the President for Economic Policy

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. AARON S. WILLIAMS
Executive Secretary
Agency for International Development

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, November 7, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~
Classified by: Andrew D. Sens
Reason: 1.5(a,b,d)
Declassify on: 10/29/15

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/9/2019
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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9521297
RECEIVED: 06 NOV 95 17

TO: LAKE

FROM: FEELEY
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 07 NOV 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 7 NOV PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 09 NOV 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FEELEY LOGREF: 9521279 9521311

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0157 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		FEELEY
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95110711	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	95110809	NOTED BY LAKE

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National Security Council
The White House

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1	D	
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake	2	**Natl Sec Advisor has seen**	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3		N
Records Mgt.			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette: NO

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	Alexander Vershbow and John F. Feeley to Anthony Lake re: November 7 PC on Bosnia (5 pages)	11/07/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4009

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0157 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, November 7, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs656

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: November 7, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 - 3:30 p.m.

AGENDA

I. Negotiations Update .....State

II. Implementation Funding .....OMB/Treasury/AID/State*

III. Military Stabilization Program: Equip and Train....OSD/JCS*

IV. Congressional Strategy .....NSC

*Papers should be circulated by OOB November 6.

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Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: November 2, 2005

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 6/24/2021
(NLC-96-82-11)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002c. paper	re: A Grain-for-Oil Swap (4 pages)	11/06/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
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PC0157 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, November 7, 1995

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002d. memo	Don Kerrick to Tony Lake re: Delegation Sanctions Issues Checklist (2 pages)	11/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4009

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0157 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, November 7, 1995

2010-0533-M
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OMB PAPER FOR PRINCIPALS ON BOSNIA FUNDING

November 6, 1995

Introduction

This paper presents funding requirements and analyzes options for the Principals to discuss for financing U.S. participation in a Bosnia peace implementation program. It provides preliminary cost estimates and potential funding sources in some detail for two of the three major components of U.S. activity in Bosnia - the Implementation Force (IFOR) and the Humanitarian and Economic Assistance programs. These initial estimates are subject to change as program details become known, but they establish a reasonable expectation for the ultimate costs of U.S. Bosnia activity and a basis upon which financing options can be discussed. The paper reviews the third component - Equip and Train (E&T) - only in summary fashion, since basic program information regarding scope and content has not yet been developed.

Providing financial support for each component of the Bosnia peace program must be done in the context of Administration and Congressional budget priorities - in particular, the imperative to reach a balanced budget in the foreseeable future. Thus, each of the financing options described later in this paper confronts the same fundamental dilemma:

> **Funding Bosnia peace programs will come at the expense of other programs in which the Administration, the Congress, or both have a keen interest. Therefore, the Administration must balance the relative priority of providing funding for specific Bosnia peace programs against the price we are likely to pay.**

The paper provides three financing options for funding the Bosnia peace implementation programs: (1) an FY 1996 emergency supplemental, (2) a "budget end game" negotiations option and: (3) an FY 1996 supplemental offset from within existing resources. The budgetary tradeoffs alluded to above are most clear in the case of a fully offset supplemental request (Option 3). However, even if Bosnia funding is sought as part of a broad end game budget negotiation, tradeoffs are inevitable:

- The end game negotiations must result in a balanced budget.
- If the total funding level for discretionary programs is not increased, funding for Bosnia programs must come from either other defense and international affairs programs, or domestic programs.
- If funding for discretionary programs is increased to pay for Bosnia programs and other Administration priorities, additional savings from other parts of the budget, such as mandatory programs (e.g., Medicare and Medicaid), must be achieved.

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An "emergency" designation for a supplemental would, in theory, allow the Administration to avoid having to make painful tradeoffs with other programs to fund our participation in the Bosnia peace plan. However, if past is prologue, Congress will insist on offsets. If the Administration is unprepared to identify such offsets, the Congress will likely provide their own by rescinding funds from other, perhaps higher, Administration priorities.

In addition to funding constraints, the Administration must consider the possibility of Congressional opposition to certain aspects of the Bosnia program. To the extent that the individual components of the package are likely to garner Congressional support, other Administration priorities are less likely to be at risk. Moreover, in shaping a funding strategy, the Administration will need to ensure that the costs of the Bosnia peace program will be equitably shared among all participating countries. The greater the burdensharing, especially for components the Congress finds less attractive, the more likely Congress will be to support the Administration's funding proposal.

Estimated Requirements and Potential Offsets

BOSNIA PEACE IMPLEMENTATION FORCE (IFOR)

Potential Funding Requirement

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has developed *preliminary* costs estimates for U.S. participation in a *representative* IFOR plan. These costs estimates are detailed in the table below, and are based on the following assumptions:

- U.S. ground forces would be deployed for 12 months.
- The U.S. would deploy a "heavy" armored Army division (with typical selected Corps-level support units) from units currently stationed in Europe.
- There would be a small activation of Guard and Reserve support units (between 2,000 and 3,000 troops.)
- Deployment would peak at about 25,000 troops, taking approximately two months to fully deploy and the same to return home.
- U.S. air forces would continue to support Operation Deny Flight [1] at operating rates similar to those experienced in the past year.
- U.S. naval forces in the region would remain with some incremental costs.

[1] Deny Flight is the ongoing air operation to enforce the no-fly zone over the former Yugoslavia.

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	Estimated Costs ($ in Millions)		
	Ground Forces	DENY FLIGHT	Total
Military Personnel	145	10	155
Personnel Support	175	80	255
Operations Support	740	165	905
Transportation	110	65	175
Total.....	1,170	320	1,490

Potential Offsets

In the FY 1996 Defense Appropriations Conference Report, the conferees added about $7 billion above the President's request, of which roughly $4.4 billion was included for programs that are **not** in DOD's Future Years Defense Plan. This increase might provide some funding offsets in the FY 1996 budget. It should be noted, however, that the Congress may find many specific offsets unacceptable, particularly if the overall funding level provided to Defense is reduced as part of an end game negotiation. Were such offsets available, they might include:

Representative Offsets

Program	$ Billions
B-2 Bomber	.5
BMDO/Missile Defense	.3
Low Priority O&M activities	.2
Low Priority Procurement Activities	.3
Low Priority R&D projects	.2
TOTAL	$1.5

HUMANITARIAN & ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

Potential Funding Requirement

Overall funding in FY 1996 for International Affairs is being sharply reduced by the Congress. However, full funding is being provided for most of the Administration's request for major **humanitarian assistance accounts** that would fund ongoing programs in Bosnia. Thus, funds for humanitarian assistance should be sufficient now and for the future to meet current estimates for the U.S. contribution to disaster, food, and refugee aid to the former Yugoslavia (approximately $160 million in FY 1996 and $250 million over three years).

The Deputies Committee has suggested an initial notional target of $600 million over three years for U.S. bilateral economic assistance, with the caveat that any final level will depend

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on a viable funding strategy. **Economic assistance accounts**, however, are bearing the brunt of Congressional reductions from the FY 1996 requested level. At the anticipated appropriation level for assistance for Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), State and USAID currently plan to allocate only about $38 million in FY 1996 (including carryover funds) for Bosnia, in addition to $8 million from USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives. No other economic assistance resources have been identified for Bosnia in FY 1996, but it is reasonable to expect at least another $30 million per year in CEE funds in FY 1997-98.

Potential Offsets

Offsetting the remaining economic reconstruction requirement would be difficult. The Secretary of State opposes seeking such offsets within function 150 accounts (International Affairs). Given the enormous pain of possible offsets (and the difficulties described below with alternative funding options), Principals may want to consider lowering the target level for U.S. bilateral economic assistance. Below are two illustrative options for offsets tailored to a $600 m. three year program and a $300 m. program over the same period.

*Economic Assistance Offset **Option A** ($600 million)*

Sources ($ in millions)	FY 96	FY 97	FY 98	Total
Central & East. Europe	70*	74	74	218
New Independent States	25	66	66	157
Development Assistance	50	55	55	160
Other international	25	20	20	65
TOTAL	170	215	215	**600**

* Only $54 million would come from FY 1996 CEE resources; the remainder comprises $8 million in carryover funds and $8 million from USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives.

This option would:

- Leave resources in the CEE account for other (albeit phased down) country programs: $270 million in FY 1996 and $250 million per year in FY 1997-98. The CEE assistance program has been defined as transitional since its inception in 1989, and resources have been gradually shifting toward countries at earlier stages in the transition to free markets and democratic politics.

- Continue the gradual phase-down of the NIS program from the $641 million conference mark in FY 1996 down to $616 million and then to $575 million in FY 1997 and FY 1998.

- Require $225 million in additional offsets over three years from other function 150 accounts (e.g., cuts in Development Assistance and other international accounts).

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Economic Assistance Offset ***Option B*** *($300 million)*

Sources ($ in millions)	FY 96	FY 97	FY 98	Total
Central & East. Europe	70*	64	64	198
New Independent States	0	51	51	102
TOTAL	70	115	115	**300**

* Only $54 million would come from FY 96 CEE resources; the remainder comprises $8 million in carryover funds and $8 million from USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives.

This option would:

- Leave resources in the CEE account for other (albeit phased down) country programs: $270 million in FY 1996 and $260 million per year in FY 1997-98.

- Continue the gradual phase-down of the NIS program from $641 million in FY 1996 (likely enacted) to $590 million in FY 1997 and FY 1998.

- Rely exclusively on offsets from within programmatically similar accounts - CEE and NIS.

  [Note: At the $600 million level, USAID and Treasury would have to reduce and better integrate currently distinct proposals for project-based technical assistance and balance of payments reconstruction assistance, which total at least $700 million. The $300 m level would be significantly below Treasury's desired target for balance of payments support. It should be noted that Congress has generally been more receptive to direct assistance programs and has opposed balance of payments support in the past. These considerations will need to be weighed in composing an assistance package and in shaping international burdensharing strategies.]

EQUIP AND TRAIN

Potential Funding Requirement

While arms reductions and arms control are an important goal for the peace process in the former Yugoslavia, the United States is committed to redressing the military imbalance between Bosnian Federation Forces and the Bosnian Serbs through the provision of military equipment and training. However, there remain significant uncertainties about the nature of such a program, about the sources for and kinds of equipment that would be provided and about who should provide the training. It is not currently possible to identify alternative program levels for these programs or to determine the U.S. share of any multilateral effort.

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Potential Offsets

The only significant, currently available source for Equip and Train programs would be Defense Department drawdowns of goods and services, notably $75 million in general drawdown authority under Section 506 of the Foreign Assistance Act and potentially $100 million in drawdown authority for military goods for Bosnia, under the pending FY 1996 foreign aid appropriations bill. In addition, some funds for training may be available from the International Military Education and Training (IMET) account. It should be noted, however, that these authorities draw on existing defense stocks and resources, with some impact on readiness. In addition, to the extent the general drawdown authority is used for Bosnia, it is no longer available for other crises and emergencies. Moreover, IMET funds are roughly allocated globally at the start of the year; reprogramming would be required to allocate a larger proportion to activities in the former Yugoslavia.

Options for Bosnia Funding Strategy

There are three basic options for securing additional funds for Bosnia programs: (1) an FY 1996 emergency supplemental; (2) a "budget end game" negotiations option; and (3) an FY 1996 offset supplemental from within existing resources.

Option #1: FY 1996 Emergency Supplemental. The Administration could request an emergency supplemental from Congress for the costs not covered by existing FY 1996 funding sources. As an "emergency," the supplemental would not require the Administration to identify offsets; it would also increase the deficit.

The "emergency" designation would theoretically avoid the painful reductions in other programs indicated above. However, the Congress would almost certainly reject an emergency designation and insist on offsetting the supplemental, as it has for supplementals the Administration requested this year for defense contingency operations, the California earthquake and the Oklahoma City bombing. Without Administration input, the Congress would likely offset the supplemental by rescinding funds from other, perhaps higher, Administration priorities. Furthermore, requesting a supplemental without offsets could undermine public perception of the Administration's willingness to seek a balanced budget.

[Note: As an alternative, the Administration might seek to provide offsets that cover the budget authority requirements for Bosnia programs, but not the outlay requirement. The Administration could request an emergency designation to accommodate the potential shortfall in outlays. For example, investment accounts (Procurement and R&D) would probably be the source of offsets in the defense budget for O&M and personnel costs associated with IFOR. Since investment programs outlay at a significantly slower rate than O&M or military personnel,

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there would be a shortfall in outlay offsets relative to actual outlays. An emergency designation would accommodate this shortfall. By the end of the fifth year the outlay differential would be virtually eliminated.]

Option #2: Budget End Game Negotiations. The Administration could seek funding for all or some of the Bosnia peace programs as part of the end game budget negotiations this fall, using offsets from other programs in the end game negotiations. This option depends on the timing, nature, and context of those negotiations. Many in Congress have indicated an unwillingness to provide any funding for Bosnia programs prior to a comprehensive debate and vote authorizing troop deployments. This suggests that a full Congressional debate may be required prior to an agreement on funding, thus raising a possible disconnect in timing between the end game negotiations and any Bosnia funding discussion.

There are several potential benefits to this option. It would probably be more acceptable to Congress than an emergency supplemental since funding for Bosnia would not increase the deficit. Also, it could provide full FY 1996 financial support for Bosnia programs early, in contrast to a supplemental request later in the fiscal year, thus minimizing turbulence to other defense and international programs.

Introducing the Bosnia funding issue into the end game negotiations, however, would further complicate an already complex situation. In addition to the usual set of players one would expect to engage in such negotiations (Appropriators, Budget & Finance Committee members, Congressional and Administration leadership), the Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committee leaders would probably request a presence at the table.

Moreover, Congressional leaders would almost certainly use the Bosnia funding issue as leverage in the negotiations, forcing the Administration to choose between funding the Bosnia programs and other defense, international affairs, or domestic funding priorities. This is a particularly important consideration; if the end game negotiations include Bosnia within current appropriations ceilings, Congress might reduce appropriations allocations (602b's) to key committees at the same time as the Administration is attempting to increase allocations to those committees to restore funding for Presidential priorities such as education, the environment and technology. Alternatively, if the end game results in higher overall discretionary spending levels (602a's), in order to continue deficit reduction, Bosnia funding could come at the expense of such Presidential priorities on the mandatory side as Medicare and low income entitlement programs.

Option #3: FY 1996 Offset Supplemental. The Administration could request supplemental funding, with offsets, at a later point, once the budget end game negotiations were concluded. The timing of the submission would depend on a variety of factors, including the Bosnia peace agreement implementation schedule and the Congressional schedule. In any case, a detailed supplemental funding plan could be developed for submission with the President's FY 1997 Budget submission.

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A supplemental request submitted later this fiscal year would afford the Administration more time to develop a comprehensive, accurate set of financial requirements, as well as realistic offsets. Finally, proposing tradeoffs and offsets would underscore the Administration's commitment to deficit reduction. As noted, however, an offset supplemental would require cuts to programs that will have been enacted at levels below the Administration's request. Such offsets are opposed by the agencies and could draw Congressional opposition as well.

Conclusion

The Principals need to consider the funding requirements for Bosnia as a whole and in the context of the Administration's overall budget priorities and the constrained fiscal environment. While offsets are likely to be required, finding sources is difficult. While tradeoffs are not impossible, they require a prioritization of competing demands consistent with the President's agenda. Therefore, it is imperative that choices are presented to the President that allow him to decide if the value of each additional increment of spending on specific Bosnia programs is worth the cost to other priority programs. Conflicting claims for resources should lead to a reconsideration both of the overall size of the package and of the Administration's strategy for seeking significant international sharing of the fiscal burden.

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Bosnia Assistance - Mix of Program Elements

At the November 1 Deputies' Committee meeting it was agreed (a) in taking decisions on economic aid for Bosnia, the U.S. should endorse the comprehensive financial approach outlined by the IMF and World Bank, and (b) Deputies recommend to Principals endorsement of a notional $600 million budget for the package over three years. (The IMF/Bank approach and the $600 million package are exclusive of humanitarian assistance.)

U.S. Objective

The U.S. assistance objective is to move quickly to reinforce a peace settlement by strengthening key Federation institutions, and to create a stable, prosperous, multi-ethnic democracy in which human rights are respected and displaced people are allowed to return.

What Is Meant By A Comprehensive Approach?

In early October, G-7 Finance Ministers tasked the Fund and Bank with developing a comprehensive medium-term financing scenario for Bosnia. The scenario pulls together the pieces of Bosnia's external financing requirements, including debt reduction, reconstruction needs, political and economic transformation, reserve build-up, and arrears clearance. The scenario is based on a highly preliminary evaluation:

- After deep debt reduction of $1-1/2 billion, Bosnia faces residual needs of $4-1/2 billion over the three years after peace.
- IMF, World Bank, EBRD and others may provide $1-1/2 billion.
- The remaining $3 billion should be covered by bilateral donors, largely on concessional terms.

USAID is developing a series of projects that will accomplish U.S. assistance objectives, but the precise mix of program elements will depend on several factors currently unknown, such as requirements arising from the peace settlement, contributions from other donors, possible Congressional earmarks, etc.

Why a $600 Million U.S. Contribution?

We are assuming the U.S. might provide on the order of 20 percent of the $3 billion, or $600 million.

- Traditionally, the U.S. provides on the order of 25 percent.
- In Bosnia a lower share is warranted. We will assume the major share of IFOR, we want Europe as the main donor, and a wider array of possible donors exists.

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PER E.O. 13526
2/6/2020 (9,12)
2013-0422-M

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SEEEA 2454, Ext. 67597
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EUR/SCE:DNeher
EB:JDehmlow
PRM:BMcKinley
AID:TMorse, DWright
Treasury:MSobel

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002f. paper	re: Sustaining a Peace Agreement in Bosnia, Military Stabilization Measures (16 pages)	10/31/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4009

FOLDER TITLE:
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002g. paper	re: Elements of Bosnian Arms Control (3 pages)	11/02/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
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([PC and Bosnia...])
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002h. list	re: Terms of Reference for Military Stabilization Assessment Team (2 pages)	11/04/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
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P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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PROPOSED TASK ORDER FOR: THE INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSIS

SUBJECT: Sustaining Bosnia Peace Agreement

BACKGROUND: Assuming a peace agreement will be achieved in the very near future, a "Deep Look/Full Assessment" of Croat/Muslim Federation force structure is required to determine what is required so they can achieve the mission of defending the Federation. The Context of the assessment must be in terms of Military Stabilization in the region. The Assessment must recognize that arms control efforts are a first priority, but that if arms control methods fail, the potential requirement for some level of equipping and training the Federation forces remains. The assessment will focus on this potential requirement to improve the Federation forces. The assessment must address what is needed and methods to achieve the needed improvements in the Federation forces.

TASKING: The assessment will define the needs of the Federation forces to achieve a level of capability sufficient to defend the Federation in the context of military stability in the region. "Needs" includes the full range of force structure and readiness considerations including, but not limited to, forces, basing, equipment, logistics, training, and doctrine at all echelons. The assessment must also recommend a near term ("quick fix = minimal requirements") and a long term strategy to achieve the required capabilities in the Federation forces. These Strategies will recognize international participation as a modality for support. The assessment will establish a framework for continued assessment of all aspects of military stabilization in the region. The assessment team will be accompanied by representatives of Ambassador Holbrooke's delegation and/or country team for all initial meeting or contacts.

The Contractor will:

(1) Provide a team of 6 to 8 analysts with appropriate background and expertise to conduct the assessment.

(2) Develop a detailed analysis plan and have it approved by the Joint Staff/J5 within one week of initiation of this Task Order.

(3) The Team will travel as required to the region and to other areas including but not limited to the USEUCOM AOR, as necessary to collect information and data and conduct the assessment. The contractor will conduct the assessment and provide the results in the form of a briefing within one month of initiating this Task Order. The contractor will provide progress reports weekly and will prepare and provide a written report within 60 days of initiation of this Task Order.

(4) Specific areas to be addressed include, but are not limited to:

-Consideration of all echelons of Federation forces.

-Appropriate Missions (i.e. Defense of Federation Territory) and Functions for Federation forces.

-Based on Missions and Functions, determination of size and composition of Federation forces (active, reserve, draftee, volunteers, etc.).

-Force sustainment.

-Appropriate levels of equipment and training required.

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DELIVERABLES

(1) A briefing presenting the methods; findings, conclusions; and recommendations will be delivered within 30 days of Task Order Initiation to Joint Staff/J-5.

(2) A written report to be delivered within 60 days of Task Order initiation Joint Staff/J-5.

(3) Weekly Progress reports to Joint Staff/J-5.

POINTS OF CONTACT:

BG John R. Walsh, US Army, Deputy Director for Political and Military Affairs, J5, the Joint Staff, 695-6585

ESTIMATED COST: $250 thousand will be provided in FY 1996.

DRAFT

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RH

ANDREA

TIA

DAVID

D

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9521279
RECEIVED: 02 NOV 95 14

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 03 NOV 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
CROATIA
AGENDA
SERBIA
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 7 NOV PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 06 NOV 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FEELEY LOGREF: 9521311

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0157 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		FEELEY
		JOSHI
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95110219	FOR DECISION
001		X	95110317	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
001	SENS	Z	95110317	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	95110318	DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	951103	FUERTH, L	
002	951103	BRILL, K	
002	951103	NYE, J	
002	951103	MCALEER, R	
002	951103	INDERFURTH, R	
002	951103	ADAMS, G	
002	951103	PANETTA, L	
002	951103	YANNUZZI, R	
002	951103	WILLIAMS, A	
002	951103	WILSON, F	

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National Security Council
The White House

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11:15am

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1/3	DJ/DJ	Tab I
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger	2	cy	
Lake		Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	(WW) 11/3	D
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: Nom + agenda Bosnia PC
11/7

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

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COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			
		PRINT LAST NAME:	
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AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			
		PRINT LAST NAME:	
		COPY: VIA FAX	
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	11/6/95	11:25	S. Graves
		PRINT LAST NAME:	GRAVES
		COPY: 1	

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MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	11/04/95	1059 am	J Palmieri
	PRINT LAST NAME: Palmieri		
	COPY: 1		
MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____
	PRINT LAST NAME: _____		
	COPY: VIA FAX		
MR. AARON WILLIAMS AGENCY FOR INTL DEVELOPMENT ROOM 5945, NEW STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20523	_____	_____	_____
	PRINT LAST NAME: _____		
	COPY: VIA FAX		
COL. F. C. WILSON JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001	_____	_____	_____
	PRINT LAST NAME: _____		
	COPY: VIA FAX		

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX +1
MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY ROOM 3408, MAIN TREASURY BLDG 1500 PENNSYLVANIA AVE, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20220	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	11/4	1055	AMcNeill PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX +1
MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY ROOM 3408, MAIN TREASURY BLDG 1500 PENNSYLVANIA AVE, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20220	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX +1
MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY ROOM 3408, MAIN TREASURY BLDG 1500 PENNSYLVANIA AVE, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20220	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	11/6/95	_____	J. Graves PRINT LAST NAME: GRAVES COPY: 1

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-4 NOV 95 04 49
NMCC/JCS

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

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DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 2344 CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOTAL: 3
(PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (202) 456-9425 WH SITROOM
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTICE/AGENDA FOR 7 NOV PC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21279

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
S	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
T	TREASURY	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
	USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B	AID	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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Initials: RDS Date: 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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TIME OF RECEIPT

K-1

11-3-95 1510

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

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MESSAGE NO.: 2344 CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTICE/AGENDA FOR 7 NOV PC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21279

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
S	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
T	TREASURY	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
	USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B	AID	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
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DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 2344 CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTICE/AGENDA FOR 7 NOV PC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21279

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
C	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
K	TREASURY	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
	USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B	AID	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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2010-0533-M

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TIME OF RECEIPT

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PRIORITY
ROUTINE

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTICE/AGENDA FOR 7 NOV PC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21279

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
R	STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
K	TREASURY	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
	USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B	AID	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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95 NOV -3 01:11:21

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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NOV 03 '95 23:37

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
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NSC LOG # 21279

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
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K	TREASURY	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
N	DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
	USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B	AID	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JCS	SECRETARY		

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- ☐ IMMEDIATE
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- ☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC LOG # 21279

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting 7 NOV PC MTG ON BOSNIA PAGES: 3

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21279

November 3, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. AARON S. WILLIAMS
Executive Secretary
Agency for International Development

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(C)~~

There will be a Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia on November 7, 1995, from 2:30 to 3:30 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. Attendance is principals plus one. The agenda is attached at Tab A. ~~(C)~~

for Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5 (a,d)
Declassify on: 11/7/2005

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: November 7, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 - 3:30 p.m.

AGENDA

I. Negotiations Update .....State

II. Implementation Funding .....OMB/Treasury/AID/State*

III. Military Stabilization Program: Equip and Train....OSD/JCS*

IV. Congressional Strategy .....NSC

*Papers should be circulated by OOB November 6.

Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: November 2, 2005

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
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2013-0672-M

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21279

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 3, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

FROM: JOHN FEELEY JF

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia November 7, 1995.

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Principals meeting on Bosnia to be held November 7, 1995. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

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Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: November 2, 2005

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/9/2019
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (3 pages)~~	~~11/16/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
002a. memo	Alexander Vershbow and John F. Feeley to Anthony Lake re: November 15 PC on Bosnia (4 pages)	11/15/1995	P1/b(1)
002b. agenda	NSC Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)	11/15/1995	P1/b(1)
002c. paper	re: Bosnia Issues for Discussion at November 15 PC Meeting (3 pages)	11/1995	P1/b(1)
002d. paper	re: Timing of Lifting of the Arms Embargo (1 page)	11/01/1995	P1/b(1)
003a. memo	[Duplicate of 002a] (4 pages)	11/15/1995	P1/b(1)
003b. agenda	[Duplicate of 002b] (1 page)	11/15/1995	P1/b(1)
003c. paper	[Duplicate of 002c] (3 pages)	11/1995	P1/b(1)
003d. paper	[Duplicate of 002d] (1 page)	11/01/1995	P1/b(1)
004. agenda	[Duplicate of 002b] (1 page)	11/15/1995	P1/b(1)

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2010-0533-M
rs657

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
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RECORD ID: 9521336
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TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 18 NOV 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
CROATIA
SOC
SERBIA
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 15 NOV PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: HARMON SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 20 NOV 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FEELEY LOGREF: 9521322 9521328

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0158 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		FEELEY
		JOSHI
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW
		WH CHIEF OF STAFF

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By RDS NARA, Date 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
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001		X	95111813	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
002		X	95111813	HARMON SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	951118	FUERTH, L	
002	951118	BRILL, K	
002	951118	MCALEER, R	
002	951118	INDERFURTH, R	
002	951118	ADAMS, G	
002	951118	YANNUZZI, R	
002	951118	WILSON, F	
002	951118	PANETTA, L	

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Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg	Copy		
Berger	Copy		
Lake	2	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	11/18	N
Records Mgt.			

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	11-20-95	PM 4:15	Anthony Taylor PRINT LAST NAME: A TAYLOR COPY: 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
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MESSAGE NO.: 2461 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 5 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: S.O.C. OF PC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21336

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE B	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD N	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B USUN (STATE)	OFFICE OF AMB		
A CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D WS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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Initials: RDS Date: 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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PRIORITY
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MESSAGE NO.: 2461 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 5 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: S.O.C. OF PC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21336

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
	STATE B	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
	DOD N	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B	USUN (STATE)	OFFICE OF AMB		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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NSC 14:27

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PRIORITY
ROUTINE

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DTG: _____

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FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: S.O.C. OF PC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21336

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
	STATE B	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
	DOD N	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B	USUN (STATE)	OFFICE OF AMB		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
D	JS	SECRETARY		

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

(SA) 11. 18. '95 14:21 NO. 1460120669 PAGE 1

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TIME OF RECEIPT

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'95 NOV 18 P2:22

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 2461 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 5 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC. OF PC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21336

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
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	DOD N	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
B	USUN (STATE)	OFFICE OF AMB		
A	CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
P	JS	SECRETARY		

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DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting SOC OF PC ON BOSNIA PAGES: 4

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21336

November 18, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the
United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for
National Security &
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, November 16, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~
Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5 (g)
Declassify on: November 13, 2005

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS, NARA, Date 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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21336

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee
DATE: November 16, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 5:45 p.m. - 7:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Anthony Lake

OVP
Leon Fuerth
Rick Saunders

State
Strobe Talbott
Robert Gallucci (video)
John Kornblum (video)

DOD
Secretary Perry
Walter Slocombe

USUN
Amb. Madeleine Albright
David Scheffer

OMB
Alice Rivlin
David Morrison

CIA
John Deutch
Dennis Blair

JCS
General Shalikashvili
Michael Byron
Wes Clark (video)

White House
Sandy Berger
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
Sandy Vershbow
John Feeley

Summary of Conclusions

Eastern Slavonia

1. Principals noted that Croatian officials in Dayton, in discussions on implementation of the Eastern Slavonia agreement, had urged the United States to help draft the UNSCR authorizing a new peacekeeping force, assume the civilian leadership role in the transitional administration, and help develop a "Friends of Eastern Slavonia" initiative similar to the "Friends of the Federation." Principals agreed that work should be accelerated to determine the requirements for an effective military

~~SECRET~~
Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5 (a,b,d)
Declassify on: 11/16/15 (44)

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RS 9/30/14 (1.79)
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implementation force, given the agreement's provisions on demilitarization, and to draft a UNSCR that describes the mandate for the force and outlines the guidelines for transition. **(Action: State/USUN/OSD)** (S)

Military Stabilization

2. Principals welcomed the reports from Dayton of progress regarding inclusion of arms control measures in the peace agreement. They recognized the requirement to provide the Federation some degree of equip & train and reaffirmed their decision of early October to have the United States coordinate a modest multilateral program. They agreed, however, that in view of the potential risks to U.S. personnel in IFOR of a high-profile U.S. role in equip & train, our role should be largely behind the scenes, with actual weapons provided by other countries. While the United States would not sign a formal memorandum of understanding with the Bosnian government, Principals agreed that the United States would assure the Bosnian government that the United States would ensure that coalition of willing states would provide weapons sufficient to develop a self-defense capability. (S)

3. Principals agreed that in this low-profile equip & train effort, the United States would use contractors. They agreed that U.S. negotiators would seek the agreement of all parties to an understanding on the need for military stabilization as a way to ensure transparency, but that this agreement would not be a precondition for an equip & train effort. (S)

Sanctions/Phasing of Lift and Equip & Train

4. Principals reaffirmed that economic sanctions would be suspended upon a full peace agreement and lifted upon implementation. Principals agreed that the suspension could take place upon initialing rather than signature of the peace agreement. (S)

5. Principals agreed to the following regarding phasing of lift/equip & train:

- The arms embargo would be juridically terminated at the time the peace agreement entered into force.
- No arms shipments would be permitted for the first 90 days (the period during which IFOR would be deploying and the parties would be carrying out their withdrawals to the agreed lines on the map).

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- After 90 days, shipments of small arms and non-lethal equipment (e.g. communications) would be permitted, but larger equipment would remain excluded for another three months.
- After six months, there would be no further restrictions on arms shipments except for any ceilings agreed upon in the arms control negotiations. (There would be no conditionality: if arms control talks failed, full lift would take effect in any case.) (S)

International Police Task Force

6. Principals endorsed the establishment of an International Police Task Force to support the civilian aspects of implementation. They reaffirmed their October 25 decision that IFOR's mission will not include police functions, but IFOR would be authorized to intervene in the event of gross violations of human rights or attacks on international civilian agencies in proximity to the force's areas of operation. (S)

7. Principals also reaffirmed their October 27 decision that the IFOR commander at the Corps level should have the authority to act, on the basis of his own judgment, against reported "over the horizon" gross violations of human rights and/or attacks on international civilian agencies, in situations of urgent and serious humanitarian needs or attacks, and where NATO forces have the means and opportunity to stop violence to life and persons and where it will not adversely affect the IFOR mission. (S)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21336

November 17, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: JOHN F. FEELEY

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, November 16, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia held November 16, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~
Reason: 1.5(a,b,d)
Declassify On: 11/15/05

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9521328
RECEIVED: 14 NOV 95 17

TO: LAKE

FROM: FEELEY
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 14 NOV 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 15 NOV PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/RMO DUE DATE: 17 NOV 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FEELEY LOGREF: 9521322 9521336

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0158 CODES: BOS CRO

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB CLOSED BY: NSDRS DOC 1 OF 1

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RPS NARA, Date 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95111514	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	96010416	OBE / STATUS OF ORIGINAL UNKNOWN
001		X	96022114	ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/RMO

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National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 21328

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1		
Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg	Copy	~~Natl Sec Advisor~~	
Berger	2	has seen	
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	2/21	N
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: PC mtg package
11/15

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	Alexander Vershbow and John F. Feeley to Anthony Lake re: November 15 PC on Bosnia (4 pages)	11/15/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4009

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0158 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, November 15, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs657

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. agenda	NSC Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)	11/15/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4009

FOLDER TITLE:
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002c. paper	re: Bosnia Issues for Discussion at November 15 PC Meeting (3 pages)	11/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4009

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0158 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, November 15, 1995

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REPUBLIKA BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA
Ministarstvo Vanjskih Poslova
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

13 November 1995

Mr. Anthony Lake
National Security Advisor
The White House
Washington

Dear Mr. Lake:

I am forwarding to you a proposal for a "Memorandum of Understanding" delivered to Secretary of State Christopher on Friday, 10 November 1995, during his meeting with President Izetbegovic and myself at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio.

We firmly believe that the arms embargo issue should be viewed as an integral part of the Dayton peace process. Peace can only be assured by allowing for Bosnia and Herzegovina's self defense. And I hope that we will be able to finalize this Memorandum of Understanding during the next several days in Dayton.

We must reiterate that this is a vital and integral part of the peace process in Dayton as it directly affects the prospects for peace in our country. This Memorandum of Understanding can only further the cause for peace and expedite the return to normalcy for the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina and for the region. We await the Administration's thoughts on this important matter.

Sincerely,

Muhamed Sacirbey
Minister

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MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

Whereas it is the desire of the Government of the United States and the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina that Bosnia and Herzegovina be capable of providing for its own defense without depending on U.S. or other outside forces;

And whereas an embargo imposed by United Nations resolutions 724 and 727 has prevented Bosnia and Herzegovina from achieving a defense force adequate for its security;

And whereas United States assistance in training and equipping the defense forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina is essential for the peace and stability of the Balkan region,

Therefore, the United States and Bosnia and Herzegovina have agreed as follows:

1. The U.S. will move at once to relieve Bosnia and Herzegovina from the continued application of the U.N. arms embargo by arranging for an immediate resolution of the U.N. Security Council that will end the embargo as it applies to Bosnia and Herzegovina or, failing that, by acting, in concert with one or more of its allies, to declare the embargo null and void.

2. The U.S. will assist the defense forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina by providing, on an urgent basis, significant material, training and logistic support sufficient in quality and quantity to enable Bosnia and Herzegovina to achieve a military balance with respect to the forces that threaten it.

3. It is understood that the forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which are now inadequate to allow a credible defense of its sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence, are particularly deficient with respect to armor, artillery, air mobility, communications, logistics and air defense.

4. The U.S. will take immediate steps to facilitate the urgent delivery of defense articles and services immediately upon removal of the embargo.

For the United States:

For Bosnia and Herzegovina

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002d. paper	re: Timing of Lifting of the Arms Embargo (1 page)	11/01/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4009

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0158 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, November 15, 1995

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Annex 11
November 11, 1995
Rev. 1

INTERNATIONAL POLICE TASK FORCE

The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Republica Srpska (the "Parties") have agreed as follows:

Article I

Civilian Law Enforcement

1. As provided in Article IV(5)(e) of the Constitution agreed as Annex 4 to the General Framework Agreement, the Parties shall provide a safe and secure environment for all persons in their respective jurisdictions, by maintaining civilian law enforcement agencies operating in accordance with internationally recognized standards and with respect for internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, and by taking such other measures as appropriate.

2. To assist them in meeting their obligations, the Parties request that the United Nations establish by a decision of the Security Council, as a UNCIVPOL operation, ~~an~~ U.N. International Police Task Force (IPTF) to carry out, throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, the program of assistance the elements of which are described in Article III below.

Article II

Establishment of the IPTF

1. The IPTF shall be autonomous with regard to the execution of its functions under this Agreement. ~~It will coordinate~~ Its activities ~~with~~ will be coordinated through the High Representative~~/Senior Implementation Coordinator (SICOR)~~ described in Annex 10 to the General Framework Agreement.

2. The IPTF will be headed by a Commissioner, who will be appointed by the Secretary General of the United Nations in consultation with the Security Council. It shall consist of persons of high moral standing who have experience in law enforcement. The IPTF Commissioner may request and accept

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personnel, resources, and assistance from states and international and nongovernmental organizations.

3. The IPTF Commissioner shall receive **guidance** ~~direction~~ from the High Representative~~/SICOR~~.

4. The IPTF Commissioner shall periodically report on matters within his responsibility to the High Representative~~/SICOR~~, the U.N. Secretary General, and **shall provide information to the IFOR Commander and**, as he or she deems appropriate, other institutions and agencies.

5. The IPTF shall at all times act in accordance with internationally **recognized** standards and with respect for internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, **and shall respect, consistent with the IPTF's responsibilities, the laws and customs of the host country**.

6. **The Parties shall accord t**~~T~~he IPTF Commissioner, IPTF personnel, and their families ~~shall be accorded~~ the ~~same~~ privileges and immunities **described in Sections 18 and 19 of the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.** ~~as are enjoyed by diplomatic agents and their families under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.~~ In particular, they shall enjoy inviolability, shall not be subject to any form of arrest or detention, and shall have absolute immunity from criminal jurisdiction. **IPTF personnel shall remain subject to penalties and sanctions under applicable laws and regulations of the United Nations and other states.**

7. The IPTF and its premises, archives, and other property shall be accorded the same privileges and immunities, including inviolability, as are **described in Articles II and III of the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.** ~~enjoyed by a diplomatic mission and its premises, archives, and other property under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.~~

8. In order to promote **the** coordination by the **High Rrepresentative** of IPTF activities with those of **other civilian organizations and agencies** ~~the High Representative/SICOR~~ and of the ~~Implementation Force (IFOR) described in Annex 1 to the General Framework Agreement~~, the IPTF Commissioner or his representatives may attend meetings of the Joint Civilian Commission established in Annex 10 to the General Framework Agreement and of the Joint Military Commission established in Annex 1, as well as meetings of their subordinate commissions ~~of those bodies~~. The IPTF Commissioner may request that meetings of appropriate commissions be convened to discuss issues within his area of responsibility.

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Article III

IPTF Assistance Program

1. IPTF assistance includes the following elements, to be provided in a program designed and implemented by the IPTF Commissioner in accordance with the U.N. Security Council decision described in Article I(2):

(a) monitoring, observing, and inspecting law enforcement activities and facilities, including associated judicial organizations, structures, and proceedings;

(b) advising law enforcement personnel and forces;

(c) training law enforcement personnel;

(d) facilitating, within the IPTF's mission of assistance, the Parties' law enforcement activities;

(e) assessing threats to public order and the capability of law enforcement agencies, including their size, composition, and expertise;

(f) advising governmental authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina on the organization of effective civilian law enforcement agencies; and

(g) accompanying the Parties' law enforcement personnel in carrying out their responsibilities, as the IPTF deems appropriate.

2. In addition to the elements of the assistance program set forth in paragraph 1, the IPTF will consider, consistent with its responsibilities and resources, requests from the Parties or law enforcement agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina for assistance described in paragraph 1.

3. The Parties confirm their particular responsibility to ensure the existence of social conditions for free and fair elections, including the protection of international personnel in Bosnia and Herzegovina in connection with the elections provided for in Annex 3 to the General Framework Agreement. They request the IPTF to give priority to assisting the Parties in carrying out this responsibility.

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Article IV

Specific Responsibilities of the Parties

1. The Parties shall cooperate fully with the IPTF and shall so instruct all their law enforcement agencies.

2. Within 30 days after this Agreement enters into force, the Parties shall provide the IPTF Commissioner or his designee with information on their law enforcement agencies, including their size, location, and force structure. Upon request of the IPTF Commissioner, they shall provide additional information, including any training, operational, or employment and service records of law enforcement agencies and personnel.

3. The Parties shall not impede the movement of IPTF personnel or in any way hinder, obstruct, or delay them in the performance of their ~~duties~~ **responsibilities**. They shall allow IPTF personnel complete access to any site, person, activity, proceeding, record, or other item or event in Bosnia and Herzegovina as requested by the IPTF in carrying out its ~~functions~~ **responsibilities** under ~~this Agreement~~ **Article III(1)**, including access to any law enforcement action, facility, or activity such as patrols, investigations, arrests, training, headquarters or support actions, detention facilities, or judicial proceedings. The IPTF shall have the right to monitor, observe, and inspect any site or facility at which it believes that police, law enforcement, detention, or judicial activities are taking place.

4. Upon request by the IPTF, the Parties shall make available for training qualified personnel, who are expected to take up law enforcement duties immediately following such training.

5. The Parties shall facilitate the operations of the IPTF in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including by the provision of appropriate assistance as requested with regard to transportation, subsistence, accommodations, communications, and other facilities at rates equivalent to those provided for the IFOR under applicable agreements.

Article V

Failure to Cooperate

1. Any obstruction of or interference with IPTF activities, failure or refusal to comply with an IPTF request, or other failure to meet the Parties' responsibilities or other obligations in this Annex, shall constitute a failure to cooperate with the IPTF.

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2. The IPTF Commissioner will notify the High Representative~~/SICOR~~ and **inform the IFOR Commander** ~~the Joint Military Commission~~ of failures to cooperate with the IPTF. The IPTF Commissioner may request that the High Representative~~/SICOR~~ take appropriate steps upon receiving such notifications, including calling such failures to the attention of the Parties, convening the Joint Civilian Commission, and consulting with the **United Nations,** relevant states, and international organizations on further responses.

Article VI

Human Rights

1. When IPTF personnel learn of credible ~~allegations of~~ **information concerning** violations of internationally recognized human rights or fundamental freedoms or of the role of law enforcement officials or forces in such violations, they shall provide such information to the Human Rights Commission established in Annex 6 to the General Framework Agreement, the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, or to other appropriate organizations.

2. The Parties shall cooperate with investigations of law enforcement forces and officials by the organizations described in paragraph 1.

Article VII

Application

This Agreement applies throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina to law enforcement agencies and personnel of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Entities, and any agency, subdivision, or instrumentality thereof. Law enforcement agencies are those with a mandate including law enforcement, criminal investigations, public and state security, or detention or judicial activities. ~~The IPTF will regard components of Forces as defined in Annex 1 to the General Framework Agreement to be law enforcement agencies only with the concurrence of the IFOR Commander.~~

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Article VIII

Entry Into Force

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature.

The Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina

For the Federation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina

For the Republica Srpska

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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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REPUBLIKA BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA
Ministarstvo Vanjskih Poslova
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

13 November 1995

Mr. Anthony Lake
National Security Advisor
The White House
Washington

Dear Mr. Lake:

I am forwarding to you a proposal for a "Memorandum of Understanding" delivered to Secretary of State Christopher on Friday, 10 November 1995, during his meeting with President Izetbegovic and myself at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio.

We firmly believe that the arms embargo issue should be viewed as an integral part of the Dayton peace process. Peace can only be assured by allowing for Bosnia and Herzegovina's self defense. And I hope that we will be able to finalize this Memorandum of Understanding during the next several days in Dayton.

We must reiterate that this is a vital and integral part of the peace process in Dayton as it directly affects the prospects for peace in our country. This Memorandum of Understanding can only further the cause for peace and expedite the return to normalcy for the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina and for the region. We await the Administration's thoughts on this important matter.

Sincerely,

Muhamed Sacirbey
Minister

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MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

Whereas it is the desire of the Government of the United States and the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina that Bosnia and Herzegovina be capable of providing for its own defense without depending on U.S. or other outside forces;

And whereas an embargo imposed by United Nations resolutions 724 and 727 has prevented Bosnia and Herzegovina from achieving a defense force adequate for its security;

And whereas United States assistance in training and equipping the defense forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina is essential for the peace and stability of the Balkan region,

Therefore, the United States and Bosnia and Herzegovina have agreed as follows:

1. The U.S. will move at once to relieve Bosnia and Herzegovina from the continued application of the U.N. arms embargo by arranging for an immediate resolution of the U.N. Security Council that will end the embargo as it applies to Bosnia and Herzegovina or, failing that, by acting, in concert with one or more of its allies, to declare the embargo null and void.

2. The U.S. will assist the defense forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina by providing, on an urgent basis, significant material, training and logistic support sufficient in quality and quantity to enable Bosnia and Herzegovina to achieve a military balance with respect to the forces that threaten it.

3. It is understood that the forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which are now inadequate to allow a credible defense of its sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence, are particularly deficient with respect to armor, artillery, air mobility, communications, logistics and air defense.

4. The U.S. will take immediate steps to facilitate the urgent delivery of defense articles and services immediately upon removal of the embargo.

For the United States:

For Bosnia and Herzegovina

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PC0158 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, November 15, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs657

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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Annex 11
November 11, 1995
Rev. 1

INTERNATIONAL POLICE TASK FORCE

The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Republica Srpska (the "Parties") have agreed as follows:

Article I

Civilian Law Enforcement

1. As provided in Article IV(5)(e) of the Constitution agreed as Annex 4 to the General Framework Agreement, the Parties shall provide a safe and secure environment for all persons in their respective jurisdictions, by maintaining civilian law enforcement agencies operating in accordance with internationally recognized standards and with respect for internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, and by taking such other measures as appropriate.

2. To assist them in meeting their obligations, the Parties request that the United Nations establish by a decision of the Security Council, as a UNCIVPOL operation, ~~an~~ U.N. International Police Task Force (IPTF) to carry out, throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, the program of assistance the elements of which are described in Article III below.

Article II

Establishment of the IPTF

1. The IPTF shall be autonomous with regard to the execution of its functions under this Agreement. ~~It will coordinate~~ Its activities ~~with~~ will be coordinated through the High Representative~~/Senior Implementation Coordinator (SICOR)~~ described in Annex 10 to the General Framework Agreement.

2. The IPTF will be headed by a Commissioner, who will be appointed by the Secretary General of the United Nations in consultation with the Security Council. It shall consist of persons of high moral standing who have experience in law enforcement. The IPTF Commissioner may request and accept

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personnel, resources, and assistance from states and international and nongovernmental organizations.

3. The IPTF Commissioner shall receive guidance ~~direction~~ from the High Representative~~/SICOR~~.

4. The IPTF Commissioner shall periodically report on matters within his responsibility to the High Representative~~/SICOR~~, the U.N. Secretary General, and shall provide information to the IFOR Commander and, as he or she deems appropriate, other institutions and agencies.

5. The IPTF shall at all times act in accordance with internationally recognized standards and with respect for internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, and shall respect, consistent with the IPTF's responsibilities, the laws and customs of the host country.

6. The Parties shall accord t~~T~~he IPTF Commissioner, IPTF personnel, and their families ~~shall be accorded~~ the ~~same~~ privileges and immunities described in Sections 18 and 19 of the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. ~~as are enjoyed by diplomatic agents and their families under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.~~ In particular, they shall enjoy inviolability, shall not be subject to any form of arrest or detention, and shall have absolute immunity from criminal jurisdiction. IPTF personnel shall remain subject to penalties and sanctions under applicable laws and regulations of the United Nations and other states.

7. The IPTF and its premises, archives, and other property shall be accorded the same privileges and immunities, including inviolability, as are described in Articles II and III of the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. ~~enjoyed by a diplomatic mission and its premises, archives, and other property under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.~~

8. In order to promote the coordination by the High Rrepresentative of IPTF activities with those of other civilian organizations and agencies ~~the High Representative/SICOR~~ and of the ~~Implementation Force (IFOR) described in Annex 1 to the General Framework Agreement~~, the IPTF Commissioner or his representatives may attend meetings of the Joint Civilian Commission established in Annex 10 to the General Framework Agreement and of the Joint Military Commission established in Annex 1, as well as meetings of their subordinate commissions ~~of those bodies~~. The IPTF Commissioner may request that meetings of appropriate commissions be convened to discuss issues within his area of responsibility.

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Article III

IPTF Assistance Program

1. IPTF assistance includes the following elements, to be provided in a program designed and implemented by the IPTF Commissioner in accordance with the U.N. Security Council decision described in Article I(2):

(a) monitoring, observing, and inspecting law enforcement activities and facilities, including associated judicial organizations, structures, and proceedings;

(b) advising law enforcement personnel and forces;

(c) training law enforcement personnel;

(d) facilitating, within the IPTF's mission of assistance, the Parties' law enforcement activities;

(e) assessing threats to public order and the capability of law enforcement agencies, including their size, composition, and expertise;

(f) advising governmental authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina on the organization of effective civilian law enforcement agencies; and

(g) accompanying the Parties' law enforcement personnel in carrying out their responsibilities, as the IPTF deems appropriate.

2. In addition to the elements of the assistance program set forth in paragraph 1, the IPTF will consider, consistent with its responsibilities and resources, requests from the Parties or law enforcement agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina for assistance described in paragraph 1.

3. The Parties confirm their particular responsibility to ensure the existence of social conditions for free and fair elections, including the protection of international personnel in Bosnia and Herzegovina in connection with the elections provided for in Annex 3 to the General Framework Agreement. They request the IPTF to give priority to assisting the Parties in carrying out this responsibility.

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Article IV

Specific Responsibilities of the Parties

1. The Parties shall cooperate fully with the IPTF and shall so instruct all their law enforcement agencies.

2. Within 30 days after this Agreement enters into force, the Parties shall provide the IPTF Commissioner or his designee with information on their law enforcement agencies, including their size, location, and force structure. Upon request of the IPTF Commissioner, they shall provide additional information, including any training, operational, or employment and service records of law enforcement agencies and personnel.

3. The Parties shall not impede the movement of IPTF personnel or in any way hinder, obstruct, or delay them in the performance of their ~~duties~~ **responsibilities**. They shall allow IPTF personnel complete access to any site, person, activity, proceeding, record, or other item or event in Bosnia and Herzegovina as requested by the IPTF in carrying out its ~~functions~~ **responsibilities** under ~~this Agreement~~ **Article III(1)**, including access to any law enforcement action, facility, or activity such as patrols, investigations, arrests, training, headquarters or support actions, detention facilities, or judicial proceedings. The IPTF shall have the right to monitor, observe, and inspect any site or facility at which it believes that police, law enforcement, detention, or judicial activities are taking place.

4. Upon request by the IPTF, the Parties shall make available for training qualified personnel, who are expected to take up law enforcement duties immediately following such training.

5. The Parties shall facilitate the operations of the IPTF in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including by the provision of appropriate assistance as requested with regard to transportation, subsistence, accommodations, communications, and other facilities at rates equivalent to those provided for the IFOR under applicable agreements.

Article V

Failure to Cooperate

1. Any obstruction of or interference with IPTF activities, failure or refusal to comply with an IPTF request, or other failure to meet the Parties' responsibilities or other obligations in this Annex, shall constitute a failure to cooperate with the IPTF.

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2. The IPTF Commissioner will notify the High Representative~~/SICOR~~ and **inform the IFOR Commander** ~~the Joint Military Commission~~ of failures to cooperate with the IPTF. The IPTF Commissioner may request that the High Representative~~/SICOR~~ take appropriate steps upon receiving such notifications, including calling such failures to the attention of the Parties, convening the Joint Civilian Commission, and consulting with the **United Nations,** relevant states, and international organizations on further responses.

Article VI

Human Rights

1. When IPTF personnel learn of credible ~~allegations of~~ **information concerning** violations of internationally recognized human rights or fundamental freedoms or of the role of law enforcement officials or forces in such violations, they shall provide such information to the Human Rights Commission established in Annex 6 to the General Framework Agreement, the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, or to other appropriate organizations.

2. The Parties shall cooperate with investigations of law enforcement forces and officials by the organizations described in paragraph 1.

Article VII

Application

This Agreement applies throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina to law enforcement agencies and personnel of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Entities, and any agency, subdivision, or instrumentality thereof. Law enforcement agencies are those with a mandate including law enforcement, criminal investigations, public and state security, or detention or judicial activities. ~~The IPTF will regard components of Forces as defined in Annex 1 to the General Framework Agreement to be law enforcement agencies only with the concurrence of the IFOR Commander.~~

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Article VIII

Entry Into Force

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature.

The Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina

For the Federation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina

For the Republica Srpska

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9521322
RECEIVED: 14 NOV 95 11

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 14 NOV 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
SERBIA
AGENDA
CROATIA
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 15 NOV PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: HARMON SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 17 NOV 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FEELEY LOGREF: 9521328 9521336

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0158 CODES: BOS CRO

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BERGER
		FEELEY
		JOSHI
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/9/2019
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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95111417	FOR DECISION
001		X	95111419	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
001	SENS	Z	95111419	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	95111420	HARMON SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	951114	FUERTH, L	
002	951114	BRILL, K	
002	951114	MCALEER, R	
002	951114	INDERFURTH, R	
002	951114	ADAMS, G	
002	951114	PANETTA, L	
002	951114	YANNUZZI, R	
002	951114	WILSON, F	

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National Security Council
The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1/4		Tab I pls
Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg	Copy		
Berger	2	ok	
Lake	3	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5	11/14	D
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

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Nov 15

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	PRINT LAST NAME:		Burnett Jensen
	COPY: 1		
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	11-15-95	5:35 AM	[signature]
	PRINT LAST NAME:		A Taylor
	COPY: VIA FAX +1		
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: VIA FAX		
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: VIA FAX		
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	9/15/95	908	[signature]
	PRINT LAST NAME:		RODRIGUEZ
	COPY: 1		
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	15/Nov 95	9:10	[signature]
	PRINT LAST NAME:		LEWINSKY
	COPY: 1		

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Initials: RDS Date: 10/9/2019
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COL. F. C. WILSON JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	11/15	7:00A	S. McElhaney PRINT LAST NAME: McElhaney COPY: VIA FAX +1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1

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AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	11/15/95		J. Graves PRINT LAST NAME: GRAVES COPY: 1
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: 1

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX +1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	11/15/95	11:15am	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: Panetta COPY: 1

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15 NOV 95 05:19
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NMCC/JCS

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: A. Lake

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 2425 CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOTAL: 3
(PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (AL) (202) 456-9425 WH SITROOM
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTICE/AGENDA FOR 15 NOV PC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21322

TO (AGENCY)		DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE	B	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	N	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	B	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
CIA	A	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	D	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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TIME OF RECEIPT

NOV 14 11 23 55

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

NOV 14 10 00 PM '95

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
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RELEASER: N. [illegible]

DTG: _____

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTICE/AGENDA FOR 15 NOV PC MTG ON BOSNIA

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TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE B	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD N	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE B	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
CIA A	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS D	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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SITUATION ROOM

Nov 14 10 30 PM '95

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
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RELEASER: A. Lake

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TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE B	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD N	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE B	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
CIA A	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS D	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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WHITE HOUSE
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95 NOV 14 PM 9:55

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF RECEIPT

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: A. Lake

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 2425 CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOTAL: 3
(PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (AL) (202) 456-9425 WH SITROOM
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTICE/AGENDA FOR 15 NOV PC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21322

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE B	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD N	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE B	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
CIA A	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS D	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION WHITE HOUSE

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: N. Burns

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 2425 CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTICE/AGENDA FOR 15 NOV PC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21322

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USUN/STATE B	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
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JCS D	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21322

November 14, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(C)~~

There will be a Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia on November 15, 1995 from 5:45 to 7:00 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. The agenda is attached at Tab A. ~~(C)~~

Joyce A. Stern
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5 (a,d)
Declassify on: 11/2/2005

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/5/2019
2010-0533-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. agenda	[Duplicate of 002b] (1 page)	11/15/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4009

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0158 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, November 15, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs657

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21322

November 14, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: JOHN FEELEY

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia
November 15, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Principals meeting on Bosnia to be held November 15, 1995. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: November 2, 2005

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By KBS NARA, Date 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title: PC0159 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, November 22, 1995				
Staff Office-Individual: Records Management				
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Row: 43	Section: 6	Shelf: 7	Position: 2	Stack: V

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (3 pages)~~	~~11/22/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
002a. memo	Alexander Vershbow and John F. Feeley to Anthony Lake re: November 22 PC on Bosnia (6 pages)	11/21/1995	P1/b(1)
~~002b. list~~	~~re: Dayton Follow-up : Checklist for November 22 PC (2 pages)~~	~~11/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
~~002c. letter~~	~~Warren Christopher to Alija Izetbegovic (2 pages)~~	~~11/20/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003a. memo~~	~~Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Your Participation in Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, November 22, 1995 (2 pages)~~	~~11/22/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
~~003b. list~~	~~[Duplicate of 002b] (2 pages)~~	~~11/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
~~004. list~~	~~[Duplicate of 002b] (2 pages)~~	~~11/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4009

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0159 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, November 22, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs658

RESTRICTION CODES

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P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9620025
RECEIVED: 09 JAN 96 09

TO: LAKE

FROM: VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 09 JAN 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
CROATIA
SOC
SERBIA
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 22 NOV PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: LAKE APPROVED RECOM 2 ONLY DUE DATE: 12 JAN 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9521341 9521354

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0159 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		FEELEY
		JOSHI
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEC CLOSED BY: NSKDB DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	96011010	FOR DECISION
001		X	96011015	LAKE APPROVED RECOM 2 ONLY

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recd 1/10 8:15am

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 20025

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1		
Dohse	4		
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger	2		
Lake	3	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5	1/10	N
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: no further action required. File for the record

Exec Sec Office has diskette

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National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 20025

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1		
Dohse	4		
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger	2		
Lake	3	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5	1/10	N
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: no further action required. File for the record

Exec Sec Office has diskette

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

20025

January 9, 1996

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the ~~Principals~~ Committee Meeting on Bosnia, November 22, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia with the President that was held on November 22, 1995 following the initialing of the Dayton peace agreement. I apologize for the delay.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to the agencies

Approve ____ Disapprove ____

Alternatively, that you approve the Summary of Conclusions for the files without circulation to the other agencies.

Approve ✓ Disapprove ____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: 11/22/15
Reason: 1.5 (a,b,d)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/19/2019
2004-0533-M

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~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

20025

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee
DATE: November 22, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 10:45 a.m. - 12:45 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

THE PRESIDENT
THE VICE PRESIDENT

CHAIR
Anthony Lake

OVP
Leon Fuerth

State
Warren Christopher
Strobe Talbott
Richard Holbrooke
John Kornblum
Christopher Hill

DOD
Secretary Perry
Walter Slocombe
James Pardew

USUN
Amb. Madeleine Albright
David Scheffer

OMB
Alice Rivlin

CIA
John Deutch
Dennis Blair

JCS
General Shalikashvili
LTG Wesley Clark

White House
Sandy Berger
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
Alexander Vershbow
BG Don Kerrick

Summary of Conclusions

1. Principals, joined by the President and Vice President for most of the meeting, were briefed by the U.S. delegation on the Dayton peace agreement signed the previous day and discussed follow-up. (U)

2. UNSC Resolutions: Principals agreed that the U.S. should insist on enactment of the UN Security Council resolution lifting the arms embargo before enactment of the resolution on suspension

~~SECRET~~
Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5 (a,b,d)
Declassify on: 11/22/15 (X4)

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0533-M
RS 9/30/14 (1.80)

of economic sanctions in order to ensure that the arms embargo lift was not blocked by Russia **(Action USUN/State)**. (C)

3. Bosnian Serb Compliance: Principals agreed that we need to press Serbian President Milosevic not only to secure Bosnian Serb initialing of the Dayton documents (pursuant to Milosevic's commitment to Secretary Christopher at Dayton), but to bring about early concrete manifestations of the Bosnian Serbs' compliance with the terms of the Dayton agreement; in this regard, we should warn Milosevic of our determination to reimpose economic sanctions if we do not see prompt indications that the Bosnian Serbs intend to implement the agreement **(Action: State)**. The President stressed that we should not seek a Congressional vote of support for U.S. participation in IFOR until we are more convinced of Bosnian Serb strategic consent. (C)

4. Equip and Train: Principals affirmed the U.S. commitment to the Bosnian Government at Dayton to ensure that Federation armed forces received the necessary equipping and training to establish an effective self-defense capability by the time IFOR leaves. They agreed that, to respond to the concerns within the USG and the Congress about the risk to U.S. forces, we will seek to ensure that the equip-and-train program is carried out by third countries, and we will seek to reduce the Federation's arms requirements to the maximum degree possible through a negotiated arms build-down. We should also make clear that U.S. support for an equip-and-train effort is dependent on Bosnia severing its military links to Iran **(Action: State)**. (S)

5. Congressional Strategy: Principals reviewed the gameplan for Congressional consultations in the period between the initialing of the peace agreement and the deployment of IFOR. The President and Vice President underscored in particular the need for DOD and JCS briefers to convey a clear message that IFOR's mission is limited and achievable, and that we will avoid mission creep **(Action: All)**. Principals asked that a detailed IFOR mission statement be prepared as a common basis for Congressional briefings, together with a description of the end-state that we expect to be achieved at the end of IFOR's one-year deployment period **(Action: JCS)**. (C)

6. IFOR Enabling Force: Principals agreed that the U.S. should support a decision at NATO to proceed with the deployment of the IFOR enabling force, with the participation of U.S. forces, prior to the signature of the peace agreement in Paris in order to preserve the option of rapidly deploying the main force immediately after signature **(Action: State/JCS)**. The President stressed the importance of full and thorough consultations with Congress on the enabling force **(Action: NSC)**. (C)

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7. Russian Participation in IFOR: Principals reviewed plans for the November 28 Perry-Grachev meeting and reaffirmed U.S. readiness to agree to a 16+1 NATO-Russia consultative framework in the context of Russian agreement to place their forces under NATO operational or tactical control **(Action: OSD/State)**. (C)

8. Civilian Implementation: Principals agreed that the U.S. could support the appointment of Carl Bildt as High Representative for civilian implementation of the peace agreement if Bildt accepted an American as one of his senior deputies **(Action: State)**. (C).

9. Funding: Principals discussed the implications for Bosnia funding of a possible Presidential veto of the Defense Appropriations bill. They agreed to explore with the Congress the possibility of using a portion of the $7 billion not requested by the Administration as the means of funding U.S. forces in IFOR and the U.S. contribution to international economic reconstruction efforts **(Action: OMB/OSD)**. (C)

10. Sanctions: Principals agreed that it was essential to maintain the ICFY and SAM monitors in at least a stand-by capacity until the Bosnian elections in order to preserve the capability of reimposing sanctions if necessary **(Action: OVP)**. (C)

11. Decision Timeline: Principals asked the Deputies Committee to prepare a detailed timeline for political and military decisions over the coming weeks in order to permit Principals to decide the best date for the Congressional vote and the signing of the peace agreement in Paris **(Action: NSC)**. (C)

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~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

20025

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MS. MARISA LINO
Acting Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, November 22, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/5/2019
2010-0533-M

~~SECRET~~
Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5 (a,b,d)
Declassify on: 11/22/15 (X4)

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~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9521355
RECEIVED: 21 NOV 95 22

TO: LAKE

FROM: FEELEY
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 21 NOV 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
CROATIA
SERBIA
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LAKE BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 22 NOV PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 24 NOV 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FEELEY LOGREF: 9521341 9521354

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0159 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		FEELEY
		NSC CHRON
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEC CLOSED BY: NSMEC DOC 1 OF 1

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/9/2019
2016-0533-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95112215	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	95112215	NOTED BY LAKE

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National Security Council
The White House

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1		
Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg	Copy ✓		
Berger	2		
Lake		Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	jml 1/22	A
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: PC mtg paper

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	Alexander Vershbow and John F. Feeley to Anthony Lake re: November 22 PC on Bosnia (6 pages)	11/21/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4009

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0159 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, November 22, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs658

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
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~~SECRET~~ 21341

NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: November 22, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 10:45 a.m. - 11:45 a.m.

AGENDA

I. Report on Dayton Agreement.....State

II. Dayton Follow-up.....All*

*See attached checklist

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By KDS NARA, Date 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

~~SECRET~~
Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5 (g)
Declassify on: November 21, 2005

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DAYTON FOLLOW-UP: CHECKLIST FOR NOVEMBER 22 PC

I. IFOR Issues

- Enabling force (How many U.S. troops? When? POTUS approval?)
- Reservists? Timing for call-up? POTUS approval?
- NATO IFOR approval timetable/Timetable for U.S. approval
  - Designation of U.S. forces
  - Finalizing military planning
  - Military Committee
  - POTUS update/instruction to Hunter
  - NAC Approval
  - Joulwan briefing of POTUS on final plan
  - POTUS approval/request to Congress
  - ACTORD
  - Signing
  - Deployment
- Policy issues requiring further guidance or follow-up in NATO:
  - Clear mission statement/measures of success
  - Duration of operation
  - IFOR presence in Serb territory
  - IFOR presence on international border
  - Other issues in military annex affecting IFOR mission?
  - Conditions on ground before deployment?
  - NATO funding
- Russian participation: Next steps

II. Congress

- Form of "request" for Congressional support?
- Timing of request
- Appropriations (for IFOR and civilian aspects)?
- Time limit on Congressional debate/deadline?
- POTUS address to Congress?
- How many U.S. troops: in Bosnia? related to Bosnia?
- Congressional Qs & As and written submissions (tasking)

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III. International Conferences

- Date of Paris peace conference.
- Relationship to NAC timetable/Congressional timetable?
- Other subjects for Paris conference?
- London implementation conference: Timing? Level of representation? Scope?
- Possible Moscow conference: Timing? Agenda?

IV. UN

- Status of resolutions on sanctions suspension and lifting of arms embargo
- Resolution authorizing military and civilian implementation:
  - Form (one or two resolutions? endorsement vs. authorization?)
  - Timing (vis-à-vis NATO, Congress and conference timetables)?

V. Peace Agreement Issues

- Civilian implementation issues:
  - Civilian implementation structure (to be established in London): G-7 plus Russia/OIC as steering group?.
  - Choice of High Representative (Bildt?). U.S. and Russian deputies?
  - Police Task Force: Concept, U.S. role, relationship to UN, next steps?
  - Economic Reconstruction Program: next steps? pledging conference in December?
  - Human rights/elections: Status of OSCE planning?
  - Arms Control/CBMs: Bonn conference, follow-up negotiations, implementation of cantonment areas?
- Equip/train: next steps, U.S. role, status of possible side-letter for Izetbegovic?
- Brcko arbitration - follow-up?
- Next steps vis-à-vis Karadzic/Mladic?
- Steps to help influence Bosnian Serb follow-through?
- Completion of Bosnia Implementation Plan (ExComm)

VI. President's Trip to Europe

- Visit troops
- Other scheduling issues?

VII. Eastern Slavonia

- Mandate for new peacekeeping force (augmented UNCRO, with Russians and Belgians?)
- Civilian implementation: Response to Croatian request for U.S. head of transitional administration?

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11/20/95 (1720)

PROPOSED COUNTER-DRAFT
ON EQUIP AND TRAIN

His Excellency
Alija Izetbegovic
President of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Dear Mr. President:

The United States has strongly supported the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We are pleased that an agreement is at hand that will preserve Bosnia and Herzegovina as a single state and create conditions for its peaceful democratic development and economic recovery.

As part of our mutual efforts to implement an agreed peace settlement, the United States attaches great importance to the achievement of military stability among the parties to the settlement. We hope that negotiated arms reductions will contribute significantly toward this end. It is our strong preference that military stabilization, to the extent possible, be achieved by limitations and reductions, not by the introduction of large quanitites of new arms into the region. We expect that Bosnian and Federation representatives will negotiate in good faith, along with the other parties, toward the arms reduction and limitation goals set forth in the peace agreement.

We believe that it will also be important, in pursuing military stabilization, that Federation armed forces be capable of providing for their own defense. We agree that the arms embargo imposed by UN Security Council resolution 713 has unfairly impeded your government's ability to obtain an adequate self-defense capability.

Accordingly, the United States, upon the initialing of a peace agreement at Dayton, intends to seek the passage of a UN Security Council resolution that will terminate the arms embargo upon signature and entry into force of the peace agreement. That resolution, in order to minimize risks to the safety of military personnel participating in the NATO-led Implementation Force, as agreed in the Military Annex to the peace agreement, will impose certain restrictions on the importation of weapons systems during the initial six months after signature of the peace agreement; but it will guarantee that there are no restrictions after that point apart from any limitations that may have been voluntarily accepted by your government as part of a regional arms control regime. We are confident of passage of this resolution by the Security Council.

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Furthermore, I can assure you that the United States will coordinate with other interested states to ensure that Federation armed forces receive the necessary equipment and training needed to establish an effective self-defense capability against the possibility of renewed conflict with the Bosnian Serbs. U.S. support of such an effort would, as you know, be contingent on Bosnia-Herzegovina terminating any military support and cooperative arrangements with Iran and other radical states, and complying fully with the peace settlement, including the terms related to military stabilization, arms control negotiation, and expulsion of Mujahideen and other foreign forces. The U.S. role in the actual provision of military equipment can only be determined based on the assessment of the deficiencies of Federation armed forces that is now being carried out, and following consultations with the U.S. Congress and with other potential contributing states.

Warren Christopher

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9521354
RECEIVED: 21 NOV 95 19

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 22 NOV 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
CROATIA
PC
SERBIA
PEACEKEEPING

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PRES BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 22 NOV PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT DUE DATE: 24 NOV 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9521341 9521355

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0159 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
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		BERGER
		JOSHI
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		VERSHBOW

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2010-0533-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95112122	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
002	PRESIDENT	Z	95112207	FOR INFORMATION
002		X	95112212	NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	951122		VICE PRESIDENT
002	951122		WH CHIEF OF STAFF

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10:45 AM - Wed

11

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National Security Council
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Soderberg	Copy		
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Lake			
Situation Room		Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
West Wing Desk	3	1/24	N
Records Mgt.			

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cc:

COMMENTS:

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10/1/2015

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 22, 1995

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
11.22.95

95 NOV 22 A7:43

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Your Participation in Principals' Committee Meeting on Bosnia, November 22, 1995, 10:45-11:45 a.m.

Principals are meeting with the U.S. negotiating team to receive a report on the peace agreement and to discuss the immediate steps needed to follow up. We suggest you attend the first part of the meeting to thank the negotiators personally for their efforts and hear their read-out and assessment of the tasks ahead. Principals then will tackle a long list of issues (attached) relating to the IFOR, Congressional consultations, and civilian implementation. You may want to participate in a portion of this discussion, which will include options for your personal involvement.

Dayton Follow-up: In the coming days, we will see whether the parties remain committed to the peace agreement and are able to deal with domestic critics of its terms. The biggest question mark is the Bosnian Serbs. They refused to initial the documents in Dayton because they had no say in the negotiation of the map, but they agreed Milosevic could be "guarantor" of their compliance. The Bosnian Serbs must sign the final agreement in Paris, and we have put the onus on Milosevic to deliver Pale in the next few weeks.

IFOR Planning and Congress: We are working with Shali and George Joulwan to speed up NATO planning so that you can be briefed on the final OPLAN early next week. That would permit you to make your final decision on U.S. participation and request Congressional support, after which roughly two weeks of intensive Hill consultations would begin leading to a vote in the Senate and House. We will work to ensure that the Paris conference is scheduled at a point that allows Congress to give the agreement and military plan a thorough examination, and permits us to make our case for U.S. involvement. At the same time, the Paris conference will set a time limit on Congressional deliberations. In the run-up to Paris, we expect the UN will pass a resolution endorsing the IFOR mission.

Civilian Implementation: In addition to IFOR, we have been planning for the range of civilian tasks that will be essential to the success of the peace agreement: economic reconstruction; organizing elections and protecting human rights; monitoring of

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Reason: 1.5abd
Declassify on: 10/22/05

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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civilian police; assisting in return of refugees; and implementing an arms reduction regime. The OSCE, UN, EU and IFIs will be responsible for different aspects of this program. At the planned London Conference, to be held sometime in December, a structure will be established to coordinate these civilian efforts, with the G-7 plus Russia and the OIC Presidency likely to serve as the steering group. A "High Representative" (possibly Carl Bildt) will be named as senior coordinator on the scene; we are seeking to have an American as his principal deputy.

Your Involvement: There are a number of issues regarding your involvement, including: key calls over the weekend (e.g. Bush, Thatcher, Powell); Oval Office address before next week's European trip; Congressional "Big 40" meeting before the trip; timing of key military decisions; how to convey the request for Congressional support and whether you should address a joint session of Congress; whether you should attend the final signing of the peace agreement in Paris; whether you should visit U.S. troops who will take part in IFOR during next week's trip.

Issues for discussion:

- What are the potential fault lines in the agreement?
- How committed are the parties to making the central government institutions work?
- What are we expecting Milosevic to do to deliver the Bosnian Serbs between now and the Paris conference? How do we respond to their belligerent statements in the meantime?
- What is required from the Bosnian Serbs between now and Paris for us to go forward with IFOR deployment?
- Can we finalize the NATO OPLAN early next week? Are there any serious differences to resolve with key Allies (e.g. robust ROE)?
- Do we need to preposition significant U.S. forces before signature? How will this affect Congressional support for the IFOR mission?
- How will we come to closure on Russian participation in IFOR?
- Which civilian implementation tasks are most critical to the success of the settlement?
- Status of UN resolutions (lift of arms embargo and sanctions suspension as early as Wednesday; endorsement of implementation mission later).

Attachment
Tab A Dayton Follow-up: Checklist for November 22 PC Meeting

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DAYTON FOLLOW-UP: CHECKLIST FOR NOVEMBER 22 PC

I. IFOR Issues

- Enabling force (How many U.S. troops? When? POTUS approval?)
- Reservists? Timing for call-up? POTUS approval?
- NATO IFOR approval timetable/Timetable for U.S. approval
  - Designation of U.S. forces
  - Finalizing military planning
  - Military Committee
  - POTUS update/instruction to Hunter
  - NAC Approval
  - Joulwan briefing of POTUS on final plan
  - POTUS approval/request to Congress
  - ACTORD
  - Signing
  - Deployment
- Policy issues requiring further guidance or follow-up in NATO:
  - Clear mission statement/measures of success
  - Duration of operation
  - IFOR presence in Serb territory
  - IFOR presence on international border
  - Other issues in military annex affecting IFOR mission?
  - Conditions on ground before deployment?
  - NATO funding
- Russian participation: Next steps

II. Congress

- Form of "request" for Congressional support?
- Timing of request
- Appropriations (for IFOR and civilian aspects)?
- Time limit on Congressional debate/deadline?
- POTUS address to Congress?
- How many U.S. troops: in Bosnia? related to Bosnia?
- Congressional Qs & As and written submissions (tasking)

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III. International Conferences

- Date of Paris peace conference.
- Relationship to NAC timetable/Congressional timetable?
- Other subjects for Paris conference?
- London implementation conference: Timing? Level of representation? Scope?
- Possible Moscow conference: Timing? Agenda?

IV. UN

- Status of resolutions on sanctions suspension and lifting of arms embargo
- Resolution authorizing military and civilian implementation:
  - Form (one or two resolutions? endorsement vs. authorization?)
  - Timing (vis-à-vis NATO, Congress and conference timetables)?

V. Peace Agreement Issues

- Civilian implementation issues:
  - Civilian implementation structure (to be established in London): G-7 plus Russia/OIC as steering group?.
  - Choice of High Representative (Bildt?). U.S. and Russian deputies?
  - Police Task Force: Concept, U.S. role, relationship to UN, next steps?
  - Economic Reconstruction Program: next steps? pledging conference in December?
  - Human rights/elections: Status of OSCE planning?
  - Arms Control/CBMs: Bonn conference, follow-up negotiations, implementation of cantonment areas?
- Equip/train: next steps, U.S. role, status of possible side-letter for Izetbegovic?
- Brcko arbitration - follow-up?
- Next steps vis-à-vis Karadzic/Madic?
- Steps to help influence Bosnian Serb follow-through?
- Completion of Bosnia Implementation Plan (ExComm)

VI. President's Trip to Europe

- Visit troops
- Other scheduling issues?

VII. Eastern Slavonia

- Mandate for new peacekeeping force (augmented UNCRO, with Russians and Belgians?)
- Civilian implementation: Response to Croatian request for U.S. head of transitional administration?

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21354

November 21, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

SUBJECT: Memorandum to the President for his Participation in Principals' Committee Meeting on Bosnia

Attached is a memorandum for the President's use in Wednesday's PC meeting with the U.S. negotiators on follow-up to Dayton.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Dayton Follow-up: Checklist for PC

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Reason: 1.5abd
Declassify On: 10/22/05

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RECORD ID: 9521341
RECEIVED: 18 NOV 95 15

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 21 NOV 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
CROATIA
PC
AGENDA
SERBIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA W/ ATTACHMENT FOR 22 NOV PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: HARMON SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 22 NOV 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FEELEY LOGREF: 9521354 9521355

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0159 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		FEELEY
		JOSHI
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95112120	FOR DECISION
001		X	95112120	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
001	SENS	Z	95112120	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	95112120	HARMON SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	951121	FUERTH, L	
002	951121	BRILL, K	
002	951121	MCALEER, R	
002	951121	INDERFURTH, R	
002	951121	ADAMS, G	
002	951121	PANETTA, L	
002	951121	YANNUZZI, R	
002	951121	WILSON, F	

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Berger	2		
Lake	3	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5	MC "SI"	D
Records Mgt.	4		

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cc:

COMMENTS:

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EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	11-22-95	6:00 AM	Anthony Taylor PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX+1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AUDIX 22:00 11/21/95 DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	11-22-95	9:30	GRAVES PRINT LAST NAME: GRAVES COPY: 1
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	11/22	8:20	Delivered Sitroom Box PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1

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COL. F. C. WILSON JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX+1
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AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
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2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
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WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

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WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319

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WASHINGTON, DC 20500

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX+1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
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PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: Kevin B. Wood

DTG: _____

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	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	State	Executive Secretary		
N	Defense	Executive Secretary		
B	USUN/State	Rick Inderfurth		736-7699
A	CIA	Executive Secretary		
D	JCS	Secretary		

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PRECEDENCE: ~~IMMEDIATE~~ PRIORITY ROUTINE

RELEASER: Kevin B Ward

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 2483 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 5 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Notification of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia November 22, 1995 NSC LOG # 9521341

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	State	Executive Secretary		
N	Defense	Executive Secretary		
B	USUN/State	Rick Inderfurth		736-7699
A	CIA	Executive Secretary		
D	JCS	Secretary		

REMARKS: URGENT

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21 NOV 95 21 48
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PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: Kevin B Ward

DTG: _____

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	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	State	Executive Secretary		
N	Defense	Executive Secretary		
B	USUN/State	Rick Inderfurth		736-7699
A	CIA	Executive Secretary		
D	JCS	Secretary		

REMARKS:

URGENT

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Initials: RDS Date: 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TIME OF RECEIPT

B 22:20

PRECEDENCE: ~~IMMEDIATE~~
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: Kevin B Wood

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 2483 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 5 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Notification of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia November 22, 1995 NSC LOG # 9521341

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
B	State	Executive Secretary		
N	Defense	Executive Secretary		
B	USUN/State	Rick Inderfurth		736-7699
A	CIA	Executive Secretary		
D	JCS	Secretary		

REMARKS:

URGENT

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Initials: RDS Date: 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE
- ☐ FLASH
- ☐ IMMEDIATE
- ☐ PRIORITY
- ☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting PC Mtg. on Bosnia PAGES: 5

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
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2010-0533-M

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21341

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

November 21, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia November 22, 1995 from 10:45 a.m. - 11:45 a.m. in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Principals only. The agenda is attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda (w/attachment)

~~SECRET~~
Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5 (g)
Declassify on: November 21, 2005

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA
DATE: November 22, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 10:45 a.m. - 11:45 a.m.

AGENDA

I. Report on Dayton Agreement.....State

II. Dayton Follow-up.....All*

*See attached checklist

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By RDS NARA, Date 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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DAYTON FOLLOW-UP: CHECKLIST FOR NOVEMBER 22 PC

I. IFOR Issues

- Enabling force (How many U.S. troops? When? POTUS approval?)
- Reservists? Timing for call-up? POTUS approval?
- NATO IFOR approval timetable/Timetable for U.S. approval
  - Designation of U.S. forces
  - Finalizing military planning
  - Military Committee
  - POTUS update/instruction to Hunter
  - NAC Approval
  - Joulwan briefing of POTUS on final plan
  - POTUS approval/request to Congress
  - ACTORD
  - Signing
  - Deployment
- Policy issues requiring further guidance or follow-up in NATO:
  - Clear mission statement/measures of success
  - Duration of operation
  - IFOR presence in Serb territory
  - IFOR presence on international border
  - Other issues in military annex affecting IFOR mission?
  - Conditions on ground before deployment?
  - NATO funding
- Russian participation: Next steps

II. Congress

- Form of "request" for Congressional support?
- Timing of request
- Appropriations (for IFOR and civilian aspects)?
- Time limit on Congressional debate/deadline?
- POTUS address to Congress?
- How many U.S. troops: in Bosnia? related to Bosnia?
- Congressional Qs & As and written submissions (tasking)

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III. International Conferences

- Date of Paris peace conference.
- Relationship to NAC timetable/Congressional timetable?
- Other subjects for Paris conference?
- London implementation conference: Timing? Level of representation? Scope?
- Possible Moscow conference: Timing? Agenda?

IV. UN

- Status of resolutions on sanctions suspension and lifting of arms embargo
- Resolution authorizing military and civilian implementation:
  - Form (one or two resolutions? endorsement vs. authorization?)
  - Timing (vis-à-vis NATO, Congress and conference timetables)?

V. Peace Agreement Issues

- Civilian implementation issues:
  - Civilian implementation structure (to be established in London): G-7 plus Russia/OIC as steering group?.
  - Choice of High Representative (Bildt?). U.S. and Russian deputies?
  - Police Task Force: Concept, U.S. role, relationship to UN, next steps?
  - Economic Reconstruction Program: next steps? pledging conference in December?
  - Human rights/elections: Status of OSCE planning?
  - Arms Control/CBMs: Bonn conference, follow-up negotiations, implementation of cantonment areas?
- Equip/train: next steps, U.S. role, status of possible side-letter for Izetbegovic?
- Brcko arbitration - follow-up?
- Next steps vis-à-vis Karadzic/Mladic?
- Steps to help influence Bosnian Serb follow-through?
- Completion of Bosnia Implementation Plan (ExComm)

VI. President's Trip to Europe

- Visit troops
- Other scheduling issues?

VII. Eastern Slavonia

- Mandate for new peacekeeping force (augmented UNCRO, with Russians and Belgians?)
- Civilian implementation: Response to Croatian request for U.S. head of transitional administration?

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21341

November 21, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: JOHN F. FEELEY, JR.

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, November 22, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Principals meeting on Bosnia to be held November 22, 1995. The Memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda (with/attachment)

Checklist
pre approved
by Berger

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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Reason: 1.5 (g)
Declassify On: November 21, 2005

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Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Conclusions of December 5 Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)~~	~~12/07/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
~~002. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (3 pages)~~	~~12/05/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
~~003. agenda~~	~~NSC Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)~~	~~12/05/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
004a. memo	Alexander Vershbow and John Feeley to Anthony Lake re: December 5 PC on Bosnia (6 pages)	12/05/1995	P1/b(1)
~~004b. agenda~~	~~[Duplicate of 003] (1 page)~~	~~12/05/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
004c. paper	re: Dealing with the Terrorist Threat to U.S. Forces [partial] (1 page)	12/04/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 6/11/2020
~~004d. cable~~	~~re: Approach to Bosnians and French Concerning Sarajevo Confidence-Building Measures (4 pages)~~	~~12/01/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~004e. paper~~	~~re: Bosnia Implementation Plan Quick Impact Package (4 pages)~~	~~12/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
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([PC and Bosnia…])
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FOLDER TITLE:
PC0160 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, November 22, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs659

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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RECORD ID: 9521395
RECEIVED: 07 DEC 95 17

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 07 DEC 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP PAPER RE CONCLUSIONS FOR 5 DEC PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT DUE DATE: 11 DEC 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9521391

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0160 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BASS
		BERGER
		JOSHI
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
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2019-0533-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95120719	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
002	PRESIDENT	Z	95120721	FOR INFORMATION
002		X	95121112	NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	951207		VICE PRESIDENT
002	951207		WH CHIEF OF STAFF

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The White House

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Harmon			
Dohse	1	D	
Sens			
Soderberg	copy		
Berger	2		
Lake		Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3/4	12/7	D STERN
Records Mgt.		MC 12/11	

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cc: BASS, ROMAN, LAKE

COMMENTS:

b/o need copies back

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

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21395

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 12-10-95

December 7, 1995

INFORMATION

95 DEC 7 P9:37

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Conclusions of December 5 Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia

Principals met Tuesday to address a number of the remaining bumps in the road from Dayton to Paris, including: handling of the Dole resolution on IFOR; eliminating threats from the mujahedin and the Iranians; addressing the security concerns of the Serb population of Sarajevo; and ensuring that the Bosnian Serbs will comply with the terms of the Dayton agreement.

Congressional Resolutions: Principals reviewed the draft text of Dole's resolution. They agreed we should try to get rid of the offensive language in the preamble, which characterizes the Dayton agreement as "ratification of ethnic cleansing," but we should focus our efforts on modifying the operative paragraphs. In particular, we will want to scale back Dole's efforts to commit us to "lead" rather than "coordinate" international efforts to equip and train Bosnian forces. Principals agreed that we could live with a requirement to report to the Congress within 30 days on efforts to equip and train the Bosnians, but not in impractical detail. They also agreed that we could accept a requirement to report regularly on IFOR's mission, rules of engagement, costs and exit strategy.

Eliminating Mujahedin and Iranian Threats: Principals agreed we must press the Bosnians more firmly on the need not only to remove foreign military and paramilitary forces as required by the Dayton agreement but also to break their military links and operational intelligence cooperation with Iran. Dick Holbrooke will travel to Sarajevo on Friday to deliver a strong message along these lines, stressing the risks that Tehran-backed terrorist groups pose to our troops and to our larger interests. John Deutch has agreed that we can present some of our intelligence about Iranian activities inside Bosnia so that Izetbegovic will have no doubt about the depth of our concern. Dick will make clear that our readiness to help the Bosnians -- both militarily and economically -- will be jeopardized if the Bosnians do not break the Iranian connection.

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 a,c,d

Declassify On: X1, X4

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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WJC HANDWRITING

Security for Serbs in Sarajevo: A second aspect of Holbrooke's mission to Sarajevo will be to encourage the Bosnians to take immediate, concrete steps to reassure the Serb population of Sarajevo that their security will be protected when they come under Federation control. We want to avoid a mass exodus of Serbs from the capital as the first fruit of the Dayton agreement. Among the steps that Dick will recommend include: delaying the deployment of Federation military forces to former Serb areas (which would be permitted after 90 days), with IFOR maintaining a presence; phasing in gradually the introduction of Muslim police and establishing a multiethnic police force under international supervision; forming a transitional city government with multiethnic representation; and establishing a local human rights commission. For our part, we will try to accelerate the deployment to Sarajevo of international police advisors and human rights monitors even before they are deployed country-wide. While these steps will not in themselves be enough to discourage all Serbs from leaving the capital, we believe that this is an important opportunity for Izetbegovic to demonstrate his commitment to preserving a unified, multiethnic Bosnia.

Ensuring Bosnian Serb Acceptance of the Agreement: The most critical subject on the Principals' agenda was how we can be sure that the Bosnian Serbs have accepted the terms of the agreement and are committed to implementing its provisions. The recent demonstrations and statements by Mladic and Karadzic have cast doubt on Milosevic's ability to deliver the Bosnian Serbs by the time of Paris. We had always stressed that we will only deploy U.S. troops to Bosnia if there is a genuine peace agreement that all the parties have accepted and are committed to implementing. Principals agreed that we needed to press Milosevic to do more between now and Paris to rein in recalcitrant elements among the Bosnian Serbs, although we should not make any one action a deal-breaker. Holbrooke will go to Belgrade from Sarajevo to warn Milosevic that, if we are not convinced that the Bosnian Serbs are committed to complying with the agreement, we will have no choice but to reimpose sanctions.

Other Issues: Principals also reviewed the state of play in New York on the UN resolution that will grant authority to IFOR. Our aim is to have the resolution enacted no later than the day after Paris, so that there will be no delay in deployment of the main force. They also discussed implementation of the Eastern Slavonia agreement: we intend to appoint a retired U.S. military officer as head of the civilian administration, as Tudjman has requested; we are trying to find additional NATO countries to reinforce the existing Belgian and Russian battalions as the core of a UN peacekeeping force.

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WJC HANDWRITING

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21395

December 7, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

SUBJECT: Memorandum to President on Conclusions of December 5 Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia

Attached is the memo on Tuesday's PC on Bosnia.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to the President

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 a,c,d
Declassify On: X4, X4

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RECORD ID: 9521391
RECEIVED: 05 DEC 95 17

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 13 DEC 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 5 DEC PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 08 DEC 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FEELEY LOGREF: 9521395

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0160 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BASS
		BERGER
		FEELEY
		JOSHI
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		VERSHBOW

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001	LAKE	Z	95121120	FOR DECISION
001		X	95121318	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
002		X	95121318	DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	951213	FUERTH, L	
002	951213	BRILL, K	
002	951213	MCALEER, R	
002	951213	INDERFURTH, R	
002	951213	ADAMS, G	
002	951213	PANETTA, L	
002	951213	YANNUZZI, R	
002	951213	WILSON, F	

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National Security Council
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Harmon			
Dohse	1/4	D/N	Sign Tab I
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger	2	ok	
Lake	3	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5	DPS 12/13	D
Records Mgt.	6		N

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cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1/4	D/N	Sign Tab I
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger	2	ok	
Lake	3	~~Natl Sec Advisor~~ has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5	PRS 12/13	D
Records Mgt.	6		N

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

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DATE 13 DEC 95

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 5 DEC PC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

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COL ROBERT P. MCALEER
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ROOM 3E880
PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

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AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER
ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
2201 C STREET NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319

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COPY: VIA FAX

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET
ROOM 238
OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG
WASHINGTON, DC 20503

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

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MR. LEON E. PANETTA
WHITE HOUSE
1ST FLOOR, WEST WING
WASHINGTON, DC 20500

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/9/2019
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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX+1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	12/14/95	_____	J. Graves PRINT LAST NAME: GRAVES COPY: 1
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1

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LOG 9521391
DATE 13 DEC 95

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 5 DEC PC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	12-14-95	AM 9:00	Anthony Tarlo PRINT LAST NAME: A Tarlo COPY: VIA FAX+1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	12/14/95	11:25	S. Graves PRINT LAST NAME: GRAVES COPY: 1
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	12/14/95	10:23a	Kreisel PRINT LAST NAME: Kreisel COPY: 1

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MESSAGE NO.: 2654 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ TOTAL: 5 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions for 5 Dec. PC Meeting on Bosnia NSC LOG # 21391

TO (AGENCY)		DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
State	B	Executive Secretary		
DOD	N	Executive Secretary		
USUN	B	Ofc. of the Rep. of the US.		736-7699
CIA	A	Executive Secretary		
JCS	D	Secretary, Joint Staff		

REMARKS:

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions for 5 Dec. PC Meeting on Bosnia NSC LOG # 21391

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions for 5 Dec. PC Meeting on Bosnia NSC LOG # 21391

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State	B	Executive Secretary		
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JCS	D	Secretary, Joint Staff		

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DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: ~~Notice~~ Summary of Meeting : 5 Dec. PC on Bosnia PAGES: Cover + 4

PLEASE DELIVER TO: #21391

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21391

December 13, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, December 5, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of December 5 Principals Committee Meeting

~~SECRET~~
Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5 (a,d)
Declassify on: 12/05/2005

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/9/2019
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee
DATE: December 5, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 p.m. - 4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR
Anthony Lake

OVP
Rick Saunders

STATE
Strobe Talbott
Peter Tarnoff
Richard Holbrooke

DEFENSE
Walter Slocombe
James Pardew

USUN
Amb. Madeleine Albright (via secure video)
David Scheffer

OMB
Gordon Adams
Phil DuSault

CIA
John Deutch
George Tenet

JCS
Gen. John Shalikashvili
LTG Wesley Clark
John Walsh

White House
Sandy Berger
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
Alexander Vershbow
John Feeley

Summary of Conclusions

Congressional Strategy

1. Principals reviewed the draft text of the Dole-McCain resolution for support of U.S. armed forces participating in IFOR. They agreed that while we should try to eliminate language in the preamble that characterizes the Dayton agreement as "ratification" of ethnic cleansing, our priority should be to improve the operative paragraphs. They agreed we should seek to scale back efforts to commit the United States to "lead" rather

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than "coordinate" international efforts to equip and train Bosnian forces. (S)

2. Principals agreed that the Administration could accept requirements to report to the Congress within 30 days on U.S. and international efforts to equip and train the Bosnians and to report regularly on IFOR's mission, rules of engagement, costs and exit strategy. (S)

Eliminating Mujahedin and Iranian Threats

3. Principals agreed we must press the Bosnians more firmly on the need not only to remove foreign military and paramilitary forces as required by the Dayton agreement but also to break their military links and operational intelligence cooperation with Iran. Principals agreed to send a strong message through Ambassador Holbrooke to President Izetbegovic along these lines, stressing the risks that Iran and Tehran-backed terrorist groups pose to our troops and to our larger interests. Specific intelligence information would be prepared to reinforce the U.S. demarche. They also agreed to tell the Bosnian government that U.S. readiness to help the Bosnians -- both militarily and economically -- will be jeopardized if the Bosnians do not break the Iranian connection **(Action: State/NSC/CIA)**. (S)

Security for Serbs in Sarajevo

4. Principals agreed to encourage the Bosnians to take immediate, concrete steps to reassure the Serb population of Sarajevo that their security will be protected when they come under Federation control. They agreed to recommend to the Bosnian government to delay the deployment of Federation military forces to former Serb areas; to phase in gradually the introduction of Muslim police and establish a multiethnic police force under international supervision; to form a transitional city government with multiethnic representation; and to establish a local human rights commission. Principals also agreed that the United States will try to accelerate the deployment to Sarajevo of international police advisors and human rights monitors before their deployment country-wide **(Action: State)**. (S)

Ensuring Bosnian Serb Acceptance of the Agreement

5. Principals agreed to press Milosevic to do more between now and Paris to rein in recalcitrant elements among the Bosnian Serbs, although we should not make any one action a deal-breaker. They agreed that Ambassador Holbrooke should warn Milosevic that if we were not convinced that the Bosnian Serbs were committed to complying with the agreement, we would have no choice but to reimpose sanctions. Principals also agreed that Ambassador Holbrooke should stress that the best solution would be to remove

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Mladic and Karadzic from their positions before the Paris signing of the agreement, since they are, in any case, barred from holding elective or appointive office under the new constitution **(Action: State/NSC).** (S)

UN

6. Principals agreed that the UNSCR authorizing IFOR must be enacted no later than the day after Paris, so that there will be no delay in deployment of the main force. If necessary, we should insist that the IFOR and civilian elements of the UK draft UNSCR be separated into two resolutions to avoid such a delay **(Action: USUN).** (C)

Eastern Slavonia

7. Regarding Eastern Slavonia, Principals agreed that since we will not contribute U.S. forces to the peacekeeping force, a retired U.S. military officer should be nominated for appointment as head of the civilian administration **(Action: JCS).** They agreed that we would prefer that the operation be under Chapter VII but that we should defer to the UN and troop contributors on this point. Principals agreed that the U.S. military would be prepared to provide some logistics support on a reimbursable basis. Given the need for additional NATO countries to reinforce the existing Belgian and Russian battalions, which would form the core of a UN peacekeeping force, Principals agreed to continue diplomatic efforts with Canada, Denmark and the Netherlands **(Action: State/NSC/JCS).** (S)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21391

December 11, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: JOHN FEELEY

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, December 5, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia held December 5, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to the agencies

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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Reason: 1.5 (a)(d)
Declassify on: OADR

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/5/2019
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RECORD ID: 9521386
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FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 05 DEC 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
CROATIA
PC
SERBIA
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 5 DEC PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 07 DEC 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9521387 9521391

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0160 CODES: BOS

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FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BAKER JANE
		BERGER
		FEELEY
		JOSHI
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		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
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002		X	95120507	DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

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DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	951205	FUERTH, L	
002	951205	BRILL, K	
002	951205	MCALEER, R	
002	951205	INDERFURTH, R	
002	951205	ADAMS, G	
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002	951205	YANNUZZI, R	
002	951205	WILSON, F	

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COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
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MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	12/5	605	JPalmieri PRINT LAST NAME: Palmieri COPY: 1

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520			PRINT LAST NAME: COPY: ~~VIA FAX~~ 1
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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	12/5/95	1449	Wms. AC PRINT LAST NAME: Williams COPY: ~~VIA FAX~~ 1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
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MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500			PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1

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NSC LOG # 21386

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DOD N	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE B	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
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MESSAGE NO.: 2577 CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTICE/AGENDA FOR 5 DEC PC MTG ON BOSNIA

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STATE B	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD N	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE B	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
CIA A	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
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REMARKS:

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DOD N	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
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CIA A	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS D	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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Initials: RDS Date: 10/9/2019
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MESSAGE NO.: 2577 CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTICE/AGENDA FOR 5 DEC PC MTG ON BOSNIA

NSC LOG # 21386

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
STATE B	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD N	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE B	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
CIA A	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS D	SECRETARY		

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MESSAGE #: _____

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting PC MTG ON Bosnia PAGES: 2

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

December 5, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(C)~~

There will be a Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia on December 5, 1995 from 2:30 to 4:00 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Principals plus one. The agenda is attached at Tab A. ~~(C)~~

for Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: 12/04/05

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/9/2019
2010-0533-M

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NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA
DATE: December 5, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 - 4:00 p.m.

AGENDA

I. Congressional Strategy.....NSC/State

-- Status of Resolutions
-- Handling of Equip and Train

II. Eliminating Mujahedeen and Iranian Threats.....NSC

III. Security for Serbs in Sarajevo.....State

IV. IFOR - Confirming Bosnian Serb Strategic Consent...State/OSD

V. UN Update.....USUN

VI. IFOR Update.....JCS

VII. Civilian Implementation Update.....State

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Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: 12/04/05

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By C2 NARA, Date 3/9/2020
2013-0682-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21386

December 4, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: JOHN FEELEY

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia
December 5, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Principals meeting on Bosnia to be held December 5, 1995. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

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Reason: 1.5 (d)
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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9521387
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TO: LAKE

FROM: FEELEY
VERSHBOW

DOC DATE: 04 DEC 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
CROATIA
SERBIA
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 5 DEC PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 07 DEC 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9521386 9521391

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0160 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		FEELEY
		JOSHI
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		SODERBERG
		VERSHBOW

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95120512	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	96022114	NOTED BY LAKE

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National Security Council
The White House

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Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg	copy 2	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	2/21	N
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

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COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004a. memo	Alexander Vershbow and John Feeley to Anthony Lake re: December 5 PC on Bosnia (6 pages)	12/05/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4009

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0159 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, November 22, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs659

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA
DATE: December 5, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 - 4:00 p.m.

AGENDA

I. Congressional Strategy.....NSC/State

-- Status of Resolutions
-- Handling of Equip and Train

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IV. IFOR - Confirming Bosnian Serb Strategic Consent...State/OSD

V. UN Update.....USUN

VI. IFOR Update.....JCS

VII. Civilian Implementation Update.....State

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Declassify on: 12/04/05

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By BC NARA, Date 3/5/2020
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004c. paper	re: Dealing with the Terrorist Threat to U.S. Forces [partial] (1 page)	12/04/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([PC and Bosnia...])
OA/Box Number: 4009

FOLDER TITLE:
PC0160 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, November 22, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs659

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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~~SECRET~~ 12/4/95

Dealing with the Terrorist Threat to U.S. Forces

Background

Article III of Annex 1A of the Dayton agreement stipulates that "all foreign forces, including individual advisors, freedom fighters, trainers, volunteers, and personnel from neighboring and other states, shall be withdrawn from the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina." Withdrawal must take place within 30 days after the agreement comes into force.

The greatest threat to U.S. forces in Bosnia is posed by three main groups:

- *The Mujahedin.* These are a ragtag, but highly motivated assortment of Islamic volunteers from outside Bosnia, who view the conflict as a *jihad.* The mujahedin, whose presence is estimated at 300-1,500, were used by the Bosnian army as shock troops. Approximately 400 have already been absorbed in the Bosnia army. The Bosnian government apparently intends to absorb as many as possible, distributing them throughout the army's force structure. Mujahedin motivation, lack of discipline, and scattered connections to terrorist groups make them the most immediate threat.

- *Iran's Presence.* There are 350-400 Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps personnel in Bosnia to train the Bosnian army. The IRGC is one of the Iranian services responsible for carrying out assassinations and other terrorist mission outside of Iran. Iran's intelligence service, MOIS, has a pervasive presence in Bosnia and enjoys easy access to senior officials in the Bosnian government. MOIS has carried out preparations for kidnapping or murdering Americans and may have been responsible for the murder of an American UNPROFOR employee, William Jefferson. 1.4(c)

[redacted] EO 13526 1.4c

The Intelligence Community believes that the most serious threat to U.S. forces will be the presence of Iranian MOIS and IRGC operatives in and around Zenica.

- *Islamic Groups.* Both Shia and Sunni groups in Bosnia pose a threat to U.S. forces. Hizbollah has an established presence in Bosnia. Anwar Shaban, a key Islamic Group terrorist, now operates in Bosnia as well. Shaban is a disciple of Sheikh Umar Abd el Rahman and is judged highly likely to attack U.S. citizens when the Sheikh receives the lengthy prison sentence

Approved for Release
CIA Historical Collections Div.
AR 70-14 10/01/2013
[2013-0682-M, 9 of 37]

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Reason: 1.5 a,c,d
Declassify on: X4

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the court is expected to hand down next month. Shaban's group is regarded as extremely dangerous. There is evidence that Shaban is in effect under Bosnian protection.

What We Have Said

The Bosnian Government has declared its intention to meet its obligations under the Dayton Agreement. We have since made it clear to Izetbegovic and Sacirbey that foreign forces must be expelled within 30 days after the agreement is signed. Izetbegovic gave us his assurances that this would be done. Izetbegovic, however, seemed to refer only to a small group of 200 mujahedin, as against our much larger estimate the Mujahedin presence. He did not allude to the full array of threats facing U.S. forces. Indeed, we have had no reassurance from Izetbegovic that he intends to eliminate the official Iranian presence, or the Sunni extremist groups in Bosnia. Moreover, the dispersion of foreign mujahedin units into Bosnian army formations suggests that he does not intend to expel the bulk of the mujahedin presence.

We should be under no illusion that our demand for the withdrawal of Iran's official presence will be easy for Izetbegovic to carry out. Iran will resist pressure for its withdrawal and will mobilize Islamic diplomatic support on the basis of their extensive prior support for Bosnia and the supposed ambiguity of the Accord as it relates to the nature of Iran's presence in Bosnia.

Bosnia has an ongoing reason for preserving Iran's presence; in October, Tehran pledged $47 million for Bosnian arms procurement. This commitment to Bosnia coming after three years of support when no other country was meeting Bosnia's defense needs has engendered a strong sympathy for Iran among officials close to Izetbegovic, including Army chief of staff Delic.

What We Want

Within 30 days we would want the following groups removed from Bosnia, whether or not they are covered by the Dayton Agreement:

- Pakistani, Malaysian, Egyptian, Afghan and other foreign mujahedin;
- Iranian personnel associated with the MOIS and IRGC; and
- Members of other extremist groups including the IG and Hizbollah, including branches of Hizbollah or other groups that are ostensibly providing humanitarian assistance or schooling.

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In addition, we would want Bosnia to formally end its arms procurement relationship with Iran and close down training camps operated by proscribed groups.

30-Day Gameplan

First, we would share with Izetbegovic, within the limits of imposed by concern for sources and methods, what we know about the presence of Iranian and other terrorist threats to the U.S. presence in Bosnia. We would make it clear that:

- We expect the Bosnian Government to comply with the Dayton agreement ban on foreign forces.

- U.S. policy requires that the Bosnian Government go beyond the terms of the Dayton agreement to expel Iranian officials and representatives of other extremist groups. This will also require a halt to Bosnian-Iranian arms procurement and training.

- Our ability to block military and economic assistance gives us leverage we are prepared to use.

- We will hold Bosnia responsible for any attacks carried out against U.S. forces by groups we had identified as threats.

We would ask the allies to demarche the Bosnian government along the same lines.

Second, our initial approach to Izetbegovic would be followed up by a strong and explicit Presidential letter and/or phone call emphasizing Bosnia's responsibility for the security of U.S. forces against terrorist attack by any foreign personnel within Bosnia.

Third, we would seek support for this position from Allies and moderate Islamic states. To the extent we can multilateralize this leverage, the better able we will be to bear down on Izetbegovic.

Fourth, we need to get Croatia to cooperate by urging Zagreb to deny refuge to Iranians leaving Bosnia and block the transshipment of Iranians arms. Croatia's large outstanding economic debt to Iran, however, may impede its cooperation in this area.

Fifth, we will need to assure Izetbegovic that we are holding the Serbs equally responsible for expelling unauthorized forces on their side. Arkan's Tigers, in particular, are a threat to U.S. forces and civilian populations. We intend to see them out of Bosnia.

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Sixth, we will need to reassure Izetbegovic that we will ensure that Bosnian forces are equipped and trained and that economic reconstruction is carried out, when we have verified that the Bosnia Government has: (a) met the terms of the Dayton agreement with regard to withdrawal of foreign and unauthorized forces; and (b) expelled Iranian officials and other proscribed groups.

Post-30-Day Gameplan

Augmented intelligence collection and a large initial troop presence in Bosnia should enable us to know whether the Bosnians are complying. We will need to make a systematic effort, however, to track and monitor the status of groups and individuals we have identified. This effort should be continuous, with the list of violators updated and transmitted to the Bosnian government on a regular basis.

In deciding how to respond to noncompliance, we will have to determine whether we are dealing with Bosnian unwillingness or incapacity.

If the Bosnian Government is unwilling, we would put equip and train on hold and withhold disbursement of economic assistance.

If the Bosnian Government is willing but unable to expel proscribed groups, and any of these groups actively threatens or attacks U.S. personnel, we would use force against the threatening elements.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

APPR ____ DRAFT____
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3 ____ 4 ____ 5 ____
6 ____ 7 ____ 8 ____

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Tal C for PC memo

EUR/SCE:JPRICE:JTP
12/01/95 X67479 SEEEYYUG 12297
EUR:RHECKLINGER

This omits idea of Bosnians delaying intro of military forces into Serb areas beyond the 90 day mark. SV

S/AL:RGALLUCCI/AFREIDMAN
EUR:CHOH
S/S:
S/S-O:

EUR/SCE:CHILL
NSC:
JCS:GEN.WCROSS

EUR, EUR/RPM, EUR/SCE, S/AL

IMMEDIATE SARAJEVO, PARIS IMMEDIATE, LONDON IMMEDIATE

IMMEDIATE BELGRADE, ZAGREB, BONN, MOSCOW, USNATO, USUN

E.O. 12958: DECL:12/01/05

TAGS: PREL, BK, FR

SUBJECT: APPROACH TO BOSNIANS AND FRENCH CONCERNING SARAJEVO CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES.

a) sarajevo 850; b) zagreb 8191; c) 11/29 french non-paper; d) 11/30 uk non-paper

1. ~~confidential~~ -- entire text. classified by richard hecklinger, eur. reason: 1.5 (d).

summary
---

2. reftels concern possible confidence-building measures that might be taken to allay the concerns of the sarajevo serb community. the department believes that many of the cbms proposed by the french and british are worthwhile and should be pursued. paris, london, and sarajevo are instructed to approach host governments immediately to raise the following points. end summary.

3. begin sarajevo talking points:

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2013-0652-M
VR 2/6/2020 (9.38)

-- we are heartened by the initial steps your government has proposed to reassure the serb community in sarajevo.

-- as vice president gore stressed in his recent meeting with prime minister siladzic, however, additional steps are needed. we want to work with you on developing and implementing a series of confidence-building measures.

-- as we have discussed with you before, the process of reassuring sarajevo's serb community will be a continuing one. your efforts will be critical to ensuring that the re-unification of the city is accomplished without undue dislocation or instability.

-- i would appreciate hearing your ideas on what more should be done. i also would like to share with you some of my government's ideas in this matter.

-- the starting point, of course, is that there can be no renegotiation of the Dayton accords.

-- we believe that federation police should deploy into former serb areas of sarajevo gradually and should develop a multi-ethnic composition which will allay serb concerns while leaving no doubt as to the final disposition of the city.

-- we would also suggest the formation of a transitional city government containing representatives of all sarajevo's ethnic communities. proportional representation within this transitional government would reflect sarajevo's status as a part of the federation.

-- existing non-military police structures in serb areas of sarajevo should be left intact. individual members of these authorities would, of course, be subject to vetting. as a complementary effort, there could be a committee for police affairs, chaired by a representative of the International Police Task Force established by annex 11 of the dayton agreement. This committee would have a mandate to monitor, mentor and assist in the integration of federation and serb police authorities in sarajevo.

-- with regard to international assistance, we would

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support the establishment of a committee on reconstruction that would ensure that an equitable distribution of international funds would go to all areas of sarajevo. this committee would be chaired by a delegate of the high representative.

-- we would also support the formation of a local human rights commission operating under the auspices of the national human rights commission provided for in annex six of the dayton agreement.

end sarajevo talking points.

comment: post may mention that we believe ambassador thomas eagleton might be the appropriate person to chair a committee on international assistance. end comment.

4. begin paris and london talking points.

-- we appreciate the ideas you have provided on possible confidence-building measures for sarajevo. we agree that reassuring the serb community in sarajevo will be an important element for successful implementation of the dayton settlement.

-- like you, we do not intend to reopen the agreements.

-- we concur with the french and british governments in most of the ideas raised, which fall well within the context what it already agreed.

-- we agree that federation police should deploy into former serb areas of sarajevo gradually and should develop a multi-ethnic composition which will allay serb concerns while leaving no doubt as to the final disposition of the city.

-- we believe that the creation of a transitional city government might also be a useful step. proportional representation in such a body would necessarily reflect sarajevo's status as part of the federation.

-- we would not object to existing serb police authorities remaining in place under the authority of the committee for police affairs outlined in the french paper. individual members of these authorities would be subject to vetting.

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-- we concur in the proposal for a committee led by a delegate of the high representative to ensure that international assistance is equitably distributed. likewise, we would support a local human rights commission operating under the auspices of the national commission provided for in annex 6 of the dayton agreement.

-- we believe that the high representatives should make confidence-building measures in sarajevo one of his early priorities, and we concur with the british proposal to underscore the importance of his work in this area, at the earliest appropriate opportunity.

-- at all upcoming conferences, the international community should make clear the priority we attach to this effort.

-- we can elaborate specific ideas in the coming weeks, but we must all emphasize immediately our determination to promote confidence-building as we consult with the parties.

end paris and london talking points.

5. sarajevo minimize considered.

YY

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DRAFT

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(1)

Bosnia Implementation Plan
Quick Impact Package

Mission

It will be necessary as soon as possible after signature of the Dayton peace settlement (December 13 in Paris) to demonstrate U.S. commitment to the peace process. The Administration should announce a "Quick Impact Package" that comprises a number of assistance activities planned to have a rapid and visible impact on the economic recovery in Bosnia. Quick impact activities will meet the following criteria:

- highly visible in order to provide the Bosnia people a sense of improvement in their lives and a return to normalcy as a result of the peace settlement;
- tied closely to the political objectives we have set for the peace (inter-ethnic cooperation, respect for human rights, a strengthened federation, etc.);
- tangible results rather than primarily mid- to long-term announcements (although we should be able to announce some mid-term activities which have to await funding);
- where possible, an enhanced sense of security (e.g., police training/funding).

Assessment of the Current Situation

In the immediate post-war period, both the people and government officials are skeptical that a peace settlement will actually work. Inclined to wait for the "end game," Bosnian citizens will be reluctant to cooperate with new Federation officials at any level until they see potential benefits. Canton and municipal structures will be created that did not exist before, so people will not easily understand how to relate to these structures. There will be a lack of political will to cooperate.

Equally skeptical will be government officials who have honed the skills of war, but not of the peaceful administration of a new country. It is clear that many of these officials would be more comfortable reestablishing the old socialist industries and do not see the need to make the transition to a market-based economy.

A quick impact package and its associated PR, is designed to provide maximum political impact to begin to overcome some of these misgivings.

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PER E.O. 13526
2018-0682-M
VR 2/6/2020 (9:39)

DRAFT

Objectives and the Desired Endstate

The objectives of the quick impact package are: high visibility, tangible results, and strengthened support for the peace settlement.

These activities will act as a bridge, providing early benefits before the main U.S. assistance package will have cleared the bureaucratic, funding and administrative obstacles necessary to its implementation.

The quick impact package will demonstrate U.S. commitment to the peace process. A companion public affairs campaign will be conducted in Bosnia designed to convince the people and government of Bosnia that they have more to gain by investing in peace than in war.

Concept of Operations

In order to achieve maximum political impact, USIA will develop and implement a public affairs strategy covering the USG's assistance to Bosnia. The strategy will include the correct and effective information flow to the Bosnian public about what is being done, and an ability to access and monitor public opinion throughout Bosnia regarding the role of western, in particular USG, assistance to the region. A vigorous public affairs campaign will be necessary to convince the Bosnians that the U.S. is committed to the rehabilitation of the country, within the limits of what the Congress judges to be our "fair share."

A number of key political settlements could, if widely publicized, also go far in lifting peoples' spirits. We should be prepared to capitalize on such political milestones via our public affairs strategy. Key political settlements include re-opening the Sarajevo airport to civilian air traffic; lifting the curfew, currently set a 10 p.m.; and eliminating checkpoints within the country.

A notional list of activities, broken down into four categories (winterization and humanitarian assistance; repair and reconstruction; community and federation building; and self-sustainability and return to normalcy), have been selected for the Quick Impact package. A sampling follows:

Winterization and Humanitarian Assistance

- Emergency Food Assistance for World Food Program.
  Total funding: $50 million

- All Weather Coat Production.
  Total funding: $ 1 million

- Winterization program (emergency repair of buildings, food).
  Total funding: $840,000

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Repair and Reconstruction

- Glassification. Replacement of glass in homes, office buildings and workplaces in Sarajevo.
  Total funding: $ 1.5 million

- Apartment rehabilitation. Repair and replacement of Sarajevo apartment building water pumps and elevators.
  Total funding: $ 2.5 million

- Gas/heating repair being carried out by the International Rescue Committee.
  Total funding: $ 2.5 million

Community and Federation Building

- Public administration and local governance program in Tuzla and Zenica.
  Total funding: $2.5 million

- Z-Tel, 15 part TV series on the Federation. A three-month television call-in show with prominent Federation personalities focussing concerns of residents of Zenica.
  Total funding: $140,000

- Kiseljak housing. Brestavo village. Rehabilitation of former front-line village with 150 Croat and Bosniac residents.
  Total funding: $140,000

Self-Sustainability and Return to Normalcy

- Rehabilitation of twelve school buildings in five municipalities in the Una Sana (Bihac) canton.
  Total funding: $ 1.6 million

- Emergency material assistance in Zenica and Tuzla.
  Total funding: $500,000

Roles and Responsibilities

USAID will be the main implementing agency of the U.S. assistance program, including the Quick Impact package. Some of the activities to be folded into the Quick Impact package, especially in the category of humanitarian assistance, will commence shortly (with or without an announcement) or are continuation of programs already underway (through the World Food Program, Catholic Relief Services, American Red Cross, the International Rescue Committee). Other types of assistance, such as municipal rehabilitation and public administration, or repair of the gas system in Sarajevo, are also underway, but can only now begin to be implemented due to previous battlefield conditions.

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DRAFT

USIA will be responsible for the public affairs strategy, for providing information to the Bosnian public about these operations, and for the assessment and monitoring of public opinion throughout Bosnia regarding the role of USG assistance to the region.

USAID and USIS will work closely in the field to maximize the "splash" of the Quick Impact package. The Ambassador will keep both agencies informed as to which assistance events should be targeted for maximum public affairs benefit.

Major Issues

Activities under the Quick Impact package are destined to begin to overcome the skepticism of the government and the people of Bosnia about the USG commitment to make the peace settlement work. It will be necessary to work with officials of both the Federation and Republic governments to assess what they perceive to be the needs and levels of assistance that could be supplied by the USG. There will also be a wide gap in public perception between what the Bosnia people believe they need in economic reconstruction and rehabilitation and what type and how much assistance the USG can provide.

A carefully coordinated effort will be necessary to overcome the following obstacles:

- The perception by the public and the government of Bosnia that the USG is not doing its share in supporting economic reconstruction.
- Bureaucratic delays in getting the Quick Impact package off the ground.
- Biased reporting by Bosnians and focus on sensational incidents by the international media on the ground that undermine the credibility of the USG effort.
- Miscues that cause "traffic jams" on the ground between the military and civilian assistance efforts.

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See also 2013-0682-M

Case Number: 2010-0533-M

MR MARKER

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~~001. memo~~	~~re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (2 pages)~~	~~12/12/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KC 6/11/2020
~~002. memo~~	~~John F. Feeley and Michael Sheehan to Anthony Lake re: December 12 PC on Bosnia (6 pages)~~	~~12/11/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
~~003. agenda~~	~~[Duplicate of 005] (1 page)~~	~~12/12/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 6/11/2020
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([PC and Bosnia...])
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FOLDER TITLE:
PC0162 PC Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina, December 12, 1995

2010-0533-M
rs660

RESTRICTION CODES

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P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
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RECEIVED: 12 DEC 95 18

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 13 DEC 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 12 DEC PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 15 DEC 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW LOGREF: 9521400 9521401

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0162 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
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		JOSHI
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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

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001	LAKE	Z	95121220	FOR DECISION
001		X	95121318	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
002		X	95121318	DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	951213	FUERTH, L	
002	951213	BRILL, K	
002	951213	MCALEER, R	
002	951213	INDERFURTH, R	
002	951213	ADAMS, G	
002	951213	PANETTA, L	
002	951213	YANNUZZI, R	
002	951213	WILSON, F	

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Soderberg			
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Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5	12/13	D
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Dohse	1 4	DPS	
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger	2	MW	
Lake	3		
Situation Room		Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
West Wing Desk	5	DPS 12/13	D
Records Mgt.	6		N

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COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX+1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
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FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions for 12 Dec. PC Meeting on Bosnia NSC LOG # 21407

TO (AGENCY)		DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
State	B	Executive Secretary		
DOD	N	Executive Secretary		
USUN	B	Ofc. of the Rep. of the U.S.		736-7699
CIA	A	Executive Secretary		
JCS	D	Secretary, Joint Staff		

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TO (AGENCY)		DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
State	B	Executive Secretary		
DoD	N	Executive Secretary		
USUN	B	Ofc. of the Rep. of the U.S.		736-7699
CIA	A	Executive Secretary		
JCS	D	Secretary, Joint Staff		

REMARKS:

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TIME OF RECEIPT

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RELEASER:

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions for 12 Dec. PC Meeting on Bosnia NSC LOG # 21407

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FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Summary ~~Notice~~ of Meeting: 12 Dec. PC on Bosnia PAGES: Cover + 3

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DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21407

December 13, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, December 12, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

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Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5 (a,d)
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee
DATE: December 12, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 p.m. - 3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR
Anthony Lake

OVP
Leon Fuerth

STATE
Secretary Warren Christopher
Peter Tarnoff
John Kornblum
Robert Gallucci

DEFENSE
Secretary William Perry
Walter Slocombe

USUN
Amb. Madeleine Albright
David Scheffer

OMB
Phebe Vickers

CIA
George Tenet
Norm Schindler

JCS
Gen. John Shalikashvili
BG John Walsh

White House
Sandy Berger
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
Alexander Vershbow
John Feeley

Summary of Conclusions

Congressional Strategy

1. Principals reviewed the status of Congressional resolutions on U.S. participation in IFOR. They agreed that the United States will take a "leadership role" in coordinating an international effort to ensure that the Bosnian Federation receives the assistance necessary to achieve an adequate military balance when IFOR leaves. In order to assure the impartiality of IFOR, Principals reaffirmed that this requires minimizing the involvement of U.S. military personnel, but they agreed that this did not exclude participation of individual military personnel,

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e.g., at OSD, DSAA or other agencies, in the planning of the effort and that we would offer the Bosnians participation in IMET programs. They approved a draft Presidential letter consistent with these decisions to respond to the just-received letter from Senators Dole and McCain. (C)

2. Principals agreed to continue their calls to the Hill before the upcoming votes and agreed on the importance of continuing engagement with Congress and the American people during the implementation of the peace settlement over the next 12 months. (U)

Decision Timeline for IFOR

3. Principals agreed that the omnibus UNSCR authorizing the establishment of IFOR, High Representative, CivPol and the withdrawal of UNPROFOR must be separated into two resolutions in order to enact the UNPROFOR and IFOR elements of the UNSCR no later than the day after Paris so that there will be no delay in deployment of the NATO main force. They recognized that high-level intervention with Allies and the Russians could be necessary in this effort **(Action: USUN/State/NSC).** (C)

Eastern Slavonia

4. Regarding the search for nations to join the implementation force for Eastern Slavonia, Principals agreed to increase efforts to recruit the Nordic states, Ireland and Spain before making another push with Canada **(Action: State/USUN).** (C)

IFOR/Non-NATO Muslim Troop Contributors

5. Principals agreed to accelerate efforts to generate voluntary contributions to support the participation in IFOR of Pakistani and possibly Jordanian and Egyptian forces **(Action: OSD/State).** (C)

Equip and Train

5. Principals agreed to encourage Turkey to play a leading role in the multinational effort to equip and train the Federation and to suggest that they might oversee day-to-day coordination among contributors and between contributors and the Bosnians **(Action: OSD).** (C)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21407

December 12, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: JOHN FEELEY

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, December 12, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia held December 12, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to the agencies.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~
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FROM: FEELEY
SHEEHAN
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KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
PC

CONGRESSIONAL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 12 DEC PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE

DUE DATE: 14 DEC 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FEELEY

LOGREF: 9521400 9521407

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0162

CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		FEELEY
		KRECZKO
		NSC CHRON
		SHEEHAN
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEC CLOSED BY: NSJDA

DOC 1 OF 1

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RBS NARA, Date 10/16/2019
2010-0533-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

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001	LAKE	Z	95121212	FOR INFORMATION
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National Security Council
The White House

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Situation Room			
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COMMENTS: Dec 12 PC Mtg Paper

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21401

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

December 11, 1995

Nat'l Sec Advisor has seen

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW/W

FROM: JOHN F. FEELEY, JR/MICHAEL SHEEHAN MS

SUBJECT: December 12 PC on Bosnia

Agenda is at Tab A. No major decisions are required. The meeting should focus on reviewing the sequencing of events and decisions regarding implementation (Congressional approval, Paris signing, Presidential authorization for U.S. main force deployment, NAC decision to deploy). Updates needed on: Holbrooke mission, London Conference, and status of Eastern Slavonia.

I. Congressional Strategy

Ask State or Bill Danvers for a status report. The Senate will begin debate on Tuesday. They will likely take up three resolutions: the Hefley resolution which requires a prior appropriation before troops can be deployed; a concurrent resolution that would state Congressional opposition to Administration policy but support for the troops; and the Dole/McCain resolution which expresses support for the troops and asks the Administration to report on equip and train and other matters related to the Dayton agreement. We anticipate that the Hefley resolution will not pass; that the concurrent resolution will pass largely along party lines; and that the Dole/McCain resolution will receive bipartisan support.

It is unclear what will happen in the House. At the moment, House Republicans are considering two resolutions: one that would reference the Hefley and Buyer-McHale resolutions and would also support the troops; and the other resolution would, to the best of our understanding, cut off funds. There are two schools of thought on the House: they will vote on both resolutions on Wednesday; and they will not vote at all prior to Paris. We should know more after the Republicans meet on Tuesday to discuss how best to proceed.

We will continue to discuss the resolutions and state of play generally with House and Senate staff. We have given comments to House and Senate leadership offices on their resolutions.

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II. Decision Timeline for IFOR

Recommend that you lead the discussion. The following five events involving major decisions affecting IFOR's implementation of the peace agreement occur in the next five days:

- **Congress will vote on resolutions to support the deployment of U.S. troops or troops themselves**, we hope before the President departs (at least in the case of the Senate).

- **The parties sign the agreement formally on December 14.** The French have threatened to move the signing from Paris if their pilots are not returned. If the issue is still unresolved, recommend you ask CIA to report on the status of the pilots and ask State about the possibility of moving the signing.

- **The UN Security Council will vote on a resolution to authorize IFOR deployment.** USUN should update Principals on the present state of play in New York. The issue is whether the resolution will be passed no later than the day after the Paris signing, when the NAC is planning to approve the ACTORD for main body deployment. With a six-hour time difference between New York and Europe, passage of the UNSCR Thursday night, the same day as Paris, is the best option. As previously discussed, USUN will need to break the IFOR and civilian aspects of the UK draft into two resolutions if the civilian elements appear likely to cause a delay.

- **The President must authorize the deployment of U.S. troops participating in the IFOR main force.** The President has approved the OPLAN and deployment of the enabling forces, and consulted with Congress. ***We need to determine the process and timing for his approval of the deployment of the U.S. forces participating in the IFOR main force, so that Bob Hunter has the necessary instructions for the NAC.***

- **The NAC must authorize the ROE and the deployment of the IFOR main force.** The NAC is scheduled to do this on Friday. **You should ask JCS to review the sequence of events and dates for the full deployment of U.S. forces into theater.**

Our View: By the end of the discussion Principals should identify any problems involved in sequencing during the next five days and have a clear picture of the timing and goals for deploying IFOR.

III. Follow-Up to Holbrooke Mission

Recommend State lead the discussion. According to Holbrooke, Izetbegovic and Silajdzic committed to initiating an intensive public affairs effort to allay concerns of Sarajevo Serbs about

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their safety under Federation authority. It is not clear whether Holbrooke pursue many of the specific CBMs that Principals approved last week. The Bosnians wants Admiral Smith to arrive in Sarajevo before December 19. Milosevic asked that Smith extend IFOR's presence in Serb areas beyond the 90-day mark and thereby convince the Bosnians to delay the introduction of Federation forces. Dick has called for a meeting in Paris on December 13 between the Dayton negotiating team, Milosevic, Izetbegovic, General Joulwan, and Admiral Smith to pursue this idea.

Regarding the elimination of foreign forces and terrorist threats, Izetbegovic told Holbrooke and Don Kerrick that all mujahedin will leave unless they become Bosnian citizens, and he undertook to meet our demands on the Iranians.

Holbrooke did not get very far in Belgrade on the Karadzic/Mladic problem (Milosevic insisted he cannot remove them before Paris, nor was he able to turn off tomorrow's referendum in Serb areas of Sarajevo. "Vice President" Koljevic and "Foreign Minister" Buha will be the "authoritative" representatives who will sign for the Bosnian Serbs in Paris. Milosevic convincingly said he did not know where the French pilots were, but undertook to keep pressing (as other sources confirm). Dick believes that the pilot issue has complicated the problem of Serbs in Sarajevo: in squeezing Mladic on the pilots, Milosevic may be exacerbating frictions with the fiercely pro-Mladic and pro-Karadzic Sarajevo Serbs.

Our view: We should support an early decision to extend IFOR's presence beyond 90 days to defuse the situation, but this would have to be at the Bosnians' request. On the Iranians, we may need to hold our fire for awhile, given the CIA's concerns that Izetbegovic has repeatedly taken our warnings directly to the Iranians to encourage them to cover their tracks more effectively.

DOD may raise eleventh-hour questions about whether Koljevic's and Buha's signatures in Paris are sufficient indication that the Bosnian Serbs will comply with the agreement. In our view, we're not likely to get much more clarity on the issue of "strategic consent" before Thursday. We will have to rely on the fact that the parties are maintaining the ceasefire and that the Serbs, despite their bluster, will in practice not challenge NATO when the main force arrives.

IV. <u>London Conference Follow-up</u>:

You should ask State to lead the discussion. Strobe and Bob Gallucci report that, as expected, the London Conference (and the Budapest OSCE Ministerial) primarily addressed organizational issues. We now need to move quickly to activate the High Representative and his primary staff, coordinate the disparate plans of the civilian and international organizations involved in

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implementation, and organize the final U.S. plan for implementation through the ExComm, where State/EUR's work has been lagging.

V. Eastern Slavonia:

Planning for implementation of the November 12 agreement on Eastern Slavonia has bogged down. The Secretary General's report to the Security Council, due on Thursday, probably will reflect the UN bureaucracy's misgivings about the proposed mission. **You should ask State and USUN to review the state of play and preview the SYG's report. If time permits, your should run through the following issues:**

- **Implementation Force Mandate/Relationship to IFOR:**

  We have had no luck recruiting a lead nation, in part because we need clarity on the force's mandate. Belgium wants at a minimum a Chapter VI operation with strong ROE. The UN wants a Chapter VII mission; some allies (e.g., Dutch) also see Chapter VII as preferable. They worry that the implementation force would not have the authority to defend itself if the Serbs do not disarm/ withdraw voluntarily and/or if Croatia attacks. The UN also believes Chapter VII is needed for the civilian Administrator to have executive authorities. A Chapter VII mandate would not confer an obligation to compel demilitarization; that would remain voluntary, per the November 12 agreement.

  IFOR's relationship to the new mission in Eastern Slavonia is still undefined, although the U.S. has agreed to provide logistics support on a reimbursable basis. IFOR's mission under OPLAN 10405 includes the evacuation of UNCRO if necessary.

  Issues:

  ⇒ Can we accept a limited, specific Chapter VII mandate if that makes recruitment easier?

  ⇒ Should IFOR's mission to evacuate UNCRO in an emergency also apply to the new force? If so, should we announce this as part of our troop recruitment effort?

- **Recruiting Core Contributors:**

  Our efforts to recruit a Western lead nation for the implementation force have been unsuccessful to date. The Belgians will stay in Eastern Slavonia only if there is another "credible" -- read NATO -- military partner. Our best bet is Canada, which might consider transferring its 1,000 IFOR-bound forces to Eastern Slavonia, but only if we push at the highest level. Also, Ottawa has indicated that it may contribute forces

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to a post-UNMIH force, but not to Eastern Slavonia as well. Canada is the preferred unit for a post-UNMIH presence in Haiti.

Issues:

⇒ Do we prefer that Canada contribute forces to Eastern Slavonia or to Haiti? If Slavonia, who will back up Canada for Haiti?

⇒ How hard and at what level do we approach Ottawa?

⇒ How would we secure London's support for our request? (Canadian IFOR troops are slated for the UK AOR)

We need to find a credible lead nation to head off Croatian military action, which intelligence reporting suggests may be more likely given the Croatian's mistrust of any international force that lacks a U.S. or strong NATO military component.

- **Civilian Administrator:**

Since we will not contribute troops, we have promised Tudjman that before Paris we will offer a retired American military officer to head the civilian Administration. JCS's top candidate, Lt. Gen. Otjen, has withdrawn his name from consideration--JCS is looking for other candidates. At the same time, Bhoutros-Ghali reportedly is unhappy with the prospect of a U.S. flag officer in this position, in part because of his negative experiences with previous Americans in similar circumstances.

Issues:

⇒ Do we still want/need a retired American flag officer as Administrator? If so, will the UN agree?

⇒ Should we nominate a civilian instead? If so, whom?

- **Funding:**

A large UN peacekeeping operation in Eastern Slavonia could cost as much as $400-500 million per year. The start-up costs would be in the tens of millions of dollars. The UN says it does not have the cash on hand to support a new start-up now. The USG has not budgeted for a new large operation of this size next year. With low numbers expected for FY 96 peacekeeping the impact on accumulating bigger UN arrears is significant.

We will have to notify the Congress of the mission. Our current understanding with the Congress is that we would consult at a high level on a new operation -- and presumably seriously consider their concerns. We've also indicated that we would not

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support large new Chapter VII UN mandates with the understanding that they are better suited for MNFs.
Issues:

⇒ How do we fund a new UN operation given the UN's apparently serious cash-flow problem?

⇒ How do we envision our consultations with the Congress on this issue? At what level? What will we tell the Congress about funding the operation?

Attachments
Tab A Agenda

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NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA
DATE: December 12, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 - 3:30 p.m.

AGENDA

I. Congressional Strategy.....NSC/State

II. Decision Timeline for IFOR (Paris/UN/NATO).....NSC

III. Follow-Up to Holbrooke Mission.....State

-- French Pilots
-- Bosnian Serbs' acceptance of Dayton agreement
-- Security for Serbs in Sarajevo
-- Eliminating Foreign Forces and Terrorist Threats

IV. London Conference Follow-Up .....State

V. Eastern Slavonia.....State/USUN

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Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: 12/04/05

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By 1/2 NARA, Date 3/10/2020
2013-0682-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

December 11, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(C)~~

There will be a Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia on December 12, 1995, from 2:30 to 3:30 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Principals plus one. The agenda is attached at Tab A. ~~(C)~~

for
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

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Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5 (d)
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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/10/2019
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NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA
DATE: December 12, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 - 3:30 p.m.

AGENDA

I. Congressional Strategy.....NSC/State

II. Decision Timeline for IFOR (Paris/UN/NATO).....NSC

III. Follow-Up to Holbrooke Mission.....State

-- French Pilots
-- Bosnian Serbs' acceptance of Dayton agreement
-- Security for Serbs in Sarajevo
-- Eliminating Foreign Forces and Terrorist Threats

IV. London Conference Follow-Up .....State

V. Eastern Slavonia.....State/USUN

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MESSAGE NO.: _____ CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Notification & Agenda for 12 Dec. PC Meeting on Bosnia NSC LOG # 21400

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
State	Executive Secretary		
DOD	Executive Secretary		
USUN	Ofc. of the Rep. of the U.S.		736-7699
CIA	Executive Secretary		
JCS	Secretary, Joint Staff		

REMARKS:

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FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting : 12 Dec. PC on Bosnia PAGES: Cover + 2

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

21400

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21400

December 11, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

FROM: JOHN FEELEY JF

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia
December 12, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Principals meeting on Bosnia to be held December 12, 1995. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove ____

Per TL conversation to C. Millison 12/14

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

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Reason: 1.5 (d)
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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX+1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1

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MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
COL. F. C. WILSON JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

8769

December 11, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR TONY LAKE

THROUGH: BILL DANVERS

FROM: WILLIAM K. DAVIS WKD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Key Senate Members on Bosnia

The President is scheduled to meet with key Senate Members on Tuesday, December 12, to discuss Bosnia. A memo for the President is attached at Tab I, and talking points are attached at Tab A.

Secretaries Christopher and Perry, as well as General Shali, will attend the meeting. As he has done in the past, you may want to suggest to the President that he turn to the two Secretaries as well as General Shali for comments before moving on to discussion with members.

Concurrence by: Vershbow

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached to the President.

Attachments
Tab I Memo for the President
Tab A Talking points
Tab B Participants

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEETING WITH
SENATORS ON BOSNIA
DATE: December 12, 1995
LOCATION: Cabinet Room
TIME: 4:00 p.m. - 5:00 p.m.

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
PAT GRIFFIN

I. PURPOSE

To discuss Bosnia with key members of the Senate.

II. BACKGROUND

You are scheduled to meet with a group of members to discuss Bosnia. Senate votes on Bosnia are expected to be within a day of the meeting. Many in this group have not yet met with you or the Vice President. This will be an opportunity to discuss this issue with them before the Senate votes.

III. PARTICIPANTS

See Tab B.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Pool spray at beginning of meeting.

V. SEQUENCE

We suggest that you make brief opening remarks, then turn to Secretaries Christopher and Perry and General Shalikashvili for brief remarks before beginning a discussion with the Senators.

Attachments
Tab A Talking Points
Tab B Participants

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BOSNIA: POINTS FOR MEETING WITH SENATORS

Why We Should Participate

- At stake: American values (stop suffering), interests (prevent wider war, preserve NATO, strong Europe), leadership (if we don't make good in Bosnia, credibility elsewhere in doubt).
- Risks if we don't act far greater -- wider war that destabilizes Europe.

The Mission

- Not fighting a war, securing a peace -- peace Bosnians chose and asked us to help take hold.
- Clear, limited, achievable military mission. Troops will monitor cease-fire, oversee separation and withdrawal of forces, help create secure environment so Bosnians can begin to rebuild their lives.
- Won't mislead you--difficult mission. Will probably be casualties. Take responsibility. But risks to troops minimized. Take orders from American general. Well-trained, heavily armed. If attacked, will respond strongly; deter others.

Exit Strategy

- Military commanders believe military mission can and will be accomplished in about one year.
- Within one year also expect: economic reconstruction firmly launched; free elections held; stable military balance established within Bosnia and region.
- Goal: Create conditions to build a lasting peace, not have NATO stay indefinitely.

Equip and Train

- Stable military balance in Bosnia important to preventing resumption of war and facilitating IFOR departure.
- Intend to pursue strong arms control provisions which provide for "build-down" of forces.
- Commitment to Bosnians that we will coordinate international effort to ensure they have what is needed for self-defense when IFOR leaves.
- Want to assure impartiality of IFOR, so providing arms and training to Federation forces will not be done by either IFOR or U.S. military. U.S. will coordinate efforts of third countries.
- Best practical approach to getting job done while minimizing risks.
- Efforts already underway. Assessment team evaluating needs of the Federation just returned from Bosnia.

Request for Support

- Mission is clear and so are stakes -- for Bosnian people, Europe's stability, U.S. leadership.
- Must let our men and women in the service know that Congress and American people stand behind them. Need your support and help.

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ADMINISTRATION PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Vice President
Secretary Christopher
Secretary Perry
Ambassador Albright
Alice Rivlin
Leon Panetta
Tony Lake
Pat Griffin
General Shalikashvili

SENATE INVITEES

Sen. Bond
Sen. Burns
Sen. Chafee
Sen. Coats
Sen. Cochran
Sen. Cohen
Sen. Hatch
Sen. Kempthorne
Sen. Lugar
Sen. McCain

Sen. Biden
Sen. Breaux
Sen. Dorgan
Sen. Heflin
Sen. Kohl
Sen. Levin
Sen. Lieberman
Sen. Nunn
Sen. Reid
Sen. Rockefeller

OTHER ADMINISTRATION PARTICIPANTS

Sandy Berger
Leon Fuerth
Alphonso Maldon
Thurgood Marshall, Jr.
Michael Feldman
Bill Danvers
Sandy Vershbow
Wendy Sherman
Sandra Stuart

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Veit, Katherine M.

From:	Hilliard, Brenda I.
To:	@EXECSEC - Executive Secretary; @UP - APNSA Special Assistants; @LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs
Cc:	/R, Record at A1
Subject:	CONG MTG, 12/12 ON BOSNIA[UNCLASSIFIED]
Date:	Monday, December 11, 1995 5:04PM
Priority:	High

The following members of the Administration have been invited to the President's meeting with Senators tomorrow in the Cabinet Room, 4-5 p.m. SUBJECT: Bosnia

Vice President
Secretary Christopher
Secretary Perry
Alic Rivlin
Ambassador Albright
Leon Panetta
Anthony Lake
Patrick Griffin
General Shalikashvili (will be travelling but will send a representative)
Samuel Berger
Al Maldon
Leon Fuerth
Bill Danvers
Sandy Vershbow
Thurgood Marshall, Jr. or Michael Feldman (only one will attend)
Wendy Sherman
Sandra Stuart

Thanks very much.

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RECORD ID: 9521400
RECEIVED: 11 DEC 95 11

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 11 DEC 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 12 DEC PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 14 DEC 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FEELEY LOGREF: 9521401 9521407

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0162 CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BASS
		BERGER
		FEELEY
		JOSHI
		KRECZKO
		LAKE
		NSC CHRON
		VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEC CLOSED BY: NSDRS DOC 2 OF 2

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By KDS NARA, Date 10/10/2019
2010-0533-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ RECORD ID: 9521400

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95121115	FOR DECISION
001		X	95121115	LAKE APPROVED RECOM
002		X	95121115	DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	951211	FUERTH, L	
002	951211	BRILL, K	
002	951211	MCALEER, R	
002	951211	INDERFURTH, R	
002	951211	ADAMS, G	
002	951211	PANETTA, L	
002	951211	YANNUZZI, R	
002	951211	WILSON, F	

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National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 21400

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG ~~AVO~~ _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1/3	D/D	
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake	2	has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4		
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____ See note on blue sheet

G:\ExecSec\21400

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, Log # 21400

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

1) Dohm to SB/TL Date Dec 11

OMB was not on the list submitted by S. Vershbow. Should we add them?

vr/ Fred

Add OMB?

Yes ✓ No ___

Per TL conversation w/ C. Millison 12/4

2) ___ to ___ Date ___

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PC 0162

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9521400
DATE 11 DEC 95

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 12 DEC PC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA NOELLE JENSEN ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	12-11-95	6:25	
	PRINT LAST NAME: BEARDSLEY		
	COPY: 1		
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	12/12	7:15A	
	PRINT LAST NAME: McE/Hanley		
	COPY: VIA FAX+1		
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: VIA FAX		
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319			
	PRINT LAST NAME:		
	COPY: VIA FAX		
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	12/11/95	6:29	
	PRINT LAST NAME: GRAVES		
	COPY: 1		
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	12/11/95	17:30	
	PRINT LAST NAME: Palmieri		
	COPY: 1		

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/10/2019
2010-0533-M

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LOG 9521400
DATE 11 DEC 95

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 12 DEC PC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
COL. F. C. WILSON JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

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MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA NOELLE JENSEN ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	12/12	7:15A	S. McE PRINT LAST NAME: McELHANEY COPY: VIA FAX+1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1

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Initials: RDS Date: 10/10/2019
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MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA NOELLE JENSEN ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX+1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	12/11/95	_____	E. Graves PRINT LAST NAME: GRAVES COPY: 1
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/10/2019
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DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9521400
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SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 12 DEC PC MTG ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA NOELLE JENSEN ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX+1
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: VIA FAX
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: 1
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: Panetta COPY: 1

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/10/2019
2010-0533-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

B

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

'96 DEC 11 P3:57 RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 2627 CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Notification & Agenda for 12 Dec. PC Meeting on Bosnia NSC LOG #: 21400

TO (AGENCY)		DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
State	B	Executive Secretary		
DOD	N	Executive Secretary		
USUN	B	Ofc. of the Rep. of the U.S.		736-7699
CIA	A	Executive Secretary		
JCS	D	Secretary, Joint Staff		

REMARKS:

URGENT

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/10/2019
2010-0533-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT 15:43

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: (IMMEDIATE) PRIORITY ROUTINE

RELEASER

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 2627 CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Notification & Agenda for 12 Dec. PC Meeting on Bosnia NSC LOG # 21400

TO (AGENCY)		DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
State	B	Executive Secretary		
DOD	N	Executive Secretary		
USUN	B	Ofc. of the Rep. of the U.S.		736-7699
CIA	A	Executive Secretary		
JCS	D	Secretary, Joint Staff		

REMARKS:

URGENT

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RDS Date: 10/10/2019
2010-0533-M

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: (IMMEDIATE) PRIORITY ROUTINE

RELEASER: [signature]

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 2627 CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Notification & Agenda for 12 Dec. PC Meeting on Bosnia NSC LOG #: 21400

TO (AGENCY)		DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
State	B	Executive Secretary		
DOD	N	Executive Secretary		
USUN	B	Ofc. of the Rep. of the U.S.		736-7699
CIA	A	Executive Secretary		
JCS	D	Secretary, Joint Staff		

REMARKS:

URGENT

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Initials: RDS Date: 10/10/2019
2010-0533-M

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

DEC. 11 TIME OF RECEIP 3 56 PM '95

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: (IMMEDIATE) PRIORITY ROUTINE

RELEASER:

DTG:

MESSAGE NO.: 2627 CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Notification & Agenda for 12 Dec. PC Meeting on Bosnia NSC LOG #: 21400

TO (AGENCY)		DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
State	B	Executive Secretary		
DOD	N	Executive Secretary		
USUN	B	Ofc. of the Rep. of the U.S.		736-7699
CIA	A	Executive Secretary		
JCS	D	Secretary, Joint Staff		

REMARKS:

URGENT

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Initials: RDS Date: 10/10/2019
2010-0533-M

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM (MO) 12.11. '95 15:38 NO. [illegible]

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT
DELTA
11 DEC 95 15 53
NMCC/JCS

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: (IMMEDIATE) PRIORITY ROUTINE

RELEASER: [signature]

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 2627 CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOTAL: 3 (PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Notification & Agenda for 12 Dec. PC Meeting on Bosnia NSC LOG #: 21400

TO (AGENCY)		DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
State	B	Executive Secretary		
DOD	N	Executive Secretary		
USUN	B	Ofc. of the Rep. of the U.S.		736-7699
CIA	A	Executive Secretary		
JCS	D	Secretary, Joint Staff		

REMARKS:

URGENT

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE
- ☐ FLASH
- ☒ IMMEDIATE
- ☐ PRIORITY
- ☐ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting : 12 Dec. PC on Bosnia PAGES: Cover + 2

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

21400

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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2010-0533-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21400

December 11, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(C)~~

There will be a Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia on December 12, 1995, from 2:30 to 3:30 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Principals plus one. The agenda is attached at Tab A. ~~(C)~~

for
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: 12/04/05

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/10/2019
2010-0533-M

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CONFIDENTIAL

NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA
DATE: December 12, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 - 3:30 p.m.

AGENDA

I. Congressional Strategy.....NSC/State

II. Decision Timeline for IFOR (Paris/UN/NATO).....NSC

III. Follow-Up to Holbrooke Mission.....State

-- French Pilots
-- Bosnian Serbs' acceptance of Dayton agreement
-- Security for Serbs in Sarajevo
-- Eliminating Foreign Forces and Terrorist Threats

IV. London Conference Follow-Up .....State

V. Eastern Slavonia.....State/USUN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: 12/04/05

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 3/1/2023

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21400

December 11, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: JOHN FEELEY

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia
December 12, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Principals meeting on Bosnia to be held December 12, 1995. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove ____

Per TL conversation to C. Millison 12/14

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 12/04/05

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By RDS NARA, Date 10/10/2019
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