
Clinton Presidential Records Mandatory Declassification Review

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INFORMATION PAPER


Subject: Lifting the Arms Embargo on Bosnia (U)

1. (S) Background. Should the Contact Group fail to agree to a significant disincentive program, to be applied as a result of the Serb rejection of the proposed map, the US may be forced to consider lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian government. The objective of such a course of action would be to enhance the capabilities of the Federation military so that the situation on the battlefield can be altered enough to force the Serbs to agree to a negotiated political settlement.

2. (U) Courses of Action. There are three general Courses of Action (COAs) for rearming Bosnian forces: light, medium, and heavy.


a. (S) COA 1. Level the playing field. Provide the Bosnian Federation army with a strong offensive capability by arming it to the same level as the Bosnian Serbs, including small arms, mortars, light anti-armor weapons, AT mines, comm gear, tanks, APCs, heavy mortars, rocket launchers, counter-battery radar, etc. (Heavy option)

• This option would cost approximately \$3+ billion dollars to accomplish and could require up to a year to accomplish.



b. (S) COA 2. Upgrade existing forces and add maneuver/counterattack capability. Provide the Bosnian army an increased offensive capability by providing small arms, mortars, light anti-armor weapons, AT mines, comm gear, etc. to properly outfit the Bosnian army, plus tanks, APCs, heavy mortars, rocket launchers, artillery and counter-battery radars to protect safe areas. (Medium option)

• This option would cost approximately \$1.7 billion dollars and take 6-8 months to accomplish.



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c. (S) COA 3. Upgrade existing light forces. Provide small arms, mortars, light anti-armor weapons, AT mines, comm gear, etc. to properly outfit 30-50,000 troops, plus limited counter-battery radar/counter-fire artillery capability. (Light option).

- COA 3 would cost approximately \$170-\$200 million dollars. Light arms could be delivered and absorbed in as little as 2-4 four months. Heavier, more complex systems could require up to 8 months until operationally effective.

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
3. (S) Strike Options. There are three general "strike" scenarios which could be coupled with the "lift" strategy: no support, interim support, and long-term support. Additionally, the applicability of current NATO obligations needs to be considered as well.

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
4. (S) Analysis. The following is a comparison of potential COAs and strike options, aimed at evaluating each combination's likelihood of success.



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
Evaluation:

o Significantly altering the battlefield situation requires robust rearmament and air support. These are long-term, high-cost options.



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5. (S) Unilateral vs Multilateral. The COAs and air strike options remain the same, regardless of whether lifting the arms embargo unilaterally or multilaterally. The following variables, however, are germane:



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EO 13526 1.4a, 1.4b

b. (S) **Equipment Availability.** Under a multilateral approach, the number of potential donors/suppliers would be greater. Embarking on a unilateral program, the US would assume primary responsibility for identifying, acquiring, funding, and supporting a rearmament effort.

EO 13526 1.4a, 1.4b

d. (S) **Training.** Under a unilateral approach, the US would be one of the few available sources of high-quality training. This could require putting troops on the

EO 13526 1.4a, 1.4b

6. (U) Mechanics of arming and training

a. (S) **Equipment sources:** Although limited stocks of required items are available (tanks, APCs, heavy mortars, artillery, and rocket launchers), the US may be required to identify other sources in order to meet Bosnia's requirements for items such as heavy artillery. COA 3, the light option, could be accomplished primarily on the international arms market.


b. (S) **Transportation means and routes:** The Federation agreement makes supply through Croatia the most cost effective option, although Croatia would probably demand significant percentage of the supplies and might balk at heavy weapons shipments.

EO 13526 1.4a, 1.4b

c. (S) **Route protection:**


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d. (S) Training: Training will probably require some US military presence in theater and thereby risk direct USG confrontation with the BSA. Time estimates vary from 2 months (very rudimentary level) for training of B-H forces in place, to a year or more if the USG attempts to level the playing field (COA 1).

- SF could provide in-country training for COA 3.
- COA 1 would require extensive use of training ranges to establish proficiency, plus significant maintenance training.



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SYMMETRICAL RESPONSES

- LOCs through which arms must flow could be interdicted.
- The eastern enclaves could be seized or Sarajevo cutoff.

ASYMMETRICAL RESPONSES

- UN/NGO personnel could be taken hostage should those organizations attempt to withdraw.
- Utilities/support structures could be destroyed making Sarajevo or other urban areas uninhabitable.
- Terrorist attacks could be initiated outside the Balkan region.

4. (U) Conclusions

- a. (S) If this strategy is pursued, the greatest likelihood for success derives from an approach which combines a robust rearmament effort and a complementary, long-term air operation. Dedicated TACPs are a must.
- This option is long-term and high cost.
 - The strategy could require significant dedication of US assets, especially if pursued unilaterally.
- b. (S) In pursuing a unilateral approach, the USG may undermine NATO solidarity and damage the credibility of the UN.

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24 January 1995

Information Paper

Subj: Political and Military Options for Supporting an UNPROFOR Withdrawal From Croatia (U)

1. (U) Purpose. To analyze the political and military aspects of supporting an UNPROFOR withdrawal from Croatia.
2. (U) Background. Croatia has stated it will not renew the UNPROFOR mandate that expires on 31 March and wants all UNPROFOR troops out of the UNPAs by 30 June. Croatia will allow UNPROFOR and UNHCR headquarters to remain in Zagreb if the UN desires; however, the UN has indicated it will relocate the headquarters if UNPROFOR withdrawal becomes a reality. The UN told NATO informally on 23 January it hoped NATO would undertake contingency planning for assistance with a pullout from Croatia. At the 25 January NAC NATO SecGen Claes will seek approval to expand Bosnia withdrawal planning to include Croatia. This will probably result in a specific tasking to the MC to expedite plans to support an UNPROFOR withdrawal from Croatia.
3. (U) Current Planning Status.
 - a. (S) UNPROFOR planning: UNPROFOR has a basic plan for withdrawal from Croatia under unopposed conditions.
 - b. (S) NATO planning: NATO planning priorities have been on withdrawal from Bosnia, with withdrawal from Croatia and Macedonia seen as less likely cases. NATO planners have commenced looking at what changes are required to OPLAN 40104 (NATO support to UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia) if withdrawal from Croatia occurs before or in parallel with withdrawal from Bosnia. A parallel withdrawal effort would significantly complicate the operation and increase troop requirements.
4. (U) Withdrawal Support Options.
 - a. (S) UNPROFOR runs own withdrawal. The UN would run its own withdrawal, contracting for required ground, air, and sea transport. This would be difficult to achieve on short notice due to contracting delays, but could be successful in an unopposed scenario given the available lead-time. However, the UN informal approach to NATO on 23 January suggests the UN may not want to pursue this option.

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b. (C) NATO provides limited support. NATO could offer to provide close air support (CAS), if required, and fixed amounts of communications, logistics, and transport support. This would minimize NATO commitment and cost, and might be relatively easy for the NAC to reach consensus. This could lead to criticism if this option results in UNPROFOR troops suffering significant casualties. NATO and the UN need to define the extent to which UNPROFOR in Croatia is exposed and vulnerable. Decisions on the extent of required support can only be made closer to the time of an actual withdrawal, based on the degree of threat to UNPROFOR posed by the Krajina-Serbs, in particular, and whether the proposed support is sufficient to counter it.

c. (C) Full NATO support similar to Bosnian withdrawal, including NATO ground troops. This would utilize the full extent of NATO assets, but increases NATO liability and commitment. It builds on existing command arrangements, forces in theater, and infrastructure. It is the most likely option to succeed, but will require resolution of issues NATO and the UN have avoided coming to closure on: C2 above theater level, role of Akashi, and financing. (These same issues will need to be resolved to support UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia.) With 7 NATO members with troops in Croatia (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Netherlands, Norway, and the US) and only three deployed to the UNPAs (Belgium, Canada, Denmark) some NATO member countries may be reluctant to support a full-scale NATO withdrawal effort. Our Congress will pose the same objection to US ground troop involvement that it would in a Bosnia contingency. A direct request for withdrawal assistance from Canada or another NATO member would help in the NAC and with Congress.

d. (C) US or other nation unilateral support. The US is the only country that possesses the lift and mobility assets to conduct an operation of this size. A unilateral US operation would be extremely difficult to justify to Congress.

5. (U) Discussion.

a. (C) A full NATO support operation (Option c) is what the UN expects and is the one most likely to succeed in

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the face of expected opposition. It would be hard for NATO to maintain credibility if it decided to support an UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia but not Croatia. It would also seriously damage US credibility among the non-NATO troop contributing nations with forces in Croatia who may be looking to the US and NATO to help evacuate their forces. New Security Council resolutions and NAC decisions will be necessary for a full scale support operation, and might be necessary even to accomplish the limited option.

b. (C) For the present, the UN, NATO, and member states need to emphasize that UNPROFOR has a vital role to play in Croatia, in particular in implementing agreements between Zagreb and the Krajina Serbs. A reduced UNPROFOR presence is preferable to a complete pull-out. When working with the Croatians on the subject of withdrawal planing and support requirements, we must bear in mind that the extensive work required to make an operation successful will have the unintentional side effect of sending a signal that the international community is losing interest in the problems of the region. At this delicate stage in negotiations between Zagreb and Knin, such a signal might be particularly damaging.

c. (C) New Security Council resolutions and NAC decisions, for example to extend CAS to all of the UNPAs, would be necessary were NATO to involve itself in assistance to an UNPROFOR withdrawal from Croatia. The NAC will address these issues on 25 January.

d. (C) In order to be prepared for withdrawal from Bosnia or Croatia, or possible peace plan implementation, SACEUR is proposing the prepositioning of command and control equipment and personnel in Croatia, Germany, and Italy. The Deputies may be requested to discuss this issue in the next several days.

Prepared by: J-5. Balkans working group/STATE EUR/RPM
n:eurcenea/croatia/pmimp.

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Options for Bosnia--Fighting Escalates in the Spring

Purpose: To identify military options that can deter or restrain potential Bosnian Serb military action as fighting intensifies after the expiration of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement on April 30, 1995. The overall objectives are to contain the conflict, reduce the level of violence, ensure the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies and create an environment that will promote a settlement by all the warring parties

Current Dilemma: The current 70/30 territorial split is satisfactory to the Bosnian Serbs but not satisfactory to the Bosnian Government, whose territorial aspirations will not be satisfied by anything less than the Contact Group division of 51/49. The government has used the winter to improve its military capability. Thus the key to the level of fighting over the summer is Bosnian Government forces who have already begun to initiate military action against the Bosnian Serbs. *The BSA has a number of response options beyond direct military confrontation, including attacking or threatening non-combatants in populated areas like Sarajevo, disrupting humanitarian relief operations, or attacking UNPROFOR directly.* Increased hostilities have already aggravated the humanitarian problem in Bihac. Renewed/increased hostilities are also likely to threaten Sarajevo and/or the eastern enclaves. UNPROFOR could be caught in the middle.

Assumptions:

- The U.S. will neither provide direct military support to Bosnian Government initiated action to reverse the current territorial situation .
- Bosnia Government military activity will not threaten non-combatants, disrupt humanitarian relief operations, nor target UNPROFOR.
- NATO will agree to U.S. initiatives. The options listed below require the willingness of many actors. Several of the options have been proposed before but have lacked any consensus for action.

Issues: (1) U.S./NATO military options to limit the violence. (2) Actions UNPROFOR can take to convince the warring parties that a negotiated solution is the preferred course of action. (3) NATO and U.S. options to pressure the UN to be more aggressive.

General Response: *The willingness of UNPROFOR to modify its current status is the critical element in any response strategy for Bosnia.* The US has no direct leverage on the situation in Bosnia without the cooperation and desire for support from UNPROFOR and NATO.

The options below are designed to make UNPROFOR more capable and willing to employ available forces to meet military requirements over the summer. The options are first described generally and then broken down into specific actions under three threat categories. General options are:

- Follow through on the December 1994 CHOD initiative at The Hague. On December 20, 1994, the NATO countries developed a range of options for a more robust approach. The early momentum of pledges to augment UNPROFOR with men and equipment has dissipated.
- Follow through on process to create safe areas/exclusion zones and/or turn existing safe areas into exclusion zones (EZs); The UN Secretary General report in December 1994 was critical of the ineffectual implementation of safe areas and EZs. This could be the first step in a build down approach as advocated by Senator Nunn;
- Assign UNPROFOR units departing Croatia to B-H. Approximately five-ten thousand troops may be leaving as a result of the new UN force structure in Croatia. Many contributing nations may be willing to continue their presence in Bosnia. This would be a ready source of manpower for augmentation.
- Use additional manpower either to force land convoys through, to guard more effectively the weapons control locations, or to strengthen presence in the enclaves. These ideas were proposed by the UK in December 1994 at the CHOD. They are consistent with the UN mandate, but require deterrent airpower to be effective;
- More rigorously enforce the exclusion zones; use air power to eliminate violations. Appropriate authorization already exists with UNSCRs 836, 908, and 958 as well as NAC decisions reached on November 10, 19, & 24, 1994. The difficulty has been with dual key (and at times triple key) implementation procedures. ROE are in place but may not be sufficiently robust;
- Suppress enemy air defenses (SEAD) to facilitate humanitarian airlift/airdrop when reinforced land convoys are not practical. UNSCRs 836 and 958 and NAC decision of November 22, 1994, authorize these operations with the same dual key problems as above.
- Rigorously enforce Deny Flight with SEAD operations, airstrikes, and CAS as appropriate. Again, the NAC and UNSCR authorizations are in place. The difficulties are the practical ones of reaching consensus for action in a timely manner under the constraints of dual and triple key arrangements.

SPECIFIC MILITARY OPTIONS:

Attacks on non-combatants:

1. Safe Area/EZ focus--clearly define the safe areas; create small EZs and expand them. Concentrate UNPROFOR more heavily in these areas. Use military force to defend the people within, including the use of airpower to destroy heavy weapons violating the EZs; requires improved C2 and more and better equipped UNPROFOR.

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2. Central Based Rapid Reaction Force--create viable, mechanized reaction force to respond with ground combat power and air support to defend populations under attack or to break a siege; requires improved C3I, combat equipment, and logistical support.
3. Consolidate populations in UNPROFOR protected safe areas; requires support of the people displaced and greater resources to address their humanitarian needs.

Attacks on UNPROFOR:

1. Increase size and capabilities of UNPROFOR units; give them the manpower and equipment to deter or repel attacks; consolidate UNPROFOR to provide economy of force and efficiency; might require pulling back some of the UNMOs and closing isolated weapons storage sites.
2. Strengthen UNPROFOR escorting humanitarian convoys; develop tougher ROE;
3. Strengthen UNPROFOR at any remaining weapons storage sites; develop appropriate ROE to resist any attempts to seize weapons from the sites.

Disruption of humanitarian relief operations:

1. Secure the Sarajevo airport--requires more and better equipped troops; likely requires the use of SEAD operations, airstrikes, and CAS to keep the air routes safe for the airlift missions; probably requires the establishment and enforcement of a DMZ.
2. Strengthen UNPROFOR escorting the land convoys; idea is to force way through if necessary with adequate ground forces and air cover.
3. Secure a land route to Sarajevo (and perhaps other locations); requires more and better equipped UNPROFOR (armed escort plus rapid reaction force); weather may be a concern, particularly in the winter.
4. Secure Tuzla airport--requires redeployment of UNPROFOR.
5. Consolidate UNPROFOR relief operations activities.

Conclusion: The level of violence and humanitarian suffering in Bosnia this spring and summer will be determined by three factors which provide the US three primary points of influence to affect the situation. First, the nature and scope of Bosnian Government military operation and their degree of success likely will set the overall tone in renewed fighting in Bosnia over the next few months. Second, the Serbs have several response options to government military actions, including attacks on population centers and humanitarian relief efforts. The third factor, and the one most significant to US and international response planning, is the willingness of UNPROFOR to take the necessary organizational and procedural measures to enable aggressive action to respond to an increase in violence. These conditions suggest that the first steps in dealing with the summer violence in Bosnia are to determine if the US will seek to limit government military actions and to determine if UNPROFOR can be persuaded to modify its structures and procedures to deter or restrain Serb attacks. ~~If the former cannot be attained, the latter is not possible.~~

One is probably not attainable without the other.

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
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5 April 95

INFORMATION PAPER

1. Purpose. To provide the CJCS definitions of the NATO reporting system as it relates to OPLAN 40104.

2. Key Points



Prepared by: LCDR, USN
European Division, J-5,
N:EUR/EURCENEA/BOSNIA/PRINCIPALS/NATOREPT.ISS

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INFORMATION PAPER

- 1. (U) Purpose. To provide to the interagency options, and a strategy, to strengthen UNPROFOR.
- 2. (U) Background. The Principals Committee met 28 March 1995 and agreed the US should immediately approach the British and French to explore measures to strengthen UNPROFOR in Bosnia. These initiatives must stay within the current mandate -- to bolster UNPROFOR's ability to protect the delivery of humanitarian aid, and to enhance/improve UNPROFOR's ability to protect itself.

3. (C-REL UK/FR) Options. There are specific options that may strengthen UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate. These include:

- **Securing Sarajevo and Tuzla Airports.** The focal points of international interest in the conflict. [Redacted]

EO 13526 1.4a

- **Establishing a ground corridor between Konjic and Sarajevo.** Would ensure the free flow of aid into Sarajevo. [Redacted]

EO 13526 1.4a

- **Establish ground corridors between Sarajevo and eastern enclaves.** Would ensure free flow of aid to enclaves.
- **Create cease fire lines.** UNPROFOR, without the use of force, can not physically separate the warring factions, without their consent. This initiative must be one fought on the political front, decided among the warring parties, in conjunction with a cessation of hostilities or peace agreement which define demilitarized areas.
- **Increase the number of, and consolidate UNPROFOR into, safe areas and exclusion zones.** The safe area concept is to protect the civilian population and to ensure access for aid. This is not compatible with the use of the safe areas for military activities. Enforcing demilitarization requires increases in UNPROFOR's capability. [Redacted]

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EO 13526 1.4a

- **Enhance capabilities within UNPROFOR.** Provide additional capabilities in order to enhance UNPROFOR's effectiveness. Provide heavy lift

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4. ~~(C-REL UK/FR)~~ Execution Strategy. The Principals Committee decision and the President Clinton/Prime Minister Major meetings provided a rejuvenated effort to strengthen UNPROFOR. To execute this initiative the following steps are necessary:

- CJCS contact British and French CHODs proposing new initiative. Agree to staff level planning, culminating in exchange of proposals by 14 April.
- Expand US proposals (shown above), study options for effectiveness and risk. Provide to British and French on 14 April.
- Convene a tri-lateral staff working group 21-24 April. Refer tri-lateral proposal to capitals on 25 April. Briefing to tri-lateral CHOD meeting on 28 April.
- Brief to President 1 May. Consult Congress 2-5 May.
- Introduce initiative at the UN on 8 May to UNSYG, SRSG, UNPROFOR Commanders.

5. ~~(C-REL UK/FR)~~ Summary. Each proposal must be carefully weighed. Staff working groups should study factors which include, but are not limited to, the risk to UNPROFOR, the cost (financial, personnel, equipment, and readiness), the will of UNPROFOR and contributing nations to achieve the objective, and visibility within the international community to achieve support. Strict enforcement of these measures would lift the pretense of the neutrality of UN and NATO forces. These actions, while neutral to one warring party, are seen as belligerent to the other. Without the complete cooperation of all warring parties, these measures essentially change the character of UNPROFOR operations from peacekeeping to peace enforcement. UNPROFOR is not currently tasked with peace enforcement. Impartiality and the delivery of humanitarian assistance is their first priority. It is not equipped, nor intended to be, to impose a solution. Peacekeeping forces can operate effectively only with the consent and full cooperation of the parties. Proactive actions to force through aid must be carefully weighed against the associated risks and benefits. UNPROFOR must be careful to balance all these divergent factors. Enforcement of these measures can not be seen as a disincentive, but a step towards peace implementation.

Prepared by: (b)(6) LCDR, USN
 European Division, J-5, Ext (b)(6)
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Continuation of Air Support Beyond the Peace Implementation Force (PIF)

Scenario: (S) A peace plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina is accepted by all warring parties. A NATO-led Peace Implementation Force conducts operations to enforce the terms of the peace agreement in B-H. NATO air will continue No Fly Zone (NFZ) operations in the airspace of B-H, and authorized areas of Croatia, to maintain a ban on military flights as an essential element for the safety of the delivery of humanitarian assistance and a decisive step to maintain a cessation of hostilities, and will conduct Close Air Support (CAS) and air strike operations as required, to support the PIF. Operations could include associated support missions such as Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD).

Assumptions: (S) The assumptions in the DoD papers "Implementing a Balkan Settlement" and "Multilateral Equipping and Training of the Bosnian Federation" apply.

Issue: (S) Should NATO continue air operations in the air space of B-H, after departure of the PIF?

Situation: (S) PIF forces have withdrawn from B-H. Multinational forces have completed efforts to equip and train selected elements of the Bosnian Federation Army and have enhanced its capability to defend the territorial integrity of the Bosnian Federation.

There are two alternatives for multinational forces efforts to equip and train the Bosnian Federation Armed Forces with an air defense capability to counter the potential air threat from the Bosnian Serbs: (1) To complete establishing an air defense capability in parallel with the equip and train efforts for ground forces with the delivery of actual weapons just prior to PIF withdrawal or; (2) To delay establishing an air defense capability until after PIF withdraws. The intent in establishing an air defense capability after the PIF withdraws is to not increase risk to NATO air operations while the PIF is in place. Continued NATO air operations would also require UNSC and NAC mandates beyond the PIF mission.

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Assessment: (S)

Close Air Support after the PIF withdraws: Equip and train efforts have provided Bosnian Federation with a self-defense capability including artillery

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and other heavy weapons. Considerations to continue CAS operations beyond the PIF include:

Pros:

- Augments Bosnian Federation capability to conduct defensive operations.

Cons:

- Commits NATO to the defense of the Bosnian Federation with no clear end state.
- Requires trained TACPs on the ground to be effective.
- Requires continued NATO air operations which include impacts on funding, manpower, readiness.
- Requires continued authority for pre-emptive SEAD throughout B-H -- potentially escalatory in nature. Enforcement puts NATO in a perceived position of a belligerent.
- Could result in captured US aircrew without US/NATO ground troops engaged.

Air Strike Operations after PIF withdraws: Equip and train efforts have provided Bosnian Federation with a self-defense capability including artillery and other heavy weapons. Considerations to continue air strike operations beyond the PIF include:

Pros:

- Provides Federation deep strike capability against the Bosnian Serbs.

Cons:

- Commits NATO to the defense of the Bosnian Federation with no clear end state.
- Requires continued NATO intelligence effort to maintain target lists.
- Requires continued NATO air operations which include impacts on funding, manpower, readiness.
- Requires continued authority for pre-emptive SEAD throughout B-H -- potentially escalatory in nature; places NATO in a perceived role of a belligerent.
- Could result in captured US aircrew without US/NATO ground troops engaged.

"No-Fly" Operations after PIF withdraws:

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Pros:

- Under the case of delaying the equipping of an air defense capability, NFZ would maintain a balance of power in B-H until Bosnian Federation establishes air defense capability.

Cons:

- Requires continued NATO air operations which include impacts on funding, manpower, readiness.
- Requires continued authority for pre-emptive SEAD throughout B-H -- potentially escalatory in nature. Enforcement puts NATO in a perceived position of a belligerent.
- Could result in captured US aircrew without US/NATO ground troops engaged.

Conclusion: (S) CAS and air strikes are not militarily required once the Bosnian Federation has established an effective self defense capability on the ground. Once the Bosnian Federation air defense capability is established, there is no military requirement for NATO NFZ operations to maintain a balance of power in B-H.

To ensure NATO is not committed to defending the Bosnian Federation beyond the PIF, establishing the Bosnian Federation air defense capability should occur concurrently with other equip and train efforts and should be completed before the PIF withdraws. This end state can be achieved while minimizing the time period in which NATO air operations are at greater risk.] ✓

To minimize this period of vulnerability, the multinational equip and train forces could conduct the assessment of the Bosnian Federation air defense requirements, conduct training of operators outside of B-H, and identify and stockpile air defense equipment concurrently with other equip and train efforts with the ground forces. The final phase of actually equipping the Bosnian Federation air defense could commence just prior to the PIF withdrawal.

If as part of the peace negotiations, it is necessary to offer the Bosnian Federation an additional short term insurance policy after PIF withdrawal, only NFZ operations should continue and only then for a defined limited period of time. Actually equipping the Bosnian Federation air defense would be delayed until NFZ operations cease.

Prepared by: (b)(6) LCDR, USN
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