
Clinton Presidential Records Mandatory Declassification Review


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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506



April 17, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER
FROM: JANE E. HOLL
SUBJECT: Principals Meeting on Bosnia, April 18, 1994

The package for the Principals meeting on Bosnia is attached at Tab I. Tab B contains the issues paper for discussion and has been reviewed by State, OSD and JCS.

OSD and JCS believe strongly that Principals should review whether ratchetting up the military pressure to force Serb compliance with UN resolutions is a sound strategy to pursue at this juncture. To give you a flavor of their concerns, I have attached the informal JCS scrub of the issues paper at Tab II. Additionally, the draft agenda opens the discussion to alternative strategies Principals might wish to suggest.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memorandum to agencies at Tab I.

Approve *W* Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to Agencies
Tab A Agenda
Tab B Issues Paper
Tab II JCS Comments on the Issues Paper

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Tabc

Options for Improving the Military Capabilities of the Bosnian Federation

The US Government has three basic option for improving the military capabilities of the Bosnian Federation by organizing, training, and equipping its forces. These options apply to the main components of such a program--funding, acquisition, and delivery. The options are: (a) the United States sponsors the lifting of the arms embargo, steps aside; and lets the international arms market provide whatever the Federation can afford, (b) the United States contributes part of the funding, weapons, training, and transport in conjunction with its NATO Allies and others, and (c) the United States alone provides the bulk of what is needed by the Federation.

Options for funding. The JCS estimates that roughly from \$100-300 million would be needed to enable the Federation to improve meaningfully its ability to wage war against the Bosnian Serbs, depending upon whether the United States went with a light or a heavy option. Although loans to the Federation are a possible option, the Bosnian government's ability to repay large sums anytime soon is subject to doubt. Moreover, it is virtually certain that the international financial institutions would not provide loans for acquiring weapons.

- **No US funding.** The Federation already has funds set aside for acquiring arms, has received weapons from Iran, and gets financial support from sympathetic Muslim countries, such as Saudi Arabia. Allowing these established mechanisms to function without hindrance would be the least expensive option for the United States but would also open the way to increased influence in Bosnia for Muslim countries, including Iran and other radical states.
- **Multilateral funding.** This option requires a new grouping of countries, hopefully predominantly Western, that would provide funding. In lieu of cash contributions, Allies could assist by providing in kind assistance, such as weapons, transport, or training sites. Multilateral funding would make it possible to tap into potential sources of major contributions (such as the Saudis) without giving up control of the operation. The advantages of this option are that it spreads the burden and gives Western countries first claim on whatever influence is derived by funding the operation. The disadvantage is that this option is likely to be difficult to implement because most West European countries are already complaining about the costs of their operations in Bosnia and are unlikely to come up with significant amounts of money.
- **US funding.** By unilaterally providing most or perhaps all of the funds necessary, the United States maximizes its control over the operation and stands to gain the most influence with the Federation. The disadvantages are that this is the most expensive option and the United States will bear sole responsibility for any difficulties

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encountered. The outlay of cash could be significantly reduced by providing weapons from US stocks (see below).

Options for sources of weapons. Bosnian forces are most capable of quickly absorbing equipment which resembles Warsaw Pact models with which Federation troops are already familiar. Federation officials have requested modest amounts of weapons--including small arms, artillery, helicopters, tanks, anti-tank rockets, and air defense equipment--but this may not be their entire shopping list. Training would also be necessary, especially for any heavy or non-Warsaw pact equipment. Options for training include: (a) non-US personnel conducting training in Bosnia, (b) US and non-US personnel conducting training in Europe, and (c) US personnel conducting training in the United States.

- **International arms market.** Plenty of Soviet bloc weapons are readily available at reasonable prices. Allowing the Federation to make purchases on the open market would reduce the administrative burden on the United States. On the other hand, the United States would lose a degree of control (such as over the amount of offensive weapons) and open market purchases would also increase the potential for corruption and problems with quality control.
- **East European or NATO stocks.** Purchasing from Eastern Europe would provide weapons that would require the least training for Federation troops and would provide welcome income for countries that are bearing much of the burden of enforcing sanctions. The US Government would have to determine whether sufficient trainers are available from US or East European sources. Material and training from NATO sources would be less appropriate, and providing such weapons might generate objections and delays from some of the Allies, such as Greece.
- **US stocks.** Providing weapons from US stocks would reduce the cash outlay and maximize US control by, for example, limiting the amount of offensive weapons provided. US weapons would also be available quickly during the period of Federation vulnerability to Serb attack immediately after a lifting of the embargo is announced. However, considerable training (six to twelve months) would be necessary before large amounts of US equipment could be used effectively. Moreover, providing weapons changes the United States from a neutral outsider to an active belligerent clearly taking sides in the conflict. Providing large amounts of weapons will increase the scope and intensity of the fighting, which in turn will exacerbate the humanitarian crisis.

Options for delivery. Transporting weapons to the Federation forces involves two distinct problems: (a) shipping the weapons from their source to the border of land-locked Bosnia, which will require cooperation from Croatia, and (b) moving the weapons

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from the border to training areas or the front, which will require transport through a conflict zone. Supplies can be delivered by sea, air, or land. Although sea routes provide the most capacity, ultimately land routes will be necessary to move large amounts of cargo quickly to the Bosnian forces. Bottlenecks are likely to develop because of the shortage of suitable ports (Split and Ploce), the limited number of airfields capable of handling large cargo aircraft, and the poor condition of many roads. Considerable amounts probably will have to be delivered by air drops, which are the most expensive option. Weapons shipments will also have to compete with relief supplies for scarce transport capacity. Federation forces, with limited resources and the distractions of conducting a war, are unlikely to be of much assistance in assuring transport across Bosnian territory.

- **Private transportation.** Although it will add to the costs, private entrepreneurs could arrange shipment to sites adjacent to Bosnia. It is unlikely, however, that they would take responsibility for delivery all the way to Federation forces.
- **Multilateral participation.** Contribution of funds or transport from others, such as NATO or a coalition of the willing, would spread the burden. The UN or other international organizations are unlikely, however, to support sending weapons to Bosnia. A coalition of the willing will be difficult to arrange. Other countries' heavy lift resources are limited. Even if they have the resources, other countries are likely to be hesitant about making deliveries through a conflict zone.
- **US transport.** Under the guidelines provided by the NSC, this would be limited, on the ground, to providing transport only as far as the border, with no US forces in Bosnia. Providing transport for all or part of the way will add to the cost for the United States and increase the risk of US involvement in the fighting, especially through attacks on US aircraft. The large amounts of supplies required and the vulnerability of many Bosnian airfields to Serb artillery mean that it will be impossible to deliver what is needed by air. Large numbers of aircraft would be needed, especially for the final leg, and with Bosnian airfields likely to be threatened, much of the delivery probably would have to be made by air drops.

Drafted by ISA/ENP, TWalton, x56516

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SUBJ/USCINCEUR OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTS OF THE NUNN-

MITCHELL AMENDMENT// (U)
 REF/A/MSG/JOINT STAFF/062325Z OCT 94 (S) //
 AMPH/ (U) MESSAGE TASKING USCINCEUR TO PERFORM OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS
 OF THE IMPACT OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NUNN-MITCHELL AMENDMENT.
 USCINCEUR IS DIRECTED TO CONSIDER THE LANGUAGE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL
 SIGNING STATEMENT IN THE ANALYSIS.//
 REF/B/NUNN-MITCHELL AMENDMENT//
 REF/C/STATEMENT/PRESIDENT CLINTON/05OCT94//
 AMPH/ (U) PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENT//
 REF/D/MEMORANDUM/SECSTATE/12OCT94//
 AMPH/ (U) SECSTATE ANALYSIS OF THE NUNN-MITCHELL AMENDMENT//

- HARR/
- (U) IN ACCORDANCE WITH JOINT STAFF DIRECTION (REF A), FOLLOWING IS USCINCEUR'S OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF THE NUNN-MITCHELL AMENDMENT (REF B) ON MILITARY SUPPORT TO SHARP GUARD, DENY FLIGHT, AND RELATED OPERATIONS. THE LANGUAGE IN THE AMENDMENT LEAVES LATITUDE FOR INTERPRETATION AND WHEN COMBINED WITH THE PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENT AND SECSTATE ANALYSIS, LEAVES ROOM FOR BROAD FLEXIBILITY.
 - (S) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. IT IS OPERATIONALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO DISTINGUISH OPERATIONS SUPPORTING THE BOSNIA ARMS EMBARGO FROM THOSE ENFORCING SANCTIONS AGAINST SERBIA. OUR OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS INDICATES THAT OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF SHARP GUARD, DENY FLIGHT, TASK FORCE ABLE BENTRY, AND PROVIDE PROMISE WOULD CONTINUE UNHINDERED. EXCEPTIONS WOULD OCCUR UNDER VERY NARROW SETS OF CIRCUMSTANCES, PARTICULARLY DENY FLIGHT NO-FLY ZONE ENFORCEMENT AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED AIR SHIPMENTS, BUT THESE WOULD BE RARE AND WOULD NOT SIGNIFICANTLY IMPACT OPERATIONS. IN THE EVENT THIS INTERPRETATION IS INCORRECT, THE CONSEQUENCES COULD BE FAR REACHING AND COULD IMPACT ON VIRTUALLY ALL OPERATIONS IN THE AREA.
 - (U) ANALYSIS. THE PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENT (REF C) AND SECSTATE ANALYSIS (REF D) BOTH MAKE A KEY INTERPRETATION OF THE AMENDMENT REGARDING SUBSECTION (F)(3)(B). THE PRESIDENT STATES "I SIGN THE BILL WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT IT THEREFORE WOULD NOT AFFECT THE UNITED STATES ABILITY TO PARTICIPATE IN ACTIVITIES IN THE ADRIATIC THAT ARE NEEDED IN ORDER TO AVOID IMPEDING ENFORCEMENT OF SANCTIONS AGAINST SERBIA... EVEN IF DOING SO PROVIDES INDIRECT OR INCIDENTAL SUPPORT OR ASSISTANCE FOR THE BOSNIA ARMS EMBARGO". THE SECSTATE ANALYSIS CONCURS: "IF AN ACTIVITY IS OF A NATURE THAT FAILURE TO UNDERTAKE IT WOULD IMPEDE ENFORCEMENT OF SANCTIONS AGAINST SERBIA, THE NUNN-MITCHELL AMENDMENT DOES NOT PROHIBIT THE PRESIDENT FROM UNDERTAKING IT".
 - (S) THE AMENDMENT STATES THAT "NO FUNDS... MAY BE USED FOR THE PURPOSE OF PARTICIPATION IN, SUPPORT FOR, OR ASSISTANCE TO THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE BOSNIA ARMS EMBARGO... [BUT] NOTHING IN [THE] LANGUAGE IS INTENDED TO IMPEDE ENFORCEMENT OF SANCTIONS AGAINST

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SERBIA". NONE REPEAT NONE OF THE OPERATIONS IN THE REGION EXIST SOLELY TO ENFORCE THE ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST BOSNIA. OPERATIONS SHARP GUARD AND DENY FLIGHT ENFORCE UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS EQUALLY AMONG ALL TARGET NATIONS, INCLUDING THE ARMS EMBARGO AND SERBIAN SANCTION ENFORCEMENT. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO SEPARATE ONE FROM THE OTHER. TERMINATING U.S. MILITARY SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS ENFORCING THE EMBARGO WOULD NECESSARILY IMPEDE ENFORCEMENT OF SANCTIONS AGAINST SERBIA, THEREBY VIOLATING THE CLEAR INTENT OF SUBSECTION (F)(3)(B). AS SUCH, IT IS OUR ANALYSIS, AS SET FORTH BELOW, THAT OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF SHARP GUARD AND DENY FLIGHT WILL BE ABLE TO CONTINUE UNCONSTRAINED (EXCEPT AS SET FORTH IN PARAGRAPH 8 BELOW).

5. (S) CERTAIN MILITARY OPERATIONS WOULD NOT BE AFFECTED IN ANY CASE SINCE THEY DO NOT CONTRIBUTE TO ENFORCING THE ARMS EMBARGO, EVEN INDIRECTLY. THEY INCLUDE THE 60 BED HOSPITAL IN ZAGREB, COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE EFFORTS, TASK FORCE ABLE SENTRY OPERATIONS, AND CLOSE AIR SUPPORT AND AIRSTRIKE OPERATIONS FOR DENY FLIGHT.

6. (S) TASKS SUPPORTING OPERATION SHARP GUARD. TASKS BELOW SUPPORT OPERATION SHARP GUARD AND ITS MISSION TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS TO MONITOR AND ENFORCE COMPLIANCE WITH U.N. SANCTIONS (RESOLUTIONS 713, 757, 787, AND 820). PREVENTING ALL UNAUTHORIZED SHIPPING FROM ENTERING THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO) AND ALL ARMS FROM ENTERING THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA.

6A. (S) TWO DESTROYERS UNDER NATO OPCON/TACON CONDUCT MARITIME INTERDICTION OPERATIONS (MIO). SPECIFICALLY, THEY:

6A1. (S) PATROL ASSIGNED AREAS.

6A2. (S) STOP ALL MERCHANT SHIPS ENTERING THE ADRIATIC SEA.

6A3. (S) BOARD SUSPECT SHIPS IF REQUIRED TO OBTAIN NECESSARY INFORMATION.

6A4. (S) DIVERT SHIPS TO PORTS FOR FURTHER INSPECTION, AS REQUIRED.

6B. (C) ONE SUBMARINE UNDER U.S. OPCON AND NATO TACON, PROVIDES DIRECT SURVEILLANCE SUPPORT. IT IS ASSIGNED TO NATO COMMANDER SUBMARINE FORCES MED.

6B1. (S) THE SUBMARINE CREW PROVIDES INTELLIGENCE AND WARNING INFORMATION TO COMMANDER TASK FORCE 440, WHO IS DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR ENFORCEMENT OF THE OPERATION.

6C. (S) EIGHT F-3C AIRCRAFT PROVIDE 24 HOUR SURVEILLANCE AND SUCAP COVERAGE FOR OPERATION SHARP GUARD FORCES. FOUR OF THE AIRCRAFT OPERATE UNDER DIRECT NATO CONTROL.

6C1. (S) THE AIRCRAFT PROVIDE CRITICAL SHIPPING INFORMATION TO COMMANDER TF40 TO ALLOW SURFACE SHIP INTERCEPTION OF MERCHANT SHIPS.

6D. (C) ONE U.S. CRUISER REMAINS UNDER U.S. OPCON, BUT DIRECTLY SUPPORTS SHARP GUARD.

6D1. (C) ACTS AS THE ANTI-AIR WARFARE COORDINATOR (AANC).

6D2. (C) ACTS AS THE NAVAL TACTICAL DATA SYSTEM (NTDS) COORDINATOR (CALLED REDCROWN).

6D3. (S) PROVIDES NTDS LINK WITH NATO AWACS.

6E. (S) U.S. CARRIER BATTLE GROUP OR MARG PERIODICALLY ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY FOR SEVERAL SHARP GUARD TASKS.

6E1. (S) SURFACE/SUBSURFACE SURVEILLANCE AND CONTROL.

6E2. (S) ELECTRONIC WARFARE AND ELECTRONIC SUPPORT MEASURES.

6E3. (S) AIRBORNE COMMAND AND CONTROL.

6E4. (S) COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE.

6E5. (S) COORDINATES WITH JFACC AND NATO CAOC FOR DENY FLIGHT OPERATIONS, AND WITH COMMANDER TF440 FOR SHARP GUARD.

6E6. (S) SHARES INFORMATION WITH SHARP GUARD FORCES ON SHIPPING CONTACTS AND HIGH INTEREST MERCHANT VESSELS. THIS HELPS FORCES MAINTAIN AN ACCURATE AND COMPLETE SURFACE PICTURE WHICH IS ESSENTIAL TO THE OVERALL SANCTION EFFORT.

7. (C) TASKS SUPPORTING OPERATION DENY FLIGHT. TASKS BELOW SUPPORT OPERATION DENY FLIGHT AND ITS THREE MISSIONS TO: CONDUCT UNDER A AIRCRAFT MONITORING AND ENFORCE COMPLIANCE WITH UNSCR 816 WHICH...

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FLIGHTS BY FIXED AND ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT IN THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA NO FLY ZONE, TO PROVIDE PROTECTIVE AIR COVER (CAS) AT THE REQUEST OF AND CONTROLLED BY UNPROFOR UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF UNSCR 836, AND TO—ON ORDER AND IN COORDINATION WITH THE U.N.—CONDUCT APPROVED AIR STRIKES AGAINST DESIGNATED TARGETS THREATENING THE SECURITY OF THE U.N. SAFE AREAS OF BIHAC, GORAZDE, SARAJEVO, SREBENICA, TUSLA, AND ZEPA.

7A. (S) OUR ANALYSIS INDICATES NUNN-MITCHELL WOULD HAVE LITTLE IMPACT ON ENFORCEMENT OF UNSCR 836, WHICH AUTHORIZES CAS AND AIR-STRIKE MISSIONS, SINCE THOSE ARE RELATED TO ENFORCEMENT OF THE EXCLUSION ZONES, AND TO SAFETY OF U.N. PERSONNEL AND DO NOT AFFECT EMBARGO OPERATIONS.

7B. (S) ANALYSING THE IMPACT ON ENFORCEMENT OF THE NO-FLY ZONE IS PROBLEMATIC. ENFORCEMENT OF THE NO-FLY ZONE PROTECTS U.N. PERSONNEL FROM AIR ATTACKS, MONITORS AND ENFORCES EXCLUSION ZONES, AND PREVENTS UNAUTHORIZED SHIPMENTS FROM ENTERING BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA. ONLY THOSE FLIGHTS SPECIFICALLY PROHIBITING UNAUTHORIZED SHIPMENTS WOULD BE AFFECTED BY THE AMENDMENT. IN PRACTICE, DENY FLIGHT NO-FLY ZONE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY SUPPORT THE PROTECTION AND EXCLUSION ZONE ASPECTS OF THE MISSION. AS SUCH, IT IS OUR ANALYSIS THAT WHILE A FEW FLIGHTS MAY BE AFFECTED, THE PRACTICAL IMPACT WILL BE NEGLIGIBLE. SPECIFIC TASKS IN SUPPORT OF ALL ASPECTS OF DENY FLIGHT FOLLOW.

7C. (C) COMBAT AIRCRAFT, OPERATING WITHIN A NATO C2 STRUCTURE, WORK UNDER COMMANDER ALLIED FORCES SOUTHERN EUROPE (COMAIRSOUTH), WITH DAY TO DAY OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF MISSION TASKING DELEGATED TO COMMANDER 5TH ALLIED TACTICAL AIR FORCE (5ATAF).

7C1. (C) FORCES SUPPORTING CAS AND NO-FLY ZONE (NFZ) ENFORCEMENT INCLUDE EIGHT USMC F/A-18D AND TWELVE USAF F-16C.

7C2. (C) TWELVE USN F/A-18C (OR F-14) SUPPORT ONLY THE NFZ.

7C3. (C) CAS OPERATIONS ARE CONDUCTED BY EIGHT USAF F-15E, TWELVE USAF O/A-10, SIX USN F/A-18C (OR A-6E).

7C4. (C) THREE USAF AC-130 PROVIDE GUNSHIP SUPPORT, AS REQUIRED.

7D. (C) COMBAT SUPPORT AIRCRAFT. THREE USAF KC-130 AND TEN USAF KC-135 PROVIDE C2 AND REFUELING SUPPORT TO DENY FLIGHT AIRCRAFT.

7D1. (C) USAF CREWEN ARE ASSIGNED TO THE NATO AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING FORCE, PROVIDING SURVEILLANCE, C2, AND FIGHTER DIRECTION. OTHER SUPPORT FORCES PROVIDE FUEL, ORDNANCE, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND LIVE SUPPORT AS REQUIRED FOR AIR OPERATIONS.

7E. (S) U.S. SURFACE SHIPS IN THE ADRIATIC OPERATING UNDER U.S. OPCON PROVIDE DIRECT AND INDIRECT SUPPORT TO DENY FLIGHT OPS.

7F1. (S) SERVE AS LAUNCH PLATFORMS FOR CARRIER BASED AIRCRAFT. PROVIDE DATA LINKS TO NATO AEW AIRCRAFT.

7F2. (S) RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT. RC-135'S AND EP-3'S PROVIDE THREAT WARNING, NOT ONLY TO DENY FLIGHT AIRCRAFT, BUT TO OPERATION PROVIDE PROMISE HUMANITARIAN AIRLIFT OPERATIONS AS WELL.

7G. (S) U-2'S OFFER LIMITED THREAT WARNING AND INTELLIGENCE DATA, AND PROVIDE IMAGERY TO SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT OF THE EXCLUSION ZONES.

7H. (S) SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES CONDUCT: COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE. NIGHT ATTACK MISSIONS, AS REQUIRED. RECONNAISSANCE SUPPORT.

7H1. (S) COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE. NIGHT ATTACK MISSIONS, AS REQUIRED. RECONNAISSANCE SUPPORT.

7H2. (S) NIGHT ATTACK MISSIONS, AS REQUIRED. RECONNAISSANCE SUPPORT.

7H3. (S) RECONNAISSANCE SUPPORT. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT IS PROVIDED FOR A VARIETY OF MISSIONS. IMPLEMENTATION OF NUNN-MITCHELL WOULD CURTAIL INTELLIGENCE WHICH WAS STRICTLY LIMITED TO KNOWLEDGE OF ILLEGAL ARMS SHIPMENTS TO BOSNIA. THIS REPRESENTS ONLY A SMALL PART OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION AND DISSEMINATION, BUT A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF THE NATO INTELLIGENCE EFFORT.

7I. (S) UNDER A VERY NARROW SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES, IT IS CONCEIVABLE THE AMENDMENT WOULD IMPACT ON OPERATIONS. THE CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRE PERFECT KNOWLEDGE OF AN INBOUND ARMS SHIPMENT TO BOSNIA, WITH ONLY

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INTERDICTION RESOURCES READILY AVAILABLE. IN THAT EVENT, A U.S. MILITARY OFFICER OCCUPYING A NATO LEADERSHIP POSITION WOULD BE PLACED IN THE IMPOSSIBLE SITUATION OF BEING REQUIRED BY NUNN-MITCHELL NOT TO ORDER U.S. FORCES TO BOARD AND DIVERT THE SHIP, BUT REQUIRED BY NATO RULES TO DO EXACTLY THE OPPOSITE. THE U.S. SHIP COMMANDER RECEIVING SUCH AN ORDER WOULD BE PLACED IN A SIMILARLY IMPOSSIBLE SITUATION.

9. (S) THE FORGOING ANALYSIS CLEARLY FORECASTS ONLY MINIMAL IMPACT ON OPERATIONS, PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF THE FLEXIBILITY ALLOWED BY THE LANGUAGE OF THE AMENDMENT. IF, HOWEVER, THE ANALYSIS IS INCORRECT, AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE AMENDMENT ARE STRICTLY INTERPRETED, WITH THE CAVEAT IN SUBSECTION (F)(3)(B) MINIMIZED, THE RESULTS WOULD BE FAR REACHING AND WOULD AFFECT NEARLY ALL OPERATIONS, EVEN THOSE NOT SUPPORTING THE EMBARGO. 9A. (C) U.S. MILITARY SUPPORT TO OPERATION SHARP GUARD WOULD EFFECTIVELY SHUT DOWN. OPERATIONS DENY FLIGHT, PROVIDE PROMISE, AND TASK FORCE ABLE SENTRY WOULD ALSO BE NEGATIVELY IMPACTED. AND EVEN THOUGH MEMBERS OF NATO STAFFS ARE EXCLUDED FROM THE PROVISIONS OF THE AMENDMENT, THEY WOULD BE PLACED IN AN UNTENABLE COMMAND AND CONTROL RELATIONSHIP. NUMEROUS U.S. PERSONNEL, INCLUDING CINCSOUTH AND COMAIRSOUTH, WORK WITH AFSOUTH AND SUBORDINATE NATO STAFFS TO PROVIDE OPERATIONAL DIRECTION AND ADMINISTRATION. BECAUSE OF THIS RELATIONSHIP, STRICT NUNN-MITCHELL IMPLEMENTATION COULD UNDERMINE THE COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE AND THE CREDIBILITY OF THE LEADERSHIP BY PLACING THE OFFICERS IN UNTENABLE POSITIONS.

9B. (U) OPERATION PROVIDE PROMISE. ALTHOUGH OPERATION PROVIDE PROMISE DOES NOT SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT OF THE ARMS EMBARGO, ITS HUMANITARIAN AIRLIFT MISSIONS COULD ALSO BE AFFECTED. BOTH AIRLAND AND AIRDROP MISSIONS CURRENTLY REQUIRE THE AVAILABILITY OF THREAT WARNING, C2, FIGHTER CAP, AND CSAR FOR EXECUTION. IF THESE ACTIONS WERE NOT CONTINUED, AIRLAND AND AIRDROP MISSIONS WOULD EITHER BE TERMINATED OR CURTAILED IN THE ABSENCE OF ROE OR MISSION CHANGES.

10. (C) OTHER IMPORTANT IMPACT. IT IS DIFFICULT TO PREDICT WITH CERTAINTY THE REACTION OF THE BOSNIAN SERBS OR OTHER WARRING FRACTIONS TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NUNN-MITCHELL. OUR INITIAL ASSESSMENT IS THAT IT WILL LIKELY CAUSE THEM TO TAKE AN OPENLY HOSTILE STANCE TOWARD U.S. OPERATIONS, SINCE IT WOULD BE VIEWED AS ABANDONING OUR IMPARTIALITY. OPEN HOSTILITIES WOULD JEOPARDISE THE U.N. HUMANITARIAN MISSION AND PRESENT A THREAT TO U.S. AIRCRAFT, AIRCREWS, SHIPS, AND SAILORS IN THE REGION.

11. (U) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. ASIDE FROM THE PRECONDITIONS FOR AIRLAND AND AIRDROP MISSIONS, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT NECESSARY CHANGES TO ROE IN THE ABSENCE OF A STRICT LEGAL INTERPRETATION OF PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES AND THE INHERENT SUBSEQUENT MISSION CHANGES.

12. (S) SUMMARY. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO DISTINGUISH OPERATIONS SUPPORTING THE ARMS EMBARGO FROM THOSE ENFORCING SANCTIONS AGAINST SERBIA. OUR OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS INDICATES THAT OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF SHARP GUARD, DENY FLIGHT, TASK FORCE ABLE SENTRY, AND PROVIDE PROMISE WOULD CONTINUE UNHINDERED. EXCEPTIONS WOULD OCCUR UNDER VERY NARROW SETS OF CIRCUMSTANCES, PARTICULARLY DENY FLIGHT NO-FLY ZONE ENFORCEMENT AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED AIR SHIPMENTS, BUT THESE WOULD BE RARE AND WOULD NOT SIGNIFICANTLY IMPACT OPERATIONS.

13. (U) POC FOR THIS ANALYSIS IS LT COL KID CURRY, DSN 430-4120.//
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



18 OCT 1994

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MEMORANDUM FOR EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL

FROM: EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
Prepared by T Walton, OSD Yugo. Task Force, x56516

SUBJECT: U.S. Observers for Serbian/Bosnian Border

In response to your memorandum of October 1, 1994, on U.S. Participation in the Serbian Border Monitoring Mission, USDP Slocombe has requested the Secretary of the Army to act on this matter. Any further queries or instructions should be referred to his office.

We have already begun a search for qualified personnel for this important mission and hope to deploy them as soon as possible.

The Yugoslav Task Force in the Office of the Secretary of Defense will continue their regular contacts with the NSC on the observer mission and monitor its progress. The Department of the Army point of contact is COL Gibson, Army Materiel Command, (703) 274-8195.

Robert P. McAleer
Robert P. McAleer

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

29 November 1994



MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: US Participation in UNPROFOR Withdrawal Operations (U)

~~(S-NF)~~ NATO's detailed planning for the withdrawal of UNPROFOR will not be complete until mid-December. However, the emerging concept is as follows: NATO will assume command of the theater, including operational command of UNPROFOR within Bosnia-Herzegovina. Forward command posts from NATO, including a corps, a subordinate division, and several brigade level headquarters, will deploy to Bosnia. Although the actual level of NATO forces required will be based on intelligence estimates and political conditions at the time of mission execution, this operation could require heavy support, including four to five additional brigades. Some or all of the NATO forces and supporting elements would be pre-positioned into the theater or inside Bosnia before the actual withdrawal commences in order to deter resistance from warring elements.

~~(S-NF)~~ Up to now, we have declined to commit to participation in this proposed operation. Now, in view of the frictions that have developed within the Alliance, it is important at the upcoming series of meetings with NATO that the Secretary of State, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I be authorized to tell our counterparts that the United States agrees in principle to participate in a NATO-led operation to support UNPROFOR's withdrawal, including committing ground forces, subject to our review of the detailed plans and consultations with Congress.

Bill Perry

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1 February 1995

DECISION PAPER

Subject: Pre-positioning for Bosnia Contingencies (U)

1. (C) Purpose. To provide information for Interagency decision on the early commitment of US communications personnel and assets when SACEUR requests, and the NAC approves, the early deployment of the initial C3 package and other Phase 1 actions prior to NAC approval of OPLAN 40104 and a NAC decision to execute the remaining phases of the withdrawal operation.

2. (U) Background.

a. (C) There is general consensus that negotiations have stalled and renewed warfare in Bosnia (and Croatia) this Spring is likely. This is not to detract from the importance of continuing to pursue negotiations as the only means of preventing a resumption of fighting, but reflects the realities of the situation. Since the same pre-positioning is required for either peace plan implementation or withdrawal support, NATO military authorities desire to take prudent military measures to support either eventuality.

b. (C) The following confluence of factors supports the need to be ready to conduct an UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia in April/May 1995: the expiration of the UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia (31 March), the expiration of the four month cessation of hostilities agreement (30 April), the Bosnian government push to give the Bosnian Serbs a 2 month deadline to start negotiations or return to open warfare, the next sanctions renewal review (late April), and the return of good weather when Spring arrives.

c. (C) Final MC and NAC approval of OPLAN 40104 could take several weeks. If approval is unduly delayed SACEUR may request the NAC to authorize the deployment of the C3 package and other Phase 1 actions in advance of OPLAN approval and a decision to actually commence the withdrawal operation.

d. (C) SACEUR has established the following planning timelines for an UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia: (derived from a combination of OPLAN 40104 and information provided by SACEUR)

PHASE 1 (PREPARATION) (Duration: 4 weeks, commencing 6-8 weeks prior to a NAC decision to execute the withdrawal)

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- SACEUR would request NAC approval of the OPLAN or a separate NAC decision to implement Phase 1.
- Logistic/Movement Control actions must be initiated. Deployment of pre-positioned assets provided by the US required, date uncertain.
- Installation of C3 architecture commences. Includes deployment of pre-positioned assets provided by the US.

PHASE 2 (DEPLOYMENT OF MAIN BODY OF TROOPS BEFORE ACTUAL WITHDRAWAL OPERATIONS BEGIN) (Duration 2-4 weeks)

- The NAC decision to execute the withdrawal starts Phase 2.
- Two to four weeks are required before the initial 3 NATO brigades (2-US, 1.4d) begin operations in Bosnia.

The OPLAN estimates a decision not to deploy prepositioned C3 assets would delay the operation by about 10 days. SACEUR is reexamining this timeline and attempting to implement actions which shorten the time required for Phase 1.

3. (U) Pre-positioned C3 Package Details.

a. (C) The C3 package, consisting of about 800 personnel and equipment

[redacted] EO 13526 1.4d

[redacted] provides a full, secure military communications system with ties to theater tactical systems, NATO systems, national military systems, commercial phone systems, and the UNPROFOR system. Personnel would

[redacted] EO 13526 1.4d

[redacted] No personnel would be deployed to Bosnia or the Krajina as part of the initial C3 package. The number of C3 nodes to be activated during pre-positioning, the number of soldiers, and their nationalities are still being refined, as is the number of support and security troops.

b. (C) Included in the four week Phase 1 preparation period is the time to finalize national contributions, prepare personnel and equipment for movement, negotiate appropriate contracts for the use of civilian communications lines and satellite frequencies, and purchase off-the-shelf communications equipment to supplement the military system. It actually

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c. (C) The initial cost of deploying this C3 package is under \$2 million. Once deployed and operational, the manpower can be reduced by about half, and it will cost about \$500,000 per month to maintain operational. There is currently \$14 million in the NATO peacekeeping fund. Although funding decisions have not been agreed at NATO or between NATO and the UN, it is anticipated no additional funding would be required at this time.

d. (C) The CINCSOUTH OPLAN 40104 C3 package supplements and interfaces with that already established for DENY FLIGHT and SHARP GUARD, and provides the dedicated communications circuits necessary to support an UNPROFOR withdrawal from both Bosnia and Croatia. The existing communications systems are not adequate for a significant ground operation.

4. (C) Discussion. The issues for consideration are: (a) the probability of UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia this Spring, (b) the balance between the political signals this deployment sends and the military preparations needed to carry out a successful operation, and (c) the US leadership role in NATO.

a. (C) There is a pessimistic consensus that the cessation of hostilities is likely to collapse and war will return to Bosnia this Spring.

b. (C) Tudjman is serious about not renewing the UNPROFOR mandate. UNPROFOR withdrawal from Croatia will probably lead to Croat-Krajina Serb fighting, which could spill over into Bosnia.

c. (C) Pre-positioning the C3 package is a prudent military action to prepare for a timely UNPROFOR withdrawal operation. Should a peace agreement be reached, NATO is better prepared for peace plan implementation. If the status quo continues, the C3 package is small enough that it can be repositioned and the experience factored into future planning.

d. (C) A significant military concern is the deployment of US signal, logistic, transport, and engineering assets for a NATO operation prior to NAC approval of the OPLAN and determination of D-Day. These assets would be unavailable for other contingencies while committed to NATO. The effect on readiness must be weighed against the risks involved in lengthening the OPLAN's deployment schedule. The requirement to pre-position logistical, transportation, movement control, and engineer assets during Phase 1 has not been determined.

e. (C) Pre-positioning will send several signals: NATO is serious about taking meaningful action, NATO supports UNPROFOR, and that UNPROFOR is serious about leaving if war breaks out. Careful control of these signals is

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required to ensure the proper message is sent. These signals could prompt the warring parties to get serious about coming to a negotiated settlement, or precipitate action by one or both sides.

f. (C) Other options short of pre-positioning to speed implementation after a NAC decision to execute include:

- **Pre-stage** required assets for prepositioning at home bases.

EO 13526 1.4d

g. (C) Since the President has already committed to US participation in an UNPROFOR withdrawal, including the use of ground troops, the deployment of several hundred communications personnel outside the high threat area is a low profile, low risk, high gain decision. It would show US leadership in the Alliance and send a signal that NATO is serious about supporting UNPROFOR.

5. (U) Recommendations.

a. (C) Inform SACEUR that the US government will approve the concept of pre-positioning the initial C3 package, including US personnel, and other Phase 1 actions prior to final NAC decisions on OPLAN 40104 approval and execution of the remaining phases of the withdrawal operation when the issue is formally raised and approved at the NAC.

b. (C) Provide guidance to the US Mission to NATO to support discussions on prepositioning with Croatian authorities to ensure NATO access to required facilities.

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TALKING PAPER

Subject: Roadmap of remaining OPLAN 40104 requirements (U)

1. (U) Purpose To provide VCJCS with information and talking points concerning the "firebreak" required between completion of NATO preparation for OPLAN 40104 and initiation of OPLAN implementation.

2. ~~(S)~~ Background. At the 23 May PC, NSC may ask for a recommendation on defining the "firebreak" between OPLAN 40104 planning and preparation and a UN request necessitating implementation of OPLAN 40104.

3. ~~(S)~~ Discussion. OPLAN 40104 assumes a new UNSCR requesting NATO support, followed by NAC approval, changing UNPROFOR's mission from peacekeeping to withdrawal. The roadmap of remaining steps to implement 40104 may help define the "firebreak":

- ACTREQ and for all remaining forces (approved 19 May). This step requests the administrative preparation and training of all remaining forces under national control.
- National responses to ACTREQs (in the US an Execution Order (EXORD)) formally commits and identifies specific units, and administratively prepare and train those forces. Transfer and deployment of forces are not authorized until the NAC approves/SACEUR releases an ACTORD.
- ACTORD Full Step 2 communications element -- UN request could precipitate this step, however there are situations where Full Step 2 would be prepositioned in the operational theater. This would most likely be in preparation for an emergency withdrawal in anticipation of a UN request.
- Activation Order (ACTORD) Enabling and Main Body Forces -- UN request would most likely precipitate this step.
- Implementation of OPLAN 40104

The existence of a NATO withdrawal force in or near the theater may be a signal to either UN troop contributors to seek early withdrawal or for the Bosnians to act to cause a UNPROFOR withdrawal in hopes that NATO will replace the UN. However, NATO's need to be ready, on order, to implement an emergency, partial or full withdrawal of UNPROFOR requires forces to be trained to the highest state possible

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4. ~~(C)~~ Conclusion. Actual force deployment of forces to the operational theater could create the conditions that may precipitate a UN request for a withdrawal of UNPROFOR. The US response to the ACTREQ for all remaining forces will allow SACEUR to prepare and train the forces (within the conditions and timeframe offered by the nations for such preparation) necessary to implement OPLAN 40104, without sending the signal prompting a UN withdrawal. Depending on the situation, any deployment or troop positioning that might risk the UN requesting UNPROFOR withdrawal must be considered on a case by case basis.

5. ~~(S)~~ Recommendation. The PC should decide:

- To approve OPLAN 40104 in the NAC. All scenarios, including an emergency, partial, or full NATO-led withdrawals of UNPF, are based on OPLAN 40104.
- Complete the Congressional consultations necessary for the US to join consensus in approving the OPLAN in the NAC (calls and presentations to staff began 18 May).
- Any actual deployment of forces should require further NAC authorization, and should be on a case by case basis based on the situation on the ground in the Former Yugoslavia.

Prepared by Balkans Working Group

J-5, EURDIV

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Training the Bosnians

US forces would conduct training to enhance Bosnian military capabilities to counter Serbian strengths in armor and artillery.

Training would be conducted outside of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Training in advanced infantry/"Ranger Type" skills are envisioned. Arms that require little to no training can be employed upon delivery; training in command and control and for specific arms to offset deficiencies in armor and artillery will require specialized skill training to counter Serbian strengths.

Initial assessment and preparation phase would take one month. To stabilize the situation, increasing weapons density and increasing individual and small unit capabilities, along with specialized skill training in heavy weapons will take at least two months. To improve the military posture, including collective training, battalion staff training, and continued special skill training will take at least four additional months.

US training contingent would consist of a Special Forces Group, which includes specialized Mobile Training Teams and associated Combat Support and Combat Service Support personnel. Approximately 2000 personnel at an approximate cost of \$19 million would be required.

Command and control, leadership, communications, and other battlefield systems would require extensive training time. It would be particularly difficult to make personnel available for training at a time when fighting is likely to be increasing.

To counter USG and other support to the Bosnian military the Serbs would likely garner additional support from Serbia and Russia.

Training would be a stop gap measure that would provide the Bosnian Army with some enhanced capabilities. Those capabilities would not seriously begin to approach the capability of the Bosnian Serb Army, especially in the vital battlefield systems of command and control, logistics, intelligence, and integrated air defense. It would take an enormous amount of time to build a Bosnian military force that could significantly affect the tactical or strategic military balance.

Multilateral Equipping and Training of the Bosnian Federation (U)

Scenario: (S) A peace plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina is accepted by all warring parties and includes a cessation of hostilities. There is international commitment to implement the provisions of the plan, including economic, diplomatic and military components. The principal military requirement is to create a stable environment during a limited period wherein the Bosnian Muslim-Croat Federation (the "Federation") is able to develop an effective self-defense relative to the Bosnian Serbs. To meet this requirement, two parallel programs are conducted concurrently: multilateral effort to provide equipment and training to the Federation forces; a NATO-led force to implement the peace plan.

Assumptions: (S)

- Public and Congressional support for the plan has been achieved.
- The arms embargo is lifted for all of the former Yugoslavia.
- Legal requirements for provision of equipment have been met.
- Overt operation.
- Bosnian Federation requests assistance.
- Croatia continues its support for and cooperation with the Federation.
- Croatia will grant access through its territory to Bosnia.
- "No-Fly" Zone will continue to be enforced.
- BSA will retain its offensive capability.
- Bosnian Federation Army can disengage to equip and train.
- Adequate training facilities and logistics are available.

Mission: (S) On order, USCINCEUR assumes operational control of a multinational force from designated NATO and non-NATO nations and conducts operations to equip and train selected elements of the Bosnian Federation Army to enhance its capability to defend the territorial integrity of the Bosnian Federation.

Intent: (S)

- Multi-national effort, US led.
- Enhance Federation Army existing core capabilities and units.
- Develop Federation Army capability to sustain training program.
- Counter-balance Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) strengths.
- Focus on defensive tasks at the company and battalion levels and on brigade and higher staff operations.
- Begin as promptly as feasible upon all parties' acceptance of the peace plan and issuance of the necessary mandates.
- Move concurrently on same timeline as peace implementation plan.

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Specified Tasks: (S)

- USCINCEUR assume operational control of a multi-national force for the mission.
- Assess Federation Army capabilities and needs.
- In coordination with the Federation Army, plan their equipping and training.
- Form a multi-national training and equipping team to execute the mission.
- Facilitate the provision of equipment to the Federation Army by donor nations.
- Assist the Federation Army to execute the plan.
- Ensure the self-defense and freedom of movement of the training and equipping team.

Framework: (S)

- Equip/train would not be conducted by NATO Peace Implementation Force.
- Multilateral equip/train effort would be under US leadership.
- Training conducted primarily outside the Bosnian Federation. Other alternatives include Croatia, other European locations, or US.
- Equipment would be US, former Warsaw Pact, or a mix.

Concept of Operations: (S) This would be a five-phase operation with phases overlapping:

- Phase I -- Assessment. Assess the doctrine, organization, equipment and training status. Determine equipment and training required; assess availability of equipment and training. Prepare legal basis for provision of equipment.
- Phase II -- Establish the support structure. Position equipment, organize training teams, and establish training facilities.
- Phase III -- Equip.
- Phase IV -- Train. Integrate leaders and equipment into units, complete individual training, and conduct unit training.
- Phase V -- Sustainment. Exercise units and transition units to training base facilities.

Desired End State: (S) Bosnian Federation Army has the capability of defending the territorial integrity of the Bosnian Federation against aggressors without external combat support within nine months of mission start.

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Issues: (S) The following issues should be discussed in the interagency before proceeding with further planning for execution of multilateral security assistance:

(1) **Legal.** There are significant domestic and international legal issues that must be resolved by interagency coordination. The primary domestic legal consideration is determining legal authority for providing US assistance. A legislative strategy must be developed for Congressional consultations. International legal concerns include SOFAs, for both the training site country and B-H, and the status of trainers and training sites under the Law of Armed Conflict.

What limitations is Congress likely to place on US participation in this effort? How much time will be required to establish a comprehensive SOFA for training in Croatia, a NATO member country, possible Middle East nations?

(2) **Funding.**

Funding requirement. Assessment of equipment and training requirements must establish overall funding requirement. At a minimum, funding must include equipment, spares, consumables, maintenance, sustainment. Funding must also be found for building a Federation air defense capability and for any No-Fly Zone operations past initial equip and train timeline.

Funding sources. Funding sources must be identified to include US, regional organizations, and bilateral. Within USG, must consider all existing legal authorities: security assistance, supplemental appropriation, and drawdown. If drawdown, what is the potential impact on readiness? If new appropriations are necessary, how long will Congressional approval take? Will Congress be willing to apply the \$100 million proposed in the Senate bill? Will they establish a formal Security Assistance funding level? Internationally, can a "Gulf" account be established? What is the best means to acquire third country contributions/ procurements/grants? Can solicitation of international funding begin now as a signal of US commitment?

(3) **Equipment availability.**

Availability. Equipment necessary to establish balance of power must be available, sustainable, maintainable. Equipment must be available for transport into region within timeline established. Issues requiring further definition during assessment phase:

What type of equipment: former Warsaw Pact, NATO, US, mixed? Current estimate indicates former Warsaw Pact equipment is the best option because of relative cost and availability, and it presently forms the basis of Federation equipment inventory. Would departing UNPF units be willing to leave some

equipment behind? Are spare parts and consumables available? Is stock (US and other contributing nations) sufficient to meet requirement and timeline? Can equipment be maintained and sustained by Bosnian Federation forces? What international linkages and leverages are involved with sustaining particular types of equipment? What is effect of linkages on long-term stability?

(4) Command and Control.

Establishing US command authority for equip and train operations for Bosnian Federation. US leadership must be established to ensure multinational efforts are coordinated to achieve the desired end state. Mission will be tasked to CINCEUR, and most likely delegated to USAREUR for detailed planning, coordination, and execution. Efforts by the international community to equip and train warring factions could easily result in small "arms race" establishing an imbalance of power thereby destabilizing the region. How will other nations be integrated into effort? Will others accept US leadership? Can the US prevent/limit participation by potentially disruptive nations (e.g. Iran)? How will unity of effort be achieved to avoid multiple, uncoordinated equip/train efforts? Can UN/EU/NATO/CSCE establish international authority for unity of effort?

(5) Operational.

Multinational air support. There are two scenarios to consider. If there is a peace agreement, then what air support should be provided the Federation during the equip/train program? Should the air support be extended beyond the program for some limited period? If there is no agreement, then what air support should be provided and for how long? Under both conditions, where are NFZ operations continued: over Federation, over Federation and SRBH, or over all of Former Yugoslavia? Should NFZ include fixed wing, helicopters, active SAM sites?

Federation air defense. Should we assist the Bosnian Federation in establishing air defense to counterbalance Bosnian Serbs? Is air defense capability provided the Federation from the outset of the equip/train program? How should establishment of Federation air defense be coordinated so as to minimize potential threat to Deny Flight? What capability should the Federation possess: guns, missiles, a mix?

Defensive force. The arms embargo will be lifted for all of the former Yugoslavia. Establishment of numerical limits and zonal sub-limits (DMZs, areas of restricted maneuvering/operations) may be required for all warring parties to achieve and maintain a balance of power. Such limits could include heavy equipment (tanks, APCs, aircraft, naval vessels), and force structure (active and reserve). Decisions required: What are the limits necessary for

Federation self-defense? At what point does a strong defensive force become a possible offensive threat to regional stability? How many tanks, mortars, aircraft, ships? Who determines limits: warring parties via peace plan, EU, CSCE, NATO, or US? Who develops initial stabilization measures (measures of transparency, constraint, reinforce confidence, monitoring compliance/evaluation)? Who maintains measures: EU, CSCE, NATO?

(6) **Risk of enduring US commitment.** Direct US ties to the Bosnian Federation Army may result in long term commitment. Failure of Bosnian Army may be US failure. Must establish exit strategy which disengages US from maintaining the Bosnian Federation. What is the exit strategy? Is it based on time, capability of Bosnian Federation forces to counter threat?

Deputies' Committee Action: (S) Recommend the Deputies' Committee:

- Confirm the assumptions, mission, and specified tasks to meet the arming and training requirements while the two parallel programs (Arm & Train and implementation of the peace plan) are conducted.
- Recommend Principals approve the above mission statement.
- Conduct preliminary discussion of and assign staffing responsibility for these issues, and possibly others which are identified.
- Direct State/OSD/JCS to initiate US planning and push for prompt initiation of multilateral involvement, to include hosting an international conference in Washington to solicit multi-national support.

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Multilateral Equipping and Training of the Bosnian Federation (U)

Scenario: (S) A peace plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina is accepted by all warring parties and includes a cessation of hostilities. There is international commitment to implement the provisions of the plan, including economic, diplomatic and military components. The principal military requirement is to create a stable environment during a limited period wherein the Bosnian Muslim-Croat Federation (the "Federation") is able to develop an effective self-defense relative to the Bosnian Serbs. To meet this requirement, two parallel programs are conducted concurrently: multilateral effort to provide equipment and training to the Federation forces; a NATO-led force to implement the peace plan.

Assumptions: (S)

- Public and Congressional support for the plan has been achieved.
- The arms embargo is lifted for all of the former Yugoslavia.
- Legal requirements for provision of equipment have been met.
- Overt operation.
- Bosnian Federation requests assistance.
- Croatia continues its support for and cooperation with the Federation.
- Croatia will grant access through its territory to Bosnia.
- "No-Fly" Zone will continue to be enforced.
- BSA will retain its offensive capability.
- Bosnian Federation Army can disengage to equip and train.
- Adequate training facilities and logistics are available.

Mission: (S) On order, USCINCEUR assumes operational control of a multinational force from designated NATO and non-NATO nations and conducts operations to equip and train selected elements of the Bosnian Federation Army to enhance its capability to defend the territorial integrity of the Bosnian Federation.

Intent: (S)

- Multi-national effort, US led.
- Enhance Federation Army existing core capabilities and units.
- Develop Federation Army capability to sustain training program.
- Counter-balance Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) strengths.
- Focus on defensive tasks at the company and battalion levels and on brigade and higher staff operations.
- Begin as promptly as feasible upon all parties' acceptance of the peace plan and issuance of the necessary mandates.
- Move concurrently on same timeline as peace implementation plan.

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Specified Tasks: (S)

- USCINCEUR assume operational control of a multi-national force for the mission.
- Assess Federation Army capabilities and needs.
- In coordination with the Federation Army, plan their equipping and training.
- Form a multi-national training and equipping team to execute the mission.
- Facilitate the provision of equipment to the Federation Army by donor nations.
- Assist the Federation Army to execute the plan.
- Ensure the self-defense and freedom of movement of the training and equipping team.

Framework: (S)

- Equip/train would not be conducted by NATO Peace Implementation Force.
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Desired End State: (S) Bosnian Federation Army has the capability of defending the territorial integrity of the Bosnian Federation against aggressors without external combat support within nine months of mission start.

Issues: (S) The following issues should be discussed in the interagency before proceeding with further planning for execution of multilateral security assistance:

(1) **Legal.** There are significant domestic and international legal issues that must be resolved by interagency coordination. The primary domestic legal consideration is determining legal authority for providing US assistance. A legislative strategy must be developed for Congressional consultations. International legal concerns include SOFAs, for both the training site country and B-H, and the status of trainers and training sites under the Law of Armed Conflict.

What limitations is Congress likely to place on US participation in this effort? How much time will be required to establish a comprehensive SOFA for training in Croatia, a NATO member country, possible Middle East nations?

(2) **Funding.**

Funding requirement. Assessment of equipment and training requirements must establish overall funding requirement. At a minimum, funding must include equipment, spares, consumables, maintenance, sustainment. Funding must also be found for building a Federation air defense capability and for any No-Fly Zone operations past initial equip and train timeline.

Funding sources. Funding sources must be identified to include US, regional organizations, and bilateral. Within USG, must consider all existing legal authorities: security assistance, supplemental appropriation, and drawdown. If drawdown, what is the potential impact on readiness? If new appropriations are necessary, how long will Congressional approval take? Will Congress be willing to apply the \$100 million proposed in the Senate bill? Will they establish a formal Security Assistance funding level? Internationally, can a "Gulf" account be established? What is the best means to acquire third country contributions/ procurements/grants? Can solicitation of international funding begin now as a signal of US commitment?

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Federation self-defense? At what point does a strong defensive force become a possible offensive threat to regional stability? How many tanks, mortars, aircraft, ships? Who determines limits: warring parties via peace plan, EU, CSCE, NATO, or US? Who develops initial stabilization measures (measures of transparency, constraint, reinforce confidence, monitoring compliance/evaluation)? Who maintains measures: EU, CSCE, NATO?

(6) **Risk of enduring US commitment.** Direct US ties to the Bosnian Federation Army may result in long term commitment. Failure of Bosnian Army may be US failure. Must establish exit strategy which disengages US from maintaining the Bosnian Federation. What is the exit strategy? Is it based on time, capability of Bosnian Federation forces to counter threat?

Deputies' Committee Action: ~~(S)~~ Recommend the Deputies' Committee:

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- Recommend Principals approve the above mission statement.
- Conduct preliminary discussion of and assign staffing responsibility for these issues, and possibly others which are identified.
- Direct State/OSD/JCS to initiate US planning and push for prompt initiation of multilateral involvement, to include hosting an international conference in Washington to solicit multi-national support.

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