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# **Clinton Presidential Records Mandatory Declassification Review**

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
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

6506



September 29, 1997

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: RICHARD CLARKE *[Signature]*

FROM: JAMIE METZLER *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Designations Of Foreign Terrorist Organizations  
To Prevent Fundraising

Attached at Tab 1 is a memorandum to the President regarding the designation of terrorist organizations under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.

The Act allows the Secretary of State to designate foreign organizations as terrorist if their activity threatens the security of U.S. nationals or the national security of the United States. In the past year and a half, we have coordinated efforts to compile the records necessary for this designation, which we will be presenting to Congress on October 1. The designation files will then be submitted to the Federal Register on November 10 absent Congressional opposition, which we do not anticipate.

Roll Out

It is the unanimous recommendation of CSG that the President not be involved in announcing these designations. The process has taken a year and a half to reach fruition and we have been criticized for taking so long and for seizing so few assets under our previous IEEPA effort. We are also hesitant to put the President out front on this issue because little will appear to happen after the announcement of designation. No arrests will be made or assets blocked for months after the designations are announced.

The rollout will begin with a classified notification of Congress on October 1. The seven day period for Congress to review the designations will be extended until October 10, to take account of the Jewish holidays. If you agree with the CSG

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Declassify On: 09-26-99

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recommendation, the State Department will then announce the designations, do the background briefing with Treasury and Justice, and notify U.S. overseas posts.

Concurrence by:            <sup>WD</sup> William Davis, <sup>AK</sup> Alan Kreczko

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign and forward the memorandum to the President.

Attachments

- Tab 1   Memorandum to the President
- Tab 2   List of Designated Organizations

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Designations of Foreign Terrorist Organizations  
to Prevent Their Fundraising

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which you signed on April 24, 1996 authorizes the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, to designate foreign organizations as terrorist if their terrorist activity threatens the security of U.S. nationals or the national security of the United States. Designation will enable us to take action against terrorist fundraising in the U.S.

Congress must be notified of designation seven days before the designation is officially published in the Federal Register. Upon notification, the Secretary of the Treasury may require U.S. financial institutions controlling assets of a designated organization to freeze all of the organization's assets. Persons who knowingly provide support or resources to a terrorist organization or attempt or conspire to do so, can be fined, imprisoned for up to ten years, or both. Designated organizations will have thirty days from the date of publication to seek judicial review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit.

The departments have developed the evidentiary records on thirty-one groups. The Secretary of State, Attorney General, and Secretary of the Treasury have now signed off on the required documents. The groups include Hamas, Hizballah, Kahane Chai, and IRA. (Full list at Tab)

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We do not expect any immediate arrests because only contributions to designated terrorist organizations made after publication in the Federal Register can be considered violations. Banks will freeze known assets of these organizations. As these terrorist organizations probably do not maintain accounts in their organization's name, we do not anticipate the dollar value of such assets to be great.

The rollout of these designations will begin with a classified notification of Congress on October 1. The seven day period for Congress to review the designations will be extended until October 10, to take account of the Jewish holidays. The State Department will then announce the designations, do the background briefing with Treasury and Justice, and notify U.S. overseas posts.

The announcement of these designations will deter fundraising on behalf of the designated groups and demonstrate again our commitment to combating terrorism. It will strengthen our hand in efforts to persuade other governments to crack down on terrorist fundraising. We are developing an appropriate press strategy to underscore this message.

List of Foreign Terrorist Organizations for Designation

Abu Nidal Organization  
Abu Sayyaf Group  
Armed Islamic Group  
Aum Shinrikyo  
Euzadi Ta Askatasuna  
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine - Hawatmeh  
Faction  
Hamas  
Harakat ul-Ansar  
Hizballah  
Gam'a al-Islamiyya  
Irish Republican Army  
Japanese Red Army  
al-Jihad  
Kack  
Kahane Chai  
Khmer Rouge  
Kurdistan Workers' Party  
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam  
Manuel Rodriguea Patriotic Front Dissidents  
Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization  
National Liberation Army  
Palestine Islamic Jihad-Shaqaqi Faction  
Palestine Liberation Front - Abu Abbas Faction  
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine  
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command  
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia  
Revolutionary Organization of 17 November  
Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front  
Revolutionary People's Struggle  
Shining Path  
Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement

February 14, 1998

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ERIC SCHWARTZ *ES*

FROM: JAMIE METZL *JM*

SUBJECT: Worldnet on Iraq - Tuesday, February 17, 1998  
11:00am-12:00pm, OEOB 489

You have agreed to a Worldnet satellite interview with journalists from Paris, Cairo, Ankara, and Riyadh on Tuesday in the OEOB studio. This interview will be broadcast simultaneously at to invited groups U.S. Embassies and on television networks worldwide. The topic is "U.S. Policy Towards Iraq."

Format: The format of the interview will be similar to that of a press conference. The program will begin with a brief opening comment by the Worldnet moderator, followed by a short video on U.S. efforts to achieve a diplomatic solution to the weapons inspection issue.

After the video, the host will introduce you and ask you a scripted question regarding the U.S. position towards Iraq. Tony Blinken is preparing this question and its answer, and will provide that information to you separately. Following this response, participants in Paris, Cairo, Ankara, and Riyadh will each receive one opening question, followed by a 12-minute time block for each site.

Questions and comments from the international journalists are live and unedited. The broadcast is one-way video, two way audio. This means that you will hear but not see the international participants. All questions will be simultaneously translated for you.

Based on recent Worldnet interviews on this subject, you should expect challenging and provocative questions. It is also expected that the nature of questions may vary according to the nationalities of the interviewers. USIA has attempted to predict

as best it can what type of questions might be asked by each geographic bloc. This information is summarized at Tab A.

Comment on Themes: USIA and CIA analysts tell us that the "man in the street" in the Arab world has little personal sympathy for Saddam, and probably recognizes him for what he is. However, Arab people are very critical of U.S. policy for two reasons: first, they see that the international isolation of Saddam has hurt the Iraqi people; and second, they believe that neither continued isolation nor a U.S. bombing campaign will change matters - i.e., neither will remove Saddam from power. Thus, they see force as only contributing to the suffering of the Iraqi people. You will have to address both these issues: first, by describing our concern about the Iraqi people, and second, by explaining why our policy toward Iraq (even if it doesn't result in the immediate elimination of Saddam) serves the region. The key points of our international Public Diplomacy effort are summarized at Tab B.

Concurrence by: *AdH for* Tony Blinken, *AdH for* Joe Marty


Attachments

- Tab A Background Notes on Interviewers and Anticipated Areas of Discussion
- Tab B Summary of U.S. Public Diplomacy Themes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

August 27, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR MARNIE GIRSHON

FROM: JAMIE METZEL 

SUBJECT: White Paper on Iraq

Thank you very much to you and your colleagues for producing the excellent White Paper entitled "Facts on Iraq's Humanitarian Situation." I sent a copy to Sandy Berger who was very impressed and praised the document highly. This White Paper is a significant and much appreciated contribution to our international information campaign on Iraq.

We look forward to working together on future projects.

# **Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs**

*13 February 1998*

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## **Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs**

### **Overview**

The Gulf war damaged Saddam Husayn's biological, chemical, ballistic missile, and nuclear weapons programs, collectively referred to as weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) was established by the Security Council and accepted by Iraq following the war to eliminate and verify the destruction of Iraq's biological, chemical, and ballistic missile programs. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) assumed responsibility for dismantling Iraq's nuclear program. Further, the UN established sanctions to prevent the purchase of equipment and materials needed to reconstitute Baghdad's WMD programs and inspections to find remaining elements of these programs and deter further research or production related to WMD.

On the basis of the last seven years' experience, the world's experts conclude that enough production components and data remain hidden and enough expertise has been retained or developed to enable Iraq to resume development and production of WMD. They believe Iraq maintains a small force of Scud-type missiles, a small stockpile of chemical and biological munitions, and the capability to quickly resurrect biological and chemical weapons production.

This conclusion is borne out by gaps and inconsistencies in Iraq's WMD declarations, Iraq's continued obstruction of UNSCOM inspections and monitoring activities, Saddam's efforts to increase the number of "sensitive" locations exempt from inspection, and Saddam's efforts to end inspections entirely. Collectively, the evidence strongly suggests that Baghdad has hidden remnants of its WMD programs and is making every effort to preserve them. Baghdad has also enhanced indigenous capabilities and infrastructure to design and produce WMD. Saddam's strategy in dealing with UNSCOM is unchanged; he is actively trying to retain what remains of his WMD

programs while wearing down the will of the Security Council to maintain sanctions.

UNSCOM and IAEA inspections and monitoring activities have severely curtailed Iraq's WMD programs, but even a small residual force of operational missiles armed with biological or chemical warheads would pose a serious threat to neighboring countries and US military forces in the region. Iraq has demonstrated its capability to employ other delivery systems. Saddam has used such weapons for tactical military purposes against Iran and to suppress rebellious segments of his population in Kurdish-held areas.

### **Assessment of Cooperation With UNSCOM and the IAEA**

Baghdad has a long history of obstructing UNSCOM inspections and has taken an increasingly hard line since March 1996 when the UN began inspecting security facilities suspected of concealing WMD-related documents and material. UNSCOM is targeting these facilities because Iraq admitted (after Husayn Kamil, Saddam's son-in-law and former head of Iraqi military industries, defected in August 1995) that security organizations were involved in concealing material from the UN:

- Resolution 687 demanded that Iraq provide declarations on all aspects of its WMD programs 15 days after the Security Council enacted the resolution in 1991. Nearly seven years later, gaps and inconsistencies remain in each of Iraq's WMD declarations covering chemical, biological, nuclear, and missile programs.
- Baghdad has modified each declaration several times to accommodate data uncovered by UNSCOM and the IAEA and has provided new information only when confronted with direct evidence. For

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## The Husayn Kamil Connection




Husayn Kamil Hasan al-Majid, Saddam's son-in-law, was the preeminent military industries' official and a fundamental player in Iraq's efforts to procure weapons of mass destruction before his defection to Jordan in August 1995. A strict and capable manager, Kamil took charge of Iraq's efforts to develop its WMD program around 1987. As the head of the Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization until 1990, he oversaw Iraq's nuclear weapons research, continued Iraq's development of biological and chemical weapons, and supervised the successful development of the Al-Husayn missile—an indigenous modification of the Scud. During this time, it is possible that Kamil directed Iraq's testing of its chemical and biological weapons on Iranian prisoners of war:

- After the Gulf war, Kamil—first from his position as Minister of Defense and then as the director of the Ministry of Industry and Minerals and the Organization of Military Industrialization—led Iraq's efforts to conceal its WMD program from international inspectors.
- Husayn Kamil's influence over the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction program did not end with his defection in 1995. For instance, he is largely responsible for using Saddam's security services—of which he was a member in the early 1980s—to hide proscribed materials and documents from the United Nations.

Despite Kamil's influence, the Iraqi WMD program did not die with his defection and subsequent murder.

as Iraq claims it did. Qusay Husayn—Saddam's second son—has assumed many of the responsibilities for concealing the proscribed programs. In addition, many of the leading scientists in Iraq's WMD programs during Husayn Kamil's tenure are still associated with the regime:

- **Lt. Gen. Amir Hamud Sadi**—who serves officially as a presidential adviser and is a leading official in Iraqi relations with UNSCOM—was one of the principal engineers in the WMD program and essentially served as Husayn Kamil's deputy. With a doctorate in chemical engineering, Sadi has dedicated his entire career to conventional and nonconventional weapons development. In 1987, Sadi received rare public praise from Saddam for his role in the development of the Al-Husayn missile.
- **Humam Abd al-Khaliq Abd al-Ghafur**—currently Minister of Culture and Information—is Iraq's leading nuclear official and the former head of its nuclear program. Abd al-Ghafur also was a close associate of Husayn Kamil, and he occasionally serves as an interlocutor with the IAEA. He led an Iraqi delegation to the IAEA annual conference in October 1997.
- **Jafar Dia Jafar** is perhaps Iraq's foremost nuclear scientist and served as Abd al-Ghafur's deputy in the Iraqi Atomic Energy Organization. Jafar now officially serves as a presidential adviser, but his position—unlike that of Sadi—appears to be largely nominal.
- **Dr. Rihab Taha** is the leading official in charge of Iraq's biological weapons program. She has overseen Iraqi efforts to develop anthrax and botulinum toxin and directed testing on animal subjects. Taha is also politically well-connected—she is married to the Minister of Oil, Amir Rashid Ubaydi, who helps direct Iraqi relations with UNSCOM.



*150 boxes of documents presented to UNSCOM at a chicken farm in Iraq in August 1995.*

example, Baghdad revised its nuclear declaration to the IAEA four times within 14 months of its initial submission in April 1991 and has formally submitted six different biological warfare declarations to date, each of which UNSCOM has rejected.

Baghdad has sought to constrain UNSCOM from inspecting numerous facilities since March 1996, mostly by declaring the sites “sensitive” and the inspections a violation of Iraqi sovereignty. Iraq has applied the term “sensitive” to a variety of facilities—on one occasion security officials declared a road sensitive. Most consistently, Iraq has sought to limit UN access to Special Republican Guard garrisons that are responsible for executing the highest priorities of Saddam’s inner circle:

- Iraq is trying to keep the whole WMD story out of reach. UNSCOM and the IAEA have detected Iraqi officials removing documents and material from buildings and even burning documents to prevent them from being evaluated. Inspectors have routinely found high-interest facilities cleaned out after their entry was delayed for several hours.
- Baghdad is interested in debilitating UNSCOM’s ability to monitor elements it has declared. Iraq disabled monitoring cameras and hid production equipment after expelling US inspectors from the country in November 1997.

- Iraqi officials have interfered with inspection operations. Iraqi escorts have endangered UN helicopter flights supporting inspections by harassing the pilot and grabbing the flight controls. Security guards have harassed inspectors on the ground.

Baghdad has tried to generate a public impression of cooperation while working hard to conceal essential information on the scope and capabilities of its WMD programs. It has allowed UNSCOM to monitor dormant WMD production facilities and has provided incomplete documentary evidence to support its claims. For example, Iraq dramatically disclosed nearly 700,000 pages of WMD-related documents following Husayn Kamil's defection. Sparse relevant information was buried within a massive volume of extraneous data, all of which was intended to create the appearance of candor and to overwhelm UNSCOM's analytic resources:

- For example, Iraq released detailed records of how many ballpoint pens it ordered in the late 1980s, but it has not provided records of how it procured biological precursors or supported claims that it destroyed missile warheads capable of delivering biological and chemical agents.
- UNSCOM and the IAEA have examined much of the documentary material and concluded that, despite advertisements to the contrary, Iraq did not release its most important WMD-related documents.

### Biological Weapons

No concrete information on the scope of Iraq's biological warfare program was available until August 1995, when Iraq disclosed, after Husayn Kamil's defection, the existence of an offensive biological warfare (BW) capability. Iraqi officials admitted that they had produced the BW agents anthrax<sup>1</sup> (8,500 liters), botulinum toxin<sup>2</sup> (19,000 liters), and aflatoxin<sup>3</sup> (2,200 liters)

<sup>1</sup> Inhalation of anthrax spores—an infectious dose is about 8,000 spores or less than one-millionth of a gram—is fatal within five to seven days nearly 100 percent of the time.



*Remains of chemical/biological-warfare-agent-filled missile warheads secretly destroyed by Iraq.*

after years of claiming that they had conducted only defensive research. Baghdad also admitted preparing BW-filled munitions—including 25 Scud missile warheads (five anthrax; 16 botulinum toxin; four aflatoxin), 157 aerial bombs, and aerial dispensers—during the Gulf war, although it did not use them. Iraq acknowledged researching the use of 155-mm artillery

<sup>2</sup> Botulinum toxin, which would most likely be dispensed as an aerosol, can kill in as little as 24 to 36 hours by paralyzing the respiratory muscles.

<sup>3</sup> Aflatoxin is a liver carcinogen that can kill years after ingestion.



*Destroyed chemical/biological-warfare-agent-filled R-400 aerial bombs.*

shells, artillery rockets, a MiG-21 drone, and aerosol generators to deliver BW agents:

- UNSCOM has destroyed a range of BW production equipment, seed stocks, and growth media claimed by Iraq for use in its BW programs.
- UNSCOM believes Iraq has greatly understated its production of biological agents and could be holding back such agents, which are easily concealed.

Iraq resisted dismantling the Al Hakam BW production facility for nearly one year after disclosing in 1995 that it manufactured more than 500,000 liters of BW agents at the facility between 1989 and 1990.

UNSCOM finally pressed Iraq to destroy Al Hakam in the summer of 1996:

- Baghdad claimed that Al Hakam was a legitimate civilian facility designed to produce single-cell proteins and biopesticides.
- Al Hakam's remote location (55 km southwest of Baghdad) and the security involved in its construction suggest that Al Hakam was intended to be a BW production facility from the outset.

Baghdad has provided no hard evidence to support claims that it destroyed all of its BW agents and munitions in 1991. UNSCOM Chairman Richard Butler stated that Iraq's most recent BW declaration, submitted in September 1997, "failed to give a remotely credible account of Iraq's biological weapons program":

- In late 1995, Iraq acknowledged weapons testing on Ricin, but did not provide details on the amount produced. In early 1997, two years later, UNSCOM discovered documents that showed Iraq had produced the biological agent Ricin.<sup>4</sup>
- Iraq has the expertise to quickly resume a small-scale BW program at known facilities that currently produce legitimate items, such as vaccines and other pharmaceuticals. Without effective UN monitoring, Baghdad could probably begin production within a few days. For example, Iraq can convert production of biopesticides to anthrax simply by changing seed material.

### **Chemical Weapons**

Iraq had an advanced chemical warfare (CW) capability that it used extensively against Iran and against its own Kurdish population during the 1980s. Iraqi forces

<sup>4</sup> Ricin can cause multiple organ failure within one or two days of inhalation. A lethal dose is estimated to be about 500 micrograms.

## Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons

Date	Area Used	Type	Approximate Casualties	Target Population
August 1983	Hajj Umran	Mustard	fewer than 100	Iranians/Kurds
October to November 1983	Panjwin	Mustard	3,000	Iranians/Kurds
February to March 1984	Majnoon Island	Mustard	2,500	Iranians
March 1984	Al Basrah	Tabun	50 to 100	Iranians
March 1985	Hawzah Marsh	Mustard/Tabun	3,000	Iranians
February 1986	Al Faw	Mustard/Tabun	8,000 to 10,000	Iranians
December 1986	Umm ar Rasas	Mustard	reportedly in the thousands	Iranians
April 1987	Al Basrah	Mustard/Tabun	5,000	Iranians
October 1987	Sumar/Mehran	Mustard/nerve agents	3,000	Iranians
March 1988	Halabjah <sup>a</sup>	Mustard/nerve agents	reportedly in the hundreds	Iranians/Kurds

<sup>a</sup> Iran also used chemicals at Halabjah that may have caused some of the casualties.

While precise information is lacking, human rights organizations have received plausible accounts from Kurdish villagers of numerous Iraqi chemical attacks against civilian villages in the 1987 and 1988 time frames—with some attacks as late as October 1988—in areas close to both the Iranian and Turkish borders.

delivered chemical agents (including Mustard<sup>5</sup> agent and the nerve agents Sarin and Tabun<sup>6</sup>) in aerial bombs, aerial spray dispensers, 122-mm rockets, and several types of artillery, both for tactical military purposes and to terrorize rebellious segments of the population. Iraq maintained large stockpiles of chemical munitions and had a major production capacity.

UNSCOM supervised the destruction of more than 40,000 CW munitions (28,000 filled and 12,000 empty), 480,000 liters of CW agents, 1,800,000 liters of chemical precursors, and eight different types of delivery systems—including ballistic missile warheads—in the past seven years. Following Husayn Kamil's defection, Iraq disclosed that it:

- Produced larger amounts of the nerve agent VX<sup>7</sup> than it previously admitted. Baghdad acknowledged, despite previous claims that it only conducted research, that it had conducted pilot production of about four tons of VX from 1988 to 1990.
- Researched in-flight mixing of binary CW weapons before the Gulf war—an advance in the development of a CW capability that extends the shelf life of chemical agents.
- Perfected techniques for the large-scale production of a VX precursor that is well suited to long-term storage.

UNSCOM believes Iraq continues to conceal a small stockpile of CW agents, munitions, and production

<sup>5</sup> Mustard is a blister agent used primarily to cause medical casualties by blistering the eyes, lungs, and skin. It is extremely persistent and presents a long-term hazard.

<sup>6</sup> Sarin and Tabun are G-series nerve agents that act within seconds of exposure and can be absorbed through the skin or respiratory tract. These agents kill by paralyzing the respiratory muscles. Both are relatively nonpersistent and present more of a vapor hazard than a skin hazard.

<sup>7</sup> VX is a V-series nerve agent that is similar to—but more advanced than—G-series agents, in that it is far more persistent. VX presents a far greater skin hazard and would be used for long-term contamination of territory.



*UNSCOM inspector in protective suit opening filling plug for sample-taking inside a Scud/Al-Husayn chemical-agent-filled missile warhead.*

equipment. Baghdad has not supplied adequate evidence to support its claims that it destroyed all of its CW agents and munitions. The destruction of as much as 200 metric tons of chemical precursors, 70 Scud warheads, and tens of thousands of smaller unfilled munitions has not been verified:

- Baghdad retains the expertise to quickly resume CW production. In the absence of UNSCOM inspectors, Iraq could restart limited mustard agent production within a few weeks, full-scale production of sarin within a few months, and pre-Gulf war production levels—including VX—within two or three years.
- Since the Gulf war, Iraq has rebuilt two facilities it once used to produce chemical agents and has the capability to shift smaller civilian facilities to CW production.

### **Ballistic Missiles**

Iraq had an active missile force before the Gulf war that included 819 operational Scud-B missiles (300-km range) purchased from the former Soviet Union, an advanced program to extend the Scud's range and modify its warhead (for example, the Al-Husayn with a 650-km range and the Al Abbas with a 950-km range), and an extensive effort to reverse-engineer and indigenously produce complete Scud missiles. Iraq also had programs to indigenously produce long-range missiles (such as the Condor) that never entered the production phase:

- UNSCOM reports that it supervised the destruction of 48 Scud-type missiles, 10 mobile launchers,



*Handling of leaking 122-mm rockets filled with the chemical nerve agent sarin prior to destruction.*


30 chemical and 18 conventional warheads, and related equipment.

- UNSCOM has verified Iraq's unilateral destruction of only 83 Scud-type missiles and nine mobile launchers. Iraq has tried to account for the remainder by claiming the missiles were destroyed by being fired in the Iran-Iraq and Gulf wars or used in static tests and training.

Discrepancies in Iraqi accounting suggest that Baghdad could still have a small force of Scud-type missiles and an undetermined number of warheads and launchers. UNSCOM believes it has accounted for all but two of the original 819 Scud missiles imported from the former Soviet Union. Iraq has not adequately explained the disposition of important missile

components that it could not produce on its own and may have removed before destruction. There are still many gaps on the scope of Iraq's indigenous missile programs:

- Iraq may have pieced together a small inventory of missiles by integrating guidance and control systems it concealed with indigenously produced parts.
- Iraq admitted producing Scud engines, airframes, and warheads before the war, but UNSCOM has not verified claims that it destroyed all of these components.
- Baghdad probably continues to receive some parts through clandestine procurement networks. In 1995,



*UNSCOM supervision of the destruction of Scud/Al-Husayn long-range missiles.*

Jordan interdicted missile-guidance equipment (gyroscopes) bound for Iraq. Baghdad admitted under UNSCOM questioning that it received a similar shipment earlier in 1995.

- In November 1995, Iraq turned over a previously undeclared SS-21 short-range ballistic missile launcher it acquired from Yemen before the Gulf war, illustrating Iraq's ability to conceal major elements of missile systems from UNSCOM inspectors.

Baghdad has not given up its plans to build larger, longer range missiles. UNSCOM has uncovered numerous Iraqi design drawings, including multistage systems and clustered engine designs, that theoretically could reach Western Europe. Inspectors have uncovered evidence that Iraq has continued missile

research since the imposition of sanctions. If sanctions were lifted, Iraq could probably acquire enough material to resume full-scale production of Scud-type missiles, perhaps within one year:

- Iraq's Al-Samoud and Ababil-100 missile programs—within the UN-allowed 150-km range limit—serve to maintain production expertise within the constraints of sanctions. Iraq has apparently flight-tested the Al-Samoud, which UNSCOM describes as a scaled down Scud, successfully. Iraq probably will begin converting these efforts into long-range missile programs as soon as sanctions are lifted.




*Scud/Al-Husayn missile launchers before destruction.*

- Iraq continues to expand a missile production facility at Ibn Al Haytham—currently used to support its authorized missile programs. Two new fabrication buildings at the facility are spacious enough to house the construction of large ballistic missiles.
- Baghdad's claim that the buildings at Ibn al Haytham are intended to be computer and administrative facilities is inconsistent with the facility's inherent size and capacity.
- Iraq admitted experimenting with seven uranium enrichment techniques and was most actively pursuing electromagnetic isotope separation, gas centrifuge, and gas diffusion.
- Baghdad planned to build a nuclear device in 1991 by using IAEA-safeguarded, highly enriched uranium from its Soviet-supplied reactors.

### **Nuclear Weapons**

Iraq had a comprehensive nuclear weapons development program before the Gulf war that was focused on building an implosion-type weapon. The program was

linked to a ballistic missile project that was the intended delivery system. After Husayn Kamil's defection in 1995, Iraq retreated from its longtime claim that its nuclear program was intended only to conduct research:



*Calutrons for uranium enrichment secretly destroyed by Iraq.*

UNSCOM and IAEA inspections have hindered Iraq's nuclear program, but Baghdad's interest in acquiring or developing nuclear weapons has not diminished:

- Iraq retains a large cadre of nuclear engineers, scientists, and technicians who are the foundation of its nuclear program. We have concerns that scientists may be pursuing theoretical nuclear research that would reduce the time required to produce a weapon should Iraq acquire sufficient fissile material.
- Iraq continues to withhold significant information about enrichment techniques, foreign procurement, weapons design, and the role of Iraq's security and intelligence services in obtaining external assistance and coordinating postwar concealment. Iraq continues to withhold documentation on the technical achievements of its nuclear program, experimentation data, and accounting.
- Baghdad has not fully explained the interaction between its nuclear program and its ballistic missile program.

## Appendix A

### Iraqi Biological Warfare Program

#### BW Agent Production Amounts<sup>a</sup>

BW Agent (Organism)	Declared Concentrated Amounts	Declared Total Amounts	Comments
Anthrax ( <i>Bacillus anthracis</i> )	8,500 liters (2,245 gallons)	85,000 liters (22,457 gallons)	UNSCOM estimates production amounts were actually three to four times more than the declared amounts, but is unable to confirm.
Botulinum toxin ( <i>Clostridium botulinum</i> )	19,400 liters (10x and 20x concentrated) (5,125 gallons)	380,000 liters (100,396 gallons)	UNSCOM estimates production amounts were actually two times more than the declared amounts, but is unable to confirm.
Gas Gangrene ( <i>Clostridium perfringens</i> )	340 liters (90 gallons)	3,400 liters (900 gallons)	Production amounts could be higher, but UNSCOM is unable to confirm.
Aflatoxin ( <i>Aspergillus flavus</i> and <i>Aspergillus parasiticus</i> )	N/A	2,200 liters (581 gallons)	Production amounts and time frame of production claimed by Iraq do not correlate.
Ricin (Castor Bean plant)	N/A	10 liters (2.7 gallons)	Production amounts could be higher, but UNSCOM is unable to confirm.

#### BW-Filled and Deployed Delivery Systems

Delivery System	Anthrax	Botulinum Toxin	Aflatoxin	Comments
Missile warheads Al-Husayn (modified Scud B)	5	16	4	UNSCOM cannot confirm the unilateral destruction of these 25 warheads due to conflicting accounts provided by Iraq.
R-400 aerial bombs	50	100	7	Iraq claimed unilateral destruction of 157 bombs, but UNSCOM is unable to confirm this number. UNSCOM has found the remains of at least 23.
Aircraft aerosol spray tanks F-1 Mirage modified fuel drop tank	4			Iraq claims to have produced four, but may have manufactured others.

#### BW Agent Growth Media<sup>b</sup>

Media	Quantity Imported	Unaccounted For Amounts
BW Agent Growth Media	31,000 kg (68,200 lbs)	3,500 kg (7,700 lbs)

<sup>a</sup> **Total** refers to amount of material obtained from the production process, while **concentrated** refers to the amount of concentrated agent obtained after final filtration/purification. **The concentrated number is the amount used to fill munitions.**

<sup>b</sup> **Media** refers to the substance used to provide nutrients for the growth and multiplication of micro-organisms.

## Appendix B

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### Iraqi Chemical Warfare Program

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#### CW Agent Stockpiles

CW Agent	Chemical Agents Declared by Iraq	Potential CW Agents Based on Unaccounted Precursors <sup>a</sup>	Comments
VX	at least 4 metric tons	200 metric tons	Iraq denied producing VX until Husayn Kamil's defection in 1995.
G-Agents (Sarin)	100 to 150 metric tons	200 metric tons	Figures include both weaponized and bulk agents.
Mustard	500 to 600 metric tons	200 metric tons	Figures include both weaponized and bulk agents.

#### CW Delivery Systems

Delivery System	Estimated Numbers Before the Gulf War	Munitions Unaccounted For <sup>b</sup>	Comments
Missile Warheads -Al Husayn (modified Scud B)	75 to 100	45 to 70	UNSCOM supervised the destruction of 30 warheads.
Rockets	100,000	15,000 to 25,000	UNSCOM supervised the destruction of nearly 40,000 chemical munitions (including rockets, artillery, and aerial bombs) 28,000 of which were filled.
Aerial Bombs	16,000	2,000	
Artillery Shells	30,000	15,000	
Aerial Spray Tanks	unknown	unknown	

<sup>a</sup>These estimates are very rough. They are derived from reports provided by UNSCOM to the Security Council and to UNSCOM plenary meetings. Gaps in Iraqi disclosures strongly suggest that Baghdad is concealing chemical munitions and precursors. Iraq may also retain a small stockpile of filled munitions. Baghdad has the capability to quickly resume CW production at known dual-use facilities that currently produce legitimate items, such as pharmaceuticals and pesticides. UNSCOM has supervised the destruction of some 45 different types of CW precursors (1,800,000 liters of liquid and 1,000,000 kilograms of solid).

<sup>b</sup>All of these munitions could be used to deliver CW or BW agents. The numbers for missile warheads include 25 that Iraq claims to have unilaterally destroyed after having filled them with biological agents during the Gulf war. UNSCOM has been unable to verify the destruction of these warheads.

## Appendix C

### Iraqi Ballistic Missile Program

Item	Initial Inventory	Comments
<b>Soviet-Supplied Scud Missiles</b> (includes Iraqi modifications of the Scud: the Al-Husayn with a range of 650 km and the Al-Abbas with a range of 950 km)	819	UNSCOM accepts Iraqi accounting for all but two of the original 819 Scud missiles acquired from the Soviet Union. Iraq has not explained the disposition of major components that it may have stripped from operational missiles before their destruction, and some Iraqi claims—such as the use of 14 Scuds in ATBM tests—are not believable. Gaps in Iraqi declarations and Baghdad's failure to fully account for indigenous missile programs strongly suggest that Iraq retains a small missile force.
Iraqi-Produced Scud Missiles	Unknown	Iraq denied producing a completed Scud missile, but it produced/produced and tested all major subcomponents.
Iraqi-Produced Scud Warheads	120	Iraq claims all 120 were used or destroyed. UNSCOM supervised the destruction of 15. Recent UNSCOM inspections found additional CW/BW warheads beyond those currently admitted.
Iraqi-Produced Scud Airframes	2	Iraq claims testing two indigenous airframes in 1990. It is unlikely that Iraq produced only two Scud airframes.
Iraqi-Produced Scud Engines	80	Iraq's claim that it melted 63 engines following acceptance tests—53 of which failed quality controls—are unverifiable and not believable. UNSCOM is holding this as an open issue.
Soviet-Supplied Missile Launchers	11	UNSCOM doubts Iraq's claim that it unilaterally destroyed five launchers. The Soviet Union may have sold more than the declared 11 launchers.
Iraqi-Produced Missile Launchers	8	Iraq has the capability to produce additional launchers.

**For Internal Use Only**

**IRAQ CORE POINTS**

**What We Were Seeking**

- From the onset of this crisis, the fundamental goal of the U.S. has been to assure that UNSCOM has unconditional and unfettered access to all suspect sites, as called for by UN Security Council resolutions. Diplomacy, backed by the threat to use overwhelming force if required, has moved us forward toward achieving that goal.
- Iraq precipitated this crisis by trying to avoid its obligations to UN Security Council resolutions. It attempted to dictate to the international community where UNSCOM could hold inspections, the manner in which inspections would be conducted and the length of time they would continue. Iraq's effort failed.

**What We Have Achieved**

- The government of Iraq has made a written commitment to provide immediate, unrestricted, unconditional access for the UNSCOM inspectors to all suspect sites. If fully implemented, this commitment will allow UNSCOM to fulfill its mission:
  - First, to find and destroy all of Iraq's chemical, biological and nuclear weapons;
  - Second to find and destroy the missiles to deliver these weapons; and,
  - Third, to institute a system for long-term monitoring to make sure Iraq does not build more.
- This commitment applies to all sites anywhere in the country, including eight so-called "Presidential sites" that now have been precisely delineated, as well as so-called sensitive sites which up to now Iraq had tried to claim were off limits to UNSCOM. Any and all of these sites are subject to repeat visits. There are no deadlines for UNSCOM to complete its work. In short, for the first time, Iraq explicitly has committed to open every site throughout the country to the weapons inspectors.
- For the "Presidential Sites" the agreement allows diplomats to accompany the UNSCOM inspectors. That is acceptable if the inspectors are free to conduct rigorous and professional inspections. All other sites will be open to inspection under existing UNSCOM procedures.
- The Secretary General has assured us UNSCOM Chairman Butler remains in charge of UNSCOM and all weapons inspections. He has also made that clear to the Iraqis.

**Questions About the MOU**

- There are issues which still need clarification, notably with respect to the inspection procedures for the eight "Presidential Sites." We have made clear that we expect all aspects of this agreement to reinforce the fundamental requirement that UNSCOM be permitted to carry out its inspections in a rigorous and professional manner.

- We have received important assurances from Secretary General Annan that clarify aspects of the MOU, notably with respect to the eight "Presidential Sites":
  - => UNSCOM and Chairman Butler will preserve their independence.
  - => The Special Team for the Presidential Sites will be part of UNSCOM.
  - => The team leader will be an UNSCOM commissioner who is expert in Iraqi WMD, chosen by the Secretary General and UNSCOM Chairman Butler.
  - => The Special Team leader will report to Chairman Butler.
  - => The diplomats will be observers only, with UNSCOM retaining operational control.
  - => Procedures for these inspections will be developed by UNSCOM and SGY, not Iraq.
  - => As has been the case since 1991, Chairman Butler will continue to report to the Security Council through the Secretary General.

### **What Next**

#### **UNSC Resolution**

- We support a resolution that will make it clear to Iraq that any violation of its commitments would have the most serious consequences. That would be a useful, but not necessary, signal from the international community.

#### **Test and Verify**

- In the days and weeks ahead, UNSCOM must robustly test and verify this commitment. Failure to allow UNSCOM to get on with its job would have serious consequences.
- The United States will keep its military forces in the Gulf at a high state of preparedness while we see if Iraq lives up to the commitment that it has signed. The United States remains resolved to secure by whatever means necessary Iraq's full compliance with its commitment to destroy its weapons of mass destruction.

### **The Bottom Line**

- Iraq's commitments are an important step forward -- but only if matched by Iraq's compliance. As the President said, "the proof is in the testing".
- This agreement can be a win/win: either Iraq implements the agreement -- or it does not. If it does, the weapons inspectors will for the first time have unrestricted, unconditional access to all suspect sites in Iraq, with no limits on the numbers of visits or deadlines to complete their work. If Iraq does not cooperate and we need to take action, we are in a stronger position internationally than ever. After two crises provoked by Iraq in four months, the international community will not stomach another bout of Iraqi defiance.

"ALDAC"

INITIALS		
APPR:	SEC	...
DRAFT:	AJB	...
CLR 1:	TRP	...
CLR 2:	MSI	...
CLR 3:	KAK	...
CLR 4:	S/S-0	...

~~SECRET~~

NEA/NGA:AJBARRY:AJB (ZALDAC2.DOC)  
12/09/98 7-6366  
THE SECRETARY

P:TRPICKERING S/S:KAKENNEY NEA:INDYK S/S-O:

S, D, P, M, C, E, G, H, L, T, SS, SSO, CMS, TF1-3, A, CA,  
DS, FMP, M/DGP, M/FLO, M/MED, NEA, S/CT, PM, PA, L  
NIACT IMMEDIATE ALDAC, SPECIAL EMBASSY PROGRAM NIACT  
IMMEDIATE, BUJUMBURA NIACT IMMEDIATE +  
IMMEDIATE RUGNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE+

FOR AMBASSADORS, CHARGES, AND PRINCIPAL OFFICERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/18

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, IZ

SUBJECT: US MILITARY ACTION/URGENT DEMARCHE REQUEST

REF: SEPTTEL

CLASSIFIED BY U/S THOMAS R. PICKERING, REASONS 1.5 (B),  
(D).

1. ~~(S)~~ NIACT IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE JUSTIFIED BY NEED FOR  
IMMEDIATE ACTION. THIS IS AN URGENT ACTION MESSAGE FOR ALL  
POSTS. SEE PARAS 6-10.

2. ~~(S)~~ POSTS SHOULD HAVE RECEIVED SEPTTEL NOTIFICATION OF  
U.S. MILITARY ACTION AGAINST IRAQ. REFTTEL INSTRUCTED POSTS  
TO NOTIFY HOST GOVERNMENTS OF THE STRIKES, AND TO ASSURE  
THEM THAT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WOULD BE FORTHCOMING.

3. ~~(S)~~ SENIOR RANKING OFFICERS PRESENT IN RECEIVING POSTS  
SHOULD SEEK IMMEDIATE FOLLOW UP MEETINGS TO BRIEF HIGHEST-  
LEVEL AVAILABLE HOST COUNTRY OFFICIALS ON THE BACKGROUND OF  
AND RATIONALE FOR THE U.S. STRIKES. ALL POSTS SHOULD DRAW  
FROM POINTS IN PARAS 7 AND 8 IN MAKING THEIR PRESENTATIONS

*SOME TIME  
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STRIKE.  
LONGER  
CABLE  
w/ POINTS*

~~SECRET~~


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PER E.O. 13526

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TO HOST COUNTRY INTERLOCUTORS, AND ADD APPROPRIATE COURTESIES. PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE WILL BE SENT SEPTTEL.

4. ~~(S)~~ ALL POSTS SHOULD REPORT DELIVERY OF THIS DEMARCHE, AND SUBSTANTIVE HOST COUNTRY RESPONSES TO THE DEPARTMENT BY IMMEDIATE CABLE.

5. ~~(S)~~ POSTS LISTED BELOW SHOULD BE AWARE THAT SEPARATE ORAL MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT WILL BE DELIVERED AS FOLLOWS: UK (BLAIR), ISRAEL (NETANYAHU), JAPAN (OBUCHI), SAUDI ARABIA (KING FAHD), KUWAIT (AMIR), BAHRAIN (AMIR), QATAR (AMIR), PA (ARAFAT), OMAN (SULTAN QABOOS), UAE (AMIR), EGYPT (MUBARAK), SYRIA (ASAD), RUSSIA (YELTSIN), FRANCE (CHIRAC), CHINA (JIANG), TURKEY (DEMIREL), CANADA (CHRETIEN), GERMANY (SCHROEDER), UNSYG.



KC:  
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IN ADDITION, CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH AND PRIME MINISTER BLAIR WILL RECEIVE PHONE CALLS FROM THE PRESIDENT.

6. ~~(S)~~ FOR AMMAN, OTTAWA, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, BRUSSELS, THE HAGUE, 1998 AND 1999 UNSC CAPITALS, NATO CAPITALS, USNATO: WHEN DELIVERING POINTS PLEASE NOTE THAT TEXT IS AN ORAL MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY. AMMAN SHOULD DELIVER MESSAGE TO CROWN PRINCE HASSAN; USNATO TO THE NATO SYG. ALL OTHER POSTS SHOULD DELIVER TO FOREIGN MINISTER. AMBASSADORS SHOULD ALSO EXPRESS GRATITUDE FOR HELPFUL PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND/OR PREVIOUS OFFERS OF MILITARY SUPPORT, AS APPROPRIATE.

7. ~~(S)~~ BEGIN POINTS:

-- THE US HAS UNDERTAKEN MILITARY ACTION AGAINST IRAQ BECAUSE OF IRAQ'S VIOLATIONS OF UNSCRS 687, 1154, 1194, 1205 AND OTHERS.

-- THE THREAT TO THE REGION POSED BY IRAQ'S REFUSAL TO COOPERATE UNCONDITIONALLY WITH UNSCOM, AND THE CONSEQUENT INABILITY OF UNSCOM TO CARRY OUT THE RESPONSIBILITIES THE COUNCIL HAS ENTRUSTED TO IT CANNOT BE TOLERATED. UNSCR 1205 EXPLICITLY REAFFIRMED THAT EFFECTIVE UNSCOM OPERATION WAS ESSENTIAL TO IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSCR 687.

-- THE SITUATION HAS ARISEN BECAUSE OF IRAQ'S REFUSAL TO PROVIDE FULL AND UNCONDITIONAL COOPERATION WITH UNSCOM, A DIRECT VIOLATION OF THE GULF WAR CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTION

~~SECRET~~

SIX GULF COUNTRIES  
3 MADE CLEAR AT THIS

LEADERS  
OF THIS

(UNSCR 687) AND IRAQ'S NOVEMBER 14 COMMITMENT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

~~STATE THAT IRAQ IS "ENTIRELY RESPONSIBLE" FOR THE SANCTIONS~~  
-- ON NOVEMBER 14, IRAQ PROMISED TO PROVIDE UNSCOM AND THE IAEA WITH FULL AND UNCONDITIONAL COOPERATION. IRAQ INFORMED THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL THAT IT WAS THE "CLEAR AND UNCONDITIONAL DECISION OF THE THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT TO RESUME COOPERATION WITH UNSCOM AND THE IAEA." IRAQ HAS VIOLATED THIS COMMITMENT, AS IT HAS VIOLATED SIMILAR PAST PROMISES. ~~OUTLET'S ACCOUNT REPORTED THAT~~ ~~OF PULLING AN~~ ~~UNSCOM~~ ~~CHN~~ ~~OUTLET'S~~ ~~REPORT~~ ~~THE SITUATION~~ ~~WAS UNUSUAL~~ ~~IF IT WERE~~ ~~ITSELF~~ ~~IT~~ ~~WAS~~ ~~NOT~~ ~~CLEAR~~

-- IRAQ HAS REFUSED TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL REQUESTED INFORMATION ON ITS BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL AND MISSILE PROGRAMS. IT BLOCKED UNSCOM'S ACCESS TO BA'ATH PARTY HEADQUARTERS ON DECEMBER 9. IT BARRED UNSCOM FROM INSPECTING A BASE ON NOVEMBER 25. ON DECEMBER 11, IRAQ FURTHER RESTRICTED UNSCOM'S ACTIVITIES BY ASSERTING THAT IT COULD NOT INSPECT ON FRIDAYS, DESPITE SEVEN YEARS OF DOING SO. ON DECEMBER 5, IRAQ RESTRICTED AN UNSCOM TEAM'S ABILITY TO PHOTOGRAPH BOMBS RELATED TO ITS CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM AND, ON THE SAME DATE, ATTEMPTED TO PREVENT ANOTHER TEAM FROM VIDEOTAPING AND PHOTOCOPYING RELEVANT DOCUMENTS. ON NOVEMBER 23, AN IRAQI ESCORT HELICOPTER PASSED OVER A UN HELICOPTER AT A LOW SPEED AND ALTITUDE, THREATENING THE SAFETY OF UN PERSONNEL. ~~IT HAS~~ ~~PROVIDED~~ ~~ONLY~~ ~~ONE~~ ~~OF~~ ~~MANY~~ ~~12~~ ~~SETS~~ ~~OF~~ ~~DOCUMENTS~~ ~~UNSCOM~~ ~~HAS~~ ~~REQUESTED~~, AND HAS SOUGHT TO PLACE UNACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS ON UNSCOM'S ACCESS TO OTHER MATERIALS. ~~WE ALSO KNOW THAT THE IRAQI MILITARY WAS ORDERED TO DESTROY WMD-RELATED DOCUMENTS IN ANTICIPATION OF THE UNSCOM INSPECTIONS.~~

-- THE US HAS WORKED WITH OUR PARTNERS ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND FRIENDS AND ALLIES TO BRING ABOUT A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM. PRESIDENT CLINTON WENT THE EXTRA MILE IN NOVEMBER WHEN HE CALLED OFF PLANNED AIR STRIKES IN ORDER TO GAVE IRAQ ONE MORE CHANCE TO FULFILL ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS.

-- THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS BEEN FIRM AND UNITED IN INSISTING IRAQ MUST PROVIDE FULL COOPERATION. REPEATED CALLS HAVE BEEN MADE IN UNSC RESOLUTIONS AND PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENTS THAT IRAQ MUST COMPLY WITH THE OBLIGATIONS IT UNDERTOOK AT THE END OF THE GULF WAR, OBLIGATIONS IT RECOMMITTED ITSELF TO LAST FEBRUARY IN THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S MOU AND AGAIN ON NOVEMBER 14.

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DOCS

~~SECRET~~

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-- IT IS CLEAR NOW THAT BAGHDAD WILL NOT RELENT. THE CYCLE WOULD CONTINUE IF LEFT UNCHECKED.

-- IRAQ HAS BEEN GIVEN REPEATED OPPORTUNITIES TO COME INTO COMPLIANCE AND MAKE PROGRESS ON OUTSTANDING WEAPONS ISSUES. IT HAS DEMANDED INSTEAD THAT THE COUNCIL LIFT THE OIL EMBARGO IRRESPECTIVE OF IRAQI NON-COMPLIANCE.

-- REPEATED COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT THIS IS UNACCEPTABLE.

7  
-- IRAQ PRESENTS A THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY. SADDAM HUSSEIN HAS COMMITTED MAJOR ACTS OF AGGRESSION AGAINST TWO NEIGHBORS. IT HAS USED NON-CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS ON THE BATTLEFIELD AND AGAINST INNOCENT IRAQI CIVILIANS.

-- THE PATTERN OF BEHAVIOR SINCE 1991 DEMONSTRATES THAT THE REGIME HAS NOT LEARNED FROM PAST MISTAKES. IRAQ WANTS TO RETAIN ITS RESIDUAL WMD AND MISSILE CAPABILITY AND REGAIN CONTROL OF FINANCIAL RESOURCES TO RECONSTITUTE ITS NON-CONVENTIONAL ARSENAL. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY CANNOT ALLOW THIS TO HAPPEN. THE US IS DETERMINED THIS WILL NOT HAPPEN.

-- EXISTING RESOLUTIONS PROVIDE THE LEGAL BASIS FOR ACTING. WE ARE ACTING DECISIVELY, BUT WITH EVERY EFFORT TO AVOID COLLATERAL CIVILIAN DAMAGE.

-- THE OBJECTIVE OF THE MILITARY ACTION WE HAVE UNDERTAKEN IS TO DEGRADE ~~SADDAM'S ABILITY TO THREATEN THE REGION AND~~ <sup>CAPABILITY</sup> TO DEGRADE HIS ~~ABILITY TO DEVELOP AND DELIVER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION,~~ ~~TO NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES.~~ AND TO DEGRADE HIS ABILITY TO THREATEN HIS NEIGHBORS.

-- WE HAVE NOT TAKEN THIS DECISION LIGHTLY. US PERSONNEL AND FRIENDS IN THE REGION COULD BE AT RISK.

-- BAGHDAD HAS TO UNDERSTAND WHAT THE CONSEQUENCES WOULD BE OF USING NON-CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AGAINST US OR OUR ALLIES.

-- WE BELIEVE THAT MOST COUNTRIES WILL UNDERSTAND AND SUPPORT THIS ACTION. WE HONESTLY DO NOT SEE THAT THERE IS ANY EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE.

-- WE HAVE NOT SOUGHT THIS CONFRONTATION.

-- IT IS BAGHDAD THAT HAS PROVOKED THE CRISIS BY ITS DELIBERATE AND REPEATED VIOLATIONS OF ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER UNSCR 687 ET AL. RESPONSIBILITY LIES SOLELY WITH BAGHDAD.

-- WE HOPE THAT AS A RESPONSIBLE MEMBER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY YOU WILL FIND A WAY TO EXPRESS YOUR SUPPORT FOR US ACTION.

8. (SBU) LEGAL BASIS FOR USE OF FORCE.

-- UNSCR 678 AUTHORIZED MEMBER STATES COOPERATING WITH KUWAIT TO USE "ALL NECESSARY MEANS" TO IMPLEMENT THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S RESOLUTIONS AND ALL SUBSEQUENT RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS "TO RESTORE INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE AREA." UNSCR 678 AND OTHER RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL REMAIN IN FORCE.

-- UNSCR 687 MANDATED A CEASE-FIRE, REAFFIRMED ALL EXISTING RESOLUTIONS, AND ALSO IMPOSED A NUMBER OF ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS, INCLUDING THE DESTRUCTION OF IRAQ WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, AND THE ACCEPTANCE BY IRAQ OF UN INSPECTIONS AND MONITORING. COMPLIANCE WITH THESE REQUIREMENTS IS A FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENT OF THE RESTORATION OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.

-- ON AUGUST 5, 1998, IRAQ ANNOUNCED ITS DECISION TO SUSPEND ALL UNSCOM AND IAEA INSPECTION ACTIVITY IN IRAQ, ALLOWING ONLY LIMITED ONGOING MONITORING ACTIVITIES TO CONTINUE. ON OCTOBER 31, 1998, IRAQ ANNOUNCED ITS DECISION TO CUT OFF ALL COOPERATION WITH UNSCOM.

-- ON NOVEMBER 14, IRAQ RESCINDED THESE DECISIONS AND AGREED TO RESUME FULL AND UNCONDITIONAL COOPERATION WITH UNSCOM AND THE IAEA CONSISTENT WITH RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS AND THE MOU.

-- HOWEVER, IRAQ HAS REPEATEDLY VIOLATED THIS COMMITMENT AND ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER UNSCRS.

-- UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, COALITION MEMBERS ARE ENTITLED TO EXERCISE THE AUTHORITY <sup>PURSUANT TO</sup> ~~GIVEN BY~~ UNSCR 678, AND TO TAKE NECESSARY AND PROPORTIONATE MEASURES (INCLUDING THE USE OF FORCE) TO COMPEL IRAQ TO TERMINATE ITS BREACH OF THE

SECURITY COUNCIL'S RESOLUTIONS AND THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING AND TO ENSURE FUTURE COMPLIANCE.

-- FURTHERMORE, MEMBER STATES ARE ENTITLED TO USE FORCE IN SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST THE USE OR THREAT OF FORCE BY IRAQ. THIS WOULD INCLUDE MEASURES NECESSARY TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF COALITION AIRCRAFT, GROUND FORCES AND NAVAL FORCES AGAINST IRAQI ATTACK, OR THREAT OF ATTACK.

9. ~~(S)~~ ADDITIONAL POINTS FOR UNSC CAPITALS:

-- THE AUTHORITY AND CREDIBILITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS BEING SEVERELY TESTED.

-- AS MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, WE HAVE A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY TO ENSURE THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN IS NOT ALLOWED TO PLAY WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS AS IF THEY HAD NO SIGNIFICANCE.

10. ~~(S)~~ ADDITIONAL POINTS FOR WARSAW (ORAL MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY):

-- THANK YOU FOR YOUR CONTINUING ASSISTANCE AS THE PROTECTING POWER OF US INTERESTS IN IRAQ.

-- I WANTED TO BE SURE THAT YOU WERE INFORMED OF THE REASONS THIS ACTION HAS BECOME NECESSARY.

-- WE WILL REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH OVER THE COMING DAYS.

11. ~~(S)~~ ADDITIONAL POINTS FOR NATO CAPITALS AND USNATO:

-- WE WOULD WELCOME A STATEMENT OF SUPPORT FROM THE NAC.

-- WE WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE A STATEMENT OF SUPPORT FROM THE NATO SYG ON HIS OWN AUTHORITY.

12. (U) MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

YY

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DAR ES SALAAM NIACT IMMEDIATE  
PESHAWAR NIACT IMMEDIATE  
TIRANA NIACT IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

7

MONROVIA NIACT IMMEDIATE  
FREETOWN NIACT IMMEDIATE  
KINSHASA NIACT IMMEDIATE  
DOHA NIACT IMMEDIATE  
Y

RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE  
RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM IMMEDIATE  
RUCJAAA/USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE  
RUCBACM/USCINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA IMMEDIATE  
RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE  
RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL IMMEDIATE  
RUEOFAA/COMJSOC FORT BRAGG NC IMMEDIATE  
JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE  
RUETIAA/DIRNSA FT GEORGE MEADE MD IMMEDIATE  
FBI WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE

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## Day After Strategy

### Key Elements for Sunday

- We will maintain a robust military presence in the area and a readiness to use force again. Saddam should already know that we will use force if Iraq threatens its neighbors, reconstitute its WMD, or moves against the Kurds.
- We will continue to contain Iraq by enforcing the United Nations sanctions and the two no fly zones.
- We support the containment of Iraq with the help of a coalition of allies.
- We will support extension of the oil for food arrangement so that the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people are assured.
- We will welcome UNSCOM/IAEA's return to Iraq **after** concrete, affirmative and demonstrated action by Iraq that show that it will provide the full cooperation that allow UNSCOM/IAEA to do their job. The burden is on Iraq to demonstrate its cooperation. We will work with the Security Council on the nature of these assurances.
- We will work with the Iraqi opposition to bring about a change of leadership in Iraq because this is the only reliable means to ensure an Iraq that is willing to live at peace with its neighbors and its own people.
- We will be ready to work with a new leadership in Iraq that abides by the UNSCRs to quickly reintegrate Iraq into the international community and ease the economic burden Saddam has created.

## Future of UNSCOM

### Key Elements:

- We want to see an effective UNSCOM return to operations in Iraq. But if it cannot, we will use our own means to ensure that Iraq does not reconstitute its WMD or threaten its neighbors.
- An effective UNSCOM would be independent, professional and impartial and able to exercise the full range of its mandated activities under the UNSCRs.
- Given the record of the last year, Iraq must first demonstrate its seriousness by concrete, authoritative, and affirmative actions.
- Once Iraq has taken such steps, UNSCOM will return to operations in Iraq for a sustained period of work.
- When UNSCOM is satisfied that it has received full cooperation, it will inform the UNSC; sanction reviews can resume and there can be a Comprehensive Review.
- The Comprehensive Review will assess the progress made toward compliance and set out a workplan for resolving issues.
- When the UNSC judges that Iraq has met its obligations under the resolutions, the UNSC will implement those resolutions.
- Until then, the needs of the Iraqi people must be protected by an extended and broad humanitarian program under the oil-for-food resolutions.

### Prior Conditions for the Return of UNSCOM:

- An authoritative statement from the highest levels committing to full and unconditional access to all sites, information and documents, and accepting all WMD-related resolutions;
- Provision of all documents requested by UNSCOM/IAEA;
- An accurate full, final and complete disclosure of WMD, as required by UNSCR 687;

- Adoption of required WMD-related legislation;
- Optional: *termination of sensitive site modalities; end to 150 km permitted missile programs; deadlines for any of the above.*

Conditions after UNSCOM Returns:

- A testing period with periodic reports from UNSCOM/IAEA.
- Iraq must demonstrate to UNSCOM/IAEA satisfaction its full cooperation.
- When UNSCOM/IAEA report full Iraqi cooperation, then sanctions reviews are restored; and a Comprehensive Review can begin.

If Iraq Refuses to Cooperate:

- UNSCOM will maintain offices in New York and Bahrain.
- It will continue to collect information on Iraq WMD and make periodic reports to the UNSC.