

9 October 1998

Jamil

Serb Compliance with 23 September UN Security Council Resolution 1199 #10

Requirement	Comments
1. Cease hostilities and maintain a cease fire	KDOM reports no major clashes on Wednesday. Albanian press says Serbs on Thursday fired on ethnic Albanian villages. UCK announced that it will observe a cease fire starting 9 October, until NATO actions are completed.
2. Cease security forces actions affecting civilians and withdraw forces used in repression of civilians	KDOM reports several army units remain field deployed and heavy police presence on major roads. KDOM also observed increased number of small mobile police checkpoints on Pec-Prishtina road. Serbian Special Police units returned to Kosovo on 6 October.
3. Provide security for international monitors	KDOM reports overall security good on Wednesday.
4. Allow freedom of movement for international monitors	Serbs denied KDOM access to Glogovac industrial complex on 7 October to investigate alleged detention of ethnic Albanians. First movement restriction on KDOM since Sunday.
5. Improve the humanitarian situation	The UN estimates that over 200,000 people have been displaced in Kosovo including 20,000 in the last week of fighting. UN estimates that 50,000 of these internally displaced persons (IDPs) are still living in the open and risk exposure to the cold. Many IDPs are salvaging crops and repairing their homes during the day, but are returning to the hills at night because of their fear of Serb police. KDOM also reports that the government aid center in Orahovac has been closed during their last eight visits. The FRY is maintaining an embargo on the commercial supply of wheat flour, oil, salt, sugar, milk, and detergent.
6. Facilitate return of refugees and displaced persons, permit free access for humanitarian organizations	Increasing numbers of IDPs are returning to their homes as Serbs lower their profile, but many are still afraid to return. Serb police continue to maintain a strong presence in Kosovo, though they have lowered their profile and the situation has relaxed. KDOM noted good freedom of movement for IDPs with many moving about without harassment on major roads, but avoiding Serb checkpoints. Humanitarian access has been good, according to KDOM.
7. Establish and abide by a timetable for talks on confidence building measures and a political solution	Belgrade has expressed willingness to grant limited autonomy, but there is no reported agreement on a timetable. Official Belgrade press reports indicate little progress made in talks with US interlocutors over the past few days.
8. Enter a meaningful dialogue on a political solution	Belgrade has called for talks with the Albanian side and shown some flexibility on the terms of the negotiations but at the same time has created a political obstacle by unilaterally naming a provisional government for Kosovo unacceptable to the current shadow government.
9. Cooperate with war crimes tribunal	Belgrade rejects authority of ICTY to investigate, interview witnesses in Kosovo.
10. Bring to justice members of the security forces involved in mistreatment of civilians and destruction of property	Belgrade claims to be conducting a full internal investigation of Gornje Obrinje and other massacres, and has agreed to allow a Finnish-led delegation into Kosovo to conduct an independent forensic investigation of alleged Serb and UCK atrocities. However, there is no indication that any domestic or ICTY charges have been filed against members of the security forces, and Serbia continues to maintain that its constitution bans extradition to the ICTY.

IPI - KOSOVO

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NICK DOWLING	NSC	456-9151	456-9150
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RICK SHERMAN	STATE EUR/SCE	6474850	6470555
Carol Lynn MacCurdy	USIA/WEU	(647-3546) 619-5590	
Ralph H. Ruedy	USIA/EEN	619-5571	202-401-6893
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(b)(3)

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SBU
CLASSIFICATION

8

MESSAGE NO 00013174

NO. OF PAGES ATTACHED 1

'98 SEP 28 A 7

28 SEP 1998 7:14



**TO: GLYN DAVIES, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL**

**CENTRAL
OPERATION**

FBIS: VIA

USIA OPER

**FROM: KRISTIE KE
DEPARTMENT
202/647-151**

**THE STATE DEPARTMENT
THE FOLLOWING PR**

OVER

AFTER

SPOT

WORLD

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM			
YUGOSLAVIA			
X	BERGER	PASCUAL	X SCHWARTZ
X	STEINBERG	ELKIND	BUSBY
X	KERRICK	WEISS	X HAWLEY
X	DAVIES		X NAPLAN
X	RICE		X METZL
X	MALLEY	X BANDLER	X WIPPMAN
X	HACHIGIAN	BROWN	
X	COSGRIFF	X BUTLER	RIEDEL
X	SIGLER	X SCHULTE	Countrvman
		X DOWLING	GREER
X	FUERTH	X HURLEY	MARTY
X	OVP STAFF	McEldowney	TODD
		SAPIRO	
	SMITH	LEE	X CLARKE
	Barks-Ruggles	BRAINARD	SIMON
	Prendergast	HENDRICKS	BOBBITT
	SANDERS	MARCHICK	BENJAMIN
			Gordon-Hagerty
		McCARTHY	GREEN
	LIEBERTHAL	GREGORY	ROSA
	BADER	KNEPPER	SISSON
	GAGNON	SHERMAN	WECHSLER
	PRITCHARD	WARD	
			SAMORE
X	FLANAGAN	DOBBINS	CARAVELLI
X	BRADEN	ARMSTRONG	HARRIS
		GALLUCCI	TUCKER
	BELL	PICCONI	
	ANDREASEN		X McCURRY
	BOUCHARD	BAKER	LEAVY
	MULLIGAN	ALLEN	CROWLEY
	Von LIPSEY	DeROSA	
	WITKOWSKY	HIGHSMITH	X SDO
	PIMENTEL		COMMS
	PETERMAN	X RUDMAN	X SMITH
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SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIEDEXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
Operations Center**SPOT REPORT NO. 1
LATEST CRISIS IN KOSOVO
0600 EDT, Monday, September 28, 1998****BELGRADE DECLARES VICTORY, SAYS OFFENSIVE IS OVER...**

(SBU) During a special session of parliament, FRY Prime Minister Mirko Marijanovic declared victory over ethnic Albanian insurgents in Kosovo and announced that all anti-terrorist activities had ended, reports the press. Marijanovic said Serbian security forces would renew their offensive only if bandit and terrorist activities reappeared. He offered amnesty to all those who had not personally committed crimes, and called on them to turn in their weapons within 10 days. The FRY has made similar declarations in the past, notes Embassy Belgrade, but seldom have they been so public or prominent. *(Watch/Embassy Belgrade telcon, Watch/Embassy Skopje telcon, Reuters)*

...AFTER DAYS OF INTENSIFIED MILITARY OPERATIONS

(SBU) The FRY announcement followed a huge upswing in military activity in Kosovo, comments Embassy Belgrade. Heavy shelling southwest of Pristina continued on the morning of September 28, reports the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission. KDOM teams had not returned to the area following the announcement to confirm whether shelling had stopped. *(Watch/Embassy Belgrade telcon, Watch/KDOM telcon, Reuters)*

Drafted: JPDeHart

Dist: S D P C G E T M H SP SRPP SS SSO PA INR USUN DS CIA FBIS NSC USIA UNW

EUR SSR DRL PRM

Approved: JMRoberts

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

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[2013-0830-M]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

September 28, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR

~~MR. LEON FUERTH~~
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

~~MR. JOHN PODESTA~~
Deputy Chief of Staff to the
President

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MS. MARIA ECHAVESTE
Deputy Chief of Staff to the
President

COL. JOSEPH REYNES, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JAMES E. STEINER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

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Staff Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

MR. GENE SPERLING
Assistant to the President
for Economic Policy

MR. ROBERT D. KYLE
Associate Director for
National Security and
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget


MS. RYAN CONROY
Executive Secretary
Agency for International
Development

COL. M. MANNING, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Paper for Principals on
Preparing for a NATO Decision on Air Strikes (S)

I attach a paper for Principals based on the results
of Saturday's Deputies Committee meeting. Unless I hear to the
contrary by 6:00 p.m. today, I will assume that your Principals
agree with the objectives and next steps described in the paper.

(S)


Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Paper

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 2/12/2024
2013-0830-M

SECRET

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(a), (d)
Declassify On: September 28, 2008

Metzl, Jamie F.

From: WHSR
Sent: Wednesday, October 14, 1998 3:51 PM
To: Allen, Charles A.; Baker, James E.; Bandler, Donald K.; Braden, Susan R.; Crowley, Philip J.; Davidson, Leslie K.; Dowling, John N. (Nick); Flanagan, Stephen J.; Guarnieri, Valerie N.; Hawley, Leonard R.; Hurley, C. Michael; Klein, Brian P.; Leavy, David C.; McEldowney, Nancy E.; Metzl, Jamie F.; Pascual, Carlos E.; Schulte, Gregory L.; Sigler, Ralph H.; Weiss, Andrew S.
Subject: SERBIA:IndependentMedi
CLASS: INTERNATIONAL
ORIG: FBIS
PREC: RUSH
TOR: 981014150211 F0301802

F4277
FBIS

277OCT14
UNCLAS 2Y

SERBIA: Independent Media Editors Condemn State 'Repression' AU1410190598
Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1727 GMT 14 Oct 98

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 14 Oct (BETA) -- A group of chief and senior editors of the independent media have today held a meeting in the Media Center. At the meeting they agreed on joint actions "in a situation in which the normal work of the media is being threatened by the work of the Information Ministry."

The meeting took place following the banning of two daily newspapers, Danas and Dnevni Telegraf, and the editors of the independent media expressed their greatest solidarity and readiness to assist one another.

The meeting was attended by the editors of the daily newspapers Nasa Borba, Danas, and Blic, the radio stations Indeks, B-92, and Radio Pancevo, the agencies BETA and Fonet, the Mreza publishing house, and representatives of the Independent Association of Serbian Journalists (NUNS) and the Media Center.

They assessed that "at this time the repression of the authorities against the media has reached dramatic dimensions and there is a great danger that Serbia will end up without any free media."

The chief and senior editors of the independent media appealed to all domestic and foreign colleagues, journalist organizations, as well as friends worldwide to support the journalists in their endeavors to retain the freedom of the press in Serbia.

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FBIS 10/14/98 14:56:00

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Metzl, Jamie F.

From: WHSR
Sent: Wednesday, October 14, 1998 3:51 PM
To: Allen, Charles A.; Baker, James E.; Bandler, Donald K.; Braden, Susan R.; Crowley, Philip J.; Davidson, Leslie K.; Dowling, John N. (Nick); Flanagan, Stephen J.; Guarnieri, Valerie N.; Hawley, Leonard R.; Hurley, C. Michael; Klein, Brian P.; Leavy, David C.; McEldowney, Nancy E.; Metzl, Jamie F.; Pascual, Carlos E.; Schulte, Gregory L.; Sigler, Ralph H.; Weiss, Andrew S.
Subject: SERBIA:NewspapersAlloc
CLASS: INTERNATIONAL
ORIG: FBIS
PREC: RUSH
TOR: 981014143041

F4267
FBIS S 267OCT14
UNCLAS 2Y

SERBIA: Newspapers Allocate Two Pages Each for Banned Danas Daily AU141018329
8 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1727 GMT 14 Oct 98

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 14 October (BETA) -- The Belgrade daily Nasa Borba and the Podgorica daily Vijesti will run two pages each in their editions tomorrow, which will be edited by the editorial staff of the Belgrade daily Danas, BETA has been told by Grujica Spasovic, chief editor of Danas.

Danas was banned last night by the Serbian Information Ministry, after which its journalists were ejected by the newsroom and the daily's premises were sealed off.

Ljubisa Mitrovic, chief editor of Podgorica Vijesti, has told BETA that the two pages of his daily will feature articles by Danas journalists, as well as its logo and lay-out.

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[2013-0830-m]

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IMMEDIATE

DATE/TIME:

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MESSAGE #:

FROM: Greg Schulte PHONE: 69451 ROOM: uev
 SUBJECT: KOSOVO - Rossin with Holbrooke PAGES: 6

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

LOCATION	DELIVER TO	ROOM	PHONE
STATE/EUR	MARC GROSSMAN		
STATE/EUR	Tony Wayne		
OSD/BTF	BETH McConnel		
JCS/J-5	George Casey		
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SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

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Initials: KRM Date: 2/12/2024

7 October 1998

Serb Compliance with 23 September UN Security Council Resolution 1199 #08

Resolution Requirement	Comment
1. Cease hostilities and maintain a cease fire.	No major Serb offensive operations reported since 30 September. Yugoslav press says insurgents attacked police unit on Tuesday. Albanian press says Serbs on Monday fired on villages near Malisevo. KDOM unable to confirm ethnic Albanian claims of shelling of several villages on Sunday.
2. Cease security forces' actions affecting civilians and withdraw forces used in repression of civilians	Some military and police forces returning to garrison. KDOM reports several army units remain field deployed and heavy police presence on major roads. Western press says 50 trucks and up to 1000 Serbs were seen departing Kosovo on Tuesday.
3. Provide security for international monitors	KDOM reports overall security good on Monday.
4. Allow freedom of movement for international monitors	Serbs have allowed unrestricted access to KDOM teams.
5. Improve the humanitarian situation	Adequate aid is available to IDPs, though many are still living in the open and risk exposure to the cold. KDOM reports that the government aid center in Orahovac has been closed during their last eight visits.
6. Facilitate return of refugees and displaced persons; permit free access for humanitarian organizations	Increasing numbers of IDPs are returning to their homes as Serb lower their profile, but many are still afraid to return. Humanitarian access has been good, according to KDOM.
7. Establish and abide by a timetable for talks on confidence building measures and a political solution	Belgrade has expressed willingness to grant limited autonomy, but no agreement on a timetable.
8. Enter a meaningful dialogue on a political solution.	Belgrade has named a provisional government for Kosovo without the approval of the current shadow government, but says it is willing to work toward elections agreed upon by all sides.
9. Cooperate with war crimes tribunal	Belgrade rejects authority of ICTY to investigate, interview witnesses in Kosovo.
10. Bring to justice members of the security forces involved in mistreatment of civilians and destruction of property	No charges reported against any member of security forces, and Serbia continues to maintain that its constitution bans extradition to the ICTY.

[2013-0830-M]

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20 October 98

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Military Radio Option for Broadcasting in Kosovo (C)

1. (U) Purpose. Provide NSC with information for the Kosovo International Public Information (IPI) IWG on 20 Oct 98.
2. (U) Key Points

(C) Military RADIO Support to OSCE / KVM: DOD has limited broadcast assets that could be deployed in support of OSCE / KVM, if requested by NATO and / or EUCOM, and authorized by DOD. Currently DOD involvement / authorization has not been approved, nor finalized, nor is it a DOD recommended Course of Action (COA) to employ such systems.

(C) If a military radio were requested and authorized for deployment, several key factors must first be resolved. First, a "Pre-deployment Site Survey (PDSS) must be conducted to ensure, terrain, space, power, life support and other factors have been identified. Major concerns over frequency management / spectrum deconfliction, force protection / security measures, programming, staffing, linguist support, administration, logistics, and other vital points must be clarified before any radio is deployed.

(C) The military radio system that is best suited for the OSCE / KVM mission, if required, is the "NAVY 10K" (10K AM / 3K FM) system that is under the operational control of the Fleet Information Warfare Center (FIWC) at Norfolk, VA; United States Atlantic Command (USACOM). This system is highly mobile and air deliverable. If the refurbishment / refit of this system has been completed (it only returned from Bosnia in July 98), it would be the preferred system for employment. It is a pure broadcasting platform, and does not have a studio capability. It would also require satellite dishes, up link / down link capability, and digital decoders to rebroadcast / pull down signals.

(C) DOD and US AID/OTI agree that non-military options to increase the independent media coverage to and within KOSOVO are preferable to any DOD involvement.

Prepared by: M.K. Seidl, LTC, USA
Information Operations Division, J3, 695-5080

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2013-0830-m(1.26)
KBH 2/12/2024

Classified By: VERNON E. CLARK
Reason: 1.5(A)
Declassify On: 18 Oct 98

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Originator: SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD-PA/DPL//

Message: 1 of 13

DTG: 161937Z OCT 98 Precedence: R DAC: General

Subject: (U) PA PLAN FOR ANVIL SERIES OPERATIONS

RTTSZYUW RUEKJCS6295 2921630-SSSS--RUEKAMH.

ZNY SSSSS

R 161937Z OCT 98

FM SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD-PA/DPL//

TO RUFGNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECDC//

RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//PA//

RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE

RUCBACM/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//J3/PA//

RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK//N3/019//

RUFDAAU/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//AEAPA/AEAGC-O//

RHFQAAA/COMUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE

RHFQAAA/HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//DO/IN/PA//

RUFGFMC/HQ MARFOREUR BOEBLINGEN GE//G3/PA//

RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC

RUENAAA/CHINFO WASHINGTON DC//OI-5//

RUFQJQ/COMSIXTHFLT

RHFQAAA/86AW RAMSTEIN AB GE//PA//

RUEAHQA/OSAF WASHINGTON DC//PAM//

RUEAHQA/HQ USAF WASHINGTON DC//XO/XOI/XOIRC//

RUEADWD/DA WASHINGTON DC//SAPA-PP/SAPA-MRD/OCL/DAMO-ODO//

RUFDAVC/CDRVCORPS HEIDELBERG GE //PAO//

RUFQSAC/USCINCEUR ALT SHAPE BE//ECCC/SPASAC//

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 PER E.O. 13526
 2013-0830-17 (1.21)
 KBH 2/14/2024

PAGE 02 RUEKJCS6295 ~~SECRET~~

RUFGNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ3/ECJ33/ECJ35/ECPA/ETCC//

RUFGNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECPOLAD/ECJ4/ECJ5/ECLA//

RUFQAAA/COMJTFS RAMSTEIN AB GE//CC//

INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD-PA/DPL//

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USD(P)//

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02

SUBJECT: (U) PA PLAN FOR ANVIL SERIES OPERATIONS

REF: USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE MESSAGE, 080715Z OCT 98, SUBJECT: (U)

PROPOSED PA PLAN FOR ANVIL SERIES OPERATIONS.

1. (U) THE FOLLOWING PA PLAN IS APPROVED.

2. (S) SITUATION.

A. GENERAL. THIS PLAN PROVIDES OVERALL GUIDANCE AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE PLANNING AN EXECUTION OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS FOR U.S. FORCES ASSIGNED TO USEUCOM FOR PARTICIPATION IN ANVIL SERIES OPERATIONS.

B. ASSUMPTIONS.

1) LARGE NUMBERS OF INTERNATIONAL MEDIA ARE ALREADY IN THE AREA, HAVE WELL-DEVELOPED LOGISTICS AND TRANSPORTATION RESOURCES, IMMEDIATE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS, MULTIPLE SOURCES OF INFORMATION, AND

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WIDE TERRITORIAL ACCESS. THEY WILL INDEPENDENTLY COVER EVERY FACET

PAGE 03 RUEKJCS6295 ~~SECRET~~

OF THE OPERATION AND CAN IMMEDIATELY REPORT INCIDENTS AND SHOW STILL-DEVELOPING NEWS STORIES TO A WIDE AUDIENCE. MEDIA PRESSURE WILL AT TIMES BE INTENSE.

2) INTERNATIONAL PRESS ON-SCENE AND OTHER EARLY ARRIVING MEDIA WILL COVER EVERY FACET OF THE OPERATION IN REAL OR NEAR-REAL TIME.

3) U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND COMPONENT COMMAND PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFFS MAY RECEIVE AUGMENTATION FROM CONUS.

4) JOINT COMBAT CAMERA ASSETS WILL DEPLOY TO THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS AND WILL BE AVAILABLE TO PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES TO ASSIST IN MAXIMIZING INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL COVERAGE OF U.S. OPERATIONS.

3. (U) MISSION. TO EXPEDITE THE FLOW OF ACCURATE AND TIMELY INFORMATION, HIGHLIGHTING U.S. COMMITMENT AND RESOLVE TO PEACE AND STABILITY IN KOSOVO, AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO NATO OPERATIONS. ADDRESSEES ARE AUTHORIZED AND ENCOURAGED TO EMBED MEDIA IN ALL FACETS OF THE OPERATION.

4. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS POSTURE. IAW OPERATIONAL THEMES AND MESSAGES, COMMANDERS MAY ACTIVELY SEEK OPPORTUNITIES TO COMMUNICATE LOCAL FORCE

CONTRIBUTIONS TO U.S. OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF NATO. COMMANDERS AT ALL LEVELS ARE ENCOURAGED TO STRONGLY SUPPORT EFFORTS THAT

PAGE 04 RUEKJCS6295 ~~SECRET~~

DEMONSTRATE TO THE PUBLIC, THROUGH THE MEDIA, THE UNITED STATES' RESOLVE AND CAPABILITIES.

5. (U) PA OBJECTIVES.

A. PROVIDE ACCURATE AND TIMELY INFORMATION ABOUT U.S. ACTIVITIES TO THE AMERICAN AND INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC.

B. SUPPORT NATO/AFSOUTH COALITION PUBLIC INFORMATION OPERATIONS; ENSURE PROPER COORDINATION OF RELEASE OF U.S. SPECIFIC INFORMATION.

C. CONTRIBUTE TO OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS BY ENSURING THE TIMELY FLOW OF ACCURATE INFORMATION.

6. (U) TASKS.

A. USEUCOM (ECPA)

1) COORDINATE AND MANAGE PA ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATED WITH U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS.

2) PROVIDE PUBLIC AFFAIRS POLICY GUIDANCE TO OPERATION PAO.

3) CONDUCT PA PROGRAM IN COLLABORATION WITH APPROPRIATE U.S. EMBASSY REPRESENTATIVES AND/OR IN SUPPORT OF NATO AND ALLIED PUBLIC INFORMATION PROGRAMS.

4) COORDINATE WITH SHAPE PIO AND/OR AFOUTH PIO PUBLIC INFORMATION POLICY AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION FOR DEPLOYMENT OF THEIR SUPPORTING FORCES.

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PAGE 05 RUEKJCS6295 ~~SECRET~~

B. COMPONENT COMMANDS/JTF COMMANDERS (WHEN ASSIGNED)

1) PLAN, COORDINATE AND CONDUCT PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROGRAMS IAW THIS PLAN.

2) COORDINATE PA ANNEXES AND PLANS WITH USEUCOM (ECPA).

3) PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR MEDIA INCLUDING INTRA-THEATER TRANSPORTATION, MESSING, AND BILLETING (ON A REIMBURSABLE BASIS) AND, IF NECESSARY, EMERGENCY MEDICAL TREATMENT. USE OF MILITARY AIRCRAFT AND OTHER CONVEYANCES FOR INTRA-THEATER TRANSPORTATION OF MEDIA IS AUTHORIZED.

4) ESTABLISH PUBLIC AFFAIRS NODES AT KEY OPERATIONAL SITES.

5) PROVIDE DAILY SITREP (DURING OPERATIONAL PHASE) TO USEUCOM-ECPA, NLT 1000Z.

6) COORDINATE REQUEST FOR JOINT COMBAT CAMERA ASSETS TO SUPPORT PUBLIC AFFAIRS VISUAL INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS AND DIRECT VIDEO/STILL SATELLITE TRANSMISSION SUPPORT.

7. (U) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

A. THEMES AND MESSAGES.

1) THERE ARE FOUR KEY OBJECTIVES THAT PRESIDENT MILOSEVIC MUST MEET:

A) A STOP TO ALL FIGHTING.

B) WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES (RETURN TO GARRISON).

C) (DISPLACED PERSONS) UNIMPEDED ACCESS TO REFUGEES BY

PAGE 06 RUEKJCS6295 ~~SECRET~~

NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND PRIVATE VOLUNTEER ORGANIZATIONS TO

PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN AID AND REFUGEES TO THEIR HOMES.

D) INITIATION OF NEGOTIATIONS.

2). (LEGITIMACY) THE U.S. MILITARY IS OPERATING AS PART OF NATO UNDER LEGITIMATE LEGAL AUTHORITY AND WITH THE CONSENSUS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES ARE A PROFESSIONAL FORCE OPERATING UNDER INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED CODES OF CONDUCT.

3) THE U.S. MILITARY, AS PART OF NATO, WILL ENFORCE NSCR 1199 EVENLY AGAINST ALL PARTIES. THE U.S. IS NOT ACTING IN SUPPORT OF ANY INVOLVED ENTITY AND WILL CONTINUE TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST ANY NON-COMPLIANT PARTY. CONTINUED VIOLENCE WILL NOT ACCOMPLISH THE OBJECTIVE OF ANY ORGANIZATION OR ETHNIC GROUP.

4) (COLLATERAL DAMAGE) THE U.S. HAS TAKEN EVERY PRECAUTION TO MINIMIZE COLLATERAL DAMAGE, AND HAS ACTED ONLY AS A LAST RESORT TO PREVENT PROLONGED VIOLENCE OR LOSS OF LIFE.

5) (FORCE PROTECTION) THE U.S. WILL ACT DECISIVELY IN RESPONSE TO ATTACKS UPON ITS FORCES, INSTALLATION, OR PERSONS UNDER ITS PROTECTION.

6) (GROUND FORCES) THERE HAVE BEEN NO REQUESTS, EITHER INFORMAL OR FORMAL, FOR GROUND FORCE CONTRIBUTIONS FROM ANY ALLIED NATION. IT

PAGE 07 RUEKJCS6295 ~~SECRET~~

WOULD BE PREMATURE TO DISCUSS ANY CONSIDERATIONS OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF GROUND TROOPS FOR A POSSIBLE PEACEKEEPING MISSION.

7) (FRYOM&TFAS) THE U.S. MAINTAINS APPROXIMATELY 350 PERSONNEL IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA SUPPORTING THE UNITED NATIONS PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT MISSION. THEY ARE ASSIGNED TO TASK FORCE ABLE SENTRY, HEADQUARTERED IN SKOPJE. IN LIGHT OF THE CURRENT SITUATION ALONG THE KOSOVO-FRYOM BORDER, EUCOM IS EVALUATING MULTIPLE OPTIONS TO ENHANCE THE SAFETY OF U.S. TROOPS ALREADY IN MACEDONIA AS PART OF TASK FORCE ABLE SENTRY.

B. REPORT ACCIDENTS AND INCIDENTS TO USEUCOM ECPA IMMEDIATELY.

C. TRANSPORTATION: IN SUPPORT OF ANVIL OPERATIONS, MEDIA TRAVEL ABOARD MILITARY CONVEYANCES IS AUTHORIZED THROUGHOUT THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS.

D. POINT OF CONTACT FOR OASD(PA) DPL IS LTC LANE VAN DE STEEG, DSN 227-7341, CMCL (703) 697-7341, E-MAIL: LANE.

VANDESTEEG@OSD.PENTAGON.MIL. POINTS OF CONTACT FOR USECOM (ECPA) ARE MAJ DAVID DAIGLE, DSN 430-8430, COMCL 49-711-680-8430, E-MAIL: DAIGLEDL@EUUCOM.MIL; MAJ HENRY HUNTLEY, DSN 430-8010, COMCL 49-711-680-8010, E-MAIL: HUNTLEYH@EUUCOM.MIL; CDR TOM VAN LEUNEN, DSN 430-8486, CMCL 49-711-680-8486, E-MAIL: VANLEUTP@EUUCOM.MIL.

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430-8486, CMCL 49-711-680-8486, E-MAIL: VANLEUTP@EUUCOM.MIL.

DECLAS/CLASSIFIED BY: C.S ABBOT, DCINCEUR REASON: 1.5 (A,D)

DECLASSIFY ON: UPON ANNOUNCEMENT.

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PER D.O. 135262013-0830-M (1.23)
KBM 2/12/2024**OSCE KOSOVO VERIFICATION MISSION****FORCES AND WEAPONS COMPONENT**

1. **Mission Statement.** Conduct verification of FRY Security Forces (MUP and VJ) and known Kosovar Albanian insurgents in Kosovo by observing, monitoring, and reporting on unit locations, assigned equipment, and current force status to provide reports for assessment by Higher Headquarters for compliance with the stipulations of UNSCR 1199 and negotiated Term of Reference.

2. **Concept of Operations.** Forces and Weapons Component will conduct its mission by performing Kosovo-wide roving patrols, site inspections, and incident follow-up. By conducting these activities, the Forces and Weapons Component will verify whether FRY security forces and Kosovo Albanian insurgents are, or are not abiding by demands required for:

- Immediate cessation of hostilities and cease fire
- Ceasing repressive actions and withdraw of units

Roving patrols will ensure periodic presence in all sectors (structure to be specified) while additionally reacting to intelligence assessments for patrol focus and location priorities. Prior to initiation of site inspections, FRY authorities must identify all Kosovo VJ/MUP locations and provide KVM inventory lists for authorized numbers of personnel and type/amount of equipment at each site. Once lists have been agreed, Force and Weapons Component will begin periodic, random site inspections/inventories to determine the FRY units' operational posture and perform a sampling count of the equipment inventory. Force and Weapons Component will have the requirement to balance inventory list numbers with authorized departures.

The Force and Weapons Component will conduct incident follow-ups based on reports by the parties or other intelligence of military type attacks. The Force and Weapons Component team will then move to the general location of an alleged attack to confirm or deny report through witness statements or physical evidence. The Force and Weapons Component team will exercise extreme caution not to become involved in ongoing fighting. The Force and Weapons Component's role is to only confirm or deny. If Force and Weapons Component encounters an ongoing fight, they would attempt to obtain information on who is fighting, how many personnel or units are involved, and type of weaponry. Subsequently, the FWC would report findings to KVM HQ and then respond to KVM orders.

3. **Mission Tasks.**

- a. Verify termination of operations in Kosovo by Special Police, MUP, and VJ forces.

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- b. ~~Verify military flight (VJ/MUP) compliance with directives of KVM director as specified from the Air Verification System.~~
 - c. Verify termination of operations by Kosovar Albanian Insurgents.
 - d. Receive reports from the parties of attacks; investigate to confirm or deny attack.
 - e. Verify VJ border control operations.
 - f. Verify return of Kosovo based MUP and VJ units to their cantonment/garrison sites.
 - g. Verify the departure from Kosovo of MUP and VJ units which are normally based from outside Kosovo.
 - h. Verify heavy weapons storage in cantonment sites. Conduct both announced and unannounced inventories/inspections.
 - i. Receive request from relevant FRY Ministries for any movement of forces and equipment. Monitor a random selection of authorized movements.
 - j. Verify that FRY security forces have not established roadblocks or checkpoints. During transition to full operations of Kosovar police, verify Serbian regular police checkpoints are for normal policing duties.
4. **Enabling Tasks.**
- a. Plan, prepare, coordinate a patrol.
 - b. Observe and monitor a specified site.
 - c. Conduct a route recon; develop alternate route plan.
 - d. Inventory a garrison/cantonment/weapons site
 - e. Prepare and submit observation reports; report violations.
 - f. Read a military map, develop grid locations; identify features
 - g. Be prepared to conduct emergency extraction.
 - h. Driving techniques and considerations for hazardous weather and terrain.
 - i. Use secure communications.
 - j. Maintain operational security during patrol.

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k. Prepare medical evacuation request/call for and control medevac.

l. Understand and conduct negotiations.

m. Deal with media.

n. Recognize signs of mine fields to avoid; conduct self-extraction from point and area mine fields.

o. Recognize and identify the VJ, MUP, and Kosovar Albanian insurgent forces, techniques, and equipment.

p. Understand the culture of the people in Kosovo.

q. Be trained in immediate lifesaving techniques (use of IV, tourniquet, stabilize person in shock, etc.)

5. Individual qualifications:

a. Operate a fully armored, wheeled vehicle.

b. Operate secure communications equipment.

c. Operate navigation aids: maps, GPS, lensetic compass, etc.

d. Operate special observation devices: binoculars, night vision devices, etc.

e. Recognize and be capable of identifying NATO forces, VJ, MUP, and Kosovar Albanians, equipment, uniforms, and techniques.

f. Be proficient in use of English language.

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Recommended Messages For "Cronies"

1. Mr. Dusan Vlatkovic: National Bank Of Yugoslavia Governor

"Mr. Vlatkovic, as a key member of the National Bank, you occupy a position of great responsibility. Your country's government, economy and people directly depend on the decisions taken by you and your fellow bank governors. It is now time to carefully consider a new decision.

President Milosevic continues to lead your country down a path of certain destruction. Are you willing to risk your bank's and your personal future on Milosevic's failed leadership?

Will your support for Milosevic cause those who wish to assist in Serbia's reconstruction to freeze you out?

Your choices are clear; continue to support Milosevic's failure and stand by while you and your bank are left out in the cold, or, distance yourself from failure and be ready to lead in an economic and financial recovery that will bring Serbia into the next millennium."

2. Message for other "Economic Cronies"

"Serbs are great chess players and strategic thinkers. We have been following your work for some time. You are a visionary and skilled decision-maker. Of all Serbs, you understand the adverse impact of the systematic destruction of Serbia's economic infrastructure.

If all Serbs dwell excessively on the past and present, no Serb will have much of a future. It is time to be a visionary, a chess master, and think a few moves ahead.

Milosevic may sacrifice everything...and for what?

As you know from your access to independent media; NATO is more unified than ever, Russia is nearly bankrupt and needs the West and the IMF to survive, and Serbia's Armed Forces in Kosovo have been cut off from Belgrade.

The time is now for a decision to work toward the future. Surely, you have heard about the West's pledge for helping in the reconstruction of Serbia once the fighting ends. Opportunities exist for wise men, men looking a few moves ahead...chess masters.

Position yourself to be one of the new economic leaders in the reconstruction. Distance yourself from Milosevic and his failed leadership. When Milosevic falls, his supporters will be frozen out from the opportunities of the reconstruction.

The Choice is yours. Don't be placed in Checkmate.

Think about yourself, your family and the future!"

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3. Momir Bulatovic: FRY Prime Minister

“Mr. Prime Minister, it will come as no surprise to you that Serbia’s current state of affairs is deteriorating rapidly.

What Serbia desperately needs is not another failure, but a visionary...a leader.

A leader, to navigate Serbia through these troubled times and set a course for a better future.

A leader, to stop the systematic destruction of Serbia’s economic infrastructure, the pain of her people and the increasing isolation from the rest of the civilized world.

A leader, to break the cycle of violence and work toward the opportunities of reconstruction.

Who will act now to move away from those who would allow Serbia’s destruction and become one of the wise men that work toward the future?

Mr Bulatovic, are you that leader, or just another follower?”

4. Message for other Political Cronies

“ Mr. _____, did you ever think that it would come to this? What will be Serbia’s next resource to go up in smoke? What will be the next piece of Serbia to be damaged beyond repair? Can you imagine?

Just imagine a Serbia where peace has returned, gas is plentiful, power is reliable and children have a real future.

Just imagine the tremendous amount of political and economic reconstruction necessary to achieve these goals.

Just imagine you will be one of the courageous politicians poised to make the vision a reality.

Or just imagine that you loyally stood by a failed leader, and can only imagine what could have been.”

5. Message for Ljubisa Velickovic Asst Chief of the Supreme Command for Air and Air Defense

“The Alliance’s air campaign is systematically destroying Serbia. It has destroyed a great deal of your Air Force and now the bombs are closing in on the VJ and MUP forces in Kosovo.

As you have seen from independent media, the strategy is clear, and every day brings continued destruction of Serbia’s military.

Despite your leaders’ promises, NATO’s solidarity and resolve are stronger than ever.

Milosevic miscalculated and is now prepared to sacrifice the Serb Armed Forces to ensure his personal survival.

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Is the price of failed leadership worth the ruin of Serbia's once proud military?

In the coming weeks Milosevic will become more frustrated and seek retribution on those whom he perceives have failed him.

Are you on the scapegoat list? Are your comrades in the Army and Navy on that list?

Why not start a new list, a list of the professional military leaders who seek to save Serbia from certain destruction.

6. **Message for other Military and Security Confidants**

Every conflict ends. The military buries their dead, and mourns their losses. They were the best Serbia had to offer. They were the best you had to offer to ensure Milosevic's personal survival. Their failed leader survives at the cost of the best of Serbia.

Military families have sacrificed as well. Fathers fighting in Kosovo and Mothers and children at home with no gas, unreliable power and their futures in doubt.

Do you really think Milosevic cares about Serbia's military and their families' sacrifices?

But every conflict ends and in addition to the funerals there will be the necessary accounting of those who violated their professional military code.

As in Bosnia, there will be a careful examination of the record of those who participated in senseless acts of violence against innocent civilians as well as those who turned a blind eye to the atrocities.

General Perisic was replaced because of his unwillingness to commit Serbian Armed Forces to participate in Milosevic's ethnic cleansing of Kosovo. He stood up for his convictions and demonstrated the true attributes of a leader.

Are you a leader?

Do you have the courage to speak up against the failed leadership that brings daily destruction to Serbia and ensures continued sacrifices by your soldiers and their families?

Or are you a follower?

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Clinton Presidential Records Mandatory Declassification Review

This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were released in full or released in part.

Those documents released with redactions have been restricted under Section 1.4 (d) of E.O. 13526.

**United States
Information
Agency**

Washington, D.C. 20547

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MEMORANDUM FOR: NSC - Jamie Metzl
(phone: 456-9361; room 302)

FROM: ~~_____~~
USIA/EEN - Robert E. McCarthy

SUBJECT: IPI Planning for Kosovo

As requested at your August 25 meeting, attached is a draft public-diplomacy plan for supporting NATO military action in Kosovo prepared by the USIA team. It is divided into two parts: (a) getting agreement of our allies to undertake military action and (b) enlisting mass and elite support before and after the action.

You also asked for thoughts on specific action to be taken now. Given the centrality of NATO to success, we recommend you immediately propose to NATO coordinated planning on an information campaign to support military action in Kosovo. We must engage them early if our IPI effort is to be coherent. Because external broadcasting is so important for Serbia-Montenegro, especially for Kosovo, we also recommend you invite a representative from USIA's International Broadcasting Bureau to attend our next meeting. We would be happy to identify the right person.

Finally, please note the attached plan does not address specific programs and activities. USIA has the full range of public-diplomacy tools available, from electronic information transmission to well connected representatives in the field. Once a strategy is approved, we are prepared to move forward with dispatch.

Attachment: as stated

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~**A KOSOVO IPI STRATEGY****CONTEXT:**

West Europe/NATO Members: International public support, especially from NATO allies, is critical to success of military action in Kosovo. A unilateral American step, or one that is perceived as mainly American with only grudging allied backing, would engender anti-American antipathy--the "hegemony factor." Allied support cannot be assumed, but it is obtainable. Opinion polls demonstrate West European publics believe their governments have not responded adequately to the crisis in Kosovo. Majorities would support NATO moves to ease the humanitarian crisis but most would stop short at this time of endorsing military action. Most would prefer that any action have multilateral approval; when asked directly, a narrow plurality favors a UN mandate for any NATO intervention. Polling results suggest that if political leaders explain the need and rationale for NATO action, with or without a UN mandate, they could win broad public approval.

Balkan Region: USIA survey data shows the polarization in the region and also suggests public diplomacy could be effective. A mid-August poll in Serbia indicates large majorities support Serb police actions in Kosovo and oppose any significant change in Kosovo's political status. But a small majority are willing to grant Kosovo some increased autonomy within Serbia. About four in ten believe the government should compromise on Kosovo if it meant some lifting of sanctions (43%) or in response to NATO's stationing troops in neighboring countries (37%). Yet as many or more oppose concessions. Significantly, nearly half (46%) would support compromise to end NATO air strikes, but a third (35%) would oppose. Compared to June, fewer Belgrade residents are now willing to make concessions when presented with these scenarios. Despite the recent escalation in violence, Serbs are as likely now (35%) as they were in March to support a family member going to fight to keep Kosovo part of Serbia. About four in ten would be opposed (44%). Thus, despite their views on Kosovo, fairly substantial numbers of Serbs appear willing to support changes if they will forestall/end NATO military action, and this group would be predisposed to our IPI effort. Obviously, opinion trends can be unpredictable; we must be alert for a hardening of opinion as a result of any military action.

Russia: We should recognize NATO military action in Kosovo will be a hard sell in Russia, and could have political implications that affect other U.S. interests. Russia's historic cultural and political association with the Balkan Serbs will make it particularly difficult to convince the public that military action against the FRY is justified. Moreover, Russians are already concerned about NATO enlargement and fear it may be directed at them; thus, they are unlikely to support NATO action in what is acknowledged to be FRY sovereign territory. Military action might trigger a sharp official reaction or have domestic political implications affecting our longer-term interests. That having been said, many thoughtful Russians are uncomfortable with Milosevic's actions in Kosovo. If and when a decision is made to intervene militarily in Kosovo, NATO must make the strongest possible case that such action is necessary, and let facts speak for themselves. Significant support for NATO peace keeping in Bosnia (54% of Moscow elites), in which Russians participate, gives us a solid starting point.

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
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STRATEGY:

This set of circumstances presents several diplomacy challenges. The first is to convince our NATO allies to take a more activist role by bringing along their publics. We can build public, and thereby government support for NATO military involvement in Kosovo by targeting major European media with stories about the growing humanitarian problem and potential refugee crisis at their doorsteps. Emphasizing the growing humanitarian/refugee crisis will also create a sense of urgency and a need to act, out of self-interest as well as humanitarian concern. Rallying allied support is a job specifically for the United States, until NATO decides to act.



Second, we have to make sure that when NATO does decide on a military course, that there is no question in the international community that this is a joint action. To do that, Secretary General Solana must have the lead in announcing NATO intentions and actions. All of the allied nations should speak in support of the NATO action, drawing on common talking points.



NATO's spokesman, Jamie Shea, should be the primary source for information and explanation about alliance actions. (Obviously, individual countries would speak about their own specific military contributions, in addition to those of the alliance as a whole). USG statements should follow Secretary Solana's initial announcement, and all USG policies and actions thereafter should be characterized as support to the NATO-led mission.

NATO



To prepare for this secondary course of action, the United States should raise the need for a Kosovo public diplomacy campaign in the appropriate NATO forum. Our Public Affairs Officer at NATO HQ in Brussels is positioned to create and present an international public diplomacy plan, with NATO Spokesman Jamie Shea, to the NAC for consideration and joint action. The NAC and the NATO Information Program (NATIP) are the proper institutional vehicles for launching an allied international public diplomacy effort. The primary target audiences would be publics within alliance countries (via their major media outlets), as well as publics and elites in the Balkans, Russia, and other countries with particular interest in the region, especially current members of the UN Security Council.

Obviously, the Balkans (and the FRY in particular) would be a special focus for public diplomacy effort. We should stress the same themes that we employ elsewhere (see below), but emphasize that NATO military action is designed to bring a quick and peaceful resolution of the humanitarian crisis and push all parties to find a political accommodation that will restore stability to the region. Currently we have excellent access to local media, but we must also be prepared for a Milosevic crackdown. In that event we can reach audiences in Serbia and Kosovo through 'spillover' effect from broadcasters in neighboring countries and via USG (and other) external broadcasting. VOA Serbian and Albanian have large audiences and VOA's new TV program "Open Studio" has a large direct-satellite viewership. If programmatically and technologically feasible, we can increase air time of VOA Albanian and VOA Serbian broadcasts. If Serbian authorities curtail local Internet service providers, we can disseminate USG policy messages by fax to local opinion leaders, NGOs, and political opposition.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~**OPERATING PRINCIPLES**

- The IPI message should emanate from NATO and allied sources as much as possible to illustrate broad multinational support, vice unilateral U.S. program. A formal NATO public diplomacy plan is essential to coordinate allied IPI efforts.
- The IPI message should be tailored for each major audience grouping (e.g. NATO allies, non-NATO countries, Russia, the Balkans, etc.) in order to be effective--one size will not fit all. It should also help solidify currently lukewarm allied support for a military option.
- The IPI message should be divided into a pre-ops program (initiated immediately) to build the rationale for potential NATO action as well as a post-ops package (ready to implement) to justify and explain the operation.
- IPI themes should be grounded in publicly stated policy objectives, consistently echoed throughout the USG and which are consistent with the NATO public affairs effort.

Ael**THEMES AND OBJECTIVES**PRE-OPERATION PHASE**THEMES**

- Belgrade's continued use of force in Kosovo is not acceptable and cannot solve the situation. Nor can force by the UCK lead to anything but more human suffering.
- Continued unrest in Kosovo threatens the stability of the entire region. The international community has a stake in restoring calm and stability in Kosovo.
- The humanitarian situation in Kosovo is desperate and getting worse. The coming winter will bring intolerable humanitarian crisis.
- Diplomacy is the preferred tool to resolve the situation. U.S. and NATO will go the extra mile to find a peaceful solution which retains Kosovo as a part of the FRY. All the nations of the Alliance back this effort, and it has broad international support..
- NATO military action may be necessary in the face of continued diplomatic failure. The U.S. will support military action if it becomes necessary.
- Violence must be a last resort; however, military action may speed a diplomatic solution, as it spurred the parties on at Dayton.
- Belgrade's offensive military actions and undemocratic policies are largely responsible for the desperate humanitarian situation in Kosovo; Belgrade must bear responsibility for any NATO military response.

OBJECTIVES

- Make the case that NATO has exhausted every reasonable diplomatic option to resolve the Kosovo crisis peacefully. Document what has been done.
- Rally allied support for NATO military action as a legitimate, useful, option.
- Convince all parties to the conflict in Kosovo that NATO will act if they themselves do not come to a solution.
- Explain to non-members of the Alliance the justification of NATO military action.

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POST OPERATIONS PHASE

THEMES:

- The NATO military option was the only option left to avert further humanitarian disaster. The U.S., acting in concert with NATO allies, was a full participant in planning and executing the action.
- There can be no military solution to this conflict, but NATO is prepared to use military action to bring all parties to the table to come to a diplomatic settlement.
- European regional stability in general and the huge investment in Bosnian stability in particular, are protected by this operation.
- Belgrade is largely responsible--its continued offensive in Kosovo made NATO's military response necessary. However, the UCK also shares responsibility through its refusal to enter into negotiations.
- The NATO operation was lawful, proportionate, and effective in averting further humanitarian suffering. We can document careful planning to limit casualties/damage and show how strikes have relieved the humanitarian situation and deterred armed action against innocent civilians.
- NATO and the U.S. are prepared to assist with recovery efforts necessitated by the operation .
- Both Belgrade and the UCK must recognize that further military action by them will not be tolerated.

OBJECTIVES

- Stop all Serbian and UCK military and security forces' offensive activity.
- Make it possible for Kosovo refugees to return to their homes and protect them.
- Initiate meaningful negotiations for a peaceful solution.
- Preserve regional stability.
- Emphasize military operation as a concerted NATO action that has international support.

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 DEPUTY SECRETARY:STALBOTT

EUR:MGROSSMAN EUR/RPM:BOKIRKPATRICK EUR/SCE:MPALMER
 P:ERUBIN D:JBASS EUR/RUS:MYOVANOVITCH IO/UNP:CSTOCKBRIDGE
 OSD:TWHELAN JCS: S/S: S/S-O: NSC:

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IMMEDIATE USNATO, USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE,
 LONDON IMMEDIATE, PARIS IMMEDIATE, BONN IMMEDIATE+
 IMMEDIATE JOINT STAFF WASHDC, SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 ANATO IMMEDIATE, BELGRADE IMMEDIATE
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E.O. 12958: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, MARR, NATO, NAC, SR

SUBJECT: ACHIEVING OUR OBJECTIVES IN KOSOVO

REF: A) SKOPJE 2543; B) USNATO 2522; C) USNATO 2517;
 D) VERSHBOW 9/27/98 FAX

CLASSIFIED BY A/S GROSSMAN FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

FOR AMBASSADORS/CHARGES

1. (S) AS A RESULT OF SUSTAINED AMERICAN EFFORT AND LEADERSHIP, THERE WERE SIGNIFICANT STEPS DURING THE WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 21 TO INCREASE PRESSURE ON FRY PRESIDENT MILOSEVIC AND TO FOCUS INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION ON THE NEED TO MAKE RAPID PROGRESS ON THE THREE TRACKS OF OUR KOSOVO STRATEGY: HUMANITARIAN, NEGOTIATIONS AND CREATING THE CREDIBLE THREAT OF FORCE. THE ADOPTION SEPTEMBER 23 OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1199 IS A CONCRETE STEP TOWARD ENDING THE VIOLENCE IN KOSOVO. ONCE THE UNSCR PASSED, WE AGREED TO A CONTACT GROUP MEETING IN NEW YORK SEPTEMBER 23 WHICH WAS PRODUCTIVE. NATO REINFORCED THE MESSAGE TO MILOSEVIC ON SEPTEMBER 24 BY AUTHORIZING SACEUR TO ISSUE AN

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ACTIVATION WARNING (ACTWARN) TO GENERATE THE FORCES NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT A LIMITED AIR OPTION AND A PHASED AIR CAMPAIGN. NATO DEFENSE MINISTERS MEETING IN PORTUGAL HIGHLIGHTED THE NEED FOR A CREDIBLE MILITARY THREAT.

2. (S) WE HAVE AT LEAST NINE IMPORTANT OBJECTIVES TO MEET IN THE COMING DAYS IF WE ARE TO RALLY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO KEEP THE PRESSURE ON MILOSEVIC TO END THE VIOLENCE, ALLOW ACCESS TO THOSE WHO HAVE SUFFERED FROM HIS CAMPAIGN OF BRUTALITY, MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD AND MONITOR THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND. WE WILL NEED TO:

-- MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM WE ACHIEVED IN THE WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 21.

-- READY NATO BOTH POLITICALLY AND MILITARILY TO CONDUCT AIR STRIKES WITHOUT A FURTHER UNSCR

-- ENSURE THAT THE UNSC IS WELL BRIEFED AND THAT THE SYG'S REPORT ON UNSCR 1199 IS ACCURATE, TIMELY AND UNAMBIGUOUS

-- CONSULT CLOSELY WITH RUSSIA BILATERALLY, AS WELL AS THROUGH THE CONTACT GROUP AND THE NATO PJC

-- ACCELERATE PROGRESS TOWARD A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT PRESENTED BY HILL AND "IMPOSED" BY THE CONTACT GROUP

-- PREPARE OURSELVES AND OUR ALLIES TO ASSIST IN IMPLEMENTING A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

-- LOOK FOR OTHER WAYS TO LEVERAGE MILOSEVIC, INCLUDING THROUGH DRIVING WEDGES BETWEEN HIM AND HIS PUBLIC AND SECURITY FORCES

-- FURTHER DEVELOP HUMANITARIAN RELIEF STRATEGIES FOR BOTH BEST-CASE AND WORST-CASE OUTCOMES

-- BUILD SUPPORT IN CONGRESS AND WITH THE PUBLIC

3. (S) WE WANT TO USE THE WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 28 TO BRING THE VARIOUS STRANDS OF OUR POLICY TOGETHER (INCLUDING WORKING WITH THE RUSSIANS) SO THAT NATO IS READY (SHOULD POLITICAL AUTHORITIES DECIDE) TO AUTHORIZE MILITARY ACTION "AT A TIME AND PLACE OF NATO'S CHOOSING" SHOULD BELGRADE FAIL TO COME INTO COMPLIANCE WITH UN, CONTACT GROUP, AND NATO

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REQUIREMENTS. WE DO NOT BELIEVE WE NEED ANOTHER UNSCR, NOR SHOULD WE ASSUME THIS IS ATTAINABLE GIVEN THE LIKELY OPPOSITION OF RUSSIA. WE DO NOT WANT TO TIE NATO'S DECISION TOO CLOSELY TO THE UNSYG'S CONCLUSIONS. INSTEAD, WE WANT TO ESTABLISH NATO'S OWN ABILITY TO ASSESS WHETHER MILOSEVIC HAS OR HAS NOT COMPLIED WITH LONG-STANDING INTERNATIONAL DEMANDS. SINCE WE MUST CONTINUE TO BUILD PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR OUR POLICY, WE WISH TO AVOID ISSUING A FORMAL ULTIMATUM DURING THE WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 28. AT THE SAME TIME, WE DO NOT WANT TO ISSUE A LATE ULTIMATUM WHICH GIVES MILOSEVIC ANOTHER EXTENDED PERIOD FOR COMPLIANCE AND REQUIRES A FURTHER DECISION BY EITHER THE NAC OR THE UNSC BEFORE MILITARY ACTION. NATO SHOULD BE FULLY READY TO ACT, IF NECESSARY, THE WEEK OF OCTOBER 5 WITH AS FEW ADDITIONAL DECISIONS REQUIRED AS POSSIBLE. IF, AT THAT TIME, THE NAC DETERMINES THAT MILOSEVIC REMAINS NON-COMPLIANT IT SHOULD:

- AUTHORIZE SACEUR TO EXECUTE THE LIMITED AIR OPTION AS A DEMONSTRATION OF NATO DETERMINATION
- SPECIFY THE CONCRETE STEPS THAT NATO EXPECTS BELGRADE TO TAKE IMMEDIATELY TO MEET NATO/UN/CG REQUIREMENTS
- THREATEN FURTHER STRIKES "AT TIMES AND PLACES OF NATO'S OWN CHOOSING" SHOULD BELGRADE FAIL TO COMPLY
- ISSUE A STRONG WARNING TO THE KOSOVAR ALBANIANS

4. (S) ACTIONS REQUESTED:

-- FOR USNATO: MAINTAINING MOMENTUM TOWARD MILITARY ACTION, WHICH NATO DEMONSTRATED BY MOVING TO ACTWARN, IS VITAL. AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW SHOULD USE THE COMING WEEK TO GIVE ALL 16 ALLIES A SENSE OF CO-OWNERSHIP OF OUR POLITICAL/MILITARY STRATEGY. HE SHOULD HAVE THE ALLIANCE MOVE TO ACTREQ FOR THE LIMITED AIR OPTION AND THE PHASED AIR CAMPAIGN AT THE NAC MEETING ON WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 30. NAC AUTHORIZATION OF ACTREQ ON SEPTEMBER 30, WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE NAC TO CONSIDER A DECISION TO GO TO ACTORD DURING THE WEEK OF OCTOBER 5.

WASHINGTON BELIEVES THAT NATO'S PRESS LINE AFTER AUTHORIZATION OF ACTREQ SHOULD BE A CLEAR STATEMENT THAT FORCES ARE BEING COMMITTED TO POSSIBLE ACTION. SYG SOLANA

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SHOULD EXPLAIN THAT THE DECISION TO GO TO ACTREQ WAS BASED ON THE ALLIANCE'S ASSESSMENT OF MILOSEVIC'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH LONG-ESTABLISHED INTERNATIONAL DEMANDS. WHILE PREVIOUS NATO PRESS GUIDANCE EMPHASIZED THAT ACTWARN WAS THE LAST STEP IN THE PLANNING PROCESS AND NOT THE FIRST STEP IN USE OF FORCE, NATO SHOULD NOW EMPHASIZE THAT THIS IS THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS A POSSIBLE USE OF FORCE. SYG SOLANA SHOULD ALSO NOTE THAT THE NAC PLANS TO AGAIN REVIEW WHETHER MILOSEVIC HAS COMPLIED WITH THESE DEMANDS WHEN IT MEETS NEXT WEEK. MISSION SHOULD DRAW FROM THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN DISCUSSING THE PRESS LINE WITH ALLIES:

- NATO FORCES ARE NOW BEING COMMITTED ACTREQ
- MILOSEVIC IS FORCING NATO TOWARDS THE USE OF FORCE
- MILOSEVIC HAS PAID NO HEED TO REPEATED CALLS TO CEASE HIS ACTIONS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, THE CONTACT GROUP, NATO DEFENSE MINISTERS, AS WELL AS THE DEMANDS OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1199
- MILOSEVIC HAS NOT ENTERED INTO NEGOTIATIONS
- MILOSEVIC HAS NOT CEASED HIS OFFENSIVE
- MILOSEVIC HAS NOT ALLEVIATED THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS
- MILOSEVIC HAS NOT RESTRAINED THE BRUTALITY OF HIS SECURITY FORCES
- MILOSEVIC HAS NOT PERMITTED FULL ACCESS FOR OUR DIPLOMATIC OBSERVERS
- WE HOLD MILOSEVIC RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PRESENT TRAGEDY IN KOSOVO
- THE NAC WILL REVIEW COMPLIANCE WITH THE DEMANDS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AT ITS NEXT MEETING.

AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW MAY ALSO USE THE PERMREPS LUNCH ON SEPTEMBER 29 AND THE NAC MEETING ON SEPTEMBER 30 TO GIVE ALLIES A SENSE OF OUR THINKING AS OUTLINED IN PARAS 1-3. AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW SHOULD ALSO HAVE NATO CONSULT WITH

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RUSSIA THROUGH THE PJC. WE BELIEVE THAT HE SHOULD SHARE SANITIZED INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ON THE SITUATION IN KOSOVO WITH THE RUSSIANS IN BRUSSELS. (FYI: AMBASSADOR MALLOY REVIEWED OVERHEAD ON DESTRUCTION IN KOSOVO WITH AMBASSADOR CHIZHOV IN NEW YORK ON SEPTEMBER 24).

AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW SHOULD SECURE NAC AGREEMENT TO TASK NMAS TO REFINE THEIR CONSIDERATION OF POTENTIAL GROUND OPTIONS TO INCLUDE A POSSIBLE SMALLER ("LIGHT") OPTION. ON SEPTEMBER 9 THE NAC NOTED OPLAN 10410 AS A "LIVING DOCUMENT" REQUIRING FURTHER REFINEMENT. AN ADDITIONAL PLAN SHOULD BE DEVELOPED FOR NATO FORCES IF REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT EITHER WITHOUT THE NEED FOR AN AIR OPTION OR AT THE CONCLUSION OF AIR STRIKES. IN ADDITION, SACEUR SHOULD BE REQUESTED TO BRIEF THE NAC DURING THE WEEK OF OCTOBER 5 ON THE MILITARY, SECURITY AND COMPLIANCE SITUATION IN KOSOVO.

SACEUR'S BRIEFING SHOULD ASSESS COMPLIANCE IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS:

- CESSATION OF OFFENSIVE POLICE AND MILITARY OPERATIONS BY FRY AND/OR SERBIAN FORCES
- WITHDRAWAL FROM KOSOVO OF VJ AND MUP UNITS NOT NORMALLY BASED IN KOSOVO
- RETURN OF VJ AND MUP UNITS BASED IN KOSOVO TO THEIR LOCAL GARRISONS
- LIFTING OF EMBARGOES ON SHIPMENTS OF FOOD, FUEL AND OTHER HUMANITARIAN AID ITEMS TO KOSOVO
- FREEDOM OF ACCESS AND MOVEMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS, AGENCIES AND NGOS ACCREDITED TO THE FRY
- RETURN OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS TO THEIR HOMES

AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW SHOULD KEEP IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH HIS QUAD COLLEAGUES. WE WOULD APPRECIATE AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW'S VIEWS ON HOW BEST TO INVOLVE PARTNER COUNTRIES THROUGH THE EAPC.

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FINALLY, IN KEEPING WITH OUR STRATEGY OF WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE RUSSIANS TO KEEP THEM ON BOARD AS WE CREATE A CREDIBLE THREAT OF FORCE, AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW SHOULD SEEK A MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR KISLYAK ON SEPTEMBER 29. VERSHBOW SHOULD INDICATE THAT THE SEPTEMBER 30 NAC WILL CONSIDER THE NEXT STEP IN FORCE GENERATION, AND IT IS POSSIBLE THAT ALLIES WILL APPROVE ADDITIONAL STEPS. THE PJC FOLLOWING THE NAC WILL PROVIDE A FORUM FOR FURTHER FRANK DISCUSSION ON NATO PLANNING. WHILE REMAINING GENERAL, VERSHBOW SHOULD CONVEY TO KISLYAK OUR COMMITMENT TO PUSH AHEAD AT NATO IN THE DAYS AHEAD.

MISSION SHOULD DISCUSS WITH ALLIES MEASURES NATO MAY TAKE TO ENSURE THAT HUMANITARIAN AND DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL ARE NOTIFIED THAT NATO HAS AUTHORIZED ACTREQ FOR THE AIR OPTIONS AND INFORMED OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ACTREQ AUTHORIZATION. IN ADDITION, WHILE NATO WOULD WISH TO EXTEND A WARNING TO EVACUATE PERSONNEL ONLY PRIOR TO COMMENCEMENT OF A NATO MILITARY STRIKE, THESE ORGANIZATIONS SHOULD PRUDENTLY CONSIDER THE CURRENT SITUATION.

WASHINGTON DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THE NAC SHOULD ENGAGE IN DEBATE ON THE MANDATE ISSUE. IT IS WASHINGTON'S VIEW THAT ALLIES MUST DECIDE ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS THEIR OWN LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ACTION. IN INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH ALLIES MISSION MAY OBSERVE THAT MILOSEVIC'S VIOLATION OF TWO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, THE THREAT POSED BY MILOSEVIC TO REGIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY AND THE HUMANITARIAN TRAGEDY MILOSEVIC HAS UNLEASHED ON KOSOVO DEMAND ACTION BY NATO.

-- FOR USUN: WE NEED THE UNSYG'S REPORT TO CLEAR THE PATH FOR POSSIBLE ACTION. WE SHOULD PROCEED ON ALL OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY AMBASSADOR SODERBERG TO THE DEPUTIES COMMITTEE ON SEPTEMBER 26, INCLUDING TRAVEL BY DEPARTMENT OFFICERS TO BRIEF ON THE STATE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, RENEWED FOCUS ON WAR CRIMES, AND HUMANITARIAN BRIEFINGS. WE WILL RECOMMEND TO THE SECRETARY THAT SHE BE IN CONTACT WITH THE SYG ON THE TIMING AND NATURE OF HIS REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. FOLLOW-UP WITH THE NON-PERMANENT UNSC MEMBERS (WHO SEEMED AT THEIR MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY ON SEPTEMBER 24 TO BE CLEAR ABOUT THE NEED TO KEEP UP THE PRESSURE ON MILOSEVIC) WOULD BE USEFUL. WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY ADDITIONAL IDEAS FROM USUN ON WAYS TO

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INFLUENCE THE SECRETARY GENERAL, THE SECRETARIAT AND THE SC.

-- FOR SKOPJE: WE APPRECIATE AMBASSADOR HILL'S AGREEMENT TO TRAVEL TO LONDON ON OCTOBER 2 TO MEET WITH CONTACT GROUP EXPERTS TO DISCUSS THE NEGOTIATION IN LONDON. AMBASSADOR HILL SHOULD PRESS FOR SERB COMMENTS ON HIS DRAFT AND CONTINUE HIS OUTSTANDING EFFORT TO TRY TO ACHIEVE A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT, THE FULL ADVANTAGE OF THE INCREASED PRESSURE NOW BEING PLACED ON MILOSEVIC. AT THE SAME TIME, AMBASSADOR HILL SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THE CONTINUING NEED FOR MILOSEVIC TO PULL BACK SECURITY FORCES FROM KOSOVO AND MAKE GOOD ON ALL HIS PREVIOUS PROMISES, E.G. ON HUMANITARIAN AND INTERNATIONAL ACCESS. WITH THE KOSOVAR ALBANIANS, AMBASSADOR HILL SHOULD CONTINUE TO EXPLORE GROUND FOR ACHIEVING AND MAINTAINING A CEASE-FIRE IN CONJUNCTION WITH AN END TO THE SERB OFFENSIVE AND BEGINNING OF TALKS ON STATUS.

-- FOR MOSCOW: WE WANT TO KEEP THE RUSSIANS ON BOARD AS WE CREATE A CREDIBLE THREAT OF FORCE. WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS ON ADDITIONAL, SPECIFIC STEPS WE CAN TAKE BEYOND CONSULTATION (AT THE PJC, FOR EXAMPLE) AND INFORMATION SHARING. WE MUST MAKE MAXIMUM USE OF THE SEPTEMBER 30 PJC TO MAINTAIN AS MUCH COMMONALITY AS POSSIBLE BETWEEN OUR POSITION AND RUSSIA'S. THE RUSSIANS HAVE RECENTLY PROPOSED (1) A "COORDINATING MECHANISM" ON THE GROUND IN BELGRADE (THEY HAVE SUGGESTED CHRIS HILL LEAD THIS GROUP OF LOCAL AMBASSADORS ON BEHALF OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY), (2) POSSIBLE TROIKA (RUSSIAN/EU/US) MINISTERIAL OR POLITICAL DIRECTOR LEVEL TRAVEL TO BELGRADE, AND (3) THE NEED FOR A CONTACT GROUP MEETING AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL TWO WEEKS FROM SEPTEMBER 23. WE WANT TO CONTINUE TO CONSULT WITH THE RUSSIANS AND ACCOMMODATE THEM WHERE POSSIBLE, BUT WITHOUT GIVING THEM A VETO ON NATO ACTION THROUGH THE UNSC OR OTHER MECHANISMS.

-- FOR LONDON, PARIS AND BONN: AT QUAD MEETINGS IN NEW YORK THERE HAD BEEN TALK OF A POLDIR LEVEL QUAD MEETING IN EUROPE ON OCTOBER 8 TO REVIEW A FORMAL ULTIMATUM. EVENTS ARE RUNNING AHEAD OF THAT PLAN. GROSSMAN WILL BE IN CONTACT WITH HIS QUAD COLLEAGUES ON SEPTEMBER 28 TO REVIEW OUR THINKING. HE WILL REPORT TO AMBASSADORS/DCMS ON THESE CONTACTS. WE ASK THAT YOU NOT/NOT APPROACH YOUR HOST GOVERNMENT IN CAPITALS UNTIL YOU HEAR FROM GROSSMAN. BUT

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AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW SHOULD/SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE IN CONTACT WITH HIS QUAD COUNTERPARTS IN BRUSSELS TO CONVEY OUR THINKING.

-- FOR CONTACT GROUP CAPITALS: WHILE WE HAVE NOT RULED OUT ATTENDING A CONTACT GROUP MEETING AT AN APPROPRIATE LEVEL IN TWO WEEKS AS PROPOSED BY THE RUSSIANS (AND SUPPORTED BY MANY OTHER CONTACT GROUP COUNTRIES), OUR INTENTION IS TO PROCEED AS WE DID IN ADVANCE OF THE CONTACT GROUP MEETING ON SEPTEMBER 24 IN NEW YORK: THAT IS, WE WILL WANT TO CHOSE SEVERAL SPECIFIC THINGS THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE ACCOMPLISHED BEFORE/BEFORE WE WOULD ATTEND A CONTACT GROUP MEETING. IF/IF YOU ARE ASKED ABOUT OUR THINKING ON A CONTACT GROUP, YOU MAY SAY THAT THE SECRETARY FOUND THE MEETING ON SEPTEMBER 23 TO BE HELPFUL, THAT WE LOOK FORWARD TO AMBASSADOR HILL'S CONSULTATIONS WITH THE CONTACT GROUP ON OCTOBER 2, THAT WE HAVE MADE NO DECISION ABOUT ATTENDING ANOTHER CONTACT GROUP MEETING AT ANY LEVEL, BUT THAT SUCH A DECISION WOULD NO DOUBT BE INFLUENCED BY THE AMOUNT OF PROGRESS WE HAVE MADE IN KEEPING THE PRESSURE ON MILOSEVIC AND CREATING A CREDIBLE MILITARY THREAT.

5. (S) WE WILL ALSO BE WORKING DURING THE WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 28 TO BUILD SUPPORT IN OTHER PARTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, FOR EXAMPLE, ASKING THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE TO BE IN CONTACT WITH THE UNSYG ON THE NEED FOR A CLEAR, TIMELY REPORT TO THE UNSC. WE WILL ALSO BE EXPLORING FURTHER MEASURES TO INCREASE THE PRESSURE ON MILOSEVIC, INCLUDING ASKING GENERAL CLARK (AS USCINCEUR) TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH THE VJ AS APPROPRIATE. WE WILL ALSO NEED TO FASHION A CLEAR MESSAGE TO THE KOSOVAR ALBANIANS ABOUT THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES. THESE WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF SEPARATE MESSAGES.

YY

ZAGREB IMMEDIATE
SARAJEVO IMMEDIATE
LJUBLJANA IMMEDIATE
SKOPJE IMMEDIATE
MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
WARSAW IMMEDIATE
PRAGUE IMMEDIATE
BUDAPEST IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE

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RUFQAAA/USNMR SHAPE BE//INTAF//
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RUCBACM/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA
RUFNBNA/USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT
RHFQAAA/CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
RUFDAAA/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
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FAX COVER PAGE

DATE : 10/11/98

FROM : Larry Rossin with Holbrooke party

TO : Jim Steenberg
Dep Asst Pres. NSA

FAX NO.:

Jim, as discussed, here is the revised version reflecting changes flowing from Dick's discussions with Milosevic and Milutinovic this afternoon. He welcomes your further comments ASAP. Best probably to phone to the Palace secure setup.

All brackets are Milosevic's. Per discussion, we will work to retain all this language. The whole business of the NATO cell in Pristina is especially tough as I mentioned. In addition, we will try to add language into the evacuation paragraph that mentions "military means" or "...assets" or as fallback "all necessary means" or something comparable. I haven't put it here because I need to discuss with Dick first, and let him work it in.

Larry Rossin

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OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission

Preambular Language

- Devoted to the respect of the principles of the UN Charter and to the Principles of the Helsinki Final Act on peace, stability and cooperation in Europe, as well as to the Paris Charter,
- Considering in particular the importance of reaching a peaceful, democratic and lasting solution of all existing problems in the Province of Kosovo and Metohija, based on the equality of all citizens and national and ethnic communities,
- Devoted to the respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states in the region, Willing to contribute to the implementation of Resolutions 1160 and 1199 of the UN Security Council,
- The Federal Government of the FR of Yugoslavia, on one side,
- and, The OSCE, on the other,
- have reached the following AGREEMENT:

Establishment and Termination

- The OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission will be established by the OSCE Permanent Council pursuant to a resolution of the United Nations Security Council calling upon OSCE to establish the Mission.
- The FRY government has informed the OSCE Chairman-in-Office of its endorsement of the establishment of the Mission.
- OSCE will request member states to contribute personnel and funding for the Verification Mission in accordance with established procedures.
- OSCE will establish coordination with other organizations it may deem appropriate to allow the Verification Mission to accomplish all its objectives most effectively.
- KDOM will act in place of the OSCE Verification Mission pending its establishment. Once OSCE is operational, KDOM will be absorbed by the Verification Mission.
- The FRY government hereby guarantees the safety and security of the Verification Mission and all its members.

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- In the event of an emergency situation in Kosovo which in the judgment of the Mission Director threatens the safety of members of the Verification Mission, the FRY shall permit and cooperate in the evacuation of Verification Mission members.
- The FRY government will accept the OSCE Verification Mission as a diplomatic entity in terms of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The Mission will enjoy the privileges and immunities conferred by such status, as will its members, in accordance with the Vienna Convention.
- The FRY government and its entities will designate formal liaison officers to work with the Verification Mission in Belgrade, Pristina and field locations. The FRY, Serbian and Kosovo authorities will undertake to provide full cooperation and support to the Verification Mission. This will include, but not be limited to, billets, frequency or frequencies, visas and documentation, customs facilities, vehicle registration, fuel, medical support, airspace access for support aircraft and access to Belgrade, Pristina and other airports in accordance with normal procedures.
- The OSCE and the FRY agree on a Verification Mission for one year, which can be prolonged upon decision of the UN Security Council.

General Responsibilities, Roles and Missions

- To oversee the free exchange of ideas through the maintenance of independent media outlets and info broadcasts.

- To verify compliance by all parties in Kosovo with UN Security Council Resolution 1199, and report instances of progress and/or non-compliance to the OSCE Permanent Council and the United Nations Security Council [and the NATO Secretary-General]. These reports will also be provided to the authorities of the FRY.
- To establish permanent presences at as many locations throughout Kosovo as it deems necessary to fulfil its responsibilities;
- To maintain close liaison with FRY, Serbian and, as appropriate, other Kosovo authorities, political parties and other organizations in Kosovo and accredited international and non-government organizations to assist in fulfilling its responsibilities;
- To report and make recommendations to the OSCE Permanent Council, the UN Security Council [and the NATO Secretary-General] on areas covered by UN Security Council Resolution 1199.

Specific Terms of Reference

- The Verification Mission will travel throughout Kosovo to verify the maintenance of the ceasefire by all elements. It will investigate reports of cease-fire violations.

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Mission personnel will have full freedom of movement and access throughout Kosovo at all times.

- **[The Verification Mission will be permitted to visit all military/police cantonments within Kosovo.]**
- The Verification Mission will receive weekly information from relevant FRY/Serbian military/police headquarters in Kosovo regarding movements of forces during the preceding week into, out of or within Kosovo. Upon request of the Verification Mission Director, Mission personnel may be invited to accompany police within Kosovo.
- The Verification Mission will look for and report on roadblocks and other emplacements which influence lines of communication erected for purposes other than traffic or crime control. The Mission Director will contact the relevant authorities upon receipt of such reports. These authorities will explain the reasons for the emplacements or else direct that the emplacements be removed immediately. The Verification Mission will also receive notification should emergent circumstances lead to the establishment of a roadblock for other than traffic or crime control-related reasons. The Mission Director may request the removal of any roadblock.
- The Verification Mission will maintain liaison with FRY authorities about border control activity and movements by units with border control responsibilities through areas of Kosovo away from the border. The Verification Mission, when invited by the FRY authorities or upon its request, will visit border control units and accompany them as they perform their normal border control roles.
- When invited or upon request, the Verification Mission will accompany police units in Kosovo as they perform their normal policing roles.
- The Verification Mission will verify the return of displaced persons to their homes, the provision of facilitative and humanitarian assistance to them by the FRY, Serbian and Kosovo authorities as well as the humanitarian organizations and NGOs, and the level of cooperation and support provided by the FRY and its entities to the humanitarian organizations and accredited NGOs in facilitating procedural requirements such as issuance of travel documentation, expedited customs clearance for humanitarian shipments and radio frequencies. The Mission will make such representations as it deems necessary to resolve problems it observes.
- As the political settlement defining Kosovo's self-government is achieved and implementation begins, the Mission Director will receive from the OSCE implementation support in areas such as elections oversight, assistance in the establishment of Kosovo institutions and police force development in Kosovo.

(5)

- The Mission Director will receive periodic updates from the relevant authorities concerning allegations of abusive actions by military or police personnel and status of disciplinary or legal actions against individuals implicated in such abuses.
- The Verification Mission will maintain liaison with FRY, Serbian and, as appropriate, Kosovo authorities and with ICRC regarding ICRC access to detained persons.
- The Mission Director will, as required, convene representatives of national communities and authorities to exchange information and provide guidance on implementation of the agreement establishing the Verification Mission.
- The Mission Director will report instances of progress and/or non-compliance or lack of full cooperation from any side to the OSCE [and NATO Secretary General].

Composition and Facilities

- A Director, together with headquarters staff to be determined by Verification Mission requirements, to include a liaison unit with [the NATO support element] [a small multinational military cell] to be established in Pristina.
- 1800 unarmed verifiers from OSCE member states will be permitted. Headquarters and support staff included in this total. [OSCE may include armed security personnel in its Mission for own-force protection.]
- A headquarters in Pristina.
- Field presence in locations around Kosovo to be determined by the Mission Director.
- A small liaison office in Belgrade.
- Vehicles, communications and other equipment along with locally-hired interpreters and support staff which the Director deems to be required for the performance of the responsibilities of the Mission.

Field Presence

- Coordination centers will be established in the capital of each *opstina* in Kosovo with specific areas of responsibility, under the Mission Director located in Pristina.
- Many *opstina* coordination centers will have one or more sub-stations in smaller towns/villages in the *opstina*. The number and location of sub-stations will vary

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from *opstina* to *opstina*, depending on the verification environment and past conflict situation.

- The chief of each coordination center will maintain a liaison relationship with the *opstina* authorities and the local leadership of the ethnic Albanian and other communities. Each sub-station will be responsible for coordination with the local authorities, including the local leadership of main ethnic groups.
- The number of verification personnel assigned to each coordination center and sub-station would depend on the complexity of verification issues in the particular area.
- Each coordination center and sub-station would have appropriately configured vehicles with which to patrol its assigned area of responsibility.

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Diplomatic Support of 30 Day Strategic Plan

Object: Compel Milosevic to accept NATO conditions by eroding his base and denying him defensive tools.

Means:

- Reinforce military operations with diplomacy aimed at isolating Milosevic and Serbia; sustain Allied support while managing Russia and Front Line States:

Target **Milosevic's** comfort zone, convince him NATO will keep raising the pressure and outlast him, that he will not be able to drive wedges either into NATO or between NATO and Russia.

With Allies:

- Maintain NAC consensus on expanding air operations, increasing economic pressure;
- Prevent freelance initiatives/visits to Belgrade
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- Prevent dilution of SACEUR's authority;
- Gain approval of Visit and Search OPLAN NLT May 3;
- Press forward ground force reassessments;
- Work to close distance between Alliance and Russia on UNSCR elements.

With Russia:

- Continue high level contacts, U.S. and Ally, to sustain Russian understanding of Allied unity and resolve;
- After Chernomyrdin Belgrade visit work to narrow distance Russia and NATO (Secstate calls to Ivanov, Chernomyrdin, coordinated with Quint calls to same);
- G-8 Poldirs discussions to determine whether a G-8 Ministerial will advance peace, possible G-8 Sherpa meeting May 2-3 (need agreed text to ensure Russians do not take advantage and produce nothing).

With Front Line States:

- Work for FLS leaders' statement -- against Milosevic, for Serb people;
- Relieve pressure from Macedonia to deny Milosevic weapon of refugees:
 - Urge NAC action to build more transit camps in Macedonia;

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- Announce accelerated evacuation of Kosovar refugees to U.S.A., increased size of Camp America (once building commenced);
- Urge all Europeans to activate and expand their previous commitments to shelter refugees;
- Shore up FLS by supporting relief efforts:
 - May 4 - U.S.-EU in Brussels;
 - May 5 G-24 Donor's conference in Paris;
 - May 6 Albright-Fischer meeting in Washington;
 - May 7 Coordination conference with IOs in Vienna;
 - May 7 U.S.-EU aid consultations in Brussels.

Cronies and Family -- sow seeds of fear that they will lose wealth and influence after the conflict.

- Public announcement of EU and U.S. sanctions (planned).
- Work FLS, Partners, and others to support Maritime Visit and Search (i.e. agree to allow inspection of their vessels);
- Work FLS to actively support EU and U.S. POL embargoes (possible: provide support for police and customs inspections);
- Work Europeans (especially Cyprus) to freeze all Yugoslav assets;
- Repeat message at U.S.-EU meetings of FRY inclusion in SEI if they come to terms in Kosovo.

VJ leadership -- sow doubt about Milosevic as commander in chief, generate fear about personal well being.

- Continue naming of VJ commanders in areas where atrocities are reported (NAC report to reinforce this?);
- OSCE, NGO reports in May to highlight atrocities;
- Work UN to forestall negative resolutions/reports on Kosovo to deny VJ comfort (push back Russian mischief);
- Move quickly to build camps and evacuate refugees from Macedonia -- denies Milosevic and VJ key weapon intended to distract the Alliance.

Serb Public -- generate doubts about the future of Serbia and its integration with civilized Europe.

- Work FLS-Leaders' statement (see above);

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- Work with International Organizations (e.g. OSCE) to publicize impact of Milosevic's wars since 1991;
- Work public statements to highlight corruption of current regime.

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U:\Serbia\Kosovo\04-30-99 30 Day Plan

Drafted: EUR/SCE:GHFrowick

Cleared: S/SA:JDobbins
EUR:JSwigert
EUR/TMS:JPardew
EUR/SCE:CHoh
EUR/RPM:PMoon
S/NIS:GKrol
PRM:ENA:NBibbins
P:ERubin
D:JBass
S/P:DHamilton

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Economic Measures To Degrade Yugoslav Capabilities

Purpose: Assess feasibility and potential effectiveness of additional military and non-military measures to degrade and undermine FRY's ability to conduct military operations and to sustain national defense in the next 30 days.

Tools: Overt - use military and non-military measures to increase the pressure on Milosevic within the context of Operation ALLIED FORCE. Unconventional – use non-military measures to target specific high-value/high-payoff economic targets, which sustain FRY defense and military capabilities.

Constraints: FRY economy redundant, nearly self-sustaining & capable of operating on near subsistence. FRY funds held off-shore and very difficult to disrupt or freeze.



Economic Measures To Degrade Yugoslav Capabilities

- **Expand economic target set: Conduct air strikes aimed at economic targets which are primary means of cash generation controlled by Milosevic and his cronies:**
 - **Mines/mining equipment (Bor, Majdenpak, Trepca,)**
 - **Sartid 1913 steel plant at smederevo**
 - **Gosa heavy industries**
 - **Timber/wood production & Simpo furniture factory**
 - **Beocin & Novi Popovac cement plants**



Economic Measures To Degrade Yugoslav Capabilities

Milosevic/cronies' targets assets, cont'd.

- **Serbia's only newsprint factory**
- **Beopetrol and Jugopetrol facilities**
- **Customs warehouses and customs facilities in Belgrade, major cities, and border areas**
- **Warehouses of large trading firms**
- **Banks -- 6 state banks and influential "private" banks such as Delta bank, Karic bank, commercial bank**
- **Cigarette factories (imports would be required)**



Economic Measures To Degrade Yugoslav Capabilities

- **Economic measures & actions:** Impose economic sanctions to degrade Milosevic's and the VJ's ability to support and conduct FRY government, military, and business transactions, which sustain the war economy.
- **U.S. will expand current U.S. sanctions which result in practice to a comprehensive trade & investment ban (expected entry in force May 1):**
 - **Ban on export and reexport of all U.S. goods, technology, and services to the FRY, including oil, petroleum products, strategic materials, and dual-use items; special consideration for humanitarian goods.**



Economic Measures To Degrade Yugoslav Capabilities

(Continued)

- **Block on all FRY and Serbian government capital and assets subject to U.S. jurisdiction**
- **Ban on all trade and export financing**
- **Ban on all imports from the FRY**
- **Ban on new investment by U.S. persons in the territory of Serbia**



Economic Measures To Degrade Yugoslav Capabilities

- **EU will also adopt sanctions on May 1, but which are less comprehensive than U.S. sanctions (expected entry in force May 1):**
 - **Export ban on oil, petroleum products, strategic materials, dual-use items**
 - **Expanded funds freeze on FRY and Serbian government officials**
 - **Prohibition of provision of export finance by private sector to existing government-financed export credits**
 - **Extention of the EU investment ban**



Economic Measures To Degrade Yugoslav Capabilities

- **Widening of scope of prohibition on export of equipment for international repression**
- **Comprehensive flight ban between FRY and EU countries (already in place in U.S.)**
- **Ban on travel of all senior leadership of the FRY and Serbian governments, including military officials and Milosevic business cronies and family members (already in place in U.S.)**



Economic Measures To Degrade Yugoslav Capabilities

Unconventional measures with economic impact: These actions are directed at specific and discrete economic-military and economic-psychological targets, which will impede, disrupt, or complicate Milosevic's and the FRY's ability to conduct military operations and sustain national defense.

- **Hack into FRY and Serbian government and military computers to disrupt operations of government & business, including government-economic assets, i.e., government command & control links, National Bank of Yugoslavia, & telephone/fax systems**
- **Interdict Milosevic's key money managers and disrupt their travel and ability to transact business**
- **Discredit Milosevic's money managers, spread rumors of personal corruption and avarice**



Economic Measures To Degrade Yugoslav Capabilities

- **Discredit and smear Milosevic's immediate family members, especially his wife Mira Markovic and her JUL party**
- **Reduce/eliminate remittances from Serbs living abroad**
- **Stoke inflation -**
 - **Spread rumors of inflation & goods shortages**
 - **Print counterfeit dinar**
 - **Swap Montenegrin-held dinars for dollars or deutsch marks and dump in Serbia**
 - **Artificially increase exchange rate in Republika Srpska of convertible mark with Yugoslav dinar**



Economic Measures To Degrade Yugoslav Capabilities

- **Suspend or block use of assets abroad of large state firms or successful smaller ones -- government does not entirely control such funds and they buoy production when necessary**
- **Seize capital equipment abroad, including merchant ships, JAT aircraft, and other militarily-significant capital assets**
- **Target and shut down "new" Serbian firms springing up in neighboring countries, Greece, Cyprus, or even Western Europe as these will be the sanctions busters following the pattern of the UN sanctions**
- **Monitor sanctions-busting routes to consider possible interdiction of cash and high value goods by air or in cooperation with neighboring country governments**

Clinton Presidential Records Mandatory Declassification Review

This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.













Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were released in part.

Those documents released with redactions have been restricted under Sections 1.4 (c) and 3.5(c) of E.O. 13526.

Serb Compliance with UN Security Council Resolution E.O. 13526, 3.5(d)

	Not Complying	Partial Compliance	Complying	Comment
Cease hostilities and maintain a cease-fire	<input checked="" type="radio"/>			Security forces operations continue
Improve the humanitarian situation		<input type="radio"/>		Relief centers established but people too frightened to return
Enter a meaningful dialogue on a political solution		<input type="radio"/>		Willing to grant only limited autonomy
Cease security forces' actions affecting civilians and withdraw forces used in repression of civilians	<input checked="" type="radio"/>			Security forces operations continue
Allow freedom of movement for international monitors		<input type="radio"/>		Some incidents of interference
Facilitate return of refugees and displaced persons; permit free access for humanitarian organizations		<input type="radio"/>		Some people returning but many homes destroyed; some interference with relief convoys
Establish and abide by a timetable for talks on confidence building measures and a political solution	<input checked="" type="radio"/>			No agreement on a timetable
Provide security for international monitors			<input type="radio"/>	Some minor incidents
Cooperate with the war crimes tribunal	<input checked="" type="radio"/>			Has not turned over suspects or allowed investigators to work without hindrance
Bring to justice members of the security forces involved in mistreatment of civilians and destruction of property	<input checked="" type="radio"/>			No charges made against any member of security forces

Serb Compliance with 23 September UN Security Council Resolution 1199

	Not Complying	Partial Compliance	Complying	Comment
Cease hostilities and maintain a cease fire				Security forces have halted offensive operations in most areas, but shelling continued near Suva Reka and Komorane on 30 September.
Cease security forces' actions affecting civilians and withdraw forces used in repression of civilians				Some military and police forces withdrawing to barracks. Two alleged massacres on 26 Sept. KDOM reported stories of continued Serb repression against refugees and health providers.
Provide security for international monitors				KDOM reports security is adequate.
Allow freedom of movement for international monitors				Access improving; KDOM reports no restrictions on 29 Sep.
Improve the humanitarian situation				Government aid centers established and stocked, but fighting still causing more IDPs.
Facilitate return of refugees and displaced persons; permit free access for humanitarian organizations				Many IDPs returning, but many unable or afraid to return. NGO humanitarian access generally good, except in conflict areas.
Establish and abide by a timetable for talks on confidence building measures and a political solution				Belgrade has expressed willingness to grant limited autonomy but no agreement on a timetable.
Enter a meaningful dialogue on a political solution				Belgrade has named a new provisional government for Kosovo without the approval or cooperation of the current shadow government but says it is willing to work towards elections agreed upon by all sides.
Cooperate with war crimes tribunal				Granted visas to one ICTY team member but denied three others week of 21 Sept.
Bring to justice members of the security forces involved in mistreatment of civilians and destruction of property				No charges reported against any member of security forces.

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E.O. 13526, 3.5(c)

28 September 1998

Serb Compliance with 23 September UN Security Council Resolution 1199 #01

Resolution Requirement	COMPLIANCE			Comment
	No	Partial	Yes	
1. Cease hostilities and maintain a cease fire	X			Security forces operations continued up until Sunday.
2. Cease security forces' actions affecting civilians and withdraw forces used in repression of civilians	X			Security forces operations continued up until Sunday.
3. Provide security for international monitors			X	Some minor incidents
4. Allow freedom of movement for international monitors		X		Some incidents of interference
5. Improve the humanitarian situation		X		Relief centers established but people too frightened to return.
6. Facilitate return of refugees and displaced persons; permit free access for humanitarian organizations		X		Some people returning but many homes destroyed; some interference with relief convoys
7. Establish and abide by a timetable for talks on confidence building measures and a political solution	X			Has expressed willingness to grant limited autonomy but no agreement on a timetable.
8. Enter a meaningful dialogue on a political solution		X		Belgrade says will name a new provisional government for Kosovo today--a step which does not bode well for cooperation between Belgrade and the current shadow government.
9. Cooperate with war crimes tribunal	X			Has not turned over suspects or allowed investigators to work without hindrance
10. Bring to justice members of the security	X			No charges reported against any member of security forces

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E.O. 13526, 3.5(c)

forces involved in mistreatment of civilians and destruction of property				
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E.O. 13526, 3.5(c)

1 October 1998

Serb Compliance with 23 September UN Security Council Resolution 1199 #04

Resolution Requirement	COMPLIANCE			Comment
	No	Partial	Yes	
1. Cease hostilities and maintain a cease fire	X->			KDOM witnessed no fighting on 30 Sept, but diplomats reported continued shelling near Suva Reka and Komorane. Inaccessible terrain near Suva Reka has slowed conclusion of operations. Military and police forces continue withdrawing to barracks. Two alleged massacres on 26 Sept. KDOM reported stories of continued Serb repression against refugees and health providers. KDOM reports security is adequate.
2. Cease security forces' actions affecting civilians and withdraw forces used in repression of civilians	X->			
3. Provide security for international monitors			X	General freedom of movement except in conflict areas [] Access improving; KDOM reports no restrictions on 29 Sep. (U)
4. Allow freedom of movement for international monitors		X		
5. Improve the humanitarian situation		X		
6. Facilitate return of refugees and displaced persons; permit free access for humanitarian organizations		X		Government aid centers established and stacked, but fighting still causing more IDPs. [] Orahovac mayor claims new governmental aid center will soon open in Ratkovac, west of Orahovac. (U). Many IDPs returning, but many unable or afraid to return. NGO humanitarian access generally good, except in conflict areas [] KDOM reports good freedom of movement for NGOs and aid organizations on 29 Sep. (U)
7. Establish and abide by a timetable for talks on confidence building measures and a political solution	X			Belgrade has expressed willingness to grant limited autonomy but no agreement on a timetable.
8. Enter a meaningful dialogue on a political solution		X		Belgrade has named a new provisional government for Kosovo without the approval or cooperation of the current shadow government but says it is willing to work towards elections agreed upon by all sides.
9. Cooperate with war crimes tribunal	X			Granted visas to one ICTY team member but denied three others week of 21 Sept.
10. Bring to justice members of the security forces involved in mistreatment of civilians and destruction of property	X			No charges reported against any member of security forces.

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July 23
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

SECRET CODEWORD

July 19, 1999
1500 EDT

KOSOVO INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY # 199

Diplomatic Developments

Kosovar Albanian officials have developed a plan to cover all of Kosovo with radio-television transmitters at a cost of \$60 million [redacted] E.O. 13526, 1.4(c) [redacted] the station would not serve any political party, group or organization. (S) [redacted] Jul 99

Should
US provide
communications
equipment

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