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## **Clinton Presidential Records Mandatory Declassification Review**

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
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 19, 1994

Natl Sec Advisor  
has seen



INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM:

DANIEL PONEMAN *DP*

SUBJECT:

Principals' Committee Meeting on North Korea,  
May 20, 1994, 4:30 p.m.-5:30 p.m.

After obtaining the usual updates (agenda at Tab I), you should pursue the following objectives in this meeting:

- Reiterate the need for discretion at this critical juncture, especially in light of the resumption of serious leaks of EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d sensitive matters of negotiating strategy.
- Decide on the appropriate linkage between a possible third round and the defueling campaign.
  - Task State to clear a message for delivery to the DPRK reflecting that decision.
- Decide whether to encourage Senators Nunn and Lugar to travel to Pyongyang and, if so, when.
  - If the decision is to proceed:
    - confirm the Senators' willingness to go;
    - task State to reflect that in a response to the letter sent by the leader of the DPRK legislature to the Vice President;
    - ask Defense if it could facilitate the Senators' travel arrangements; and
    - task NSC to draft a Presidential message for Nunn and Lugar to carry.
- Provide guidance to the SSK on our approach either to the third round or to sanctions (depending on the answer to the first question) and task further work accordingly.
- Agree on a press and Congressional strategy for the weeks ahead, and underline the need for press and Hill statements to be fully coordinated.

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The first and last points are self-explanatory; the balance of this memo will focus on the middle three issues. State has circulated a discussion paper

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

Linkage between third round and defueling campaign

This issue relates to whether to propose a third round to the DPRK and, if so, under what conditions. On the assumption that the IAEA reports that it has fulfilled its UNSC March 31 mandate -- to conclude the March and maintenance inspection activities -- the SSK identified three options:

- Set a date for the third round

EO 13526 1.4d

EO 13526 1.4d

The sense of the SSK was to support the first option. After all, we said that we would set a date for the third round in those circumstances. The downside, obviously, is that we could appear once again to have a deal which, suddenly, falls through if Pyongyang defuels in an unacceptable way.

EO 13526 1.4d

EO 13526 1.4d

We recommend the first option.

EO 13526 1.4d

EO 13526 1.4d

The DPRK has been calling for a meeting in New York; State tentatively agreed to one Saturday so that a PC-cleared position could be conveyed at that time. You should task State to clear our message to the DPRK interagency.

Nunn-Lugar DPRK Trip

You recall that Ambassador Laney was pushing this idea, based on a vague North Korean message brought back by Bill Taylor of CSIS. We understood that Nunn was willing to go, if Lugar did, too. We need to confirm that, probably through Gallucci.

The Vice President received a letter in his capacity as the President of the Senate from the leader of the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly. (Tab IV.) Apart from the usual cant it proposed bilateral legislative contacts. The SSK agreed this was a more appropriate vehicle to use than the Taylor contact if we wish to pursue this.

The SSK believed this idea worth pursuing, and one that could enhance our prospects in the third round. Nunn and Lugar would not negotiate, and would characterize theirs as a factfinding trip. Ideally, the trip would take place late next week, before a June 1 third round. Alternatively, the third round could slip a week if necessary to accommodate the Senators' trip. More delay is probably unwise, in light of the continuing defueling; if necessary the trip could follow the third round.

While not negotiating, we could use Nunn and Lugar to carry a Presidential message, along the lines that we earlier prepared for Dellums.

Third Round Issues

Beyond the issues raised in the State paper at Tab II, discussion has continued over the third round strategy paper (Tab V) prepared for the SSK meeting this week (including the ACDA proposal). Defense continues to raise general concerns about whether we have a coherent strategy for the third round. What concrete outcomes do we seek? What next steps do we envisage? What is our overall gameplan to move from the third round to full achievement of our objectives? What are the areas of interagency disagreement surrounding these issues, and how should they be resolved?

It is unrealistic to expect the Principals to make much progress here, at the end of the meeting. It would be useful, however, to stimulate Principals' views on these questions by asking Gallucci to spell out his answers to these questions. I have primed Gallucci to be prepared to speak to this at your prompting. He will also have a draft Framework Agreement to distribute at the meeting.

Principals' views should then inform the drafting of a strategy paper for the third round and beyond that is addressed by Principals once more before the third round.

Final Note: Sanctions Strategy

We have yet to provide the level of refinement urged by Principals, in terms of what actions trigger what sanctions, and

under what circumstances sanctions are removed. You should  
retask that next cut at the sanctions strategy. EO 13526 1.4d

EO 13526 1.4d

Concurrences by: Stanley Roth  
NA

Attachments

- Tab I Agenda
- Tab II State Discussion Paper
- Tab III Cables on IAEA Inspections
- Tab IV DPRK Letter to the Vice President
- Tab V State and ACDA Papers on Third Round Strategy

ARCHITECTURE FOR THE THIRD ROUND

What We Want from the DPRK

Our overall objective is DPRK agreement to our "broad and thorough" approach for resolving nuclear and other issues, including North Korean return to the NPT, compliance with fullscope safeguards, implementation of the North-South Denuclearization Declaration, and progress on non-nuclear issues such as the conventional military balance, missile exports, terrorism, and human rights.

Our primary immediate objective is North Korea's return to full membership in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and compliance with its fullscope safeguards obligations under the Treaty. NPT compliance requires that the DPRK accept routine and ad hoc inspections and cooperate and assist the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify North Korea's initial plutonium declaration, including special inspections. We would require that the DPRK's commit to accept measures to resolve discrepancies, including special inspections

EO 13526 1.4d

We would also insist that the North maintain the current "freeze" on its nuclear program (e.g., no reprocessing), which ensures no additional production or diversion of nuclear material as a basic condition for continuing the process leading to a thorough and broad resolution. We would also attempt to convince the DPRK to refrain from additional steps that would be inconsistent with a final resolution of the nuclear issue. For example, since final resolution includes DPRK conversion to light water reactors, we could argue that the DPRK should halt further development of its graphite reactor-based infrastructure (i.e., no refueling the 5 MW reactor, cease construction of the 50 and 200 MW reactors). To support our non-nuclear objectives, we could also seek DPRK agreement to suspend further missile exports.

EO 13526 1.4d

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What We Would Offer

We would commit to implement a long term plan on the basis of reciprocity to improve U.S./DPRK bilateral relations, address the North's stated security concern [EO 13526 1.4d] and support international assistance to the North's energy sector [EO 13526 1.4d]. [EO 13526 1.4d] We would state clearly that we are prepared to establish full diplomatic relations, lift bilateral economic sanctions [EO 13526 1.4d] and facilitate multilateral provision of a light water reactor.

In the short term, we would agree to take specific steps as the North moves toward full compliance with its NPT obligations. We can begin taking steps as the North implements ad hoc/routine inspections, and moves to implement measures necessary to clear up past discrepancies in its plutonium production declaration. [EO 13526 1.4d]

[EO 13526 1.4d]

Once Blix reports to the IAEA Board of Governors that North Korea has satisfied the IAEA requirements to verify its plutonium declaration and is in compliance with its safeguards obligations under the NPT [EO 13526 1.4d]

[EO 13526 1.4d] (The attached paper and timeline provides a detailed scenario for simultaneous actions leading to special inspections.)

Form of the Agreement

If possible, we would conclude a joint "framework agreement", laying out both sides' commitment to the principles and objectives of our broad and thorough approach. This framework agreement could be issued as a joint statement to mark the end of the meetings in Geneva.

In any event, we would seek agreement on a specific timetable and sequence for implementing the North's compliance with its NPT obligations and the reciprocal U.S. actions that will be taken along the way. [EO 13526 1.4d]

[EO 13526 1.4d]

Scenario for the Third Round

We envision roughly two weeks of meetings in Geneva.

1. First Session In two or three days of formal meetings, we will present our concept of a "broad and thorough

resolution" and listen to the North Korean proposal for "comprehensive package solution." In this opening session, we anticipate that the U.S. and DPRK positions will be far apart. In a 4 March public statement, Vice Minister Kang Sok Ju suggested that the DPRK's "comprehensive solution" requires "termination of the U.S. nuclear threat and hostile policy against the DPRK, the introduction of light water reactors, and the improvement of bilateral relations" in exchange for resumption of IAEA ad hoc and routine inspections. The North is likely to be pleasantly surprised by what we are prepared to offer over the long term on the diplomatic front

EO 13526 1.4d

Over lunch and in the margins, where the real bargaining is done, A/S Gallucci will begin to spell out our minimum requirements for continuing the process, including DPRK commitment to accept and complete measures to resolve declaration discrepancies such as special inspections

EO 13526 1.4d

Presumably, Kang will also drop hints about what the DPRK realistically expects from the U.S. in exchange for resuming ad hoc and routine inspections.

2. The Break Once the formal presentations are completed, we would propose to break for a few days for consultations. Kang may need to return to Pyongyang for further instructions.

EO 13526 1.4d

EO 13526 1.4d

3. Second Session After the break, we would reconvene to determine whether a basis exists for continuing the talks.

EO 13526 1.4d

If the North accepts our basic approach, we would begin work on a framework agreement and as much of the implementing agreement as possible. Depending on circumstances, we could tackle the issues seriatim, or the delegations could divide into working groups to negotiate individual elements simultaneously. The most contentious issues

EO 13526 1.4d

would need to be reserved for direct Gallucci-Kang talks.

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In any event, the negotiations are likely to be very  
difficult.


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What Happens If the Talks fail?



EO 13526 1.4d

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for  
Meeting of NSC Principals' Committee

DATE: May 20, 1994  
LOCATION: Situation Room  
TIME: 4:40-5:35 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of PC Meeting on North Korea (U)

PARTICIPANTS:

The Vice President's Office:  
Leon Fuerth

The White House:  
Anthony Lake  
Samuel Berger

State:  
Warren Christopher  
Robert Gallucci

NSC:  
Daniel Poneman

DOD:  
William Perry

USUN:  
Madeleine Albright

CIA:  
James Woolsey

JCS:  
John Shalikashvili

ACDA:  
John Holum

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- In speaking to the DPRK representatives in New York on May 21, State will set a date of June 1 for the third round, provided that the IAEA does not conclude between now and then that the DPRK has diverted additional nuclear material from the core of the 5 MW reactor or precluded the IAEA from the opportunity to conduct historical analysis of the spent fuel in the core.

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- The date of June 1 will not be made public or backbriefed outside the Principals' present at the meeting.
- Our public diplomacy will stress that we have prevented future diversion of plutonium while preserving the ability through negotiations to clarify whether there have been past diversions of plutonium beyond the amounts declared by the DPRK to the IAEA.
- We will encourage Nunn and Lugar to accept an invitation to travel to North Korea, not as Administration emissaries but on a factfinding mission. If possible, they should travel before the third round; otherwise they can travel after the third round. We will not defer the date of a third round.
- State and OVP will discuss whether or not the letter to the Vice President is the appropriate vehicle to respond to the invitation to Nunn and Lugar.
- On the third round strategy, the SSK will prepare two options for Principals' consideration. One option would approach the issue with early, major steps designed to achieve concrete results in the near term; the other would take a more measured approach to account for the risk of DPRK reversals. These proposals should be spelled out in substantial detail, e.g., in the form of a draft framework agreement.
- The SSK should also sharpen the analysis in the sanctions paper for further Principals' consideration.
- Press themes should emphasize that we view this situation as serious, that it is not clear how it will turn out, but that we have seen progress in recent days in preventing the risk of future diversion of plutonium. We still have questions concerning past North Korean nuclear activity, which we will continue to press in the third round.

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