

MIR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 201				
Document ID: 9404881				
Row: 44	Section: 3	Shelf: 4	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. draft	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Telephone Call to President Carter on North Korea. Record ID: 9404881. [with annotations] (2 pages)	06/18/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 9/21/2018
002. draft	Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation. Record ID: 9404881. (2 pages)	06/18/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 9/21/2018
003. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Telephone Call to President Carter on North Korea. Record ID: 9404881. (2 pages)	06/18/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 9/21/2018
004. talking points	Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation. Record ID: 9404881. (2 pages)	06/18/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 9/21/2018
005. memo	Duplicate of 003. (2 pages)	06/18/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 9/21/2018
006. talking points	Duplicate of 004. (2 pages)	06/18/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 9/21/2018

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 [Carter, North Korea]
 OA/Box Number: 201

FOLDER TITLE:

9404881

2013-0871-M

vz2258

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 18 JUN 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOREA NORTH
PUBLIC STATEMENTS
MEDIA

TELCALL
PRESS

PERSONS: CARTER, JIMMY

SUBJECT: PRES TELCALL TO FORMER PRES CARTER RE NORTH KOREA

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DUE DATE: 22 JUN 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: AOKI

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 12/16/2013
2013-0871-M

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSRCB CLOSED BY: NSDRS DOC 2 OF 2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE
002 PRESIDENT
002

Z 94061814 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
Z 94061817 FOR INFORMATION
X 94062017 NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 940618
002 940618

VICE PRESIDENT
WH CHIEF OF STAFF

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to President Carter on North Korea

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**
2013-0871-M (1.01)
5/11/2013 KBH

I recommend that you telephone former President Carter to hear directly the results of his discussions in Pyongyang and to convey our preliminary reaction to reports of his talks. (Talking points are at Tab A.) While he was in North Korea in a private capacity, we briefed him on our position so that he could accurately convey it to Kim Il-Sung. I spoke to him while he was in North Korea to clarify where we stood, and the Vice President called him before his press conference in Seoul. Nonetheless, his public statements -- including some identified as representing only his personal views -- have been played in the press as reflecting incoherence in the Administration's policy.

In a press conference in Seoul June 18, President Carter made clear that he was not negotiating on behalf of the Administration. He said that Kim Il-Sung offered to freeze the North Korean nuclear program and allow IAEA inspectors to continue their activities, but wanted assurances that the U.S. would hold a third round. Kim also reiterated North Korea's desire for light water reactor technology and security assurances from the U.S.

President Carter also carried a message from President Kim Young-Sam proposing a North-South summit meeting, which Kim Il-Sung accepted. The summit could revive the moribund North-South track of the nuclear dialogue, and also may save us from a serious split with the South Koreans, who in recent days have felt they have been relegated to a distinctly junior role in determining the fate of their own country.

Substantively, much of what the North Koreans said to President Carter on the nuclear issue was not new. They have previously sought a package deal that would bring them diplomatic recognition and light water reactors in return for a return to the NPT and acceptance of IAEA safeguards. Their offer to Carter to freeze their nuclear program and allow continued IAEA monitoring of their nuclear activities may, however, be a new development, reversing their statement last week that no further inspections would be permitted. It is not clear that they will go along with our best-light interpretation of the comments they

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made to President Carter. We are seeking confirmation of their position through their UN Mission.

In your conversation with President Carter, you should seek a debrief of his discussions with Kim Il-Sung, while making clear where the Administration stands on both the conditions for a third round and sanctions.

Attachments

Tab A Talking Points

SECRET

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT CARTER

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2013-0871-M (1.02)
5/11/2013 KBH

- I want to express my appreciation for your taking the initiative to go to North Korea. Your trip may have helped the North Koreans to find a diplomatic route out of the corner they got themselves into.
- You've now probably had more direct contact with Kim Il-Sung than any other American. I'd like to hear directly from you where the North Koreans are.
- Let me tell you what our position is.
- First, we need to have the North Koreans confirm directly and officially to us that they stand behind the commitments and proposals they made to you.
- Second, we are ready to go to a third round with North Korea if they agree to freeze their nuclear program now and while these talks are taking place.
 - This means specifically that they agree not to refuel the reactor, not to reprocess any more spent fuel, and to allow IAEA inspectors and monitoring equipment to function as needed to keep IAEA safeguards in place.
- (If needed)
 - I understand that there has been some confusion over whether we are asking the North to freeze its nuclear program while negotiations are in progress or permanently. I can confirm that our condition for going to a third round is that they agree to freeze their nuclear activities and allow IAEA inspections up to and during the negotiation. Of course, one of our key objectives in the talks would be to get them to return permanently to compliance with IAEA safeguards and to abandon reprocessing or the production of additional plutonium in their existing reactor.
- Finally, on sanctions: if the North Koreans take the steps they discussed with you, and restore the basis for dialogue, our focus would obviously shift to the third round, which we hope would result in agreement by North Korea to resolve the safeguards violations that led to consideration of sanctions in the first place.
- I would be very interested in your perceptions of Kim Il-sung as a leader and as a personality.

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-- Unfortunately, the press has emphasized differences of view, rather than our common commitment to solving the North Korean problem. I hope we can try to correct this impression in the future.

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National Security Council
The White House

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Berger	_____	_____	_____
Lake	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>BB 9/20</u>	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

20 JUN 96 11:51

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4881
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM ERS NSC INT
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Soderberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	<u>2</u>	<u>WB</u>	_____
Lake	<u>3</u>	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>WA</u> <u>6/18</u>	<u>D</u> <u>PODESTA</u>
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS: CC: nsv

18 JAN 91 4 1 04

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
6/20/94

June 18, 1994

94 JUN 19 AIO : 56

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2013-0871-M (1.03)
5/11/2018 KBN

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE ✓

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to President Carter on North Korea

In a press conference in Seoul June 18, President Carter made clear that he was not negotiating on behalf of the Administration. He said that Kim Il-Sung offered to freeze the North Korean nuclear program and allow IAEA inspectors to continue their activities, but wanted assurances that the U.S. would hold a third round. Kim also reiterated North Korea's desire for light water reactor technology and security assurances from the U.S.

President Carter also carried a message from President Kim Young-Sam proposing a North-South summit meeting, which Kim Il-Sung accepted. The summit could revive the moribund North-South track of the nuclear dialogue, and also may save us from a serious split with the South Koreans, who in recent days have felt they have been relegated to a distinctly junior role in determining the fate of their own country.

Substantively, much of what the North Koreans said to President Carter on the nuclear issue was not new. They have previously sought a package deal that would bring them diplomatic recognition and light water reactors in return for a return to the NPT and acceptance of IAEA safeguards. Their offer to Carter to freeze their nuclear program and allow continued IAEA monitoring of their nuclear activities may, however, be a new development, reversing their statement last week that no further inspections would be permitted. But we need to confirm this.

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Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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In your conversation with President Carter, you should seek a brief report of his discussions with Kim Il-Sung, while making clear where the Administration stands on both the conditions for a third round and sanctions.

Attachments

Tab A Talking Points
Tab B June 18 White House Press Statement

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT CARTER

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2013-0871-M (1.04)
5/11/2018 KBH

- I want to express my appreciation for your taking the initiative to go to North Korea. Your trip may have helped the North Koreans to find a diplomatic route out of the corner they got themselves into.
 - You've now probably had more direct contact with Kim Il-Sung than any other American. I'd like to hear directly from you where the North Koreans are.
 - Let me tell you what our position is.
 - First, we need to have the North Koreans confirm directly and officially to us that they stand behind the commitments and proposals they made to you.
 - Second, we are ready to go to a third round with North Korea if they agree to freeze verifiably their nuclear program now and while these talks are taking place.
 - This means specifically that they agree while the talks are ongoing, not to refuel the reactor, not to reprocess any more spent fuel, and to allow IAEA inspectors and monitoring equipment to function as needed to keep IAEA safeguards in place.
- (If needed)
- I understand that there has been some confusion over whether we are asking the North to freeze its nuclear program while negotiations are in progress or permanently. I can confirm that our condition for going to a third round is that they agree to freeze their nuclear activities and allow IAEA inspections during the negotiation. Of course, one of our key objectives in the talks would be to get them to return permanently to compliance with IAEA safeguards and to abandon reprocessing or the production of additional plutonium in their existing reactor.

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- Finally, on sanctions: if the North Koreans take the steps they discussed with you, and restore the basis for dialogue, our focus would obviously shift to the third round, which we hope would result in agreement by North Korea to resolve the safeguards violations that led to consideration of sanctions in the first place.
- I would be very interested in your perceptions of Kim Il-sung as a leader and as a personality.
- Unfortunately, the press has emphasized differences of view, rather than our common commitment to solving the North Korean problem. The Vice President, Tony Lake and I have been trying to correct this and will continue to do so.

SECRET

The White House
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

June 18, 1994

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

Preliminary reports from President Carter's visit to Pyongyang present the possibility that the North Koreans may be prepared to make commitments and take actions that would restore the basis for a third round of U.S.-DPRK talks. In this connection, we note his report of North Korea's assurances that IAEA inspectors and IAEA monitoring equipment would be kept in place. We also note North Korea's desire to replace its gas-graphite fuel cycle with more proliferation-resistant light water technology, and its willingness to return to full compliance with nuclear non-proliferation treaty and IAEA safeguards, including special inspections, as part of an overall settlement to this issue.

As we have said, we would be prepared to go to a third round if this also means that North Korea is committed to freezing the major elements of its nuclear program while new talks took place, that is, not refueling the reactor or reprocessing the spent fuel it has just removed, and permitting the IAEA to maintain the continuity of safeguards.

We will soon discuss with President Carter the results of his trip.

We will then explore this matter through diplomatic channels.

If this meaning of the message is clearly confirmed through those channels, and we hope it will be, we would be prepared to enter a third round of talks to resolve the outstanding issues between North Korea and the international community, including the issue of IAEA access to sites that could clarify North Korean activities in 1989.

U.S. policy remains unchanged. Following the June 3rd IAEA report to the UN Security Council, it has been our position that North Korea must act to restore the basis of the U.S.-DPRK dialogue before a third round could be held. Diplomatic confirmation of North Korea's readiness to verifiably freeze its nuclear program during the talks would restore such a basis.

Meanwhile, we are continuing to consult on a sanctions resolution at the UN Security Council.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 18, 1994

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2013-0871-M (1.05)
5/11/2018 KBHINFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE ✓

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to President Carter on North Korea

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Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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Attachments

- Tab A Talking Points
- Tab B June 18 White House Press Statement

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT CARTER

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2013-0871-M (1.04)
5/11/2018 KBH

- I want to express my appreciation for your taking the initiative to go to North Korea. Your trip may have helped the North Koreans to find a diplomatic route out of the corner they got themselves into.
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- Let me tell you what our position is.
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(If needed)

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- Finally, on sanctions: if the North Koreans take the steps they discussed with you, and restore the basis for dialogue, our focus would obviously shift to the third round, which we hope would result in agreement by North Korea to resolve the safeguards violations that led to consideration of sanctions in the first place.
- I would be very interested in your perceptions of Kim Il-sung as a leader and as a personality.
- Unfortunately, the press has emphasized differences of view, rather than our common commitment to solving the North Korean problem. The Vice President, Tony Lake and I have been trying to correct this and will continue to do so.

SECRET

The White House
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

June 18, 1994

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

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U.S. policy remains unchanged. Following the June 3rd IAEA report to the UN Security Council, it has been our position that North Korea must act to restore the basis of the U.S.-DPRK dialogue before a third round could be held. Diplomatic confirmation of North Korea's readiness to verifiably freeze its nuclear program during the talks would restore such a basis.

Meanwhile, we are continuing to consult on a sanctions resolution at the UN Security Council.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 18, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: DANIEL PONEMAN *DP*

FROM: STEVEN AOKI *SA*

SUBJECT: North Korea

You asked for talking points and background for the President's use in a telephone call with former President Carter.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Talking Points

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *VZ* NARA, Date *12/16/2013*
2013-0871-M

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Declassify on: OADR

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Case Number: 2013-0871-M

MIR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 477				
Document ID: 9405081				
Row: 44	Section: 4	Shelf: 5	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. letter	Jimmy Carter to President Bill Clinton. Record ID: 9405081. (8 pages)	06/21/1994	P1/b(1) KBN 9/21/2018
002. talking points	Talking Points for Telephone Call with President Kim Young sam. (1 page)	06/22/1994	P1/b(1) KBN 9/21/2018
003. letter	North Korean Foreign Minister Kang Soo Ju to Ambassador Robert Gallucci. [English Translation] (2 pages)	06/22/1994	P1/b(1) KBN 9/21/2018
004. talking points	Duplicate of 002. (1 page)	06/22/1994	P1/b(1) KBN 9/21/2018
005. letter	Duplicate of 003. (2 pages)	06/22/1994	P1/b(1) KBN 9/21/2018

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 [Carter, North Korea]
 OA/Box Number: 477

FOLDER TITLE:

9405081

2013-0871-M
 vz2259

RESTRICTION CODES

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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: CARTER, JIMMY

DOC DATE: 23 JUN 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOREA NORTH
NON PROLIFERATION

KOREA SOUTH

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: CARTER RPT ON NORTH KOREA

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DUE DATE: 27 JUN 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE

LOGREF:

FILES: *PA*

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

AOKI
GOTTEMOELLER
KRISTOFF
MISLOCK
PONEMAN
ROSNER
ROTH
TENET
WALES

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP

CLOSED BY: NSASK

DOC 1 OF 2

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9405081

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

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X 94062320 NOTED BY PRESIDENT

UNCLASSIFIED

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

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for for

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2013-0871-M (1.07)

5/17/2018 KBM

June 21, 1994

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To President Bill Clinton

I appreciated our brief conversation this morning, and your willingness to make a statement that there will be no need for sanctions if the commitments of President Kim Il Sung to me are honored. I have asked the North Koreans to be patient, to make only positive statements for a few days, and to refrain from criticisms of President Kim Young Sam.

I presume you have received the brief trip report I left for you at the White House Sunday about my visits to the two Koreas. I'd like to supplement it with a few personal reflections.

What I intended to be a mission designed to help implement your policy and demonstrate my unity with you in a common effort has, unfortunately, created some difficulties for your administration. In retrospect, and perhaps too subjectively, I consider my effort to have been completely successful -- provided the North Koreans honor the commitments made to me by President Kim Il Sung. I attempted to be as thoroughly briefed as possible by your assistants on the nuclear issue. Bob Gallucci and quite a number of others gave me a good picture of the technical aspects of the situation, so that when I prepared my talking points before leaving home and checked them with Bob, I was confident that I was on the right track. However, as you know, I had no instructions, authority, or insight into strategy or diplomacy.

Realizing when I left home that there was opposition to my trip both in Washington and in South Korea, I attempted at least to assuage the concerns in Seoul. I believe I succeeded, as their crisis atmosphere dissipated, and now they are probing toward a summit conference. Their top officials, by the way, have called and written to thank me profusely. However, something like a comedy of errors has kept the pot brewing at home. I regret this very much, and have explained thoroughly the quick sound bite on CNN that caused the basic problem. It was plain to the North Koreans that I was giving my personal opinion of what the results would be, predicated on a full implementation of Kim Il Sung's previous commitment to me. It was basically the same

Page 2

statement that you and I discussed this morning. Also, I went on to explain my comment as applying to the sanctions resolution being held in abeyance -- and had to define the word for the interpreter.

I realized when I arrived at the White House that all was not well when none of the cabinet officers or their superiors were there for my briefing. I can say, however, that Tony and Bob helped us to relieve the strain, and your phone call was very welcome. As I remarked, yours were the first affirmative or complimentary words I had heard.


Our only possible difference, which is not insignificant, is that I did not agree that sanctions should be pursued without giving some chance for direct communication with Kim Il Sung, the only person who could make a decision that could end the impasse. I still feel that a war was imminent if official international condemnation were imposed on a leader treated almost as a deity.

Maybe you and I can talk over some basic international matters sometime in the future, after we all have had a chance to observe how well the North Korean nuclear agreements are implemented. I do not wish to intrude or to be a problem to you. I have been eager to help when given an opportunity with NAFTA, the Aidid problem, MFN, and a few less significant matters.

My life and Rosalynn's are in work of The Carter Center, and we have a surprisingly broad agenda. In most cases, we go our own way in parts of the world where few others want to be involved, and we prefer little or no publicity. This week, for instance, I'll be in Nicaragua in a Carter Center effort at reconciliation of the fragmented parties, in preparation for what I hope will be a successful election. Only rarely do we inject ourselves into something in the front pages or the evening news. The North Korean case, I believe, will be a rare if not unique occurrence.

My hope and expectation is to work with you as a loyal and admiring friend.

Sincerely,



The Honorable Bill Clinton
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500-2000

JUN-21-1994

REPORT OF OUR TRIP TO KOREA, JUNE 1994
Jimmy Carter

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

About an hour before President Clinton departed for Europe to participate in the Normandy landing ceremonies, I called to tell him how concerned I was about the developing crisis with North Korea. We agreed that I would receive a definitive briefing, which later resulted in Assistant Secretary Robert Gallucci's visit to my home on Sunday afternoon, June 5. I was impressed with the seriousness of the situation and the apparent lack of an avenue of communication with the top leader of North Korea, who was the only one who could make the decisions to alleviate the crisis and avoid another Korean war.

The following day the North Koreans reconfirmed my standing invitation to visit Pyongyang, with assurances that it was from President Kim Il Sung. I called Vice President Al Gore and informed him of my strong inclination to accept. The next morning he called back to report that President Clinton and his top advisers approved my visit. While still in Atlanta conducting our annual budget hearings, I received a number of briefings, including one from a Ga. Tech nuclear engineer and information from the CNN crew who had recently been to North Korea. On Friday afternoon, June 10, Rosalynn, Marion Creekmore, and I went to Washington for additional briefings on the subject. (We were to find some of the assessments of our North Korea experts sharply different from our later observations.) Saturday, I reviewed all the information, wrote out my talking points for the trip, read them to Gallucci, and he had no suggestions for changes.

We left home on Sunday, June 12, as well briefed as possible but without any clear instructions or official endorsement. In effect, we were on our own. While in Seoul, we had talks with President Kim Young Sam and his top advisers. They seemed somewhat troubled about our planned visit to Pyongyang. Minister Li, in charge of reunification talks, was more positive and helpful, and seemed to have more objective views toward North Korea. U.S. General Luck, Commander of all military forces in South Korea, was deeply concerned about the consequences of a Korean war. He estimated that the costs would far exceed those of the 1950s.

The crossing at Panmunjom was a bizarre and disturbing experience, evidence of an incredible lack of communication and understanding. For more than forty years, the Koreans and Americans have stared across the demilitarized zone with total suspicion and often hatred and fear. We were the first persons permitted to cross the DMZ to and from Pyongyang -- since the armistice was signed in 1953! One current problem that was explained to me by U.S. Colonel Chilton was that they could not work out an agreement for joint U.S. and North Korean teams to find and recover the remains of Americans killed in the Korean war. He believes our people know precisely where 3000 bodies were buried while our troops occupied the territory.

We were turned over from U.S. authorities to the care of Vice Foreign Minister Song Ho Kyong. His high rank was an indication of the importance they attached to our visit. We had a pleasant two-hour drive over an almost empty four-lane highway. He explained that they did not produce luxury cars, but only buses, trains, subways, and trucks. We were to find a superb mass transit system in Pyongyang, with an especially beautiful subway system more than 300 feet underground.

Throughout our visit, our hosts were open, friendly, and remarkably reticent about making abusive or critical comments against the South Koreans. The North Koreans expressed concern about misunderstandings and lack of progress on the peninsula, but would acknowledge that these had been caused by mutual mistakes.

Our first meeting was with Foreign Minister Kim Yong Nam. The responses to my proposal on how to end the impasse were quite hard line, with an apparent fixation on beginning a third round of talks with the U.S. as a prerequisite to any affirmative actions. It was obvious that the threat of sanctions had no effect on them whatsoever, except as a pending insult, branding North Korea as an outlaw nation and their revered leader as a liar and criminal. This was something they could not accept. Economic sanctions had no meaning for them, since their basic philosophy -- almost a religion -- is "Ju-che," meaning self-reliance. In a practical sense, what was being proposed in the U.N. Security Council would not be damaging since their trade with the U.S. and its allies was almost non-existent and U.N. agencies provide them with little benefit. They seemed totally uninterested in the specifics. Although the foreign minister's comments were moderate in tone, it seemed quite likely that they would go to war rather than yield to international condemnation and economic pressure.

I was distressed, and woke up at 3 a.m. the following morning to decide what to do. I realized that I had no instructions or authority. In desperation, I finally decided that Marion Creekmore should drive down to Panmunjom to send a secure message from South Korea, to inform Washington of the situation and seek authorization from President Clinton to propose a third round of talks to defuse the crisis. In addition, I included a suggestion that Bob Gallucci might consider a visit to Korea. Marion was to refrain from sending my message until I could meet that morning with President Kim Il Sung.

When this meeting took place at his palace the next morning, Foreign Minister Kim, Vice Foreign Minister Song Ho Kyong, and First Vice Minister Kang Sok Chu also attended. The latter is Bob Gallucci's counterpart, responsible for negotiating with the United States on the nuclear issue.

President Kim Il Sung is 82 years old, but we found him to be vigorous, alert, intelligent, and remarkably familiar with the issues. He consulted frequently with his advisers, each of whom bounced up and stood erect while speaking to "The Great Leader." There was no doubt that Kim Il Sung was in full command and could make the final decisions. After thanking me for accepting his three-year-old invitation, he asked me to speak first.

I described my unofficial role, my briefings, my visit with South Korean President Kim Young Sam, and then made the presentation that I had prepared before leaving home. I outlined the entire situation to be sure that he was fully aware of all concerns about North Korean nuclear policies. On occasion, he would nod or ask me to pause while he talked to his advisers. Dick Christenson, our state department interpreter, later reported that he was obviously not thoroughly briefed on one important problem: IAEA inspectors being expelled.

Finally, in effect, he accepted all my proposals, with two major requests. One was that the U.S. support their acquisition of light water reactor technology, realizing that the funding and equipment could not come directly from America. (He had been promised a 2,000 megawatt reactor by President Brezhnev in the late 1970s, but the Soviets later defaulted on this after Chernenko became leader.) This is something we want the North Koreans to have, because the enriched fuel will have to be acquired from foreign sources, and the production of weapons grade plutonium is not so easy as in their old graphite moderated reactor that can use refined uranium directly from their own mines. His second request was that the U.S. guarantee that there will be no nuclear attack against his country. He wanted the third round of U.S.-NK talks to be resumed to resolve all the outstanding nuclear issues. He was willing to freeze their nuclear program during the talks, and to consider a permanent freeze if their aged reactors could be replaced with modern and safer ones. I was surprised to find him familiar with these detailed issues.

I assured him that there are no nuclear weapons in South Korea or tactical weapons in the waters surrounding the peninsula, and that my understanding is that the U.S. desires to see North Korea acquire light water reactors. He agreed with me that the entire Korean peninsula should be nuclear-free. Since I now felt that I had gotten everything we needed, Dick called Marion to tell him to return to Pyongyang without sending any message to Washington.

After lunch, we moved to talks with First Vice Minister Kang Sok Chu, their chief negotiator on nuclear questions. He went through the history of the nuclear issue from their point of view, which seemed reasonable in some respects. He was meticulous in his description of what had happened, and I could understand the correlation of events from totally disparate perspec-

tives. On occasion, he tended to deviate in his position from what Kim Il Sung had committed to do, but when I asked him each time if he had a different policy from his "Great Leader", he would back down.

He claimed that they had delayed unloading their reactor more than six months after the normal date, and had been surprised by the IAEA's announcement to the U.N. Security Council, backed by the U.S., that they had violated their agreement and passed the point where inspectors could confirm the history of their reactor's operation. He claimed they had made a reasonable proposal, to which they never received any response.

Vice Minister Kang informed me that when I arrived they had already decided to expel the inspectors and disconnect surveillance equipment as a response to the abusive sanctions language announced by UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright and Bob Gallucci. Also, he said, "All the people in this country and our military are gearing up now to respond to those sanctions. If the sanctions pass, all the work you have done here will go down the drain." He said they are convinced that the spent fuel rods can still be assessed by the IAEA, and are willing to be flexible if this conviction is proven wrong. He maintained that noted physicists in Europe and the United States agreed with their position. We discussed a number of other points of a somewhat technical nature. I saw no reason to argue with him on these points, but just to protect the agreement I had reached with his president.

After supper, I called Bob Gallucci on an open line to report the apparent agreement with President Kim Il Sung. He said they were having a high level meeting in the White House and would consider my report. I notified him of my plan to give CNN an interview, but to refrain from speaking for the U.S. government, and he had no objection. During the end of my interview, I was informed that National Security Adviser Tony Lake wanted to talk to me, and we finally got him on the phone. After I answered a few questions, he asked me to call him back in an hour for the U.S. decision. I did this, and he asked for three more hours to consult with other nations. This brought us to 5:30 a.m., and I understood that they would accept the terms I had worked out. He then went over a statement that they proposed to make. He agreed to a few changes. It was understood that the North Koreans would freeze their nuclear program through the new good faith talks. It will be several months before the rods are cooled down enough for reprocessing, and President Kim Il Sung had agreed to "freeze" their nuclear program during good faith talks.

Later that morning (Friday in Korea, Thursday at home) we were invited to go on a long boat ride with President Kim, from Pyongyang to the "barricade," a remarkable five-mile dam, built by North Korean soldiers, that separates the river from the sea.

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I advised him that in my opinion the implementation of our agreement would mean that the sanctions effort would be stopped, or held in abeyance. I explained to the interpreter the meaning of "abeyance." We discussed the issue of removing the remains of U.S. soldiers buried during the war, and when I explained that this would avoid later arguments and be a significant goodwill gesture to the American people, the president finally listened to comments of his wife and then agreed to permit joint teams to find and return these bodies to the U.S. I urged him not to let this joint effort become bogged down in debates. On the boat ride I had a more thorough talk with Vice Minister Kang concerning no reprocessing of spent fuel rods, and I explained that a permanent commitment could be predicated on approval of light water reactor technology. He is not a nuclear expert, and did not seem to understand that, once rods are removed, there are alternatives to reprocessing.

During the trip, President Kim and I had a long discussion about future relations between North and South Korea. He described several North-South discussions that had been held, but stated that no good results had ever materialized. He stated that fault for lack of progress lay on both sides, and responsibility for mistakes had to be shared. He expressed pleasure that President Kim Young Sam had proposed a summit meeting during his political campaign, and President Kim Il Sung said it should be done without preconditions or extended preparatory talks. He also expressed willingness to work on the issue of reciprocal military site inspections to implement the 1991 Joint N-S Declaration on Denuclearization of the Peninsula; to follow up on general principles adopted in 1992 regarding reunification; to a step by step reduction of Korean armed forces to 100,000 men on each side, with U.S. forces to be reduced in the same proportions; to remove weapons from within the DMZ and then jointly to pull back the military from near the DMZ; to permit cross border visitation, etc. He said that for 40 years no progress had been made, and he asked if The Carter Center would be willing to provide our good services to bridge the existing gaps and to help insure success of North-South talks in the future. I promised to mention all these things to President Kim Young Sam on my return to Seoul.

He is very friendly toward Christianity, having been saved from a Japanese prison in China by Christian pastors. Also, he is an avid hunter (killed two bears and 200 boar this past year), and quite interested in fishing. He said that after the Japanese were expelled in 1945, the families along the rivers tried to kill all the "Japanese fish." He knew they were rainbow trout introduced before 1910 by American miners, and has had a large program since then to stock the streams from several nurseries. We agreed that I would send in some biologists and flyfishermen to analyze North Korea's fishing opportunities.

Page 6

After visiting the children's palace and seeing one of the most remarkable performances of young people's skill and talent of our lives, I finally went back to the guest house for some sleep. The next morning we returned to the DMZ, where we had a press conference and answered questions from CNN, the North Korean news media, and those from China and Russia. Then we traveled with Ambassador Jim Laney to Seoul, where we were amazed to discover that our actions in North Korea had been met by criticism and partial rejection in Washington. I discussed this on a secure telephone line with V.P. Gore, and told him I would like to go by Washington before going home to explain the results of my trip in more detail. I considered all my actions to have been in accord with the policies of the administration.

I met with the South Korean president and his ministers, relayed the messages from Pyongyang, and found them to be very interested and supportive. Then I held an extensive press conference, during which I was informed that President Kim had agreed to the summit meeting. I explained the nuclear situation to the best of my ability, answered questions, and made it plain that I was still speaking as a private citizen representing The Carter Center.

Marion Creekmore and I returned to Washington via Atlanta, while Rosalynn went on home to Plains.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON
June 22, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE *AL*
SUBJECT: Call to President Kim

President Kim has agreed to take a call from you at 6:45pm.
Attached are the suggested talking points.

Attachments

Tab A Talking Points
Tab B Letter from Vice Foreign Minister Kang

Points for call to South Korean President Kim

- 8/11/97
USIA
Dept
- I wanted to talk to you directly about today's developments.
 - It is vital that we work closely together on this issue and that we coordinate our actions.
 - That's why Tony Lake called Dr. Chong as soon as we got the news, even though it was so early your time.

I welcome the agreement between your government and North Korea to pursue a meeting between you and Kim Il-Sung. We hope the discussions on June 28 go well, and that you can move promptly to a summit.

We received information this afternoon that North Korea is willing to freeze verifiably the major elements of its nuclear program while a new round of talks between our nations proceeds.

- In response, we are informing the North Koreans that we are ready to go forward with the new round of talks in Geneva next month. While no date has yet been set, the North Koreans have proposed July 8.

- North Korea has also assured us that while we go forward with these talks, it will not reload its five-megawatt reactor with new fuel or reprocess spent fuel.

- We have also been assured that the IAEA will be allowed to keep its inspectors and monitoring equipment in place at the Yongbyon facility.

I welcome this very positive development, which restores the basis for talks between North Korea and the United States.

- In addition to addressing the nuclear issue, we are also prepared to discuss the full range of security, political and economic issues that affects North Korea's relationship with the international community.

- During these discussions, we will suspend our efforts to pursue a sanctions resolution in the UN Security Council.

These developments do not mark a solution to the problem, but a new opportunity to find one.

- As always, it will be critical that we work closely together on this and stay in touch.

757-2678

(Translation)

Pyongyang, June 22, 1994

Ambassador Robert L. Gallucci,
Head of the USA Delegation to the DPRK-USA Talks
Assistant Secretary of State
for Political-Military Affairs
United States of America

Dear Ambassador Gallucci,
I acknowledge my receipt of your message dated June 20.

We are pleased to see that, during recent significant meetings between the great leader of our people President KIM IL SUNG and Mr. Carter, the basis has been established that will enable a resolution of the outstanding issues between the DPRK and the United States.

The great leader told former President Mr. Carter that the process of building confidence between the DPRK and the United States is the key to the resolution of the nuclear issue, and he has made a momentous proposal aimed at breaking the current DPRK-USA impasse and resolving the nuclear issue at its root once and for all.

In this connection, we would like to make it clear that we are willing, within the framework of the DPRK-USA confidence-building process and also of our proposed package solution to the nuclear issue, to fully implement the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA/Agency), to replace the existing graphite-moderated reactors with light-water reactors and to freeze the major elements of our nuclear program while the DPRK-USA talks go under way.

For the immediate future, we would like to assure you that, for the sake of the third round of the DPRK-USA talks, we are prepared neither to reload the five-megawatt experimental reactor with new fuel nor to reprocess the spent fuel, and to permit the inspections for the continuity of safeguards including the maintenance of the presence of IAEA inspectors and of the Agency's surveillance equipment in place at the Nyongbyon nuclear facilities. Issues after that stage will be subject to the discussion at the third round of talks.

We would have no objection to your suggestion of holding a third round of DPRK-USA talks in Geneva on July 6, but we would like to propose to begin the proposed third round of talks on July 8, for the reason of convenience of air route connections. The specific scheduling of the talks for final confirmation of date could soon be agreed upon through working-level contacts in New York.

I would like to take this opportunity to note the arguments by some officials within the US Administration for the "sanctions" against the DPRK, and also to reiterate, in no uncertain terms, our position that the "sanctions" and dialogue are absolutely incompatible.

It is my hope that the third round of talks will certainly take place on an equal and unprejudiced basis, that will bring us to another meeting with you soon in Geneva.


Sincerely Yours,

Kang Sol Ju
Head of the DPRK Delegation to the DPRK-USA Talks
First Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs
Democratic People's Republic of Korea

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON
June 22, 1994

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NK to Treasury
US State Dept

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING

(Translation)

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