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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

12-Jul-1993 13:18 EDT

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Norma D. Schillaci (SCHILLACI)

FROM: Jennifer C. Ward (WARD)

SUBJECT: info memo to lake

Info Memo to Lake

African Issues Update as of 7/12/93

1. In Brief:

- An agreement was reached between the Togolese opposition and the Eyadema Government to hold elections in late August;
- Rwanda's peace pact is to be signed July 15, according to a press report;
- State is considering whether to receive an envoy from President Mobutu, following A/S Moose's recent conversations;
- The situation in Congo remains at an impasse between the Government and the opposition; the army has not yet intervened.
- An agreement was reached in Angola between the GRA and UNITA to deliver humanitarian assistance by air. No progress on the negotiating front. An IWG has been called on Angola next week. You have Wisner memorandum on Angola.

2. NIGERIA

Further to my memo to you last week, the situation still remains unclear although an FMG (IBB) announcement on an interim government, possibly a government of national unity, is due today. Dissension within the SDP, between Abiola and his party, within the military over the nature/composition/length of tenure of the proposed interim government. State preparing a suggested "next steps" to show displeasure with IBB's machinations. We need to keep the Liberia dimension in mind. EC political committee meeting today on subject of Nigeria. Jesse Jackson has called for President Clinton to mediate and has offered his assistance.

0 Draft proposed White House Statement for your approval in works which would reiterate our position re June 12 elections, focus on our goals in/for Nigeria rather than the current procedural manoeuvres, condemn FMG actions with

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respect to human rights groups, newspapers, etc. Will likely also suggest response to Babangida letter by the President along similar lines, appealing to Nigerian ego, as example for Africa, etc.

CC: Records

(RECORDS)

Additional Header Information Follows

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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August 2, 1993

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INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: R. RAND ^{BE}BEERS, Acting

FROM: SUSAN E. ⁸²SMITH

SUBJECT: Five Imminent New U.N. Peacekeeping Operations

Within the next two or three weeks, the UN Security Council will consider establishing five new peacekeeping operations: in Haiti, Liberia, Abkhazia, Rwanda, and Cambodia. The U.S. has some interest in resolving each of these conflicts; however, we do not have the funds to pay for them.

By the end of FY 94, the U.S. is expected to be over \$1 billion in debt to the UN for peacekeeping. This is before the establishment of any new or expanded missions. Thus, we have two choices: voting for missions for which we cannot pay, or; vetoing resolutions because we lack sufficient funds. The first course is irresponsible and eventually will cripple the UN's infrastructure so that operations will suffer or shut down. The latter course may result in a "snowball effect" since some other P-5 countries are in an equal or worse financial situation.

The reality is that the U.S. must begin immediately to make tough choices among new as well as existing operations, while we fight strenuously to obtain sufficient funds from Congress and support from the American public.

Haiti

The UNSC is expected to vote this week to establish the police and military presence in Haiti. Very rough U.S. estimates put the cost of the Haiti operation at least \$50-60 million annually. If the operation is assessed, which is probably the most economical option for the U.S., our share would be roughly \$20 million. We will, however, be able to reduce our overall costs by receiving reimbursement for our military contribution. No offsets have been identified to cover our assessed costs.

Liberia

Within two or three weeks the UNSC will be asked to send 250 military observers to Liberia to guarantee the neutrality of ECOMOG. Very rough (and probably inflated) estimates put the

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annual cost of the UN mission at \$42 million. No offsets have been identified for our assessed costs.

In addition, the UN is asking the US voluntarily to lift and equip the five additional ECOMOG battalions called for under the Gordon-Somers plan. Much of this cost could be offset by reprogramming already identified ESF funds. In informal consultations in Washington, Gordon-Somers also asked the U.S. to pay the lion's share of the stipends for the anticipated 16,000 ECOMOG troops. State/AF's estimate of the cost of this additional support is \$104 million.

Much of the draft Gordon-Somers plan needs clarification and rationalization before it is ripe for Security Council consideration. As currently constructed, the size of the force may be excessive and the costs exorbitant. Moreover, these costs do not include those for UN-sponsored elections due in seven months or for post-conflict reconstruction. Until the plan has been further vetted and refined, it is difficult to estimate the ultimate cost of the entire UN/ECOWAS operation, much of which may fall to the U.S.

Abkhazia

As a result of the signing of a ceasefire last week, the UNSC faces an immediate decision as to whether to send 50 military observers to Abkhazia. At the G-7 Conference, President Clinton and Secretary Christopher pledged U.S. support for UN action in the event of a ceasefire. Now President Shevardnadze and leaders of the Russian Federation are putting substantial pressure on the U.S. to support the rapid dispatch of observers. Failure to do so within a week's time could undo the fragile ceasefire, which in turn could lead to Shevardnadze's ouster.

The UN estimates the annual cost of the proposed observer mission to be \$18 million per year. No offsets have been identified.

Rwanda

In addition to the recently approved small observer mission on the Uganda-Rwanda border, the UNSC will soon be asked to authorize a joint UN-OAU Neutral Interpository Force as part of the anticipated settlement of the Rwandan civil war on August 4. France is pushing hard to secure UNSC support for ending this conflict, which has had serious humanitarian consequences. The force is likely to be 500 strong, but the size of its UN component remains to be determined. Its likely cost is unknown. No offsets been identified thus far for either Rwandan peacekeeping operation.

Cambodia

UNTAC's mandate expires on August 28. UNSC and Core Group countries are considering the optimal UN successor presence in Cambodia. If asked by the new Cambodian government, the UN will

likely supplement its planned human rights, development, and demining presence with a SYG's Special Representative (SRSG), a modest interim UN liaison office, and some quantity of military observers. The role of the observers could range from liaison and reporting to border monitoring or military training. Their numbers could vary from 20 to 500.

A small military observer presence (20-30) coupled with a UN coordinating office and SRSG could cost approximately \$25 million a year. Arguably, only the observer mission would be an assessed peacekeeping operation. The rest should be paid for through the UN's regular budget or through voluntary contributions to UN-affiliated organizations like UNDP, UNESCO, and UNICEF. No U.S. funds have been identified to offset the USG's potential peacekeeping assessment.

Additional Complications

Clearly, one important aspect of tackling this broad problem is finding offsets to pay for new operations since obtaining brand new money is obviously unlikely in the near term. Unfortunately, making use of offsets to pay for assessed peacekeeping operations is not as simple as transferring funds from ESF or FMF to another 150 account. The arcane Congressional committee structure and legal restrictions on the CIPA account (from which assessed peacekeeping operations are paid) require that Congress pass a budget amendment to enable such a transfer of funds. Given the current hostility among Congressional appropriators to peacekeeping, obtaining a budget amendment for new operations in regions of little public interest could be difficult and require, at a minimum, high-level Administration lobbying.

Concurrences by: *RF* Rosemarie Forsythe, Richard Feinberg,
Jennifer Ward, Fervial Saeed

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
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON DC 20506

CHRON FILE

September 20, 1993



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: RICHARD CLARKE/JENNIFER WARD

FROM: SUSAN RICE/NICK BRASMUSSEN

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on African Peacekeeping Issues

The Peacekeeping Core Group met September 9 to discuss proposed operations in Rwanda and Liberia. It was clear from that meeting that there are issues that warrant Deputies' attention. As a next step, we suggest that you convene a DC meeting possibly as soon as this week, to consider the proposed Rwanda operation. We would also use the meeting to tie up a few loose ends relating to Liberia. Global Affairs will draft a paper for the DC on the Rwanda operation.

Rwanda

A UN resolution is likely to be voted on within the next couple of weeks. The USG has never addressed at a senior level the question of whether or not we should support a Rwanda operation or whether such an operation is consistent with the guidelines set out in PRD-13. This issue may fuel concern on the Hill that we can't say no. It's yet another operation that we cannot pay for. On the other hand, we must consider the implications of failing to support the Rwanda peace plan, which the U.S. helped broker.

E.O. 13526, 1.4(b), E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)

E.O. 13526, 1.4(b), E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)

Liberia

Though the Deputies agreed some weeks ago to support in principle a UN observer mission in Liberia, they left a key issue unresolved: the question of participation by U.S. military observers. Since the last DC, the UN has informally requested 15-20 U.S. military observers. Deputies should decide how to answer that request. In addition, there is the question of placing U.S. logisticians on the ground. One of the key prerequisites for the participation of the potential new ECOMOG contributors is that the U.S. provide sustaining logistical support in Liberia for the duration of the operation. This would

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require U.S. military personnel to facilitate operations in Monrovia, at Roberts Field, and at two major ports.

You should also be aware that Jennifer Ward, with support from Global Affairs is working closely with State and Defense to resolve a number of related Liberia issues before a UNSC vote. A EUCOM assessment team has just returned from Liberia. Their report, plus a State-drafted Progress Report, will address all of these issues, including:

- Level of Support for ECOMOG Forces: Although we have expressed a willingness in principle to help ECOMOG stand up and sustain 4 additional battalions, there are unanswered questions about specific requirements. Lift, equipment, personnel costs, ongoing logistical support.
- Costs: We need a better handle on what the entire spectrum of our involvement could cost. At present, we have no sense of total cost. Presumably, there will be a need also to fund demobilization and resettlement of the combatants, as well as an election process and humanitarian support.
- Timeframe: Is the 7 month period for elections overly ambitious? Should we push for an extension of the UN mandate?
- Humanitarian Requirements: We need to get OFDA's view of the humanitarian assistance requirements needed to make a peacekeeping operation viable, as well as post-PKO requirements.
- ECOMOG Viability: There are concerns about the availability of sufficient African troops to augment ECOMOG. The OAU has not taken steps to accelerate recruitment. There are no countries committed to participate at this stage and deployment could take several months. There is also some concern that Nigeria may reduce its participation in peacekeeping, including in Liberia.
- The French Problem: We need to manage effectively the French attempt to link Liberia and Rwanda.

RECOMMENDATION

That you agree to convene a meeting of the Deputies in the near future as soon as papers have been prepared to discuss Rwanda and tie up loose ends related to Liberia.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

28-Sep-1993 14:31 EDT

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MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Jennifer C. Ward
(WARD)

SUBJECT: Rwanda

Sandy:

Assuming that we can get the paperwork sped up, would you be willing to add Rwanda to the agenda for the Thursday Deputies Meeting on Sudan? Dick and I agree that we need to make a decision quickly. I got a call from Ambassador Albright's office noting that it would be unlikely that we could hold the UNSC off much longer, and that a decision sooner rather than later was preferable.

Please advise. Thanks.


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28-Sep-1993 19:28 EDT

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

VAX_MAIL@OEOB
RICE@A1@OEOB
RAGLE@A1@OEOB

FROM: White House Situation Room
(WHSR@A1@WHSR)

SUBJECT: RWANDA AND CRITERIA FOR NEW UN PKO

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SIT: RAGLE RICE VAX

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SUBJ>

RWANDA AND CRITERIA FOR NEW UN PKO

TEXT>

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 004735

PLEASE PASS TO SECRETARY'S DELEGATION

FOR AF-MOOSE, IO-BENNET, EUR-OXMAN,

LSO IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AF/C, L/UNA, L/AF

WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ECDEF FOR OSD/ISA

JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J5, J3

.0.12356: DECL:OADR

AGS: MOPS, MARR, PREL, UNSC

SUBJECT: RWANDA AND CRITERIA FOR NEW UN PKO

REF: A) USUN 4653, B) USUN 4690, C) USUN 4720

. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT. THIS IS AN ACTION CABLE, SEE

PARA 4.

. SUMMARY: FRENCH FONMIN JUPPE MAY RAISE WITH THE

(see para 5 onward)

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SECRETARY TOMORROW THE QUESTION OF A UN PKO IN RWANDA. THE FRENCH PLAN TO CALL FOR A SECURITY COUNCIL VOTE THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 30 ON THE RESOLUTION ESTABLISHING THE RWANDA PEACEKEEPING OPERATION. FOLLOWING IN PARAS 5 THROUGH 11 IS AN EXAMINATION OF THE PROPOSED UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN RWANDA (REFTELS) IN RELATION TO THE PRD-13 CRITERIA CURRENTLY UNDER DISCUSSION, AND TO PRESIDENT CLINTON'S SEPTEMBER 27 SPEECH TO THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY. IN OUR ANALYSIS, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE PROPOSED PKO FOR RWANDA MEETS THE DRAFT CRITERIA SUBJECT TO FINAL SUBMISSION OF A FINANCIAL STATEMENT WHICH IS EXPECTED IMMEDIATELY. END SUMMARY.

3. FRENCH PERMREP MERIMEE WARNED USUN DEPUTY PERMREP WALKER THAT FRENCH FONMIN JUPPE MAY RAISE THE ISSUE OF A NEW UN PKO (REFTELS) WITH SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER SEPTEMBER 29. THE FRENCH WANT TO CONSIDER THE DRAFT RESOLUTION (REFTEL B) TUESDAY, REFINE THE TEXT WEDNESDAY, PUT IT INTO ITS FINAL DRAFT VERSION WEDNESDAY NIGHT, AND VOTE THURSDAY. MERIMEE WANTS TO CONCLUDE THIS MATTER DURING SEPTEMBER, SO AS TO AVOID THE DELAYS THAT ARE INEVITABLE WHEN A NEW PERSON ASSUMES THE SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENCY ON THE FIRST OF OCTOBER. THE FRENCH KNOW THEY HAVE AT LEAST TEN POSITIVE VOTES (ONE MORE THAN NEEDED TO PASS A RESOLUTION IN THE ABSENCE OF A VETO). THE FRENCH BELIEVE THE RWANDA OPERATION MEETS THE CRITERIA SPELLED OUT BY PRESIDENT CLINTON IN HIS SPEECH TO THE UNGA. MERIMEE POINTED OUT THAT THE FRENCH COOPERATED ON THE RECENT LIBERIA AND HAITI RESOLUTIONS ESTABLISHING NEW PKO'S. USUN HAS NEVER INDICATED THAT WE ACKNOWLEDGE A LINKAGE. COMMENT: IF WE TAKE THE STEP OF VETOING THE FRENCH DRAFT RESOLUTION, THEREBY FORCING THE FRENCH TO MAINTAIN THEIR BATTALION IN KIGALI, WE CAN ALMOST CERTAINLY WRITE OFF THE POSSIBILITY OF FRENCH TROOPS REMAINING IN SOMALIA. END COMMENT.

. THE ONLY WAY WE COULD STOP THE RWANDA PKO IS BY THREATENING TO VETO A RESOLUTION THURSDAY. WE MUST, THEREFORE, RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS TO EITHER VOTE YES, ABSTAIN, OR VETO BY 10 AM THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 30. INSTRUCTIONS ON THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION WILL HAVE THE MOST EFFECT ON THE DELIBERATIONS OF THE TEXT IF RECEIVED BY OOB WEDNESDAY. IF INSTRUCTED TO VETO, USUN WILL REQUIRE AN EXPLANATION OF VOTE (EOV) FROM THE DEPARTMENT.

. DURING THE PROCESS OF DEFINING USG FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED BEFORE VOTING ON NEW UN PEACEKEEPING AND PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS, SIX FACTORS HAVE EMERGED AS PART OF THE LATEST PRD-13 DRAFT. TO AID THE USG REVIEW PROCESS, WE WILL APPLY THESE STANDARDS TO THE PROPOSED OPERATION FOR RWANDA.

. IS THERE A THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY? YES. INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION OCCURRED WHEN PF TROOPS INVADDED RWANDA FROM UGANDAN TERRITORY IN 1990. ALSO, ALMOST 1 MILLION DISPLACED PERSONS AND

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REFUGEES FLED THEIR FARMS DURING THE FIGHTING, CONSTITUTING A HUMANITARIAN DISASTER REQUIRING URGENT ACTION, COUPLED WITH VIOLENCE.

7. IS THERE AN INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OF INTEREST FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM ON A MULTILATERAL BASIS? YES. AT LEAST TEN SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS HAVE VOICED SUPPORT FOR THE PKO PROPOSED BY THE SYG. THE OAU AND THE OBSERVERS TO THE PEACE TALKS IN ARUSHA, TANZANIA ALSO FAVOR THE MULTILATERAL APPROACH CALLED FOR IN THE PEACE AGREEMENT.

8. ARE THERE CLEAR OBJECTIVES, INCLUDING AN UNDERSTANDING OF WHERE THE MISSION FITS ON THE SPECTRUM BETWEEN TRADITIONAL PEACEKEEPING AND PEACE ENFORCEMENT? YES. THIS WOULD BE A CLASSIC PEACEKEEPING OPERATION OPERATING UNDER CHAPTER VI WHERE THE CEASEFIRE,

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 004735

STATE PLEASE PASS TO SECRETARY'S DELEGATION

STATE FOR AF-MOOSE, IO-BENNET, EUR-OXMAN,

ALSO IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AF/C, L/UNA, L/AF

WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA

JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J5, J3

E.O.12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: MOPS, MARR, PREL, UNSC

SUBJECT: RWANDA AND CRITERIA FOR NEW UN PKO

DEMobilIZATION AND OTHER AGREEMENTS REACHED BETWEEN THE PARTIES WOULD BE MONITORED BY THE UN. NO PEACE ENFORCEMENT POWERS WOULD BE INVOLVED, ALTHOUGH THE FORCE WOULD HAVE THE CAPABILITY OF ACTING IN SELF-DEFENSE IF NEEDED. THE OPERATION HAS A CLEAR 22-25 MONTH PERIOD FOR EXECUTION, WITH PRECISE MILEPOSTS ON THE WAY, AT THE END OF WHICH TIME THE MANDATE AND MISSION EXPIRES. THIS IS ONE OF THE BETTER-ORGANIZED AND PLANNED PKO'S WE HAVE SEEN.

9. FOR CHAPTER VI PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, IS A CEASEFIRE IN PLACE AND HAVE THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT CONSENTED BEFORE THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL VOTES TO DEPLOY THE PEACEKEEPING MISSION. YES. THE CEASEFIRE HAS BEEN HOLDING WELL FOR SEVERAL MONTHS. THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT SIGNED AN AGREEMENT IN ARUSHA, TANZANIA IN WHICH THEY REQUESTED THAT A PEACEKEEPING MISSION BE DEPLOYED AS PART OF THE TRANSITION PROCESS TO PEACEFUL ELECTIONS AND DEMOCRACY.

10. ARE THE MEANS TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION AVAILABLE, INCLUDING (A) FORCES (REGIONAL OR UN) APPROPRIATE TO THE MISSION? YES. THE UN HAS INFORMALLY CONTACTED SEVERAL FRANCOPHONE COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE PRELIMINARILY EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER CONTRIBUTING THE TWO BATTALIONS RECOMMENDED FOR THE RWANDA PKO. THE SIZE OF THE FORCE WILL VARY BETWEEN APPROXIMATELY 700 AND 2,500 DEPENDING ON THE NEEDS AT ANY GIVEN TIME IN ORDER TO SAVE ON COSTS. (B) MANDATE: THE MANDATE WOULD BE TO FACILITATE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT, CONTRIBUTING TO THE DISENGAGEMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND INTEGRATION

PHASE, WHILE PROVIDING AN ADEQUATE LEVEL OF SECURITY. SOME OF THE SPECIFICS OF THE MANDATE, AS SPELLED OUT IN A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, WOULD BE TO: A) CONTRIBUTE TO THE SECURITY OF THE TOWN OF KIGALI, B) SUPERVISE THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT, INCLUDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CANTONMENT AND ASSEMBLY ZONES AND THE DEFINING OF DEMILITARIZATION PROCEDURES, C) OVERSEE THE CONDITIONS OF SECURITY IN THE COUNTRY DURING THE FINAL STAGE OF THE MANDATE OF THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT UNTIL THE ELECTIONS, D) CONTRIBUTE TO MINE CLEARING EFFORTS RELATED TO THE OPERATION, IN PARTICULAR BY MEANS OF TRAINING PROGRAMS, E) EXAMINE AT THE REQUEST OF THE PARTIES OR ON ITS OWN INITIATIVE, INSTANCES OF NON-IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROTOCOL OF AGREEMENT ON THE INTEGRATION OF THE ARMED FORCES AND DETERMINE THOSE WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE, F) OVERSEE THE SECURITY OF THE PROCESS OF REPATRIATION OF RWANDESE REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS, G) SUPERVISE THE ACTIVITIES OF THE GENDARMERIE AND POLICE. (C) FINANCE: THE FINANCIAL STATEMENT HAS NOT YET BEEN SUBMITTED BY THE SECRETARIAT AND THE COUNCIL WILL NOT ACT UNTIL IT HAS BEEN PUBLISHED. THE COUNCIL HAS ACTED, HOWEVER, AS IN THE CASE OF HAITI, IMMEDIATELY ON PUBLICATION OF THE FINANCIAL STATEMENT. 11. FINALLY, CAN AN END-POINT TO UN INVOLVEMENT BE IDENTIFIED? YES. THE INSTALLATION OF A DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT AT THE END OF THE TRANSITION AND ELECTORAL PROCESS (APPROXIMATELY 22-25 MONTHS AFTER ADOPTION OF A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION).

ALBRIGHT

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 29, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
THROUGH: RICHARD A. CLARKE/JENNIFER WARD
FROM: NICK RASMUSSEN *NR*
SUBJECT: Rwanda Peacekeeping Operation

\$200 million
*\$60 million -
US over
2 years*

If approved, a UN peacekeeping operation for Rwanda stands a good chance of being a success. Both parties to the conflict want UN involvement and believe it is necessary for continued progress in implementing the Arusha peace accord (which we helped broker). The ceasefire has held for several months; its durability attests to a strong desire on both sides for a political solution. OAU and UN observers have been in country for several months and have not been harmed or threatened in any way.

The PRD-13 Factors. There are satisfactory answers to a number of the PRD factors that we have developed to guide our decisions on support for new UN operations.

- o There is an international community of interest for dealing with the problem on a multilateral basis. USUN reports that at least 10 UNSC members will vote in favor of a resolution.
- o There are clear objectives and a clear understanding that this a peacekeeping, not peace enforcement mission.
- o A ceasefire is in place; both parties want the UN to come in.
- o An end point to UN involvement has been identified. When an integrated armed force is created and elections produce a new government, the UN will leave. The UN estimates this will take 22-25 months.

Looking at some of the other guidelines, however, the picture is less favorable:

- o It is not clear that there are means available to support this mission. There is consensus that the OAU is overburdened and cannot take on the mission. While some UN member states have indicated that they are willing to consider stepping forward, we are a long way from having firm troop commitments. We can also assume that this operation would add to our UN arrearages.

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- o The first guideline, that there be a threat to international peace and security, is met, but just barely. The most compelling rationale for UN involvement is to bring an end to a conflict which has displaced almost 1 million people, not to halt aggression.

Demobilization: Ambitious and Expensive. Beyond the PRD guidelines, we have some concerns which center around the UN's concept of operations. In the early stages of the mission, the UN would do what we know it can do successfully -- oversee a ceasefire so that a transitional government can take office in a climate of security. Later, however, the mission would be responsible for organizing demobilization of the two armed forces so that an integrated, national army could be created. Demobilization of two large armed forces (30,000 on one side, 20,000 on the other) is a complex and ambitious undertaking, made much more so by the UN's relative inexperience with disarmament. If there is any point at which this operation could break down, this would be it.

A demobilization component to the mission has significant cost implications as well. At its peak, the number of UN peacekeepers will climb to almost 2600. Though the UN has not yet provided cost estimates, we expect that it will be quite expensive. There have already been several attempts to scale down the size of the proposed operation, but given the ambitious mandate, this has not been possible.

Next Steps. If we are inclined to support this mission in the Security Council, we should nonetheless take the time to make sure our concerns about mission scope and costs are given a fair hearing and to scrub the text of the resolution. Given the President's clear statement on Monday, Security Council members and Boutros-Ghali should expect no less. Even if we end up supporting the mission in its current form, we will have established that we will exercise our right to scrutinize an operation in advance of a decision, regardless of time pressures from other members.

We understand that Secretary Christopher informed French PM Juppe in New York today that we want to delay the Security Council vote scheduled for Thursday. Ambassador Albright is following up through UN channels. State has also begun putting together comments on the draft resolution offered by the French. Most of the changes will involve being more precise about the mandate and end points. We will have their input early on Thursday.

E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)

CONFIDENTIAL



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E.O. 13526, 1.4(d) We have developed a preliminary draft of a response.

We believe that State will support a Rwanda resolution (USUN has already weighed in favor -- see Tab C). OSD and JCS would have to be convinced, but their concerns appear seem more tied up in the process (a hurried vote without good information) than with the substance. If we can slow the process down and demonstrate to them that we are faithfully applying the PRD guidelines, they will likely support a yes vote.

RECOMMENDATION

That you agree to schedule this week either a Deputies meeting or conference call involving State, DOD and NSC to develop a USG position on a Rwanda resolution.


Approve _____

Disapprove *md*

Attachments

Tab A Mitterand's Letter
Tab B Draft Letter of Response
Tab C USUN Cable

CONFIDENTIAL



Re: RWANDA

~~SECRET NOFORN WMINTEL ORCON~~

(b)(3)
30 SEP 93

ASSESSMENT:
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN RWANDA

I. (U) KEY JUDGEMENTS

- (C) The military, political, social, economic, and operational conditions in Rwanda favor an economical and easily executed peacekeeping operation.
- (C) The United Nations peacekeeping plan for Rwanda is sound with room for some economies.
- (C) If adopted and properly executed, the United Nations peacekeeping plan for Rwanda has excellent prospects for success.
- (C) United Nations failure to provide a peacekeeping force to Rwanda will probably lead to a breakdown of the peacekeeping process, and increased regional instability adverse to US interests.

II. (U) BACKGROUND

(C) Historical Roots. The conflict in Rwanda is an historical and ethnic struggle between the Hutu (85% of the population) and the Tutsi (14%). Traditional Tutsi subjugation of the Hutu majority was sustained during Belgian colonial rule. However, a bloody but successful Hutu uprising at independence in 1959 brought down the Rwandan Tutsi monarchy and forced hundreds of thousands of Tutsi into exile into Uganda, Zaire, and Burundi. Periodic regional Hutu-Tutsi bloodbaths have occurred since, killing more hundreds of thousands from both ethnic groups, and sustaining Rwandan Tutsi expatriate covenants to return to Rwanda.

(S/NF/WN) The Current War. The Rwandan Civil War began in earnest on 1 October 1990. A large conventional military force, composed almost entirely of expatriate Rwandan Tutsi, attacked Rwanda from Uganda with the intention of militarily seizing the country from the single party control of the Hutu-led National Movement for the Development of the Republic (MRND). The invasion was stopped short of the capital of Kigali by a combination of Rwandan Army (FAR) counterattack, and reënforcement of Rwandan national defense by Zairian, Belgian, and French troops. The Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was subsequently pushed back into Uganda by the FAR. For the next two years the RPF, supported logistically by the Ugandan government and National Army (NRA), conducted periodic conventional military incursions into Rwandan territory. In 1992 the RPF seized a measurable portion of land in the north (see attachment A), displacing almost a million Rwandan citizens. After this limited success the RPF sued for peace.

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PER E. O. 13526

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(C) The Peace Accords. Internationally supervised peace talks concluded in Arusha, Tanzania on 4 August 1993 with the signing of a peace accord between the government of Rwanda and the RPF. The accords call for the cessation of hostilities, establishment of democratic government, demobilization and reorganization of the armed forces, voluntary repatriation of all Rwandan expatriates, and neutral international supervision of the process. The United Nations sent a peacekeeping assessment mission to Rwanda in August 1993, and on 24 September that mission rendered its report recommending the establishment of the United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR).

(S/NF/WN) The Present Situation. Currently a cease fire is in effect and all offensive military operations in Rwanda have ended. The 20,000-man RPA controls 4% of Rwandan territory in the north, although the bulk of the RPA is in Uganda. (20,000 is a UN figure; E.O. 13526, 1.4(c) RPA troop strength as closer to 6-8,000.) The combat zone has clearly defined front lines, separated by a neutral zone all along the front except at the Byumba salient. Rwandan defense forces consist of the 23,000 man FAR and 6,000 man Gendarmerie deployed throughout the country, but concentrated along the front. Approximately 350 French paratroops, advisors, and trainers secure the Kigali airport and provide security assistance to the FAR. Both the FAR and the RPA are conventional, light infantry forces; adequately supplied and equipped. Morale and discipline are good. Although both armies started the conflict with exceptionally well-trained forces, rapid wartime expansion has diluted some of that capability. The FAR still has very good basic military infrastructure, to include a remarkably competent officer military academy. Extraordinary operational security and deception characterize RPA operations, which otherwise are conventional in nature.

III. (U) PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS CONSIDERATIONS

(C/NF/WN) Operations Support and Logistics. Several factors will facilitate peacekeeping operations in Rwanda. The country is geographically small, and the country's road system is adequate to support vehicular deployment from Kigali to almost anywhere with only a few hours travel time, reducing transportation requirements and expenses considerably over other PKOs in Africa. The climate is mild and pleasant; well suited to troops from almost any country, although the altitude may pose some initial problems. Food, basic services and logistics are readily available. Adequate troop training areas, facilities, billets, and bases already exist or require only minimal upgrade. International and internal telephone and postal communications are excellent. The Kigali airport is very modern and fully capable of receiving strategic deployment of peacekeepers. All other airports are adequate for PKO. In short, support of UN operations should be inexpensive, uncomplicated, and far less demanding than the PKOs in Mozambique, Angola, Somalia, and elsewhere in Africa.

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(S/NF/WN/OC) The Political Environment. The population welcomes United Nations presence. Ethnic tensions are high and sometimes explosive, but the people respond well to military and police intervention. Only one or two very small ethnic organizations propound civil disobedience, usually in the form of small (5-25 person) sit-ins or demonstrations, and usually directed against the occasional inefficiency of UN relief agencies. Although in transition, the country is politically stable and the government has the support of the vast majority of the people; portending almost no civil disturbance problems. There is no terrorist threat. The majority of the military leadership in the RPA and FAR support the peace agreements, and will enforce respect for the security of UNAMIR troops. Furthermore, the leaders of both armies expect to surrender a certain amount of autonomy and authority to the UNAMIR commander. If the UNAMIR commander cultivates his actual and perceived authority and leadership position, the RPA and FAR will defer to him beyond that which is required under the Arusha accords, further enhancing PKO effectiveness. Members of both forces have the expectation of unequivocal UN military response to any military violations, to include consequence of arrest or use of military action, giving psychological advantage to UNAMIR.

(G/WN) Peacekeeping Operations. The actual conduct of peacekeeping operations should be easier than elsewhere in Africa. Rwandan terrain is hilly with low cultivated vegetation and only occasional forest, with excellent long-range observation from hill tops. Fewer observers are needed than in typical flat, African savannah. Infiltration routes from Uganda are predicable and accessible, and the small geographic area involved lends itself well to unattended sensor surveillance. In addition, the dense population makes covert or surprise military movement difficult. The conventional military situation is much easier to monitor than an unconventional war. Combatants are all uniformed, well organized, controlled, and disciplined. Front lines and unit positions are well defined and easily accessible.

(G) Mines. Mines were used during the war, but the problem is nowhere near that which of other African conflicts. Most mine fields, although unmarked, are known and placed in front of existing fixed defensive positions; easily recoverable. There are a few mines scattered in the countryside, but the number probably does not warrant a systematic search except in a few very small areas of past, intense conflict. Unexpended ordnance is a greater problem. The country, especially in the north, is littered with unexploded mortar rounds, hand grenades, and unexpended ammunition of all types. Casualties are a daily occurrence, especially among children.

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(S/NF/WN) Refugees. 600,000 of the 900,000 persons internally displaced by the war spontaneously returned to their homes after the signing of the peace accords. The remainder represent mostly those whose farms are in RPF territory. These persons will probably stay in their current locations until SEP 94, when the RPF has left the zone and the approach of the rainy season predicates planting. Tutsi and other refugees located outside the country will not begin repatriation in any numbers until the military and political processes have been nearly completed, and there is a reasonable security situation. The current United Nations representative for refugee affairs in Rwanda is generally regarded as incompetent by all parties in country, and ill-suited for supervising the resolution of the difficult refugee situation.

(U) The UN Plan. The UNAMIR mission includes security of Kigali, monitoring the cease fire and security situation country-wide during the entire process, mine-clearing and training, investigation of accord violations, and security of refugees and displaced persons during repatriation. The operational concept specifies a phased deployment of approximately 2,500 peacekeepers, to include a mobile infantry battalion in Kigali, and another in the neutral zone. Besides support elements, UNAMIR would include an observer force (to include the small Neutral Military Observer Group, NMOG, currently in Rwanda) and police observers to monitor the security situation elsewhere in the country E.O. 13526, 1.4(c)

(C) Assessment of the UN Plan. The proposed UNAMIR structure and operational plan is technically sound and is likely to succeed. The force structure is economical. The 800-man figure for infantry battalions is probably a round number. 650-man infantry units would fulfill mission requirements as long as the units had four maneuver companies and all support elements. Rwandan terrain favors the use of light infantry (to include airborne, air assault, and commando). The battalions should have enough wheeled, armored troop carriers for one or two companies. Light wheeled vehicles, cargo trucks, and buses would suffice for the balance of the transport. The addition of a military police platoon to the Kigali-based battalion would greatly enhance the unit's urban operational capability. The police observer group is an excellent proposal, and will help liaison with the government in general. The air transport unit could consist of 2 (vice 4) utility helicopters and one small fixed wing aircraft, and an aero-medevac helicopter. This would reduce air transport costs at least 30%, and give UNAMIR an air-medical capability. If needed, additional air assets could be obtained from the FAR. The civilian support component of UNAMIR is entirely too large for the mission, which could be easily done with half (70) the number proposed.

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(S/NF/WN) The UN operational plan is very good and reflects the realities of the peacekeeping situation there. The proposal of an enforceable weapons control zone around Kigali is essential to avoid spontaneous violence between the RPF and FAR battalions based in the city. The exchange of liaison officers, not practiced at other UN operations in the region, will extend the UNAMIR commander's influence and help reduce communication problems. The plan has no provision for intelligence collection/processing, a major weakness considering the RPF's deception capabilities. Addition of a S5 Civic Affairs Officer, responsible for compiling operational information (from both external and internal sources), and a counterpart Operations Coordinator Officer in the S3, can fulfill the same role with no political ramification. In addition, the plan only glosses military-civil affairs, a crucial aspect of peacekeeping in the Africa region. Finally, the UNAMIR plan calls for support of 26 assembly and cantonment points and training centers (of 48 proposed by the belligerents. This number is far greater than needed or feasible. The same mission can be accomplished far more efficiently and economically (in terms of manpower, resources, and money) with around 10-12 points: 3 RPF points (one in each RPF command zone), and 7-8 FAR points (one at each major garrison).

(S/NF/WN/OC) Threats and Pitfalls. Should the United Nations fail to provide a peacekeeping force, or provide an ineffective force, the peace process will probably break down. While leaders of both sides want to end the war, they also realize that the underlying ethnic tensions are very volatile, and suspicions run deep. Revenge, retaliation, and reprisals are culturally embedded. The Tutsi culture dictates a continued struggle to rule the Hutu peasant, one they will not give up despite the pronouncements of the leadership. Similarly, the Hutu will never accept Tutsi rule. The intellectual desire to end the war is insufficient to overcome these emotions. An authoritative arbitrator, with power to enforce, is essential for any plan of reconciliation. Many of the leaders of both elements privately admit that they do not have the discipline to execute the peace accords themselves, and that they will exploit any weakness in the peace accords, or the authority of peacekeeping operation commander, to exact whatever retribution is still due the other side.

(S/NF/WN) UNAMIR composition cannot include certain nationalities without risking the viability of the force. The RPF will not accept French troops as peacekeepers under any circumstances. The FAR will not accept Ugandan peacekeepers. Both France and Uganda played key supporting roles in the war, and as a result lack neutrality. Neither force will accept Zairi troops, who fought against the RPF while looting the Rwandan countryside. Similarly, both sides feel that Tanzanian and Burundi units cannot be neutral because both armies have members of Tutsi and Hutu ethnicity.

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(S/NF/WN) The US has ~~EnO~~ 13526.1.4(c) capability in Rwanda, a serious shortcoming given the nature of the conflict. The US embassy in Kigali is too small and lacks qualified personnel to properly monitor and participate in the process. There is no resident military attache. A military TDY augmentation to the embassy staff, to support peacekeeping operational requirements for the duration of UNAMIR, will help fill the personnel void. E.O. 13526.1.4(c)

E.O. 13526.1.4(c) to round out country team efforts, and provide maximum effectiveness in liaison between UNAMIR, host country military units, and the US government.

IV. (U) OUTLOOK.

(G/NF) Rwanda is important to the stability of Central Africa, where internal security is precarious at best. Failure of the peace process in Rwanda, for any reason, would greatly increase the likelihood of increased regional ethnic violence. Tutsi-Hutu conflict could quickly spread to Zaire, Burundi, Tanzania, and Uganda. Other ethnic groups could and would retaliate, compounding social and political instability, generating international political crises in Burundi and Uganda, ethnic slaughter in Zaire, and continued civil war in Rwanda. None of these developments will serve any US interest or goal, and probably require evacuation of US and allied citizens from all these areas. In the end far more scarce United Nations peacekeeping efforts and resources would have to go into the region.

(G) The UNAMIR plan has an excellent probability of success. Competent execution of the plan will greatly enhance Rwandan stability over the next 3-4 years. This will further enhance political and social stability in the region, and facilitate international efforts to restore stability and effective government in Uganda and Zaire, and nurture the fledgling democracy in Burundi.

PREPARED BY:

(b)(3)

E.O. 13526, 1.4(c)

CONFIDENTIAL

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7511.Redo

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 1, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: RICHARD A. CLARKE/JENNIFER WARD

SUBJECT: Draft Message to General Quesnot on Rwanda
Peacekeeping

President Mitterrand has written to ask for support for a UNSC resolution establishing a UN peacekeeping force in Rwanda. The resolution is pending before the Council; a **final vote is likely to take place on Monday, October 4.** The French have a keen interest in this operation because deployment of UN troops to Kigali, the Rwandan capital, would permit Paris to withdraw 400 French troops who are currently there to provide security for the expatriate community. Our mission at the UN also reports that,

E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)

While this operation may have a better chance of success than some others, the Security Council vote comes at a difficult moment for us given our stated reluctance to say "yes" to every proposed operation. We also have concerns about the cost of the mission (our share could exceed \$80 million over two years) and the fact that this operation will add to the already substantial burden on the UN's peacekeeping apparatus and budget. In addition, the operation involves disarming and demobilizing troops, an effort at which the UN has had only limited success in the past. The UN may also have difficulty finding enough countries to provide troops for the operation. (N.B. U.S. troops will not participate. Both the UN and the parties to the conflict in Rwanda understand this.)

E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)

Concurrences by: Jennifer Walker

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PER E. O. 13526

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Declassify on: OADR

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2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize transmittal of the message at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Reply to General Quesnot

Tab II Incoming Correspondence

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VIA BLUE CHANNEL

Dear General Quesnot:

I thank you for President Mitterrand's letter to President Clinton on the situation in Rwanda. I agree with you that the international community needs to support the Arusha accords so that efforts to bring peace to Rwanda are not compromised.

To that end, the U.S. will support a resolution establishing a UN force in Rwanda, provided of course that our concerns about the mission's mandate and cost are resolved in a satisfactory manner. As President Clinton made clear in his remarks to the UNGA, it is imperative that we consider all aspects of an operation before we move to a final vote. I greatly appreciate your government's willingness to accept a short delay in the Council's final vote on this matter so that we can address the issues that concern the U.S.

I understand that deployment of a UN force will permit France to withdraw its forces from Rwanda. I hope you can also tell the UN that the creation of a UN force in Rwanda can permit French forces to remain in Somalia beyond the end of the year. As you know, I think it is vital that the Secretary General's efforts in Somalia receive the continuing strong support of the international community. Let me close by thanking you for your help in ensuring that cooperation between France and the U.S. on peacekeeping matters around the world remains strong.

Sincerely,


Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7511.redo2

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506



October 2, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: RICHARD A. *Walker* CLARKE/JENNIFER *Walker* WARD

SUBJECT: Draft Message from the President to Francois
Mitterrand on Rwanda Peacekeeping

President Mitterrand has written to the President to urge that he support a UNSC resolution establishing a UN peacekeeping operation in Rwanda. **A final Security Council vote on the matter has been postponed once at our behest and will likely take place on or before Tuesday, October 5.** We have drafted a reply indicating that we are prepared to support such a resolution assuming that our concerns on cost and the operational aspects of the mission can be adequately addressed. The reply also expresses the hope that France will leave its troops in Somalia beyond the end of this year.

Concurrences by: Jennifer *Walker* Walker

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memo to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

- Tab I Memo to the President
- Tab A Draft Reply to President Mitterrand
- Tab B Incoming Correspondence

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on:

OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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PER E.O. 13526

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7511

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 2, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE ✓

SUBJECT: Reply to President Mitterrand's Letter on
Peacekeeping in Rwanda

Purpose

To respond to President Mitterrand's letter asking that you support a UNSC resolution establishing a UN peacekeeping operation in Rwanda.

Background

President Mitterrand has written to ask your support for a UNSC resolution establishing a UN peacekeeping force in Rwanda. The resolution is pending before the Council; a final vote is likely to take place by Tuesday, October 5. The French have a keen interest in this operation because deployment of UN troops to Kigali, the Rwandan capital, would permit Paris to withdraw 400 French troops who are currently there to provide security for the expatriate community. Our mission at the UN also reports that, when the French voted for the UN resolutions on Liberia and Haiti, they indicated an expectation that their support would be reciprocated by a U.S. vote for a Rwanda operation.

The UN and the parties to the conflict clearly understand that the U.S. will not participate in this mission. But the U.S. share of the cost of this operation is estimated to be as much as \$80 million over two years. While JCS and OSD have some concerns about the military concept for this operation, the agencies agree that given the seemingly strong will of the parties for a lasting settlement, this mission has a good chance of success. We will work with the French and with the UN to address our operational concerns and ask that the costs be examined more closely.

E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)

E.O. 13526, 1.4(d) Given our desire to draw down the U.S. presence in Somalia, we would clearly like to see the French remain. We will express this hope to the French in New York and in Paris.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The attached message from you to Mitterrand indicates our willingness to support the Rwanda mission assuming that the cost and operational details are satisfactorily addressed. It also makes mention of our hope that French troops will remain in Somalia past December.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize transmittal of the message at Tab A.


Approve _____ Disapprove _____

*President has approved
per Shawn Wagner
10/4 18.*

Attachments

- Tab A Response to President Mitterrand
- Tab B Incoming Correspondence

Shaw



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

02-Oct-1993 13:17 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Susan E. Rice
(RICE)

SUBJECT: RWANDA UPDATE

Sandy--

I have sent up to you a revised version of the President's letter to Mitterand taking into account the concerns that I understand you expressed to Dick.

I am assuming that we still plan to support the Rwanda mission, despite a rumor that Frank Wisner was reconsidering after looking more closely at the latest French resolution. Please let us know if our position has changed.

Late yesterday afternoon we had a working level interagency videoconference to try to respond to widespread concerns about the military concept of operations for the Rwanda mission and to reach consensus on a U.S. position on the draft resolution. While much common ground was found on the outline of the resolution, you should know that JCS and to a somewhat lesser extent OSD have very serious concerns about the mission as currently conceived.

In particular, they believe that since the mission is a traditional CH. VI in a supposedly completely permissive environment, the operation should be conducted by unarmed military observers (or at most very lightly armed observers) rather than the planned 2 infantry battalions. As the mission now stands, they "non-concur", and remain adamantly opposed for this reason.

State supports the 2 infantry battalions. I tend to agree with JCS that there is considerable dissonance between the concept of operations and the supposed permissive environment. We ought to be able to achieve the same goals with observers if the parties truly want peace. However, it will be difficult to move the French, the UN and the Rwandan parties in the short time we have before a vote. JCS and/or OSD may raise this at your level.


I think we ought to talk to the French and the UN in New York to address these issues, preferably before a vote, if JCS insists.

Distribution:

FOR: Samuel R. Berger

(BERGER)

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FOR: Jennifer C. Ward (WARD)
FOR: W. Anthony K. Lake (LAKE)
FOR: Richard A. Clarke (CLARKER)
FOR: Mary C. Emery (EMERY)
FOR: Wilma G. Hall (HALL)
FOR: Kristen K. Cicio (CICIO)
FOR: Katherine M. Veit (VEIT)
FOR: James W. Reed (REED)
FOR: William H. Itoh (ITOH)
FOR: Kristie A. Kenney (KENNEY)
FOR: M. Brooke Darby (DARBY)
CC: Records (RECORDS)

Additional Header Information Follows

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Al Folder: OCT93
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 02-Oct-1993 13:04
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

04-Oct-1993 14:34 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Susan E. Rice
(RICE)

SUBJECT: RWANDA

Sandy--

It seems that State and DOD/JCS have managed to come to agreement on instructions to USUN to support the Rwanda resolution. In short, JCS walked back from the cliff and agreed to more open-ended language about the composition of the force (armed battalions vs. unarmed military observers) in exchange for absolute clarity that this is meant to be a traditional (pacific) Chapter VI operation.

This is a good compromise. We are looking forward to rapidly clearing the x-hatched instruction cable.

I have tried to track down the message from the President to Mitterrand. As far as we can tell, the package went to the President on Saturday evening, but has not yet been signed out. Kathy Millison is checking further for us.

Susan

Distribution:

- FOR: Samuel R. Berger (BERGER)
- FOR: Nancy Soderberg (SODERBERG)
- FOR: Mary C. Emery (EMERY)
- FOR: Wilma G. Hall (HALL)
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- FOR: William H. Itoh (ITOH)
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- CC: Records (RECORDS)
- CC: Richard A. Clarke (CLARKER)
- CC: Randy R. Beers (BEERS)
- CC: Jennifer C. Ward (WARD)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 04-Oct-1993 13:42
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 016991
VMS Filename: OASSHARE42:ZUWVKU2TF.WPL
AI Folder: OCT93

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Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 04-Oct-1993 13:42
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

IMMEDIATE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT BERGER COMM COMM FUERTH HALL ITOH KENNEY LAKE REED SIT SODERBERG
WWING
SIT FILE HOTLINE OUT SIGLER SUM2

PREC IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 050021Z OCT 93

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO ELYSEE PALACE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

0000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO
PRESIDENT MITTERRAND.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCOIS:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER ON THE SITUATION IN RWANDA. I
AGREE WITH YOU THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY NEEDS TO
SUPPORT THE ARUSHA ACCORDS SO THAT EFFORTS TO BRING PEACE TO
RWANDA ARE NOT COMPROMISED.

TO THAT END, THE U.S. IS PREPARED TO SUPPORT A RESOLUTION
ESTABLISHING A UN MISSION IN RWANDA, ASSUMING OF COURSE THAT
OUR CONCERNS ABOUT THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE OPERATION AS
WELL AS ITS COST CAN BE ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED. AS I STATED
BEFORE THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, I THINK IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT
WE CONSIDER ALL ASPECTS OF AN OPERATION BEFORE WE MOVE TO A
FINAL VOTE. I GREATLY APPRECIATE YOUR GOVERNMENT'S
WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT A SHORT DELAY IN THE COUNCIL'S VOTE ON
THIS MATTER SO THAT WE CAN ADDRESS THE ISSUES THAT CONCERN
THE U.S.

ON A SEPARATE MATTER, AS YOU KNOW, WE THINK IT VITAL THAT THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL'S EFFORTS IN SOMALIA RECEIVE THE CONTINUING
STRONG SUPPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. I DO HOPE

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

THAT FRANCE WILL BE ABLE TO EXTEND ITS PARTICIPATION IN UNOSOM II BEYOND DECEMBER TO HELP ENSURE THE SUCCESS OF THIS IMPORTANT UN MISSION. LET ME CLOSE BY THANKING YOU FOR YOUR HELP IN MAINTAINING THE STRONG COOPERATION BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE U.S. ON PEACEKEEPING MATTERS AROUND THE WORLD.

WITH BEST WISHES.

BILL CLINTON

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

BT

*1823

NNNN

<MSGID> M0641922

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

13-Dec-1993 22:01 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Susan E. Rice
(RICE)

SUBJECT: Upcoming Issues in UNSC

OMNIBUS PEACEKEEPING E-Mail

INFORMATION:

The Security Council is expected within the next week to renew routinely a number of peacekeeping mandates:

Cyprus

The UNSC will vote this week another 6 month renewal of UNFICYP. The last renewal came in the summer as the Canadians were leaving and after the Russians initially vetoed the resolution for procedural reasons. Today, the Argentines have replaced the Canadians, and the Russians seem satisfied on the issue. The U.S. and allies have also succeeded in getting Greece and Cyprus to pick up over 50% of the cost of the operation, thus reducing the U.S. share to roughly \$7 million/pa.

This week's vote should be an easy, pro forma extension. The draft resolution is a good one, stating that the status quo is unacceptable and calls for a thorough review of the future role of the UN in Cyprus in February.

Angola

The UNSC will vote by the 15th to extend UNAVEM's mandate at current strength for 3 months. As Jennifer has informed you, the U.S. tabled a draft resolution that has been considered by the P-5. USUN is trying to ensure that it remains balanced to put appropriate political pressure on both sides.

Liberia

We are at the 3 month stage when the UNSC must decide to continue the mission in Liberia for the duration of its seven month mandate. This is very similar to the procedural issue we faced last week on Haiti. Again, this continuation can be achieved without any formal resolution, only a letter from UNSC Pres. to SYG or a statement. Not expected to be a big deal.

Rwanda

There are 2 Rwanda missions-- 80 border monitors looking for arms traffic on the Rwanda/Uganda border and a larger

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peacekeeping force in Kigali. The upcoming renewal (required by the 22nd) will give the Ugandan border mission its second 6-month mandate. Happily, the two missions, while formally separate for political reasons, are well-integrated in terms of command. Better yet, after Dec. 22 they will have a single budget, allowing us to capture all possible economies of scale.

ACTION:

South Africa: How to authorize and fund the anticipated UN election monitoring mission.

Normally, straight election monitoring (w/o peacekeepers) is a UNGA activity paid for on the regular budget, for which US pays 25%. But according to USUN, the South African parties, the Frontline States and many others want the UNSC to mandate the South Africa mission, because the UNGA can't move quickly and doesn't carry the same political weight.

The problem is that if the UNSC mandates it, the UNGA (which controls the UN purse strings) is likely to insist that it be paid for on the peacekeeping budget (we pay 31.7%). Funding non-peacekeeping on the Peacekeeping budget would set a terrible precedent.

ISSUE: If you agree, Jennifer and I will ask State to draft a cable to USUN, instructing them to submit quickly a strategy for speedy UN action on South Africa paid for on the regular budget. We propose to give them a relatively short time frame in which to implement that strategy.

If USUN fails, I think we will need a DC in early Jan. to decide whether the U.S. wants to work through the UNGA, which may be opposed by the parties and slow down deployment, or; whether we want to pay for this on the peacekeeping budget, which could raise serious questions on the Hill and would set a dangerous precedent.

Distribution:

FOR: W. Anthony K. Lake	(LAKE)
FOR: Samuel R. Berger	(BERGER)
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FOR: Mary C. Emery	(EMERY)
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FOR: James W. Reed	(REED)
FOR: William H. Itoh	(ITOH)
FOR: Kristie A. Kenney	(KENNEY)
FOR: M. Brooke Darby	(DARBY)
FOR: Cathy Millison	(MILLISON)
CC: Records	(RECORDS)
CC: Records	(RECORDS)
CC: Richard A. Clarke	(CLARKER)

CC: Randy R. Beers (BEERS)
CC: Jennifer C. Ward (WARD)
CC: Jane E. Holl (HOLL)
CC: Ernest J. Wilson III (WILSON)

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Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 13-Dec-1993 22:01
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

06-Apr-1994 13:01 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Allison M. Wright
(WRIGHT)

SUBJECT: Crosshatch Clearance

Hi Don, Mac and Dan,

Looking for Clearance on the following Crosshatches:

002029 - cable to Pretoria: South African military Assistance Request - due 4/6

002016 - Cable to USUN New York: Rwanda: Authorization to Vote and EOY - due 4/6

Don, still awaiting guidance on 000919 - Cable to Nairobi: Reponse to John Garang.

Please E-Mail your comments at your soonest convenience.

Thanks!


Distribution:

FOR: Donald K. Steinberg	(STEINBERG)
FOR: MacArthur DeShazer	(DESHAZER)
FOR: Dan W. Mozena	(MOZENA)
CC: Records	(RECORDS)
CC: Pat A. Battenfield	(BATTENFIELD)
CC: M. Kay LaPlante	(LAPLANTE)

Additional Header Information Follows

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Deletable Flag: Y
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Read-Receipt Requested: NO
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Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

07-Apr-1994 13:42 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Donald K. Steinberg
(STEINBERG)

SUBJECT: Update on Rwanda/Burundi (1:30 pm)

Update on Rwanda :

The situation in Rwanda continues to deteriorate. There is open fighting in the streets of Kigali; cannons and gunfire can be heard regularly. There is also communal violence in the countryside. The former government forces (RPF) have taken up arms and is fighting with government troops. Belgian troops tried to secure the airport, and were unsuccessful. Apparently, two Belgians have been killed, 10 have been taken hostage, five platoons are trapped near the airport. Another two Ghanaian peacekeepers have apparently been killed by government forces.

The Belgians and French are considering their next actions. The Belgians at least are contemplating bringing in substantial numbers of troops from a mobile force elsewhere in central Africa to pacify the situation. The United Nations will hold a special session this afternoon on the situation and next steps.


The good news -- so far -- is that all Americans (205, including about 60 outside of Kigali) have been in communication and are safe at their homes.

State has set up a task force and has made a basic determination to evacuate our personnel. They are now meeting with DOD to determine how we would do it. One possibility is to contact the military in Rwanda to arrange for safe passage for expatriates to leave. This may be very difficult. Indeed, given the random violence now occurring and the fact that foreigners have not been targeted so far, it may be best for the Americans to continue to hunker down. I'll keep you posted.

So far, Burundi remains calm, but we are already urging voluntary departure of Americans (there are 177), and considering the question of going beyond that soon.

I spoke at length with Kristie Kenney on this, who will brief the President. I discussed with her the situation with Monique.

Distribution:



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

07-Apr-1994 20:09 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Donald K. Steinberg
(STEINBERG)

SUBJECT: Update on Rwanda (8:00 p.m.)

Another update on Rwanda (8:00 EDT)

Our Ambassador in Kigali, David Rawson, reports that things have calmed down somewhat now that night has fallen, but there is still gunfire and occasional shelling in the city. There have been no incidents involving Americans, although at least 11 Belgian military have been killed, along with "vast numbers" of Rwandans. A communication net has been set up for the Americans (who apparently now number 258, with another 30 or so non-American USG contractors), and they are staying hunkered down and in touch every hour. The Army has control of the airport, and have kept it closed. Confirmed dead include the prime minister and the ministers of social affairs, information, and agriculture. Elsewhere in the country, the South is quiet, but there is some fighting in the North.

We have been in touch with the French and the Belgians here and in their capitals to determine their plans. Both apparently are proceeding with planning for possible action in Kigali -- either to evacuate expatriates or stabilize the situation -- but are waiting to see what daylight brings tomorrow. The French have reportedly put their troops in Bangui on alert. There is a meeting tomorrow morning between the French and the Belgians (and possibly EUCOM).

The UNSC is about to have a presidential statement of concern over the violence. ("The Council will remain seized of the matter.") More important is the question of what to do with the U.N. peacekeeping force, especially if the French or Belgians move in. We will have a core group meeting on this question tomorrow.

The State Department is expected to shortly authorize an ordered departure for all American personnel from Kigali. This does not mean that we have yet decided to close everything down, only that preparations are now being made. The Joint Chiefs have ordered Eucom to get ready for a possible evacuation, including an evacuation in which they have to force their way in. The Department has also decided to draw dependents out of Burundi as a precaution, although all remains calm there for now.

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President Clinton's statement from this morning has gotten substantial press coverage. He has not been asked about the situation directly. There have been some questions to State Department about the whereabouts of Monique, the human rights monitor. We are still trying to reach her.

Distribution:

FOR: Susan E. Rice	(RICE)
FOR: Mary C. Emery	(EMERY)
FOR: Wilma G. Hall	(HALL)
FOR: Kristen K. Cicio	(CICIO)
FOR: Katherine M. Veit	(VEIT)
FOR: William H. Itoh	(ITOH)
FOR: Kristie A. Kenney	(KENNEY)
FOR: M. Brooke Darby	(DARBY)
FOR: Cathy Millison	(MILLISON)
FOR: James W. Reed	(REED)
FOR: Neal S. Wolin	(WOLIN)
FOR: Natalie S. Wozniak	(WOZNIAK)
FOR: Calvin A. Mitchell	(MITCHELLC)
FOR: Tara D. Sonenshine	(SONENSHINE)
FOR: Thomas B. Ross	(ROSS)
FOR: Pat A. Battenfield	(BATTENFIELD)
FOR: Jennifer C. Ward	(WARD)
FOR: MacArthur DeShazer	(DESHAZER)
FOR: Dan W. Mozena	(MOZENA)
FOR: Donald K. Steinberg	(STEINBERG)
CC: Non Records	(NONRECORD)

National Photographic



Interpretation Center

Page 1 of 1

Imagery Analysis Brief Priority Exploitation Group

E.O. 13526, 1.4(c)
NPIC/PEG (4/94)
8 April 1994

Runway Blocked Kigali, Rwanda (S/WN) 7 April 1994

The runway at Kigali airfield, 7 km northeast of Kigali in central Rwanda, has been blocked. E.O. 13526, 1.4(c) showed six vehicles parked on the runway, one at each end and four in the middle near the parking apron, preventing fixed-wing flight operations. A possible C-130 was on the parking apron. This is the principal airfield in Rwanda, supporting international and domestic civilian air traffic and the Rwandan Air Force. (S/WN)

No roadblocks or military vehicles were observed in the areas around the US Embassy in Kigali. (S/WN)

According to press reports, violence erupted in Rwanda following the deaths of the Rwandan and Burundi presidents in a plane crash Wednesday. (U)

E.O. 13526, 1.4(c) Coordinates 01-58-04S 030-08-24E (S)

Comments and queries regarding this briefing board may be directed to (b)(3) secure 31-4644. (U)

Attached is one photo print. (U)

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM		
RWANDA		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> LAKE	WALKER	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CLARKE
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> BERGER	HOLL	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> BEERS
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SOEDERBERG	LEBOUENGOIS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RICE
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ITON	WADDELL	SCHWARTZ
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> KENNEY		WILSON
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> WOLIN	SCHIFTER	DARRAGH
	FRIED	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FUERTH		BELL
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OVP STAFF	BURNS	ANDREASEN
MCCLARTY	BEYBLE	HAHN
	COTTEMPELLER	JONES
HALPERIN	FORSYTHE	WITKOWSKY
ROBBER	INDYK	PONEMAN
ANDRUCOS	SATTERFIELD	HARRIS
DANVERS	LAIPSON	AOKI
		CLEMENTS
KIRICZKO	BOTH	
BAKER	KRISTOFF	TEN ET
	SUETTINGER	CENTON
		MELLOCK
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WALSH	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MOZINA	ALEXANDER
FUNK		BURGOS
	CLAUSSEN	BLECKEN

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or Methods Involved

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9408141

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

April 8, 1994

~~CONFIDENTIAL/EXDTS~~

DECL: OADR

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Response to Belgian Request


Secretary of State Christopher and Deputy Secretary of Defense Deutch have agreed to respond positively to the Belgian Prime Minister's request that the U.S. authorize cooperative emergency planning for the evacuation of American citizens and expatriates from Rwanda providing that the military action pertains to evacuation only.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'M. Grossman', written over a horizontal line.

Marc Grossman
Executive SecretaryDECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526~~CONFIDENTIAL/EXDTS~~CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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Drafted:AF/C:ARender
4/8/94, 7-6614
W-SECA 3512

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520 9408116

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL:OADR

April 8, 1994

2704

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Request for Department of Defense participation in joint U.S.-Belgian-French evacuation of expatriates from Rwanda and for Department of Defense provision of appropriate air support on a non-reimbursable basis


The situation on the ground in Kigali remains chaotic and violent. The French and Belgian Governments share our concern over the security of our respective nationals, and have suggested informally that we coordinate our efforts in any evacuation.

Belgium may be prepared to dispatch approximately 800 troops to Rwanda to assist in any evacuation, but may require U.S. airlift assistance to move these forces and their equipment. France may be prepared to contribute four Jaguar fighter planes in support of an evacuation operation.

The Department of State requests that the Department of Defense participate in planning for a joint U.S.-Belgium-France operation to evacuate our respective nationals from Rwanda. The Department of State also requests that the Department of Defense be prepared to provide all appropriate airlift support to such an operation.

Department of State will reimburse the Department of Defense for airlift of U. S. citizens. The Department of State will consult the Department of Defense and the National Security Council on other funding issues, including whether reimbursement should be sought from the French and Belgians, and/or whether the President should be asked to order a drawdown of defense services under the Foreign Assistance Act.

Thank you for your assistance in this important matter.


Marc Grossman
Executive Secretary

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PER E.O. 13526

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

RWANDA

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

08-Apr-1994 07:24 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Donald K. Steinberg
(STEINBERG)

SUBJECT: Update on Kigali

UPDATE 4 (7:20 am, 4/7)

Tony/Sandy:

First, I think it's worth considering having the President make a very brief call out to our Ambassador in Kigali, David Rawson. He has been doing a great job of keeping the 280 or so Americans there safe and in contact with each other, and planning for the evacuation. Even a two-minute call from the President would really help buck up the spirits of the entire community out there through a very harrowing time.


There continues to be fighting in the streets of Kigali, primarily inter-ethnic and largely between the current military and the RPF of the former regime. Civil authority has completely broken down. 17 Rwandan Jesuits priests and nuns have been killed, as have many Rwandan workers for international relief agencies, including UNICEF. The UN commander on the ground has been trying to get the military commanders together, but to no avail so far. Brussels has put its paratroopers in the region on alert, as are the French troops in Bangui for a possible evacuation or pacification effort. EUCOM is meeting with the French and Belgians in Brussels to discuss joint evacuation efforts -- Belgium is seeking our airlift support, and State has contacted Defense to see what can be done.

We have ordered the departure of our personnel from Kigali, but that will not be easy to accomplish, considering the fighting in the streets and the continued closure of the airport. The Embassy in Kigali is considering two possible plans: South by land to Kigali or forced exit via the airport. Neither is a good plan. For now, it is best that they continue to hunker down.

Distribution:

FOR: Susan E. Rice
FOR: Mary C. Emery
FOR: Wilma G. Hall
FOR: Kristen K. Cicio
FOR: Katherine M. Veit
FOR: William H. Itoh

(RICE)
(EMERY)
(HALL)
(CICIO)
(VEIT)



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

08-Apr-1994 10:24 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Eric P. Schwartz
(SCHWARTZ)

SUBJECT: MONIQUE MUJAWAMARIYA OF RWANDA

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PRESS OR DISCUSSED PUBLICLY AT THIS POINT.

I reported to you yesterday that Monique Mujawamariya, the Rwandan human rights activist who met the President, appeared to have been killed. I characterized the report as unconfirmed.

(The report was based on the fact that Monique had been talking by phone with a friend in the U.S. when soldiers who were killing her neighbors approached her home. The phone went dead and further attempts to reach Monique were unsuccessful, with men answering the phone and hanging up. [There is a Washington Post account of these events on today's Op Ed page.]

Thankfully, Monique appears not to have been killed. She apparently fled her home and hid in the bush. She is now back at her home and our Embassy is trying to figure out how we might help in getting her to a safe place.


THIS NEW INFORMATION IS NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PRESS OR DISCUSSED PUBLICLY AT THIS POINT.

Our Embassy's Task Force in Kigali believes strongly that Monique's chances of survival will be increased if she is believed to be dead, as Rwandan soldiers continue to look for her.

Distribution:

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FOR: Samuel R. Berger	(BERGER)
CC: Records	(RECORDS)
CC: Donald K. Steinberg	(STEINBERG)
CC: MacArthur DeShazer	(DESHAZER)
CC: Nancy Soderberg	(SODERBERG)
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CC: William H. Itoh	(ITOH)
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


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CC: James W. Reed (REED)
CC: Neal S. Wolin (WOLIN)
CC: Richard A. Clarke (CLARKER)
CC: Richard L. Canas (CANAS)
CC: Wanda D. Lindsey (LINDSEY)
CC: Rand R. Beers (BEERS)
CC: Eric P. Schwartz (SCHWARTZ)
CC: Ernest J. Wilson III (WILSON)
CC: Susan E. Rice (RICE)
CC: Marcia G. Norman (NORMAN)
CC: O. Ruth Stalcup (STALCUP)
CC: Sean J. Darragh (DARRAGH)

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Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

08-Apr-1994 14:15 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Richard A. Clarke (CLARKER)

FROM: Sean J. Darragh (DARRAGH)

SUBJECT: UPDATE ON RWANDA

Marguelis from PM said the situation on the ground appears to be getting better. 200 Rwandans have taken refuge in the Ambassador's house. 5 UN troopers are on the way to help secure his compound.

21 Americans are trapped in 7 day adventists compound in Mudende, which is north of Kigali. Amb. trying to negotiate safe route out for them. Many Rwandans killed. Apparently, the wrath of Khan is only for Rwandans.

Belgium is about to ask for formal cooperation. I don't know what that means yet. I'll let you know.

All for now


sjd

CC: Records (RECORDS)

Additional Header Information Follows

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Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

08-Apr-1994 15:16 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Donald K. Steinberg
(STEINBERG)

SUBJECT: Rwanda Update (3 p.m.)

Things have calmed somewhat in Rwanda as night has fallen. The Ambassador's residence is secure, although the 200 Rwandans remain in the garage/parking area (apparently inside the wall). Unfortunately, it appears that the five UNAMIR soldiers have left. UNAMIR reports that they are having some problems with their own security. At the mission school in Mudendi, things have also calmed somewhat. Still no injuries to Americans.

On the positive side, the Embassy reports that the a General Ndlianya has assumed control of the military and is negotiating with the UNAMIR commander and the RPF at an undisclosed site. The Embassy knows Ndlianya and believes him to be serious and professional, but acknowledges that it is hard to say how seriously we should take this information, given the chaos that continues to reign. Also, there are rumors that a new head of government is about to be announced and that the remaining Ministers have met.

There is a report that the Belgians and French views are gelling around having the French troops out of Bangui go in to secure the airport and the Belgians troops arrange the evacuation of the expatriate community. The Belgian Prime Minister has apparently called for a "qualitative improvement" in the equipment of his nation's peacekeepers -- the thought is that if a convoy goes in overland from Burundi to evacuate the expatriates, it should also take in additional arms for the peacekeepers. The Belgians are also apparently pushing strongly for the nationalization of the UNAMIR troops.

Distribution:

FOR: Mary C. Emery (EMERY)
FOR: Wilma G. Hall (HALL)
FOR: Kristen K. Cicio (CICIO)
FOR: Katherine M. Veit (VEIT)
FOR: William H. Itoh (ITOH)
FOR: Kristie A. Kenney (KENNEY)
FOR: M. Brooke Darby (DARBY)
FOR: Cathy Millison (MILLISON)
FOR: James W. Reed (REED)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

08-Apr-1994 15:29 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Richard A. Clarke
(CLARKER)

SUBJECT: *** FOR 4:00 MEETING IN PENTAGON

DOD is looking at three options:

1. Permissive evacuation: The ambassador thinks he can get a safe conduct/laissez passe to drive the Amcits out of the country. (This strikes DOD as the easy way out but frankly scares me.)
2. Belgian Forced Entry: The Belgians would be flown in by the US to a staging area (Bujumbura) and would then be choppered in to Kigali. DOD opposes the use of US helos.
3. US NEO: George Joulwan has begun planning. The Marine carrier has been moved from Somalia to Mombasa (a long way from Rwanda). The US Special Forces Group in Germany has an African specialist unit that could be flown in quickly (8 hour flight). JCS thinks that this force is "too small" and is worried about doing an operation at the end of such a long tether.


E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)

Distribution:

FOR: W. Anthony K. Lake	(LAKE)
FOR: Samuel R. Berger	(BERGER)
FOR: Neal S. Wolin	(WOLIN)
FOR: Donald K. Steinberg	(STEINBERG)
FOR: Kristen K. Cicio	(CICIO)
FOR: Wilma G. Hall	(HALL)
CC: Records	(RECORDS)

 Additional Header Information Follows

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 Message Format:
 Message Status: READ



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
Date Modified: 08-Apr-1994 15:20

Forward Flag: YES

Read-Receipt Requested: NO

Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO

Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

08-Apr-1994 19:14 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Richard A. Clarke
(CLARKER)

SUBJECT: ***RWANDA:NEW REPORT FROM UN

Rwanda Update from UN Headquarters:

Two French civilians killed, 1 Guinean

The Force Commander has arranged a cease fire between all the factions to begin tomorrow morning. A Provisional Government has been formed and all forces have agreed to return to their barracks. (There is no evaluation of the strength of this agreement or the seriousness of the Provisional Government).

The Secretary General, in a second letter to the Security Council, has backed off the recommendation to withdraw all of the peacekeepers with a proposed civilian evacuation and has limited it to all UN "civilian staff."


Distribution:

- FOR: Mary C. Emery (EMERY)
- FOR: Wilma G. Hall (HALL)
- FOR: Kristen K. Cicio (CICIO)
- FOR: Katherine M. Veit (VEIT)
- FOR: William H. Itoh (ITOH)
- FOR: Kristie A. Kenney (KENNEY)
- FOR: M. Brooke Darby (DARBY)
- FOR: Cathy Millison (MILLISON)
- FOR: James W. Reed (REED)
- FOR: Neal S. Wolin (WOLIN)
- CC: Records (RECORDS)
- CC: Donald K. Steinberg (STEINBERG)


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 Message Format:
 Message Status: READ
 Date Modified: 08-Apr-1994 19:06
 Forward Flag: YES
 Read-Receipt Requested: NO
 Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO

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PER E.O. 13526**



Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

09-Apr-1994 16:00 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Donald K. Steinberg
(STEINBERG)

SUBJECT: Reporting on Rwanda

Jill Daugherty tells me that CNN from Nairobi is reporting that:

A first convoy of Americans and other Westerner has made it out of Rwanda and to the hotel in Bujumbura. They are scheduled to be taken to Nairobi in C-130 aircraft. Two other convoys are still on the Rwandan side of the border. They will come out tomorrow. All of these convoy include Americans and other Westerners. There is a "fourth" convoy of Embassy officials (sic), but CNN is not informed as to their whereabouts. There are no U.S. troops in Rwanda escorting the convoys.

I told her that I couldn't comment on any of this, but warned her off the fourth convoy story. I also pointed out the danger in CNN trying to provide too many details on what's going on in this sensitive situation.

Good
(TL 4/9)

Don

Distribution:

- FOR: Mary C. Emery (EMERY)
- FOR: Wilma G. Hall (HALL)
- FOR: Kristen K. Cicio (CICIO)
- FOR: Katherine M. Veit (VEIT)
- FOR: William H. Itoh (ITOH)
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- FOR: James W. Reed (REED)
- FOR: Neal S. Wolin (WOLIN)
- FOR: Natalie S. Wozniak (WOZNIAK)
- FOR: Calvin A. Mitchell (MITCHELLC)
- FOR: Tara D. Sonenshine (SONENSHINE)
- FOR: Thomas B. Ross (ROSS)
- FOR: Richard A. Clarke (CLARKER)
- FOR: Richard L. Canas (CANAS)
- FOR: Wanda D. Lindsey (LINDSEY)
- FOR: Rand R. Beers (BEERS)
- FOR: Eric P. Schwartz (SCHWARTZ)
- FOR: Ernest J. Wilson III (WILSON)

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check with JCS

In response to the recent developments in Rwanda, the Department of Defense has pre-positioned military transport aircraft and helicopters in the region to assist, if necessary, with the evacuation of American citizens from Rwanda.

Throughout the past two days, we have ^{been working} ~~closely coordinated~~ with our NATO allies, especially with the Belgians and the French, particularly with respect to the French action last evening to secure the airport in Kigali.

At the present time, all Americans in Rwanda are reported to be safe. Despite some positive developments on the ground, such as the establishment of a provisional government and the announcement of a temporary ceasefire, the situation in Rwanda remains uncertain. The ordered departure remains in effect. Americans ~~will be~~ evacuated as soon as ~~it is~~ possible. ~~to do so~~ are being

Cons
DCM

#1 - PAO
#2 - AID Popin
#3 - AID Employee
Conroy in radio



3 convoys

— Conroy

— move beyond

— Belgian requests

Sandy Stewart

3 convoys

↳ half way to border

2 gendarmes a piece - gone back

270

how many Americans → ? 130 people left
258 Americans

other nationalities

how many left

Eucom - helicopters

200 Marines
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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→ CW/BSW April / Elisa

John
April
Bill
Mary
Mara

→ Bob Bouson -
April Jackson

→ Gordon - OFIC

→ Adl.

→ Rwanda
~~→ Furse~~

April →

→

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

09-Apr-1994 16:38 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Richard A. Clarke
(CLARKER)

SUBJECT: RWANDA: NEXT STEPS, FOR SUNDAY AND BEYOND

With dawn on Sunday, convoys two and three will leave the Danish Mission 2 kms from the border and drive into Burundi. During the nite the USMC force in Buj will run hourly radio checks on the status of the convoys. That will leave us with the following questions:

--how do we get the remaining Americans out?

--do we help the Belgians get in? (note: The Rwandan rebels are reportedly rpt reportedly moving toward Kigali.)

--do we pull the UN force out?

1. Getting the Americans out

The embassy may put together another convoy or may put the Americans out the French flights out. The first French flight out left late on Saturday.

2. Getting the Belgians in

There are 2000 Belgian citizens still at risk. Fighting is likely to escalate. Thus, once we know that our citizens are safe, we should work with the French to see if they can insure the safety of flights in to Kigali. If the French do secure the airbase area, we probably should fly the Belgians in.

3. Terminating the UN Force

We make a lot of noise about terminating UN forces that aren't working. Well, few could be as clearly not working. We should work with the French to gain a consensus to terminate the UN mission.

Distribution:

FOR: Donald K. Steinberg (STEINBERG)
 FOR: MacArthur DeShazer (DESHAZER)
 FOR: Mary C. Emery (EMERY)
 FOR: Wilma G. Hall (HALL)
 FOR: Kristen K. Cicio (CICIO)
 FOR: Katherine M. Veit (VEIT)


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FOR: Ernest J. Wilson III (WILSON)
FOR: Susan E. Rice (RICE)
FOR: Marcia G. Norman (NORMAN)
FOR: O. Ruth Stalcup (STALCUP)
FOR: Sean J. Darragh (DARRAGH)
CC: Records (RECORDS)

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Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 09-Apr-1994 16:30
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS



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E.O. 13526, 1.4(c)

Dr. Theodore SINDIKUBWABO

(Phonetic: sindeekoobWAHBO)

RWANDA

Interim President (since 8 April 1994)

Designated Interim President under constitution...almost certainly an ethnic Hutu...political, ethnic views unknown; however, comes from southern region which has vied with Habyarimana's northern clan for power...Minister of Public Works during 1962-63...became medical doctor in 1969...Minister of Health from 1972 until Habyarimana seized power in 1973...became member of Habyarimana's ruling MDR party...elected to National Development Committee (Rwandan National Assembly) in late 1970s...appointed speaker in 1989...age about 70 E.O. 13526, 1.4(c)

Jean KAMBANDA

(Phonetic: kahmBANdah)

Prime Minister (since 8 April 1994)

Hutu...member Democratic Republican Movement (MDR); belongs to hardline faction opposed to powersharing with Tutsis...elected head of local MDR chapter in southern region in 1993...made unsuccessful bid for Prime Minister in early 1993...former banking official, according to Embassy reports E.O. 13526, 1.4(c)

E.O. 13526, 1.4(c)

LDA M 94-11760 E.O. 13526, 1.4(c)
9 April 1994

E.O. 13526, 1.4(c)

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E.O. 13526, 1.4(c)

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

09 April 1994

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Rwanda: Background to the Crisis

1. Renewed ethnic fighting in Rwanda this week dramatically ends efforts by the Hutu-dominated government and Tutsi rebels to implement an August 1993 peace accord. Both sides were committed to a 22-month program of demobilization, refugee repatriation, and democratic elections in 1995. E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)

Colonial Background

2. Unlike most African states, Rwanda was not an artificial creation of colonial rule but was absorbed by German East Africa in 1899. Rwandan and Burundi had been kingdoms for several centuries. After the First World War, they became territory of the Belgians. In 1959 Hutus toppled the Tutsi monarchy; Rwanda became independent in 1962. Rwanda's first Hutu President was overthrown in 1973 by President Habyarimana who dominated Rwandan politics until his assassination last week. E.O. 13526, 1.4(c)

Ethnic Background

3. Rwanda's ethnic groups, which speak the same language and have largely the same religion, have a long history of ethnic bloodletting that dates back to the 15th century when the Nilotic Tutsis moved south to dominate the agricultural Hutus. More than 100,000 people have been killed in ethnic fighting since independence, triggering an exodus of 500,000 Tutsi refugees. After 30 years, these numbers have grown to over a million Tutsis. Some Tutsis, who comprise about 15 percent of the population, are successful business people, but most are marginalized. E.O. 13526, 1.4(c)

Post Independence Politics

4. Rwandan politics had been dominated for years by President Habyarimana's virtually uncontested rule marked by an obsession to keep Hutus in control. Growing internal pressure in recent years began to challenge his authoritarian rule however. He divided power among the country's major institutions, marginalized rivals and favored bringing to power Hutu elites from

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E.O. 13526, 1.4(c)

E.O. 13526, 1.4(c)

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E.O. 13526, 1.4(c)

SUBJECT: Rwanda: Background to the Crisis

his northern stronghold. He has used hardline Hutus to disrupt efforts to foster ethnic reconciliation with the Tutsi minority, almost certainly sanctioning violence against Tutsi civilians. E.O. 13526, 1.4(c)

Tutsi Invasion...

5. About 2000 Rwandan exiles from the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) based in Uganda invaded northeastern Rwanda on 1 October 1990, threatening President Habyarimana's regime and raising the specter of renewed ethnic violence in the region. Initial successes by the exile force--which managed to enter the Rwandan capital--prompted Belgium and France to send troops to protect their nationals and secure the airport. Zaire, which had a mutual defense agreement with Rwanda, also provided some 1200 troops to aid Rwandan forces. The initial invasion of about 2000 Rwandan Tutsi deserters from the Ugandan Army was joined by other Tutsis and disaffected Hutus, bringing the exiles' strength to what we estimate may have numbered 20,000. Following early combat success, the RPF guerrilla force was hampered by logistic constraints and the Rwandan Army, benefiting from military resupply by France, Belgium, Egypt, and South Africa contained the rebels primarily to the northeastern Mutara region. E.O. 13526, 1.4(c)

...Evolves into Peace Talks

6. After nearly a year of negotiations held in Arusha Tanzania, in August 1993 the Hutu government and the Tutsi rebels signed the peace accord giving the Tutsi minority seats in a multi-ethnic cabinet, slots in the armed forces, and a process for resettling Tutsi refugees. Mutual distrust undermined efforts to implement the agreements, but both sides agreed to the deployment of UN troops to serve as a confidence building force. Until this week, UNAMIR's 2500 man force had been relatively effective and quick to investigate claims of cease-fire violations. Last December, the rebels sent a 600-man bodyguard force to Kigali to protect rebel leaders participating in talks over forming a multi-ethnic coalition government. E.O. 13526, 1.4(c)

...But Tensions Recently Increased

7. Efforts to form the transitional government--which should have been installed in September 1993--recently stalled with both sides blaming each other for the delays. The RPF, increasingly impatient with what it viewed as Hutu President

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E.O. 13526, 1.4(c)

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E.O. 13526, 1.4(c)

SUBJECT: Rwanda: Background to the Crisis

Habyarimana's manipulation of the 1993 accords, recently threatened to return to war if progress was not made toward forming the multi-ethnic government. The RPF also refused to allow a Hutu supremacist party, the Coalition for Defense of the Republic (CDR), to take a national assembly seat until the CDR demonstrated its commitment to the Arusha accord. With Rwanda's two main opposition parties--the Liberal Party (PL) and the Movement for a Democratic Rwanda (MDR)--divided by ethnic based power struggles, Habyarimana and the Tutsi rebels attempted to secure a more prominent role in the future transitional government.

8. Although the Arusha accords appeared to be falling apart, meetings last week in Kampala and Tanzania on resolving ethnic conflicts in Burundi and Rwanda offered some hope that civil war would be averted in Rwanda.

E.O. 13526, 1.4(c)

E.O. 13526, 1.4(c)

Troubled Outlook

9. The renewed conflict in Rwanda will undermine UNAMIR'S mandate, fuel massive refugee flows and, threaten ethnic reconciliation in neighboring Burundi. Civil war in Kigali will almost certainly slow peace efforts between neighboring Burundi's ethnic Hutu-dominated government and the Tutsi-dominated military--which launched a coup last October killing Burundi's Hutu President and his direct line of succession, triggering more than 700,000 in refugees in the region and unleashing ethnic bloodletting which left scores of Burundians dead.

10. Moreover, if the RPF rebels engage government forces in Kigali the fighting is likely to be more intense as the RPF seeks to seize the government. In addition, the RPF is unlikely to seek an accommodation with the newly named interim government, which they see as a continuation of hardline Hutu political domination. We believe that the rebel forces are probably more disciplined than government forces who have always looked to the Paris to

3

E.O. 13526, 1.4(c)

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E.O. 13526, 1.4(c)

SUBJECT: Rwanda: Background to the Crisis

support them in the capital. Even if the RPF defeats government forces, they are unlikely to be able to maintain control of the Hutu majority in Kigali. E.O. 13526, 1.4(c)

4

E.O. 13526, 1.4(c)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LENTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Revised

RWANDA:

Tutsi Military Poised To Attack

The Rwandan military and Tutsi forces from the Rwandan Patriotic Front apparently are adhering to a cease-fire as the evacuation of foreign nationals proceeds, but at least 4,000 heavily armed RPF rebels continue to advance on the capital. Leaders of the RPF say they will let French and Belgian forces assist in removing their nationals but have threatened to attack the French forces if they intervene for the government's side. Rebel leaders also rejected talks with the new Hutu interim government, which they accuse of killing Tutsis and undermining ethnic reconciliation.

— *The RPF almost certainly intends to seize Kigali but is holding back until most expatriates are evacuated. It would be hard pressed to control the city, however, because armed militias and Hutu hardliners there vehemently oppose any sharing of power with Tutsis. (C-NF)*

The Hutu-dominated security forces are divided regionally between southerners and northerners, and clashes have been reported between Army and Gendarmerie forces, according to a foreign government service. Armed Hutu militias continue to rampage throughout the city and to threaten Belgian and French citizens. *Neither Paris nor Brussels wants to be drawn into Rwanda's civil war, and they probably will withdraw their troops as soon as the evacuation is complete.*

— A senior UN official privately has told Belgian, French, and US officials that the Secretary General believes the lightly armed UN force of 2,500, which already has suffered 16 killed, must be evacuated unless there is an effective cease-fire. *It probably will continue to be attacked if it remains in Kigali after the evacuation. (S-NF)*

A revived civil war in Rwanda could intensify the volatility of Burundi, where up to 150,000 people reportedly were killed after the Hutu president was assassinated last fall. In a move to support Tutsis in Rwanda, the Tutsi military could try to take over the Hutu-dominated government. (C-NF) -CIA E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)

DOWNGRADED FROM
TOP SECRET TO SECRET

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~~Top Secret~~

SC 01677/94
11 April 1994

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
Operations Center
TFRW01
SITUATION REPORT NO. 28
SITUATION AS OF 0545 EDT, 04/11/94

• (U) A C-141 carrying 20 Amcits missionaries and most of Embassy Kigali's staff is scheduled to depart Bujumbura for Nairobi by 0630 EDT. (Embassy Nairobi/TFRW01 telecon)

STATE
REASUS &
FICES

• (U) Consular update information as of 0500 EDT: The Gakoni orphanage group, including eight Amcits (Sitrep 27), intended to split up; part of the group, including six of the eight Amcits, planned to drive from Rwamagana to Tanzania; two Amcits decided to return to Kigali with UNAMIR escort and plan to depart 4/11. The group driving to Tanzania planned to cross at Rusumo and will radio Carl Wilkins (Sitrep 26), who will then contact Embassy Nairobi. Embassy Bujumbura believes that three Amcits remain in Butare, Rwanda near the Burundi border; approximately 22 Amcits from Adventist University in Mudende reached the Zaire border at Gisenyi and all have crossed into Zaire; six additional Amcits are for the moment staying in the Rwanda/Zaire border town of Cyangugu. (Embassy Nairobi and Embassy Bujumbura/TFRW01 telcons)

ADDITIONAL:

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ENCIES:

• (U) RPF Commander Major-General Paul Kagame told Reuter Sunday that two battalions of 600 fighters each were battling towards Kigali to reinforce a rebel battalion already there. According to the French Embassy in Nairobi, the main body of the RPF is within 10-15 kilometers of Kigali. (Reuter Report April 11; Nairobi 06380)

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
• (C) E.O. 13526, 1.4(c) that the French evacuated President Habyarimana's family. The French also passed on unconfirmed reports of the assassination of RPF leaders Kanyarengwe and Bizimungu. E.O. 13526, 1.4(c)

David Pierce
David Pierce
Coordinator

Peter Petrihos
Peter Petrihos
Senior Watch Officer

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL:OADR

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PER E. O. 13526



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

11-Apr-1994 11:12 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Donald K. Steinberg
(STEINBERG)

SUBJECT: Rwanda - Update (11:00 a.m.)

OUR ACTIONS ON RWANDA:

We are planning to ask the Burundian government to allow our Marines in Bujumbura to stay until tomorrow, so that they can fly during daylight hours. Some of the troops will be returning to Kenya, while we are asking the Ugandan government's permission to station others at Entebbe for 3 days in possible support for evacuation operations in Rwanda.

We have been asked by the Germans for helicopter assistance in getting about a dozen of their citizens out of a Deutsche Welle relay station near Kigali. We have indicated that we do not intend to introduce American forces into Rwanda (as we similarly declined requests from the Belgians and French), and are discussing with the Belgians/French what assets they may have available to meet the German request.

We are also following the progress of American "stragglers". Of some concern is a group of Adventists who are east of Kigali. Most of this group intends to continue on to Tanzania, but two elderly members of the group are planning to return to the airport in Kigali for air transport out.

The U.N. Security Council will meet this afternoon on the UNAMIR mission's future. Apparently, the Commander on the ground says that the troops should be pulled out, as he is hard-pressed to see how his troops can support a mission that no longer exists. We will need to work out our position on this soon.

Assistant Secretary Moose has been asked to brief members of the Senate Foreign Relations committee on Rwanda at 1 p.m. today.


We last had contact with Human Rights watcher Monique at 6:45 a.m. yesterday. She was safe. We have asked UNAMIR to pay close attention to her safety.

Distribution:

FOR: Mary C. Emery
FOR: Wilma G. Hall
FOR: Kristen K. Cicio
FOR: Katherine M. Veit
FOR: William H. Itoh
FOR: Kristie A. Kenney

(EMERY)
(HALL)
(CICIO)
(VEIT)
(ITOH)
(KENNEY)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

11-Apr-1994 12:45 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Richard A. Clarke
(CLARKER)

SUBJECT: RWANDA: DECISION MAY BE REQUIRED

TO: TL/SRB

FM: RAC

RE: RWANDA

The UN is planning to pull out the UN peacekeeping force, according to USUN.

The UN may rpt may ask for US airlift to get the force out fast.

Meanwhile, the French are beginning to pull their force out and the Belgians are continuing to insert troops.

If the UN asks for help getting out, USAF transports standing by in Kenya could be available.

ACTION REQUESTED:

Do you have any guidance for us on how we should respond to a UN request?

Distribution:

FOR: Donald K. Steinberg	(STEINBERG)
FOR: MacArthur DeShazer	(DESHAZER)
FOR: Mary C. Emery	(EMERY)
FOR: Wilma G. Hall	(HALL)
FOR: Kristen K. Cicio	(CICIO)
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FOR: Neal S. Wolin (WOLIN)
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CC: Susan E. Rice (RICE)
CC: Marcia G. Norman (NORMAN)
CC: O. Ruth Stalcup (STALCUP)
CC: Sean J. Darragh (DARRAGH)

Additional Header Information Follows

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Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

11-Apr-1994 12:45 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Richard A. Clarke
(CLARKER)

SUBJECT: RWANDA: DECISION MAY BE REQUIRED

TO: TL/SRB

FM: RAC

RE: RWANDA

The UN is planning to pull out the UN peacekeeping force, according to USUN.

The UN may rpt may ask for US airlift to get the force out fast.

Meanwhile, the French are beginning to pull their force out and the Belgians are continuing to insert troops.

If the UN asks for help getting out, USAF transports standing by in Kenya could be available.


ACTION REQUESTED:

Do you have any guidance for us on how we should respond to a UN request?

Distribution:

- FOR: Donald K. Steinberg (STEINBERG)
- FOR: MacArthur DeShazer (DESHAZER)
- FOR: Mary C. Emery (EMERY)
- FOR: Wilma G. Hall (HALL)
- FOR: Kristen K. Cicio (CICIO)
- FOR: Katherine M. Veit (VEIT)
- FOR: William H. Itoh (ITOH)
- FOR: Kristie A. Kenney (KENNEY)
- FOR: M. Brooke Darby (DARBY)
- FOR: Cathy Millison (MILLISON)
- FOR: James W. Reed (REED)
- FOR: Neal S. Wolin (WOLIN)
- CC: Records (RECORDS)
- CC: Richard A. Clarke (CLARKER)
- CC: Richard L. Canas (CANAS)
- CC: Wanda D. Lindsey (LINDSEY)
- CC: Rand R. Beers (BEERS)
- CC: Eric P. Schwartz (SCHWARTZ)


**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**



CC: Ernest J. Wilson III (WILSON)
CC: Susan E. Rice (RICE)
CC: Marcia G. Norman (NORMAN)
CC: O. Ruth Stalcup (STALCUP)
CC: Sean J. Darragh (DARRAGH)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 11-Apr-1994 12:41
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VMS Filename: OA\$SHARE44:ZVECI88L0.WPL
A1 Folder: APR94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 11-Apr-1994 12:41
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

11-Apr-1994 14:41 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Eric P. Schwartz
(SCHWARTZ)

SUBJECT: MONIQUE MUJAWAMARIYA OF RWANDA

According to Holly Burkhalter of Human Rights Watch, Monique Mujawamariya -- the Rwandan human rights activist who met the President -- is now safe and in Nairobi.

More details to come as I receive them.

Distribution:

FOR: W. Anthony K. Lake	(LAKE)
CC: Records	(RECORDS)
CC: Records	(RECORDS)
CC: Morton H. Halperin	(HALPERIN)
CC: Donald K. Steinberg	(STEINBERG)
CC: Mary C. Emery	(EMERY)
CC: Wilma G. Hall	(HALL)
CC: Kristen K. Cicio	(CICIO)
CC: Katherine M. Veit	(VEIT)
CC: William H. Itoh	(ITOH)
CC: Kristie A. Kenney	(KENNEY)
CC: M. Brooke Darby	(DARBY)
CC: Cathy Millison	(MILLISON)
CC: James W. Reed	(REED)
CC: Neal S. Wolin	(WOLIN)
CC: Richard A. Clarke	(CLARKER)
CC: Richard L. Canas	(CANAS)
CC: Wanda D. Lindsey	(LINDSEY)
CC: Rand R. Beers	(BEERS)
CC: Eric P. Schwartz	(SCHWARTZ)
CC: Ernest J. Wilson III	(WILSON)
CC: Susan E. Rice	(RICE)
CC: Marcia G. Norman	(NORMAN)
CC: O. Ruth Stalcup	(STALCUP)
CC: Sean J. Darragh	(DARRAGH)

Additional Header Information Follows

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Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 11-Apr-1994 14:41

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PER E.O. 13526**

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Forward Flag: YES

Read-Receipt Requested: NO

Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO

Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

11-Apr-1994 15:03 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Eric P. Schwartz
(SCHWARTZ)

[003a]

SUBJECT: MONIQUE MUJAWAMARIYA: FOLLOW-UP MESSAGE

Regarding the attached E mail on Monique Mujawamariya (which you should have already received):

PLEASE DO NOT REVEAL THE NEW INFORMATION ABOUT MONIQUE TO THE PRESS OR TO THE PUBLIC AT THIS POINT.

Distribution:

- FOR: W. Anthony K. Lake (LAKE)
- CC: Records (RECORDS)
- CC: Donald K. Steinberg (STEINBERG)
- CC: MacArthur DeShazer (DESHAZER)
- CC: Mary C. Emery (EMERY)
- CC: Wilma G. Hall (HALL)
- CC: Kristen K. Cicio (CICIO)
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- CC: Marcia G. Norman (NORMAN)
- CC: O. Ruth Stalcup (STALCUP)
- CC: Sean J. Darragh (DARRAGH)

Additional Header Information Follows

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Message Status: READ

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**



Date Modified: 11-Apr-1994 15:00
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

□

□

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

11-Apr-1994 14:41 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Eric P. Schwartz
(SCHWARTZ)

SUBJECT: MONIQUE MUJAWAMARIYA OF RWANDA


[0036]

According to Holly Burkhalter of Human Rights Watch, Monique Mujawamariya -- the Rwandan human rights activist who met the President -- is now safe and in Nairobi.

More details to come as I receive them.

Distribution:

- FOR: W. Anthony K. Lake (LAKE)
- CC: Records (RECORDS)
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- CC: Morton H. Halperin (HALPERIN)
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- CC: Richard A. Clarke (CLARKER)
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- CC: Wanda D. Lindsey (LINDSEY)
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- CC: Eric P. Schwartz (SCHWARTZ)
- CC: Ernest J. Wilson III (WILSON)
- CC: Susan E. Rice (RICE)
- CC: Marcia G. Norman (NORMAN)
- CC: O. Ruth Stalcup (STALCUP)
- CC: Sean J. Darragh (DARRAGH)



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

11-Apr-1994 17:14 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Mary C. Emery
(EMERY)

SUBJECT: RE: Rwanda - Update (11:00 a.m.)

Tony Lake has read your e-mail and noted as follows:

Paragraph 3: Keep me informed.

Paragraph 4: check mark

Paragraph 5: good

Distribution:

FOR: Donald K. Steinberg	(STEINBERG)
CC: Non Records	(NONRECORD)
CC: Sean J. Darragh	(DARRAGH)
CC: O. Ruth Stalcup	(STALCUP)
CC: Marcia G. Norman	(NORMAN)
CC: Susan E. Rice	(RICE)
CC: Ernest J. Wilson III	(WILSON)
CC: Eric P. Schwartz	(SCHWARTZ)
CC: Rand R. Beers	(BEERS)
CC: Wanda D. Lindsey	(LINDSEY)
CC: Richard L. Canas	(CANAS)
CC: Richard A. Clarke	(CLARKER)
CC: Thomas B. Ross	(ROSS)
CC: Tara D. Sonenshine	(SONENSHINE)
CC: Calvin A. Mitchell	(MITCHELLC)
CC: Natalie S. Wozniak	(WOZNIAK)
CC: Donald K. Steinberg	(STEINBERG)
CC: Dan W. Mozena	(MOZENA)
CC: MacArthur DeShazer	(DESHAZER)
CC: Jennifer C. Ward	(WARD)
CC: Pat A. Battenfield	(BATTENFIELD)
CC: Neal S. Wolin	(WOLIN)
CC: James W. Reed	(REED)
CC: Cathy Millison	(MILLISON)
CC: M. Brooke Darby	(DARBY)
CC: Kristie A. Kenney	(KENNEY)
CC: William H. Itoh	(ITOH)
CC: Katherine M. Veit	(VEIT)
CC: Kristen K. Cicio	(CICIO)
CC: Wilma G. Hall	(HALL)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 11-Apr-1994 17:13

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PER E.O. 13526**CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

11-Apr-1994 17:22 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Mary C. Emery
(EMERY)

SUBJECT: RE: RWANDA: DECISION MAY BE REQUIRED

Tony Lake has read e-mail and responded as follows:

Next to Action Requested: "Inclined to help. But decision should go to Principals."


Distribution:

- FOR: Richard A. Clarke (CLARKER)
- CC: Sean J. Darragh (DARRAGH)
- CC: O. Ruth Stalcup (STALCUP)
- CC: Marcia G. Norman (NORMAN)
- CC: Susan E. Rice (RICE)
- CC: Ernest J. Wilson III (WILSON)
- CC: Eric P. Schwartz (SCHWARTZ)
- CC: Rand R. Beers (BEERS)
- CC: Wanda D. Lindsey (LINDSEY)
- CC: Richard L. Canas (CANAS)
- CC: Richard A. Clarke (CLARKER)
- CC: Records (RECORDS)
- CC: Neal S. Wolin (WOLIN)
- CC: James W. Reed (REED)
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- CC: Kristie A. Kenney (KENNEY)
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- CC: Kristen K. Cicio (CICIO)
- CC: Wilma G. Hall (HALL)
- CC: MacArthur DeShazer (DESHAZER)
- CC: Donald K. Steinberg (STEINBERG)
- CC: Records (RECORDS)


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 Message Format:
 Message Status: READ
 Date Modified: 11-Apr-1994 17:21
 Forward Flag: YES
 Read-Receipt Requested: NO

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**



Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS



Ruanda

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

11-Apr-1994 20:26 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Eric P. Schwartz
(SCHWARTZ)

SUBJECT: MONIQUE MUJAWAMARIA: CORRECTED INFORMATION

I reported to you today that Human Rights Watch had been informed that Monique was safe and in Nairobi. State had also received this information from Human Rights Watch, which was based on a report provided informally by a UN official in New York.

Unfortunately, the information was inaccurate -- the UN official apparently confused Monique with another Rwandan.

We do not have current information about Monique. We believe our Embassy's last contact with her was early Sunday morning in Rwanda. According to State, our DCM gave information on Monique's whereabouts to the ICRC and asked that they coordinate with UNAMIR in trying to get her to a place of safety.

I'm terribly sorry for the confusion on this. I will continue to follow up with State.

Under these circumstances, Monique's safety in Rwanda is again enhanced by the perception that she has been killed (as this perception will discourage soldiers from looking for her). Thus news of her being alive should not be discussed publicly or with the press.

Distribution:

FOR: W. Anthony K. Lake	(LAKE)
CC: Records	(RECORDS)
CC: MacArthur DeShazer	(DESHAZER)
CC: Donald K. Steinberg	(STEINBERG)
CC: Mary C. Emery	(EMERY)
CC: Wilma G. Hall	(HALL)
CC: Kristen K. Cicio	(CICIO)
CC: Katherine M. Veit	(VEIT)
CC: William H. Itoh	(ITOH)
CC: Kristie A. Kenney	(KENNEY)
CC: M. Brooke Darby	(DARBY)
CC: Cathy Millison	(MILLISON)
CC: James W. Reed	(REED)
CC: Neal S. Wolin	(WOLIN)
CC: Richard A. Clarke	(CLARKER)
CC: Richard L. Canas	(CANAS)

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PER E.O. 13526

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

CC: Wanda D. Lindsey (LINDSEY)
CC: Rand R. Beers (BEERS)
CC: Eric P. Schwartz (SCHWARTZ)
CC: Ernest J. Wilson III (WILSON)
CC: Susan E. Rice (RICE)
CC: Marcia G. Norman (NORMAN)
CC: O. Ruth Stalcup (STALCUP)
CC: Sean J. Darragh (DARRAGH)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

12-Apr-1994 18:48 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Neal S. Wolin
(WOLIN)

SUBJECT: C-P-L lunch agenda -- 13 April

Below is a tentative agenda for tomorrow's C-P-L lunch. Where indicated, please provide me, by not later than 10:15 a.m. Wednesday, a short background paper (via e-mail) for Tony's use.

Lake:

o Update on Efforts to Defeat Exon-Grassley -- will discuss next steps on strategy for FY 95 budget conference. (Jeremy Rosner/Bob Bell please provide background.)

o Bosnia Authorization Resolution -- will discuss advisability of seeking congressional authorization for use of force in Bosnia. (Alan Kreczko/Jeremy Rosner please provide background.)

Christopher:

o Revitalizing Nunn-Lugar -- will ask Secretary Perry to become more engaged in seeking additional Nunn-Lugar funds. (Rose Gottemoeller please provide background.)

o Bosnia Update -- will consult on where we are on Gorazde, discussions in Sarajevo, etc. (Jenonne Walker/Jane Holl please provide background.)

o Skrunda -- will answer some of Secretary Perry's questions from last week's lunch regarding availability of State funds for Skrunda dismantlement. (John Beyrle please provide background.)


Perry:

o Peacekeeping Funding -- will discuss next steps on dealing with arrearages and PDD-13 funding issues after Monday's meeting with the President. (Dick Clarke/Susan Rice please provide background as appropriate.)

o U.S. Support for Evacuation of Allies' Nationals from Rwanda -- will ask what support the USG ought to give the French and Belgians in evacuating their nationals from Rwanda. (Dick Clarke/Don Steinberg please provide background.)

o North Korea -- will discuss plans for his impending trip to Asia. (Dan Poneman/Stanley Roth please provide background.)

Distribution:


**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

FOR: Jane E. Holl (HOLL)
 FOR: Daniel Fried (FRIED)
 FOR: MacArthur DeShazer (DESHAZER)
 FOR: Rose E. Gottemoeller (GOTTEMOELLER)
 FOR: Randy R. Beers (BEERS)
 FOR: Susan E. Rice (RICE)
 FOR: John R. Beyrle (BEYRLE)
 FOR: Robert G. Bell (BELL)
 FOR: Richard E. Feinberg (FEINBERG)
 FOR: R. Nicholas Burns (BURNS)
 FOR: Martin S. Indyk (INDYK)
 FOR: George J. Tenet (TENET)
 FOR: Jenonne R. Walker (WALKER)
 FOR: Eileen B. Claussen (CLAUSSEN)
 FOR: Richard A. Clarke (CLARKER)
 FOR: Kent M. Wiedemann (WIEDEMANN)
 FOR: Jennifer C. Ward (WARD)
 FOR: Alan J. Kreczko (KRECZKO)
 FOR: Jeremy D. Rosner (ROSNER)
 FOR: Donald K. Steinberg (STEINBERG)
 FOR: Daniel B. Poneman (PONEMAN)
 FOR: Richard Schifter (SCHIFTER)
 CC: Records (RECORDS)
 CC: Nancy Soderberg (SODERBERG)
 CC: William H. Itoh (ITOH)
 CC: Kristie A. Kenney (KENNEY)
 CC: James W. Reed (REED)

 Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 12-Apr-1994 17:27
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 A1 Folder: APR94
 Message Format:
 Message Status: READ
 Date Modified: 12-Apr-1994 18:48
 Forward Flag: YES

 Read-Receipt Requested: NO
 Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
 Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

13-Apr-1994 11:36 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Neal S. Wolin (WOLIN)

FROM: MacArthur DeShazer (DESHAZER)

SUBJECT: U.S. Support for Evacuation of Allies' from Rwanda

Neil:

The French and Belgian requests for assistance with evacuation of their citizens from Rwanda have been overcome by events. All French nationals wanting to depart Rwanda have left. There are no Belgian citizens waiting for evacuation at collection points in Kigali or Nairobi. 650-700 Belgians have been evacuated, or about half of the Belgian expatriate population. The remaining Belgian citizens are scattered throughout the countryside (mostly North of Kigali) and are being assisted by the more than 400-500 Belgian ParaCommandos currently in country. We are, however, transporting armored personnel carriers from Somalia to Kigali, Rwanda for use by the Belgians.


Mac

CC: Records (RECORDS)
CC: Pat A. Battenfield (BATTENFIELD)
CC: Donald K. Steinberg (STEINBERG)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 13-Apr-1994 10:59
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 036069
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARE52:ZVEEGLDLB.WPL
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Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 13-Apr-1994 11:36
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

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PER E.O. 13526



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

13-Apr-1994 11:36 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: Neal S. Wolin (WOLIN)

FROM: MacArthur DeShazer (DESHAZER)

SUBJECT: U.S. Support for Evacuation of Allies' from Rwanda


Neil:

The French and Belgian requests for assistance with evacuation of their citizens from Rwanda have been overcome by events. All French nationals wanting to depart Rwanda have left. There are no Belgian citizens waiting for evacuation at collection points in Kigali or Nairobi. 650-700 Belgians have been evacuated, or about half of the Belgian expatriate population. The remaining Belgian citizens are scattered throughout the countryside (mostly North of Kigali) and are being assisted by the more than 400-500 Belgian ParaCommandos currently in country. We are, however, transporting armored personnel carriers from Somalia to Kigali, Rwanda for use by the Belgians.

Mac

CC: Records (RECORDS)
CC: Pat A. Battenfield (BATTENFIELD)
CC: Donald K. Steinberg (STEINBERG)

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

13-Apr-1994 12:45 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: Richard A. Clarke (CLARKER)

FROM: Pat A. Battenfield (BATTENFIELD)

SUBJECT: Rwanda and Belgian Assistance

[004a]

per your conversation with Mac DeShazer

CC: Records (RECORDS)

 Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 13-Apr-1994 12:44
 Deletable Flag: Y
 DOCNUM: 036099
 VMS Filename: OA\$SHARE32:ZVEEI8JL6.WPL
 A1 Folder: APR94
 Message Format:
 Message Status: READ
 Date Modified: 13-Apr-1994 12:44
 Forward Flag: YES
 Read-Receipt Requested: NO
 Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
 Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

13-Apr-1994 11:36 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: Neal S. Wolin (WOLIN)


FROM: MacArthur DeShazer (DESHAZER)

SUBJECT: U.S. Support for Evacuation of Allies' from Rwanda

[0046]

CC: Records (RECORDS)
 CC: Pat A. Battenfield (BATTENFIELD)
 CC: Donald K. Steinberg (STEINBERG)


Neil:



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PER E.O. 13526

The French and Belgian requests for assistance with evacuation of their citizens from Rwanda have been overcome by events. All French nationals wanting to depart Rwanda have left. There are no Belgian citizens waiting for evacuation at collection points in Kigali or Nairobi. 650-700 Belgians have been evacuated, or about half of the Belgian expatriate population. The remaining Belgian citizens are scattered throughout the countryside (mostly North of Kigali) and are being assisted by the more than 400-500 Belgian ParaCommandos currently in country. We are, however, transporting armored personnel carriers from Somalia to Kigali, Rwanda for use by the Belgians.

Mac



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

14-Apr-1994 09:10 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: MacArthur DeShazer
(DESHAZER)

SUBJECT: Rwanda Update

Tony:

Two attempts by a combination of Belgian and UNAMIR troops have been unsuccessful in extracting the seven journalists (American citizens) from the Milles Collines hotel. The journalists arrived recently in Kigali after the U.S. evacuation. The attempts were pushed back by fighting between Government forces and RPF soldiers at the base of the hill on which the hotel is located. The journalists working for the NY Times, Washington Post, Newsweek, National Public Radio and Associated Press, requested to be evacuated last evening. Apparently, there is a UNAMIR representative at the hotel with a radio who was in touch with other UNAMIR elements in Kigali. The Belgian Foreign Ministry has been very helpful in this effort.

At the UN, Boutros-Ghali sent a letter to the Security Council informing them of the Belgian decision to withdraw from Rwanda, and stating that unless a similar contingent can be found UNAMIR's mandate will become "untenable." He further stated that he has asked his representative and force commander to draw up contingency plans for a UNAMIR withdrawal. USUN estimates we do not have the votes on the UNSC to adopt a resolution formally terminating UNAMIR. As Dick Clark might have told you from his teleconference yesterday, there will be a short delay while we seek a mechanism to terminate UNAMIR while attempting to maintain a UN political presence in or near Rwanda.

We will keep you posted.

Distribution:

FOR: Mary C. Emery	(EMERY)
FOR: Wilma G. Hall	(HALL)
FOR: Kristen K. Cicio	(CICIO)
FOR: Katherine M. Veit	(VEIT)
FOR: William H. Itoh	(ITOH)
FOR: Kristie A. Kenney	(KENNEY)
FOR: M. Brooke Darby	(DARBY)
FOR: Cathy Millison	(MILLISON)
FOR: James W. Reed	(REED)
FOR: Neal S. Wolin	(WOLIN)
CC: Records	(RECORDS)
CC: Records	(RECORDS)
CC: Donald K. Steinberg	(STEINBERG)

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CC: Pat A. Battenfield (BATTENFIELD)
CC: Richard A. Clarke (CLARKER)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 14-Apr-1994 08:24
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 036226
VMS-Filename: OA\$SHARE35:ZVEFD4B63.WPL
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Message Format:
Message Status: READ
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

14-Apr-1994 09:10 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: MacArthur DeShazer
(DESHAZER)

SUBJECT: Rwanda Update

Tony:

Two attempts by a combination of Belgian and UNAMIR troops have been unsuccessful in extracting the seven journalists (American citizens) from the Milles Collines hotel. The journalists arrived recently in Kigali after the U.S. evacuation. The attempts were pushed back by fighting between Government forces and RPF soldiers at the base of the hill on which the hotel is located. The journalists working for the NY Times, Washington Post, Newsweek, National Public Radio and Associated Press, requested to be evacuated last evening. Apparently, there is a UNAMIR representative at the hotel with a radio who was in touch with other UNAMIR elements in Kigali. The Belgian Foreign Ministry has been very helpful in this effort.

At the UN, Boutros-Ghali sent a letter to the Security Council informing them of the Belgian decision to withdraw from Rwanda, and stating that unless a similar contingent can be found UNAMIR's mandate will become "untenable." He further stated that he has asked his representative and force commander to draw up contingency plans for a UNAMIR withdrawal. USUN estimates we do not have the votes on the UNSC to adopt a resolution formally terminating UNAMIR. As Dick Clark might have told you from his teleconference yesterday, there will be a short delay while we seek a mechanism to terminate UNAMIR while attempting to maintain a UN political presence in or near Rwanda.

We will keep you posted.

Distribution:

FOR: Mary C. Emery (EMERY)
FOR: Wilma G. Hall (HALL)
FOR: Kristen K. Cicio (CICIO)
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FOR: Cathy Millison (MILLISON)

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<DIST>PRT: SIT{C2}

SIT: CLARKER DESHAZER RICE STEINBERG SUM SUM2 VAX

<PREC>IMMEDIATE<CLAS>CONFIDENTIAL<OSRI>RUCNDT<DTG>150141Z APR 94

<ORIG>USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

<TO>RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5721

INFO RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0358

RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY 0170

RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 1104

RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0435

RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 0327

RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0879

<SUBJ>TFRWOL: UN RECOMMENDATIONS TO BE ACTED UPON 4/15

<TEXT>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 001581

DEPT FOR IO-DAS WARD, ALSO RWANDA TASK FORCE;

WHITEHOUSE PASS NSC FOR D. CLARK, S. RICE AND D. STEINBERG;

JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;

SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA

E.O.12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: MARR, PINS, PREL, MOPS, UNSC, RW

SUBJECT: TFRWOL: UN RECOMMENDATIONS TO BE ACTED UPON 4/15

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THE UN SYG PRESENTED TWO OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF UNAMIR. THE COUNCIL HOPES TO DECIDE BETWEEN THOSE TWO OPTIONS AND ADOPT A RESOLUTION FRIDAY AFTERNOON, APRIL 15. MISSION SEEKS URGENT GUIDANCE. END SUMMARY.

3. THE UN SECRETARIAT PRESENTED RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL APRIL 14 ON POSSIBLE WAYS TO PROCEED IN RWANDA. THE SECRETARIAT CLARIFIED THAT THE SYG WAS NOT RPT NOT RECOMMENDING TOTAL PULLOUT OF UNAMIR. THEY TERMED THAT AN INCORRECT INTERPRETATION OF THE SYG'S LETTER OF 4/13. FORCE COMMANDER GENERAL DALLAIRE HAS REPORTED THAT BOTH THE PARTIES HAVE CONVEYED A DESIRE TO SEE UNAMIR STAY IN RWANDA. GEN. DALLAIRE WISHES TO USE THIS DESIRE AS LEVERAGE OVER THE PARTIES TO FORCE THEM TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. ALSO, IT IS NOT LOGISTICALLY POSSIBLE TO PULL UNAMIR'S TROOPS OVERNIGHT.

4. PRECONDITION: GEN. DALLAIRE WOULD PRESENT AN ULTIMATUM TO THE PARTIES. THEY WOULD HAVE 5 DAYS TO ONE WEEK TO WORK OUT A CEASE-FIRE. GEN DALLAIRE WOULD LET THE PARTIES KNOW THAT DURING THAT TIME, HE AND UNHQ WOULD BE PREPARING A PLAN FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNAMIR. ALSO DURING THOSE 5 DAYS, DALLAIRE WOULD STRENGTHEN UNAMIR'S PRESENCE AT THE AIRPORT. IF THE PARTIES DID AGREE ON A CEASE-FIRE WITHIN 5 DAYS, ONE OF TWO OPTIONS COULD KICK IN.

5. OPTION ONE: ALL OF UNAMIR, MINUS THE BELGIAN CONTINGENT, WOULD STAY IN RWANDA, BUT MOVE OUT OF THE DMZ AND REDEPLOY TO KIGALI. DALLAIRE WOULD SET ANOTHER DEADLINE FOR THE PARTIES. THEY WOULD HAVE 3 WEEKS TO RETURN TO THE PEACE PROCESS. THE PARTIES WOULD HAVE TO

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MEET CERTAIN CONDITIONS -- BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SECURITY OF UNAMIR PERSONNEL, GUARANTEE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, KEEP THE AIRPORT NEUTRAL. AT FIVE OR SIX DAYS BEFORE THE EXPIRATION OF THE 3 WEEKS, DALLAIRE WOULD WARN THE PARTIES THAT THEIR TIME WAS RUNNING OUT, AND THAT UNAMIR WAS PLANNING FOR COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL. IF NEGOTIATIONS HAD NOT RESUMED WITHIN 3 WEEKS, UNAMIR WOULD WITHDRAW.

6. OPTION TWO: ONCE A CEASE-FIRE WAS REACHED WITHIN 5 DAYS; REDUCE UNAMIR TO A MINIMAL POLITICAL PRESENCE (THE SRSG, SUPPORT STAFF AND A SECURITY DETAIL OF AT LEAST 150 MEN) FOR AN UNSPECIFIED TIME. THIS WOULD PRESUPPOSE THAT THE PARTIES WERE NOT HEADED BACK TOWARDS THE ARUSHA FRAMEWORK QUICKLY.

7. POSSIBLE OPTION THREE: ALTHOUGH NOT FORMALLY PRESENTED AS ONE OF THE SYG'S OPTIONS, THE SECRETARIAT SUGGESTED THAT OPTION ONE AND TWO MIGHT BE COMBINED. NAMELY, AFTER 3 WEEKS HAD PASSED IF NEGOTIATIONS HAD NOT STARTED THE FORCE WOULD BE REDUCED TO THE SIZE OF OPTION TWO.

8. THE SYG PREFERS OPTION ONE. FRANCE ALSO PREFERS OPTION ONE. NIGERIA ASKED FOR TIME TO CONVENE A MEETING OF THE NON-ALIGNED CAUCUS TO WORK OUT THEIR POSITION. OTHERS ASKED FOR TIME TO GET INSTRUCTIONS FROM CAPITALS. ONE THING WHICH IS UNCLEAR, AND WHICH MANY MEMBERS OF THE SC, INCLUDING AMB ALBRIGHT, QUERIED WAS WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF NO CF WAS REACHED WITHIN 5 DAYS. UK POINTED OUT THAT THE COUNCIL NEEDS TO EXPLICITLY SPELL OUT WHAT THE MANDATE OF UNAMIR UNDER OPTION 1 OR 2 WOULD BE. ALL AGREED THE URGENCY OF THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND DEMANDS THAT THE COUNCIL MAKE A DECISION AND ADOPT A RESOLUTION BY TOMORROW, FRIDAY, 15 APRIL.

9. THROUGHOUT THE DAY, A WORKING GROUP OF THE COUNCIL HAMMERED OUT LANGUAGE FOR A RESOLUTION, LEAVING ASIDE THE MOST-CONTENTIOUS ISSUE OF THE FUTURE MANDATE AND SIZE OF UNAMIR. A FEW BRACKETED ALTERNATIVES REMAIN IN THE TEXT, WHICH WILL BE SORTED OUT TOMORROW AT THE AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL.

10. SUBSEQUENT TO THE SC INFORMALS, THE PRESIDENT OF ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 001581 DEPT FOR IO-DAS WARD, ALSO RWANDA TASK FORCE; WHITEHOUSE PASS NSC FOR D. CLARK, S. RICE AND D.STEINBERG; JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA

E.0.12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: MARR, PINS, PREL, MOPS, UNSC, RW

SUBJECT: TFRWOL: UN RECOMMENDATIONS TO BE ACTED UPON 4/15 THE COUNCIL, IN CONSULTATION WITH FRANCE AND NIGERIA, WORKED OUT AN ADDITION TO THE DRAFT TEXT WHICH THEY HOPED WOULD MEET AMERICAN CONCERNS. THE TEXT WOULD CLEARLY LAY OUT THE 5-DAY ULTIMATUM, AND PUT OFF ANY DECISION ON THE TWO OPTIONS UNTIL LATER.

11. BEGIN TEXT OF NEW, KEY OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS:
-- DEMANDS THAT THE PARTIES AGREE TO AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE THROUGHOUT RWANDA.

-- DECIDES THAT, IF WITHIN FIVE DAYS OF THE ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION, THERE IS AN EFFECTIVE CEASEFIRE IN PLACE, THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL REVIEW THE MANDATE AND COMPOSITION OF UNAMIR WITH A VIEW TO ASSISTING THE PARTIES IN A RESUMPTION OF THE PEACE PROCESS IN RWANDA

ON THE BASIS OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT.

-- FURTHER DECIDES THAT, IF WITHIN FIVE DAYS OF THE ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION, THERE IS NO EFFECTIVE CEASEFIRE IN PLACE, THE COUNCIL WILL RECONSIDER THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF UNAMIR IN RWANDA.
END TEXT.

12. COMMENT: THESE PARAGRAPHS WILL NOT ACTUALLY COMMIT THE USG TO MUCH, SINCE "ASSISTING THE PARTIES IN RESUMPTION OF THE PEACE PROCESS" MIGHT BE ACCOMPLISHED WITH A SMALL POLITICAL PRESENCE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE THREAT OF PULLING OUT IS IMPLIED BY "RECONSIDER THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF UNAMIR". THIS SEEMS A GOOD COMPROMISE FOR NOW. THE FRENCH, OF COURSE, WILL EXERT PRESSURE, IF THERE IS A CEASE-FIRE IN 5 DAYS, TO ACCEPT A LARGE UNAMIR PRESENCE. END COMMENT.

13. BEGIN TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION: (NON-AGREED LANGUAGE WITHIN DOUBLE PARENTHESES):
THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
REAFFIRMING ALL ITS PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS ON THE SITUATION IN RWANDA, IN PARTICULAR ITS RESOLUTION 872 (1993) OF 5 OCTOBER 1993 BY WHICH IT ESTABLISHED THE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA (UNAMIR), NOTING ITS RESOLUTION 909 (1994) OF 5 APRIL 1994 WHICH EXTENDED THE MANDATE OF UNAMIR UNTIL 29 JULY 1994 WITH A SIX-WEEK REVIEW PROVISION ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT PROGRESS WOULD BE MADE IN ESTABLISHING THE TRANSITIONAL INSTITUTIONS PROVIDED FOR UNDER THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA AND THE RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT.
RECALLING ITS STATEMENT OF 7 APRIL 1994 (S/PRST/1994/16) WHICH, INTER ALIA, REAFFIRMED ITS COMMITMENT TO THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT AND URGED ALL PARTIES TO IMPLEMENT IT FULLY,
STRESSING THAT THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT REMAINS CENTRAL TO THE PEACE PROCESS IN RWANDA,
EXPRESSING DEEP REGRET AT THE FAILURE OF THE PARTIES TO IMPLEMENT FULLY THE PROVISIONS OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT, PARTICULARLY THOSE PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE CEASE-FIRE,
WELCOMING THE INITIATIVES OF THE LATE PRESIDENTS OF RWANDA AND BURUNDI TO WORK TOWARDS RESOLVING THE PROBLEMS IN THEIR COUNTRIES THROUGH PEACEFUL MEANS AND IN COLLABORATION WITH REGIONAL LEADERS.
SHOCKED AT THE TRAGIC INCIDENT THAT RESULTED IN THE DEATHS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF RWANDA AND BURUNDI ON 6 APRIL 1994,
APPALLED AT THE ENSUING LARGE SCALE VIOLENCE IN RWANDA WHICH HAS RESULTED IN THE DEATH OF THOUSANDS OF INNOCENT CIVILIANS, INCLUDING WOMEN AND CHILDREN, THE DISPLACEMENT OF A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF THE RWANDESE
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 001581
DEPT FOR IO-DAS WARD, ALSO RWANDA TASK FORCE;
WHITEHOUSE PASS NSC FOR D. CLARK, S. RICE AND D.STEINBERG;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PREL, MOPS, UNSC, RW
SUBJECT: TFRWOL: UN RECOMMENDATIONS TO BE ACTED UPON 4/15 POPULATION, AND THE SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN REFUGEES TO NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES
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DEEPLY CONCERNED BY CONTINUING FIGHTING, LOOTING, BANDITRY AND THE BREAKDOWN OF LAW AND ORDER PARTICULARLY IN KIGALI, EXPRESSING ITS DEEP CONCERN ALSO FOR THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF UNAMIR AND OTHER UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL, AND PERSONNEL OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, WHO ARE ASSISTING IN IMPLEMENTING THE PEACE PROCESS AND IN DISTRIBUTING HUMANITARIAN RELIEF.

((DETERMINING THAT THE SITUATION IN RWANDA CONSTITUTES A THREAT TO PEACE AND SECURITY,))

-- 1. EXPRESSES REGRET AT THE TRAGIC INCIDENT IN WHICH THE PRESIDENTS OF RWANDA AND BURUNDI LOST THEIR LIVES, AND REITERATES ITS INVITATION TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE COUNCIL AS REQUESTED IN ITS STATEMENT OF 7 APRIL 1994;

-- 2. EXPRESSES REGRET ALSO AT THE ENSUING VIOLENCE WHICH HAS CLAIMED THE LIVES OF THE PRIME MINISTER, CABINET MINISTERS, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND THOUSANDS OF OTHER CIVILIANS;

-- 3. CONDEMNS THE ONGOING VIOLENCE IN RWANDA, PARTICULARLY IN KIGALI, WHICH ENDANGERS THE LIVES AND SAFETY OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION;

-- 4. STRONGLY CONDEMNS THE ATTACKS AGAINST UNAMIR AND OTHER UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL LEADING TO THE DEATHS OF AND INJURY TO SEVERAL UNAMIR PERSONNEL AND CALLS UPON ALL CONCERNED TO PUT AN END TO THESE ACTS OF VIOLENCE AND TO RESPECT FULLY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW;

-- 5. CALLS FOR AN IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND AN END TO THE MINDLESS VIOLENCE AND CARNAGE WHICH ARE ENGULFING RWANDA, AND IN THIS CONNECTION, ((DEMANDS THAT THE RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF) AGREE WITHOUT DELAY TO AN EFFECTIVE CEASE-FIRE)) AND THAT BOTH PARTIES RETURN TO THE POSITIONS HELD BY THEM BEFORE THE PRESENT HOSTILITIES;

-- 6. COMMENDS THE ACTIVE ROLE OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND OF THE FORCE COMMANDER TO BRING ABOUT A CEASE-FIRE AND TO MEDIATE BETWEEN THE PARTIES IN ORDER TO BRING ABOUT THE EARLIEST RESOLUTION OF THE RWANDAN CRISIS;

-- 7. ((DECIDES, IN THE LIGHT OF THE CURRENT SECURITY SITUATION IN RWANDA, TO INCREASE THE STRENGTH OF UNAMIR AND TO REVISE ITS MANDATE TO ENABLE IT TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE RESTORATION OF LAW AND ORDER AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TRANSITIONAL INSTITUTIONS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT;)) (COMMENT: THE THREE NEW PARAGRAPHS WORKED OUT BETWEEN FRANCE, NIGERIA AND NEW ZEALAND WOULD APPEAR HERE. END COMMENT)

-- 8. REITERATES THE CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE OF THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT TO THE SETTLEMENT OF THE RWANDAN CONFLICT AND INVITES THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU) TO CONTINUE TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE UNITED NATIONS IN THIS REGARD;

-- ((9. URGES ALL COUNTRIES, IN PARTICULAR THOSE OF OHE REGION, TO REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTION THAT WOULD FURTHER EXACERBATE THE SITUATION IN RWANDA;))

-- ((9 ALTERNATIVE. CALLS ON ALL MEMBER STATES, IN PARTICULAR NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES, ACTING INDIVIDUALLY OR THROUGH REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE EFFORTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE OAU TO BRING ABOUT AN END TO THE CRISIS IN RWANDA.))

-- 10. CALLS UPON THE PARTIES IN RWANDA ((IN PARTICULAR THE RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT)) TO RENEW THEIR COMMITMENT TO ((THE PEACE PROCESS IN RWANDA ON THE BASIS OF)) THE ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 001581 DEPT FOR IO-DAS WARD, ALSO RWANDA TASK FORCE; WHITEHOUSE PASS NSC FOR D. CLARK, S. RICE AND D.STEINBERG; JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;

SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA

E.O.12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: MARR, PINS, PREL, MOPS, UNSC, RW

SUBJECT: TFRWOL: UN RECOMMENDATIONS TO BE ACTED UPON 4/15 ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT, AND TO ACCEPT THE FUTILITY OF A MILITARY SOLUTION TO THE POLITICAL PROBLEM;

-- 11. CALLS ALSO UPON THE PARTIES TO COOPERATE FULLY IN ENSURING THE UNIMPEDED DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO ALL IN NEED THROUGHOUT RWANDA AND IN THIS REGARD, APPEALS TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO PROVIDE INCREASED HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE COMMENSURATE WITH THE SCALE OF THE HUMAN TRAGEDY IN RWANDA;

-- 12. AFFIRMS ITS COMMITMENT TO PRESERVING THE UNITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF RWANDA;

-- 13. INVITES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONTINUE TO MONITOR THE EVENTS IN RWANDA AND TO REPORT FULLY TO THE COUNCIL ON THE EVOLVING SITUATION AND AT LEAST NOT LATER THAN FIFTEEN DAYS AFTER THE ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION;


-- 14. DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE MATTER. END TEXT.

11. ACTION REQUESTED: DEPARTMENT PLEASE PROVIDE GUIDANCE ON ABOVE TEXT BEFORE 11:30 AM APRIL 15.

ALBRIGHT

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<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 04<SSN>1581<STOR>940414214840 M0994545
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Rwanda


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<PREC>IMMEDIATE<CLAS>CONFIDENTIAL<OSRI>RUCNDT<DTG>151941Z APR 94
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<TO>RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5733
INFO RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE 0177
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RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0365
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0444
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 0334
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0888
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 1550

<SUBJ>TFRWOL: US DROPS BOMBSHELL ON SECURITY COUNCIL,
-- 4/15

<TEXT>

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001588
DEPT FOR RWANDA TASK FORCE, ALSO IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AND AF/C
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND MOZENA;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PREL, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: TFRWOL: US DROPS BOMBSHELL ON SECURITY COUNCIL,
-- 4/15
REF: STATE 99440
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.



E.O. 13526, 1.4(b), E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)

ALTHOUGH SOME MEMBERS ADVISED WAITING, OTHERS STILL WANT TO TRY FOR A RESOLUTION TODAY. COUNCIL WILL RECONVENE AT 4:30 PM APRIL 15. END SUMMARY.

3. THE COUNCIL'S APRIL 15 MORNING INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS BEGAN WITH A READ-OUT FROM THE SECRETARIAT OF THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND. THE FORCE COMMANDER (FC) IS STILL TRYING TO GET TALKS GOING. UNAMIR IS MOVING INTO THE AIRPORT BEFORE THE DEPARTURE OF THE BELGIANS. FRENCH FORCES ARE ALMOST ENTIRELY OUT; BELGIAN NON-UN FORCES WILL BE OUT BY SATURDAY. BELGIAN UNAMIR FORCES WILL BE OUT WITHIN 48-72 HOURS. A SMALL ITALIAN COMPANY LANDED AT THE KIGALI AIRPORT WITHOUT NOTICE. THE FC ASKED THEM TO DEPART. THE FC HAD TWO REQUESTS OF THE COUNCIL: FIRST, GIVE THE FC THE FLEXIBILITY TO SET APPROPRIATE TIMEFRAME FOR A CEASEFIRE, NEGOTIATIONS, ETC. SECOND, DO NOT CAST BLAME ON ANY ONE PARTY, BUT ~~RECEIVE~~ ALL MESSAGES TO BOTH.

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DOING OTHERWISE WOULD COMPLICATE THE NEGOTIATIONS.

4. NIGERIAN AMB GAMBARI LAID OUT ITS MAXIMALIST POSITION, ON BEHALF OF THE NAM CAUCUS. WHILE BELGIAN CONCERNS ARE UNDERSTANDABLE, THEY SHOULD NOT DICTATE TO THE COUNCIL ON THE FUTURE OF UNAMIR. UNAMIR SHOULD NOT RPT NOT WITHDRAW. BOTH SIDES WANT THE UN TO STAY, SINCE THEY ARE PROVIDING A MEASURE OF ORDER IN A CHAOTIC SITUATION. NO OTHER TROOPS CONTRIBUTORS INDICATED A WISH TO WITHDRAW. THE FIGHTING HAS DIMINISHED AND THE UN IS ENCOURAGING A CEASEFIRE. THE OAU WROTE TO SAY UNAMIR IS ESSENTIAL TO THE RESTORATION OF PEACE, AND TO APPEAL TO THE SC TO ENSURE THE CONTINUED EFFECTIVENESS OF UNAMIR. THE OAU ALSO OFFERED TO TAKE AN ACTIVE ROLE IN PROMOTING A CEASEFIRE, THROUGH THE GOOD OFFICES OF OAU SYG SALIM, OAU PRESIDENT MUBARAK, TANZANIAN PRESIDENT MWINYI AND UGANDAN PRESIDENT MUSEVENI. THE UN SYG AND SRSG WANT UNAMIR TO REMAIN. GIVEN ALL THE ABOVE FACTORS, NIGERIA ASSERTED THAT THE QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED WERE: WHAT TASKS ARE APPROPRIATE FOR THE UN, AND WHICH OF THE TWO OPTIONS BEST ENABLES THE UN TO CARRY OUT THOSE TASKS.

5. GAMBARI SUGGESTED THE FOLLOWING FOUR TASKS WERE APPROPRIATE FOR THE UN: (A) LEND A HELPING HAND IN SAVING INNOCENT CIVILIAN LIVES, WITHOUT GUARANTEEING SAFETY OF CIVILIANS, (B) HELP BRING ABOUT A CEASEFIRE, (C) PROMOTE THE POLITICAL CLIMATE NEEDED FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT, AND (D) ESTABLISH A LIAISON FOR THE OAU'S DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS, ONCE THOSE GET OFF THE GROUND. HE DECLARED THAT THE NAM PREFERRED OPTION ONE, BUT WITH A FORCE OF THE SIZE OF UNAMIR PRIOR TO BELGIAN WITHDRAWAL.

E.O. 13526, 1.4(b), E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001588
DEPT FOR RWANDA TASK FORCE, ALSO IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AND AF/C
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND MOZENA;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PREL, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: TFRWOL: US DROPS BOMBSHELL ON SECURITY COUNCIL,
-- 4/15

E.O. 13526, 1.4(b), E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)

7. THE SC PRESIDENT POINTED OUT THAT BY NOT TAKING A DECISION TO WITHDRAW, THE COUNCIL WAS ACTUALLY DECIDING TO KEEP THE FORCE IN PLACE, ALTHOUGH THE DECISION WAS NOT ON PAPER.

E.O. 13526, 1.4(b), E.O. 13526, 1.4(d) WANTED TO HOLD OFF FOR NOW. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] SAID A FAILURE TO TAKE A DECISION WAS UNSATISFACTORY. IT WOULD LEAVE UNAMIR IN PLACE, BUT WITHOUT ANY SENSE OF [REDACTED], AND WITH A MANDATE IT

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CANNOT POSSIBLY FULFIL. HE ACKNOWLEDGED HOW HARD IT WOULD BE TO GET A DECISION TODAY WITH THE NAM AND THE U.S. SO FAR APART. UK LEANS TOWARDS OPTION 2, SINCE IT HAS NO TIME LIMIT. THERE DOES NOT NEED TO BE A LARGE NUMBER OF MILITARY LEFT IN RWANDA. SOME MILITARY STAFF ARE NEEDED TO PROVIDE THEIR EXPERT OPINIONS ON THE TALKS ABOUT CEASEFIRE. THE LIMITED UN PRESENCE LEFT TO FACILITATE PEACE TALKS COULD BE CALLED SOMETHING OTHER THAN "UNAMIR", IF THAT WOULD BE HELPFUL. THEN UNAMIR COULD BE SUSPENDED.

E.O. 13526, 1.4(b), E.O. 13526, 1.4(d) URGED A SC DECISION ASAP. HE FEARED A WEAKENED UNAMIR COULD BE OPEN TO ATTACK, IN WHICH CASE THE COUNCIL MEMBERS WOULD HAVE THE NEW CASUALTIES ON THEIR CONSCIENCES- HE ALSO LEANED TOWARDS OPTION TWO, WITHOUT NECESSARILY THAT NUMBER OF MILITARY PERSONNEL.

10. COUNCIL PRESIDENT WILL MEET WITH U.S., FRANCE, NIGERIA AND BELGIUM AT 3:30 4/15. COUNCIL WILL RESUME INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS AT 4:30 4/15.

ALBRIGHT

NNNN

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02<SSN>1588<STOR>940415160517 M0996759

<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02<SSN>1588<STOR>940415160518 M0996760

<TOR>940415162121

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

19-Apr-1994 13:27 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Susan E. Rice (RICE)
Donald K. Steinberg (STEINBERG)

FROM: Eric P. Schwartz
(SCHWARTZ)

SUBJECT: PULL-OUT OF UNAMIR

I just heard from Human Rights Watch, pleading that we oppose a quick UNAMIR pull-out from Rwanda. Human Rights Watch seemed to indicate that UNAMIR is protecting thousands (25,000?) Rwandans and if they pull out, the Rwandans will quickly become victims of genocide.

Is this true? If so, shouldn't it be a major factor informing high-level decision-making on this issue? Has it been?

I am expecting to receive a fax on this shortly and will see that you get it.

Eric

CC: Records (RECORDS)

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Date Modified: 19-Apr-1994 13:24
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Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

19-Apr-1994 10:06 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Richard A. Clarke (CLARKER)
 Randy R. Beers (BEERS)

FROM: Sean J. Darragh
 (DARRAGH)

SUBJECT: Somalia Update

Heavy skirmishes continue in Mogadishu between Habr Gedir and Hawadle clans. Looks like the Habr Gedir will eventually take over control of all access routes/roads to the Airfield.

Similarly the SNA is on the march in Merca, Baidoa and Belet Weyne. They are moving large contingents of men to this area to take over control of these towns.

CIA believes we are about to see a replay of December 1992; with massive looting and complete isolation of UN contingent on a UN compound.

NGOs have begun to move out of areas plagued by cholera because of recent violence. This is likely to lead to increase deaths.

C-12 duties were taken over by civilian contractor yesterday.

All US helos that were sent to Rwanda will be back on station today in Kenya.

Kouyote has not fired Adeyemi yet or moved him away from his duties with the Somali Police. This is causing problems. Dobbins is supposed to be running this to ground.

Irish are planning to pull out soon.

Indonesia which planned to send a contingent will likely not send anyone.

E.O. 13526, 1.4(a) are playing nice with the SNA. They are supplying them with supplies, perhaps even ammo.

UN staffers have routinely been searched by SNA as they enter the UN compound in Merca.

607 agreement expires May 5. (I need to find out more about this one.)

UN has been balking on continuing contract with the US on spare parts issues. Could be a big problem.



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 PER E. O. 13526

sjd

CC: Records

(RECORDS)

Additional Header Information Follows

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Message Format:
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Date Modified: 19-Apr-1994 09:54
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

4/20/79 Rwanda (Refugee issue)

940 Bang	} Mainly in Kigali	
400 - Glouais		- some guarding stadiums
420 - Belgians out		- others in airports - Daulaire opened + new hospital
<hr/>		
2,100 left	No Bangladeshis have left, except handful or less - essential	

Stadium = next to hotel, which is UNAMUR sec

St. Elizabeth's Church	} how many under UNAMUR control?
Hospital	

What kind of assets of UNAMUR


6 APCs; 2 fighters	} not good enough for 2,000 people
Belgian helicopter?	
UNAMUR helicopters (4)?	
Jeeps/Trucks/Landrovers (4 wheel drive; unarmored)	

People under UNAMUR control = urban Africans fleeing army
Tutsi primarily, but also Hutu

Is This
Rawson

Options

- 1) Take them + put them into RPF controlled areas of town
 - easiest
 - most dangerous (lack of food; unclear RPF will maintain control)
- 2) Take them down to Tanzania → already 20k people waiting south
 - UNAMUR could help them UNAMUR trying to help them
 - high logistical problem
 - have to pay for transport
 - Tan 2



3) Move North

- out of hand way
- logistical issue
- not much in the North; no resources to receive people.

4) UNAMIR withdraws w/ 12,000 friends into Uganda

+ leave them in refugee camps in Uganda.

- No state assistance effort - small UN effort

- If W protects them - grid start @ 12,000 + end up w/ 250,000

Platen: only answer = ceasefire


Agmt control? UNAMIR?
Government?

Caed:

- More safe

- in to get lines

- destabilize Burundi



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

20-Apr-1994 07:52 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Donald K. Steinberg
(STEINBERG)

SUBJECT: Rwanda: Meeting with Monique

Eric/Mort:

I think it's vitally important that the President at least drop by a meeting with Monique. We need to do everything we can to keep the tragedy in the public eye, and this visit would give us the opportunity to make public our continuing concern over the killings. Are we putting forth a scheduling proposal? Can I help you with it?

Don

Distribution:

FOR: Eric P. Schwartz	(SCHWARTZ)
FOR: Morton H. Halperin	(HALPERIN)
CC: Records	(RECORDS)
CC: Natalie S. Wozniak	(WOZNIAK)
CC: Calvin A. Mitchell	(MITCHELLC)
CC: Tara D. Sonenshine	(SONENSHINE)
CC: Thomas B. Ross	(ROSS)
CC: Pat A. Battenfield	(BATTENFIELD)
CC: Jennifer C. Ward	(WARD)
CC: MacArthur DeShazer	(DESHAZER)
CC: Dan W. Mozena	(MOZENA)
CC: Donald K. Steinberg	(STEINBERG)

Additional Header Information Follows

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Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS



CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

20-Apr-1994 08:22 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: Donald K. Steinberg (STEINBERG)

FROM: Eric P. Schwartz (SCHWARTZ)

SUBJECT: MONIQUE

I agree and Mort has asked (or is asking Sandy) to suggest it. (Mort, let me know what you want me to do on this -- we'll need to do a scheduling proposal).

At the same time, let me raise again the issue I raised in yesterday's E mail -- Human Rights Watch's concern that withdrawal of UNAMIR now will lead to the slaughter of many thousands of Rwandans. If we don't look at that question urgently, the visit with Monique could turn into more of an embarrassment than an opportunity.

Eric

CC: Records (RECORDS)
CC: Records (RECORDS)
CC: Susan E. Rice (RICE)
CC: Morton H. Halperin (HALPERIN)

Additional Header Information Follows

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Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

20-Apr-1994 07:52 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Donald K. Steinberg



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**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

(STEINBERG)

SUBJECT: Rwanda: Meeting with Monique

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CC: MacArthur DeShazer	(DESHAZER)
CC: Dan W. Mozena	(MOZENA)
CC: Donald K. Steinberg	(STEINBERG)

PCG - Rwanda 4/21/94

270 - protect SRSG
UN should develop plan for protection for UN + civilians
plan transition to 270 - political only.
within resources

Baird wants to withdraw 200 troops...

500 - 1 coy @ airport

↓ Rest @ stadium protecting + unharmed

270 total - want to do target

1 coy 120 Rwandan troops have been of alert

80 Tanzanians protection of SRSG...

general consensus that we can sign up to Paris. (including Nigeria)

Action not needed for withdrawal

- bad precedent, potentially

1) Do we need resolution to withdraw

2) How do we protect people if forces are withdrawn

3) Do we want to hand this off to a regional approach as Masvenzi suggested

UNDP was 2,200

430 Belgians

880 Bangl.

400 Rwandans

0
(-200) 650

400 - or Paris way down from DMZ

Mainly protecting stadium (12,000)

1 company around stadium

- We think but not certain re - probably

- Psychological
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Safety of PK = @ nile

- Bengali = fundamental vital problems
- Bangladeshis = usually respectable

Concerned abt. democracy - effect of full pull out or around.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

25-Apr-1994 10:51 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Donald K. Steinberg
(STEINBERG)


SUBJECT: USG Actions on Rwanda

Stories throughout the weekend seem to suggest that we are sitting on our hands while the blood-letting in Rwanda rages. It is true that our capacity to end the killing is painfully limited, but we are undertaking a series of measures.

- It was our initiative to ask regional leaders in Tanzania and Uganda (now supported by the UN and OAU Secretary General Salim Salim) to draw together the leaders of the Rwandan army and the RPF to seek a cease fire and re-assert the Arusha process. Our Ambassadors in Tanzania (De Vos) and Uganda (Carson) have been deeply involved in these so-far largely unsuccessful efforts. We expect to send Ambassador Rawson back out to the region shortly to facilitate this process.
- Whereas we strongly supported efforts to safeguard the lives of the U.N. peacekeepers, we also insisted that the draw-down of the peacekeepers not be accomplished in a way that put at risk the lives of Rwandans under their protection.
- Following Tony's meeting on Friday with Rwandan human rights monitor Monique Mujawamarija, we issued a tough statement (attached) condemning the continued violence and calling on both sides to stop the killing, with the specific mention of names of the leaders of Rwandan armed forces (to put them on notice that we are watching them). We instructed our envoy to the Arusha talks to read the statement to the Government and RPF representatives there. He says that when he read the statement, the RPF representatives smiled, the Government representatives "blinked."
- We are about to announce new humanitarian assistance funds (\$15 million) for Burundi and Rwanda.
- We have contacted DOD to see if any of the U.S. military trainers who worked with Rwandan government forces in the past believe they have contacts within Rwanda that may be of use.

These efforts, of course, are not enough. I hope to sit down today with Ambassador Rawson to discuss other possible actions, especially in terms of greater involvement for other African leaders in the process. We will also discuss what we might do in Burundi to keep it from going the same route, especially in light of this morning's failed coup. State is holding a working group on Rwanda/Burundi tomorrow afternoon. I'll keep you posted.

□

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PER E.O. 13526**

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

25-Apr-1994 10:51 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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(STEINBERG)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

26-Apr-1994 18:10 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Richard A. Clarke
(CLARKER)

SUBJECT: RWANDA AND THE UN

We floated the following idea with Strob, Peter Tarnoff, Madeleine Albright and some State bureaus (AF, IO):

--the President announces a \$15m ERMA drawdown

--we have the UNSC call upon the UNSYG to direct UNHCR to arrange cross border assistance to the 500,000 in country refugess concentrated along the borders with Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, and Zaire

--the UNSC calls upon those border countries to take steps immediately to engage in cross border feeding/assistance

--we authorize UNAMIR to station UN Civ Pol (police) in the UNHCR camps to provide security.

So far everyone likes the idea. USUN is exploring how to put it into a draft.

Distribution:

FOR: Donald K. Steinberg	(STEINBERG)
FOR: MacArthur DeShazer	(DESHAZER)
FOR: Mary C. Emery	(EMERY)
FOR: Wilma G. Hall	(HALL)
FOR: Kristen K. Cicio	(CICIO)
FOR: Katherine M. Veit	(VEIT)
FOR: William H. Itoh	(ITOH)
FOR: Kristie A. Kenney	(KENNEY)
FOR: M. Brooke Darby	(DARBY)
FOR: Cathy Millison	(MILLISON)
FOR: James W. Reed	(REED)
FOR: Neal S. Wolin	(WOLIN)
FOR: Richard A. Clarke	(CLARKER)
FOR: Richard L. Canas	(CANAS)
FOR: Wanda D. Lindsey	(LINDSEY)
FOR: Rand R. Beers	(BEERS)
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FOR: Susan E. Rice	(RICE)
FOR: Marcia G. Norman	(NORMAN)
FOR: O. Ruth Stalcup	(STALCUP)


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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
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FOR: Sean J. Darragh (DARRAGH)
CC: Records (RECORDS)

Additional Header Information Follows

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Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

27-Apr-1994 14:19 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Richard A. Clarke
(CLARKER)

SUBJECT: FOR BERGER: ADD RWANDA TO SOMALIA DC?

Sandy,

There is high level interest in State and here on Rwanda.
I recommend that you add a 15 minute section to the Somalia
DC on Friday to here from State, AID, and USUN on what we are
doing on Rwanda.

Dick


Distribution:

FOR: Donald K. Steinberg	(STEINBERG)
FOR: Mary C. Emery	(EMERY)
FOR: Wilma G. Hall	(HALL)
FOR: Kristen K. Cicio	(CICIO)
FOR: Katherine M. Veit	(VEIT)
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FOR: Eric P. Schwartz	(SCHWARTZ)
FOR: Ernest J. Wilson III	(WILSON)
FOR: Susan E. Rice	(RICE)
FOR: Marcia G. Norman	(NORMAN)
FOR: O. Ruth Stalcup	(STALCUP)
FOR: Sean J. Darragh	(DARRAGH)
CC: Records	(RECORDS)


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Message Format:

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Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 27-Apr-1994 14:17
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

28-Apr-1994 09:25 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Samuel R. Berger (BERGER)
Kristen K. Cicio (CICIO)

FROM: Richard A. Clarke
(CLARKER)

SUBJECT: THURSDAY MORNING NOTES FOR SANDY BERGER FROM GLOBAL

Sandy,

Good Morning from your friends in Global Issues>

Could you get back to us today on the following:

1. RWANDA: Can we add a short discussion on the agenda for Friday's DC on Somalia?
2. HAITI: Can I circulate at the 3:00 meeting Watson is holdiong something like the paper on peacekeeping we sent you yesterday afternoon?
3. CUBA: Please react to the draft policy cover paper for the Cuba contingency planning DC.
4. COUNTER-TERRORISM: Please try to resolve the PDD with Talbott today in view of the Congressional report required to be sent up next Monday.
5. EXCESS F-16s: Could you ask Deutch and Talbott about this at the lunch today. We have suplied you with paper.

Thanx.


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Date Modified: 28-Apr-1994 09:20
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO

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Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

28-Apr-1994 17:52 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Richard A. Clarke
(CLARKER)

SUBJECT: ***FOR CLEARANCE: RWANDA DC PAPER

~~SECRET~~

Deputies Committee Discussion Paper

RWANDA

Background

The UN reports that in excess of 100,000 Rwandans have been killed. Fighting between the government and rebel forces continues. Militia led massacres are also continuing, urged on by radio stations calling for more killing.

UNAMIR has drawdown to 270 troops and is attempting to arrange for the safety of Rwandans under its protection at the Kigali Amahoro stadium.

About 500,000 in-country refugees have fled to the border areas with Tanzania, Uganda, and Zaire. They are being prevented from crossing the borders and are in need of humanitarian assistance.

The White House issued a statement last Friday, mentioning specific military leaders who human rights groups believe have been implicated in the slaughters (tab 1).

Objectives

The IWG has identified six short-term policy objectives:

1. to stop the on-going massacres as quickly as possible through contacts with GOR and RPF leaders and demarches for similar representations with neighboring states, France, Belgium, and others.

2. to support the UN and others in attempts to achieve a ceasefire.

3. to encourage Tanzanian and other attempts to resume negotiations under the Arusha Framework.

4. to seek to prevent the violence from spreading outside Rwanda through contacts with neighboring states.

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5. to push in the UN to launch an immediate expanded humanitarian assistance effort.

6. to prevent a similar round of slaughter and disorder in Burundi by closely monitoring the situation there and staying in touch with the various elements in the country to dissuade.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

Issues for Discussion

The Deputies should provide direction to the IWG on the degree of activism that they wish to encourage on further international steps aimed at addressing the slaughter and assisting refugees.

A new UNSC resolution is being co-drafted by the Czechs and Argentines. Among the possible elements in the resolution could be a genocide investigation, a call for UNHCR and border countries to engage in cross border assistance to the trapped in country refugees, limited protection for the refugees, and an arms embargo. In the new UNSCR debate, should the US support:


1. Genocide investigation: language that calls for an international investigation of human rights abuses and possible violations of the genocide convention?

2. In Country Protection of Refugees: language that authorizes the use of UNAMIR military or civilian police to protect in-country refugee camps receiving UNHCR or ICRC relief?

3. Arms embargo: language banning arms exports to Rwanda and would, inter alia, sanction the on going Ugandan aid to the rebels?

In addition to the UNSCR, are there additional actions that should be explored aimed at stopping the killing, or punishing those who may have planned it, or at least be seen to be pressuring the Rwandan government to have it punish them.

4. Counter-propaganda: should the US engage in additional propaganda activities to get a message into Rwanda to counter the radio stations that are urging killing?



5. Pressure to Punish Organizers of Killing: should the US work with other nations to explore directed sanctions (no admission on travel status, assets seizures, etc.) aimed at those who may have engineered the slaughter? and/or diplomatic sanctions (down grading relations, termination of non-emergency assistance) against Rwanda until those responsible are tried?


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FOR: O. Ruth Stalcup	(STALCUP)
FOR: Sean J. Darragh	(DARRAGH)
CC: Records	(RECORDS)

Additional Header Information Follows

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Deletable Flag: Y
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Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 28-Apr-1994 17:51
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

29-Apr-1994 16:36 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Richard A. Clarke
(CLARKER)

SUBJECT: FOR SANDY'S APPROVAL: DRAFT DC SUMMARY

~~SECRET~~

format: DC Summary

Subject: Somalia and Rwanda

The Deputies Committee decided that:


1. Consideration of Terminating UNOSOM: The US should not be seen as taking the lead to threaten termination of UNOSOM, but should make clear to the Somalis that donor and troop contributors may well decide to terminate operations soon because of the continued violence and failure to achieve a political solution.

Donors/Troop Contributors: State, AID, and DOD should consult with the donors and major troop contributors about their views on continuing the operation. We should urge them to make the risk of termination clear to the Somalis.

Special Envoy: State should consult with the UN (specifically the acting SRSG) and regional states (Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda) to determine whether and when a trip to the region by a special US envoy would be helpful in reducing factional fighting and promoting a political settlement. If there is a consensus that such a trip should occur, then Amb. Oakley or some other envoy should head a team to the region.

Mandate Review Guidance: When the UNSC considers the UNOSOM mandate extension, USUN will support a 30 or 45 day extension only. It will support Council action to insure that there is a review toward the end of that period of the possibility of terminating or significantly reducing the mandate and UN presence, unless factional fighting has stopped and there has been significant progress toward a political settlement.

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3. Contingency Evacuation of UNOSOM: JCS and CINCENT should evaluate the UN plan for permissive and emergency evacuation. They should determine to what degree the UN is planning to rely upon the US, what US capabilities would be required, and what would be necessary to have those capabilities available in a timely manner. The Deputies decided to defer consideration of the proposal to consult with Congress on this contingency pending review of the JCS evaluation.

□

4. UNOSOM Personnel: Agencies will report immediately on candidates to fill positions on the UNOSOM staff: Development Office (AID), Judicial section (State/INM and Justice), political office (State), and Demining/Disarmament/and Demobilization (OSD and ACDA).

RWANDA

State will prepare a draft action plan for review Monday 3 May. It will be a vigorous program and include approaches to the UNSYG, the OAU leadership, concerned European states, and regional leaders. Among the ideas that we will solicit reaction to will be an OAU authorized peacekeeping force for Rwanda, a preventive diplomacy/deterrent force in Burundi, an arms embargo, a human rights/genocide investigation, and a UN protective operation for Rwandan refugees.

The Deputies will review the plan and the status of the issue at a telconference early in the week.

USUN will support Security Council action to endorse an arms embargo, a genocide investigation, and assistance (including UNHCR) for the refugees.

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FOR: Wilma G. Hall	(HALL)
FOR: Kristen K. Cicio	(CICIO)
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Discussion Paper: Deputies Committee
on Somalia

April 29, 1994

Issue 1: What further measures should the US undertake to support the political reconciliation process? And, how should the US approach the Somalia mandate renewal?

Interclan fighting is on the rise and the March 24 Nairobi agreement signed by Aideed and Ali Mahdi is unraveling. If this trend continues, political reconciliation will be impossible, and the UN will have to consider terminating the UNOSOM operation.

UNOSOM II mandates ends on May 31st. Regional and National Peace talks, scheduled in the Nairobi Accord for April 8 and 15, have slipped to May 15 and 30 respectively.

The best chance that the UN has of forcing the Somali factions into brokering a durable peace agreement rests on the threat of termination of all UN activities in Somalia, especially economic rehabilitative assistance. The faction leaders must be made to understand the UN's patience is wearing thin.

The US has told the Somalis that we will recommend to the Security Council that the UNOSOM mandate not be extended if they are unable to conclude an agreement on new Somali national elections by the end of May. Conversely, we have told them that if they succeed in this endeavor, we will recommend continued UN involvement to March of 1995. Acting SRSG Kouyate has passed the same message.

Possible steps for putting further pressure on the Somali factions include:

- Send Ambassador ~~Quayle~~ or another envoy to the region to reinforce our warning about terminating the UN mandate;
- Provide Ambassador ~~Quayle~~ with a Presidential or SecState message;
- Issue a US public declaration of our intent to recommend UNOSOM withdrawal from Somalia by some end date;
- Encourage troop contributors and other Security Council members to send similar warning signals to Somali factions;
- Suggest regional leaders to re-engage in the process and send similar warning signals; and
- Recommend the UN make an early public statement of its intent to withdraw from Somalia if progress is not made.

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Ambs. Bogosian or Oakley or some other senior official could visit the region and key contributing states to build consensus and subsequently issue a coordinated threat to end UNOSOM and its associated aid programs.

One or more troop contributors will likely depart around 31 May. Their departure could trigger the withdrawal of all the other contingents. If the Somalis cannot achieve a workable peace, it is better for UNOSOM to withdraw as a conscious act of policy, in a planned and deliberate fashion. A withdrawal would demonstrate that peacekeeping is the responsibility of the conflicted parties as well as the UN.

Faction leaders recognize that a quick departure of UNOSOM would likely cause the country to return quickly to chaos. Public declarations by the UN or USG warning the factions leaders to perform by a certain date may increase the credibility of the threat. It will also prepare the public for the possibility that the UN may terminate UNOSOM soon. We must, however, be willing to act on any threat we issue.

Actual termination of UNOSOM could result in a return of the conditions prior to the US involvement. In addition to the calamity that would mean for the Somali people, the US and the UN would be criticized for a wasted and costly intervention. African states would view the departure as yet another indication of the developed world walking away from Africa. Peacekeeping and the prospect of future emergency humanitarian assistance in similar circumstances would suffer a setback.

The possibilities for dealing with the mandate as the renewal date of 31 May draws closer include:

--Renewal of the mandate for three or six months, depending on the extent of tangible progress;

--Termination on 31 May in the absence of significant political progress and restoration of order;

--A 4-6 week extension, combined with a statement of intent to review at that time with a view to terminating in the absence of significant progress;

--Either of the preceding two combined with a call by the UNSC for the SYG to develop an option for a limited residual force to protect a down sized political and humanitarian relief program.

Issue 2: What kind of security should the US Liaison Office (USLO) have after June 30?

Fifty US Marines are now protecting the USLO. Their departure is now scheduled for 30 June.

The Department of State has decided on a security arrangement for the period after the Marines depart. It calls for US

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personnel to train a Somali diplomatic protection police to provide exterior security. The interior would be protected by 12 Marines and 6 security officers from the State Department. The Department of State requests that the fifty Marines be continued on until October or December, by which time the Somali force would have been recruited and trained. DOD has declined the request for extension.

Thus, the alternatives include:

- The State Department proposal outlined above;
- Having the Marines leave on schedule and requiring the State Department to contract for a private security service (with American or foreign personnel) for six months until the Somali force is trained;
- Seeking an exterior protection arrangement from a UNOSOM contingent, possibly involving direct or indirect compensation from the US;
- Closing USLO.

Were the State Department proposal to be adopted and the fifty Marines to be extended for six months, there is the additional question of what department would pay for their presence. Currently, DOD pays for most of the cost of the fifty Marines. The Department of State has declined to pay for the Marines, were their assignment to be extended.

Issue 3: Should we have a UN emergency evacuation scenario from Somalia, if so how?

UNOSOM has been putting together a plan in the field for an emergency evacuation since February. General Aboo, Ambassador Kouyate, and Kofi Annan have expressed an opportunity to review this document in New York when it has been completed and reviewed by UN headquarters. State and Defense believe that it is important to see the UN plan so that we can coordinate our own evacuation planning, since any emergency evacuation by the UN would require a simultaneous US withdrawal.

While we have pressed the UN repeatedly for their plan, we have yet to see it. We have been told by Kouyate that it is a high priority, but it has not yet been sent to New York. We will continue in New York and Mogadishu to urge completion of the plan.

Without reviewing the UN plan and coordinating our plan with it, we risk US casualties in a chaotic mass evacuation scenario. That said, the UN may simply be incapable of such planning without US help. Offering US help in the planning process may encourage completion of the UN planning; however, the offer would beg the question of what role the US is prepared to play in assisting the UN evacuation beyond pulling out US nationals.

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Administration lawyers believe that the Byrd Amendment does not allow US military assistance to the UN even in an evacuation scenario. Contract civilian air and sea lift are possible, but not with DOD funds. The law, however, could be changed in an emergency or Congress, through consultations, could allow the Administration to interpret the law to exclude emergency evacuation from the Byrd Amendment prohibitions. The President could also assert that the Byrd Amendment is an unconstitutional restriction on his authority.

Among the questions the Deputies should address are:

--do we wish to give CENTCOM guidance to prepare a contingency plan for assisting the UN in an evacuation?

--do we wish to preconsult with some Members of Congress on what they would view would be in case this contingency arose?

Issue 4: How should the US respond to the recent UN requests for personnel for the UNOSOM staff?

The UN has requested the US to fill several important positions on the UNOSOM staff: head of the Development Office, head of the Disarmament, Demining, and Demobilization (D-3) Division, section head of the Judicial Section of the Justice Division, and a political officer in the political division. The Development Office and the political officer are replacements.

The Development Office is a UNDP entity and will run the several hundred million dollar economic rehabilitation program. The D-3 Division, along with the police effort, is key to improving security and has yet to undertake any serious work beyond demining. The Judicial Section of the Justice Division is responsible for assisting in the selection, training and placement of judges, as well as reviewing and revising the penal code. The preceding three positions would be senior level advisors in the UNOSOM structure. The political officer would work as part of the political section. All four of these positions would allow the US and USLO important influence in UNOSOM without a great deal of visibility.

E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)

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Without an influx of new personnel, UNOSOM will continue to fumble and fail to complete key tasks. Finding personnel for the UNOSOM staff has been a major UN weakness which has been repeatedly noted by every US visitor to Mogadishu. US personnel may not resolve UNOSOM's problem, but a US contribution will help and could encourage others. Given the US military disengagement, however, to what extent do we wish to remain engaged on the civilian side. If we are prepared in-principle to provide personnel for these positions, we may have to assign agencies responsibility for finding candidates to ensure assignments in a timely fashion.

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NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: Friday, April 29, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 10:30 - 11:30 a.m.

SOMALIA

Agenda

- I. Introduction.....NSC
- II. Intelligence Update.....CIA
- III. UNOSOM Mandate/Political Options.....STATE
- IV. USLO Security Post June 30.....STATE/JCS
- V. Emergency Evacuation.....JCS
- VI. UNOSOM Personnel Requests.....STATE
- VII. Conclusions/Wrap Up.....NSC

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on Somalia

April 29, 1994

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E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20546

Summary of Conclusions of
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: April 29, 1994
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 10:30 am - 12:00 pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on
Somalia and Rwanda (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

The Vice President's Office
Leon Fuerth
James Carman

USUN
Rick Inderfurth
Michael Sheehan

STATE
Peter Tarnoff
James Dobbins
Richard Bogosian

JCS
William Owens
Frank Bowman

DOD
Frank Wisner
Thomas Longstreth

AID
Richard McCall
Gary Bombardier

CIA
Douglas MaEachin

The White House
Sandy Berger

(b)(3)

NSC
Richard Clarke
Don Steinberg
Sean Darragh

Summary of Conclusions

The Deputies Committee decided that:

SOMALIA:

1. Consideration of Terminating UNOSOM: The US should not take the lead in threatening termination of UNOSOM, but should make clear to the Somalis that donor and troop contributors may well decide to terminate operations soon because of the continued violence and failure to achieve a political solution. (S)

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RWANDA:

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USUN will support Security Council action to endorse an arms embargo, a genocide investigation, and assistance (including UNHCR) for the refugees. (S)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

30-Apr-1994 10:58 EDT

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

Samuel R. Berger (BERGER)
Mary C. Emery (EMERY)

FROM: Richard A. Clarke
(CLARKER)

SUBJECT: SATURDAY NOTES FOR SANDY FROM GLOBAL

1. Somalia/Rwanda: We e-mailed you the draft summary and conclusions of the DC on Friday. We would like approval to send them out Saturday if possible.

2. Haiti: Alec Watson held a LARGE and somewhat wandering meeting on peacekeeping on Thursday and agreed to draft a paper. There was some confusion on the fundamental assumption operating: was this a force inserted before or after a political agreement? We said we assumed it was part of such an agreement. Could you please react to our paper to you on this subject, so that we can have some guidance for these meetings?

3. Cuba: State promises the Contingency Paper on Monday, following which you promised the AG a Deputies Committee. You have our draft overview paper for that DC. Is it the sort of thing you had in mind?

4. Counter-terrorism PDD: We have put a hold on the 1 May report to Congress, pending resolution of the PDD. If that hold lasts more than a few days, it will begin to attract attention.

5. Peacekeeping: As I know Jeremy has been urging, we need to have the Presidential meeting/event with the Defense authorizers and appropriaters soon.


6. Terrorism: On the subject of the recent Principals Committee, we now have the materials from CIA to send the package to the President. You will have it on Monday. I am informed that State has joined the consensus, but you may want to double check that with Strobe.

CC: Records


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Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

01-May-1994 18:31 EDT

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MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW


FROM: Donald K. Steinberg
(STEINBERG)

SUBJECT: Additional Actions on Rwanda

Tony/Sandy:

I hope we can meet with Dick early on Monday to review where we are and where we're going with respect to Rwanda. In particular, we need to review our potential support for OAU and regional efforts if/when they act to protect refugees on both sides of the border or take more aggressive action to end the massacre. In addition to the new instructions (State 114636) to the USUN on actions to pursue with respect to a resolution on Rwanda (based on Dick's suggestions), the following actions are being taken:

- The President's message yesterday is being pumped into Rwanda through VOA, BBC, Radio France and Radio Belge. We've already received indications that it is being heard, if not heeded, by the government and RPF leadership. It also received very heavy press play in the United States.
- We are continuing to work with the regional leaders, especially Presidents Mwinyi of Tanzania and Museveni of Uganda, to shore up their efforts at resolving the crisis. New talks are scheduled for Tuesday in Arusha, although it is uncertain whether the RPF (this time) will show up. Our Ambassador to Tanzania, Peter De Vos, will attend and help facilitate the discussions.
- AS John Shattuck and Ambassador Rawson will leave tomorrow (Monday) night to travel to the region, including Uganda, Burundi and Tanzania to shore up the regional leaders' efforts to achieve peace and protect refugees in Rwanda. The UN Commission for Human Rights is sending a team to the region to investigate the current abuses.
- Senior USG officials have been contacting Government and RPF leaders on a daily basis to urge a ceasefire and renewal of negotiations. For example, DAS Bushnell talked with General Bizimungu (RGF) and General Kagame (RPF) today to relate the President's message from yesterday. She also told the RPF that there are reports the RPF is impeding the flow of refugees to Tanzania, which he strongly denied.
- State is assembling a revised package of \$15 million in emergency relief assistance for the region. A team of refugee officials from our Embassy in Tanzania is going to the border with Rwanda to assess the current situation and make recommendations for new assistance.

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
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Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

03-May-1994 10:08 EDT

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Susan E. Rice
(RICE)

SUBJECT: Slightly Revised Kofi Annan Memo

May 3, 1994

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: RICHARD A. CLARKE

FROM: SUSAN E. RICE

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Kofi Annan, Tuesday, May 3,
1994, at 12:15 pm.

Kofi Annan, UN Undersecretary General for Peacekeeping, is in Washington for meetings with Members of Congress, including a hearing yesterday before the Senate Africa Subcommittee on peacekeeping in Africa. Annan is likely to wish to cover a range of issues with you including: Bosnia, Rwanda, and possibly Somalia, the status of our PDD and peacekeeping funding.

Update on Peacekeeping Reform at the UN

The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), which Annan heads, has made significant progress in the past year in improving its capacity to manage peace operations. In addition to a substantial reorganization and increase in its staff, DPKO now has a 24-hour situation room and a stand-by forces planning team. The latter is a the result of a year-long project to solicit voluntary, but non-binding commitments of troops, equipment, and services from member states. This effort has yielded pledges of over 50,000 troops, which should improve the UN's force planning and rapid deployment capabilities measurably.

Consistent with the PDD, the U.S. has not made any such pledges, but once the PDD is signed we will offer the UN information on potentially available U.S. forces or capabilities. We will, of course, make no commitments to provide such forces when they are requested.

Suggested Talking Points



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Bosnia

-- I appreciate the Secretary-General's expressed concern about criticism of U.S. policy by UNPROFOR officials. These statements have not been helpful to our shared goal of improved coordination between the UN and NATO.

□ -- This public sniping has to stop. What can we do, in your view to improve UN-NATO relations both on the ground and in the press?

-- We are very concerned that the Serbs continue to violate the Gorazde and Sarajevo exclusion zones.

E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)

E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)

Rwanda

-- We are very concerned about the grave situation in Rwanda. We are hopeful that African nations will respond favorably to the SYG's request for troops. What is your expectation? What role do you think peacekeepers could usefully play? How many do you expect are needed?

-- If adequate troops are available, we will do what we can to make voluntary contributions to deploy and sustain them. We do not think it would be wise, however, to fund a non-UN mission through UN assessments. This would set a bad precedent.

-- We are also planning to make available \$15 million to support the refugee and emergency relief effort and have dispatched Ambassador Rawson and John Shattuck to the region to try to reinvigorate the peace process.

Somalia

-- We have threatened to discontinue support for UNOSOM II if the parties fail to make substantial political progress. We are considering how to respond if this threat does not bring results.


-- Do you think, if the UNSC threatens to withdraw the force and donors threaten to cut assistance, this will yield any useful result? Do you think there is any collective will to carry out such a threat?

-- How confident are you that the major troops contributors will stay beyond May/June? If they are not likely to stay, wouldn't it be preferable for the UN to be seen to withdraw because the parties have failed to cooperate rather than because the UN mission crumbled?

Haiti

-- Do you have any sense of what role a reconfigured, more robust UNMIH might play, in the event that sanctions soften the military regime? Do you think there would be any appetite in the UN for a peace enforcement mission in Haiti?

Georgia



-- The Russians are pressing for the immediate dispatch of a UN mission to Georgia. This seems premature given the failure of the parties to reach any form of settlement. Do you see any role for UN peacekeepers at this stage? What role might the UN play if the Russians decide to go in unilaterally with a CIS force?

Peacekeeping Funding

(FYI: A NSC/State/OMB team travelled to the UN last week to try to obtain additional information on the UN's cash flow picture for presentation to Congress. Yesterday, an OMB-NSC team met with House and Senate appropriators. While the general mood was more or less cooperative and understanding of the severity of the problem, staff expressed serious doubt that Congress will be able to act before the August recess (when the cash flow crisis is likely to become severe) and concern that the House Republicans will try to extract additional conditions or hold up the supplemental over UN reform.

Another thing that was clear from these meetings is the importance of scheduling a Presidential meeting with the Defense authorizers/appropriators immediately. Many are feeling left out and increasingly angry.)

-- Thank you for your help in providing financial information to our team that visited the UN last week. We are working hard with Congress to try to find a solution to the funding problem. The President is personally committed to this effort.

-- We are hoping to be able to have some funds to the UN in August, but this will be difficult given the complexity of the appropriations process this year.

-- One thing is clear: It is absolutely crucial that we obtain an effective inspector general. Otherwise, we will never be able to pay off our debts in full. What do you think we can do to press our case more effectively both with the SYG and the membership?

Containing UN Peacekeeping Costs


-- We appreciate the efforts the UN has made to try to reduce the costs of on-going peacekeeping operations.

-- We would like to work with your staff in a low-key and quiet way to try to identify additional, readily implementable cost-savings measures.

-- We would like to send a small team to New York to work with DPKO in the same cooperative spirit that our logistics team did last Fall. How do you view this proposal?

Concurrences by: Jenonne Walker

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Date Modified: 03-May-1994 10:07
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

03-May-1994 23:10 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Donald K. Steinberg
(STEINBERG)

SUBJECT: **URGENT FOR RICE** Rwanda TPS

Susan:

Below is a draft E-mail for Tony's lunch with Christopher and Perry. I'd appreciate your reactions ASAP: it has to go to Tony immediately. Thanks.

Rwanda

Background

The situation in Rwanda continues to deteriorate, with reliable reports of at least 200,000 deaths and displacement of at least half a million people in largely communal violence. The situation combines ethnic civil war and hardline Hutus killing Tutsis and "sympathetic" Hutus behind Government lines. Fighting has reached a tentative stalemate, although it continues to rage. The Government (RGF) is calling for UN or OAU intervention, while the RPF distrusts the UN (and especially its representative Booh-Booh) and believes a ceasefire would only allow the RGF to continue massacres in territory it controls. The mass flows of refugees towards Tanzania and other border areas continue: there are at least 250,000 in empty fields on the Tanzanian border. Humanitarian relief is moving into the region slowly, and there is real fear of famine and disease.

Peace talks in Arusha and elsewhere, which we asked President Mwinyi to host, have not gotten off the ground as RPF and Government forces refuse to meet. Our ambassadors in Tanzania and Uganda are deeply involved in these efforts.

Meanwhile, the situation in Burundi remains strangely calm but tense. A coup attempt was nipped in the bud last week, but the largely Tutsi government is having problems in disarming Hutu militia, who fear a potential massacre if they are left unarmed. Renewed widespread communal violence is clearly a strong possibility.

Our Response

We have identified five key goals for the international effort in

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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Rwanda: stop the on-going massacres, achieve an RPF/RGF ceasefire, resume negotiations under the Arusha Framework, prevent the violence from spreading to neighboring states (especially Burundi) and ensure humanitarian assistance.


Among the steps we've taken are Presidential statements radioed into Rwanda, \$15 million in emergency humanitarian relief, sending A/S Shattuck and Ambassador Rawson to the region, urging Presidents Mwinyi and Museveni to continue to broker peace and direct conversations with the RPF and Rwandan Government forces.

At the UN, we are pushing for an arms embargo; asking the UN to work with the OAU to protect refugees on both sides of the borders, backed by external support; and urging the Human Rights Commissioner to go to the region (including Rwanda) to investigate the massacres.

USUN is pursuing this initiative, but raises the key question: what degree of financial, logistical and/or material support are we prepared to provide for UN or OAU actions. This questions hinges, of course, on what kind of mission we are talking about. Boutros Ghali has called on the international community to assemble a force to act in the region, although it is unclear what he is proposing. In his meeting with Sandy yesterday, Kofi Anan thought that the only way to take "robust" action would be to use African troops, Belgian/French assets and U.S. airlift. The OAU continues to talk about an emergency foreign ministers meeting to discuss its role in Rwandan peacekeeping, but it remains unscheduled.

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DRAFT

SCENARIOS AND OPTIONS

Scenario I: Non-permissive environment.

Situation: Armed conflict continues between the RPF and the RAF, as do ethnic killings. One or both sides oppose deployment of a UN force.


-- Option 1: Chapter VII operation designed to achieve swift pacification of the country, followed by demobilization of the military forces and disarmament of civilians. Force requirements would be massive, akin to Operation Restore Hope (30,000 troops with significant air support). Leadership (including significant contribution of forces) would have to be taken by a country possessing a modern military capability if the operation is to obtain quick results. An all-African force a la ECOMOG would likely be inadequate to the task. Transport, equipment and logistics support for a battalion (750 troops) for one year would be at least \$18.5 million (based on ECOMOG support estimates). Total cost of such a military operation could range from \$500 million to \$1.5 billion per year, depending upon the length and extent of armed resistance.

-- Option 2: Chapter VII operation designed to establish secure zones in Rwanda for the protection of persons at risk. Secure zones could include urban areas and border zones. Force would likely be configured around reinforced (armor) infantry battalions, a quick reaction force, and air support. Depending on the number and type of secure zones, the size of the force could range from 5,000 (one-two border zones) to 15,000 (two-four border zones plus one-two urban areas). Total cost of such a military operation could range from \$100-500 million per year.

Scenario Two: Semi-Permissive Environment

Situation: Sporadic armed conflict continues between the two sides. Some troops and militias are not subject to their leaders' command and control. Both sides ostensibly agree to a peace enforcement operation to support a ceasefire and/or protect secure zones for the protection of persons at risk.

-- Option 1: Chapter VII operation designed to monitor and enforce a ceasefire. Troops would be deployed between the factions. Force would be based on reinforced (armor) infantry battalions, a quick reaction force, and air support. Number of troops required would likely be 15,000 - 20,000 (similar to UNOSOM). Total cost could range from \$300 - \$500 million per year.



-- Option 2: Chapter VII operation designed to establish secure zones for the protection of persons at risk. Mission scope, force requirements and estimated costs are the same as Scenario One/Option 2. While the threat to PKO forces would not be as great as in Scenario One, it would remain significant and would require similar resources for self-protection and protection of those at risk.

-- Option 3: Chapter VII operation designed to monitor and enforce a ceasefire, as well as to establish secure zones for the protection of persons at risk. Mission scope is combination of Options 1 & 2. Force requirements: 15,000 - 30,000. Estimated cost: \$400 million - \$ 1 billion.

Scenario Three: Permissive Environment

Situation: Both sides agree to a ceasefire, resumption of reconciliation talks, and UN assistance in achieving both. RPF and RAF exercise relatively effective control over their units and over the militias. However, some banditry and killings continue, and tensions between the two ethnic groups and their political organizations remains high.

-- Option 1: Chapter VII operation designed to monitor and enforce a ceasefire. Details are the same as Scenario Two/Option 1. The unstable political-military situation in Rwanda would require a similarly-sized force for self-protection.

-- Option 2: Chapter VI operation designed to monitor a ceasefire and inspire confidence. Force requirement would be 6000-8000 troops, configured in reinforced (armor) infantry battalions and a QRF. Estimated cost would be \$200-400 million (akin to a beefed-up ONUMOZ). The unstable political-military situation in Rwanda could require the more sizeable troop number for self-protection as well as to inspire confidence in the UN.

-- Option 3: Chapter VII operation designed to establish secure areas for the protection of persons at risk. Details are the same as Scenario Two/Option 2. The unstable political-military situation in Rwanda would require a similarly-sized force for self-protection.

-- Option 4: Chapter VII operation designed to monitor and enforce a ceasefire, as well as establish secure areas for the protection of persons at risk. Details are the same as Scenario Two/Option 3. The unstable political-military situation in Rwanda would require a similarly-sized force for self-protection.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

06-May-1994 21:58 EDT

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Susan E. Rice
(RICE)

SUBJECT: Suggested Talking Points for VP's Meeting on Rwanda

Sandy,

Attached are suggested talking points for the Vice President's meeting with Boutros-Ghali et al. on Rwanda.

They have been informally cleared by JCS, State and OSD. Don Steinberg concurs as well.

Once you and your counterparts have cleared/commented, I will forward formally to the Vice President's office.

I will also provide the Vice President's office with a chart being prepared by State that summarizes the FY 94 resources that may still be available to support voluntary contributions to a potential Rwanda mission.


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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

06-May-1994 21:49 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Donald K. Steinberg (STEINBERG)
Richard A. Clarke (CLARKER)
Randy R. Beers (BEERS)

FROM: Susan E. Rice
(RICE)

SUBJECT: Revised TPs for VP's Meeting on Rwanda

CC: Records (RECORDS)

Suggested Talking Points for Vice President's Meeting
with Boutros-Ghali, Salim Salim et. al. on Rwanda


-- We remain extremely concerned about the on-going tragedy in Rwanda. This is a problem that demands prompt international action.

-- The United States wants to play a constructive role in alleviating the suffering in Rwanda and supporting efforts to achieve a lasting political solution.

-- There have been a number of proposed responses to this tragedy. We would like to explore these ideas with you further, as well as with representatives of concerned African states and our colleagues in the Security Council.

-- We have already taken some important steps. We will continue to support the diplomatic efforts now underway by the UN and regional leaders to reach a ceasefire and return to the Arusha peace process. We want to consider how to support the UN effort to work with the OAU to ensure the safety of refugees on both sides of the border.

-- We are committed to provide humanitarian relief, to implement the arms embargo and to have the UN Human Rights Commission fully investigate the situation in Rwanda.



-- In addition, there may be another vitally important humanitarian mission that the UN and/or OAU could perform.

-- We would be interested in exploring the possibility of creating a protective zone with an international force to provide security to populations in the southern portion of Rwanda, where refugees and displaced persons are in the most immediate danger.

Such a force could not only provide security for the protective zone and the distribution of humanitarian assistance but also assist in refugee repatriation and serve in a preventive capacity to deter the spread of violence to Burundi. The operation would require robust rules of engagement.

This mission may require fewer troops and be less complex logistically than some other proposals now being discussed.

It would, however, need the active support of the Burundi government and, preferably, the assent of the Rwandan parties.

-- If capable troops were available and the mission considered viable, the U.S. would endeavor to help by providing financial resources, equipment and lift as well as humanitarian assistance.

-- We would expect to be joined in this effort by other concerned nations.

-- If the mission were mounted independently by the OAU or by a collection of concerned states with the blessing of the UN Security Council, the U.S. would offer some assistance on a voluntary basis.

-- If the mission were funded through UN assessments, the U.S. would pay more than 30% of the cost and seek the normal reimbursement for any additional contributions of equipment or services.

-- At the same time, we have serious reservations about proposals to establish a large peace enforcement mission, which would operate throughout Rwanda with a mandate to end the fighting, restore law and order and pacify the population.

-- While we have not definitively ruled in or out any particular response, in our view, there are several problems with this approach:

E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)

This mission would be particularly complex, perhaps even more so than Somalia.

It remains very unclear whether the parties to the conflict would use force to oppose such a mission.

Thus far, no country has committed to send troops, and it appears unlikely that there will be sufficient pledges to mount the large force required.

Logistically, it would be difficult to stage a sizeable force out of Kigali, because all movement of troops and supplies would have to be done by air.

It is unclear precisely what the peace enforcement mission would be or when it would end.

Finally, the chances of success appear slim, particularly without the participation of a major military power.

-- Again, let me say that we hope we can work together to try to craft a viable diplomatic solution and provide relief to the hundreds of thousands who are suffering as result of this tragic conflict.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

07-May-1994 11:46 EDT

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Susan E. Rice
(RICE)

SUBJECT: Updated Talking Points on Rwanda

Suggested Talking Points for Vice President's Meeting
with Boutros-Ghali, Salim Salim et. al. on Rwanda

-- We remain extremely concerned about the on-going tragedy in Rwanda. This is a problem that demands prompt international action.

-- The United States wants to play a constructive role in alleviating the suffering in Rwanda and supporting efforts to achieve a lasting political solution.

-- There have been a number of proposed responses to this tragedy. We would like to explore these ideas with you further, as well as with representatives of concerned African states and our colleagues in the Security Council.

-- We have already taken some important steps. We will continue to support the diplomatic efforts now underway by the UN and regional leaders to reach a ceasefire and return to the Arusha peace process. We want to consider how to support the UN effort to work with the OAU to ensure the safety of refugees on both sides of the border.

-- We are committed to provide humanitarian relief, to implement the arms embargo and to have the UN Human Rights Commission fully investigate the situation in Rwanda.

-- In addition, there may be another vitally important humanitarian mission that the UN and/or OAU could perform.

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LINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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It would, however, need the active support of the Burundi and/or Tanzanian government and the assent of the Rwandan parties.

In considering the actual humanitarian/peacekeeping mission in Rwanda, we must be mindful not to upset the delicate political balance that presently exists in Burundi.

We must also work together to define clearly achievable objectives and an end-state such as resettlement of the displaced persons and refugees and/or a sunset provision requiring reconsideration of the operation in six months to preclude the mission becoming an open-ended one.

-- If capable troops were available and the mission considered viable, the U.S. would endeavor to help by providing financial resources, equipment and lift as well as humanitarian assistance, upon agreement of a clear concept of operations.

-- We would expect to be joined in this effort by other concerned nations.

-- If the mission were mounted independently by the OAU or by a collection of concerned states with the blessing of the UN Security Council, the U.S. would offer some assistance on a voluntary basis.

-- If the mission were funded through UN assessments, the U.S. would pay more than 30% of the cost and seek the normal reimbursement for contributions of equipment or services.

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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
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Message Status: READ
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RWANDA OPTIONS PAPER

This paper considers three options for bringing humanitarian assistance to the victims of the conflict in Rwanda. After describing the options, the paper assesses whether they meet or do not meet the guidelines in PDD 25, and then sets forth the resources available from the U.S. Note: In a letter to UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, OAU Secretary General Salim Salim said that his organization would not take the lead in providing forces for a peace operation in Rwanda.

Briefly, the options are:

1. A UN-proposed military operation based out of Kigali to assure the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Rwanda.
2. A cross-border military operation to secure zones in Rwanda to protect and care for those at risk.
3. A humanitarian operation, without the use of force, to assist Rwandan refugees in the border areas outside Rwanda.

I. The Kigali based option


The UN is proposing a UN peacekeeping operation based out of Kigali. UNAMIR Commander Dallaire is asking for a force of 5,000 to 8,000 troops, with a mandate to use force as necessary to assure delivery of humanitarian assistance and to protect persons in threatened enclaves, by, for example, breaking through roadblocks manned by hoodlums and disarming roving gangs. Dallaire believes this can be done under Chapter VI authority. He has requested 150 M-113 armored personnel carriers to protect his troops. The UN is asking for contributions to a special fund of \$50-70 million. We estimate the total cost would be a minimum of \$150-200 million per year to equip, transport and sustain these units.

II. The cross border option with force

The second option would be a military operation to

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- 2 -

establish secure zones in Rwanda for the protection of persons at risk and for the delivery of humanitarian relief. Humanitarian assistance would be stored in neighboring countries and transported into the secure zones. The mission would defend the zones' perimeters against incursions and, within the zones, enforce security, disarm civilians and escort humanitarian assistance shipments. At the very least this would be a Chapter VI-Plus operation. Even if the Interim Government of Rwanda and the Rwanda Patriotic Front agree to the mission, the existence of renegade military units and civilian militia outside the control of Government authorities makes Rwanda a semi-permissive environment.


Based on known flows of refugees and displaced persons and the location of persons at risk, the zones should be set up on the Rwanda borders with Burundi, Tanzania, Zaire and Uganda, in that order. Each zone would require at least one combat-ready battalion with mechanized and armor capability, and with scout and combat air support. Larger zones with populations of over 200,000 refugees and displaced persons (such as the Burundi and Tanzanian borders) would probably require two combat-ready battalions. Each zone would require logistical and engineering support forces. The zones in Burundi and Tanzania would each likely require a logistics and engineering battalion.

The size of the force could range from 5,000 (for one to two zones) to 15,000 (for two to four zones). If this is an assessed operation, the cost would be a minimum of \$85 million for the first six months for a 5,000-troop mission, and approximately \$65 million for each subsequent six month period. That would translate into a minimum annual expense of \$150-450 million depending on the number and size of the zones.

This option does not address the fate of the roughly 3,000 Rwandans taking shelter under UN protection in the Kigali stadium, nor of those in enclaves elsewhere in Rwanda.

III. The operation without force

In the third option, the UN and various NGO's would facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Rwandan refugees in neighboring countries and ensure that they have safe havens outside Rwanda. This would not involve the use of troops. The U.S. would probably provide airlift outside Rwanda on a reimbursable basis, as well as substantial funding.

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- 3 -

The international community would see this option as nothing different from what is already being done. Support for this option would probably leave the U.S. isolated on the Security Council. This option, like option 2, also would not address the problem how to rescue those within Rwanda, including the people in the Kigali stadium and other enclaves.

Analysis of guidelines for U.S. decision to support


1. Whether UN involvement advances U.S. interests, and an international community of interest exists for dealing with the problem on a multilateral basis.

- For option 1, YES. The U.S. has a general interest in the maintenance of peace and stability in the region and a strong humanitarian interest. Both the UN Security Council and the OAU are exploring peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance options. Neighboring states, led by Tanzania and supported by the U.S., are pressing for a resumption of the Arusha peace talks.
- For option 2, the same.
- For option 3, the same.

2. Whether there is a threat to or breach of international peace and security, often of a regional character, defined as one or a combination of the following: (a) international aggression; (b) urgent humanitarian disaster coupled with violence; or (c) sudden interruption of established democracy or gross violation of human rights coupled with violence, or threat of violence.

- For option 1, YES. The killing of over 100,000 people over the past month, with many more continuing to be at risk, and the need for humanitarian assistance for up to 500,000 refugees and displaced persons, constitute a humanitarian disaster coupled with violence. The death of the Rwandan President and subsequent assassination of much of Rwanda's political opposition constituted a sudden and unexpected interruption of the democratic process. The wholesale slaughter of civilians constituted a gross violation of human rights coupled with violence and the threat

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thereof.

-- For option 2, the same.

-- For option 3, the same.

3. Whether there are clear objectives and an understanding of where the mission fits on the spectrum between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

-- For option 1, NOT YET. We have not seen a clearly developed concept. Those who have developed the idea believe that it could be a Chapter VI operation, but it is hard to see how it could remain that way in a civil war. A Kigali-based operation would likely require a Chapter VII mandate unless the warring sides were to acquiesce in the UN mission. Even then it would require a robust Chapter VI mandate, given the Interim Government's lack of command and control over renegade army units and extremist militias.


-- For option 2, NOT YET. This is a possible U.S. proposed alternative to option 1, and, therefore, if we believe it preferable, we ourselves would need to develop the mission statement further, and define where on the peace operations spectrum it should fit. Since this force is designed to operate outside the area of maximum confrontation between the government and rebel forces, it would be less likely to provoke major confrontation with either side than option 1, and would be more likely, therefore, to operate within a Chapter VI mandate, albeit at the rougher end of the peacekeeping part of this spectrum.

-- For option 3, NO. This would be neither peacekeeping nor peace enforcement. How the mission could operate without any force component is also unclear.

4. Whether, if UNAMIR is to remain a Chapter VI peacekeeping operation, a ceasefire is in place; or, if it is to become a Chapter VII peace enforcement operation, the threat to international peace and security is considered significant.

-- For option 1, NO on Chapter VI. No ceasefire is in place, and, given the lack of command and control

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- 5 -


exercised by the Interim Government over renegade military forces and Hutu militia, it is debatable how effective a ceasefire would be.

- For option 1, YES on Chapter VII. A significant threat does exist to international peace and security. The refugee flows threaten to overwhelm resources in neighboring states. The violence in Rwanda also threatens to spill over into neighboring Burundi.
- For option 2, NO on Chapter VI. No ceasefire is in place. Option 2 is designed to put forces in areas of minimum confrontation between the warring parties. The issue whether Chapter VI is applicable devolves, therefore, on whether each of the parties is prepared to accept a UN presence.
- For option 2, YES on international significance.
- For option 3, NO on the ceasefire.

5. Whether the means to accomplish the mission are available, including the forces, financing and a mandate appropriate to the mission.

- For option 1, UNCLEAR. The availability of adequate numbers and quality of troops for this mission is questionable. Nigeria has offered a battalion, two other (unidentified) African battalions are said to be available and Dallaire believes Australia may be willing to provide at least 1,000 troops to UNAMIR. The UN and OAU are optimistic that sufficient forces can be found. Experience in Somalia suggests, however, that a Chapter VII operation would require a U.S. or Western European combat capability, which appears unlikely in Rwanda. Sufficient financing for a Chapter VII mission also is doubtful. It may be available for a Chapter VI mission. The UN Secretary General is attempting to set up a voluntary fund of at least \$50-70 million. A hybrid of a voluntary fund and assessed contributions is possible in order to access money authorized for the existing assessment for UNAMIR. The U.S. theoretically could provide up to \$173.3 million in DoD drawdown, PKO and CIPA

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- 6 -

assistance. We also have up to \$60 million in reallocation authority, although this will mean reducing or eliminating other programs.

- For option 2, MORE LIKELY. While this option may require at least as many forces as option 1, the military character is different and the quality of forces need not be so high.
- For option 3, N/A.

6. Whether the political, economic and humanitarian consequences of inaction by the international community have been weighed and are considered unacceptable.

- For option 1, YES. The international community clearly views what is happening in Rwanda as a humanitarian disaster of the highest magnitude and considers inaction to be unacceptable.
- For option 2, the same.
- For option 3, the same. But option 3 may be viewed as inaction.


7. Whether the operation's anticipated duration is tied to clear objectives and realistic guidelines for ending the operation.

- For option 1, NO. The duration of each is tied to a restoration of sufficient order in Rwanda to allow return of refugees and the absence of serious threat to humanitarian efforts. While criteria are clear enough, the time by which to meet them would be indeterminate.
- For option 2, the same.
- For option 3, the same.

PDD guidelines for U.S. participation

On the assumption that U.S. participation is highly unlikely, this paper does not consider the PDD guidelines for U.S. participation.

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- 7 -

Resources available from the U.S.


The U.S. has the following resources available:

- \$75,000,000 FAA Sec. 506(a)(1) DoD drawdown
- \$75,000,000 FAA Sec. 506(a)(2) DoD drawdown
- \$10,000,000 Unspent UNAMIR CIPA
- \$13,000,000 Unspent Sec. 551 Haiti PKO account
- \$ 700,000 Unspent Sec. 552(c)(2) DoD drawdown
- ~~\$173,700,000 Funds/Drawdown Authority Available~~
- \$15,000,000 Sec. 552(c)(1) reallocation authority
- \$45,000,000 Sec. 451(a)(1) reallocation authority
- ~~\$60,000,000 Total reallocation authorized~~
- ~~\$233,000,000 Total Funds/Drawdown/Reallocation~~

Attachments:

- Security Assistance Voluntary Peacekeeping
- Use of Foreign Assistance Authorities in FY 1994
- Immigration, Migration and Refugee Assistance

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
RWANDA OPTIONS PAPER

Approved:SCP:JDobbins
Drafted:IO/PHO:JSBrims/DJensen; PM/ISP:AHMargulies;
IO/UNP:SZelle

Cleared:

IO:GWard
AF:PBushnell
PM:ISP:JPiazza
PM/DRSA:BTobias
RP/AAA:MMcKelvey
P:EBrimmer
S/RPP:RBeckham (info)

SEPKA 451 5/7/94 X 6-7733



of Rwanda refugees in Burundi that may be attracted back → Rwanda.
= 50,000

- 65,000 Burundi in Rwanda (according to Catholic Relief Services)

20,000 Rwandan displaced in Burundi

35,000 Gakoma + (no food, housing, etc.)

- 100,000

250,000 Cagali

170,000 NTF (under RPF control)

- 200,000

200,000 SE (under RPF control)

} IORC

~~200,000~~

Area in East, around Burundi = greatest area of need.

Need to balance deployment

- full deploy in East ... need to do in North (RPF)
 - political balance.

- Need to focus on political / diplomatic / humanitarian ways to slow balance of neutrality

in Somalia, we went where need was greatest + stated so up front

AF/C to bring together group w/ maps + good knowledge of area to draw goose-egg

Human Rights

- Shuttle trip

- general agreement on # of ptr

- trip reassured ^{leaders} that they are not a lion

Seller goes further of w/ shutting up problems back on regional ops.

Agreements
 on

1) HR civil order ^{required} 2) Geographic ^{required} 3) Size kind of unit presence (preferably expanded) → Protection of civilian humanitarian rescue force also

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FROM: LAKE

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KEYWORDS: HAITI
RWANDA

SOUTH AFRICA
EUROPE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FORN POLICY TEAM MTG

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DUE DATE: 16 MAY 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: GRAY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

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
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 12, 1994

MEETING WITH
FOREIGN POLICY TEAM

DATE: May 12, 1994

LOCATION: Oval Office

TIME: 9:00 - 10:30 am

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE ✓

I. PURPOSE

To hold an informal discussion of key foreign policy issues.

II. BACKGROUND

You have agreed to meet on a regular basis with key members of your foreign policy team for an informal discussion.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Vice President
Secretary Perry
Acting Secretary Talbott
Thomas McLarty
Anthony Lake

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House Photographer only.

V. SEQUENCE

Informal discussion will focus on three major topics:

- Haiti
- South Africa and Rwanda
- European Trip Issues

Attachments

Tab A Haiti Background
Tab B South Africa and Rwanda Background
Tab C European Trip Issues

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RWANDA

RCG - Rwanda 5/13/94

E.O. 13526, 1.4(c)

RPF holds 1/2 country + has encircled Kigali
- Thinks its too late for PKO

No Massacs reported in RPF held territory

ORBAT

RPF 13,000 (4-5,000) in Kigali

GRA →

Militias > 10,000

SA-7

RPF capable of taking Kigali - closer

could take awhile... Tutsi safe
initias may not be safe.

BBC claims his proposal = ch VI

VP ref: all 3 saw as serious not as solution, but would do as
part of > robust activity scale.

How do we bring Council back to our original story:

JD: - block agreement while we work on concept. Take it up then

Diplomatic Play

Send team to NY

Public Affairs

5/17
- Ugandan shipping
parus in bulk to
Rwanda - (50 tons)
- Also 3 batts in
Rwanda from
Uganda
- Need to
draw out of
base and cut off
to see how
we set
up.

- Need to
demand
presence of
observers
of UN

APCs -
36 man
of
wheeled vehicle
+ Cadillac
= are.
50 cost =
\$1.5 mill.

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Rwanda in JCS

Options


1. - Duclair → UNOSOM x 3 difficulty
 - Less accessible than Moz
 - Afr. who anchor country
 - Messier situation
 - interior lines problem - hard to support logistically
2. - Alleged state - net of adjoining countries on both sides
 - safe havens along border
 - ↳ assuming agreement of parties, its doable for auxiliary units
 - Chap VII fighting - protect means don't to let

3. - Do nothing
 - Ch VI - have to wait until Reg come after year. - Rtd military or defences
 - would require more troops
 - have to occupy every km² of perimeter
 - ORF

Doable if acquire Ch. VII. Can African forces pull Rtd off
 estimates 5,000 → 50,000 rtd
 35,000: troops

- ③ Don't use force +
 - beseech regional states to help refugees, use Rtd military to protect humanitarian
 - may be beyond border state capability + not enough

- ② to 350,000 ^(inside) really need protection? Int'l sup. say:
 - No danger to Rwandan refugees
 - displaced general agreement small security problem along Tanz/Uganda
 - 250,000 → cattle drive



Along Burundi border (Butare → South)

v. serious danger

Rwandia - in Bur.

Burundia - in

- in Rw.

Rwandia displaced

all in same degree of danger

Look @ most threatened populat.

Safe haven in Rwanda

Small preventive deployment in B. if agreeable

Will be hard to operate out of Rwanda for Bur!

- FORC

- get hands out of B.

- get Rw. folks back.

- put ours back in place

Ch. VII

size of safe haven ?

incl. Butare (30 miles from border)

could be 10,000 troops

operate out of Rujumbura

Kigali has to be resolved politically

ARF - need free by camp to cooperate + internal patrolling + some response force

Better UN mandate than OAU

End state?

Ruanda

5/13/94

update on ongoing
matters

- Camb. - Liberia
- Ruanda
- Angola

OSD to set up Ruanda Task Force - led by Vince Kern
Ed Byrum to take over

1) Humanitarian Assistance

- cable denying request for C-130 into Kigali - wait go out
- Shobe wants to fly into Kigali; Perry will look into it.

IO - strategy to keep U.S. looking proactive
while vetoing this resolution.

} French.

2) PICO

- logistically a burden for Burundi - political burden
- economic benefits - Burundi want of. first
- DAF in Bujumbura to talk to military
- change to talk to Political Affairs folks

PCG

degree of cont.

C130s +
other
support

} Potable
to each.

- Fly into Kigali?
- Team to UN?

Any inducements for Burundi?

- better airfield
- left equipment
- etc.
- reintegration assistance

DEGREE
OF
US
COMMITMENT

- Our own resolution?
- what to do now
that we've pressed to
the wall
- USUN doing UN option
vs. criteria + UN ther.
strat.
- JCS Op. Plan
- Burundi's View of
this option
- UN Political track

- what abt. Boole-Boye
- what's our political
goal.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

14-May-1994 09:29 EDT

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MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Richard A. Clarke
(CLARKER)

SUBJECT: SATURDAY MORNING NOTES FOR SRB

1. Jamaica: You should meet with the Jamaican ambassador today and hand him the President's letter. State is trying to arrange.

2. PM Major: We need POTUS to make the call, even if its from the airplane over Indianapolis.

3. Rwanda: We delayed a vote in the UNSC on a new PKO, but they will want to vote on Monday. Two big problems: a) the consensus in the UNSC is for a Somalia-styled operation, not the limited one we favor; and b) we now by law need to tell the Congress five days in advance of such a vote or invoke a Presidential waiver. We're doing two things:

--sending a team to the UN Monday to brief our concept again and elaborate the problems with theirs; and


--OMB and OSD have asked for a DC meeting, pursuant to PDD-25. We've penciled in an SVTS at 4:30 Monday for 30 minutes, but that may be too late in the day.

4. Drugs: The lawyers group that we needed to have prior to any decision or DC met on Friday. Opinion was firm from all agencies that both US and international law prohibited shoot downs and there were no exceptions. Thus, I think our only choice is to ask Peru and Colombia to agree not to use our info for shootdowns. I'll try to sell that. If I can't, you should call Strobe. This one will not benefit from a DC.

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


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20613
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520 9411350

May 16, 1994

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DECL: OADR

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Subject: Discussion Paper for the Deputies Committee on
Peacekeeping Options in Rwanda

PDD-25 requires Deputies Committee-level approval of all U.S. votes in the United Nations Security Council to establish new peacekeeping operations. The Peacekeeping Core Group is to provide an analysis of the options to aid the Deputies in their decision.

The proposed expansion of the size and mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) changes the operation significantly enough to qualify in effect as a "new" mission. The attached discussion paper analyzes three proposals now before the Security Council in relation to the decision factors set out in PDD-25.

Your assistance in distributing the attached paper to all members of the Deputies Committee is appreciated.


Marc Grossman
Executive Secretary

Attachment: Discussion Paper on Rwanda

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RWANDA OPTIONS PAPER

This paper considers three options for bringing humanitarian assistance to the victims of the conflict in Rwanda. After describing the options, the paper assesses whether they meet or do not meet the guidelines in PDD 25, and then sets forth the resources available from the U.S. Note: In a letter to UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, OAU Secretary General Salim Salim said that his organization would not take the lead in providing forces for a peace operation in Rwanda.

Briefly, the options are:

1. A UN-proposed military operation based out of Kigali to assure the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Rwanda.
2. A cross-border military operation to secure zones in Rwanda to protect and care for those at risk.
3. A humanitarian operation, without the use of force, to assist Rwandan refugees in the border areas outside Rwanda.

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
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II. The cross border option with force

The second option would be a military operation to

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- 2 -

establish secure zones in Rwanda for the protection of persons at risk and for the delivery of humanitarian relief. Humanitarian assistance would be stored in neighboring countries and transported into the secure zones. The mission would defend the zones' perimeters against incursions and, within the zones, enforce security, disarm civilians and escort humanitarian assistance shipments. At the very least this would be a Chapter VI-Plus operation. Even if the Interim Government of Rwanda and the Rwanda Patriotic Front agree to the mission, the existence of renegade military units and civilian militia outside the control of Government authorities makes Rwanda a semi-permissive environment.


Based on known flows of refugees and displaced persons and the location of persons at risk, the zones should be set up on the Rwanda border with Burundi. The UN force would establish a secure zone inside Rwanda along the border with Burundi to protect refugees/displaced persons in most immediate danger and provide security for the delivery of humanitarian relief to those personnel. The force would deploy to Burundi, establish a base of operations in Burundi near the Rwandan border, conduct cross-border operations to secure and establish displaced persons camps within Rwanda, and provide continuous security for the operation of those camps. The force would establish security for UNHCR-run camps but not transport displaced persons to the camps. The force would also secure lines of communication and relief convoys in the zone.

Rules of engagement would clearly spell out the authority of the UN force commander to defend the humanitarian mission, to include UN forces, camps and displaced persons being protected.

The concept relies on the following assumptions:

- [a] the current UNAMIR force would remain in Kigali to help negotiate a political settlement and provide the overall force commander;
- [b] well trained, disciplined troops will be available for the mission;
- [c] the UN has RPF/RGF permission to establish the zone in Rwanda, and Burundi permission to establish base operations in, and allow logistic support of secure zone through, Burundi;
- [d] UNHCR would run the camps, and the UN force would only provide security; and

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- 3 -

[e] the UN and the NGOs would be responsible for transportation and distribution of humanitarian supplies into Rwanda, while the UN force would provide its own logistic support.

The UN force would debark in Burundi, establish a forward support base near the Rwandan border, and conduct operations to establish a secure zone for the displaced persons camps. About 6,000-6,500 UN force personnel per 100,000 refugees/displaced persons would be required.

This option does not address the fate of those in enclaves elsewhere in Rwanda. UNAMIR forces in Kigali would continue their responsibility for the safety of persons currently under their protection.

III. The operation without force

In the third option, the UN and various NGOs would facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Rwandan refugees in neighboring countries and ensure that they have safe havens outside Rwanda. This would not involve the use of troops. The U.S. would probably provide airlift outside Rwanda on a reimbursable basis, as well as substantial funding.


The international community would see this option as nothing different from what is already being done. Support for this option would probably leave the U.S. isolated on the Security Council. This option, like option 2, also would not address the problem how to rescue those within Rwanda, including the people in the Kigali stadium and other enclaves.

Analysis of guidelines for U.S. decision to support

1. Whether UN involvement advances U.S. interests, and an international community of interest exists for dealing with the problem on a multilateral basis.

-- For option 1, YES. The U.S. has a general interest in the maintenance of peace and stability in the region and a strong humanitarian interest. Both the UN Security Council and the OAU are exploring peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance options. Neighboring states, led by Tanzania and supported by the U.S., are pressing for a resumption of the Arusha peace talks.

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- 4 -

- For option 2, the same.
- For option 3, the same.

OSD agrees with State's assessment. However, we believe sending in 5,000-15,000 troops represents a commitment which may exceed the U.S.' "general interest in the maintenance of peace and stability in the region."


2. Whether there is a threat to or breach of international peace and security, often of a regional character, defined as one or a combination of the following: (a) international aggression; (b) urgent humanitarian disaster coupled with violence; or (c) sudden interruption of established democracy or gross violation of human rights coupled with violence, or threat of violence.

- For option 1, YES. The killing of over 100,000 people over the past month, with many more continuing to be at risk, and the need for humanitarian assistance for up to 500,000 refugees and displaced persons, constitute a humanitarian disaster coupled with violence. The death of the Rwandan President and subsequent assassination of much of Rwanda's political opposition constituted a sudden and unexpected interruption of the democratic process. The wholesale slaughter of civilians constituted a gross violation of human rights coupled with violence and the threat thereof.
- For option 2, the same.
- For option 3, the same.

3. Whether there are clear objectives and an understanding of where the mission fits on the spectrum between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

- For option 1, NOT YET. We have not seen a clearly developed concept. Those who have developed the idea believe that it could be a Chapter VI operation, but it is hard to see how it could remain that way in a civil war. A Kigali-based operation would likely require a Chapter VII mandate unless the warring sides were to acquiesce in the UN mission. Even then it would require a robust Chapter VI mandate, given the

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- 5 -

Interim Government's lack of command and control over renegade army units and extremist militias.

- For option 2, NOT YET. This is a possible U.S. proposed alternative to option 1, and, therefore, if we believe it preferable, we ourselves would need to develop the mission statement further, and define where on the peace operations spectrum it should fit. Since this force is designed to operate outside the area of maximum confrontation between the government and rebel forces, it would be less likely to provoke major confrontation with either side than option 1, and would be more likely, therefore, to operate within a Chapter VI mandate, albeit at the rougher end of the peacekeeping part of this spectrum.

Joint Staff believes that the establishment of a protective zone would be very likely to provoke major confrontation with the Presidential Guard, militias and roving gangs intent on continued slaughter of moderate Hutus and Tutsis. Therefore, Chapter VII rules of engagement and mandate would likely be required.


- For option 3, NO. This would be neither peacekeeping nor peace enforcement. How the mission could operate without any force component is also unclear.

OSD believes that both options 1 and 2 would be Chapter VII operations undertaken by African forces with robust rules of engagement, and that option 3 is not going to stop the killings.

4. Whether, if UNAMIR is to remain a Chapter VI peacekeeping operation, a cease-fire is in place; or, if it is to become a Chapter VII peace enforcement operation, the threat to international peace and security is considered significant.

- For option 1, NO on Chapter VI. No cease-fire is in place, and, given the lack of command and control exercised by the Interim Government over renegade military forces and Hutu militia, it is debatable how effective a cease-fire would be.

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- 6 -

- For option 1, YES on Chapter VII. A significant threat does exist to international peace and security. The refugee flows threaten to overwhelm resources in neighboring states. The violence in Rwanda also threatens to spill over into neighboring Burundi.
- For option 2, NO on Chapter VI. No cease-fire is in place. Option 2 is designed to put forces in areas of minimum confrontation between the warring parties. The issue whether Chapter VI is applicable devolves, therefore, on whether each of the parties is prepared to accept a UN presence.

Joint Staff believes that agreement of Rwandan government to cease-fire proposal could not necessarily be considered to constitute assent by Presidential Guard, hard-line Hutu militias, and roving gangs behind government lines, all of whom have been implicated in slaughter. To date, Government forces unable to control mass killings of Tutsis and moderate Hutu. Joint Staff position underscores Option 2 as probable Chapter VII operation, especially on Rwanda-Burundi border, where possibility of confrontation with Hutu extremists likely to be greatest.

- For option 2, YES on international significance.
- For option 3, NO on the cease-fire.

5. Whether the means to accomplish the mission are available, including the forces, financing and a mandate appropriate to the mission.

- For option 1, UNCLEAR. The availability of adequate numbers and quality of troops for this mission is questionable. Nigeria has offered a battalion, and Zimbabwean and Ghanaian battalions are said to be available. The UN and OAU are optimistic that sufficient forces can be found. Experience in Somalia suggests, however, that a Chapter VII operation would require a U.S. or Western European combat capability, which appears unlikely in Rwanda. Sufficient financing for a Chapter VII mission also is doubtful.

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- 7 -

It may be available for a Chapter VI mission. The UN Secretariat estimates a cost for the first six months of \$115 million for this option. A hybrid of a voluntary fund and assessed contributions is possible in order to access money authorized for the existing assessment for UNAMIR. The U.S. theoretically could provide up to \$173.3 million in DoD drawdown, PKO and CIPA assistance. We also have up to \$60 million in reallocation authority, although this will mean reducing or eliminating other programs.


-- For option 2, MORE LIKELY. While this option may require at least as many forces as option 1, the military character is different and the quality of forces need not be so high.

Joint Staff believes just the opposite. Forces will be in peace enforcement role protecting displaced Tutsis and moderate Hutus from roving gang, militias, and Presidential Guard; will require clearing secure zones, searching and disarming (if necessary) displaced Rwandans allowed into camps, and then protecting those camps. Questions about how displaced Rwandans get to camps have yet to be answered. Any intent to have UN/OAU forces go out and bring back displaced Rwandans to camps will require operations in territory controlled by Rwandan government troops and possible direct confrontation with gangs, militias and Presidential Guard forces.

Moreover, assuming RPF remains true to stated intent of continuing Southward movement to punish "rogues" who have committed slaughter, expect Presidential Guard, militias and gangs to retreat in face of advance and attempt to seek refuge in UN-held camps. Significant possibility exists for PKO forces to conflict with either extremist Hutus, or with RPF should RPF believe extremists are seeking safe haven in camps.

Need to remain neutral under above situations will continuously challenge Option 2 forces. Therefore, quality and capability of troops performing mission must be as high as, if not higher than, those posited for Option 1.

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- 8 -

OSD disagrees with State's analysis for options 1 and 2. We believe "NO" is the correct answer for both. While option 1 is almost a repeat of the Somalia experience and is therefore unlikely to generate much support, State presents a faulty argument for option 2 that may be misleading. State asserts that option 2 may require at least as many forces as option 1, but that the military character is different and the quality of forces need not be so high. We strongly disagree that forces charged with protection of displaced persons in only a "semi-permissive" environment (facing uncontrolled gangs, the Presidential Guard, and militias) do not need the training, equipment, or support that a force operating in a non-permissive environment requires. Furthermore, there is no evidence outside of Boutros-Ghali's optimism, that support, forces and equipment, can be marshaled for any large operation in Rwanda.

-- For option 3, N/A.

6. Whether the political, economic and humanitarian consequences of inaction by the international community have been weighed and are considered unacceptable.


-- For option 1, YES. The international community clearly views what is happening in Rwanda as a humanitarian disaster of the highest magnitude and considers inaction to be unacceptable.

-- For option 2, the same.

-- For option 3, the same. But option 3 may be viewed as inaction.

OSD agrees that inaction is unacceptable, however, we do not believe that our present activities (or option 3) are "inaction."

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7. Whether the operation's anticipated duration is tied to clear objectives and realistic guidelines for ending the operation.

- For option 1, NO. The duration of each is tied to a restoration of sufficient order in Rwanda to allow return of refugees and the absence of serious threat to humanitarian efforts. While criteria are clear enough, the time by which to meet them would be indeterminate.
- For option 2, the same.
- For option 3, the same.


PDD guidelines for U.S. participation

On the assumption that U.S. participation is highly unlikely, this paper does not consider the PDD guidelines for U.S. participation.

Resources available from the U.S.

The U.S. has the following resources available:

- \$75,000,000 FAA Sec. 506(a)(1) DoD drawdown
- \$75,000,000 FAA Sec. 506(a)(2) DoD drawdown
- \$10,000,000 Unspent UNAMIR CIPA
- \$13,000,000 Unspent Sec. 551 Haiti PKO account
- \$ 700,000 Unspent Sec. 552(c)(2) DoD drawdown
- \$173,700,000 Funds/Drawdown Authority Available
- \$15,000,000 Sec. 552(c)(1) reallocation authority
- \$45,000,000 Sec. 451(a)(1) reallocation authority
- \$60,000,000 Total reallocation authorized
- \$233,000,000 Total Funds/Drawdown/Reallocation



DRAFT

**PRICE & AVAILABILITY DATA FOR
50 M113A2 ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS (APCS)
FOR UN/UNAMIR TROOPS IN RWANDA**

<u>Equipment</u>	<u>Equipment Qty</u>	<u>Purchase Price</u>	<u>Monthly Lease Cost</u>
1. APC, M113A2	50	\$ 8,961,900	\$ 45,950
M2 Machine Gun	50	424,650	4,328
M3 Mach. Gun Mount	50	25,750	
Radio, AN/VRC-46	50	404,700	3,500
M259 Smoke Grenade Launcher	50	18,250	50
AN/PVS-5C Night Vision Goggle	50	221,176	4,425
Gun Shield Kits (Note 1)	50	227,750	227,750
2. Support Equipment (Note 2)		1,804,262	1,804,262
3. Ammunition		287,432	287,432
4. Transportation (Note 3)		6,617,052	6,617,052
a. M113A2 SAM flight, Frankfurt-Kigali Return by Ship, Mombasa-CONUS Packing, Crating and Handling (PC&H), Est. Cost \$3,153,337			
b. M2 Machine Gun and Mount Air transport, CONUS-Kigali, (PC&H), Est. Cost \$60,000			
c. Radios Air transport, CONUS-Kigali PC&H, Est. Cost \$29,200			
d. Grenade Launcher, M259 Air transport, CONUS/Kigali PC&H, Est. Cost \$5,515			
e. CSRs and other support equip. Air transport, CONUS-Kigali, Est. Cost \$2,617,000			
f. Material staging and consolidation in CONUS Est. Cost \$112,000			

DRAFT


g. Ammo, 1 SAM flight, C-5
aircraft, CONUS to Kigali
Est. Cost \$640,000

5. Mobile Training Team (Note 4)	<u>250,327</u>	<u>250,327</u>
Total Estimated P&A Cost	\$19,243,249	\$9,245,076

NOTES:

1. Gun Shield Kits - the P&A estimate does not include an estimated cost for installation. Also, the U.S. Army is researching the availability of these kits.
2. Support Equipment and Services - the P&A data provides for a 6 months spare parts package, tools, quality assurance team, refurbishment prior to shipment and prior to return to conus, pre-shipment inspection and repair, and decontamination of equipment upon return to the U.S.
3. Transportation - the CONUS/Kigali transport costs for machine guns, smoke grenade launchers, and radios may be reduced as they have been identified as available in Germany, and could presumably be shipped with the APCs for at a lesser cost. The estimates provided do not cover ground transport in Europe, Rwanda or to Mombasa at the end of the lease.
4. Mobile Training Team (MTT) - the P&A data provides for operator and maintenance training for 35 days in country.
5. Location/condition of vehicles identified by USAEUR - USAEUR has identified 50 each M113A2 APCs in Fully Mission Capable condition at the following locations:

1st Combat Equipment Group, Mannheim GE	5 each
3rd CEG, Karlsruhe, GE	14 each
6th CEG, Miesau, GE	31 each



Rwanda

5/24/94

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E.O. 13526, 1.4(c)

- RPF admitted no intention of holding ceasefire, want to save as many lives as possible. Want resistance stopped in Kigali to dissuade UN from basing in Kigali, + keeping GFA pinned down. (Jim Woods act)

Igor Rizzo's meeting = unproductive

A lot of bodies in Lake Kivu as well as Lake Victoria

Final number of dead - likely to be 500,000

E.O. 13526, 1.4(c)

JG - brief new plans for RPF - try to get 1 page TPs + concepts
Spec. Act. w/ Kofi (un-paper from @ UN)

- meeting of Dallaire + USG options

✓ - Dallaire's Phase I (UN as Neutral Conty; plan to be later + depend in Kigali)

forces already there; assist in ensuring (w/o protecting) degree of security. Airport

- Tell UN that Dallaire's Phase II has merit, but would be too risky stretched defending LOC

+ themselves + not help large # of people

→ make it Phase II of deployment

✓ - Phase II - Deployment along border of Burundi (Bukuru corridor) Safe Haven in vicinity of Bukuru w/ log base in Burundi

✓ - Phase III - after some time, with > political accord + CF. Move safe haven log base to close out Kigali - operate out of Kigali in support of safe haven

- All pull back from safe area to Kigali

✓ - Phase IV - open up accendian + deploy at free

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Hope safe houses = silent
area mission
(eg. 1 month)
L. R. K. (to go)

- Allow them to make greater use of 4,750 who are not already in Kigali.
- Timing of phases depends on political progress.

Questions

How avoid being a magnet?

- problem. But better able to get forces in + get relief to them.

How do you convince RPF concern that not area + be protected?

get numbers escape into
- remember weapons in order to come into safe areas

What to outside Kigali in Phase VI?

- UNCOMROL; HR monitor
- investigate / detain / return

- protect at risk people
- provide security for humanitarian relief

Phase III/IV - Require RPF stays in Kigali

→ want to understand
but to require
monitor

Can RPF agree to fire above 2,500 limit? Possible

If no Binindi agreement, fall back to safe areas out of other neighboring countries of Tanz.

Not doing as much good.
But way of showing we care, but not get into Kigali.

Ruanda 5/31/94

FACT SHEET
ERONA &

RPF delaying political negotiations until T. hrs / Increasingly recalcitrant
- little incentive to negotiate (about to seize Kigali + G. tarans)
- fired on UN convoys evacuating displaced women
1 Senegalese soldier killed in x-fire

Douglas: militias = out of control
Nairobi: 09554 today
met w/ Ashood 5000 troop # not viable
rejected safe haven idea as protecting militia members

Huge mass movement G. tarans → Rutana


Burundi: tensions building
Huts going to Burundi almost certain to be killed by Tutsi

not there next week
Tanganyika - people in Rutana but not mass as expected.
(Monday)

OSD: APCs - Army is unlikely to procure + lease:
46 M113 A-2 conventionally configured
w/ 3 ~~REC~~ Recovery vehicles, M578
1 Ambulance M113

no dozens? 50
Cost to ship in = huge, if OS ships → Uganda
UN could also use FL-76's (as in Somalia)

preparation
lease ~~documents~~
completed this week.
Spare parts document
next week.



Traveling concept → what is max speed we can provide same ports of vehicles - (OSS will look into.)

Thursday meeting w/ Kofi - on demand to Burundi/Uganda.

Refugees - massive flow both. - CNN looks huge.

annual intake. (he claimed over 50,000)

Humanitarians left to Bujumbura + Aqilat/Port capacity.

- Lawson → charge - discussions = organizing ~~boats~~

are levels discussed adequate??

→ JA Review we need > space to

accept his mission (humanitarian + consumer) in truly fashion.

Demand to Paris

to reinforce embargo - w/ Zaire.

we've done a lot w/ Museveni.

UNDPED Rwanda 6/31

Riza: RPF guide advance; swift retreat of RPF
country divided into 2

- RPF zone = empty - people concentrated in camps, being screened for those who committed atrocities
- Govt zone - vast # of refugees - having fled loyalty + RPF advance
- confusion in gov't zone. (self-opted gov't in Butare; with control beyond Gov't + Butare)

Humanitarian Ops have started in RPF areas

(UNOS + UN agencies) under rather stringent RPF zones → caution mentioned
+ some to RPF personnel

Little humanitarian support in RPF zones (camps of 20-50,000)

no organized humanitarian ops. } when we decide, major effort
must be made

1.5-2.0 mill = internally displaced - mainly in RPF

400,000 - Refugees mainly Tang, but also in Bur./Zaire → getting
abst

Most folks @ risk = D.P.s in control part of RPF zones.

RPF refuses any contact w/ humanitarian govt.

Geoffie - RPF did agree to talk to military commanders in Kigali as only
instit. w/ any extent of control, but no political negotiations

Deployment Plan

- only 35 observers = deployed; others could not deploy b/c not able to deploy safely or w/ a role to play. → No tasks for them to perform.

UN - must go outside Kigali

- Task: secure Rwandan people + help w/ humanitarian
- concept needs to adapt to war over which we have no control
 - go asap + do as much as possible to save lives.

Rwandans agreed to cooperate + to deployment of mission

Airport in Kigali in RPF hands for last 10 days - won't give away but will share. Have secured immediate perimeter.

- in artillery range + possibly mortar (5 shells last night)
- runway limited (but not disabled) capability
- airport operational

Phase I - needs to happen asap. - concept needs to be finalized + deployment adjusted

- guards > security in Kigali. Needs less b/c some DP's have moved into RPF territory

- airport secured by RPF - only need 1 Coy @ airport

1-2 Coy → go outside to Rwandan area (20,000 in nearby in Kigali area)

- Sending Coy only w/ consent of govt among gendarmes. Must try to see how files will react.

- Face lower profile - be can go. if RPA have control + agree.

but if a whole, but may be able to a video

Phase I+II = simultaneous of fire delay

Can't come into Kajali (use Zaire, Burundi or Uganda) ⇒ too risky + difficult

1 mech. batt } will depend on C.F.
1 motorized batt } - waiting if CF using observers
- if not, ?

- Humanitarian/Security role ^{to be effective} has to happen in context of C.F.
- If paralyzed, no faster deployment - if possible create base up now

Op must be totally flexible - we don't know what's going to happen

Deployment

- Kajali can't take it, although would like to
- Have contact w/ get of Uganda roads, have food/fuel contacts
can use Entebbe + Rijunetura (a little unstable now, maybe had @ 1st)
- Zaire = too unstable, had to get fuel - could use if necessary

Phase I+II: have to come from 2 entry pts: Kajali + Uganda, Burundi

- difficult to get W.G. support - looking (looking most promising)

@ BTR ⇒ 2 hours flying away

- looking @ log base outside hands until safe (Uganda etc.)

- if we use Uganda as base, R.F. unit be happy.

Troop availability / equipment

Ethiopia }
Zair } same
 } no
 } equip

- Ghana (no name) batts - no equip
- Senegal (no name) batts - no equip
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY NO. APCS,

no equipment

Italy, Netherlands = adding C130s to Canadian planes } purely humanitarian
+ UNAMIR
resupply

Canada likely to give commercial's squadron

Russia may provide helicopter corp + strategic airlift

Key element: ceasefire or not.

- RPF not likely to occupy whole country. Want to discredit gov't in Garam

IF:

- Ceasefire = bad to operators; people may begin to go back. Humanitarian assistance = possible

Scenario 1

Scenario 2

- If fighting continues ("unlikely") = v. different + will have to judge what we do. (e.g. do we bring in 3rd phase)

V. difficult to have precise clarity on op. plans.

Step: Def. ceasefire?

Riza: - killings must stop; RPF must demonstrate commitment to end killing

- agreement H.W. RPF/RPF ceasefire.

- Radio incitement must stop + tell people to stop killing + will punish offenders

- clean up militias

Step: Phase III - not conditioned on ceasefire, but Phase III is

Step: - 1st time we fail to get Ruge + bitacame, we've lost credibility. Way that will come is also

Panic to collapse. RPF don't have to... Clinton Library Photocopy... would lift militias from Ruge of threat to us.

UN issues → Safe zones - UN ^{protection} protection in areas where DP are concentrated

These actively under attack

Step

- take care of these kinds of
Ruanda - wherever

Number of safe zones

UN presence may give ^{RBF} courage to bring militia under control. - safe however

Dailliance

doesn't want to be based into to any particular area

Step = Ok - we don't want to pinpoint any spot

Do we want to est. safe areas where it's already safe (Step - yes) ?

or do we want to go to unsafe areas + create safe areas (eg. Somalia) ? (No ~~54~~)

Riza

We can't wait for C.F. Can't retain credibility - Our approach = deploy -

Step - CF ≠ prerequisite of deployment. Can do what we're due in legal.

W/ ceasefire we can do much more.

- Go where threatened people are.

Phase I + II - ceasefire doesn't matter

Phase III - next steps depend on treaty or c.f.

UN will
Need consent/cooperation of parties

Bonus - ch. VI + VII - mixed

UN unwilling to wait for R. ceasefire

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UN = not going to take them on + stop killing;
Riza: No intent to place offensive operations; we can't do it

Report - has to be clear: on Cl. 6. operati- in Cl. VII environment

@ immediate risk = estimated $[150,000 +]$

Need defined objectives, def. success, progress

Report - mandate limited

Obj. don't use success - issue = when do we say that country has done enough?
+ people can carry on

Use 60 APCs in Somalia → hands
get spares, new guns + new replace in Somalia
from Europe.

N.S. = lease

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

14-Jun-1994 11:50 EDT

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MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

**FROM: Donald K. Steinberg
(STEINBERG)**

SUBJECT: Points for POTUS with Members

Jeremy:

Attached is a page of talking points on Rwanda. We need to get a decision from Tony on the bracketted language -- not only for the meeting with the Members, but for public as well. I think it would do the President well to stand up himself and say that genocide has occurred in Rwanda. Period. He is in the unique position to break through the goobledy-gook that the rest of us are required to say. If he does it, it will make it seem like he himself is frustrated over the bureaucracy's inability to call a spade a spade -- that would be a good thing...We have addressed below the question of what obligation that entails, or if he thinks we are responding adequately.

Don

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Rwanda

- I've been deeply concerned over the continuing tragedy in Rwanda. We have are providing \$68 million in humanitarian assistance for Rwandan refugees, including food, medicine, blankets and other supplies. Our military is flying in three planeloads a day of food into Burundi.
 - o This is by far the lion's share of the humanitarian relief effort. Our efforts have helped to save lives throughout the neighboring countries.
 - o We've also sent disaster relief teams into Rwanda to assist the distribution of humanitarian relief there.

- We share the frustration over the slowness in drawing together an international peacekeeping force. That is why we've been so involved in the process of getting peacekeepers into Rwanda. The Vice President's meeting with UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali, OAU Secretary General Salim Salim and Tanzanian President Mwinyi in South Africa on May 10 helped drive this process, leading to a UNSC Resolution less than a week later to authorize 5500 troops.
 - o We've helped the UN planning process and mobilized to provide equipment, airlift, training and financial support for the operation.
 - o We've contacted numerous African countries to get their support for the mission. We're helping the UN peacekeeping secretariat coordinate the dozen or so country forces that have to be merged into this mission.
 - o We previously sent military equipment in Europe to assist its quick delivery. For example, we have 50 armored personnel carriers for this mission in Germany about to be shipped to Kampala, where they will be used for the training of Ghanaian troops and driven to Kigali.

- We have every reason to believe that [acts of genocide have] [genocide has] occurred in Rwanda, as defined under the 1948 convention. That's why we've supported so strongly the introduction of 5500 UN peacekeepers into Rwanda and why we have urged the U.N. Human Rights Commission to send a special rapporteur to Rwanda to investigate these acts of genocide and ensure that those responsible for acts of genocide be held accountable for their deeds.
 - o (if asked) The Genocide Convention does not impose a

responsibility on the part of any government to take any specific action. We believe that creation of the peacekeeping force, the appointment of a special rapporteur and our massive humanitarian assistance effort is an appropriate response.

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
Operations Center

DRAFT

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

DATE: Thursday, June 16, 1994

TIME: 1915 EDT

PARTICIPANTS: The Deputy Secretary and French FM Chief of Staff de Villepin

SUBJECT: French Proposal for Intervention in Rwanda

The Deputy Secretary, at the request of the Secretary, telephoned the Quai d'Orsay to return Foreign Minister Juppe's call. In Juppe's absence, the Deputy Secretary spoke with Juppe's Chief of Staff, de Villepin.

De Villepin told the Deputy Secretary that Juppe wanted to discuss the French proposal to intervene militarily in Rwanda. De Villepin said the French are concerned that the massacres in Rwanda are continuing while the international community attempts to mobilize an expanded UNAMIR force. He said UNSYG Boutros-Ghali has been trying everything possible to expand the force quickly, but the French anticipate that this will not occur for several weeks, and that the cease-fire which the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and interim GOR announced in Tunis June 15 will not be implemented.

De Villepin said that, given this context, the GOF feels it is not possible to wait any longer to deploy a force in Rwanda to stop the killing. France is seeking to fill the gap until the expanded UNAMIR force being assembled can arrive in Rwanda. Therefore, France is proposing to provide troops for immediate deployment, with the cooperation of the major EU nations, African nations, and any other countries which wish to assist or participate, including the U.S. The force would go within the framework and with the support of the UN. De Villepin stated that Boutros-Ghali has signaled his support for this initiative. The French see a number of possible options for securing the UN's explicit approval, such as through a UNSC resolution, or through a letter from Boutros-Ghali to the President of the UNSC.

De Villepin said that this proposal is not rigid, and can evolve as necessary in its implementation. He stressed that the goal is to stop the violence immediately and that this intervention would be for the limited time necessary to fill the gap until the arrival of the expanded UNAMIR force. Countries wishing to participate could contribute men, materiel, logistical support, or even humanitarian aid. A maximum of 2,000 men are needed, with a first stage deployment of 500 troops to go into the areas where the worst massacres are occurring, and to begin evacuating those people most at risk to the countries bordering Rwanda.

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De Villepin asked the Deputy Secretary what the U.S. positions are on the situation in Rwanda in general, and the French proposal in particular.

The Deputy Secretary thanked de Villepin for his clear presentation of the French proposal. He said the U.S. shares the GOF's outrage, anguish, and impatience over the situation in Rwanda, and agrees that the international community must react quickly. The Deputy Secretary said the U.S. is doing everything possible to expedite the deployment of the expanded UNAMIR force, and gave as an example the preparations for delivery of 50 armored personnel carriers, which may start arriving in Rwanda as soon as June 22.

E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)

De Villepin stated that the GOF contacted both parties on June 16 to make clear that France has no political agenda, and was proposing this intervention on purely humanitarian grounds. The Deputy Secretary then asked how soon the GOF thought troops could be on the ground under this proposal. De Villepin said deployment by June 20 or 22 is feasible; he thought the urgent dispatch of the troops was of the greatest importance. On the subject of the UN, de Villepin repeated that it is imperative to make this intervention a coordinated mission sanctioned by the UNSC, and said that France feels it is on the same wavelength as Boutros-Ghali.

The Deputy Secretary asked which nations, particularly African nations, might be willing to participate. De Villepin answered that the GOF was in contact with Senegal, Benin, and Ghana, which appeared ready to contribute troops; he felt that, based on discussions France had at the OAU summit in Tunis, there would not be a problem in getting African support.

E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)

E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)

France and the developing nations consider the situation nothing less than horrendous, and are ready to intervene to stop the carnage.

The Deputy Secretary said he appreciated de Villepin's position, and promised to pass the information on to the Secretary, in order that the Department may respond to Paris in full by early June 17. De Villepin expressed his thanks, and hoped the U.S. would be able to help with coordination in the UN, as well as to participate in the intervention.

The call concluded at 1731 EDT.

Drafted:MPZorick

Approved:GNSibley

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DECL: OADR

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**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
Operations Center**

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

DATE: Friday, June 17, 1994

TIME: 1416 EDT

PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary and French FM Juppe

SUBJECT: France's Rwanda Initiative; Bosnia Peace Process

**MEMCON
1st DRAFT**

Foreign Minister Juppe called the Secretary from Abidjan to discuss France's Rwanda initiative. The Secretary told Juppe he had been fully briefed by Deputy Secretary Talbott. The Secretary said he admires the initiative and wanted to lend it his support. He has spoken to Ambassador Albright and instructed her to support France's efforts to achieve approval of a UNSC resolution sanctioning the operation.

The Secretary said U.S. support of the effort will be logistical in nature and promised that 50 APCs would be airlifted to Rwanda, beginning June 19.

E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)

Juppe told the Secretary he had spoken to UNSYG Boutros-Ghali, who supports the French initiative. Boutros-Ghali believes there will be a need for a UNSC resolution authorizing states to undertake a humanitarian mission to Rwanda, similar to other resolutions issued in the past. Juppe said Italy and Senegal had expressed willingness to contribute troops to this operation, and added


E.O. 13526, 1.4(b), E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)
He said African countries had expressed political support for France's moves.

E.O. 13526, 1.4(b), E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)

E.O. 13526, 1.4(b), E.O. 13526, 1.4(d) Juppe stressed that the operation is a purely humanitarian mission of short duration, intended to put an end to the genocide. France has no desire to install its forces for a long period in Rwanda. The operation will halt the slaughter, restoring a degree of order and paving the way for a full-fledged UN peace-keeping operation.

**SECRET/NO DIS
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The Secretary shifted the conversation to the Bosnia Contact Group meeting in London. He was encouraged by reports that the Contact Group had made progress in outlining a map of the disputed territory. However, no consensus has been reached about how to proceed if one side in the conflict accepts the map and the other does not. The Secretary asserted that it is necessary to encourage the Contact Group to continue to work on a map and also develop an approach to deal with the consequences of any disagreement over the map's outlines. No high-level meeting should occur until both issues are resolved.

Juppe agreed that the reports from London on the work of the Contact Group were encouraging and no high-level meeting should take place in the absence of an agreement on both the map and consequences. He stressed that much depends on a shared U.S.-French viewpoint and that we should strive for a late June date for a high-level meeting on Bosnia.

The call concluded at 1426 EDT.

Drafted:JKFuller

Approved:MRKennon

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DECL: OADR

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
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POINTS ON RWANDA FOR THE SECRETARY FOR TELCON WITH FM JUPPE
Friday, June 17, 1994

Handwritten: 11/2 00
6/17

- We agree that there is an immediate need to stop the killings in Rwanda and that this must be our first priority.
- For this reason, we support your proposed plan for a multinational French-led force to intervene now and "bridge" the gap until the regular UNAMIR contingents can arrive.
- In order to assure the success of the mission and the full support of the international community, we recommend you address the following issues:
 - The mission should have the sanction of the UN and should be fully coordinated with UNAMIR. We would prefer a Security Council resolution authorizing the mission.
 - We agree that other countries should contribute troops to this initiative, and we urge you to have as broad a participation as possible. We are encouraged to hear that the Senegalese and perhaps others have agreed to join.
 - You should continue to talk to the RPF to make clear your purely humanitarian purpose and try to obtain their approval for the mission. [Redacted: E.O. 13526, 1.4(b), E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)]
[Redacted: E.O. 13526, 1.4(b), E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)]
 - You should make similar efforts to enlist the support of Rwanda's neighbors [Redacted: E.O. 13526, 1.4(b), E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)] Again, we are prepared to help.
[Redacted: E.O. 13526, 1.4(b), E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)]
 - [Redacted: E.O. 13526, 1.4(b), E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)]
[Redacted: E.O. 13526, 1.4(b), E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)] Therefore, you should continue to make clear that this initiative is not intended in any way to intervene in the fighting between government forces and the RPF or to support the government or its forces.
 - In the meantime, we need to accelerate efforts to deploy an expanded UNAMIR. We are working hard to help expedite deployment. We have completed the lease with the UN for 50 Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) and hope to start delivery next week.
 - We are looking at equipment needs, particularly for the Ghanaian battalion, which we are trying to get on the ground as soon as possible. We will do our best to help equip them and hope you can do the same with other contingents.
 - The U.S. has no intention of sending troops into Rwanda.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
SUBJECT: Rwanda: Daily Report

Situation in Goma

-- **Water** production and distribution was up again today to 100,000 gallons per day. Trucks for distribution of water remain in short supply, but more vehicles are due to arrive in the region on the weekend. Additional water production units should arrive Thursday, but we are still far from the overall objective of 3.4 million gallons per day.

-- **Aircraft sorties** are up, but the runway capacity at Goma continues to be a limiting factor. We are awaiting the recommendation of the Kigali survey team before making a final decision on opening that airport to the relief effort. Aviation fuel in theater may also become a problem. Rapid turn-around of aircraft at forward bases requires forward deployed fuel and therefore additional aircraft and fuel bladders. EUCOM is working on this problem.

-- **Additional Water Supplies** will also start arriving by ship on Saturday in Mombassa, Kenya. These supplies include water purification equipment, water pipes, tanker trucks and general purpose trucks. This equipment will then either be trucked or, possibly, helicopter-lifted to Goma and elsewhere to avoid taking up valuable runway space.


U.S. Deployment

-- **925 U.S. Special Forces Troops** will begin arriving in Goma over the weekend to provide medical, communications and other support as well as to help control refugee flows.

-- **A full U.S. Engineering Battalion** should begin arriving on Friday with bulldozers and other heavy equipment to assist with burials.

Efforts to Galvanize Support for UNHCR's 8 Requirements

Following your letter last weekend, we have continued to press in foreign capitals for contributions to fulfill UNHCR's other 4 requirements-- those that the U.S. is not addressing. UNHCR is holding a pledging and coordination meeting in Geneva on Friday.



Political Efforts

Assistant Secretary George Moose will travel with Secretary Perry to Zaire and then continue on to Kigali to meet with representatives of the new government. He will stress four themes:

- The importance of government support for the humanitarian relief effort;
- The need to expand the government's political base to ensure that it is adequately representative;
- The need to respect the rule of law and refrain from reprisals against adversaries;
- The importance of creating a secure and stable environment for the return of refugees.

The NGO Briefing

-- **Thursday's briefing for NGOs was a great success.** Shali's presentation was excellent. He was applauded by the NGOs. They also had some good ideas about better coordination, encouraging the UN to do more, etc. We will continue the dialogue here and with the UN in New York.

-- **The NGOs went out to the press afterward and praised our effort.** Even Lionel Rosenblatt who has been a frequent critic expressed his support for our efforts. With some breathing space from some of our critics, we should now have time to produce even more results.

-- Given the response to Shali's briefing, we plan to replicate it tomorrow in the White House Press Room.