

Case Number: 2014-0546-M

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2720				
Document ID: 9902374				
Stack: v	Row: 46	Section: 4	Shelf: 2	Position: 3

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. cable	re: Message to President Yeltsin (3 pages)	04/03/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001b. cable	re: Message to President Boris Yeltsin (2 pages)	04/03/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001c. memo	Samuel Berger to POTUS re: Message to President Yeltsin (1 page)	04/01/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001d. cable	[Duplicate of 001a] (2 pages)	04/03/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001e. cable	[Duplicate of 001a] (2 pages)	04/03/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001f. cable	[Duplicate of 001a] (2 pages)	04/03/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001g. cable	[Duplicate of 001a] [incomplete copy] (1 page)	04/03/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001h. cable	[Duplicate of 001a] (2 pages)	04/03/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001i. memo	[Duplicate of 001c] (1 page)	04/01/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001j. cable	[Duplicate of 001a] (2 pages)	04/03/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kosovo and Yeltsin])
OA/Box Number: 2720

FOLDER TITLE:

9902374

2014-0546-M

rs1048

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9902374
RECEIVED: 01 APR 99 11

TO: YELTSIN, BORIS

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 03 APR 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

KOSOVO

PERSONS: IVANOV, IGOR

SUBJECT: CABLE RE KOSOVO

ACTION: CABLE SENT VIA SIT ROOM

DUE DATE: 07 APR 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PASCUAL

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BLINKEN
KAUFMAN
NSC CHRON
PASCUAL
SCHULTE

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSVJD

CLOSED BY: NSTSM

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KSM/NARA, Date 10/2/2018
2014-0546-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9902374

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001
002

Z 99040120 FOR SIGNATURE
X 99040715 BERGER APPROVED RECOM
X 99040715 CABLE SENT VIA SIT ROOM

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 990403 YELTSIN, BORIS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Receipt

Prep for transmission
but don't transmit
until 0700 Moscow
time 3 April.

2200
~~4000~~ Thanks
KJc

TRANSMITTED AT 0701 AM
moscow time

Ament moscow acknowledged
Receipt at 07:16 AM
moscow time

-JD

National Security Council
The White House

4/1 2/17 4/2 0905 1342

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 2374
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM RBS NSC INT ARS
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG DMK A/O _____

Tmt

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Rice Jacobson	1	D 4/1	copy done
Davies			
Kerrick			
Steinberg			
Berger	2		
Situation Room	3		
West Wing Desk	4	4/2	N/R
Records Mgt.	5	4/7	N
~~Passant~~	#		

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

POTUS msg to Yeltsin

1996 APR 10 8:25

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

National Security Council
The White House

4/4
2/1/7
4/2
0905
1342

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 2374
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM RBS NSC INT ARS
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG DMK AO _____

Tmt

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Rice Jacobson	1	D 4/1	copy done
Davies			
Kerrick			
Steinberg			
Berger	2		
Situation Room	3		
West Wing Desk	4	4 1/2	✓ NIR
Records Mgt.	5	4/7	

Receipt

TRANSMITTED AT 07:01 AM
moscow time

Prep for transmission
but don't transmit
until 0700 Moscow
time 3 April.

Ambassador Moscow acknowledged
Receipt at 07:16 AM
moscow time

2200
~~thought~~ Thanks
KJC

-JD

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: BERGER COMM COSGRIFF DAVIES FUERTH HACHIGIAN KERRICK RICEE SIT
STEINBERG SUTPHEN

SIT: ALLEN BELL BENJAMIN BLACK BRADEN BRODY BROWN BUSBY BUTLER COQ
DAVIDSON ELKIND FARANDA FICKLIN FLANAGAN GUARNIERI HASMAN HURLEY KAUFMAN
MILLER PASCUAL SAPIRO SCHULTE SEGAL SUM2 VACCARO WEISS
SIT: NSC

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 030300Z APR 99

FM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC

TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW NIACT
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NIACT
QQQQ

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0546-M (1.01)
10/2/2013 KBH

AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM
PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL
BE PROVIDED.

BEGIN TEXT:

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN

DEAR BORIS:

I AM WRITING TO YOU AGAIN ON THE SUBJECT OF KOSOVO, WHICH HAS
BECOME ONE OF THE MOST DIFFICULT PROBLEMS I HAVE HAD TO DEAL

PAGE 2 RHEHAAA2649 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WITH IN THE COURSE OF MY PRESIDENCY -- NOT LEAST BECAUSE IT HAS
PUT SUCH A BURDEN ON RUSSIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS. LIKE YOU, I
WANT TO SEE THE VIOLENCE STOPPED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE; LIKE
YOU, I AM READY TO PURSUE EVERY AVENUE THAT MIGHT LEAD TO
PEACE. BUT THE EVENTS OF THE PAST WEEK MAKE CLEAR HOW SERIOUS
THE THREAT TO PEACE IS.

THE NEWS COMING OUT OF KOSOVO IS TRULY SHOCKING. THERE IS
AMPLE EVIDENCE THAT WHOLE VILLAGES ARE BEING BURNED,
INNOCENT CIVILIANS SUMMARILY EXECUTED AND TENS OF THOUSANDS
DISPLACED -- NOT BY NATO ACTIONS BUT THROUGH A PRE-MEDITATED
AND PRE-PLANNED CAMPAIGN BY THE YUGOSLAV SECURITY FORCES. I
VERY MUCH APPRECIATED YOUR STRONG STATEMENT THAT RUSSIA
WILL NOT BE DRAWN INTO THE CONFLICT. I AM GLAD THAT YOU HAVE
RECOGNIZED THAT SUCH INVOLVEMENT WOULD BE A DANGEROUS
DEVELOPMENT AND I ASK YOU TO CONTINUE YOUR FIRM STANCE
AGAINST IT.

WE HAVE RECEIVED WITH INTEREST YOUR PROPOSAL FOR AN
EMERGENCY G-8 MEETING ON KOSOVO. MADELEINE HAS GIVEN IGOR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

PAGE 3 RHEHAAA2649 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SOME REACTIONS AND SOME ADDITIONAL IDEAS. THEY WILL CONTINUE TALKING ABOUT HOW WE CAN BEST COORDINATE OUR EFFORTS TO RESTORE CONDITIONS FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN KOSOVO.

WHAT IS MOST IMPORTANT IS THAT WE STAY AS UNITED AS POSSIBLE IN OUR MESSAGE TO BELGRADE. MILOSEVIC MUST KNOW THAT IF HE WANTS TO END THIS CONFLICT, HE CAN DO SO AT ANY MOMENT BY ENDING HIS MILITARY CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE KOSOVAR ALBANIANS, PULLING BACK HIS FORCES AS HE COMMITTED TO DO IN OCTOBER, ALLOWING REFUGEES TO RETURN, AND ASSURING SECURITY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT FOR THE KOSOVARS. BUT HE MUST ALSO KNOW THAT IF HE IS UNWILLING TO MEET THESE CONDITIONS, NATO'S AIR CAMPAIGN WILL CONTINUE. I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS PROBLEM AT LENGTH WITH JACQUES, GERHARD AND TONY, AND WE ARE IN FULL AGREEMENT.

I KNOW DEVELOPMENTS IN KOSOVO HAVE STRAINED RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES. BUT I AM GLAD WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO CONTINUE WORKING ON MANY IMPORTANT ISSUES ON OUR BILATERAL AGENDA. WE OWE IT TO OUR PEOPLE AND TO WORLD PEACE TO KEEP

PAGE 4 RHEHAAA2649 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE VITAL U.S.-RUSSIAN PARTNERSHIP ALIVE AND PRODUCTIVE THROUGH SUCH TIMES OF DIFFICULTY. THE CFE AGREEMENT ACHIEVED ON MARCH 31 IS A TRULY HISTORIC ACCOMPLISHMENT, FOR WHICH WE HAVE ALL WORKED VERY HARD. I AM ALSO PLEASED THAT, DESPITE THE CANCELLATION OF LAST WEEK'S MEETING, THE CONCRETE WORK OF THE BINATIONAL COMMISSION HAS CONTINUED, HIGHLIGHTED BY THE HEU AGREEMENT SIGNED LAST WEEK AND THE PROSPECTIVE SIGNINGS OF THE MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE TREATY AND THE CIVIL AVIATION AGREEMENT.

I WAS ALSO ENCOURAGED THAT THE IMF WILL SEND A FULL MISSION TO MOSCOW TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS. AS YOU AND I HAVE DISCUSSED ON MANY OCCASIONS, GETTING A SOUND ECONOMIC PROGRAM IN PLACE IS CRUCIAL TO MEETING THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE. AS I SAID TO YOU BEFORE, WHEN RUSSIA AND THE IMF CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT, I AM PREPARED TO WORK HARD WITH PARTNERS TO RESCHEDULE RUSSIA'S DEBT.

FINALLY, I WOULD LIKE TO CONGRATULATE YOU ON YOUR SUPERB SPEECH TO THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE. IT WAS AN ELOQUENT EXPRESSION OF

PAGE 5 RHEHAAA2649 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

YOUR VISION FOR A DEMOCRATIC, TOLERANT, PROSPEROUS RUSSIA, AVOIDING A RETURN TO COLD WAR AND PROMOTING RUSSIA'S INTEGRATION INTO THE WORLD ECONOMY -- A VISION YOU KNOW I SHARE AND AM COMMITTED TO WORKING WITH YOU TO ACHIEVE. IT IS THE TRUE UNSHAKEABLE FOUNDATION OF U.S-RUSSIAN RELATIONS. IN TROUBLED TIMES SUCH AS NOW, YOUR COURAGE, COMMON SENSE AND FORESIGHT ARE AN ENCOURAGEMENT TO ME PERSONALLY AND TO ALL WHO ARE TRYING TO BUILD A NEW, MORE PEACEFUL WORLD FOR THE NEXT CENTURY.

SINCERELY,
BILL

END TEXT
DECL: D(X6)
<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01
<^SSN>2649
<MSGID> M3780627

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NODIS

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0546-M (1.02)
10/2/2018 KSM

PREC: NIAC IMMEDIATE
FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE
TO: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
INFO: SECSTATE WASHDC
SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN

1. AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL BE PROVIDED.
2. BEGIN TEXT.

DEAR BORIS:

I AM WRITING TO YOU AGAIN ON THE SUBJECT OF KOSOVO, WHICH HAS BECOME ONE OF THE MOST DIFFICULT PROBLEMS I HAVE HAD TO DEAL WITH IN THE COURSE OF MY PRESIDENCY -- NOT LEAST BECAUSE IT HAS PUT SUCH A BURDEN ON RUSSIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS. LIKE YOU, I WANT TO SEE THE VIOLENCE STOPPED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE; LIKE YOU, I AM READY TO PURSUE EVERY AVENUE THAT MIGHT LEAD TO PEACE. BUT THE EVENTS OF THE PAST WEEK MAKE CLEAR HOW SERIOUS THE THREAT TO PEACE IS.

THE NEWS COMING OUT OF KOSOVO IS TRULY SHOCKING. THERE IS AMPLE EVIDENCE THAT WHOLE VILLAGES ARE BEING BURNED, INNOCENT CIVILIANS SUMMARILY EXECUTED AND TENS OF THOUSANDS DISPLACED -- NOT BY NATO ACTIONS BUT THROUGH A PRE-MEDITATED AND PRE-PLANNED CAMPAIGN BY THE YUGOSLAV SECURITY FORCES. I VERY MUCH APPRECIATED YOUR STRONG STATEMENT THAT RUSSIA WILL NOT BE DRAWN INTO THE CONFLICT. I AM GLAD THAT YOU HAVE RECOGNIZED THAT SUCH INVOLVEMENT WOULD BE A DANGEROUS DEVELOPMENT AND I ASK YOU TO CONTINUE YOUR FIRM STANCE AGAINST IT.

WE HAVE RECEIVED WITH INTEREST YOUR PROPOSAL FOR AN EMERGENCY G-8 MEETING ON KOSOVO. MADELEINE HAS GIVEN IGOR SOME REACTIONS AND SOME ADDITIONAL IDEAS. THEY WILL CONTINUE TALKING ABOUT HOW WE CAN BEST CONCERT OUR EFFORTS TO RESTORE CONDITIONS FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN KOSOVO.

WHAT IS MOST IMPORTANT IS THAT WE STAY AS UNITED AS POSSIBLE IN OUR MESSAGE TO BELGRADE. MILOSEVIC MUST KNOW THAT IF HE WANTS TO END THIS CONFLICT, HE CAN DO SO AT ANY MOMENT BY ENDING HIS MILITARY CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE KOSOVAR ALBANIANS, PULLING BACK HIS FORCES AS HE COMMITTED TO DO IN OCTOBER, ALLOWING REFUGEES TO RETURN, AND ASSURING SECURITY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT FOR THE KOSOVARS. BUT HE MUST ALSO KNOW THAT IF HE IS UNWILLING TO MEET THESE CONDITIONS, NATO'S AIR CAMPAIGN WILL CONTINUE. I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS PROBLEM AT LENGTH WITH JACQUES, GERHARD AND TONY, AND WE ARE IN FULL AGREEMENT.

I KNOW DEVELOPMENTS IN KOSOVO HAVE STRAINED RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES. BUT I AM GLAD WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO CONTINUE WORKING ON MANY IMPORTANT ISSUES ON OUR BILATERAL AGENDA. WE OWE IT TO OUR PEOPLE AND TO WORLD PEACE TO KEEP THE VITAL U.S.-RUSSIAN PARTNERSHIP ALIVE AND PRODUCTIVE THROUGH SUCH TIMES OF DIFFICULTY. THE CFE AGREEMENT ACHIEVED ON MARCH 31 IS A TRULY HISTORIC ACCOMPLISHMENT, FOR WHICH WE HAVE ALL WORKED VERY HARD. I AM ALSO PLEASED THAT, DESPITE THE CANCELLATION OF LAST WEEK'S MEETING, THE CONCRETE WORK OF THE BINATIONAL COMMISSION HAS CONTINUED, HIGHLIGHTED BY THE HEU AGREEMENT SIGNED LAST WEEK AND THE PROSPECTIVE SIGNINGS OF THE MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE TREATY AND THE CIVIL AVIATION AGREEMENT.

I WAS ALSO ENCOURAGED THAT THE IMF WILL SEND A FULL MISSION TO MOSCOW TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS. AS YOU AND I HAVE DISCUSSED ON MANY OCCASIONS, GETTING A SOUND ECONOMIC PROGRAM IN PLACE IS CRUCIAL TO MEETING THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE. AS I SAID TO YOU BEFORE, WHEN RUSSIA AND THE IMF CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT, I AM PREPARED TO WORK HARD WITH PARTNERS TO RESCHEDULE RUSSIA'S DEBT.

FINALLY, I WOULD LIKE TO CONGRATULATE YOU ON YOUR SUPERB SPEECH TO THE RUSSIA PEOPLE. IT WAS AN ELOQUENT EXPRESSION OF YOUR VISION FOR A DEMOCRATIC, TOLERANT, PROSPEROUS RUSSIA, AVOIDING A RETURN TO COLD WAR AND PROMOTING RUSSIA'S INTEGRATION INTO THE WORLD ECONOMY -- A VISION YOU KNOW I SHARE AND AM COMMITTED TO WORKING WITH YOU TO ACHIEVE. IT IS THE TRUE UNSHAKEABLE FOUNDATION OF U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS. IN TROUBLED TIMES SUCH AS NOW, YOUR COURAGE, COMMON SENSE AND FORESIGHT ARE AN ENCOURAGEMENT TO ME PERSONALLY AND TO ALL WHO ARE TRYING TO BUILD A NEW, MORE PEACEFUL WORLD FOR THE NEXT CENTURY.

SINCERELY,
BILL

END TEXT.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0546-M (1.03)
10/2/2018 KBN

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Message to President Yeltsin

SRB -
TP 2 REVISED
AS REQUESTED.

(S)

Purpose

Approve a message to President Yeltsin on the Kosovo crisis.

DOES POTUS
NEED TO SEE
THIS PRIOR
TO TRANSMISSION?
YES — NO @

Background

Russia has made several efforts to get back into the negotiating process on Kosovo. Prime Minister Primakov's initiative earlier this week, however, was not constructive and was quickly rejected by Chancellor Schroeder. Russia's most recent suggestion is to convene a G-8 ministerial on the conflict.

Madeleine is in daily contact with Foreign Minister Ivanov, trying to encourage a more cooperative approach. In today's call, she outlined the many points of agreement between us, such as Milosevic's commitment to President Yeltsin last June not to repress Albanian civilians, and your September joint statement with Yeltsin calling for a withdrawal of Serbian security forces. The one major point of difference is over the necessity of an armed international security presence. Ivanov was intrigued by her presentation and asked for a nonpaper.

Your message builds on the progress Madeleine made today. You underscore the need to stay engaged constructively, while at the same time outlining our key requirements for Milosevic: pull back his forces and embrace the Rambouillet settlement.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message at Tab A.

Approve A Disapprove

Attachment

Tab A Message to President Yeltsin

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 4/1/09

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2374

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

April 1, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: CARLOS PASCUAL *CP*

FROM: STUART KAUFMAN *SK*

SUBJECT: Message to Russian President Yeltsin

The memorandum at Tab I recommends a Presidential message to President Boris Yeltsin on the Kosovo crisis. The message follows up Secretary Albright's discussion with Foreign Minister Ivanov today, encouraging Russia to engage constructively on the issue, while also outlining our key requirements for Milosevic: pull back his forces and embrace the Rambouillet settlement.

Concurrence by: Tony Blinken, Rick Saunders, Greg Schulte *for*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President

Tab A Message to President Yeltsin

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *KRM* NARA, Date *10/3/2013*
2014-0546-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 4/1/09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NODIS

PREC: NIAC^TIMMEDIATE
FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE
TO: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
INFO: SECSTATE WASHDC

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0546-M (1.04)
10/2/2018 KBN

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN

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2. BEGIN TEXT.

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THE NEWS COMING OUT OF KOSOVO IS TRULY SHOCKING. THERE IS AMPLE EVIDENCE THAT WHOLE VILLAGES ARE BEING BURNED, INNOCENT CIVILIANS SUMMARILY EXECUTED AND TENS OF THOUSANDS DISPLACED -- NOT BY NATO ACTIONS BUT THROUGH A PRE-MEDITATED AND PRE-PLANNED CAMPAIGN BY THE YUGOSLAV SECURITY FORCES. I VERY MUCH APPRECIATED YOUR STRONG STATEMENT THAT RUSSIA WILL NOT BE DRAWN INTO THE CONFLICT. I AM GLAD THAT YOU HAVE RECOGNIZED THAT SUCH INVOLVEMENT WOULD BE A DANGEROUS DEVELOPMENT AND I ASK YOU TO CONTINUE YOUR FIRM STANCE AGAINST IT.

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SINCERELY,
BILL

END TEXT.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NODIS

PREC: IMMEDIATE
FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE
TO: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
INFO: SECSTATE WASHDC

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2014-0546-M (1.05)
10/2/2013 KSH

2374

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN

1. AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL BE PROVIDED.
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IN THIS CONNECTION WE HAVE RECEIVED WITH INTEREST YOUR PROPOSAL FOR AN EMERGENCY G-8 MEETING ON KOSOVO. MADELEINE HAS GIVEN IGOR SOME REACTIONS AND SOME ADDITIONAL IDEAS. THEY WILL CONTINUE TALKING ABOUT HOW WE CAN BEST CONCERT OUR EFFORTS TO RESTORE CONDITIONS FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN KOSOVO.

WHAT IS MOST IMPORTANT IS THAT WE STAY AS UNITED AS POSSIBLE IN OUR MESSAGE TO BELGRADE. MILOSEVIC MUST KNOW THAT IF HE WANTS TO END THIS CONFLICT, HE CAN DO SO AT ANY MOMENT BY ENDING HIS MILITARY CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE KOSOVAR ALBANIANS, PULLING BACK

I AM
GLAD
THAT YOU
HAVE RECENTLY
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INVOLVEMENT
WOULD BE
A DANGER-
OUS DEVELOP-
MENT.
I ASK YOU
TO CONTINUE
YOUR FIRM
STANCE AGAINST
IT.

HIS FORCES AS HE COMMITTED TO DO IN OCTOBER, ALLOWING REFUGEES TO RETURN, AND ASSURING SECURITY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT FOR THE KOSOVARs. BUT HE MUST ALSO KNOW THAT IF HE IS UNWILLING TO MEET THESE CONDITIONS, NATO'S AIR CAMPAIGN WILL CONTINUE. I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS PROBLEM AT LENGTH WITH JACQUES, GERHARD AND TONY, AND WE ARE IN FULL AGREEMENT.

I KNOW DEVELOPMENTS IN KOSOVO HAVE STRAINED RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES. BUT I AM GLAD WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO CONTINUE WORKING ON MANY IMPORTANT ISSUES ON OUR BILATERAL AGENDA. WE OWE IT TO OUR PEOPLE AND TO WORLD PEACE TO KEEP THE VITAL U.S.-RUSSIAN PARTNERSHIP ALIVE AND PRODUCTIVE THROUGH SUCH TIMES OF DIFFICULTY. THE CFE AGREEMENT ACHIEVED ON MARCH 31 IS A TRULY HISTORIC ACCOMPLISHMENT, FOR WHICH WE HAVE ALL WORKED VERY HARD. I AM ALSO PLEASED THAT, DESPITE THE CANCELLATION OF LAST WEEK'S MEETING, THE CONCRETE WORK OF THE BINATIONAL COMMISSION HAS CONTINUED, HIGHLIGHTED BY THE HEU AGREEMENT SIGNED LAST WEEK AND THE PROSPECTIVE SIGNINGS OF THE MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE TREATY AND THE CIVIL AVIATION AGREEMENT.

I WAS ALSO ENCOURAGED THAT THE IMF WILL SEND A FULL MISSION TO MOSCOW TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS. AS YOU AND I HAVE DISCUSSED ON MANY OCCASIONS, GETTING A SOUND ECONOMIC PROGRAM IN PLACE IS CRUCIAL TO MEETING THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE. AS I SAID TO YOU BEFORE, WHEN RUSSIA AND THE IMF CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT, I AM PREPARED TO WORK HARD WITH PARTNERS TO RESCHEDULE RUSSIA'S DEBT.

FINALLY, I WOULD LIKE TO CONGRATULATE YOU ON YOUR SUPERB SPEECH TO THE RUSSIA PEOPLE. IT WAS AN ELOQUENT EXPRESSION OF YOUR VISION FOR A DEMOCRATIC, TOLERANT, PROSPEROUS RUSSIA, AVOIDING A RETURN TO COLD WAR AND PROMOTING RUSSIA'S INTEGRATION INTO THE WORLD ECONOMY -- A VISION YOU KNOW I SHARE AND AM COMMITTED TO WORKING WITH YOU TO ACHIEVE. IT IS THE TRUE UNSHAKEABLE FOUNDATION OF U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS. IN TROUBLED TIMES SUCH AS NOW, YOUR COURAGE, COMMON SENSE AND FORESIGHT ARE AN ENCOURAGEMENT TO ME PERSONALLY AND TO ALL WHO ARE TRYING TO BUILD A NEW, MORE PEACEFUL WORLD FOR THE NEXT CENTURY.

SINCERELY,

BILL

END TEXT.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NODIS

PREC: IMMEDIATE
FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE
TO: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
INFO: SECSTATE WASHDC

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2014-0546-M (1.06)
10/2/2013 KBH

2374

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN

1. AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL BE PROVIDED.
2. BEGIN TEXT.

DEAR BORIS:

I AM WRITING TO YOU AGAIN ON THE SUBJECT OF KOSOVO, WHICH HAS BECOME ONE OF THE MOST ~~PAINFUL~~ PROBLEMS I HAVE HAD TO DEAL WITH IN THE COURSE OF MY PRESIDENCY -- NOT LEAST BECAUSE IT HAS PUT SUCH A BURDEN ON RUSSIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS. LIKE YOU, I WANT TO SEE THE VIOLENCE STOPPED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE; LIKE YOU, I AM READY TO PURSUE EVERY AVENUE THAT MIGHT LEAD TO PEACE. BUT THE EVENTS OF THE PAST WEEK MAKE CLEAR HOW SERIOUS THE THREAT TO PEACE IS.

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IN THIS CONNECTION WE HAVE RECEIVED WITH INTEREST YOUR PROPOSAL FOR AN EMERGENCY G-8 MEETING ON KOSOVO. MADELEINE HAS GIVEN IGOR SOME REACTIONS AND SOME ADDITIONAL IDEAS. THEY WILL CONTINUE TALKING ABOUT HOW WE CAN BEST CONCERT OUR EFFORTS TO RESTORE CONDITIONS FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN KOSOVO.

WHAT IS MOST IMPORTANT IS THAT WE STAY AS UNITED AS POSSIBLE IN OUR MESSAGE TO BELGRADE. MILOSEVIC MUST KNOW THAT IF HE WANTS TO END THIS CONFLICT, HE CAN DO SO AT ANY MOMENT BY ENDING HIS MILITARY CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE KOSOVAR ALBANIANS, PULLING BACK HIS FORCES AS HE COMMITTED TO DO IN OCTOBER, ALLOWING REFUGEES

assuring security and self government

assuring security and self government for the Kosovars

TO RETURN, AND ~~EMBRACING THE RAMBOUILLET ACCORDS AS THE~~
~~FRAMEWORK FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.~~ BUT HE MUST ALSO KNOW THAT
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 CONTINUE. I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS PROBLEM AT LENGTH WITH JACQUES,
 GERHARD AND TONY, AND WE ARE IN FULL AGREEMENT.

I KNOW DEVELOPMENTS IN KOSOVO HAVE STRAINED RELATIONS BETWEEN
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SINCERELY,
 BILL

END TEXT.

if he
is
unwilling
to

2374

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NODIS

PREC: NIAC IMMEDIATE
FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE
TO: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
INFO: SECSTATE WASHDC

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2014-0546-M (1.07)
10/2/2018 KBH

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN

1. AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL BE PROVIDED.
2. BEGIN TEXT.

DEAR BORIS:

I AM WRITING TO YOU AGAIN ON THE SUBJECT OF KOSOVO, WHICH HAS BECOME ONE OF THE MOST DIFFICULT PROBLEMS I HAVE HAD TO DEAL WITH IN THE COURSE OF MY PRESIDENCY -- NOT LEAST BECAUSE IT HAS PUT SUCH A BURDEN ON RUSSIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS. LIKE YOU, I WANT TO SEE THE VIOLENCE STOPPED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE; LIKE YOU, I AM READY TO PURSUE EVERY AVENUE THAT MIGHT LEAD TO PEACE. BUT THE EVENTS OF THE PAST WEEK MAKE CLEAR HOW SERIOUS THE THREAT TO PEACE IS.

THE NEWS COMING OUT OF KOSOVO IS TRULY SHOCKING. THERE IS AMPLE EVIDENCE THAT WHOLE VILLAGES ARE BEING BURNED, INNOCENT CIVILIANS SUMMARILY EXECUTED AND TENS OF THOUSANDS DISPLACED -- NOT BY NATO ACTIONS BUT THROUGH A PRE-MEDITATED AND PRE-PLANNED CAMPAIGN BY THE YUGOSLAV SECURITY FORCES. I VERY MUCH APPRECIATED YOUR STRONG STATEMENT THAT RUSSIA WILL NOT BE DRAWN INTO THE CONFLICT. I AM GLAD THAT YOU HAVE RECOGNIZED THAT SUCH INVOLVEMENT WOULD BE A DANGEROUS DEVELOPMENT [^] I ASK YOU TO CONTINUE YOUR FIRM STANCE AGAINST IT. ^{AND}

[IN THIS CONNECTION] WE HAVE RECEIVED WITH INTEREST YOUR PROPOSAL FOR AN EMERGENCY G-8 MEETING ON KOSOVO. MADELEINE HAS GIVEN IGOR SOME REACTIONS AND SOME ADDITIONAL IDEAS. THEY WILL CONTINUE TALKING ABOUT HOW WE CAN BEST CONCERT OUR EFFORTS TO RESTORE CONDITIONS FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN KOSOVO.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NODIS

PREC: IMMEDIATE

FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE

TO: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

INFO: SECSTATE WASHDC

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0546-M (1.08)
10/2/2013 KBH

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN

1. AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL BE PROVIDED.

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HIS FORCES AS HE COMMITTED TO DO IN OCTOBER, ALLOWING REFUGEES TO RETURN, AND ASSURING SECURITY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT FOR THE KOSOVAR. BUT HE MUST ALSO KNOW THAT IF HE IS UNWILLING TO MEET THESE CONDITIONS, NATO'S AIR CAMPAIGN WILL CONTINUE. I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS PROBLEM AT LENGTH WITH JACQUES, GERHARD AND TONY, AND WE ARE IN FULL AGREEMENT.

I KNOW DEVELOPMENTS IN KOSOVO HAVE STRAINED RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES. BUT I AM GLAD WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO CONTINUE WORKING ON MANY IMPORTANT ISSUES ON OUR BILATERAL AGENDA. WE OWE IT TO OUR PEOPLE AND TO WORLD PEACE TO KEEP THE VITAL U.S.-RUSSIAN PARTNERSHIP ALIVE AND PRODUCTIVE THROUGH SUCH TIMES OF DIFFICULTY. THE CFE AGREEMENT ACHIEVED ON MARCH 31 IS A TRULY HISTORIC ACCOMPLISHMENT, FOR WHICH WE HAVE ALL WORKED VERY HARD. I AM ALSO PLEASED THAT, DESPITE THE CANCELLATION OF LAST WEEK'S MEETING, THE CONCRETE WORK OF THE BINATIONAL COMMISSION HAS CONTINUED, HIGHLIGHTED BY THE HEU AGREEMENT SIGNED LAST WEEK AND THE PROSPECTIVE SIGNINGS OF THE MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE TREATY AND THE CIVIL AVIATION AGREEMENT.

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SINCERELY,

BILL

END TEXT.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: ~~THE EXECUTIVE CLERK~~

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Message to President Yeltsin

DECLASSIFIED**PER E.O. 13526**

2014-0546-M (1.09)

10/2/2013 K8H

Purpose

To approve a message to President Yeltsin on the Kosovo crisis.

Background

Russia has made several efforts to get back into the negotiating process on Kosovo. Prime Minister Primakov's initiative earlier this week, however, was not constructive and was quickly rejected by Chancellor Schroeder. Russia's most recent suggestion is to convene a G-8 ministerial on the conflict.

Madeleine is in daily contact with Foreign Minister Ivanov, trying to encourage a more cooperative approach. In today's call, she outlined the many points of agreement between us, such as Milosevic's commitment to President Yeltsin last June not to repress Albanian civilians, and your September joint statement with Yeltsin calling for a withdrawal of Serbian security forces. The one major point of difference is over the necessity of an armed international security presence. Ivanov was intrigued by her presentation and asked for a nonpaper.

Your message builds on the progress Madeleine made today. You underscore the need to stay engaged constructively, while at the same time outlining our key requirements for Milosevic: pull back his forces and embrace the Rambouillet settlement.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message at Tab A.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A Message to President Yeltsin

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 4/1/09

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NODIS

PREC: IMMEDIATE

FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE
TO: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
INFO: SECSTATE WASHDC

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2014-0546-M (1.10)
10/1/2018 KBH

2374

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN

1. AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE DELIVER ^{the} FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL BE PROVIDED.

2. BEGIN TEXT.

DEAR BORIS:

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THE NEWS COMING OUT OF KOSOVO IS TRULY SHOCKING. THERE IS AMPLE EVIDENCE THAT WHOLE VILLAGES ARE BEING BURNED, INNOCENT CIVILIANS SUMMARILY EXECUTED ~~KILLED~~ AND TENS OF THOUSANDS DISPLACED -- NOT BY NATO ACTIONS BUT THROUGH A PRE-MEDITATED AND PRE-PLANNED CAMPAIGN BY THE YUGOSLAV SECURITY FORCES. ✓

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2 check font

TO RETURN, AND EMBRACING THE RAMBOUILLET ACCORDS AS THE FRAMEWORK FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. BUT HE MUST ALSO KNOW THAT UNLESS HE MEETS THESE CONDITIONS, NATO'S AIR CAMPAIGN WILL CONTINUE. I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS PROBLEM AT LENGTH WITH JACQUES, GERHARD AND TONY, AND WE ARE IN FULL AGREEMENT.

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SINCERELY,
BILL

END TEXT.

Case Number: 2014-0546-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2727				
Document ID: 9903450				
Row: 46	Section: 4	Shelf: 5	Position: 1	Stack: v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. cable	re. Message to President Yeltsin on Kosovo (3 pages)	05/11/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001b. memo	Samuel Berger to POTUS re. Message to President Yeltsin on Kosovo (1 page)	05/10/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001c. cable	[Duplicate of 001a] (2 pages)	05/11/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001d. letter	President Yeltsin to POTUS (2 pages)	05/02/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001e. cable	[Duplicate of 001a] [incomplete copy] (1 page)	05/11/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001f. cable	[Duplicate of 001a] (2 pages)	05/11/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001g. cable	[Duplicate of 001a] (2 pages)	05/11/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001h. cable	[Duplicate of 001a] (2 pages)	05/11/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kosovo and Yeltsin])
OA/Box Number: 2727

FOLDER TITLE:

9903450

2014-0546-M
rs1049

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9903450
RECEIVED: 06 MAY 99 13

TO: YELTSIN, BORIS

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 11 MAY 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA
KOSOVO

HS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MSG TO RUSSIAN PRES YELTSIN ON KOSOVO

ACTION: CABLE SENT VIA SIT ROOM

DUE DATE: 18 MAY 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WEISS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
PASCUAL
WEISS

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM

CLOSED BY: NSDMK

DOC 3 OF 3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBM/NARA, Date 10/2/2018
2014-0546-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9903450

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 WEISS	Z 99050613 PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER
002 BERGER	Z 99051111 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR SIGNATURE
002 WEISS	Z 99051111 FOR REDO
002 BERGER	Z 99051111 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR SIGNATURE
002	X 99051317 BERGER APPROVED RECOM
003	X 99051317 CABLE SENT VIA SIT ROOM

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

<u>DOC</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR ACTION</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR INFO</u>
001	990502		ALBRIGHT, M
001	990502		TALBOTT, S
001	990502		FUERTH, L

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 3450
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TTC A/O _____

SSG

JACOBSON

POWELL

RICE

DAVIES

KERRICK

STEINBERG

BERGER

SITUATION ROOM

WEST WING DESK

RECORDS MGMT.

SEQUENCE TO

INITIAL/DATE

DISPOSITION

_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	~~_____~~	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	<u>1</u>	_____	_____
_____	<u>2</u>	_____	_____
_____	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>CABLE</u>
_____	<u>3</u>	<u>R 5/11</u>	<u>D</u>
_____	<u>5</u>	<u>DW 5/13</u>	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

90 MAY 11 am 11:22

CC:

COMMENTS:

Pres Mog to Pres Galtai

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE

yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 3450
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 3 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
JACOBSON	<u>1</u>	<u>5/10</u> <u>PD</u>	
POWELL			
RICE			
DAVIES			
KERRICK			
STEINBERG	<u>2</u>		<u>relo</u>
BERGER	<u>3</u>		
SITUATION ROOM			
WEST WING DESK	<u>3</u>	<u>RC 5/11</u>	<u>PASQUAL</u>
RECORDS MGMT.			
<u>Pasqual</u>	<u>4</u>		

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

COMMENTS:

Pres msg to Pres Galtzin

EXEC SEC -

U/S

message changed
per Jim Steinberg

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 3450

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TIC A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
JACOBSON	_____	_____	_____
POWELL	_____	_____	_____
RICE	<u>/</u>	_____	_____
DAVIES	_____	_____	_____
KERRICK	_____	_____	_____
STEINBERG	<u>1</u>	_____	_____
BERGER	<u>2</u>	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>CABLE</u>
WEST WING DESK	<u>3</u>	<u>R 5/11</u>	<u>D</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>5</u>	<u>DMK 5/13</u>	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

99 MAY 11 11 11 AM '99

CC:

COMMENTS:

Pres Msg to Pres Yeltsin

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE

yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 3450

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 13 A/O _____

550

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
JACOBSON	<u>1</u>	<u>5/10</u> <i>[initials]</i>	
POWELL			
RICE			
DAVIES			
KERRICK			
STEINBERG	<u>2</u>		<u>reler</u>
BERGER	<u>3</u>		
SITUATION ROOM			
WEST WING DESK	<u>3</u>	<u>RC 5/11</u>	<u>JPASCUA</u>

EXEC SEC -

message changed
per Jim Steinberg

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: BLINKEN, COQ, DAVIDSON, FLANAGAN, HURLEY, PASCUAL, SCHULTE, WEISS, FUERTH, NODIS

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG: 112240Z MAY 99

FM: THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC

TO:
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW NIACT

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2014-0546-M (1.11)
10/1/2018 KBN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NIACT NODIS
QQQQ

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN ON KOSOVO

AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM
PRESIDENT CLINTON TO DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT'S PARTY AT THE
EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BORIS:

I WANT TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR RECENT LETTER AND FOR SENDING

PAGE 2 RHEHAAA3197 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
VIKTOR STEPANOVICH TO WASHINGTON. AL AND I VALUED OUR
EXTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM AND BELIEVE THAT
CHERNOMYRDIN'S DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS ARE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT
AND CAN CONTRIBUTE TO A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE KOSOVO
CONFLICT.

I AM ALSO PLEASED WITH THE PROGRESS THAT MADELEINE, MINISTER
IVANOV AND THE OTHER G-8 MINISTERS MADE LAST WEEK IN
GERMANY. I THINK THEIR STATEMENT SENT AN UNAMBIGUOUS
MESSAGE TO MILOSEVIC -- THAT ETHNIC CLEANSING CANNOT BE
ALLOWED TO STAND. THE G-8 HAVE NOW FULLY EMBRACED THE
COMMON OBJECTIVES YOU AND I DISCUSSED ON THE PHONE: SAFE AND
SECURE RETURN OF REFUGEES, UNIMPEDED HUMANITARIAN ACCESS,
AUTONOMY FOR KOSOVO, AND PRESERVATION OF YUGOSLAVIA'S
INTEGRITY. THEIR STATEMENT ALSO TOOK US ANOTHER STEP
FORWARD BY AGREEING ON THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AND CIVILIAN PRESENCES, AND ON AN INTERIM
ADMINISTRATION FOR KOSOVO. AS WE HAVE DONE IN THE PAST, WE
AGAIN HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO DEFY THOSE WHO DO NOT BELIEVE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THAT RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES CAN WORK TOGETHER FOR

PAGE 3 RHEHAAA3197-~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
PEACE AND STABILITY IN EUROPE.

I AM SENDING STROBE BACK TO MOSCOW THIS WEEK, AND I AM
CONFIDENT THAT HE WILL HAVE MEANINGFUL DISCUSSIONS WITH
YOUR TEAM ABOUT HOW TO BUILD FROM THIS BASE. OUR TEAMS HAVE
A GOOD UNDERSTANDING OF THE KEY ISSUES WE NEED TO ADDRESS. IN
PARTICULAR, WE BOTH AGREE THAT THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
PRESENCE MUST BE EFFECTIVE -- AND IN ORDER FOR IT TO BE
EFFECTIVE IT MUST HAVE NATO AT ITS CORE, RUSSIA MUST PLAY A KEY
ROLE, AND THERE SHOULD BE A FULL WITHDRAWAL OF SERB FORCES
AS PART OF AN OVERALL DEMILITARIZATION OF KOSOVO THAT
INCLUDES THE KLA. IF WE CAN NOW DEFINE THE ARRANGEMENTS THAT
WILL ALLOW US TO PROCEED ON THESE TERMS, I TRULY BELIEVE THAT
WE CAN ACHIEVE THE KIND OF SOLUTION TO THE KOSOVO CRISIS THAT
YOU AND I HAVE DISCUSSED. REFUGEES WILL BE ABLE TO RETURN
WITH SECURITY, BOTH THE SERB AND ALBANIAN POPULATIONS OF
KOSOVO WILL BE PROTECTED, YUGOSLAVIA'S SOVEREIGNTY AND
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY WILL BE PRESERVED AND KOSOVO WILL GET
THE AUTONOMY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT IT DESERVES. WHAT IS ALSO
CRITICALLY IMPORTANT, WE CAN SUCCEED IN CREATING AN

PAGE 4 RHEHAAA3197-~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ENVIRONMENT WHERE OUR PEACEKEEPERS ARE NEITHER ENDANGERED
NOR DRAWN INTO A RENEWED CYCLE OF VIOLENCE.

I HOPE THAT STROBE CAN MAKE PROGRESS ON THESE AND OTHER
IMPORTANT QUESTIONS. I TRUST THAT YOU ENJOYED THE MAY
HOLIDAYS AND LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM YOU AGAIN SOON.

SINCERELY,
BILL

END TEXT.

DECL: X1

<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01
<^SSN>3197
<^TOR>990511190139 M3850437

FROM:
SITREPT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Message to President Yeltsin on Kosovo

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**2014-0546-M (1.12)
10/2/2018 K3HPurpose

Approve a message to President Yeltsin.

Background

Strobe will be in Moscow early this week to follow up on the Chernomyrdin visit and to gauge whether the Russians are ready for serious work on how NATO's conditions might be implemented. It would be helpful for Strobe to carry a letter from you commending Russia's diplomatic efforts and urging Yeltsin to sustain momentum generated by Chernomyrdin's visit to Washington and the G-8 foreign ministers' meeting in Germany. The letter also reaffirms our red lines and cautions against seeking diplomatic solutions that are not compatible with NATO's conditions.

Yeltsin's behavior over the past week has been increasingly erratic, again reminding us of the fragility of his health and the fact that even a small return to alcohol can knock him seriously off balance. You may need to call Yeltsin again over the next week, but we should first assess the results of Strobe's trip, Chernomyrdin's meeting with the Chinese, and any further information about Yeltsin's health.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message at Tab A.

Approve



Disapprove

Attachments

Tab A Message to President Yeltsin

Tab B Incoming Correspondence

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 4/10/09

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/NODIS

IMMEDIATE

FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE
TO: AMEMBASSY (MOSCOW)
INFO: SECSTATE WASHDC

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2014-0516-M (1.13)
10/2/2013 KBH

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN ON KOSOVO

1. AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT'S PARTY AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

2. BEGIN TEXT.

DEAR BORIS:

I WANT TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR RECENT LETTER AND FOR SENDING VIKTOR STEPANOVICH TO WASHINGTON. AL AND I VALUED OUR EXTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM AND BELIEVE THAT CHERNOMYRDIN'S DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS ARE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT AND CAN CONTRIBUTE TO A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE KOSOVO CONFLICT.

I AM ALSO PLEASED WITH THE PROGRESS THAT MADELEINE, MINISTER IVANOV AND THE OTHER G-8 MINISTERS MADE LAST WEEK IN GERMANY. I THINK THEIR STATEMENT SENT AN UNAMBIGUOUS MESSAGE TO MILOSEVIC - THAT ETHNIC CLEANSING CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO STAND. THE G-8 HAVE NOW FULLY EMBRACED THE COMMON OBJECTIVES YOU AND I DISCUSSED ON THE PHONE: SAFE AND SECURE RETURN OF REFUGEES, UNIMPEDED HUMANITARIAN ACCESS, AUTONOMY FOR KOSOVO, AND PRESERVATION OF YUGOSLAVIA'S INTEGRITY. THEIR STATEMENT ALSO TOOK US ANOTHER STEP FORWARD BY AGREEING ON THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND CIVILIAN PRESENCES, AND ON AN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION FOR KOSOVO. AS WE HAVE DONE IN THE PAST, WE AGAIN HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO DEFY THOSE WHO DO NOT BELIEVE THAT RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES CAN WORK TOGETHER FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN EUROPE.

I AM SENDING STROBE BACK TO MOSCOW THIS WEEK, AND I AM CONFIDENT THAT HE WILL HAVE MEANINGFUL DISCUSSIONS WITH YOUR TEAM ABOUT HOW TO BUILD FROM THIS BASE. OUR TEAMS HAVE A GOOD UNDERSTANDING OF THE KEY ISSUES WE NEED TO ADDRESS. IN PARTICULAR, WE BOTH AGREE THAT THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PRESENCE MUST BE EFFECTIVE -- AND IN ORDER FOR IT TO BE

EFFECTIVE IT MUST HAVE NATO AT ITS CORE, RUSSIA MUST PLAY A KEY ROLE, AND THERE SHOULD BE A FULL WITHDRAWAL OF SERB FORCES AS PART OF AN OVERALL DEMILITARIZATION OF KOSOVO THAT INCLUDES THE KLA. IF WE CAN NOW DEFINE THE ARRANGEMENTS THAT WILL ALLOW US TO PROCEED ON THESE TERMS, I TRULY BELIEVE THAT WE CAN ACHIEVE THE KIND OF SOLUTION TO THE KOSOVO CRISIS THAT YOU AND I HAVE DISCUSSED. REFUGEES WILL BE ABLE TO RETURN WITH SECURITY, BOTH THE SERB AND ALBANIAN POPULATIONS OF KOSOVO WILL BE PROTECTED, YUGOSLAVIA'S SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY WILL BE PRESERVED AND KOSOVO WILL GET THE AUTONOMY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT IT DESERVES. WHAT IS ALSO CRITICALLY IMPORTANT, WE CAN SUCCEED IN CREATING AN ENVIRONMENT WHERE OUR PEACEKEEPERS ARE NEITHER ENDANGERED NOR DRAWN INTO A RENEWED CYCLE OF VIOLENCE.

I HOPE THAT STROBE CAN MAKE PROGRESS ON THESE AND OTHER IMPORTANT QUESTIONS. I TRUST THAT YOU ENJOYED THE MAY HOLIDAYS AND LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM YOU AGAIN SOON.

SINCERELY,
BILL

END TEXT.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3450

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 10, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: CARLOS PASCUAL *CP*

FROM: ANDREW WEISS *AW*

SUBJECT: Message to President Boris Yeltsin on Kosovo

Strobe will be in Moscow on Tuesday and Wednesday to see how far the Russians have moved on critical questions such as the scope and composition of the international force and the need for a total withdrawal of FRY forces. It would be very helpful to have a message to President Yeltsin that expresses appreciation for Russia's cooperative diplomacy while reaffirming our commitment to NATO's conditions to resolve the Kosovo crisis.

Concurrence by: Leon Fuerth, Greg Schulte *AW for*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Message to President Yeltsin
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *KBM* NARA, Date *10/2/2018*
2014-0546-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 4/10/09

PRESIDENT
Russian Federation

May 2, 1999
No. Pr-560

Moscow, Kremlin

Dear Bill,

In spite of Russia's insistent appeals, NATO continues its aggression against a sovereign state in the center of Europe, which brings immense destruction and countless human casualties.

As a result of the NATO's military operations against Yugoslavia the situation on the Balkans is severely deteriorating. The crisis has already encircled the whole region. This tragedy, unless immediately ceased, can result in irreparable consequences for international stability. You and I have already said that we cannot allow this to happen.

MAY 4 16:16 SRYu S. Milosevic, there is beginning to appear the following possible scheme of actions:

- At an agreed upon day, Belgrade announces the start of a withdrawal of its forces from Kosovo. Simultaneously, NATO announces a suspension of missile-bomb strikes and gives guarantees on the non-deployment of ground operations;

HIS EXCELLENCY
MISTER WILLIAM J. CLINTON
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Washington

- **The Secretary General of the UN promptly flies to Belgrade for the purpose of working out a text of a UN Security Council Resolution on the settling of the situation surrounding Yugoslavia. Negotiations are held with the participation of the special representative of the President of the Russian Federation for the Yugoslav settlement;**
- **The UN Security Council adopts the resolution. After this, NATO's military operation is finally ceased and in Kosovo an international presence under UN auspices is deployed.**

As you understand, it was not easy for us to achieve this. There is now a chance that no one should miss. Naturally, we will continue working with S. Milosevic as well.

With this message, I am sending my special representative Victor Stepanovich Chernomyrdin who will lay out in detail all of the particulars of our plan. We must act quickly and decisively.

I am depending upon your understanding and rapid positive response.

With respect,

B. Yeltsin

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9903450
DATE 02 MAY 99

SUBJECT: NATO & YUGOSLAVIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MS. MADELEINE ALBRIGHT 7TH FLOOR 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC DEPARTMENT OF STATE	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME:	_____
		COPY: 1	_____
MR. STROBE TALBOTT VIA EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7220, MAIN STATE DEPARTMENT OF STATE	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME:	_____
		COPY: 1	_____
MR. LEON FUERTH ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506 OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME:	_____
		COPY: 1	_____

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KBM Date: 10/2/2018
2014-0546-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9903450

REFERRAL

DATE: 06 MAY 99

MEMORANDUM FOR: FUERTH, L

OFC OF VICE PRESIDENT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: PRESIDENT

SOURCE: YELTSIN, BORIS

DATE: 02 MAY 99

SUBJ: NATO & YUGOSLAVIA

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE DATE:

COMMENT:

FOR



JOHN W. FICKLIN

NSC RECORDS MANAGEMENT OFFICE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9903450

REFERRAL

DATE: 06 MAY 99

MEMORANDUM FOR: ALBRIGHT, M

STATE

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: PRESIDENT

SOURCE: YELTSIN, BORIS

DATE: 02 MAY 99

SUBJ: NATO & YUGOSLAVIA

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE DATE:

COMMENT:

FOR



JOHN W. FICKLIN

NSC RECORDS MANAGEMENT OFFICE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9903450

REFERRAL

DATE: 06 MAY 99

MEMORANDUM FOR: TALBOTT, S

STATE

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: PRESIDENT

SOURCE: YELTSIN, BORIS

DATE: 02 MAY 99

SUBJ: NATO & YUGOSLAVIA

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE DATE:

COMMENT:

(FOR)




JOHN W. FICKLIN

NSC RECORDS MANAGEMENT OFFICE

LOG NO. _____

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

HoS DISTRIBUTION REVIEW
(Suggested Distribution Attached)



APPROVE w/CHANGES DISAPPROVE

RICE	<u>1(R)</u>	☐	☒	☐
COSGRIFF	_____	☐	☐	☐
DAVIES	_____	☐	☐	☐
KERRICK	_____	☐	☐	☐
STEINBERG	<u>2</u>	☐	☐	☐
BERGER	_____	☐	☐	☐
RECORDS	<u>3</u>			

1
- Log into system to Adv
- Action to Adv

Comments: Jim - Attached is the Yeltsin letter
Chernomyrdin delivered. Do you approve the
recommended distribution?

EA

MAY 1997

RETURN TO RECORDS MANAGEMENT FOR DISTRIBUTION

STATE E.O. S, D
Fuerth

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9903450
RECEIVED: 06 MAY 99 13

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: YELTSIN, BORIS

DOC DATE: 02 MAY 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA
KOSOVO

HS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NATO & YUGOSLAVIA

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER.

DUE DATE: 18 MAY 99 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: WEISS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
WEISS

FOR CONCURRENCE
SCHULTE

FOR INFO
BERGER
DAVIES
KERRICK
PASCUAL
STEINBERG

COMMENTS: STAFFING PER DAPSNA

DISPATCHED BY EB DATE 5/6 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KSH NARA, Date 10/1/2018
2014-0546-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL RECORDS MANAGEMENT STAFFING DOCUMENT

Document Description:

TO: PRESIDENT DOCUMENT DATE: 5/2/99
 FROM: YELTSIN, BORIS
 SUBJECT: DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO KOSOVO
CRISIS

Document Distribution:

ACTION	CONCURRENCE	INFO
<u>LESS</u>	~~SCHE~~	<u>BERGER</u>
	<u>SCHULTE</u>	<u>STEINBERG</u>
	~~BANDER~~	<u>PASQUAL</u>
		<u>DAVIER</u>
		<u>KERRICK</u>
		<u>FUERTH</u>
		<u>STATE (EYES ONLY SEC/DEAC)</u>

ACTION REQUIRED: PREPARE MEMO BERGER
 DUE DATE: 15 MAY 99

COMMENTS: _____

MAY 4 17:20

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: KRM Date: 10/2/2018
 2014-0546-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

13
LOGGED BY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/NODIS

IMMEDIATE

FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE

TO: AMEMBASSY (MOSCOW)

INFO: SECSTATE WASHDC

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN ON KOSOVO

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2014-0546-M (1.15)

10/2/2013 K8H

(3450)

1. AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT'S PARTY AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

2. BEGIN TEXT.

DEAR BORIS:

I WANT TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR RECENT LETTER AND FOR SENDING VIKTOR STEPANOVICH TO WASHINGTON. AL AND I VALUED OUR EXTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM AND BELIEVE THAT CHERNOMYRDIN'S DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS ARE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT AND CAN CONTRIBUTE TO A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE KOSOVO CONFLICT.

I AM ALSO PLEASED WITH THE PROGRESS THAT MADELEINE, MINISTER IVANOV AND THE OTHER G-8 MINISTERS MADE LAST WEEK IN GERMANY. I THINK THEIR STATEMENT SENT AN UNAMBIGUOUS MESSAGE TO MILOSEVIC -- THAT ETHNIC CLEANSING CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO STAND. THE G-8 ~~HAVE~~ ^{HAVE} ~~1/AVS~~ [✓] NOW FULLY EMBRACED THE COMMON OBJECTIVES YOU AND I DISCUSSED ON THE PHONE: SAFE AND SECURE RETURN OF REFUGEES, UNIMPEDED HUMANITARIAN ACCESS, AUTONOMY FOR KOSOVO, AND PRESERVATION OF YUGOSLAVIA'S INTEGRITY. WE NOW ALSO HAVE AGREEMENT ON THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND CIVILIAN PRESENCES, AND ~~THAT THERE MUST BE AN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION FOR KOSOVO.~~

I AM SENDING STROBE BACK TO MOSCOW THIS WEEK, AND I AM CONFIDENT THAT HE WILL HAVE MEANINGFUL DISCUSSIONS WITH YOUR TEAM ABOUT HOW TO BUILD FROM THIS BASE. YOUR TEAM HAS A GOOD UNDERSTANDING OF OUR KEY REQUIREMENTS -- THAT THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PRESENCE MUST HAVE NATO AT ITS CORE AND THAT ALL SERB FORCES MUST BE WITHDRAWN FROM KOSOVO. I TRULY BELIEVE THAT IF WE DO NOT DO THESE THINGS, ONLY ARMED GUERILLAS WILL RETURN TO KOSOVO, BENT ON REVENGE AGAINST YUGOSLAV FORCES. THIS WOULD ENDANGER OUR PEACEKEEPERS AND POSSIBLY DRAW THEM INTO A RENEWED CYCLE OF VIOLENCE. I AM ALSO JUST AS CONVINCED THAT RUSSIA MUST PLAY A

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2014-0546-M (1.16)

10/2/2013 KBH

IMMEDIATE

FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE

TO: AMEMBASSY (MOSCOW)

INFO: SECSTATE WASHDC

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN ON KOSOVO

1. AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT'S PARTY AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

2. BEGIN TEXT.

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I WANT TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR RECENT LETTER AND FOR SENDING VIKTOR STEPANOVICH TO WASHINGTON. AL AND I VALUED OUR EXTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM AND BELIEVE THAT CHERNOMYRDIN'S DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS ARE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT AND CAN CONTRIBUTE TO A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE KOSOVO CONFLICT.

I AM ALSO PLEASED WITH THE PROGRESS THAT MADELEINE, MINISTER IVANOV AND THE OTHER G-8 MINISTERS MADE LAST WEEK IN GERMANY. I THINK THEIR STATEMENT SENT AN UNAMBIGUOUS MESSAGE TO MILOSEVIC - THAT ETHNIC CLEANSING CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO STAND. THE G-8 HAVE NOW FULLY EMBRACED THE COMMON OBJECTIVES YOU AND I DISCUSSED ON THE PHONE: SAFE AND SECURE RETURN OF REFUGEES, UNIMPEDED HUMANITARIAN ACCESS, AUTONOMY FOR KOSOVO, AND PRESERVATION OF YUGOSLAVIA'S INTEGRITY. THEIR STATEMENT ALSO TOOK US ANOTHER STEP FORWARD BY AGREEING ON THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND CIVILIAN PRESENCES, AND ON AN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION FOR KOSOVO. AS WE HAVE DONE IN THE PAST, WE AGAIN HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO DEFY THOSE WHO DO NOT BELIEVE THAT RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES CAN WORK TOGETHER FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN EUROPE.

I AM SENDING STROBE BACK TO MOSCOW THIS WEEK, AND I AM CONFIDENT THAT HE WILL HAVE MEANINGFUL DISCUSSIONS WITH YOUR TEAM ABOUT HOW TO BUILD FROM THIS BASE. YOUR TEAM HAS A GOOD UNDERSTANDING OF OUR KEY REQUIREMENTS -- THAT THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PRESENCE MUST HAVE NATO AT ITS CORE AND THAT ALL SERB FORCES MUST BE WITHDRAWN FROM KOSOVO. AS I HAVE CONSISTENTLY SAID, I

AS THE G-8

WANT RUSSIA TO PLAY A KEY ROLE BOTH IN FACILITATING A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION AND PARTICIPATING IN ITS IMPLEMENTATION. IF WE CAN NOW DEFINE THE ARRANGEMENTS THAT WILL ALLOW US TO PROCEED ON THESE TERMS, I TRULY BELIEVE THAT WE CAN ACHIEVE THE KIND OF SOLUTION TO THE KOSOVO CRISIS THAT YOU AND I HAVE DISCUSSED. REFUGEES WILL BE ABLE TO RETURN WITH SECURITY, BOTH THE SERB AND ALBANIAN POPULATIONS OF KOSOVO WILL BE PROTECTED, YUGOSLAVIA'S SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY WILL BE PRESERVED AND KOSOVO WILL GET THE AUTONOMY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT IT DESERVES. WHAT IS ALSO CRITICALLY IMPORTANT, WE CAN SUCCEED IN CREATING AN ENVIRONMENT WHERE OUR PEACEKEEPERS ARE NEITHER ENDANGERED NOR DRAWN INTO A RENEWED CYCLE OF VIOLENCE.

I HOPE THAT STROBE CAN MAKE PROGRESS ON THESE AND OTHER IMPORTANT QUESTIONS. I TRUST THAT YOU ENJOYED THE MAY HOLIDAYS AND LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM YOU AGAIN SOON.

SINCERELY,
BILL

END TEXT.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/NODIS

IMMEDIATE

FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE
TO: AMEMBASSY (MOSCOW)
INFO: SECSTATE WASHDC

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0546-M (1.17)
10/2/2013 KSH

3450

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN ON KOSOVO

1. AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT'S PARTY AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

2. BEGIN TEXT.

DEAR BORIS:

I WANT TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR RECENT LETTER AND FOR SENDING VIKTOR STEPANOVICH TO WASHINGTON. AL AND I VALUED OUR EXTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM AND BELIEVE THAT CHERNOMYRDIN'S DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS ARE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT AND CAN CONTRIBUTE TO A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE KOSOVO CONFLICT.

I AM ALSO PLEASED WITH THE PROGRESS THAT MADELEINE, MINISTER IVANOV AND THE OTHER G-8 MINISTERS MADE LAST WEEK IN GERMANY. I THINK THEIR STATEMENT SENT AN UNAMBIGUOUS MESSAGE TO MILOSEVIC - THAT ETHNIC CLEANSING CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO STAND. THE G-8 HAVE NOW FULLY EMBRACED THE COMMON OBJECTIVES YOU AND I DISCUSSED ON THE PHONE: SAFE AND SECURE RETURN OF REFUGEES, UNIMPEDED HUMANITARIAN ACCESS, AUTONOMY FOR KOSOVO, AND PRESERVATION OF YUGOSLAVIA'S INTEGRITY. THEIR STATEMENT ALSO TOOK US ANOTHER STEP FORWARD BY AGREEING ON THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND CIVILIAN PRESENCES, AND ON AN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION FOR KOSOVO. AS WE HAVE DONE IN THE PAST, WE AGAIN HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO DEFY THOSE WHO DO NOT BELIEVE THAT RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES CAN WORK TOGETHER FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN EUROPE.

I AM SENDING STROBE BACK TO MOSCOW THIS WEEK, AND I AM CONFIDENT THAT HE WILL HAVE MEANINGFUL DISCUSSIONS WITH YOUR TEAM ABOUT HOW TO BUILD FROM THIS BASE. YOUR TEAMS HAVE A GOOD UNDERSTANDING OF OUR THE KEY REQUIREMENTS ISSUES WE NEED TO ADDRESS. IN PARTICULAR, WE BOTH AGREE THAT THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PRESENCE MUST BE EFFECTIVE -- AND IN ORDER FOR IT TO BE

EFFECTIVE IT MUST HAVE NATO AT ITS CORE, AND RUSSIA MUST PLAY A
KEY ROLE, AND THERE SHOULD BE A FULL WITHDRAWAL OF SERB FORCES
AS PART OF AN OVERALL DEMILITARIZATION OF KOSOVO THAT INCLUDES
THE KLA. THAT ALL SERB FORCES MUST BE WITHDRAWN FROM KOSOVO.
~~AS I HAVE CONSISTENTLY SAID, I WANT RUSSIA TO PLAY A KEY ROLE~~
~~BOTH IN FACILITATING A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION AND PARTICIPATING IN~~
~~ITS IMPLEMENTATION. IF WE CAN NOW DEFINE THE ARRANGEMENTS THAT~~
WILL ALLOW US TO PROCEED ON THESE TERMS, I TRULY BELIEVE THAT WE
CAN ACHIEVE THE KIND OF SOLUTION TO THE KOSOVO CRISIS THAT YOU
AND I HAVE DISCUSSED. REFUGEES WILL BE ABLE TO RETURN WITH
SECURITY, BOTH THE SERB AND ALBANIAN POPULATIONS OF KOSOVO WILL
BE PROTECTED, YUGOSLAVIA'S SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
WILL BE PRESERVED AND KOSOVO WILL GET THE AUTONOMY AND SELF-
GOVERNMENT IT DESERVES. WHAT IS ALSO CRITICALLY IMPORTANT, WE
CAN SUCCEED IN CREATING AN ENVIRONMENT WHERE OUR PEACEKEEPERS
ARE NEITHER ENDANGERED NOR DRAWN INTO A RENEWED CYCLE OF
VIOLENCE.

I HOPE THAT STROBE CAN MAKE PROGRESS ON THESE AND OTHER
IMPORTANT QUESTIONS. I TRUST THAT YOU ENJOYED THE MAY HOLIDAYS
AND LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM YOU AGAIN SOON.

SINCERELY,
BILL

END TEXT.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/NODIS

IMMEDIATE

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2014-0546-M (1.18)

10/2/2013 KBH

3450

FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE

TO: AMEMBASSY (MOSCOW)

INFO: SECSTATE WASHDC

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN ON KOSOVO

1. AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT'S PARTY AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

2. BEGIN TEXT.

DEAR BORIS:

I WANT TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR RECENT LETTER AND FOR SENDING VIKTOR STEPANOVICH TO WASHINGTON. AL AND I VALUED OUR EXTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM AND BELIEVE THAT CHERNOMYRDIN'S DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS ARE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT AND CAN CONTRIBUTE TO A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE KOSOVO CONFLICT.

I AM ALSO PLEASED WITH THE PROGRESS THAT MADELEINE, MINISTER IVANOV AND THE OTHER G-8 MINISTERS MADE LAST WEEK IN GERMANY. I THINK THEIR STATEMENT SENT AN UNAMBIGUOUS MESSAGE TO MILOSEVIC - THAT ETHNIC CLEANSING CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO STAND. THE G-8 HAVE NOW FULLY EMBRACED THE COMMON OBJECTIVES YOU AND I DISCUSSED ON THE PHONE: SAFE AND SECURE RETURN OF REFUGEES, UNIMPEDED HUMANITARIAN ACCESS, AUTONOMY FOR KOSOVO, AND PRESERVATION OF YUGOSLAVIA'S INTEGRITY. WE NOW ALSO HAVE AGREEMENT ON THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND CIVILIAN PRESENCES, AND AN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION FOR KOSOVO.

I AM SENDING STROBE BACK TO MOSCOW THIS WEEK, AND I AM CONFIDENT THAT HE WILL HAVE MEANINGFUL DISCUSSIONS WITH YOUR TEAM ABOUT HOW TO BUILD FROM THIS BASE. YOUR TEAM HAS A GOOD UNDERSTANDING OF OUR KEY REQUIREMENTS -- THAT THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PRESENCE MUST HAVE NATO AT ITS CORE AND THAT ALL SERB FORCES MUST BE WITHDRAWN FROM KOSOVO. I TRULY BELIEVE THAT IF WE DO NOT DO THESE THINGS, ONLY ARMED GUERILLAS WILL RETURN TO KOSOVO, BENT ON REVENGE AGAINST YUGOSLAV FORCES. THIS WOULD ENDANGER OUR PEACEKEEPERS AND POSSIBLY DRAW THEM INTO A RENEWED CYCLE OF VIOLENCE. I AM ALSO JUST AS CONVINCED THAT RUSSIA MUST PLAY A

KEY ROLE TO REASSURE THE SERB MINORITY THAT THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE WILL PROVIDE FOR THEIR SAFETY AND SECURITY AS WELL.

I HOPE THAT STROBE CAN MAKE PROGRESS ON THESE AND OTHER IMPORTANT QUESTIONS. I TRUST THAT YOU ENJOYED THE MAY HOLIDAYS AND LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM YOU AGAIN SOON.

SINCERELY,
BILL

END TEXT.

Case Number: 2014-0546-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2727				
Document ID: 9903455				
Row: 46	Section: 4	Shelf: 5	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. letter	President Yeltsin to POTUS [translated copy] (3 pages)	04/14/1999	P1/b(1) KBN 5/2/2019
001b. letter	President Yeltsin to POTUS [untranslated copy] (3 pages)	04/14/1999	P1/b(1) KBN 5/2/2019

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kosovo and Yeltsin])
OA/Box Number: 2727

FOLDER TITLE:

9903455

2014-0546-M

rs1050

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9903455
RECEIVED: 06 MAY 99 13

TO: DAVIES

FROM: KENNEY, K

DOC DATE: 05 MAY 99
SOURCE REF: 9906206

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA
KOSOVO

HS
NATO

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: STATE FWDS 14 APR LTR FM YELTSIN RE KOSOVO

ACTION: NO REPLY REQUIRED PER STATE

DUE DATE: 18 MAY 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCELDFOWNEY
NSC CHRON
PASCUAL
SCHULTE
WEISS

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM

CLOSED BY: NSTSM

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9903455

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001

X 99050613 NO REPLY REQUIRED PER STATE

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 9906206
Date May 5, 1999

FOR: Mr. Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary
National Security Council
The White House

REFERENCE:

To: President Clinton
From: President Yeltsin
Date: 4/14/99
Subj: Letter from President Yeltsin on Kosovo

WH Referral dated: _____
NSCS ID# (if any): _____

_____ The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State.

ACTION TAKEN:

_____ A draft reply is attached.
_____ A draft reply will be forwarded.
_____ A translation is attached.
_____ An information copy of a direct reply is
attached.
_____ X We believe no response is necessary for the
reason cited below.
_____ The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.
_____ Other (see remarks).

REMARKS: President Clinton and President Yeltsin talked on April
19 and again on May 2 and discussed Kosovo.

Adrian Davis
Director for
Secretariat Staff

MAY 6 9:25

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

9906206

(Translation Division)

LS No.0390479

JS/LAP
Russian

Dear Bill:

[handwritten sentence: In connection with your letter of March 22, I would like to set forth my basic assessments and views regarding the settlement of the Kosovo crisis.] I agree with you that the situation in and around Kosovo is very alarming. It is no secret to anyone that if a conflagration begins in Kosovo, it will spread immediately through the entire region. That must be prevented.

I am deeply convinced that there is only one solution: to reach, as soon as possible, political agreements that could not only ensure broad autonomy for Kosovo while preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY, but also create conditions for bringing about lasting peace in the region.

It is a pity, of course, that in Rambouillet and Paris we were unable, despite all our efforts, to come up with an agreed document on a political settlement. However, we are not inclined to consider this a total failure. As you know, Bill, this sort of document is difficult to hammer out.

HIS EXCELLENCY
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Through our joint efforts we have done a great deal of work, which cannot be simply ignored. We must continue combined efforts within the framework of the Contact Group, whose unity is the main guarantee of success. It is now vital that the political process not be allowed to come to a halt. It was precisely for this reason we endorsed the idea of sending a "trio" of negotiators to Belgrade to continue working with the Yugoslav leadership.

It is important, certainly, that the Kosovo Albanian delegation agreed to sign the proposed document. Nonetheless, immediately after signing, the Albanians issued a statement wherein they virtually disavowed their signature, reaffirming their intention to seek the independence of Kosovo and its secession from the FRY by means of a referendum. To be frank, I was astonished that the U.S. delegation at the talks overlooked this glaring fact, which was a direct challenge to the Contact Group.

During all this time Russia was working actively with the other members of the Contact Group to find a political solution to the Kosovo crisis. As you recall, I managed to persuade President Milosevic to consent to the deployment of the OSCE verification mission in Kosovo. I regret that the decision was made to withdraw it. The presence of the mission had a restraining effect on extremists of every stripe. We can see that its withdrawal has led to a new upsurge of armed conflict in the region.

We shall of course keep working actively with Belgrade, urging it to show restraint and sign a political agreement as quickly as possible. That is our firm policy, from which we shall not retreat.

As regards international assistance in the practical implementation of political agreements, we deem it necessary to consider this matter carefully, taking into account all factors, especially the opinion of Yugoslavia as a sovereign state.

I have taken note of your warnings concerning NATO's readiness to employ force. Let me be frank: we have categorically opposed this and will continue doing so. On what grounds does NATO take it upon itself to decide the fate of peoples in sovereign countries? Who gave it the right to act as a guardian of order?

Quite obviously, this action by NATO would not only break off the negotiating process but would complicate the situation even more and bring the Balkans to the brink of a great war. Who will take responsibility for that?

I ask you once more to weigh all the consequences before making this decision, which, I will tell you frankly, could be fatal. It is not military scenarios, but continuation of the political process that is the only way out of the impasse.

I hope that we shall continue our close cooperation in resolving the Kosovo problem in the interest of peace and stability not only in that region but in Europe as a whole.

Sincerely,
B. Yeltsin

В связи с твоим посланием от 22 марта с.г. хотел бы изложить свои принципиальные оценки и выдающие ситуации вокруг косовского урегулирования.

Дорогой Билл,

Согласен с тобой, что ситуация в Косово и вокруг него складывается очень тревожная. Ни для кого не секрет, что, если в Косово разгорится пожар, то он незамедлительно перекинется на весь регион. Этого допустить нельзя.

Выход, по моему глубокому убеждению, один - скорейшее достижение политических договоренностей, способных не только обеспечить широкую автономию для Косово при сохранении суверенитета и территориальной целостности СРЮ, но и создать условия для установления прочного мира в регионе.

Конечно жаль, что в Рамбуйе и Париже, несмотря на все предпринятые нами усилия, не удалось выйти на согласованный документ по политическому урегулированию. Вместе с тем, мы не склонны рассматривать это как окончательный провал. Ты же знаешь. Билл, что такого рода документы легко не даются.

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖ.КЛИНТОНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

Совместными усилиями мы проделали огромную работу, которую нельзя просто так сбрасывать со счетов. Необходимо продолжать коллективные усилия в рамках Контактной группы, единство которой - главный залог успеха. Сейчас исключительно важно не допустить остановки политического процесса. Именно поэтому мы поддержали идею направления "тройки" переговорщиков в Белград для продолжения работы с югославским руководством.

Конечно, важно, что делегация косовских албанцев согласилась подписать предложенный документ. Вместе с тем, сразу после подписания албанцы выступили с заявлением, которым они фактически дезавуировали свою подпись, подтвердив намерение добиваться независимости Косово и его отделения от СРЮ путем проведения референдума. Откровенно скажу: меня удивило, что американская делегация на переговорах прошла мимо этого вопиющего факта, который явился прямым вызовом Контактной группе.

Все это время Россия вместе с другими членами Контактной группы активно работала над нахождением политического решения косовского кризиса. Как ты помнишь, мне удалось убедить Президента СРЮ С.Милошевича дать согласие на развертывание Миссии ОБСЕ по проверке в Косово. Сожалею, что принято решение о ее выводе. Присутствие Миссии оказывало сдерживающее воздействие на экстремистов всех мастей. Мы видим, что с ее уходом в крае с новой силой вспыхнули вооруженные столкновения.

Разумеется, мы будем продолжать активно работать с Белградом, призывая его к сдержанности и скорейшему подписанию политического соглашения. Это - наша твердая линия, от которой мы не отступим.

Что касается международного содействия в практической реализации политических договоренностей, то считаем необходимым тщательное рассмотрение данного вопроса с учетом всех факторов, и прежде всего мнения Югославии как суверенного государства.

Я обратил внимание на твои предупреждения относительно готовности НАТО задействовать силу. Скажу прямо: мы были и будем категорически против этого. На каком основании НАТО берется решать судьбы народов в суверенных государствах? Кто наделил его правом выступать в роли блюстителя порядка?

Совершенно очевидно, что подобная акция НАТО не только сорвала бы переговорный процесс, но и еще больше осложнила ситуацию, подвела Балканы на грань большой войны. Кто возьмет на себя ответственность за это?

Прошу тебя еще раз взвесить все последствия перед тем, как принимать такое решение, которое, прямо скажу, может стать роковым. Не военные сценарии, а продолжение политического процесса - вот единственный выход из тупика.

Надеюсь, что мы и впредь будем продолжать тесно с тобой взаимодействовать в разрешении косовской проблемы в интересах мира и стабильности не только в регионе, но и в Европе в целом.

С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

Case Number: 2014-0546-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2728				
Document ID: 9903526				
Row: 46	Section: 4	Shelf: 5	Position: 2	Stack: V

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9903526
RECEIVED: 08 MAY 99 12

TO: BERGER

FROM: WEISS

DOC DATE: 08 MAY 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS:

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR TO YELTSIN RE KOSOVO

ACTION: LOG NUMBER NOT USED

DUE DATE: 14 MAY 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WEISS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSCLG

CLOSED BY: NSVJD

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9903526

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001

X 00061315 LOG NUMBER NOT USED

UNCLASSIFIED

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

National Security Council

DATE: 21 Jun 1999

CREATE ID: NSCLG

Memorandum for: WEISS

From: NSC/S

CREATE DATE: 990508

Subject: LTR TO YELTSIN RE KOSOVO

Log #9903526 has been issued to your office

We need the necessary data/copies in order to maintain the active suspense file or index the item for further reference and tracking purposes.

Your help is needed. Thanks.

Check as may be appropriate:

- ☐ Action completed, file attached.
- ☐ Action still pending, copy attached.
- ☐ Action transferred to _____.
- ☐ Action sent forward, copy attached.
- ☐ Cannot find, will continue to check.
- ☐ System action not sent forward, copy attached.
- ☒ Log Number not used.
- ☐ Other: _____.

Please return to Secretariat, Room 379 OEOB.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Case Number: 2014-0546-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2729				
Document ID: 9903751				
Row: 46	Section: 4	Shelf: 5	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Samuel Berger to POTUS re: Message to President Yeltsin on Impachment Vote (2 pages)	05/15/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001b. cable	re: Message to President Yeltsin (1 page)	05/17/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
002a. cable	[Duplicate of 001b] (2 pages)	05/17/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
002b. cable	[Duplicate of 001b] (1 page)	05/17/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
002c. memo	[Duplicate of 001a] (2 pages)	05/15/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
002d. cable	[Duplicate of 001b] (1 page)	05/17/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
002e. memo	[Duplicate of 001a] (2 pages)	05/15/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
002f. cable	[Duplicate of 001b] (1 page)	05/17/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
002g. memo	[Duplicate of 001a] (2 pages)	05/15/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
002h. cable	[Duplicate of 001b] (1 page)	05/17/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
003. memo	Berger to POTUS re: Development in Russia (2 pages)	05/15/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kosovo and Yeltsin])
OA/Box Number: 2729

FOLDER TITLE:

9903751

2014-0546-M

rs1051

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9903751
RECEIVED: 14 MAY 99 18

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 17 MAY 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MSG TO YELTSIN

ACTION: ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/RMO DUE DATE: 18 MAY 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PASCUAL

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMTS

CLOSED BY: NSDMK

DOC 2 OF 3

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBM NARA, Date 10/2/2013
2014-0546-17

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9903751

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER	Z 99051422 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
001	X 99051917 OBE PER APNSA OFFICE
002 PRESIDENT	Z 99051817 FOR DECISION
002	X 99051817 PRESIDENT APPROVED RECOM
002	X 99052714 ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/RMO
003	X 99051817 CABLE SENT VIA SIT ROOM

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

5-16-99

3751

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

'99 MAY 17 PM5:58

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER 

SUBJECT: Message to President Yeltsin on Impeachment Vote

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2014-0546-M (1.21)

10/2/2018 KBN

Purpose

Approve a message to President Yeltsin.

Background

We are carefully tracking the turmoil in Russian domestic politics. While many Western pundits had predicted the worst, Saturday's surprise impeachment vote demonstrated Yeltsin's knack for rising to the occasion and putting the Duma on the defensive. The Communists' ability to secure a two-thirds majority on any of the impeachment charge was stymied by Yeltsin's brash, combative approach to politics and pro-presidential provisions of the Russian constitution. Duma deputies also understood that any article of impeachment they approved would probably have been tossed out by the pro-Yeltsin Constitutional Court. Support from Zhirinovskiy's party, which is notorious for giving its votes to the highest bidder, sealed Yeltsin's victory.

Still, Yeltsin is not over the hump and must now turn to the confirmation of a new prime minister. Starting with a vote on Wednesday, the Duma will have three shots to reject or approve Yeltsin's candidate. If there is a third rejection, Yeltsin can dissolve the Duma and call for early elections within three months. But there's an interesting twist: once the Duma is dissolved, Yeltsin can appoint a prime minister (the very same one who was rejected if he wants) without Duma confirmation who can serve for the remainder of Yeltsin's term. Meanwhile, Duma members probably will be deprived of phones, faxes, cars and free travel, all of which they need to get re-elected. The Communists, who see the Duma as their main power base, would have the most to lose.

These realities are now sinking in with Russian parliamentarians. Having failed to support impeachment, they

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 5/15/09

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

have the unpalatable choice of whether to vote against Yeltsin's candidate for prime minister and spark the loss of their sinecures while failing to prevent Yeltsin from installing his candidate. The Yeltsin team would not mind having early elections -- much better to have them in the fall than in December when everyone is in a foul mood. And many liberals like PM-designate Stepashin, a Yeltsin loyalist who helped rein in the hard-line opposition and is tolerant of the new entrepreneurial class.

This is not to suggest that we should relax and take Russia's latest political upheaval lightly. The IMF program could indeed be stillborn. Russia could find itself with a government in gridlock for several months. However, today's events remind us that the disaster scenarios are not a given. Obviously, we will look at every possibility and prepare for them.

We have prepared a short message to Yeltsin indicating that you have been following the political situation closely and expressing appreciation for Russian diplomatic efforts on Kosovo. The message also highlights the importance of preparing a successful G-8 summit in Cologne on June 18-19 and suggests a separate bilateral meeting with Yeltsin on the margins of the summit.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message at Tab A.

Approve

*Approved By Angus 5/16/99
EAL*

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab A Message to President Yeltsin

PREC: IMMEDIATE

CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/NODIS

FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE

TO: AMEMBASSY (MOSCOW)

INFO: SECSTATE WASHDC

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2014-0546-M (1.22)

10/2/2018 K84

1. AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

2. BEGIN TEXT.

DEAR BORIS:

I HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING THE SITUATION IN MOSCOW VERY CLOSELY AND THINKING OF YOU OFTEN. I KNOW THAT THIS CRISIS HAS BEEN DIFFICULT, BUT I KNOW YOU ARE PLEASED, AS I AM, THAT IT ENDED POSITIVELY FOR YOU.

STROBE HAS GIVEN ME A POSITIVE REPORT ON THE TALKS ON KOSOVO THAT HE AND HIS TEAM OF EXPERTS HAD IN MOSCOW WITH VIKTOR CHERNOMYRDIN AND FOREIGN MINISTER IVANOV. THE TRILATERAL MEETING IN HELSINKI ON TUESDAY WITH VIKTOR STEPANOVICH AND PRESIDENT AHTISAARI WILL BE AN IMPORTANT NEXT STEP IN OUR JOINT EFFORTS TO FIND A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS IN KOSOVO.

THE G-8 SUMMIT IN COLOGNE NEXT MONTH IS FAST APPROACHING, AND OUR TEAMS ARE DOING GOOD WORK TO PREPARE A SUCCESSFUL MEETING. I HOPE THAT WE CAN ALSO FIND TIME TO SIT DOWN SEPARATELY DURING THE SUMMIT AND TO MAKE PROGRESS ACROSS THE BROAD RANGE OF ISSUES ON THE U.S.-RUSSIAN AGENDA, INCLUDING SUPPORT FOR RUSSIAN ECONOMIC REFORM, ARMS CONTROL, AND NONPROLIFERATION. I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU AGAIN SOON.

SINCERELY,

BILL

END TEXT

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9903751
RECEIVED: 14 MAY 99 18

TO: YELTSIN, BORIS

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 17 MAY 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MSG TO YELTSIN RE KOSOVO / IMPEACHMENT

ACTION: CABLE SENT VIA SIT ROOM

DUE DATE: 18 MAY 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PASCUAL

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC .CHRON
PASCUAL
WEISS

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMTS

CLOSED BY: NSDMK

DOC 3 OF 3

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRM NARA, Date 10/2/2018
2017-0546-17

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9903751

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
002 PRESIDENT
002
003

Z 99051422 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
Z 99051817 FOR DECISION
X 99051817 PRESIDENT APPROVED RECOM
X 99051817 CABLE SENT VIA SIT ROOM

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 3751
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
JACOBSON	<u>1</u>	<u>JS 5/15</u>	
POWELL			
RICE			
DAVIES			
KERRICK			
STEINBERG	<u>2</u>		
BERGER	<u>3</u>	<u>R</u>	
SITUATION ROOM			
WEST WING DESK	<u>4</u>	<u>(13) 5/17</u>	<u>N</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>5</u>	<u>DMK 5/18</u>	<u>2</u>

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

COMMENTS:

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 3751
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
JACOBSON	<u>1</u>	<u>D 5/15</u>	
POWELL			
RICE			
DAVIES			
KERRICK			
STEINBERG	<u>2</u>		
BERGER	<u>3</u>	<u>R</u>	
SITUATION ROOM			
WEST WING DESK	<u>4</u>	<u>(13) 5/17</u>	<u>N</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>E</u>	<u>DMK 5/16</u>	<u>N</u>

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

COMMENTS:

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

Sent to Col Rice/ POTUS

5/16 at 1900 HRS.

POTUS wanted language changed on letter
Weiss changed.

Resent to Col Rice at 2026

POTUS signed

Sent to Embassy Moscow


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NN      NN 00000000 NN      NN EEEEEEEEE
NNN     NN 00000000 NNN     NN EEEEEEEEE
NNN     NN 00      00 NNN     NN EE
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NN      NNN  00000000 NN      NNN  EEEEEEEEE
NN      NN  00000000 NN      NN  EEEEEEEEE

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NN      NNNN  SS      SS DD      DD MM      MM KK KK
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NNNN    NN  SSS      DD      DD MM MM MM KKKK
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NN      NNNN  SS      SS DD      DD MM      MM KK KK
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NN      NN  SSSSSS DDDDD  MM      MM KK      KK

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SPOOLID: 0989
 CLASS: P
 PRINTER: PRTGRP4L
 SYSTEMID: CPUTA
 PRINT DATE: 05/18/1999
 PRINT TIME: 16:58:32

USER/NODEID: NSDMK CPUTA
 FILENAME/TYPE: NONE NONE
 FILE CREATE DATE: 05/18/1999
 FILE CREATE TIME: 16:58:21
 DIST: NSDMK

START

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: COMM SIT

SIT: BRODY COQ FICKLIN HASMAN PASCUAL SUM2 WEISS

SIT: NODIS

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2014-0516-M (1.23)
10/2/2013 K8H

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 170321Z MAY 99

FM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC

TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NODIS

QQQQ

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN

AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM
PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST
OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.
BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BORIS:

I HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING THE SITUATION IN MOSCOW VERY CLOSELY

PAGE 2 RHEHAAA3248 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
AND THINKING OF YOU OFTEN. I KNOW THAT THIS CRISIS HAS BEEN
DIFFICULT, BUT I KNOW YOU ARE PLEASED, AS I AM, THAT IT ENDED
POSITIVELY FOR YOU.

STROBE HAS GIVEN ME A POSITIVE REPORT ON THE TALKS ON KOSOVO
THAT HE AND HIS TEAM OF EXPERTS HAD IN MOSCOW WITH VIKTOR
CHERNOMYRDIN AND FOREIGN MINISTER IVANOV. THE TRILATERAL
MEETING IN HELSINKI ON TUESDAY WITH VIKTOR STEPANOVICH AND
PRESIDENT AHTISAARI WILL BE AN IMPORTANT NEXT STEP IN OUR JOINT
EFFORTS TO FIND A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS IN KOSOVO.

THE G-8 SUMMIT IN COLOGNE NEXT MONTH IS FAST APPROACHING, AND
OUR TEAMS ARE DOING GOOD WORK TO PREPARE A SUCCESSFUL
MEETING. I HOPE THAT WE CAN ALSO FIND TIME TO SIT DOWN
SEPARATELY DURING THE SUMMIT AND TO MAKE PROGRESS ACROSS
THE BROAD RANGE OF ISSUES ON THE U.S.-RUSSIAN AGENDA, INCLUDING
SUPPORT FOR RUSSIAN ECONOMIC REFORM, ARMS CONTROL, AND
NONPROLIFERATION. I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU AGAIN SOON.

SINCERELY,

PAGE 3 RHEHAAA3248 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

.
BILL

.
END TEXT

.
DECLAS: 190-6 (D)

.
<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01

<^SSN>3248

<MSGID> M3859164

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PREC: IMMEDIATE

CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/NODIS

FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE

TO: AMEMBASSY (MOSCOW)

INFO: SECSTATE WASHDC

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2014-0546-M (1.24)

10/2/2013 K8H

1. AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

2. BEGIN TEXT.

DEAR BORIS:

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SINCERELY,

BILL

END TEXT

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTSInitials: KBM Date: 10/2/2018
2014-0546-M~~SECRET~~**PRECEDENCE****MODE**IMMEDIATESECURE FAX # XPAGES (Including Header) C+109

PRIORITY

ADMIN FAX # _____

Date-Time-Group: 170415Z

ROUTINE

FILE (VDC) # _____

Operator Initials: _____

1. FROM ADDRESSEE:

COL RICE

2. TO ADDRESSEE:

NAME

LOCATION

SDOSITROOMto POTUS
for signature
and transmittal

3. INFO ADDRESSEE:

NAME

LOCATION

4. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS and/or REMARKS:

POTUS APPROVED BOTH (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3751

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONACTIONDECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 135262014-0546-M (1.25)
10/2/2013 KBM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER 

SUBJECT: Message to President Yeltsin on Impeachment Vote

Purpose

Approve a message to President Yeltsin.

Background

We are carefully tracking the turmoil in Russian domestic politics. While many Western pundits had predicted the worst, Saturday's surprise impeachment vote demonstrated Yeltsin's knack for rising to the occasion and putting the Duma on the defensive. The Communists' ability to secure a two-thirds majority on any of the impeachment charge was stymied by Yeltsin's brash, combative approach to politics and pro-presidential provisions of the Russian constitution. Duma deputies also understood that any article of impeachment they approved would probably have been tossed out by the pro-Yeltsin Constitutional Court. Support from Zhirinovskiy's party, which is notorious for giving its votes to the highest bidder, sealed Yeltsin's victory.

Still, Yeltsin is not over the hump and must now turn to the confirmation of a new prime minister. Starting with a vote on Wednesday, the Duma will have three shots to reject or approve Yeltsin's candidate. If there is a third rejection, Yeltsin can dissolve the Duma and call for early elections within three months. But there's an interesting twist: once the Duma is dissolved, Yeltsin can appoint a prime minister (the very same one who was rejected if he wants) without Duma confirmation who can serve for the remainder of Yeltsin's term. Meanwhile, Duma members probably will be deprived of phones, faxes, cars and free travel, all of which they need to get re-elected. The Communists, who see the Duma as their main power base, would have the most to lose.

These realities are now sinking in with Russian parliamentarians. Having failed to support impeachment, they

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 5/15/09

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

have the unpalatable choice of whether to vote against Yeltsin's candidate for prime minister and spark the loss of their sinecures while failing to prevent Yeltsin from installing his candidate. The Yeltsin team would not mind having early elections -- much better to have them in the fall than in December when everyone is in a foul mood. And many liberals like PM-designate Stepashin, a Yeltsin loyalist who helped rein in the hard-line opposition and is tolerant of the new entrepreneurial class.

This is not to suggest that we should relax and take Russia's latest political upheaval lightly. The IMF program could indeed be stillborn. Russia could find itself with a government in gridlock for several months. However, today's events remind us that the disaster scenarios are not a given. Obviously, we will look at every possibility and prepare for them.

We have prepared a short message to Yeltsin indicating that you have been following the political situation closely and expressing appreciation for Russian diplomatic efforts on Kosovo. The message also highlights the importance of preparing a successful G-8 summit in Cologne on June 18-19 and suggests a separate bilateral meeting with Yeltsin on the margins of the summit.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message at Tab A.

Approve Approved By Angus 5/16/99 Disapprove _____
CAR

Attachments

Tab A Message to President Yeltsin

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/NODIS
FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE
TO: AMEMBASSY (MOSCOW)
INFO: SECSTATE WASHDC
SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2014-0546-M (1.26)
10/2/2018 KBH

1. AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM
PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST
OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

2. BEGIN TEXT.

DEAR BORIS:

I HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING THE SITUATION IN MOSCOW VERY CLOSELY AND
THINKING OF YOU OFTEN. I KNOW THAT THIS CRISIS HAS BEEN
DIFFICULT, BUT I KNOW YOU ARE PLEASED, AS I AM, THAT IT ENDED
POSITIVELY FOR YOU.

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THAT HE AND HIS TEAM OF EXPERTS HAD IN MOSCOW WITH VIKTOR
CHERNOMYRDIN AND FOREIGN MINISTER IVANOV. THE TRILATERAL
MEETING IN HELSINKI ON TUESDAY WITH VIKTOR STEPANOVICH AND
PRESIDENT AHTISAARI WILL BE AN IMPORTANT NEXT STEP IN OUR JOINT
EFFORTS TO FIND A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS IN KOSOVO.

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OUR TEAMS ARE DOING GOOD WORK TO PREPARE A SUCCESSFUL MEETING.
I HOPE THAT WE CAN ALSO FIND TIME TO SIT DOWN SEPARATELY DURING
THE SUMMIT AND TO MAKE PROGRESS ACROSS THE BROAD RANGE OF ISSUES
ON THE U.S.-RUSSIAN AGENDA, INCLUDING SUPPORT FOR RUSSIAN
ECONOMIC REFORM, ARMS CONTROL, AND NONPROLIFERATION. I LOOK
FORWARD TO SEEING YOU AGAIN SOON.

SINCERELY,

BILL

END TEXT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3751

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 15, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: CARLOS PASCUAL *JP*

FROM: ANDREW WEISS *JP*

SUBJECT: Russian Political Update and Message to President
Boris Yeltsin on Impeachment Vote

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *KBNARA*, Date *10/2/2013*
2014-0546-M

Attached at Tab I is an assessment of the politics behind Saturday's failed impeachment vote in Moscow. At Tab A is a short note to Yeltsin from the President expressing appreciation that constitutional procedures were upheld during the crisis and our interest in laying the groundwork for a successful meeting in Cologne next month.

Concurrences by: Leon Fuerth, Rick Holtzapple *JP*
Strobe Talbott *JP*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President

Tab A Message to President Yeltsin

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 5/15/09

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER 

SUBJECT: Message to President Yeltsin on Impeachment Vote

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0546-M (1.27)
10/2/2013 KBHPurpose

Approve a message to President Yeltsin.

Background

We are carefully tracking the turmoil in Russian domestic politics. While many Western pundits had predicted the worst, Saturday's surprise impeachment vote demonstrated Yeltsin's knack for rising to the occasion and putting the Duma on the defensive. The Communists' ability to secure a two-thirds majority on any of the impeachment charge was stymied by Yeltsin's brash, combative approach to politics and pro-presidential provisions of the Russian constitution. Duma deputies also understood that any article of impeachment they approved would probably have been tossed out by the pro-Yeltsin Constitutional Court. Support from Zhirinovskiy's party, which is notorious for giving its votes to the highest bidder, sealed Yeltsin's victory.

Still, Yeltsin is not over the hump and must now turn to the confirmation of a new prime minister. Starting with a vote on Wednesday, the Duma will have three shots to reject or approve Yeltsin's candidate. If there is a third rejection, Yeltsin can dissolve the Duma and call for early elections within three months. But there's an interesting twist: once the Duma is dissolved, Yeltsin can appoint a prime minister (the very same one who was rejected if he wants) without Duma confirmation who can serve for the remainder of Yeltsin's term. Meanwhile, Duma members probably will be deprived of phones, faxes, cars and free travel, all of which they need to get re-elected. The Communists, who see the Duma as their main power base, would have the most to lose.

These realities are now sinking in with Russian parliamentarians. Having failed to support impeachment, they

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 5/15/09

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

have the unpalatable choice of whether to vote against Yeltsin's candidate for prime minister and spark the loss of their sinecures while failing to prevent Yeltsin from installing his candidate. The Yeltsin team would not mind having early elections -- much better to have them in the fall than in December when everyone is in a foul mood. And many liberals like PM-designate Stepashin, a Yeltsin loyalist who helped rein in the hard-line opposition and is tolerant of the new entrepreneurial class.

This is not to suggest that we should relax and take Russia's latest political upheaval lightly. The IMF program could indeed be stillborn. Russia could find itself with a government in gridlock for several months. However, today's events remind us that the disaster scenarios are not a given. Obviously, we will look at every possibility and prepare for them.

We have prepared a short message to Yeltsin indicating that you have been following the political situation closely and expressing appreciation for Russian diplomatic efforts on Kosovo. The message also highlights the importance of preparing a successful G-8 summit in Cologne on June 18-19 and suggests a separate bilateral meeting with Yeltsin on the margins of the summit.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message at Tab A.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab A Message to President Yeltsin

PREC: IMMEDIATE

CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/NODIS

FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE

TO: AMEMBASSY (MOSCOW)

INFO: SECSTATE WASHDC

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2014-0546-M (1.23)

10/2/2013 KBH

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN

1. AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

2. BEGIN TEXT.

DEAR BORIS:

I HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING THE SITUATION IN MOSCOW VERY CLOSELY AND THINKING OF YOU OFTEN. ~~I HAVE BEEN IMPRESSED THAT THROUGHOUT THIS CRISIS THE RUSSIAN CONSTITUTION HAS BEEN FAITHFULLY RESPECTED. YOU UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE A BUSY WEEK AHEAD OF YOU AS YOU PUT FORWARD A NEW PRIME MINISTER FOR CONFIRMATION.~~

STROBE HAS GIVEN ME A POSITIVE REPORT ON THE TALKS ON KOSOVO THAT HE AND HIS TEAM OF EXPERTS HAD IN MOSCOW WITH VIKTOR CHERNOMYRDIN AND FOREIGN MINISTER IVANOV. THE TRILATERAL MEETING IN HELSINKI ON TUESDAY WITH VIKTOR STEPANOVICH AND PRESIDENT AHTISAARI WILL BE AN IMPORTANT NEXT STEP IN OUR JOINT EFFORTS TO FIND A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS IN KOSOVO.

THE G-8 SUMMIT IN COLOGNE NEXT MONTH IS FAST APPROACHING, AND OUR TEAMS ARE DOING GOOD WORK TO PREPARE A SUCCESSFUL MEETING. I HOPE THAT WE CAN ALSO FIND TIME TO SIT DOWN SEPARATELY DURING THE SUMMIT AND TO MAKE PROGRESS ACROSS THE BROAD RANGE OF ISSUES ON THE U.S.-RUSSIAN AGENDA, INCLUDING SUPPORT FOR RUSSIAN ECONOMIC REFORM, ARMS CONTROL, AND NONPROLIFERATION. I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU AGAIN SOON.

SINCERELY,

BILL

END TEXT

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONACTIONDECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 135262014-0546-M (1.29)
10/2/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Message to President Yeltsin on Impeachment Vote

Purpose

Approve a message to President Yeltsin.

Background

We are carefully tracking the turmoil in Russian domestic politics. While many Western pundits had predicted the worst, Saturday's surprise impeachment vote demonstrated Yeltsin's knack for rising to the occasion and putting the Duma on the defensive. The Communists' ability to secure a two-thirds majority on any of the impeachment charge was stymied by Yeltsin's brash, combative approach to politics and pro-presidential provisions of the Russian constitution. Duma deputies also understood that any article of impeachment they approved would probably have been tossed out by the pro-Yeltsin Constitutional Court. Support from Zhirinovskiy's party, which is notorious for selling its votes to the highest bidder, sealed Yeltsin's victory.

guy

If there is a

Still, Yeltsin is not over the hump and must now turn to the confirmation of a new prime minister. Starting with a vote on Wednesday, the Duma will have three shots to reject or approve Yeltsin's candidate. Upon the third rejection, Yeltsin can dissolve the Duma and call for early elections within three months. But there's an interesting twist: once the Duma is dissolved, Yeltsin can appoint a prime minister (the very same one who was rejected if he wants) without Duma confirmation who can serve for the remainder of Yeltsin's term. Meanwhile, Duma members probably will be deprived of phones, faxes, cars and free travel, all of which they need to get re-elected. The Communists, who see the Duma as their main power base, would have the most to lose.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 5/15/09

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

These realities are now sinking in with Russian parliamentarians. Having failed to support impeachment, they have the unpalatable choice of whether to vote against Yeltsin's candidate for prime minister and spark the loss of their sinecures while failing to prevent Yeltsin from installing his candidate. The Yeltsin team would not mind having early elections -- much better to have them in the fall than in December when everyone is in a foul mood. And many liberals like PM-designate Stepashin, a Yeltsin loyalist who helped rein in the hard-line opposition and is tolerant of the new entrepreneurial class.

He
~~My intent~~ is not to suggest that we should relax and take Russia's latest political upheaval lightly. The IMF program could indeed be stillborn. ~~Yeltsin may toughen his stance on Kosovo out of pique at NATO's resolve or if he decides he needs to "look strong" for domestic purposes. Russia could even find itself with a government in gridlock for several months. However, today's events remind us that the disaster scenarios are not a given. Obviously, we will look at every possibility and prepare for them. But we should not yet join those who are panicking about Russian democracy's demise.~~

We have prepared a short message to Yeltsin indicating that you have been following the political situation closely and expressing appreciation for Russian diplomatic efforts on Kosovo. The message also highlights the importance of preparing a successful G-8 summit in Cologne on June 18-19 and suggests a separate bilateral meeting with Yeltsin on the margins of the summit.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message at Tab A.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A Message to President Yeltsin

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/NODIS

FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE

TO: AMEMBASSY (MOSCOW)

INFO: SECSTATE WASHDC

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2014-0546-M (1.30)
10/2/2018 KBH

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN

1. AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

2. BEGIN TEXT.

DEAR BORIS:

I HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING THE SITUATION IN MOSCOW VERY CLOSELY AND THINKING OF YOU OFTEN. I HAVE BEEN IMPRESSED THAT THROUGHOUT THIS CRISIS THE RUSSIAN CONSTITUTION HAS BEEN FAITHFULLY RESPECTED. YOU UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE A BUSY WEEK AHEAD OF YOU AS YOU PUT FORWARD A NEW PRIME MINISTER FOR CONFIRMATION.

STROBE HAS GIVEN ME A POSITIVE REPORT ON THE TALKS ON KOSOVO THAT HE AND HIS TEAM OF ~~MILITARY~~ EXPERTS HAD IN MOSCOW WITH VIKTOR CHERNOMYRDIN AND FOREIGN MINISTER IVANOV. THE TRILATERAL MEETING IN HELSINKI ON TUESDAY WITH VIKTOR STEPANOVICH AND PRESIDENT AHTISAARI WILL BE AN IMPORTANT NEXT STEP IN OUR JOINT EFFORTS TO FIND A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS IN KOSOVO. e

THE G-8 SUMMIT IN COLOGNE NEXT MONTH IS FAST APPROACHING, AND OUR TEAMS ARE DOING GOOD WORK TO PREPARE A SUCCESSFUL MEETING. I HOPE THAT WE CAN ALSO FIND TIME TO SIT DOWN SEPARATELY DURING THE SUMMIT AND TO MAKE PROGRESS ACROSS THE BROAD RANGE OF ISSUES ON THE U.S.-RUSSIAN AGENDA, INCLUDING SUPPORT FOR RUSSIAN ECONOMIC REFORM, ARMS CONTROL, AND NONPROLIFERATION. I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU AGAIN SOON.

SINCERELY,

BILL

END TEXT

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9903751
RECEIVED: 14 MAY 99 18

TO: BERGER

FROM: PASCUAL

DOC DATE: 15 MAY 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DEVELOPMENTS IN RUSSIA

ACTION: OBE PER EXEC SEC

DUE DATE: 18 MAY 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PASCUAL

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
PASCUAL

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMTS

CLOSED BY: NSDMK

DOC 1 OF 3

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBNARA, Date 10/2/2013
2014-0546-17

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9903751

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER	Z 99051422 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
001	X 99051917 OBE PER EXEC SEC
002 PRESIDENT	Z 99051817 FOR DECISION
002	X 99051817 PRESIDENT APPROVED RECOM
002	X 99052714 ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/RMO
003	X 99051817 CABLE SENT VIA SIT ROOM

~~SECRET~~

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE**

5/15

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 3751
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 12 A/O _____

JSB

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
JACOBSON	<u>1</u>	<u>D 5/12</u>	_____
POWELL	_____	_____	_____
RICE	_____	_____	_____
DAVIES	_____	<u>DBE</u>	_____
KERRICK	_____	_____	_____
STEINBERG	<u>2</u>	<u>D</u>	_____
BERGER	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	<u>4</u>	<u>TC 5/15</u>	<u>N</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>5</u>	<u>DMK 5/19</u>	<u>N/K</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

98 MAY 14 PM 7:40

COMMENTS:

Russia Developments

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE Yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE

5/15

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 3751
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 12 A/O _____

LSB

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
JACOBSON	<u>1</u>	<u>D 5/12</u>	
POWELL			
RICE			
DAVIES			
KERRICK			
STEINBERG	<u>2</u>		
BERGER	<u>3</u>		
SITUATION ROOM			
WEST WING DESK	<u>4</u>	<u>TC 5/15</u>	<u>N</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>5</u>	<u>DMK 5/19</u>	<u>N/R</u>

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

COMMENTS:

Russia Developments

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE

Yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3751

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 15, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

FROM: CARLOS PASCUAL 
SUBJECT: Developments in Russia

The memorandum for the President at Tab I comments on the latest political developments in Russia and provides some context that may help the President interpret what will inevitably be confusing news reports over the coming days.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum for the President

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By BBM NARA, Date 10/2/2012
2014-0546-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5b,d

Declassify On: 5/15/09

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONINFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Developments in Russia

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 135262014-0546-M (1.31)
10/2/2013 HBN

We are carefully tracking whether the chaos in Russian politics could lead to a political meltdown. Pundits are already predicting the worst, and that could be the case. But the political calculus in Moscow has shifted since Primakov was fired, with prospects for Yeltsin's political survival increasing significantly.

Two political events are unraveling together: Yeltsin's impeachment and the confirmation of a new prime minister. Starting with a vote this coming week, the Duma gets three shots to reject or approve Yeltsin's candidate for prime minister. Upon the third rejection, Yeltsin can dissolve the Duma and call for early elections in three months. But here's the interesting twist: once the Duma is dissolved, Yeltsin can appoint a prime minister (the very same one who was rejected if he wants) without Duma confirmation. Meanwhile, Duma members are deprived of phones, cars and free travel, all of which they need to get re-elected.

Russia's bizarre constitution may also be Yeltsin's best friend on the impeachment vote. One of five articles of impeachment -- against waging an unjust war in Chechnya -- could narrowly pass. That would give the Duma up to three months of immunity from being dissolved -- unless the Supreme Court, Constitutional Court or Federation Council overrule the Duma's vote. The latter is almost a given. The Constitutional Court already decided once that the Chechen War was legal, it would probably waste no time reaffirming this decision.

These realities are now sinking into the consciousness of Russian parliamentarians. They may take a political stand and vote for impeachment, but their vote will probably get overturned and have no practical impact. They may reject

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5b,d

Declassify On: 5/15/09

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Yeltsin's candidate for prime minister, but they will lose their jobs and Yeltsin will get his candidate anyway. Russian liberals would not mind having early elections -- much better to have them in the fall than in December when everyone is in a foul mood. And many liberals like PM-designate Stepashin, who did a credible job as Justice Minister, where he focused on promoting the rule of law.

My intent is not to suggest that we should relax and take Yeltsin's latest political upheaval lightly. The IMF program could indeed be stillborn. Yeltsin may toughen his stance on Kosovo if he feels he needs to "look strong" for domestic purposes. Russia could even find itself without a government for several months. However, the disaster scenarios are not a given. Obviously we will look at every possibility and prepare for it. But we should not yet join those who are panicking about Russia's demise.

Case Number: 2014-0546-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2733				
Document ID: 9904267				
Row: 46	Section: 4	Shelf: 7	Position: 1	Stack: v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. cable	re: Message to President Yeltsin from President Clinton (2 pages)	06/04/1999	P1/b(1)
~~001b. memo~~	~~Samuel Berger to POTUS re: Message to President Yeltsin (1 page)~~	~~06/03/1999~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 5/2/2019
001c. cable	[Duplicate of 002a] (2 pages)	06/04/1999	P1/b(1)
~~002a. cable~~	~~re: Message to President Yeltsin from President Clinton (2 pages)~~	~~06/04/1999~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 5/2/2019
~~002b. cable~~	~~[Duplicate of 002a] (2 pages)~~	~~06/04/1999~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 5/2/2019
~~002c. memo~~	~~[Duplicate of 001b] (1 page)~~	~~06/03/1999~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 5/2/2019
002d. cable	[Duplicate of 002a] (2 pages)	06/04/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kosovo and Yeltsin])
OA/Box Number: 2733

FOLDER TITLE:

9904267

2014-0546-M

rs1052

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9904267
RECEIVED: 03 JUN 99 17

TO: YELTSIN, BORIS

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 04 JUN 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: MSG TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN ON KOSOVO

ACTION: ORIGINAL EDITS RETURNED TO NSC/RMO DUE DATE: 07 JUN 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PASCUAL

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
PASCUAL

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMTS

CLOSED BY: NSDMK

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KGM NARA, Date 10/2/2013
2014-0546-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9904267

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001
002
002

Z 99060320 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR SIGNATURE
X 99060717 BERGER APPROVED RECOM
X 99060717 CABLE SENT VIA SIT ROOM
X 99091317 ORIGINAL EDITS RETURNED TO NSC/RMO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # _____

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
GIRE	_____	_____	_____
JACOBSON	_____	_____	_____
POWELL	_____	_____	_____
SARGEANT	_____	_____	_____
BRADTKE	_____	_____	_____
RUDMAN	_____	_____	_____
STEINBERG	_____	_____	_____
BERGER	_____	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	_____	_____	_____
RECORDS MGMT.	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

COMMENTS:

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE _____

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. cable	re: Message to President Yeltsin from President Clinton (2 pages)	06/04/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kosovo and Yeltsin])
OA/Box Number: 2733

FOLDER TITLE:

9904267

2014-0546-M
rs1052

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4267

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

June 3, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

FROM: CARLOS PASCUAL *CP*

**WWD - New Copy
for the File**

SUBJECT: Message to President Yeltsin on Kosovo

4/3 7:30pm

The memorandum for the President at Tab I recommends that he approve a message to President Yeltsin that both congratulates Yeltsin for Russia's role in recent progress on the Kosovo crisis and encourages him to sustain Russian pressure on Milosevic to comply with his commitments.

Concurrence by: Leon Fuerth, Greg Schulte, Tony Blinken *CP for*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum for the President

Tab A Message to President Yeltsin

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *KRM* NARA, Date *10/2/2018*
2014-0546-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5b,d

Declassify On: 6/3/09

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 3, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Message to President Yeltsin

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2014-0546-M (1.33)
10/2/2013 KBN

Purpose

To approve a message to President Yeltsin on Kosovo.

Background

The message at Tab A both congratulates Yeltsin for Russia's role in recent progress on the Kosovo crisis and encourages him to sustain Russian pressure on Milosevic to comply with his commitments.

There has been a mixed response in Russian political circles to the proposal Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin presented to the Serbs. While Russian public opinion is overwhelmingly in favor of a diplomatic solution, the Communists, nationalists and some in the military have criticized Chernomyrdin for giving away too much. Your message to Yeltsin will help reinforce in his mind that he made the right choice by working with the West toward resolving this crisis.

A copy of your letter will be delivered to Prime Minister Stepashin. The Vice President will call Chernomyrdin.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message to President Yeltsin at Tab A.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A Message to President Yeltsin

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5b,d

Declassify On: 6/3/09

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001c. cable	[Duplicate of 002a] (2 pages)	06/04/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kosovo and Yeltsin])
OA/Box Number: 2733

FOLDER TITLE:

9904267

2014-0546-M
rs1052

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9904267
RECEIVED: 03 JUN 99 17

TO: YELTSIN, BORIS

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 04 JUN 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: MSG TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN ON KOSOVO

ACTION: CABLE SENT VIA SIT ROOM

DUE DATE: 07 JUN 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PASCUAL

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
PASCUAL

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMTS

CLOSED BY: NSDMK

DOC 2 OF 2

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 10/2/2018
2014-0546-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9904267

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001
002

Z 99060320 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR SIGNATURE
X 99060717 BERGER APPROVED RECOM
X 99060717 CABLE SENT VIA SIT ROOM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE**

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4267
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG Sul A/O

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>cm</i> JACOBSON	_____	_____	_____
POWELL	_____	_____	_____
RICE	_____	_____	_____
DAVIES	<u>1</u>	<u>8/3</u>	_____
KERRICK	<u>Copy</u>	_____	_____
STEINBERG	<u>2</u>	_____	_____
BERGER	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	_____	_____	_____
RECORDS MGMT.	_____	_____	_____
<u>Sit Room</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6/3</u>	<u>OK</u>

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

95 JUN 3 7:18
 CC:

COMMENTS:

*message to President
 Yeltsin
 EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG #

4267

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM

PRS

INT

ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG

SUR A/O

SEQUENCE TO INITIAL/DATE DISPOSITION

JACOBSON

POWELL

RICE

DAVIES

KERRICK

STEINBERG

BERGER

SITUATION ROOM

WEST WING DESK

RECORDS MGMT.

Sit Room

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

COMMENTS:

message to President
Yeltsin
yes

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: BLINKEN, COQ, DAVIDSON, FICKLIN, FLANAGAN, HURLEY, PASCUAL, RUDMAN, SCHULTE, SUM2, WEISS, BERGER, DAVIES, FUERTH, HACHIGIAN, KERRICK, POWELL, RICEE, SIT{C2}, STEINBERG, SUTPHEN, NODIS

PREC: IMMEDIATE **CLASS:** ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ **DTG:** 040105Z JUN 99

FM: THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC

TO:
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2014-0546-M (1.35)
10/2/2013 K13M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NODIS
QQQQ

EMBASSY MOSCOW FOR THE AMBASSADOR AND DCM ONLY

STATE FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT AND S/NIS SESTANOVICH

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON

1. EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER TO APPROPRIATE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL(S) ON FRIDAY, JUNE 4, 1999. A COPY OF THE LETTER IS TO BE PROVIDED TO PRIME MINISTER STEPASHIN'S OFFICE. NO/NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

PAGE 2 RHEHAAA3427-~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2. BEGIN TEXT OF LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON.

DEAR BORIS,

I JUST RECEIVED STROBE TALBOTT'S REPORT FROM COLOGNE, WHERE HE TALKED DIRECTLY WITH MARTTI AHTISAARI AND SPOKE BY PHONE WITH VIKTOR STEPANOVICH. I WANTED TO CONGRATULATE YOU AND VIKTOR STEPANOVICH PERSONALLY BECAUSE I KNOW THAT WE SIMPLY COULD NOT HAVE MADE SO MUCH PROGRESS WITHOUT YOUR TIRELESS AND VISIONARY DEDICATION TO REACH A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT ON THE KOSOVO CRISIS.

EVEN THOUGH MUCH WORK STILL NEEDS TO BE DONE, RUSSIA'S CRITICALLY IMPORTANT EFFORTS HAVE DEMONSTRATED THE IMPORTANCE OF YOUR PARTNERSHIP WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND RUSSIA'S FUNDAMENTAL ROLE IN EUROPEAN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECURITY. I KNOW THAT SOME SKEPTICS CONTINUE TO QUESTION
RUSSIA'S ENGAGEMENT WITH THE WEST. ONCE AGAIN YOU HAVE

PAGE 3 RHEHAAA3427 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SHOWN THAT THROUGH SUCH ENGAGEMENT YOU CAN ADVANCE
RUSSIA'S INTERESTS AS WELL AS THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE AND
SECURITY IN EUROPE. AS A RESULT OF YOUR EFFORTS, PEACE IS
WITHIN REACH IN YUGOSLAVIA, AND WE HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO
FURTHER DEEPEN RUSSIA'S INTEGRATION WITH EUROPE AND THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

AS ALWAYS, YOU AND I STILL HAVE GREAT CHALLENGES BEFORE US. I
KNOW THAT THROUGH OUR PARTNERSHIP THERE IS NOTHING WE
CANNOT ACHIEVE. I AM GRATEFUL FOR YOUR PERSONAL
INVOLVEMENT ON THIS PROBLEM, FOR THE GUIDANCE AND SUPPORT
YOU GAVE VIKTOR STEPANOVICH, AND FOR THE CONSTRUCTIVE CALL I
HAD WITH PRIME MINISTER STEPASHIN ON MONDAY. I LOOK FORWARD
TO SEEING YOU IN COLOGNE.

SINCERELY,
WILLIAM J. CLINTON

PAGE 4 RHEHAAA3427 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLAS: X1..

<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01

<^SSN>3427

<^TOR>990603211943 M3891275

FROM:
SITREPT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Millison, Cathy L.

From: Sutphen, Mona K.
Sent: Thursday, June 03, 1999 8:09 PM
To: Pascual, Carlos E.; @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc: @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary
Subject: RE: Dear Boris -- Round Two ~~{CONFIDENTIAL}~~

Carlos - Sandy cleared w/out change -- assume you'll send this out? m

-----Original Message-----

From: Pascual, Carlos E.
Sent: Thursday, June 03, 1999 7:54 PM
To: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc: @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine
Subject: FW: Dear Boris -- Round Two ~~{CONFIDENTIAL}~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBNARA, Date 10/2/2018
2017-0516-m

-----Original Message-----

From: Pascual, Carlos E.
Sent: Thursday, June 03, 1999 7:52 PM
To: Sutphen, Mona K.
Cc: Schulte, Gregory L.
Subject: Dear Boris -- Round Two ~~{CONFIDENTIAL}~~

<< File: 4267ltrredraft.doc >>

Mona -- try this. Read it to Andrew, who passed it to Strobe, who concurs.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NODIS

NIACT IMMEDIATE

FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE
TO: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

INFO: SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE

EMBASSY MOSCOW FOR THE AMBASSADOR AND DCM ONLY

STATE FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT AND S/NIS SESTANOVICH

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON

1. EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER TO APPROPRIATE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL(S) ON FRIDAY, JUNE 4, 1999. A COPY OF THE LETTER IS TO BE PROVIDED TO PRIME MINISTER STEPASHIN'S OFFICE. NO/NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

2. BEGIN TEXT OF LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON.

DEAR BORIS,

I JUST RECEIVED STROBE TALBOTT'S REPORT FROM COLOGNE, WHERE HE TALKED DIRECTLY WITH MARTTI AHTISAARI AND SPOKE BY PHONE WITH VIKTOR STEPANOVICH. I WANTED TO CONGRATULATE YOU AND VIKTOR STEPANOVICH PERSONALLY BECAUSE I KNOW THAT WE SIMPLY COULD NOT HAVE MADE SO MUCH PROGRESS WITHOUT YOUR TIRELESS AND VISIONARY DEDICATION TO REACH A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT ON THE KOSOVO CRISIS.

EVEN THOUGH MUCH WORK STILL NEEDS TO BE DONE, RUSSIA'S CRITICALLY IMPORTANT EFFORTS HAVE DEMONSTRATED THE IMPORTANCE OF YOUR PARTNERSHIP WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND RUSSIA'S FUNDAMENTAL ROLE IN EUROPEAN SECURITY. I KNOW THAT SOME SKEPTICS CONTINUE TO QUESTION RUSSIA'S ENGAGEMENT WITH THE WEST. ONCE AGAIN YOU HAVE SHOWN THAT THROUGH SUCH ENGAGEMENT YOU CAN ADVANCE RUSSIA'S INTERESTS AS WELL AS THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE. AS A RESULT OF YOUR EFFORTS, PEACE IS WITHIN REACH IN YUGOSLAVIA, AND WE HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO FURTHER DEEPEN RUSSIA'S INTEGRATION WITH EUROPE AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

AS ALWAYS, YOU AND I STILL HAVE GREAT CHALLENGES BEFORE US. I KNOW THAT THROUGH OUR PARTNERSHIP THERE IS NOTHING WE CANNOT

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0546-M (1.36)
10/2/2018 KBH

ACHIEVE. I AM GRATEFUL FOR YOUR PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT ON THIS PROBLEM, FOR THE GUIDANCE AND SUPPORT YOU ~~HAVE~~ VIKTOR STEPANOVICH, AND FOR THE CONSTRUCTIVE CALL I HAD WITH PRIME MINISTER STEPASHIN ON MONDAY. I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN COLOGNE.

SINCERELY,
WILLIAM J. CLINTON

END TEXT

GAVE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4267

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

June 3, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

FROM: CARLOS PASCUAL *CP*
SUBJECT: Message to President Yeltsin on Kosovo

The memorandum for the President at Tab I recommends that he approve a message to President Yeltsin that both congratulates Yeltsin for Russia's role in recent progress on the Kosovo crisis and encourages him to sustain Russian pressure on Milosevic to comply with his commitments.

Concurrence by: Leon Fuerth, Greg Schulte, Tony Blinken *CP for*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Message to President Yeltsin

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KGM/NARA, Date 10/2/2018
2014-0546-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5b, d
Declassify On: 6/3/09

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 3, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Message to President Yeltsin

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2017-0546-M (1.37)
10/2/2018 KBH

Purpose

To approve a message to President Yeltsin on Kosovo.

Background

The message at Tab A both congratulates Yeltsin for Russia's role in recent progress on the Kosovo crisis and encourages him to sustain Russian pressure on Milosevic to comply with his commitments.

There has been a mixed response in Russian political circles to the proposal Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin presented to the Serbs. While Russian public opinion is overwhelmingly in favor of a diplomatic solution, the Communists, nationalists and some in the military have criticized Chernomyrdin for giving away too much. Your message to Yeltsin will help reinforce in his mind that he made the right choice by working with the West toward resolving this crisis.

A copy of your letter will be delivered to Prime Minister Stepashin. The Vice President will call Chernomyrdin.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message to President Yeltsin at Tab A.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A Message to President Yeltsin

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5b,d

Declassify On: 6/3/09

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002d. cable	[Duplicate of 002a] (2 pages)	06/04/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kosovo and Yeltsin])
OA/Box Number: 2733

FOLDER TITLE:

9904267

2014-0546-M

rs1052

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Case Number: 2014-0546-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2733				
Document ID: 9904335				
Row: 46	Section: 4	Shelf: 7	Position: 1	Stack: v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	re: Telephone Call with President Boris Yeltsin (1 page)	06/07/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001b. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with President Boris Yeltsin (3 pages)	06/07/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001c. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with President Boris Yeltsin (2 pages)	06/07/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001d. talking points	re: [Additional Points] (1 page)	06/07/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kosovo and Yeltsin])
OA/Box Number: 2733

FOLDER TITLE:

9904335

2014-0546-M

rs1053

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9904335
RECEIVED: 07 JUN 99 13

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 07 JUN 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA
TELCALL

KOSOVO

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR 7 JUN POTUS TELCALL TO PRES YELTSIN

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DUE DATE: 12 JUN 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PASCUAL

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
PASCUAL

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM

CLOSED BY: NSTSM

DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KSM NARA, Date 10/2/2013
2014-0546-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECORD ID: 9904335

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 PRESIDENT
001

Z 99060713 FOR INFORMATION
X 99060713 NOTED BY PRESIDENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4335

XX

TELEPHONE CALL WITH
PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN

DATE: June 7, 1999

LOCATION: Oval Office

TIME: 11:00 am

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2014-0546-M (1.39)

10/2/2013 KBH

I. PURPOSE

To encourage a constructive Russian role on Kosovo.

II. BACKGROUND

Attached are talking points for your call to Yeltsin. Allies agreed on the text of a UN Security Council resolution earlier today during a meeting with Madeleine. G-8 ministers are now discussing the text with Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov. The resolution could be introduced later today in New York and could open the door to the following sequence: military-technical agreement, withdrawals, pause, ACTORD for KFOR.

Cooperation with us on the resolution is an important test of Russian good faith. You should make clear to Yeltsin that if this process drags out, it will look like the Russians are providing cover to Milosevic, and the bombing will continue. Today's discussions also may clarify whether the Russians are in league with Milosevic and are trying to walk back last week's agreement. Russian representatives at the military-technical talks have played an unhelpful role by arguing the Serbs' case.

Attachment

Tab A Points to be Made

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5b,d

Declassify On: 6/07/09

6-7-99

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN

- Boris, you and I have set the tone for finding a diplomatic solution to the Kosovo crisis, and we must now step in again to ensure that the work we have already done stays on track.
- At your instruction, Prime Minister Stepashin had a good conversation with me last Monday - exactly a week ago. Sorry we could not talk then, but glad we can do so now.
- If Stepashin takes the call at the last minute instead of Yeltsin: You and I had what I regard as a good conversation last Monday -- exactly a week ago.
- Exactly one week ago, when you sent Viktor Stepanovich and I sent Strobe to Bonn, we agreed on a common approach for dealing urgently with the Kosovo crisis and creating conditions for the suspension of hostilities.
- In particular, we agreed to empower our presidential representatives to make tough decisions and binding commitments on our behalf.
- Strobe did that on my behalf, and Viktor Stepanovich did important work on [yours][President Yeltsin's].
- I'm sticking by the commitments I made last week, including the commitment to suspend bombing if Milosevic confirms, abides by and begins to implement the agreement he made with Viktor Stepanovich and President Ahtisaari on Friday.

DEFENSE

- [Boris][Sergey Vadimovich], I want you to understand the following: the bombing could be in suspension today -- and we could be having a very different sort of conversation -- if Milosevic had followed through on what he promised Ahtisaari and [you, Boris,] [the President of the Russian Federation] via Russia's envoy, Viktor Stepanovich.
- Instead, the bombing continues. ~~Peace remains elusive.~~ The possibility of a diplomatic settlement remains frustrated.
- That is no one's fault but Milosevic's.

PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING

- ~~He has reneged on the commitment he made to the international community, including the Russian Federation.~~
- Specifically, he is trying to back away from his agreement to total withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo according to a rapid, pre-agreed timetable. [FYI, the document/agreement specified a timetable of a week or so.] ~~He's also trying to postpone the withdrawal~~ by linking it to a UN Security Council resolution.
- The commitment for an immediate, rapid withdrawal was contained in the Chernomyrdin-Ahtisaari document; Milosevic agreed - and he's now trying to back away.
- That's why we haven't been able to suspend the bombing, and we won't be able to unless and until he keeps the promise he made last Friday.
- I'm counting on you and your government to join me, President Ahtisaari and other leaders of the international community to make clear to Milosevic in coming hours what must happen.

Pause

- Let me repeat what we need: Milosevic must make good on his agreement last Friday to total withdrawal of Serb military and paramilitary forces from Kosovo according to a rapid, pre-agreed timetable, and he must recognize -- as the Chernomyrdin-Ahtisaari document made clear -- that this agreement is a precondition to a pause in the bombing.
- ~~I understand that~~ ^{Jan} there's an issue of a United Nations Security Council Resolution. We know that having a resolution is important to Russia, to Yugoslavia and to others.
- Madeleine, Minister Ivanov and the other G-8 ministers are meeting today to discuss this. We have a draft text. We should agree to it today. This would make it easier for Milosevic. It would also facilitate rapid deployment of the international security force under UN auspices, eliminating any security gap as the Serb forces withdraw.

- Our best option is to move this resolution quickly. Let's not ~~make a bombing pause a precondition for deliberation and decision on a Security Council resolution.~~ *agree on the text of a UNSCR and then the sequencing becomes much easier.*
- ~~Nor should we allow the passage of a Security Council resolution to become a new, additional condition for suspending the bombing.~~
- Too many linkages will result in Serb forces remaining in place, fighting continuing, and NATO continuing its bombing.
- In other words, we're prepared to proceed on the basis of the Chernomyrdin-Ahtisaari agreement with Milosevic - no more, no less. We need you to help convince Milosevic to have his military immediately sign the technical agreement.
- We also need you to help ensure we have an agreed UN Security Council text that can immediately go to the Security Council.
- If Milosevic himself agrees to proceed on that basis, then when [you and I], or [President Yeltsin and I] meet in Cologne for the G-8 summit in 11 days, we will be meeting with peace in the Balkans and with a very visible triumph for Russian diplomacy in hand.
- If, however, Milosevic persists in his intransigence and bad faith, then the Cologne Summit will be under a cloud, because the air campaign will still be going on.
- I'll come prepared to work with you, Jacques, Gerhard and the others on managing the crisis and keeping alive the chances of peace and triumph for Russian diplomacy.
- Let's make sure that Madeleine and Igor do good work today.

Sutphen, Mona K.

From: Pascual, Carlos E.
Sent: Monday, June 07, 1999 8:33 AM
To: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc: @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; @KOS; @VP - VP Natl Security Affairs
Subject: VP-Cherno Call [UNCLASSIFIED]

Importance: High

PLEASE MAKE SURE SANDY AND JIM ARE AWARE

VP will call Cherno at 10:45. He'll use same points as POTUS adapted as appropriate for the VP and Cherno.

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN

- Boris, we are on the verge of an important achievement - a diplomatic solution to the crisis in Kosovo that will lead to an end of the bombing and a return of the refugees - exactly as you and I discussed in late April.
- As you will remember, on that day you suggested that Viktor Stepanovich engage with the Vice President and me to find a solution. Over the past several weeks, he has worked with Al, President Ahtisaari and Strobe, and they came up with an excellent plan that Milosevic accepted last Friday.
- But now we have a problem with implementing the agreement. Milosevic says that he won't live up to his commitment to withdraw all his forces unless a peacekeeping force enters Kosovo under UN auspices.
- Although we don't agree with his interpretation, there is a very simple way to solve this problem. If we can agree today on a UN Security Council Resolution covering the peacekeeping force, I believe we will be able to develop a sequence that will allow for a beginning of Serb withdrawal and a suspension of the bombing, immediately followed by the passage of the resolution we agree to today and then the entry of the peacekeeping force into Kosovo.
- Boris, as you know our Foreign Ministers are discussing this Security Council Resolution at the G-8 meeting that's going on right now in Germany. It's critical that you instruct Minister Ivanov to do everything possible to reach agreement today. I've told Madeleine the same thing, and I've talked to Tony Blair about it to, and he agrees. Your role has been indispensable up till now, and it still is today.
- This is the best way to get Milosevic to live up to his commitments and to get an end to the bombing and the refugees back. If we reach agreement on the Security Council Resolution today, this can all be over quickly, and it will set the stage for an important G-8 meeting in Cologne in two weeks with a very visible Russian diplomatic triumph.

PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING

6-7-99

- (If he says no resolution without a bombing pause): Let's agree on the text. If we do, I'm sure we can work out a sequence that will lead to a bombing pause before we vote on the Resolution in the Security Council.

in let it snatch defeat fr. jaws of victory

If Yeltsin says that the proposed MTA imposes new conditions on Belgrade

- The broad terms of such a document have been known to all for months. They are no more than what is necessary to ensure a permissive environment for the international security presence.
- They impose obligations on both sides to the conflict in ways that ensure that forces are separated and opens the way for a more permanent negotiated resolution.
- The changes offered by Milosevic's generals this weekend were a transparent effort to return to the terms of the October 1998 agreement.
- For example, Belgrade is attempting to keep thousands of VJ and MUP in Kosovo. Kosovar refugees simply will not return home under those circumstances, and the conflict would continue.

PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING

Case Number: 2014-0546-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2734				
Document ID: 9904407				
Row: 46	Section: 4	Shelf: 7	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. talking points	re: Points for Phone Call with President Yeltsin (3 pages)	04/25/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001b. talking points	re: [Additional Points] (2 pages)	04/25/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001c. talking points	re: [Yeltsin Talking Points to Carlos Pascual from Strobe Talbott] (3 pages)	04/25/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kosovo and Yeltsin])
OA/Box Number: 2734

FOLDER TITLE:

9904407

2014-0546-M

rs1054

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9904407
RECEIVED: 09 JUN 99 14

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 25 APR 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA
KOSOVO

TELCALL

PERSONS: TALBOTT, STROBE

YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: TALKING PTS FOR POTUS TELCALL TO YELTSIN 25 APR

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE DATE: 15 JUN 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
PASCUAL

COMMENTS: PTS WERE GIVEN DIRECTLY TO POTUS 4/25

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDMK

CLOSED BY: NSDMK

DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRM NARA, Date 10/2/2018
2014-0546-17

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9904407

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001

X 99060914 FOR RECORD PURPOSES

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National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4407
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff	_____	_____	_____
Rice	_____	_____	_____
Davies	_____	_____	_____
Kerrick	_____	_____	_____
Steinberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>1</u> → <u>6/7 DMK</u>		<u>R</u>
Records Mgt.	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

CC:

COMMENTS: *Log for Record Purposes
 Orig of these points
 were passed to POTUS
 4/25*

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

National Security Council
The White House

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URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff	_____	_____	_____
Rice	_____	_____	_____
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Kerrick	_____	_____	_____
Steinberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>1</u>	<u>6/7 DMK</u>	<u>R</u>
Records Mgt.	_____	_____	_____
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CC:

COMMENTS:

Log for Record Purposes
Orig of these points
were passed to POTUS
4/25

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS FOR PHONE CALL WITH
PRESIDENT YELTSIN

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0546-M (1.43)
10/2/2013 K8H

If Yeltsin complains about reports that we're moving toward ground troops:

- I haven't made a decision to use ground troops. In fact, I've repeated as recently as this weekend that I believe we can accomplish our goals with air power.
- What I have said, Boris -- and what Schroeder, Blair, Chirac and virtually every other leader here has said -- is that NATO is going to persist in its air strikes until we prevail.
- And "prevailing" means until the conditions exist for the safe return of the refugees; that means Serb forces out and an international security force in -- I'd hope with Russian participation.

If he complains about oil embargo:

- The Alliance was united on this. Milosevic is using that oil for one purpose above all: to keep his forces in the field in operation, so that they can continue the slaughter and expulsion of Kosovo Albanians.
- We're going to keep tightening the vice on him, Boris; that's going to continue until he's prepared to meet his obligations -- including promises that he's made to you, and broken.
- While I know you don't approve of the oil embargo any more than you approve of the air strikes, I'd hope you'd take every precaution to avoid this conflict putting Russia and NATO directly at odds. That could be unbelievably dangerous, and would, among other things, ruin whatever chance there is of us working together diplomatically in the crucial days and weeks ahead.

If he calls for a bombing pause -- to give diplomacy a chance:

- Boris, as I told you last Monday when we talked, the bombing could be suspended tomorrow if Milosevic today were to do three simple things: 1) call off the killings and deportations that his forces are carrying out in Kosovo; 2) agree to their withdrawal and begin that withdrawal in a way

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (b, d)

Declassify on: 04/25/09

that we can verify; and 3) agree to the deployment of an international security force.

- Short of that, the air strikes are going to continue.
- All 19 of the Presidents and Prime Ministers gathered here support that course, and those conditions. So do a lot of the others who are here for the EAPC event.

If he lays out proposals for engagement between Chernomyrdin and various key NATO countries OR if he suggests Chernomyrdin come to Washington:

- [Fine. Always glad to see him. We'll make the most of the meeting.]
- As I told you last week, we really want to be support of Victor Stepanovich's efforts. We've studied closely everything that he and others have said since he was in Belgrade.
- Some of what we've heard from the Russian side confirms that you're trying hard to be constructive and achieve a solution. However, what we've heard from Belgrade since Victor was there is just the opposite: it suggests they're still dug in on their old, unacceptable positions.
- Let me just reiterate, as clearly as I possibly can, what it will take to move from military action to a political, diplomatic process:
 - The bombing is going to continue unless and until Belgrade accepts:
 1. cessation of all operations currently being conducted by Serb forces in Kosovo;
 2. evidence that we can see that the forces are being withdrawn;
 3. agreement to the deployment in Kosovo of an international security force.
- Now, on that last point, Boris, as Madeleine and Igor Ivanov have discussed many times -- and as Jim Collins has discussed with Victor Stepanovich -- we feel very, very strongly that NATO is going to have to be very much at the core of an international security force. That still leaves us plenty to talk about on other subjects: the full composition of the

force (we'd hope it would include Russia in a major role) and the overall auspices for the force (we'd be open to a role for the UN and the OSCE, and therefore, once again, for Russia).

- If those are subjects that our people can usefully talk about, we can have Madeleine follow up with Igor, and as I told you, I'm prepared to send Strobe to Moscow as well.

If he accuses you/us of taking a harder line at the Summit than you "promised" in the phone call last Monday

- Boris, I assure you that's not true. Everything that I said at the Summit -- and indeed, what the Alliance as a whole has said -- is totally consistent with what I told you, and what Madeleine has told Igor Sergeyevich, and what Jim Collins told Victor Stepanovich.

If he previews a Russian plan likely to come out of the Russian government meeting scheduled for tomorrow:

- *(First review bottom-line points.)*
- Boris, please don't put out something in public that you know we and the Allies will have no choice but to reject. That will make it only more difficult for us to find a solution and to work together in doing so.
- I might say that we have appreciated the cautious way in which Victor Stepanovich has handled this most recent round.

If Yeltsin calls for UN force in Kosovo.

- Only way this will work is if we have strong, cohesive force, and if NATO plays key role to convince KLA to disarm. Russia has big role, especially to protect Serbs in Kosovo.
- Welcome a UN umbrella. Would be a coalition of the willing. Don't care what it is called. Don't need NATO sign over door or patches on uniform. But UN force would not achieve objectives of safety, security, getting KLA to disarm.

If he charges that NATO is pushing to make Kosovo an international protectorate and that this could have disastrous consequences for Russia and NIS.

- NATO not pushing to make Kosovo a protectorate. Have made clear we want solution that preserves FRY territorial integrity and gives Kosovars autonomy.
- But the longer Milosevic continues his attacks, the harder it will be to keep his grip on Kosovo. Hope you can make clear to him that he needs to reverse course -- only option to preserve FRY and disarm KLA.

If he complains about Open Door and inviting new members.

- Our policy hasn't changed -- have kept my promise of no surprises. The Alliance is prepared to accept new members when they are ready. We did not issue any new invitations for membership. We will review this again at next Summit.

If he complains about Membership Action Plan.

- Nine countries actively seeking membership. That is their choice. Developed a Membership Action Plan that makes clear the standards for joining the Alliance. But no decisions have been taken on new members.

If he complains about "global NATO" authorized in NATO strategic concept.

- Said last September when we met that strategic concept would focus on security challenges for 21st C, and that is what we did. Affirmed that we are committed to upholding UN charter.
- Also affirmed in the strategic concept, and in virtually every summit document, NATO's desire for cooperation with Russia. Russia and NATO must work as partners on European security. We have to do all we can to cooperate.

If he complains about Caucasus event with three regional presidents hosted by Albright.

- First, want to make clear this meeting is not part of the summit, and we are not creating a new forum. Wanted Russia to participate and extended invitation. Remain committed to OSCE processes in which Russia and U.S. are working as partners.
- Want to emphasize that regional cooperation on economic and security issues among states of the Caucasus is in their self-interest. If all three countries can set goals that they think are important, that will reinforce the peace processes we are working on together.

Millison, Cathy L.

From: Pascual, Carlos E.
Sent: Sunday, April 25, 1999 9:42 AM
To: @KOSOVO; @NATO; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary
Cc: @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine
Subject: Yeltsin Call [CONFIDENTIAL]

Importance: High



BNY contingency_.doc

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KSM NARA, Date 10/3/2013
2014-0546-M

Call happening in 45 minutes. Core points drafted by Strobe and not on e-mail. Attached are contingencies.

04/25/99

URGENT FROM TO CARLOS PASCUAL 456-9160

From Strobe Talbott

If Yeltsin complains about reports that we're moving toward ground troops:

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- And "prevailing" means until the conditions exist for the safe return of the refugees: that means Serb forces out and an international security force in — I'd hope with Russian participation.

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- We're going to keep tightening the vice on him, Boris; that's going to continue until he's prepared to meet his obligations — including promises that he's made to you, and broken.
- While I know you don't approve of the oil embargo any more than you approve of the air strikes, I'd hope you'd take every precaution to avoid this conflict putting Russia and NATO directly at odds. That could be unbelievably dangerous, and would, among other things, ruin whatever chance there is of us working together diplomatically in the crucial days and weeks ahead.

If he calls for a bombing pause — to give diplomacy a chance...

- Boris, as I told you last Monday when we talked, the bombing could be suspended tomorrow if Milošević today were to do three simple things: 1) call off the killings and deportations that his forces are carrying out in Kosovo, 2) agree to their withdrawal and begin that withdrawal in a way that we can verify, and 3) agree to the deployment of an international security force.
- Short of that, the air strikes are going to continue.

- All 19 of the Presidents and Prime Ministers gathered here support that course, and those conditions. So do a lot of the others who are here for the EAPC event.

If he lays out proposals for engagement between Chernomyrdin and various key NATO countries...

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- If those are subjects that our people can usefully talk about, we can have Madeleine follow up with Igor and, as I told you, I'm prepared to send Strobe to Moscow as well.

If he suggests Chernomyrdin comes to Washington...

- Fine. Always glad to see him. We'll make the most of the meeting. (*Then do previous points on our bottom-line for conditions.*)

If he accuses you/us of taking a harder line at the Summit than you "promised" in the phone call last Monday...

- Boris, I assure you that's not true. Everything that I've said at the Summit — and indeed, what the Alliance as a whole has said — is totally consistent with what I told you, and what Madeleine has told Igor Sergeyevich, and what Jim Collins told Victor Stepanovich.

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- *(First, review bottom-line points.)*
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- I might say that we have appreciated the cautious way in which Victor Stepanovich has handled this most recent round.

Case Number: 2014-0546-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2734				
Document ID: 9904415				
Row: 46	Section: 4	Shelf: 7	Position: 2	Stack: v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. talking points	re. Points to be Made in Telephone Conversation with President Yeltsin (6 pages)	05/02/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kosovo and Yeltsin])
OA/Box Number: 2734

FOLDER TITLE:

9904415

2014-0546-M

rs1055

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9904415
RECEIVED: 09 JUN 99 15

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 02 MAY 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA
KOSOVO

TELCALL

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: TALKING PTS FOR POTUS TELCALL W/ YELTSIN 2 MAY

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DUE DATE: 15 JUN 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSDMK

CLOSED BY: NSDMK

DOC 1 OF 1

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRM NARA, Date 10/2/2018
2014-0546-M

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RECORD ID: 9904415

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 PRESIDENT

001

Z 99060915 FOR INFORMATION

X 99060915 NOTED BY PRESIDENT

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National Security Council
The White House

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URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff	_____	_____	_____
Rice	_____	_____	_____
Davies	_____	_____	_____
Kerrick	_____	_____	_____
Steinberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>1</u>	<u>6/9 DUK</u>	<u>~~A~~</u>
Records Mgt.	_____	_____	_____
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98 MAY 5 1998
A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

File for the Record

COMMENTS: *Needs log #*

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National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4415

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff	_____	_____	_____
Rice	_____	_____	_____
Davies	_____	_____	_____
Kerrick	_____	_____	_____
Steinberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>1</u>	<u>6/9 DUK</u>	<u>~~A~~</u>
Records Mgt.	_____	_____	_____
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A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

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File for the Record

COMMENTS:

Needs Log #

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

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Staff Secy | 5/3

Phil '99 MAY 3 AM 8:17
Used by POTUS for
Sunday, 5/2 phone
call.

Slgr |

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRM NARA, Date 10/2/2018
2014-0546-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

5-2-99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE IN
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT YELTSIN

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0546-M (1.46)
10/2/2018 KRM

Assuming Yeltsin presses for accepting a deal that is NATO-light and Serb-heavy

- Boris, before going to the specifics of what you're saying, let me assure that all of us -- Tony, Jacques, Gerhard, and the rest of us -- appreciate what you are trying to do.
- As I told you last Sunday, we take your personal engagement in the search for peace as a positive development.
- We know how hard and how conscientiously Viktor Stepanovich has been working. He's had two good talks with Al, and will have another later today. VP
- Let me also repeat that all of us would be very pleased to see Russia play a crucial role in achieving a political settlement and in implementing it.
- So Tony, Jacques, Gerhard, and I all see an opportunity in what you're doing on the diplomatic front to be not just good for peace in the Balkans, but also good for Russia and for our relations with Russia.
- But, Boris, I need you to hear directly from me -- and to understand -- what we can accept and work with, and what we can't and why.
- Basically, it comes down to this: the right sort of deal will truly bring this crisis to an end on a lasting basis; the wrong sort of deal will prolong the crisis -- and even make it worse.
- Now, let me turn to the specifics of what you're urging, based on your negotiations with Belgrade.

International Military Presence, UN Role.

- I think it's good that you've used your influence to open up the possibility of an international force that includes a military element. As long as it is strong and involves NATO at its core, it can have a United Nations umbrella over it and plenty of room for participation by Russia and others.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- As a broad concept, that do-able, Boris, and I'm prepared to have our people work hard on fleshing that out in the days to come.
- We should all keep talking to Kofi Annan, who I know had a good visit to Moscow. We can work with the UN and with the OSCE on how to keep the peace.

FRY Territorial Integrity.

- Another point that I know is important to you: there is absolutely no disagreement between us on the vital importance of solving the crisis in a way that keeps Kosovo inside the territory of Yugoslavia. Again, our people are having good, constructive discussions on how to achieve that.
- But there are two major problems with what you've proposed to me here -- and what Viktor Stepanovich heard in Belgrade.

Total Withdrawal of FRY Forces.

- First, your sense of what Belgrade would accept is unacceptable to me -- and I think it should be unacceptable to you, too -- because it would leave substantial numbers of armed Serbs in Kosovo.
- That means rank-and-file, peaceful Albanian refugees will never come home.
- The only Albanians who will come back into Kosovo will be armed extremists bent on killing Serbs.
- That means Kosovo will continue to be in a state of civil war -- a guerilla war, and one that will spread into neighboring countries for years to come. It will be a permanent, explosive source of instability -- and, frankly, of tension and even potential conflict between ourselves and our successors. We can't have that. That's not good for either of us or our countries.

Strong International Security Presence.

- Second, the international peacekeeping force would be too weak to deal with either the Serbs if they got out of hand or with the Albanian extremists.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- Kosovo will be an exceedingly dangerous environment for the peacekeepers, including the Russians who take part.
- What Milosevic is trying to do, Boris, is to get us to go back and accept the compromise that we -- Russia, U.S., UK, Germany, France, and Italy -- worked out last October: an unarmed or very lightly armed "observer" mission that is caught in a vise of violence between armed Serbs and armed Albanians.
- Remember, Boris, it's because Milosevic violated all those agreements with you personally and your government as well as with the rest of us, that this crisis exploded.
- In order to defuse it now, we need an outcome that does three things:
 1. Keeps Kosovo in Yugoslavia under an internationally supervised and enforced arrangement, preferably through the UN;
 2. Permits Albanians to return -- that is, peaceful, law-abiding citizens who just want to go about their lives;
 3. Makes it possible to disarm or demilitarize the Kosovo Liberation Army.
- There's only way to achieve that outcome:
 1. Require all armed Serb forces out;
 2. Deploy a strong, capable international force, and that means with NATO at its core with U.S. participation, and including Russia and other troops as well.
- Any outcome short of that will not only fail to bring peace -- it will guarantee a worse and wider war.

If Yeltsin presses for a bombing pause

- When Strobe met with Chernomyrdin and Ivanov, they talked in detail about the conditions that would permit a bombing pause. Al and Viktor Stepanovich have gotten into this as well.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- As I told you last Sunday, the bombing could stop almost immediately if Milosevic would agree to the basic point I've discussed here and we -- Russia and U.S. together, along with others -- could verify that he had begun to comply with and implement his obligations.
- In particular, he has to agree to full withdrawal in advance, and then we've got to see the beginning of withdrawal.
- That's another subject on which I think we should work hard in coming days.

If he tries to guilt-trip us on the destruction and suffering inside Serbia

- Boris, we're doing what we can in dangerous conditions to limit civilian casualties.
- I think it's important for you to think about the enormity of the atrocities -- and that means, the deliberate, systematic and massive killings -- which Belgrade has perpetrated in Kosovo. The full story is only beginning to get out.
- When it comes out fully, it's really important that the international community, and that means to the extent possible, with Russia, stood up against this outrage.
- It would be devastating to me as a friend of Russia and a friend of yours if Russia were to appear to have been on the wrong side here.

If Yeltsin asks to send Chernomyrdin to Washington

- Would be very happy to receive Viktor Stepanovich. Al and Viktor can talk later today and see what works.
- Want to hear more about Chernomyrdin's meetings in Belgrade. Know Chernomyrdin had good meetings with Strobe last week. Important to keep dialogue going with direction from two of us.
- Viktor posed some important questions last week. We're working internally and with NATO to answer them. In addition to Viktor's trip here, would like to send Strobe and experts back to Moscow the week of May 10 to discuss.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

If Yeltsin complains Kosovo about becoming international protectorate

- Know issue is sensitive for you. Important that any solution preserves FRY territorial integrity and current borders. Want to work with you on developing and implementing solution. See big role for Russia here.
- Scale of Milosevic's brutality means we simply can't allow him retain control over Kosovo. And enormous devastation inside Kosovo means that refugees will need a lot of help from international community to run their affairs.

If Yeltsin says Serbs will accept international force but only non-combatant NATO countries can be on ground in Kosovo

- Post-conflict environment will be very dangerous. International security force must be capable, effective. NATO needs to be there if refugees are going to return and KLA going to disarm.
- Can't let Milosevic arbitrarily dictate which countries participate. Will be reassuring for Albanians if we're there, just as it will be reassuring to Serbs if Russia participates.

If Yeltsin asks about press line

VPA
st

Think we should say that we're continuing our intensive work. That we're pleased with results of Strobe's trip, looking forward to Chernomyrdin's visit to Washington and his update on recent talks in Belgrade.

- ① Also should say we reaffirmed need for end to violence against Kosovars, withdrawal of Serb forces, return of refugees, and humanitarian access inside Kosovo.
- ② Should stress our agreement on preserving FRY territorial integrity and ensuring autonomy for Kosovo. And that we intend to keep working closely with European partners, UN Secretary General Annan, OSCE, and others.

If Yeltsin asks for G-8 foreign ministers meeting

- Know Madeleine and Ivanov have been talking about G-8 meeting. Chernomyrdin's visit will help us determine how much progress we've made in recent week, enough consensus on key points to guarantee successful outcome.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

② G-8 political directors meeting tomorrow in Germany. Want any G-8 ministerial to show we're together, pursuing common approach.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Case Number: 2014-0546-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2735				
Document ID: 9904697				
Row: 46	Section: 4	Shelf: 7	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. letter	President Yeltsin to President Clinton [untranslated copy] (1 page)	06/17/1999	P1/b(1) KSH 5/2/2019

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kosovo and Yeltsin])
OA/Box Number: 2735

FOLDER TITLE:

9904697

2014-0546-M

rs1056

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9904697
RECEIVED: 18 JUN 99 18

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: YELTSIN, BORIS

DOC DATE: 17 JUN 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA
KOSOVO

HS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: THANK YOU LTR & POLITICAL SOLUTION IN YUGOSLAVIA

ACTION: ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/RMO

DUE DATE: 30 JUN 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WEISS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM

CLOSED BY: NSDMK

DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBN NARA, Date 10/2/2018
2014-0546-17

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9904697

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 WEISS
001
001

Z 99061818 APPROPRIATE ACTION
X 99062313 NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED
X 99071513 ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/RMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

001 990617 STATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



ПОСОЛЬСТВО
РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ
В США

July 8th, 1999

Dear Mr. Pascual,

I have the honor to transmit to you the signed original of the letter from the President of the Russian Federation to the President of the United States conveyed to you earlier.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'I. Neverov', with a long, sweeping horizontal stroke at the end.

Igor S. Neverov,
Deputy Chief of Mission

JUL 15 9:19

THE HONORABLE CARLOS PASCUAL
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
SENIOR DIRECTOR
RUSSIAN, UKRAINIAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS
THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON D.C., 20500



**ПРЕЗИДЕНТ
РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ**

« 17 » ИЮНЯ 19 99 г.

№ Пр-769

г. Москва, Кремль

Дорогой Билл,


Выражаю признательность за поздравление в связи с Днем принятия Декларации о государственном суверенитете Российской Федерации.

Также как и ты удовлетворен прекращением военной акции против Югославии и переводом косовского кризиса в политическое русло. Это еще раз доказывает, что только в тесном сотрудничестве и при использовании многосторонних переговорных механизмов мы способны находить решения самых сложных проблем в национальных интересах России и США.

Исхожу из того, что реализация мирных договоренностей по Косово, как и урегулирование других глобальных и региональных проблем должны осуществляться таким образом, чтобы способствовать укреплению российско-американских отношений, доверия между нашими странами.

Наина и я передаем наилучшие пожелания Хиллари и тебе.

JUL 15 9:19

 Б.Ельцин

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ УИЛЬЯМУ ДЖЕФЕРСОНУ КЛИНТОНУ,
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г.Вашингтон

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2718				
Document ID: 9902080				
Row: 46	Section: 4	Shelf: 2	Position: 1	Stack: v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. notes	re: [Notes for Yeltsin Telephone Conversation] (3 pages)	03/24/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001b. notes	re: [Notes for Yeltsin Telephone Conversation] (3 pages)	03/24/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001c. memo	re: Phone Call with President Yeltsin (2 pages)	03/24/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001d. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin (2 pages)	03/24/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001e. talking points	re: Additional Points for Yeltsin Phone Call (4 pages)	03/24/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001f. talking points	[Duplicate of 001d] (2 pages)	03/24/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001g. talking points	[Duplicate of 001d] (2 pages)	03/24/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Yeltsin and Tel...])
OA/Box Number: 2718

FOLDER TITLE:

9902080

2014-0546-M

rs1057

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9902080
RECEIVED: 23 MAR 99 18

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 24 MAR 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCALL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR YELTSIN TELCALL 24 MAR

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DUE DATE: 26 MAR 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WEISS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
PASCUAL
WEISS

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMTS

CLOSED BY: NSDMK

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KBN Date: 10/2/2018
2014-0546-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9902080

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
002 PRESIDENT
002

Z 99032407 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
Z 99032407 FOR INFORMATION
X 99060118 NOTED BY PRESIDENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**National Security Council
The White House**

3/23

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 2080
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: X DOCLOG TMA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff	_____	_____	_____
Rice	_____	_____	_____
Davies	<u>1</u>	<u>g 3/23</u>	<u>done</u>
Kerrick	_____	_____	<u>edit</u>
Steinberg	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____
Berger	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>TTC 8/24</u>	<u>DCAPLAN</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>5</u>	<u>DMK 6/1</u>	<u>2</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: POTUS telcall to Yeltsin
24 mar

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

National Security Council
The White House

3/23

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 2080
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS
BYPASSED WW DESK: X DOCLOG TMA A/O _____

TMA

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff	_____	_____	_____
Rice	_____	_____	_____
Davies	<u>1</u>	<u>g 3/23</u>	<u>done</u>
Kerrick	_____	_____	<u>edit</u>
Steinberg	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____
Berger	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>TIC 3/24</u>	<u>DCORAN</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>5</u>	<u>DMK 6/1</u>	<u>2</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: POTUS telcall to Yeltsin
24 mar

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

3-24-99

Milosevic ~~has~~ a
communist dictator
wants to destroy
what you & I as
Democratic Leaders of
Great countries have
accomplished

We did pool our
diplomatic efforts -
& Milosevic defied
us.

You + I have two years
to define our legacy - we
can do it for ourselves, or
let Milosevic define it for
us - I think that would be a tragedy

I've got people telling
me Russia is our real
enemy. I tell them they're
wrong. I reject & fight them.
You've got people tell you U.S.
is real enemy. I hope you're telling
them they're wrong.

If, after air strikes,
Milosevic is ready to
resume diplomacy, we will
be ready too - & we'll
be eager to work with
you ~~on~~ on that.

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE

We have tried together
and we ~~have~~ were rebuffed together
This is not just my view,
but Chirac, Blair, Schroeder.

Milosevic is taking advantage
of your good will.

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

3-24-99

Milosevic ~~has~~ a
communist dictator

wants to destroy

what you & I as

Democratic Leaders of

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE

great countries have
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Mr. Milosevic is taking advantage
of your good will.

We did pool our
diplomatic efforts —
& Milošević defied
us.

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE

We have tried together
and we ~~have~~ were rebuffed together
This is not just my view,
but Clinton, Blair, Schroeder.

If, after air strikes,
Milosević is ready to
resume diplomacy, we will
be ready too — & we'll
be eager to work with
you ~~on~~ on that.

I've got people telling
me Russia is our real
enemy. I tell them they're
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You've got people tell you U.S.
is real enemy. I hope you're telling
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DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE

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to define our legacy — we
can do it for ourselves, or
let Milosević define it for
us — I think that would be a tragedy

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

3-24-99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2080

THE WHITE HOUSE

'99 MAR 24 AM 7:27

WASHINGTON

March 24, 1999

PHONE CALL WITH
PRESIDENT YELTSIN

DATE: March 24, 1999

LOCATION: Oval Office

TIME: 9:15 - 9:30 a.m.

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER 

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2014-0546-M (1.50)

10/2/2018 KBH

I. PURPOSE

Discuss the situation in Kosovo prior to NATO military action.

II. BACKGROUND

Your goal for the call is to mitigate the negative impact on the U.S.-Russia relationship from military action against Serbia and remind Yeltsin of how much has been achieved during your tenures.

Primakov turned back to Moscow in mid-flight after the Vice President notified him that Milosevic had refused to accept the international peace agreement. In his two phone calls with the Vice President, Primakov spoke pessimistically about the likely damage to the U.S.-Russian relationship, emphasized that that we had not given diplomacy enough of a chance, and said that we should "have learned our lesson" from Iraq. Primakov's report to Yeltsin upon arrival in Moscow probably will have a sharper edge.

Russian rhetoric is already heightening. Foreign Minister Ivanov earlier today criticized likely "NATO aggression" against the FRY and suggested that Russia may push at the UN to reopen the arms embargo. The detention of a large cargo plane in Azerbaijan earlier today carrying seven MiG 21 airplanes and 30 mercenary pilots, possibly bound for the FRY, may be a harbinger of future problems. Yeltsin is expected to make a public statement today (Wednesday).

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (b, d)

Declassify On: 3/23/09

You should be aware that Yeltsin, who was released from the hospital only six days ago, is now enmeshed in a bare-knuckles political crisis. The deepening crisis will make it even more difficult than usual to communicate effectively with him. Credible revelations of corruption have been laid at his family's and entourage's doorstep by Procurator General Skuratov and his Communist allies in parliament. The Yeltsin team probably believes that Primakov had a hand in spreading allegations that Yeltsin's daughters are involved in illegal activities.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President
Strobe Talbott
Leon Fuerth
Carlos Pascual

IV. SEQUENCE

Pre-brief followed by phone call

Attachment
Tab A Points to be Made

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0546-M (1.51)
10/2/2018 KBH

- Boris, we've been through a lot together. We've stood by each other at very difficult moments over six and a half years. Have supported each other in some hard times.
- We've never gone wrong asserting the fundamental importance of U.S.-Russian relations. Think this is one of these times.
- The situation in Kosovo is grave and getting worse. Major Serb operations and humanitarian disaster already under way. Milosevic defying international community and ignoring his promises to you.
- Appreciate quick response to my letter. Our teams have worked hard and well. Al and Yevgeney spoke twice yesterday. Madeleine and Ivanov in touch daily. Important to keep channels working.
- Know it was difficult for Yevgeniy to postpone his trip, but preferable to creating situation where he would have to interrupt visit and leave. Al hopes to reschedule soon.
- Have given diplomacy every chance: Rambouillet, then Paris. On Monday Russian, American and EU negotiators appealed to Milosevic and he rebuffed all of us. I sent Holbrooke to give Milosevic one last clear chance.
- Milosevic refused to pull back troops or agree to a cease-fire. His posture is threatening and belligerent.
- Situation on the ground horrifying. 30,000 Kosovars displaced since Friday. Villages being burned; innocent people being killed. Reports of summary executions.
- Use of force is not our preference. But Milosevic has left us no other course of action to stop the bloodshed. Further delay will only result in more innocent victims.

Pause

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (b, d)

Declassify On: 3/23/09

- You and I have two key tasks. First is to bring peace to Kosovo. Need to prevent more killing of helpless civilians. Milosevic can tell us at any time he accepts the peaceful solution developed by Russia and the rest of the Contact Group.
- Second is to ensure that Milosevic's intransigence does not derail U.S.-Russia relationship. Fully committed to advancing interests we have always shared: Russia's integration into global community, democracy, a strong economy, reducing our nuclear arsenals.
- In coming days want to keep moving in our discussions on CFE. Hope you will continue your negotiations with IMF. Let's sustain momentum to fix proliferation problems.
- Some will call for Russia and U.S. to abandon START II and NATO-Russia relationship. May not be the time to advance these, but have to protect them and keep hope alive to redefine global and European security.
- Truly hope, Boris, that we can overcome differences on use of force. Tried every alternative. Let's focus on how much we have to gain through cooperation and not let Milosevic destroy what you and I have worked so hard to build.

3-24-99

ADDITIONAL POINTS FOR YELTSIN PHONE CALL

①

- Boris, this is one of the more difficult calls I've ever had to make to you. It's also one of the more important.
- It's about the decision that Jacques Chirac, Tony Blair, Gerhard Schroeder and the rest of us have made to launch air strikes against Serbian military targets. That's going to happen ^{soon} ~~in the coming~~ ~~hours~~.
- My people have kept in the closest possible touch with your ^{negotiator} ~~for~~ for many days now. We've been totally open about how we saw the situation unfolding and how we felt we'd have to respond. By stonewalling ^{your} Holbrooke and continuing his rampage in Kosovo, Milošević simply left us no choice.
- I know how much you oppose this action we're taking, but I want you to know how much I'm determined to keep our disagreement on this subject from ruining everything else we've done together and that we can still do together.
- Boris, let's remember how long we've been working together and what we've been through together. We've been at it for 6 ½ years. During that time we've been through some rough times for both of us. I was always there for you, and you were very supportive of me. I'm thinking about the spring of '96 and the fall of '98, when I came to Moscow even though a lot of people were telling me not to. I've always given priority to my support for you, and I sense you've done the same when the chips were down.

- I've thought a lot about that over the past few days as Milošević as forced a situation that has brought U.S.-Russian relations close to a point of crisis.
 - I don't know about you, but I find it infuriating that a third-rate bully and dictator like Milošević could create so much trouble ^{TWO GREAT POWERS LIKE THE U.S. + RUSSIA.} between our ~~governments~~. Here's a guy who has defied you, defied your letters to him, defied your foreign minister — refused to do what Russia has urged him to do, and done it over and over and over again. He's done the same to me. Yet the crisis he's created now poses the biggest source of tension and the biggest challenge between us.
-

4

- We're bigger than he is in every sense. We ought to be able to ride out the trouble he's causing.
- I know you're going to have to deal with people who want to exploit this situation and use it against you and me and our legacy. I gather there are some who are saying, "Let's tear up and throw out the NATO-Russia Founding Act.... Let's disband the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council." Don't let them do that, Boris. The U.S. and Russia are major powers, with major responsibilities and major opportunities. We can't let a minor villain like Milošević put all our work in jeopardy.
- One more thing, Boris: even though Milošević has given us no choice but to hit him, that doesn't mean we've given up on diplomacy. Maybe after this first wave of air strikes, he'll come to his senses. In that case, we're prepared to give diplomacy another chance. And

Madeleine stands ready to go back to work with Ivanov through the Contact Group.

- **So let's be like good chess players; let's be thinking several moves in advance. For my part, I want those to be moves that the U.S. and Russia are taking together.**

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0546-M (1.53)
10/2/2013 KBH

- (2)
- Boris, we've been through a lot together. We've stood by each other at very difficult moments over six and a half years. Have supported each other in some hard times.
 - We've never gone wrong asserting the fundamental importance of U.S.-Russian relations. Think this is one of these times.
 - The situation in Kosovo is grave and getting worse. Major Serb operations and humanitarian disaster already under way. Milosevic defying international community and ignoring his promises to you.
 - Appreciate quick response to my letter. Our teams have worked hard and well. Al and Yevgeney spoke twice yesterday. Madeleine and Ivanov in touch daily. Important to keep channels working.
 - Know it was difficult for Yevgeniy to postpone his trip, but preferable to creating situation where he would have to interrupt visit and leave. Al hopes to reschedule soon.
 - Have given diplomacy every chance: Rambouillet, then Paris. On Monday Russian, American and EU negotiators appealed to Milosevic and he rebuffed all of us. I sent Holbrooke to give Milosevic one last clear chance.
 - Milosevic refused to pull back troops or agree to a cease-fire. His posture is threatening and belligerent.
 - Situation on the ground horrifying. 30,000 Kosovars displaced since Friday. Villages being burned; innocent people being killed. Reports of summary executions.
 - Use of force is not our preference. But Milosevic has left us no other course of action to stop the bloodshed. Further delay will only result in more innocent victims.

Pause

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (b, d)

Declassify On: 3/23/09

- You and I have two key tasks. First is to bring peace to Kosovo. Need to prevent more killing of helpless civilians. Milosevic can tell us at any time he accepts the peaceful solution developed by Russia and the rest of the Contact Group.
- *Need*
3 ~~Second is~~ to ensure that Milosevic's intransigence does not derail U.S.-Russia relationship. Fully committed to advancing interests we have always shared: Russia's integration into global community, democracy, a strong economy, reducing our nuclear arsenals.
- In coming days want to keep moving in our discussions on CFE. Hope you will continue your negotiations with IMF. Let's sustain momentum to fix proliferation problems.
- Some will call for Russia and U.S. to abandon START II and NATO-Russia relationship. May not be the time to advance these, but have to protect them and keep hope alive to redefine global and European security.
- Truly hope, Boris, that we can overcome differences on use of force. Tried every alternative. Let's focus on how much we have to gain through cooperation and not let Milosevic destroy what you and I have worked so hard to build.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2080

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

March 24, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: CARLOS PASCUAL }
FROM: ANDREW WEISS } *via e-mail*
SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Russian President Yeltsin

The memorandum for the President at Tab I provides background and talking points for a Presidential call to President Yeltsin.

Concurrence by: Miriam Sapiro, Leon Fuerth

RECOMMENDATION

via e-mail

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Talking Points

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By ~~KSH~~ NARA, Date 10/2/2018
2014-0546-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 b,d
Declassify On: 3/22/09

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2014-0546-M (1.54)

10/2/2018 K8H

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN

- Boris, we've been through a lot together. We've stood by each other at very difficult moments over six and a half years. Have supported each other in some hard times.
- We've never gone wrong asserting that U.S.-Russian relations ~~are extremely important and needed to be defended~~. Think this is one of these times. *the fulfillment of the fundamental importance of*
- ~~Wanted to talk given deteriorating situation in Kosovo. Major Serb operations and humanitarian disaster already under way. Milosevic defying international community and ignoring his commitments to you.~~ *he is sure all self here is grave and getting worse*
- Appreciate quick response to my letter. Our teams have worked hard and well. Al and Yevgeney spoke twice yesterday. Madeleine and Ivanov in touch daily. Important to keep channels working.
- Know it was difficult for Yevgeniy to postpone his trip, but preferable to creating situation where he would have to interrupt visit and leave. Al hopes to reschedule soon.
- *On Monday / on Monday* Have given diplomacy every chance: Rambouillet, then Paris. Russian, American and EU negotiators appealed to Milosevic. *and he will shut all of us*
~~Sent Holbrooke. I sent Holbrooke to give M. one last clear chance~~
- ~~Milosevic gave Ambassador Holbrooke no indication that he has any intention of negotiating a peaceful solution. Refused to pull back troops or agree to a cease-fire. His posture is threatening and belligerent.~~ *burned burned*
- Situation on the ground horrifying. 30,000 Kosovars displaced since Friday. Villages being ~~rased~~; innocent people being killed. Reports of summary executions.
- Use of force is not our preference. But Milosevic has left us no other course of action to stop the bloodshed. Further delay will only result in more innocent victims.

Pause

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5b,d

Declassify On: 3/23/09

*Milosevic has rebuffed all of us.
He has repeatedly broken his promise to
you and to the OSCE*

You and I

- Have two key tasks. First is to bring peace to Kosovo. Need to ~~deter action against~~ helpless civilians. Milosevic can tell us at any time he accepts the peaceful solution developed by Russia and the rest of the Contact Group.
- Second is to ensure Milosevic ^{that} ~~does not~~ ^{intransigence} ~~derail~~ ^{intransigence} U.S.-Russia relationship. Fully committed to advancing interests we have always shared: Russia's integration into global community, democracy, a strong economy, reducing our nuclear arsenals.
- Many critics here and in Russia calling for an end to engagement. Would miss a historic opportunity. Need to make sure Russian and American people understand fundamental interests we share.
- In coming days want to keep moving in our discussions on CFE. Hope you will continue your negotiations with IMF. Let's sustain momentum to fix proliferation problems.
- Some will call for Russia and U.S. to abandon START II and NATO-Russia relationship. May not be the time to advance these, but have to protect them and keep hope alive to redefine global and European security.
- Truly hope, Boris, that we can overcome differences on use of force. Tried every alternative. Let's focus on how much we have to gain through cooperation and not let Milosevic derail what you and I have worked so hard to build.

must
very
well if
prevent
more
killing
of

~~_____~~


destroy
destroy

Case Number: 2014-0546-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2719				
Document ID: 9902107				
Row: 46	Section: 4	Shelf: 2	Position: 2	Stack: V



Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. teleon	re: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin (5 pages)	03/24/1999	P1A(1) KBM 7/13/2018

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Yeltsin and Tel...])
OA/Box Number: 2719

FOLDER TITLE:

9902107

2014-0546-M
rs1058

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9902107
RECEIVED: 24 MAR 99 17

TO: BERGER

FROM: WEISS
PASCUAL

DOC DATE: 25 MAR 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCON

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: MEMCON BTW POTUS & YELTSIN ON 24 MAR

ACTION: KERRICK APPROVED RECOM 2

DUE DATE: 30 MAR 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WEISS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

FICKLIN
NSC CHRON
PASCUAL
WEISS

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDMK

CLOSED BY: NSDMK

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2004
By KSH NARA, Date 10/1/2018
2014-0546-07

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9902107

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001

Z 99032521 FOR DECISION
X 99060118 KERRICK APPROVED RECOM 2

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 2107

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRB NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG 13 A/O _____

TMA

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Rice Jacobson	1	3/25	
Davies	2	~~3/25~~	
Kerrick	3	3/26	
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	3/26	D
Records Mgt.	5	DMK 6/1	N

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Telcor
 24
 No brain.
 Shouldn't be
 dist. w. d
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RECORDED 25 MAR 1983

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 2107
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM RRS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 13 A/O _____

TMA

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff	_____	_____	_____
Rice Jacobson	<u>1</u>	<u>3/25</u>	_____
Davies	<u>2</u>	~~3/25~~	_____
Kerrick	<u>3</u>	<u>3/26</u>	_____
Steinberg	<u>copy</u>	_____	_____
Berger	<u>copy</u>	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>3/26</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>5</u>	<u>DMK 6/1</u>	<u>N</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: *[arrow pointing down]*

COMMENTS: ~~3~~ Telcon w/ Yeltsin
 24 march

99 MAR 25 AM 8:51

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes _____

Don (3/26)
 No brain.
 Shouldn't be
 destroyed *[initials]*

~~SECRET~~

2107

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

March 25, 1999

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBYNARA, Date 10/2/2018
2014-0546-M

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

(K) R

THROUGH: CARLOS PASCUAL

FROM: ANDREW WEISS

> on original

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Boris Yeltsin, March 24, 1999

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the March 24 telephone conversation between the President and Russian President Yeltsin.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Glyn Davies to transmit the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A to the Department of State.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

(K)

Andrew/Carlos
may brief Steve who
will know.

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

(K)

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to State

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 3/25/09

~~SECRET~~

2107

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Yeltsin (C)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Russian President Boris Yeltsin is provided for the information of the Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary. It must be distributed via NODIS channels. It may also be sent to our Embassy in Moscow for the Ambassador only.
(C)

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A

Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBA NARA, Date 10/2/2018
2014-0546-M

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 3/25/09

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONDECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0782-M-2 (1.41)
3/13/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Yeltsin (S)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Yeltsin

Interpreter: Yuri Shkeyrov
Notetakers: Jenny McGee, Miles Murphy,
Joel Schrader, James Smith, Andrew Weiss

DATE, TIME March 24, 1998, 9:20 - 9:56 a.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello, Boris. (U)

President Yeltsin: Yes, hello Bill. (U)

The President: Thank you for taking my call. I want to talk to you today about the situation in Serbia and Kosovo. I know you are aware already that Jacques Chirac, Tony Blair, Gerhard Schroeder and the rest of the Europeans have decided we have to launch airstrikes against military targets in Serbia soon. My people have kept in very close touch with yours for many days now and have tried to talk openly about how the situation is developing and what we would be required to do. But as you know, Milosevic has stonewalled your negotiator and Dick Holbrooke, and he has continued to move his forces into Kosovo and to evacuate villages. He has left us no choice. I know that you oppose what we are doing, but I want you to know that I am determined to do whatever I can to keep our disagreement on this from ruining everything else we have done and can do together in the coming years. (S)

President Yeltsin: I'm afraid we shall not succeed in that. If you do that [unintelligible] our side very much. Because what was needed to have begun were political discussions again and again and again, instead of bombing and destroying people. Primakov is only the first step ... [unintelligible]. We have

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(b)
Declassify On: 3/25/09

many steps to aim against your decision, maybe inadmissible steps. (S)

The President: Let me just say this, Boris. I did everything I could do along with you to try to negotiate with Milosevic. He made an agreement last Fall and ended the trouble for awhile, and then he unilaterally violated the agreement. In violation of the agreement he made with us, he has massed 40,000 troops in Kosovo around the border and nearly 300 tanks, and he is running people out of their villages again. He won't even stop the violence, and this means he is going to recreate Bosnia all over again, and we're supposed to sit around and say that this is terribly unfortunate. Basically, it will be your decision if you decide to let this bully destroy the relationship we worked hard for six and a half years to build up. (S)

I have always been there for you, working hard with my people to support Russia economically. I came there last Fall. I was there in 1996 when a lot of people said I shouldn't go. You may decide to let this get in the way of our relationship, but I'm not going to because I do not think he is that important. I won't sit still while Europe is pleading with me to help them avoid another Bosnia. (S)

He made 2.5 million refugees there, and there are another 250,000 from Kosovo, and I'm not going to let him make another 2 million and impose those kind of burdens. I'm sorry he is a Serb. I wish he were Irish or something else, but he is not. He has constantly refused every plea to stop his aggression. He is not important enough for us to allow him to wreck the relationship between the U.S. and Russia and all the European support. It is not worth it. (S)

He has displaced 30,000 more people just since last Friday. He is killing innocent people. We have reports of summary executions. He has basically told Russian, EU, and American negotiators that he doesn't care what any of us think. If we don't do something, we are going to have another Bosnia all over again. We had a peace agreement at Rambouillet. No one wanted to take his land, his property away, but he wants to crush them militarily. I think we have to do something about it, but I do not believe it should get in the way of bigger issues of trying to make Russia stronger economically, politically, securing its role in the world in a positive way, and both of us reducing our nuclear arsenals. That's a lot more important than Milosevic. But if we let him destabilize the Balkans, that is all we will do for the next two years. (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes, Bill, it is a great pity for me. We have been for so long working in each other's direction. We have done a great deal. I have reached agreement with the State Duma with regards to START II, and on the sixth of April, they were supposed to ratify that Treaty. This time around that will not happen, of course, under the circumstances. (S)

It is easy to throw bombs about. However, the long-term political search for a constructive solution to the situation, that's a different thing. But this is the only correct approach, the only correct way. If we pool our strengths together, we could turn Milosevic around. Their parliament made some appropriate decisions yesterday. (S)

The President: Well, let me just say this, I believe we should not give up on diplomacy. After what -- [Yeltsin interrupts] (S)

President Yeltsin: Of course, we are going to talk to each other, you and me. But there will not be such a great drive and such friendship that we had before. That will not be there again. (S)

The President: But the problem is, Boris, if you remember going back to Bosnia, remember what happened in Bosnia. After threatening a few airstrikes and him losing a few battles on the ground to the Croatian forces, and a few other things happened, then he was willing to talk about diplomacy. But right now, he is only too happy to have people come in and talk to him because he continues his invasion in violation of his own constitution and his own agreement.

How can you negotiate with someone while he's evacuating villages and has no intention of stopping, but he is happy to have you in for a talk and give you a cup of tea while he does it? That is why the Europeans feel even more strongly than the U.S. does. My God, they have nightmares they'll repeat Bosnia and all the instability and all the problems, and it will spread from Kosovo to Macedonia to Albania and engulf all of their southern flank. They are very, very worried about it. They are right to be worried about it. I think we should take this first round of action and then engage in diplomacy again. Then maybe Milosevic will listen. (S)

President Yeltsin: But this is an intolerable situation when something is done because of the position of one person. It is intolerable because of the hundreds of thousands of people who will suffer and die. We cannot be guided only because of his words, we should not proceed only from his position and actions. He should be surrounded by the people who will encourage the situation in the correct direction so that it would become intolerable for Milosevic to behave the way that he has until now. Foreign intelligence [services] should also play a part in that process. (S)

The President: If I thought that were true, that would be wonderful, but the truth is he has dislocated 25,000-30,000 people since last week. (S)

President Yeltsin: In the name of our future, in the name of you and me, in the name of the future of our countries, in the name of security in Europe, I ask you to renounce that strike, and I suggest that we should meet somewhere and develop a tactical line of fighting against Milosevic, against him personally. And we are wiser, we are more experienced, we can come up with a solution. That should be done for the sake of our relationship. That should be done for the sake of peace in Europe. It is not known who will come after us and it is not known what will be the road of future developments in strategic nuclear weapons. It is known, however, what will be when we are in power because we have taken the decision to decrease them, decrease them, decrease them. (S)

The President: Well, Boris, I want to work with you to try to bring an end to this, but I don't believe there is any way to call off the first round of strikes because Milosevic continues to displace thousands of people every day. I think we can get some of our people together in the next couple of days to try to dissuade him. I don't want this to be a great source of a split between Russia and Europe and Russia and the U.S. We have worked too hard. There are too many economic and political things for us to do together, and I regret this more than I can say. (S)

I could not believe after we got this agreement from the Kosovar Albanians that he not only refused to sign the agreement, but moved into their territory, but that is what has happened. What has to be done in the next day or so is clear. I hope we can stay in touch and find a diplomatic solution. I think you know what has to be done to find a diplomatic solution. Maybe after a first round of airstrikes, he will be ready to give diplomacy

a chance. Madeleine is ready to go back to work with Ivanov, back to the Contact Group. We should think several moves ahead, almost as if we are playing a chess game. (S)

This would be the time to come together to resolve this, but I can't go against the unified opinion of the Europeans, as well as my own view, that this man is not going to stop his military advance unless someone does something. Milosevic is still a communist dictator and he would like to destroy the alliance that Russia has built up with the U.S. and Europe and essentially destroy the whole movement of your region toward democracy and go back to ethnic alliances. We cannot allow him to dictate our future. (S)

I know this is a political problem for you at home, and I will do everything I can to put it right and restart the diplomacy at any point in this. I'd give anything not to have to make this telephone call today, but we have no choice. I hope between the two of us we will not let it destroy all the bigger issues before us and the world. (S)

President Yeltsin: I think that now we should try and seek at least some ways in order to retain, to save, some of what we have managed to develop during these years. But our people will certainly from now have a bad attitude with regard to America and with NATO. I remember how difficult it was for me to try and turn the heads of our people, the heads of the politicians towards the West, towards the United States, but I succeeded in doing that, and now to lose all that. Well, since I failed to convince the President, that means there is in store for us a very difficult, difficult road of contacts, if they prove to be possible. Goodbye. (S)

-- End of Conversation --

~~SECRET~~

2107

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

March 25, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: CARLOS PASCUAL *CP*

FROM: ANDREW WEISS *AW*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Boris Yeltsin, March 24, 1999

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the March 24 telephone conversation between the President and Russian President Yeltsin.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Glyn Davies to transmit the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A to the Department of State.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to State

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5(b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *KBM* NARA, Date *10/2/2018*
2014-0546-M

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 3/25/09

Case Number: 2014-0546-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2722				
Document ID: 9902561				
Row: 46	Section: 4	Shelf: 3	Position: 2	Stack: V

See 2009-1290-M

Case Number: 2014-0546-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2722				
Document ID: 9902642				
Row: 46	Section: 4	Shelf: 3	Position: 2	Stack: V

Case Number: 2014-0546-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 2723				
Document ID: 9902743				
Row: 46	Section: 4	Shelf: 3	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. notes	re: [Notecards for Yeltsin Telephone Conversation] (4 pages)	04/19/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001b. notes	re: [Notecards for Yeltsin Telephone Conversation] (2 pages)	04/19/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001c. memo	re: Phone Call with President Yeltsin (2 pages)	04/18/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001d. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin (3 pages)	04/18/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001e. talking points	[Duplicate of 001d] (2 pages)	04/18/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001f. talking points	re: [Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with Yeltsin] (1 page)	04/19/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001g. talking points	[Duplicate of 001d] (3 pages)	04/19/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001h. talking points	[Duplicate of 001d] (3 pages)	04/19/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001i. memo	re: Phone Call with President Yeltsin (2 pages)	04/18/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001j. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin (3 pages)	04/19/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Yeltsin and Tel...])
OA/Box Number: 2723

FOLDER TITLE:

9902743

2014-0546-M

rs1059

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9902743
RECEIVED: 13 APR 99 15

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 18 APR 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA
AP

TELCALL

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: TELCALL TO PRES YELTSIN ON 19 APR

ACTION: ORIGINAL EDITS RETURNED TO NSC/RMO DUE DATE: 19 APR 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WEISS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSEMK

CLOSED BY: NSEMK

DOC 2 OF 2

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 10/2/2018
2014-0546-17

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RECORD ID: 9902743

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
002
002

Z 99041621 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
X 99041920 NOTED BY PRESIDENT
X 99042819 ORIGINAL EDITS RETURNED TO NSC/RMO

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National Security Council
The White House

4/17

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URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 23 A/O _____

TMA

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Rice	<u>1</u>	<u>@ 4/17</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
Davies			
Kerrick			
Steinberg	<u>2</u>		<u>[Signature]</u>
Berger	<u>3</u>		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>TTC 4/19</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>5</u>	<u>DLK 4/28</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>

A = Action

to Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

WWD- original
w/ PRES 4/18,
Copies given to
SRB, JS, DLK, EAIR.
GTD, BIH, NLE

n 19
Apr

Exec Sec Office

National Security Council
The White House

4/17

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 2743

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG 23 A/O _____

TMA

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Rice	<u>1</u>	<u>@ 4/17</u>	<u>OK</u>
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A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

CC:

COMMENTS:

Telcall to Yeltsin 19
Apr

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

WWD original
w/ PRES 4/18,
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SRB, JS, DLK, EMR,
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DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE

Very important ~~to~~

Polus ^{DENY} ~~deny~~, & say we

oppose, arming KLA,

way to handle Yeltsin on plea for

~~Belgrade~~ bombing pause:

"Boris, NATO could - & would -
stop bombing tomorrow if Belgrade
accepted the principles on which you
& have agreed & begin withdrawing
its forces from Kosovo."

- 1) need to put down marker
on Russian help to Fry
- 2) of course, not helping
Slovenian fighters

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

4-19-99

need to make clear that
while we want dipl. solution,
will continue air campaign
until we are sure
Kotovans can return w/
security

Suggest Cherno
& Collins talk
soon about the
program.

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE

THE WHITE HOUSE

Mr. President -

I checked on IMF status is:

- Some give in Russian positions starting ^{last} Friday.
- Still distance to go. Good but long way from certain chance of agreement when Russian economic team is here in 7 day.
- Program would be restricted -- paying fund back not new net money.
- World loosen WB/Japan/debt constraints

Larry Summers

ST willing to
meet in Europe

even before going

| to other Euro capitals

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 to other Euro capitals

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 18, 1999

PHONE CALL WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN

DATE: April 19, 1999

LOCATION: Oval Office

TIME: 9:30 - 9:45 a.m.

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER *S*

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2014-0546-M (1.58)

10/2/2018 KBH

I. PURPOSE

Discuss Kosovo, insulate impact on U.S.-Russian relationship.

II. BACKGROUND

This may be our most important window of opportunity with Yeltsin to get traction on Kosovo. Although polls show 93 percent of Russians against NATO's actions, most Russians favor a peaceful outcome and are against military action. Yeltsin sees a political solution is a political winner for him at home. Primakov is caught in the middle; the Communist and nationalist constituency he has courted in the Duma favors a hard-line response, and he does not want to alienate them even if he disagrees. For Yeltsin, being the peacemaker on Kosovo could raise his political fortunes, and could help him undercut Primakov who has helped air corruption charges against the Yeltsin family.

Yeltsin is pushing to be more visible -- and relevant -- on Kosovo. On Thursday, he appointed Chernomyrdin as his special envoy. Ambassador Collins met with Chernomyrdin for over an hour on Friday and found him to be engaged and serious. Yeltsin will hold a Kosovo strategy meeting on Monday, and Chernomyrdin plans to go to Belgrade early next week, so your call is well-timed. Chernomyrdin is no fan of Milosevic, and he has possible leverage in light of Belgrade's dependence on Gazprom.

It's important to use this call to focus Yeltsin on the key issue separating us -- an international security force. Yeltsin may still be personalizing our dispute over Kosovo, so you will need to use care to get him into a problem-

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Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)

Declassify on: 4/19/09

solving mode. You should underscore that our positions really aren't that far apart -- we agree on the need for an immediate halt to the attacks on Kosovar Albanians, withdrawal of FRY forces from Kosovo, safe return of refugees, access for humanitarian organizations, and disarming the KLA. You should stress that these principles allow a solution that will preserve Yugoslavia's territorial integrity -- the point Yeltsin will need to sell at home -- but the only way to ensure their implementation is through an international force.

Attachment

Tab A Points to be Made

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0546-M (1.59)
10/2/2013 KBH

- Great deal at stake over Kosovo. Greatest test of the new Europe you and I have long worked to achieve -- a Europe free of communist dictatorships, democratic, prosperous, undivided by ethnic or ideological intolerance.
- Important we listen to each other and work to bring our positions together. Appreciate your heartfelt messages. Glad to see your hands-on involvement; critical to solving problem. You and I have solved toughest problems by working together.
- Glad you suggested Albright-Ivanov meeting. Ambassador Collins had excellent meeting with Viktor Chernomyrdin. Collins says Viktor Stepanovich is energized to help find political solution; that is what you and I want.
- Believe Madeleine and Ivanov achieved a great deal in defining common principles, and they are important: end attacks on Kosovars, withdraw Serb forces, allow refugees to return and access for relief organizations.
- These create foundation for political solution that allows Serbs to preserve territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, provided we can be assured that Milosevic will implement them.
- Now we're down to the last step -- to devise the machinery to implement our agreed principles. Milosevic leaves no choice but to have an international security force; after what he has done in Kosovo, Kosovars will never return without international security presence. It will protect both Serbs and Albanians; will permit FRY to maintain territorial integrity.
- Let's agree, Boris, that you and I will instruct our teams to find formula we can both accept that includes military component. Important that Russia play key role in force to protect rights and safety of Serb civilians in Kosovo.
- Ready to call it an "international force" or coalition of the willing if that helps. Would be flexible so long as force is strong, cohesive and ready to do what is needed to keep the peace.

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Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)

Declassify on: 4/19/09

- NATO's role in organizing the force is key to getting KLA to disarm. Hope to see military force complemented by OSCE-led civilian implementation mission where Russia would also play big role.
- If our people can agree on a formula, we might take it to the G-8 to endorse the key principles and then draft a UN Security Council Resolution sponsored by all the G-8.

Pause for Response

- Want to thank you for strong position against being drawn into the conflict militarily. Know pressures you face; crucial that you have taken moral stance against involvement.
- G-8 needs your help to get Milosevic to accept international security force and to recognize that this will ensure that he gets to preserve Yugoslavia's territorial integrity.
- Situation inside Kosovo truly grave. Refugees in hills could starve. Grateful for anything you can do to urge Belgrade to allow safe access.
- Understand Chernomyrdin may go to Belgrade this week; we should try to reach a common position before he goes that will give him leverage and authority he needs to get Milosevic to pull Serb forces out and agree to international security force.

Pause for Response

- Been thinking about you as we prepare for important meetings in Washington later this week. Would like nothing better than for you to be there, but know that may be unrealistic. Still hope Russia can come at some level.
- Also want to assure you that purpose of Summit is to reinforce principles you and I have developed together. 21st Century security challenges already upon us; need to pool our forces. Kosovo is an example of that. We need to work together.
- You and I must safeguard all we've achieved since 1993. Can't let Milosevic jeopardize work left to be done -- arms control, support for Russian economy, all the security challenges you and I laid out for 21st Century.

If Yeltsin warns that introducing NATO ground forces could push Russia into conflict

- Have made clear that we don't have any intention to introduce ground forces in nonpermissive environment. Have made no decision to do so. Milosevic may drive us to assess prospects, but no decisions taken.

If Yeltsin charges U.S. arming KLA

- Administration is fully upholding UN arms embargo and is not supplying arms to KLA. Am strongly opposed to legislation in our Congress calling for such support.

If Yeltsin calls for special G-8 meeting

- Good idea, but must highlight G-8 unity and common direction. Important for Madeleine and Ivanov to find the right formula for international force. Then take to G-8 and UN.

If Yeltsin complains U.S. blocked Russian humanitarian aid to FRY

- Hope Russian assistance will help those directly affected by crisis. We've done nothing to impede shipments. Pleased that dispute was resolved in cooperative way that ensured full transparency about the contents and purpose.

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0546-M (1.40)
10/2/2018 KBH

- Great deal at stake over Kosovo. Greatest test of the new Europe you and I have long worked to achieve -- a Europe free of communist dictatorships, democratic, prosperous, undivided by ethnic or ideological intolerance.
- Important we listen to each other and work to bring our positions together. Appreciate your heartfelt messages. Glad to see your hands-on involvement; critical to solving problem. You and I have solved toughest problems by working together.
- Glad you suggested Albright-Ivanov meeting. Ambassador Collins had excellent meeting with Viktor Chernomyrdin. Collins says Viktor Stepanovich is energized to help find political solution; that is what you and I want.
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- Ready to call it an "international force" or coalition of the willing if that helps. Would be flexible so long as force is strong, cohesive and ready to do what is needed to keep the peace.

• Key is to get teams working on details of solution we can take to G-8.

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Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)

Declassify on: 4/19/09

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- You and I must safeguard all we've achieved since 1993. Can't let Milosevic jeopardize work left to be done -- arms control, support for Russian economy, all the security challenges you and I laid out for 21st Century.

- Even though the military action continues, the search for a diplomatic outcome must also continue. I want to talk about how we can work together on that.
- I truly believe that the best diplomatic outcome would be one that Russia helped bring about and that Russia was central in implementing.
- Madeleine has stressed that point repeatedly in her phone conversations and meetings with Igor Ivanov.
- By the way, Boris, I really value the way Madeleine and Igor have been working together. Their meeting in Oslo last week went a long way toward managing the differences between us and maximizing the common ground. They must keep up their good work.
- At the same time, I can see that you are personally throwing yourself into the search for a political settlement on Kosovo.
- I take it as a positive development that you have appointed Victor Chernomyrdin to be your presidential envoy.
- My team and I obviously know Victor Stepanovich well; we respect him; we think of him as a problem-solver. He's never had a bigger and more important problem to solve than this one.
- I want to do everything I possibly can to support you in your efforts — and his on your behalf.
- Therefore I want to make Strobe Talbott available to work — quietly and confidentially — with Victor Stepanovich in any way that you think will help him succeed in his mission.
- Victor Stepanovich has already had a good meeting with our ambassador, Jim Collins, and if you're agreeable to what I propose, Jim will be back in touch with him to talk about how we can coordinate our diplomatic efforts in the days and weeks ahead.
- Strobe will report to me through Madeleine on how we're doing and on what I can do to help this effort.
- I'm suggesting this, Boris, because the stakes are so high. We're not just trying to achieve a lasting peace in the Balkans; we're also trying to bring about an outcome that will ensure for Russia a leading role in the achievement and enforcement of that peace. And we're also trying to protect our legacy, yours and mine, by putting U.S.-Russian relations back on the right track, the one that you and I laid down 6 ½ years ago.

1 - Tellis with
discussed

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WJC HANDWRITING

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

REDO

2743

April 16, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: CARLOS PASCUAL *CP*

FROM: ANDREW WEISS *AW*

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Russian President Yeltsin on
Kosovo

The memorandum for the President at Tab I provides background
and talking points for a Presidential call to Yeltsin on Kosovo.

Concurrence by: Greg Schulte *ASW for*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Points to be Made

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *KBN* NARA, Date *10/2/2013*
2014-0546-11

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Reason: 1.5 b,d
Declassify On: 4/16/09

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PER E.O. 13526

2014-0546-M (1.62)

10/2/2013 KBH

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN

- Great deal at stake over Kosovo. Greatest test of the new Europe you and I have long worked to achieve -- a Europe free of communist dictatorships, democratic, prosperous, undivided by ethnic or ideological intolerance.
- Important we listen to each other and work to bring our positions together. Appreciate your heartfelt messages. Glad to see your hands-on involvement; critical to solving problem. You and I have solved toughest problems by working together.
- Glad you suggested Albright-Ivanov meeting. Ambassador Collins had excellent meeting with Viktor Chernomyrdin. Collins says Viktor Stepanovich is energized to help find political solution; that is what you and I want.
- Believe Madeleine and Ivanov achieved a great deal in defining common principles, and they are important: end attacks on Kosovars, withdraw Serb forces, allow refugees to return and access for relief organizations.
- These create foundation for political solution that allows Serbs to preserve territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, provided we can be assured that Milosevic will implement them.
- Now we're down to the last step -- to devise the machinery to implement our agreed principles. Milosevic refuses every attempt at diplomacy; he leaves no choice but to have an international security force; ~~only way to protect refugees and guarantee FRY territorial integrity.~~
- Let's agree, Boris, that you and I will instruct our teams to find formula we can both accept that includes military component. Essential that Russia play key role in force to protect rights and safety of Serb civilians in Kosovo. *be flexible so*
- Ready to call it an "international force" or coalition of the willing if that helps. Would ~~accept any formula as long as~~ force is strong, cohesive and ready to do what is needed to keep the peace. *be flexible so*

*It will ~~for~~ protect
both Serbs and Albanians*

SECRET

*only way for refugees
Reason: 1.5 (b) (d) to feel safe*
Declassify on: 4/19/09

*in returning, will
permit*

*It will protect both Serbs and
Albanians; as long as
to feel safe is what
will permit*

- NATO's role in organizing the force is key to getting KLA to disarm. Hope to see military force complemented by OSCE-led civilian implementation mission where Russia would also play big role.
- If our people can agree on this formula, we might take it to the G-8 to endorse the key principles and then draft a UN Security Council Resolution sponsored by all the G-8.

Pause for Response

- Want to thank you for strong position against being drawn into the conflict militarily. Know pressures you face; crucial that you have taken moral stance against involvement.
- G-8 need your help to get Milosevic to accept international security force and to recognize that this will ensure that he gets to preserve Yugoslavia's territorial integrity.
- Situation inside Kosovo truly grave. Refugees in hills could starve. ~~Greeks just got Milosevic to give NGOs access.~~ Grateful for anything you can do to urge Belgrade to allow safe access. *We should try to reach a common position before he goes, that will*
- Understand Chernomyrdin may go to Belgrade this week; ~~can play an important role.~~ *Hope he can* give him leverage and authority he needs to get Milosevic to pull Serb forces out and agree to international security force.

Pause for Response

- Been thinking about you as we prepare for important meetings in Washington later this week. Would like nothing better than for you to be there, but know that may be unrealistic. Still hope Russia can come at some level.
- Also want to assure you that purpose of Summit is to reinforce principles you and I have developed together. 21st Century security challenges already upon us; need to pool our forces. Kosovo is an example of that. We need to work together.
- You and I must safeguard all we've achieved since 1993. Can't let Milosevic jeopardize work left to be done -- arms control, support for Russian economy, all the security challenges you and I laid out for 21st Century.

- Finally, wanted to tell you I've been watching political debate in Russia. Great to see you in good form. Know the causes you're fighting for domestically are freedom, democracy, and prosperity. You have my support.

If Yeltsin warns that introducing NATO ground forces could push Russia into conflict

- Have made clear that we don't have any intention to introduce ground forces in nonpermissive environment. Have made no decision to do so. Milosevic may drive us to assess prospects, but no decisions taken.

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- Administration is fully upholding UN arms embargo and is not supplying arms to KLA. Am strongly opposed to legislation in our Congress calling for such support.

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- Good idea, but must highlight G-8 unity and common direction. Important for Madeleine and Ivanov to find the right formula for international force. Then take to G-8 and UN.

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- Hope Russian assistance will help those directly affected by crisis. We've done nothing to impede shipments. Pleased that dispute was resolved in cooperative way that ensured full transparency about the contents and purpose.

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2014-0546-M (1.63)

10/2/2018 KBH

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
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- Ready to call it an "international force" or coalition of the willing if that helps. ↑ Would be flexible so long as force is strong, cohesive and ready to do what is needed to keep the peace.

after what he has done in Kosovo, Kosovars will never return without international security presence

Would need some NATO discussion if we were to participate but could be other elements as well.

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Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)

Declassify on: 4/19/09

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9902743
RECEIVED: 13 APR 99 15

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 18 APR 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA
AP

TELCALL

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: TELCALL TO PRES YELTSIN ON 19 APR

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DUE DATE: 19 APR 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WEISS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
PASCUAL
SCHULTE
WEISS

COMMENTS: _____

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DOC 2 OF 2

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBR/NARA, Date 10/2/2018
2014-0546-M

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9902743

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
002

Z 99041621 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
X 99041920 NOTED BY PRESIDENT

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

'99 APR 18 PM5:24

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 135262014-0546-M (1.64)
10/2/2013 KBH

April 18, 1999

PHONE CALL WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN

DATE: April 19, 1999

LOCATION: Oval Office

TIME: 9:30 - 9:45 a.m.

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER *S*I. PURPOSE

Discuss Kosovo, insulate impact on U.S.-Russian relationship.

II. BACKGROUND

This may be our most important window of opportunity with Yeltsin to get traction on Kosovo. Although polls show 93 percent of Russians against NATO's actions, most Russians favor a peaceful outcome and are against military action. Yeltsin sees a political solution is a political winner for him at home. Primakov is caught in the middle; the Communist and nationalist constituency he has courted in the Duma favors a hard-line response, and he does not want to alienate them even if he disagrees. For Yeltsin, being the peacemaker on Kosovo could raise his political fortunes, and could help him undercut Primakov who has helped air corruption charges against the Yeltsin family.

Yeltsin is pushing to be more visible -- and relevant -- on Kosovo. On Thursday, he appointed Chernomyrdin as his special envoy. Ambassador Collins met with Chernomyrdin for over an hour on Friday and found him to be engaged and serious. Yeltsin will hold a Kosovo strategy meeting on Monday, and Chernomyrdin plans to go to Belgrade early next week, so your call is well-timed. Chernomyrdin is no fan of Milosevic, and he has possible leverage in light of Belgrade's dependence on Gazprom.

It's important to use this call to focus Yeltsin on the key issue separating us -- an international security force. Yeltsin may still be personalizing our dispute over Kosovo, so you will need to use care to get him into a problem-

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)

Declassify on: 4/19/09

solving mode. You should underscore that our positions really aren't that far apart -- we agree on the need for an immediate halt to the attacks on Kosovar Albanians, withdrawal of FRY forces from Kosovo, safe return of refugees, access for humanitarian organizations, and disarming the KLA. You should stress that these principles allow a solution that will preserve Yugoslavia's territorial integrity -- the point Yeltsin will need to sell at home -- but the only way to ensure their implementation is through an international force.

Attachment

Tab A Points to be Made

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0546-M (1.65)
10/2/2013 KSH

- Great deal at stake over Kosovo. Greatest test of the new Europe you and I have long worked to achieve -- a Europe free of communist dictatorships, democratic, prosperous, undivided by ethnic or ideological intolerance.
- Important we listen to each other and work to bring our positions together. Appreciate your heartfelt messages. Glad to see your hands-on involvement; critical to solving problem. You and I have solved toughest problems by working together.
- Glad you suggested Albright-Ivanov meeting. Ambassador Collins had excellent meeting with Viktor Chernomyrdin. Collins says Viktor Stepanovich is energized to help find political solution; that is what you and I want.
- Believe Madeleine and Ivanov achieved a great deal in defining common principles, and they are important: end attacks on Kosovars, withdraw Serb forces, allow refugees to return and access for relief organizations.
- These create foundation for political solution that allows Serbs to preserve territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, provided we can be assured that Milosevic will implement them.
- Now we're down to the last step -- to devise the machinery to implement our agreed principles. Milosevic leaves no choice but to have an international security force; after what he has done in Kosovo, Kosovars will never return without international security presence. It will protect both Serbs and Albanians; will permit FRY to maintain territorial integrity.
- Let's agree, Boris, that you and I will instruct our teams to find formula we can both accept that includes military component. Important that Russia play key role in force to protect rights and safety of Serb civilians in Kosovo.
- Ready to call it an "international force" or coalition of the willing if that helps. Would be flexible so long as force is strong, cohesive and ready to do what is needed to keep the peace.

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)

Declassify on: 4/19/09

- NATO's role in organizing the force is key to getting KLA to disarm. Hope to see military force complemented by OSCE-led civilian implementation mission where Russia would also play big role.
- If our people can agree on a formula, we might take it to the G-8 to endorse the key principles and then draft a UN Security Council Resolution sponsored by all the G-8.

Pause for Response

- Want to thank you for strong position against being drawn into the conflict militarily. Know pressures you face; crucial that you have taken moral stance against involvement.
- G-8 needs your help to get Milosevic to accept international security force and to recognize that this will ensure that he gets to preserve Yugoslavia's territorial integrity.
- Situation inside Kosovo truly grave. Refugees in hills could starve. Grateful for anything you can do to urge Belgrade to allow safe access.
- Understand Chernomyrdin may go to Belgrade this week; we should try to reach a common position before he goes that will give him leverage and authority he needs to get Milosevic to pull Serb forces out and agree to international security force.

Pause for Response

- Been thinking about you as we prepare for important meetings in Washington later this week. Would like nothing better than for you to be there, but know that may be unrealistic. Still hope Russia can come at some level.
- Also want to assure you that purpose of Summit is to reinforce principles you and I have developed together. 21st Century security challenges already upon us; need to pool our forces. Kosovo is an example of that. We need to work together.
- You and I must safeguard all we've achieved since 1993. Can't let Milosevic jeopardize work left to be done -- arms control, support for Russian economy, all the security challenges you and I laid out for 21st Century.

If Yeltsin warns that introducing NATO ground forces could push Russia into conflict

- Have made clear that we don't have any intention to introduce ground forces in nonpermissive environment. Have made no decision to do so. Milosevic may drive us to assess prospects, but no decisions taken.

If Yeltsin charges U.S. arming KLA

- Administration is fully upholding UN arms embargo and is not supplying arms to KLA. Am strongly opposed to legislation in our Congress calling for such support.

If Yeltsin calls for special G-8 meeting

- Good idea, but must highlight G-8 unity and common direction. Important for Madeleine and Ivanov to find the right formula for international force. Then take to G-8 and UN.

If Yeltsin complains U.S. blocked Russian humanitarian aid to FRY


- Hope Russian assistance will help those directly affected by crisis. We've done nothing to impede shipments. Pleased that dispute was resolved in cooperative way that ensured full transparency about the contents and purpose.

Case Number: 2014-0546-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2724				
Document ID: 9902901				
Row: 46	Section: 4	Shelf: 4	Position: 1	Stack: V



Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
9901. telecon	re: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin (6 pages)	04/19/1999	P1/b(1) K8H 7/13/2018

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Yeltsin and Tel...])
OA/Box Number: 2724

FOLDER TITLE:

9902901

2014-0546-M
rs1060

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9902901
RECEIVED: 19 APR 99 11

TO: KENNEY, K

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 20 APR 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCON

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TELCON W/ RUSSIAN PRES YELTSIN ON 19 APR 99

ACTION: JACOBSON SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 24 APR 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WEISS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC
FICKLIN
NSC CHRON
WEISS

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY JP DATE 4/21 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDMK

CLOSED BY: NSGP

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBM NARA, Date 10/2/2018
2014-0546-17

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9902901

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001
002

Z 99042019 FOR DECISION
X 99042106 KERRICK APPROVED RECOM
X 99042106 JACOBSON SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 990420 KENNEY, K

~~SECRET~~

Need to send to
Moscow tonight prior
to a Collins meeting
with Chernomyrdin tomorrow
Carlos

Don- Please sign out. We need
to get this to State ASAP so
they can give to Ambassador
Collins before this meeting w/
Chernomyrdin tomorrow.

TD

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 2901
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TTC A/O _____

TMA

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff	_____	_____	_____
~~Rice~~ Jacobson	<u>1</u>	<u>J 4/20</u>	_____
Davies	_____	_____	_____
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>(C) 4/20</u>	_____
Steinberg	<u>com</u>	_____	_____
Berger	<u>com</u>	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>TTC 4/20</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>D</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'99 APR 26 PM 6:00

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes _____

National Security Council
The White House

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LOG # 2901

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DOCLOG TTC A/O _____

TMA

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff	_____	_____	_____
~~Rice~~ Jacobson	<u>1</u>	<u>J 4/20</u>	_____
Davies	_____	_____	_____
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>(D) 4/20</u>	_____
Steinberg	<u>copy</u>	_____	_____
Berger	<u>copy</u>	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>TTC 4/20</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>D</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

Don- Please sign out. We need to get this to State ASAP so they can give to Ambassador Collins before his meeting w/ Chernomyrdin tomorrow.

T

Need to send to Moscow tonight prior to a Collins meeting with Chernomyrdin.

~~SECRET~~

2901

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504


April 20, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2004
By KSM NARA, Date 10/2/2018
2014-0546-17

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Yeltsin (S)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Russian President Boris Yeltsin is provided for the information of the Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary. It must be distributed via NODIS channels. It may also be sent to our Embassy in Moscow for the Ambassador only.
(S)


Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A

Memorandum of Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 4/19/09

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONDECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 135262015-0782-M-2 (1.42)
3/13/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Yeltsin (S)

PARTICIPANTS: President Clinton
President Boris Yeltsin

Notetakers: Robert Ford, Michael T.
Manning, Roger Merletti, Matt Sibley,
Jim Smith, Andrew Weiss
Interpreter: Nikolai Sorokin

DATE, TIME April 19, 1999, 9:30 - 10:13 a.m. EDT,
AND PLACE: Oval Office

THE PRESIDENT: Hello Boris. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Good morning, Bill. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you for taking the call. I wanted to talk to you about Kosovo today. Kosovo is clearly one of the greatest tests we have faced for the Europe you and I have worked to achieve, one which is free from communist dictatorships and is democratic and undivided. I appreciate your heartfelt messages and am glad to see you involved in this problem. (S)

We have solved some of the toughest problems by working together. The best diplomatic outcome is one Russia helps bring about. Russia is central in implementing a solution. The meeting that Albright and Foreign Minister Ivanov had in Oslo went a long way in managing the differences between us and maximizing common ground. I value the way they are working together, and they must keep it up. At the same time, I am glad you are involving yourself in the search for a political settlement, and I think it's important that you appointed Viktor Chernomyrdin to be your personal envoy. Obviously, all of us here know Viktor well. We respect him and think he is a problem-solver, and he has never had a bigger problem than this one. I want to do whatever I can to support you in these

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Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 4/20/09

efforts. I want to appoint Strobe Talbott to work quietly and confidentially with Viktor. He already had a good meeting with Ambassador Jim Collins, and if you are agreeable, Jim will be back in touch with him to coordinate diplomatic efforts. Strobe will report to me and Madeleine, and I will see what I can do to help. I know, Boris, how high the stakes are. We're trying to achieve a lasting peace in the Balkans, but also an outcome that would ensure Russia a role in that peace and that would protect the legacy you and I have built by getting Russian and U.S. relations back on track, which we have worked on for the last six and a half years. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Well, Bill, at this difficult time in international affairs and in U.S.-Russian relations, we need to maintain constant contact. I have never met such a difficult, complicated issue as the ongoing NATO military action against Yugoslavia. Let me reiterate that the developments of the past few weeks confirm that the U.S. and NATO have made a big mistake. You have miscalculated the consequences of the situation itself. Milosevic will never capitulate. Instead of resolving the humanitarian problem, what has been achieved is a giant humanitarian catastrophe, and significant damage has occurred to U.S.-Russian relations. (S)

I'll tell you quite frankly that the anti-American and anti-NATO sentiment in Russia keeps growing like an avalanche. Great pressure is exerted on me and the Russian leadership as a whole in favor of taking measures to help Yugoslavia, all the more so since NATO has helped the Albanian fighters. We continue to oppose Russian involvement in the conflict, but our ability to counteract those demands are limited. (S)

We have to take emergency measures to try and switch to development of a peaceful, political settlement. I am satisfied that you accepted my proposal to have our foreign ministers meet. That was the first meeting since the beginning of the Yugoslav conflict. They succeeded in outlining the overall principles, as Minister Ivanov told me in Moscow, the overall application of which would enable us to achieve a breakthrough and turn around this situation. But to be able to achieve that, all violence and repression should be stopped in Kosovo, and the safe return of refugees should be ensured, regardless of their ethnicity. International humanitarian organizations should be given access throughout Yugoslavia and primarily Kosovo. (S)

We also share positions regarding the need for the resumption of work on a political framework agreement that would maintain

broad-based autonomy for Kosovo and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia in full accordance with international law. At most, the greatest differences between us have to do with the question of an international presence in Kosovo. We understand that without international support, no safe return of refugees can be possible, but the question of international presence should be dealt with and resolved, taking into account the political leadership of Yugoslavia. (S)

Please, believe me that it took us a great amount of effort to gain consent on the part of Milosevic for an international civilian presence, and I think we should be farsighted enough to build on these achievements. I appointed Mr. Chernomyrdin as my special envoy for Yugoslavia because he is a neutral person and has no other concerns. His primary concern will be Yugoslavia. We discussed the situation specifically in great detail. (S)

Bill, what I think is needed now with Kosovo is a strong Albanian leader, so we can get them both to the negotiating table -- Milosevic and the strong Albanian leader. Of course, we also need signals from NATO if we are to cut our losses in finding a way out of this situation. It is clear as day that Yugoslavia will not accept a military mission, particularly if it is a NATO-led mission, because for a long time they will be allergic to NATO. I think other avenues should be explored, and we should come up with a compromise that Milosevic will grudgingly have to accept. (S)

We think, obviously, such an option would be for UN blue helmets, based on Security Council resolutions. We think it would be necessary to have among the blue helmets a contingent of Russian forces. Should we accept this position and common understanding, I think we can instruct our foreign ministers to collaborate on this in detail. (S)

Now, there is one thing standing in the way of negotiations. That is, the bombardment, and the bombardment should be stopped. Of course, it is easily understood that it is hard to think of a settlement when bombs and missiles are exploding all around you. I think a proper pretext should be found for making a pause in the bombardment. It is completely up to you, of course. Such a step on your side would be the testimony of a statesman, wisdom, and an act of humanity. (S)

For our part, we will be prepared to fully cooperate with you and continue our pressure on Milosevic. As for Chernomyrdin, I gave him a special airplane to fly around to Muslim countries to

gain support for the Albanians. Then it will be a realistic thing to bring the Albanians and Serbs to the negotiating table. After that, we could address the whole settlement issue by joint effort -- the U.S., Russia, Yugoslavia and NATO. These are my proposals, Bill. What is your view? (S)

THE PRESIDENT: First, I think it is good we agreed on the common principles: the ending of attacks, withdrawal of forces, the safe return of refugees, access for humanitarian organizations. These create a foundation for a political solution that will allow the Serbs to preserve the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, provided we can ensure that Milosevic will implement it. (S)

Now, I think in order to implement these principles, there needs to be an international presence in Kosovo that has both a military and nonmilitary element. If there is no military element, the Kosovars will never return. The Serbs forces have burned all their villages, burned them alive, raped children, and there is no way they will come back without military protection. Here is the dilemma about a military force. I don't care what it is called, but if there is no NATO involvement, we won't be able to get the Albanians to disarm. We can get the KLA to disarm. We can get the KLA to disarm, and contrary to what you said, we are not arming them. There is a proposal in Congress to arm them. But I oppose having the U.S. or Russia getting arms in there and stirring up the water, so I have been resisting arming the Albanians. (S)

On the other hand, let me emphasize that I think it would be a grave mistake for there to be a military-diplomatic mission where Russians are not present. We need Russians to make this work. After all, there is a Serb minority in Kosovo, and they have to be protected, too, and know they are protected. It is imperative that Albanian refugees feel protected, that the Serb minority feels protected, and that we have a basis on which we can disarm the Kosovar Albanians. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: The problem that needs to be addressed is that there are many Serbs among the refugees. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: I think we can find a formula. I have said in every public statement that I have made that I want the force to have Russian participation and leadership and that I would personally not approve going into Kosovo unless our mandate includes protecting the Serbs as well as the Albanians in Kosovo. In terms of a pause in the bombing, NATO could and

would stop tomorrow if Milosevic started withdrawing his forces. The problem with stopping the bombing with no withdrawal at all is that we have been there before. Last October, we were promised that, and Milosevic broke his word before. Before we started bombing, he had 40,000 soldiers and 300 tanks and started to implement the plan he had drawn up last year and changed the military hierarchy so there'd be no opposition and went about flushing out the country. He has to do something to show this is more than just words. (S)

I would like to agree that we are getting much closer to an agreement. Let's instruct our teams to find a formula with a military component that is also sensitive to our concerns about NATO. Strobe can work with Viktor. It won't work unless Russia plays a leading role. There is no way in the world this will work, Boris, unless Russia plays a military and political role, and the Albanians and Serbs believe they will be protected in a formula where autonomy is genuine and the territory of Serbia is maintained. It cannot happen unless we find a way to do this together. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: But then, we were at a stage where Russia was not involved. Russia can, of course, put pressure on Milosevic. Bill, as I said before, Chernomyrdin will now go to several Muslim countries to try to help the Albanians. After that, he wants to go to Belgrade for a meeting with Milosevic, and after that to see you. I think it is a good option. What is a great concern to me is this anti-American sentiment we have in Russia, and that is what I am worried about. We have spent too many efforts in all areas to let them all collapse overnight. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: What about having Strobe come to Europe to meet with Chernomyrdin even sooner? (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: That would be all right. That can be done. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think we ought to do that. I can see that we are close enough to get an agreement. I will have Ambassador Collins get in touch with Chernomyrdin to work it out. I feel quite good about this conversation, Boris. We just have to work hard and stay in close touch. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I feel that way too. I agree with you and think we can find our way out. We must find a way out. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: All right. We will do it. This is a good conversation. I'm glad to hear you, and I appreciate your involvement in this. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I agree although I find it increasingly difficult to resist sentiments here. I am subjected to violent attacks and assailed by the Communists. They insist that I send armaments and equipment and that I send our troops there. They are calling for an unleashing of a European and world-wide war, and I am absolutely opposed to that. Today I gave orders to repeal previous instructions to send seven ships to the conflict area, so we will have just one ship, a reconnaissance ship, to provide us with information. (S)

We will not provide them with our military equipment, though we are sending them humanitarian aid and doing it publicly in front of TV cameras. What we are sending are foodstuffs and consumer goods. We have already sent 100 cars and trucks with aid. Bill, just like you, I think we have had a good conversation and think we, too, have avenues to explore where we can reach a common ground. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: I agree, Boris. Let's just keep working on it. Thank you very much. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: All right. Goodbye, Bill. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~SECRET~~

2901

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

April 20, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER 

THROUGH: CARLOS PASCUAL 

FROM: ANDREW WEISS 


SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Boris Yeltsin, April 19, 1999

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH/NARA, Date 10/2/2018
2014-0546-M

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the
April 19 telephone conversation between the President and
Russian President Yeltsin.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Glyn Davies to transmit the Memorandum of
Telephone Conversation at Tab A to the Department of State.

Approve 

Disapprove _____

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed
for the record.

Approve 

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to State

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 4/20/09

TIME OF TRANSMISSION:

TIME OF RECEIPT:

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE:

✓

IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO: _____

CLASSIFICATION:

~~SECRET~~

PAGES: 7

(Including Cover)

FROM: NSC West Wing Desk
(NAME)

(202) 456-9425
(PHONE NUMBER)

WH Situation Room
(ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION:

Memorandum of Telcall w/ Yeltsin Apr 19

NSC LOG # 9902901

TO (AGENCY)

DELIVER TO

DEPT/ROOM NO.

PHONE NUMBER

DOS

Ex. Sec.

REMARKS:

Please forward to Amb. Collins

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: KSH Date: 10/2/2018

2014-0546-M

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9902901
DATE 20 APR 99

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCON W/ RUSSIAN PRES YELTSIN ON 19 APR 99
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Initials: KBM Date: 10/2/2018

2014-0576-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

Case Number: 2014-0546-M

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Original OA/ID Number: 2725				
Document ID: 9903106				
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. telcon~~	~~re: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin (12 pages)~~	~~04/25/1999~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 7/13/2018
~~001b. telcon~~	~~[Duplicate of 001a] (12 pages)~~	~~04/25/1999~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 7/13/2018

COLLECTION:

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9903106
RECEIVED: 26 APR 99 09

TO: KENNEY, K

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 28 APR 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

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PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCON W/ RUSSIAN PRES YELTSIN ON 25 APR 99

ACTION: DAVIES SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 01 MAY 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WEISS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRM NARA, Date 10/2/2018
2014-0546-17

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RECORD ID: 9903106

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
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Z 99042715 FOR DECISION
X 99042909 DAVIES APPROVED RECOM
X 99042909 DAVIES SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 990428 KENNEY, K

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3106

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

April 28, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBM/NARA, Date 10/2/2018
2014-0546-M

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Yeltsin (S)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the
President and Russian President Boris Yeltsin is provided EYES
ONLY for the information of the Secretary of State and the
Deputy Secretary. (S)



Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 4/26/09

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0782-M-2(1.43)
3/13/2018 KBN

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Yeltsin (S)

PARTICIPANTS: President Clinton
President Boris Yeltsin

Notetakers: George Chastain, Doug Bailey,
Frank Jarosinski, Joel Schrader,
Andrew Weiss
Interpreter: Yuriy Shkeyrov

DATE, TIME April 25, 1999, 10:35 - 11:58 a.m. EDT,
AND PLACE: NATO Summit Trip Building

President Yeltsin: Hello, Bill. (U)

The President: Hello, Boris. (U)

President Yeltsin: Well, I am calling on Sunday, and this is a traditional day off for us. But it is not a day off for you and me. (U)

The President: No, not today. (U)

President Yeltsin: This is because of the situation in the Balkans and the continued military action by NATO against Yugoslavia. We have agreed with you to step up efforts in all directions to find a way out of the Kosovo tragedy. This is also an ecological problem because the Danube is flowing into the Black Sea and it is extremely important to us that the sky over Europe is not clouded over again. You know I have sent Chernomyrdin as my special envoy on this Yugoslav problem. You know him and trust him. (S)

The President: Yes, I do. (U)

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 4/26/09

President Yeltsin: Out of six points, we have negotiated five. [Note: reference to six points announced by Chernomyrdin after his meetings with Milosevic.] Out of the five points you named we have gotten Milosevic to agree to four of them. [Note: reference to five points discussed by Secretary Albright and Minister Ivanov in Oslo.] There is only one point remaining.

(8)

[Note: reference to a continuing disagreement over an international security force.] We have agreed to [Note: reference to what has been agreed between Russia and the FRY] the following points: the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, then international assistance in the reconstruction of Yugoslavia's economy, including Kosovo and the region as a whole, and an international presence under UN auspices with the participation of Russia agreed to by Yugoslavia and here, of course, is meant a military presence. Then the pullout of troops and resuming work on the political regime on the future autonomy of the region. And then the reduction of the military and police forces in Kosovo accompanied by pullout of units along the border with Yugoslavia. And international assistance in reconstructing the Yugoslav economy including Kosovo and Europe as a whole because many countries have suffered including Russia. Launching of a peacekeeping operation would be under UN auspices, and Russia is prepared to take part in this. (8)

In our view, this is a big and important step forward. We are continuing our active efforts along those lines with Belgrade on format and composition and mandate for this operation. This is a difficult task, but we shall pursue it persistently in order to find a final solution to the problem. (8)

It is important that your special envoy, Talbott, whom I know quite well, get involved in our efforts, but this will not be enough. So, I propose we move the remaining issues for discussion of the war to the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission. This would give an opportunity for Mr. Gore to look good in his election campaign in relation to the situation in Yugoslavia and would produce a good result because Gore and Chernomyrdin know how to negotiate with each other. This Commission will work for some time and where it will work doesn't matter to me or Chernomyrdin. It could work in either Washington or Europe or Moscow or intermittently in all those places. (8)

Well, in other words, there are signs of the possibility of reaching a mutually acceptable solution, and I count on your weight for its support, but what is important is that air raids

be suspended to provide a good background to the Commission for progress and acceptable results in getting the situation around Kosovo back on a political track. I believe we should set aside our emotions and work in a pragmatic way to arrange a political settlement against the background of discontinuation of air raids by NATO against Yugoslavia. At least for the time of the work of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, and in this case we will create the impression that everyone saved face in getting out of the tragic situation in Kosovo. (S)

I spoke with Chernomyrdin several hours ago but it was too early to talk to you because it was four in the morning in America. If we establish the position to refer the issues to the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, it would create an opportunity for Gore to be the peacemaker. (S)

We are working in all areas and directions, including our government delegations and the visit to Belgrade by our Patriarch who had a successful mission. So we are attacking Milosevic from all sides, and there was also assistance from our Parliament. Let us forget at this stage all other issues and get to solving this one because this problem is worse than the others, and it is worth dozens of billions of dollars. (S)

When I talked with Chernomyrdin today he agreed to work in the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission on this issue. So we will not leave much room for maneuver to Belgrade and will keep them in our sights, also including their political network. So what is your reaction? I am waiting for it. (S)

The President: First of all, I want to thank you for making the vigorous efforts you and Viktor Stepanovich are putting into this. Secondly, I think your idea of the Vice President and Chernomyrdin working together on this might work, but I think that they probably ought to have a telephone conversation. Then Strobe Talbott should meet with Chernomyrdin early this week to see what is possible. (S)

On this specific thing that has been achieved so far in your work with Milosevic, I would like to make a couple of comments. On a commitment by the U.S. and Europe to regional development and intensive assistance to everyone affected, I completely agree. I have repeatedly said we have to build a positive future for Southeast Europe to prevent them from falling back into old hatreds. Now on the details. Based only on what you have said to me and what has been reported in the news on what

Milosevic has said, I would like to talk about the details --
(S)

President Yeltsin: [interrupting] So you do agree that Gore and Chernomyrdin resume their work? (S)

The President: I think that we should have Gore and Chernomyrdin talk on the phone tomorrow, and what I would like to do is to have Strobe Talbott fly to see Viktor Stepanovich Tuesday or tomorrow or whenever you want him to go. And let me comment now -- (S)

President Yeltsin: [interrupting] Well, I thought that after today's conversation we can tell the media that myself and President Clinton have found a common point of view on how we can solve this problem together and then the details can be worked out later, and we will continue to work actively with Milosevic on all these questions. (S)

You know that I have decided not to send seven military ships to the Mediterranean as we have agreed, and I will continue to comply with what I promised. And what assistance we have given to Yugoslavia is only humanitarian in nature and delivered by road. There were some difficulties on the Hungarian border, but now these have been settled. Milosevic is insisting that we supply to Yugoslavia the antiaircraft system S-300, but we shall not give this system to him, and you can believe me on that.
(S)

The President: Thank you. (U)

President Yeltsin: Because it will not allow any planes close to the borders of Yugoslavia. Well, I am listening to you Bill.
(S)

The President: First of all, let me respond to what you said we can tell the press and then I have to talk a little about the details of the proposal. I think we should say as little as possible about the specifics of what we are going to do in the long run because I have not talked to Gore at all about this and, in all fairness, I have to talk to him. I think we should have Gore and Chernomyrdin talk tomorrow and have Strobe Talbott and Chernomyrdin talk the next day and see if we can work it out. (S)

It is fine for you to say we agreed to pursue a diplomatic solution at a very high level and that you and I are going to

personally work on it and maintain a high level of involvement. I at least need to have a brief conversation with the Vice President before I commit him to it. But I have no problem with your saying I am encouraged by your personal involvement and Chernomyrdin's. As you know, I do not believe there can be a settlement without Russia's leadership and involvement. (S)

Now, I would like to talk about two things very briefly. One is the peacekeeping force. I think it is, in theory, fine to have it be under the UN, and I also think Russia should be a strong part of it. Now I know that Milosevic does not want NATO to be any part of it. If I could design it the best way I could, I would have it look like the work we are doing in Bosnia. There are two things you should keep in mind as you work through it in coming days. The first is that I don't think the refugees will go home unless there is a NATO and an American presence. The second is, in order to make this work, the UCK and KLA have to disarm, and I don't believe anyone but NATO and the U.S. can do this. (S)

I would like to make another point, which is that there would have to be a large number of forces, and one of the things they will have to do is to protect the Serb minority from angry Kosovars seeking revenge once they are back in the country. I think you know me well enough to trust me when I say we will protect the Serbs as well as the Kosovars by working with you, but we are going to need a lot of forces to do that. (S)

The other thing that is unclear in the commitment that Milosevic made is to what extent the Serb forces would be withdrawn. But from newspaper accounts he said not all troops will be withdrawn. I do not believe the refugees will go home unless the Serb military and police and paramilitaries are gone. And keep in mind, if Russian forces are in there, that should help them deal with their legitimate concerns about maintaining the sovereignty issue. But they have to withdraw or there is no point in our doing this. The measure of success is bringing all the refugees home. (S)

Now, on the question of a bombing pause. There was a huge debate at the NATO meeting, well, not a debate, but a discussion, and there was a unanimous feeling that there could be a pause only if all the refugees could come home and secondly, agreement on an international security force and third that the Serbs must begin their withdrawal. I agree a bombing pause might be helpful, but we have to work on getting the security forces out and get the beginning of a withdrawal -- not

just you and me, but Milosevic also has to agree because all 19 members agreed to this, and I am bound by the decision the group has taken. And I think it is a good decision. You have made so much progress, we might be able to get this done in the next few days if we just work on it. (S)

President Yeltsin: Well, Bill, we are continuing and shall continue to work actively with Milosevic as if we were converting him to another faith. And I believe that on this one point that was mentioned by you that we did not manage to get Milosevic to agree on, we shall be able to do so soon. I know Talbott, and I trust him, but now we should raise the levels of these contacts and I believe that these contacts should be on the level of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission. We shall help and aid Chernomyrdin in working with Milosevic, so as to make Milosevic agree to the solution of the remaining issues. And finally, so that everyone gets the impression that it is you and me that stopped that war. This would influence the domestic political situation in your country and especially in this country, but what is most important is that it will help put an end to this conflict. (S)

The President: Yes. (U)

President Yeltsin: You know that I am hearing concerns by our military who are talking about getting military servicemen to go and help Milosevic. You know I have condemned this in the strictest terms and convened my Security Council and said there should be no talk about that. Any General that speaks of sending troops to help Milosevic will be summarily dismissed from the military. (S)

The President: Thank you. (U)

President Yeltsin: Well, there is one commander in the Military District of the Far East, Colonel-General Chechevatov, who was going to get a battalion which would go to Yugoslavia to help Milosevic. I dismissed him from his post. All our law enforcement agencies and ministries are strictly under my command and report only to me. So there will be no surprises here, and no unexpected things will come. We shall maintain contacts with you at all times. (S)

Well, let us by today's conversation solve two problems with two tasks. Let us resume the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission and instruct them to take up the Yugoslav problem. As soon as the Commission, at the very hour and minute it starts working, the

air raids should stop. Of course, Talbott will be involved in that as a member of the Gore team, and he will deal with technical matters, not the big politics. So let us decide on these two questions, and if we can announce this in the media, this will mark an end to the tragedy. (S)

The President: But -- (U)

President Yeltsin: [interrupting] You understand, you see what a difficult situation I am in, and I am holding myself and stifling my emotions, and I am talking with you in a constructive way. I also am leaving room for our subsequent cooperation. Well, of course this cooperation should not be abruptly stopped by the many Russians who write me letters on this issue. Let us do this Bill, and we should consider our conversation today constructive and a useful one. (S)

The President: Well first -- (U)

President Yeltsin: [interrupting] Do you agree? (U)

The President: Boris, first of all, I agree this has been a useful conversation, and I am encouraged by your energy and personal involvement you have put into this. We cannot solve this without your leadership, but I have to make three points that make it impossible to make the announcement to the press as you suggested. I hope you will listen to me carefully. (S)

First of all, I cannot get Gore into this publicly until I at least talk to him about it. He has had very limited involvement at this point, and I owe it to him to have a conversation with him before I put him into the middle of this. I know you understand he has been my partner for six years now, and he is running for President, and I can't run. I don't want to do anything that involves him in this way without talking to him. (S)

The second thing is, as I said, we just voted -- all 19 leaders of NATO -- to have a pause only when agreement on the security force, refugee return, and when withdrawal of Milosevic's forces can begin. I cannot unilaterally change that, and I don't want to say in public anything that implies I have abandoned what the others have agreed to. (S)

Now, there is a third problem that you and I both have if we do this. We have got to decide how to deal with the European Union because they have been very involved in this and, if we resolve

this we need them to come up with most of the money to rebuild Southeast Europe and to provide economic aide for everyone involved. So if we do this -- (S)

President Yeltsin: [interrupting] You should -- (U)

The President: Let me finish -- (U)

President Yeltsin: [interrupting] Understand, Bill, the work of this Commission has an international reputation and they could invite both NATO leaders and Milosevic to take part. I can guarantee you that on the part of Milosevic. (S)

The President: Yes, I understand that but wait -- (U)

President Yeltsin: [interrupting] And you can guarantee this on the NATO side and this would form the basis for the end of the war. (S)

The President: Yes, but what I am saying is -- (U)

President Yeltsin: [interrupting] So, do not push Russia into this war. You know what Russia is. You know how it is equipped, but don't push Russia into this. (S)

The President: Wait a minute, Boris. I am agreeing with what you are trying to do, but what I am saying is you have got all of the Europeans here taking the lead in this initiative, and we have to figure out how to deal with this before dropping it on them in the newspaper. They are our allies and our friends, and they have to come up with most of the money to rebuild the region. We just can't have them wake up in the morning and read it in the newspaper no matter how good it would be for us and our countries. (S)

Boris, how about this. I would like to say today that we talked today for an hour, and that I thanked you for your leadership for peace, and that we agreed on further steps. And then have Gore and Chernomyrdin talk early tomorrow in the morning and work out the arrangements for next steps. Then we can have more to say tomorrow and that will give me more time to get the Europeans in a positive frame of mind. (S)

I am not trying to push you into this conflict, Boris, and I believe we can make this initiative work. But, I am no good to you, unless I can hold our group together and then in the end they can come up with the money to make this work. (S)

Boris, how about this. Suppose we say today you and I talked for an hour, and I agreed with you that we would work together to find a diplomatic solution to this conflict at the highest levels and that we will provide more details in the days ahead. That gives us time to figure out what to do with the Europeans and gives me time to talk to Gore, and time for Gore to talk to Chernomyrdin. But it has the benefit of getting your peace initiative out today, which I think is important. (S)

President Yeltsin: Well, Bill, you can't deny the work of, let's not call it a commission, Gore and Chernomyrdin would be useful and could provide the basis for a solution. We should decide that the very moment the commission starts working, there will be an end to the air raids, and at the same time the troops in the Yugoslavian units will pull out of Kosovo, and we will get Milosevic to do this. You can depend on me to get Milosevic to do this. Then we should reestablish Kosovo autonomy so all the populations that inhabit the region, no matter the ethnic origin, Albanian or Serb, could get back there and live together. Serbs are also fleeing to save themselves from NATO air raids. (S)

You know that Kofi Annan is coming to Moscow, and I will meet him, and I will do so in a way that we have a common position. Just a moment. Well, in this way, we shall unlock the situation and give the commission a chance to work. And it will work only when air raids stop. Milosevic will not slip out from our influence -- he will do everything we tell him to do. I hope your line of communication is a closed one like mine. (S)

The President: Yes. Let me ask you something, Boris. I need to talk to Gore and do some more work on this. Can we talk again tomorrow, and then have Gore talk to Chernomyrdin tomorrow? (S)

President Yeltsin: Let them begin the work, and then we shall continue efforts to work together so it looks like we stopped the European war, the World War. I realize that ground forces do not carry nuclear weapons now but of course they are capable, and if you bomb the power plants and fuel sites that would mean that there will be ecological instability in Europe for a long time. Well, I am listening to you Bill. (S)

The President: Boris, this might work if we can get the agreement on the security force and the beginning of withdrawal, then we could get a pause. If we get an agreement on the return

of refugees, agreement on the security force and the beginning of a withdrawal, then we can have a pause in the bombing and a process that could work. I think it is very important what we say and how we say it. I know the Europeans would support that kind of process and would finance the reconstruction that needs to be done in Kosovo. It is important that you and I not say this will happen just because you and I agree, because Milosevic has to agree as well. That is why I believe you and I have to talk again after Gore and Chernomyrdin talk. (S)

President Yeltsin: We shall follow the work of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission every day and every other day. If there is something we don't like, we will give each other a call. (S)

The President: Yes. (U)

President Yeltsin: I wanted to be sure that we have not planned [inaudible] our only aim is to stop the war so I believe that ... [inaudible] nothing that we can lose you and me can only gain from this. We can change our information for the media. [inaudible] (S)

The President: Sorry, I did not hear that. (U)

President Yeltsin: The first point will be Gore-Chernomyrdin, we can change the second point that it will be that we agreed on conditions without going into details and it is not excluded that if everything is as we planned and the official hierarchy then we sign the letter [inaudible] although even if they do not take [inaudible] I trust this very much ... [inaudible] So -- (S)

The President: Well I have a lot of confidence -- (U)

President Yeltsin: [interrupting] So what do you think about that, Bill? (U)

The President: We lost telephone communication for about five minutes, I have not heard the last three translations. Can you repeat them, not Boris, just the translator. (U)

President Yeltsin: OK. We have agreed? (U)

The President: No. No. I have not heard the last three translations. Can we just have -- (U)

RUSSIAN INTERPRETER: Mr. President, you should be assured that we are not taking sides with Milosevic. My only aim is to stop the war and stop the air raids and form the political basis for all sides to negotiate. And that we should use the same approach to all the sides of the conflict no matter how great their force. But it is most important that we find a solution to this most painful problem. We should stop the air raids. That would form the basis for the political solution of this tragedy. (S)

So I say again, of the five points enumerated by Albright, we got Milosevic to agree to four of them, and we have a statement signed by him on that. So probably we might change our second point in our information to the media, to say the first point will be that Gore and Chernomyrdin are working on this problem and the second point is that we have agreed on the conditions of the cessation of the air raids without going into details. So I don't also exclude if everything goes okay that this could help Chernomyrdin climb up the service ladder. (S)

Well, we also got a written request from Milosevic forwarded by his people regarding the union between Russia and Belarus and Yugoslavia. I tried to delay this, and we are saying we are not ready for this. I can tell you confidentially that this will never happen. (S)

The President: That is good. Let me say this, Boris. I think we are a little closer here in that I have no problem saying we have clarified conditions for a bombing pause. The most important thing is to say we have talked for an hour and committed ourselves to pursuing peace and that in the days ahead we will explain how we are going to do it. I will say again, I will have to talk to Gore before I can put him in the middle of this. (S)

President Yeltsin: And also you should take into account anti-American feelings are growing in our society. I should put an end to this, but this will not be possible to do while the air raids continue. So that is now the risk for you or me to get this Gore-Chernomyrdin to work with Milosevic and NATO so they elaborate on a short document that could be signed publicly. (S)

The President: Boris, I will work on nothing else but this for the next day. I will send Strobe tonight and have Gore get on the phone with Chernomyrdin. I will do nothing else but this,

but we have to be careful not to say something else in public that might make it impossible to work. (S)

President Yeltsin: But you will tell this to Gore also? (U)

The President: Yes, I will tell him. As soon as I get off the phone with you, I will tell him. Okay? (U)

President Yeltsin: And I will instruct Chernomyrdin to start talks with Rugova. (S)

The President: Good. Thanks, Boris. I will see you. Goodbye. (U)

President Yeltsin: I think our discussion was frank, constructive, and balanced. So we did not let out our emotions surface. (U)

The President: No, and we won't. (U)

President Yeltsin: We shall work for the future. (U)

The President: Goodbye friend, I will see you. (U)

President Yeltsin: I was more talkative than you. (U)

The President: Yes, but we are going to do this. I am very encouraged. If you are involved, we can do this. Goodbye. (U)

President Yeltsin: So, let's agree on this. This call was my initiative and the next will be yours. (U)

The President: Yes, and it will be soon. (U)

President Yeltsin: Very well, Bill. (U)

The President: Bye bye. (U)

President Yeltsin: Goodbye. (U)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~SECRET~~

3106

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

April 26, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER *G for*

THROUGH: CARLOS PASCUAL *OK*

FROM: ANDREW WEISS *OK for*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Boris Yeltsin, April 25, 1999

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBM NARA, Date 10/2/2013
2014-0546-M

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the
April 25 telephone conversation between the President and
Russian President Yeltsin.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Glyn Davies to transmit the Memorandum of
Telephone Conversation at Tab A to the Department of State.

Approve *G 4/28* Disapprove _____

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed
for the record.

Approve *G 4/28* Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to State

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 4/26/09

~~SECRET~~

3106

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBN/NARA, Date 10/2/2018
2014-0546-M

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Yeltsin (S)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the
President and Russian President Boris Yeltsin is provided for
the information of the Secretary of State and the Deputy
Secretary. It must be distributed via NODIS channels. It may
also be sent to our Embassy in Moscow for the Ambassador only.
(S)

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A

Telephone
Memorandum of Conversation

and not
below the
Deputy
Assistant
Secretary (DAS)
level.

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 4/26/09

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2015-0782-M-2 (1.63)
3/13/2018 KBY

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Yeltsin (S)

PARTICIPANTS: President Clinton
President Boris Yeltsin (S)

Interpreter: Yuriy Shkeyrov
Notetakers: George Chastain, Doug Bailey,
Frank Jarosinski, Joel Schrader,
Andrew Weiss #

DATE, TIME: April 25, 1999, 10:35-11:58 a.m. EDT,
AND PLACE: NATO Summit Trip Building

President Yeltsin
PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Hello, Bill. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Hello, Boris. (U)

The President
PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Well, I am calling on Sunday, and this is a
traditional day off for us. But it is not a day off for you and
me. (U)

No caps
THE PRESIDENT: No, not today. (U)

take out (?)
PRESIDENT YELTSIN: This is because of the situation in the
Balkans and the continued military action by NATO against
Yugoslavia. We have agreed with you and Russia to step up
efforts in all directions to find a way out of the Kosovo
tragedy. This is also an ecological problem because the Danube
is flowing into the Black Sea and it is extremely important to
us that the sky over Europe is not clouded over again. You know
I have sent Chernomyrdin as my special envoy on this Yugoslav
problem. You know him and trust him. (S)

#
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I do. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Out of six points, we have negotiated five.
[Note: reference to six points announced by Chernomyrdin after

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Five

his meetings with Milosevic.] Out of the five points you named we have gotten Milosevic to agree to four of them. [Note: reference to ⑤ points discussed by Secretary Albright and Minister Ivanov in Oslo.] There is only one point remaining.

(S)

[Note: reference to a continuing disagreement over an international security force.] We have agreed to [Note: reference to what has been agreed between Russia and the FRY] the following points: the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, then international assistance in the reconstruction of Yugoslavia's economy, including Kosovo and the region as whole, and an international presence under UN auspices with the participation of Russia agreed to by Yugoslavia and here, of course, is meant a military presence. Then the pullout of troops and resuming work on the political regime on the future autonomy of the region. And then the reduction of the military and police forces in Kosovo accompanied by pullout of units along the border with Yugoslavia. And international assistance in reconstructing the Yugoslav economy including Kosovo and Europe as a whole because many countries have suffered including Russia. Launching of a peacekeeping operation would be under UN auspices, and Russia is prepared to take part in this. (S)

In our view, this is a big and important step forward. We are continuing our active efforts along those lines with Belgrade on format and composition and mandate for this operation. This is a difficult task, but we shall pursue it persistently in order to find a final solution to the problem. (S)

It is important that your special envoy, Talbott, whom I know quite well, get involved in our efforts, but this will not be enough. So, I propose we move the remaining issues for discussion of the war to the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission. This would give an opportunity for Mr. Gore to look good in his election campaign in relation to the situation in Yugoslavia and would produce a good result because Gore and Chernomyrdin know how to negotiate with each other. This Commission will work for some time and where it will work doesn't matter to me or Chernomyrdin. It could work in either Washington or Europe or Moscow or intermittently in all those places. (S) (#)

Well, in other words, there are signs of the possibility of reaching a mutually acceptable solution, and I count on your weight for its support, but what is important is that air raids be suspended to provide a good background to the Commission for progress and acceptable results in getting the situation around

Kosovo back on a political track. I believe we should set aside our emotions and work in a pragmatic way to arrange a political settlement against the background of discontinuation of air raids by NATO against Yugoslavia. At least for the time of the work of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, and in this case we will create the impression that everyone saved face in getting out of the tragic situation in Kosovo. (S)

I spoke with Chernomyrdin several hours ago but it was too early to talk to you because it was four in the morning in America. If we establish the position to refer the issues to the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, it would create an opportunity for Gore to be the peacemaker. (S)

We are working in all areas and directions, including our government delegations and the visit to Belgrade by our Patriarch who had a successful mission. So we are attacking Milosevic from all sides, and there was also assistance from our Parliament. Let us forget at this stage all other issues and get to solving this one because this problem is worse than the others, and it is worth dozens of billions of dollars. (S)

When I talked with Chernomyrdin today he agreed to work in the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission on this issue. So we will not leave much room for maneuver to Belgrade and will keep them in our sights, also including their political network. So what is your reaction? I am waiting for it. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: First of all, I want to thank you for making the vigorous efforts you and Viktor Stepanovich are putting into this. Secondly, I think your idea of the Vice President and Chernomyrdin working together on this might work, but I think that they probably ought to have a telephone conversation. Then Strobe Talbott should meet with Chernomyrdin early this week to see what is possible. (S)

On this specific thing that has been achieved so far in your work with Milosevic, I would like to make a couple of comments. On a commitment by the U.S. and Europe to regional development and intensive assistance to everyone affected, I completely agree. I have repeatedly said we have to build a positive future for South-East Europe to prevent them from falling back into old hatreds. Now on the details. Based only on what you have said to me and what has been reported in the news on what Milosevic has said, I would like to talk about the details -- (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: [interrupting] So you do agree that Gore and Chernomyrdin resume their work? (S)

THE PRESIDENT: I think that we should have Gore and Chernomyrdin talk on the phone tomorrow, and what I would like to do is to have Strobe Talbott fly to see Viktor Stepanovich Tuesday or tomorrow or whenever you want him to go. And let me comment now -- (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: [interrupting] Well, I thought that after today's conversation we can tell the media that myself and President Clinton have found a common point of view on how we can solve this problem together and then the details can be worked out later, and we will continue to work actively with Milosevic on all these questions. (S)

You know that I have decided not to send seven military ships to the Mediterranean as we have agreed, and I will continue to comply with what I promised. And what assistance we have given to Yugoslavia is only humanitarian in nature and delivered by road. There were some difficulties on the Hungarian border, but now these have been settled. Milosevic is insisting that we supply to Yugoslavia the antiaircraft system S-300, but we shall not give this system to him, and you can believe me on that. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Because it will not allow any planes close to the borders of Yugoslavia. Well, I am listening to you Bill. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: First of all, let me respond to what you said we can tell the press and then I have to talk a little about the details of the proposal. I think we should say as little as possible about the specifics of what we are going to do in the long run because I have not talked to Gore at all about this and, in all fairness, I have to talk to him. I think we should have Gore and Chernomyrdin talk tomorrow and have Strobe Talbott and Chernomyrdin talk the next day and see if we can work it out. (S)

It is fine for you to say we agreed to pursue a diplomatic solution at a very high level and that you and I are going to personally work on it and maintain a high level of involvement. I at least need to have a brief conversation with the Vice President before I commit him to it. But I have no problem with

your saying I am encouraged by your personal involvement and Chernomyrdin's. As you know, I do not believe there can be a settlement without Russia's leadership and involvement. (S)

Now, I would like to talk about two things very briefly. One is the peacekeeping force. I think it is, in theory, fine to have it be under the UN, and I also think Russia should be a strong part of it. Now I know that Milosevic does not want NATO to be any part of it. If I could design it the best way I could, I would have it look like the work we are doing in Bosnia. There are two things you should keep in mind as you work through it in coming days. The first is that I don't think the refugees will go home unless there is a NATO and an American presence. The second is, in order to make this work, the UCK and KLA have to disarm, and I don't believe anyone but NATO and the U.S. can do this. (S)

I would like to make another point, which is that there would have to be a large number of forces, and one of the things they will have to do is to protect the Serb minority from angry Kosovars seeking revenge once they are back in the country. I think you know me well enough to trust me when I say we will protect the Serbs as well as the Kosovars by working with you, but we are going to need a lot of forces to do that. (S)

The other thing that is unclear in the commitment that Milosevic made is to what extent the Serb forces would be withdrawn. But from newspaper accounts he said not all troops will be withdrawn. I do not believe the refugees will go home unless the Serb military and police and paramilitaries are gone. And keep in mind, if Russian forces are in there, that should help them deal with their legitimate concerns about maintaining the sovereignty issue. But they have to withdraw or there is no point in our doing this. The measure of success is bringing all the refugees home. (S)

Now, on the question of a bombing pause. There was a huge debate at the NATO meeting, well, not a debate, but a discussion, and there was a unanimous feeling that there could be a pause only if all the refugees could come home, and secondly, agreement on an international security force, and third that the Serbs must begin their withdrawal. I agree a bombing pause might be helpful, but we have to work on getting the security forces out and get the beginning of a withdrawal -- not just you and me, but Milosevic also has to agree because all 19 members agreed to this, and I am bound by the decision the group has taken. And I think it is a good decision. You have made so

much progress, we might be able to get this done in the next few days if we just work on it. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Well, Bill, we are continuing and shall continue to work actively with Milosevic as if we were converting him to another faith. And I believe that on this one point that was mentioned by you that we did not manage to get Milosevic to agree on, we shall be able to do so soon. I know Talbott, and I trust him, but now we should raise the levels of these contacts and I believe that these contacts should be on the level of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission. We shall help and aid Chernomyrdin in working with Milosevic, so as to make Milosevic agree to the solution of the remaining issues. And finally, so that everyone gets the impression that it is you and me that stopped that war. This would influence the domestic political situation in your country and especially in this country, but what is most important is that it will help put an end to this conflict. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: You know that I am hearing concerns by our military who are talking about getting military servicemen to go and help Milosevic. You know I have condemned this in the strictest terms and convened my Security Council and said there should be no talk about that. Any General that speaks of sending troops to help Milosevic will be summarily dismissed from the military. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Well, there is one commander in the Military District of the Far East, Colonel-General Chechevatov, who was going to get a battalion which would go to Yugoslavia to help Milosevic. I dismissed him from his post. All our law enforcement agencies and ministries are strictly under my command and report only to me. So there will be no surprises here, and no unexpected things will come. We shall maintain contacts with you at all times. (S)

Well, let us by today's conversation solve two problems with two tasks. Let us resume the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission and instruct them to take up the Yugoslav problem. As soon as the Commission, at the very hour and minute it starts working, the air raids should stop. Of course, Talbott will be involved in that as a member of the Gore team, and he will deal with technical matters, not the big politics. So let us decide on

these two questions, and if we can announce this in the media, this will mark an end to the tragedy. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: But -- (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: [interrupting] You understand, you see what a difficult situation I am in, and I am holding myself and stifling my emotions, and I am talking with you in a constructive way. I also am leaving room for our subsequent cooperation. Well, of course this cooperation should not be abruptly stopped by the many Russians who write me letters on this issue. Let us do this Bill, and we should consider our conversation today constructive and a useful one. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Well first -- (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: [interrupting] Do you agree? (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Boris, first of all, I agree this has been a useful conversation, and I am encouraged by your energy and personal involvement you have put into this. We cannot solve this without your leadership, but I have to make three points that make it impossible to make the announcement to the press as you suggested. I hope you will listen to me carefully. (S)

First of all, I cannot get Gore into this publicly until I at least talk to him about it. He has had very limited involvement at this point, and I owe it to him to have a conversation with him before I put him into the middle of this. I know you understand he has been my partner for six years now, and he is running for President, and I can't run. I don't want to do anything that involves him in this way without talking to him. (S)

The second thing is, as I said, we just voted -- all 19 leaders of NATO -- to have a pause only when agreement on the security force, refugee return, and when withdrawal of Milosevic's forces can begin. I cannot unilaterally change that, and I don't want to say in public anything that implies I have abandoned what the others have agreed to. (S)

Now, there is a third problem that you and I both have if we do this. We have got to decide how to deal with the European Union because they have been very involved in this and, if we resolve this, we need them to come up with most of the money to rebuild Southeast Europe and to provide economic aide for everyone involved. So if we do this -- (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: [interrupting] You should -- (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Let me finish -- (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: [interrupting] Understand, Bill, the work of this Commission has an international reputation and they could invite both NATO leaders and Milosevic to take part. I can guarantee you that on the part of Milosevic. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I understand that but wait -- (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: [interrupting] And you can guarantee this on the NATO side and this would form the basis for the end of the war. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but what I am saying is -- (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: [interrupting] So, do not push Russia into this war. You know what Russia is. You know how it is equipped, but don't push Russia into this. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute, Boris. I am agreeing with what you are trying to do, but what I am saying is you have got all of the Europeans here taking the lead in this initiative, and we have to figure out how to deal with this before dropping it on them in the newspaper. They are our allies and our friends, and they have to come up with most of the money to rebuild the region. We just can't have them wake up in the morning and read it in the newspaper no matter how good it would be for us and our countries. (S)

Boris, how about this. I would like to say today that we talked today for an hour, and that I thanked you for your leadership for peace, and that we agreed on further steps. And then have Gore and Chernomyrdin talk early tomorrow in the morning and work out the arrangements for next steps. Then we can have more to say tomorrow and that will give me more time to get the Europeans in a positive frame of mind. (S)

I am not trying to push you into this conflict, Boris, and I believe we can make this initiative work. But, I am no good to you, unless I can hold our group together and then in the end they can come up with the money to make this work. (S)

Boris, how about this. Suppose we say today you and I talked for an hour, and I agreed with you we would work together to

that

find a diplomatic solution to this conflict at the highest levels and that we will provide more details in the days ahead. That gives us time to figure out what to do with the Europeans and gives me time to talk to Gore, and time for Gore to talk to Chernomyrdin. But it has the benefit of getting your peace initiative out today, which I think is important. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Well, Bill, you can't deny the work of, let's not call it a commission, Gore and Chernomyrdin would be useful and could provide the basis for a solution. We should decide that the very moment the commission starts working, there will be an end to the air raids, and at the same time the troops in the Yugoslavian units will pull out of Kosovo, and we will get Milosevic to do this. You can depend on me to get Milosevic to do this. Then we should reestablish Kosovo autonomy so all the populations that inhabit the region, no matter the ethnic origin, Albanian or Serb, could get back there and live together. Serbs are also fleeing to save themselves from NATO air raids. (S)

You know that Kofi Annan is coming to Moscow, and I will meet him, and I will do so in a way that we have a common position. Just a moment. Well, in this way, we shall unlock the situation and give the commission a chance to work. And it will work only when air raids stop. Milosevic will not slip out from our influence -- he will do everything we tell him to do. I hope your line of communication is a closed one like mine. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Let me ask you something, Boris. I need to talk to Gore and do some more work on this. Can we talk again tomorrow, and then have Gore talk to Chernomyrdin tomorrow? (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Let them begin the work, and then we shall continue efforts to work together so it looks like we stopped the European war, the World War. I realize that ground forces do not carry nuclear weapons now but of course they are capable, and if you bomb the power plants and fuel sites that would mean that there will be ecological instability in Europe for a long time. Well, I am listening to you Bill. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Boris, this might work if we can get the agreement on the security force and the beginning of withdrawal, then we could get a pause. If we get an agreement on the return of refugees, agreement on the security force and the beginning of a withdrawal, then we can have a pause in the bombing and a process that could work. I think it is very important what we

say and how we say it. I know the Europeans would support that kind of process and would finance the reconstruction that needs to be done in Kosovo. It is important that you and I not say this will happen just because you and I agree, because Milosevic has to agree as well. That is why I believe you and I have to talk again after Gore and Chernomyrdin talk. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: We shall follow the work of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission every day and every other day. If there is something we don't like, we will give each other a call. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I wanted to be sure that we have not planned [inaudible] our only aim is to stop the war so I believe that ... [inaudible] nothing that we can lose you and me can only gain from this. We can change our information for the media. [inaudible] (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Sorry, I did not hear that. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: The first point will be Gore-Chernomyrdin, we can change the second point that it will be that we agreed on conditions without going into details and it is not excluded that if everything is as we planned and the official hierarchy then we sign the letter [inaudible] although even if they do not take [inaudible] I trust this very much ... [inaudible] So -- (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Well I have a lot of confidence -- (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: [interrupting] So what do you think about that, Bill? (U)

THE PRESIDENT: We lost telephone communication for about five minutes, I have not heard the last three translations. Can you repeat them, not Boris, just the translator. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: OK. We have agreed? (U)

THE PRESIDENT: No. No. I have not heard the last three translations. Can we just have -- (U)

RUSSIAN INTERPRETER: Mr. President, you should be assured that we are not taking sides with Milosevic. My only aim is to stop the war and stop the air raids and form the political basis for all sides to negotiate. And that we should use the same

approach to all the sides of the conflict no matter how great their force. But it is most important that we find a solution to this most painful problem. We should stop the air raids. That would form the basis for the political solution of this tragedy. (S)

So I say again, of the five points enumerated by Albright, we got Milosevic to agree to four of them, and we have a statement signed by him on that. So probably we might change our second point in our information to the media, to say the first point will be that Gore and Chernomyrdin are working on this problem and the second point is that we have agreed on the conditions of the cessation of the air raids without going into details. So I don't also exclude if everything goes OK that this could help Chernomyrdin climb up the service ladder. (S)

okay

Well, we also got a written request from Milosevic forwarded by his people regarding the union between Russia and Belarus and Yugoslavia. I tried to delay this, and we are saying we are not ready for this. I can tell you confidentially that this will never happen. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: That is good. Let me say this, Boris. I think we are a little closer here in that I have no problem saying we have clarified conditions for a bombing pause. The most important thing is to say we have talked for an hour and committed ourselves to pursuing peace and that in the days ahead we will explain how we are going to do it. I will say again, I will have to talk to Gore before I can put him in the middle of this. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: And also you should take into account anti-American feelings are growing in our society. I should put an end to this, but this will not be possible to do while the air raids continue. So that is now the risk for you or me to get this Gore-Chernomyrdin to work with Milosevic and NATO so they elaborate on a short document that could be signed publicly. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Boris, I will work on nothing else but this for the next day. I will send Strobe tonight and have Gore get on the phone with Chernomyrdin. I will do nothing else but this, but we have to be careful not to say something else in public that might make it impossible to work. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: But you will tell this to Gore also? (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I will tell him. As soon as I get off the phone with you, I will tell him. (U) *OK? Okay*

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: And I will instruct Chernomyrdin to start talks with Rugova. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Good. Thanks, Boris. I will see you. Goodbye. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I think our discussion was frank, constructive, and balanced. So we did not let out our emotions surface. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: No, and we won't. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: We shall work for the future. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Goodbye friend, I will see you. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I was more talkative than you. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but we are going to do this. I am very encouraged. If you are involved, we can do this. Goodbye. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: So, let's agree on this. This call was my initiative and the next will be yours. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, and it will be soon. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Very well, Bill. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Bye bye. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Goodbye. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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3106

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBM NARA, Date 10/2/2018
2014-0546-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Yeltsin (8)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Russian President Boris Yeltsin is provided for the information of the Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our Embassy in Moscow for the Ambassador only. (8)

E.O. MKAS Strobe T.

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

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Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 4/26/09

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WH Situation Room
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Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
with Russian President Yeltsin

NSC LOG # 9903106

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
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THE WHITE HOUSE

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URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG DK A/O _____

TMA

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
JACOBSON	_____	_____	_____
POWELL	_____	_____	_____
RICE	_____	_____	_____
DAVIES	<u>1</u>	<u>G 5/8</u>	_____
KERRICK	<u>2</u>	<u>(G)</u>	_____
STEINBERG	<u>COG</u>	_____	_____
BERGER	<u>LN</u>	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	<u>3</u>	<u>Q 5/8</u>	<u>N</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	_____	_____	_____
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A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

99 MAY 7 10 07Z
COMMENTS:

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes = but no memcom

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 3364

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG DK A/O _____

TMA

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
JACOBSON	_____	_____	_____
POWELL	_____	_____	_____
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DAVIES	<u>1</u>	<u>G 5/8</u>	_____
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BERGER	<u>LN</u>	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	<u>3</u>	<u>Q 5/8</u>	<u>N</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	_____	_____	_____
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A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

99 NOV 7 08 26
COMMENTS:

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes = but no memcon

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONDECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0782-M-2 (1.64)
3/13/2018 KBN

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Yeltsin (S)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Russian President Yeltsin

Notetakers: Tony Campanella, Elizabeth
Rogers, Michael Manning, Sean Tarver,
Andrew Weiss
Interpreter: Peter Afanasenko

DATE, TIME May 2, 1999, 10:18 - 10:31 a.m. EDT,
AND PLACE: Residence

The President: Hello, Boris? (U)

President Yeltsin: Good afternoon, Bill. (U)

The President: Good afternoon. It is good to hear to hear your voice. (U)

President Yeltsin: Very well, Bill. I decided to call you on Sunday because this question is extremely important. As you know, on my instructions, my envoy Victor Chernomyrdin engaged in extremely difficult negotiations in Belgrade for many hours, and there are some results of these negotiations. Moreover, I believe that now real prospects have opened for making a practical step in reaching a political settlement. That was exactly the objective we agreed on with you. Not only the people of the U.S., Yugoslavia, and Russia, but the entire world needs this. Because of the very urgent nature of these developments, I have instructed my special envoy Chernomyrdin to go to Washington and deliver my personal message to you. I would ask you, Bill, to receive him without delay and want you to receive him tomorrow on May 3rd. That is all I have to say.
(S)

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 4/26/09

The President: First of all, Boris, I will be glad to see him and am pleased by everything you have been doing, by your personal involvement, and by how hard Viktor has worked. He and Gore have been in touch, and I want to thank you for all the good work that has been done and by all progress that has been made. I also want -- (S)

President Yeltsin: [interrupting] Do you agree to receive Chernomyrdin on Monday? (U)

The President: Yes, I do. The Japanese Prime Minister will be here, and I will ask him to adjust our schedule, but I will be glad to receive him. I think it is important that he meet with Al Gore to keep the channel working there. (S)

President Yeltsin: He will relate to you all the details of the latest developments. (S)

The President: I can't wait to see him, but I think it's important that he see Al Gore, too, to keep that channel working. As you know, I am very impressed by the work he has been doing and by the progress that has been made. Also, I want to say again how important -- (S)

President Yeltsin: [interrupting] Can we agree now on the exact hour you will receive Chernomyrdin tomorrow? (S)

The President: No, it will have to be tomorrow afternoon, but I can see him. I would like him to see Al Gore first, and then I will see him and will give him plenty of time. I will have to look at my schedule, and we can get back to your people, perhaps later today. (S)

President Yeltsin: It is okay that he meet with Mr. Gore, but I ask you to receive Chernomyrdin personally and to receive from him my personal letter. That is what I'm asking. (U)

The President: Absolutely, I will do that. (U)

President Yeltsin: Chernomyrdin will need all the proper identification papers so everything is official and on a solid level. (U)

The President: Absolutely, there will be no problem with that. (U)

President Yeltsin: I think at the airport it will be desirable for an official, some representative, not necessarily a high level official, of the government to meet him at the airport. I have provided him with my personal plane. (S)

The President: Yes, I will have someone meet him. (U)

President Yeltsin: Are we agreed on this, Bill? (U)

The President: Yes, we are. (U)

President Yeltsin: I owe you a bear hug. (U)

The President: Yes, I want a bear hug. You remember, Boris, I think it's very important that we get out of this whole affair in a way that is good for peace in the Balkans and good for Russia, and good for our relations. I am very pleased you are involved in this and that Chernomyrdin is involved, and I look forward to seeing him tomorrow. We both have to be involved. (S)

President Yeltsin: This morning, I held a closed meeting of the Security Council, in the narrow composition, and Chernomyrdin attended that meeting. We agreed on further work with Milosevic, so we shall continue our activities. You mentioned to me it is useful when Russia is involved as an intermediary in this process. (S)

The President: Yes, it is very useful, and I believe the right sort of deal can truly bring this crisis to a conclusion, but the wrong kind of deal will prolong the crisis. But I believe you have to be involved, the U.S. has to be involved, and the Europeans have to be involved, not only in Kosovo, but we have to help in all of the Balkans and Southeast Europe. It is critical to the future of our relations. So you have to be involved in a leading role, and I am very pleased. We just have to get the right kind of deal here. (S)

President Yeltsin: Very well, Bill. (U)

The President: Alright, Boris, I will see him tomorrow. Thank you very much. (U)

President Yeltsin: He is leaving Moscow very shortly and looking forward to meeting with you tomorrow on May 3rd. (U)

The President: Thank you. Good-bye. (U)

President Yeltsin: Thank you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~SECRET~~

3364

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 7, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER *(K) 12*

THROUGH: CARLOS PASCUAL *(K)*

FROM: ANDREW WEISS *AW*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Boris Yeltsin, May 2, 1999

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *KRM* NARA, Date *10/2/2018*
2014-0546-M

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the
May 2 telephone conversation between the President and Russian
President Yeltsin.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Glyn Davies to transmit the Memorandum of
Telephone Conversation at Tab A to the Department of State.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____ *(K) STREBE has Brief seen after*

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed
for the record.

Approve *(K)* _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to State

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 4/26/09

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

3364

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By ~~K31~~ NARA, Date 10/2/2018
2014-0546-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Yeltsin (S)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Russian President Boris Yeltsin is provided for the information of the Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary. It must be distributed via NODIS channel and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our Embassy in Moscow for the Ambassador only. (S)

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 5/5/09

~~SECRET~~

3364

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Yeltsin (S) (#)

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(S)

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

and not below
the Deputy
Assistant
Secretary
(DAS) level.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH/NARA, Date 10/2/2018
2014-0546-M

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 5/5/09

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Yeltsin (S)

PARTICIPANTS: *The* President Clinton
Russian President ~~Boris~~ Yeltsin

Notetakers: Tony Campanella, Elizabeth
Rogers, Michael Manning, Sean Tarver,
Andrew Weiss
Interpreter: Peter Afanasenko

DATE, TIME May 2, 1999, 10:18 - 10:31 a.m. EDT,
AND PLACE: Residence

THE PRESIDENT: Hello, Boris? (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Good afternoon, Bill. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Good afternoon. It is good to hear to hear your
voice. (U)

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Sunday because this question is extremely important. As you
know, on my instructions, my envoy Victor Chernomyrdin engaged
in extremely difficult negotiations in Belgrade for many hours,
and there are some results of these negotiations. Moreover, I
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practical step in reaching a political settlement. That was
exactly the objective we agreed on with you. Not only the
people of the U.S., Yugoslavia, and Russia, but the entire
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to receive him tomorrow on May 3rd. That is all I have to say.
(S)

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 4/26/09

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2015-0732-M-2 (1.64)
3/13/2018 KBH

THE PRESIDENT: First of all, Boris, I will be glad to see him and am pleased by everything you have been doing, by your personal involvement, and by how hard Viktor has worked. He and Gore have been in touch, and I want to thank you for all the good work that has been done and by all progress that has been made. I also want -- (S)

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THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I do. The Japanese Prime Minister will be here, and I will ask him to adjust our schedule, but I will be glad to receive him. I think it is important that he meet with Al Gore to keep the channel working there. (S)

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PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Very well, Bill. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Alright, Boris, I will see him tomorrow. Thank you very much. (U)


PRESIDENT YELTSIN: He is leaving Moscow very shortly and looking forward to meeting with you tomorrow on May 3d. (U)

3-4

THE PRESIDENT: Great. Thank you. Good-bye. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Thank you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --



MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2732				
Document ID: 9904164				
Row: 46	Section: 4	Shelf: 6	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	re: Phone Call with President Yeltsin (3 pages)	05/31/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001b. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin (5 pages)	05/31/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001c. talking points	re: Additional Talking Points for POTUS with Stepashin (1 page)	05/31/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001d. memo	[Duplicate of 001a] (2 pages)	05/31/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001e. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin (6 pages)	05/31/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Yeltsin and Tel...])
OA/Box Number: 2732

FOLDER TITLE:

9904164

2014-0546-M

rs1063

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9904164
RECEIVED: 31 MAY 99 12

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 31 MAY 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCALL

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR TELCALL TO PRES YELTSIN ON 31 MAY

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DUE DATE: 05 JUN 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PASCUAL

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
PASCUAL
SARGEANT
WEISS

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM

CLOSED BY: NSDMK

DOC 1 OF 1

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 10/2/2018
2014-0546-17

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9904164

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 PRESIDENT
001

Z 99053112 FOR INFORMATION
X 99062816 NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

001 990531
001 990531

VICE PRESIDENT
WH CHIEF OF STAFF

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

6-28-99

41164

PHONE CALL WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN

DATE: May 31, 1999

LOCATION: Oval Office

TIME: 9:30 - 10:15 a.m.

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2014-0546-M (1.72)
10/2/2018 KSH

I. PURPOSE

Discuss Kosovo, preparations for Cologne summit.

II. BACKGROUND

Yeltsin asked for this phone call; it is likely to be a difficult and critical call. Yeltsin, who remains very angry about the airstrikes, has one over-riding objective - to stop the bombing. He feels he has two ways to achieve that: 1) bringing pressure to bear on Milosevic to acquiesce in the international community's conditions and 2) trying to split the Alliance to make those conditions more lenient. Yeltsin's team is doing both simultaneously.

Milosevic is proving to be a hard, perhaps impossible, nut to crack. He treats Russian mediation efforts, including Chernomyrdin's, with disdain and defiance. That leads the Russians to try harder to get NATO to adjust its conditions. Yeltsin needs to understand that NATO's conditions to suspend the bombing will not be watered down.

Yeltsin will play up Milosevic's purported acceptance of the G-8 principles, which has sparked optimism among some Europeans that exceeds the facts. You should make clear that promises alone cannot end the air campaign. Trial balloons from Moscow and Belgrade suggest that Milosevic also agreed to a Russian proposal for troop withdrawals down to October 1998 levels and a UN-led, neutral-commanded peacekeeping mission that would restrict NATO's presence to Kosovo's southern borders, Albania, and Macedonia.

Yeltsin may use the call to reinforce Chernomyrdin's and Ivanov's efforts to get you to send the Vice President or

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)

Declassify on: 4/19/09

JUN 28 16:14

Madeleine to the Bonn meeting on Tuesday. The Russians say that we're into the end-game and need someone in Bonn who can "make final decision" -- i.e., make further substantial concessions. Their desire to change messengers is really a desire to change our message. They also suggested designating a single envoy to go to Belgrade (vice Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari). You should push back and argue that we need to take one step at a time, that there is no evidence that Milosevic is moving to embrace NATO's conditions, and that Strobe has full authority to represent you in Bonn. If Albright were to attend, Fischer and other Europeans would find it hard to stay away. Strobe will ask Albright to send Ivanov a letter tonight explaining why her participation is not a good idea. Similarly, the Vice President going to Europe Tuesday could very well result in perceptions that he has failed or added pressure to retreat on our core conditions.

You have four goals for the call:

1. Impress upon Yeltsin our resolve to achieve peace on conditions that will encourage the refugees to go home with safety and security.
2. Press Yeltsin to see Milosevic, not NATO, as the source of the conflict and the target of our joint pressure.
3. Assure Yeltsin that we will support Russian diplomacy so long as it's compatible with our objectives.
4. To induce Yeltsin to support the following game plan:
 - a three-way meeting in Bonn on Tuesday among Chernomyrdin, Ahtisaari, and Strobe, with Chancellor Schroeder joining in at the end;
 - a possible Chernomyrdin-Ahtisaari trip to Belgrade Wednesday;
 - another call between you and Yeltsin to assess;
 - possible follow-up by the G-8 and the UN Security Council; and
 - a Cologne G-8 Summit that hopefully brings us closer to a solution rather than further Russian self-isolation.

~~SECRET~~

3

Attachment

Tab A Points to be Made

~~SECRET~~

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0546-M (1.72)
10/2/2018 K8H

If Yeltsin says Milosevic is now ready to make the hard decision on his part, and the time has come for hard decisions on our part

- First, let me say how much I appreciate Russia's diplomatic efforts -- and yours in particular. This is a hard and important issue for both of us, not least because of its relevance to U.S.-Russian relations and my own relationship with you.
- Second, Viktor Stepanovich has obviously been doing hard work on your behalf. I'm very much looking forward to getting a full report from Strobe, who will meet with Viktor and Ahtisaari in Bonn on Tuesday.
- I hope Viktor and Ahtisaari will go to Belgrade together on Wednesday. That will give us a fresh reading on where Milosevic stands on the key issues.
- But let me be clear. Milosevic knows what he has to do to stop the bombing. We cannot eliminate any of the essential details that need to be nailed down to bring this conflict to an end.
- Think you and I should talk as soon as possible after Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari complete the mission.

If Yeltsin says, "We can't delay hard decisions any longer -- we've got to accelerate and upgrade this process right now. Enough stalling - enough going around in circles."

- Boris, I'm as determined as anyone to keep the diplomacy moving forward as quickly as possible. But there are a couple of points I hope you'll understand.
- First, I need the report from the Chernomyrdin-Ahtisaari mission as a basis for my own judgement about where Milosevic is.
- Second, the conditions I laid out for you back in mid-April still stand. The two most important of those conditions are, first, that NATO must be at the core of the peacekeeping

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)

Declassify on: 4/19/09

operation; this is essential to get the refugees back; it is important that other nations participate, too. Second, there can't be any armed Serbs still in Kosovo or we will just have a new civil war there.

- NATO cannot change these conditions for very simple reasons: anything short of these conditions will not lead to a lasting peace.

If Yeltsin says that Milosevic has already agreed to the G-8 principles, a NATO presence in Kosovo, and to withdraw his troops -- so stop the bombing

- I hope you're right about Milosevic's commitments. But the G-8 principles are general. This would not be the first time he's claimed to accept the G-8 principles or made promises to the international community and failed to follow through with important issues.
- Both details and actions here are critical. Let's see how the Chernomyrdin-Ahtisaari mission goes and what they find out.
- Essential that Milosevic agree to effective international security presence. That means NATO at the core, a unified command for the peacekeepers, and contributions from countries like Russia.
- That's the only way we can get an effective solution and not just empty promises that will fall apart.

If Yeltsin says, together we can end this thing, but you need to send the Vice President or the Secretary of State to Bonn on Tuesday, not Talbott

- First, you need to know that all important decisions will be mine.
- Al is deeply involved, as you know from the amount of time he spent with Viktor a month ago. He'll remain involved.
- Madeleine works every day on this problem, especially with Foreign Minister Ivanov. They talked on Saturday and will be talking again in a couple of hours. They're probably going to be meeting in the near future.
- For purposes of the Bonn meeting, I want Strobe to head our team. He speaks for me in this meeting. He has full

authority. You have my word. Al and I have relied on him on these matters since the very beginning of our partnership.

- What I need now, Boris, is a better sense of what Milosevic is prepared to do, and Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari are best able to do that together -- together they can pin Milosevic down on the details.
- The next step should be to get Chernomyrdin, Ahtisaari and Strobe back together. The one after that is Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari go to Belgrade. Then, you and I should talk again.

If Yeltsin says that the U.S. keeps adding new conditions or hanging up the diplomacy on "details."

- We're sticking to the very same conditions I raised with you when we talked on April 25. This has been our bottom line in every discussion.
- Viktor and Strobe have spent many hours together, and I believe they've made progress. Let's instruct them to make more progress on Tuesday.

If Yeltsin calls for a UN-led force or a neutral commander for the peacekeeping force

- My core objectives are to allow the refugees to return, protect all the civilians of Kosovo - and that means the Serb minority, make sure there is humanitarian access, and provide autonomy for Kosovo while protecting Yugoslavia's territorial integrity.
- You and I have gone over these objectives and we agree. The real issue is how to achieve them.
- That is why I have to insist on a international security force with NATO at the core. I have said before that the force does not have to have a NATO label. But NATO has to be there for the KLA to disarm and the refugees to return.
- We cannot risk another disaster with the UN at the helm like Somalia or the early days in Bosnia before you and I worked out a new approach at Hyde Park.

If Yeltsin rants about NATO's bombing, casualties, "politicization" of the Milosevic indictment, etc.

- You and I have talked about this before. Frankly, it disturbs me to hear you talk as though NATO is the root of the problem. Milosevic's brutality is the root of the problem.
- Russia and the U.S. worked together on a peaceful solution for 14 months before Milosevic made it impossible for me and our Allies to avoid use of force.
- I can't believe you'd let Milosevic wreck everything you've done to create cooperative relations between Russia on the one hand and the U.S., France, Germany, and Britain on the other.
- There's no question what Milosevic stands for: he's a Communist who wants to restore the Communist past in the Balkans - and to wreck your relations with the West. That's one of many reasons why we cannot let him succeed.

If he threatens to end Russia's diplomatic initiative

- I hope you don't, since I think Russia is playing a constructive role. I think any problem in the world is more likely to be solved if the U.S. and Russia are working cooperatively, even if we have some disagreements.
- But I know you'll make a decision based on Russian national interest, so I'll respect your decision whatever it is. But we want you engaged.
- Speaking for myself, I can promise you that the U.S. will keep working for an acceptable diplomatic solution - preferably with Russia.

If Yeltsin threatens not to come to Cologne or threatens that it will be a bad meeting

- Look, Boris. The G-8 exists because of you. And, for that matter, because of my vigorous support for creating the G-8 to demonstrate Russia's integration with the world's major democracies.
- You'll handle the meeting -- including your participation -- as you see fit.
- Let me tell you how I'll handle Cologne. If, together, we've been able to achieve a breakthrough on Kosovo on what all of us agree are acceptable terms, I'll lead the applause for you as a peacemaker.

- If, however, Milosevic is still holding out, and the military conflict is still under way, I'll use Cologne to highlight Russia's diplomacy and -- if Russia is still pursuing that diplomacy -- to concentrate our further efforts on getting a solution as soon as possible.

If Yeltsin suggests a common press line on the call.

- First, we should tell everyone that our personal representatives are meeting again on Tuesday in Bonn and will also meet with Chancellor Schroeder who holds the presidency of the EU and the G-8.
- Second, we should say that we both firmly committed to working together, along with our European partners, to find a diplomatic solution.
- Third, we stressed that Chernomyrdin's efforts are very important and that Russia is a key player on the diplomatic track.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4164
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
GIRE	_____	_____	_____
JACOBSON	_____	_____	_____
POWELL	_____	_____	_____
SARGEANT	_____	_____	_____
BRADTKE	_____	_____	_____
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A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

OB per WW

COMMENTS:

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE _____

Exec Sec

Three points should
be added for the
record to the Yeltsin/
Stepashin call
package of May 31.

Carlos

Note

at 06:15, the Russians
asked if PM Stepashin
could place the call
instead of Yeltsin due
to schedule changes.

We agreed. The
call took place at
10:00. CB

ADDITIONAL TALKING POINTS FOR POTUS WITH STEPASHIN

Monday, May 31, 1999

- Good morning, Mr. Prime Minister. I'm delighted to hear from you. Please give my best wishes to your President.

[Pause for reply]

- You've taken on a huge job. It's important not just for Russia but for the world, and certainly for U.S.-Russian relations. I hope in the course of your work and mine, our paths will cross and, in due course, I hope you and Al Gore will be able to continue the bilateral commission.
- I know that in addition to all your other duties, you've been closely involved in supervising Russian diplomatic efforts to bring peace to the Balkans.
- We've heard from President Ahtisaari how impressed he was by his meeting with you last week.
- As President Yeltsin and I have discussed, the U.S. supports Russian diplomacy.
- As you know — and Boris and I have been candid about this, as well — Russia and the U.S. have got some pretty profound disagreements about how to deal with the Belgrade leadership.
- But we also have what I feel are some crucial common interests:
 - ⇒ We agree on the broad outlines of what a peace should look like;
 - ⇒ We're working together on getting the message to Milošević about what it will take to get the bombing stopped.
 - ⇒ We're working together on the composition of both a security force and an international civilian presence that would go into Kosovo to implement an agreement.
- I also wanted to stress one critical issue that I have asked Strobe to take up in Bonn — and that is how much of the diplomatic initiative that we have been working on will be accepted by President Milosevic.
 - We still don't know how Milosevic will respond. We need to think carefully about this, and be sure we have the right responses that keep the pressure on Milosevic to accept the views of the international community — regardless of what his initial reactions might be.
- Despite all the attention we have had to focus on Kosovo, I also want to make sure we do not forget other pressing issues in the bilateral relationship. We need to get U.S.-Russian relations on the right track of cooperation and mutual benefit.
- Anyway, Mr. Prime Minister, this is an important week, and you can be sure that I'll be following developments closely.

Pause for reply

WWD- Please
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Septer. It
was done on
Sunday by
S. F. Rm.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2014-0546-M (1.74)
10/2/2018 KBH

PHONE CALL WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN

DATE: May 31, 1999

LOCATION: Oval Office

TIME: 9:45 - 10:15 a.m.

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

I. PURPOSE

Discuss Kosovo, preparations for Cologne summit.

II. BACKGROUND

Yeltsin asked for this phone call; it is likely to be a difficult and critical call. Yeltsin, who remains very angry about the airstrikes, has one over-riding objective -- to stop the bombing. He feels he has two ways to achieve that: 1) bringing pressure to bear on Milosevic to acquiesce in the international community's conditions and 2) trying to split the Alliance to make those conditions more lenient. Yeltsin's team is doing both simultaneously.

Milosevic is proving to be a hard, perhaps impossible, nut to crack. He treats Russian mediation efforts, including Chernomyrdin's, with disdain and defiance. That leads the Russians to try harder to get NATO to adjust its conditions. Yeltsin needs to hear that NATO's conditions to suspend the bombing will not be watered down and that Milosevic will not be given a veto over key issues.

Yeltsin will play up Milosevic's purported acceptance of the G-8 principles, which has sparked unwelcome diplomatic initiatives in Europe. You should make clear that promises alone cannot end the air campaign. Trial balloons from Moscow and Belgrade suggest that Milosevic also agreed to a Russian proposal for troop reductions inside Kosovo to October 1998 levels and a UN-led, neutral-commanded peacekeeping mission that would restrict NATO's presence to Kosovo's southern borders, Albania, and Macedonia.

SECRET

Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)

Declassify on: 4/19/09

Yeltsin may use the call to reinforce Chernomyrdin's and Ivanov's efforts to get you to send the Vice President or Madeleine to the Bonn meeting on Tuesday. The Russians say that we're into the end-game and need someone in Bonn who can "make final decision" -- i.e., make concessions. They also suggested designating a single envoy to go to Belgrade. You should push back and argue that we need to take one step at a time, that there is no evidence that Milosevic is moving to embrace NATO's conditions, and that Strobe has full authority to represent you in Bonn. If Albright were to attend, Fischer and other Europeans would find it hard to stay away. Strobe will ask Albright to send Ivanov a letter tonight explaining why her participation is not a good idea. The Vice President has not ruled out going to Bonn on Tuesday, but is waiting on Leon's account of your conversation with Yeltsin before deciding.

You have four goals for the call:

1. Impress upon Yeltsin our resolve to achieve peace on conditions that will encourage the refugees to go home with safety and security.
2. Press Yeltsin to see Milosevic, not NATO, as the source of the conflict and the target of our joint pressure.
3. Assure Yeltsin that we will support Russian diplomacy so long as it's compatible with our objectives.
4. To induce Yeltsin to support our game plan:
 - a three-way meeting in Bonn on Tuesday among Chernomyrdin, Ahtisaari, and Strobe, with Chancellor Schroeder joining in at the end;
 - a possible Chernomyrdin-Ahtisaari to Belgrade Wednesday;
 - possible follow-up by the G-8 and the UN Security Council; and
 - a Cologne G-8 Summit that brings us closer to a solution rather than further Russian self-isolation.

Attachment

Tab A Points to be Made

SECRET

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0546-M (1.75)
10/2/2013 KBH

If Yeltsin says Milosevic is now ready to make the hard decision on his part, and the time has come for hard decisions on our part

- First, let me say how much I appreciate Russia's diplomatic efforts -- and yours in particular. I know how hard and important this issue is for you. It's very important for me, too, not least because of its relevance to U.S.-Russian relations and my own relationship with you.
- Second, Viktor Stepanovich has obviously been doing incredibly hard work on your behalf. I'm very much looking forward to getting a full report from Strobe, who will meet with Viktor and Ahtisaari in Bonn on Tuesday.
- It sounds as though there's a good chance Viktor and Ahtisaari will go to Belgrade together on Wednesday. I hope they do. That will give us a fresh reading on where Milosevic stands on the key issues.
- But let me be clear. Milosevic knows what he has to do to stop the bombing. We're not negotiating with him and can't let him slide out from underneath any of the essential details that need to be nailed down to bring this conflict to an end.
- Think you and I should talk as soon as possible after Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari complete the mission.

If Yeltsin says, "We can't delay hard decisions any longer -- we've got to accelerate and upgrade this process right now. Enough stalling - enough going around in circles."

- Boris, I'm as determined as anyone to keep the diplomacy moving forward as quickly as possible. But there are a couple of points I hope you'll understand.
- First, I want to have the report from the Chernomyrdin-Ahtisaari mission as a basis for my own judgement about where Milosevic is.
- Second, the conditions I laid out for you back in mid-April still stand. The two most important of those conditions are

SECRET

Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)

Declassify on: 4/19/09

that NATO must be at the core of the peacekeeping operation and there can't be any armed Serbs still in Kosovo.

- NATO cannot change these conditions for very simple reasons: anything short of these conditions will not lead to a lasting peace, or to a return of the refugees, or to a safe environment for the Serb minority that stays in Kosovo.

If Yeltsin says that Milosevic has already agreed to the G-8 principles, a NATO presence in Kosovo, and to withdraw his troops -- so stop the bombing

- I hope you're right about Milosevic's commitments. But this would not be the first time he's claimed to accept the G-8 principles or made promises to the international community and failed to follow through. So we need to be careful and precise with Milosevic.
- He also needs to know that promises alone won't stop the bombing -- both details and actions here are critical. Let's see how the Chernomyrdin-Ahtisaari mission goes and what they find out.
- Essential that Milosevic agree to effective international security presence. That means NATO at the core, a unified command for the peacekeepers, and contributions from countries like Russia.
- That's the only way we can get an effective solution and not just empty promises that will fall apart.

If Yeltsin says, together we can end this thing, but you need to send the Vice President or the Secretary of State to Bonn on Tuesday

- Al is deeply involved, as you know from the amount of time he spent with Viktor a month ago. He'll remain involved.
- Madeleine works day in and day out on this problem, especially with Foreign Minister Ivanov. They talked on Saturday and will be talking again in a couple of hours. They're probably going to be meeting in the near future.
- For purposes of the Bonn meeting, I want Strobe to head our team. Al and I have relied on him since the very beginning of my Administration and our partnership.

- Strobe has reviewed every detail and step of the discussion on Kosovo with Al and Madeleine and me. He has our complete trust and full authority to do anything that needs to be done. You have my personal word on that.
- What I need now, Boris, is a better sense of what Milosevic is prepared to do, and Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari are best able to do that together -- together they can really pin Milosevic down on the details.
- So, let's take this one step at a time. The next step is to get Chernomyrdin, Ahtisaari and Strobe back together. The one after that is Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari to Belgrade. Then we'll talk again.

If Yeltsin says that the U.S. keeps adding new conditions or hanging up the diplomacy on "details."

- We're sticking to the very same conditions I raised with you when we talked on April 25. This has been our bottom line in every discussion.
- Chernomyrdin, Ahtisaari and Strobe are trying to make sure that all of us understand exactly what these conditions mean so there are no misunderstandings.
- We don't want to reach agreement on general principles and then have them fall apart afterwards. This isn't just about details, it's making sure there are no surprises on the "essential specifics," and that both of us are ready to support them.
- Viktor and Strobe have spent hours on this subject, and I believe they've made progress. Let's instruct them to make more progress on Tuesday.

If Yeltsin calls for a UN-led force or a neutral commander for the peacekeeping force

- My core objectives are to allow the refugees to return, protect all the civilians of Kosovo - and that means the Serb minority, make sure there is humanitarian access, and provide autonomy for Kosovo while protecting Yugoslavia's territorial integrity.
- You and I have gone over these objectives and we agree. The real issue is how to achieve them.

- That is why I have to insist on a international security force with NATO at the core. I have said before that the force does not have to have a NATO label. But NATO has to be there for the KLA to disarm and the refugees to return.
- We cannot risk another disaster with the UN at the helm like Somalia or the early days in Bosnia before you and I worked out a new approach at Hyde Park.

If Yeltsin rants about NATO's bombing, casualties, "politicization" of the Milosevic indictment, etc.

- You and I have talked about this before. Frankly, it disturbs me to hear you talk as though NATO is the root of the problem. Milosevic's brutality is the root of the problem.
- Russia and the U.S. worked together on a peaceful solution for 14 months before Milosevic made it impossible for me and our Allies to avoid use of force.
- Milosevic has repeatedly defied Russia, lied to Russia, broken promises to Russia - and to you personally. I think we're more likely to bring him into line if we can at least agree that he's the problem.
- I can't believe you'd let Milosevic wreck everything you've done to create cooperative relations between Russia on the one hand and the U.S., France, Germany, and Britain on the other.
- There's no question what Milosevic stands for: he's a Communist who wants to restore the Communist past in the Balkans - and to wreck your relations with the West. That's one of many reasons why we cannot let him succeed.

If he threatens to end Russia's diplomatic initiative

- I hope you don't, since I think Russia is playing a constructive role. I think any problem in the world is more likely to be solved if the U.S. and Russia are working cooperatively, even if we have some disagreements.
- But I know you'll make a decision based on Russian national interest, so I'll respect your decision whatever it is. But we want you engaged.

- Speaking for myself, I can promise you that the U.S. will keep working for an acceptable diplomatic solution - preferably with Russia.

If Yeltsin threatens not to come to Cologne or threatens that it will be a bad meeting

- Look, Boris. The G-8 exists because of you. And, for that matter, if it weren't for me and my vigorous support for creating the G-8 to demonstrate Russia's integration with the world's major democracies.
- You'll handle the meeting -- including your participation -- as you see fit. But I won't let you forget what you told the reporters when we met on Bosnia in October 1995.
- They asked if our meeting was a disaster, and you told them that they were the disasters, and that you and I were getting the work done.
- Let me tell you how I'll handle Cologne. If, together, we've been able to achieve a breakthrough on Kosovo on what all of us agree are acceptable terms, I'll lead the applause for you as a peacemaker.
- If, however, Milosevic is still holding out, and the military conflict is still under way, I'll use Cologne to highlight Russia's diplomacy and -- if Russia is still pursuing that diplomacy -- to concentrate our further efforts on getting a solution as soon as possible.

If Yeltsin suggests a common press line on the call.

- First, we should tell everyone that the diplomatic track is not dead. Our personal representatives are meeting again on Tuesday in Bonn and will also meet with Chancellor Schroeder who holds the presidency of the EU and the G-8.
- Second, we should say that we both firmly committed to working together, along with our European partners, to find a diplomatic solution. We discussed Chernomyrdin's trip to Belgrade and what he heard from Milosevic.
- Third, we stressed that Chernomyrdin's efforts are very important and that Russia is a key player on the diplomatic track. And we agreed that Milosevic's actions, not just his promises, are key to finding a solution.


- Finally, I want you to know that I will stress that NATO's conditions have not changed, and Milosevic must accept these to stop the bombing. I don't expect you to talk about NATO's conditions, but I don't want you to be surprised when I do.

Case Number: 2014-0546-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2733				
Document ID: 9904358				
Row: 46	Section: 4	Shelf: 7	Position: 1	Stack: v



Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. telecon	re: Telecon with President Yeltsin of Russia (2 pages)	06/07/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Yeltsin and Tel...])
OA/Box Number: 2733

FOLDER TITLE:

9904358

2014-0546-M
rs1064

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9904358
RECEIVED: 08 JUN 99 11

TO: KENNEY, K

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 09 JUN 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCON

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCON W/ PRES YELTSIN OF RUSSIA ON 7 JUN 99

ACTION: RICE SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 14 JUN 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PASCUAL

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC

FICKLIN

NSC CHRON

PASCUAL

COMMENTS: _____

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DATE

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BY HAND

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *KRM/NARA*, Date *10/2/2018*
2014-0546-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9904358

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

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X 99060911 KERRICK APPROVED RECOM
X 99060911 RICE SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

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**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE**

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
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POWELL	_____	_____	_____
RICE	<u>1 13</u>	<u>② 6/8 4/9</u>	_____
DAVIES	_____	<u>① 6/9</u>	_____
KERRICK	<u>2</u>	_____	_____
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BERGER	<u>com</u>	_____	_____
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A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

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99 JUN 8 PM 5:13

COMMENTS:

Yeltsin Mem con. 6/7/99

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE

yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4359

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM ARS INT ARS

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
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POWELL	_____	_____	_____
RICE	<u>1 / 3</u>	<u>② 6/8/99</u>	_____
DAVIES	_____	<u>② 6/9</u>	_____
KERRICK	<u>2</u>	_____	_____
STEINBERG	<u>con</u>	_____	_____
BERGER	<u>con</u>	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
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A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

00 JUN 800 5112

COMMENTS:

Yeltsin Mem con. 6/7/99

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4358

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

June 9, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRM/NARA, Date 10/2/2013
2014-0546-M

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with
President Yeltsin of Russia

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and President Yeltsin of Russia is provided for the information of the Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary and Ambassador Sestanovich. It may also be sent to our embassy in Moscow for Ambassador Collins only. (S)


Glyn T. Davies
For Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 06/08/09

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2015-0782-M-2 (1.65)
3/13/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Yeltsin of Russia (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Russian President Yeltsin

Notetakers: Robin Rickard, James Smith
Michael Manning, Roger Merletti, Stuart
Kaufman

Interpreter: Kyrill Borissow

DATE, TIME 7 June 1999, 11:07 - 11:14 a.m. EST,
AND PLACE: Oval Office

President Yeltsin: Good afternoon, Bill. (U)

The President: Hello, Boris. Thank you for taking this call. I think we are on the verge of a very important achievement to get an end to the bombing and the return of refugees, as we discussed last April. As you remember, on that day you suggested that Viktor Stepanovich engage with the Vice President, and since then he has worked with Al Gore, President Ahtisaari and Strobe Talbott and has come up with an excellent plan, which President Milosevic accepted last Friday. (C)

President Yeltsin: I think, Bill, we have come a long way together, and the only thing remaining is for us to finalize this work. (C)

The President: I agree with that. If we can get agreement today on a UN Security Council resolution covering the peacekeeping force in the G-8 meeting going on now in Germany, I think everything will work out all right. I think it's important that Ivanov do everything possible to reach an agreement. Your role has been indispensable until now. This can all be over very quickly and will set the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified By: Glyn T. Davies

Classify Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 06/08/09

stage for the G-8 meeting in Cologne in two weeks and a great Russian diplomatic triumph. (C)

President Yeltsin: I have been thinking a lot and with concern about the possibility of losing the positive experience we gained together with you. This would be extremely dangerous. (C)

The President: I agree with that. I have told our people, and I know the other Europeans have been told, that we need to reach agreement today, and I hope you can tell Ivanov this. If we can get agreement on a Security Council resolution, we can work the sequencing out, so they begin to withdraw, then we have a bombing pause, then we pass a resolution, then the peacekeeping forces go in, and we can all go to work. That's what we have to do. But we have to make sure nothing happens to make Milosevic think he can stall; we can't let him stall or backslide. If he had done what he told Chernomyrdin Friday, there would be no bombs falling today. We have to go forward, we need to pass the draft resolution today. I hope you will do all you can. The G-8 needs to approve it. (C)

President Yeltsin: I fully agree with you. If we fail to join our efforts together, we will certainly have failed. (C)

The President: I will call Madeleine right now and tell her to redouble our efforts. Will you do the same with Ivanov? (C)

President Yeltsin: Of course, of course, Bill, and immediately. (C)

The President: Good. Let's keep working at it, Boris. We can do this today, and it will be a great triumph for Russian diplomacy, and then when we get to the G-8 in Cologne, we will have something to celebrate rather than worry about. And I will lead the ovation. (C)

President Yeltsin: Okay, agreed. I agree with this. If any misunderstanding would exist between us, I would be able to get in touch and give the necessary instructions to my minister, Ivanov. (C)

The President: That is very good news. Thank you, Boris. (U)

President Yeltsin: Goodbye, Bill. Thank you for this conversation. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

June 8, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: CARLOS E. PASCUAL

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with
President Yeltsin of Russia on June 7, 1999DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KGM NARA, Date 10/2/2018
2014-0546-M

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and President Yeltsin of Russia on June 7, 1999.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Glyn Davies to transmit the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A to State.

Approve K Disapprove

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve K Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to State

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 06/08/09

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9904358
DATE 09 JUN 99

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCON W/ PRES YELTSIN OF RUSSIA ON 7 JUN 99
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: ORIGINAL + DISK

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: KBH Date: 10/2/2018
2014-0546-m

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGMT, ROOM 379 OEOB


PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

Case Number: 2014-0546-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2733				
Document ID: 9904397				
Row: 46	Section: 4	Shelf: 7	Position: 1	Stack: V



Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. telcon~~	~~re: Telephone Conversation with President Yeltsin of Russia (3 pages)~~	~~06/08/1999~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBM 7/13/2018
~~001b. telcon~~	~~[Duplicate of 001a] [incomplete copy] (2 pages)~~	~~06/08/1999~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBM 7/13/2018

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Yeltsin and Tel...])
OA/Box Number: 2733

FOLDER TITLE:

9904397

2014-0546-M

rs1065

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9904397
RECEIVED: 09 JUN 99 11

TO: KENNEY, K

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 11 JUN 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCON

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: TELCON W/ PRES YELTSIN OF RUSSIA ON 8 JUN

ACTION: SARGEANT SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 15 JUN 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PASCUAL

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC
FICKLIN
NSC CHRON
PASCUAL

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP

CLOSED BY: NSEMK

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 10/2/2018
2014-0546-M

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9904397

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001
002

Z 99061008 FOR SIGNATURE & DECISION
X 99061116 KERRICK APPROVED RECOM
X 99061116 SARGEANT SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 990611 STATE

~~SECRET~~

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE**

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4397
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG RIC A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<u>Alv</u> JACOBSON	<u>3</u>		
POWELL <u>Sargeant</u> RICE	<u>1/3</u>	<u>S 6/10</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
DAVIES			
KERRICK	<u>2</u>	<u>(10)</u>	
STEINBERG	<u>copy</u>		
BERGER	<u>copy</u>		
SITUATION ROOM			
WEST WING DESK	<u>3</u>		<u>[Signature]</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>4</u>	<u>(F) 6/10</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
	<u>5</u>	<u>ENCL 6/11</u>	<u>DT DISK</u>

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

COMMENTS:

Yeltsin memcon

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE

yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4397
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TIC A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<u>Clw</u> JACOBSON	<u>3</u>		
POWELL <u>Sargeant</u> RICE	<u>1/3</u>	<u>2 6/10</u>	<u>Done</u>
DAVIES			
KERRICK	<u>2</u>	<u>(10)</u>	
STEINBERG	<u>copy</u>		
BERGER	<u>copy</u>		
SITUATION ROOM			
WEST WING DESK	<u>3</u>		<u>3</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>4</u>	<u>(F) 6/10</u>	<u>D</u>
	<u>5</u>	<u>Encl 6/11</u>	<u>DD-DISK</u>

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

COMMENTS:

Yeltsin memcon

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE

yes

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

4397


June 11, 1999

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By ~~KBH~~NARA, Date ~~10/2/2018~~
2014-0546-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with
President Yeltsin of Russia (S)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and President Yeltsin of Russia is provided for the information of the Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary and Ambassador Sestanovich. It may also be sent to our embassy in Moscow for Ambassador Collins only. (S)

for 
Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn Davies

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 06/09/09

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4397

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 9, 1999

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2015-0782-M-2 (1.66)
3/13/2013 KRM

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President
Yeltsin of Russia

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Russian President Yeltsin

Interpreter: Nikolai Sorokin
Notetakers: Bonnie Glick, Sean Tarver,
Roger Merletti, Don Cheramie

DATE, TIME June 8, 1999, 8:58 - 9:13 a.m., EST
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello, Boris. (U)

President Yelstin: Hello, Bill, how are you? Well, Bill, Minister Ivanov has reported to me on the progress of the work on the UN Security Council resolution on Kosovo, and he told me that by and large his work has been completed. The text has been agreed upon in its main elements. I believe this is the result of my instructions to Ivanov and your instructions to your representative. And as a follow-on to our conversation of yesterday, immediately after our conversation, I got in touch with my Foreign Minister and told him that no matter what happens, he must stay there, don't come back. And I believe he was there, and he immediately began his work with his G-8 partners on all these things, and I believe he has done a good job, and this has been a success. What do you think, Bill? (S)

The President: First, I want to tell you, I appreciated our talk yesterday, and I'm thrilled that we reached agreement on the text of the UN Security Council resolution today. I think it shows that when we make our partnership work, we can do whatever we need to do. Strobe Talbott and his team are coming to Moscow soon to work with your team on the military details so we can have a formula to allow Russia to participate in the international security force. We made it work in Bosnia, and we

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 06/09/09

~~SECRET~~

need to do it again and get the details worked out. We also have to get the military-technical agreement done with Serbia to make sure Milosevic honors his commitments to you and all of us so the Chernomyrdin-Ahtisaari diplomatic breakthrough will last. That way we can use next week's meeting in Cologne to put the spotlight on Russia's efforts and to make the peace work. (S)

President Yeltsin: Bill, just a second, Bill. When we talked this matter over with you, I think we agreed that if I give the necessary authority to Ivanov to complete the work on the resolution and to agree on the text as we have discussed with you, then the bombing will be stopped. (S)

The President: As soon as they begin to withdraw, then it will. Believe me, I am anxious to do that. And once he begins the withdrawal, then we will stop. That was the agreement Milosevic reached with Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari, and once he begins the withdrawals, then we will stop. (S)

President Yeltsin: Well, I believe that perhaps there was a little bit of misunderstanding between us. As I recall our conversation, we agreed very firmly that once the UN Security Council resolution is agreed upon, it will be up to you to stop the bombing, and it will be up to me to get Ivanov to complete the work on the resolution. I recall our agreement included this element of cessation of bombing once a resolution is agreed upon. Do I understand that you are now drawing back? (S)

The President: No, Boris. Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin made an agreement with Milosevic that Milosevic would begin to withdraw, and when he began, we would end the bombing. He then said that he did not want to withdraw until there is a UN resolution. But the Serbs are now meeting with NATO military representatives to conclude the agreement. Once they finish, the Serbs can begin to withdraw, but under the Ahtisaari-Chernomyrdin agreement, they will begin the withdrawal and immediately the bombing will stop. And that could happen very, very soon. If Milosevic had followed through on the agreement he gave to Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari, then the bombing would have stopped yesterday. They are now meeting, and I think this can happen at any time. I think they are very close to a conclusion, even as we speak. Boris, don't worry, this is going to work out the way you and I agreed. As soon as this conversation is done, I will get back to my people who are working on this, and it will work out. (S)

President Yeltsin: Well, Bill, I would like to emphasize once again that we firmly link the completion of work on the draft

resolution with the conclusion on the bombing of Yugoslavia. I can tell you very frankly that without this, we will not allow the Security Council resolution to go forward. I warned you about this, and do it again, quite frankly. (S)

The President: I understand that. We just have to get Serbia to sign off on the timetable right now, and we will begin. I will do with our people today what you have done with Ivanov. We will get this done, and I will get on it right now. Under the agreement, they have to agree to the timetable. We can stop the bombing and get on with the Security Council resolution. I will get on it right away. I won't waste a minute. (S)

President Yeltsin: OK. Then I will suggest that you call your military right now. Then we will get back in touch and see where we are. (S)

The President: Yes, let's do it. Thank you, Boris. (U)

President Yeltsin: Thank you very much. We are agreed. OK. My best wishes to you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9904397
DATE 11 JUN 99

SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM OF TELCON W/ PRES YELTSIN OF RUSSIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
ROOM 7224
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: ORIGINAL + Disk

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: KBH Date: 10/2/2018
2014-0546-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9904397
DATE 11 JUN 99

SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM OF TELCON W/ PRES YELTSIN OF RUSSIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
ROOM 7224
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: ORIGINAL + *Digt*

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KBH Date: 10/2/2018
2014-0546-m

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

4397

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

June 9, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM:

CARLOS PASCUAL

SUBJECT:

Telephone Conversation with President Yeltsin of
Russia on June 8, 1999

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KSH NARA, Date 10/2/2018
2014-0546-M

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
between the President and President Yeltsin of Russia on June 8,
1999.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Glyn Davies to transmit the Memorandum of
Telephone Conversation at Tab A to State.

Approve

Disapprove

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed
for the record.

Approve

Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to State

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify On: 6/9/09

~~SECRET~~

4397

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH/NARA, Date 10/2/2018
2014-0546-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with
President Yeltsin of Russia (S)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and President Yeltsin of Russia is provided for the information of the Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary and Ambassador Sestanovich. It may also be sent to our embassy in Moscow for the Ambassador Collins only. (S)

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 06/09/09

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~June 9, 1999~~**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**2015-0732-m-2 (1.66)
3/13/2018 KBN

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President
Yeltsin of Russia

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Russian President Yeltsin

Interpreter: Nikolai Sorokin
Notetakers: Bonnie Glick, Sean Tarver,
Roger Merletti, Don Cheramie

DATE, TIME: June 8, 1999, 8:58 - 9:13 a.m., EST
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello, Boris. (U)

President Yelstin: Hello, Bill, how are you? Well, Bill, Minister Ivanov has reported to me on the progress of the work on the UN Security Council resolution on Kosovo, and he told me that by and large his work has been completed. The text has been agreed upon in its main elements. I believe this is the result of my instructions to Ivanov and your instructions to your representative. And as a follow-on to our conversation of yesterday, immediately after our conversation, I got in touch with my Foreign Minister and told him that no matter what happens, he must stay there, don't come back. And I believe he was there, and he immediately began his work with his G-8 partners on all these things, and I believe he has done a good job, and this has been a success. What do you think, Bill? (S)

The President: First, I want to tell you, I appreciated our talk yesterday, and I'm thrilled that we reached agreement on the text of the UN Security Council resolution today. I think it shows that when we make our partnership work, we can do whatever we need to do. Strobe Talbott and his team are coming to Moscow soon to work with your team on the military details so we can have a formula to allow Russia to participate in the international security force. We made it work in Bosnia, and we

SECRET

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 06/09/09

resolution with the conclusion on the bombing of Yugoslavia. I can tell you very frankly that without this, we will not allow the Security Council resolution to go forward. I warned you about this, and do it again, quite frankly. (S)

The President: I understand that. We just have to get Serbia to sign off on the timetable right now, and we will begin. I will do with our people today what you have done with Ivanov. We will get this done, and I will get on it right now. Under the agreement, they have to agree to the timetable. We can stop the bombing and get on with the Security Council resolution. I will get on it right away. I won't waste a minute. (S)

President Yeltsin: OK. Then I will suggest that you call your military right now. Then we will get back in touch and see where we are. (S)

The President: Yes, let's do it. Thank you, Boris. (U)

President Yeltsin: Thank you very much. We are agreed. OK. My best wishes to you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

Case Number: 2014-0546-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2734				
Document ID: 9904403				
Row: 46	Section: 4	Shelf: 7	Position: 2	Stack: v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin (1 page)	06/08/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Yeltsin and Tel...])
OA/Box Number: 2734

FOLDER TITLE:

9904403

2014-0546-M
rs1066

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9904403
RECEIVED: 09 JUN 99 13

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 08 JUN 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCALL

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR POTUS TELCALL TO PRES YELTSIN ON 8 JUN

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DUE DATE: 15 JUN 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WEISS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
WEISS

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM

CLOSED BY: NSTSM

DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KSM NARA, Date 10/2/2018
2014-0546-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9904403

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 PRESIDENT
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 99060913 FOR INFORMATION
X 99060913 NOTED BY PRESIDENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Millison, Cathy L.

From: Weiss, Andrew S.
Sent: Tuesday, June 08, 1999 8:33 AM
To: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc: @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary; @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; @KOSOVO
Subject: Updated Yeltsin talkers [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

PLEASE PASS TO SANDY AND JIM ASAP

Includes reference to Strobe mission to Moscow tonight.



BNY talkpts June
8_.doc

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRM/NARA, Date 10/2/2018
2014-0546-M

6-8-99

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN

- Boris, really appreciated chance to talk yesterday. Know that several of our friends are looking forward to seeing you in Cologne. We're all grateful to Russia for Viktor Stepanovich's important diplomatic accomplishments last week.
- Thrilled we could reach agreement today on text of UN Security Council Resolution. Again goes to show that when we make our partnership work, there is little we cannot do.
- Strobe and his team flying to Moscow tonight to work with your team on military details. Want to find formula that allows Russia to participate in international security force. Always said need Russia there. Made it work in Bosnia and can do it again.
- Now need to focus on getting military technical agreement done. Must pressure Milosevic to honor commitments to Russia and international community; blame will lie with him if Chernomyrdin-Ahtisaari diplomatic breakthrough fails.
- All of us want to use next week's summit to put spotlight on Russia's successes. As soon as Milosevic begins to withdraw, can suspend bombing. Ready to lead the applause for Russia at Cologne.

If Yeltsin says NATO adding demands to military-technical agreement

- Agreement will ensure safe environment for peacekeepers and refugees. But Milosevic's generals want to reopen last week's agreement and keep thousands of troops in Kosovo. That won't work -- both refugees and peacekeepers won't feel safe.

Case Number: 2014-0546-M

MIR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 2734				
Document ID: 9904417				
Row: 46	Section: 4	Shelf: 7	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Phone Call with Russian President Yeltsin (1 page)	06/09/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Yeltsin and Tel...])
OA/Box Number: 2734

FOLDER TITLE:

9904417

2014-0546-M

rs1067

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9904417
RECEIVED: 09 JUN 99 16

TO: BERGER

FROM: KAUFMAN
PASCUAL

DOC DATE: 10 JUN 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCALL

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: TELCALL W/ RUSSIAN PRES YELTSIN JUN 10

ACTION: OBE PER APNSA OFFICE

DUE DATE: 15 JUN 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PASCUAL

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

FARANDA
KAUFMAN
NSC CHRON
PASCUAL

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSEMK

CLOSED BY: NSDMK

DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KSM NARA, Date 10/2/2013
2014-0546-m

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9904417

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 BERGER
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 99061009 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
X 99061015 OBE PER APNSA OFFICE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4417
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TTC A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>h</i> JACOBSON	_____	_____	_____
POWELL	_____	_____	_____
RICE	_____	_____	_____
DAVIES	_____	_____	_____
KERRICK	_____	_____	_____
STEINBERG	<u>1</u>	<u>gdx</u>	_____
BERGER	_____	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	<u>2</u>	<u>TTC 6/10</u>	<u>N</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>3</u>	<u>DMK 6/10</u>	<u>N 1/12</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

96 JUN 10 am 9:23

COMMENTS:

Call to Yeltzer

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 447
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TC A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
JACOBSON	_____	_____	_____
POWELL	_____	_____	_____
RICE	_____	_____	_____
DAVIES	_____	_____	_____
KERRICK	_____	_____	_____
STEINBERG	<u>1</u>	<u>ODK</u>	_____
BERGER	_____	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	<u>2</u>	<u>TC 6/10</u>	<u>N</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>3</u>	<u>DMK 6/10</u>	<u>N 112</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

COMMENTS:

Call to Yeltzer

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4417

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By ~~KSM~~ NARA, Date 10/2/2018
2014-0544-M

June 10, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: CARLOS PASCUAL *CP*

FROM: STUART KAUFMAN AND REGINA FARANDA *SK*

SUBJECT: POTUS Telephone Call to Russian President Boris Yeltsin

The attached memorandum provides background and talking points for a Presidential call to President Yeltsin. The call should not be offered until after the Kosovo bombing has been suspended.

Concurrence by: Gregory Schulte; Leon Feurth *LL for*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum to the President.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to POTUS

Tab A Points to be Made for Phone Call with Russian President Yeltsin

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (b, d)
Declassify On: 6/9/09

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TELEPHONE CALL WITH
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN

DATE: June 10, 1999
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: TBD
FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By ~~KB1~~ NARA, Date ~~10/1/2013~~
2014-0546-M

I. PURPOSE

Congratulate President Yeltsin on Russia's role in settling the Kosovo crisis.

II. BACKGROUND

Yeltsin continues to face attacks from the media and political enemies for his handling of the Kosovo crisis, especially for his appointment of Chernomyrdin as his Kosovo envoy. In addition, Russia has not yet agreed to the modalities of its participation in the international force for Kosovo. Your call will encourage Yeltsin to stay engaged and stay in a constructive mood in the run-up to Cologne.

Attachment

Tab A Points to be Made

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR PHONE CALL WITH
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN

- Boris, wanted to congratulate you on this triumph of Russian diplomacy. Could not have happened without your leadership.
- Your active engagement has been critical throughout the crisis. Your appointment of Viktor Stepanovich as your personal envoy was decisive in getting the diplomatic process moving. And your instructions to FM Ivanov were vital in clinching the deal that was already within our reach.
- As I promised in our last call, I quickly contacted our military experts to accelerate their work. Because of our joint efforts, we were able to bring maximum pressure on Milosevic to fulfill his commitments to Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari.
- Once again, Boris, our joint efforts showed, as they have done so often before, the value of the strong U.S.-Russia relationship that we have built. There is little we cannot accomplish when we work together, especially when we are working for the cause of peace.

[Pause]

- Boris, I want you to know that I am committed to working together with you on implementing the agreement we have achieved. Russian participation in the international security force will be critical in making the settlement work, and I have sent Strobe and his team to Moscow to continue work on the details.
- Let's make sure their talks succeed soon, so Russia can take up its role as a full partner in implementing the UN Security Council Resolution.
- Boris, I look forward to seeing you in Cologne. It will give us a chance to celebrate our victory in the cause of peace. And we have many challenges to address together in the future.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0546-M (1.8b)
10/2/2018 KRH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (b, d)


Declassify on: 6/9/09

Case Number: 2014-0546-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2734				
Document ID: 9904501				
Row: 46	Section: 4	Shelf: 7	Position: 2	Stack: v



Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. telcon	re: Telecon with President Yeltsin of Russia (2 pages)	06/10/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Yeltsin and Tel...])
OA/Box Number: 2734

FOLDER TITLE:

9904501

2014-0546-M

rs1068

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9904501
RECEIVED: 11 JUN 99 14

TO: KENNEY, K

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 15 JUN 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCON

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCON W/ PRES YELTSIN OF RUSSIA ON 10 JUN 99

ACTION: SARGEANT SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 17 JUN 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KAUFMAN

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC
FICKLIN
KAUFMAN
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY JP DATE 6/16 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSEMK

CLOSED BY: NSGP

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 10/2/2018
2014-0546-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9904501

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001
002

Z 99061511 FOR SIGNATURE & DECISION
X 99061606 KERRICK APPROVED RECOM
X 99061606 SARGEANT SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 990615 KENNEY, K

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4501
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TTC A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<u>Wm</u> Sargeant ~~JACOBSON~~	<u>1/3</u>	<u>5/1/15</u>	<u>Sign Tab I</u>
POWELL	_____	_____	_____
RICE	_____	_____	_____
DAVIES	_____	_____	_____
KERRICK	<u>2</u>	<u>6/1/15</u>	_____
STEINBERG	<u>copy</u>	_____	_____
BERGER	<u>copy</u>	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	<u>4/5</u>	<u>6/1/15</u>	<u>DR</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	_____	_____	<u>D+DISK</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC: _____

COMMENTS:

Yeltsin Telcon for
Jun 10

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4501
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TTC A/O _____

lm
Sargeant
~~JACOBSON~~

SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<u>1/3</u>	<u>5/15</u>	<u>Sign Tab I</u>
POWELL		
RICE		
DAVIES		
KERRICK	<u>2</u>	<u>6/15</u>
STEINBERG	<u>copy</u>	
BERGER	<u>copy</u>	
SITUATION ROOM		
WEST WING DESK	<u>1/5</u>	<u>6/15 OK</u>
RECORDS MGMT.		<u>DISK</u>

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

COMMENTS:

Yeltsin Telcon for
Jun 10
 EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4501

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504


June 15, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 10/2/2018
2014-0546-M

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with
President Yeltsin of Russia (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and President Yeltsin of Russia is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in Russia for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (U)


Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify on: 06/11/09

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0782-M-2 (1.67)
3/13/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Yeltsin of Russia (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Russian President Yeltsin

Interpreter: Peter Afansenko
Notetakers: George Chastain, Matt Sibley,
Sean Tarver, Robert Ford, Roger Merletti,
James Smith

DATE, TIME June 10, 1999, 10:40 - 10:50 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: Oval Office

President Yeltsin: Good afternoon, Bill. (U)

The President: Hello, Boris. I just called to thank you very much for your leadership in bringing this conflict to a conclusion. The withdrawal has begun, the bombing has stopped, and now we are waiting for passage of the UN resolution, but I am looking forward to working with you there. (C)

President Yeltsin: Well, I know we have common work. It was most difficult to achieve that. I am sorry if in some cases I was nosy. (C)

The President: No, I am just pleased that it happened and I am looking forward to our people working together on Kosovo and I'm looking forward to meeting you in Cologne at the G-8. It's a great triumph for Russian diplomacy, and now we have to work to help you achieve your other objectives with the economy and your continuing efforts at political reform. I just want to say again, we couldn't have brought this to a good conclusion without your leadership and the role Mr. Chernomyrdin played with President Ahtisaari. That was the key to breaking this open, and I am very grateful and I just wanted to call and thank you. (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 06/11/09

President Yeltsin: I'm very glad about that. You know, it would have been a real tragedy for us if our ways had gone in different directions, because we have been working for many years. But I am very glad about the fact that we will be able to continue working together and cooperating. That is just great. So, I would like to hug and kiss you, and I am sincerely glad that in such a difficult situation our friendship wasn't broken. (C)

The President: Thank you, Boris. Our friendship will never be broken, as long as we are honest with each other. We had straight talks and we made it work, as we made it work in Bosnia, and I am looking forward to seeing you. (C)

President Yeltsin: Yes, I am glad to hear that. So, we will all just work in the same way if the same situation arises. (C)

The President: Good, and I will see you soon in Cologne, I hope. (C)

President Yeltsin: I am embracing you very, very strongly and really glad to share your happiness. (C)

The President: Thank you, Boris. I will see you soon. (U)

President Yeltsin: That's okay. See you later. Goodbye, Bill. (U)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4501

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

June 11, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: CARLOS PASCUAL

FROM: STUART KAUFMAN

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Yeltsin of Russia on
June 10, 1999

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRM/NARA, Date 10/2/2012
2014-0546-M

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and President Yeltsin of Russia on June 10, 1999.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Glyn T. Davies to transmit the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A to State.

Approve *(initials)* Disapprove

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve *(initials)* Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to State

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason:

Declassify on:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9904501
DATE 15 JUN 99

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCON W/ PRES YELTSIN OF RUSSIA ON 10 JUN 99
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520 DEPARTMENT OF STATE	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME:	_____
		COPY: <u>ORIGINAL</u> +	DISK

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KBH Date: 10/1/2013
2014-0546-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

See
Case Number: 2006-1185-F; 2014-0546-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 2735				
Document ID: 9904539				
Row: 46	Section: 4	Shelf: 7	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. cover sheet	Cover Sheet for talking points (2 pages)	06/14/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001b. note	Handwritten note re: talking points (2 pages)	ca. 06/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001c. talking points	Talking points for telephone call (2 pages)	06/13/1999	P1/b(1), P9 KBH 5/2/2019

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
[Yeltsin]
OA/Box Number: 2735

FOLDER TITLE:

9904539

2006-1185-F

ke300

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9904539
RECEIVED: 14 JUN 99 13

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 13 JUN 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA
TELCALL

KOSOVO
MILITARY POSTURE

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR POTUS TELCALL TO YELTSIN 13 JUN

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE DATE: 19 JUN 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
PASCUAL

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDMK

CLOSED BY: NSDMK

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KB/NARA, Date 10/2/2018
2014-0546-M

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9904539

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001

X 99061414 FOR RECORD PURPOSES

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4539

These are prints POTUS
used for ~~the~~ call
to Yeltsin on 4/13.
File for the record.

~~#4539~~ (P)
FRP

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRM NARA, Date 10/3/2018
2014-0546-M

~~SECRET~~

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NN      NN 00000000 NN      NN EEEEEEEEE
NNN     NN 00000000 NNN     NN EEEEEEEEE
NNNN    NN 00      00 NNN    NN EE
NNNN    NN 00      00 NNNN   NN EE
NNNN    NN 00      00 NNNN   NN EE
NN NN   NN 00      00 NN NN   NN EEEEEEE
NN NN   NN 00      00 NN NN   NN EEEEEEE
NN      NNNN 00      00 NN      NNNN EE
NN      NNNN 00      00 NN      NNNN EE
NN      NNN  00      00 NN      NNN  EE
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NN      NN  00000000 NN      NN EEEEEEEEE

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NN      NN SSSSSS EEEEEEEE M      M KK      KK
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NN NN   NN SSSSSS EEEEEEE MM MM MM KKK
NN NN   NN SSSSSS EEEEEEE MM      MM KKK
NN      NNNN      SSS EE      MM      MM KKKK
NN      NNNN      SS EE      MM      MM KK      KK
NN      NNN SS      SS EE      MM      MM KK      KK
NN      NNN SSSSSSSS EEEEEEEE MM      MM KK      KK
NN      NN SSSSSS EEEEEEEE MM      MM KK      KK

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NN      NN SSSSSS EEEEEEEE M      M KK      KK
NNN     NN SSSSSSSS EEEEEEEE MM      MM KK      KK
NNN     NN SS      SS EE      MMM      MM KK      KK
NNNN    NN SS      EE      MMMMMMMM KK      KK
NNNN    NN SSS      EE      MM MM MM KKKK
NN NN   NN SSSSSS EEEEEEE MM MM MM KKK
NN NN   NN SSSSSS EEEEEEE MM      MM KKK
NN      NNNN      SSS EE      MM      MM KKKK
NN      NNNN      SS EE      MM      MM KK      KK
NN      NNN SS      SS EE      MM      MM KK      KK
NN      NNN SSSSSSSS EEEEEEEE MM      MM KK      KK
NN      NN SSSSSS EEEEEEEE MM      MM KK      KK

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SPOOLID: 1860
 CLASS: P
 PRINTER: PRTGRP4L
 SYSTEMID: CUA
 PRINT DATE: 06/11/1999
 PRINT TIME: 15:43:27

USER/NODEID: NSEMK CUA
 FILENAME/TYPE: NONE NONE
 FILE CREATE DATE: 06/11/1999
 FILE CREATE TIME: 15:43:25
 DIST: NSEMK

START

~~SECRET~~

6/13

TALKING POINTS FOR CALL TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN

- Let me first congratulate you on Russia's national day yesterday. Russia has come a long way in seven years under your leadership -- and so has our relationship, including through some tough times. We can both be very proud of that, and I'm proud to work with you.
- I believe we are at another important and promising moment in our partnership. Our hard work together brought an end to the conflict in Kosovo. We kept our disagreements, serious as they were, from ruining everything, and we made the most of our cooperation and friendship.
- We must now work equally hard to ensure a lasting and just peace and that our militaries work well together on the ground.
- As Vice President Gore made clear to Prime Minister Stepashin yesterday, we have had some difficult moments in the last two days in our efforts to coordinate our roles in Kosovo.
- We need to take charge of the situation -- both for the sake of our goals in Kosovo and so that we can show the world that we are working together.
- There is one matter I need to raise. We need to resolve the issue of the use of the airport at Pristina. I hope you will give orders to General Zvarzin (zuh-VAR-ZIN) to work this out today with General Jackson, the KFOR Commander on the basis of unity of command.

We expect Yeltsin will respond with the following points:

This situation arose because, until now, we didn't have an agreement on the modalities and conditions for the equitable participation of Russia in the peacekeeping operation.

As President, we should give instructions to find a solution as soon as possible to the problem -- and thus, to create the necessary conditions for the closest possible cooperation of our forces in the interest of peace in Kosovo.

We are counting on you to take account of the interests of the Russian Federation in this situation. This will allow us to erase any misunderstanding and to make sure the implementation of the peace is in strict accordance with the UN Security Council resolution.

- First, I understand we've agreed on the short-term proposal our generals have worked out to start to deploy forces together as soon as possible.

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2014-0546-M (1.82)
10/2/2013 KBH

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- This is an *interim* approach based on what you and I worked out for Bosnia. We know it works; it's the fastest way to get Russian and American troops on the ground together now.
- Second, Madeleine Albright and Strobe Talbott have been working with Foreign Minister Ivanov on what I regard as some promising ideas on how we should use the next week to solve important, even urgent, outstanding challenges.
- These ideas and proposals, if promptly developed, could guarantee us a good meeting in Cologne one week from today.
- While Madeleine and Minister Ivanov should intensify their efforts, I think it would be useful to give some instructions to our Ministers of Defense as well.
- Let's have them meet urgently, in the coming days, to talk things over and make some concrete recommendations to us on how Russia and the U.S. can coordinate and cooperate in Kosovo and how we can resolve other organizational issues.
- With the right guidance from us, Boris, I think we can resolve these problems – which matter a lot to both of us – by the time we meet.
- At Cologne, I suggest we also issue a strong public statement on next steps on arms control and announce that our binational commission will resume its work under Vice President Gore and PM Stepashin in July.

If Yeltsin pushes for a Russian sector/commander:

- Boris, I think I understand your needs and interests. I'm going to do everything I can – and will make sure that Madeleine and Secretary Cohen do, too – and go as far as we possibly can in accommodating you.
- Strobe's team that was just in Moscow made a number of creative proposals on how we can ensure that Russia has an area of responsibility in Kosovo which is equitable – and that is worthy of Russia's role and interests.
- At the same time, we must be careful about three things:
 - 1) The operation must be militarily effective;
 - 2) We must ensure unity of command;
 - 3) We must not allow either the perception or the reality of a partition of Kosovo.
- We need to ask our Defense Ministers to develop these ideas this week and present us with solutions.

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Case Number: ^{Sec}2006-1185-F; 2014-0546-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 2735				
Document ID: 9904540				
Row: 46	Section: 4	Shelf: 7	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. cover sheet	Cover sheet for talking points (2 pages)	06/14/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001b. note	Handwritten notes re: talking points (3 pages)	06/14/1999	P1/b(1), P5 KBH 5/2/2019
001c. note	Handwritten note re: talking points (1 page)	ca. 06/1999	P1/b(1), P5 KBH 5/2/2019
001d. note	Handwritten note re: talking points (1 page)	ca. 06/1999	P1/b(1), P5 KBH 5/2/2019
001e. note	Handwritten note re: talking points (1 page)	ca. 06/1999	P1/b(1), P5 KBH 5/2/2019
001f. note	Photocopy of handwritten notes re: talking points (2 pages)	06/14/1999	P1/b(1), P5 KBH 5/2/2019
001g. note	Photocopy of handwritten note: talking points (1 page)	ca. 06/1999	P1/b(1), P5 KBH 5/2/2019
001h. note	Photocopy of handwritten note re: talking points (1 page)	ca. 06/1999	P1/b(1), P5 KBH 5/2/2019
001i. talking points	Talking points for telephone call (4 pages)	06/14/1999	P1/b(1), P5 KBH 5/2/2019

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
[Yeltsin]
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9904540
RECEIVED: 14 JUN 99 14

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 14 JUN 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA
TELCALL

KOSOVO
MILITARY POSTURE

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR POTUS TELCALL TO YELTSIN 14 JUN

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE DATE: 19 JUN 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
PASCUAL

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDMK

CLOSED BY: NSDMK

DOC 1 OF 1

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRM NARA, Date 10/2/2018
2014-0546-17

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9904540

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001

X 99061414 FOR RECORD PURPOSES

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
6-14-99

I commit to you

to ensure an
equitable & responsible

role for Russia
worthy of its ^{74's} TH ^{terrors}
contribution & its prestige

[WARNING: "joint (*)

command" — not

good.] But this should

say "unified command
with equitable & responsible
role for Russia"

Helena, Betty

— Ahlstrom has
agreed. ~~for~~ our
people ~~had~~ have
discussed.

Goal - let's
decided on 2nd
stage by time you &
I meet at weekend.

Next step: Get
Marshall Sergeyev &
Secretary Cohen to Helsinki
Wednesday to work out
long-term solution to time
for our meeting in Cologne

~~Sub ~~text~~~~ (BACKGROUND)
"Joint Command"
means "split
command," "Russian
sector," "dilution of
NAC political control."

(*) What Yeltsin
saying is
good -
but Zavarzin
must have
some instructions
today.

DATE

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Page 1

4540

Impasse at
~~Your presence~~ at airport
has prevented us from
taking action to protect others
and gives KLA an excuse
to act ~~independtly~~ independtly

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PER E.O. 13526

2014-0546-M (1.83)

10/2/2018 KBH

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PER E.O. 13526

2014-0546-M(1.83)

10/24/2018 KBH

(Boris, let me summarize points I believe we agreed:

- ① There will be an interim deployment using the Bosnia model that will fold in the Russia contingent at the airport.
- ② The impasse at the airport will be resolved using this model, recognizing that Russia's troops at the airport will stay there. There will be no more deployments until we agree.
- ③ Our Defense Ministers will meet urgently, let's say in Helsinki, to work out the long-term arrangements for Russian participation in KFOR.

Can we announce that we've agreed on this course of action?

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Impasse at
~~Your presence~~ at airport
has prevented us from
taking action to protect others
and gives KLA an excuse
to act ~~independently~~ independently

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PER E.O. 13526
2014-0546-M (1.84)
10/2/2018 KBH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Boris, let me summarize points I believe we agreed:

- ① There will be an interim deployment using the Bosnia model that will fold in the Russia contingent at the airport.
- ② The impasse at the airport will be resolved using this model, recognizing that Russia's troops at the airport will stay there. There will be no more deployments until we agree.
- ③ Our Defense Ministers will meet urgently, let's say in Helsinki, to work out the long-term arrangements for Russian participation in KFOR.

Can we announce that we've agreed on this course of action?

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

What William
 saying is good -
 but I am in
 must have
 some instructions
 today.

Next step: Get
 Marshall Sergeyev &
 Secretary Cohen to Helsinki
 Wednesday to work out
 long-term solution for time
 for our meeting in Cologne

~~Sub~~ (BACKGROUND)
 "Joint Command"
 means "split
 command," "Russian
 sector" "dilution of
 NAC political control!"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

6-14-99

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN

6/14

- Boris, you and I agreed yesterday to instruct our generals to meet and resolve the problem of command at the airport, and report back to us on what they worked out.
- I was very disappointed and concerned to learn that your general said he was only there to listen and refused to work out a plan with the commander of KFOR, General Jackson. This is a serious situation which must be resolved.
- I was encouraged to hear from Al Gore that he and Stepashin had a good call a few hours ago on this subject. Stepashin told Gore that you have agreed that Bosnia rules will apply in Kosovo in the interim until you and I agree on a long-term arrangement, and that the arrangements for your forces in this interim period will be worked out with General Jackson. This is a good arrangement, but it is essential that we give our generals clear and decisive instructions to implement this today. Let's both do it as soon as we finish this call. Do you agree?
- Stepashin and Al also discussed the idea of Sec Cohen and Minister Sergeyev getting together in Helsinki to prepare for the meeting between you and I this weekend; they can make a joint proposal to us on the long-term arrangements for Russian participation in KFOR. I think this is a good idea, but only if we have the airport issue and the interim arrangements in place.
- Once we have heard that your General in Pristina has reached agreement with General Jackson on the Bosnia model for the interim period, I will instruct Cohen to meet with Sergeyev.
- In the meantime, both PM Stepashin and FM Ivanov have assured us there will be no further deployments to Kosovo until you and I resolve this matter. I hope we can count on this.

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2014-0546-M (1.85)
10/2/2013 KBH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

a success, we need to give instructions to our Ministers of Defense.

- Let's have them meet urgently to develop concrete recommendations to us on how we can cooperate together in Kosovo over the longer-term. Your people and mine have discussed Helsinki. I support that. You and I had a good meeting there. Let's have our defense ministers meet there.
- Our foreign ministers would follow-up. By Cologne, our teams could present to you and me a well defined proposal to review.
- Boris, if we can move on these fronts -- implementing the interim proposal to deploy our forces in the short-term, and agreeing to have our teams meet to prepare for our meeting -- we can get this issue under control and help make Cologne a success.

If Yeltsin pushes for a Russian sector/commander

- Boris, I think I understand your needs and interests. I'm going to do everything I can - and will make sure that Madeleine and Secretary Cohen do, too - and go as far as we possibly can in accommodating you.
- Strobe's team that was just in Moscow made some creative proposals on how we can ensure that Russia has an area of responsibility in Kosovo which is equitable - and that is worthy of Russia's role and interests.
- At the same time, we must be careful about four things:
 - 1) The operation must be militarily effective;
 - 2) We must ensure unity of command;
 - 3) We must not allow either the perception or the reality of a partition of Kosovo.
 - 4) Russia must be fully integrated into KFOR to minimize the possibility that the KLA will see the Russian troops as a target. We became aware of a KLA plot against Russian troops yesterday, which we were able to head off.
- We need to ask our defense ministers to develop these ideas this week and present us with solutions.

If Yeltsin links Track 1 and Track 2

- Boris, I hope at a minimum we can agree now to go ahead with the first track. Time is precious, and we need to show again that our troops can work side-by-side to protect the peace.
- The second track is more complicated, but let's instruct our generals to agree on the details on the basis of our conversation.
- If we can do these things, not only can we make the peace settlement work in Kosovo, we will have the basis for a real celebration when we meet in Cologne.

If Boris links Track 1 to agreement on Track 2

- There is a real urgency about Track 1 because we cannot allow a security vacuum to form that would jeopardize the peace.
- We know the interim model works. We're making it work in Bosnia. So let's use it.
- You also have my commitment to move as quickly as Russia can on Track 2. My bottom lines are effectiveness and unity of command and control.
- But let's not link these two tracks together, especially when we can move together now and get facts on the ground that show that we can work effectively side-by-side.

If Boris suggest a one-week deadline on Track 2

- I am committed to move as quickly as Russia as long as we stay focused on an effective force with unified command and control.

PHOTOCOPY
AND HANDWRITING

- There is a real urgency about getting the Russians already in Kosovo fully integrated into KFOR because we cannot allow a security vacuum to form that would jeopardize the peace.
- Our people have agreed on an interim model that will get this problem fixed quickly. We're using a similar approach in Bosnia. So let's use it and make it work.
- You also have my commitment to move as quickly as possible on the longer-term command arrangements for Russian participation in KFOR. My bottom lines are effectiveness and unity of command and control.
- But let's not link these two tracks together, especially when we can move together now and get facts on the ground that show that we can work effectively side-by-side.

* If Yeltsin says the KLA is going to provoke Russian forces

- We learned of a plot against Russia. Boris, if Russian troops are not part of KFOR, the KLA will believe they came into Kosovo to protect Serb forces, and Russian troops will become a greater target.
- We've made clear that we would not tolerate any attacks on your forces, but this illustrates the importance of your forces coming fully into KFOR with its UN mandate.

PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING

