

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2014-05-17-M (1.08)

KBH 1/31/2024

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Kosovo - Further Thoughts Looking Ahead

Purpose

Today your Foreign Policy Team reflected on the issues that I raised in this morning's memorandum on Kosovo. This note provides further reflections based on our meeting.

RESPONDING TO A MILOSEVIC "PEACE OFFENSIVE"

The "peace offensive" that I wrote about this morning materialized later in the day when Belgrade announced: (1) a unilateral cease-fire to mark Orthodox Easter -- but conditioned on KLA restraint; (2) negotiations toward a political agreement with Dr. Rugova -- though providing for ethnic instead of territorial self-government; and (3) preparation of a refugee return program with the UNHCR and ICRC.

Principals quickly agreed that this announcement was insufficient to meet our conditions, and Secretary General Solana announced this same conclusion after meeting with the NATO Council. Madeleine has agreed with her key allied counterparts to raise publicly a series of questions about Belgrade's announcement, including whether Milosevic is prepared to withdraw his forces from Kosovo and accept an international security presence.

Despite NATO's rapid rejection of Belgrade's announcement, we can expect allied calls for NATO to undertake a diplomatic initiative, particularly if the cease-fire seems to be real. We discussed two options for a diplomatic initiative during Orthodox Easter:

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Reason: 1.5(b,d)

Declassify on: 4/6/09

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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- a two- or three-night "challenge pause," during which we would insist on a real cease-fire, access for humanitarian relief and acceptance of NATO's conditions; this might be combined with dispatch of an envoy to Belgrade;
- a "goodwill" pause, without any conditions, in respect for Orthodox Easter.

For either option, we would want the allies' agreement that air strikes would resume automatically if our full conditions were not met. We would also want to insist in advance on a strong restatement of our conditions at the meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers that we have requested for Monday, April 12.

We propose to maintain a public posture of skepticism about Belgrade's "peace offensive" in the coming days. Later this week, we will reconsider options for a NATO initiative. In any event, we would not want to portray a pause in NATO air strikes as a response to a Serb "cease-fire".

THE ENDGAME AND ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES

While today's announcement fell far short of our conditions, Dick Holbrooke thought that it might indicate some willingness by Milosevic to negotiate, based on a growing realization that NATO was serious in inflicting serious damage. Dick thinks that we will see more forward movement toward our positions as the air strikes continue.

That said, there is still the risk that a loss of allied will or of domestic support will bring air strikes to an end before we achieve an agreement. And we are also conscious of the Vice President's concern that Milosevic will never agree to our conditions, regardless of the damage inflicted by NATO.

After reviewing the alternative strategies described in this morning's memorandum, we were unable to establish a preference. Several of the options -- ousting Milosevic, containing and isolating Serbia, and training and equipping the Kosovar Albanians -- would delay success as we define it today. However those options that have a greater probability of success -- ground operations to enforce a "safe haven" or to "liberate" Kosovo -- would carry significant risks and likely lead to a long-term commitment.

A number of observations from our meeting are worth reporting:

- Any strategy that does not allow refugees to return to Kosovo will be seen as a defeat for the United States and NATO.
- If the Kosovars cannot return secure from repression, we should expect a long-term intifada. This will lead to continued violence in Kosovo and growing instability in the region. The KLA will train and equip, whether or not we provide support.
- Prospects for Albanians and Serbs living together in multi-ethnic communities are low after the current violence. Thus any stable solution in Kosovo is likely to involve some form of ethnic partition, whether de facto or de jure.
- Whether we reach an agreement with Milosevic, or adopt an alternate strategy, we should step up our efforts to promote his removal.

I intend to have another meeting of your Foreign Policy Team before coming back to you later this week to discuss our longer term strategy in the absence of an agreement. In the meantime, we all agree that the best course is the one we are on, particularly in light of the alternatives.

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
4-14-99
LIMITED ACCESS/2603

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 13, 1999

MEETING WITH
FOREIGN POLICY TEAM

DATE: April 14, 1999

LOCATION: Cabinet Room

TIME: 10:00 - 11:00 a.m.

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER *S for*

I. PURPOSE

Review ongoing military, humanitarian and diplomatic efforts related to Kosovo and to discuss our longer-term strategy.

II. BACKGROUND

My memorandum of yesterday describes the Foreign Policy Team's latest thinking on how to bring Milosevic to meet our conditions and alternative strategies should it become apparent in the weeks ahead that he will not accede to our demands. At our meeting, you will want to consider Madeleine's concept of Kosovo as an internationally protected area and whether NATO should update its assessment of ground force options for a non-permissive environment and bring planning to the point where we and our allies can assess the requirements and risks involved.

III. PARTICIPANTS

See attached list.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Official photographer.

V. SEQUENCE

After opening the meeting, I will ask Bill Cohen and Hugh Shelton to report on military operations, and Brian Atwood for an update on humanitarian relief efforts. I will then ask Madeleine to report on her meetings with the NATO and

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Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify On: April 9, 2009

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Russian Foreign Ministers and to present her diplomatic strategy and concept for placing Kosovo under international protection.

Attachments

Tab A Issues to Discuss

Tab B Participants List

ISSUES TO DISCUSS FOR MEETING WITH
FOREIGN POLICY TEAM

- What more can be done to get humanitarian relief to displaced persons in Kosovo?
 - Air drops?
 - Humanitarian corridors?
 - Third-party assistance?

- Should we pursue the concept of an internationally protected area for Kosovo?
 - Allied views?
 - Russian views?
 - Prospect of support from the UN Security Council?

- Should NATO update its assessment of introducing ground forces in a non-permissive environment and take planning to the point where we can assess requirements and risks?
 - Allied views?
 - Congressional and public reaction?
 - Signal to Milosevic?

- New themes for Thursday's foreign policy address in San Francisco?

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2014-0547-M (1.11)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 12, 1999

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PER E.O. 13526

2014-0547-M (1.16)
KBN 1/31/2024

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Kosovo - Further Thoughts Looking Ahead

PURPOSE

On April 6, I sent you a memorandum that addressed two paths ahead on Kosovo: first, the path that leads Milosevic, under continued air strikes, to accept our conditions, and second, the path in which he refuses to accept those conditions compelling us to achieve our objectives by other means. This memo provides further thoughts on these two paths, based upon two meetings of your Foreign Policy Team.

PATH I: MILOSEVIC MEETS OUR CONDITIONS

If we are to succeed in bringing Milosevic to accept our conditions, we will need to sustain an intense air campaign for a protracted period. Above all, this requires keeping the allies together and Congress essentially on board. Bill met with close allied counterparts last week and Madeleine is meeting with NATO Foreign Ministers this week precisely to keep the allies on the same track and there is a broad range of Congressional briefings this week to gain support for continued bombing, regardless of varied criticisms.

We are also working to ensure that General Clark has the military capabilities that he requires. The initial elements of Task Force Hawk (attack helicopters and rocket launchers) arrived in Albania last week, and Hugh assures me that we should have the initial capability this week. We will seek your approval before the systems are actually used. We and our allies are also committing additional air assets, including the UK's aircraft carrier HMS Invincible.

Wes has asked for a further task force of rocket launchers to be deployed in Croatia to assist in suppressing air defense systems

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in northern Serbia. The Pentagon is currently considering this proposal, although Madeleine and Dick are concerned that deploying such systems into Croatia could widen the war, reignite Croat-Serb fighting and undercut Dayton.

Our upcoming supplemental request, although undoubtedly controversial, might provide one of the strongest signals that we can send to Milosevic. It provides budgeting for air operations to the end of the fiscal year, i.e. another six months. We'll make sure that Milosevic learns of this fact.

We are seeking to complement military operations with diplomatic and economic activities designed to weaken Milosevic and his war machine. We're approaching neighboring countries asking that they limit supplies of fuel or other dual-use materials to Serbia (Croatia has already done so). State is also working with Treasury, OVP and various allies to determine ways to disrupt the Yugoslav economy and limit Milosevic's access to offshore accounts.

As we step up military and economic pressure on Milosevic, we have tried to be clear about our objectives, while retaining some flexibility. We are now calling for an "international security force" rather than a "NATO-led implementation force". (Although any U.S. participation presupposes a NATO core, we are looking at ways in which we could design the Russians "in"). We've also moved away from insisting on acceptance of the Rambouillet accords per se as a precondition to stop bombing; instead we're insisting that Milosevic be willing to work on the basis of the key principles of Rambouillet [autonomy and security] without the need to embrace an agreement which has been "overtaken by events".

We are seeking to engage the Russians in our diplomatic strategy, encouraged by Moscow's agreement in the G-8 to what are effectively NATO's conditions. The Russians are trying to pull matters back into the UN Security Council, where they will inevitably try to drive NATO out of the "international security presence" but this could be a workable problem (as long as NATO command and control is retained for us) and we should encourage the Russians to press Milosevic to agree to the NAC/Annan/G-8 points.

Bringing the Russians on board, with an undiminished show of Alliance unity behind an ever-intensifying air campaign, is at this point our best strategy to bring Milosevic to meet our conditions.

~~PATH II: ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES~~

My last memorandum described five alternative strategies should it become apparent in the weeks ahead that Milosevic won't accede to our demands, or should we lose the allied or domestic support necessary to sustain the air strikes. These strategies included: seeking to oust Milosevic; enforcing a safe haven in southern Kosovo (partition); mounting a ground campaign to "liberate" Kosovo; containing and isolating Serbia, while leaving the refugees out of Kosovo in the interim; and training and equipping the Kosovar Albanians. Over the last week, the Foreign Policy Team has assessed these alternatives against our objective of returning the refugees to Kosovo with security and self-government.

Unless we lower our sights, and seek success measured in years not months, we probably can rule out the strategies exclusively aimed at ousting Milosevic or containing and isolating Serbia. Elements of these approaches most definitely should be incorporated into our current strategy, and any alternative, but as we've seen from Saddam, they are at best long-term enterprises. All of your Foreign Policy Team (except General Kerrick who you should hear from) agree that shifting toward a containment strategy alone would be seen as a major defeat for the United States and the Alliance.

Another alternate strategy involves recognizing the independence of Kosovo and training and equipping the Kosovar Albanians so that they can push a degraded Serb force out of Kosovo, or at least raise the cost of keeping Kosovo so that Milosevic decides to pull the forces out himself. Supporting the KLA could have support at home, particularly as an alternative to introducing American troops into Kosovo. However, the Principals are concerned about creating an armed force we cannot control and which could become a future source of instability, terrorism, and criminal activity in the region. There is real concern about breaking with our allies and encouraging the Russians to give corresponding military assistance to the Serbs.

This faces us with the very difficult decision of whether an alternative strategy needs to involve the deployment of ground forces into a non-permissive environment, i.e. without Belgrade's explicit agreement. All of your advisors approach this with serious reservations, some more disposed than others.

We could introduce ground forces only after a protracted air campaign designed to create a "submissive" environment, one in which FRY forces would be more likely to withdraw in the face of NATO ground forces rather than to stand and fight. In any event, Hugh warns that the campaign would be "ugly" and produce casualties, though NATO would certainly succeed in driving Serb forces out of Kosovo.

Under this scenario, NATO would need to be prepared to help rebuild Kosovo and provide security for the returning refugees within the territory of the FRY. A final political settlement would ultimately depend on political reform in Serbia. Until then, we would continue our efforts to contain and isolate Serbia, and to undermine Milosevic.

According to one view, preparing for this strategy would increase the pressure on Milosevic to accept our conditions rather than face a pitched battle with NATO forces. It could give our allies greater motivation to sustain the current air campaign to avoid this option. However, a second view holds that visible preparations for forced entry actually would harden Serb attitudes and further rally the Serb people around Milosevic, as well as create a divisive debate in the U.S.

We do not need to decide now on whether to launch NATO ground forces into Kosovo. However, we do need to decide soon whether we should plan for this option. One line of attack from the Hill (e.g. McCain) is that we are not even planning for this contingency; thus we face the choice of capitulation by Milosevic or defeat. We attempted to reposition our rhetoric on this on Sunday by noting that, while we still have no intention of deploying ground forces into a non-permissive environment, NATO did an assessment in the Fall and could rather quickly update it if necessary.

Beyond our rhetorical posture, however, we need to decide whether you want formal planning to go forward (recognizing that it would take roughly 3 months to deployment, says Hugh). The dilemma is this: without further planning, the options to "defeat" Milosovic, in the event that several more weeks of bombing do not succeed, are limited. On the other hand, initiating formal planning could be seen as an acknowledgement that the air campaign won't work (something none of your advisors or military commanders accept) and could head us down a slippery slope, if patience with the air campaign wanes.

One further and potentially useful idea that we are developing is to set as NATO's political objective establishment of Kosovo as an "internationally protected area" - within Serbia for purposes of sovereignty but under the authority of the international community (UN? OSCE?). This is an end-state which gives greater clarity to our objectives (Serbs out, refugees in, international force in) and might be seen as a post-colonial (post-crisis) trusteeship. If embraced by the Russians and empowered by a UN mandate, it would have solid international standing. If the Russians (or others) could get Milosevic to agree (doubtful but not impossible), we could consider arrangements for an international force that was less-visibly "NATO" (e.g. OSCE "on the door" but NATO "inside", as long as they meet our, and Congress' requirements for "unity of command"). Of course, if Milosevic does not agree, we still face the same options for getting the refugees back in the absence of Milosevic's acquiescence.

As you know, I have serious questions about the efficacy of ground forces in achieving our objectives at an acceptable cost. Invading Kosovo would have serious risks and likely require us to "occupy" Kosovo for a protracted period, perhaps with Milosevic still in Belgrade. Securing and sustaining the necessary support at home and with allies could be very difficult, and we could find ourselves in an even more difficult situation with Russia. All the more important, therefore, to stay with the air campaign over an extended and unrelenting period, and to convey the confidence that it will succeed. Alternatively, we may be faced with the choice of intervention in a "submissive" environment or something less than victory.

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accept

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Kosovo - Further Thoughts Looking Ahead

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PURPOSE

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PATH I: MILOSEVIC MEETS OUR CONDITIONS

If we are to succeed in bringing Milosevic to accept our conditions, we will likely need to sustain the air campaign for a protracted period. Above all this requires keeping the allies together; Bill met with close allied counterparts last week and Madeleine is meeting with NATO Foreign Ministers this week with precisely that purpose in mind. ~~that~~ ^{compelling to other means to achieve our objectives.} We are likely to face greater short-term challenge from congress than our allies. We are also working to ensure that General Clark has the military capabilities that he requires. The initial elements of Task Force Hawk (attack helicopters and rocket launchers) arrived in Albania last week, and Hugh assures me that we should have ^{the} an initial capability this week. We will seek your approval before the systems are actually used. We and our allies are also committing additional air assets, including the UK's aircraft carrier HMS Invincible.

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As we step up military and economic pressure on Milosevic, we are ~~purposely keeping some flexibility in our conditions for the cessation of air strikes.~~ We are now asking for an "international security force" rather than a "NATO-led implementation force" (although any U.S. participation presupposes a NATO core). We've also moved away from insisting on signature of the Rambouillet accords as a precondition to stop bombing; instead we've adopted a ~~convoluted~~ EU formulation insisting that Milosevic provide "credible assurance of his willingness to work on the basis of the Rambouillet agreement in the establishment of a political framework agreement...."

We are ~~also~~ seeking to engage the Russians in our diplomatic strategy and are encouraged by Moscow's agreement in the G8 to what are effectively NATO's conditions. ~~At the same time,~~ The Russians are trying to pull matters back into the UN Security Council, where they will inevitably try to drive NATO out of the "international security presence" but ~~this is~~ ^{we should be} bringing the Russians on board, with a ^{workable plan if the Russians want to pass Milosevic to agree to the new NAC-ANNA-C.P. points.} continued show of Alliance unity behind an ever-intensifying air campaign. ~~It is probably at this point our best strategy to bring Milosevic to meet our conditions.~~

PATH II: ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES

^{weeks ahead} My last memorandum described five alternative strategies should it become apparent in the ~~coming weeks~~ that Milosevic won't accede to our demands, or should we lose the allied or domestic support necessary to sustain the air strikes. These strategies should

~~SECRET~~

(Croatia has already done so)

although we are looking at ways in which we could design the Russian "in")

OVP and calling for

have tried to be clear about our objectives while retain some flexibility

an undiminished, confident

has been "overstaken by events" embrace the need to [autonomy and security] without the principles of Rambouillet

3 while leaving the refugees out of Kosovo in the interim;

included: ousting Milosevic; enforcing a safe haven in southern Kosovo; mounting a ground campaign to "liberate" Kosovo; containing and isolating Serbia; and training and equipping the Kosovar Albanians. Over the last week, your Foreign Policy Team has assessed these alternatives against our objective of returning the refugees to Kosovo with security and self-government.

Unless we lower our sights, and seek ~~less than~~ success instead of an early victory, we can probably rule out the strategies aimed at ousting Milosevic, enforcing a safe haven, or containing and isolating Serbia. Elements of the first and third should be incorporated into our current strategy and any alternative, but none of the three can guarantee success on their own. In particular, your Foreign Policy Team agreed that shifting toward a containment strategy, like our strategy in Iraq, would be seen as a major defeat for the United States and the Alliance.

The measured in years not months,

These approach most definitely should be

as we've seen from Saddam, they are at best

Another alternate strategy involves training and equipping the Kosovar Albanians so that they can push Serb forces out of Kosovo, or at least raise the cost of keeping Kosovo so high that Milosevic decides to pull them out himself. One argument for adopting this strategy is the likelihood that the KLA will rearm and seek victory regardless of support from the West. Moreover, supporting the KLA would be popular at home, particularly as an alternative to introducing American troops into Kosovo. However, the Principals are very concerned about creating an armed force which we cannot control and which could become a future source of terrorism and criminal activity in the region. There is a real concern about creating rifts with our allies and encouraging the Russians to give military assistance to the Serbs.

long-term enterprises

??

a degraded

have support

This faces us with the very difficult decision of whether an alternative strategy needs to involve the deployment of ground forces into a non-permissive environment, i.e. without Belgrade's explicit agreement. We would only want to do so only after a protracted air campaign designed to create a "submissive" environment, one in which FRY forces would choose to withdraw in the face of NATO ground forces rather than to stand and fight. In any event, Hugh warns that the campaign would be "ugly" and produce casualties, though NATO would certainly succeed in driving Serb forces out of Kosovo.

corresponding

Under this scenario, NATO would need to be prepared to help rebuild Kosovo and provide security for the returning refugees

could

All members of your Foreign Policy Team (except General Kerrick who you should hear from) felt

All of your advisors approach this with some reservations, (some with more than others).

~~SECRET~~

~~pending the creation of some type of international protectorate that would provide self-government for Kosovo within the territory of the FR Yugoslavia. A final political settlement would ultimately depend on political reform in Serbia. Until then, we would continue our efforts to contain and isolate Serbia, and to undermine Milosevic.~~

In one view, merely preparing for this strategy would encourage Milosevic to accept our conditions rather than face a pitched battle with NATO forces. It might also give our allies greater motivation to sustain the current air campaign. However there is a second view that visible preparations for forced entry would harden Serb attitudes and further rally the Serb people around Milosevic.

increase the pressure on

could

actually

We do not need to decide now on whether to launch NATO ground forces into Kosovo. However, we do need to decide whether this should be an option. If so, we need to reposition our rhetoric, taking advantage of a growing willingness on the Hill and in the public to consider ground options. If we want a real option, we also need to allow NATO planning to proceed. Last year, NATO assessed various options for ground operations, but initiated detailed planning and force generation only for the deployment of an implementation force in a permissive environment. Hugh warns that even with a decision now to initiate detailed planning for a non-permissive environment, the need to generate and prepare the necessary forces would mean that such an operation could not be launched until July at the earliest.

soon

As you know, I have serious questions about the efficacy of ground forces in achieving our objectives at an acceptable cost. Invading Kosovo would have serious risks and likely require us to "occupy" Kosovo for a protracted period, perhaps with Milosevic still in Belgrade. Securing the necessary support at home and with allies could be very difficult, and we could find ourselves in an even more difficult situation with Russia. That said, if the current air campaign causes Milosevic to back down, we might conclude that only the commitment of ground forces in a "submissive" environment will allow us to prevail and achieve our objectives.

RECOMMENDATION

~~we should continue the current air campaign, committing additional resources as appropriate and augmenting it with diplomatic and economic measures to weaken Milosevic and his war machine. At the same time, to keep all options open and to that, while we still have no intention of ground forces, NATO did an assessment in the Fall and could rather quickly update it if necessary. Beyond our rhetorical posture, however, we need to decide whether you want real planning to go forward (recognizing that it would take roughly 3 months~~

~~SECRET~~

One line of attack from the Hill is that we are not even planning for this possibility. Thus we face capitulation by Milosevic or defeat. We have attempted to reposition our rhetoric on this a bit Sunday by noting

The dilemma is this: without further planning, the options to "defeat" in the event of deployment, say Hugh, several more weeks of bombing do not succeed

increase the pressure on a (over)

acknowledgment that the air campaign won't work (something none of your advisors accept) and could head us down a slippery slope ~~too~~ if patience with the air campaign wanes.

The idea that we are ~~is~~ developing is to establish Kosovo as an "internationally protected area" -- within Serbia for purposes of sovereignty but under the umbrella of the international community (~~and~~ OSCE, ~~etc~~ (UN? OSCE?)).

This is an end-state which gives greater clarity to our objectives (Serbs out, ~~to~~ refugees in, international force in) and ~~perhaps~~ might be seen as a post-colonial (post. crisis) trusteeship.

If embraced by the Russians and therefore endorsed by a UN mandate, it would have solid international standing. If the Russians (or others) could get Milosovic

to agree (doubtful but not impossible) we could consider ~~an~~ arrangements for the international force that were less- visibly

"NATO" ~~for~~ long as they met our requirements for "unity of command". Of course, if Milosovic does ~~not~~ agree, we still face the problem of how to get the refugees back in the absence of Milosovic's acquiescence.

(and Congress!)

(e.g. OSCE "~~etc~~" "on the door" but NATO inside, etc)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0547-M (1.19)
KBH 1/31/2024

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Kosovo - Further Thoughts Looking Ahead

PURPOSE

On April 6, I sent you a memorandum that addressed the two paths on Kosovo: first, the path that leads to Milosevic accepting our conditions, and second, the path down which he refuses to meet those conditions and we need to pursue an alternate strategy. This memo provides further thoughts on these two paths, based upon two meetings of your Foreign Policy Team. It also recommends that we allow NATO to proceed with updating options for the non-permissive use of ground forces.

PATH I: MILOSEVIC MEETS OUR CONDITIONS

If we are to succeed in bringing Milosevic to accept our conditions, we will likely need to sustain the air campaign for a protracted period. Above all this requires keeping the allies together; Bill met with close allied counterparts last week and Madeleine is meeting with NATO Foreign Ministers this week with precisely that purpose in mind.

We are also working to ensure that General Clark has the military capabilities that he requires. The initial elements of Task Force Hawk (attack helicopters and rocket launchers) arrived in Albania last week, and Hugh assures me that we should have an initial capability this week. We will seek your approval before the systems are actually used. We and our allies are also committing additional air assets, including the UK's aircraft carrier HMS Invincible.

Wes has asked for a further task force of rocket launchers to be deployed in Croatia to assist in suppressing air defense systems in northern Serbia. We are currently considering this proposal, although Madeleine is concerned that deploying such systems into

SECRET

Reason: 1.5(b,d)

Declassify on: 4/11/09

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Croatia could be seen as widening the war and undercutting Dayton.

Our upcoming supplemental request might provide one of the strongest signals that we can send to Milosevic. It budgets for air operations to continue to the end of the fiscal year, i.e. another six months. We'll make sure that Milosevic learns of this fact.

We are complementing military operations with diplomatic and economic activities designed to weaken Milosevic and his war machine. We've already approached neighboring countries asking that they limit supplies of fuel or other dual-use materials to Serbia. State is also working with Treasury and various allies to determine ways to disrupt the Yugoslav economy and limit Milosevic's access to offshore accounts.

As we step up military and economic pressure on Milosevic, we are purposely keeping some flexibility in our conditions for the cessation of air strikes. We are now asking for an "international security force" rather than a "NATO-led implementation force" (although any U.S. participation presupposes a NATO core). We've also moved away from insisting on signature of the Rambouillet accords as a precondition to stop bombing; instead we've adopted a tortuous EU formulation insisting that Milosevic provide "credible assurance of his willingness to work on the basis of the Rambouillet agreement in the establishment of a political framework agreement...."

We are also seeking to engage the Russians in our diplomatic strategy and are encouraged by Moscow's agreement in the G8 to what are effectively NATO's conditions. At the same time, the Russians are trying to pull matters back into the UN Security Council, where they will inevitably try to drive NATO out of the "international security presence."

Bringing the Russians on board, with a continued show of Alliance unity behind an ever-intensifying air campaign, is probably at this point our best strategy to bring Milosevic to meet our conditions.

PATH II: ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES

My last memorandum described five alternative strategies should it become apparent in the coming weeks that Milosevic won't accede to our demands, or should we lose the allied or domestic support necessary to sustain the air strikes. These strategies

included: ousting Milosevic; enforcing a safe haven in southern Kosovo; mounting a ground campaign to "liberate" Kosovo; containing and isolating Serbia; and training and equipping the Kosovar Albanians. Over the last week, your Foreign Policy Team has assessed these alternatives against our objective of returning the refugees to Kosovo with security and self-government.

Unless we lower our sights, and seek long-term success instead of an early victory, we can probably rule out the strategies aimed at ousting Milosevic, enforcing a safe haven, or containing and isolating Serbia. Elements of the first and third should be incorporated into our current strategy and any alternative, but none of the three can guarantee success on their own. In particular, your Foreign Policy Team agreed that shifting toward a containment strategy, like our strategy in Iraq, would be seen as a major defeat for the United States and the Alliance.

Another alternate strategy involves training and equipping the Kosovar Albanians so that they can push Serb forces out of Kosovo, or at least raise the cost of keeping Kosovo so high that Milosevic decides to pull them out himself. One argument for adopting this strategy is the likelihood that the KLA will rearm and seek victory regardless of support from the West. Moreover, supporting the KLA would be popular at home, particularly as an alternative to introducing American troops into Kosovo. However, the Principals are very concerned about creating an armed force which we cannot control and which could become a future source of terrorism and criminal activity in the region. There is also a real concern about creating rifts with our allies and encouraging the Russians to give military assistance to the Serbs.

This faces us with the very difficult decision of whether an alternative strategy needs to involve the deployment of ground forces into a non-permissive environment, i.e. without Belgrade's explicit agreement. We would only want to do so after a protracted air campaign designed to create a "submissive" environment, one in which FRY forces would choose to withdraw in the face of NATO ground forces rather than to stand and fight. In any event, Hugh warns that the campaign would be "ugly" and produce casualties, though NATO would certainly succeed in driving Serb forces out of Kosovo.

~~Under this scenario, NATO would need to be prepared to help~~
~~rebuild Kosovo and provide security for the returning refugees~~
~~pending the creation of some type of international protectorate~~
~~that would provide self-government for Kosovo within the~~
~~territory of the FRY. A final political settlement would~~
~~ultimately depend on political reform in Serbia. Until then, we~~
~~would continue our efforts to contain and isolate Serbia, and to~~
~~undermine Milosevic.~~

According to one view, merely preparing for this strategy would encourage Milosevic to accept our conditions rather than face a pitched battle with NATO forces. It might also give our allies greater motivation to sustain the current air campaign. However, a second view holds that visible preparations for forced entry would harden Serb attitudes and further rally the Serb people around Milosevic.

We do not need to decide now on whether to launch NATO ground forces into Kosovo. However, we do need to decide whether this should be an option. If so, we need to reposition our rhetoric, taking advantage of a growing willingness on the Hill and in the public to consider ground options. If we want a real option, we also need to allow NATO planning to proceed. Last year, NATO assessed various options for ground operations, but initiated detailed planning and force generation only for the deployment of an implementation force in a permissive environment. Hugh warns that even with a decision now to initiate detailed planning for a non-permissive environment, the need to generate and prepare the necessary forces would mean that such an operation could not be launched until July at the earliest.

As you know, I have serious questions about the efficacy of ground forces in achieving our objectives at an acceptable cost. Invading Kosovo would have serious risks and likely require us to "occupy" Kosovo for a protracted period, perhaps with Milosevic still in Belgrade. Securing the necessary support at home and with allies could be very difficult, and we could find ourselves in an even more difficult situation with Russia. That said, if the current air campaign causes Milosevic to back down, we might conclude that only the commitment of ground forces in a "submissive" environment will allow us to prevail and achieve our objectives.

RECOMMENDATION

We should continue the current air campaign, committing additional resources as appropriate and augmenting it with diplomatic and economic measures to weaken Milosevic and his war machine. At the same time, to keep all options open and to hedge against the possibility of Milosevic remaining defiant, we should reposition our rhetoric on ground forces in a non-permissive environment and allow NATO to begin updating the options that it developed last year.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2014-0547-M (1.20)
KBH 1/31/2021

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Kosovo - Further Thoughts Looking Ahead

PURPOSE

ahead

On April 6th, I sent you a memorandum that addressed the two paths on Kosovo: first, the path that leads to Milosevic, ~~under~~ *under continued* accepting our conditions, and second, the path ~~down~~ *air strikes,* which he refuses to meet those conditions, ~~and we need to pursue an alternate strategy.~~ *to accept* This memo provides further thoughts on these two paths, based upon two meetings of your Foreign Policy Team. It also recommends that we allow NATO to proceed with updating options for the non-permissive use of ground forces. *(M)*

PATH I: MILOSEVIC MEETS OUR CONDITIONS

If we are to succeed in bringing Milosevic to accept our conditions, we will likely need to sustain the air campaign for a protracted period. Above all this requires keeping the allies together; Bill met with close allied counterparts last week and Madeleine is meeting with NATO Foreign Ministers this week with precisely that purpose in mind. *We are likely to face greater short-term challenge from Congress than our allies.* We are also working to ensure that General Clark has the military capabilities that he requires. The initial elements of Task Force Hawk (attack helicopters and rocket launchers) arrived in Albania last week, and Hugh assures me that we should have *the* an initial capability this week. We will seek your approval before the systems are actually used. We and our allies are also committing additional air assets, including the UK's aircraft carrier HMS Invincible. *Compelling to other means to achieve our objectives.*

Wes has asked for a further task force of rocket launchers to be deployed in Croatia to assist in suppressing air defense systems in northern Serbia. We are currently considering this proposal, although Madeleine ~~is~~ concerned that deploying such systems into

SECRET

Reason: 1.5(b,d)

Declassify On: 4/11/09

and Dick are

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

SECRET

Croatia ~~could be seen as widening the war and undercutting Dayton.~~ *could widen the war, reignite Croat - Serb fighting and undercut Dayton.*

Our upcoming supplemental request might provide one of the strongest signals that we can send to Milosevic. It budgets for air operations to continue to the end of the fiscal year, i.e. another six months. We'll make sure that Milosevic learns of this fact.

We are ~~complementing~~ *seeking to complement* military operations with diplomatic and economic activities designed to weaken Milosevic and his war machine. We've already approached neighboring countries asking that they limit supplies of fuel or other dual-use materials to Serbia. State is also working with Treasury and various allies to determine ways to disrupt the Yugoslav economy and limit Milosevic's access to offshore accounts. ~~We want~~

As we step up military and economic pressure on Milosevic, we are purposely keeping some flexibility in our conditions for the cessation of air strikes. We are now asking for an "international security force" rather than a "NATO-led implementation force" (although any U.S. participation presupposes a NATO core). We've also moved away from insisting on signature of the Rambouillet accords as a precondition to stop bombing; instead we've adopted a ~~terse~~ EU formulation insisting that Milosevic provide "credible assurance of his willingness to work on the basis of the Rambouillet agreement in the establishment of a political framework agreement...."

We are ~~also~~ seeking to engage the Russians in our diplomatic strategy and are encouraged by Moscow's agreement in the G8 to what are effectively NATO's conditions. At the same time, the Russians are trying to pull matters back into the UN Security Council, where they will inevitably try to drive NATO out of the "international security presence." *but this should be a workable problem if the Russians want to pass Milosevic to agree to the now NAC-ANNA- G.8 points.* Bringing the Russians on board, with a continued show of Alliance unity behind an ever-intensifying air campaign, is probably at this point our best strategy to bring Milosevic to meet our conditions.

PATH II: ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES

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My last memorandum described five alternative strategies should it become apparent in the ~~coming weeks~~ that Milosevic won't accede to our demands, or should we lose the allied or domestic support necessary to sustain the air strikes. These strategies should

SECRET

(Croatia has already done so)

although we are looking at ways in which we could design the Russians "in")

OVP and

calling for

have tried to be clear about our objectives, while retain some flexibility

an undiminished, confident

has been overtaken by events, embrace the need to [autonomy and security] without key principles of Rambouillet (in other words, the need to embrace an autonomy and security] without key principles of Rambouillet

while leaving the refugees out of Kosovo in the interim;

included: ousting Milosevic; enforcing a safe haven in southern Kosovo; mounting a ground campaign to "liberate" Kosovo; containing and isolating Serbia; and training and equipping the Kosovar Albanians. Over the last week, your Foreign Policy Team has assessed these alternatives against our objective of returning the refugees to Kosovo with security and self-government.

The measured in years not months,

Unless we lower our sights, and seek ~~long-term~~ success instead of an early victory, we can probably rule out the strategies aimed at ousting Milosevic, enforcing a safe haven, or containing and isolating Serbia. Elements of the first and third should be incorporated into our current strategy and any alternative, but none of the three can guarantee success on their own. In particular, your Foreign Policy Team agreed that shifting toward a containment strategy, like our strategy in Iraq, would be seen as a major defeat for the United States and the Alliance.

These approach most definitely should be

As we've seen from Saddam, they are at best

All members of your Foreign Policy Team (except General Kerrich who you should hear from) felt

Another alternate strategy involves training and equipping the Kosovar Albanians so that they can push Serb forces out of Kosovo, or at least raise the cost of keeping Kosovo so high that Milosevic decides to pull them out himself. One argument for adopting this strategy is the likelihood that the KLA will rearm and seek victory regardless of support from the West. Moreover, supporting the KLA would be popular at home, particularly as an alternative to introducing American troops into Kosovo. However, the Principals are very concerned about creating an armed force which we cannot control and which could become a future source of terrorism and criminal activity in the region. There is a real concern about creating rifts with our allies and encouraging the Russians to give military assistance to the Serbs.

Long-term enterprises

a degraded

have support

This faces us with the very difficult decision of whether an alternative strategy needs to involve the deployment of ground forces into a non-permissive environment, i.e. without Belgrade's explicit agreement. We would only want to do so only after a protracted air campaign designed to create a "submissive" environment, one in which FRY forces would choose to withdraw in the face of NATO ground forces rather than to stand and fight. In any event, Hugh warns that the campaign would be "ugly" and produce casualties, though NATO would certainly succeed in driving Serb forces out of Kosovo.

corresponding

all of your advisors approach this with serious reservations,

Under this scenario, NATO would need to be prepared to help rebuild Kosovo and provide security for the returning refugees

could

some with more than others)

~~SECRET~~

~~pending the creation of some type of international protectorate that would provide self-government for Kosovo within the territory of the FRY. A final political settlement would ultimately depend on political reform in Serbia. Until then, we would continue our efforts to contain and isolate Serbia, and to undermine Milosevic.~~

In one view, ~~merely~~ preparing for this strategy would ~~encourage~~ ^{increase the pressure on} Milosevic to accept our conditions rather than face a pitched battle with NATO forces. It ~~might also~~ ^{could} give our allies greater motivation to sustain the current air campaign. However there is a second view that visible preparations for forced entry would harden Serb attitudes and further rally the Serb people around Milosevic. ^{actually}

We do not need to decide now on whether to launch NATO ground forces into Kosovo. However, we do need to decide ^{soon} whether this should be an option. ~~If so, we need to reposition our rhetoric, taking advantage of a growing willingness on the Hill and in the public to consider ground options. If we want a real option, we also need to allow NATO planning to proceed. Last year, NATO assessed various options for ground operations, but initiated detailed planning and force generation only for the deployment of an implementation force in a permissive environment. Hugh warns that even with a decision now to initiate detailed planning for a non-permissive environment, the need to generate and prepare the necessary forces would mean that such an operation could not be launched until July at the earliest.~~

As you know, I have serious questions about the efficacy of ground forces in achieving our objectives at an acceptable cost. Invading Kosovo would have serious risks and likely require us to "occupy" Kosovo for a protracted period, perhaps with Milosevic still in Belgrade. Securing the necessary support at home and with allies could be very difficult, and we could find ourselves in an even more difficult situation with Russia. That said, if the ~~current~~ air campaign ~~causes~~ ^{does not cause} Milosevic to back down, we might conclude that only the ~~commitment~~ ^{back down} of ground forces in a "submissive" environment will allow us to prevail and achieve our objectives.

RECOMMENDATION

~~We should continue the current air campaign, committing additional resources as appropriate and augmenting it with diplomatic and economic measures to weaken Milosevic and his war machine. At the same time, to keep all options open and to that, while we still have no intention of ground forces, NATO did an assessment in the Fall and could rather ~~do~~ ^{quickly update} it if necessary. Beyond our rhetorical posture, however, we need to decide whether you want real planning to go forward (recognizing that it would take roughly 3 months~~

~~SECRET~~

One line of attack from the Hill is that we are not even planning for this possibility. Thus we face capitulation by Milosevic or defeat. We have attempted to reposition our rhetoric on this a bit Sunday by noting

The dilemma is this: without options to "defeat" in the event of bombing do not succeed in deployment, says Hugh. Further planning, weeks of bombing do not succeed that several more. ... intentions toward planning could be seen as a (area)

acknowledgment that the air campaign won't work (something none of your advisors accept) and could head us down a slippery slope ~~to~~ if patience with the air campaign wanes.

One idea that we are ~~is~~ developing is to establish Kosovo as an "internationally protected area" -- within Serbia for purposes of sovereignty but under the umbrella of the international community (~~not~~ OSCE, ~~not~~ (UN? OSCE?)).

This is an end-state which gives greater clarity to our objectives (Serbs out, ~~to~~ refugees in, international force in) and ~~otherwise~~ might be seen as a post-colonial (post-crisis) trusteeship.

If embraced by the Russians and therefore empowered by a UN mandate, it would have solid international standing. If the Russians (or others) could get Milosovic to agree (doubtful but not impossible) we could consider ~~an~~ arrangements for the international force that were less-visibly "NATO" (so long as they met our requirements for "unity of command"). Of course, if Milosovic does not agree, we still face the problem of how to get the refugees back in the absence of Milosovic's acquiescence.

CA @ (e.g. OSCE "~~not~~" on the door": but NATO inside, etc)

and Congress!

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER D.O. 13526

2014-0517-M (1.21)

KBM 1/31/2024

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Kosovo - Further Thoughts Looking Ahead

PURPOSE

On April 6, I sent you a memorandum that addressed two paths ahead on Kosovo: first, the path that leads to Milosevic, under continued air strikes, to accept our conditions, and second, the path in which he refuses to meet those conditions, ~~other means to achieve our objectives.~~ This memo provides further thoughts on these two paths, based upon two meetings of your Foreign Policy Team.

PATH I: MILOSEVIC MEETS OUR CONDITIONS

If we are to succeed in bringing Milosevic to accept our conditions, we will ~~likely~~ need to sustain the air campaign for a protracted period. Above all ~~this~~ requires keeping the allies together. Bill met with close allied counterparts last week and Madeleine is meeting with NATO Foreign Ministers this week with ~~precisely that purpose in mind.~~ We are likely to face a greater ~~short-term challenge from Congress than our allies.~~

We are also working to ensure that General Clark has the military capabilities that he requires. The initial elements of Task Force Hawk (attack helicopters and rocket launchers) arrived in Albania last week, and Hugh assures me that we should have the initial capability this week. We will seek your approval before the systems are actually used. We and our allies are also committing additional air assets, including the UK's aircraft carrier HMS Invincible.

Wes has asked for a further task force of rocket launchers to be deployed in Croatia to assist in suppressing air defense systems in northern Serbia. We are currently considering this proposal, although Madeleine and Dick are concerned that deploying such

SECRET

Reason: 1.5(b,d)

Declassify On: 4/11/09

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

And Congress at bay.

by other means.

Compelling us to

and compelled by

as intense an

as fumble

There is a broad range of Congressional meetings this week to gain support for continued bombing regardless of varied criticisms.

systems into Croatia could widen the war, reignite Croat-Serb fighting and undercut Dayton.

although undoubtedly controversial,

~~Our upcoming supplemental request~~ might provide one of the strongest signals that we can send to Milosevic. It ~~budgets~~ ^{provide budget} for air operations ~~to continue~~ to the end of the fiscal year, i.e. another six months. We'll make sure that Milosevic learns of this fact.

We're

We are seeking to complement military operations with diplomatic and economic activities designed to weaken Milosevic and his war machine. ~~We've already~~ ^{ing} approached neighboring countries asking that they limit supplies of fuel or other dual-use materials to Serbia (Croatia has already done so). State is also working with Treasury, OVP and various allies to determine ways to disrupt the Yugoslav economy and limit Milosevic's access to offshore accounts.

As we step up military and economic pressure on Milosevic, we have tried to be clear about our objectives, while retain some flexibility. We are now calling for an "international security force" rather than a "NATO-led implementation force". ~~(Any U.S. participation presupposes a NATO core, although we are looking at ways in which we could design the Russians "in").~~ We've also moved away from insisting on signature of the Rambouillet accords as a precondition to stop bombing; instead we've adopted ~~an EU formulation insisting that Milosevic provide "credible assurance of his willingness to work on the basis of the Rambouillet agreement in the establishment of a political framework agreement..."~~ ^{ing} ~~(In other words)~~ the key principles of Rambouillet [autonomy and security] without the need to embrace an agreement which has been "overtaken by events". *(Although any)*

We're insisting that Milosovic be willing to work on the basis of

We are seeking to engage the Russians in our diplomatic strategy, ~~and are~~ encouraged by Moscow's agreement in the G-8 to what are effectively NATO's conditions. The Russians are trying to pull matters back into the UN Security Council, where they will inevitably try to drive NATO out of the "international security presence" but this ~~should~~ ^{could} be a workable problem if the Russians want to press Milosevic to agree to the now ~~NAC/Annan G-8~~ ^{NAC/Annan/ G-8} points.

Bringing the Russians on board, with an undiminished, ~~confident~~ show of Alliance unity behind an ever-intensifying air campaign, is at this point our best strategy to bring Milosevic to meet our conditions.

PATH II: ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES

My last memorandum described five alternative strategies should ~~it become apparent in the weeks ahead that Milosevic won't~~ accede to our demands, or should we lose the allied or domestic support necessary to sustain the air strikes. These strategies included: ~~ousting~~ ^{seeking to} Milosevic; enforcing a safe haven in southern Kosovo; mounting a ground campaign to "liberate" Kosovo; containing and isolating Serbia, while leaving the refugees out of Kosovo in the interim; and training and equipping the Kosovar Albanians. Over the last week, the Foreign Policy Team has assessed these alternatives against our objective of returning the refugees to Kosovo with security and self-government.

Unless we lower our sights, and seek success measured ^{exclusively} in years not months, we can probably rule out the strategies aimed at ousting Milosevic or containing and isolating Serbia. Elements of these approaches most definitely should be incorporated into our current strategy and any alternative, but as we've seen from Saddam, they are at best long-term enterprises. All of your Foreign Policy Team (except General Kerrick who you should hear from) agreed that shifting toward a containment strategy would be seen as a major defeat for the United States and the Alliance.

Another alternate strategy involves training and equipping the Kosovar Albanians so that they can push a degraded Serb force out of Kosovo, or at least raise the cost of keeping Kosovo so high that Milosevic decides to pull the forces out himself. ~~Moreover,~~ ^{Recognizing the independence of Kosovo and} supporting the KLA would have support at home, particularly as an alternative to introducing American troops into Kosovo. However, the Principals are ~~very~~ concerned about creating an armed force we cannot control and which could become a future source of terrorism and criminal activity in the region. There is real concern about ~~creating rifts~~ ^{instability,} with our allies and encouraging the Russians to give corresponding military assistance to the Serbs. ^{breaking}

This faces us with the very difficult decision of whether an alternative strategy needs to involve the deployment of ground forces into a non-permissive environment, i.e. without Belgrade's explicit agreement. All of your advisors approach this with serious reservations, some ~~with~~ more than others.

We could introduce ground forces only after a protracted air campaign designed to create a "submissive" environment, one in which FRY forces would ~~choose~~ ^{be more likely to} to withdraw in the face of NATO.

ground forces rather than to stand and fight. In any event, Hugh warns that the campaign would be "ugly" and produce casualties, though NATO would certainly succeed in driving Serb forces out of Kosovo.

Under this scenario, NATO would need to be prepared to help rebuild Kosovo and provide security for the returning refugees within the territory of the FRY. A final political settlement would ultimately depend on political reform in Serbia. Until then, we would continue our efforts to contain and isolate Serbia, and to undermine Milosevic.

According to one view, preparing for this strategy would increase the pressure on Milosevic to accept our conditions, rather than face a pitched battle with NATO forces. It could give our allies greater motivation to sustain the current air campaign. However, a second view holds that visible preparations for forced entry actually would harden Serb attitudes and further rally the Serb people around Milosevic,

We do not need to decide now on whether to launch NATO ground forces into Kosovo. However, we do need to decide soon whether this should be an option. One line of attack from the Hill is that we are not even planning for this possibility; thus we face capitulation by Milolovic or defeat. We have attempted to reposition our rhetoric on this ~~abit~~ Sunday by noting that, while we still have no intention of deploying ground forces into a non-permissive environment, NATO did an assessment in the Fall and could rather quickly update it if necessary.

Beyond our rhetorical posture, however, we need to decide whether you want real planning to go forward (recognizing that it would take roughly 3 months to deployment, says Hugh). The dilemma is this: without further planning, the options to "defeat" in the event that several more weeks of bombing do not succeed, ~~aren't too attractive~~. On the other hand, initiating formal planning could be seen as an acknowledgement that the air campaign won't work (something none of your advisors accept) and could head us down a slippery slope if patience with the air campaign wanes.

One idea that we are developing is to establish Kosovo as an "internationally protected area" - within Serbia for purposes of sovereignty but under the ~~umbrella~~ of the international community (UN? OSCE?). This is an end-state which gives greater clarity to our objectives (Serbs out, refugees in, international force in) and might be seen as a post-colonial (post-crisis)

as well as create a divisive debate in the U.S.

to avoid this option.

we

understand this

Milosevic

OM

authority

are limited.

trusteeship. If embraced by the Russians and therefore empowered by a UN mandate, it would have solid international standing. If the Russians (or others) could get Milosovic to agree (doubtful but not impossible), we could consider arrangements for ~~the~~ international force that were less-visibly "NATO" (e.g. OSCE "on the door" but NATO inside, as long as they ~~met~~ our and Congress' requirements for "unity of command"). Of course, if Milosovic does not agree, we still face the problem of how to get the refugees back in the absence of Milosovic's acquiescence.

As you know, I have serious questions about the efficacy of ground forces in achieving our objectives at an acceptable cost. Invading Kosovo would have serious risks and likely require us to "occupy" Kosovo for a protracted period, perhaps with Milosevic still in Belgrade. Securing the necessary support at home and with allies could be very difficult, and we could find ourselves in an even more difficult situation with Russia. ~~That said, if the air campaign does not cause Milosevic to back down,~~ we may be faced with intervention in a "submissive" environment or something less than victory.

meet

The choice of

All the more important, therefore, to ~~stay~~ take advantage of NATO's overwhelming power

take a longer-term stay with the air campaign over an extended and unrelenting period. Alternatively,

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2014-0547-M (1-22)
KBH 1/31/2024

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Richard Holbrooke's Thoughts on Kosovo and
Soloban Milosevic

I attach two thoughtful memoranda from Dick Holbrooke, one on next steps for Kosovo and the second on Slobodan Milosevic. He characterizes both as "works in progress."

In the first memoranda, Dick reviews the choices that both we and Milosevic face. Dick rules out ending the bombing without achieving our objectives; he also rules out sending ground troops into a potentially open-ended conflict and hostile occupation. His preferred choice is to intensify the bombing and continue until the Serbs change their position -- preferably by changing their leader. Indeed one of Dick's main conclusions is that our real goal should be regime change, even if this takes time.

Dick's conclusion faces us with a difficult dilemma if intensified bombing succeeds in causing Milosevic to seek a negotiated outcome. Can we negotiate with a man who is destined for indictment? Will negotiating with Milosevic give him new legitimacy and undercut efforts to change his regime? Faced with these questions, Dick recommends that we negotiate with someone other than Milosevic, at a site outside Yugoslavia. He further recommends that the United States control the negotiations, that we continue the bombing through the talks, and that we stick to our core goals but be ready to defer most political issues.

Dick's second memorandum addresses Milosevic himself and questions his mental stability. Dick suggests that Milosevic has adopted a policy that he now knows he cannot survive. His close associates probably understand this and might look for ways to save their own skins. Thus we should be watching for signs of dissension that we can exploit to achieve our aims with respect to Kosovo, as well as to support a change in regime.

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (a) (d)

Declassify On: 4/21/09

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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Indeed, we may already have detected initial signs of dissension, in the form of a recent message to Chris Hill from ~~Nikolai Sainovic, the Serb security chief in Pristina, and a separate message from Vuk Draskovic, the one-time opposition leader and now Deputy Prime Minister, sent through a Serb-American associate of Milan Panic.~~

I agree with most of Dick's conclusions:

- We need to stick to our conditions, press forward with our air campaign and reinforce it with additional economic pressure. Despite those questioning the efficacy of airpower, it is much too early to consider any other course.
- We should plan for ground options in a "non-permissive" environment, but recognize the real risks involved, not only the problems associated with getting in, but the risks once we are there and the difficulty of getting out.
- The nature of an agreement has changed since Rambouillet. The focus should be on our core goals (Serb forces out, international security force in, refugees back) with agreement on the political arrangements deferred. This means preparing for an international administration of Kosovo that is nominally "interim" but likely to be lengthy unless there is a regime change in Belgrade.
- While difficult, we need to look for interlocutors other than Milosevic. This supports a policy of regime change. It also hedges against the risk that Milosevic has consciously chosen a suicidal course and will be unwilling to consider any type of agreement with the West.
- We need to do more to engage the Kosovar Albanians. State is now starting a more systematic effort to reach out to all members of the delegation from Rambouillet and to promote regular contacts with us and amongst themselves.

Dick also concludes that we should not rely too heavily on Moscow to help achieve a settlement. It is true that Primakov and Ivanov have done little more than to promote Belgrade's position. However, I believe that the involvement of Chernomyrdin offers a new opportunity that we should seek to exploit. However, we will need to avoid any temptation to compromise on our core goals with respect to Belgrade in order to accommodate Moscow.

Attachments

Tab A Memorandum -- Kosovo: Next Steps

Tab B Memorandum -- Some Thoughts about Slobodan Milosevic

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2014-0597-M (1.25)
KBH 1/31/2024

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Richard Holbrooke's Thoughts on Kosovo and
Soloban Milosevic

I attach two thoughtful memoranda from Dick Holbrooke, one on next steps for Kosovo and the second on Slobodan Milosevic. He characterizes both as "works in progress."

In the first memoranda, Dick reviews the choices that both we and Milosevic face. Dick rules out ending the bombing without achieving our objectives; he also rules out sending ground troops into a potentially open-ended conflict and hostile occupation. His preferred choice is to intensify the bombing and continue until the Serbs change their position -- preferably by changing their leader. ~~X~~ Indeed one of Dick's main conclusions is that our real goal should be regime change, even if this takes time. ✓

Dick's conclusion faces us with a difficult dilemma if intensified bombing succeeds in causing Milosevic to seek a negotiated outcome. Can we negotiate with a man who is destined for indictment? Will negotiating with Milosevic give him new legitimacy and undercut efforts to change his regime? Faced with these questions, Dick recommends that we negotiate with someone other than Milosevic, at a site outside Yugoslavia. He further recommends that the United States control the negotiations, that we continue the bombing through the talks, and that we stick to our core goals but be ready to defer most political issues.

Dick's second memorandum addresses Milosevic himself and questions his mental stability. Dick suggests that Milosevic has adopted a policy that he now knows he cannot survive. His close associates probably understand this and might look for ways to save their own skins. Thus we should be watching for signs of dissension that we can exploit to achieve our aims with

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Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify On: April 21, 2009

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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respect to Kosovo, as well as to support a change in regime. ~~Indeed, we may already have detected initial signs of~~ dissension, in the form of a recent message to Chris Hill from Nikolai Sainovic, the Serb security chief in Pristine ^{Or} and a separate message from Vuk Draskovic, the one-time opposition leader and now Deputy Prime Minister, sent through a Serb-American associate of Milan Panic.

I agree with most of Dick's conclusions:

- We need to stick to our conditions, press forward with our air campaign and reinforce it with additional economic pressure. Despite those questioning the efficacy of airpower, it is much too early to consider any other course.
- We should plan for ground options in a "non-permissive" environment, but recognize the real risks involved. We may be deploying ground forces into Kosovo later this year, and it is much preferable to do so to implement an agreement rather than to impose an occupation.
- The nature of an agreement has changed since Rambouillet. The focus should be on our core goals (Serb forces out, international security force in, refugees back) with agreement on the political arrangements deferred. This means preparing for an international administration of Kosovo that is nominally "interim" but likely to be lengthy.
- While difficult, we need to look for interlocutors other than Milosevic. This supports a policy of regime change. It also hedges against the risk that Milosevic has consciously chosen a suicidal course and will be unwilling to consider any type of agreement with the West.
- We need to do more to engage the Kosovar Albanians. State is now starting a more systematic effort to reach out to all members of the delegation from Rambouillet and to promote regular contacts with us and amongst themselves.

Dick also concludes that we should not rely too heavily on Moscow to help achieve a settlement. It is true that Primakov and Ivanov have done little more than to promote Belgrade's position. However, I believe that the involvement of Chernomyrdin offers a new opportunity that we should seek to


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INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER 

SUBJECT: Kosovo - Further Thoughts Looking Ahead

PURPOSE

On April 6, I sent you a memorandum that addressed two paths ahead on Kosovo: first, the path that leads Milosevic, under continued air strikes, to accept our conditions, and second, the path in which he refuses to accept those conditions compelling us to achieve our objectives by other means. This memo provides further thoughts on these two paths, based upon two meetings of your Foreign Policy Team.

PATH I: MILOSEVIC MEETS OUR CONDITIONS

If we are to succeed in bringing Milosevic to accept our conditions, we will need to sustain an intense air campaign for a protracted period. Above all, this requires keeping the allies together and Congress essentially on board. Bill met with close allied counterparts last week and Madeleine is meeting with NATO Foreign Ministers this week precisely to keep the allies on the same track and there is a broad range of Congressional briefings this week to gain support for continued bombing, regardless of varied criticisms.

We are also working to ensure that General Clark has the military capabilities that he requires. The initial elements of Task Force Hawk (attack helicopters and rocket launchers) arrived in Albania last week, and Hugh assures me that we should have the initial capability this week. We will seek your approval before the systems are actually used. We and our allies are also committing additional air assets, including the UK's aircraft carrier HMS Invincible.

Wes has asked for a further task force of rocket launchers to be deployed in Croatia to assist in suppressing air defense systems

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in northern Serbia. The Pentagon is currently considering this proposal, although Madeleine and Dick are concerned that deploying such systems into Croatia could widen the war, reignite Croat-Serb fighting and undercut Dayton.

Our upcoming supplemental request, although undoubtedly controversial, might provide one of the strongest signals that we can send to Milosevic. It provides budgeting for air ~~operations to the end of the fiscal year~~, i.e. another six months. We'll make sure that Milosevic learns of this fact.

We are seeking to complement military operations with diplomatic and economic activities designed to weaken Milosevic and his war machine. We're approaching neighboring countries asking that they limit supplies of fuel or other dual-use materials to Serbia (Croatia has already done so). State is also working with Treasury, OVP and various allies to determine ways to disrupt the Yugoslav economy and limit Milosevic's access to offshore accounts.

As we step up military and economic pressure on Milosevic, we have tried to be clear about our objectives, while retaining some flexibility. We are now calling for an "international security force" rather than a "NATO-led implementation force". (Although any U.S. participation presupposes a NATO core, we are looking at ways in which we could design the Russians "in"). We've also moved away from insisting on acceptance of the Rambouillet accords per se as a precondition to stop bombing; instead we're insisting that Milosevic be willing to work on the basis of the key principles of Rambouillet [autonomy and security] without the need to embrace an agreement which has been "overtaken by events".

We are seeking to engage the Russians in our diplomatic strategy, encouraged by Moscow's agreement in the G-8 to what are effectively NATO's conditions. The Russians are trying to pull matters back into the UN Security Council, where they will inevitably try to drive NATO out of the "international security presence" but this could be a workable problem (as long as NATO command and control is retained for us) and we should encourage the Russians to press Milosevic to agree to the NAC/Annan/G-8 points.

Bringing the Russians on board, with an undiminished show of Alliance unity behind an ever-intensifying air campaign, is at this point our best strategy to bring Milosevic to meet our conditions.

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PATH II: ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES

My last memorandum described five alternative strategies should it become apparent in the weeks ahead that Milosevic won't accede to our demands, or should we lose the allied or domestic support necessary to sustain the air strikes. These strategies included: seeking to oust Milosevic; enforcing a safe haven in southern Kosovo (partition); mounting a ground campaign to "liberate" Kosovo; containing and isolating Serbia, while leaving the refugees out of Kosovo in the interim; and training and equipping the Kosovar Albanians. Over the last week, the Foreign Policy Team has assessed these alternatives against our objective of returning the refugees to Kosovo with security and self-government.

Unless we lower our sights, and seek success measured in years not months, we probably can rule out the strategies exclusively aimed at ousting Milosevic or containing and isolating Serbia. Elements of these approaches most definitely should be incorporated into our current strategy, and any alternative, but as we've seen from Saddam, they are at best long-term enterprises. All of your Foreign Policy Team (except General Kerrick who you should hear from) agree that shifting toward a containment strategy alone would be seen as a major defeat for the United States and the Alliance.

Another alternate strategy involves recognizing the independence of Kosovo and training and equipping the Kosovar Albanians so that they can push a degraded Serb force out of Kosovo, or at least raise the cost of keeping Kosovo so that Milosevic decides to pull the forces out himself. Supporting the KLA could have support at home, particularly as an alternative to introducing American troops into Kosovo. However, the Principals are concerned about creating an armed force we cannot control and which could become a future source of instability, terrorism, and criminal activity in the region. There is real concern about breaking with our allies and encouraging the Russians to give corresponding military assistance to the Serbs.

This faces us with the very difficult decision of whether an alternative strategy needs to involve the deployment of ground forces into a non-permissive environment, i.e. without Belgrade's explicit agreement. All of your advisors approach this with serious reservations, some more disposed than others.

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We could introduce ground forces only after a protracted air campaign designed to create a "submissive" environment, one in which FRY forces would be more likely to withdraw in the face of NATO ground forces rather than to stand and fight. In any event, Hugh warns that the campaign would be "ugly" and produce casualties, though NATO would certainly succeed in driving Serb forces out of Kosovo.

Under this scenario, NATO would need to be prepared to help rebuild Kosovo and provide security for the returning refugees within the territory of the FRY. A final political settlement would ultimately depend on political reform in Serbia. Until then, we would continue our efforts to contain and isolate Serbia, and to undermine Milosevic.

According to one view, preparing for this strategy would increase the pressure on Milosevic to accept our conditions rather than face a pitched battle with NATO forces. It could give our allies greater motivation to sustain the current air campaign to avoid this option. However, a second view holds that visible preparations for forced entry actually would harden Serb attitudes and further rally the Serb people around Milosevic, as well as create a divisive debate in the U.S.

X // We do not need to decide now on whether to launch NATO ground forces into Kosovo. However, we do need to decide soon whether we should plan for this option. One line of attack from the Hill (e.g. McCain) is that we are not even planning for this contingency; thus we face the choice of capitulation by Milosevic or defeat. We attempted to reposition our rhetoric on this on Sunday by noting that, while we still have no intention of deploying ground forces into a non-permissive environment, NATO did an assessment in the Fall and could rather quickly update it if necessary.

Z // Beyond our rhetorical posture, however, we need to decide whether you want formal planning to go forward (recognizing that it would take roughly 3 months to deployment, says Hugh). The dilemma is this: without further planning, the options to "defeat" Milosovic, in the event that several more weeks of bombing do not succeed, are limited. On the other hand, initiating formal planning could be seen as an acknowledgement that the air campaign won't work (something none of your advisors or military commanders accept) and could head us down a slippery slope, if patience with the air campaign wanes.

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One further and potentially useful idea that we are developing is to set as NATO's political objective establishment of Kosovo as an "internationally protected area" - within Serbia for purposes of sovereignty but under the authority of the international community (UN? OSCE?). This is an end-state which gives greater clarity to our objectives (Serbs out, refugees in, international force in) and might be seen as a post-colonial (post-crisis) trusteeship. If embraced by the Russians and empowered by a UN mandate, it would have solid international standing. If the Russians (or others) could get Milosevic to agree (doubtful but not impossible), we could consider arrangements for an international force that was less-visibly "NATO" (e.g. OSCE "on the door" but NATO "inside", as long as they meet our, and Congress' requirements for "unity of command"). Of course, if Milosevic does not agree, we still face the same options for getting the refugees back in the absence of Milosevic's acquiescence.

As you know, I have serious questions about the efficacy of ground forces in achieving our objectives at an acceptable cost. Invading Kosovo would have serious risks and likely require us to "occupy" Kosovo for a protracted period, perhaps with Milosevic still in Belgrade. Securing and sustaining the necessary support at home and with allies could be very difficult, and we could find ourselves in an even more difficult situation with Russia. All the more important, therefore, to stay with the air campaign over an extended and unrelenting period, and to convey the confidence that it will succeed. Alternatively, we may be faced with the choice of intervention in a "submissive" environment or something less than victory.

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Detailed Timeline

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2014-0517-M (1.43)

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Tuesday, March 23, 1999

- POTUS meets with key Congressional Members (0930).
- Holbrooke departs Belgrade for Brussels (1200).
- POTUS speech to AFSCME (1200).
- US Embassy Belgrade closes; Core Staff evacuates (TBD).
- Holbrooke briefs NATO (TBD).
- POTUS briefing on military targets (TBD).
- POTUS initial decision on military strikes (TBD).
- POTUS calls Congressional leaders if strikes are a "go" (TBD).
- POTUS calls Blair, Chirac, Schroeder, Lott, Daschle, Hastert, Gephardt.

Wednesday, March 24, 1999

- Solana passes Phase I key to SACEUR; Conducts consultations and obtains key for Phase II strikes (completed by TBD).
- Relief agencies complete evacuation of personnel from FRY (estimated complete by 1500). *18 ICRC staff will stay*
- NAC?
- Contact with Russia? *letsin call? MKA call*
- Chris Hill (Skopje) and Dick Holbrooke (Budapest) available to receive Milosevic capitulation by phone (all day).
- Frontline States: Solana, or Deputy SYG, brief ambassadors from frontline states, in broad terms, on scope of Phase 1 (before strikes; TBD). US Ambassador's in frontline states (Albania, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia) brief Host Governments on scope of Phase 1 (before strikes). In

Washington, EUR AS Grossman and a JCS rep brief the Ambassadors of frontline states (concurrent with strikes; TBD).

- POTUS makes final go-ahead decision for initial strikes (TBD).
- POTUS calls before strikes begin (TBD).
 - Congressional Leaders
 - Former Presidents
 - etc.
- Berger, Slocombe, Pickering, and Sapiro calls to Validators (before strikes begin, TBD)
- AIR STRIKES begin (TBD).
- POTUS Address to the Nation from Oval Office (TBD).
- Berger and Albright brief in White House Briefing Room following Oval Office address.
- Cohen and Shelton Military Operations briefing from Pentagon (TBD).

Thursday, March 25, 1999

- POTUS calls to Chirac, Schroeder, Blair; Albright calls to xxx; Cohen calls to xxx; Shelton calls to xxx. Message, "stay the course."
- Chris Hill (Skopje) and Dick Holbrooke (Budapest) available to receive Milosevic capitulation by phone.

Friday, March 26, 1999

- Update frontline states with Solana brief; contacts in capitals, and Grossman/JCS brief in Washington.

Saturday, March 27, 1999

Sunday, March 28, 1999

Monday, March 29, 1999

Tuesday, March 30, 1999

Wednesday, March 31, 1999

Thursday, April 1, 1999

Friday, April 2, 1999

Saturday, April 3, 1999

Notional Timeline
As of March 24, 1999, 1:00 AM

	23-Mar TUE	24-Mar WED	25-Mar THU	26-Mar FRI	27-Mar SAT
Diplomatic Track	Holbrooke Team departs Belgrade.	Chris Hill in Skopje as POC for Milosevic. Gelbard works Montenegro issues. Bymes maintains contact with KLA.			
Military/NATO	Solana gives Phase 1 key to SACEUR.	AIR STRIKES could begin at night. Upon initiation, Solana conducts consultations and obtains Phase 2 key.	NAC meets to assess situation, determine or refuse pause, consider Phase III authorization to Solana. Possible second night of strikes.	Possible NAC to consider pause issues, next steps. Possible third night of strikes.	
Drawdowns	Embassy Belgrade closes. Embassy Sarajevo recalls all official Americans from Republica Srpska posts (Issues warden to private AmCits urging to leave RS). UK Embassy closes.	Belgrade Core Staff and NATO Air Liaison Team (NALT) depart via US C-9 Aircraft at 0500 Local time. Relief agencies complete evac during day.			
Russia	Yeltsin letter to POTUS.	POTUS call to Yeltsin.	High-level calls.	Albright call to Ivanov.	
Administration Actions	POTUS briefing on military options. POTUS calls to key Allies if strikes are a "go."	POTUS final go-ahead to initial strikes. High-level calls to Allies. POTUS calls to former Presidents Bush, Carter, Ford.	High-level calls to Allies to stay the course. Build Alliance unity on purpose/length of any pause. Evaluate response to humanitarian situation.	Assess need for high-level envoy to Belgrade. High-level calls to any wavering allies.	
			POTUS WEST COAST TRIP (March 25-27)		
Congress-related Action	POTUS meets with Leaders and key Members (0930hrs.) SRB calls to key Senate Members. Senate vote on cloture (1415hrs)	POTUS calls Leaders prior to strikes. Other high-level calls.	POTUS calls Leaders.	Congress goes out of session.	
Public Diplomacy	Coverage of continued Serb offensive, diplomatic mission, military preparations, and Congressional debate. POTUS AFSCME address on Kosovo.	Calls to Validators. POTUS short statement as strikes begin. POTUS Oval Office speech in prime time. Berger/Albright at WH press room. Cohen/Shelton operational update from Pentagon.	SRB meeting with influentials. POTUS Statement (TBD). DoD operational update at Pentagon. SRB, JS, Cohen on News shows.	High-level news appearances (TBD). Daily briefs, DoD operational update. NATO statement (TBD).	DECLASSIFIED PER E.O. 13526 2014-0547-M (1.44) K&H 1/31/2024

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Detailed Timeline

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Wednesday, March 24, 1999

Congress

- POTUS calls to Leaders before strikes
- SRB, State, and DOD place calls to Chairs and Rankings of Senate and House armed services, intelligence, foreign affairs and appropriations committees and defense/foreign ops subcommittees as assigned in Tab X

Allies

- SECSTATE calls to Dini, Vollebaek confirming go-ahead.
- Solana passes Phase I key to SACEUR, conducts consultations and obtains key for Phase II strikes.

FRY (Serbia & Montenegro)

- Chris Hill remains in Skopje as contact point for Milosevic.
- Bob Gelbard call to Djukanovic
- Bob Gelbard addresses Montenegrins via WorldNet (1500 hrs).

Kosovar Albanians

- Shaun Byrnes maintains contact with KLA.
- Jim Dobbins calls to Albanian-American leaders.

Front Line States

- SECSTATE calls to Albanian PM and Slovene FM.
- SECSTATE letters to Bulgarians, Macedonians, and Romanians.
- A/S Grossman and JCS rep brief ambassadors of front line states (concurrent with strikes).
- U.S. ambassadors in front line states (Albania, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia) brief host governments on scope of Phase I (concurrent with strikes).

- Solana, or Deputy SYG, brief ambassadors from frontline states, in broad terms, on scope of Phase 1 (before strikes).

Russia

- POTUS-Yeltsin phone call (before strikes)
- Charge Tefft meeting with or call to Dep FM Mamedov. Marker on military assistance to FRY.
- Embassy Moscow presents rationale for strikes to MFA, Presidential Administration. Lay marker on military assistance. Solicit help curbing violence in Republika Srpska, front-line states. (continuing)
- Albright-Ivanov phone call
- Treasury consultations with IMF on requirements to send Mission to Russia
- Talbott or Pickering WorldNet appearance

Others

- POTUS messages (cable) to Macedonian, Albanian, Romanian, Bulgarian, Bosnian presidency, Croatian, and Slovenian heads of government when bombing commences.
- SECSTATE calls to UNSYG Annan and UNHCR Ogata.
- Send ALDAC message for posts to use with host nations, demarche to UNSC members.
- DEPSECSTATE calls counterparts in UNPREDEP contributing countries (Denmark, Finland, Indonesia) troop contributing countries.
- DEPSECSTATE calls to Swedish FM (protecting power for Embassy Belgrade) and Japanese counterpart.

Public Affairs

0930 Lockhart Gaggle

1230 State Department Daily Briefing

1300 White House Daily Briefing

Xhr NATO SYG Press Statement

Xhr POTUS Address in White House Briefing Room

X+30min SRB and MKA White House briefing

X+1hr Principals call Validators

X+1hr SACUER Briefing from Brussels

X+2hr SecDef/CJCS Operational Briefing at Pentagon

X+2hr VPOTUS or SRB/MKA calls to Network Anchors

1800 SRB on Lehrer (TBD)

2100 POTUS Address from Oval Office

2100 TBD Larry King Live

2330 TBD Appearance on Nightline

Thursday, March 25

Allies

- Solana, Clark, Message to Serb people*
- POTUS calls to Chirac, Schroeder, Blair, D'Alema. Message: "Stay the course."
 - APNSA calls key ally counterparts.
 - SECDEF calls key ally counterparts.
 - CJCS calls key ally counterparts.
 - SECSTATE calls to Solana and Contact Group ministers as needed to assess, confirm position on any possible pause.
 - DEPSECSTATE calls to Hungarian, Dutch, and Greek counterparts.
 - SECSTATE/DEPSECSTATE calls to any wavering Allies.

- NAC meets to assess situation, determine or refuse pause, consider PHASE III authorization to Solana.

FRY (Serbia & Montenegro)

- Chris Hill remains in Skopje as contact point for Milosevic.
- Bob Gelbard calls Djukanovic.

Kosovar Albanians

- Shaun Byrnes maintains contact with KLA.
- Calls to contacts in Europe and U.S.

Front Line States

- Hold EAPC meeting in Brussels.
- DEPSECSTATE calls to Albanian and Macedonian FMs.

Russia

- Fuerth review with Ushakov Binational Commission business finished and pending and how to advance agenda.
- Talbott call to Mamedov to gauge temperature in Moscow, encourage closure on CFE principles by March 30
- Embassy Moscow call on Primakov acting chief of staff Kosachev
- Check-in calls with Ushakov
- Russian press backgrounders

Others

- Messages -- explaining reasons for military action - dispatched to posts.
- Brief NGOs in Washington.

Friday, March 26

Allies

- APNSA calls to any wavering allies.
- SECDEF calls to any wavering allies.
- SECSTATE calls to any wavering allies.
- NAC assesses situation; fend off attempts to pause in Phase I.

FRY (Serbia & Montenegro)

- Chris Hill remains in Skopje as contact point for Milosevic.
- Assess need for high-level envoy to Belgrade.

Kosovar Albanians

- Shaun Byrnes maintains contact with KLA, urges restraint.
- Calls to contacts in Europe and U.S.

Front Line States

- Send policy update to our embassies in front line states.

Russia

- Talbott-hosted PSG on status of U.S.-Russian relations
- Jim Collins arrives in Moscow
- State, NSC, OVP Congressional staff briefs to explain status of U.S.-Russian relations
- Albright call to Ivanov
- Check-in calls with Ushakov

Others

- Brief Washington ambassadors.
- Send instruction to US Mission Geneva to consult with UNHCR on humanitarian situation.

Saturday, March 27

Allies

- NAC assesses situation; fend off attempts to pause in Phase I. get Phase III authorization for Solana.
-

FRY (Serbia & Montenegro)

- Amb. Hill remains in Skopje as contact point for Milosevic.

Kosovar Albanians

- Shaun Byrnes maintains contact with KLA.
- Calls to contacts in Europe and U.S.

Front Line States

- Assess need for high-level envoy to visit Front Line States.

Others

- Respond to results of consultations with UNHCR in Geneva.
- Chris Hill (Skopje) and Dick Holbrooke (Budapest) available to receive Milosevic capitulation by phone.

Wednesday, March 24, 1999

Allies

- SECSTATE calls to Dini, Vollebaek confirming go-ahead.
- Solana passes Phase I key to SACEUR; ~~conducts consultations and obtains key for Phase II strikes.~~

FRY (Serbia & Montenegro)

- Chris Hill remains in Skopje as contact point for Milosevic.
- Bob Gelbard call to Djukanovic
- Bob Gelbard addresses Montenegrins via WorldNet (1500 hrs).

Kosovar Albanians

- Shaun Byrnes maintains contact with KLA.
- Jim Dobbins calls to Albanian-American leaders.

Front Line States

- SECSTATE calls to Albanian PM and Slovene FM.
- SECSTATE letters to Bulgarians, Macedonians, and Romanians.
- A/S Grossman and JCS rep brief ambassadors of front line states (concurrent with strikes).
- U.S. ambassadors in front line states (Albania, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia) brief host governments on scope of Phase I (concurrent with strikes).
- Solana, or Deputy SYG, brief ambassadors from frontline states, in broad terms, on scope of Phase 1 (before strikes).

Others

- POTUS messages (cable) to Macedonian, Albanian, Romanian, Bulgarian, Bosnian presidency, Croatian, and Slovenian heads of government when bombing commences.
- SECSTATE calls to UNSYG Annan and UNHCR Ogata.
- Send ALDAC message for posts to use with host nations, demarche to UNSC members.
- DEPSECSTATE calls counterparts in UNPREDEP contributing countries (Denmark, Finland, Indonesia) troop contributing countries.
- DEPSECSTATE calls to Swedish FM (protecting power for Embassy Belgrade) and Japanese counterpart.

Thursday, March 25

Allies

- POTUS calls to Chirac, Schroeder, Blair, D'Alema. Message: "Stay the course."
- APNSA calls key ally counterparts.
- SECDEF calls key ally counterparts.
- CJCS calls key ally counterparts.
- SECSTATE calls to Solana and Contact Group ministers as needed to assess, confirm position on any possible pause.
- DEPSECSTATE calls to Hungarian, Dutch, and Greek counterparts.
- SECSTATE/DEPSECSTATE calls to any wavering Allies.
- NAC meets to assess situation, determine or refuse pause, consider PHASE III authorization to Solana.

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- Hold EAPC meeting in Brussels.
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Front Line States

- Send policy update to our embassies in front line states.

Others

- Brief Washington ambassadors.
- Send instruction to US Mission Geneva to consult with UNHCR on humanitarian situation.

Saturday, March 27

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- NAC assesses situation; fend off attempts to pause in Phase I. get Phase III authorization for Solana.

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Others

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Humanitarian Activity

Issue: How to deal with humanitarian needs in Kosovo in the context of airstrikes and their aftermath?

Current Humanitarian Situation: Since March 19, 30,000 additional Kosovars have been displaced, leaving the total estimated population of displaced persons at about 250,000. The displaced people are reliant on external assistance to meet their basic food, health and shelter needs. There are also large concentrations of Kosovar refugees outside the province, with 25,000 in Montenegro, 10,000 in Macedonia, 18,500 in Albania, 30,000 in Serbia, 10,000 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 100,000 in other European countries.

Relief agencies: As of March 23, thirty-seven expatriate relief workers (three Americans) remained in Pristina, including staff from UNHCR, ICRC and four NGOs. All but ICRC's 18 expatriates plan to depart on March 24. Most relief operations ceased on March 23, with agencies unable to venture outside Pristina. UNHCR and WFP made some deliveries within Pristina and limited mobile health activities continued. ICRC continued to deliver food and other relief supplies and operate its mobile clinics. Even prior to March 23, access to war-affected civilians was sporadic, with towns cut off during fighting and relief agencies only able to reach displaced people once they found refuge in safe villages.

Dilemmas posed by bombing: Most expatriate relief workers are evacuating Kosovo, due to Serb military actions and in advance of the bombing. ICRC plans to remain but will have little ability to operate. Absent expatriates, local staff and local NGOs will likely be unable to pass through checkpoints and deliver supplies. Humanitarian conditions will deteriorate. Unable to access food, supplies and health care, Kosovars may cross international borders in large numbers, causing problems in neighboring countries. Also, bombing could cause additional displacements, and may result in some collateral damage. Moreover, it could precipitate a further escalation of violence against Kosovars, including by armed Serb civilians.

What we are doing to prepare:

- UN/NGOs have established sub-warehouses in Pec, Prizren and Mitrovica, in addition to Pristina. If any relief

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deliveries are possible, the decentralized system will help support distributions in those parts of Kosovo that are relatively secure.

- Warehouses inside Kosovo currently contain sufficient food for up to 400,000 people for one month, and enough relief supplies for 100,000 people for two weeks.
- Mother Theresa Society, a local NGO, has improved its administrative structure and ability to distribute aid (but is still dependent on expatriates to pass through checkpoints.)
- UNHCR has pre-positioned commodities and conducted site planning and is prepared to support approximately 100,000 refugees in the region, including 40,000 in Macedonia. State and USAID's Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) are encouraging UNHCR to prepare for further refugee flows.
- USAID is diverting upcoming shipments of U.S. humanitarian assistance from Bar, Montenegro to Thessaloniki, Greece. These supplies could be moved by land to Macedonia to accommodate an influx of refugees or to support cross-border operations into Kosovo.
- State is reminding the Presidents of Macedonia and Albania of their responsibility as the country of first refuge for populations fleeing Kosovo, and assuring them that the U.S. will assist in caring for the refugees.
- USAID/DART is pre-positioned in Macedonia to coordinate U.S. humanitarian activities.

Limitations: Providing assistance within Kosovo is contingent on access to the vulnerable population; access to humanitarian supply sources inside and outside of Kosovo; and the continued presence of at least a limited number of expatriates. Airdrops are only helpful if there is a capacity in country to receive and distribute commodities. *Short of a NATO military presence on the ground, the international community will require sufficient security and GOFRY permission (or acquiescence) to provide humanitarian assistance in Kosovo, including cross-border operations.*

Policy Issues to Consider:

- Prepare Neighboring Countries: Macedonia is reluctant to handle additional refugees because it could strain their fragile economy and upset the ethnic balance between Slavs and Albanians, leading to social unrest. UNHCR estimates that Macedonia could accommodate up to 40,000 refugees. On March 23, Macedonia closed its border to those carrying Yugoslav passports, but it is not yet clear whether this was to prevent refugees from crossing. Given its legitimate concerns and to avoid creating a new crisis, we need to consider how far and when to push Macedonia, what we can offer them and possible alternatives. USAID has already agreed to provide food aid to local Macedonian populations, as requested. Macedonia has also asked for a written guarantee from the EU for third country resettlement of refugees. State will work with the Europeans and others to develop durable solutions for the refugees, including the possibility of third country resettlement. Statements by NATO authorities regarding the Alliance's concern with Macedonia's security could also make them more accommodating on refugees.
- Military Assistance - In the event that a refugee crisis initially overwhelms the capacity of U.S. and international civilian agencies, DoD (or NATO) logistical support may be needed for humanitarian activities in Macedonia, Albania or other areas of refuge. This could include airlift and ground transport, property such as tents or generators and support for the delivery of water and health services
- Public Affairs - Humanitarian conditions will worsen in the short term during bombing. We need a vigorous public affairs campaign to explain that our end goal is a political settlement to resolve the conflict, which is the only way to definitely address the humanitarian crisis. Strategic use of public affairs may also be needed to flag likely Serb obstruction of relief efforts and push Serbs to permit full and unfettered access.
- Return of Relief Agencies - The situation on the ground is likely to remain dangerous after bombing. Milosevic may set difficult conditions for the return of relief agencies, if he allows them to return at all. If humanitarian needs are significant, to what extent will we encourage relief agencies to return to Kosovo?

Russia Strategy

Objectives

- Insulate U.S.-Russian relationship from impact of NATO airstrikes.
- Attempt to moderate Russian rhetoric over NATO action. Ensure Russian people and decision-makers have access to unbiased information on situation and U.S. rationale.
- Blunt unhelpful Russian diplomatic moves vis-à-vis Belgrade or at UNSC.
- Keep option open for further cooperation on interim agreement and Russian participation in KFOR.
- Lay strict markers on Russian military cooperation with FRY.

Key Events

Wednesday, March 24, 1999

- POTUS-Yeltsin phone call (before strikes)
- [*If Yeltsin not available*] Albright-Ushakov phone call (before strikes)
- Charge Tefft meeting with or call to Dep FM Mamedov. Marker on military assistance to FRY.
- Embassy Moscow presents rationale for strikes to MFA, Presidential Administration. Lay marker on military assistance. Solicit help curbing violence in Republika Srpska, front-line states. (continuing)
- Albright-Ivanov phone call
- Check-in call with Ushakov (Talbot/Sestanovich/Pascual)
- Treasury consultations with IMF on requirements to send Mission to Russia
- Vershbow call to Amb. Kislyak (continuing)
- Embassy Moscow calls to Russian political figures and opinion-makers re: rationale for strike (continuing)
- Talbott or Pickering WorldNet appearance

- ~~Taskings to Intelligence Community re: possible military assistance to FRY~~
- Backgrounders for Russian Washington press corps, supply background footage to Russian TV bureaus
- Public diplomacy package to Embassy Moscow

Thursday, March 25, 1999

- Fuerth review with Ushakov Binational Commission business finished and pending and how to advance agenda.
- Talbott call to Mamedov to gauge temperature in Moscow, encourage closure on CFE principles by March 30
- Embassy Moscow call on Primakov acting chief of staff Kosachev
- Check-in calls with Ushakov
- Russian press backgrounders

Friday, March 26, 1999

- Talbott-hosted PSG on status of U.S.-Russian relations
- Review status of above measures in run-up to Phase 2
- Jim Collins arrives in Moscow
- Fuerth, et al press backgrounders to explain continuation/accomplishments of Commission work
- State, NSC, OVP Congressional staff briefs to explain status of U.S.-Russian relations
- Albright call to Ivanov
- Check-in calls with Ushakov

Monday, March 29, 1999

- POTUS to Yeltsin letter to explain rationale to build on mutual interests.
-

- Talbott call to Mamedov to review CFE status.

- Check-in calls with Ushakov

Tuesday, March 30

- VP call to Primakov (schedule permitting) to underscore need to sustain cooperation, propose continuation of Commission work.
- Possible IMF announcement of mission to Russia.
- Albright op-ed on next steps in US-Russian relations.

Wednesday, March 31

- Republication of Albright op-ed in Russian press

Tuesday, April 6

- Foreign policy team review with POTUS and VP on Russia relationship

Early April

- Small interagency delegation to Moscow to review positive areas for cooperation

Post-Bombing Scenarios and Policy Options

NATO air strikes, and the parties' response to them, may significantly alter the political and security situation in Kosovo and the FRY. Further, the intentions of our Allies and Russia may change once strikes begin. This paper outlines possible post-bombing scenarios and presents alternative policy options should Milosevic fail to agree to the IPA during or immediately after an initial set of air strikes.

Assumptions

- Our basic objectives with respect to Kosovo are fundamentally unchanged i.e., to:
 - protect regional stability and our investment in Bosnia;
 - avert a humanitarian disaster or further atrocities and other gross violations of human rights; and
 - preserve U.S. and NATO credibility and our relationship with Russia, particularly in light of the upcoming Summit.
- Kosovars have agreed to the terms of the IPA.
- Milosevic refuses to agree to the IPA.
- NATO initiates an initial set of air strikes; KVM, or its successor, is withdrawn but remains poised for re-entry.
- Milosevic has adopted one of three strategies:
 - A. Absorb bombing, and then accept IPA: to prove to the Serbs that he stood up to NATO, but had no choice but to agree to its demands.
 - B. Ride-out bombing, and then reopen negotiations: based on a belief that Allied unity will falter, resulting in short-lived bombing and a reversion to less coercive means and either a better deal for the FRY or continued, inconclusive negotiations.
 - C. Bunker mentality: Milosevic determines that his personal survival depends on avoiding a NATO presence in Kosovo at all costs and refuses to agree to the IPA.
- Milosevic may augment his strategy with one of several wildcards:
 - 1. Renew offensive against KLA in Kosovo
 - 2. Renew offensive against KLA in Kosovo and Albania

3. Declare a state of emergency and use it as a pretext to seize control in Montenegro
4. Seize and hold key areas within Kosovo and seek to partition Kosovo
5. Precipitate crisis along Macedonian border
6. Precipitate crisis in Bosnia

Potential Scenarios

1. Milosevic opts to absorb the bombing and then accept the IPA. During the bombing he launches a VJ/MUP shock offensive to destroy as much of the KLA as possible and consolidate control over key areas of Kosovo before accepting the IPA.

- The offensive could lead to widespread fighting, further atrocities, a humanitarian crisis and possible spillover into Albania and Macedonia. The KLA would be unable to mount an effective counterattack and would remain dispersed, limiting its military actions to hit and run attacks.
- Humanitarian agencies would withdraw before bombing and relief would cease; numerous civilians would flee the FRY-KLA fighting; food, water, and shelter shortages would become severe after about two weeks.
- Given the Serb offensive, the Allies and Russia would reluctantly consent to deal firmly with Milosevic during any pauses in the air strikes. The worsening humanitarian conditions would further bolster Allied resolve and unity.
- Once Milosevic accepts the IPA, the KFOR/KVM implementation environment would be uncertain, at best, and perhaps, hostile. NATO forces in particular could face increased risk from Serb acts of retribution. It would be unsafe for KVM to return unless KFOR were deployed.

2. Calculating that laying low would greatly dissipate Allied resolve or that he needs the strikes to provide domestic cover to accept a deal, Milosevic absorbs the bombing and accepts the IPA without launching an offensive, keeping VJ/MUP in a defensive posture.

- Despite Contact Group warnings, the KLA initiates attacks against VJ/MUP; VJ/MUP minimize response.
- Serb restraint reduces the negative effects on the humanitarian situation: humanitarian aid programs still cease

but civilian casualties and IDPs are limited; food, water, and shelter shortages would emerge only after protracted period.

- Serb restraint and the absence of an impending humanitarian disaster would foment intense pressure from Allies and Russia to halt bombing at the earliest time, and dissipate Allied interest in dealing firmly with Milosevic afterwards.
- The implementation environment would be uncertain, at best, with an increased risk compared to the pre-strike situation.

3. Milosevic decides to ride-out the bombing and seek to reopen inconclusive negotiations, while both sides initiate major offensives in Kosovo. Milosevic's goal would be a sweeter deal than the draft IPA, based on calculation that NATO allies will be more flexible about a deal in order to reach closure and avert further bombing. In this outcome, the political and security situation would be similar to the first situation above, i.e. widespread hostilities in Kosovo and a serious humanitarian situation that grows worse with time. We'd have to hold the line with the Allies.

4. Milosevic adopts the bunker mentality, in which he never agrees to a NATO presence, spurns negotiations, and continues to fight the Kosovars. This outcome is similar to 1 and 3, i.e. widespread fighting and an impending humanitarian disaster. However, unlike 3, Milosevic's refusal to negotiate would strengthen NATO's unity for a firm response as the humanitarian situation worsens.

Policy Options

Securing Milosevic's consent to the IPA would remain a key goal of our post-bombing strategy. In this strategy, natural pauses in the air strikes provide opportunities to obtain Milosevic's consent to the IPA. If Allies prove unwilling to continue with bombing, we could threaten to shift our position on Kosovo independence as leverage against both the Allies and Milosevic.

Should Milosevic continue to refuse agreeing to the IPA, options include:

- Containment: Shift focus to containing the conflict and bolstering regional stability, such as through a preventive deployment of NATO forces to Albania and Macedonia, the latter to replace the withdrawing UN preventive deployment. To deal with the humanitarian consequences of the Kosovo conflict, refugee/relief centers would need to be established along the

Albanian and Macedonian borders and wherever possible within the FRY.

- Maintaining Readiness to Further Degrade Belgrade's Offensive Capabilities: Announce further FRY offensive actions will precipitate an additional NATO air response. Goal is to prevent another Serb offensive through deterrence and, if that does not work, cause further damage to FRY military capabilities. While this does not force us into heavy involvement, it does enable the Serbs to call the shots. Further, this is probably a temporary strategy that would eventually need to revert to seeking a political settlement.
- Seek Regime Change in Belgrade: Cut off all relations with the current regime and encourage political change by signaling that removal of Milosevic could lead to lifting of sanctions. Include "regime" targets in a second set of air strikes to reinforce this option. Increase support for democratic opposition in FRY. More actively support Djukanovic. Explore further possibility of indicting Milosevic and freezing his foreign assets.
- Support Kosovar Independence: This option could be graduated from minimal to full endorsement and support e.g., material support, direct military support, support for organizing a government in exile, and recognition of Kosovo as an independent state. This option subsumes several steps that could be initiated in succession, e.g. issuing the threat of recognition privately to Milosevic, making it public, and finally providing the support to the Kosovars.
- Non-permissive Ground Intervention: Continue air strikes and, if necessary, intervene with a large ground force to mitigate the human suffering and impose a settlement. NATO military authorities previously estimated that 75,000 troops would be required for forced entry operations into Kosovo and that 200,000 troops would be required for FRY-wide operations. This option is not viable.

Concerns

Allied and Russian Unity: In each of these options, and especially those that require NATO's continued use of force against the FRY, unity among the NATO Allies could be fragile. We might bolster unity if we could 1) keep Kosovars on-board with the IPA; 2) clearly identify Milosevic as perpetrator of hostilities and atrocities; 3) stress the impending humanitarian disaster; and, 4) reinforce that Allies cannot afford a failure in Kosovo in the run up the NATO Summit. Agreement from Russia,

or at least acquiescence, is important as well. We should nurture their cooperation while being prepared to manage any negative consequences in our bilateral relationship for taking steps that Russia does not prefer

KLA Response: As indicated above, keeping the Kosovars on-board with the IPA will be essential to any option that entails more than very short-lived coercive actions against the Serbs. Furthermore, a major diplomatic effort would be required to convince the KLA that its interest is best served by limiting itself to defensive actions, such as dispersion, in response to any Serb offensive. It may be futile to seek significant KLA restraint once hostilities reinitiate.

Humanitarian Crisis: During bombing, humanitarian relief efforts would cease and renewed hostilities among the parties could cause significant civilian casualties and atrocities, as well as a massive civilian displacement. This would cause tremendous pressure for actions to mitigate the human suffering. Should it be perceived that air strikes precipitated the violence and resulting humanitarian crisis, demands for action would be magnified. However, without a ground presence in Kosovo it would be difficult to address the humanitarian crisis. We could attempt to negotiate some type of NGOs presence in areas of minimal fighting. However, this would have limited effect and there would likely be strong calls to do more for those "trapped" by the conflict, e.g. humanitarian relief corridors, safe havens, humanitarian airdrops, military protection of relief providers, etc. None of these are attractive options.

Spillover: As shelter, food, and water shortages and the level of atrocities become more dire and if a NATO ground presence seems unlikely, a large number of civilians would flow across borders, initially to Montenegro and Macedonia, but also to Albania. The international community could provide relief in these neighboring areas. Further, if hostilities follow the civilians toward the border, or if the refugee crossing rate is high, there may be need for an international military or civilian presence along the Albanian and Macedonian borders to help maintain order and deter spillover of hostilities. The presence of refugees in Albania and Macedonia could be destabilizing. Further, should Milosevic decide to use one of the more dramatic wildcards described above (e.g., precipitate a crisis in Bosnia or attempt to seize control in Montenegro) the spillover effects could reverberate throughout the region and severely affect U.S. interests.

Montenegro Scenarios and Policy Options

Assumptions:

- NATO uses military force against the FRY, including within Montenegro.
- We need Djukanovic: he supports our policy on Kosovo, his regime is the only democratic government in the FRY and represents substantial democratic opposition to Milosevic, he supports Dayton, he may be useful on war crimes, and he continues to provide humanitarian support to displaced persons and refugees.
- We don't support independence: Although independence was offered to Bulatovic in 1992, we are concerned that now it would undermine the cohesiveness of Bosnia as well as increase Kosovar demands (even if Montenegro could technically be distinguished as a former republic of the SFRY, like Slovenia, Croatia, etc).
- The CG, including Russia, and other close Allies will continue to oppose Montenegrin independence.
- Belgrade's attempt to assert federal control over Montenegro could split the VJ.
- If Milosevic declares a state of emergency throughout the FRY and suspends the Montenegrin Government in response to NATO strikes, Djukanovic may: (1) resist Belgrade's authority and attempt to remain in power; (2) call for independence; or (3) flee and establish a "government-in-exile."
- Under any of these scenarios, he is likely to appeal for U.S. support and assistance.

Policy Objectives:

- Maintain Djukanovic in power and Montenegro as part of the FRY;
- Minimize negative effects of NATO air strikes on Montenegro;
- Minimize civil strife between Serbs and Montenegrins; and
- Avoid wider regional instability.

Preventive Policy Options (not mutually exclusive):

1. Deter effort by Milosevic to seize control.

- Communicate to Milosevic that Serb action against Montenegro will be factored into NATO calculus concerning air strikes.

2. Prevent Montenegrin secession from the FRY.

- SecState sent message to Djukanovic on 3/22 making it clear that we have concerns about any move towards independence and support resolution of the current crisis within the territory of the FRY.
- Continue to emphasize that we envision a solution within the territorial confines of the FRY and are willing to provide generous economic assistance to Montenegro in that context.
- Work with Allies to generate similar messages to Djukanovic discouraging independence but offering financial assistance.
- Work to disburse quickly \$10M reprogrammed ESF to Montenegro; continue efforts to secure additional \$10 million. Strengthen message to clarify that no assistance given if seeking independence.
- Differentiate to greater extent between Montenegro and Serbia/Milosevic in visible public statements.
- If pro-independence elements gain ground, consider emphasizing that restraint now could lead us to support independence later.

Response Policy Options (if Milosevic moves against Djukanovic and/or Djukanovic moves towards independence)

1. Djukanovic requests U.S. public or economic support to counter threat to his survival.

- No downside to public support for democracy in Montenegro and against Milosevic strong-arm tactics but may be seen as insufficient.
- As suggested above, can move to disburse economic assistance quickly (15-day Congressional notification underway). Could also take lead among the Allies to generate other economic support.

2. Djukanovic request NATO military support or an OSCE mission to help him maintain control of Montenegro as democratic province of FRY.

- Factor Serb action against Montenegro into calculus of continued NATO air operations

- Consider calibrating strikes to damage VJ capacity to take action in Montenegro.
- ~~Explore OSCE mission idea, although may be difficult to bypass Belgrade.~~

3. Montenegro declares its independence, sparking a Montenegrin-Serb civil war.

- Under current policy, we would not support Montenegrin independence however, failure to recognize Djukanovic would place him in an even more perilous position.
- Given that we were prepared to recognize Montenegro in past, should consider whether change would be warranted and its impact on Kosovar and Bosnian situations could be isolated.
- United States could state that it is considering recognition, without reaching a conclusion for some time.
- United States could also continue to work Djukanovic, without recognition while arguing that there are peaceful mechanisms within the FRY Constitution for seeking independence, albeit this might be a difficult line to hold if Montenegro is under sustained attack.
- If our policy is to oppose independence, stress to Djukanovic that we will not expand NATO options to Montenegro unless he reverses his position on independence.

4. Djukanovic flees Montenegro and sets up a "government-in-exile" (unlikely because his power base is local)

- Help Djukanovic leave.
- Urge Djukanovic to declare his intent to return to Montenegro as soon as possible. Help him to return quickly.
- Provide support for and assist him in exile, without recognizing a "government."
- Continue to provide public support for democracy in Montenegro and economic assistance to NGOs operating there.