

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|-----------------------|--|------------|----------------------|
| 001. email | Richard Brody to Kristen Pisani re: Talkers (6 pages) | 04/26/1999 | P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019 |
| 002. email | Brody to Richard Saunders et al. re: Draft Memcon on VP-Cherno Call (9 pages) | 04/26/1999 | P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019 |
| 003. email | Brody to Douglas Bayley et al. re: Cable for Possible Transmission Tonight (4 pages) | 04/28/1999 | P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019 |
| 004. email | Brody to Saunders re: Latest Version of Memcon (6 pages) | 04/30/1999 | P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019 |
| 005. email | Christopher Bolan to James Babbit et al. re: Summary of Actions/Latest Updates for VP Call (9 pages) | 05/01/1999 | P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019 |
| 006. email | Brody to Leslie Davidson re: FW: VP-Cherno: Arrangements and TPs (3 pages) | 05/03/1999 | P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019 |
| 007. email | Brody to Bonnie Broadwick re: WASHFAX to Secretary Albright (9 pages) | 05/05/1999 | P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019 |
| 008. email | Brody to Broadwick et al. re: VP Letter to Chernomyrdin (5 pages) | 05/17/1999 | P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019 |
| 009. email | Brody to Douglas Bayley re: VP Call to Chernomyrdin (3 pages) | 06/03/1999 | P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019 |
| 010. email | Brody to Michael Roberts re: Cover Memo and Letter to Cherno (3 pages) | 06/04/1999 | P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019 |
| 011. email | Brody to Saunders et al. re: Just In Case (4 pages) | 06/04/1999 | P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019 |
| 012. email | Brody to Bayley et al. re: Corrected-VP Letters to Stepashin and Chernomyrdin (6 pages) | 06/07/1999 | P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019 |

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Emails
 Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Cherno and VP...])
 OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[04/26/1999-06/14/1999]

2014-0560-M
rs1069

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|--|------------|----------------------|
| 013: email | Brody to Darrien re: Kosovo Memcons (73 pages) | 06/14/1999 | P1/b(1) KBM 5/2/2019 |

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Cherno and VP...])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[04/26/1999-06/14/1999]

2014-0560-M
rs1069

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 4/26/99 10:32:36 AM
 FROM Brody, Richard J.
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)
 DATECLASSIFIEDON 04/26/1999
 DECLASSIFYON 04/26/2009
 SUBJECT talkers [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]
 TO Pisani, Kristen L.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
 2014-0560-M (1.01)
 10/2/2018 KBM

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT vp cherno kosovo call april 26 -- final_.doc
 TALKING POINTS

CALL WITH VIKTOR CHERNOMYRDIN

MONDAY, APRIL 26, 1999, 11:15 A.M.

* Viktor Stepanovich, thank you for taking my call. I know you've been to Belgrade and that you just had your party congress and that you have little time.

* I'm calling on Kosovo. Our Presidents had an important talk on Sunday. For 90 minutes they discussed the requirements for a diplomatic solution to the crisis.

* I was pleased, Viktor Stepanovich, that President Yeltsin suggested that you and I may have a role to play. We have done excellent work together. We now owe it to our Presidents and to our countries to think very carefully of how we can best serve each of our national interests and our bilateral relationship.

* I hope we can do two things in this call. The first is to discuss procedural

questions on what needs to be done next. The second is to review some of the key substantive issues.

* One of the reasons for our success has been total candor, and I will be frank now. President Yeltsin suggested that we reactivate our commission. I do not think that what we need now is a mechanism. Rather, we can work more effectively if you and I add a channel to our dialogue that can help us solve this crisis.

* I know you spent nine hours with Milosevic. We cannot cover all the details and nuances by phone. But it is important for us to understand his position. That is why the President and I have asked Strobe to go to Moscow and get a full briefing from you about your meetings with Milosevic.

* Some of what we've heard from the Russian side confirms that you are trying hard to be constructive and achieve a solution. However, what we've heard from Belgrade since you left is just the opposite: it suggests that they're still dug in on their old, unacceptable positions.

* We need to truly understand every aspect of what you accomplished, the issues where Milosevic refused to cooperate, and the nature of Milosevic's situation that we might be able to exploit together.

* I also want Strobe to brief you on our discussions in Washington this past weekend. All of the NATO countries are firmly united. We want to be flexible, but there are some irreducible conditions that simply must be met. I want you to be able to ask Strobe as many questions as you need to understand these conditions.

* Once we have had a chance to put more information on the table, I think we each need to step back and assess what can be done together.

* Here is what I am concerned about. Solving this conflict in the right

way is important for the future of Europe. But it will also shape the course of U.S. and Russian relations for years.

* We need to define a path forward that spells success for the U.S. and Russia and that means a diplomatic solution that will work. We cannot afford a high-profile initiative where the U.S. and Russia, and you and I in particular, are on opposite sides of the fence and cannot find a way to break through. That would only please all the critics of engagement.

* So let's start, as we have always done, with getting the facts. You and I have always found that doing our homework first is a lot smarter -- and in the end a lot faster -- than running full speed before we know in which direction we're headed.

* Does this make sense to you?

Pause for Chernomyrdin's response

* There are three issues that I would like to ask you to give special attention because we have to understand every detail. Perhaps you and I can start, and Strobe can follow up.

* The first is the complete withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo. All the Contact Group, including Russia, have agreed on this point. There can be no compromise. But what we hear from Milosevic is that he will only consider a reduction of his forces. There is simply no way we can get the refugees to return to Kosovo if Serb forces are on the ground.

* Viktor, can you tell me if there was any agreement on a complete force withdrawal, including VJ, MUP, and paramilitaries?

* The second is the nature of an international security force.

* President Clinton and NATO have made clear that we would

welcome a UN mandate,
although UN command and control doesn't work, as we saw in
Somalia and the early
days of Bosnia.

* Bosnia is a good model to start from. There is a key role for NATO
(which is
essential for our participation, for the Kosovars to return, and to
enable force
to disarm the KLA). But Russia should be a key participant along with
other
non-NATO nations and other organizations like OSCE.

* We don't care what the force is called. It doesn't need a NATO sign
over door
or patches on the uniforms.

* But it must be a security force, or civilians and refugees simply
won't return.
Has Milosevic moved at all on this point?

* Viktor, can you tell me more about your conversations with
Milosevic about the
need for a strong international security force with real military
capability?

* The third issue is NATO's conditions to stop the bombing. The
Alliance has
just affirmed in a formal document agreed to by 19 heads of state that
the
bombing could be suspended if Milosevic were to do five things:

* Ensure a verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate
ending of
violence and repression in Kosovo;

* Withdraw from Kosovo his military, police and para-military forces;

* Agree to the stationing in Kosovo of an international military
presence;

* Agree to the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and
displaced
persons, and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid
organizations; and

* Provide credible assurance of his willingness to work for the
establishment of
a political framework agreement.

* I know President Yeltsin wants NATO to halt the air strikes the moment a diplomatic initiative begins. That won't work. We will suspend bombing once he has demonstrably begun to withdraw his forces according to a rapid timetable and has accepted our conditions. We must have more than promises. We have seen him break those promises too often before.

Pause for Chernomyrdin's reaction

* Viktor, let me sum up. I think we can work together in an effort to bring Milosevic to accept the international conditions for ending the war. He is most likely to accept if he sees that we agree and are united. We should proceed carefully and without delay. The first step is to get more information, and Strobe will be ready to listen and answer questions starting tonight.

* The second is to give special attention to the three issues I outlined: a complete withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo, the design of an international security force, and NATO's conditions to halt the air strikes.

* After that, we each need to assess the situation and decide if we see a path forward. And I need to hear back from Strobe and discuss this with my colleagues.

* For now, it does not help to say publicly that you and I were instructed to find a solution to the crisis. That will make success more difficult. Rather, I suggest we say publicly that we were asked to be in touch to review your trip and highlight issues for further discussion.

* I suggest we talk again soon, possibly at the end of this week or over the weekend. We can set the time later. But it will be soon.

* There is room for creativity here; we have a lot to work with. And if Russia plays this right, it can be a great victory for Russian diplomacy and Russian

peacekeeping that will help you outflank the critics that want to draw Russia into the conflict militarily.

If Chernomyrdin complains about the oil embargo

* The Alliance is united on this, and the EU is also on board. Milosevic is using that oil for one purpose above all: to keep his forces in the field in operation, so that they can continue to attack and expel Kosovo Albanians.

* We've agreed that we need to stop that violence, and I ask you to look at the embargo in that context.

* While I know you don't approve of the oil embargo any more than you approve of the air strikes, I hope you take every precaution to avoid putting Russia and NATO directly at odds. That could be dangerous and ruin whatever chance we have to find a diplomatic solution.

3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 4/26/99 5:49:12 PM
 FROM Brody, Richard J.
 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~
 CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)
 DATECLASSIFIEDON 04/26/1999
 DECLASSIFYON 04/26/2009
 SUBJECT Draft memcon on VP-Cherno call [SECRET]
 TO Saunders, Richard M.
 Davidson, Leslie K.
 Black, Steven K.

**DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526**
 2014-0560-M (1.02)
 10/2/2018 KBH

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT memcon -- vp cherno kosovo call april 26.doc
 DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: THE VICE PRESIDENT
 VIKTOR STEPANOVICH CHERNOMYRDIN

LOCATION: WEST WING OFFICE

NOTE TAKER: RICHARD BRODY

INTERPRETER: YURIY SHKEYROV

DATE/TIME: 26 APRIL 1999/1210-1310 EDT

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Viktor Stepanovich? It's great to talk to you. Thanks for taking my call.

VIKTOR CHERNOMYRDIN: I'm happy to hear you.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: How is Valentina Fedorovna?

VIKTOR CHERNOMYRDIN: She's doing fine. How are you and your children?

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Well, we're fine. We're expecting our first

grandchild at
the end of June.

VIKTOR CHERNOMYRDIN: I hope that everything will go well.
Please convey my best
wishes to your family.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Well thank you and please convey my
best wishes and
Tipper's to your family. And I hope your grandchildren are well.

VIKTOR CHERNOMYRDIN: How are you doing?

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: I'm doing very well. I just returned from
the memorial
service in Colorado for that horrible tragedy at the school there, but
overall
things are going very well. I'm glad to have the chance to work with
you again.
I know you've been to Belgrade and that you just had your party
congress and that
you have little time.
So perhaps we should turn to the topic of Kosovo. As you know, our
Presidents
had an important talk on Sunday. For 90 minutes they discussed the
requirements
for a diplomatic solution to the crisis. I was pleased, Viktor
Stepanovich, that
President Yeltsin suggested that you and I may have a role to play. Of
course,
we have done excellent work together. We now owe it to our
Presidents and to our
countries to think very carefully of how we can best serve each of our
national
interests and our bilateral relationship.

VIKTOR CHERNOMYRDIN: This problem is very important for all
of us...We have
found solutions to other problems...We need to do that for
everybody...I will do
my best to find a solution for everybody

[Interruption by US interpreter to ask Russian interpreter to translate
consecutively, not simultaneously]

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: I got most of what you said and I agree
with it and I hope
we can do two things in this call. The first is to discuss procedural
questions
on what needs to be done next. The second is to review some of the

key substantive issues. Is that alright as a way to proceed in this conversation?

VIKTOR CHERNOMYRDIN: Yes, I absolutely agree with that.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Well ok. One of the reasons for our success has been total candor, and I will be frank now. President Yeltsin suggested that we reactivate our commission. And I think what he is really trying to say is we did great work on our commission and wants us to....that. But we cannot have two commissions. I have one with Prime Minister Primakov and it would be harmful to create a second one. I'm sure this was President Yeltsin's way of having us work together. We can be more effective if we add a channel to our dialogue rather than reactivate the commission.

VIKTOR CHERNOMYRDIN: I totally agree with you. I've just spoken a few hours ago with our president and we discussed all these problems including the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission. I believe there is no need to replace the existing commission, Gore-Primakov, and all the more there is no need to set up a second commission. What we need is to ensure permanent communication and to attract the necessary experts to work at our level to help work out our positions, which must be agreed upon with our presidents and then get results. Once again, I would like to agree with you there's no need for another commission.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: I know you so well, my friend. I Knew you would agree. But it was important to raise this point. I know you spent nine hours with Milosevic. We cannot cover all the details and nuances by phone. But it is important for us to understand his position. That is why the President and I have asked Strobe to go to Moscow and get a full briefing from you about your meetings with Milosevic. Some of what we've heard from the Russian side confirms that you are trying hard to be constructive and achieve a solution. I

know for
certain myself that that is exactly what you are doing. However, what
we've
heard from Belgrade since you left is just the opposite: it suggests that
they're still dug in on their old, unacceptable positions. So, we need to
truly
understand every aspect of what you accomplished, the issues where
Milosevic
refused to cooperate, and the nature of Milosevic's situation that we
might be
able to work with together. In the same visit, I also want Strobe to
brief you
on our discussions in Washington this past weekend with all of the
NATO
countries. We remain firmly united and we want to be flexible, but
there are
some irreducible conditions that simply must be met from our
standpoint. I want
you to be able to ask Strobe as many questions as you need to fully
understand
these conditions - where we are and what the conditions are.

VIKTOR CHERNOMYRDIN: I know that Mr. Talbott is already here
in Moscow, and
tomorrow I will meet him. First at 9 o'clock he will have a talk with
Mr.
Ivanov, our foreign minister, and then we'll get together with him. I'll
inform
him of our position in the first stage and my talks with Milosevic. It
was a
hard talk, and we have to convince him of many things, which is not
easy. One
thing he has accepted is the international presence there. Naturally, he
is
against NATO, but there are some advances in his position and
evidently we need
to work out some type of compromise. What is important is that in the
statement
you adopted in Washington you expressed certain positions which
coincide with
those we take and with what sometimes Milosevic says. Those
positions have been
discussed with Mr. Ivanov and Madame Albright. All we need now is
to deepen
those positions. I talked just ten minutes before our call to the deputy
of Mr.
Milosevic, Mr. Draskovic, and he also accepted the international
presence. He
shares many positions of ours. Tomorrow we will discuss with Mr.

Talbott and it will be a large talk and we will see what compromises are possible. We need to meet each other at one point and time. To prevent the situation from getting worse. All we need is to find some kind of compromise.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: There are three issues that I would like to ask you to give special attention because we have to understand every detail, and Strobe can follow up on these. The first is the complete withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo. All the Contact Group, including Russia, have agreed on this point. There can be no compromise on this point. But what we hear from Milosevic is that he will only consider a reduction of his forces. There is simply no way we can get the refugees back into Kosovo if Serb forces are still there on the ground. Viktor Stepanovich, can you tell me if there was any agreement on a complete force withdrawal, including VJ, MUP, and paramilitaries?

VIKTOR CHERNOMYRDIN: Yes, he has agreed, but only to reduce his armed forces to the limit he had in the prewar period, and the same goes for the police forces which are there to ensure peace and order. Naturally, he insists that NATO also would withdraw its forces from the Yugoslav border. We did not discuss the details as to how much the armed forces and police forces should be reduced, but naturally, the police is needed there to ensure elementary peace and order. It was difficult at the first talk to agree on anything. We have to continue. He said he will reserve some police forces in the Serbian part of Kosovo.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Okay, well, it's obvious that's something that will require a good deal more discussion. But let me move to the second point, and that is the nature of an international security force. President Clinton and NATO have made clear that we would welcome a UN mandate, although UN command and control doesn't work, as we saw in Somalia and the early days of Bosnia.

Bosnia is a good model to start from. There is a key role for NATO (which is essential for our participation, for the Kosovars to return, and to enable force to disarm the KLA). But Russia should be a key participant along with other non-NATO nations and other organizations like OSCE. We don't care what the force is called. It doesn't need a NATO sign over the door or NATO patches on the uniforms. But it must be a security force, or civilians and refugees simply won't return. Now I don't think we can proceed if there is any kind of Serb police or VJ or MUP there, but on this point about the international security force, there is a basis for our position to be accepted by Milosevic, if he is agreed to a security force. Has he moved at all on this point?

VIKTOR CHERNOMYRDIN: This was the main issue we discussed with him. He accepted the international security forces and he said it may be...or military people from Greece or from other NATO countries may take part in the international forces, but he made a point that Russia must be largely represented in those forces...Ukraine also and from South Africa, but I totally agree with you there's no need to put a sign on the door or to put the NATO patch on the uniform. The main thing is it should be under the aegis of the United Nations. He insists on a large participation from Russia. Geography can be discussed later. The main thing is to find a compromise. He agreed the international forces should be headed by someone from the United Nations.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: We would welcome a UN mandate, but it must be a security force, or civilians and refugees simply won't return. Now the third issue has to do with NATO's conditions to stop the bombing. The Alliance has just affirmed in a formal document agreed to by 19 heads of state that the bombing could be suspended if Milosevic were to do five things: First, ensure a verifiable stop

to all military action and the immediate ending of violence and repression in Kosovo; second, withdraw from Kosovo his military, police and paramilitary forces; third, agree to the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence; fourth, agree to the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons, and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid

organizations; and fifth, provide credible assurance of his willingness to work

for the establishment of a political framework agreement. I know President

Yeltsin wants NATO to halt the air strikes the moment a diplomatic initiative

begins. But that won't work. We will suspend bombing once he has demonstrably

begun to withdraw his forces according to a rapid timetable and has accepted our

conditions. We must have more than promises. We have seen him break those

promises too often before. Strobe can follow up on these points but I wanted to

make sure you heard from me as far as this third issue is concerned.

VIKTOR CHERNOMYRDIN: We have those joint statements adopted in Washington and if

we look at that statement and at the outcome of the talks with Mr. Milosevic, we

can see many things are either close or coincide, including the cessation of the

military hostilities, the safe return of the refugees, necessary conditions for

humanitarian organizations, and the need to work out a [political] framework

agreement. If we look once again, we see half of the provisions, half of the

points, may be considered as coinciding. Naturally, we need to persuade him and

convince him. One talk I had with Milosevic already revealed the possibility of

working further. He has agreed to pull out his troops and what is needed is to

establish security conditions for the return of the refugees. There must be

someone to ensure security, and that is international forces. We should have a

100 percent guarantee for the safe conditions for the refugees. My talk with

Draskovic once again convinced me that it is possible as I return to exert every effort in order to achieve that agreement.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Well, that's very good. We each need to assess the situation and decide if we see a path forward. And I need to hear back from Strobe after his visit with you, and I need to discuss this with my colleagues.

For now, it does not help to say publicly that you and I were instructed to find a solution to the crisis. That will make success more difficult by raising expectations before we've all been able to make an assessment.

Rather, I suggest we say publicly that we were asked to be in touch to create a channel of discussions to review your trip and highlight issues for further discussion. I suggest we talk again soon, possibly at the end of this week or over the weekend.

We can set the time later. But it will be soon. There is room for creativity here, Viktor Stepanovich; we have a lot to work with. And if Russia plays this right, it can be a great victory for Russian diplomacy and Russian peacekeeping that will help you outflank the critics that want to draw Russia into the

conflict militarily. I look forward to talking again soon on this. It's a great joy to work with you again my friend.

VIKTOR CHERNOMYRDIN: Thank you. It is true we have to analyze the situation and have to be aware of all the developments that take place in Yugoslavia. And I totally agree with you we should not make any public announcements that we were instructed to work together. All we can mention is yes, we have to work in concert to work on an acceptable solution...The situation is getting more and more complicated and with destruction taking place on a large scale it is more difficult to convince Milosevic. You have to realize in our country it is also not that easy. There are people who want to send military units to Yugoslavia.

I think the situation here and there is not that easy and we should not delay the search for the solution because conditions are becoming more and more severe and the destruction larger and larger. I don't think the delay will help us find a solution at a later stage because we could see a final destruction [in Yugoslavia]... Tomorrow I'll meet with Talbott and we will discuss all those issues. After that we can analyze the situation and we can meet to work out options further. We can meet some place in Europe like Zurich, together with other West European leaders. We have to find a way out of this. You are getting more and more involved in this humane [sic] force, and perhaps we'll work together to find a solution. Tomorrow the situation may become even more difficult, and that's why we have to see what we can do.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Well, very good. I enjoyed talking with you and look forward to hearing from you soon. I look forward to hearing back from Strobe. Once again, give my best to Valentina, and I wish the best for you, too and look forward to talking to you soon. Goodbye.

VIKTOR CHERNOMYRDIN: Thank you. I'm really, really happy to have this chance to talk with you and I hope we'll keep in touch to find an acceptable solution, and I wish you all the best in everything.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Okay, bye.

3

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 4/28/99 9:10:42 PM
 FROM Brody, Richard J.
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)
 DATECLASSIFIEDON 04/28/1999
 DECLASSIFYON 04/28/2009
 SUBJECT CABLE FOR POSSIBLE TRANSMISSION TONIGHT -- PER
 BRODY INSTRUCTIONS TO SDO
 [CONFIDENTIAL]

DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526
 2014-0560-M (1.03)
 10/2/2018 KBH

TO

Bayley, Douglas C.
 Bresnahan, Gary E.
 Broadwick, Bonnie .
 Campanella, Anthony
 Chastain, George M.
 Cosgriff, Kevin J.
 Crowder, Stevan D.
 Crowell, Thomas R.
 Erdahl, Douglas M.
 Ford, Robert G.
 Fuchs, Joachim D.
 Glick, Bonnie L.
 Jansen, Christian P.
 Jarosinski, Frank J.
 Laskowski, Gregory J.
 Manning, Michael T.
 McClellan, Christina L.
 McGee, Jenny A.
 Merletti, Roger D.
 Murphy, Miles R.
 Payne, Raymond H.
 Porterfield Patrick C.
 Rickard, Robin S.
 Rogers, Elizabeth B.
 Schrader, Joel M.
 Sibley, Matthew W.
 Sigler, Ralph H.
 Smith, James A.
 Tarver, J. Sean
 Unrue, Michael
 Broadwick, Bonnie .
 Campanella, Anthony

Chastain, George M.
Crowder, Stevan D.
Crowell, Thomas R.
Erdahl, Douglas M.
Fuchs, Joachim D.
Glick, Bonnie L.
Jansen, Christian P.
Laskowski, Gregory J.
McClellan, Christina L.
Porterfield Patrick C.
Schrader, Joel M.
Sigler, Ralph H.

CARBON_COPY

Saunders, Richard M.
Brody, Richard J.
Davidson, Leslie K.
Pascual, Carlos E.

TEXT_BODY**TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT**

CABLE WITH VP ORAL MESSAGE TO CHERNO.DOC
PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE

CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/NODIS

FROM: WHITE HOUSE//OVP//

TO: SECSTATE
AMEMBASSY BONN

INFO: AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT'S ORAL MESSAGE TO VIKTOR
CHERNOMYRDIN

REF: WHITE HOUSE DTG

FOR THE AMBASSADOR

SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT'S ORAL MESSAGE TO VIKTOR
CHERNOMYRDIN

1. THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE. PLEASE DELIVER THE
FOLLOWING ORAL MESSAGE FROM THE
VICE PRESIDENT TO VIKTOR CHERNOMYRDIN, WHO IS
SCHEDULED TO TRAVEL TO BONN AND

ROME ON THURSDAY, APRIL 29, FOR CONSULTATIONS ON KOSOVO WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS. SUGGEST YOU CONTACT LOCAL RUSSIAN EMBASSY TO ASCERTAIN CHERNOMYRDIN'S PLANS AND WHEREABOUTS.

2. FOR EMBASSY BONN: IF UNABLE TO DELIVER TO CHERNOMYRDIN WHILE HE IS IN BONN, PLEASE NOTIFY EMBASSY ROME TO COMPLETE THE ACTION.

3. BEGIN TEXT OF MESSAGE:

--AS YOU PURSUE YOUR DISCUSSIONS, I WANTED TO SEND YOU A BRIEF MESSAGE WITH AN UPDATE ON OUR THINKING ON KOSOVO.

--THANK YOU FOR RECEIVING STROBE TALBOTT IN MOSCOW. HE GAVE ME A FULL ACCOUNT OF HIS MEETINGS WITH YOU AND OF THE FOUR ISSUES THAT YOU AND YOUR TEAM HAVE ASKED US TO LOOK INTO:

--WITHDRAWAL OF SERB FORCES FROM KOSOVO;
--THE NATURE OF AN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PRESENCE FOR KOSOVO;
--THE NATURE OF AN INTERNATIONALLY PROTECTED AREA IN KOSOVO;
--AND NATO'S CONDITIONS TO SUSPEND AIRSTRIKES AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA.

--I AGREE WITH YOU THAT IMPLEMENTING NATO'S CONDITIONS IN THESE AREAS WILL REQUIRE A GREAT DEAL OF THOUGHT. SO I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT WE ARE WORKING SERIOUSLY TO ELABORATE OUR STRATEGY. WE PROMISE TO FOLLOW UP WITH YOU SOON.

--IN THE MEANTIME, I HOPE YOU HAVE GOOD AND PRODUCTIVE MEETINGS WITH SCHROEDER AND D'ALEMA. I ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT YOU WILL TRAVEL TO BELGRADE TO SEE MILOSEVIC. I KNOW THAT YOU UNDERSTAND OUR VIEWS WELL AND WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR CONVEYING THEM FORCEFULLY.

--WE APPRECIATED THE CAUTIOUS WAY YOU HANDLED THE PRESS AFTER YOUR LAST TRIP. SOMETIMES THE LESS SAID IN PUBLIC THE BETTER, AND IT CERTAINLY REDUCES THE

CHANCES THAT MILOSEVIC WILL CONTRADICT WHAT
YOU SAY.

--I LOOK FORWARD TO TALKING WITH YOU WHEN YOU
RETURN TO MOSCOW AFTER YOUR
TRAVELS.

4. END TEXT OF MESSAGE.

2

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 4/30/99 10:24:08 PM
 FROM Brody, Richard J.
 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~
 CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)
 DATECLASSIFIEDON 04/30/1999
 DECLASSIFYON 04/30/2009
 SUBJECT LATEST VERSION OF MEMCON [~~SECRET~~]
 TO Saunders, Richard M.
 CARBON_COPY Brody, Richard J.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
 2014-0560-M (1.04)
 10/2/2018 KBH

TEXT_BODY

THIS IS LATEST/BEST VERSION OF MEMCON (WITH
 CARLOS' INPUT INCLUDED)

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT memcon -- vp cherno kosovo call april 29.doc
 DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: THE VICE PRESIDENT
 VIKTOR STEPANOVICH CHERNOMYRDIN

LOCATION: WEST WING OFFICE

NOTE TAKER: RICHARD BRODY

INTERPRETER: YURIY SHKEYROV

DATE/TIME: 29 APRIL 1999/1029-1052 EDT

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: Hello. Victor Chernomyrdin here. I am
 listening.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Hello, Viktor Stepanovich?

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: Yes.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: How are you doing?

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: Everything is okay. I am here in Bonn now

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Viktor Stepanovich, I'm glad I was able to catch you during your travels. As you pursue your discussions, I wanted to update you briefly on our thinking. Thanks for receiving Strobe. He gave me a full account of his meetings with you and of the issues that you and your team have asked us to elaborate more fully. As I understand it, these issues include: terms for withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo (including schedule and verification means); the nature of an international security presence for Kosovo; the nature of an interim, provisional administration for Kosovo; and NATO's conditions to suspend airstrikes against Yugoslavia.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: I understand. We discussed these conditions with Mr. Talbott. Everything is clear, but in order to achieve all that one has to start from something. I am proceeding based on the telephone conversation between our two presidents, President Clinton and President Yeltsin. In this conversation, Clinton said that if Milosevic starts withdrawing his troops from Kosovo and if simultaneously we create conditions for the safe return of refugees to Kosovo, and if we determine the conditions for an international contingent which has to enter, then the rockets and bomb strikes can end, and later we can discuss other issues like the extent to which he has to withdraw his military forces and the special police and everything that is in Kosovo. The question is whether we are talking about full withdrawal of forces or if some forces have to stay. Because people have to be living in Kosovo and someone has to ensure normal life in Kosovo, especially taking into account that Kosovo remains a part of Yugoslavia.

Then one has to discuss the configuration of the international presence. We

understand there has to be civil and military components of that presence. The civil component is those people who help organize a normal life in Kosovo and ensure that there is autonomy for Kosovo and in general ensure that people are living normally in Kosovo. And the military people have to ensure the safe return of refugees and those who decide on continuing to live in Kosovo and it takes time to do all that. I think those are possibilities and I will talk with Milosevic and will try to convince him of that.

But we need to do something now to stop these processes, because blood is being spilled in Kosovo, civilians are being killed. The bombing has to be temporarily suspended in order to pursue this. Something has to be done. Otherwise we cannot assure the return of refugees or assure the movement of international forces into Kosovo and the problem meanwhile is getting more complicated. The more blood that gets spilled, the more difficult the solution to this problem will be. And today I believe it is possible to hold talks with Milosevic but in the future if it goes on further there will be no one to talk to because Serbia is being destroyed and people are getting killed. Russia then has to decide [indecipherable]. And one cannot allow that.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: I understand we're far apart and I agree with you that implementing NATO's conditions in these areas will require careful work. So I want to assure you that we are working seriously to answer your questions. We promise to follow up with you soon. Let me just mention two points for now. On the international security presence, as I noted in our earlier call, there are many possible models for this force. But, NATO must be at its core. On the question of a UN role, I want to reiterate that we would welcome a UN mandate, although we cannot accept UN command and control. As we saw in Somalia and in the early days of Bosnia, that just does not work. Certainly both the

UN and OSCE would be directly involved in implementing civilian aspect of any settlement. In the meantime, I hope you are having good and productive meetings with Schroeder and D'Alema. I also understand that you will travel to Belgrade tomorrow to see Milosevic. I would be interested in your thinking as you get ready to go. I wish you well in your efforts.

I also wanted to say, Viktor Stepanovich, that we appreciated the cautious way you handled the press after your last trip. Sometimes the less said in public the better. Such a strategy certainly reduces the chances that Milosevic will contradict what you say - and it avoids inadvertently locking your Government into an untenable position. In fact, I strongly advise, if you will permit me, that you try to avoid committing in public to a position you have reason to believe cannot be reconciled with ours. This is precisely what we need to be talking about before we go public. Let's keep this line of communication wide open. I look forward to talking to you when you return, so good luck my friend.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: Thank you very much. I would like to tell you I am a convinced supporter of what has been discussed with President Yeltsin and our government. We have to find a solution through political ways because the military way is not the right way to do this. That is why I will talk to Mr. Milosevic. I understand this is the main question and I will try to convince him about safe return of refugees and I will insist on a civilian and military mission. It must also include NATO countries and I will try to convince him of just that. I will also try to convince him that this has to be done under the auspices of the UN with participation of OSCE and EU. One has to understand his position. I had a discussion today with Kofi Annan and I don't

understand his position. He has the desire only he doesn't have anything else; that is why the gigantic effort is required to ensure all this.

I absolutely agree with you, and it is my position as well it is not necessary to comment publicly, it is necessary to try to achieve results. Once again I will today be in Rome and tomorrow in Belgrade and it is without doubt we will find the possibility to talk to again. But I also would like to ask another question about whether we could meet somewhere in Europe. Today I had a telephone call from Mr. Blair as well. My main thing is find a possibility to meet with you somewhere in Europe provided it is possible.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Viktor Stepanovich, let's wait until your trip to Belgrade has concluded then assess whether progress has been made and compare notes before making a decision on that. We have to know if there is a basis for genuine progress, significant progress, before we schedule a meeting of that sort. We have to do more work behind the scenes to prepare the ground but let's wait until your visit has concluded. And let's talk perhaps on a secure line when you return to Moscow. And then we will make an assessment on that. Does that sound ok to you?

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: I agree completely. Only after my trips to Bonn, Rome and Belgrade can we agree on some future actions.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Very good. Good luck in your travels. My prayers are with you and I look forward to talking to you after this phase of your journey.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: Thank you very much. As soon as I finish all these matters I will immediately give you a call. Best to your home.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Do svedeniia and best to your home.

1
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 5/1/99 8:12:24 PM

FROM Bolan, Christopher J.

CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(b)(d)

DATECLASSIFIEDON 05/01/1999

DECLASSIFYON 05/01/2009

SUBJECT Summary of actions/latest updates for VP call to Cherno on Sunday
[CONFIDENTIAL]

TO Babbitt, James F.
Black, Steven K.
Bolan, Christopher J.
Boulton, Darrien D.
Brody, Richard J.
Davidson, Leslie K.
Fuerth, Leon S.
Hilty, Joanne M.
Orfini, Michael H.
Osius, Theodore G.
Pisani, Kristen L.
Roberts, Michael W.
Saunders, Richard M.
Woolston, Ann E.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0560-M (1.05)
10/2/2018 KBH

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

Just for sake of convenience....here are talkers (same as sent at 7:10PM tonight) and updated cover memo. Hardcopy package to include type-written tabs (yes, I've found my next career) and enclosures are in Rick's slot in the vault. On my way home I'm leaving a copy of the tp's with the Sitroom, in the event Leon wants an updated version sent to him at home.

Larry Walker is the driver on duty (home: 562-2848). I've asked him to call Richard tomorrow morning between 9-9:30AM to confirm details of delivery of the package to VP at the residence (which I told him should be between 10-11:00AM depending on updates/edits, etc.).

POW calls sheets were sent
in a separate e-mail. POC at the Pentagon is the DDO at the NMCC,
BGen Lee (703)-695-0098/0100. Army Command Center at (703)-
695-2769
is also key player. Sitroom is following all of this closely.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Chernom-VP cover note_2may99.doc

May 2, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: LEON FUERTH

SUBJECT: Your Phone Call with Former Prime Minister
Chernomyrdin

Talking points are attached as are the draft memorandum of your last
phone call
with Chernomyrdin and Strobe Talbott's report on his Moscow
meeting with him.

The call is currently set for 1:00 p.m. EDT on Sunday. I will call you
shortly
before for a quick pre-brief.

We do not know at this point whether Chernomyrdin will ask to come
to Washington
on Monday. His people have applied for visas, but the actual decision
to travel
probably will not be made until after Chernomyrdin's meeting with
Yeltsin on
Saturday.

If he asks, Sandy, Madeleine, and I agree that you should accept - but
cite the
caveats in your talking points about not raising expectations or
giving
Milosevic false hopes.

As for the logistics of meeting Chernomyrdin, Lisa Berg says you are working from 9:00 a.m. to 6:45 p.m. on Monday, so a Monday dinner would work (you might specifically mention dinner to Chernomyrdin so he will be sure to arrive in Washington early enough). You depart for Detroit at 10:00 a.m. on Tuesday.

Attachments:

Talking points
MemCon
Strobe's report
NATO Statement on Kosovo

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Cherno-VP TPs May 2 99.doc
Talking Points
Phone Call to Former Prime Minister Chernomyrdin
May 2, 1999

I'm glad we've been able to get in touch so quickly after your return to Moscow.
I'm looking forward to hearing news of your discussions in Belgrade.

I want to say this is an important day for us with the release of the U.S. servicemen. I wonder if you raised this issue with Milosevic and, if you did, I thank you for that.

I also appreciate the way you handled the press. President Clinton and I want to be as supportive as possible of Russia's efforts on the diplomatic track.

When we talked on Thursday, you said that you would ask Milosevic a number of specific questions. So I wanted to talk with you today to see if you were able to move him at all on these issues.

As I recall, you were going to press Milosevic on the nature of the

international
presence in Kosovo.

As part of this, you said you would try to convince Milosevic to accept an international military presence to assure the safe return of refugees and a lasting halt to the violence. How did Milosevic respond?

[pause for Chernomyrdin's response]

I realize that the press often doesn't get the details correct, but I want to make sure we understand each other about the UN's role. You've talked publicly and privately about UN auspices and a UN peacekeeping force.

Let me reiterate what I said on Thursday: By "UN auspices" we mean a Chapter VII resolution providing the mandate for the international military presence. We do not mean UN command and control of the military force. I think we agreed on that point.

This is a key point for us and I want to make sure I understood you correctly.
Is that right, Viktor?

[pause for Chernomyrdin's response]

And one other thing, when we say that NATO must be at the core of the military presence, we intend that US forces participate as well. Some have talked about only having selected NATO nations in the military force - we oppose this.

It will be important to the Kosovars, I believe, for us to participate, just as it would be reassuring for the Serbs, if Russia participates.

[pause for Chernomyrdin's response]

Let me return to what you raised with Milosevic - did you see any indication that he is ready to stop military operations and end the violence and repression his forces are committing in Kosovo?

I inferred from your remarks on Thursday that you might talk to Milosevic about the need for withdrawal of military and paramilitary forces in Kosovo. Was there any movement on his part towards the total withdrawal of his forces?

Unless he gets all of his forces out, the refugees won't go back, and only armed guerillas will return to Kosovo. Any FRY military or paramilitary forces will be dangerous to the international security presence, and we won't be able to get the KLA to disarm.

[pause for Chernomyrdin's response]

Is Milosevic ready to agree to the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons, and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organizations?

What about getting Milosevic to accept, in addition to the international military presence, roles for UN, OSCE and EU? How did he react to these ideas?

[pause for Chernomyrdin's response]

As I mentioned on Thursday, I agree with you that it is important to work out the details of how NATO's conditions would be implemented. We are working hard inside our government and with NATO on responses to your questions about how to implement NATO's conditions.

I hope to have experts begin discussions with yours soon. The President and I want to send Strobe back to Moscow as part of these talks. But I want to be frank -- success will not be found simply by trying to mechanically split the difference between NATO's conditions and Milosevic's position.

The main purpose of our discussions with you and the Russian government is to find a way to get Milosevic to accept NATO's conditions for an end to the bombing. Milosevic repeatedly has made promises and violated them

while
continuing his strategy of brutal repression in Kosovo. He must be
stopped.

If asked - Contingency Points

If Chernomyrdin asks to come to Washington on Monday:

I am ready to meet with you if you think the time is right. I would be
glad to
outline our current thinking if you come to Washington. I would also
welcome
hearing more about your trip. Of course, I will not be able to give you
a lot
more detail on the questions you asked Strobe; we have more work to
do
internally and with Allies.

My only concern is that any meeting not create unreasonable
expectations of a
breakthrough.

Secretary Albright and Minister Ivanov have made progress in
affirming the areas
where we agree: Milosevic has to stop the violence against the
Kosovars, allow
the refugees to return and allow unimpeded humanitarian access.
There is no new
news for us to make on these points.

We've now also made progress in defining the issues where we still
need more
work, particularly the international security presence and the
international
provisional administration. We still need some time to elaborate these
issues
fully and discuss them with the other NATO countries. We also
promised to
outline our views on a full Serb force withdrawal, and we are still
working on
that.

If you would agree to meet on this basis - recognizing that we are not
in a
position to reach any conclusions - then I would welcome the chance
to talk
face-to-face.

I think we would also have to make clear to the press in advance that
we are

meeting to share views on where we currently stand in the process and to discuss next steps, but that we are not in a position to reach a settlement. We need to do this in advance to make sure that expectations do not run too high.

Does this sound OK to you?

There is another thing we must consider as well. We have learned in our dealings with Milosevic that the most dangerous thing one can do is give him reason to hope that he can divide his opponents and shake their resolve. NATO's conditions are firm and will not be watered down or changed.

The best way for you and me to help end this conflict is to demonstrate to Milosevic that we agree on what he must do.

If Chernomyrdin asks about NATO stopping the bombing/speed of Serb withdrawal:

Let me reiterate that NATO is prepared to suspend air strikes only when Belgrade has unequivocally accepted NATO conditions and demonstrably begun to withdraw its forces from Kosovo according to a precise and rapid timetable.

What we mean by "rapid" is that all Serb military, police, and paramilitary forces would have to be withdrawn from Kosovo in a matter of days. The bombing would stop when he begins his withdrawal. It would start up again if he fails to meet the timetable for the withdrawal or any of the other conditions.

If Chernomyrdin asks about verifying the Serb withdrawal:

Regarding verifying the Serb withdrawal, the international military force would do that with air surveillance and any forces going into Kosovo. We, of course, welcome Russian participation in the international military force and its

verification functions. We would have to work with Russia to develop the proper arrangements for this.

If Chernomyrdin suggests that U.S. forces limit deployment to Albania and FYROM:

The immediate post-conflict environment is going to be very dangerous. The international force must be as effective as possible if the refugees are going to return and the KLA is going to disarm.

We cannot allow Milosevic arbitrarily to dictate which NATO countries participate in the force. Of course, we would also welcome participation by Russia, Ukraine, and other countries.

Chernomyrdin calls for a bigger residual Serb military presence or a return to October 1998 levels:

Our position is that all Serb military, police, and paramilitary forces must be withdrawn. A small number of Serb security personnel might be allowed to return to Kosovo, subject to agreement by the Kosovar Albanians and supervision by the international military force, to protect Serb patrimony or to serve as liaison to the international military force. (I don't want to get into specific numbers, but let me tell you that we're thinking on the order of a few dozen Serb personnel at most.)

If Chernomyrdin complains about International provisional administration for Kosovo or creation of a "protectorate":

I know this is a sensitive issue for you and that you are concerned about the implications for conflict areas in the former Soviet Union.

An international provisional administration would be established under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the FRY. We would be open to having this administration mandated by the UN Security Council with roles for UN agencies, OSCE, and key partners like Russia..

Please bear in mind that the scale of what Milosevic has done -- the human cost and the level of violence -- creates unique circumstances. We cannot allow Milosevic to retain control over Kosovo. And even if the Kosovar Albanians return, they will not be able simply to pick up their lives and start running their affairs -- they will need a lot of help.

5

2

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 5/3/99 1:17:29 PM

FROM Brody, Richard J.

CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)

DATECLASSIFIEDON 05/03/1999

DECLASSIFYON 05/03/2009

SUBJECT FW: VP-Cherno: arrangements and TPs [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

TO Davidson, Leslie K.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2014-0560-m (1.06)
10/2/2018 KBH

-----Original Message-----

From: Schulte, Gregory L.
Sent: Monday,
May 03, 1999 1:10 PM
To: Brody, Richard J.
Subject: FW: VP-Cherno:
arrangements and TPs [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

pls see changes.

-----Original
Message-----

From: Brody, Richard J.
Sent: Monday, May 03, 1999
12:54 PM
To: Saunders, Richard M.; Davidson, Leslie K.; Weiss, Andrew
S.; Pascual, Carlos E.; Schulte, Gregory L.
Subject: VP-Cherno:
arrangements and TPs [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

NEED CLEARANCE ON ATTACHED
ASAP -- ASSUME 10-MINUTE MEETING. ALSO NOTE
FOLLOWING:

- VP-Cherno
will be true 1-on-1 (Cherno, VP, interpreters, 2 notetakers)
- VP-Cherno

dinner: no decision yet

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT talking points for vp-chno mtg 5-3.doc
TALKING POINTS
MEETING WITH VIKTOR CHERNOMYRDIN
MAY 3, 1999

* Viktor Stepanovich, it's good to see you. I'm glad you were able to come to Washington.

* The President and I were very pleased by the release of the U.S. servicemen. I wonder if you raised this issue with Milosevic and, if you did, I thank you for that.

* You and I have just a few minutes before we meet with the President. He and I are most eager to hear about your discussions with Milosevic.

* Before we go in to the President, I wanted to let you know that we have been doing a lot of thinking about the questions you asked Strobe last week. We agree that our experts might get together next week to talk about the technical details of implementing NATO's conditions. But I want to make sure that both countries are trying to move in the same direction.

* We think that we are both trying to move towards sovereignty, order, and safety in Kosovo. We need to know that this is your view also. When we talk with the President we'll go into more detail.

IF TIME PERMITS:

* Let me explain further what we mean by these three points:

* On sovereignty: we mean autonomy for Kosovo within the FRY.

* On order: we envision an international military force that can prevent short-term chaos and contribute to long-term stability. To do this - and be credible to all Kosovo residents -- the force must have NATO at the core with

participation by Russia;

* On safety: we want to assure safety for Kosovar Albanians, Serbs, and any international personnel there to administer post-conflict agreements. This will not be possible if Serb military and police units remain in Kosovo and the KLA is not disarmed.

* If we send our experts to Moscow, they would be senior, skilled, and have the authority to come to conclusions. We need to know that your team will be at the same level and have the same authority.

2

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 5/5/99 5:51:07 PM

FROM Brody, Richard J.

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)

DATECLASSIFIEDON 05/05/1999

DECLASSIFYON 05/05/2009

SUBJECT WASHFAX TO SECRETARY ALBRIGHT ~~[SECRET]~~

TO Broadwick, Bonnie .
Campanella, Anthony
Chastain, George M.
Crowder, Stevan D.
Crowell, Thomas R.
Erdahl, Douglas M.
Fuchs, Joachim D.
Glick, Bonnie L.
Jansen, Christian P.
Laskowski, Gregory J.
McClellan, Christina L.
Porterfield Patrick C.
Schrader, Joel M.
Sigler, Ralph H.

CARBON_COPY Brody, Richard J.
Saunders, Richard M.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0560-M (1.07)
10/2/2018 KBH

TEXT_BODY

PLEASE FAX ATTACHED TO SECRETARY OF STATE AT HER
TRIP SITE
IN EUROPE FOR DELIVERY TO HER FIRST THING IN THE
MORNING. PLEASE
SEND UNDER AS NODIS/EYES ONLY. THANKS.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT memo to mka on cherno points.doc

May 5, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

FROM LEON FUERTH

SUBJECT Readout on VP-Chernomyrdin meetings

You may recall that I had a colleague in the room taking notes during the Vice President's meetings with Chernomyrdin. I asked him to extract the points that illustrate the state of Chernomyrdin's thinking and the points of agreement we share with him.

I have attached this document. I have also provided a copy to Strobe. I hope it is helpful to you.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Chernomyrdin Points of Agreement.doc
Composite Chernomyrdin View

- * Need to maintain Serb sovereignty over Kosovo
- * Ethnic cleansing has taken place (but only after bombing started);
- * Milosevic violated October agreement about pull-out of troops from Kosovo;
- * Safe return of all refugees;
- * Need to disarm KLA;
- * Withdrawals:
 - * Need for withdrawal of some Serb forces to enable refugees to return; says also that Milosevic has agreed to withdraw some forces; but Chernomyrdin argues need to leave some Serb forces to protect border, historical sites and prevent Serb-led guerrilla war.
 - * Possible agreement on need for "down payment" withdrawals before bombing ceases
 - Cherno said he understood us, but his agreement was ambiguous.
- * Military/police forces:

- * International military force necessary to end bloodshed
- * Need some Serb troops to protect sites of Serb patrimony, but disagree on numbers and implications for total Serb forces in Kosovo
- * Some type of police presence necessary in Kosovo, but disagree over who would provide it
- * NATO presence: VP, SRB, et al reiterated at-core-not-on-door position; no explicit agreement from Cherno to NATO presence in force, but he seems to imply acceptance because:
 - * He says Milosevic accepts NATO's 5 points
 - * He (Cherno) is receptive to IFOR-type arrangement
- * Need for international assistance to help rebuild Yugoslavia
- * Need to provide special entity/fig leaf for Milosevic (cannot be US or Russia)
- * UN can provide mandate for agreement worked out by Russia/U.S. behind scenes;
 - * Can be UN Ch. VII SC resolution
 - * But Annan cannot have control over process.
- * Ahtisaari should be special designate
- * Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin will negotiate Milosevic acceptance of NATO conditions
 - * Ahtisaari will operate independent of Annan - Annan will have no control over process and nature of agreement.

2

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

Doc4.doc

TIME OF TRANSMISSION: TIME OF RECEIPT:

WHITE HOUSE

SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE
CLASSIFICATION:
RELEASER:

DATE/TIME:

MESSAGE #:

FROM:
LEON FUERTH
PH:
69511
ROOM:

SUBJECT:
VP-CERNOMYRDIN MEETINGS
PAGES:

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

LOCATION

DELIVER TO

ROOM

PHONE

TRIP SITE

SECRETARY OF STATE

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

PLEASE DELIVER TO SECRETARY ALBRIGHT UNDER
NODIS/EYES ONLY PROCEDURES

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 5/17/99 8:47:42 PM
 FROM Brody, Richard J.
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)
 DATECLASSIFIEDON 05/17/1999
 DECLASSIFYON 05/17/2009
 SUBJECT VP letter to Chernomyrdin [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]
 TO

**DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526**

2014-0560-M (1.08)
 10/2/2018 KBH

Broadwick, Bonnie .
 Campanella, Anthony
 Chastain, George M.
 Crowder, Stevan D.
 Crowell, Thomas R.
 Erdahl, Douglas M.
 Fuchs, Joachim D.
 Glick, Bonnie L.
 Jansen, Christian P.
 Laskowski, Gregory J.
 McClellan, Christina L.
 Porterfield Patrick C.
 Schrader, Joel M.
 Sigler, Ralph H.
 Bayley, Douglas C.
 Bresnahan, Gary E.
 Broadwick, Bonnie .
 Campanella, Anthony
 Chastain, George M.
 Cheramie, Don E.
 Cosgriff, Kevin J.
 Crowder, Stevan D.
 Crowell, Thomas R.
 Erdahl, Douglas M.
 Ford, Robert G.
 Fuchs, Joachim D.
 Glick, Bonnie L.
 Jansen, Christian P.
 Jarosinski, Frank J.
 Laskowski, Gregory J.
 Manning, Michael T.
 McClellan, Christina L.
 McGee, Jenny A.
 Merletti, Roger D.

Murphy, Miles R.
Payne, Raymond H.
Porterfield Patrick C.
Powell, Elliott
Rickard, Robin S.
Rogers, Elizabeth B.
Schrader, Joel M.
Sibley, Matthew W.
Sigler, Ralph H.
Smith, James A.
Tarver, J. Sean
Unrue, Michael

CARBON_COPY

Saunders, Richard M.
Pascual, Carlos E.
Davidson, Leslie K.
Black, Steven K.

TEXT_BODY

I have attached a VP letter to Chernomyrdin in cable format. Please tee this up as a NODIS cable and hold for clearance from me or Commander Kevin Scott within the next couple of hours.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

VP-CHERNO LETTER 5-17.doc
PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE

CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM: WHITE HOUSE//OVP/NSA//

TO: AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
SECSTATE (INFO)

SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM VICE PRESIDENT TO
VIKTOR CHERNOMYRDIN

NODIS

1. AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER TO STROBE TALBOTT UPON HIS ARRIVAL IN HELSINKI. LETTER SHOULD BE PRINTED AND FORMATTED FOR OFFICIAL DELIVERY TO MR CHERNOMYRDIN. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW. TEXT OF MESSAGE FOLLOWS:

2. BEGIN TEXT:

His Excellency
Viktor Stepanovich Chernomyrdin
Special Envoy of the Russian Federation
on Kosovo
Moscow, Russian Federation

Dear Viktor Stepanovich:

Strobe has extensively reported to the President and me on his talks with you last week, and on preparations for your meeting in Helsinki today. I appreciate the time you've given to him and to this effort. Your personal engagement increases the chances of an outcome that will serve not only the cause of peace in the Balkans but also the goal, to which you and I have devoted so much of our joint work, of solid and cooperative relations between the U.S. and the Russian Federation. Strobe has reported in full measure your own concerns and suggestions. I'm well aware of the strain that the conflict in Yugoslavia has put on Russia's relations not just with the U.S., but with others as well, and on Russian domestic politics.

You and I had a full airing of the issues when you were in Washington, and Strobe speaks fully for the President and me on issues that have come more sharply into focus since then, including our good-faith effort to make the most of your work with President Ahtisaari. At the beginning of what could be a crucial week in these efforts, I would like to offer a few general thoughts that I hope you will consider as you conduct your discussions in Helsinki.

First, we agree that the discussions that have taken you twice to Helsinki should not continue indefinitely for their own sake. The goal here, I'm sure you agree, is to influence Milosevic to accept conditions that will permit the refugees to return to Kosovo and peace to return to the region. The two issues on

which you
and Strobe have spent so much time - total withdrawal of Serbian
forces from
Kosovo and the need for NATO to be at the core of an international
security
presence, preferably supported by a United Nations Security Council
Resolution -
are, for us, make-or-break. Without clarity on those two objectives,
refugees
will not return, the region will continue to be plagued by instability
and
conflict, and our efforts - individual and collective - will come to
naught.

You have made it clear that your government will decide on the basis
of the
Helsinki talks whether to continue to work cooperatively with us on
the
diplomacy, and more specifically, whether to keep trying to
accomplish something
through the channel you have established with President Ahtisaari.
We agree that
this week may be vital. If it goes well, it could contribute to the kind
of
progress that you and I have been working toward. You have also said
that if
Helsinki is just a repetition of past positions, then this experiment is
probably
not worth continuing. This makes it all the more important that we
concert our
efforts in Helsinki to ensure that if and when you undertake another
trip to
Belgrade, it does not yield less than we have set as a bottom-line
condition for
suspension of hostilities. Such an outcome would not be positive for
anyone
except Milosevic. Frankly, I do not see how it's even good for him,
since the
prolongation of hostilities will only make it harder for the
international
community, over the long run, to keep Yugoslavia together in the face
of the
widely deepening radicalization of the Kosovo Albanians.

The President's foreign policy team met just before Strobe's departure.
He is
coming to Helsinki prepared to work very hard on the basis of our
position and
what we understand to be yours.

If you want to talk at any time in the coming days, I would be pleased to speak with you directly. Our personal and professional relationship has served our countries well in the past, including two weeks ago. Let us make sure it continues to be available to our Presidents as we try to work our way through this immensely difficult and high-stakes challenge.

Sincerely,

Al Gore

END TEXT.

2

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/3/99 6:41:46 PM

FROM Brody, Richard J.

CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)

DATECLASSIFIEDON 06/03/1999

DECLASSIFYON 06/03/2009

SUBJECT VP call to Chernomyrdin [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

TO Bayley, Douglas C.
 Bresnahan, Gary E.
 Broadwick, Bonnie .
 Campanella, Anthony
 Chastain, George M.
 Cheramie, Don E.
 Cosgriff, Kevin J.
 Crowder, Stevan D.
 Crowell, Thomas R.
 Erdahl, Douglas M.
 Ford, Robert G.
 Fuchs, Joachim D.
 Glick, Bonnie L.
 Jansen, Christian P.
 Jarosinski, Frank J.
 Laskowski, Gregory J.
 Manning, Michael T.
 McClellan, Christina L.
 McGee, Jenny A.
 Merletti, Roger D.
 Murphy, Miles R.
 Payne, Raymond H.
 Porterfield Patrick C.
 Powell, Elliott
 Rickard, Robin S.
 Rogers, Elizabeth B.
 Schrader, Joel M.
 Sibley, Matthew W.
 Sigler, Ralph H.
 Smith, James A.
 Tarver, J. Sean

CARBON_COPY Saunders, Richard M.
 Davidson, Leslie K.

**DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526**

2014-0560-M (1.09)
 10/2/2018 KBH

Black, Steven K.
Pascual, Carlos E.

TEXT_BODY

The Vice President would like to talk briefly with Viktor Chernomyrdin tomorrow morning. Since the VP's schedule is still in flux, I will call you later this evening with a time window. After that:

- * Please call State ops to arrange for interpreter
- * Please reach out to embassy Moscow to set up call
- * Please hold attached talking points for Kevin Scott, who will pick them up around 7:30 a.m. tomorrow morning.

Logistics: VP will most likely be aboard AFII. Please set up call with notetakers either in WHSR or in OVP/NSA (your choice).

Please call me if you have questions. As always, many thanks.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

vp-chno telcon talkers 6-4-99.doc
Talking Points

Conversation with Viktor Chernomyrdin

- * Hello, Viktor. I'm calling from the plane, so unfortunately we won't be able to have a long conversation.

- * I did want to call, however, to congratulate you on the progress you've made toward achieving a diplomatic breakthrough in the Kosovo crisis.

- * From the moment I heard that President Yeltsin had appointed you as his special envoy on Kosovo, I knew you were the right person for the task. And when we met in my home in Washington last month, I was confident that you would find a way to succeed in your mission.

- * I know how hard you have worked since then. Through these long weeks of discussions, you've demonstrated the determination, independence of

mind, and
strong convictions for which I've long respected you.

* I hope that yesterday's news from Belgrade leads to the peace that has been our joint goal. But I also know that that there is still much work to be done and that you will not rest until you have achieved success.

* In the meantime, I wanted to let you know how proud I am of our work together and what we've accomplished. We have once again demonstrated the value of the U.S.-Russian partnership that you and I helped forge.

* I know that Sunday is Valentina Fedorovna's birthday. After your many days of almost non-stop travel, you must be happy to be able to celebrate with her at home, in Moscow. Please convey best wishes to her from Tipper and me.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/4/99 1:30:52 PM
FROM Brody, Richard J.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT cover memo and letter to cherno [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Roberts, Michael W.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

Per conversation, please fax to plane and call cmdr Scott.
Need VP's approval today. Thanks.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT memo to vp on cherno kosovo congrats.doc

June 4, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM LEON FUERTH

SUBJECT Letter to Chernomyrdin on Kosovo

Since we were unable to set up a call between you and Chernomyrdin today, I have drafted a written message of congratulations from you to him. It is attached for your approval.

RECOMMENDATION: That you approve the letter.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Let's
Talk _____

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

vp to chernomyrdin congrats on kosovo -- final.doc

Dear Viktor Stepanovich

I am writing to congratulate you on the progress you have made toward achieving a diplomatic breakthrough in the Kosovo crisis.

From the moment I heard that President Yeltsin had appointed you as his special envoy on Kosovo, I knew you were the right person for the task. And when we met in my home in Washington last month, I was confident that you would find a way to succeed in your mission. I know how hard you have worked since then. Through these long weeks of discussions, you have demonstrated the determination, independence of mind, and strong convictions for which I have long respected you.

I hope that yesterday's news from Belgrade leads to the peace that has been our joint goal. But I also know that that there is still much work to be done and that you will not rest until you have achieved success.

In the meantime, I wanted to let you know how proud I am of our work together and what we have accomplished. We have once again demonstrated the value of the U.S.-Russian partnership that you and I helped forge.

I know that Sunday is Valentina Fedorovna's birthday. After your many days of almost non-stop travel, you must be happy to be able to celebrate with her at home, in Moscow. Please convey best wishes to her from Tipper and me.

Sincerely,

Al Gore

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/4/99 4:40:08 PM
 FROM Brody, Richard J.
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)
 DATECLASSIFIEDON 06/04/1999
 DECLASSIFYON 06/04/2009
 SUBJECT JUST IN CASE [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]
 TO Saunders, Richard M.
 Davidson, Leslie K.
 Black, Steven K.

**DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526**

2014-0560-M (1.11)
 10/2/2018 KBH

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

HERE ARE THE VP-CHERNO TALKERS PREPARED FOR THE CALL THAT DID NOT HAPPEN THIS MORNING AND THE VP-CHERNO LETTER THAT WE SENT FOR HIS APPROVAL THIS AFTERNOON. I'M SENDING TO YOU JUST IN CASE I'M NOT AVAILABLE AND THEY ARE NEEDED OVER THE WEEKEND.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT vp-chno telcon talkers 6-4-99.doc
 Talking Points

Conversation with Viktor Chernomyrdin

* Hello, Viktor. I'm calling from the plane, so unfortunately we won't be able to have a long conversation.

* I did want to call, however, to congratulate you on the progress you've made toward achieving a diplomatic breakthrough in the Kosovo crisis.

* From the moment I heard that President Yeltsin had appointed you as his special envoy on Kosovo, I knew you were the right person for the task. And when we met

in my home in Washington last month, I was confident that you would find a way to succeed in your mission.

* I know how hard you have worked since then. Through these long weeks of discussions, you've demonstrated the determination, independence of mind, and strong convictions for which I've long respected you.

* I hope that yesterday's news from Belgrade leads to the peace that has been our joint goal. But I also know that that there is still much work to be done and that you will not rest until you have achieved success.

* In the meantime, I wanted to let you know how proud I am of our work together and what we've accomplished. We have once again demonstrated the value of the U.S.-Russian partnership that you and I helped forge.

* I know that Sunday is Valentina Fedorovna's birthday. After your many days of almost non-stop travel, you must be happy to be able to celebrate with her at home, in Moscow. Please convey best wishes to her from Tipper and me.

If asked why NATO hasn't suspended the bombing:

* We're ready to suspend the bombing as soon as it's clear that Milosevic has accepted our conditions and is beginning to withdraw his forces.

* We're somewhat worried that Belgrade is not prepared to conclude a military-technical agreement immediately. Early conclusion of this agreement will help to show that they're prepared to implement what they have agreed to.

* We can't trust Milosevic. He's repeatedly made promises to the US and Russia then broken them. I can assure you, however, that we want to bring this conflict to a close as soon as possible.

1

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT vp to chernomyrdin congrats on kosovo -- final.doc

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE

CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM: WHITE HOUSE//OVP/NSA//

TO: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM VICE PRESIDENT TO
VIKTOR CHERNOMYRDIN

NODIS

NIACT - HOLD FOR 0700

1. AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE DELIVER THE
FOLLOWING LETTER AT YOUR EARLIEST
CONVENIENCE TO VIKTOR CHERNOMYRDIN. NO SIGNED
ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW. TEXT OF
MESSAGE FOLLOWS:

2. BEGIN TEXT:

JUNE 4, 1999

DEAR VIKTOR STEPANOVICH

I AM WRITING TO CONGRATULATE YOU ON THE
PROGRESS YOU HAVE MADE POSSIBLE TOWARD
ACHIEVING A DIPLOMATIC BREAKTHROUGH ON THE
KOSOVO CRISIS.

FROM THE MOMENT I HEARD THAT PRESIDENT YELTSIN
HAD APPOINTED YOU AS HIS SPECIAL
ENVOY ON KOSOVO, I KNEW YOU WERE THE RIGHT
PERSON FOR THE TASK. AND WHEN WE MET
IN MY HOME IN WASHINGTON LAST MONTH, I WAS
CONFIDENT THAT YOU WOULD FIND A WAY TO
SUCCEED IN YOUR MISSION. I KNOW HOW HARD YOU
HAVE WORKED SINCE THEN. THROUGH
THESE LONG WEEKS OF DISCUSSIONS, YOU HAVE
DEMONSTRATED THE DETERMINATION,

INDEPENDENCE OF MIND, AND STRONG CONVICTIONS FOR WHICH I HAVE LONG RESPECTED YOU.

I HOPE THAT YESTERDAY'S NEWS FROM BELGRADE LEADS TO THE PEACE THAT HAS BEEN OUR JOINT GOAL. BUT I ALSO KNOW THAT THAT THERE IS STILL MUCH WORK TO BE DONE AND THAT YOU WILL NOT REST UNTIL YOU HAVE ACHIEVED SUCCESS.

IN THE MEANTIME, I WANTED TO LET YOU KNOW HOW PROUD I AM OF OUR WORK TOGETHER AND WHAT WE HAVE ACCOMPLISHED. WE HAVE ONCE AGAIN DEMONSTRATED THE VALUE OF THE U.S.-RUSSIAN PARTNERSHIP THAT YOU AND I HELPED FORGE.

I KNOW THAT SUNDAY IS VALENTINA FEDOROVNA'S BIRTHDAY. AFTER YOUR MANY DAYS OF ALMOST NON-STOP TRAVEL, YOU MUST BE HAPPY TO BE ABLE TO CELEBRATE WITH HER AT HOME, IN MOSCOW. PLEASE CONVEY BEST WISHES TO HER FROM TIPPER AND ME.

SINCERELY,

AL GORE

END TEXT

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/7/99 9:33:34 PM

FROM Brody, Richard J.

CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)

DATECLASSIFIEDON 06/07/1999

DECLASSIFYON 06/07/2009

SUBJECT CORRECTED -- VP LETTERS TO STEPASHIN AND
CHERNOMYRDIN ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO Bayley, Douglas C.
Broadwick, Bonnie .
Campanella, Anthony
Chastain, George M.
Crowder, Stevan D.
Crowell, Thomas R.
Erdahl, Douglas M.
Fuchs, Joachim D.
Glick, Bonnie L.
Jansen, Christian P.
Laskowski, Gregory J.
McClellan, Christina L.
McGee, Jenny A.
Porterfield Patrick C.
Rogers, Elizabeth B.
Schrader, Joel M.
Sibley, Matthew W.
Sigler, Ralph H.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0560-M (1.12)
10/2/2018 KBH

CARBON_COPY

Saunders, Richard M.
Black, Steven K.
Davidson, Leslie K.
Pascual, Carlos E.
Weiss, Andrew S.
Kaufman, Stuart J.
Bayley, Douglas C.
Bresnahan, Gary E.
Broadwick, Bonnie .
Campanella, Anthony
Chastain, George M.
Cheramie, Don E.
Cosgriff, Kevin J.
Crowder, Stevan D.

Crowell, Thomas R.
Erdahl, Douglas M.
Ford, Robert G.
Fuchs, Joachim D.
Glick, Bonnie L.
Jansen, Christian P.
Jarosinski, Frank J.
Laskowski, Gregory J.
Manning, Michael T.
McClellan, Christina L.
McGee, Jenny A.
Merletti, Roger D.
Murphy, Miles R.
Payne, Raymond H.
Porterfield Patrick C.
Powell, Elliott
Rickard, Robin S.
Rogers, Elizabeth B.
Schrader, Joel M.
Sibley, Matthew W.
Sigler, Ralph H.
Smith, James A.
Tarver, J. Sean

TEXT_BODY

PER OUR CONVERSATION, CORRECTED VERSION
ATTACHED.

-----Original

Message-----

From: Brody, Richard J.

Sent: Monday, June 07, 1999

9:13 PM

To: @COMM - WHSR Comm Officers

Cc: Saunders, Richard M.;

Black, Steven K.; Davidson, Leslie K.; Pascual, Carlos E.; Weiss,

Andrew S.; Kaufman, Stuart J.; @WHSR - WH Situation Room

Subject: VP

LETTERS TO STEPASHIN AND CHERNOMYRDIN

~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~

PLEASE SEND

ATTACHED CABLE TO EMBASSY MOSCOW UNDER

FOLLOWING PROCEDURES:

* HOLD

UNTIL 2300 WASHINGTON TIME THEN SEND AS NIACT

* DESIGNATE CABLE

AS NODIS

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

vp to stepashin and cherno on kosovo 6-7-99 --finall.DOC
PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE

CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM: WHITE HOUSE//OVP/NSA//

TO: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
SECSTATE (INFO)

SUBJECT: MESSAGES FROM VICE PRESIDENT TO
PRIME MINISTER STEPASHIN AND VIKTOR
CHERNOMYRDIN

NODIS
NIACT

1. AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE DELIVER THE
FOLLOWING LETTERS AT YOUR EARLIEST
CONVENIENCE TO PRIME MINISTER STEPASHIN AND TO
VIKTOR CHERNOMYRDIN. IT IS
IMPERATIVE THAT THE LETTERS REACH STEPASHIN AND
CHERNOMYRDIN PERSONALLY AS EARLY
AS POSSIBLE ON TUESDAY MORNING. NO SIGNED
ORIGINALS WILL FOLLOW. TEXT OF
MESSAGES FOLLOWS:

2. BEGIN TEXT - LETTER TO STEPASHIN:

JUNE 7, 1999

HIS EXCELLENCY
SERGEY VADIMOVICH STEPASHIN
CHAIRMAN OF THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
MOSCOW

DEAR SERGEY VADIMOVICH:

I TRIED TO CONTACT YOU EARLIER TODAY, BUT WAS
UNABLE TO REACH YOU. I WANTED TO
TALK WITH YOU BECAUSE I BELIEVE WE ARE AT A
HISTORIC MOMENT WHEN WE HAVE THE
OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE THE LAST FEW STEPS TOWARD
THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE
KOSOVO CRISIS.

EARLIER TODAY, OUR PRESIDENTS HAD A VERY
CONSTRUCTIVE CONVERSATION IN WHICH THEY

AGREED THAT WE MUST NOT ALLOW MILOSEVIC TO STEP BACK FROM THE COMMITMENTS HE MADE TO VIKTOR STEPANOVICH, PRESIDENT AHTISAARI, AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY LAST WEEK. G-8 FOREIGN MINISTERS WORKED DILIGENTLY ON A DRAFT UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION THAT WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT ASPECT OF IMPLEMENTING THESE COMMITMENTS. AS YOU MAY KNOW, OUR PRESIDENTS HAD AGREED TO ISSUE INSTRUCTIONS TO THEIR MINISTERS TO RESOLVE THE REMAINING ISSUES. MINISTER IVANOV MADE CLEAR THAT HE WAS UNABLE TO AGREE TO THE TEXT WITHOUT ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FROM MOSCOW. IN THE MEANTIME, MILOSEVIC IS TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE SITUATION TO TRY TO UNDO WHAT RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY WAS SO INSTRUMENTAL IN ACCOMPLISHING LAST WEEK.

THE REMAINING DIFFERENCES DO NOT SEEM INSURMOUNTABLE AND TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE. WE MUST ACHIEVE PROGRESS ON TUESDAY, OR THE OPPORTUNITY FOR SUCCESS MAY SLIP FROM OUR HANDS. WITH THE G-8 MEETING IN COLOGNE LESS THAN TWO WEEKS AWAY, WE SHOULD NOT LOSE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO HIGHLIGHT RUSSIA'S ROLE IN ACHIEVING THIS DIPLOMATIC TRIUMPH.

I THEREFORE ASK THAT YOU DO EVERYTHING YOU CAN TO FIX THIS PROBLEM. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT MINISTER IVANOV BE EQUIPPED AT THE OPENING OF TUESDAY'S DISCUSSIONS IN BONN WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS AND AUTHORITY HE NEEDS TO REACH FINAL AGREEMENT ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION.

SINCERELY,

AL GORE

END TEXT.

3. BEGIN TEXT - LETTER TO CHERNOMYRDIN

JUNE 7, 1999

HIS EXCELLENCY
VIKTOR CHERNOMYRDIN
SPECIAL ENVOY OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE

RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON KOSOVO

DEAR VIKTOR STEPANOVICH:

I AM WRITING TO YOU BECAUSE I BELIEVE WE ARE AT A HISTORIC MOMENT WHEN WE HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE THE LAST FEW STEPS TOWARD THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE KOSOVO CRISIS.

EARLIER TODAY, OUR PRESIDENTS HAD A VERY CONSTRUCTIVE CONVERSATION IN WHICH THEY AGREED THAT WE MUST NOT ALLOW MILOSEVIC TO STEP BACK FROM THE COMMITMENTS HE MADE TO YOU, PRESIDENT AHTISAARI, AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY LAST WEEK. G-8 FOREIGN MINISTERS WORKED DILIGENTLY ON A DRAFT UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION THAT WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT ASPECT OF IMPLEMENTING THESE COMMITMENTS. AS YOU MAY KNOW, OUR PRESIDENTS HAD AGREED TO ISSUE INSTRUCTIONS TO THEIR MINISTERS TO RESOLVE THE REMAINING ISSUES. MINISTER IVANOV MADE CLEAR THAT HE WAS UNABLE TO AGREE TO THE TEXT WITHOUT ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FROM MOSCOW. IN THE MEANTIME, MILOSEVIC IS TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE SITUATION TO TRY TO UNDO WHAT YOU ACCOMPLISHED LAST WEEK.

THE REMAINING DIFFERENCES DO NOT SEEM INSURMOUNTABLE AND TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE. WE MUST ACHIEVE PROGRESS ON TUESDAY, OR THE OPPORTUNITY FOR SUCCESS MAY SLIP FROM OUR HANDS.

I THEREFORE ASK THAT YOU DO EVERYTHING YOU CAN TO FIX THIS PROBLEM. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT MINISTER IVANOV BE EQUIPPED AT THE OPENING OF TUESDAY'S DISCUSSIONS IN BONN WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS AND AUTHORITY HE NEEDS TO REACH FINAL AGREEMENT ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION.

SINCERELY,

AL GORE

END TEXT.

3

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/14/99 2:43:11 PM
FROM Brody, Richard J.
CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON 06/14/1999
DECLASSIFYON 06/14/2009
SUBJECT kosovo memcons [~~SECRET~~]
TO Boulton, Darrien D.
CARBON_COPY Saunders, Richard M.
Hilty, Joanne M.
TEXT_BODY Darrien: Recent Kosovo memcons attached for OVP records. Some
might
need some formatting, but most are in final format.
TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT memcon -- vp cherno kosovo call april 26.doc
DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS: THE VICE PRESIDENT
VIKTOR STEPANOVICH CHERNOMYRDIN
LOCATION: WEST WING OFFICE
NOTE TAKER: RICHARD BRODY
INTERPRETER: YURIY SHKEYROV
DATE/TIME: 26 APRIL 1999/1210-1310 EDT
VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Viktor Stepanovich? It's great to talk to
you. Thanks for
taking my call.
MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: I'm happy to hear you.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0560-M (1.13)
10/2/2018 KBH

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: How is Valentina Fedorovna?

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: She's doing fine. How are you and your children?

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Well, we're fine. We're expecting our first grandchild at the end of June.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: I hope that everything will go well. Please convey my best wishes to your family.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Well thank you and please convey my best wishes and Tipper's to your family. And I hope your grandchildren are well.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: How are you doing?

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: I'm doing very well. I just returned from the memorial service in Colorado for that horrible tragedy at the school there, but overall things are going very well. I'm glad to have the chance to work with you again. I know you've been to Belgrade and that you just had your party congress and that you have little time. So perhaps we should turn to the topic of Kosovo. As you know, our Presidents had an important talk on Sunday. For 90 minutes they discussed the requirements for a diplomatic solution to the crisis. I was pleased, Viktor Stepanovich, that President Yeltsin suggested that you and I may have a role to play. Of course, we have done excellent work together. We now owe it to our Presidents and to our countries to think very carefully of how we can best serve each of our national interests and our bilateral relationship.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: This problem is very important for all of us...We have found solutions to other problems...We need to do that for everybody...I will do my best to find a solution for everybody

[Interruption by US interpreter to ask Russian interpreter to translate consecutively, not simultaneously]

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: I got most of what you said and I agree with it and I hope we can do two things in this call. The first is to discuss procedural questions on what needs to be done next. The second is to review some of the key substantive issues. Is that alright as a way to proceed in this conversation?

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: Yes, I absolutely agree with that.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Well ok. One of the reasons for our success has been total candor, and I will be frank now. President Yeltsin suggested that we reactivate our commission. And I think what he is really trying to say is we did great work on our commission and wants us to....that. But we cannot have two commissions. I have one with Prime Minister Primakov and it would be harmful to create a second one. I'm sure this was President Yeltsin's way of having us work together. We can be more effective if we add a channel to our dialogue rather than reactivate the commission.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: I totally agree with you. I've just spoken a few hours ago with our president and we discussed all these problems including the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission. I believe there is no need to replace the existing commission, Gore-Primakov, and all the more there is no need to set up a second commission. What we need is to ensure permanent communication and to attract the necessary experts to work at our level to help work out our positions, which must be agreed upon with our presidents and then get results. Once again, I would like to agree with you there's no need for another commission.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: I know you so well, my friend. I knew you would agree. But it was important to raise this point. I know you spent nine hours with Milosevic. We cannot cover all the details and nuances by phone. But it is important for us to understand his position. That is why the President

and I
have asked Strobe to go to Moscow and get a full briefing from you
about your
meetings with Milosevic. Some of what we've heard from the Russian
side confirms
that you are trying hard to be constructive and achieve a solution. I
know for
certain myself that that is exactly what you are doing. However, what
we've
heard from Belgrade since you left is just the opposite: it suggests that

they're still dug in on their old, unacceptable positions. So, we need to
truly
understand every aspect of what you accomplished, the issues where
Milosevic
refused to cooperate, and the nature of Milosevic's situation that we
might be
able to work with together. In the same visit, I also want Strobe to
brief you
on our discussions in Washington this past weekend with all of the
NATO
countries. We remain firmly united and we want to be flexible, but
there are
some irreducible conditions that simply must be met from our
standpoint. I want
you to be able to ask Strobe as many questions as you need to fully
understand
these conditions - where we are and what the conditions are.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: I know that Mr. Talbott is already here in
Moscow, and
tomorrow I will meet him. First at 9 o'clock he will have a talk with
Mr.
Ivanov, our foreign minister, and then we'll get together with him. I'll
inform
him of our position in the first stage and my talks with Milosevic. It
was a
hard talk, and we have to convince him of many things, which is not
easy. One
thing he has accepted is the international presence there. Naturally, he
is
against NATO, but there are some advances in his position and
evidently we need
to work out some type of compromise. What is important is that in the
statement
you adopted in Washington you expressed certain positions which
coincide with
those we take and with what sometimes Milosevic says. Those
positions have been
discussed with Mr. Ivanov and Madame Albright. All we need now is

to deepen those positions. I talked just ten minutes before our call to the deputy of Mr. Milosevic, Mr. Draskovic, and he also accepted the international presence. He shares many positions of ours. Tomorrow we will discuss with Mr. Talbott and it will be a large talk and we will see what compromises are possible. We need to meet each other at one point and time. To prevent the situation from getting worse. All we need is to find some kind of compromise.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: There are three issues that I would like to ask you to give special attention because we have to understand every detail, and Strobe can follow up on these. The first is the complete withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo. All the Contact Group, including Russia, have agreed on this point. There can be no compromise on this point. But what we hear from Milosevic is that he will only consider a reduction of his forces. There is simply no way we can get the refugees back into Kosovo if Serb forces are still there on the ground. Viktor Stepanovich, can you tell me if there was any agreement on a complete force withdrawal, including VJ, MUP, and paramilitaries?

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: Yes, he has agreed, but only to reduce his armed forces to the limit he had in the prewar period, and the same goes for the police forces which are there to ensure peace and order. Naturally, he insists that NATO also would withdraw its forces from the Yugoslav border. We did not discuss the details as to how much the armed forces and police forces should be reduced, but naturally, the police is needed there to ensure elementary peace and order. It was difficult at the first talk to agree on anything. We have to continue. He said he will reserve some police forces in the Serbian part of Kosovo.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Okay, well, it's obvious that's something that will require a good deal more discussion. But let me move to the second point, and

that is the nature of an international security force. President Clinton and NATO have made clear that we would welcome a UN mandate, although UN command and control doesn't work, as we saw in Somalia and the early days of Bosnia. Bosnia is a good model to start from. There is a key role for NATO (which is essential for our participation, for the Kosovars to return, and to enable force to disarm the KLA). But Russia should be a key participant along with other non-NATO nations and other organizations like OSCE. We don't care what the force is called. It doesn't need a NATO sign over the door or NATO patches on the uniforms. But it must be a security force, or civilians and refugees simply won't return. Now I don't think we can proceed if there is any kind of Serb police or VJ or MUP there, but on this point about the international security force, there is a basis for our position to be accepted by Milosevic, if he is agreed to a security force. Has he moved at all on this point?

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: This was the main issue we discussed with him. He accepted the international security forces and he said it may be...or military people from Greece or from other NATO countries may take part in the international forces, but he made a point that Russia must be largely represented in those forces...Ukraine also and from South Africa, but I totally agree with you there's no need to put a sign on the door or to put the NATO patch on the uniform. The main thing is it should be under the aegis of the United Nations. He insists on a large participation from Russia. Geography can be discussed later. The main thing is to find a compromise. He agreed the international forces should be headed by someone from the United Nations.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: We would welcome a UN mandate, but it must be a security force, or civilians and refugees simply won't return. Now the third issue has to

do with NATO's conditions to stop the bombing. The Alliance has just affirmed in a formal document agreed to by 19 heads of state that the bombing could be suspended if Milosevic were to do five things: First, ensure a verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending of violence and repression in Kosovo; second, withdraw from Kosovo his military, police and paramilitary forces; third, agree to the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence; fourth, agree to the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons, and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid

organizations; and fifth, provide credible assurance of his willingness to work for the establishment of a political framework agreement. I know President Yeltsin wants NATO to halt the air strikes the moment a diplomatic initiative begins. But that won't work. We will suspend bombing once he has demonstrably begun to withdraw his forces according to a rapid timetable and has accepted our conditions. We must have more than promises. We have seen him break those promises too often before. Strobe can follow up on these points but I wanted to make sure you heard from me as far as this third issue is concerned.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: We have those joint statements adopted in Washington and if we look at that statement and at the outcome of the talks with Mr. Milosevic, we can see many things are either close or coincide, including the cessation of the military hostilities, the safe return of the refugees, necessary conditions for humanitarian organizations, and the need to work out a [political] framework agreement. If we look once again, we see half of the provisions, half of the points, may be considered as coinciding. Naturally, we need to persuade him and convince him. One talk I had with Milosevic already revealed the possibility of working further. He has agreed to pull out his troops and what is needed is to

establish security conditions for the return of the refugees. There must be someone to ensure security, and that is international forces. We should have a 100 percent guarantee for the safe conditions for the refugees. My talk with Draskovic once again convinced me that it is possible as I return to exert every effort in order to achieve that agreement.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Well, that's very good. We each need to assess the situation and decide if we see a path forward. And I need to hear back from Strobe after his visit with you, and I need to discuss this with my colleagues. For now, it does not help to say publicly that you and I were instructed to find a solution to the crisis. That will make success more difficult by raising expectations before we've all been able to make an assessment. Rather, I suggest we say publicly that we were asked to be in touch to create a channel of discussions to review your trip and highlight issues for further discussion. I suggest we talk again soon, possibly at the end of this week or over the weekend. We can set the time later. But it will be soon. There is room for creativity here, Viktor Stepanovich; we have a lot to work with. And if Russia plays this right, it can be a great victory for Russian diplomacy and Russian peacekeeping that will help you outflank the critics that want to draw Russia into the conflict militarily. I look forward to talking again soon on this. It's a great joy to work with you again my friend.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: Thank you. It is true we have to analyze the situation and have to be aware of all the developments that take place in Yugoslavia. And I totally agree with you we should not make any public announcements that we were instructed to work together. All we can mention is yes, we have to work in concert to work on an acceptable solution...The situation is getting more and

more complicated and with destruction taking place on a large scale it is more difficult to convince Milosevic. You have to realize in our country it is also not that easy. There are people who want to send military units to Yugoslavia. I think the situation here and there is not that easy and we should not delay the search for the solution because conditions are becoming more and more severe and the destruction larger and larger. I don't think the delay will help us find a solution at a later stage because we could see a final destruction [in Yugoslavia]... Tomorrow I'll meet with Talbott and we will discuss all those issues. After that we can analyze the situation and we can meet to work out options further. We can meet some place in Europe like Zurich, together with other West European leaders. We have to find a way out of this. You are getting more and more involved in this humane [sic] force, and perhaps we'll work together to find a solution. Tomorrow the situation may become even more difficult, and that's why we have to see what we can do.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Well, very good. I enjoyed talking with you and look forward to hearing from you soon. I look forward to hearing back from Strobe. Once again, give my best to Valentina, and I wish the best for you, too and look forward to talking to you soon. Goodbye.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: Thank you. I'm really, really happy to have this chance to talk with you and I hope we'll keep in touch to find an acceptable solution, and I wish you all the best in everything.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Okay, bye.

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TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

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DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: THE VICE PRESIDENT
VIKTOR STEPANOVICH CHERNOMYRDIN

LOCATION: WEST WING OFFICE

NOTE TAKER: RICHARD BRODY

INTERPRETER: YURIY SHKEYROV

DATE/TIME: 29 APRIL 1999/1029-1052 EDT

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: Hello. Victor Chernomyrdin here. I am listening.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Hello, Viktor Stepanovich?

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: Yes.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: How are you doing?

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: Everything is okay. I am here in Bonn now

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Viktor Stepanovich, I'm glad I was able to catch you during your travels. As you pursue your discussions, I wanted to update you briefly on our thinking. Thanks for receiving Strobe. He gave me a full account of his meetings with you and of the issues that you and your team have asked us to elaborate more fully. As I understand it, these issues include: terms for withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo (including schedule and verification means); the nature of an international security presence for Kosovo; the nature of an interim, provisional administration for Kosovo; and NATO's conditions to suspend airstrikes against Yugoslavia.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: I understand. We discussed these conditions with Mr. Talbott. Everything is clear, but in order to achieve all that one has to start from something. I am proceeding based on the telephone conversation between our

two presidents, President Clinton and President Yeltsin. In this conversation, Clinton said that if Milosevic starts withdrawing his troops from Kosovo and if simultaneously we create conditions for the safe return of refugees to Kosovo, and if we determine the conditions for an international contingent which has to enter, then the rockets and bomb strikes can end, and later we can discuss other issues like the extent to which he has to withdraw his military forces and the special police and everything that is in Kosovo. The question is whether we are talking about full withdrawal of forces or if some forces have to stay. Because people have to be living in Kosovo and someone has to ensure normal life in Kosovo, especially taking into account that Kosovo remains a part of Yugoslavia.

Then one has to discuss the configuration of the international presence. We understand there has to be civil and military components of that presence. The civil component is those people who help organize a normal life in Kosovo and ensure that there is autonomy for Kosovo and in general ensure that people are living normally in Kosovo. And the military people have to ensure the safe return of refugees and those who decide on continuing to live in Kosovo and it takes time to do all that. I think those are possibilities and I will talk with Milosevic and will try to convince him of that.

But we need to do something now to stop these processes, because blood is being spilled in Kosovo, civilians are being killed. The bombing has to be temporarily suspended in order to pursue this. Something has to be done. Otherwise we cannot assure the return of refugees or assure the movement of international forces into Kosovo and the problem meanwhile is getting more complicated. The more blood that gets spilled, the more difficult the solution to this problem will be. And today I believe it is possible to hold talks

with
Milosevic but in the future if it goes on further there will be no one to
talk to
because Serbia is being destroyed and people are getting killed.
Russia then has
to decide [indecipherable]. And one cannot allow that.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: I understand we're far apart and I agree
with you that
implementing NATO's conditions in these areas will require careful
work. So I
want to assure you that we are working seriously to answer your
questions. We
promise to follow up with you soon. Let me just mention two points
for now. On
the international security presence, as I noted in our earlier call, there
are
many possible models for this force. But, NATO must be at its core.
On the
question of a UN role, I want to reiterate that we would welcome a
UN mandate,
although we cannot accept UN command and control. As we saw in
Somalia and in
the early days of Bosnia, that just does not work. Certainly both the
UN and
OSCE would be directly involved in implementing civilian aspect of
any
settlement. In the meantime, I hope you are having good and
productive meetings
with Schroeder and D'Alema. I also understand that you will travel to
Belgrade
tomorrow to see Milosevic. I would be interested in your thinking as
you get
ready to go. I wish you well in your efforts.

I also wanted to say, Viktor Stepanovich, that we appreciated the
cautious way
you handled the press after your last trip. Sometimes the less said in
public
the better. Such a strategy certainly reduces the chances that Milosevic
will
contradict what you say - and it avoids inadvertently locking your
Government
into an untenable position. In fact, I strongly advise, if you will permit
me,
that you try to avoid committing in public to a position you have
reason to
believe cannot be reconciled with ours. This is precisely what we need
to be
talking about before we go public. Let's keep this line of

communication wide
open. I look forward to talking to you when you return, so good luck
my friend.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: Thank you very much. I would like to tell
you I am a
convinced supporter of what has been discussed with President
Yeltsin and our
government. We have to find a solution through political ways
because the
military way is not the right way to do this. That is why I will talk to
Mr.
Milosevic. I understand this is the main question and I will try to
convince him
about safe return of refugees and I will insist on a civilian and military

mission. It must also include NATO countries and I will try to
convince him of
just that. I will also try to convince him that this has to be done under
the
auspices of the UN with participation of OSCE and EU. One has to
understand his
position. I had a discussion today with Kofi Annan and I don't
understand his
position. He has the desire only he doesn't have anything else; that is
why the
gigantic effort is required to ensure all this.

I absolutely agree with you, and it is my position as well it is not
necessary to
comment publicly, it is necessary to try to achieve results. Once again
I will
today be in Rome and tomorrow in Belgrade and it is without doubt
we will find
the possibility to talk to again. But I also would like to ask another
question
about whether we could meet somewhere in Europe. Today I had a
telephone call
from Mr. Blair as well. My main thing is find a possibility to meet
with you
somewhere in Europe provided it is possible.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Viktor Stepanovich, let's wait until your
trip to Belgrade
has concluded then assess whether progress has been made and
compare notes before
making a decision on that. We have to know if there is a basis for
genuine
progress, significant progress, before we schedule a meeting of that

sort. We
have to do more work behind the scenes to prepare the ground but let's
wait until
your visit has concluded. And let's talk perhaps on a secure line when
you
return to Moscow. And then we will make an assessment on that.
Does that sound
ok to you?

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: I agree completely. Only after my trips to
Bonn, Rome and
Belgrade can we agree on some future actions.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Very good. Good luck in your travels.
My prayers are with
you and I look forward to talking to you after this phase of your
journey.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: Thank you very much. As soon as I finish
all these matters I
will immediately give you a call. Best to your home.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Do svedeniia and best to your home.

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DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: THE VICE PRESIDENT
SERGEY VADIMOVICH STEPASHIN

LOCATION: AIR FORCE II

NOTE TAKER: RICHARD BRODY

INTERPRETER: KYRILL BORISOW

DATE/TIME: 4 JUNE 1999/1025-1040 EDT

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Good afternoon, Sergey Vadimovich. It's good to talk with you. Let me congratulate you once again on your confirmation as Prime Minister. I look forward to working with you.

PRIME MINISTER STEPASHIN: Thank you for your congratulations and your proposal to work together.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: I will be writing you soon about some important issues on which I would like to engage your assistance. But I wanted to call you this morning to let you know that the President and I very much appreciate the constructive role Russia has played on the Kosovo issue. Yesterday's news from Belgrade was very encouraging. We could not have made this progress without Russia's diligent efforts to reach a peaceful settlement to the crisis. I am convinced that the progress we have achieved on Kosovo demonstrates the value of Russia's partnership with the international community. It also highlights Russia's fundamental role in European security. We have once again proved to those who question Russia's engagement with the West that our partnership can advance Russia's interests and enhance the prospects for peace and security in Europe. As you know, much work still needs to be done to ensure that Milosevic adheres to the conditions of the peace plan and that the plan's other provisions are fully implemented. Russia's continued participation in this process will be critically important. I am confident that you and your team will continue to provide the leadership that has already yielded so much progress. I also hope to talk with or write to Viktor Stepanovich soon to thank him for his role in this process.

PRIME MINISTER STEPASHIN: Thank you for your phone call, Al.

You realize that this step was a complicated one for us. I mentioned this to President Clinton during our call. That is why I believe today that it is difficult to talk about progress in the real sense of the word. What will matter most is that we succeed in stopping the bloodshed in that region. [] with Russia in its work with Milosevic. That is why I see a three-fold task we're facing. I want you and President Clinton to know this.

The first task is cessation of air strikes. The second is work to prepare a UNSCR. Third, we must already think about reestablishing what has been destroyed during the bombardment of Kosovo and Yugoslavia to create conditions for people to live there. It is here that I see a role to be played by the G-8, the U.S., and Russia and our joint Commission work. So I would like to take this opportunity to confirm my willingness to continue with the Gore-Stepashin Commission on trade and economics. I'll work seriously and pay attention to the activity of this Commission. I believe we can arrange a meeting between you and me to outline the work to do with the Commission.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Thank you. On the first point you made, we're ready to suspend the bombing as soon as it's clear that Milosevic has accepted our conditions and is beginning to withdraw his forces. We're somewhat worried that Belgrade is not prepared to conclude a military-technical agreement immediately. Early conclusion of this agreement will help to show that they're prepared to implement what they have agreed to. We can't trust Milosevic. He's repeatedly made promises to the U.S. and Russia and then broken them. I can assure you, however, that we want to bring this conflict to a close as soon as possible. And I'm very confident that it's moving in the right direction.

On your second point, I have enjoyed working with your predecessors

through the Commission. And I welcome your statements about it. It has been a very useful tool for building our partnership and accomplishing our mutual goals. As I noted in my recent message to you, I look forward to continuing this cooperation with you. I appreciate your affirmation of it this morning. Perhaps it would be best to have our staffs contact each other to review the current state of Commission business and to discuss the possibility of a future meeting. Who's going to be your personal representative we should deal with?

PRIME MINISTER STEPASHIN: Of course I think that first of all we should maintain contacts through the Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Ivanov. With regard to financial issues, I will be helped by Mr. [Khristenko].

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: We will be in touch. Thanks for taking my call. And thanks for the role Russia has played in this process.

PRIME MINISTER STEPASHIN: Thank you. I think we'll soon have the opportunity to meet and discuss these matters. I wish you success.

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DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: THE VICE PRESIDENT, LEON FUERTH,
SANDY BERGER,
STROBE TALBOTT, VIKTOR STEPANOVICH
CHERNOMYRDIN,
MIKHAIL TARASOV, AMBASSADOR YURI USHAKOV,
VLADIMIR

MARKOV, BORIS IVANOVSKY

LOCATION: DINING ROOM, VICE PRESIDENT'S RESIDENCE

NOTE TAKER: RICHARD BRODY

INTERPRETERS: PETER AFANASENKO [+ CHERNOMYRDIN'S INTERPRETER]

DATE/TIME: 3 MAY 1999/2045-2245 EDT

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Our discussion in the Oval Office was productive and interesting. Maybe on some nuances we were talking past each other. But in the main, we have a good understanding. You have learned and understood our conditions. Certain methodological questions can benefit from discussion this evening. You asked certain questions of Strobe in Moscow and he told you we'd give you answers. We have completed a nonpaper for your use only to answer these questions. Peter will translate the document as Sandy reviews the five questions on which you sought greater clarity.

MR. BERGER: [Reading from nonpaper] First, the size, pace, and manner of withdrawal of FRY forces. There are two points: NATO is to suspend strikes once Belgrade has unequivocally accepted NATO conditions and demonstrably begun to withdraw forces according to a precise timetable; all Serb forces must be withdrawn within a specified number of days. It says seven, but that's not a magical number.

Second, how will withdrawal be verified and will Russia participate? It can take place under an international force; Russia is welcome to participate and verification mechanisms are to be developed. On the issue of an alternate mechanism for accurate verification - we can discuss this.

Third, the residual Serb military presence in Kosovo.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: We shared this document with NATO allies and it's therefore a joint product not easily changed without difficult consultations within NATO.

MR. BERGER: [on third point] All forces are to be withdrawn initially. A limited number might be allowed to return under agreed terms to protect Serb patrimony...

Fourth, the nature of an international military force. A chapter VII UNSCR, with U.S. forces under NATO, Russian forces under Grachev-Joulwan. We would expect other non-NATO countries to participate, particularly Ukraine and other orthodox countries

Fifth, the nature of the international protected area. It will be under the mandate of the UNSC.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: What is meant by a protected area?

MR. BERGER: What is status of Kosovo? It would remain within Yugoslavia but since there's no government or Serb administration, we would need some mechanism at least in the beginning for administration.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: To protect Serbs against violence by Kosovar Albanians and against Kosovar Albanians by Serbs.

MR. BERGER: As the President said, we believe Kosovo should stay part of Yugoslavia. But for a period at the start, Kosovars won't accept Yugoslav administration. So the UN would administer.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Under the sovereignty of Yugoslavia.

MR. BERGER: One last thing and I think it's a point President was making - the fundamental requirement is that Kosovar Albanians can return. That requirement carries two other necessities: they won't return unless Serb forces are out; and they won't return unless there is international security force to protect

them.

That's the mechanism by which Kosovo stays in Yugoslavia, we avoid civil war, and ironically the only way in which Milosevic can keep Kosovo.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: I'd like Strobe to elaborate on the international protected area.

MR. TALBOTT: I found in Moscow a particular concern on the Russian side about the phrase international protected area. In particular a concern that this is a disguise that would forever take Kosovo out of Yugoslavia.

[Interpreter asks to repeat word "disguise"]

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Disguise - like a beard and mustache.

MR. TALBOTT: In fact, what we have in mind would have the opposite consequence - it would help keep Kosovo in Yugoslavia and with your permission I'd like to walk you through the logic. In the Oval Office you told the President and Vice President what you told me last week - that the core point the US and Russia agree on is the need to return all refugees: rank and file citizens who just want to go about their business peacefully. As we see it, there are only four options available to make this happen:

First: Belgrade authorities remain in charge in Kosovo. We believe Milosevic would like this. But it's impossible because with Belgrade in charge, the right kind of refugees won't come back. The only ones who will come back are UCK terrorists armed with Kalashnikovs bent on killing Serbs.

Second, Kosovar Albanians in charge. This would mean UCK because power flows from the barrel of a gun. It's unacceptable and would lead to a war of independence or secession.

Third, no one in charge. This would mean chaos, the breakup of Yugoslavia, and the spread of violence in the region.

Fourth, the only possible option. We - the international community - would take temporary charge. This could mean the UN and OSCE with details and structure to be worked out in conversations like this one.

What the international protected area doesn't mean is a NATO-led military governorship.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Pardon our long monologue, but I'd like Sandy to complete our answers.

MR. BERGER: These are the answers, but let me note where there is flexibility and where there's not. There's flexibility in the nature of the international force, recognizing we can't participate unless within the context of NATO. This is partially for domestic political reasons. So there has to be a NATO core - but these are words and can be discussed.

All Serbs must leave, but we can envision a face-saving way for Serb forces to be at special places of historical and cultural significance. But 10,000 Serb soldiers means refugees won't come back. KLA will come back and fight Serbs. This is gray zone that President spoke of.

So (we agree on the following) 1.....
2.....
3 We agree - Kosovars have to come back.

And there's flexibility in the design of the verification regime and the exact nature of the international presence. We don't need NATO flags. We can give on form if the substance is ok. And there's some flexibility in the timetable though we would say days and weeks, not months.

So on certain things related to getting the Kosovo refugees back - the practical realities - there [is less flexibility]. On the other things, there's more room for discussion.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: One other methodological question. I think it's easy to imagine an agreement to stop the bloodshed, stop the forced relocation of refugees, and stop the bombing. But it might be difficult for Milosevic to say yes if he was saying yes to the US or to NATO and maybe even to Russia. If there's some mechanism by which the UN can play role to give him a way to say yes but it doesn't put us at the mercy of Kofi Annan going off on his own adventure - we've had unpleasant experiences with him - then we're open to this kind of method. But otherwise bombing will continue, all 19 countries are united, our publics are horrified by the killings as I know Russians are whenever they see the evidence. And history is intertwined in this region, the Balkans are the Balkans... Yevtushenko wrote a piece recently saying that history is like a Raskolnikov - it always returns to the scene of the crime. Every once in a while, when he's sober, he comes up with a great line.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: I have a few questions. The withdrawal of forces - how do you envision it? Who will be in control? Who will verify?

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Russia can play a role in verification with us.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: While the bombs are falling?

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: No. If withdrawal begins after agreement by Milosevic to a plan that envisions withdrawal, the bombing would stop.

MR. BERGER: Think about the following steps: Step 1 - agreement to a road map;
Step 2 - Milosevic makes a down-payment, because he's violated many past agreements. It doesn't have to be measured in 10 days. As long as we see him pulling out. It would make no sense for us to continue bombing.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: What do you mean by down-payment?

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: First steps.

MR. BERGER: If Milosevic would commit to pull out forces it would make no sense to continue bombing.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: That's not a down-payment. It's conditions. A down-payment is like when I put my watch down on the table.

MR. BERGER: We made an October agreement to withdraw and he didn't do it.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: I'm not arguing.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Let me explain the phrase. In the U.S. if a family wants to buy a house, they sign a contract and agree to payments. But they start with a big payment - the down-payment - and are obligated to continue. It's almost like buying gas.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: [in jest] It's almost the same - but buying and selling gas are two different things. It's all clear. With Strobe in Moscow I discussed having protection for areas of Kosovo with patrimony - there are many monasteries, historical sites, etc. with history....More than 30,000 sites and 8000 protected already by international organizations like UNESCO. So we're talking of sacred places for every Serb. How can they be protected? How do you envision it?

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Let me venture some answers. If you ask people of any country, what are your sacred sites, they'd have a list of sacred ones. But if you wanted to list every site, you'd name every cemetery, etc. So 8000 sounds too high. Let's say agreement to a reasonable number of important sites. We could imagine how impossible it would be for Serb police or guards to be stationed to protect so many. So we could name some important sites - for example, the center of Serb Orthodox church is in Pec, there's the Field of

Blackbirds, Kosovo Field.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: I understand and agree. Let's say we named 500 sites - what would you have in mind? Would guards be armed?

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: 500 is too much.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: OK

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Let's say 10. I think we could negotiate a force that could symbolize Serb sovereignty, protect against desecration, but not large enough to inspire fear of attack - so somewhere in between in terms of size.

MR. BERGER: From Milosevic's point of view, his worst option is an insufficient force in Kosovo. 2, 3, 4000 soldiers - he'd be in a guerrilla war.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: With whom? And if there were no Serb troops there would also be a guerrilla war - but on behalf of 250,000 Kosovar Serbs. Nationalist military forces would go into the country to fight Albanians.

MR. BERGER: That's why it's so important for you and us to be there.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: I agree.

MR. BERGER: And other countries - with orthodox ones disproportionately in Serb areas to provide sense of safety.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: Let's get to brass tacks and stop talking erratically. You've put forward a condition of complete withdrawal.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: But this was modified [to allow protection of patrimony]

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: Second, you say some portion of Serb forces must be left to protect sites. Third, you say it doesn't make sense to leave an insufficient level of troops. We [both] want to avoid a guerrilla war. But who will protect the border?

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Initially it would have to be an

international security
force, until conditions return to normal, until there is order, peace, and

confidence that would allow, over time, for that function to return to
Yugoslavia. But this would mean big trouble at the start because that's
the
ethnic cleansing began.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: I acknowledge that ethnic cleansing did
take place - but
after the bombardment. NATO helped promote total.....

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: We disagree. I don't want to argue. But I
will note that
350,000 refugees were forced out before the bombing.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: It's now one million.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: That's IDPs and EDPs. Milosevic
speeded it up when the
bombing started.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: If it was 300,000, that's one thing. But now
it's one
million.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: And think about [the potential] elsewhere
- there are
350,000 Hungarians in Vojvodina.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: Again - need to think about the historical
sites, borders,
some protection for municipal authorities. If there's a drunken street
fight
there must be someone to take care of it because troops won't do this.
There are
so many issues of life that a professional military can't handle.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: I see where you're headed but our trust in
Milosevic is
practically zero. If he said he wanted to have his police to protect
order that
would be enough to keep Kosovar Albanians away. But I agree this is
not a
military function. It doesn't take an army or ANTO to deal with
drunks. But
there's a way to train people whom Kosovar Albanians won't suspect
of ethnic
cleansing. If the general principle is accepted, there are ways for
NATO, OSCE,

and Russia to establish mechanisms to assure normal public functions. We have done this in Bosnia and it worked well.

MR. BERGER: Two more points. We would anticipate that one of the responsibilities of an international force would be to disarm the KLA.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: But you can't find them. Milosevic has gotten rid of them all.

MR. BERGER: Our information is that there are more KLA today than when Milosevic began in March, but they're in the mountains or in Albania.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: There's nobody to disarm, but that's not the issue. They'll return. I'm trying to grasp your logic. How will it be implemented in real life?

Now they'll have to withdraw all troops then maybe some troops can return.

Let's say I agree to 10-12,000 or 8000. We need to return Albanians - Muslims - gypsies, Serbs. There's not just Albanian refugees, there are others as well.

Also, by cluster of nationalities they need to be coordinated.

Albanians,

gypsies, Serbs. So why put hurdles in the way? Why remove their opportunity to

build their life? Also, you say that with a military force there, no one will

allow guerrillas or hostilities. But if there are 5, 7, or 10,000 troops to take

care of a huge region. International presence should be at least 27-30,000

troops. 32,000 troops to allow....

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: This depends on whether or not there's a genuine willingness

on both sides to resolve the issues peacefully. If so, I think fewer would

suffice. In Bosnia we have a total of 8-10,000.

[short gap in note-taking]

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: I think 8-12,000 would be effective against guerrillas.

MR. BERGER: This is why I disagree. We need to demilitarize

Kosovo except for
an international military presence. Otherwise there will be civil war.
With
8000 Serb soldiers - and the hatred in the region - there's natural
combustion
with tens of thousands of Kosovars who were driven from their
homes, angry and
seeking revenge. If I were a Serb soldier, I wouldn't want to be
stationed on
the Albanian border.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: I understand the point. But don't think
Albanians will form
guerrilla units and will wage guerrilla war only because of Serbs. The
Serbs
will form guerrilla units. [They're the best guerrilla fighters in the
world.]
Hitler fought them for four years and couldn't do anything. The
Albanians are
not born guerrillas. But the Serbs are. Then this 32,000-man force will
have
its hands full. It's not for me to decide.... Why insist on complete
withdrawal?
A guerrilla war will be waged by Serbs - you'll need 100,000 troops.
Milosevic
would be ready to order this.

Would you allow him 8-10,000 troops? We can make the calculations
to allow him
forces to protect the border and historical sites - as many as are
necessary.
Why withdraw the forces to create a problem and send them back in to
solve it?

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Well, we do differ.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: Let's minimize our differences.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: After what Serb troops and paramilitaries
have done, I
don't see how they can keep thousands of troops in Kosovo and have
the refugees
back.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: Now, no. Not with 100,000 of his troops
there. He should
withdraw some. He is prepared for a big war, ground operations, so to
wage war
against 100,000 Serbs, NATO needs at least 200,000. And Milosevic
agreed to cut

some forces. What's the purpose of pushing him to zero? We can count forces and agree to tell him the number he needs. If he kept [8000?] there'd be no guerrilla war. Kosovo is similar to Chechnya. I can show you [brings out map]. Look. There's just this one road to Pristina, the other to the border, the rest is woods...

MR. BERGER: Why does he need 8000 troops?

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: To protect historic sites.

MR. BERGER: 8000?

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: I don't know. It's necessary [to assess] his needs. We can ask how many for sites - let's say 500, then for police ____, then for the border let's say 2000 for a total of 2500-3000 in all. We haven't discussed the issue. I don't know the situation. I don't know what he needs. First you said all the troops must go then some must return. Then you say Kosovo is part of Yugoslavia. At the same time you cut his presence out while the international community oversees it.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Somehow the international community has to play a role or there will be bloodshed without end.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: I agree.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Let's be frank. History has distorted the idea of the nation where Serbia is concerned. In the U.S. we have the story of Ripp Van Winkle. He left his village and lay down in the woods and slept for 100 years. When he woke up everything looked the same. But when he returned to his village everything was different. Serbia is like Ripp Van Winkle. As a nation they had their greatest glory in the 14th century. Then the Ottoman Turks came and Serb nationality went to sleep for 500 years. Then it woke up in 1914-15 and some

things looked the same, like the Fields of Black Birds, but 90% of the people living there were Albanians. But there would be a greater injustice. Just because the Serbs have woken from national slumber doesn't give them the right to kill, rape, and maim. But the national heart is there [in Kosovo]. So what is a just outcome? Justice means two things to me: alleviation of national suffering [burning, rape, etc.]; but in justice to the Serbs and their suffering, some protection for their rights and sovereignty is necessary. Especially for important historical/cultural sites. So the essence is how to reconcile the dream from 600 years ago [and from Tito's time also], their nationhood, with compassion for the people who live there. If we get locked into the word "nation" - we can't solve the problem. So the only way to solve it is with international protection of some kind to build confidence that violence won't be used by one side against the other. So we are sensitive to Serb dreams but also to innocent people and the demands of justice...So that's what it's all about. We can argue over formulas, but we have to find a way to stop the bloodshed.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: I agree. I'm not satisfied with arguments that are more shape and form and no substance.

AMBASSADOR USHAKOV: What does the U.S. expect from Chernomyrdin as a mediator? What result he is supposed to leave Washington with?

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: We want Viktor Stepanovich to speak in his own name and in that capacity explain to Milosevic his understanding of the NATO position and what flexibility he might be able to see in positions here. I know you know you can't solve these difficult problems in just one trip. Because we trust you so much and can speak candidly to you, you're in a unique position to describe what you see and hear without getting into negotiations with Milosevic. We're also

willing to hear your ideas about an OSCE or UN presence. Sandy will describe our ideas.

MR. BERGER: There's one other dimension. The Vice President suggested that you digest our points and explain them to Milosevic. But there's a second dimension. The President and Vice President have tried to explain the logic of our

position. For Kosovars to return, there must be a departure of the vast bulk of Serb forces and the insertion of an international military force. What you can do is not just convey positions, but also the logic. We are convinced that the only way Milosevic can keep Kosovo is for him to accept the international military force. Otherwise it's his Afghanistan or Vietnam. The President explained how it's in Milosevic's own interests: the only way Kosovo stays in Yugoslavia; the international community can work to rebuild the Balkans; and the air campaign will end, instead of going on and on.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: We'd also be pleased if you'd tell him we're at a fork in the road. [Vice President draws on paper] This first way lies bombing,

continued and accelerated. We understand it carries risks for the region. But NATO is united. One or two countries might be nervous. And here in the U.S. you can see that some people are unsure, like in Congress. But we will continue....and his war materiel will be completely destroyed. If he takes the second fork, he could keep Kosovo. It also involves an international effort to rebuild Serbia, integrate Serbia and Montenegro into the European economic sphere and with Russia. This will help Russia as well. The future of this other path is a return to prosperity. NATO has already agreed to massive aid. It's one [fork] or another for him.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: I'm convinced Milosevic fully understands this. He's a sick man, but not to the extent that he can't understand what's going on.

You recall his actions when you started the bombing.. He didn't want any progress. He was preparing for something on a larger scale - ground operations. And I told Strobe that those were my first impressions. Because his country is bombed, factories destroyed, people are dying. That's what I thought he would be - like a normal person. [?]

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: This is how we see him too.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: He's waiting for a ground operation. He wants it.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: He won't get it.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: He planned it all in advance. He got rid of the opposition. Now he's a national hero. He consolidated the nation around him. He couldn't have done this in the past. He now realizes there's wiggle room. I told him: you'll have 3-4 months and Yugoslavia will be flattened like a disk. He said people would support their country and not give in. You see he's a sick person and his nation doesn't know what's happening. Like Germany under Hitler. Only later Germany realized what Hitler got them into. Meanwhile, his country is being destroyed. People are unemployed. You talk of the return of refugees - but to where? Pristina? There's nothing left. They won't return. There's no home to return to. Milosevic understands it all. I'm not such a simpleton to tell him you will be cursed by your own people and should stop what you're doing. I'm not a diplomat. I'm not there for small talk. In my second meeting we came to terms. When he agreed to reduce and withdraw forces, support an international presence with NATO there. No one says only Russia will be part of the force. The only thing he says is give me an umbrella [a hat]. I don't want to surrender either to Russia or NATO, but to the UN. That's why I brought up Kofi Annan. I

asked him if he thought Annan would solve it - that it wouldn't be up to him because he has no mandate and the U.S. would be the main country [calling the shots]. He said "I understand, but give me a chance." Let's sit down at the negotiating table and dictate our conditions to him. And then the refugees will return and the military presence will be reduced. And no one will ask him whether he approves or not.

Russia is not a participant. We want to be guarantors. But if we send Russian troops, do you think we'll just stay and watch you? We won't send people to get shot and killed. Milosevic said he and NATO would withdraw forces from the border. I asked how? The numbers have to be decided in negotiations. We can work it out. He agreed to a protectorate. Today he agrees, He's at the negotiating table. But we need to make headway. In my conversation, I used harsher words. But he agreed to the five items. So we need to launch serious negotiations and all will be resolved.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Thank you. This is not easy for you. We agree he's a sick person and appreciate your candor. We know his history - his mother and father committed suicide. His wife brought out the worst in him. The tragedy is that the Serb people are cursed with a demagogue that brings out the worst

ultranationalist hatred of people who are different. It's a tragedy that he found a way to unlock this well of hatred. So we see the tragedy in similar ways. I agree with you there are dangers.

First, let me say that Kofi Annan is untrustworthy. I say this in confidence. We cannot rely on him. The feeling is so strong we are not willing to have him in charge of the negotiations. But it may be possible for the U.S. and Russia behind the scenes - us consulting with NATO and you with Milosevic - to draft a chapter VII UNSCR embodying the conditions we are discussing and

using it as
basis for further diplomatic action. If we could find countries seen as
neutral
to lead the drafting of the document we prepare, it could serve as the
fig leaf
Milosevic needs and solve our lack of trust in Annan. We're open to
other
suggestions. We're open to that.

Second point. For all the progress you've made on your journeys,
there are still
wide differences between what Milosevic and NATO find acceptable:
the presence of
Serb police around sensitive sites; protection of borders; simultaneity
and
length of withdrawal - sequencing of withdrawal and stopping
bombing. These are
gaps that can be narrowed. That is the role you could play. Or a
different one.
You be the judge.

Third point. What happens with more bombing? I understand your
point that
Milosevic gains strength and unifies people. But only up to a point.
We're
seeing massive desertions. Serb police are going door-to-door in
Belgrade
rounding up young men for the army before they can run out the back
door. I've
seen reports that the VJ is ceasing in areas to exist as an entity due to
the
damage we've caused. So he will pass the point of strengthening him
to one that
weakens him.

To conclude: we see a two-stage strategy: a stage-managed UNSCR to
give Milosevic
a fig leaf; and you work on your interpretations of our positions to talk
with
Milosevic. And it may be that we have to do this first, that the
differences
have to be narrowed to get to a UNSCR.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: If Milosevic agrees to all the conditions,
who will deal with
him? We are mediators, acting on the instructions of President
Yeltsin. We can
make five more visits, but if Milosevic agrees, who will deal with
him?

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Two points. First, decisions on our part are taken by NATO. If not for fig leaf demands, that would be the contact. For the second, I'd like to turn to Sandy.

MR. BERGER: Assuming you could narrow the differences we could work up a UNSCR to embody this. Milosevic would then accept a UN mandate. He's surrendering to the UN, not Kofi Annan. But the preliminary step to maximize that chance that will happen is to narrow the differences. He might not like all..... Then he's acceding to the rule of the UN, not US, Russia, or NATO.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: If it's a resolution, it needs to be passed by the UNSC.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: It would be written behind the scenes by the US and Russia.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: Yes. China would need to be persuaded. But it still rests with UN. Not Kofi Annan - he's not fit. But we're still talking about the UN. Someone has to make a decision to agree to the resolution....

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Maybe and maybe not. The Security Council can act without a single member negotiating with Milosevic. It could act on its own in a statement of principles. This has happened elsewhere. The patrons refer to the UNSC as the basis. If the purpose is to give a fig leaf, then this suffices. Your role is getting Milosevic's interpretation of meaning of resolution.

MR. BERGER: It's also possible that a UNSCR would then provide for some sort of representative like in Bosnia - with administrative responsibilities, like in OSCE. A civilian administrator that Milosevic accepted under UN would provide machinery.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: Let's say he agrees to all of this and a UNSCR passed. And Milosevic and NATO agree. There needs to be someone to declare a willingness

that they've agreed.

MR. BERGER: If NATO and Milosevic and UN agree there would be civilian and military component, with the civilian appointed by the UN or OSCE.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: These are nuances. Someone - an agency - must be able to take the decisions: Yugoslavia agrees, Milosevic agrees.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: I think there's a difference in views. We've talked of a UNSCR that Milosevic or NATO accepts. But putting the UN in charge of negotiations is a problem for us. We don't trust Annan and don't know of another appropriate person. If it were a UNSCR that Milosevic accepted, at some point the NATO command would have to meet with VJ command to work out how an international force would be inserted to keep peace. Just as in Bosnia when Yugoslav forces agreed with Russia, Ukraine, and NATO.

MR. TALBOTT: But it was called IFOR - a new thing.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: It could be a new entity. Not NATO or UN. But authorized by the UN with participation by NATO and Russia. A new entity with which Belgrade negotiated final details.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: This can't be. Kosovo is part of Yugoslavia. Russia is not taking part in the conflict. We won't sign anything. We want Milosevic to surrender either now or when he has nothing left. We drove him to surrender through his actions. His whole industry was destroyed... [???

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: We don't agree.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: Let me finish. I can convey points. He knows about the five points. It was made part of the package I signed with him and we need to launch negotiations. So if you don't trust Annan, find someone else. There's no point trying to make us play this part. We want to end this but we can't do it in such

a simplified manner. He agreed to all the conditions. So either proceed this way or bomb to the end. He can surrender either today or 3-4 months later. He has no other option. By the way, I have no information on desertions. The VJ is not suffering losses, only the civilians. So he can surrender either today or 3-4 months from now. But we can sit down and negotiate today. He's agreed to everything. Or you can wait 3-4 months. Russia can't take responsibility to solve it for him... We don't support or justify Milosevic. We're talking matters of substance. It's only a matter of a final proposal. So let's put Lavrov, or Petrov, or someone else in Annan's place. Milosevic wants to be civilized. But we are driving him into a dead end. But that's not possible. He's ready to spend days and nights at the negotiating table. What did he write to the President?

MR. BERGER: He went backward. He said he believes in peace and international presence, but....

MR. TALBOTT: He named four things he's willing to support, but only at a high level of generality and there's nothing about withdrawal.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: That's my mission. I told him don't drive me into a dead end or it's my last visit...

AMBASSADOR USHAKOV: We wanted to clarify what Milosevic's message was. Now we know.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: It wasn't meaningful. We appreciate what you've done, Viktor. If you decide you can do no more, you've made a good effort, played an honorable role, people would understand. We've told you what we'd like you to do. We respect your response that it's impossible to do. But we disagree that what we're saying is a demand to surrender. But there's no disagreement over the

fig leaf. But we'll need more than a fig leaf to change our position from Rambouillet to say we support independence for Kosovo. But if this continues, that may change. Also, an international force doesn't have to be NATO, it can be under... but led by NATO. Also, if Milosevic starts withdrawal and has accepted the plan, the bombing will stop immediately. [You have helped move the process] Because of you we've agreed to reintroduce forces to protect Serb patrimony. All of these are tangible changes in NATO's position out of respect for your understanding and our evolving understanding. If we coupled it to a UNSCR that means he doesn't have to accept NATO and can then sit down with a brand new entity, with NATO participation. But what we're hearing is horrible - the refugee stories, it's like humanity has regressed 1000 years...such brutality as we enter the 21st century...[bloodshed, children killed, etc.] Viktor Stepanovich, I respect you, your heart beats like mine. If you think it might be useful to pursue these the ideas we've discussed, you may be in a unique position. You're the only person with the respect of Washington and Belgrade capable of advancing the process. I leave it to you and what you decide.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: Thank you...This will never grow tiresome for me. As a human being, I cannot stand injustice and evil. I think we're on the threshold of war and can slip into it very easily. You're right that genocide is genocide., but we don't see these instances in Russia. Our mass media doesn't cover it.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Gusinsky's station shows it, the others don't.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: No, I don't think so. Those atrocities - all agree NTV is the most unbiased station, but it doesn't mention thousands killed. Even Europe doesn't see it. We asked for proof and were told that all we can show is

satellite images.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: I'll ask my colleagues to provide reports to you to show the reality. We'll endeavor to get evidence to you so you can see it with your own eyes. We'll give you our best evidence.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: I raised the point because I told Milosevic about it. He said he didn't allow it, but there were some instances and he has arrested 200 people. Since there's no capital punishment, some people are now serving prison terms. But he said there are not mass instances. I said just look - 600,000 refugees. He says yes, but the KLA caused the destruction.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Milosevic learned from Hitler about telling the big lie.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: I agree. Maybe we should show such evidence [to the Russian people] in case they're not aware.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: When do you leave tomorrow? I want to give you as much material as I can before you leave for New York.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: 9:00 a.m.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: We'll have it to you by 8:30.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: We'll do our best to find solutions. But [the crisis] can be resolved only with movement on both sides. We've made good progress. Milosevic has shifted. We could make headway if we can sit at the negotiating table. We must work out a formula, so we propose that there must be an official international agency to carry out this work. We will participate. Our position is one of principle.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Two final things. Here are the written answers to the questions that Sandy reviewed earlier [passes document to Chernomyrdin]. We need to be especially careful with the press. One thing to avoid: neither of us

should say the other side has moved. This would hurt us. And we won't say the Russians or Milosevic have moved either.

MR. BERGER: We should say that we're engaged in a process of better understanding each other's positions.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: Yes, I will say that negotiations or discussions are underway. I've come under criticism, it's all I hear now. "Chernomyrdin's on his way to Belgrade to resolve all the problems." I'm ready to give it to someone else.

[Farewells]

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TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

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DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: THE VICE PRESIDENT, SECRETARY OF STATE, LEON FUERTH, SANDY BERGER, STROBE TALBOTT, VIKTOR STEPANOVICH CHERNOMYRDIN, MIKHAIL TARASOV, AMBASSADOR YURI USHAKOV, VLADIMIR MARKOV, BORIS IVANOVSKY

LOCATION: DINING ROOM, VICE PRESIDENT'S RESIDENCE

NOTE TAKER: RICHARD BRODY

INTERPRETERS: PETER AFANASENKO [+ CHERNOMYRDIN'S INTERPRETER]

DATE/TIME: 4 MAY 1999/0900-0945 EDT

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: I'm glad you called and I'm eager to hear what you have to

say.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: During yesterday's conversations here and in the Oval Office we cleared up our positions, so I think we should determine our starting point and what we should tell the world. Everyone is anxious to hear the results of our meeting. So I want to say that for the past two weeks we accomplished some major things. We laid the foundation and all arrangements to put [the conflict] to an end. I think we've reached agreement on 99 percent of our positions to end the crisis. So Annan is not fit, then who is? Who will go to negotiate with Milosevic? To whom should Milosevic surrender? From whom should he accept conditions of surrender? Prior to the Oslo meeting of Secretary Albright and Foreign Minister Ivanov, Milosevic didn't agree to these positions. He didn't agree to the five articles in the Washington [NATO] declaration. Now he agrees.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Have you communicated with him since last night?

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: No. It's not possible, though we can expect anything from him. He can surrender and tomorrow go back on his word. So it's not a matter of Russia or NATO [taking the surrender]. It must be the UN. Who will represent the UN? Let's find or create that person who will participate in that process.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Let me start by responding to your first point about the world's interest. I still believe the less we say the more chance there is for progress. One of the reasons I think it's best to say as little as possible is the need to avoid wrong interpretations.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: This is clear.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: My colleagues and I would all say our impression is that we are not in 99 percent agreement. It may be that we and Russia

could reach 99
or even 100 percent agreement because we have a shared respect for
humanity. But
Milosevic is not saying the kinds of things to lead us to believe that at
all.
About the UN: We believe a UNSCR under chapter VII could be the
mechanism to give
Milosevic the international fig leaf or organ to say what he needs to
say.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: That's the crux of the problem - to whom to
surrender/speak
to. The resolution needs to be worked out.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: After there's a resolution, the president of
the Security
Council would speak for the Security Council and NATO countries
would participate
in an international force. Not a NATO force but a new entity. The
commander of
that entity would speak with the commander of Yugoslav forces to see
how to bring
into force the arrangement.

[short gap in note-taking]

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: I distrust Milosevic as much as you do. I
pushed him, put
real pressure on him. He is ready to accept the five points. But he
needs to
give his consent to somebody. Let's say I go to Belgrade, to talk to
him, to
press him. Then we go to a resolution. Then he'll start saying "no."
He'll
start talking about the monuments, Clark's role, etc. We'll be to blame.
We'll
end up drawing out the whole process. He will surrender, but it's a
matter of
when and at what price. How much blood will be spilled? The whole
world is
watching us. Everyone knows. The Europeans subscribe to this point
of view. I
will do all I can to get Milosevic to agree to autonomy, a force with
NATO
participation, safe return of refugees to avert a guerrilla war. I can't
ask for
more. For self-government purposes, someone will be found to do
self-government.
So let's find someone to discuss this with Milosevic. We need to
resolve the

question of who is in charge, otherwise you make me hostage to Milosevic.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Let's send Jesse Jackson.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: Yes [laughs]

MR. BERGER: [Here's the sequence.] You go back to Belgrade. Then there's a UNSCR. Then after the UNSCR [interrupted]

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: Milosevic doesn't want to surrender to Russia or any country, but to an international organization. The UN. Who will represent the UN? He won't surrender to Russia. We do we even need a UNSCR? If he's ready to accept the five articles, why do we need a resolution? We need to pressure him, put conditions on him, make him realize that...

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: You're quite right that the essence of the question is whether Milosevic agrees. If so, the rest is form not substance - how to find a way to surrender not to Russia or the US. We suggest the Security Council, but if differences are narrowed and he's ready to agree to the five principles, then Annan could receive the surrender. We don't want Annan to negotiate, but he could serve as a figurehead. But narrowing the gap still requires work. I trust your judgment, but we don't yet have an indication that he's anywhere close.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: He's so close. He himself told me - we're putting in an international presence clause that entails safe return of refugees. He said I'll agree to a NATO military presence. But he thinks we're asking too much. He asked me whether I thought I could trust him. I don't know, but I had a witness. Ivanovsky was there taking notes. I said I will [transmit his message] but what's the next step. He told me so much already. He agreed to withdrawal of troops. At some point, we can solve question of numbers of troops to be

withdrawn. He agreed to an international presence, return of refugees. He's also facing the issue of who will restore his country. He knows Russia won't restore/rebuild anything. He needs confirmation restoration will be made.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: I can confirm that NATO allies are fully prepared to restore the country. In Washington we expressed ourselves on that point. The Europeans even more so. One thing is most important. We can stop bombing only if he agrees to complete withdrawal. We can stop bombing almost immediately if that happens.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: To whom should he surrender?

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: There are several possibilities. The incoming president of the EU is a Finn - Mr. Ahtisaari. He's trusted by everyone, you know him, he's worked on the Bosnia question for the UN. He's already a member of the Troika.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: Under what umbrella?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: He's the next EU president. Kofi could designate him.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: Good. That's an option. Annan or someone would have to designate him. Put him in charge. He's acceptable.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: And he has worked on Bosnia for the UN.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: OK. Then we can see the logic. Otherwise it's a bottleneck, there's no movement or wiggle room.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: But we need to work with Kofi quietly to make sure he won't try to designate someone else. It's best for you not to raise it with him. I would prefer you didn't meet with him at all.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: I would like to cancel the meeting, but

we've already
announced it. We can just meet and make a statement.

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Kofi wanted to name two special envoys
and Ahtisaari didn't
want the job. He didn't want to do it full-time. What we're talking
about is
not full-time. He'd be going with you to Belgrade.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: I'm not full-time either.

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Kofi still wants to name others as special
envoy. We can
talk about this. He's named Kukan and now we need a Western
representative. But
this is not the same job.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: I'm ready for this. I'll be with him
[Ahtisaari].

MR. TALBOTT: You're the one to use the hammer on Milosevic and
Ahtisaari is the
one to receive the sword from him.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: I think we can't find a better person.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Good. This shows that you've been right
to push on this
this morning. Now let's think about what we should tell the press.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: Ahtisaari needs a [mandate] too, so
everyone understands this
is not another assignment acting on behalf of the UN.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: We need to move quickly.

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Let's try to do this today.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: We should wrap it up today. Let's not waste
time.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: I agree. We'll work with Kofi today. The
less we say to
the press the better. We'll avoid any statement that talks of
compromise,
concessions, surrender.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: No talk of concessions. We're searching for
ways...It can't
be more difficult with a war going on. Do you think Ahtisaari would

turn this
down?

MR. TALBOTT: I've known him very well for several years. I spoke with him about whether he should take the special envoy job for Kofi. I understand why he turned that job down. My personal assessment is that he'd be interested in the role you're describing. But we need to be careful over the next 48 hours because the Germans have the presidency of the EU. No one, including the Germans, think they're the ones to receive the sword from Yugoslavia. So we should first try to...

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: We need to call Fischer so that he understands what we're doing.

AMBASSADOR USHAKOV: [conversation about communications with Chernomyrdin] If you succeed, I'll call Viktor Stepanovich and let him know.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: We'll communicate before you see Kofi.

MR. BERGER: Let's be clear on the public line. We had good meetings, tried to understand each other's positions, Chernomyrdin is playing a useful role, discussions will continue.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: Well, I wouldn't say I'm instrumental.

MR. BERGER: Ok, we won't say that.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: [in jest] Because other Russians might take offense.

MR. TALBOTT [speaking in Russian]: You can say the Americans were pivotal excluding of course the bombing.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: [describing bombing in Belgrade] Seems that as soon as I arrived they started pounding Belgrade. After eight hours of talks with Milosevic my jacket was completely soaked. We took off and looked down - only

one street was illuminated. We could see the tracer flashes from anti-aircraft fire. Guess they were trying to shoot us down.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: You know those were Russian air defense systems.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: Possibly.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Madeleine will call Kofi. And note this is not the permanent envoy position.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: Yes. Like me. A temporary designate.

MR. BERGER: One quick trip and he says yes.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: I'm glad you came back this morning. Perhaps this will lead to the breakthrough we need.

[discussion of travel plans]

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: I'm ready to fly to Finland or Belgrade or wherever.

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: There's a G8 meeting on Thursday.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: That would be a waste of time unless we could reveal plans.

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: But we should try to meet.

MR. CHERNOMYRDIN: OK, let's keep working. Let me know if you don't succeed with Ahtisaari.

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: We'll call

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: This is the first time I've ever heard Viktor Stepanovich talk about not succeeding at something.

[meeting breaks up]

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TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT memcon -- vp-primakov call april 6 1999.doc
DRAFT MEMCON

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN
VICE PRESIDENT GORE AND RUSSIAN PRIME MINISTER
PRIMAKOV

Tuesday, April 6, 1999 10:35 - 11:20 a.m.

- * PM: I'm very glad to hear your voice, Mr. Vice President.
- * VP: Thank you for taking my call. How are you?
- * PM: I'm ok, but the situation is much worse in Yugoslavia than here.

* VP: And it's even worse in Kosovo. I'm calling because I think we are at the threshold of events that could have very long-term effects on the future, not just of the United States and Russia, but of the world as well. Let me begin by saying that I fully understand how difficult the situation in Serbia is for Russia politically and emotionally. Nevertheless, I think we both know that events in Kosovo show that Milosevic is running true to character.

At the beginning of this century, the hatreds that never seem to die out in the Balkans destroyed the hopes for the future that the people at that time entertained. It would be the most horrible irony if at the end of the twentieth century the passions of the Serbs would again be allowed to blight the future that my country, your country, and all the rest of Europe have been trying to build. I have a deep concern that we could be coming to a threshold action on your part that could risk having this effect and I wanted to talk to you about it.

I want to raise three points with you today: The importance of protecting the US-Russia relationship at this critical time; What NATO is trying to do in Kosovo and why, and; How we might work together to energize the diplomatic track. I

think you will agree that we must do all we can to protect the U.S.-
Russian
relationship from lasting damage over our disagreement about
Kosovo.

President Clinton and I deeply appreciated President Yeltsin's
statements and
your statements on the importance of Russia's continued integration
with the
international community as well as your resistance to calls for a more
isolationist posture. We also appreciate assurances that Russia will not
be
drawn militarily into the conflict in Kosovo. If that were to happen, it
would
put Russia not only on the opposite side of the United States, but
almost all of
Europe and the Muslim world as well. This would have a devastating
impact on our
relationship and everything that we've tried to build since the end of
the Cold
War.

In this regard, I have two immediate concerns. First of all, during a
recent
discussion of the Russian intelligence ship in the region, Minister
Ivanov told
Madeleine that Russia will not be sharing intelligence information
with the FRY.
It would help me a great deal if you could give me your personal
assurance that
you will not provide intelligence information to the Serbs about
NATO's military
operations. You can imagine the devastating consequences for our
relations if
Russian intelligence were used against American pilots.

The second concern relates to the UN arms embargo. I appreciate that
you and
others have said that Russia will not provide military assistance.
However, we
have reason to believe that people in the Ministry of Defense and
other
government entities are making preparations for shipments of military
equipment
to Yugoslavia. I ask that you check on the activities of the people who
may be
involved and respectfully request that you ensure that these shipments
do not
take place. Let me reiterate that shipping military equipment or
sharing

intelligence while NATO military operations are ongoing would cause grave damage to Russia's relations with the West.

* PM: First, I want to say that we're interested, like you, in maintaining the relationship and preventing deterioration. And I assure you that all possible efforts should be made to prevent deterioration. But this should not be a one-way street. You say we should not escalate our support to Yugoslavia. But at the same time you failed to mention that you won't escalate your military action against Yugoslavia. This is an illogical position for you - you should understand this because you're a clever politician and should know that these are closely linked. I would like to say that I very much liked the points you raised. So let's use them as a basis. First, you suggest we should value the relationship and do all we can to protect it. Second, you suggest that we do all we can to end military action in Kosovo. And then you say that we should think of what can be done to return to a diplomatic solution. I'm very satisfied with this. We keep working with Milosevic to assure that Yugoslavia's position is moderate. First, I visited Belgrade and he gave a signal that you didn't find satisfactory. I think today he's prepared to go even further and take another step forward. And I ask you very much to carefully analyze what he'll say and draw the logical conclusions. We are also preparing for the meeting of the G-8 foreign ministers. I think they'll be able to discuss how to switch from military to diplomatic ways to settle the conflict. Every day Madeleine discusses things with Mr. Ivanov. I ask you to believe that me that if you make efforts to defuse tensions and scale down military operations, Russia will do all it can to conserve the relationship. And we'll be even more transparent in our relations with Belgrade. Let's work together. Al, I know you're one of the leading candidates, and I hope you'll be President. So let's work

together. If you personally undertake this task and do all you can to switch to diplomatic avenues and do everything possible to divide responsibilities and functions - I think this is imperative because you also face difficulties. Because not

everyone in the West is delighted to see escalation of military operations, that Belgrade is now being bombarded and that civilian targets are being bombed more than military ones. To conclude, let me assure you once again that we'll do all in our power to find a diplomatic solution. But you should do all you can to ensure a political solution will be possible rather than assure the capitulation of Yugoslavia. Believe me, that won't happen.

* VP: Thank you, Yevgeniy. I understand from Madeleine that you raised a sub-ministerial G-8 meeting with Mr. Schroeder. Our hope is that the Contact Group meeting tomorrow will reinforce the areas of agreement and explore how we can resolve our differences. If we make progress on Wednesday, the G-8 political directors can build on it when they meet at the end of the week. I'm aware of the diplomatic track, but I would like to return to what you noted as a logical flaw in my argument. Please understand that nothing we've done is aimed at Russia. The actions we're taking now are designed to stop the violence and allow the Kosovar Albanians who have been expelled from their homes to return with security and autonomy. This means that for airstrikes to end, Milosevic must agree to the return of all refugees, withdraw Serb forces, and allow deployment of an international security force, while we put in place a political framework for Kosovo on the basis of the Rambouillet accords. The situation on the ground remains very difficult. There is overwhelming evidence of ethnic cleansing. We have shared that evidence with your ambassador. They're separating out the men. Albanian males are being executed. Kosovar Albanian houses are being

systematically burned. Over a million people have been driven from their homes, with elderly people forced from their sick beds, forced into the rain and mountains, many dying along the way. NATO is acting against this crime against humanity. NATO is targeting the tools that Serbia is using to conduct its campaign of ethnic cleansing. That's why we are now hitting targets inside Belgrade and why we are sending attack helicopters to the region. I want to be clear, though, we would rather resolve this crisis through diplomacy than by force. If Milosevic takes the actions we have specified, we will stop the bombing and work hard to reach a lasting political settlement. But nothing we have done is directed against Russia. And let me repeat that there would be grave consequences if Russia took actions that could be used against the U.S., such as sharing intelligence or shipping military equipment.

* PM: Al, I want to tell you that a missile missed the Russian embassy by 500 meters. What would happen if it had hit? A missile landed 300 meters from our school. What if it had landed in our school? I absolutely am not defending ethnic cleansing. That is absolutely inhumane.

* VP: Spasibo.

* PM: But the mass exodus began and people were squeezed out after the beginning of the bombing.

* VP: No, it started long before the bombing.

* PM: Our ambassador was in a hospital in Pristina and says that 70% of the wounded are Albanian civilians. Every day, thousand of refugees come to Belgrade, including Albanians. Where did you get that figure - one million?

It's the entire population. Again, I repeat that this is horrible - ethnic cleansing and military actions against civilians. But this is a consequence of the bombing. Please listen carefully to what will be said today because not all can be solved overnight. If we start a political settlement process and

work
together, then we'll be in a position to solve everything. Now, about
ground
operations. There would be many casualties on both sides. God forbid
it comes
to this.

* VP: First of all, let me assure you that deployment of helicopters to
Albania
is not a precursor for deployment of NATO ground forces. Our
position on ground
forces has not changed - we intend to deploy them only as part of a
settlement.
Let me return to your comments on ethnic cleansing. Thank you so
much for
feeling the compassion we feel for the people who are suffering so
badly in
Kosovo. Our evidence is comprehensive that ethnic cleansing began
long before
the bombings. And all of the refugees in the camps, the hundreds of
thousands of
refugees confirm that the bombing had nothing to do with the refugee
crisis. In
interviews on television with little boys and girls, they tell of the
knock on
the door in the middle of the night by armed men in ski-masks saying
that they
had to hand over their money and leave their house in five minutes
and then march
over the mountains with the men separated out and murdered. These
are the
actions of a mass murderer.

* PM: I want you to know that we're sending our aid to both sides, to
Macedonia
and not just Montenegro.

* VP: Thanks for that. It is very significant. You say that our missiles
didn't
hit the Russian buildings in Belgrade. They did not because we took
great
precautions not to hit Russian targets. We have taken no actions
against Russia.
But we see signs that some in Russia are talking about taking actions
against us
by providing intelligence or military equipment to the Serbs. This
would cause
grave consequences for our relationship. Believe me that we would
like to
preserve [our overall relationship]. So it would help a great deal if you

could
assure me that Russia will not provide intelligence or military
equipment to the
Serbs.

* PM: We know you are assisting the UCK with weapons and have
liaison officers
there. [Note: In Russian, Primakov says, "Your communications
specialists are
there working with them."]. These are hard facts. We're not asking
you to
stop this. I'm urging you to do all you can to try to explore political
avenues
to settle the conflict and there will be no need to ask such pointed
questions.
Let me assure you that neither President Yeltsin nor I want Russia to
get
involved in that conflict in any way. And we'll do all we can to
prevent this.
But not everything depends on us - there are others in Russia. It
depends on you
too.

* VP: We, too, would like to stop this through diplomacy rather than
through the
use of force. We know from Madeleine's conversations with Foreign
Minister Ivanov
that we already agree on many key areas including ending repression
of the
civilian population, withdrawal of Serb security forces, unhindered
return of
refugees, and full access by humanitarian organizations. We still
disagree on
two key points: the need for an international security force to
guarantee safe
return of refugees and the need for Belgrade to move first. Our hope is
that the
Contact Group meeting tomorrow will reinforce the areas of
agreement and explore
how we can resolve our differences. In respect to your comment, we
do not have
military officers with the UCK and are not changing our position on
ground
forces. I again ask you to consider after this call is concluded how
important
it is to protect this relationship. You yourself know the stakes before
us as
well as anyone -- we cannot sacrifice all we have accomplished since
the Cold War
because of our differences over Belgrade. Let's keep in touch directly

to make
 sure we keep the relationship on a solid track.
 * PM: Let's keep it such. I share your view about the necessity to do
 all our
 best to keep the relationship on track. It's our aim also. You see I'm a
 little
 more optimistic after your assurances about ground operations and
 about the
 discussions over the next several days.
 * VP: I hope you'll be able to give assurances about sharing of
 intelligence and
 military assistance. This is very important to our country.
 * PM: Yes, we shall think about it.

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TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT memcon -- vp-stepashin call 6-12-99.doc
 DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: THE VICE PRESIDENT
 SERGEY VADIMOVICH STEPASHIN

LOCATION: RESIDENCE

NOTE TAKER: RICHARD BRODY

INTERPRETER: Nick Sorokin

DATE/TIME: 12 JUNE (times?)

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Hello, this is Al Gore. Thank you for
 taking this call. I
 know it's your national day and that you are very busy. I wouldn't be
 calling
 unless it was very important and urgent. I know that our Presidents
 plan to
 speak tomorrow and that they will discuss the current situation in
 Kosovo. The
 reason I am calling is to suggest a way to resolve the problems
 currently before

us so that by the time our presidents speak, they can affirm our agreement on a path forward. We have an opportunity to consolidate our achievements on Kosovo. If the current situation is not handled well, it could undo all of the progress that we have made. However, I do not want to call about problems without offering solutions as well. Let me summarize what I see as the current problem.

PRIME MINISTER STEPASHIN: I accept your proposal. So in order to simplify our conversation, let's use our first names. I'm Sergei, you're Al. I think we should talk like friends do.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Thank you. Contrary to assurances we received yesterday from Foreign Minister Ivanov, Russian forces have deployed in Kosovo unilaterally and without warning. Also contrary to the assurances we received, those forces have not been withdrawn. Now we see reports of possible further unilateral developments. Just now we've heard CNN announce that President Yeltsin approved yesterday's deployment and ordered MOD to implement it. Unless these matters are clarified, these mixed signals will deeply damage Russia's international credibility. Sergei, this situation is very serious. We need to do everything possible to avoid a conflict over this matter and work together to solve it. The solution to this problem was developed last night with Ministers Ivanov and Sergeyev. Strobe and his team met with them for hours, and together they developed a sound proposal. As we speak, Russian and American generals and military people are meeting in Macedonia to work out the details that would allow us to deploy together in Kosovo in the short term. This is not a permanent solution, but it is a way we can show that we are working together now. I have three requests in order to make this approach work. I ask that you instruct your generals to complete these discussions immediately, and we

will send the same instructions to our team. Second, the Russian forces that have deployed to Pristina have to be folded into the interim joint deployment that the generals are now planning. I stress this would be an interim solution under US command based on the SFOR model. We need to go with a model we know will work so that we can move together tomorrow. Third, we need your agreement that Russia will not deploy additional troops without our coordination and agreement. If that happens, it would be a very serious blow to our relationship and to our ability to resolve this problem in a satisfactory way. That is the temporary solution I recommend and the three requests I respectfully make to make this approach work.

PRIME MINISTER STEPASHIN: OK. First of all, thanks for the call and the holiday greetings. We haven't talked since we reached the major agreement on putting an end to NATO's strikes on Yugoslavia. Russia and the US worked together to get that agreement. But today as you mentioned we're facing a similarly difficult task on the civilian administration and deployment of the international security presence. Unfortunately, the UNSCR didn't spell out all the modalities which creates objective problems for implementation at the initial stage. We need to tackle the problem with mutual understanding and that is the approach I propose to you. It has been our approach with Strobe to take care of misunderstandings and it should be used in all of our approaches. I would like to calm you right away. About the CNN report, I can assure you President Yeltsin never approved deployment of forces. I just spoke with Ivanov and he reported on the outcomes of his discussions with Strobe. My information is that they have not reached an agreement. As for the three points you raised, I don't think we have misunderstandings on them. Our generals agree to no movement without a political

arrangement. I would like you to inform President Clinton of this before he speaks with President Yeltsin tomorrow. The second point you mentioned - our troops in Pristina. I think the formula is very interesting and in the framework of our discussions we can think of a technical [tactical?] redeployment or a way to make them part of the troops in Kosovo as part of the settlement. I agree we should send a message to our generals that a political agreement would be most important, to spell out the sectors. I thought when I spoke with Strobe several days ago that there was no disagreement on this. To avoid misunderstanding in the future we should agree on the role Russian forces will play in Kosovo. Unfortunately, our negotiations as of now haven't reached a mutually acceptable solution. But it's a matter of time. We need a strong political message on both sides. Russia does not plan to play some special role, although you know what role we played in reaching the [peace] settlement and we expect Russia would play a fair and respectful part in future operations. In that regard, I rely on your understanding. As you know, in the days to come, our presidents are scheduled to meet. And this will play a big part in these discussions. We're preparing for this meeting and want it to go without a hitch and be a success. I think in tomorrow's conversation between our presidents if President Clinton would raise the question of our upcoming July meeting on economic and technical cooperation, this would be very important. I'm getting prepared for that meeting. You said it took a great effort to reach a diplomatic settlement in Kosovo. But you shouldn't dramatize it. We'll reach some agreement. I know the US side is now having doubts about how you can trust or mistrust Russia...I would like to assure you that confidence and trust is the underlying principle of our policy. And we will stick to it in the future. I sincerely welcome the formula for the interaction we've developed. Whenever we have a problem we call

and discuss it.

This reflects a constructive attitude. It's better not to get the news from CNN, but from the horse's mouth, like we're doing now.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: I appreciate the fact that you know confidence and trust are important to the relationship. I pledge to you that I will work with you to

rebuild that confidence and trust, but we must deal with the serious blow to the

confidence that the world community has in Russia right now.

Because it has been

reported to the entire world that contrary to what we were told, President

Yeltsin approved yesterday's deployment and ordered the MOD to implement it. I

welcome your statement that it's not true. It's important to have a public

statement today clarifying the problem the conflicting signals have created.

This could result in irreparable damage to Russia's international reputation.

The foreign minister assures us they will not be deployed, and then they are.

Then we're assured that they'll be withdrawn, and then they're not.

Then we're

told it was a mistake, then it's reported that Yeltsin ordered it. We want to

help you clarify this. We have exercised great restraint and have not dramatized

this...I pledge to work with you closely in order to find a solution. Part of

the solution must be, in my opinion, a statement today clarifying that President

Yeltsin did not order this deployment and that we are agree to work together to

solve this problem. And then I have some comments to make about the future

structure of the security force.

PRIME MINISTER STEPASHIN: I would like to answer your first question right away.

I will instruct Minister Ivanov to find an acceptable formula to explain the

existing situation and we will speak to the principle which was spelled out in

the decision of the Security Council of the consolidated decision taken by our

military people. The decision and the document which would spell out

the exact
numbers of our forces, modalities, nature of forces. That's the spirit
we'll
work in and it will be the spirit of the Presidents' call tomorrow.
Before I
hear your proposal, I would like to make a proposal on my side. It
would be
useful to have a statement from the US side - that Russia's part will be
respected. Russia together with the US will determine the modalities
of its part
in the peace keeping force. That its role will be responsible
[respected?] and
we'll play a considerable part.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Thank you Sergei. We've consistently
said we welcome
Russian participation. We've consistently praised the constructive and
competent
and professional manner in which Russia has played an extremely
important role in
Bosnia and we have always invited Russian participation and we will
make that
clear. As you know, we have also felt very strongly and do now, of
course, that
unity of command is absolutely critical for the success of the mission.
Reconciling your concerns with ours is the reason why we have
recommended this
interim solution, based on to SFOR model. I've heard your concerns
and let me
say we are committed to work together on a long-term solution. I hope
we can
work together on an approach and I'll pause for the interpreter. Our
objective
is to achieve a solution that is satisfactory to Russia, allows it to
participate
in the international security force, and is consistent with unity of
command and
effectiveness on which we have all agree. The proposal which we
offered goes as
far as possible to create a special Russian area of responsibility. It is
not as
much as you have asked, but it is a lot, and it is much more than some
have
proposed. President Clinton has told me that if you agree a with this
approach,
he will fight for its approval. I believe that if we can put this plan in
place,
it will again show the success of our cooperation and that it will
provide

reassurance to the peaceful Serbs who have remained in Kosovo. As we look ahead to next week's meetings at Cologne, none of us want to entertain the prospect that our disagreement on these issues could ruin what we have achieved thus far in Kosovo. All of us want to see our two presidents highlight our cooperation and demonstrate how much we can accomplish when we work together. I will give my people instructions to get all of this done today, so that as I have suggested earlier, by the time our Presidents speak tomorrow, all the things we have discussed will be completed. I hope you will do the same. And I hope you'll make a public statement clarifying that President Yeltsin didn't order deployment of Russian troops and that it was as you've said a mistake.

PRIME MINISTER STEPASHIN: OK, about the issue of deployment of our forces on the ground. That was done through MOD channels. We can provide an adequate explanation. I ask a favor, before tomorrow's conversation between our presidents that you don't divulge the details of this conversation to the public. I think we should each give a chance to our diplomats and military representatives to work on this and tomorrow in the phone conversation between our presidents...will make it clear.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Well Sergei, am I free to say that President Yeltsin didn't order the deployment of the troops? Did he or didn't he?

PRIME MINISTER STEPASHIN: I know that he didn't give such an order. But again, I would like to refer to the favor that I asked of you that in tomorrow's conversation between our presidents, they should make everything clear. Before that we should refrain from making the details of our conversation public. I think for the short term, which lies between this phone conversation and tomorrow's conversation, I think I have provided enough information to you and for President Clinton.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Well, Sergei, I will respect your wishes, because this line of communication is so important to our two countries, and because I place so much importance on our friendship, which is just now really beginning and also is important to our countries. But I must remind you with all due respect that Russia is now in the following situation. Your foreign minister and you as prime minister have said the deployment was a mistake and not ordered by your president. The spokesperson for the president has said to the international news media the president did order the deployment. This is a country with a very large and powerful military. It deals with the entire world, and if the world is left in great doubt as to who is in control and doubt as to whether your

president has ordered the military to move, that stands to do very grave damage to Russia's international reputation. I say this to you privately, as a friend and as a colleague. And I said once more that I believe it would be important for Russia as well as for the relations between our two countries to have this matter clarified publicly today. And I say this with all due respect, my friend.

PRIME MINISTER STEPASHIN: What representative of the president made such a statement?

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: The statement was made on CNN as representing a decision by President Yeltsin. And the world has understood this to be coming from the Kremlin. If someone not authorized to speak for the President, then someone who is authorized to speak for the President should say it's not true.

PRIME MINISTER STEPASHIN: Well, I agree to the way you put this question and I would like to refer to the proposal which I made before, which is to refrain from making public statements about our conversation and I will instruct the defense

minister and foreign minister to do that. Following this, a public statement will be made. And now I'd like to say a few words about the public statement that caused all the problem. I think the misunderstandings are caused by the amount of effort and strain it took to reach the peace agreement. It took much effort and strain to reach it. Of course there are elements of distrust present, it's not easy, and I would like you to understand.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: I understand it's been a difficult time. I understand in your personal situation, you face difficulties which I can only imagine. But with all due respect, to have Minister Ivanov seek to clarify the situation may not repair the damage to Russia's credibility, because he and the defense ministry have said previously things which have just been contradicted by not only by the statement representing President Yeltsin's views, but also by Russia's actions on the ground. I don't want to repeat what I've said, but it's of such importance to try to reassure the international community that Russia has a unified chain of command and President Yeltsin is in control and I would urge you to reflect upon what I have said and if possible to revisit the possibility of a statement. But I respect what you have said and accept what you have said and look forward to continuing our communication on these matters. And thank you very much.

PRIME MINISTER STEPISHIN: Thank you and I would like to have a few words, with your permission. First of all, I agree with your basic premise. I would like to assure you the situation is under our control and there is unity of command and everything you mentioned. I will like to chalk up the breakdown to temporary lack of clarity in the UNSCR and documents that were signed. Second, our position will be clarified following tomorrow's presidential telephone conversation. Only they can clarify this. I think that will happen

tomorrow. I think it's of cardinal importance and that is what our presidents will discuss tomorrow. I would like to make clear that Russia-US relations are moving forward. Thank you.

[good byes]

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TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT memcon -- vp-stepashin call 6-14-99.doc
DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: THE VICE PRESIDENT
SERGEY VADIMOVICH STEPASHIN

LOCATION: RESIDENCE

NOTE TAKER: RICHARD BRODY

INTERPRETER: ?

DATE/TIME: 14 JUNE 0740/0816 EDT

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Sergey, thank you for taking my call at such short notice and I wanted to express appreciation for our very good conversation on Saturday. I know you're chairing a Security Council meeting today. So I appreciate your taking the call. Based on our conversation Saturday, I believe we are able to discuss even the most sensitive topics frankly and productively. And President Clinton is looking forward to seeing you in Cologne. Our Presidents had a constructive call yesterday. Their discussion laid a useful foundation for how we move forward on cooperation in Kosovo. Our countries must be seen as working together, not at cross purposes. Otherwise our success in bringing peace to Kosovo will falter and the conflict will quickly re-ignite, with our forces in the middle. I wanted to review the four issues that President Clinton will wish to discuss later today when he speaks to President Yeltsin. First, they

agreed
that Generals Jackson and Zvarzin would meet today in Pristina and
find a way to
resolve the situation at the airport. This meeting is important for
substantive
reasons and because the problem at the airport raises further questions
about
Russia's credibility and its commitment to work cooperatively on
implementing the
peace agreement in Kosovo. Despite what we asked for yesterday, the
problem at
airport still isn't fixed. Zvarzin said he was not there to work things
out,
only to listen. But he insisted on Russian control of the airport. That
won't
do. Both the Chernomyrdin-Ahtisaari agreement and the UNSCR call
for unity of
command. This is serious. It will cast a negative tone over all we've
done on
Kosovo; it could ruin the meeting in Cologne; it could cause the peace
to break
down. We must instruct our people to fix this today. If we can't get
this
resolved, it will be impossible to go on to address the other issues. I
can go
on if you wish, but I can pause for you to respond if you'd like to.

PRIME MINISTER STEPASHIN: Good morning again. I'm glad to
hear you. I'm happy
we have the regular possibility to talk to each other. I'm convinced it's
the
correct method of communication. Besides, it's useful to remove
misunderstandings
while their happening to prevent them becoming something more
serious. During
our last conversation and again now you underlined the importance of
mutual
confidence between Russia and the US. In Moscow we ascribe
particular importance
to this issue. Without trust and confidence we could not attain what
we've
managed to attain between our two countries and this is the way to
work in the
future as well. About Kosovo, within the first stage of the settlement
we should
come to the framework of the Russian presence at the Slatina airport
which is
situated near Pristina. And I would like to say that that stage should be
in the
international presence and I would like to underline the international

presence
in Kosovo. On instructions from the President of Russia, General
Zvarzin is
negotiating with General Jackson and in doing so we proceed from the
following:
the support group of the Russian peacemaking force remains in the
Slatina
airport. And as I understand General Jackson has nothing against this.
And then
as a matter of principle comes what you have now set forth to me as a
question .
The cooperation of the group with the commanders of the
peacemaking force is done
in accordance with the Bosnia formula. And for that purpose at the
earliest
stage the package of understanding would be put together and the
mechanism for
ensuring cooperation would be also put together. And as I know
British liaison
officers work in the Slatina airport already now. And the parts of the
contingent which are lacking now can be brought over there in
accordance with the
schedule that has to be approved by General Jackson and we would
like to
underline this. Within the next 2 or 3 days in the scope of track 2
several
issues of principle should be come forth. And they should apply to the

deployment of the Russian peacemaking contingent in the scope and
in the
framework of the international security presence and the international
security
force. And agreements pertaining to that should be reached at the level
of the
Ministers of Defense and foreign affairs and reported to the
presidents.
Minister Ivanov already informed Madeleine Albright about that
during the last
night. And I would like to reiterate that position. And it is of great
importance to have the meeting of ministers of defense held tomorrow
or the day
after and Minister of Defense Sergeyev is prepared to welcome
Secretary Cohen in
Moscow. If you would agree with that let us say that this is an
agreement and we
will report to the President. There is one new issue which causes great
concern
among us and which can upset the settlement in Kosovo. What I mean
is the
appearance of armed guerillas of the so-called KLA and they make

their appearance
in the areas where KFOR has already located. And there are already
people killed
and would there which is quite inadmissible and this is in violation of
the
UNSCR. And we all of us have to take urgent measures in order to
demilitarize
the units of the KLA. And Minister Ivanov informed Madame
Albright about that
and she assured him that the appropriate work is being done and we
do count on
the contribution from the American side. Thank you. I'm now
prepared to hear
the other points you wanted to make.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: First, about your proposal for Secretary
Cohen to come to
Moscow. I'm not prepared to answer now. But I will consult with
Secretary Cohen
on the state of his dialogue and they will be in further communication
on w ere
and when a meeting might take place. I quite understand the depths of
your
concern on the need to disarm the KLA. We share this concern and
are working
very hard to make sure that does happen. The danger you refer to
simply
underscores the importance to both of our countries to working out
unity of
command and arrangements for the US and Russia and the rest of the
international
force. If Russia is there by itself not on terms that have been agreed to
then
that could increase the chances that the conflict could restart and that
your
forces and ours could be caught in middle. That's a situation that is a
real
cause for concern and a reason to resolve this. Let me go on to the
point I
raised first. I'll pause for the interpreter. Now on the very first point, it
is true that Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that General Jackson
and
Zvarzin would meet and find a way to resolve the situation at the
airport. But
let me repeat that when Zvarzin came to the meeting he said he was
not there to
work things out, not there to resolve the issue, but was instructed only
to
listen. So there is no agreement on how to handle this situation at

airport. I repeat this is a serious matter. Second, Minister Ivanov told Strobe yesterday that your military people had agreed to fold the Russian contingent in Kosovo into KFOR on an interim basis under Bosnia-type arrangements to be reached with General Jackson, the British KFOR commander. We now need instructions from our Presidents to the relevant military people to implement this agreement. To avoid a security vacuum or problems on the ground, we must act quickly. What must happen to make sure that this is done to get instructions from our Presidents to the relevant military people to implement the agreements?

PRIME MINISTER STEPASHIN: Well I accept the formula to which you referred, namely that the militaries should receive the appropriate instructions. And before the conversation between Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton we shall inform him about what you have said and about the need to have appropriate instructions so the military could come up with their scheme for solving the matter which should be reported to the commander in chief. And as I understand the military have come up with further plans to that effect. And after that after the appropriate instructions are given the second meeting would actually be in order, the one I referred to between the ministers of defense should be held tomorrow or the day after in order to ensure that that proper instructions are approved and transmitted into reality. And in this way we could overcome the security vacuum that you referred to. Now I would like again to affirm the fact to which Mr. Ivanov said we are prepared and should work on the basis of the Bosnia formula and indeed this intention of ours remains in force, meaning the first stage.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: I agree with your suggestions about the need for a work plan for long-term arrangements for Russian participation in KFOR. I would propose that our defense ministers meet Wednesday in Helsinki. They would

be joined later
by our Foreign Ministers and could work to advance an agreement as
far as
possible before Cologne. We support this idea, and our President will
confirm
that our side is ready.

PRIME MINISTER STEPASHIN: AI, I agree that it's a very good
formula. And I shall
report this accordingly to the president. Today that would be referred
to in the
conversation between the presidents. Of course I can not now speak
on behalf of
the President, but I can tell you that the appropriate report will be
prepared
and position worked out. I do support the position you suggested and
will
examine it and we will examine it at the Security Council meeting.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Thank you. The other point I wanted to
make was that we
agreed on Saturday that it was very important that no additional
Russian forces
enter Kosovo absent mutual agreement. Let me underscore the
continuing
importance of this issue. We also believe that sending Russian forces
to Serbia
would be a provocative move.

PRIME MINISTER STEPASHIN: I agree with you and this would of
course be maintained
and this is the position of our president that this agreement should be
kept in
force. And the last thing AI, this is an issue which is outside the
framework
of Kosovo. You know I'm going to be in Cologne the first two days.
And I would
very much like if you could ask your assistant Mr. Fuerth to come
over there
where I intend to stay on the 18th and 19th and get in touch with my
personal
assistant, Mr. Engelsberg, to discuss details of our forthcoming
meeting that
will take place in July.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: I'd be happy to do so. I think that's an
excellent
suggestion. Let me close by saying thank you Sergey for an excellent
conversation. President Yeltsin yesterday proposed a meeting between
the two

Presidents. They will of course meet next Sunday in Cologne, and President Clinton is looking forward to this. But as you know it is critically important to get these issues resolved in the next few days to ensure that this meeting is a success.

PRIME MINISTER STEPASHIN: I absolutely agree with your formula and I am prepared for that .

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Have a very good have a good day and good luck in your Security Council meeting. And I look forward to talking with you again soon.
Good bye.

[good byes]

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TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

memcon on vp-primakov call on kosovo march 18 1999.doc
MEMCON: TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN VICE
PRESIDENT GORE
PRIME MINISTER PRIMAKOV
MARCH 18, 1999

* AG: I appreciate your taking my call on such short notice. I am looking forward to your visit to Washington and to the upcoming session of the Commission.

* YP: I also looking forward to seeing you - impatiently

* AG: We've been preparing well for the meeting. It will have big meaning for our relations. President Clinton and I believe it is essential that we use the visit to secure maximum progress on issues like promoting Russia's economic

recovery and charting next steps on strategic stability, arms control and nonproliferation.

* YP: I propose to discuss all the subject and of course look forward to my meeting with President Clinton.

* AG: I believe success in these areas will send a very important signal about the vibrancy of the U.S.-Russian partnership and our determination to tackle

tough problems together. I know that Madeleine called Minister Ivanov because

they are working closely on Kosovo and the negotiations in Paris. I am concerned

that events on the ground are moving very fast. Belgrade continues to block

progress in the peace talks. The talks may be suspended either today or

tomorrow. The security situation on the ground is very worrisome. I hope your

members of KVM have been telling you the same information we have been receiving.

The Yugoslav army and special police forces have now reached levels in and

around Kosovo that far exceed deployments last summer when Belgrade conducted

offensive actions against the KLA. They may unleash a major offensive on very

short notice. Under these circumstances, the KVM's security is in jeopardy and

it is preparing to evacuate. With their departure, we cannot predict what will

happen. We recognize that this situation could have an impact on your own

decision making about our meeting. We are eager for you to have a successful

trip to Washington, and I am doing all I can to ensure that we make progress on

key issues. But at this key moment in the situation in Kosovo, I think Russia's

direct efforts with Belgrade are especially important. The President and I

appreciate all that your people have been doing to make them recognize their

approach is gravely mistaken. Bombing is not NATO's preference - an effective

peace agreement is. We need to put maximum pressure on the FRY authorities to

agree quickly on all aspects of the peace agreement. If the talks collapse,

strong Russian statements that Belgrade has only itself to blame would be very valuable. I understand that recent Russian talks with FRY officials have not been easy. But I think it's essential that through our public statements we make it clear that the international community is unified. Because we cannot allow Belgrade's irresponsible behavior to drive a wedge between the United States and Russia. We have too much at stake and too much important work left to accomplish.

So I wanted to communicate this to you and hope our people can stay in the closest possible touch in coming days.

* YP: I can agree with many of the assessments you made. [We called the Yugoslav ambassador in - he's the brother of Milosevich] We told him we're against Yugoslavia's [] and that we advocate signing of the peace agreement. And all

the rest can be agreed upon later. But it is very important to sign the agreement today. This is our firm position. I think that it is very necessary

to avoid any split in the Contact Group position. And I therefore believe our

visit [in Washington] can concentrate specifically on this area. I want the U.S.

side to understand well that we want to be straightforward. We're doing

everything so that there won't be an explosion in the situation. So we're trying

to influence FRY to sign the agreement. As to the statement to which you

referred: I of course link it to air strikes. We absolutely sincerely believe

that if we make such a statement now, it would invite a strike. But we can't do

that. About our diplomacy and policy work: We're still optimistic and firmly

believe we can achieve [a solution through] using it. But I believe resolutely

that we should act jointly, that we should also agree upon a division of roles.

Because I have only one objective goal. I've finished my statement.

* AG: You know the French and British Co-Chairs are considering closing the talks

today. NATO will be meeting tomorrow. I think you know that European concerns

are as high as ours about the situation there. I have to tell you frankly

that
Belgrade's continued intransigence and aggression will leave us no
choice but to
act. The only way to avoid this will be for us to work together to put
maximum
pressure on Belgrade both publicly and privately, starting now if at all
possible. It can still be averted, but it will require that Belgrade accept
the
agreement and the reality of its position.

* YP: I agree and have enough information to testify to that fact. I told
you we
invited the Yugoslav Ambassador today and sent another tough
statement to
Belgrade. I think there will be a stop then because they'll understand
Russia
won't be a pawn in their game.

* AG: Here's what would help most: if the talks collapse, a Russian
statement
that Yugoslavia has only itself to blame. That would have the most
impact.

* YP: We can't say directly that Yugoslavia is itself to be blamed
because the
problem has many deviations. But at the same time we can agree that
we should
make a statement if the talks are frustrated and from which our
position would be
clear and would be well understood. Even now they understand our
position.

* AG: Let's stay in touch. We continue to work hard on preparations
for the
Commission and I look forward to seeing you.

* YP: I also think our meeting will be very fruitful and can tell you
with all
sincerity that we're doing a lot and I'm spending much time on
preparing for the
meeting. I gave an interview today to Tom Brokaw - if you have time,
you should
watch it.

* AG: I will try. Thank you. See you in Washington.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|---------------------------------|--|-----------------------|---------------------------------|
| 001a. note | re: Summary Points to be Made for Meeting with Viktor Stepanovich Chernomyrdin (3 pages) | 05/03/1999 | P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019 |
| 001b. memo | From Samuel Berger re: Meeting with Russian Special Envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin (2 pages) | 05/03/1999 | P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019 |
| 001c. talking points | re: Summary of Points to be Made for Meeting with Viktor Stepanovich Chernomyrdin (4 pages) | 05/03/1999 | P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019 |
| 001d. talking points | [Duplicate of 001a] (1 page) | 05/03/1999 | P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019 |
| 001e. talking points | [Duplicate of 001c] (3 pages) | 05/03/1999 | P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019 |
| 001f. talking points | [Duplicate of 001c] (4 pages) | 05/03/1999 | P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019 |
| 001g. memo | [Duplicate of 001b] (2 pages) | 05/03/1999 | P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019 |
| 001h. talking points | [Duplicate of 001c] (3 pages) | 05/03/1999 | P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019 |
| 001i. talking points | [Duplicate of 001c] [incomplete copy] (1 page) | 05/03/1999 | P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019 |

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- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 03 MAY 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

AP

PERSONS: CHERNOMYRDIN, VIKTOR

SUBJECT: POTUS CHERNOMYRDIN MTG 3 MAY

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DUE DATE: 08 MAY 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WEISS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

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FOR ACTION

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

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X 99052716 NOTED BY PRESIDENT

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DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

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VICE PRESIDENT
WH CHIEF OF STAFF

National Security Council
The White House

5/3
1455

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| Rice | <u>1</u> | <u>5/3</u> | _____ |
| Davies | _____ | _____ | _____ |
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| Steinberg | <u>2</u> | <u>[Signature]</u> | _____ |
| Berger | <u>3</u> | <u>[Signature]</u> | _____ |
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| Records Mgt. | <u>5</u> | <u>(R) 5/27</u> | <u>N</u> |

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COMMENTS: *Pres Mtg with
Chernomyrdin*

MAY 3 1994

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

~~SECRET~~

THE PRESIDENT HAS ONLY 3 PM 4:26
5-3-99

SUMMARY POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
MEETING WITH
VIKTOR STEPANOVICH CHERNOMYRDIN

- Appreciate all you're doing on diplomatic track. As Strobe and Al have told you, we take Yeltsin's and your personal engagement in the search for peace as positive development. Good for Balkans, good for U.S.-Russian relationship.
- Your channel with Al very important. Want to see Russia play a crucial role in achieving a political settlement, get credit for right sort of deal that ends crisis on lasting basis.
- Wrong sort of deal will prolong the crisis -- and even make it worse -- with possible further damage to our relations.
- Have strong basis of understanding from which to work: stop violence against Kosovo Albanians, return of refugees to safe and secure environment, unimpeded humanitarian access. Glad you have stressed these with Serbs.

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 05/03/09

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2014-0560-M (1.17)
10/2/2013 KBH

- To achieve these outcomes, need two things:
 1. Serbs must withdraw all armed forces. Can discuss small FRY presence as symbols of sovereignty, but have to start with full withdrawal.
 2. Deploy strong, capable international military force. That means NATO at its core with U.S. participation, and includes Russia and other troops as well.
- If we can agree on these points, I'm convinced we can find a formula that gives autonomy to Kosovo, keeps Kosovo inside Yugoslavia, creates environment to demilitarize KLA and protects Serb minority. We can do this as partners.
- Anything short of these conditions will fail to bring peace -- it will guarantee a worse and wider war.

~~SECRET~~

3

- Here's how I see managing this process. Boris and I, you and Al will work on overarching principles. Madeleine and Ivanov will work with G-8 and UN to translate principles into Security Council Resolution. Strobe will bring experts to Moscow to sketch out details for implementation.

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council
The White House

5/13/55
1455

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| Rice | <u>1</u> | <u>5/3</u> | _____ |
| Davies | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| Kerrick | _____ | _____ | _____ |
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| Berger | <u>3</u> | <u>[Signature]</u> | _____ |
| Situation Room | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| West Wing Desk | <u>4</u> | <u>5/3</u> <u>[Signature]</u> | <u>[Signature]</u> |
| Records Mgt. | <u>5</u> | <u>[Signature]</u> <u>5/27</u> | <u>N</u> |

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COMMENTS: *Pres Mtg with Chernomyrin*

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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2014-0560-M (1.15)
10/2/2018 KBH

MEETING WITH
RUSSIAN SPECIAL ENVOY VIKTOR CHERNOMYRDIN

DATE: Monday, May 3, 1999

LOCATION: Oval Office

TIME: TBD

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER *SB*

I. PURPOSE

- Hear Russia's thinking on next steps on Kosovo based on Chernomyrdin's visit to Belgrade.
- Outline our thinking on what it will take to get a resolution to the conflict that will work.

II. BACKGROUND

Chernomyrdin brings a letter from Yeltsin that probably outlines a new set of Russian ideas for ending the conflict. The Russians are still selling what they think Milosevic will accept, rather than adopting NATO's conditions. That said, Chernomyrdin asked Strobe several penetrating questions last week, suggesting an interest in working with NATO's conditions. You should expect three basic themes from Chernomyrdin:

- *Stop the bombing.* The Russians desperately want to portray themselves as having forced NATO to halt its attacks.
- *Respect international law, Serb sovereignty.* For face-saving and precedent-setting reasons (Chechnya), the Russians want heavy UN involvement in any force and greater FRY residual presence inside Kosovo.
- *Help Milosevic save face.* Chernomyrdin will claim that Milosevic is feeling cornered, but will never capitulate and that he has nothing to lose.

At the outset, you should emphasize that we welcome Yeltsin's and Chernomyrdin's roles and would be happy to see Russia get the credit for any success on the diplomatic track. You should underscore that NATO does not plan to negotiate its conditions with the Serbs. But within these conditions, there is scope for flexibility. You should point to two key follow-up actions: first, drafting a UNSCR that the G-8 can support; second, sketching out the implementation details for Serb withdrawal, an international security presence, and an international provisional administration. Strobe will be prepared to take up the second step in Moscow next week.

III. PARTICIPANTS

| | |
|----------------------------|---------------------|
| The President | Viktor Chernomyrdin |
| The Vice President | Ambassador Ushakov |
| Samuel Berger | Others TBD |
| James Steinberg | |
| Leon Fuerth | |
| Secretary Albright | |
| Strobe Talbott | |
| Carlos Pascual (notetaker) | |

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House photographer only.

V. SEQUENCE

Prebrief, followed by photo. The Vice President will lead off the meeting with a short description of his discussion with Chernomyrdin.

Attachments

Tab A Points to be Made

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
VIKTOR STEPANOVICH CHERNOMYRDIN

- Appreciate all you're doing on diplomatic track. As Strobe and Al have told you, we take Yeltsin's and your personal engagement in the search for peace as positive development. Good for Balkans, good for U.S.-Russian relationship.
- Your channel with Al very important. Want to see Russia play a crucial role in achieving a political settlement, get credit for right sort of deal that ends crisis on lasting basis.
- Wrong sort of deal will prolong the crisis -- and even make it worse -- with possible further damage to our relations.
- Have strong basis of understanding from which to work: stop violence against Kosovo Albanians, return of refugees to safe and secure environment, unimpeded humanitarian access. Glad you have stressed these with Serbs.
- To achieve these outcomes, need two things:
 1. Serbs must withdraw all armed forces. Can discuss small FRY presence as symbols of sovereignty, but have to start with full withdrawal.
 2. Deploy strong, capable international military force. That means NATO at its core with U.S. participation, and includes Russia and other troops as well.
- If we can agree on these points, I'm convinced we can find a formula that gives autonomy to Kosovo, keeps Kosovo inside Yugoslavia, creates environment to demilitarize KLA and protects Serb minority. We can do this as partners.
- Anything short of these conditions will fail to bring peace -- it will guarantee a worse and wider war -- and the eventual dissolution of the FRY.
- Here's how I see managing this process. Boris and I, you and Al will work on overarching principles. Madeleine and Ivanov will work with G-8 and UN to translate principles into Security Council Resolution. Strobe will bring experts to Moscow to sketch out details for implementation.

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 05/03/09

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2014-0520-M (1.16)
10/2/2013 KBH

Following are responses to points Chernomyrdin may raise:

Bombing pause essential for negotiated settlement

- Milosevic has made numerous promises and violated them while continuing his strategy of brutal repression in Kosovo. No peaceful Albanian will go home based solely on his word.
- Bombing could stop almost immediately if Milosevic agrees to international community's demands and we verify that he has begun to withdraw his forces according to a precise and rapid timetable.
- Working on your questions of timetable and verification. Want Russia to have role in verification. Need to be clear, though, that we would start bombing again if Milosevic fails to meet timetable or any other conditions.

Leave details/scale of FRY withdrawal for later negotiation

- Unless Milosevic gets all forces out quickly, refugees won't go back, and only armed guerillas will return to Kosovo. Any military or paramilitary forces will be dangerous to peacekeepers. We won't be able to get KLA to disarm.
- Willing to talk to you about return, after full withdrawal, of very small, symbolic presence that might protect Serb patrimony or serve as liaison to international military force. Need to work internally and at NATO.
- Hope Madeleine and Ivanov can discuss in Europe later this week. Strobe can follow up in Moscow next week. We'll be ready for intensive discussions. Hope you will, too.

Russian role in verifying Serb withdrawal

- We want to work with Russia to develop the proper arrangements. Madeleine and Ivanov should discuss later this week. When we're finished with internal work and at NATO, hope Strobe can follow up next week.

Kosovo can't become international protectorate

- Committed to solution preserving FRY territorial integrity, current borders. Open to having administration mandated by UN Security Council with roles for UN, OSCE, Russia, others.
- Any political solution has to lead to long-term stability. NATO has no desire to become the "pro-counsel" in the Balkans.
- Scale of Milosevic's brutality, however, means he will never again be able to exert meaningful political control over Kosovo. Otherwise, refugees will never go home. Enormous devastation inside Kosovo means that refugees will need a lot of help from international community to run their affairs.

International force limited to NATO non-combatants

- Post-conflict environment will be very dangerous. International security force must be capable, effective.
- NATO, and, in particular, U.S., need to be there if refugees are going to return and KLA going to disarm -- just as it will be reassuring to Serbs if Russia participates.

International force under UN auspices

- By "UN auspices" we mean a Chapter VII resolution providing the endorsement for the international military presence. We cannot agree to UN command and control of the military force.
- UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Somalia showed UN command and control won't work. Need NATO at core of force. Can't let Milosevic arbitrarily decide which countries participate. Madeleine and Ivanov can discuss.
- IFOR/SFOR in Bosnia is a good model.

EU/US oil embargo and NATO maritime inspections unacceptable

- Cutting off fuel to Milosevic's war machine critical to speedy resolution of conflict. NATO still working details of visit and search regime. Want to work constructively with you on implementation to avoid problems.

Destruction and suffering inside Serbia

- Doing what we can in dangerous conditions to limit civilian casualties. Important for you to think about enormity of Belgrade's atrocities in Kosovo. Full story just emerging.
- When it comes out, really important that international community, and ideally that includes Russia, stand together in opposition to this outrage.
- Would be devastating to me as a friend of Russia and a friend of yours if Russia were to appear to have been on the wrong side here.

SUMMARY POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
VIKTOR STEPANOVICH CHERNOMYRDIN

- Appreciate all you're doing on diplomatic track. As Strobe and Al have told you, we take Yeltsin's and your personal engagement in the search for peace as positive development. Good for Balkans, good for U.S.-Russian relationship.
- Your channel with Al very important. Want to see Russia play a crucial role in achieving a political settlement, get credit for right sort of deal that ends crisis on lasting basis.
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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0560-m (1.17)
10/2/2013 KBH

~~SECRET~~

3306

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 3, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: CARLOS PASCUAL *CP*

FROM: ANDREW WEISS *AW*

SUBJECT: Briefing Materials for the President's Meeting
with Russian Special Envoy Chernomyrdin

Attached for your review are briefing materials and talking points for the President's March 24 meeting with Viktor Chernomyrdin.

Concurrence by: Leon Fuerth, Greg Schulte *AW for*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President

Tab A Points to be Made

Tab B Summary Points

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 10/2/2013
2014-0560-M


~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify on: 3/22/09

1. JS —

2. SRB —



Scott-Perez, Marilyn L.

From: Pascual, Carlos E.
Sent: Monday, May 03, 1999 1:29 PM
To: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc: Schulte, Gregory L.; Weiss, Andrew S.; Saunders, Richard M.; Davidson, Leslie K.; Brody, Richard J.
Subject: POTUS-Cherno [CONFIDENTIAL]
Importance: High

FOR SANDY AND JIM

Revised based on Jim's guidance.



3306 talkpts___.doc

3306

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KSM NARA, Date 10/24/2013
2014-0560-M

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
VIKTOR STEPANOVICH CHERNOMYRDIN

- Appreciate all you're doing on diplomatic track. As Strobe and Al have told you, we take Yeltsin's and your personal engagement in the search for peace as positive development. Good for Balkans, good for U.S.-Russian relationship.
- ~~Appreciated your help behind the scenes to get our POWs out.~~ *fun?*
Your channel with Al very important. Want to see Russia play a crucial role in achieving a political settlement, get credit for right sort of deal that ends crisis on lasting basis. *love?*
- Wrong sort of deal will prolong the crisis -- and even make it worse -- with possible further damage to our relations.
- Have strong basis of understanding from which to work: stop violence against Kosovo Albanians, return of refugees to safe and secure environment, unimpeded humanitarian access. Glad you have stressed these with Serbs.
- To achieve these outcomes, need two things:
 1. Serbs must withdraw all armed forces. Can discuss *small* FRY *small* presence as symbols of sovereignty, but have to start with full withdrawal.
 2. Deploy strong, capable international ~~security~~ *military* force. That means NATO at its core with U.S. participation, and includes Russia and other troops as well.
- If we can agree on these points, I'm convinced we can find a formula that gives autonomy to Kosovo, keeps Kosovo inside Yugoslavia, creates environment to demilitarize KLA and protects Serb minority. We can do this as partners.
- Anything short of these conditions will fail to bring peace -- it will guarantee a worse and wider war.
- Here's how I see managing this process. Boris and I, you and Al will work on overarching principles. Madeleine and Ivanov will work with G-8 and UN to translate principles into Security Council Resolution. Strobe will bring experts to Moscow to sketch out details for implementation.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0560-M (1.18)
10/2/2018 KBH

Following are responses to points Chernomyrdin may raise

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- Milosevic has made numerous promises and violated them while continuing his strategy of brutal repression in Kosovo. No peaceful Albanian will go home based solely on his word.
- Bombing could stop almost immediately if Milosevic agrees to international community's demands and we verify that he has begun to withdraw his forces according to a precise and rapid timetable.
- Working on your questions of timetable and verification. Want Russia to have role in verification. Need to be clear, though, that we would start bombing again if Milosevic fails to meet timetable or any other conditions.

Leave details/scale of FRY withdrawal for later negotiation

- Unless Milosevic gets all forces out quickly, refugees won't go back, and only armed guerillas will return to Kosovo. Any military or paramilitary forces will be dangerous to peacekeepers. We won't be able to get KLA to disarm.
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- Hope Madeleine and Ivanov can discuss in Europe later this week. Strobe can follow up in Moscow next week. We'll be ready for intensive discussions. Hope you will, too.

Russian role in verifying Serb withdrawal

- We want to work with Russia to develop the proper arrangements. Madeleine and Ivanov should discuss later this week. When we're finished with internal work and at NATO, hope Strobe can follow up next week.

Kosovo can't become international protectorate

- Committed to solution preserving FRY territorial integrity, current borders. Open to having administration mandated by UN Security Council with roles for UN, OSCE, Russia, others.

Obama agrees with us so

- Scale of Milosevic's brutality means we simply can't allow him retain control over Kosovo. And enormous devastation inside Kosovo means that refugees will need a lot of help from international community to run their affairs.

Otherwise, refugees will never go home

International force limited to NATO non-combatants

- Post-conflict environment will be very dangerous. International security force must be capable, effective.
- NATO, and, in particular, U.S., need to be there if refugees are going to return and KLA going to disarm -- just as it will be reassuring to Serbs if Russia participates.

International force under UN auspices

- By "UN auspices" we mean a Chapter VII resolution providing the ~~mandate~~ for the international military presence. We ~~do not~~ *cannot agree* to ~~not mean~~ UN command and control of the military force. *cannot agree*

Endorsement

- UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Somalia showed UN command and control won't work. Need NATO at core of force. Can't let Milosevic arbitrarily decide which countries participate. Madeleine and Ivanov can discuss.

Bosnia a good model

EU/US oil embargo and NATO maritime inspections unacceptable

- Cutting off fuel to Milosevic's war machine critical to speedy resolution of conflict. NATO still working details of visit and search regime. Want to work constructively with you on implementation to avoid problems.

~~Guilt-trip on~~ Destruction and suffering inside Serbia

- Doing what we can in dangerous conditions to limit civilian casualties. Important for you to think about enormity of Belgrade's atrocities in Kosovo. Full story just emerging.
- When it comes out, really important that international community, and ideally that includes Russia, stand together in opposition to this outrage.
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*IPEN
SPEN
IC*

*(For)
SPEN
in
Bosnia
is
a
good
model*

Bartlett, L. June

From: Pascual, Carlos E.
Sent: Monday, May 03, 1999 2:27 PM
To: @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary
Cc: Davidson, Leslie K.; Weiss, Andrew S.
Subject: Chernob-POTUS points [CONFIDENTIAL]

3306



3306 talkpts_.doc

If possible, could you put these fixes in from OVP?

Done
LB
5-3-99

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *KGM* NARA, Date *10/2/2018*
2014-0560-m

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0560-M (1.19)
10/2/2013 KBH

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- By "UN auspices" we mean a Chapter VII resolution providing the mandate for the international military presence. We do not mean UN command and control of the military force.
- UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Somalia showed UN command and control won't work. Need NATO at core of force. Can't let Milosevic arbitrarily decide which countries participate. Madeleine and Ivanov can discuss.

EU/US oil embargo and NATO maritime inspections unacceptable

- Cutting off fuel to Milosevic's war machine critical to speedy resolution of conflict. NATO still working details of visit and search regime. Want to work constructively with you on implementation to avoid problems.

Guilt-trip on destruction and suffering inside Serbia

- Doing what we can in dangerous conditions to limit civilian casualties. Important for you to think about enormity of Belgrade's atrocities in Kosovo. Full story just emerging.

~~Belgrade's willingness to shed blood indiscriminately has been proven over and over. Think back to 80 men, women and children killed in Drenica early last spring. This was followed by the massacres at Racak and Rogovo.~~

~~Full story just emerging.~~

- When it comes out, really important that international community, and ideally that includes Russia, stand together in opposition to this outrage.
- Would be devastating to me as a friend of Russia and a friend of yours if Russia were to appear to have been on the wrong side here.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEETING WITH
RUSSIAN SPECIAL ENVOY, VIKTOR CHERNOMYRDIN

DATE: Monday, May 3, 1999
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: ~~4:30-5:30 p.m.~~ *TBD*

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

I. PURPOSE

- Hear Russia's thinking on next steps on Kosovo based on Chernomyrdin's visit to Belgrade.
- Outline our thinking on what it will take to get a resolution to the conflict that will work.

II. BACKGROUND

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- *Help Milosevic save face.* Chernomyrdin will claim that Milosevic is feeling cornered, but will never capitulate and that he has nothing to lose.

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify on: 3/22/09

05/03/09

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0560-M (1.20)
10/2/2013 KBH

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Samuel
James
 The President
 The Vice President
 APNSA Berger
 DAPNSA Steinberg
 Leon Fuerth
 Secretary Albright
 Strobe Talbott
 Carlos Pascual (notetaker)

Viktor Chernomyrdin
 Ambassador Ushakov
 Others TBD

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House photographer only.

V. SEQUENCE

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Attachments

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Secret
Reason
Declassify

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0560-M (1.21)
10/2/2018 KBH

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 2. Deploy strong, capable international security force. That means NATO at its core with U.S. participation, and includes Russia and other troops as well.
- If we can agree on these points, I'm convinced we can find a formula that gives autonomy to Kosovo, keeps Kosovo inside Yugoslavia, creates environment to demilitarize KLA and protects Serb minority. We can do this as partners.
- Anything short of these conditions will fail to bring peace -- it will guarantee a worse and wider war.
- Here's how I see managing this process. Boris and I, you and Al will work on overarching principles. Madeleine and Ivanov will work with G-8 and UN to translate principles into Security Council Resolution. Strobe will bring experts to Moscow to sketch out details for implementation.

~~Secret~~
R -
Declassify

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0560-M (1.22)
10/2/2018 KBH

MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

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| Original OA/ID Number: 2734 | | | | |
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UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9904413
RECEIVED: 09 JUN 99 14

TO: DAVIES

FROM: PASCUAL

DOC DATE: 09 JUN 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

MEMCON

PERSONS: CHERNOMYRDIN, VICTOR

SUBJECT: MEMCON W/RUSSIAN SPECIAL ENVOY CHERNOMYRDIN MAY 3

ACTION: RICE APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 12 JUN 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PASCUAL

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
EXECSEC
NSC CHRON
PASCUAL

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMTS

CLOSED BY: NSDMK

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9904413

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 DAVIES
001

Z 99061012 FOR DECISION
X 99061015 RICE APPROVED RECOM

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—
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4413
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PR INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TR A/O _____

| | SEQUENCE TO | INITIAL/DATE | DISPOSITION |
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| JACOBSON | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| POWELL | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| RICE | <u>1</u> | <u>⊗ 4/10</u> | _____ |
| DAVIES | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| KERRICK | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| STEINBERG | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| BERGER | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| SITUATION ROOM | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| WEST WING DESK | <u>2</u> | <u>TR 6/10</u> | <u>N</u> |
| RECORDS MGMT. | <u>3</u> | <u>DMK 6/10</u> | <u>N/R</u> |
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| _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ |

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

199 JUN 10 10 11 AM
 CC:

COMMENTS: Memo on w/Chernomyrdin
5/3

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4413

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TR A/O _____

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| RECORDS MGMT. | <u>3</u> | <u>DMK 6/10</u> | <u>N/R</u> |
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A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

COMMENTS: Mem con w/ Chernomyskin
5/3

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE 40

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

June 9, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR GLYN T. DAVIES *GD*

FROM: CARLOS PASCUAL *CP*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with Russian Special
Envoy Chernomyrdin

Attached at Tab I is the Memorandum of Conversation of the May 3 meeting between the President and Russian Special Envoy Chernomyrdin.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve ✓

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Russian Special Envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Secretary Albright
Samuel Berger
Deputy Secretary Talbott
James Steinberg
Leon Fuerth

DATE, TIME May 3, 1999, 4:30 p.m. - 6:00 p.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

There was no notetaker present at this meeting and, subsequently, no written record of the meeting.

-- End of Conversation --

Silva, Mary Ann T.

From: Joshi, M. Kay
Sent: Wednesday, June 09, 1999 12:02 PM
To: Pascual, Carlos E.; Silva, Mary Ann T.; @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine
Cc: @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary
Subject: RE: Overdue Memcons/Telcons/SOCs [CONFIDENTIAL]

Carlos: per Ed, we need a memcon (to be filed for record only) done. You would do the memcon as usual listing subject, participants and date, time and place. In the section that has verbatim text, you would put something to the effect that there was no notetaker at this meeting and subsequently no written record of the meeting.

-----Original Message-----

From: Pascual, Carlos E.
Sent: Tuesday, June 08, 1999 4:41 PM
To: Joshi, M. Kay; Silva, Mary Ann T.; @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine
Cc: @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary
Subject: RE: Overdue Memcons/Telcons/SOCs [CONFIDENTIAL]

Sandy, Jim, Albright, Strobe, Fuerth, POTUS, VP -- who do you want to ask to write the memcon? :-)

-----Original Message-----

From: Joshi, M. Kay
Sent: Tuesday, June 08, 1999 3:19 PM
To: Silva, Mary Ann T.; @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine
Cc: @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary
Subject: RE: Overdue Memcons/Telcons/SOCs [CONFIDENTIAL]

Who was in the meeting?

-----Original Message-----

From: Silva, Mary Ann T.
Sent: Tuesday, June 08, 1999 3:14 PM
To: Joshi, M. Kay; @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine
Cc: @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary
Subject: RE: Overdue Memcons/Telcons/SOCs [CONFIDENTIAL]

Kay--
SOC on Russian DC, 4/15 - will be prepared
Memcon w/Chernomyrdin - RUE was not in the meeting.
Telcall w/Aliyev, 5/3 - went forward as pkg 4022.
SOC on Ukrainian DC, 6/2 - now in draft

-----Original Message-----

From: Joshi, M. Kay
Sent: Tuesday, June 08, 1999 2:11 PM
To: @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine
Cc: @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary
Subject: Overdue Memcons/Telcons/SOCs [CONFIDENTIAL]

I have been asked, once again, to try and get closure on overdue Memcons, Telcons and Summaries of Conclusions. Below is a list of items due from your office. Please let us know the status of each as soon as possible.

If you have already prepared a response, please let me know the package number. If there were no summaries of conclusion for a PC or DC meeting, then a quick memo for the record needs to be done (memo from you to Glyn asking him to sign the memorandum for the record). The memorandum for the record should state the date, time and subject of the meeting. Any questions, please feel free to call. Thank you.

SOC DC Mtg on Russia, 4/15 (Frontline States was also done at this DC meeting; I will task CEE for their portion)

Memcon w/Russian Special Envoy Chernomyrdin, 5/3

Telcall w/Pres Aliyev of Azerbaijani, 5/14

SOC DC on Ukraine, 6/2

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KSM NARA, Date 10/1/2018
2014-0560-M