
Clinton Presidential Records Mandatory Declassification Review

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

26-Feb-1994 08:17 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

VAX MAIL@OEOB
GOTTEMOELLER@A1@OEOB
BRANSCUM@A1@OEOB
BEYRLE@A1@OEOB

FROM: White House Situation Room
(WHSR@A1@WHSR)

SUBJECT: SPACE COOPERATION WITH UKRAINE

<DIST>
SIT: BEYRLE BRANSCUM GOTTEMOELLER VAX
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261255Z FEB 94
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AMEMBASSY KIEV
<TO>

SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4719

<SUBJ>
SPACE COOPERATION WITH UKRAINE

<TEXT>
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 KIEV 001539

DEPT PLS PASS TO NSC-BURNS/GOTTEMOELLER
DEPT PLS PASS TO NASA-GOLDIN
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, PREL, TSPL, KNNP, KTIA, MNUC, UP
SUBJECT: SPACE COOPERATION WITH UKRAINE
REF: KIEV 01009

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
AGREEMENT ON U.S.-UKRAINE SPACE COOPERATION

2. DURING A RECENT MEETING WITH ANDRIJ TITARENKO (PROTECT), DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE UKRAINIAN NATIONAL SPACE AGENCY, WE WERE ADVISED THAT THE GOU IS SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN SPACE COOPERATION WITH THE U.S. AND WANTS TO BUILD ON THE INITIATIVES PROPOSED BY DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER SHMAROV IN HIS FEBRUARY 2 LETTER TO NASA DIRECTOR GOLDIN (REFTEL). TITARENKO STATED THAT THE CABINET OF MINISTERS HAS DIRECTED THE RELEVANT

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MINISTRIES TO PREPARE A DRAFT TEXT OF A U.S.-UKRAINE AGREEMENT ON SPACE COOPERATION. ACCORDING TO TITARENKO, THE AGREEMENT MAY BE PRESENTED BY KRAVCHUK DURING HIS MARCH VISIT TO WASHINGTON. MFA OFFICIALS CONFIRMED THAT SUCH AN AGREEMENT IS BEING PREPARED, BUT WERE NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT THE DRAFT WOULD CLEAR THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS BEFORE KRAVCHUK'S VISIT. THE NATIONAL SPACE AGENCY IS ALSO PROPOSING THAT A JOINT STATEMENT OR PROTOCOL ON SPACE COOPERATION BE SIGNED DURING THE VISIT. UKRAINE PLANS TO JOIN MTCR

3. TITARENKO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT UKRAINIAN MEMBERSHIP IN THE MTCR REGIME IS A NECESSARY PRECONDITION FOR FUTURE SPACE COOPERATION WITH THE U.S. RECOGNIZING THIS FACT, HE STATED THAT THE UKRAINIAN NATIONAL DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE (COMPOSED OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM RELEVANT MINISTRIES) HAS RECOMMENDED TO THE CABINET OF MINISTERS THAT UKRAINE JOIN THE MTCR REGIME. TITARENKO UNDERScoreD THAT UKRAINE WILL NEED U.S. ASSISTANCE IN IMPLEMENTING MTCR GUIDELINES. IN CONVERSATIONS WITH MFA OFFICIALS, WE WERE TOLD THAT THE ISSUE OF MTCR ADHERENCE IS UNDER REVIEW BY THE CABINET OF MINISTERS. VISIT OF NASA EXPERTS TO UKRAINE

4. TITARENKO TOLD US THAT THE NATIONAL SPACE AGENCY HAS BEEN IN DIRECT TELEPHONE CONTACT WITH NASA AND IS EXPECTING A GROUP OF EXPERTS TO COME TO KIEV IN MID-MARCH TO DISCUSS SPACE COOPERATION. DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS SERHIY OSSYKA, WHO IS A CLOSE CONTACT OF UKRAINIAN SPACE AGENCY CHAIRMAN GORBULIN, TOLD US GORBULIN PLANS TO SHOW NASA EVERYTHING. THINGS WE HAVEN'T SHOWN ANYONE YET, IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE SERIOUS COOPERATION." SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ENTER

5. TITARENKO ALSO CONFIRMED THAT THE CABINET OF MINISTERS HAS DESIGNATED THE NATIONAL SPACE AGENCY AS THE LEAD ON THE CENTER (REPORTED SEPTEL). ACCORDING TO TITARENKO, THE GOU PROPOSES TO IMPLEMENT THE STCU AGREEMENT BY PRESIDENTIAL DECREE THEREBY OBTAINING THE NEED FOR RADA RATIFICATION. COMMENT

6. SPACE COOPERATION IS A KEY UKRAINIAN CONCERN. THE GOU WANTS TO PRESERVE ITS SPACE-RELATED INDUSTRY BECAUSE IT BELIEVES THAT THE GIANT MISSILE COMPLEX IN DNEPROPETROVSK HAS ENORMOUS ECONOMIC POTENTIAL. POLITICALLY, THE FUTURE OF THIS COMPLEX IS IMPORTANT TO THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL SECTOR WHICH HAS SUBSTANTIAL INFLUENCE IN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE RADA. THERE IS ALSO A CLEAR NEED TO "DELIVER" SOMETHING THAT WILL SATISFY PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK'S MAIN OPPONENT - LEONID KUCHMA - WHO HAS BOTH A PROFESSIONAL AND PERSONAL

INTEREST IN THIS ISSUE. THIS MAY PARTIALLY ACCOUNT FOR THE AMBIVALENCE ON THE PART OF SOME UKRAINIAN LOWER LEVEL OFFICIALS ON THE QUESTION OF DISMANTLEMENT OF SS-24 MISSILES AND SILOS. THE INFLUENCE OF THIS SECTOR ALSO MAY EXPLAIN THE DECISION OF THE CABINET OF MINISTERS IN DESIGNATING THE NATIONAL SPACE AGENCY TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CENTER. THE GOU IS CONCERNED ABOUT A POSSIBLE "BRAIN-DRAIN" OF MISSILE SPECIALISTS IF THE SPACE INDUSTRY IS DISMANTLED, THEREBY ADDING TO THE PROLIFERATION PROBLEM.

7. WE BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL FOR WASHINGTON TO SIGNAL U.S. INTEREST DURING THE UPCOMING VISIT BY ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 KIEV 001539
DEPT PLS PASS TO NSC-BURNS/GOTTEMOELLER
DEPT PLS PASS TO NASA-GOLDIN
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM, PREL, TSPL, KNNP, KTIA, MNUC, UP
SUBJECT: SPACE COOPERATION WITH UKRAINE
PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK IN PURSUING DIRECT SPACE COOPERATION WITH UKRAINE. A POTENTIAL U.S. POLICY PROPOSAL COULD INCLUDE UKRAINIAN AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO ADHERE TO THE MTCR IN EXCHANGE FOR A U.S. AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO COOPERATE IN THIS AREA. THE THEMES OF U.S.-UKRAINIAN SPACE COOPERATION COULD INCLUDE A JOINT STUDY ON HOW TO INTEGRATE UKRAINE INTO THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE MARKET, JOINT SPACE PROJECTS, AND JOINT INDUSTRY EFFORTS WITH POSSIBLE SEED MONEY FROM THE GOVERNMENT. IN THE NEAR TERM, WE COULD SHOW U.S. INTEREST IN SPACE COOPERATION THROUGH VISITS OF U.S. GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS REPRESENTATIVES.

8. ANOTHER SUGGESTION WOULD BE TO EXPAND OUR COOPERATION WITH UKRAINE BY ESTABLISHING A MECHANISM PARALLEL TO THE GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN COOPERATION FORUM WITH RUSSIA. THE FORUM COULD BE USED TO COORDINATE COOPERATION ON A BILATERAL AND TRILATERAL (WITH RUSSIA) BASIS IN THE AREAS OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, SPACE AND ENERGY. WE COULD UNDERSCORE OUR INTEREST BY PROPOSING SUCH A FORUM, POSSIBLY DURING THE KRAVCHUK VISIT, AND SEND THE VICE PRESIDENT TO KIEV TO ANNOUNCE IT. WE COULD ALSO USE THE VISIT TO INITIATE THE OPERATION OF THE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CENTER.

9. WE SHOULD NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE PROLIFERATION PROBLEM THAT WOULD RESULT IF UKRAINE'S SIGNIFICANT SPACE CAPABILITY IS NOT CHANNLED IN THE PROPER DIRECTION OR IS ALLOWED TO DISINTEGRATE. MEANINGFUL ENGAGEMENT NOW WILL GO A LONG WAY IN INSURING THAT OUR NON-PROLIFERATION EFFORTS ARE SUCCESSFUL. MILLER

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 1, 1994

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen


ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: R. NICHOLAS BURNS *NR*

FROM: ROSE GOTTEMOELLER *RG*

SUBJECT: Ukraine's Ideas on Nunn-Lugar Assistance



Attached at Tab I is a Memorandum to the President that responds to his interest in Ukraine's ideas about its FY-1994 Nunn-Lugar assistance program. The three key points in the subject paragraph at Tab A will all be issues that President Kravchuk will want to discuss with the President at their meeting on Friday: SS-24 missile dismantlement, space launch and Nunn-Lugar funds for defense conversion. I have therefore taken the opportunity of this memorandum to preview the substance of all three for the President. We will be following up tomorrow with further substance in the memorandum for Friday's meeting.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Comments on SSD Negotiations in Ukraine
- Tab ~~B~~ Message from Kiev on Space Launch Issues

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DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By KOE NARA, Date 05/26/16
2014-0644-M

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

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PER E.O. 13526
2014-0644-M
05126116 KDE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL R. BERGER

SUBJECT: Ukraine's Ideas for FY-1994 Nunn-Lugar Funds

You commented (Tab A) on Ukraine's ideas for using the \$100 million in Nunn-Lugar funds that we are prepared to extend to the Ukrainians in FY-1994. There are several points to stress about the Safety, Security and Dismantlement (SSD) talks in Kiev on February 17-18. First, the insistence that Ukraine wanted to maintain SS-24s for space launch came from a lower level Ukrainian negotiator who was surprised when he heard that Kravchuk's National Security Advisor, Anton Buteyko, had already submitted to us (in January) a proposal to use Nunn-Lugar funds to dismantle the SS-24s. We handed back to the lower level negotiator and his colleagues on the Ukrainian delegation a copy of the Buteyko paper.

The experience of our SSD negotiators in this case pointed to the fact that communication among higher and lower levels of the Ukrainian government is poor, not that the Ukrainian government is changing its position on this critical issue. Nevertheless, you will want to clarify this point with President Kravchuk when you see him on Friday. Because decisionmaking seems limited to Kravchuk and his close staff, we will need his direct and continued involvement to maintain progress on this and related SSD questions.

The issue of space launch is complicated, however. You will likely hear from President Kravchuk about Ukraine's aspirations to enter the space launch market and its willingness to do so under the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The Ukrainian government is clearly mindful of the agreements that we reached with Russia, which balanced adherence to the MTCR guidelines against access to the commercial space launch market.

Ukraine's interest in the MTCR is clearly welcome, but its commercial access to space presents several serious problems. For one thing, there are no launch facilities in Ukraine and Ukraine's access to the Baykonur facilities in Kazakhstan must be worked out in the context of the Russian-Kazakhstani agreement on use of those facilities. For another, the U.S.-Russian commercial space launch agreement was negotiated to ensure U.S. market share against low-priced Russian launch vehicles.

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Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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Admitting another non-market economy, Ukraine, to the launch market would be complicated and would have to be balanced against the interests of the U.S. launch industry. Despite these complexities, your conversation with Kravchuk on Friday will present an important opportunity to encourage Ukraine to begin to move toward adherence to the MTCR while we gain a better understanding of Ukraine's aspirations for the commercial space launch market.

On the issue of SSD funding, we can be flexible about the Ukrainian request for more money for defense conversion, although the Nunn-Lugar legislation places some restrictions on how we spend funds for this purpose. We have proposed to the Ukrainians that we put \$30 million into defense conversion projects in FY-1994 and are currently waiting for their reply. This will also be an issue that you will want to discuss further with Kravchuk. He will be especially interested in discussing housing for officers.

Under the SSD program, we are willing to provide Ukraine with the same type of housing projects that we have begun in Russia and Belarus. The Nunn-Lugar legislation constrains us to spending no more than \$20 million per year of Nunn-Lugar funds on housing. (Funds from our other bilateral assistance programs are, as you know, used on housing projects with fewer restrictions.) Nunn-Lugar projects must have a strict defense conversion link -- e.g., converting a defense production plant to produce modular housing. Kravchuk should be interested in this idea, although the lower-level negotiators with whom our SSD delegation met asked instead for direct cash subsidies to the existing Ukrainian housing industry -- an approach restricted by the Nunn-Lugar legislation.

We will be providing points on each of these issues for your discussions with President Kravchuk on Friday.

Tab A Comments on SSD Negotiations in Ukraine

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

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2014-0644-M
05/26/16 KDE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL R. BERGER

SUBJECT: Ukraine's Ideas for FY-1994 Nunn-Lugar Funds

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The issue of space launch is complicated, however. ~~As the message at Tab B indicates,~~ you will likely hear from President Kravchuk about Ukraine's aspirations to enter the space launch market and its willingness to do so under the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The Ukrainian government is clearly mindful of the agreements that we reached with Russia, which balanced adherence to the MTCR guidelines against access to the commercial space launch market.

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
We will be providing points on each of these issues for your discussions with President Kravchuk on Friday.

- Tab A Comments on SSD Negotiations in Ukraine
- Tab B ~~Message from Kiev on Space Launch Issues~~

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 8, 1994



Nat Sec Advisor
has seen

NOTED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: NICHOLAS BURNS/DAN PONEMAN ^{NB} ^{NB for}

FROM: ROSE GOTTEMOELLER/STEVE AOKI ^{NB for} ^{NB for}

SUBJECT: Balkanization of the Nunn-Lugar Program

In the FY 95 budget year, the Nunn-Lugar assistance program came under strong attack from Defense Appropriations committees on the Hill, who claimed that certain projects--defense conversion, housing, nuclear material control and accounting--were not really "defense" programs and should therefore be jettisoned. John Deutch has been negotiating with Strobe Talbott and Charlie Curtis on ways to jettison parts of the program that Defense fears will create more enemies for it on the Hill. Some of the proposals revolve around providing some Nunn-Lugar money from Defense to State or Energy in the FY 96 budget year, but no further funds after FY 96. Other ideas would involve transferring unspent FY 95 funds to State and Energy, but providing no further funds after FY 95.

From a White House perspective, we are concerned that the effect of such movements will be to "Balkanize" the Nunn-Lugar program, creating small pockets of nuclear-related work in various agencies with no central direction, no mechanism to set priorities and no longevity. With no further funding after FY 95 or FY 96 (depending on the proposal) for critical projects such as nuclear material protection, control and accounting (MPC&A), we are concerned that the President's intense and successful policy focus on nonproliferation may be at risk. In particular, we would like to emphasize that the Department of Energy would receive no further funds for the MPC&A after FY 95.

This pessimistic future is greatly at odds with the use to which we have been able to put the Nunn-Lugar assistance program over the past two years. It has been a vital tool of our nonproliferation and arms control policy. Without the offer of these funds for housing and defense conversion, we would not have been able to convince Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan to part with the nuclear weapons on their territories. The program also played a critical role in the Sapphire project, which brought

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600 kg. of highly enriched uranium from Kazakhstan to safe storage in the United States. It provided funding for the operation as well as for the assistance program that is part of the compensation package to Kazakhstan. And the funds have helped to accelerate the dismantlement of nuclear systems in Russia and the other Lisbon states--the compensation package in the Trilateral deal contains a healthy amount of dismantlement assistance for Ukraine. This is a core mission for Nunn-Lugar that will remain critical for years to come.

In each of these cases, our dealings with these countries were successful because we were able to use Nunn-Lugar as a coherent tool of our diplomacy and symbol of U.S. concern for them as they grappled with the nuclear question. Nunn-Lugar is well-known among the leaders of the Lisbon countries as a "swords into plowshares" program--the original intent of Senators Nunn and Lugar was to use the peace dividend out of the defense budget to get a handle on the problems caused by the Soviet nuclear breakup. The four Lisbon leaders and especially Presidents Kuchma, Nazarbayev and Lukashenko, understand it in the same way--a program to help them denuclearize and convert their nuclear infrastructures.

Kuchma, Nazarbayev and Lukashenko will be watching closely in the next few months to see if we will still be with them now that they have agreed to denuclearize. That is one important reason why the coherence and diplomatic utility of the Nunn-Lugar program must be maintained--denuclearization is not over with Budapest, but must proceed through a two- to three-year implementation period that is fraught with possible landmines, among them discord with Russia. If we have no leverage to continue to work with the Lisbon countries through this period, then the gains of our denuclearization diplomacy may be lost.

And we need Nunn-Lugar to accomplish the new phases of our arms control and nonproliferation policy. In particular, our efforts to address the "loose nukes" problem by improving material protection, accounting and control as well as the export control systems of these countries will be vital. We are just beginning to make headway with our idea for a "quick fix" of the most urgent nuclear security deficiencies at civil facilities in Russia--the source of much of the nuclear smuggling. We need to be able to expand our efforts in this area, should we have greater success. The program could also provide resources to support our more formal efforts to ensure transparency and irreversibility of warhead dismantlement and destruction in Russia. The program thus has a continuing rationale tied to the next stage of our arms control and nonproliferation strategy.

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As we approach White House deliberations on the defense budget, it is vital that we make the point to DOD and the other agencies involved that Nunn-Lugar is the tool of a high-visibility and high-stakes Presidential policy. It cannot be "Balkanized" without serious and high-level consideration, directed from the White House, of the implications for the President's denuclearization and nonproliferation policy. This is not a decision for the Defense Department to reach in private conversations with State and Energy--the President's interests must be fully represented.

Strategy

We would like to propose the following steps to engage the agencies, especially Defense, in a fuller discussion of the implications of moving parts of the Nunn-Lugar program to State and Energy:

- 1.) Sandy raises NSC concerns about this issue in the Berger-Talbott-Deutch lunch of December 8. (Talking points attached at Tab I.)
- 2.) With Rose's departure, Dan, in conjunction with Nick and Gordon Adams of OMB, convenes a meeting early in the week of December 12 to hear a full Defense Department briefing of the negotiations being pursued with State and Energy. Interagency discussion of implications follows.
- 3.) Following this meeting, Dan and Nick, in conjunction with Bob Bell and Gordon Adams, prepare memorandum for the President with recommendations for his deliberations on the defense budget.

Concurrence by: Gordon Adams, Robert Bell, Jessica Stern) NB

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the strategy outlined above, including the discussion at the Berger-Talbott-Deutch lunch of December 8.

Approve *JK* Disapprove

Attachment

Tab I Talking points for use at Berger lunch.

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March 28, 1995

INFORMATION

JK

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: COIT BLACKER *CB*

FROM: STEVE PIFER *SP*

SUBJECT: Nunn-Lugar Multi-Year Plan

DOD will shortly submit to Congress its multi-year plan for the Nunn-Lugar (Cooperative Threat Reduction) program. It envisages that, on top of \$1.3 billion allocated in FY 1992-1995, DOD will seek \$2.0 billion in FY 1996-2001, after which the program will end. The plan breaks activities with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan into three areas: dismantlement and destruction of nuclear/chemical weapons, chain of custody over nuclear warheads and demilitarization support.

Dismantlement and Destruction. The plan envisages \$1.372 billion over the life of the program (FY 1992-2001) to:

- o *Assist Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan in becoming non-nuclear states:* \$516 million to assist elimination of ballistic missiles, silos, bombers, missile propellant and nuclear infrastructure.
- o *Assist elimination of nuclear arms in Russia:* \$314 million for elimination of ballistic missiles, silos, missile-carrying submarines, bombers and missile propellant. This includes funds to help Russia accelerate START II cuts.
- o *Assist CW Destruction:* \$542 million for an analytical lab and a one-fourth scale CW destruction facility.

Chain of Custody. The plan projects expenditure of \$1.388 billion over FY 1992-2001 for:

- o *Fissile material storage facilities:* \$800 million to assist construction of facilities at Mayak and Tomsk for secure storage of fissile material removed from nuclear weapons.
- o *Containers:* \$167 million for 100,000 storage containers for fissile material removed from nuclear weapons (the material from one nuclear weapon requires three-five containers).

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- o *Enhancement of safety and security of nuclear weapons in movement and interim storage:* \$421 million for transportation containers and equipment to enhance safety of warhead movements by rail, security enhancements at military nuclear weapons storage sites and personnel reliability systems.

Demilitarization Support: The plan projects expenditure of \$425 million over FY 1992-2001 for:

- o *Defense conversion/enterprise funds/science centers/special projects:* \$355 million, of which \$243 million goes to joint defense conversion projects and enterprise funds (funds for these programs, controversial on the Hill, end in FY 1997).
- o *Military-to-military contacts:* \$70 million to support bilateral exchanges and training programs.

\$132 million goes to general program management/administration.

A few comments on the plan:

- o The report makes clear it is a planning document and that funding priorities may change if new opportunities -- e.g., elimination/conversion of BW facilities -- open. This would, of course, mean shifting funds from other areas.
- o The plan becomes increasingly Russo-centric after FY 1996, reflecting completion of funding for programs to eliminate strategic arms in Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan.
- o DOD will submit the report as a SECRET document, in part to avoid generating expectations in the recipient countries that could go unmet if Congress cuts back funding. We will want to consider, however, how selective release of some figures or a sense of the assistance we can provide -- with proper qualifiers -- may be useful, e.g., to facilitate START II or CWC ratification in the Duma.
- o Beginning with FY 1996, DOE takes responsibility for material protection, control and accounting, and State takes responsibility for science centers and export control. They are developing their own multi-year plans; the DOD plan does not reflect DOE and State funding requests.

Concurrences by: Robert Bell, Steven Aoki, Elisa Harris,
William Danvers

SP for

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 12, 1996

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
THROUGH: COIT BLACKER *AMB*
FROM: STEVE PIFER *SP*
SUBJECT: Nunn-Lugar Certification

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen
NOTED

Summary. With the agreement of all relevant agencies, State is recommending to Secretary Christopher that he certify Belarus, Kazakstan, Ukraine and Russia for continued Cooperative Threat Reduction (Nunn-Lugar) assistance. We expect he will do so shortly. There may be criticism of our decision to certify Russia, but we have a defensible case.

Certification Requirement. The Cooperative Threat Reduction legislation requires that the President each year certify to Congress that the proposed recipient countries are *committed* to meeting six criteria. (The authority to certify has been delegated to the Secretary of State.) The condition that receives the most attention is that the proposed recipient is "committed to complying with all relevant arms control agreements." A failure to certify would halt Nunn-Lugar assistance to that country.

The interagency working group has reviewed the certification justifications for Belarus, Kazakstan, Russia and Ukraine. All agencies agree we can certify the four countries, and State is recommending to Secretary Christopher that he sign the certification. The certification will be accompanied by a justification (classified SECRET) for each of the four countries, explaining the basis for the decision to certify.

Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine. Certification of these three countries raised no questions; the justifications are straight-forward. While Belarus failed to meet its CFE reduction requirement, it has said that it will do so by April. There are CFE issues with Ukraine (flank zone limits and the disposition of Black Sea Fleet ground equipment), but no agency questions Kiev's commitment to comply with the Treaty once these are resolved.

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Reason: 1.5 (c) (d)
Declassify On: 2/12/06

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Russia. Russia provoked the most intense review in the inter-agency process, with a focus on CFE, CW and BW compliance. Russian compliance with the CFE Treaty falls short on several counts. However, Russia's approval of the November 17 Joint Consultative Group decision on a solution of the flank zone issue (which *inter alia* commits to full compliance with the Treaty) and our bilateral contacts with Moscow on the flank issue make a solid case for Russian commitment to comply with CFE.

Russian commitment to compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention and Wyoming MOU on a bilateral CW data exchange received more intense scrutiny. As noted in the Russia justification, Russia has failed to meet fully its obligations under the BWC and Wyoming MOU. The justification, however, also notes ongoing contacts with the Russians on these problems, high-level expressions of commitment to arms control obligations by Yeltsin and others, and certain concrete steps the Russians have taken as our basis for concluding that Russia remains committed to complying with these agreements.

You should be aware that, while little new evidence emerged in 1995 regarding Russian noncompliance in the BW/CW areas, frustration is growing within some elements of the USG over the fact that our exchanges with Moscow have not more quickly resolved particular concerns. Some agencies have suggested that an absence of progress in addressing U.S. concerns in 1996 may affect their view of the balance between Russian words and actions when we consider whether to certify Russia next year. (The Vice President and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin agreed at their January meeting to pursue the BW and CW problems.)

Possible Criticism? Some on the Hill, particularly those who are dubious of Moscow's intentions or of the Nunn-Lugar program in general, may criticize our decision to certify Russia. On balance, however, we believe the justification makes a defensible case for our decision to certify Russia.

Critics may try again this year to alter the standard for certification. The House last year sought to delete the "committed to" language and condition Nunn-Lugar assistance on outright compliance. Had "committed to" not been restored in conference, we would have had to shut down Nunn-Lugar assistance to Russia, Belarus and, perhaps, Ukraine. Despite the program's value in eliminating former Soviet weapons of mass destruction, there could be a tough fight on this issue this year; Senator Nunn's departure from the Senate will not make it easier.

Concurrence by:

^{SP for}
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