

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: Early December Meeting (5 pages)	12/03/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Cables
 Jan 1997-Dec 1998 ([Turki])
 OA/Box Number: 520000

FOLDER TITLE:

[12/03/1998]

2014-0797-M

rs1073

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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001. email	Christopher Bolan to Leon Fuerth re: Afghanistan:Tensions Reportedly Mount (10 pages)	09/28/1998	P1/b(1), P6/b(6) KBH 8/29/2019
002. email	Joseph Marty to Steven Simon re: What POTUS Had for Abdullah (2 pages)	09/29/1998	P1/b(1)
003. email	Christopher Bolan to Leon Fuerth re: Afghanistan: Pakistani Official (10 pages)	09/30/1998	P1/b(1), P6/b(6) KBH 8/29/2019
004. email	James Smith to Christopher Bolan re: Note on VP-Abdallah Call (3 pages)	12/18/1998	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019
005. email	Michael Orfini to Richard Saunders re: Document1 (2 pages)	12/18/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Emails
 Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Turki])
 OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[09/28/1998-12/18/1998]

2014-0797-M
 rs1074

RESTRICTION CODES

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concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 9/28/98 3:40:55 PM
 FROM Bolan, Christopher J.
 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~
 CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)
 DATECLASSIFIEDON 09/28/1998
 DECLASSIFYON 09/28/2008
 SUBJECT AFGHANISTAN: TENSIONS REPORTEDLY MOUNT WITHIN
 TALIBAN AS [~~SECRET~~]
 TO Fuerth, Leon S.
 CARBON_COPY Saunders, Richard M.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
 2014-0797-M (1.02)
 3/6/2019 KBH

TEXT_BODY

Leon: Saudi decision to withdraw charge d'affaires causing serious rift among Taliban -- possibly even inspiring a rumored coup attempt of Omar. Pakistan and UAE are two remaining Taliban supporters of consequence. Cohen will be pushing this agenda item when he is in UAE the beginning of next month.

-----Original Message-----

From: WHSR

Sent: Monday, September 28, 1998 9:27 AM

To: Bandler, Donald K.;

Bolan, Christopher J.; Fisch, Eytan J.; Greer, Jason H.; Marty, Joseph H.; Riedel, Bruce O.; Sapiro, Miriam E.

Subject: AFGHANISTAN:

TENSIONS REPORTEDLY MOUNT WITHIN TALIBAN AS

~~SECRET~~ SECTION

01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 007242

DEPT FOR SA/PAB, S/CT, AND EUR/CACEN;
 LONDON FOR POL/SUTPHIN; PARIS
 FOR POL/RAVELING; ABU DHABI PLEASE
 PASS TO DUBAI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/28/08

TAGS: PREL, PTER,

KISL, PGOV, SA, AF

SUBJ: AFGHANISTAN: TENSIONS REPORTEDLY MOUNT

WITHIN TALIBAN AS
TIES WITH SAUDI ARABIA DETERIORATE OVER BIN LADIN

REFS:

(A) ISLAMABAD 7201
- (B) ISLAMABAD 7156
- (C) RIYADH
3263 (NOTAL)

(U) CLASSIFIED BY JOHN R. SCHMIDT, POLITICAL COUNSELOR.
REASONS:
1.5 (C)(D).

1. (U) THIS MESSAGE WAS COORDINATED WITH CONSULATE
PESHAWAR.

2. (S) SUMMARY: FURTHER DETAILS ARE EMERGING
CONCERNING
SAG
INTELLIGENCE CHIEF TURKI'S SEPTEMBER 19 MEETING WITH
TALIBAN
LEADER
OMAR IN KANDAHAR. OMAR REPORTEDLY REJECTED TURKI'S
REQUEST
THAT
THE TALIBAN EXPEL TERRORIST USAMA BIN LADIN TO SAUDI
ARABIA
AND
THEN WENT ON TO CRITICIZE THE SAG FOR ALLOWING U.S.
TROOPS TO
BE
STATIONED IN SAUDI ARABIA. AN ANGRY TURKI
REPORTEDLY RETURNED
TO
RIYADH AND USHED THROUGH THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT'S
DECISION TO
DOWNGRADE
TIES WITH THE TALIBAN. THE DOWNTURN IN RELATIONS
ALSO
REPORTEDLY
ANGERED TALIBAN DEPUTY LEADER MULLAH RABBANI,
WHO IS
KNOWN FOR HIS
PRO-SAUDI VIEWS, AND THERE ARE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS
THAT RABBANI
MAY HAVE LAUNCHED A COUP ATTEMPT AGAINST OMAR ON
SEPTEMBER 25.
THERE ARE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS THAT THE COUP FAILED
AND RABBANI WAS
ARRESTED. END SUMMARY.

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OMAR
CRITICIZES SAG IN MEETING WITH TURKI

3.
(S)-FURTHER DETAILS ARE NOW EMERGING ABOUT SAG
INTELLIGENCE
CHIEF
PRINCE TURKI AL-FAYSAL'S SEPTEMBER 19 VISIT TO
KANDAHAR (SEE
REF
B). IN SEPARATE SEPTEMBER 28 MEETINGS WITH POLOFF.

(b)(6)

RELATED THAT "A SAUDI DIPLOMAT" (NOT FURTHER
IDENTIFIED)
HAD TOLD
THEM THAT TURKI'S DISAGREEMENT WITH TALIBAN LEADER
"AMIR
AL-MUMININ"
(COMMANDER OF THE FAITHFUL) MULLAH OMAR OVER
TERRORIST
USAMA BIN
LADIN HAD SET THE STAGE FOR A SERIOUS DETERIORATION
IN
THE SAUDI/TALIBAN
RELATIONSHIP [REDACTED] (b)(6) THEN PROVIDED
SIMILAR OUTLINES OF
WHAT THEY HAD HEARD TOOK PLACE DURING THE
TURKI/OMAR MEETING:

-- THE MEETING BEGAN WITH A BRIEF DISCUSSION ABOUT
TALIBAN/IRANIAN
RELATIONS WITH TURKI ARGUING THAT THE TALIBAN
SHOULD TAKE STEPS
TO DEFUSE TENSIONS WITH IRAN.

-- TURNING TO THE MAIN TOPIC
OF THE MEETING, TURKI THEN
REQUESTED THAT THE TALIBAN SURRENDER
TERRORIST USAMA BIN LADIN

AND OTHER ARAB MILITANTS RESIDENT
IN AFGHANISTAN TO THE SAG
SINCE IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE TALIBAN
COULD NOT CONTROL THEIR
ACTIVITIES.

-- MULLAH OMAR
REPLIED THAT THE TALIBAN HAD NO INTENTION OF
SURRENDERING BIN
LADIN OR ANY OTHER ARABS TO THE SAUDI
GOVERNMENT.

--
OMAR CONTENDED THAT THE SAG GOVERNMENT WAS
"ILLEGITIMATE"
BECAUSE
IT WAS ALLOWING U.S. TROOPS TO REMAIN IN THE COUNTRY.
OMAR
SAID HE HAD HEARD THAT THE SAG WAS PLANNING TO
ALLOW U.S.
TROOPS
TO OCCUPY THE HOLY SITES OF MAKKAH AND MADINAH.

-- OMAR ADDED
THAT THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT HAD NO BUSINESS
INTERFERING IN AFGHAN
MATTERS SINCE THE WHOLE MUSLIM "UMMAH"
(INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
WAS IN THE PROCESS OF RISING AGAINST
IT (THE SAG) BECAUSE OF
ITS FAILED STEWARDSHIP OF THE TWO HOLY
SITES.

KANDAHAR
MEETING LEADS TO DECISION TO DOWNGRADE TIES

4.
(S) [REDACTED] (b)(6) AGREED THAT TURKI HAD BEEN SO
ANGERED
ABOUT
WHAT HAD TRANSPIRED IN KANDAHAR THAT WHEN HE
RETURNED TO
RIYADH
HE HAD MET WITH OTHER SAUDI OFFICIALS AND PUSHED
THROUGH THE

~~S-E-C~~
~~R-E-T~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 007242

DEPT FOR SA/PAB, S/CT,
AND EUR/CACEN; LONDON FOR POL/SUTPHIN; PIS
FOR POL/RAVELING; ABU
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TIES WITH SAUDI ARABIA DETERIORATE OVER
BIN LADIN

DECISION TO DOWNGRADE SAUDI/TALIBAN TIES. (NOTE: AS
NOTED IN REF
B, THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED ON SEPTEMBER 22
THAT
IT WOULD
RECALL ITS CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN KABUL AND THAT THE
TALIBAN
AFGHAN
CHARGE SHAHABUDDIN DILAWAR WOULD HAVE TO LEAVE
SAUDI ARABIA.)

(b)(6)

TOLD POLOFF THAT HE HAD HEARD THAT DILAWAR HAD
RETURNED TO
PAKISTAN
ON SEPTEMBER 26 AND HAD BEEN HEARD TO COMPLAIN
THAT HE HAD
BEEN
FORCED TO LEAVE SAUDI ARABIA BECAUSE OF
DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN
THE
SAG AND THE TALIBAN OVER BIN LADIN. (NOTE: DILAWAR
WAS ALSO
QUOTED
IN THE PAKISTANI PRESS AS ASCRIBING HIS FORCED
DEPARTURE
FROM SAUDI
ARABIA TO DISAGREEMENTS OVER BIN LADIN.)

5.-(S) POLOFF WAS TOLD
SEPTEMBER 28 BY (b)(6) THE SON OF
A WELL-KNOWN AFGHAN POLITICAL/RELIGIOUS
LEADER, THAT THE SAUDIS HAD
TAKEN ANOTHER STEP MEANT TO PUT PRESSURE
ON THE TALIBAN: ACCORDING
TO (b)(6) (OTHER SOURCES COULD NOT CONFIRM
THIS), THE SAUDI
EMBASSY IN ISLAMABAD STOPPED ISSUING VISAS LAST

WEEK TO AFGHANS WHO
WANTED TO TRAVEL TO SAUDI ARABIA FOR UMRAH (A
VISIT TO THE HOLY
SITES OUTSIDE OF THE HAJ SEASON) OR BUSINESS.

TENSIONS
MOUNT WITHIN TALIBAN: POSSIBLE COUP ATTEMPT?

6.
(S) DISCUSSING THE AFGHAN REACTION TO THE SAUDI
DECISION TO
DOWNGRADE
TIES, A NUMBER OF POLOFF'S SOURCES COMMENTED THAT
THE
SAUDI ACTION
HAS LEAD TO TENSIONS BETWEEN OMAR AND HIS
SUPPORTERS,
AND THOSE
TALIBAN WHO WANT A GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH SAUDI
ARABIA.

(b)(6)
(b)(6) A CONTACT WITH CLOSE LINKS TO THE TALIBAN,
TOLD POLOFF
SEPTEMBER 28 THAT HE HAD HEARD THAT TALIBAN DEPUTY
LEADER MULLAH
MOHAMMAD RABBANI WAS SO INCENSED BY OMAR'S
TREATMENT
OF TURKI THAT
HE IMMEDIATELY BEGAN TO PLAN A MILITARY OPERATION
TO
REMOVE OMAR
FROM POWER. POLOFF ASKED (b)(6) ABOUT PAKISTANI
PRESS
REPORTS
THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME SORT OF COUP ATTEMPT BY
"FORMER
COMMUNISTS"
IN KABUL ON SEPTEMBER 25. (NOTE: ACCORDING TO THE
PRESS REPORTS,
50 TALIBAN MILITARY OFFICIALS WERE ARRESTED FOR
TRYING TO OVERTHROW
OMAR. THE TALIBAN HAVE DENIED THAT A COUP
ATTEMPT TOOK PLACE.)
(b)(6) COMMENTING THAT HE DOUBTED THERE
WERE ENOUGH "FORMER COMMUNISTS"
IN TALIBAN RANKS TO LAUNCH A COUP,
RESPONDED THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE
THAT THE PRESS REPORTS WERE
REFERRING TO MILITARY MOVES BY RABBANI

AND HIS SUPPORTERS. HE
 COULD NOT CONFIRM THAT SUCH MOVES HAD IN
 FACT BEEN MADE, BUT HE HAD
 HEARD "RUMORS" THAT RABBANI MAYAVE LAUNCHED
 A COUP. THE RESULT
 OF THE COUP -- IF IT HAD INDEED HAPPENED --
 WAS NOT YET KNOWN.

7. (S) ASKED ABOUT THE COUP REPORTS. (b)(6)

(b)(6) SAID HE HAD
 ALSO HEARD THAT RABBANI HAD BEEN ANGERED BY
 OMAR'S TREATMENT OF
 TURKI, ADDING THAT "IT HAS BEEN KNOWN A LONG
 TIME" THAT RABBANI WAS
 CLOSE TO THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT. HE COULD
 NOT CONFIRM WHETHER OR NOT
 THERE HAD BEEN ANY COUP ATTEMPT BY RABBANI,
 BUT HE SAID SOME OF HIS
 SOURCES WERE REPORTING THAT THERE HAD BEEN
 SUCH AN ATTEMPT, AND
 RABBANI HAD BEEN ARRESTED AND TAKEN TO KANDAHAR.

(b)(6) SAID HE
 COULD NOT CONFIRM THIS. IN FACT, HE BELIEVED THAT
 RABBANI WAS IN
 KABUL AND NOT UNDER ARREST. THE MOST THAT COULD
 BE SAID AT THIS
 TIME WITH ANY CERTAINTY. (b)(6) CONTINUED, WAS
 THAT THE SITUATION
 WAS "MURKY." HOWEVER, HE BELIEVED THAT SOMETHING
 WAS GOING ON
 WITHIN THE TALIBAN LEADERSHIP, NOTING THAT HE HAD
 BEEN
 TOLD THAT
 THE SITUATION IN KANDAHAR WAS TENSE. (NOTE: (b)(6)

A
 FSN AT EMBASSY KABUL, REPORTED BY SATPHONE TO
 EMBASSY ON SEPTEMBER
 28
 THAT A RUMOR WAS SWEEPING KABUL THAT MULLAH
 RABBANI HAD EITHER
 LAUNCHED
 A COUP AGAINST OMAR OR WAS IN THE PROCESS OF
 LAUNCHING
 ONE.)

 REMOVAL
 OF OMAR SEEN AS DIFFICULT

8.
(S) QUERIED ABOUT THE EFFICACY OF POSSIBLE ATTEMPTS
BY MULLAH
RABBANI
OR OTHER TALIBAN LEADERS TO REMOVE OMAR, POLOFF'S
CONTACTS
AGREED
THAT IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO ACCOMPLISH.

(b)(6) SAID

IT WAS
KNOWN THAT OMAR MAINTAINED A STRONG FORCE OF
PERSONAL GUARDS
AS
WELL AS THE PERSONAL LOYALTY OF THE HEAD OF THE
KANDAHAR ARMY
CORPS,
ONE OF THE LARGEST TALIBAN ARMED UNITS. HE ADDED
THAT OMAR

S-E

C-R-E-T SECTION 03 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 007242

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MOUNT WITHIN TALIBAN AS
TIES WITH SAUDI ARABIA DETERIORATE OVER
BIN LADIN

ALSO BENEFITED FROM THE SUPPORT OF THE LARGE FORCE
OF
PAKISTANI
EXTREMISTS FIGHTING WITH THE TALIBAN. (NOTE:
ESTIMATES
VARY, BUT
IT IS BELIEVED THAT UP TO 40 PERCENT OF THE TALIBAN
FIGHTING
FORCE
COULD BE MADE UP OF PAISTANI NATIONALS.) ON THE
OTHER HAND,

(b)(6)

AND OTHER CONTACTS AGREED THAT THE SAG HAD MANY
FRIENDS IN
THE TALIBAN

MOVEMENT WHO WERE BOUND -- LIKE RABBANI -- TO BE
DEEPLY
DISTURBED
BY THE DETERIORATING SAUDI/TALIBAN RELATIONSHIP.

TALIBAN
TRY DAMAGE CONTROL

9. (S) IN LIGHT
OF THE DOWNTURN IN TIES WITH SAUDI ARABIA, (b)(6)

(b)(6)
(b)(6) SAID HE HAD HEARD THAT THE TALIBAN WERE
TRYING TO REPAIR
LINKS WITH THE SAG, WHILE ENSURING THAT TIES WITH
OTHER COUNTRIES
DID NOT DETERIORATE. EXPANDING ON THESE POINTS,

(b)(6) RELATED THAT
HE HAD HEARD THAT THE TALIBAN HAD SENT
EMISSAJHES TO PAKISTAN AND
THE UAE. MULLAH JALIL, A KANDAHAR-BASED
TALIBAN "DEPUTY FOREIGN
MINISTER," HAD VISITED ISLAMABAD LATE LAST
WEEK TO DISCUSS THE SAUDI/TALIBAN
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PAKISTANI
GOVERNMENT (b)(6) SAID JALIL'S
VISIT HAD FAILED WHEN IT BECAME
CLEAR TO THE GOP THAT THE TALIBAN
HAD NO PLANS TO APOLOGIZE TO
TURKI FOR HIS TREATMENT IN KANDAHAR
AND NO PLANS TO SURRENDER BIN
LADIN (b)(6) SAID THE PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT
HAD COMMUNICATED TO THE
SAG THAT ITS EFFORTS TO MEDIATE THE DISPUTE
WERE GOING NOWHERE. IN
THE MEANTIME (b)(6) SAID MAULAWI WAKIL AHMED,
OMAR'S CLOSEST
ADVISER, WAS CURRENTLY IN ABU DHABI TRYING TO
ENSURE
THAT THE UAE
DID NOT DOWNGRADE TIES (b)(6) PREDICTED THAT THE
UAE
WOULD SOON DO
SO BECAUSE OF PRESSURE FROM SAUDI ARABIA AND OTHER
ARAB STATES,
INCLUDING EGYPT.

COMMENT

10.
(S) THE WIDESPREAD VIEW AMONG AFGHAN WATCHERS
HERE IS THAT THE
TALIBAN
HAVE MADE A SERIOUS MISTAKE IN ALIENATING SAUDI
ARABIA.
THE SAG
MAINTAINS GREAT RESPECT AMONG AFGHANS BECAUSE OF
ITS ROLE
AS CUSTODIAN
OF THE TWO ISLAMIC HOLY SITES. IN ADDITION, MOST
AFGHANS DEEPLY
APPRECIATE THE IMPORTANT ROLE THE SAUDI
GOVERNMENT
PLAYED IN FINANCING
THE RESISTANCE AGAINST THE SOVIETS. FINALLY,
IN A REGION WHERE
PERSONAL LINKS COUNT FOR SO MUCH, PRINCE TURKI IS
HIGHLY RESPECTED
BY MANY AFGHANS FOR HIS ROLE AS CHIEF SAUDI POINT
MAN IN THE YEARS
OF THE RESISTANCE. THE REPORTS THAT OMAR
CRITICIZED THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT
TO TURKI'S FACE ARE BOUND TO
REDOUND BADLY AGAINST THE TALIBAN AMONG
HIS MANY FRIENDS. THAT
SAID, WHETHER ANYTHING CAN BE DONE AGAINST
OMAR IS QUESTIONABLE,
GIVEN THE STRONG SUPPORT HE ENJOYS WITHIN
THE TALIBAN MOVEMENT,
ESPECIALLY AMONG THOSE WITH THE GUNS. HOWEVER,
IF PAKISTAN -- THE
TALIBAN'S CLOSEST INTERNATIONAL SUPPORTER --
THROWS IN ITS WEIGHT
BEHIND SAUDI ARABIA ON THE BIN LADIN ISSUE,
THE PRESSURE ON THE
TALIBAN MAY BECOME UNBEARABLE. AS OF THIS TIME,
PAKISTAN HAS NOT
YET MADE ITS POSITION CLEAR.
MILAM

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 9/30/98 9:58:29 AM

FROM Bolan, Christopher J.

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(b)(d)

DATECLASSIFIEDON 09/30/1998

DECLASSIFYON 09/30/2008

SUBJECT AFGHANISTAN: PAKISTANI MFA OFFICIAL SAYS GOP TRYING
[~~SECRET~~]

TO Fuerth, Leon S.

CARBON_COPY Saunders, Richard M.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0797-M (1.04)
3/6/2019 KBH

TEXT_BODY

Leon: Cable from Islamabad confirms Saudi break with Taliban and points out that Saudis have gone so far as to increase their contacts with anti-Taliban forces. However, this report also indicates that Pakistan is not yet ready to apply the same pressure to Taliban (still believing that Taliban can be a stabilizing influence in Afghanistan) and is instead attempting to repair the rift between the Saudis and Taliban.

-----Original Message-----

From: WHSR
Sent: Tuesday,
September 29, 1998 11:06 AM
To: Benjamin, Daniel; Bobbitt, Philip
C.; Bolan, Christopher J.; Clarke, Richard A.; Gordon-Hagerty, Lisa
E.; Green, Charles A.; Greer, Jason H.; Gregory, Susan J.; Marty,
Joseph H.; McCarthy, Mary O.; Montgomery, Mark C.; Orfini, Michael
H.; Riedel, Bruce O.; Sherman, David J.; Sigler, Ralph H.; Simon,
Steven N.; Ward, Steven R.; Wechsler, William F.
Subject: AFGHANISTAN:
PAKISTANI MFA OFFICIAL SAYS GOP TRYING

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01
OF 03 ISLAMABAD 007297

DEPT FOR SA/PAB, S/CT, AND EUR/CACEN; LONDON
FOR POL/SUTPHIN; PARIS
FOR POL/RAVELING; ABU DHABI PLEASE PASS TO
DUBAI

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. email	Christopher Bolan to Leon Fuerth re: Afghanistan: Pakistani Official [partial] (9 pages)	09/30/1998	P6/b(6)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Turki])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[09/28/1998-12/18/1998]

2014-0797-M
rs1074

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/29/08
 TAGS: PREL, PTER, KISL, SA,
 AF, PK
 SUBJ: AFGHANISTAN: PAKISTANI MFA OFFICIAL SAYS GOP
 TRYING
 TO
 MEDIATE BETWEEN SAUDI ARABIA AND TALIBAN OVER BIN
 LADIN

REFS:

(A) ISLAMABAD 7242; (B) ISLAMABAD 7201

(U) CLASSIFIED BY JOHN
 R. SCHMIDT, POLITICAL COUNSELOR.
 REASONS: 1.5 (C)(D).

1. (S)

SUMMARY: IN A SEPTEMBER 29 MEETING WITH POLOFF,
 PAKISTANI
 MFA DIRECTOR

(b)(6) WHILE CRITICIZING SAUDI
 ARABIA, SPOKE
 HIGHLY OF TALIBAN PROPOSAL THAT AN ISLAMIC COURT BE
 SET UP TO TRY
 USAMA BIN LADIN AND OTHER MILITANTS. HE RELATED
 THAT
 PAKISTAN CONTINUES
 TO TRY TO MEDIATE BETWEEN THE SAG AND THE
 TALIBAN, BUT PAKISTAN
 HAS HAD LITTLE SUCCESS IN MODERATING THE
 TALIBAN AND THEIR LEADER
 MULLAH OMAR WHOM HE CHARACTERIZED AS "A
 MADMAN." (b)(6) ALONG WITH
 OTHER CONTACTS, SAID TENSIONS ARE
 BUILDING WITHIN THE TALIBAN OVER
 BIN LADIN AND THE DETERIORATING
 RELATIONSHIP WITH SAUDI ARABIA.
 HOWEVER, THERE APPEARED TO BE NO
 SUBSTANCE TO RUMORS THAT THERE
 HAD BEEN A COUP ATTEMPT AGAINST OMAR
 LAUNCHED BY TALIBAN DEPUTY
 LEADER RABBANI. END SUMMARY.

 A COURT
 TO JUDGE BIN LADIN?

2. (S) POLOFF

MET SEPTEMBER 29 WITH (b)(6) PAKISTANI MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS DIRECTOR (b)(6) POLOFF ASKED

(b)(6)
WHETHER HE
HAD DETAILS CONCERNING THE STATE OF THE
SAUDI/TALIBAN
RELATIONSHIP,
AND REPORTS THAT IT HAD DETERIORATED OVER THE
PRESENCE OF TERRORIST
USAMA BIN LADIN AND OTHER ARAB MILITANTS IN
AFGHANISTAN (SEE REF
A). IN RESPONSE, (b)(6) CRITICIZING SAUDI
ARABIA AND INTELLIGENCE
CHIEF PRINCE TURKI, MADE THE FOLLOWING
POINTS ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP,
FOCUSSING ON WHAT HE SAID WAS A
TALIBAN PROPOSAL THAT BIN LADIN
AND OTHER MILITANTS BE TRIED BY AN
ISLAMIC COURT MADE UP OF AFGHAN
AND SAUDI RELIGIOUS SCHOLARS:

-- (b)(6) SAID HE FELT THAT
SAUDI INTELLIGENCE CHIEF PRINCE
TURKI AL-FAYSAL WAS TOO ANGRY
AT THE TALIBAN AND SHOULD
CONSIDER THE TALIBAN'S VIEWS ON BIN
LADIN. (NOTE: TURKI MET
WITH TALIBAN LEADER MULLAH OMAR ON
SEPTEMBER 19 IN KANDAHAR.
IN WHAT WAS REPORTEDLY AN ACRIMONIOUS
MEETING, OMAR -- WHO
PURPORTEDLY CRITICIZED THE PRESENCE OF
U.S. TROOPS IN SAUDI
ARABIA -- REFUSED TO SURRENDER BIN LADIN
AND OTHER ARAB
MILITANTS TO THE SAG -- SEE REF A.)

-- TURKI HAD ACTED IN "A VERY ARROGANT MANNER"
TOWARD THE
TALIBAN
IN HIS SEPTEMBER 19 MEETING. NOTING THAT HE HAD
SERVED IN
RIYADH PREVIOUSLY, (b)(6) SAID HE KNEW THE SAUDIS
AND
THEY BELIEVED
THAT "EVERYTHING COULD BE SOLVED WITH MONEY."

-- (b)(6) SAID

THE SAG SHOULD CAREFULLY CONSIDER A TALIBAN PROPOSAL THAT BIN LADIN AND OTHER MILITANTS BE TRIED BY AN ISLAMIC COURT MADE UP OF AFGHAN AND SAUDI RELIGIOUS SCHOLARS. THE COURT COULD MEET ANYWHERE, INCLUDING ISLAMABAD. BIN LADIN AND OTHER MILITANTS WOULD NOT HAVE TO ATTEND THE COURT PROCEEDINGS. (NOTE: EMBASSY HAS HEARD REPORTS THAT THIS PROPOSAL MAY ACTUALLY BE PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT-GENERATED.)

-- SAUDI ARABIA HAD NOT YET GIVEN ITS ANSWER CONCERNING THE TALIBAN PROPOSAL, PROBABLY BECAUSE TURKI WAS SO ANGRY AT THE TALIBAN. HOWEVER, TURKI SHOULD "TAKE A LONG DRINK OF COLD WATER TO RELAX." IT WOULD HELP RESOLVE MATTERS IF THE U.S. WOULD URGE THE SAG TO AGREE TO THE TALIBAN PROPOSAL SINCE IT WAS A "WAY OUT OF THE IMPASSE."

 GOP
 TRIES TO MEDIATE BETWEEN THE SAG AND TALIBAN

3.
 (S) POLOFF ASKED (b)(6) WHAT THE GOP POSITION WAS VIS-A-VIS THE SAUDI/TALIBAN DISPUTE, UNDERSCORING THAT THE U.S. SHARED SAUDI CONCERNS ABOUT THE DANGERS POSED BY THE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES OF BIN LADIN AND HIS ASSOCIATES. (b)(6) REPLIED THAT THE GOP WAS TRYING "TO MEDIATE" BETWEEN THE SAUDIS AND THE TALIBAN BY URGING THE SAG TO SERIOUSLY CONSIDER THE TALIBAN PROPOSAL THAT AN ISLAMIC COURT BE
 S E C R E
 †-SECTION 02 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 007297

DEPT FOR SA/PAB, S/CT, AND

EUR/CACEN; LONDON FOR POL/SUTPHIN; PARIS
FOR POL/RAVELING; ABU DHABI
PLEASE PASS TO DUBAI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/29/08
TAGS: PREL,
PTER, KISL, SA, AF, PK
SUBJ: AFGHANISTAN: PAKISTANI MFA OFFICIAL
SAYS GOP TRYING TO MEDIATE BETWEEN SAUDI ARABIA AND
TALIBAN OVER BIN
LADIN

SET UP. HOWEVER, THUS FAR, PAKISTAN HAS HAD LITTLE
SUCCESS
IN
COOLING DOWN TEMPERATURES BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES.
PAKISTAN REALIZED
THAT
IT "HAS A LOT TO LOSE" IF SAUDI/TALIBAN TIES
DETERIORATED
FURTHER
AND IT CERTAINLY DID NOT WANT TO GET INTO A POSITION
WHERE
IT MIGHT
HAVE TO CHOOSE ONE SIDE OVER THE OTHER. THE GOP
LOOKED
FORWARD
TO DISCUSSING THESE ISSUES DURING THE UPCOMING VISIT
TO
ISLAMABAD
BY SAUDI CROWN PRINCE ABDALLAH. (NOTE: THE SAUDI
EMBASSY HAS CONFIRMED
THAT ABDALLAH IS SCHEDULED TO VISIT PAKISTAN
IN LATE OCTOBER.)

OMAR
SEEN TO BE "A MADMAN"

4. (S) TAKING
POLOFF'S POINTS ON BOARD, (b)(6) REPLIED THAT THE
U.S.&. SHOULD UNDERSTAND
THAT THE PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT "HAS LIMITED
INFLUENCE ON THE TALIBAN."
THE GOP COULD NOT EXERT ENOUGH
POLITICAL OR MATERIAL LEVERAGE ON
THE TALIBAN TO FORCE THEM TO DO
ANYTHING. IN ANY CASE, OMAR WAS
"A MADMAN" CONVINCED THAT HE IS

RIGHT. PAKISTAN WAS TRYING TO PRESSURE
OMAR TO MODERATE HIS
POSITIONS, BUT HAD HAD LITTLE SUCCESS. ANOTHER
PROBLEM FOR THE
PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT WAS THAT MANY PAKISTANIS
SUPPORTED
THE TALIBAN
AND BIN LADIN. THIS FACTOR UNDERMINED THE GOP'S
FREEDOM
OF
MANEUVER ON THIS ISSUE. POLOFF NOTED THAT THE
SITUATION WAS
QUITE
SERIOUS AND IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE GOP PRESSURE
THE TALIBAN
TO
TAKE ACTION TO DEAL WITH THE BIN LADIN PROBLEM AS
SOON AS POSSIBLE.

TENSIONS
IN TALIBAN ON THE INCREASE, BUT NO COUP ATTEMPT

5.
(S) TURNING TO AN UNCONFIRMED REPORT SEVERAL
SOURCES HAD PASSED
TO
POLOFF ON SEPTEMBER 28 (REF A), POLOFF ASKED (b)(6)
WHETHER HE
HAD
ANY INFORMATION ON WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN SOME
SORT OF COUP
ATTEMPT
AGAINST MULLAH OMAR IN THE PAST SEVERAL DAYS.
POLOFF NOTED
THAT
ONE VARIATION OF THESE REPORTS WAS THAT TALIBAN
DEPUTY LEADER
MULLAH
RABBANI MAY HAVEED THE PURPORTED COUP ATTEMPT
AND BEEN
ARRESTED
BY OMAR'S SUPPORTERS WHEN IT FAILED (b)(6)
RESPONDED THAT
HE COULD
NOT CONFIRM WHETHER OR NOT THERE HAD BEEN A COUP
ATTEMPT,
BUT HE
DID NOT BELIEVE THE STORY. AS FAR AS HE KNEW, MULLAH

RABBANI WAS NOT IN DETENTION. HOWEVER, (b)(6) CONTINUED, THERE WERE MANY REPORTS THAT TENSIONS BETWEEN OMAR AND RABBANI WERE ON THE UPSWING. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO HAD NEVER BEEN GOOD, AND IT WAS GROWING WORSE BECAUSE RABBANI WAS PRO-SAUDI AND THOUGHT THAT OMAR WAS MISHANDLING THE RELATIONSHIP WITH SAUDI ARABIA. (b)(6) ADDED THAT HE THOUGHT RABBANI WAS AN IMPRESSIVE PERSON, WHO WOULD MAKE "A FINE TALIBAN LEADER." THAT SAID, PAKISTAN WAS HESITANT ABOUT UNDERMINING OMAR'S POSITION IN FAVOR OF RABBANI LEST SUCH ACTIONS HARM THE TALIBAN MOVEMENT.

 AGREEMENT
 THAT RABBANI IS NOT UNDER ARREST

6.
 (S) POLOFF ASKED OTHER CONTACTS ABOUT REPORTS OF THE COUP ATTEMPT AND ALL SAID THEY BELIEVED THAT IT HAD NOT HAPPENED.

(b)(6)

TOLD

POLOFF
 SEPTEMBER 29
 THAT TENSIONS WERE GROWING WITHIN THE TALIBAN MOVEMENT ABOUT WHAT TO DO ABOUT BIN LADIN. HOWEVER, MULLAI RABBANI HAD NOT LAUNCHED A COUP ATTEMPT AND WAS NOT UNDER ARREST. IN A SEPTEMBER 29 CONVERSATION, (b)(6) THE SON OF A WELL-KNOWN POLITICAL-RELIGIOUS LEADER, TOLD POLOFF THAT HE HAD HEARD THAT RABBANI WAS

FINE AND IN KABUL.

(b)(6) A SOURCE WITH CLOSE LINKS TO THE TALIBAN, AGREED THAT RABBANI WAS NOT UNDER ARREST. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT INTRA-TALIBAN ARGUMENTS ABOUT WHAT DO ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP WITH SAUDI ARABIA AND BIN LADIN WERE "BECOMING QUITE FIERCE. RABBANI WAS SIDING WITH THOSE WHO WANTED TO IMPROVE THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SAUDIS.

 ANTI-TALIBAN
 OFFICIAL SAYS SAUDIS REACH OUT

S
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 007297

DEPT FOR SA/PAB, S/CT,
 AND EUR/CACEN; LONDON FOR POL/SUTPHIN; PARIS
 FOR POL/RAVELING; ABU
 DHABI PLEASE PASS TO DUBAI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/29/08
 TAGS:
 PREL, PTER, KISL, SA, AF, PK
 SUBJ: AFGHANISTAN: PAKISTANI MFA
 OFFICIAL SAYS GOP TRYING
 TO MEDIATE BETWEEN SAUDI ARABIA AND TALIBAN
 OVER BIN LADIN

7. (S) IN A POSSIBLE FURTHER INDICATION OF THE INCREASING LEVEL OF SAUDI/TALIBAN TENSIONS, (b)(6) A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ANTI-TALIBAN NATIONAL ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF AFGHANISTAN (NIMA), TOLD POLOFF IN A SEPTEMBER 29 MEETING THAT SAUDI ARABIA WAS INCREASING ITS CONTACTS WITH ANTI-TALIBAN GROUPS. HE RELATED THAR HE HAD BEEN CONTACTED TWO DAYS AGO BY THE ANNEX OF THE SAUDI EMBASSY IN ISLAMABAD DEALING WITH AFGHANISTAN AND ASKED TO MAINTAIN REGULAR

CONTACTS WITH THE EMBASSY. NIMA LEADER GENERAL DOSTAM, WHO WAS NOW BASED IN MASHHAD, HAD ALSO BEEN CONTACTED BY SAUDI OFFICIALS IN RECENT DAYS (b)(6) ADDED THAT HE HAD HEARD THAT OTHER ANTI-TALIBAN OFFICIALS HAD ALSO BEEN CONTACTED BY THE SAUDIS, INCLUDING GULBUDDIN HEKMATYAR AND ABDUL RASUL SAYYAF (b)(6) SAID HE BELIEVED THAT THE SAG WAS TRYING TO BROADEN ITS CONTACTS WITH AFGHAN GROUPS AS A WAY TO PRESSURE THE TALIBAN. IN ANY CASE, THE SAUDI/TALIBAN TENSIONS WERE "AN IMPORTANT MORALE BOOST" FOR THE ANTI-TALIBAN ALLIANCE AS THEY WERE A SIGN OF HOW UNPOPULAR THE TALIBAN WERE IN THE INTERNATIONAL CMUNITY. IN THE MEANTIME, IN MEETINGS WITH THE PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT (b)(6) SENSED THAT THE GOP WAS TRYING TO DISTANCE ITSELF FROM MULLAH OMAR. IN A REITERATION OF (b)(6) COMMENT IN PARA FOUR (b)(6) RECOUNTED THAT (b)(6) AN INTER-SERVICES INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE (ISI) OFFICER SECONDED TO THE PAKISTANI MFA, HAD RECENTLY REFERRED TO OMAR AS "A MADMAN" IN A MEETING WITH (b)(6)

 COMMENT

8. (S) (b)(6) HAS BEEN A GOOD SOURCE AND IS BELIEVED TO BE CLOSE TO THE SET OF ISI OFFICERS THAT IMPLEMENTS GOP AFGHAN POLICY. (NOTE: LIKE MANY ISI OFFICERS INVOLVED IN AFGHAN ISSUES -- AND MOST TALIBAN, (b)(6) S A PASHTUN.) INTERESTINGLY, HE MADE NO EFFORT TO HIDE WHAT APPEARED TO BE HIS DISLIKE OF SAUDIS AND PRINCE TURKI

IN
PARTICULAR.
NONETHELESS, HE WAS CLEARLY WORRIED ABOUT SAUDI
ARABIA'S RECENT
TURN AGAINST THE TALIBAN. BASED ON (b)(6)
COMMENTS, THE GOP --
WHICH HAS NOT MADE ANY PUBLIC COMMENTS ON THE
MATTER -- SEEMS TO
BELIEVE THAT THE PROPOSAL TO TRY BIN LADIN AND
OTHER MILITANTS IN
SOME SORT OF ISLAMIC COURT IS THE BEST WAY TO
DECREASE SAUDI/TALIBAN
TENSIONS.
MILAM

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 12/18/98 10:40:27 AM
FROM Smith, James A.
CLASSIFICATION ~~TOP SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(a)(c)(d)(g)
DATECLASSIFIEDON 12/18/1998
DECLASSIFYON 12/18/2008
SUBJECT notes on VP-Abdallah call ~~[TOP SECRET]~~
TO Bolan, Christopher J.
CARBON_COPY Marty, Joseph H.
TEXT_BODY Chris/Joe -- Since the VP stuck so closely to the talkers, and for the sake of celerity, I've simply typed out the rest of the conversation. Hope this is of assistance.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT VPAbdallahnote.doc
Abdallah: Hello?
VP: Pt 1 (to "..call.")
Abdallah: Thank you very much, Mr. Vice President.
VP: Points 1-8. We know that these attacks are likely to come in very short order and we are obligated to do everything we can to try to prevent the loss of innocent life.
Abdallah: Mr. Vice President, I'm wondering if Amir Turki and the DCI are also in communication on this issue or not.
VP: Yes, the DCI is going to be in touch with Prince Turki on this issue.

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2014-0797-M (1.05)
3/6/2019 KBH

Abdallah: Do they have a plan to implement or not, the DCI and Turki?

VP: It's difficult to plan for the prevention of attacks everywhere, when we don't know the specific targets to be attacked. The plan therefore consists of heightened awareness and alertness and additional precautions in all the places that could be targets. But in order for the plan to succeed, it must have the objective of bring UBL to justice. Though the Taliban refused to honor this legitimate request for justice, we believe we must continue to make these [gap] the centerpiece if the plan is going to succeed.

Abdallah: I know all that you've mentioned, Mr. Vice President. We will do all the arrangements we need to and can from this end. But my point is, there is a plan between Turki and the DCI and I am wondering if you are aware of it or not.

Regarding our relations with the Taliban, they are not good all. You know we recalled the DCM and we don't really have any communications with them for the time being.

VP: Very well. I believe the DCI has already been in touch with Prince Turki, and we are taking what steps we can. We will continue to explore ways we can influence the Taliban. Points 9-13.

Abdallah: Thank you very much, Mr. Vice President. We wish you the best of luck and a happy new year. I assure you I will convey your kind words to His Majesty, the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques.

VP: Thank you very much.

Abdallah: Thank you, Mr. Vice President. Please convey my best and warmest wishes to His Excellency, the President.

VP: Thank you, and mine to His Majesty, the King. Goodbye.

Abdallah: Thank you. So long.

2

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. email	Michael Orfini to Richard Saunders re: Document1 (2 pages)	12/18/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Emails
 Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Turki])
 OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[09/28/1998-12/18/1998]

2014-0797-M
rs1074

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. notes	re: Summary Points for Meeting with Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia (2 pages)	09/22/1998	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019
001b. notes	re: Summary Points for Meeting with Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia (1 page)	09/22/1998	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019
001c. memo	From Samuel Berger re: Meeting with Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah (7 pages) Partial release - KBH 8/29/2019	09/23/1998	P1/b(1)
001d. notes	[Duplicate of 001a] (1 page)	09/22/1998	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019
001e. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Meeting with Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia (6 pages)	09/22/1998	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019
001f. report	re: U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	09/17/1998	P1/b(1)
001g. memo	Madeleine Albright to POTUS re: Your Meeting and Lunch with Saudi Arabian Corwn Prince Abdullah (3 pages)	09/23/1998	P1/b(1)
001h. memo	Joseph Marty to Samuel Berger re: Briefing Memo for POTUS Meeting with Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Abdullah (1 page)	09/22/1998	P1/b(1) KBH 8/29/2019
001i. memo	From Samuel Berger re: Meeting with Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah (8 pages)	09/22/1998	P1/b(1)
001j. talking points	re: Summary Points for Meeting with Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia (1 page)	09/22/1998	P1/b(1)
001k. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Meeting with Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia (8 pages)	09/22/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Abdullah])
 OA/Box Number: 43325

FOLDER TITLE:

9806426

2014-0797-M
rs1075

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001l. memo	From Samuel Berger re: Meeting with Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah (7 pages) <i>Partial release - KBH 8/29/2019</i>	09/22/1998	P1/b(1)
001m. talking points	re: Summary Points for Meeting with Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia (1 page)	09/22/1998	P1/b(1) <i>KBH 8/29/2019</i>
001n. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Meeting with Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia (7 pages) <i>Partial release - KBH 8/29/2019</i>	09/22/1998	P1/b(1)
001o. memo	From Samuel Berger re: Meeting with Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah (8 pages)	09/22/1998	P1/b(1)
002. notes	re: Summary Points for Meeting with Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia (2 pages)	09/22/1998	P1/b(1) <i>KBH 8/29/2019</i>

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Abdullah])
 OA/Box Number: 43325

FOLDER TITLE:

9806426

2014-0797-M
rs1075

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 23 SEP 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SAUDI ARABIA AP
LIMITED ACCESS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: POTUS MTG W/ CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH 24 SEP -- LIMITED ACCESS

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT DUE DATE: 24 SEP 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: MARTY LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
RIEDEL

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP CLOSED BY: NSVJD DOC 3 OF 3

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001
002 BERGER
003 PRESIDENT
003

Z 98092219 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
Z 98092316 FOR REDO
Z 98092319 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
Z 98092321 FOR INFORMATION
X 98092409 NOTED BY PRESIDENT

~~SECRET~~ LIMITED ACCESS

SUMMARY POINTS FOR MEETING WITH
CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH OF
SAUDI ARABIA

[Address as "Your Royal Highness"]

- One-on-One: On Iraq, we continue our measured approach, but if Iraq expels or cripples UNSCOM, despite UNSC action, will have to consider other options. No rewards/incentives for Iraq absent compliance. Military force may be necessary if Iraq stalls or ratchets up. Have sufficient forces in region for potential strike.
- One-on-One: On terrorism: important to use all necessary means to press Taliban on Usama; need cooperation on Khobar.
- MEPP parties not far apart on substance, distrust harder to overcome. Movement on MEPP critical to U.S. credibility and to our relations with all the countries of the region. I'm determined to achieve breakthrough, avoid breakdown that will not help Arafat. Need you to help me with Arafat, Mubarak, and Assad, as I continue to press Netanyahu.

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify On: 9/22/08

98 SEP 23 PM 9:59

~~SECRET~~ LIMITED ACCESS

2

- Jordan is important ally and friend of MEPP. Urge you to do what you can to help Jordan economically.
- (If time permits) On Iran, encouraged by Khatami, want to see real changes in policies. What are your views of the Iranian government?

~~SECRET~~

- Jordan is important ally and friend of MEPP. Urge you to do what you can to help Jordan economically.
- (If time permits) On Iran, encouraged by Khatami, want to see real changes in policies. What are your views of the Iranian government?

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2014-0797-M (1.09)
3/6/2019 KBH

SUMMARY POINTS FOR MEETING WITH
CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH OF
SAUDI ARABIA

[Address as "Your Royal Highness"]

- **One-on-One:** On Iraq, we continue our measured approach, but if Iraq expels or cripples UNSCOM, despite UNSC action, will have to consider other options. No rewards/incentives for Iraq absent compliance. Military force may be necessary if Iraq stalls or ratchets up. Have sufficient forces in region for potential strike.
- **One-on-One:** On terrorism: important to use all necessary means to press Taliban on Usama; need cooperation on Khobar.
- MEPP parties not far apart on substance, distrust harder to overcome. Movement on MEPP critical to U.S. credibility and to our relations with all the countries of the region. I'm determined to achieve breakthrough, avoid breakdown that will not help Arafat. Need you to help me with Arafat, Mubarak, and Assad, as I continue to press Netanyahu.

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

9-24-98 6426 LIMITED ACCESS

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 23, 1998

'98 SEP 23 PM 10:00

2014-0797-M (1.10)

3/6/2019 KBM

MEETING WITH
SAUDI CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH

DATE: Thursday, September 24, 1998

LOCATION: Oval Office, Family Dining Room

TIME: 12:45 p.m. - 2:00 p.m.

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER (2)

I. PURPOSE

To have serious discussions on regional issues and terrorism with the leader of our most important ally in the Muslim world and show our continuing respect for and acceptance of Abdullah's new role as de facto leader of the Kingdom.

II. BACKGROUND

Your meeting with Crown Prince Abdullah is the highpoint of his round-the-world trip marking his de facto assumption of Saudi Arabia's leadership. He will just have been in France and the UK, and will leave here for China, Japan, South Korea, and Pakistan. In addition to your lunch, he will have a further meeting with the Vice President (which Abdullah requested one-on-one), as well as meetings with Madeleine, Bob Rubin, John Hamre, and Louis Freeh. He will have seen George Tenet prior to your meeting. You will have a short Oval Office photo session, followed by a brief one-on-one, then lunch.

We have agreed with the Saudi embassy that your meetings should focus on Iraq, the Middle East peace process, and the economy while the Vice President will focus on Iran, terrorism, the environment and a few other issues. We recommend that you discuss the Middle East peace process in the large group, while focusing on Iraq and briefly on terrorism in the one-on-one. (We have given you material and points for all issues, since your conversations may expand out of these areas).

Contrary to what is reported in the press, the Crown Prince is a firm supporter of the U.S.-Saudi relationship. For the last thirty years he has commanded the National Guard -- the Kingdom's Praetorian Guard -- and used only U.S. equipment and

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Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 09/22/08

trainers to develop it. While he is committed to keeping the U.S. tie firm, he does not understand our unique relationship with Israel.

The Vice President and Madeleine have spent much time developing a personal relationship with Abdullah over the past year as he has taken the lead on most major decisions in the Kingdom. The Vice President talked extensively with him last May about Israel and the role of the Holocaust in shaping U.S. opinion. The Crown Prince is an earnest and direct interlocutor who will want to convince you personally of his commitment to maintaining close ties.

Iraq. This is a key issue for us. The Saudi leadership endorses our diplomatic approach to the current Iraqi challenge toward UNSCOM. Abdullah made clear just last week to Ambassador Fowler that the Saudis do not support U.S. unilateral use of force in Iraq to support UNSCOM's presence. U.S. military action, in their view, should be reserved for situations when Saddam threatens Kuwait or Saudi Arabia again, and should be aimed at removing Saddam. This Saudi view is based on concerns about the efficacy of using force to compel compliance, as well as Saudi public concerns about our double standard with respect to Israel/Iraq as well as the suffering of the Iraqi people. Also, Saudi Arabia and many other Gulf countries underestimate Iraq's WMD threat. So while Abdullah believes that UN inspections and monitoring should continue and that there will be no accommodation with Saddam, their minimization of Iraq's WMD threat undercuts our ability to get support for forceful action. George will have briefed Abdullah on the Iraqi WMD threat prior to your meeting to prepare him for your session.

You will want to outline our phased approach to the current challenge, but also caution that Saddam's kicking out UNSCOM entirely will call for further response, which could include use of force. You should not seek an explicit Saudi promise to help us in your one-on-one but should make clear that we may need to call on the SAG again if this challenge persists.

Middle East Peace Process. Abdullah's number one priority will be to emphasize his deep personal distress with the current status of the Middle East peace process and the danger it poses both to the U.S. role in the region and the ability of moderate Arab regimes to deflect domestic criticism. He will convey the perception -- broadly shared in the Arab world -- that the United States caved this Spring to Israeli demands to modify our proposal after Arafat had agreed to it. In his eyes, our

unwillingness to openly blame Netanyahu for rejecting our ideas has significantly undermined our credibility throughout the region, leading many to accuse us of a double standard in our treatment of Israel and Iraq and to question our ability to extract Israeli concessions on any matter of importance. On Monday the Saudi cabinet issued a statement expressing appreciation for your efforts to break the deadlock, a message Abdullah will refer to as showing the Kingdom's support.

You need to push back on Abdullah, even as you share his frustration with the impact that the paralysis in the peace process is having, not only on regional stability but also on the United States' image and role in the Arab world. You should explain that is precisely why we have pushed -- even as you speak -- for a breakthrough rather than a more damaging breakdown in the negotiations. We have moved Netanyahu. You should press him for help with Arafat and Egypt.

Abdullah is personally close to Syrian President Assad and may well have a message for you from the Syrians. Abdullah has long believed the Syrian track is the real key to peace. You should agree on the need to revitalize this track and press Abdullah to get Assad to be more flexible.

Jordan. While Saudi relations with Jordan have improved somewhat from the Gulf War nadir, lingering Saudi distaste for Amman has made Riyadh less willing to assist Jordan in its current economic troubles. You should make a pitch for better Saudi ties with Jordan given the King's failing health, Jordan's contributions to the Middle East peace process, and the risk that Jordan otherwise will need to tilt towards Baghdad.

Economy. Abdullah faces a significant decline in government revenue that is not expected to be reversed over the short term. While the Saudi public often has linked its declining financial position to excessive purchases of U.S. military goods (there are no major U.S. sales of defense hardware on the horizon), the SAG's money woes come from low oil prices, overspending, and a rapidly growing population. Half the population is under age 20.

Iran. In 1996, Abdullah initiated a cautious rapprochement with Tehran, calculating that closer ties would reduce Iranian interference in Saudi domestic affairs -- and those of Riyadh's GCC neighbors -- and mitigate the Iranian WMD threat. He appears to be seeking a modus vivendi, not a genuine friendship or strategic partnership, and remains wary of Iran's extremist

elements. Riyadh wants to help Iran change and believes that the time has come for U.S.-Iran rapprochement. When the Vice President visited Riyadh he passed a message from you to the Crown Prince asking him to intervene with Khatami to begin a U.S.-Iran dialogue. We have not heard a response because the Iranians never answered Abdullah.

Although the Vice President will have detailed conversations about Iran, you should probe Abdullah's views of the government and brief on our own approach.

Terrorism. Cooperation on terrorism remains a major area of concern. After Khobar, the SAG supported consolidation of our military forces in the Kingdom to ensure safety, but sharing of intelligence and law enforcement information is still a serious problem. Our constant pleas for the final report of the SAG investigation are met with a "still-working-on-it" response.

On Usama bin Ladin, we have pressed the Saudis to cooperate with us in blocking his activities and financial dealings and getting Taliban to bring him to justice. Although Saudi officials say they have cut him off from his family totally, there are reports that bin Ladin continues to have access to his family's resources, and a key bin Ladin associate -- Madani al-Tayyib -- lives on the family's compound in Jeddah. The bin Ladin family is one of the wealthiest in the Kingdom, with close ties to the royal family. The Saudis thus far have provided us a detailed briefing from al-Tayyib, but rebuffed our efforts to allow U.S. investigators to question him face-to-face. We still need that.

Prime Minister Sharif told you in New York on Monday that Saudi intelligence chief Prince Turki and his Pakistani counterpart traveled secretly to Afghanistan last week to push the Taliban to extradite bin Ladin; when nothing happened, the Kingdom decided to pull its representative from Afghanistan and to increase pressure on the Taliban. The Saudis did indeed recall their charge d'affaires from Afghanistan on Tuesday and asked the Afghan counterpart in Riyadh to leave. We should applaud this action. We should see what Abdullah has in mind next.

The Vice President will have terrorism as a focus with Abdullah; any discussion you have should be saved for your one-on-one. In your one-on-one, you will want to impress upon Abdullah the critical importance of cooperation both on past terrorist acts (e.g. Khobar) and into the future, noting the increased danger to the United States and Saudi Arabia from bin Ladin. You should note Prince Turki's effort in Afghanistan, and press for

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more of such coordinated Saudi-Pakistani pressure on the Taliban to bring bin Ladin to justice.

U.S. Military Force Presence. There are currently 6,000 U.S. deployed personnel in Saudi Arabia, mostly connected to Operation Southern Watch and its mission to patrol the no-fly zone below the 33rd parallel. Consolidation of this presence at Prince Sultan Air Base has diminished the visibility of American forces to a great extent. FM Saud Al-Faisal recently said that U.S. forces are welcome to remain as long as they continue to maintain a low profile. As King, Abdullah likely would support continued U.S. presence. As commander of the Saudi National Guard, Abdullah has had a long working relationship with the United States Army, which has served as advisors and trainers for over 25 years. It was those advisors' headquarters (OPM/SANG) which were bombed in Riyadh in 1995, an attack which Abdullah took personally.

Even if it's there, we cannot always use it. While the Saudis permitted plus-ups of mostly support aircraft during last winter's Iraqi crisis, in February the Saudis opposed -- and influenced countries such as Bahrain to oppose -- permitting U.S. military action against Saddam from their territory. Most recently, Abdullah said that Saudi Arabia's role as guardian of Islam's two holiest places preclude it from future support of attacks against Iraq. When the United States drew down early in the summer, Abdullah and Defense Minister Prince Sultan were pleased by the decision. Abdullah warned that there would be no automatic permission to plus-up once again unless there is a direct threat to Saudi Arabia.

EO 13526 1.4d

Libya. Bandar will press Abdullah to raise Pan Am 103 which is Bandar's pet project these days. You should simply reiterate our offer and urge the Saudis to get Qadhafi to put up the two defendants or denounce Qadhafi for welching on the deal.

Freedom of Religion. U.S. advocates for stronger U.S. Government action on freedom of religion has made Saudi Arabia a country of focus, due to the strict prohibitions on the public practice of faiths other than Islam. Your intervention in July with Prince Abdul Aziz bin Fahd over detained Christian

proselytizers placed a marker on the importance of this issue for us. You should thank Abdullah for ordering their release and push carefully for further progress.

III. PARTICIPANTS

Oval Office:

U.S.

The President
The Vice President
Samuel Berger
Leon Fuerth
Bruce Riedel
Ambassador Wyche Fowler
Gamal Helal, Interpreter

Saudi Arabia

Prince Abdullah bin
Abdulaziz, Crown Prince
Prince Saud Al-Faisal,
Foreign Minister
Prince Bandar bin Sultan bin
Abdulaziz, Ambassador to
the United States
Abdulaziz Al-Tuwaijri,
Assistant Deputy Commander
of the National Guard

Lunch:

U.S.

The President
The Vice President
Samuel Berger
Martin Indyk
General Joseph Ralston
John Hamre
George Tenet
Leon Fuerth
Bruce Riedel
Ambassador Wyche Fowler
Gamal Helal, Interpreter

Saudi Arabia

Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz
Al-Saud
Prince Saud Al-Faisal
Prince Bandar bin Sultan bin
Abdulaziz
Abdulaziz Al-Tuwaijri
Prince Turki bin Abdullah
Al-Saud, Counselor
Prince Abdulaziz bin Abdullah
Al-Saud, Counselor
Ali Al-Noami, Minister of
Petroleum and Mineral
Resources
Ibrahim Al-Assaf, Minister of
Finance and National
Economy
Prince Faisal bin Abdullah
Prince Mansour bin Abdullah

IV. PRESS PLAN

Official photo/video only during Oval Office meeting.
There will be a joint press statement released, which is still being negotiated with the Saudis.

V. SEQUENCE

12:40 - 12:45 -- Oval Office Official Photo

12:45 - 1:00 -- Two-on-One (with Vice President)

1:05 - 1:55 -- Lunch in Family Dining Room

Attachments

Tab A Talking Points

Tab B Biography

Tab C Memo from Secretary of State

A

SUMMARY POINTS FOR MEETING WITH
CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH OF SAUDI ARABIA
[Address as "Your Royal Highness"]

- One-on-One: On Iraq, we continue our measured approach, but if Iraq expels or cripples UNSCOM, despite UNSC action, will have to consider other options. No rewards/incentives for Iraq absent compliance. Military force may be necessary if Iraq stalls or ratchets up. Have sufficient forces in region for potential strike.
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- MEPP parties not far apart on substance, distrust harder to overcome. Movement on MEPP critical to U.S. credibility and to our relations with all the countries of the region. I'm determined to achieve breakthrough, avoid breakdown that will not help Arafat. Need you to help me with Arafat, Mubarak, and Assad, as I continue to press Netanyahu.
- Jordan is important ally and friend of MEPP. Urge you to do what you can to help Jordan economically.
- (If time permits) On Iran, encouraged by Khatami, want to see real changes in policies. What are your views of the Iranian government?

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2014-0797-M (1.11)
3/6/2014 KBH

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH OF SAUDI ARABIA

Oval Office Session

- Pleased to be able to receive you. Wanted to personally express my respect for you and the close friendship between you and U.S. Understand you and Vice President have developed strong working ties.
- Appreciate that Saudi Arabia is undergoing transition. It is a credit to you and the rest of Saudi government that it has been proceeding so smoothly.
- Am confident our ties will remain close as ever.

One-on-One

Iraq

- Iraq's suspension of cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA is a challenge to the authority of the Security Council and the Secretary General. Council must meet this challenge, or risk making itself irrelevant.
- We have taken a measured, deliberate approach to this issue, but if the Council fails to act effectively, we will have no choice but to consider other options.
- UNSCR 1194 makes clear that there can be no comprehensive review until Iraq resumes cooperation. The Council should not negotiate with Baghdad about the terms of the review or reward Iraqi intransigence.
- Saddam understands diplomacy backed by the credible threat of military force. We currently have sufficient force in the region for a potent strike. Willing to beef up forces if necessary, but don't have plans to do that now. We will continue to consult with you as the situation progresses.
- Appreciate your past and continuing support. I assure you that diplomacy is our preferred option, but military force may become necessary if Iraq fails to reverse itself or kicks UNSCOM out entirely.

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Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify on: 09/22/08

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2014-0797-M (1.12)

3/6/2019 KBH

- Saddam Hussein continues to perpetuate the myth that the UN is driving his people to starvation. We understand how powerfully this Iraqi propaganda resonates in the Arab world and hope you will take it upon yourselves to disseminate accurate information about this issue within your country.
- (IF ASKED about "light at the end of the tunnel"): Now, while Iraq is in flagrant violation of its obligations, is not the time to discuss incentives. We will not reward Iraq for violating its international obligations.

Terrorism (VP will discuss in more detail)

- I know you agree that Usama bin Ladin and his network continue to pose a serious danger to both the United States and Saudi Arabia.
- Prime Minister Sharif told me of the effort by Prince Turki and his Pakistani counterpart to press the Taliban for bin Ladin's extradition. I applaud that aggressiveness, and your decisive diplomatic break with the Taliban when they refused.
- Need to keep pressure on. Best is a coordinated Pakistani-Saudi approach.
- We appreciate the information on Madani al-Tayyib you provided thus far. Al-Tayyib has in-depth knowledge of Usama's finances and terrorist apparatus. In order to take those steps ourselves, we would like to have our own investigators put questions to al-Tayyib.
- On al-Khobar, we have a deep and abiding interest in getting the results of your investigation. We should have no surprises on Khobar.

Lunch

Middle East Peace Process

- Dennis Ross met several times last week with Chairman Arafat and Prime Minister Netanyahu to reach agreement on broad package including further Israeli redeployments and measures parties would take to ensure security.

- These intensive efforts will continue this week with separate meetings between Secretary Albright, Netanyahu and Arafat.
- Bottom line: parties not far apart on substance of an agreement. What separates them is profound distrust, lack of confidence that other side will live up to its commitments.
- This gap is much harder to narrow than differences over 13%, third phase of redeployment, security measures, etc.
- My view, which I know you share, is that movement on peace process important to U.S. interests and credibility throughout the region.
- That is why I am determined to remain engaged on this and to do what it will take, including pressing both parties hard to move forward. Cannot afford to let much more time go by without significant progress.
- Saudi Arabia can help me move this process: You have great influence with Arafat, Mubarak, and Assad. I need your help.
- You can help forward the peace process by urging the Palestinians and Egyptians to make a deal now. Arafat can get more land if he will agree to a real security work plan.
- I'm not asking Arafat to do anything he hasn't already promised to do. Now is the time to close the deal.
- I hope you will also urge President Assad to find a more flexible way to go forward. Urge him to look for a new formula.

[If he claims that we changed our ideas after Arafat had agreed to them in order to accommodate Israeli concerns:]

- U.S. ideas have not changed and will not change. What happened is that when we fleshed them out in more detail, Palestinians expressed concern with some aspects.
- That said, will not dispute that events surrounding our proposal have hurt our credibility in the region.
- Makes it all the more imperative that we rapidly reach an agreement and move on to permanent status issues.

Jordan

- Jordan is an important ally to us. Given its economic difficulties and the health problems of the King, I urge the Saudi government to do what it can to help Jordan.

Economy

- We value and appreciate the stabilizing influence of Saudi Arabia in the international petroleum market. Your policies have been a major contributing factor to maintaining a stable global oil market.
- Interested in how you are responding to persistently low oil prices. (Secretary Rubin will discuss in detail.)

(IF PRESSED on OPEC Price Agreements:)

- We realize the serious crisis that the decline in oil prices has caused oil producers, both abroad and here. Nevertheless, we just cannot endorse coordinated oil production cuts. The market is the best determinant of prices over the long run.

Iran (time permitting, since Vice President will discuss in his meeting)

- Khatami's improved rhetoric about the West and his determination to change Iran's course give us hope. He represents a strategic opportunity to promote a process of positive change.
- However, powerful hardline elements still hold many of the levers of power. WMD programs appear to be unchecked. And despite some promising signals, we cannot as of yet mark any decline in Iran's support for terrorist organizations. For this reason, Iran continues to represent a regional threat.
- Troubled by Iran's testing of the medium-range Shahab 3 missile. Iran does not need such weapons for self-defense; it is an effort to intimidate neighbors and dominate the region.

- In our view, the way forward is to enter official talks with Iran. We have made this clear to the Iranians -- most recently in the Secretary's June 17 speech in New York -- but they have so far declined.

Iran-Afghanistan (IF ASKED)

- We condemn the killing of Iran's diplomats in northern Afghanistan. We join with other Security Council members in calling for an investigation.
- The military situation on the Afghanistan-Iran concerns us and we are watching it closely. We continue to urge all parties in the region to respect international borders and to refrain from taking any action which would enflame or enlarge the conflict.

U.S. Military Presence (IF ASKED)

- Understand desire in your country to keep small the American "footprint." Very aware of the concerns that you have about a public backlash against too large an American presence, or against its use upon Iraq.
- Nonetheless, your and my governments have agreed on the need to defend your country. To do that, we need sufficient forces in the region to be able to deter possible aggression by your neighbors.
- I would like your help in explaining to the Saudi people and the region why it is in our mutual interest to have U.S. forces in the Kingdom.

Pakistan (IF ASKED)

- Had a good meeting with PM Sharif in New York. Eager to revive an important relationship but need progress on the benchmarks laid out by UN on arms control.

Libya (IF ASKED)

- We offered Qadhafi the deal Bandar said Libya will take: a UK trial in Holland.
- Now is time for Qadhafi to deliver.

- If Qadhafi doesn't deliver I expect you will make clear he broke the deal your Ambassador said he would accept.

Religious Freedom and Proselytizers (IF ASKED)

- Thank you for ordering the recent release of the Filipino and Dutch Christians. The case generated interest among the American public and the USG, and we are grateful that it was resolved quickly.

B

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001f. report	re: U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	09/17/1998	P1/b(1)

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001g. memo	Madeleine Albright to POTUS re: Your Meeting and Lunch with Saudi Arabian Corwn Prince Abdullah (3 pages)	09/23/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Abdullah])
OA/Box Number: 43325

FOLDER TITLE:

9806426

2014-0797-M
rs1075

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

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Initials: KBM Date: 3/6/2019
2014-0797-M

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

LIMITED ACCESS 6426
REDO

September 23, 1998

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: BRUCE RIEDEL *BR*

FROM: JOSEPH MARTY *JM*

SUBJECT: Briefing Memo for POTUS Meeting with Saudi
Arabian Crown Prince Abdullah on September 24.

Attached is the briefing memo for the President's Thursday meeting and lunch with Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah.

The memorandum and points reflect schedule changes and changes made to the memo and talking points which were requested.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Talking Points
Tab B Biography

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *KBM* NARA, Date *3/4/2019*
2014-0797-M

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 09/23/08

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2014-0797-M (1.15)

3/6/2019 KBH

September 22, 1998

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: BRUCE RIEDEL *BR*

FROM: JOSEPH MARTY *JM*

SUBJECT: Briefing Memo for POTUS Meeting with Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Abdullah on September 24.

Attached is the briefing memo for the President's Thursday meeting and lunch with Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah.

We worked the schedule and agenda closely with Leon and with other agencies. Jim chaired a small group on it. We have focused the President's time on the MEPP and Iraq, with background and some provisional points on other topics. The Vice President will focus on Iran, terrorism, the Saudi economy, and environment.

We want the President to have a short Oval Office photo session, a one hour lunch for main discussion, followed by a 15-30 minute one-on-one. The latter forum is the place to put down a marker on the potential use of force in Iraq, ask about the President's letter to Abdullah on Khatami, and touch on sensitive terrorism matters.

With a total of an hour and half, we will be pressed. At a minimum, we would like to shorten any Oval Office meeting and move to lunch before 1:00, so that time remains at the end for a one-on-one. We should discuss how to do that. We could use an extra 15-30 minutes (until 2:15 or 2:30), and recommend you urge a short extension.

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum for the President
- Tab A Talking Points
- Tab B Bio

Sandy

Scheduling will not add

any extra time for a one-on-one but POTUS as of now has phone and office time after the lunch. Suggest you engineer ending lunch few minutes early and handle w/POTUS, Abdullah for 5-10 minutes. Olga

See my note

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001i. memo	From Samuel Berger re: Meeting with Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah (8 pages)	09/22/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Abdullah])
OA/Box Number: 43325

FOLDER TITLE:

9806426

2014-0797-M
rs1075

RESTRICTION CODES

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001j. talking points	re: Summary Points for Meeting with Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia (1 page)	09/22/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Abdullah])
OA/Box Number: 43325

FOLDER TITLE:

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001k. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Meeting with Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia (8 pages)	09/22/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Abdullah])
OA/Box Number: 43325

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

2014-0797-M (1.19)
3/6/2019 KBH

MEETING WITH
SAUDI CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH
DATE: Thursday, September 24, 1998
LOCATION: Oval Office, Family Dining Room
TIME: 12:45 p.m. - 2:00 p.m.

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER *SB*

I. PURPOSE

To have serious discussions on regional issues and terrorism with the leader of our most important ally in the Muslim world and show our continuing respect for and acceptance of Abdullah's new role as de facto leader of the Kingdom.

II. BACKGROUND

Your meeting with Crown Prince Abdullah is the highpoint of his round-the-world trip marking his de facto assumption of Saudi Arabia's leadership. He will just have been in France and the UK, and will leave here for China, Japan, South Korea, and Pakistan. In addition to your lunch, he will have a further meeting with the Vice President (which Abdullah requested by ~~one-on-one~~ one-on-one), as well as meetings with Madeleine, Bob Rubin, John Hamre, and Louis Freeh. He will have seen George Tenet prior to your meeting. You will have a short Oval Office photo session, followed by a brief one-on-one, then lunch.

~~We have agreed among agencies and with the Saudi embassy that your meetings should focus on Iraq, the Middle East peace process, and the economy while the Vice President will focus on Iran, terrorism, the environment and a few other issues. We recommend that you discuss the Middle East peace process in the large group, while focusing on Iraq in the one-on-one. (We have given you material and points for all issues, since your conversations may expand out of these areas).~~

We have agreed with the

and briefly on terrorism

Contrary to what is reported in the press, the Crown Prince is a firm supporter of the U.S.-Saudi relationship. For the last thirty years he has commanded the National Guard, the Kingdom's Praetorian Guard, and used only U.S. equipment and trainers to

and briefly on terrorism

SECRET

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 09/22/08

(-)

(-)

9 develop it. While he is committed to keeping the U.S. tie firm, he ~~frankly~~ does not understand our unique relationship with Israel.

The Vice President and Madeleine have spent much time developing a personal relationship with Abdullah over the past year as he has taken the lead on most major decisions in the Kingdom. The Vice President talked extensively with him last May about Israel and the role of the Holocaust in shaping U.S. opinion. The Crown Prince is an earnest and direct interlocutor who will want to convince you personally of his commitment to maintaining close ties.

Iraq. This is a key issue for us. The Saudi leadership endorses our ~~deliberate~~ diplomatic approach to the current Iraqi challenge toward UNSCOM. Abdullah made clear just last week to Ambassador Fowler that the Saudis do not support U.S. unilateral use of force in Iraq to ~~enforce UNSCOM inspections~~. U.S. military action, in their view, should be reserved for situations when Saddam threatens Kuwait or Saudi Arabia again, and should be aimed at removing Saddam. This Saudi view is based on concerns about the efficacy of using force to compel compliance, as well as Saudi public concerns about our double standard with respect to Israel/Iraq as well as the suffering of the Iraqi people. Also, Saudi Arabia and many other Gulf countries underestimate Iraq's WMD threat. So while Abdullah believes that UN inspections and monitoring ~~must~~ continue and that there will be no accommodation with Saddam, their minimization of Iraq's WMD threat undercuts our ability to get support for forceful action. George will have briefed Abdullah on the Iraqi WMD threat prior to your meeting to prepare him for your session.

to support UNSCOM's presence.

should

call for

You will want to outline our ~~measured and~~ phased approach to the current challenge, but also caution that Saddam's kicking out UNSCOM entirely will ~~demand~~ further response, which could include use of force. You should not seek an explicit Saudi promise to help us in your one-on-one but should make clear that we may need to call on the SAG again if this challenge persists.

Middle East Peace Process. Abdullah's number one priority will be to emphasize his deep personal distress with the current status of the Middle East peace process and the danger it poses both to the U.S. role in the region and the ability of moderate Arab regimes to deflect domestic criticism. He will convey the perception -- broadly shared in the Arab world -- that the United States caved this Spring to Israeli demands to modify our

proposal after Arafat had agreed to it. In his eyes, our unwillingness to openly blame Netanyahu for rejecting our ideas has significantly undermined our credibility throughout the region, leading many to accuse us of a double standard in our treatment of Israel and Iraq and to question our ability to extract Israeli concessions on any matter of importance. On Monday the Saudi cabinet issued a statement expressing appreciation for your efforts to break the deadlock, a message Abdullah will refer to as showing the Kingdom's support.

You need to push back on Abdullah, even as you share his frustration. ^{WSTN}

~~You should indicate to Abdullah that you share his concerns about the impact the paralysis in the peace process is having, not only on regional stability but also on the United States' image and role in the Arab world. You should explain that is precisely why you remain committed to working on this issue and determined to press both parties to make the necessary compromises. You should press him for help with Arafat and Egypt, to support our ideas.~~

That

we have pushed -- even as you speak -- for a breakthrough

Abdullah is personally close to Syrian President Assad and may well have a message for you from the Syrians. Abdullah has long believed the Syrian track is the real key to peace. You should agree on the need to revitalize this track and press Abdullah to get Assad to be more flexible.

Jordan. While Saudi relations with Jordan have improved somewhat from the Gulf War nadir, lingering Saudi distaste for Amman has made Riyadh less willing to assist Jordan in its current economic troubles. You should make a pitch for better Saudi ties with Jordan given the King's failing health, Jordan's contributions to the Middle East peace process, and the risk that Jordan otherwise will need to tilt towards Baghdad.

*rather than
more
damaging
head-on
in the
negotiations.
We
have
moved
Netanyahu.*

Economy. Abdullah faces a significant decline in government revenue that is not expected to be reversed over the short term. While the Saudi public often has linked its declining financial position to excessive purchases of U.S. military goods (there are no major U.S. sales of defense hardware on the horizon), the SAG's money woes come from low oil prices, overspending, and a rapidly growing population. Half the population is under age 20.

Iran. In 1996, Abdullah initiated a cautious rapprochement with Tehran, calculating that closer ties would reduce Iranian interference in Saudi domestic affairs -- and those of Riyadh's GCC neighbors -- and mitigate the Iranian WMD threat. He appears to be seeking a modus vivendi, not a genuine friendship

or strategic partnership, and remains wary of Iran's extremist elements. Riyadh wants to help Iran change and believes that the time has come for U.S.-Iran rapprochement. When the Vice President visited Riyadh he passed a message from you to the Crown Prince asking him to intervene with Khatami to begin a U.S.-Iran dialogue. We have not heard a response because the Iranians never answered Abdullah.

Although the Vice President will have detailed conversations about Iran, you should probe Abdullah's views of the government and brief on our own approach.

Terrorism. Cooperation on terrorism remains a major area of concern. After Khobar, the SAG supported consolidation of our military forces in the Kingdom to ensure safety, but sharing of intelligence information is still a ~~real~~ problem. Our constant pleas for the final report of the SAG investigation are met with a "still-working-on-it" response.

and law enforcement *serious*

On Usama bin Ladin, we have pressed the Saudis to cooperate with us in blocking his activities and financial dealings and getting Taliban to bring him to justice. Although Saudi officials say they have cut him off from his family totally, there are reports that bin Ladin continues to have access to his family's resources, and a key bin Ladin associate -- Madani al-Tayyib -- lives on the family's compound in Jeddah. The bin Ladin family is one of the wealthiest in the Kingdom, with close ties to the royal family. The Saudis thus far have provided us a detailed briefing from al-Tayyib, but rebuffed our efforts to allow U.S. investigators to question him face-to-face. We still need that.

Prime Minister Sharif told you in New York on Monday that Saudi intelligence chief Prince Turki and his Pakistani counterpart traveled secretly to Afghanistan last week to push the Taliban to extradite bin Ladin; when nothing happened, the Kingdom decided to pull its representative from Afghanistan and to increase pressure on the Taliban. The Saudis did indeed recall their charge d'affaires from Afghanistan on Tuesday and asked the Afghan counterpart in Riyadh to leave. We should applaud this action. We should see what Abdullah has in mind next.

The Vice President will have terrorism as a focus with Abdullah; any discussion you have should be saved for your one-on-one.

You will want to impress upon Abdullah the critical importance of cooperation both on past terrorist acts (e.g. Khobar) and into the future, noting the increased danger to the United States and Saudi Arabia from bin Ladin. You should note Prince

in your one on one,

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
0011. memo	From Samuel Berger re: Meeting with Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah [partial] (1 page)	09/22/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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Turki's effort in Afghanistan, and press for more of such coordinated Saudi-Pakistani pressure on the Taliban to bring bin Ladin to justice.

U.S. Military Force Presence. There are currently 6,000 U.S. deployed personnel in Saudi Arabia, mostly connected to Operation Southern Watch and its mission to patrol the no-fly zone below the 33rd parallel. Consolidation of this presence at Prince Sultan Air Base has diminished the visibility of American forces to a great extent. FM Saud Al-Faisal recently said that U.S. forces are welcome to remain as long as they continue to maintain a low profile. As King, Abdullah likely would support continued U.S. presence. As commander of the Saudi National Guard, Abdullah has had a long working relationship with the United States Army, which has served as advisors and trainers for over 25 years. It was those advisors' headquarters (OPM/SANG) which were bombed in Riyadh in 1995, an attack which Abdullah took personally.

Even if it's there, we cannot always use it. While the Saudis permitted plus-ups of mostly support aircraft during last winter's crisis, in February the Saudis opposed -- and influenced countries such as Bahrain to oppose -- permitting U.S. military action against Saddam from their territory. Most recently, Abdullah said that Saudi Arabia's role as guardian of Islam's two holiest places preclude it from future support of attacks against Iraq. When the United States drew ~~back down to pre-crisis levels~~ early in the summer, Abdullah and Defense Minister Prince Sultan were pleased by the decision. Abdullah warned that there would be no automatic permission to plus-up once again unless there is a direct threat to Saudi Arabia.

Iraqi

EO 13526 1.4d

Libya. ~~a~~ Bandar will press Abdullah to raise Pan Am 103 which is Bandar's pet project these days. You should simply reiterate our offer and urge the Saudis to get Qadhafi to put up the two defendants or denounce Qadhafi for welching on the deal.

Freedom of Religion: U.S. advocates for stronger U.S. Government action on freedom of religion has made Saudi Arabia a country of focus, due to the strict prohibitions on the public practice of faiths other than Islam. Your intervention in July

with Prince Abdul Aziz bin Fahd over detained Christian proselytizers placed a marker on the importance of this issue for us. You should thank Abdullah for ordering their release and push carefully for further progress.

III. PARTICIPANTS

Oval Office:

U.S.

The President
The Vice President
Samuel Berger
Leon Fuerth
Bruce Riedel
Ambassador Wyche Fowler
Gamal Helal, Interpreter

Saudi Arabia

Prince Abdullah bin
Abdulaziz, Crown Prince
Prince Saud Al-Faisal,
Foreign Minister
Prince Bandar bin Sultan bin
Abdulaziz, Ambassador to
the United States
Abdulaziz Al-Tuwaijri,
Assistant Deputy Commander
of the National Guard

Lunch:

U.S.

The President
The Vice President
Samuel Berger
Martin Indyk
General Joseph Ralston
John Hamre
George Tenet
Leon Fuerth
Bruce Riedel
Ambassador Wyche Fowler
Gamal Helal, Interpreter

Saudi Arabia

Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz
Al-Saud
Prince Saud Al-Faisal
Prince Bandar bin Sultan bin
Abdulaziz
Abdulaziz Al-Tuwaijri
Prince Turki bin Abdullah
Al-Saud, Counselor
Prince Abdulaziz bin Abdullah
Al-Saud, Counselor
Ali Al-Noami, Minister of
Petroleum and Mineral
Resources
Ibrahim Al-Assaf, Minister of
Finance and National
Economy
Prince Faisal bin Abdullah
Prince Mansour bin Abdullah

IV. PRESS PLAN

Official photo/video only during Oval Office meeting.
There will be a joint press statement released, which is still being negotiated with the Saudis.

V. SEQUENCE

	40	45		official photo
	12:45	12:50	--	Oval Office Meeting
	45	00		Two
	12:50	1:10	--	one -on-One (with Vice President)
	05	1:55		
	1:10	2:00	--	Lunch in Family Dining Room

Handwritten notes:
pss
EAC
fec

Handwritten notes:
[Per NSA -
VP to be in
one room]

Attachments

- Tab A Talking Points
- Tab B Biography
- Tab C Memo from Secretary of State

SUMMARY POINTS FOR MEETING WITH
CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH OF SAUDI ARABIA
[Address as "Your Royal Highness"]

- One-on-One: On Iraq, we continue our measured approach, but if ~~Council action fails to change Iraq's actions~~, will have to consider other options. No rewards/incentives for Iraq absent compliance. Military force may be necessary if Iraq stalls or ratchets up. Have sufficient forces in region for potential strike.

Iraq expels or outpaces UNSCOM, despite UNSC action,

- MEPP parties not far apart on substance, distrust harder to overcome. Movement on MEPP critical to U.S. credibility and to our relations with all the countries of the region. I'm determined to remain engaged, press both parties. Need you to ~~press~~ Arafat, Mubarak, and Assad.

achieve to breakthrough, avoid breakdown that will not help Arafat.

- Jordan is important ally and friend of MEPP. Urge you to do what you can to help Jordan economically.

help me with

- ~~How are low oil prices affecting you?~~

as I continue to press Netanyahu.

- (If time permits) On Iran, encouraged by Khatami, want to see real changes in policies. What are your views of the Iranian government?

One-on-one

- On terrorism: important to use all necessary means to press Taliban on Osama; need cooperation on Khorbar

important to use all necessary means to press Taliban on Osama; need cooperation on Khorbar

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH OF SAUDI ARABIA

Oval Office Session

- Pleased to be able to receive you. Wanted to personally express my respect for you and the close friendship between you and U.S. Understand you and Vice President have developed strong working ties.
- Appreciate that Saudi Arabia is undergoing transition. It is a credit to you and the rest of Saudi government that it has been proceeding so smoothly. ~~I have highest regard for your leadership as Saudi Arabia moves into new century.~~
- Am confident our ties will remain close as ever. ~~Look forward to working with you even more closely in the future.~~

One-on-OneIraq

- Saddam understands diplomacy backed by the credible threat of military force. We currently have sufficient force in the region for a potent strike. Willing to beef up forces if necessary, but don't have plans to do that now. We will continue to consult with you as the situation progresses.
- Appreciate your past and continuing support. I assure you that diplomacy is our preferred option, but military force may become necessary if Iraq fails to reverse itself or kicks UNSCOM out entirely.
- Iraq's suspension of cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA is a challenge to the authority of the Security Council and the Secretary General. Council must meet this challenge, or risk making itself irrelevant.
- We have taken a measured, deliberate approach to this issue, but if the Council fails to act effectively, we will have no choice but to consider other options.
- ~~The Council is united in demanding that Iraq immediately resume cooperation. The resolution suspending sanctions~~

SECRET

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify on: 09/22/08

DECLASSIFIED IN PART PER E. O. 13526

2014-0797-M (1.21)
3/6/2014 KBH

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001n. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Meeting with Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia [partial] (1 page)	09/22/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Abdullah])
OA/Box Number: 43325

FOLDER TITLE:

9806426

2014-0797-M
rs1075

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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reviews was a positive step (UNSCR 1194, passed September 9), but has not yet made Iraq reverse course.

- UNSCR 1194 makes clear that there can be no comprehensive review until Iraq resumes cooperation. The Council should not negotiate with Baghdad about the terms of the review or reward Iraqi intransigence.
- Saddam understands diplomacy backed by the credible threat of military force. We currently have sufficient force in the region for a potent strike. Willing to beef up forces if necessary, but don't have plans to do that now. We will continue to consult with you as the situation progresses.
- Appreciate your past and continuing support. I assure you that diplomacy is our preferred option, but military force may become necessary if Iraq fails to reverse itself or kicks UNSCOM out entirely.

EO 13526 1.4d

- Saddam Hussein continues to perpetuate the myth that the UN is driving his people to starvation. He has the ability both to relieve Iraq of sanctions and, while sanctions are in place, to meet all the essential needs of the Iraqi population.
- We understand how powerfully this Iraqi propaganda resonates in the Arab world and hope you will take it upon yourselves to disseminate accurate information about this issue within your country.
- (IF ASKED about "light at the end of the tunnel"): Now, while Iraq is in flagrant violation of its obligations, is not the time to discuss incentives. We will not reward Iraq for violating its international obligations.

Lunch

Middle East Peace Process

- Dennis Ross met several times last week with Chairman Arafat and Prime Minister Netanyahu to reach agreement on broad

package including further Israeli redeployments and measures parties would take to ensure security.

- These intensive efforts will continue this week with separate meetings between Secretary Albright, Netanyahu and Arafat.
- Bottom line: parties not far apart on substance of an agreement. What separates them is profound distrust, lack of confidence that other side will live up to its commitments.
- This gap is much harder to narrow than differences over 13%, third phase of redeployment, security measures, etc.
- My view, which I know you share, is that movement on peace process important to U.S. interests and credibility throughout the region.
- That is why I am determined to remain engaged on this and to do what it will take, including pressing both parties hard to move forward. Cannot afford to let much more time go by without significant progress.
- All the more important since this is only first step in process that must lead to resolution of permanent status issues and beginning of comprehensive and just peace.
- Saudi Arabia can help me move this process: You have great influence with Arafat, Mubarak, and Assad. I need your help.
- You can help forward the peace process by urging the Palestinians and Egyptians to make a deal now. Arafat can get more land if he will agree to a real security work plan.
- I'm not asking Arafat to do anything he hasn't already promised to do. Now is the time to close the deal.
- I hope you will also urge President Assad to find a more flexible way to go forward. Urge him to look for a new formula.

[If he claims that we changed our ideas after Arafat had agreed to them in order to accommodate Israeli concerns:]

- U.S. ideas have not changed and will not change. What happened is that when we fleshed them out in more detail, Palestinians expressed concern with some aspects.
- That said, will not dispute that events surrounding our proposal have hurt our credibility in the region.
- Makes it all the more imperative that we rapidly reach an agreement and move on to permanent status issues.

Jordan

- Jordan is an important ally to us, ~~and critical to the peace process.~~
- Given its economic difficulties and the health problems of the King, I urge the Saudi government to do what it can to help Jordan.

Economy

- We value and appreciate the stabilizing influence of Saudi Arabia in the international petroleum market. Your policies have been a major contributing factor to maintaining a stable global oil market.
- Interested in how you are responding to persistently low oil prices. (Secretary Rubin will discuss in detail.)

(IF PRESSED on OPEC Price Agreements:)

- We realize the serious crisis that the decline in oil prices has caused oil producers, both abroad and here. Nevertheless, we just cannot endorse coordinated oil production cuts. The market is the best determinant of prices over the long run.

Iran (time permitting, since Vice President will discuss in his meeting)

- Khatami's improved rhetoric about the West and his determination to change Iran's course give us hope. He represents a strategic opportunity to promote a process of positive change.
- However, powerful hardline elements still hold many of the levers of power. WMD programs appear to be unchecked. And

despite some promising signals, we cannot as of yet mark any decline in Iran's support for terrorist organizations. For this reason, Iran continues to represent a regional threat.

- Troubled by Iran's testing of the medium-range Shahab 3 missile. Iran does not need such weapons for self-defense; it is an effort to intimidate neighbors and dominate the region.
- Genuine improvement in relations between the U.S. and Iran can only come with an improvement in these Iranian policies.
- In our view, the way forward is to enter official talks with Iran. We have made this clear to the Iranians -- most recently in the Secretary's June 17 speech in New York -- but they have so far declined.
- Perhaps Iranian Foreign Minister Kharrazi's speech September 28 at the Asia Society will provide Tehran's answer.

Iran-Afghanistan (IF ASKED)

- We condemn the killing of Iran's diplomats in northern Afghanistan. We join with other Security Council members in calling for an investigation.
- The military situation on the Afghanistan-Iran concerns us and we are watching it closely. We continue to urge all parties in the region to respect international borders and to refrain from taking any action which would enflame or enlarge the conflict.
- Madeleine's meeting with the seven other interested parties in New York helped reassure others that the world wants peace in Afghanistan but Taliban must behave according to global norms.

move up to one on one

~~Terrorism (Time permitting, Vice President will discuss in his meeting)~~

VP will discuss in more detail

Make up one on one

- I know you agree that Usama bin Ladin and his network continue to pose a serious danger to both the United States and Saudi Arabia.
- Prime Minister Sharif told me of the effort by Prince Turki and his Pakistani counterpart to press the Taliban for bin Ladin's extradition. I applaud that aggressiveness, and

more reports

your decisive diplomatic break with the Taliban when they refused.

- ~~Need to keep pressure on. Best is a coordinated Pakistani-Saudi approach.~~ SECRET
- We appreciate the information on Madani al-Tayyib you provided thus far. Al-Tayyib has in-depth knowledge of Usama's finances and terrorist apparatus. In order to take those steps ourselves, we would like to have our own investigators put questions to al-Tayyib.
- On al-Khobar, we have a deep and abiding interest in getting the results of your investigation. We should have no surprises on Khobar.

U.S. Military Presence (IF ASKED)

- Understand desire in your country to keep small the American "footprint." Very aware of the concerns that you have about a public backlash against too large an American presence, or against its use upon Iraq.
- ~~We have tried to distribute our forces more widely to other countries in the region.~~
- Nonetheless, your and my governments have agreed on the need to defend your country. To do that, we need sufficient forces in the region to be able to deter possible aggression by your neighbors.
- ~~We do not wish to force our military presence on you. We will leave when asked. But I would like your help in explaining to the Saudi people and the region why it is in our mutual interest to have U.S. forces in the Kingdom.~~

Pakistan (IF ASKED)

- Had a good meeting with PM Sharif in New York. Eager to revive an important relationship but need progress on the benchmarks laid out by UN on arms control.
- ~~Strobe Talbott is leading U.S. talks with both Pakistan and India asking for same benchmarks from each.~~ SECRET

- ~~Want you to urge Sharif to accelerate Talbott process. I will instruct my team to do the same.~~

Libya (IF ASKED)

- We offered Qadhafi the deal Bandar said Libya will take: a UK trial in Holland.
- Now is time for Qadhafi to deliver ~~the two to Kofi Annan.~~
- If Qadhafi doesn't deliver I expect you will make clear he broke the deal your Ambassador said he would accept.

Religious Freedom and Proselytizers (IF ASKED)

- Thank you for ordering the recent release of the Filipino and Dutch Christians. The case generated interest among the American public and the USG, and we are grateful that it was resolved quickly.
- ~~The American people place a high value on the right of all religious groups to worship freely. Hope that you can build on the expression of tolerance made by Prince Sultan last Fall.~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001o. memo	From Samuel Berger re: Meeting with Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah (8 pages)	09/22/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Abdullah])
OA/Box Number: 43325

FOLDER TITLE:

9806426

2014-0797-M
rs1075

RESTRICTION CODES

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~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9806426
RECEIVED: 18 SEP 98 10

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 23 SEP 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SAUDI ARABIA AP
LIMITED ACCESS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: POTUS MTG W/ CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH 24 SEP -- LIMITED ACCESS

ACTION: ORIGINAL MTG CARDS RETURNED DUE DATE: 24 SEP 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: MARTY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
RIEDEL

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP CLOSED BY: NSVJD DOC 3 OF 3

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 3/6/2019
2014-0797-M

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0797-M (123)
3/6/2019 KBH

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001
002 BERGER
003 PRESIDENT
003
003

Z 98092219 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
Z 98092316 FOR REDO
Z 98092319 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
Z 98092321 FOR INFORMATION
X 98092409 NOTED BY PRESIDENT
X 98112416 ORIGINAL MTG CARDS RETURNED

~~SECRET~~ LIMITED ACCESS THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 9-24-98 6426

SUMMARY POINTS FOR MEETING WITH
CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH OF
SAUDI ARABIA

[Address as "Your Royal Highness"]

- One-on-One: On Iraq, we continue our measured approach, but if Iraq expels or cripples UNSCOM, despite UNSC action, will have to consider other options. No rewards/incentives for Iraq absent compliance. Military force may be necessary if Iraq stalls or ratchets up. Have sufficient forces in region for potential strike.
- One-on-One: On terrorism: important to use all necessary means to press Taliban on Usama; need cooperation on Khobar.
- MEPP parties not far apart on substance, distrust harder to overcome. Movement on MEPP critical to U.S. credibility and to our relations with all the countries of the region. I'm determined to achieve breakthrough, avoid breakdown that will not help Arafat. Need you to help me with Arafat, Mubarak, and Assad, as I continue to press Netanyahu.

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify On: 9/22/08

98 SEP 23 PM 9:59

PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING

- Jordan is important ally and friend of MEPP. Urge you to do what you can to help Jordan economically.
- (If time permits) On Iran, encouraged by Khatami, want to see real changes in policies. What are your views of the Iranian government?

MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 43325				
Document ID: 9808457				
Row: 50	Section: 2	Shelf: 10	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	From Samuel Berger re: Telephone Call with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (1 page)	12/18/1998	P1/b(1)
001b. talking points	re: Talking Points Call to Nawaz Sharif (2 pages)	12/18/1998	P1/b(1)
001c. memo	[Duplicate of 001a] (1 page)	12/18/1998	P1/b(1)
001d. talking points	[Duplicate of 001b] (2 pages)	12/18/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Sharif])
 OA/Box Number: 43325

FOLDER TITLE:

9808457

2014-0797-M

rs1076

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 18 DEC 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: PAKISTAN
TELCALL

TERRORISM

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TELCALL W/PM SHARIF 18 DEC

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DUE DATE: 24 DEC 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SIMON

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP

CLOSED BY: NSVJD

DOC 2 OF 2

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KGM NARA, Date 3/4/2019
2014-0797-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
002 PRESIDENT
002

Z 98121812 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR SIGNATURE
Z 98121812 FOR INFORMATION
X 98121814 NOTED BY PRESIDENT

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 8457
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TR A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff	_____	_____	_____
Rice	_____	_____	_____
Davies	_____	_____	_____
Kerrick	_____	_____	_____
Steinberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>1</u>	<u>TR 12/18</u>	<u>SCAPLAN</u>
Records Mgt.	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 8457
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TR A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff	_____	_____	_____
Rice	_____	_____	_____
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Berger	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>1</u>	<u>TR 12/18</u>	<u>DCAPLAN</u>
Records Mgt.	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	From Samuel Berger re: Telephone Call with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (1 page)	12/18/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Sharif])
OA/Box Number: 43325

FOLDER TITLE:

9808457

2014-0797-M
rs1076

RESTRICTION CODES

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. talking points	re: Talking Points Call to Nawaz Sharif (2 pages)	12/18/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Sharif])
OA/Box Number: 43325

FOLDER TITLE:

9808457

2014-0797-M
rs1076

RESTRICTION CODES

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

8457

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

December 18, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: RICHARD A. CLARKE^{rf}

FROM: STEVEN SIMON^{SI}

SUBJECT: POTUS Phone Call to Sharif Regarding Usama bin Ladin

Attached is a memorandum the President on the subject issue.

Concurrence by: Bruce Riedel^{rf}

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached memorandum to the President.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Talking Points

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KSH NARA, Date 3/4/2019
2014-0797-m

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Steven Simon

Reason: 1.5 (d) (g)

Declassify On: 12/18/08

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001c. memo	[Duplicate of 001a] (1 page)	12/18/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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NSC Records Management
([Sharif])
OA/Box Number: 43325

FOLDER TITLE:

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- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001d. talking points	[Duplicate of 001b] (2 pages)	12/18/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Sharif])
OA/Box Number: 43325

FOLDER TITLE:

9808457

2014-0797-M
rs1076

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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