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 LINE2: ZNY SSSSS
 LINE3: P 291845Z AUG 94
 LINE4: FM USCINCSO SCPA QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
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 TO: RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OATSD(PA):DPL/DDI//
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 RUEPPAN/CDRUSARSO FT CLAYTON PM//SOCM-EN/SOEN/SOPA/SORM-MS3//
 RHCGSRB/CDRFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA//AFOP-TX/AFOP-TI/FCPA//
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 RUWMJAC/CINCLANTFLT DET SO RODMAN PM//NOO/N3/PA//
 RUVMDBC/HQ USSOUTHAF DAVIS MONTHAN AFB AZ//A1-CEX/A3-DOXE/PA//
 RUWMEGA/HQ USSOUTHAF FWD HOWARD AFB PM//JM/PA//
 RHLBAAG/24WG HOWARD AFB PM//PA//

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 PER E.O. 13526
 2014-0835-M
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SUBJ: PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE -- OPERATION SAFE HAVEN (U)

TEXT:

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QQQQ

SECTION 01 OF 02

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE -- OPERATION SAFE HAVEN (U)

A. USCINCSO (SCCC) MSG 271908Z AUG 94, SUBJ: SAFE HAVEN OPERATION.

B. USCINCSO (SCCC) MSG 261348Z AUG 94, SUBJ: MIGRANT SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN SOUTHCOM AOR (S).

C. CJCS MSG 271414Z AUG 94, EXORD.

D. PRESS COMMUNIQUE FROM PANAMANIAN PRESIDENT-ELECT ERNESTO PEREZ BALLADARES, 23 AUG 94.

1. (U) THIS PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE FOR OPERATION SAFE HAVEN CONTAINS:

A. INITIAL NEWS RELEASE, WHICH WILL BE RELEASED BY THE

U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND;

B. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS; AND

C. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

3. ~~(S/NF)~~ PROPOSED NEWS RELEASE:

(HEAD) U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND TO PROVIDE TEMPORARY SAFE HAVEN FOR CUBAN MIGRANTS IN PANAMA

A. (BEGIN QUOTE) QUARRY HEIGHTS, PANAMA -- SEPTEMBER 1 -- THE UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND (USSOUTHCOM) IN PANAMA WILL ESTABLISH A TEMPORARY SAFE HAVEN IN PANAMA FOR UP TO 10,000 CUBAN MIGRANTS FOR A PERIOD NOT TO EXCEED SIX MONTHS. SOUTHCOM WILL BE READY TO RECEIVE THE FIRST MIGRANTS SEPT 3.

B. IN SUPPORT OF THIS EFFORT, JOINT TASK FORCE PANAMA -- USSOUTHCOM'S STANDING JOINT TASK FORCE IN PANAMA -- WILL CONDUCT OPERATION SAFE HAVEN, A HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATION, TO PROVIDE IMMEDIATE RELIEF AND TEMPORARY SHELTER FOR CUBAN MIGRANTS.

C. A COMPLEX OF FOUR TEMPORARY SAFE HAVENS ARE NEARING COMPLETION ON THE EMPIRE RANGE TRAINING COMPLEX. THE EMPIRE RANGE COMPLEX IS A U.S. MILITARY-CONTROLLED AREA NEAR THE PANAMA CANAL ON THE PACIFIC SIDE OF THE ISTHMUS OF PANAMA. THE FIRST SAFE HAVEN IS EXPECTED TO BE OPERATIONAL ON SEPTEMBER 3, WITH THE OTHER THREE SAFE HAVENS TO BE COMPLETED WITHIN TWO WEEKS.

D. JOINT TASK FORCE PANAMA'S MISSION WILL BE TO RECEIVE, SHELTER, FEED, SECURE AND PROVIDE MEDICAL CARE TO AND SANITATION FOR THE CUBAN MIGRANTS.

E. THE FIRST GROUP OF CUBAN MIGRANTS IS EXPECTED TO ARRIVE AT HOWARD AIR FORCE BASE IN PANAMA FROM GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA, ON SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 3, ABOARD U.S. AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT.

F. THE CUBAN MIGRANTS WILL BE MEDICALLY SCREENED AND INITIALLY PROCESSED AT A RECEPTION CENTER IMMEDIATELY UPON ARRIVAL. THEY WILL THEN BE TRANSPORTED TO THE SAFE HAVEN COMPLEX AT EMPIRE RANGE WHERE THEY WILL REMAIN WITHIN THEIR ASSIGNED SAFE HAVEN FOR THE DURATION OF THEIR STAY IN PANAMA. THESE SAFE HAVENS ARE LOCATED AWAY FROM POPULATED AREAS. SECURITY AT EACH SAFE HAVEN WILL BE PROVIDED BY THE U.S. MILITARY. IN ADDITION, TRAINED MEDICAL, CIVIL AFFAIRS, LINGUISTS, AND OTHER SPECIALIZED PERSONNEL WILL BE ASSIGNED TO EACH SAFE HAVEN TO ASSIST THE CUBAN MIGRANTS. AN AIR FORCE AIR TRANSPORTABLE FIELD HOSPITAL WILL BE CENTRALLY LOCATED TO SERVE ALL FOUR SAFE HAVENS.

G. ECONOMIC BENEFITS TO THE PANAMANIAN ECONOMY FROM THE ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION OF THESE TEMPORARY SAFE HAVEN FACILITIES WILL INCLUDE LOCAL PURCHASING OF CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS PLUS OTHER GOODS AND SERVICES, AND THE IMMEDIATE HIRING OF PANAMANIAN WORKERS FOR CONSTRUCTION, FOOD PREPARATION, SANITATION SERVICES, TRANSPORTATION AND OTHER ACTIVITIES.

THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE SOUTHERN COMMAND IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CONDUCT OF THIS HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATION. (END QUOTE)

4. ~~(S/NF)~~ QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS:

Q1: HOW MANY CUBAN REFUGEES ARE EXPECTED TO COME TO PANAMA?

A1: THE GOVERNMENT OF PANAMA HAS AGREED THAT THE U.S. MAY BRING UP TO 10,000 CUBAN MIGRANTS. THE SOUTHERN COMMAND WILL BE PREPARED TO RECEIVE THEM AS SOON AS CONSTRUCTION FOR EACH SAFE HAVEN IS COMPLETE.

Q2: HOW LONG DOES THE SOUTHERN COMMAND EXPECT THIS OPERATION TO LAST?

A2: THE GOP HAS APPROVED SIX MONTHS.

Q3: WHO WILL PAY FOR THE U.S. SUPPORT AND HOW MUCH WILL IT COST?

A3: COSTS HAVE NOT YET BEEN FINALIZED, BUT IT IS ESTIMATED AT APPROXIMATELY \$50 MILLION FOR SIX MONTHS. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WILL PAY ALL COSTS.

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Q4: WILL PANAMA BE EXPECTED TO SHARE IN THE COSTS?

A4: NO.

Q5: WILL THE MEDIA BE ALLOWED TO VISIT THE SAFE HAVEN FACILITIES TO COVER THE ACTIVITIES?

A5: THE NEWS MEDIA WILL BE ALLOWED ACCESS TO THE ACTIVITIES THE U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND UNDERTAKES IN THIS HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATION. ALL NEWS MEDIA ARE REQUESTED TO REGISTER FOR APPROPRIATE CREDENTIALING AT THE U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND JOINT INFORMATION BUREAU AT CAMP ROUSSEAU (LOCATED BETWEEN HOWARD AIRFORCE BASE AND EMPIRE RANGE) PRIOR TO VISITING THE SAFE HAVEN FACILITIES. THE NEWS MEDIA WILL BE INFORMED BY AN SCPA PRESS ADVISORY OF THE DETAILS WHEN THEY ARE AVAILABLE.

Q6. WHEN WILL THE SAFE HAVEN BE OPENED AND WHERE WILL IT BE LOCATED?

A6: THE SAFE HAVEN WILL CONSIST OF FOUR CAMPS CONSTRUCTED BY THE U.S. MILITARY ON THE EMPIRE RANGE TRAINING COMPLEX, A U.S. MILITARY CONTROLLED AREA NEAR THE PANAMA CANAL ON THE PACIFIC SIDE OF THE ISTHMUS OF PANAMA. EACH WILL BE ABLE TO SHELTER 2,500 MIGRANTS.

Q7: HOW MANY CUBANS CAN BE ACCOMMODATED IN PANAMA?

A7: PANAMA HAS AGREED TO PERMIT UP TO 10,000 CUBAN MIGRANTS.

Q8: WILL ADDITIONAL TROOPS BE NEEDED, BEYOND THOSE STATIONED IN PANAMA, TO SUPPORT THIS OPERATION?

A8: YES.

Q9: IF SO, HOW MANY, WHAT TYPES AND FROM WHERE?

A9: MORE THAN 800 MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM VARIOUS INSTALLATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES WILL AUGMENT MILITARY PERSONNEL IN PANAMA. THESE AUGMENTATION PERSONNEL WILL INCLUDE MEDICAL AND PREVENTIVE MEDICINE PERSONNEL, CIVIL AFFAIRS SPECIALISTS, AND LINGUISTS, AMONG OTHER APPROPRIATE SPECIALISTS. A DETAILED LIST WILL BE RELEASED AS SOON AS THIS INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE.

Q10: WILL THE CUBAN MIGRANTS BROUGHT TO PANAMA LATER HAVE A CHANCE TO GO TO THE UNITED STATES?

A10: REFER TO THE USG STATEMENTS.

Q11: WILL HAITIAN MIGRANTS ALSO BE BROUGHT TO PANAMA?

A11: THERE ARE NO PLANS FOR THIS.

Q12: WILL PANAMA BE A PLATFORM FOR AN INVASION OF HAITI OR CUBA?

A12: WE NEVER SPECULATE OR COMMENT ON FUTURE MILITARY OPERATIONS. WOULD REMIND YOU THAT HAITI AND CUBA ARE NOT IN THE SOUTHERN COMMAND'S GLOGRAPHI AREA OF OPERATIONS.

~~S E C R E T~~ NOFORN

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FINAL SECTION OF 02

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE -- OPERATION SAFE HAVEN (U)

Q13: WILL THE U.S. BE SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR SECURITY OF THE CUBAN MIGRANTS OR WILL SUCH RESPONSIBILITY BE SHARED WITH PANAMANIAN AUTHORITIES?

A13: THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WILL BE SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE GENERAL SECURITY, GOOD ORDER, AND DISCIPLINE OF THE CUBANS DURING ALL PHASES OF THIS HUMANITARIAN OPERATION.

Q14: WHO WILL HAVE CUSTODY OF CUBAN MIGRANTS INVOLVED IN THE COMMISSION O ANY CRIME(S) WHILE IN PANAMA?

A14: THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WILL TRANSFER TO PANAMANIAN CUSTODY ANY CUBAN SUSPECTED OF COMMITTING A CRIME AGAINST PANAMANIAN LAW FOR THE EXERCISE OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION.

Q15: DID THE U.S. PRESSURE PANAMA TO ACCEPT CUBAN MIGRANTS IN PANAMA?

A15: THE AGREEMENT WAS REACHED IN CONSULTATION BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS.

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Q16: WILL ANY BENEFITS COME TO PANAMA FROM THIS OPERATION?

A16: PANAMA HAS OFFERED ITS SUPPORT AS A HUMANITARIAN GESTURE. HOWEVER, THE CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE OF FACILITIES WHERE THE CUBAN MIGRANTS WILL BE SHELTERED WILL GENERATE JOBS AND BENEFITS TO PANAMA. ESTIMATES WILL BE RELEASED WHEN AVAILABLE.

Q17: WILL SHELTERING CUBANS ON A U.S. MILITARY BASE VIOLATE THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY?

A17: DEFINITELY NOT. THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY AND ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTS (PARTICULARLY ARTICLE 1 OF THE "AGREEMENT IN IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE IV OF THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY") CLEARLY PROVIDE THAT THE REPUBLIC OF PANAMA AGREES TO PERMIT THE UNITED STATES TO USE CERTAIN AREAS AND INSTALLATIONS WITHIN PANAMA "FOR THE SPECIFIC PURPOSES OF THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY, AND AS THE TWO GOVERNMENTS MAY OTHERWISE AGREE..." IN ADDITION, THE "AGREEMENT ON CERTAIN ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN THE REPUBLIC OF PANAMA" (WHICH ALSO ACCOMPANIES THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY) PROVIDES THAT THE UNITED STATES MAY ENGAGE IN ADDITIONAL SPECIFIED ACTIVITIES IN THE REPUBLIC OF PANAMA, INCLUDING "HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS, INCLUDING SEARCH AND RESCUE."

Q18: DOES PLACING THE CUBANS ON A FIRING RANGE JEOPARDIZE THEIR SAFETY?

A18: NO.

5. (U) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS:

A. NO RELEASE OF INFORMATION WILL BE MADE UNTIL AFTER THE PANAMANIAN GOVERNMENT MAKES PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF ITS AGREEMENT TO ACCEPT CUBAN MIGRANTS ON ITS TERRITORY. PANAMANIAN PRESIDENT-ELECT ERNESTO PEREZ BALLADARES ISSUED A PRESS COMMUNIQUE 23 AUGUST STATING HIS AGREEMENT TO CONSIDER ANY REQUEST TO RECEIVE CUBAN MIGRANTS IN PANAMA BASED ON CERTAIN CONDITIONS, I.E., THEIR STAY IN PANAMA NOT TO EXCEED SIX MONTHS; THEY MUST BE HOUSED ON U.S. MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN PANAMA IN ACCORDANCE WITH A COMMON AGREEMENT BETWEEN PANAMA AND THE UNITED STATES; AND THE COSTS OF THE OPERATION, AS WELL AS REPATRIATION OF ALL CUBAN MIGRANTS, MUST BE BORNE BY THE UNITED STATES. THE COMMUNIQUE WAS FORWARDED TO OATSD-PA.

B. ALL PUBLIC RELEASE OF INFORMATION ON THIS OPERATION TO THE PUBLIC WILL BE PROVIDED BY THE U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND PUBLIC AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE (SCPA) AND THE SCPA JOINT INFORMATION BUREAU (JIB).

C. SCPA WILL ESTABLISH A JIB AT CAMP ROUSSEAU (LOCATED BETWEEN HOWARD AIR FORCE BASE AND EMPIRE RANGE) ON 30 AUGUST FOR REGISTERING NEWS MEDIA AND SERVING AS THE FOCAL POINT FOR INFORMATION ON THE OPERATION. THE JIB WILL BE OPEN TO RECEIVE THE NEWS MEDIA BEGINNING 1 SEPTEMBER. SCPA WILL ISSUE A PRESS ADVISORY ANNOUNCING THE OPENING DATE, LOCATION, AND DETAILS OF THE JIB.

D. THE NEWS MEDIA WILL HAVE ACCESS TO THE ACTIVITIES THE U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND UNDERTAKES IN SUPPORT OF THE PANAMANIAN GOVERNMENT IN THIS HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATION. ALL NEWS MEDIA MUST REGISTER FOR APPROPRIATE CREDENTIALING AT THE JIB PRIOR TO VISITING ANY SAFE HAVEN FACILITIES.

E. FURTHER DETAILS ON THE SOUTHERN COMMAND'S SUPPORT WILL BE ANNOUNCED IN FOLLOW-ON NEWS RELEASES AND/OR ADDED TO THE LIST OF QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS.

6. SCPA POC'S ARE COL JAMES L. FETIG, DIRECTOR, SCPA; DSN 313-282-4226, COMM (507) 82-4226; FOR PLANNING: MSG MICHAEL HOWARD, PLANS NCO, DSN 313-282-3546; AND FOR MEDIA QUERIES: MR. WILLIAM H. ORMSBEE, MEDIA RELATIONS OFFICER, DSN 313-282-3206/4255, COMM (507) 82-3206/4255 OR (507) 28-4163.

DECLASSIFY UPON PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT FOLLOWING APPROVAL OF PAG BY OATSD(PA).

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14.0 MIGRATION AND REFUGEES

Mission: To provide for the repatriation of Haitian migrants now in US custody in a manner consistent with our commitments to the Refugee Convention and basic human rights; and to create a policy for dealing with future Haitian migrants.

14.0.1 Assumptions:

14.0.1.1 Restoration of Democracy will end the "crisis" of the boat people

Once the coalition forces have restored stability and Aristide is returned, the immediate crisis of the boat people will be over. Most of the Haitians in Guantanamo will return home and the conditions that contribute to the present rate of boat departures will improve enough to cause the outflow to stay low.

14.0.1.2. Boat departures are not likely to cease entirely.

Nonetheless, some boat departures will continue. Some boat people may continue to claim political asylum, arguing that persecution by local authorities continues despite the change of government in Port-au-Prince. A new brand of asylum-seekers may appear -- Aristide's political opponents fearing retribution. And in the absence of a deterrent, economic migrants are likely to take to the boats in an attempt to reach Florida even if the Haitian economy begins to improve.

14.0.1.3 Our transition and our post-Cedras migration strategy must into account the following requirements:

-- detering economic migration: we will continue to implement measures that discourage boat departures by those leaving Haiti for economic reasons;

-- promoting humanitarian principles and avoiding a loss of UN, international, U.S.-NGO support that our migration policy has thus far received: we will consult with the UNHCR on the timing and method of return of those in safe haven; we will emphasize voluntary return and implement coercive measures when voluntary measures are not adequate and conditions in Haiti permit. In implementing coercive measures for return of those in safe haven and return of post-Cedras boat people, we will maintain internationally recognized procedural safeguards.

-- maintaining a long-range perspective: our migration policy will take account of the fact that instability in Haiti or elsewhere in the Caribbean may reemerge and that effective measures we have established to deal with the migration implications of such instability should not be discarded.

14.1 Migration During Military Operations

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14.1.1 Contingency Planning for a Boat Migration Spike During Military

Operations: During military operations to oust the Haitian military leaders and restore President Aristide to office, some Haitians may flee the initial uncertainty by taking to boats.

Any spike that may occur during the initial military operation should be handled in the same manner we are handling current outflows; we will continue to interdict Haitians and place them in the existing safehaven sites until the end of hostilities permits their repatriation.

*While the CIA
voiced an
opposing
opinion
re Releant
this conce
makes more
sense. Both
J-3 and J-5
at USACom
have concurred*

Coast Guard, with Navy back up, will ensure adequate coverage in the Windward Passage. State and DOD will ensure adequate safe haven capacity.

14.1.2. Movements into the Dominican Republic during military operations

There may be flight into the Dominican Republic, not only by those associated with the Cedras regime, but also by Haitians who seek to flee conflict. State should demarche the GODR to urge that GODR border authorities deal humanely with those who seek to flee into their country.

14.2. Facilitating Voluntary Return to Haiti: Operational requirements and the security situation in Haiti will not permit us to consider large-scale returns until several weeks after the intervention. When, however, the security situation is sufficiently stable and operational requirements permit, we will seek to begin large-scale repatriations.

*in coordina
with CSTF-160*

Once the initial military operation has secured key sites and is assisting in providing essential civic order, announcements will be made in existing safe haven sites that military authorities in Haiti are no longer in power.

State will develop a plan that can be implemented on five days notice to facilitate voluntary return. The plan will seek to make available to Haitians in safe haven information about the situation in Haiti and provide Haitians in safe haven the opportunity to meet with representatives of the legitimate Government who would encourage return. The plan will ensure reception capacity in Haiti, transport of migrants to their homes and necessary assistance upon return and will identify agencies to perform such tasks. The plan will begin by providing information about conditions in Haiti and, when conditions permit, move toward actively encouraging return. The plan will envision UNHCR involvement but will not be dependent upon such involvement to begin. The plan should be finalized no later than Friday, September 16.

Coast Guard and Navy will provide necessary transportation for repatriation operations, ~~re~~

coordinate with USACOM and

14.2.1 A Symbolic Early Return of Haitian Migrants

Although operational and security requirements may preclude large-scale return in the short-term, we will seek to effect the return of up to several hundred migrants in the first week to ten days after the intervention as a demonstration of the transition that has taken place.

State will develop a plan to obtain such volunteers, ensuring that they are aware of any risks of early return and that such returnees are provided with adequate reception and assistance.

CJTF 170,
Coast Guard and Navy will coordinate logistics for such return. ^{AND TIMING}

14.3 Involuntary Return Of The Pre-Intervention Safe Haven Population: For several reasons, we should exhaust active efforts at voluntary return before considering coercion. First, CRS and other specialists believe that most will eagerly return home to Haiti. Second, if we need ultimately to implement involuntary return, it will be easier to effect with a migrant population significantly reduced as a result of voluntary returns. Third, involuntary return will generate some controversy and is best avoided if possible. Finally, involuntary return will raise the difficult question of how to assess claims of those who express continued fears of persecution upon return to Haiti. If we forcibly return without any assessment, the UN -- whose participation in the overall Haiti endgame is critical -- is likely to criticize publicly our action.

In the aftermath of the intervention, State will publicly indicate that we are facilitating and emphasizing voluntary return but are not foreclosing involuntary return of migrants should that become necessary. State will also inform the interagency when it determines that conditions in Haiti are safe enough to permit involuntary return and we will, at that point, assess progress in the voluntary return program.

in coordination with the military command

If progress is deemed inadequate and involuntary return is necessary, State, in coordination with INS, will develop a plan to effect involuntary return. We will ensure basic fairness before effecting such returns. Without necessarily applying a full refugee determination, State will develop a means to assess possible claims of those who resist such involuntary return and will consult with UNHCR on the development of this system. (See 14.4.1.2; below.)

14.4 In-Country Processing: Once the intervention occurs, we will suspend the in-country processing program. We will, however, have continued Presidential authority to operate the in-country program and will maintain the option of reinstating a limited program should future conditions in Haiti so mandate.

State will make every effort to stay current on pending applications so as to minimize the numbers of such cases that exist at the time of an intervention.

When we suspend processing of pending applications, we will make a public announcement to that effect. State will prepare, by September 16, such an announcement. At their discretion, State and INS may complete processing of pending compelling humanitarian cases and may also initiate processing of such cases on an exceptional, case-by-case basis.

At the time of the intervention, there will likely be several hundred or more approved refugees in Haiti who have been granted admission but have not yet completed medical and other processing. Many of these individuals may have sold personal items, quit their jobs or have taken other actions in reliance of U.S. admission. In view of these facts, as well as general concerns that we are generally less-than-generous toward Haitians, we will permit admission of such approved refugees.

State will ensure that the Haitian Government understands the reasoning behind our decision to move approved refugees and does not infer that it represents a lack of confidence in the new leadership.

14.4 Policy On Post-Cedras Migration

14.4.1 The Short-Term: What To Do With Interdicted Haitians In The Immediate Post-Invasion Period?

14.4.1.1 How Long To Maintain Safe Haven for new arrivals? As indicated in 14.3, above, when the environment in Haiti is deemed to be sufficiently safe and stable we will be justified in forcibly returning non-refugee Haitians provided we observe basic principles of fairness and provided we have first provided them the chance to return voluntarily.

14.4.1.2 Returning interdicted Haitians against their will. If outflows continue -- even at a greatly diminished level -- and/or some of those in safe haven resist return even after Haiti is declared safe -- we will be justified in implementing forced return. We will do so in a manner that provides basic procedural safeguards but that ends the extraordinary treatment we have accorded Haitians seeking asylum.

Assuming a successful transition in Haiti (and a Haiti declared safe for returnees), we will deal with interdicted migrants from Haiti in the manner that we have dealt with other interdicted populations that do not appear to have a significant number of bonafide refugees, such as Chinese who are transported by alien smugglers.

We will transport interdicted Haitians to Guantanamo or other safe haven locations, inform them that U.S. resettlement is not a possibility, and indicate that economic migrants will be returned to Haiti. As is the case with smuggled Chinese aliens, we will obtain basic information from each of the migrants to determine whether any express what appear to be genuine fears of return. If, in such cases, such fears appear to justify deferring return, we will maintain such a person in a safe haven location pending a durable (i.e., permanent) solution for them. Such a solution could include addressing the circumstance in Haiti that is the object of the fear of return (thus permitting return), or use by the Haitian of one of the small number of resettlement slots that have been offered to us by countries such as Canada, the Netherlands and Australia. (If outflows remain very small over time, we could consider the U.S. as a durable solution for some -- as we do with Chinese -- but not until we are convinced that this would not have a magnet effect on departures.)

(The interviewing process described above can also take place aboard cutters, as is the case with Chinese migrants. However, an on-land process is much more convenient and publicly defensible.)

Compared to current procedures, this process is not likely to impose significant logistical requirements but will maintain international support for our migration policy. With an improvement in conditions in Haiti, there is good reason to believe boat departures may end almost completely and that those who do leave by boat will, after intensive counseling, decide to return home.

State, in coordination with DOD, will prepare a plan for the status of safe havens in the months after an intervention. State, in coordination with INS, will develop an appropriate assessment process.

14.4.1.3 Interdiction Of Excludables: State, in conjunction with INS, will develop a plan for return of interdicted Haitians who would not be entitled to protection under the Refugee Convention and Protocol (assuming those instruments applied outside the territory of the United States). This plan will be available no later than September 16.

14.4.2 The Longer Term: Seeking Permanent Commitments To Safe Haven: Over the long term, our policy toward migration from Haiti will have to be flexible, adapting to circumstances within the country. The more peaceful and democratic the country becomes, the less likely we are to see large outflows. Moreover, we can deal with such outflows in a relatively summary manner, as the presumption in a democratic Haiti will be that those leaving do not fear persecution and can be returned.

On the other hand, a less democratic Haiti -- or a democratic Haiti with a relatively chaotic political process -- may in the future produce large numbers of genuine

refugees or other asylum-seekers who, while not fearing individual persecution, are fleeing conditions of conflict. Under these circumstances or if migration from Cuba or elsewhere resumed in large numbers, we will want to have safe haven options that can be quickly "stood up."

For this reason, we should not discard the safe haven possibilities we have begun to develop but rather undertake negotiations to ascertain whether we can enter longer term safe haven commitments with governments such as Suriname and Belize, and possibly Dominica or St. Lucia. Our goal should be to maintain a capacity to hold between 10,000 and 20,000 on short notice should conditions so require.

State should begin informal discussions with governments in the region to determine their willingness to enter such arrangements, many of which would remain on "stand-by" status.

~~State should develop a plan to take over operations and maintenance of safe havens on a permanent basis.~~

Based on these discussions, STATE should develop a plan to take over operations and maintenance of safe havens on a permanent basis.

~~SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-2000



POLICY

MEMORANDUM FOR ERIC SCHWARTZ

FROM: DIRECTOR, OSD HAITI TASK FORCE
 Prepared by Cecil Bailey (b)(7)c

SUBJECT: Future Migration and Refugee Policy (S)

(S) Concur in general with the subject draft. There clearly will be difficulties in managing the migrant population downward once Haiti stabilizes. However, repatriation from safehaven should be the declared intent of our migrant policy and should begin implementation soon after we can reasonably define a stable environment in Haiti. We anticipate that repatriation from safehaven should certainly begin upon shifting from the MNF to the UNMIH mission.

- Since we have concluded that most of the migrants now in safehaven are economically, and not politically driven, we should not delay in developing and having ready for execution plans for involuntary repatriation from the safehavens.
- All of our agreements for third country safehaven are temporary and we have no intention of operating Guantanamo as a long term safehaven. We understand that the change to the current policy denying refugee processing to boat people intended only to provide safehaven until the crisis in Haiti is resolved and stability restored.
- Reaffirmation of this intent might also encourage early voluntary repatriation.

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LINE2: ZNY CCCCC
LINE3: P 080135Z NOV 94
LINE4: FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
OSRI: RUEKJCS
DTG: 080135Z NOV 94
ORIG: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
TO: ////
INFO: RUERAAA/CJCS NMCC SITE R FT RITCHIE MD
RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE
P 080115Z NOV 94
FM USCINCSO SCJ3 QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
TO RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3/J4/SURG/J5/MRD//
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/NMCC WASHINGTON DC
RUERFCP/CDRJTF-PM FT CLAYTON PM//J3/J4/J6//
RUERPMM/CDRUSARSO FT CLAYTON PM
RUVDBC/USSOUTHAF DAVIS MONTHAN AFB AZ//DO/A3//
RUCBCLF/CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA//N3//
RULYSHH/COMMARFORLANT NORFOLK VA//G3//
RHLBAE/COMSOUTH QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//J3//
RUEAHD/COMJTF-B SOTO CANO AB HO//J3//
RUWMJAC/CINCLANTFLT DET SO RODMAN PM//N3//
RUWMEGA/USSOUTHAF FWD HOWARD AFB PM
RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//J3/J4//
RHCUAAA/USCINCTrans SCOTT AFB IL//TCJ3-TCJ4//
RUCJAAA/USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL//J3//
RUEHPO/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO//USDAO//
RUEHZA/AMEMBASSY PANAMA CITY
SUBJ: SITREP NO. 71 FROM 070001Z NOV 94 TO 072359Z NOV 94 FOR
OPERATIONS SAFE HAVEN AND DISTANT HAVEN//
REF/A/ORDER/CINC USSOUTHCOM/230405Z AUG 94/-/NOTAL//
AMPN/OPORD FOR OPERATION DISTANT HAVEN//
REF/B/ORDER/CINC USSOUTHCOM/271908Z AUG 94/-/NOTAL//
TEXT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0835-M
05/26/16 KDE

PAGE 03 RHLBAAR1559 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
QQQQ
SUBJ: SITREP NO. 71 FROM 070001Z NOV 94 TO 072359Z NOV 94 FOR
OPERATIONS SAFE HAVEN AND DISTANT HAVEN//
REF/A/ORDER/CINC USSOUTHCOM/230405Z AUG 94/-/NOTAL//
AMPN/OPORD FOR OPERATION DISTANT HAVEN//
REF/B/ORDER/CINC USSOUTHCOM/271908Z AUG 94/-/NOTAL//
AMPN/OPORD FOR OPERATION SAFE HAVEN//
REF/C/MESSAGE SCJ3 USSOUTHCOM/060210Z SEP 94/-/NOTAL//

AMPN/OUTLINE GOP TRANSFER RESTRICTIONS SAFE HAVEN//
 REF/D/OPREP-3/USCINCSO/071955Z NOV 94/-/NOTAL//
 AMPN/OPREP-3 REPORT OF ESCAPE OF TWO MIGRANTS//
 PART I, SITREP FOR OPERATION SAFE HAVEN (PANAMA).

1. (U) GENTEXT/OPERATIONS/SAFE HAVEN. NO MIGRANT FLIGHTS ARRIVED TODAY. NEXT SCHEDULED MIGRANT FLIGHT IS 09 NOV.
 2. ~~(S)~~ GENTEXT/PERSONNEL/SAFE HAVEN. REPORT AS OF 071500Z NOV 94:
 A. BLUE FORCES/STARTSTR/GAINS/RTD/LOSSES/CAS/ENDSTR/CMNT

ARFOR	509/	2/	0/	3/	0/	508/
AFFOR	666/	0/	0/	1/	0/	665/
NAVFOR	50/	0/	0/	0/	0/	50/
MARFOR	4/	0/	0/	0/	0/	4/

PAGE 04 RHLBAAR1559 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

B. CIVILIAN /STARTSTR/GAINS/RTD/LOSSES/CAS/ENDSTR/CMNT

DOD	5/	0/	0/	0/	0/	5/
DOS	1/	0/	0/	0/	0/	1/
INS	1/	0/	0/	0/	0/	1/
IRC	12/	0/	0/	0/	0/	12/
DOJ	12/	0/	0/	0/	0/	12/
UNHCR	1/	0/	0/	0/	0/	1/

CPO 238/ 0/ 0/ 0/ 0/ 238/
 CRS 11/ 0/ 0/ 0/ 0/ 11/

C. MIGRANT FLOW (CUBANS). REPORT AS OF 072200Z NOV 94;
 START/GAINS/PAROLE/REPATRIATED/DEATH/MISSING/ENDSTR/ENROUTE/OTHER
 8673/ 0/ 0/ 0/ 0/ 0/ 8673/ 0/ 0/

3. ~~(S)~~ GENTEXT/CDRS ASSESSMENT/SAFE HAVEN. AS REPORTED REF D, TWO MALE MIGRANTS ESCAPED FROM SAFE HAVEN CAMP AT 071430Z THE TWO MIGRANTS WERE RECAPTURED AT 072207Z. BASED ON 072100Z CAMP RECONCILIATION, ALL MIGRANTS HAVE BEEN ACCOUNTED FOR.
 PART II, SITREP FOR OPERATION DISTANT HAVEN (SURINAME).
 1. (U) GENTEXT/OPERATIONS/DISTANT HAVEN. THE CAMP IS IN CARETAKER STATUS.

PAGE 05 RHLBAAR1559 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2. ~~(S)~~ GENTEXT/PERSONNEL/DISTANT HAVEN. AS OF 071500Z NOV 94
 BLUE FORCES /STARTSTR/GAINS/RTD/LOSSES/CAS/ENDSTR/CMNT

AFFOR	0/	0/	0/	0/	0/	0/
NAVFOR	1/	0/	0/	0/	0/	1/
MARFOR	0/	0/	0/	0/	0/	0/

CIVILIAN /STARTSTR/GAINS/RTD/LOSSES/CAS/ENDSTR/CMNT

DOD	0/	0/	0/	0/	0/	0/
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3. (U) USSOUTHCOM POC IS THE JOC WATCH OFFICER, DSN 313-282-9645, COM: 507-82-9645.//

DECL/OADR//
 BT
 #8712

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 8712

TOR: 941107203854 M1348924

DIST:

SIT: VAX NSC

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Cable

PREC: PRIORITY
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 LINE1: PTTCZYUW RUEKJCS7250 3420652-CCCC--RHEHAAA.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC
 LINE3: P 080652Z DEC 94
 LINE4: FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
 OSRI: RUEKJCS
 DTG: 080652Z DEC 94
 ORIG: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
 TO: ////
 INFO: RUERAAA/CJCS NMCC SITE R FT RITCHIE MD
 RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE
 P 080625Z DEC 94
 FM USCINCSO SCJ3 QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
 TO RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3/J4/SURG/J5/MRD//
 INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
 RUEKJCS/NMCC WASHINGTON DC
 RUERFCP/CDRJTF-PM FT CLAYTON PM//J3/J4/J6//
 RUERPMN/CDRUSARSO FT CLAYTON PM
 RUVMDBC/USSOUTHAF DAVIS MONTHAN AFB AZ//DO/A3//
 RUCBLF/CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA//N3//
 RUCBLFA/COMMARFORLANT//G3//
 RHLBAAE/COMSOUTH QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//J3//
 RUEAHND/COMJTF-B SOTO CANO HO//J3//
 RUWMJAC/CINCLANTFLT DET SO RODMAN PM//N3//
 RUWMEGA/USSOUTHAF FWD HOWARD AFB PM
 RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//J3/J4//
 RHCUAAA/USCINTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//TCJ3-TCJ4//
 RUCJAAA/USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL//J3//
 RUEHPO/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO//USDAO//
 RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA CITY
 SUBJ: SITREP NO. 101 FROM 070001Z DEC 94 TO 072359Z DEC 94 FOR
 OPERATIONS SAFE HAVEN AND DISTANT HAVEN//
 REF/A/ORDER/CINC USSOUTHCOM/230405Z AUG 94/-/NOTAL//
 AMPN/OPORD FOR OPERATION DISTANT HAVEN//
 REF/B/ORDER/CINC USSOUTHCOM/271908Z AUG 94/-/NOTAL//
 TEXT: ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526
 2614-0835-M
 05126116 KDE

PAGE 03 RHLBAAR2618 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
 QQQQ

SUBJ: SITREP NO. 101 FROM 070001Z DEC 94 TO 072359Z DEC 94 FOR
 OPERATIONS SAFE HAVEN AND DISTANT HAVEN//
 REF/A/ORDER/CINC USSOUTHCOM/230405Z AUG 94/-/NOTAL//
 AMPN/OPORD FOR OPERATION DISTANT HAVEN//
 REF/B/ORDER/CINC USSOUTHCOM/271908Z AUG 94/-/NOTAL//
 AMPN/OPORD FOR OPERATION SAFE HAVEN//
 REF/C/RMG/USSOUTHCOM SCJ3/060210Z SEP 94/-/NOTAL//

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

AMPN/OUTLINE GOP TRANSFER RESTRICTIONS SAFE HAVEN//
 REF/D/OPREP-3P/USCINCSO SCJ3/080405Z DEC 94/-/NOTAL//
 AMPN/OPREP-3P REPORT CONCERNING MIGRANT CAMP DISTURBANCES//
 PART I, SITREP FOR OPERATION SAFE HAVEN (PANAMA).

1. ~~(S)~~ GENTEXT/OPERATIONS/SAFE HAVEN. AS REPORTED REF D,
 THERE WERE SEVERAL SIGNIFICANT DISTURBANCES IN MIGRANT
 CAMPS 1, 2, AND 3 ON 07 DEC. ALL DISTURBANCES HAVE CEASED,
 ALL MIGRANTS HAVE RETURNED TO THE CAMPS, AND THE SITUATION IS
 CALM. RESERVE SECURITY FORCES REMAIN ON SITE AS AMAGE IS
 ASSESSED AND SECURITY SITUATION IS EVALUATED.

2. ~~(S)~~ GENTEXT/PERSONNEL/SAFE HAVEN. AS OF 071700Z DEC 94:
 A. BLUE FORCES/STARTSTR/GAINS/RTD/LOSSES/CAS/ENDSTR/CMNT

PAGE 04 RHLBAAR2618 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

ARFOR	495/	0/	0/	0/	0/	495/
AFFOR	615/	0/	0/	0/	0/	615/
NAVFOR	44/	0/	0/	0/	0/	44/
MARFOR	5/	0/	0/	0/	0/	5/

B. CIVILIAN /STARTSTR/GAINS/RTD/LOSSES/CAS/ENDSTR/CMNT

DOD	4/	0/	0/	0/	0/	4/
DOS	0/	0/	0/	0/	0/	0/
INS	4/	0/	0/	0/	0/	4/
IRC	64/	0/	0/	0/	0/	64/
DOJ	16/	0/	0/	0/	0/	16/
UNHCR	1/	0/	0/	0/	0/	1/
CPO	365/	0/	0/	0/	0/	365/
CRS	12/	0/	0/	0/	0/	12/

C. MIGRANT FLOW (CUBANS). REPORT AS OF 071700Z DEC 94:

START/GAINS/PAROLE/REPATRIATED/DEATH/MISSING/ENDSTR/ENROUTE/OTHER									
8649/	0/	0/	0/	0/	0/	0/	8649/	0/	0/

D. PAROLEE STATUS AS OF 071700Z DEC 94:

CATEGORY	/ TOTAL	/ AWAITING	/ TOTAL TO/
	/ CANDIDATES	/ TRAVEL	/ CONUS /
MEDICAL PAROLEES	/ 11	/ 0	/ 8 /

PAGE 05 RHLBAAR2618 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

CARE GIVERS FOR ABOVE	/ 13	/ 0	/ 8 /
70 AND OVER	/ 1	/ 0	/ 6 /
CARE GIVERS FOR ABOVE	/ 0	/ 0	/ 17 /
MEDEVAC	/ 0	/ 0	/ 5 /
CARE GIVERS	/ 0	/ 0	/ 3 /
UNACCOMPANIED LESS THAN 17	/ 92	/ 38	/ 0 /
APPROVED VISAS	/ 0	/ 0	/ 3 /
TOTAL PAROLEES	/ 117	/ 38	/ 50 /

3. (U) GENTEXT/CDRS ASSESSMENT/SAFE HAVEN.

A. (U) SPAIN SELECTED 69 INDIVIDUALS FOR RESETTLEMENT (21 FROM
 GTMO AND 48 FROM JTF-SH). SPAIN INDICATED THAT THEY WILL CONSIDER
 A SECOND ROUND OF CUBANS AT A FUTURE DATE. APPROXIMATELY 59 PAROLED
 CUBANS (UNACCOMPANIED MINORS AND MEDICAL CASES) WILL ALSO TRAVEL TO
 THE U.S.

PART II, SITREP FOR OPERATION DISTANT HAVEN (SURINAME)

1. (U) GENTEXT/OPERATIONS/DISTANT HAVEN. NSTR.

2. ~~(S)~~ GENTEXT/PERSONNEL/DISTANT HAVEN. AS OF 071700Z DEC 94:
 BLUE FORCES /STARTSTR/GAINS/RTD/LOSSES/CAS/ENDSTR/CMNT

ARFOR	22/	0/	0/	0/	0/	22
AFFOR	1/	0/	0/	0/	0/	1/

PAGE 06 RHLBAAR2618 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

NAVFOR 0/ 0/ 0/ 0/ 0/ 0/

MARFOR 0/ 0/ 0/ 0/ 0/ 0/

CIVILIAN /STARTSTR/GAINS/RTD/LOSSES/CAS/ENDSTR/CMNT

DOD 0/ 0/ 0/ 0/ 0/ 0/

3. (U) USSOUTHCOM POC IS THE JOC WATCH OFFICER, DSN 313-282-9645,

COM: 507-82-9645.//

DECL/OADR//

BT

#7250

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 7250

TOR: 941208015447 M1403454

DIST:

SIT: NSC

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Cable

PREC: PRIORITY
 CLASS: ~~SECRET~~
 LINE1: PATSZYUW RHLBAAQ3524 0010227-SSSS--RHEHWSR.
 LINE2: ZNY SSSSS
 LINE3: P 312021Z DEC 94
 LINE4: FM USCINCSO SCJ2 QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//SCJ2//
 OSRI: RHLBAAQ
 DTG: 312021Z DEC 94
 ORIG: USCINCSO SCJ2 QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//SCJ2//
 TO: RUEKJCS/NMIC WASHINGTON DC
 INFO: RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC//DJS//
 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J2/J3/J5//
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP-IA//
 RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DR/J2M/CH-5/PAN-3D/PGT//
 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//ALA//
 RHEHWSR/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC//WASH DC//
 RUETIAA/NSACSS FT GEORGE G MEADE MD//B3//
 RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE WASHINGTON DC//ARA-WATSON/PATTERSON//
 RUEAHQA/HQ USAF WASHINGTON DC//IN//
 RUEADWD/DA WASHINGTON DC//DAMI-ZA//
 RULSHBA/ONI SUITLAND MD
 RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC//DIRINT//
 RUVDBC/USSOUTHAF DAVIS MONTHAN AFB AZ//DONI//
 RUCBLFA/COMMARFORLANT//G2/
 RUERFCP/CDRJTF-PM FT CLAYTON PM
 RHLBAAK/CDRUSARSO MAXI FT CLAYTON PM//DSCINT//
 RHLBAAK/COMJTF-PM MAXI FT CLAYTON PM//J2//
 SUBJ: INCREASING THREAT OF SUICIDE BY CUBAN MIGRANTS IN PANAMA

DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526
 2014-0835-M
 05/26/16 KDE

TEXT: ~~SECRET~~ NOFORN
 QQQQ

SUBJECT: INCREASING THREAT OF SUICIDE BY CUBAN MIGRANTS IN PANAMA

- A. 291727Z DEC 94, SUBJECT PANAMA: ACTING PAPAL NUNCIO VISIT TO CUBAN SAFE HAVEN CAMPS. ~~(S)~~
1. ~~(S)~~ PURPOSE. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO CALL ATTENTION TO WHAT APPEARS TO BE AN INCREASING TREND TOWARD SUICIDE ATTEMPTS BY CUBAN MIGRANTS AT THE JTF SAFE HAVEN CAMP SITES IN PANAMA.
 2. ~~(S/NF)~~ BACKGROUND. A. ~~(S/NF)~~ THIS MESSAGE IS PROMPTED IN PART

BY THE VISIT OF PAPAL NUNCIO (AD INTERIM) PASCAL N' KOUE TO JTF SAFE HAVEN ON 28 DECEMBER (REF A). DURING THE VISIT, CUBAN MIGRANTS EXPRESSED THE INTENT TO COMMIT SUICIDE WHEN CONFRONTED WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF RETURNING TO GTMO.
 B. ~~(S)~~ WHILE THE SCALE OF FUTURE SUICIDE ATTEMPTS IS UNKNOWN, WE

EXPECT THAT THE INCIDENCE OF INDIVIDUAL SUICIDE ATTEMPTS WILL BE SUBSTANTIAL AS THE RETURN DATE APPROACHES. SINCE SEPTEMBER, THERE HAVE BEEN 39 SUICIDE ATTEMPTS AT THE OPERATION SAFE HAVEN CAMP SITES; 20 OF THESE HAVE OCCURRED SINCE 1 DECEMBER. AS A SPECIFIC EXAMPLE OF THIS UPWARD TREND, ONE OF THE FOUR CAMPS REPORTED SIX SUICIDE ATTEMPTS IN THE LAST 15 DAYS WITH FOUR OF THE SIX ATTEMPTS OCCURRING ON 29 DECEMBER ALONE. TO UNDERSCORE THEIR DESPERATION, TWO OF THE FOUR 29 DECEMBER ATTEMPTS INVOLVED MIGRANTS DRIVING FOUR TO FIVE INCH LENGTHS OF CYCLONE FENCE RETAINER INTO THEIR ABDOMENS, AND A THIRD SWALLOWED THE RETAINER. WHILE THE ASSESSMENT OF A SUICIDE ATTEMPT VERSUS A GESTURE IS SUBJECTIVE, CLEARLY, THE TREND IN BOTH NUMBERS AND SEVERITY IS INCREASING.

3. ~~(S/NF)~~ ASSESSMENT. AS LONG AS THE MIGRANTS' FATE REMAINS UNCERTAIN, FRUSTRATION WILL PERSIST, MOOD SWINGS WILL ACCOMPANY EVEN SMALL EVENTS AND RUMORS, AND WE ASSESS THAT THE CURRENT TREND OF

INCREASED MIGRANT SUICIDE ATTEMPTS WILL ALSO CONTINUE. PAROLE TO THE U.S. WOULD REVERSE THIS TREND, BUT OTHER POSSIBLE OUTCOMES, SUCH AS A RETURN OF CUBAN MIGRANTS TO GTMO WILL LIKELY INCREASE THIS SELF DESTRUCTIVE BEHAVIOR. IT IS PROBABLE THAT SOME OF THE REPORTED SUICIDE ATTEMPTS WERE NOT LEGITIMATE, BUT RATHER GESTURES AIMED AT FOCUSING ATTENTION ON THE CUBANS' PLIGHT. NONETHELESS, WE BELIEVE THAT THE TREND IN SUICIDE ATTEMPTS WILL INCREASE WHEN THE MIGRANTS ARE CONFRONTED WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF A RETURN TO GTMO. IN THAT SITUATION, THEIR COLLECTIVE SENSE WILL RANGE FROM DESPAIR TO RAGE AND PROMPT A WIDE VARIETY OF POTENTIAL REACTIONS, FROM VIOLENCE TO ATTEMPTED ESCAPE, TO VARIOUS FORMS OF RESISTANCE, TO SUICIDE. THE PAPAL NUNCIO VISIT HIGHLIGHTED THE NEED FOR CONCERN ABOUT THE POTENTIAL FOR MULTIPLE MIGRANT SUICIDES IF THEY ARE FACED WITH A RETURN TO GTMO. THIS MESSAGE ECHOES THAT CONCERN. THE POSSIBILITY OF A RETURN TO GTMO REPRESENTS AN IN EXTREMIS SITUATION FOR THE MIGRANTS, AND WE MUST ALL BE ALERT TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A SIGNIFICANT SUICIDE THREAT AND TO TAKING TIMELY, FORCEFUL ACTION TO PRECLUDE SUCH ACTIONS.

4. (U) POC FOR THIS MESSAGE IS SCJ2, BG J.W. SMITH, DSN

313-282-6980/1.

DECLASS OADR
BT
#3524

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 3524

TOR: 941231213625 M1441358

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

DIST:

SIT: BEERS BROWN CLARKER FEINBERG HALPERIN MALLEY NSC RICE ROCHA
SCHWARTZ SIMON
□

Cable

PREC: PRIORITY
 CLASS: ~~SECRET~~
 LINE1: PATSZFDY RHLBAAQ0546 0181604-SSSS--RHEHWSR.
 LINE2: ZNY SSSSS
 LINE3: P 312021Z DEC 94
 LINE4: FM USCINCSO SCJ2 QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//SCJ2//
 OSRI: RHLBAAQ
 DTG: 312021Z DEC 94
 ORIG: USCINCSO SCJ2 QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//SCJ2//
 TO: RUEKJCS/NMIC WASHINGTON DC
 INFO: RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC//DJS//
 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J2/J3/J5//
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP-IA//
 RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DR/J2M/CH-5/PAN-3D/PGT//
 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//ALA//
 RHEHWSR/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM//WASH DC//
 RUERJFA/NSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD//B3//
 RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE WASHINGTON DC//ARA-WATSON/PATTERSON//
 RUEAHQA/HQ USAF WASHINGTON DC//IN//
 RUEADWD/DA WASHINGTON DC//DAMI-ZA//
 RUDMONI/ONI WASHINGTON DC//
 RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC//DIRINT//
 RUVMDBC/USSOUTHAF DAVIS MONTHAN AFB AZ//DONI//
 RUCBLFA/COMMARFORLANT//G2/
 RUERFCP/CDRJTF-PM FT CLAYTON PM
 RHLBAAK/CDRUSARSO MAXI FT CLAYTON PM//DSCINT//
 RHLBAAK/COMJTF-PM MAXI FT CLAYTON PM//J2//

DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526
 2014-0835-M
 05126116 KOE

SUBJ: INCREASING THREAT OF SUICIDE BY CUBAN MIGRANTS IN PANAMA

~~(S)~~

TEXT:

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN
 QQQQ

SUBJECT: INCREASING THREAT OF SUICIDE BY CUBAN MIGRANTS IN PANAMA

~~(S)~~

A. 291727Z DEC 94, SUBJECT PANAMA: ACTING PAPAL NUNCIO VISIT TO CUBAN SAFE HAVEN CAMPS. ~~(S)~~

1. ~~(S)~~ PURPOSE. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO CALL ATTENTION TO WHAT APPEARS TO BE AN INCREASING TREND TOWARD SUICIDE ATTEMPTS BY

CUBAN MIGRANTS AT THE JTF SAFE HAVEN CAMP SITES IN PANAMA.

2. ~~(S/NF)~~ BACKGROUND. A. ~~(S/NF)~~ THIS MESSAGE IS PROMPTED IN PART BY THE VISIT OF PAPAL NUNCIO (AD INTERIM) PASCAL N' KOUE TO JTF SAFE HAVEN ON 28 DECEMBER (REF A). DURING THE VISIT, CUBAN MIGRANTS EXPRESSED THE INTENT TO COMMIT SUICIDE WHEN CONFRONTED WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF RETURNING TO GTMO.

B. ~~(S)~~ WHILE THE SCALE OF FUTURE SUICIDE ATTEMPTS IS UNKNOWN, WE

EXPECT THAT THE INCIDENCE OF INDIVIDUAL SUICIDE ATTEMPTS WILL BE SUBSTANTIAL AS THE RETURN DATE APPROACHES. SINCE SEPTEMBER, THERE HAVE BEEN 39 SUICIDE ATTEMPTS AT THE OPERATION SAFE HAVEN CAMP SITES; 20 OF THESE HAVE OCCURRED SINCE 1 DECEMBER. AS A SPECIFIC EXAMPLE OF THIS UPWARD TREND, ONE OF THE FOUR CAMPS REPORTED SIX SUICIDE ATTEMPTS IN THE LAST 15 DAYS WITH FOUR OF THE SIX ATTEMPTS OCCURRING ON 29 DECEMBER ALONE. TO UNDERSCORE THEIR DESPERATION, TWO OF THE FOUR 29 DECEMBER ATTEMPTS INVOLVED MIGRANTS DRIVING FOUR TO FIVE INCH LENGTHS OF CYCLONE FENCE RETAINER INTO THEIR ABDOMENS, AND A THIRD SWALLOWED THE RETAINER. WHILE THE ASSESSMENT OF A SUICIDE ATTEMPT VERSUS A GESTURE IS SUBJECTIVE, CLEARLY, THE TREND IN BOTH NUMBERS AND SEVERITY IS INCREASING.

3. ~~(S/NF)~~ ASSESSMENT. AS LONG AS THE MIGRANTS' FATE REMAINS

UNCERTAIN, FRUSTRATION WILL PERSIST, MOOD SWINGS WILL ACCOMPANY EVEN SMALL EVENTS AND RUMORS, AND WE ASSESS THAT THE CURRENT TREND OF INCREASED MIGRANT SUICIDE ATTEMPTS WILL ALSO CONTINUE. PAROLE TO THE U.S. WOULD REVERSE THIS TREND, BUT OTHER POSSIBLE OUTCOMES, SUCH AS A RETURN OF CUBAN MIGRANTS TO GTMO WILL LIKELY INCREASE THIS SELF DESTRUCTIVE BEHAVIOR. IT IS PROBABLE THAT SOME OF THE REPORTED SUICIDE ATTEMPTS WERE NOT LEGITIMATE, BUT RATHER GESTURES AIMED AT FOCUSING ATTENTION ON THE CUBANS' PLIGHT. NONETHELESS, WE BELIEVE THAT THE TREND IN SUICIDE ATTEMPTS WILL INCREASE WHEN THE MIGRANTS ARE CONFRONTED WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF A RETURN TO GTMO. IN THAT SITUATION, THEIR COLLECTIVE SENSE WILL RANGE FROM DESPAIR TO RAGE AND PROMPT A WIDE VARIETY OF POTENTIAL REACTIONS, FROM VIOLENCE TO ATTEMPTED ESCAPE, TO VARIOUS FORMS OF RESISTANCE, TO SUICIDE. THE PAPAL NUNCIO VISIT HIGHLIGHTED THE NEED FOR CONCERN ABOUT THE POTENTIAL FOR MULTIPLE MIGRANT SUICIDES IF THEY ARE FACED WITH A RETURN TO GTMO. THIS MESSAGE ECHOES THAT CONCERN. THE POSSIBILITY OF A RETURN TO GTMO REPRESENTS AN IN EXTREMIS SITUATION FOR THE MIGRANTS, AND WE MUST ALL BE ALERT TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A SIGNIFICANT SUICIDE THREAT AND TO TAKING TIMELY, FORCEFUL ACTION TO PRECLUDE SUCH ACTIONS.

4. (U) POC FOR THIS MESSAGE IS SCJ2, BG J.W. SMITH, DSN 313-282-6980/1.

DECLASS OADR
BT
#0546

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 0546

TOR: 950118110807 M1464783

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DIST:

SIT: BLAKEMAN FEINBERG NSC ROCHA

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