

MIR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 2730				
Document ID: 9903915				
Row: 46	Section: 4	Shelf: 6	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	From Samuel Berger re: Telephone Calls with NATO Leaders on Kosovo (2 pages)	05/26/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001b. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with French President Jacques Chirac (2 pages)	05/25/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001c. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with Dutch Prime Minister Kok (2 pages)	05/25/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001d. memo	From Samuel Berger re: Telephone Calls with NATO Leaders on Kosovo (4 pages)	05/21/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001e. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with British Prime Minister Tony Blair (1 page)	05/20/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001f. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with German Chancellor Schroeder (2 pages)	05/20/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001g. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with French President Jacques Chirac (2 pages)	05/20/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001h. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister D'Alema (2 pages)	05/20/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001i. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with Dutch Prime Minister Kok (2 pages)	05/20/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001j. memo	From Samuel Berger re: Telephone Calls with NATO Leaders on Kosovo (3 pages)	05/25/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001k. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with French President Jacques Chirac (2 pages)	05/25/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([D'Alema])
 OA/Box Number: 2730

FOLDER TITLE:

9903915

2014-0862-M
 rs1086

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
 PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
 RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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0011. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister D'Alema (2 pages)	05/25/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001m. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with French President Jacques Chirac [incomplete copy] (1 page)	05/25/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
001n. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with Dutch Prime Minister Kok (2 pages)	05/25/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 5/2/2019
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TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 26 MAY 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
TELCALL
GERMANY

GREAT BRITAIN
FRANCE
ITALY

PERSONS: BLAIR, TONY
CHIRAC, JACQUES

SCHROEDER, GERHARD
D'ALEMA, MASSIMO

SUBJECT: POTUS TELCALL TO EUROPEAN LEADERS

ACTION: OBE PER RECORDS MANAGEMENT

DUE DATE: 24 MAY 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BUTLER

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSNHM CLOSED BY: NSGP DOC 3 OF 3

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
002 PRESIDENT
002
002
003 PRESIDENT
003

Z 99052114 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
Z 99052121 FOR INFORMATION
X 99052615 OBE PER APNSA OFFICE
Z 99052620 REOPEN / FOR FURTHER ACTION
Z 99052620 FOR INFORMATION
X 99082609 OBE PER RECORDS MANAGEMENT

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 990521
002 990521

VICE PRESIDENT
WH CHIEF OF STAFF

3915
00 01

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Jim -

SRB unable to clear
Tuesday night. Need
to get to PSUS by 8:30am.
for 9:00 a.m. start for
phone calls.

FD

* D'Alema confirmed for
b/w 9+10 this am.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____
PASSED WW DESK: _____

LOG # 3915
SYSTEM (X) PRS INT ARS
DOCLOG (7) A/001

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
GIRE	_____	_____	_____
JACOBSON	_____	_____	_____
POWELL	_____	_____	_____
SARGEANT	_____	_____	_____
BRADTKE	_____	_____	_____
RUDMAN	_____	_____	_____
STEINBERG	_____	_____	_____
BERGER	_____	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	1	(7) 8/25	SRB
RECORDS MGMT.	2	_____	PER WWD

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:
89 AUG 25 am 8:19

COMMENTS:

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE _____

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG# 3915
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) INT _____
 BYPASSED WW DESK: X DOCLOG TMS A/O 01

TMSA

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
JACOBSON	_____	_____	_____
POWELL	_____	_____	_____
RICE	<u>1</u>	<u>@ 5/25</u>	<u>dis done</u>
DAVIES	_____	_____	_____
KERRICK	_____	_____	_____
STEINBERG	<u>2</u>	_____	_____
BERGER	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	<u>4</u>	<u>EMK 5/25</u>	<u>D</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

COMMENTS:
30 MAY 2001 9:01

POTUS telcalls to
Chirac, D'Alema, KOK
re Kosovo

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 3915
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 710 A/O 01

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
GIRE	_____	_____	_____
JACOBSON	_____	_____	_____
POWELL	_____	_____	_____
SARGEANT	_____	_____	_____
BRADTKE	_____	_____	_____
RUDMAN	_____	_____	_____
STEINBERG	_____	_____	_____
BERGER	_____	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	<u>1</u>	<u>② 8/25</u>	<u>BRZ</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>PER WWD</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:
'99 AUG 25 AM 8:19

COMMENTS:

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE _____

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 3915
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT _____
 BYPASSED WW DESK: X DOCLOG TMA A/O 01

TMA

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
JACOBSON	_____	_____	_____
POWELL	_____	_____	_____
RICE	<u>1</u>	<u>@ 4/25</u>	<u>dis done</u>
DAVIES	_____	_____	_____
KERRICK	_____	_____	_____
STEINBERG	<u>2</u>	_____	_____
BERGER	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	<u>4</u>	<u>EMK 5/25</u>	<u>D</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

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CC:

COMMENTS: 5/25/99 9:01

POTUS telcalls to
Chirac, D'Alema, KOK
re Kosovo

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes


THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 26, 1999

99 MAY 26 PM 8:44

TELEPHONE CALLS WITH
NATO LEADERS ON KOSOVO

DATE: TBD
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: TBD

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER 

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2014-0862-M (1.01)
10/2/2013 KBH

I. PURPOSE

- Bolster support for our Kosovo strategy.
- Urge Alliance leaders to maintain a unified public face.

II. BACKGROUND

You asked that we set up calls with key NATO leaders to bolster support for our Kosovo strategy. You spoke with D'Alema today and we recommend you also call Chirac and Kok. You should speak to Blair once you've had the chance to see where the others are.

The EU NATO members are starting to gear up for the German-hosted European Council summit June 3-4 in Cologne. While Kosovo will clearly dominate, the leaders will also grapple with post-NATO ESDI issues, personnel questions (who will become the EU's representative for common foreign and security and defense policy) and internal issues affecting economic policy, budgets and enlargement.

Chirac. Chirac has been steadfast in his support of our air campaign, and he (as well as Jospin) has defended it vigorously to the French public and parliament. France has now also joined the NATO consensus to support updating planning for KFOR at NATO, overcoming its concern that doing so would exclude the Russians. France is also with us on our public posture toward ground troops; Vedrine said earlier this week that "the Alliance has not modified its position." Jospin has said similar things, but leaves the door open by adding that France would require a UN mandate should ground troops be required. Less helpfully, Vedrine

306002

said in a newspaper interview this week that the future international force in Kosovo should be made up of contingents from NATO, Russia, and "third countries" (neutral and regional states), and that it should be under the "aegis" of the UN. **You should reiterate the requirement that any force have NATO at its core.**

Kok. The Dutch coalition government fell last week when a junior partner withdrew support after its senior partners failed to secure parliamentary passage of a constitutional amendment allowing referenda. There are two possible resolutions to the crisis: early elections or a reconfigured coalition. We assess that it is likely Kok will find a replacement for the defecting partner. In either scenario, Kok will stay on as caretaker, with key foreign policy positions -- including participation in NATO actions in Kosovo -- intact. Up to this point, Dutch adhesion to NATO's aims has been unqualified. The government has contributed 16 F-16s and more than 20 million Dutch guilders (\$9.7 million) to humanitarian relief.

Attachments

Tab A Points to Make for President Chirac

Tab B Points to Made for Prime Minister Kok

A

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
FRENCH PRESIDENT JACQUES CHIRAC

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0862-M (1.02)
10/2/2018 KBH

- Sorry we were not able to talk on Monday. I really wanted to speak to you but got tied up and could not break away. Hope this didn't inconvenience you too much.

Military Campaign Succeeding

- We should be encouraged by what we're seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic's policies.
- Air campaign and economic pressure are working -- some evidence Milosevic is realizing how much damage being inflicted.
- Need to sustain air campaign. Make clear to Milosevic it will be relentless and will intensify until he meets NATO's conditions.
- Need at long last to start maritime visit and search operations to complement EU embargo in preventing oil deliveries.

Plan for Success

- Indictment of Milosevic and four of his colleagues complicates our diplomacy but also provides a new opportunity to increase international pressure and isolation. Good that Chernomyrdin called off his trip.
- We should use the indictment to undercut Milosevic's legitimacy at home and reduce the number of visitors to Belgrade. But we must also not make his immediate departure a new condition for success.
- Pleased NATO has endorsed updated plan for KFOR. Know France had some concerns about making it final before Russia signs on. But I think we can do this in a way that keeps the door open for their participation under a model like SFOR.

- Need to move now to raise the additional forces required so that KFOR can quickly deploy after Milosevic accepts our conditions.
- Additional military police and gendarmes will be essential to establish a secure environment. Can you make any French gendarmes available?

Maintain Unity

- As we move ahead on the military and diplomatic fronts, we need to show the same uncompromising unity that we demonstrated at the Summit. If Milosevic senses fissures, he will think he can outlast us.
- Value greatly your steady, steadfast position with others.
- Convinced that we need an intensive period of private discussions among us on future military and diplomatic strategy, while keeping public postures in line with one another: pursuing air strategy working, NATO doing reassessment of other options, no reason at this point to change course.

Humanitarian

- Believe we are meeting the immediate needs of refugees, but I know you share my concern about conditions of the up to 700,000 displaced people inside Kosovo, particularly as winter approaches.
- You expressed interest in humanitarian airdrops early on. I think you are aware civilian airdrops may start soon, with an NGO and a private contractor, shortly. We would welcome your involvement in this initiative.

B

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
WITH DUTCH PRIME MINISTER KOK

- Wish you well in rebuilding your coalition. What are the prospects?

Military Campaign Succeeding

- We should be encouraged by what we're seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic's policies.
- Air campaign and economic pressure are working -- some evidence Milosevic is realizing how much damage being inflicted.
- Need to sustain air campaign. Make clear to Milosevic it will be relentless and will intensify until he meets NATO's conditions.
- Need at long last to start maritime visit and search operations to prevent oil deliveries.

Plan for Success

- Indictment of Milosevic and four of his colleagues complicates our diplomacy but also provides a new opportunity to increase international pressure and isolation. Good that Chernomyrdin called off his trip.
- We should use the indictment to undercut Milosevic's legitimacy at home and reduce the number of visitors to Belgrade. But we must also not make his immediate departure a new condition for success.
- Now that NATO has updated its plan for KFOR, need to raise the additional focus that will be required to move into Kosovo quickly when Belgrade accepts our conditions.
- Need to look hard for additional military police and gendarmes to establish secure environment. Will also need armed international civil police until we can train and establish new local police.

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5(b)(d)
Declassify on: 5/25/09

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2014-0862-M (1.03)
10/2/2013 KBH

- Could Netherlands make available any of its own Maree Chausee (may-RAY show-SAY) either for KFOR or the international police?

Maintain Unity

- As we move ahead on the military and diplomatic fronts, we need to show the same uncompromising unity that we demonstrated at the NATO Summit. If Milosevic senses fissures, he will think he can outlast us.
- Convinced that we need an intensive period of private discussions among us on future military and diplomatic strategy, while keeping public postures in line with one another: pursuing air strategy working, NATO doing reassessment of other options, no reason at this point to change course.

ADD TO FILE

THERE'S ANOTHER
MEMO OUT THERE
DATED 5/26.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3915

5-25-99

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

99 MAY 21 PM 9:12

May 21, 1999

TELEPHONE CALLS WITH
NATO LEADERS ON KOSOVO

DATE: TBD
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: TBD

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2014-0860-M (1.04)
10/2/2018 KBH

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER *for*

I. PURPOSE

Bolster support for our Kosovo strategy. Urge Alliance leaders to maintain a unified public force.

II. BACKGROUND

At your meeting with the Foreign Policy Team on Thursday, you asked that we set up another round of calls with NATO leaders to bolster support for our Kosovo strategy. We recommend beginning with calls to Blair, Schroeder, Chirac D'Alama and Kok.

Blair. Your intervention with Blair seems to have had the desired effect in Britain. Foreign Secretary Cook was here to dampen the stories about a gap between London and Washington. Cook's public message was that he was here to present shared objectives, and change the focus from accidents to atrocities. In private, he pressed the argument that it is time to plus-up forces in Macedonia in preparation for either a substantially larger than planned KFOR or for a non-permissive entry. Cook sees boosting troop deployments as taking pressure off Blair to demonstrate to the British public that preparations are underway for getting the refugees home before winter sets in.

Visit and Search. As of Thursday, the visit and search regime remains blocked due to the standoff between the UK and Germany. Absent Bundestag agreement, Germany does not believe that it has a legal basis for the German navy to participate or for the German government to consent to the search of German merchant ships. As a result, Germany has

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Reason: 1.5(b)(c)

Declassify On: 3/23/09

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'99 MAY 25 PM 1:52

been blocking agreement to the operation. The UK, for its part, does not want to approve the operation if a NATO country opts out. We are pressing the UK to allow Germany to opt out, at least for now, so that the operation can commence.

UK Domestic situation. Blair held sway on a key vote on welfare reform with a 40-vote margin (310-270), the smallest to date. Sixty-five Labour MPs voted against it, with others abstaining. This was embarrassing, but reflected the tensions between traditional and "new" labour, and highlighted that Blair is beginning to face harder going on his domestic agenda. This also helps explain some of his anxiety over making faster progress on Kosovo.

Schroeder. Following his meeting in Italy with D'Alema Tuesday, Schroeder told the NAC Wednesday that NATO's dual strategy of air strikes and diplomacy is working. He said there is no need to add, and Germany would not support, a "third element" either in the form of a pause or planning for ground troops. This fueled press stories questioning Alliance unity. Schroeder also called for a comprehensive and precise report on the Chinese Embassy bombing. Some German officials are concerned by our perceived influence with Ahtisaari, the next EU president; the EU co-opted him as their special envoy in part as a way of keeping Bonn's hand in the peace effort. Schroeder met with Ahtisaari May 17 and expressed strong support at the May 19 NAC for the Talbott-Ahtisaari-Chernomyrdin troika. On the humanitarian front, the Interior Minister announced that Germany would double its intake of refugees to 20,000. As described above, Germany continues to block agreement to the maritime visit-and-search regime for national legal reasons.

Chirac. Chirac has been steadfast in his support of our air campaign, and he (and Jospin as well) has defended it vigorously to the French public and parliament. Where France has been less helpful is in supporting planning for KFOR at NATO, out of concern that (i) moving ahead with formal NATO plans for a force would exclude the Russians and; (ii) taking such a step would in fact be a subterfuge for planning a non-permissive entry. We have taken the position that it is essential to proceed with "planning for success" in case we have to implement an agreement on short notice. We have also argued that a formal NATO force generation process is necessary to do this properly.

France is with us on our public posture toward ground troops; Vedrine said earlier this week that "the Alliance has not modified its position." Jospin has said similar things, but leaves the door open by adding that France would require a UN mandate should ground troops be required. Less helpfully, Vedrine said in a newspaper interview this week that the future international force in Kosovo should be made up of contingents from NATO, Russia, and "third countries" (neutral and regional states), and that it should be under the "aegis" of the UN. You will want to reiterate to Chirac the requirement that any force have NATO at its core.

D'Alema. Italian support on Kosovo remains critical in terms of both operational necessity and Alliance cohesion. Bolstered by your direct contacts with him, D'Alema has managed to stand with NATO while maintaining leftist support for his coalition. Nonetheless, he has shown signs of wobbliness in the last week. Given approaching European Parliament elections on June 13 and his concern that now core members of his own coalition and 60 percent of Italians oppose the bombing, D'Alema is anxious to demonstrate that he is doing everything possible to bring about a political settlement. As such, he has proposed a pause in the bombing following agreement on a draft Security Council resolution. If Milosevic resists implementation, D'Alema would then support sending in ground troops. This proposal was endorsed by the Italian Parliament on May 19, but Italian officials have assured us that it does not affect Italy's role in the Alliance. Italy has agreed to allow us to use their airport in Pascara to conduct civilian airdrops to provide humanitarian assistance in Kosovo. This effort is risky and will have low pay-off, but is our only way to provide assistance to those displaced who remain in the hills. We will be working under the auspices of the NGO International Rescue Committee, and hope to finalize arrangements so that airdrops can begin next week. We are keeping our effort quiet, until such time as we are ready to begin operations.

Italy was shaken by the assassination of the top aide to D'Alema's labor minister (the latter dined with the First Lady in Naples last week.) The Red Brigades, a notorious left wing guerilla group thought to have been eliminated, took responsibility for the attack, linking it to NATO action, raising fears that political terrorism has returned to Italy after more than a decade of relative tranquility.

Kok. The Dutch coalition government fell Wednesday when a junior partner withdrew support after the cabinet failed to secure parliamentary passage of a constitutional amendment allowing referenda. There are two possible resolutions to the crisis: early elections or a reconfigured coalition. It is likely that Kok will find a replacement for the defecting partner. In the interim, he will carry on as a caretaker, with key foreign policy positions, including participation in NATO actions in Kosovo, unchanged. Up to this point, Dutch adhesion to NATO's aims has been unqualified. The government has contributed more than 20 million Dutch guilders (\$9.7 million) to humanitarian relief.

Attachments

Tab A Points to Make for Prime Minister Blair
Tab B Points to Make for Chancellor Schroeder
Tab C Points to Make for President Chirac
Tab D Points to Make for Prime D'Alema
Tab E Points to Made for Prime Minister Kok

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
WITH BRITISH PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR

- Cook had an effective visit here, appreciate your efforts to manage the public dimension.
- Am calling Chirac, Schroeder, D'Alema, Kok, others to say:
 - We should be encouraged by what we're seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic's policies.
 - Air campaign and economic pressure are working -- some evidence Milosevic is realizing how much damage being inflicted.
 - Need to sustain air campaign. Make clear to Milosevic it will be relentless and will intensify until he meets NATO's conditions.
 - As we move ahead on the military and diplomatic fronts, we need to talk about any differences privately.
 - Publicly, we need to show the same uncompromising unity that we demonstrated at the NATO Summit. If Milosevic senses fissures, he will think he can outlast us.
 - Convinced that we need an intensive period of private discussions among us on future military and diplomatic strategy, while keeping public postures in line with one another: pursuing air strategy working, NATO doing reassessment of other options, no reason at this point to change course.
- As we discussed, NATO needs to move forward quickly with updating KFOR and generating additional forces so we can quickly move into Kosovo when Milosevic accepts conditions.
- Search and Visit. Appreciate Schroeder's dilemma, urge you to accept letting him opt out until he can get Bundestag cover.

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (b, d)
Declassify on: 5/20/09

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2014-0862-M (1.05)
10/2/2018 KBH

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
WITH GERMAN CHANCELLOR SCHROEDER

- We should be encouraged by what we're seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic's policies.
- Air campaign and economic pressure are working -- some evidence Milosevic is realizing how much damage being inflicted.
- Need to sustain air campaign. Make clear to Milosevic it will be relentless and will intensify until he meets NATO's conditions.
- As we move ahead on the military and diplomatic fronts, we need to talk about any differences privately.
- Publicly, we need to show the same uncompromising unity that we demonstrated at the NATO Summit. If Milosevic senses fissures, he will think he can outlast us.
- Convinced that we need an intensive period of private discussions among us on future military and diplomatic strategy, while keeping public postures in line with one another: pursuing air strategy working, NATO doing reassessment of other options, no reason at this point to change course.

Update Planning

- NATO needs to move forward quickly with updating KFOR and generating additional forces so we can quickly move into Kosovo when Milosevic accepts our conditions; know that this will force you to go back to Bundestag, but hope you will.
- Deploying a force without Belgrade's consent is a much tougher issue that we need to deal with in the next several weeks. Need to discuss this privately -- and not air any differences in public.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2014-0862-M (1.06)
10/2/2018 KBM

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (b, d)
Declassify on: 5/20/09

Visit and Search

- Almost a month since Summit, but NATO still hasn't started visit and search regime to halt oil deliveries to Yugoslav ports.
- There hasn't been a large tanker delivering oil since May 1. However, we can expect more if NATO fails to act. One tanker can replenish the Serb military's fuel supplies for a significant time.
- Understand that Germany continues to block the operation since your lawyers believe it requires a Bundestag decision. Also understand the Bundestag is out of session until mid-June. A lot of fuel can be delivered in that time.
- Urge you to agree to the operation, even if German ships cannot participate, so that we can start this operation.

Chinese Embassy

- Appreciate your effort to soothe the Chinese during your recent trip to Beijing.
- We are preparing a further report on the embassy bombing; prepared to have NATO submit its own report, but contents and delivery means should be carefully coordinated.

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
FRENCH PRESIDENT JACQUES CHIRAC

- We should be encouraged by what we're seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic's policies.
- Air campaign and economic pressure are working -- some evidence Milosevic is realizing how much damage being inflicted.
- Need to sustain air campaign. Make clear to Milosevic it will be relentless and will intensify until he meets NATO's conditions.
- As we move ahead on the military and diplomatic fronts, we need to talk about any differences privately.
- Publicly, we need to show the same uncompromising unity that we demonstrated at the NATO Summit. If Milosevic senses fissures, he will think he can outlast us.
- Convinced that we need an intensive period of private discussions among us on future military and diplomatic strategy, while keeping public postures in line with one another: pursuing air strategy working, NATO doing reassessment of other options, no reason at this point to change course.

Update Military Planning

- NATO needs to move forward quickly with updating KFOR and generating additional forces. Understand you have some concerns about excluding Russians, but I think we can do this in a way that allows for involving Russians when we get a deal. Important to proceed now, though.
- Need to look hard for additional military police and gendarmes to establish secure environment.

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 5/20/09

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2014-0862-M (1.07)
10/2/2018 KBH

- Saw Vedrine's comments about UN-mandated force for Kosovo made up of NATO, Russia, and "neutral" contingents. We have always said we would seek a UN mandate, but have to reiterate concerns about uncoordinated force without NATO command and control. Refugees will not go back without NATO at core of international security force.
- Deploying a force into a non-permissive environment is a much tougher issue that we need to deal with in the next several weeks. What are your thoughts on forced-entry option?

Chinese Embassy

- We are preparing a further report on the Chinese embassy bombing; prepared to have NATO submit its own report, but contents and delivery means should be carefully coordinated.

Humanitarian

- Believe we are meeting the immediate needs of refugees, but I know you share my concern about conditions of the up to 700,000 displaced people inside Kosovo, particularly as winter approaches.
- You expressed interest in humanitarian airdrops early on. I think you are aware that we hope to start civilian airdrops, with an NGO and a private contractor, shortly. We would welcome your involvement in this initiative.

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER D'ALEMA

- We should be encouraged by what we're seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic's policies.
- Air campaign and economic pressure are working -- some evidence Milosevic is realizing how much damage being inflicted.
- Need to sustain air campaign. Make clear to Milosevic it will be relentless and will intensify until he meets NATO's conditions.
- As we move ahead on the military and diplomatic fronts, we need to talk about any differences privately.
- Publicly, we need to show the same uncompromising unity that we demonstrated at the NATO Summit. If Milosevic senses fissures, he will think he can outlast us.
- Convinced that we need an intensive period of private discussions among us on future military and diplomatic strategy, while keeping public postures in line with one another: pursuing air strategy working, NATO doing reassessment of other options, no reason at this point to change course.

Update Planning

- Must also plan for success. Need to move forward quickly to approve updated plan for KFOR and to raise the additional forces that will be required.
- Need to look hard for additional military police and carabinieri to establish secure environment. Italy has such capabilities; are you ready to contribute?

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2014-0862-M (1.08)
10/2/2018 KBH

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5(b, d)
Declassify On: 5/20/09

- Deploying a force into a non-permissive environment is a much tougher issue that we need to deal with in the next several weeks. I was struck by your proposal that we might do this if Milosevic failed to abide by a UN resolution restating NATO's conditions and endorsing a force.
- Need to discuss this privately and not make Milosevic think we're divided in our purpose or faltering in our determination.

Humanitarian

- Grateful to Italy for allowing us to use airport in Pescara for civilian airdrops inside Kosovo that we are planning with the NGO International Rescue Committee.
- Very concerned with condition of IDPs, given reports of extreme food shortages and particularly as winter approaches.

Bomb Dumping

- Want you to know how much Hillary enjoyed seeing you in Naples last week and finally meeting your wife, Linda. She mentioned to me your concern about NATO jettisoning bombs in the Adriatic. Want you to know that Bill Cohen and Hugh Shelton got right on top of the problem. Understand it has been resolved: your military chose new sites further out to sea and NATO is preparing a plan to recover ordnance already jettisoned.

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
WITH DUTCH PRIME MINISTER KOK

- We should be encouraged by what we're seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic's policies.
- Air campaign and economic pressure are working -- some evidence Milosevic is realizing how much damage being inflicted.
- Need to sustain air campaign. Make clear to Milosevic it will be relentless and will intensify until he meets NATO's conditions.
- As we move ahead on the military and diplomatic fronts, we need to talk about any differences privately.
- Publicly, we need to show the same uncompromising unity that we demonstrated at the NATO Summit. If Milosevic senses fissures, he will think he can outlast us.
- Convinced that we need an intensive period of private discussions among us on future military and diplomatic strategy, while keeping public postures in line with one another: pursuing air strategy working, NATO doing reassessment of other options, no reason at this point to change course.

Plan for Success

- Must also plan for success. Need to move forward quickly to approve updated plan for KFOR and to raise the additional forces that will be required to move into Kosovo when Belgrade accepts our conditions.
- Need to look hard for additional military police and gendarmes to establish secure environment.
- Wonder whether you could make available some of your superb Maree Chausee (may-RAY show-SAY)?

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5(b)(d)
Declassify on: 5/20/09

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2014-0262-M (1.09)
10/2/2013 KBH

- Deploying a force without Belgrade's OK is a much tougher issue we need to deal with in the next several weeks.
- Need to discuss this privately and not let public debate over ground forces make Milosevic think we're divided in our purpose or faltering in our determination.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2014-0862-M (1.10)
10/2/2013 KBN

TELEPHONE CALLS WITH
NATO LEADERS ON KOSOVO

DATE: TBD
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: TBD

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

I. PURPOSE

- Bolster support for our Kosovo strategy.
- Urge Alliance leaders to maintain a unified public face.

II. BACKGROUND

you also

You asked that we set up calls with key NATO leaders to bolster support for our Kosovo strategy. We recommend ~~beginning with calls to Chirac, D'Alema and Kok.~~ You should speak to Blair once you've had the chance to see where the others are.

You spoke with D'Alema today and

The EU NATO members are starting to gear up for the German-hosted European Council summit June 3-4 in Cologne. While Kosovo will clearly dominate, the leaders will also grapple with post-NATO ESDI issues, personnel questions (who will become the EU's representative for common foreign and security and defense policy) and internal issues affecting economic policy, budgets and enlargement.

Chirac. Chirac has been steadfast in his support of our air campaign, and he (as well as Jospin) has defended it vigorously to the French public and parliament. France has now also joined the NATO consensus to support updating planning for KFOR at NATO, overcoming its concern that doing so would exclude the Russians. France is also with us on our public posture toward ground troops; Vedrine said earlier this week that "the Alliance has not modified its position." Jospin has said similar things, but leaves the door open by adding that France would require a UN mandate should ground troops be required. Less helpfully, Vedrine

said in a newspaper interview this week that the future international force in Kosovo should be made up of contingents from NATO, Russia, and "third countries" (neutral and regional states), and that it should be under the "aegis" of the UN. **You should reiterate the requirement that any force have NATO at its core.**

D'Alema. Italian support on Kosovo remains critical in terms of both operational necessity and Alliance cohesion. Bolstered by your direct contacts with him, D'Alema has managed to stand with NATO while maintaining leftist support for his coalition. Nonetheless, he has shown signs of wobbliness in the last week. Given approaching European Parliament elections on June 13 and his concern that now core members of his own coalition and 60 percent of Italians oppose the bombing, D'Alema is anxious to demonstrate that he is doing everything possible to bring about a political settlement. As such, he has proposed a pause in the bombing following agreement on a draft Security Council resolution. If Milosevic resists implementation, D'Alema would then support sending in ground troops. This proposal was endorsed by the Italian Parliament on May 19, but Italian officials have assured us that it does not affect Italy's role in the Alliance.

Italy recently agreed to let us use its airport in Pescara to conduct civilian airdrops to provide humanitarian assistance in Kosovo. This effort is risky and will have low pay-off, but is our only way to provide assistance to those displaced who remain in the hills. We will be working under the auspices of the NGO International Rescue Committee and hope to finalize arrangements so that airdrops can begin next week. We are keeping our effort quiet, until such time as we are ready to begin operations.

Last week, Italy was shaken by the murder of Massimo, D'Antona, the top aide to Labor Minister Bassolino (the latter, who is also the Mayor of Naples, dined with the First Lady during her visit.) The Red Brigades, a notorious left wing guerilla group inactive until last week, took responsibility for the attack and linked it to NATO action. The murder has raised fears that political terrorism has returned to Italy after more than a decade of relative tranquility and that Americans, as well as Italians, may be targeted.

Kok. The Dutch coalition government fell last week when a junior partner withdrew support after its senior partners failed to secure parliamentary passage of a constitutional amendment allowing referenda. There are two possible resolutions to the crisis: early elections or a reconfigured coalition. We assess that it is likely Kok will find a replacement for the defecting partner. In either scenario, Kok will stay on as caretaker, with key foreign policy positions -- including participation in NATO actions in Kosovo -- intact. Up to this point, Dutch adhesion to NATO's aims has been unqualified. The government has contributed 16 F-16s and more than 20 million Dutch guilders (\$9.7 million) to humanitarian relief.

Attachments

Tab A Points to Make for President Chirac

~~Tab B Points to Make for Prime D'Alema~~

Tab C Points to Made for Prime Minister Kok

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0862-M (1.11)
10/2/2018 KBH

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
FRENCH PRESIDENT JACQUES CHIRAC

- Sorry we were not able to talk on Monday. I really wanted to speak to you but got tied up and could not break away. Hope this didn't inconvenience you too much.

Military Campaign Succeeding

- We should be encouraged by what we're seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic's policies.
- Air campaign and economic pressure are working -- some evidence Milosevic is realizing how much damage being inflicted.
- Need to sustain air campaign. Make clear to Milosevic it will be relentless and will intensify until he meets NATO's conditions.
- Need at long last to start maritime visit and search operations to complement EU embargo in preventing oil deliveries.

Plan for Success

- We continue to work with Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari to see if they can pull Milosevic toward our conditions. This may take some time, but we need to plan for success.
- Pleased NATO has endorsed updated plan for KFOR. Know France had some concerns about ~~excluding Russia~~. But I think we can do this in a way that keeps the door open for their participation under a model like SFOR.
- Need to move now to raise the additional forces required so that KFOR can quickly deploy after Milosevic accepts our conditions.

My last life Putin signs on

making it final before Russia signs on

- Additional military police and gendarmes will be essential to establish a secure environment. Can you make any French gendarmes available?
- Saw Vedrine's comments about UN-mandated force for Kosovo made up of NATO, Russian, and "neutral" contingents. We have always said we would seek a UN mandate, but have to reiterate concerns about uncoordinated force without NATO command and control.
- Refugees will not go back without NATO at core of international security force. Nor will the US be able to participate.

Maintain Unity

- As we move ahead on the military and diplomatic fronts, we need to show the same uncompromising unity that we demonstrated at the Summit. If Milosevic senses fissures, he will think he can outlast us.

- *Value Smith your steady, steadfast pose with others*
 • Need your help in ~~steadying D'Alema and Schroeder, both of whom face political problems at home. Also unhappy with the recent Greek-Czech initiative, which allows Serb forces to remain and relies on a UN force.~~

Value greatly your steady, steadfast position.

- Convinced that we need an intensive period of private discussions among us on future military and diplomatic strategy, while keeping public postures in line with one another: pursuing air strategy working, NATO doing reassessment of other options, no reason at this point to change course.

Humanitarian

- Believe we are meeting the immediate needs of refugees, but I know you share my concern about conditions of the up to 700,000 displaced people inside Kosovo, particularly as winter approaches.
- You expressed interest in humanitarian airdrops early on. I think you are aware that ~~we hope to start civilian airdrops~~ with an NGO and a private contractor, shortly. We would welcome your involvement in this initiative.

*my set see
may start soon*

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2014-0842-M (1.12)
10/2/2018 KBH

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER D'ALEMA

- At outset want to tell you how saddened I was by murder of Massimo D'Antona, adviser to Labor Minister Bassolino. Share your concern about new round of political violence by Red Brigades, against Italians and Americans. Must continue to fight terrorism wherever it surfaces.

Military Campaign Succeeding

- We should be encouraged by what we're seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic's policies.
- Air campaign and economic pressure are working -- some evidence Milosevic is realizing how much damage being inflicted.
- Need to sustain air campaign. Make clear to Milosevic it will be relentless and will intensify until he meets NATO's conditions.
- Need at long last to start maritime visit and search operations to help prevent further oil deliveries. Realize this might put a further strain on Italy, but count on your support.

Plan for Success

- We continue to work with Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari to see if they can pull Milosevic toward our conditions. This may take some time, but we need to plan for success.
- Now that NATO has updated plan for KFOR, need to move quickly to raise the additional forces that will be required to deploy quickly into Kosovo when Milosevic accepts our conditions.
- Need to look hard for additional military police and gendarmes to establish secure environment. Your carabinieri have been invaluable in Bosnia; can you make any more available for Kosovo?]

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5(b, d)
Declassify On: 5/25/09

Maintain Unity

- As we move ahead on the military and diplomatic fronts, we need to show the same uncompromising unity that we demonstrated at the NATO Summit. If Milosevic senses fissures, he will think he can outlast us.
- ^{Aware of} ~~Intrigued by~~ your idea of a pause for a Security Council resolution. But we should only offer it if we are convinced that the Russians will give us what we need. Not clear that we're there yet.
- Convinced that we need an intensive period of private discussions among us on future military and diplomatic strategy, while keeping public postures in line with one another: pursuing air strategy working, NATO doing reassessment of other options, no reason at this point to change course.

Humanitarian

- Grateful to Italy for allowing us to use airport in Pascara for civilian airdrops inside Kosovo that we are planning with the NGO International Rescue Committee.
- Very concerned with condition of IDPs, given reports of extreme food shortages and particularly as winter approaches.

Bomb Dumping

- Want you to know how much Hillary enjoyed seeing you in Naples last week and finally meeting your wife, Linda. She mentioned to me your concern about NATO jettisoning bombs in the Adriatic. Want you to know that Bill Cohen and Hugh Shelton got right on top of the problem. Understand it has been resolved: your military chose new sites further out to sea and NATO is preparing a plan to recover ordnance already jettisoned.

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
FRENCH PRESIDENT JACQUES CHIRAC

- Sorry we were not able to talk on Monday. I really wanted to speak to you but got tied up and could not break away. Hope this didn't inconvenience you too much.

Military Campaign Succeeding

- We should be encouraged by what we're seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic's policies.
- Air campaign and economic pressure are working -- some evidence Milosevic is realizing how much damage being inflicted.
- Need to sustain air campaign. Make clear to Milosevic it will be relentless and will intensify until he meets NATO's conditions.
- Need at long last to start maritime visit and search operations to complement EU embargo in preventing oil deliveries.

Plan for Success

- We need to use the ICTY indictment to increase the pressure on Milosevic. Think it's important that we say publicly we support ICTY's work, that the indictment won't change our objectives but will deepen Milosevic's isolation.
- We continue to work with Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari to see if they can pull Milosevic toward our conditions. This may take some time, but we need to plan for success.
- Pleased NATO has endorsed updated plan for KFOR. Know France had some concerns about making it final before Russia signs on. But I think we can do this in a way that keeps the door open for their participation under a model like SFOR.

insert here

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
WITH DUTCH PRIME MINISTER KOK

- Wish you well in rebuilding your coalition. What are the prospects?

Military Campaign Succeeding

- We should be encouraged by what we're seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic's policies.
- Air campaign and economic pressure are working -- some evidence Milosevic is realizing how much damage being inflicted.
- Need to sustain air campaign. Make clear to Milosevic it will be relentless and will intensify until he meets NATO's conditions.
- Need at long last to start maritime visit and search operations to prevent oil deliveries.

Plan for Success

- We continue to work with Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari to see if they can pull Milosevic toward our conditions. This may take some time, but we need to plan for success.
- Now that NATO has updated its plan for KFOR, need to raise the additional focus that will be required to move into Kosovo quickly when Belgrade accepts our conditions.
- Need to look hard for additional military police and gendarmes to establish secure environment. Will also need armed international civil police until we can train and establish new local police.
- Could Netherlands make available any of its own Maree Chausee (may-RAY show-SAY) either for KFOR or the international police?

Maintain Unity

- As we move ahead on the military and diplomatic fronts, we need to show the same uncompromising unity that we demonstrated at the NATO Summit. If Milosevic senses fissures, he will think he can outlast us.
- Convinced that we need an intensive period of private discussions among us on future military and diplomatic strategy, while keeping public postures in line with one another: pursuing air strategy working, NATO doing reassessment of other options, no reason at this point to change course.

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2014-0862-m (1.15)
10/2/2018 KBH

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
FRENCH PRESIDENT JACQUES CHIRAC

- Sorry we were not able to talk on Monday. I really wanted to speak to you but got tied up and could not break away. Hope this didn't inconvenience you too much.

Military Campaign Succeeding

- We should be encouraged by what we're seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic's policies.
- Air campaign and economic pressure are working -- some evidence Milosevic is realizing how much damage being inflicted.
- Need to sustain air campaign. Make clear to Milosevic it will be relentless and will intensify until he meets NATO's conditions.
- Need at long last to start maritime visit and search operations to complement EU embargo in preventing oil deliveries.

Plan for Success

- *we need to use the ICTY indictment to increase the pressure on Milosevic. Think it's important that we say publicly our support for the ICTY's work that the indictment won't change our objective but will deepen Milosevic's isolation.*
- We continue to work with Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari to see if they can pull Milosevic toward our conditions. This may take some time, but we need to plan for success.
- Pleased NATO has endorsed updated plan for KFOR. Know France had some concerns about making it final before Russia signs on. But I think we can do this in a way that keeps the door open for their participation under a model like SFOR.
- Need to move now to raise the additional forces required so that KFOR can quickly deploy after Milosevic accepts our conditions.


- Additional military police and gendarmes will be essential to establish a secure environment. Can you make any French gendarmes available?

Maintain Unity

- As we move ahead on the military and diplomatic fronts, we need to show the same uncompromising unity that we demonstrated at the Summit. If Milosevic senses fissures, he will think he can outlast us.
- Value greatly your steady, steadfast position with others.
- Convinced that we need an intensive period of private discussions among us on future military and diplomatic strategy, while keeping public postures in line with one another: pursuing air strategy working, NATO doing reassessment of other options, no reason at this point to change course.

Humanitarian

- Believe we are meeting the immediate needs of refugees, but I know you share my concern about conditions of the up to 700,000 displaced people inside Kosovo, particularly as winter approaches.
- You expressed interest in humanitarian airdrops early on. I think you are aware civilian airdrops may start soon, with an NGO and a private contractor, shortly. We would welcome your involvement in this initiative.



TELEPHONE CALLS WITH
NATO LEADERS ON KOSOVO

DATE: TBD
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: TBD

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**
2014-0862-M (1.16)
10/2/2018 KBH

I. PURPOSE

- Bolster support for our Kosovo strategy. • Urge Alliance leaders to maintain a unified public face.

Bullet

II. BACKGROUND

You asked that we set up calls with key NATO leaders to bolster support for our Kosovo strategy. We recommend beginning with calls to Chirac, D'Alema and Kok. You should speak to Blair once you've had the chance to see where the others are.

The EU NATO members are starting to gear up for the German-hosted European Council summit June 3-4 in Cologne. While Kosovo will clearly dominate, the leaders will also grapple with post-NATO ESDI issues, personnel questions (who will become the EU's representative for common foreign and security and defense policy) and internal issues affecting economic policy, budgets and enlargement.

Chirac. Chirac has been steadfast in his support of our air campaign, and he (as well as Jospin) has defended it vigorously to the French public and parliament. France has now also joined the NATO consensus to support updating planning for KFOR at NATO, overcoming its concern that doing so would exclude the Russians. France is also with us on our public posture toward ground troops; Vedrine said earlier this week that "the Alliance has not modified its position." Jospin has said similar things, but leaves the door open by adding that France would require a UN mandate should ground troops be required. Less helpfully, Vedrine said in a newspaper interview this week that the future

international force in Kosovo should be made up of contingents from NATO, Russia, and "third countries" (neutral and regional states), and that it should be under the "aegis" of the UN. **You should reiterate the requirement that any force have NATO at its core.**

D'Alema. Italian support on Kosovo remains critical in terms of both operational necessity and Alliance cohesion. Bolstered by your direct contacts with him, D'Alema has managed to stand with NATO while maintaining leftist support for his coalition. Nonetheless, he has shown signs of wobbliness in the last week. Given approaching European Parliament elections on June 13 and his concern that now core members of his own coalition and 60 percent of Italians oppose the bombing, D'Alema is anxious to demonstrate that he is doing everything possible to bring about a political settlement. As such, he has proposed a pause in the bombing following agreement on a draft Security Council resolution. If Milosevic resists implementation, D'Alema would then support sending in ground troops. This proposal was endorsed by the Italian Parliament on May 19, but Italian officials have assured us that it does not affect Italy's role in the Alliance.

Italy recently agreed to let us use its airport in Pescara to conduct civilian airdrops to provide humanitarian assistance in Kosovo. This effort is risky and will have low pay-off, but is our only way to provide assistance to those displaced who remain in the hills. We will be working under the auspices of the NGO International Rescue Committee and hope to finalize arrangements so that airdrops can begin next week. We are keeping our effort quiet, until such time as we are ready to begin operations.

Last week, Italy was shaken by the murder of Massimo, D'Antona, the top aide to Labor Minister Bassolino (the latter, who is also the Mayor of Naples, dined with the First Lady during her visit.) The Red Brigades, a notorious left wing guerilla group inactive until last week, took responsibility for the attack and linked it to NATO action. The murder has raised fears that political terrorism has returned to Italy after more than a decade of relative tranquility and that Americans, as well as

Italians, may be targeted.

pg break

Kok. The Dutch coalition government fell last week when a junior partner withdrew support after its senior partners

failed to secure parliamentary passage of a constitutional amendment allowing referenda. There are two possible resolutions to the crisis: early elections or a reconfigured coalition. We assess that it is likely Kok will find a replacement for the defecting partner. In either scenario, Kok will stay on as caretaker, with key foreign policy positions including participation in NATO actions in Kosovo intact. Up to this point, Dutch adhesion to NATO's aims has been unqualified. The government has contributed 16 F-16s and more than 20 million Dutch guilders (\$9.7 million) to humanitarian relief.

Attachments

- Tab A Points to Make for President Chirac
- Tab B Points to Make for Prime D'Alema
- Tab C Points to Made for Prime Minister Kok

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2014-0362-M(1.17)
10/2/2018 KBH

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER D'ALEMA

- At outset want to tell you how saddened I was by murder of Massimo D'Antona, adviser to Labor Minister Bassolino. Share your concern about new round of political violence by Red Brigades, against Italians and Americans. Must continue to fight terrorism wherever it surfaces. ✓

Military Campaign Succeeding

- We should be encouraged by what we're seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic's policies.
- Air campaign and economic pressure are working -- some evidence Milosevic is realizing how much damage being inflicted.
- Need to sustain air campaign. Make clear to Milosevic it will be relentless and will intensify until he meets NATO's conditions.
- Need at long last to start maritime visit and search operations to help prevent further oil deliveries. Realize this might put a further strain on Italy, but count on your support.

Plan for Success

- We continue to work with Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari to see if they can pull Milosevic toward our conditions. This may take some time, but we need to plan for success.
- Now that NATO has updated plan for KFOR, need to move quickly to raise the additional forces that will be required to deploy quickly into Kosovo when Milosevic accepts our conditions.
- Need to look hard for additional military police and gendarmes to establish secure environment. Your carabinieri have been invaluable in Bosnia; can you make any more available for Kosovo?

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5(b, d)
Declassify On: 5/25/09

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
WITH DUTCH PRIME MINISTER KOK

- Wish you well in rebuilding your coalition. What are the prospects?

Military Campaign Succeeding

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- Air campaign and economic pressure are working -- some evidence Milosevic is realizing how much damage being inflicted.
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- Need to look hard for additional military police and gendarmes to establish secure environment. Will also need armed international civil police until we can train and establish new local police.
- Could Netherlands make available any of its own Maree Chausee (may-RAY show-SAY) either for KFOR or the international police?

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER, TONY

DOC DATE: 21 MAY 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
 TELCALL
 GERMANY

GREAT BRITAIN
FRANCE
ITALY

PERSONS: BLAIR, TONY
 CHIRAC, JACQUES

SCHROEDER, GERHARD
D'ALEMA, MASSIMO

SUBJECT: POTUS TELCALL TO EUROPEAN LEADERS

ACTION: OBE PER APNSA OFFICE

DUE DATE: 24 MAY 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BUTLER

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BLINKEN
BUTLER
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSNHM CLOSED BY: NSDMK DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRM/NARA, Date 10/2/2013
2014-0862-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
002 PRESIDENT
002

Z 99052114 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
Z 99052121 FOR INFORMATION
X 99052615 OBE PER APNSA OFFICE

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 990521
002 990521

VICE PRESIDENT
WH CHIEF OF STAFF

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE

5/21/1353

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 3915
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
JACOBSON	_____	_____	_____
POWELL	_____	_____	_____
RICE	<u>2</u>	_____	_____
DAVIES	<u>1</u>	<u>CS/21</u>	_____
KERRICK	<u>2</u>	<u>(C)</u>	_____
STEINBERG	_____	_____	_____
BERGER	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	<u>4</u>	<u>(D) 5/21</u>	<u>DTC</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>5</u>	<u>DMK 5/26</u>	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:
799 MAY 21 AM 10:35

COMMENTS: POTUS Calls to European Leaders

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

ORE PER
ARNA / EXEC
SEC

5/21/83 1353

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 3915

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
JACOBSON			
POWELL			
RICE	8		
DAVIES	1	(S) 5/21	
KERRICK	2	(S)	
STEINBERG			
BERGER	3		
SITUATION ROOM			
WEST WING DESK	4	(S) 5/21	(S) PC
RECORDS MGMT.	5	DMK 5/20	N

A = ACTION I = INF	MIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION
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ORSE PER

CC: '99 MAY 21 AM 10:00

ARNA / EXEC SEC

COMMENTS: P

European Leaders

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE 40

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 21, 1999

TELEPHONE CALLS WITH
NATO LEADERS ON KOSOVO

DATE: TBD

LOCATION: TBD

TIME: TBD

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER *S for*

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2014-0862-M (1-19)

10/2/2013 KBH

I. PURPOSE

Bolster support for our Kosovo strategy. Urge Alliance leaders to maintain a unified public force.

II. BACKGROUND

At your meeting with the Foreign Policy Team on Thursday, you asked that we set up another round of calls with NATO leaders to bolster support for our Kosovo strategy. We recommend beginning with calls to Blair, Schroeder, Chirac D'Alema and Kok.

Blair. Your intervention with Blair seems to have had the desired effect in Britain. Foreign Secretary Cook was here to dampen the stories about a gap between London and Washington. Cook's public message was that he was here to present shared objectives, and change the focus from accidents to atrocities. In private, he pressed the argument that it is time to plus-up forces in Macedonia in preparation for either a substantially larger than planned KFOR or for a non-permissive entry. Cook sees boosting troop deployments as taking pressure off Blair to demonstrate to the British public that preparations are underway for getting the refugees home before winter sets in.

Visit and Search. As of Thursday, the visit and search regime remains blocked due to the standoff between the UK and Germany. Absent Bundestag agreement, Germany does not believe that it has a legal basis for the German navy to participate or for the German government to consent to the search of German merchant ships. As a result, Germany has

been blocking agreement to the operation. The UK, for its part, does not want to approve the operation if a NATO country opts out. We are pressing the UK to allow Germany to opt out, at least for now, so that the operation can commence.

UK Domestic situation. Blair held sway on a key vote on welfare reform with a 40-vote margin (310-270), the smallest to date. Sixty-five Labour MPs voted against it, with others abstaining. This was embarrassing, but reflected the tensions between traditional and "new" labour, and highlighted that Blair is beginning to face harder going on his domestic agenda. This also helps explain some of his anxiety over making faster progress on Kosovo.

Schroeder. Following his meeting in Italy with D'Alema Tuesday, Schroeder told the NAC Wednesday that NATO's dual strategy of air strikes and diplomacy is working. He said there is no need to add, and Germany would not support, a "third element" either in the form of a pause or planning for ground troops. This fueled press stories questioning Alliance unity. Schroeder also called for a comprehensive and precise report on the Chinese Embassy bombing. Some German officials are concerned by our perceived influence with Ahtisaari, the next EU president; the EU co-opted him as their special envoy in part as a way of keeping Bonn's hand in the peace effort. Schroeder met with Ahtisaari May 17 and expressed strong support at the May 19 NAC for the Talbott-Ahtisaari-Chernomyrdin troika. On the humanitarian front, the Interior Minister announced that Germany would double its intake of refugees to 20,000. As described above, Germany continues to block agreement to the maritime visit-and-search regime for national legal reasons.

Chirac. Chirac has been steadfast in his support of our air campaign, and he (and Jospin as well) has defended it vigorously to the French public and parliament. Where France has been less helpful is in supporting planning for KFOR at NATO, out of concern that (i) moving ahead with formal NATO plans for a force would exclude the Russians and; (ii) taking such a step would in fact be a subterfuge for planning a non-permissive entry. We have taken the position that it is essential to proceed with "planning for success" in case we have to implement an agreement on short notice. We have also argued that a formal NATO force generation process is necessary to do this properly.

France is with us on our public posture toward ground troops; Vedrine said earlier this week that "the Alliance has not modified its position." Jospin has said similar things, but leaves the door open by adding that France would require a UN mandate should ground troops be required. Less helpfully, Vedrine said in a newspaper interview this week that the future international force in Kosovo should be made up of contingents from NATO, Russia, and "third countries" (neutral and regional states), and that it should be under the "aegis" of the UN. You will want to reiterate to Chirac the requirement that any force have NATO at its core.

D'Alema. Italian support on Kosovo remains critical in terms of both operational necessity and Alliance cohesion. Bolstered by your direct contacts with him, D'Alema has managed to stand with NATO while maintaining leftist support for his coalition. Nonetheless, he has shown signs of wobbliness in the last week. Given approaching European Parliament elections on June 13 and his concern that now core members of his own coalition and 60 percent of Italians oppose the bombing, D'Alema is anxious to demonstrate that he is doing everything possible to bring about a political settlement. As such, he has proposed a pause in the bombing following agreement on a draft Security Council resolution. If Milosevic resists implementation, D'Alema would then support sending in ground troops. This proposal was endorsed by the Italian Parliament on May 19, but Italian officials have assured us that it does not affect Italy's role in the Alliance. Italy has agreed to allow us to use their airport in Pescara to conduct civilian airdrops to provide humanitarian assistance in Kosovo. This effort is risky and will have low pay-off, but is our only way to provide assistance to those displaced who remain in the hills. We will be working under the auspices of the NGO International Rescue Committee, and hope to finalize arrangements so that airdrops can begin next week. We are keeping our effort quiet, until such time as we are ready to begin operations.

Italy was shaken by the assassination of the top aide to D'Alema's labor minister (the latter dined with the First Lady in Naples last week.) The Red Brigades, a notorious left wing guerilla group thought to have been eliminated, took responsibility for the attack, linking it to NATO action, raising fears that political terrorism has returned to Italy after more than a decade of relative tranquility.

Kok. The Dutch coalition government fell Wednesday when a junior partner withdrew support after the cabinet failed to secure parliamentary passage of a constitutional amendment allowing referenda. There are two possible resolutions to the crisis: early elections or a reconfigured coalition. It is likely that Kok will find a replacement for the defecting partner. In the interim, he will carry on as a caretaker, with key foreign policy positions, including participation in NATO actions in Kosovo, unchanged. Up to this point, Dutch adherence to NATO's aims has been unqualified. The government has contributed more than 20 million Dutch guilders (\$9.7 million) to humanitarian relief.

Attachments

- Tab A Points to Make for Prime Minister Blair
- Tab B Points to Make for Chancellor Schroeder
- Tab C Points to Make for President Chirac
- Tab D Points to Make for Prime D'Alema
- Tab E Points to Made for Prime Minister Kok

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
WITH BRITISH PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR

- Cook had an effective visit here, appreciate your efforts to manage the public dimension.
- Am calling Chirac, Schroeder, D'Alema, Kok, others to say:
 - We should be encouraged by what we're seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic's policies.
 - Air campaign and economic pressure are working -- some evidence Milosevic is realizing how much damage being inflicted.
 - Need to sustain air campaign. Make clear to Milosevic it will be relentless and will intensify until he meets NATO's conditions.
 - As we move ahead on the military and diplomatic fronts, we need to talk about any differences privately.
 - Publicly, we need to show the same uncompromising unity that we demonstrated at the NATO Summit. If Milosevic senses fissures, he will think he can outlast us.
 - Convinced that we need an intensive period of private discussions among us on future military and diplomatic strategy, while keeping public postures in line with one another: pursuing air strategy working, NATO doing reassessment of other options, no reason at this point to change course.
- As we discussed, NATO needs to move forward quickly with updating KFOR and generating additional forces so we can quickly move into Kosovo when Milosevic accepts conditions.
- Search and Visit. Appreciate Schroeder's dilemma, urge you to accept letting him opt out until he can get Bundestag cover.

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (b, d)
Declassify on: 5/20/09

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0862-M (1.20)
10/2/2018 KBH

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
WITH GERMAN CHANCELLOR SCHROEDER

- We should be encouraged by what we're seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic's policies.
- Air campaign and economic pressure are working -- some evidence Milosevic is realizing how much damage being inflicted.
- Need to sustain air campaign. Make clear to Milosevic it will be relentless and will intensify until he meets NATO's conditions.
- As we move ahead on the military and diplomatic fronts, we need to talk about any differences privately.
- Publicly, we need to show the same uncompromising unity that we demonstrated at the NATO Summit. If Milosevic senses fissures, he will think he can outlast us.
- Convinced that we need an intensive period of private discussions among us on future military and diplomatic strategy, while keeping public postures in line with one another: pursuing air strategy working, NATO doing reassessment of other options, no reason at this point to change course.

Update Planning

- NATO needs to move forward quickly with updating KFOR and generating additional forces so we can quickly move into Kosovo when Milosevic accepts our conditions; know that this will force you to go back to Bundestag, but hope you will.
- Deploying a force without Belgrade's consent is a much tougher issue that we need to deal with in the next several weeks. Need to discuss this privately -- and not air any differences in public.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0862-M (1.21)
10/2/2013 KBM

Visit and Search

- Almost a month since Summit, but NATO still hasn't started visit and search regime to halt oil deliveries to Yugoslav ports.
- There hasn't been a large tanker delivering oil since May 1. However, we can expect more if NATO fails to act. One tanker can replenish the Serb military's fuel supplies for a significant time.
- Understand that Germany continues to block the operation since your lawyers believe it requires a Bundestag decision. Also understand the Bundestag is out of session until mid-June. A lot of fuel can be delivered in that time.
- Urge you to agree to the operation, even if German ships cannot participate, so that we can start this operation.

Chinese Embassy

- Appreciate your effort to soothe the Chinese during your recent trip to Beijing.
- We are preparing a further report on the embassy bombing; prepared to have NATO submit its own report, but contents and delivery means should be carefully coordinated.

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
FRENCH PRESIDENT JACQUES CHIRAC

- We should be encouraged by what we're seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic's policies.
- Air campaign and economic pressure are working -- some evidence Milosevic is realizing how much damage being inflicted.
- Need to sustain air campaign. Make clear to Milosevic it will be relentless and will intensify until he meets NATO's conditions.
- As we move ahead on the military and diplomatic fronts, we need to talk about any differences privately.
- Publicly, we need to show the same uncompromising unity that we demonstrated at the NATO Summit. If Milosevic senses fissures, he will think he can outlast us.
- Convinced that we need an intensive period of private discussions among us on future military and diplomatic strategy, while keeping public postures in line with one another: pursuing air strategy working, NATO doing reassessment of other options, no reason at this point to change course.

Update Military Planning

- NATO needs to move forward quickly with updating KFOR and generating additional forces. Understand you have some concerns about excluding Russians, but I think we can do this in a way that allows for involving Russians when we get a deal. Important to proceed now, though.
- Need to look hard for additional military police and gendarmes to establish secure environment.

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 5/20/09

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0362-M (1.22)
10/2/2018 KBH

- Saw Vedrine's comments about UN-mandated force for Kosovo made up of NATO, Russia, and "neutral" contingents. We have always said we would seek a UN mandate, but have to reiterate concerns about uncoordinated force without NATO command and control. Refugees will not go back without NATO at core of international security force.
- Deploying a force into a non-permissive environment is a much tougher issue that we need to deal with in the next several weeks. What are your thoughts on forced-entry option?

Chinese Embassy

- We are preparing a further report on the Chinese embassy bombing; prepared to have NATO submit its own report, but contents and delivery means should be carefully coordinated.

Humanitarian

- Believe we are meeting the immediate needs of refugees, but I know you share my concern about conditions of the up to 700,000 displaced people inside Kosovo, particularly as winter approaches.
- You expressed interest in humanitarian airdrops early on. I think you are aware that we hope to start civilian airdrops, with an NGO and a private contractor, shortly. We would welcome your involvement in this initiative.

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER D'ALEMA

- We should be encouraged by what we're seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic's policies.
- Air campaign and economic pressure are working -- some evidence Milosevic is realizing how much damage being inflicted.
- Need to sustain air campaign. Make clear to Milosevic it will be relentless and will intensify until he meets NATO's conditions.
- As we move ahead on the military and diplomatic fronts, we need to talk about any differences privately.
- Publicly, we need to show the same uncompromising unity that we demonstrated at the NATO Summit. If Milosevic senses fissures, he will think he can outlast us.
- Convinced that we need an intensive period of private discussions among us on future military and diplomatic strategy, while keeping public postures in line with one another: pursuing air strategy working, NATO doing reassessment of other options, no reason at this point to change course.

Update Planning

- Must also plan for success. Need to move forward quickly to approve updated plan for KFOR and to raise the additional forces that will be required.
- Need to look hard for additional military police and carabinieri to establish secure environment. Italy has such capabilities; are you ready to contribute?

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5(b, d)
Declassify On: 5/20/09

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2014-0862-M (1.23)
10/2/2018 KBH

- Deploying a force into a non-permissive environment is a much tougher issue that we need to deal with in the next several weeks. I was struck by your proposal that we might do this if Milosevic failed to abide by a UN resolution restating NATO's conditions and endorsing a force.
- Need to discuss this privately and not make Milosevic think we're divided in our purpose or faltering in our determination.

Humanitarian

- Grateful to Italy for allowing us to use airport in Pascara for civilian airdrops inside Kosovo that we are planning with the NGO International Rescue Committee.
- Very concerned with condition of IDPs, given reports of extreme food shortages and particularly as winter approaches.

Bomb Dumping

- Want you to know how much Hillary enjoyed seeing you in Naples last week and finally meeting your wife, Linda. She mentioned to me your concern about NATO jettisoning bombs in the Adriatic. Want you to know that Bill Cohen and Hugh Shelton got right on top of the problem. Understand it has been resolved: your military chose new sites further out to sea and NATO is preparing a plan to recover ordnance already jettisoned.

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
WITH DUTCH PRIME MINISTER KOK

- We should be encouraged by what we're seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic's policies.
- Air campaign and economic pressure are working -- some evidence Milosevic is realizing how much damage being inflicted.
- Need to sustain air campaign. Make clear to Milosevic it will be relentless and will intensify until he meets NATO's conditions.
- As we move ahead on the military and diplomatic fronts, we need to talk about any differences privately.
- Publicly, we need to show the same uncompromising unity that we demonstrated at the NATO Summit. If Milosevic senses fissures, he will think he can outlast us.
- Convinced that we need an intensive period of private discussions among us on future military and diplomatic strategy, while keeping public postures in line with one another: pursuing air strategy working, NATO doing reassessment of other options, no reason at this point to change course.

Plan for Success

- Must also plan for success. Need to move forward quickly to approve updated plan for KFOR and to raise the additional forces that will be required to move into Kosovo when Belgrade accepts our conditions.
- Need to look hard for additional military police and gendarmes to establish secure environment.
- Wonder whether you could make available some of your superb Maree Chausee (may-RAY show-SAY)?

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5(b)(d)
Declassify on: 5/20/09

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0862-M (1.24)
10/2/2018 KBH

- Deploying a force without Belgrade's OK is a much tougher issue we need to deal with in the next several weeks.
- Need to discuss this privately and not let public debate over ground forces make Milosevic think we're divided in our purpose or faltering in our determination.

OPED

Ed

Do you think we should
send revised Chirac
and D'Almeida points
forward?

Cathy -

Let's not send forward.

Cathy

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NN      NN  OOOOOOOO  NN      NN  EEEEEEEE
NNN     NN  OOOOOOOO  NNN     NN  EEEEEEEE
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NN      NNN  OOOOOOOO  NN      NNN  EEEEEEEE
NN      NN  OOOOOOOO  NN      NN  EEEEEEEE

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
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SYSTEMID: CPUA
PRINT DATE: 05/26/1999
PRINT TIME: 15:07:17

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FILE CREATE TIME: 15:07:12
DIST: NSDMK

START

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 21, 1999



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ANTONY BLINKEN *(AJG)*

FROM: LAWRENCE BUTLER *(P)*

SUBJECT: Presidential Telephone Calls to European Leaders on Kosovo

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding talking points for his calls to Blair, Schroeder, Chirac, D'Alema and Kok to bolster allied solidarity, per his request at today's Foreign Policy Team meeting.

Concurrence by: Greg Schulte, Miriam Sapiro, Sam Moyn, Phil Gordon

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

- Tab I Memo to the President
- Tab A Points to be Made for Prime Minister Blair
- Tab B Points to be Made for Chancellor Schroeder
- Tab C Points to be Made for President Chirac
- Tab D Points to be Made for Prime Minister D'Alema
- Tab E Points to be Made for Prime Minister Kok

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRM/NARA, Date 10/2/2018
2014-0842-M

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
FRENCH PRESIDENT JACQUES CHIRAC

- We should be encouraged by what we're seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic's policies.
- Air campaign and economic pressure are working -- some evidence Milosevic is realizing how much damage being inflicted.
- Need to sustain air campaign. Make clear to Milosevic it will be relentless and will intensify until he meets NATO's conditions.
- As we move ahead on the military and diplomatic fronts, we need to talk about any differences privately.
- Publicly, we need to show the same uncompromising unity that we demonstrated at the NATO Summit. If Milosevic senses fissures, he will think he can outlast us.
- Convinced that we need an intensive period of private discussions among us on future military and diplomatic strategy, while keeping public postures in line with one another: pursuing air strategy working, NATO doing reassessment of other options, no reason at this point to change course.

Update Military Planning

- NATO needs to move forward quickly with updating KFOR and generating additional forces. Understand you have some concerns about excluding Russians, but I think we can do this in a way that allows for involving Russians when we get a deal. Important to proceed now, though.
- Need to look hard for additional military police and gendarmes to establish secure environment.

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 5/20/09

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0862-M (1.25)
10/2/2013 KBH

- Saw Vedrine's comments about UN-mandated force for Kosovo made up of NATO, Russia, and "neutral" contingents. We have always said we would seek a UN mandate, but have to reiterate concerns about uncoordinated force without NATO command and control. Refugees will not go back without NATO at core of international security force.
- Deploying a force into a non-permissive environment is a much tougher issue that we need to deal with in the next several weeks. What are your thoughts on forced-entry option?

Diplomacy Advancing

- Appreciate your support for Ahtisaari-Chernomyrdin efforts. Strobe and Martti going back to Moscow next week, but Friday's talks were difficult.
- Need to keep moving on this track, but still have big differences with Russians on key issues like composition of force, need for total withdrawal of FRY forces.

Chinese Embassy

- We are preparing a further report on the Chinese embassy bombing; prepared to have NATO submit its own report, but contents and delivery means should be carefully coordinated.

Humanitarian

- Believe we are meeting the immediate needs of refugees, but I know you share my concern about conditions of the up to 700,000 displaced people inside Kosovo, particularly as winter approaches.
- You expressed interest in humanitarian airdrops early on. I think you are aware that we hope to start civilian airdrops, with an NGO and a private contractor, shortly. We would welcome your involvement in this initiative.

added

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
WITH GERMAN CHANCELLOR SCHROEDER

- We should be encouraged by what we're seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic's policies.
- Air campaign and economic pressure are working -- some evidence Milosevic is realizing how much damage being inflicted.
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- Convinced that we need an intensive period of private discussions among us on future military and diplomatic strategy, while keeping public postures in line with one another: pursuing air strategy working, NATO doing reassessment of other options, no reason at this point to change course.

Update Planning

- NATO needs to move forward quickly with updating KFOR and generating additional forces so we can quickly move into Kosovo when Milosevic accepts our conditions; know that this will force you to go back to Bundestag, but hope you will.
- Deploying a force without Belgrade's consent is a much tougher issue that we need to deal with in the next several weeks. Need to discuss this privately -- and not air any differences in public.

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (b, d)
Declassify on: 5/20/09

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0862-M (1.26)
10/2/2013 KBH

Visit and Search

- Almost a month since Summit, but NATO still hasn't started visit and search regime to halt oil deliveries to Yugoslav ports.
- There hasn't been a large tanker delivering oil since May 1. However, we can expect more if NATO fails to act. One tanker can replenish the Serb military's fuel supplies for a significant time.
- Understand that Germany continues to block the operation since your lawyers believe it requires a Bundestag decision. Also understand the Bundestag is out of session until mid-June. A lot of fuel can be delivered in that time.
- Urge you to agree to the operation, even if German ships cannot participate, so that we can start this operation.

Diplomacy Advancing

- Pleased that you met with Strobe last week and appreciate your support for Ahtisaari-Chernomyrdin efforts. Strobe and Martti going back to Moscow next week, but Friday's talks were difficult.
- Need to keep moving on this track, but still have big differences with Russians on key issues like composition of force, need for total withdrawal of FRY forces.

Chinese Embassy

- Appreciate your effort to soothe the Chinese during your recent trip to Beijing.
- We are preparing a further report on the embassy bombing; prepared to have NATO submit its own report, but contents and delivery means should be carefully coordinated.

*This
section
added*

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER D'ALEMA

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0862-M (1.27)
10/2/2013 KBH

- We should be encouraged by what we're seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic's policies.
- Air campaign and economic pressure are working -- some evidence Milosevic is realizing how much damage being inflicted.
- Need to sustain air campaign. Make clear to Milosevic it will be relentless and will intensify until he meets NATO's conditions.
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- Convinced that we need an intensive period of private discussions among us on future military and diplomatic strategy, while keeping public postures in line with one another: pursuing air strategy working, NATO doing reassessment of other options, no reason at this point to change course.

Update Planning

- Must also plan for success. Need to move forward quickly to approve updated plan for KFOR and to raise the additional forces that will be required.
- Need to look hard for additional military police and carabinieri to establish secure environment. Italy has such capabilities; are you ready to contribute?

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5(b, d)
Declassify On: 5/20/09

- Deploying a force into a non-permissive environment is a much tougher issue that we need to deal with in the next several weeks. I was struck by your proposal that we might do this if Milosevic failed to abide by a UN resolution restating NATO's conditions and endorsing a force.
- Need to discuss this privately and not make Milosevic think we're divided in our purpose or faltering in our determination.

Diplomacy Advancing

- Appreciate your support for Ahtisaari-Chernomyrdin efforts. Strobe and Martti going back to Moscow next week, but Friday's talks were difficult.
- Need to keep moving on this track, but still have big differences with Russians on key issues like composition of force, need for total withdrawal of FRY forces.

Humanitarian

- Grateful to Italy for allowing us to use airport in Pascara for civilian airdrops inside Kosovo that we are planning with the NGO International Rescue Committee.
- Very concerned with condition of IDPs, given reports of extreme food shortages and particularly as winter approaches.

Bomb Dumping

- Want you to know how much Hillary enjoyed seeing you in Naples last week and finally meeting your wife, Linda. She mentioned to me your concern about NATO jettisoning bombs in the Adriatic. Want you to know that Bill Cohen and Hugh Shelton got right on top of the problem. Understand it has been resolved: your military chose new sites further out to sea and NATO is preparing a plan to recover ordnance already jettisoned.

This section added }



5/13
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

May 19, 1999

9909491

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

'99 MAY 19 P2:12

S/SSM 5/19

To POTUS



UNCLASSIFIED

TO: The Secretary

FROM: EUR E. Anthony Wayne, Acting *EAW*

SUBJECT: Resignation of Dutch Government

Prime Minister Wim Kok presented May 19 the resignation of his government to Queen Beatrix due to a narrow domestic issue. This step became inevitable when the First Chamber of Parliament rejected, May 18, an amendment to the constitution allowing referenda on municipal-level decisions. The junior coalition partner, Democrats 66 (D66), had conditioned participation in the government coalition to the amendment's adoption.

The Queen will now consult key political figures on the next step. There are two options: early elections or trying to patch up the coalition without D66. It is too early to tell which option will be selected. The government will carry on in a caretaker status until the political crisis is resolved.

The cabinet's resignation will not affect key foreign policy matters, including Dutch participation in NATO actions in Kosovo.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- 2 -

May 19, 1999

Drafter:

EUR/UBI:OGDeSoto *W*

ID: IM GON Resigns 990519 ext. 7-6557

Clearance:

EUR/UBI:JLeCroy *W*

Clearance:

P:ERubin *W*

UNCLASSIFIED

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
WITH BRITISH PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR

- Cook had an effective visit here, appreciate your efforts to manage the public dimension. We should be encouraged by what we're seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic's policies.
- Am calling Chirac, Schroeder, D'Alema, Kok, others to say:
 - As we move ahead on the military and diplomatic fronts, we need to talk about any differences privately.
 - Publicly, we need to show the same uncompromising unity that we demonstrated at the NATO Summit. If Milosevic senses fissures, he will think he can outlast us.
 - Only a clear demonstration of common resolve will bring him to accept our conditions so we can end the conflict on our terms -- not his.
 - Air campaign and economic pressure are working -- some evidence Milosevic is realizing how much damage being inflicted.
 - Need to sustain air campaign. Make clear to Milosevic it will be relentless and will intensify until he meets NATO's conditions.
 - Should use G-8 process to bring Russia along while reinforcing NATO's conditions; avoid creating unnecessary fissures with Russia; work out any problems in Quint before exposing allied differences in front of Russia.
- As we discussed, NATO needs to move forward quickly with updating KFOR and generating additional forces so we can quickly move into Kosovo when Milosevic accepts conditions.
- Search and Visit. Appreciate Schroeder's dilemma, urge you to accept letting him opt out until he can get Bundestag cover.

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
WITH GERMAN CHANCELLOR SCHROEDER

Need for Unity

- As we move ahead on the military and diplomatic fronts, we need to talk about any differences privately.
- Publicly, we need to show the same uncompromising unity that we demonstrated at the NATO Summit. If Milosevic senses fissures, he will think he can outlast us.
- Only a clear demonstration of common resolve will bring him to accept our conditions so we can end the conflict on our terms -- not his.

Air Campaign, ~~Diplomacy~~ Working

- We should be encouraged by what we're seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic's policies.
- No question our air campaign and economic pressure are having an effect. Some evidence Milosevic is realizing how much damage being inflicted.
- We need to sustain air campaign. Make clear to Milosevic it will be relentless and will intensify until he meets NATO's conditions.

Need for Unity

- Should use G-8 process to bring Russia along while reinforcing NATO's conditions; avoid creating unnecessary fissures with Russia; work out any problems in Quint before exposing allied differences in front of Russia;

Update Planning

- NATO needs to move forward quickly with updating KFOR and generating additional forces so we can quickly move into Kosovo when Milosevic accepts our conditions; know that this will force you to go back to Bundestag, but hope you will.
- Deploying a force without Belgrade's consent is a much tougher issue that we need to deal with in the next several weeks.

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5(b)(d)
Declassify on: 5/20/09

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2014-0862-M (1.29)
10/2/2018 KBH

Need to discuss this privately -- and not air any differences in public.

Visit and Search

- Almost a month since Summit, but NATO still hasn't started visit and search regime to halt oil deliveries to Yugoslav ports.
- There hasn't been a large tanker delivering oil since May 1. However, we can expect more if NATO fails to act. One tanker can replenish the Serb military's fuel supplies for a significant time.
- Understand that Germany continues to block the operation since your lawyers believe it requires a Bundestag decision. Also understand the Bundestag is out of session until mid-June. A lot of fuel can be delivered in that time.
- Urge you to agree to the operation, even if German ships cannot participate, so that we can start this operation.

Chinese Embassy

- Appreciate your effort to soothe the Chinese during your recent trip to Beijing.
- We are preparing a further report on the embassy bombing; prepared to have NATO submit its own report, but contents and delivery means should be carefully coordinated.

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
FRENCH PRESIDENT JACQUES CHIRAC

Need for Unity

- Have appreciated your strong support for air campaign. What we need most right now is unity and your statements have been big help. Hope you can encourage Gerhard and Massimo not to stray too far in public from our common positions.
- Publicly, we need to show the same uncompromising unity that we demonstrated at the NATO Summit. If Milosevic senses fissures, he will think he can outlast us.
- Only a clear demonstration of common resolve will bring him to accept our conditions so we can end the conflict on our terms -- not his.

Air Campaign Working/~~Diplomacy Progressing~~

- We should be encouraged by what we're seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic's policies.
- No question our air campaign and economic pressure are having an effect. Also some evidence Milosevic is realizing how much damage being inflicted.
- Need to sustain air campaign. Make clear to Milosevic it will be relentless and will intensify until he meets NATO's conditions.
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Update Military Planning

- NATO needs to move forward quickly with updating KFOR and generating additional forces. Understand you have some concerns about excluding Russians, but I think we can do this in a way that allows for involving Russians when we get a deal. Important to proceed now, though.

SECRET

Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 5/20/09

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2014-0862-M (1.30)
10/2/2013 KBH

- Need to look hard for additional military police and gendarmes to establish secure environment.
- Saw Vedrine's comments about UN-mandated force for Kosovo made up of NATO, Russia, and "neutral" contingents. We have always said we would seek a UN mandate, but have to reiterate concerns about uncoordinated force without NATO command and control. Refugees will not go back without NATO at core of international security force.
- Deploying a force into a non-permissive environment is a much tougher issue that we need to deal with in the next several weeks. What are your thoughts on forced-entry option?

Chinese Embassy

- We are preparing a further report on the Chinese embassy bombing; prepared to have NATO submit its own report, but contents and delivery means should be carefully coordinated.

Humanitarian

- Believe we are meeting the immediate needs of refugees, but I know you share my concern about conditions of the up to 700,000 displaced people inside Kosovo, particularly as winter approaches.
- You expressed interest in humanitarian airdrops early on. I think you are aware that we hope to start civilian airdrops, with an NGO and a private contractor, shortly. We would welcome your involvement in this initiative.

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER D'ALEMA

Need for Unity

- As we move ahead on the military and diplomatic fronts, we need to talk about any differences privately.
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- Only a clear demonstration of common resolve will bring him to accept our conditions so we can end the conflict on our terms -- not his.

Military Campaign Working

- Wanted to touch base this week on Kosovo. Should be encouraged by what we're seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic's policies.
- No question our air campaign and economic pressure are having an effect. Also some evidence Milosevic himself is realizing how much damage being inflicted.
- We need to sustain air campaign. Make clear to Milosevic it will be relentless and it will intensify until he meets NATO's conditions.
- Need also to increase pressure on Milosevic in other ways. I know NATO's maritime visit and search regime will create additional burden for Italy, but hope for your full support.

D'Alema Initiative Need for Unity

- Have been briefed on your proposal for a pause following a UN Security Council resolution. I might be willing to consider such a step if -- and that's a big if -- Moscow and Beijing agree to a resolution that fulfills NATO and G-8 conditions. It would also have to be clear that we would resume air operations automatically if there is no verifiable withdrawal right after.

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5(b) (d)
Declassify On: 5/20/09

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**
2014-0862-M (1.31)
10/2/2018 KBH

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
WITH DUTCH PRIME MINISTER KOK

Need for Unity

- As we move ahead on the military and diplomatic fronts, we need to talk about any differences privately.
- Publicly, we need to show the same uncompromising unity that we demonstrated at the NATO Summit. If Milosevic senses fissures, he will think he can outlast us.
- Only a clear demonstration of common resolve will bring him to accept our conditions so we can end the conflict on our terms -- not his.
- ~~Want to get status report on your political situation; appreciate your public statement that domestic developments will not affect Kosovo cooperation and diplomacy.~~

Air Campaign, ~~Diplomacy~~ Working

- Should be encouraged by what we're seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic's policies.
- No question air campaign and economic pressure are working. Also evidence that Milosevic is realizing how much damage being inflicted.
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Plan For Success

- Must also plan for success. Need to move forward quickly to approve updated plan for KFOR and to raise the additional forces that will be required to move into Kosovo when Belgrade accepts our conditions.
- Need to look hard for additional military police and gendarmes to establish secure environment.
- Wonder whether you could make available some of your superb Maree Chausee (may-RAY show-SAY)?

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
WITH BRITISH PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR

① For others

① • Cook had an effective visit here, appreciate your efforts to manage the public dimension. We should be encouraged by what we're seeing in Serbia: Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic's policies.

② • Am calling Chirac, Schroeder, D'Alema, Kok others to say:

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- ~~Only a clear demonstration of common resolve will bring him to accept our conditions so we can end the conflict on our terms -- not his.~~

• AS we discussed, NATO needs to move forward quickly with updating KFOR and generating additional forces so we can quickly move into Kosovo when Milosevic accepts conditions.

③ • Search and Visit. Appreciate Schroeder's dilemma, urge you to accept letting him opt out until he can get Bundestag cover.

Convinced that we need an intensive period of private discussions among us on future military and diplomatic strategy, while keeping public lines postures in line with one another: pursuing air strategy, working, NATO doing reassessment of other options, no reason at this point to change course.

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
WITH GERMAN CHANCELLOR SCHROEDER

[Handwritten signature]

Air Campaign Working

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- No question our air campaign and economic pressure are having an effect. Some evidence Milosevic is realizing how much damage being inflicted.
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Need for Unity

- As we move ahead on the military and diplomatic fronts, we need to talk about any differences privately.
- Publicly, we need to show the same uncompromising unity that we demonstrated at the NATO Summit. If Milosevic senses fissures, he will think he can outlast us.
- Only a clear demonstration of common resolve will bring him to accept our conditions so we can end the conflict on our terms -- not his.

Update Planning

- NATO needs to move forward quickly with updating KFOR and generating additional forces so we can quickly move into Kosovo when Milosevic accepts our conditions; know that this will force you to go back to Bundestag, but hope you will.
- Deploying a force without Belgrade's consent is a much tougher issue that we need to deal with in the next several weeks. Need to discuss this privately -- and not air any differences in public.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2014-0862-M (1.34)

10/2/2018 KBH

Visit and Search

- Almost a month since Summit, but NATO still hasn't started visit and search regime to halt oil deliveries to Yugoslav ports.
- There hasn't been a large tanker delivering oil since May 1. However, we can expect more if NATO fails to act. One tanker can replenish the Serb military's fuel supplies for a significant time.
- Understand that Germany continues to block the operation since your lawyers believe it requires a Bundestag decision. Also understand the Bundestag is out of session until mid-June. A lot of fuel can be delivered in that time.
- Urge you to agree to the operation, even if German ships cannot participate, so that we can start this operation.

Chinese Embassy

- Appreciate your effort to soothe the Chinese during your recent trip to Beijing.
- We are preparing a further report on the embassy bombing; prepared to have NATO submit its own report, but contents and delivery means should be carefully coordinated.

LS

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
FRENCH PRESIDENT JACQUES CHIRAC

Air Campaign Working

- We should be encouraged by what we're seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic's policies.
- No question our air campaign and economic pressure are having an effect. Also some evidence Milosevic is realizing how much damage being inflicted.
- Need to sustain air campaign. Make clear to Milosevic it will be relentless and will intensify until he meets NATO's conditions.

Need for Unity

- Have appreciated your strong support for air campaign. What we need most right now is unity and your statements have been big help. Hope you can encourage Gerhard and Massimo not to stray too far in public from our common positions.
- Publicly, we need to show the same uncompromising unity that we demonstrated at the NATO Summit. If Milosevic senses fissures, he will think he can outlast us.
- Only a clear demonstration of common resolve will bring him to accept our conditions so we can end the conflict on our terms -- not his.

Update Military Planning

- NATO needs to move forward quickly with updating KFOR and generating additional forces. Understand you have some concerns about excluding Russians, but I think we can do this in a way that allows for involving Russians when we get a deal. Important to proceed now, though.
- Need to look hard for additional military police and gendarmes to establish secure environment.

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 5/20/09

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0862-M (1.35)
10/2/2018 KBH

- Saw Vedrine's comments about UN-mandated force for Kosovo made up of NATO, Russia, and "neutral" contingents. We have always said we would seek a UN mandate, but have to reiterate concerns about uncoordinated force without NATO command and control. Refugees will not go back without NATO at core of international security force.
- Deploying a force into a non-permissive environment is a much tougher issue that we need to deal with in the next several weeks. What are your thoughts on forced-entry option?

Chinese Embassy

- We are preparing a further report on the Chinese embassy bombing; prepared to have NATO submit its own report, but contents and delivery means should be carefully coordinated.

Humanitarian

- Believe we are meeting the immediate needs of refugees, but I know you share my concern about conditions of the up to 700,000 displaced people inside Kosovo, particularly as winter approaches.
- You expressed interest in humanitarian airdrops early on. I think you are aware that we hope to start civilian airdrops, with an NGO and a private contractor, shortly. We would welcome your involvement in this initiative.

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER D'ALEMA

Air Campaign Working

- Wanted to touch base this week on Kosovo. Should be encouraged by what we're seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic's policies.
- No question our air campaign and economic pressure are having an effect. Also some evidence Milosevic himself is realizing how much damage being inflicted.
- We need to sustain air campaign. Make clear to Milosevic it will be relentless and it will intensify until he meets NATO's conditions.
- Need also to increase pressure on Milosevic in other ways. I know NATO's maritime visit and search regime will create additional burden for Italy, but hope for your full support.

Need for Unity

- Have been briefed on your proposal for a pause following a UN Security Council resolution. I might be willing to consider such a step if -- and that's a big if -- Moscow and Beijing agree to a resolution that fulfills NATO and G-8 conditions. It would also have to be clear that we would resume air operations automatically if there is no verifiable withdrawal right after.
- As we move ahead on the military and diplomatic fronts, we need to talk about any differences privately.
- Publicly, we need to show the same uncompromising unity that we demonstrated at the NATO Summit. If Milosevic senses fissures, he will think he can outlast us.
- Only a clear demonstration of common resolve will bring him to accept our conditions so we can end the conflict on our terms -- not his.

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5(b)(d)
Declassify On: 5/20/09

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0862-M (1.36)
10/2/2018 KBH

Update Planning

- Must also plan for success. Need to move forward quickly to approve updated plan for KFOR and to raise the additional forces that will be required.
- Need to look hard for additional military police and carabinieri to establish secure environment. Italy has such capabilities; are you ready to contribute?
- Deploying a force into a non-permissive environment is a much tougher issue that we need to deal with in the next several weeks. **I was struck by your proposal that we might do this if Milosevic failed to abide by a UN resolution restating NATO's conditions and endorsing a force.**
- Need to discuss this privately and not make Milosevic think we're divided in our purpose or faltering in our determination.

Humanitarian

- Grateful to Italy for allowing us to use airport in Pascara for civilian airdrops inside Kosovo that we are planning with the NGO International Rescue Committee.
- Very concerned with condition of IDPs, given reports of extreme food shortages and particularly as winter approaches.

Bomb Dumping

- Want you to know how much Hillary enjoyed seeing you in Naples last week and finally meeting your wife, Linda. She mentioned to me your concern about NATO jettisoning bombs in the Adriatic. Want you to know that Bill Cohen and Hugh Shelton got right on top of the problem. Understand it has been resolved: your military chose new sites further out to sea and NATO is preparing a plan to recover ordnance already jettisoned.

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
WITH DUTCH PRIME MINISTER KOK

Air Campaign Working

- Should be encouraged by what we're seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic's policies.
- No question air campaign and economic pressure are working. Also evidence that Milosevic is realizing how much damage being inflicted.
- Need to sustain air campaign. Make clear to Milosevic it will be relentless and will intensify until he meets NATO's conditions.

Need for Unity

- As we move ahead on the military and diplomatic fronts, we need to talk about any differences privately.
- Publicly, we need to show the same uncompromising unity that we demonstrated at the NATO Summit. If Milosevic senses fissures, he will think he can outlast us.
- Only a clear demonstration of common resolve will bring him to accept our conditions so we can end the conflict on our terms -- not his.

Plan for Success

- Must also plan for success. Need to move forward quickly to approve updated plan for KFOR and to raise the additional forces that will be required to move into Kosovo when Belgrade accepts our conditions.
- Need to look hard for additional military police and gendarmes to establish secure environment.
- Wonder whether you could make available some of your superb Maree Chausee (may-RAY show-SAY)?

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5(b)(d)
Declassify on: 5/20/09

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0862-M (1.37)
10/2/2018 KBH

- Deploying a force without Belgrade's OK is a much tougher issue we need to deal with in the next several weeks.
- Need to discuss this privately and not let public debate over ground forces make Milosevic think we're divided in our purpose or faltering in our determination.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2014-0862-M (1.38)
10/2/2018 KBH

TELEPHONE CALLS WITH
NATO LEADERS ON KOSOVO

DATE: TBD
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: TBD

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

I. PURPOSE

Bolster support for our Kosovo strategy. *Unq Alliance leaders to maintain a unified public face.*

II. BACKGROUND

At your meeting with the Foreign Policy Team on Thursday, you asked that we set up another round of calls with NATO leaders to bolster support for our Kosovo strategy. We recommend beginning with calls to Blair, Schroeder, Chirac D'Alema and Kok.

Blair. Foreign Secretary Cook was here to dampen the stories about a gap between London and Washington, ~~on how to bring the conflict in Kosovo to a successful conclusion.~~ Your intervention with Blair seems to have had the desired effect in Britain. Cook's public message was that he was here to present shared objectives, and change the focus from accidents to atrocities. In private, he pressed the argument that it is time to plus-up forces in Macedonia in preparation for either a substantially larger than planned KFOR or for a non-permissive entry. Cook sees boosting troop deployments as taking pressure off Blair to demonstrate to the British public that preparations are underway for getting the refugees home before winter sets in.

Visit and Search. As of Thursday, the visit and search regime remains blocked due to the standoff between the UK and Germany. Absent Bundestag agreement, Germany does not believe that it has a legal basis for the German navy to participate or for the German government to consent to the search of German merchant ships. As a result, Germany has

been blocking agreement to the operation. The UK, for its part, does not want to approve the operation if a NATO country opts out. We are pressing the UK to allow Germany to opt out, at least for now, so that the operation can commence.

UK Domestic situation. Blair held sway on a key vote on welfare reform with a 40-vote margin (310-270), the smallest to date. Sixty-five Labor^u MPs voted against it, with others abstaining. This was embarrassing, but reflected the tensions between traditional and "new" labor^u, and highlighted that Blair is beginning to face harder going on his domestic agenda. ^{also} this helps explain some of his anxiety over making faster⁼ progress on Kosovo.

Schroeder. Following his meeting in Italy with D'Alema Tuesday, Schroeder told the NAC Wednesday that NATO's dual strategy of air strikes and diplomacy is working. He said ~~that~~ there is no need to add, and Germany would not support, a "third element" either in the form of a pause or planning for ground troops. This fueled press stories questioning Alliance unity. Schroeder also called for a comprehensive and precise report on bombing of the Chinese Embassy. Some German officials are concerned by our perceived influence with Ahtisaari, the next EU president; the EU co-opted him as their special envoy in part as a way of keeping Bonn's hand in the peace effort. Schroeder met with Ahtisaari May 17 and expressed strong support at the May 19 NAC for the Talbott-Ahtisaari-Chernomyrdin troika. On the humanitarian front, the Interior Minister announced that Germany would double its intake of refugees to 20,000. As described above, Germany continues to block agreement to the maritime visit^o and search regime for national legal reasons. ✓

Chirac. Chirac has been steadfast in his support of our air campaign, and he (and Jospin as well) has defended it vigorously to the French public and parliament. Where France has been less helpful is in supporting planning for KFOR at NATO, out of concern that (i) [#]moving ahead with formal NATO plans for a force would exclude the Russians^o and; (ii) taking such a step would in fact be a subterfuge for planning a non-permissive entry. We have taken the position that it is essential to proceed with "planning for success" in case we have to implement an agreement on short notice. We have also argued that a formal NATO force generation process is necessary to do this properly.

France is with us on our public posture toward ground troops; Vedrine said earlier this week that "the Alliance has not modified its position." Jospin has said similar things, but leaves the door open by adding that France would require a UN mandate should ground troops be required. Less helpfully, Vedrine said in a newspaper interview this week that the future international force in Kosovo should be made up of contingents from NATO, Russia, and "third countries" (neutral and regional states), and that it should be under the "aegis" of the UN. You will want to reiterate to Chirac the requirement that any force have NATO at its core.

D'Alema. Italian support on Kosovo remains critical in terms of both operational necessity and Alliance cohesion. Bolstered by your direct contacts with him, D'Alema has managed to stand with NATO while maintaining leftist support for his coalition. Nonetheless, he has shown signs of wobbliness in the last week. Given approaching European Parliament elections on June 13 and his concern that now core members of his own coalition and 60 percent of Italians oppose the bombing, D'Alema is anxious to demonstrate that he is doing everything possible to bring about a political settlement. As such, he has proposed a pause in the bombing following agreement on a draft Security Council resolution. If Milosevic resists implementation, D'Alema would then support sending in ground troops. This proposal was endorsed by the Italian Parliament on May 19, but Italian officials have assured us that it does not affect Italy's role in the Alliance. Italy has agreed to allow us to use their airport in Pescara to conduct civilian airdrops to provide humanitarian assistance in Kosovo. This effort is risky and will have low pay-off, but is our only way to provide assistance to those displaced who remain in the hills. We will be working under the auspices of the NGO International Rescue Committee, and hope to finalize arrangements so that airdrops can begin next week. We are keeping our effort quiet, until such time as we are ready to begin operations.

Italy was shaken by the assassination of the top aide to D'Alema's labor minister (the latter dined with the First Lady in Naples last week.) The Red Brigades, a notorious left wing guerilla group thought to have been eliminated, took responsibility for the attack, linking it to NATO action, raising fears that political terrorism has returned to Italy after more than a decade of relative tranquility.

Kok. The Dutch coalition government fell Wednesday when a junior partner withdrew support after the cabinet failed to secure parliamentary passage of a constitutional amendment allowing referenda. There are two possible resolutions to the crisis: early elections or a reconfigured coalition. It is likely that Kok will find a replacement for the defecting partner. In the interim, he will carry on as a caretaker, with key foreign policy positions, including participation in NATO actions in Kosovo, unchanged. Up to this point, Dutch adhesion to NATO's aims has been unqualified. The government has contributed more than 20 million Dutch guilders (\$9.7 million) to humanitarian relief.

Attachments

- Tab A Points to Make for Prime Minister Blair
- Tab B Points to Make for Chancellor Schroeder
- Tab C Points to Make for President Chirac
- Tab D Points to Make for Prime D'Alema
- Tab E Points to Made for Prime Minister Kok

- Time now for NATO to also plan for success. Need to move forward quickly to approve updated plan for KEOR and to raise the additional forces that will be required.
- Need to look hard for additional military police and ~~gondarmes~~^{carabinieri} to establish secure environment. Italy has such capabilities; are you ready to contribute?
- Deploying a force into a non-permissive environment is a much tougher issue that we need to deal with in the next several weeks. I was struck by your proposal that we might do this if Milosevic failed to abide by a UN resolution restating NATO's conditions and endorsing a force.
- ~~We~~ need to discuss this privately ^{and not} and not air any differences in public. Our strength is in unity. We cannot have a public debate over ground forces that makes Milosevic think we're divided in our purpose or faltering in our determination.

Humanitarian

- Grateful to Italy for allowing us to use ~~their~~ airport in Pascara for ~~the~~ civilian airdrops inside Kosovo that we are planning with the NGO International Rescue Committee.
- Very concerned with ~~the~~ condition of ~~the~~ IDPs, given reports of extreme food shortages and particularly as winter approaches.

Bomb Dumping

- Want you to know how much Hillary enjoyed seeing you in Naples last week and finally meeting your wife, Linda. She mentioned to me your concern about NATO jettisoning bombs in the Adriatic. Want you to know that Bill Cohen and Hugh Shelton got right on top of the problem. Understand it has been resolved: your military chose new sites further out to sea and NATO is preparing a plan to recover ordnance already jettisoned.

DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526
 2014-0862-M (1.39)
 10/2/2013 KBH

*D'Alena
 carabinieri
 (Italian)
 delete
 gendarmes*

Davies, Glyn T.

From: Schulte, Gregory L.
Sent: Friday, May 21, 1999 11:12 AM
To: @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary
Subject: Points to Add after G-8 Part of Call Package [UNCLASSIFIED]

Ⓢ *Need for Unity*

- ~~As we move ahead on the military and diplomatic fronts, we need to talk about any differences privately.~~
- Publicly, we need to show the same uncompromising unity that we demonstrated at the NATO Summit. If Milosevic senses fissures, he will think he can outlast us.
- Only a clear demonstration of common resolve will bring him to accept our conditions so ~~that~~ we can end the conflict on our terms -- not his. *?*

Ed

gendarmes is French

carabinieri is Italian

I think they meant
for this to used in
appropriate points
Chirac - Gendarmes
d'Alone Carabinieri

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SPOOLID: 1773
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 PRINTER: PRTGRP4L
 SYSTEMID: CPUA
 PRINT DATE: 05/26/1999
 PRINT TIME: 15:01:40

USER/NODEID: NSDMK CPUA
 FILENAME/TYPE: NONE NONE
 FILE CREATE DATE: 05/26/1999
 FILE CREATE TIME: 14:49:03
 DIST: NSDMK

START

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
FRENCH PRESIDENT JACQUES CHIRAC

Need for Unity (do not use first 3 bullets; put 2 last 2 bullets after this one)

- Have appreciated your strong support for air campaign. What we need most right now is unity and your statements have been big help. Hope you can encourage Gerhard and Massimo not to stray too far in public from our common positions.

Air Campaign Working/Diplomacy Progressing

- We should be encouraged by what we're seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic's policies.
- No question ~~that~~ our air campaign and economic pressure are having an effect. ~~There is also some evidence that Milosevic himself is realizing the amount of damage being inflicted.~~ *how much*
- ~~We need to continue to sustain the~~ air campaign. Make clear to Milosevic ~~that~~ it will be relentless and ~~it~~ will intensify *de* until he meets NATO's conditions.
- Must make clear to Milosevic that he cannot outlast NATO. Must not let him think that we're desperate for a diplomatic solution or are willing to compromise our conditions.
- ~~We should use G-8 process to bring Russia along while reinforcing NATO's conditions; avoid creating unnecessary fissures with Russia; or showing signs of disarray to Milosevic; work out any problems in Quint before exposing allied differences in front of Russia;~~

Update Military Planning

- NATO needs to move forward quickly with updating KFOR and generating additional forces. Understand you have some concerns about excluding Russians, but I think we can do this in a way that allows for involving Russians when we get a deal. Important to proceed now, though.
- Need to look hard for additional military police and gendarmes ~~carabinieri~~ *carabinieri* to establish secure environment.

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
WITH GERMAN CHANCELLOR SCHROEDER

Air Campaign, Diplomacy Working

- We should be encouraged by what we're seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic's policies.
- No question ~~that~~ our air campaign and economic pressure are having an effect. ~~There is also some evidence that Milosevic himself is realizing the amount of damage being inflicted.~~
how much
- We need to ~~continue~~ to sustain the air campaign. Make clear to Milosevic ~~that~~ it will be relentless^o and ~~we~~ will intensify^o until he meets NATO's conditions.
- Must make clear to Milosevic that he cannot outlast NATO. Unity is paramount. Must not let him think that we're desperate for a diplomatic solution or are willing to compromise our conditions.
- ~~We~~ should use G-8 process to bring Russia along while reinforcing NATO's conditions; avoid creating unnecessary fissures with Russia; ~~or showing signs of disarray to Milosevic;~~ work out any problems in Quint before exposing allied differences in front of Russia;

Update Planning

- NATO needs to move forward quickly with updating KFOR and generating additional forces so ~~that~~ we can quickly move into Kosovo when Milosevic accepts our conditions; ^{know} that this will force you to go back to Bundestag, but hope ~~that~~ you will.
- Deploying a force without Belgrade's consent is a much tougher issue that we need to deal with in the next several weeks.
- We need to discuss this privately -- and not air any differences in public. ~~Our strength is in unity. We cannot public debate over ground forces to make Milosevic think we're divided in our purpose or faltering in our determination.~~

Visit and Search

- Almost a month since ~~the~~ Summit, but NATO still hasn't started ~~its~~ visit and search regime to ~~help~~ halt oil deliveries to Yugoslav ports.
- There hasn't been a large tanker delivering oil since May 1. However, we can expect more if NATO fails to act. One tanker can replenish the Serb military's fuel supplies for a significant time.
- Understand that German⁷ continues to block the operation since your lawyers believe it requires a Bundestag decision. Also understand ~~that~~ the Bundestag is out of session until mid-June. A lot of fuel can be delivered in that time.
- I urge you to agree to the operation, even if German ships cannot participate, so that we can start this operation.

Chinese Embassy

- Appreciate your effort to soothe the Chinese during your recent trip to Beijing.
- We are preparing a further report on the embassy bombing; prepared to have NATO submit its own report, but contents and delivery means should be carefully coordinated.

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
WITH BRITISH PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR

- Cook had an effective visit here, appreciate your efforts to manage the public dimension. We should be encouraged by what we're seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic's policies.

- Am calling Chirac, Schroeder, D'Alema, ^{Kol} others to ^{say:} ~~pass along~~ message:

~~insert~~

- ~~that our~~ air campaign and economic pressure are ^{working,} ~~having an~~ effect, some evidence ~~that~~ Milosevic himself is realizing ^{how much} ~~the amount of~~ damage being inflicted.

- need to ~~continue to~~ sustain the air campaign. ^{and} Make clear to Milosevic ~~that~~ it will be relentless ~~and it~~ will intensify until he meets NATO's conditions.

- must make clear to Milosevic ~~that~~ he cannot outlast NATO. Unity is paramount. Must not let him think that we're desperate for a diplomatic solution or are willing to compromise our conditions.

- We should use G-8 process to bring Russia along while reinforcing NATO's conditions; avoid creating unnecessary fissures with Russia; ~~or showing signs of disarray to~~ ~~Milosevic,~~ work out any problems in Quint before exposing allied differences in front of Russia.

- As we discussed, NATO needs to move forward quickly with updating KFOR and generating additional forces so ~~that~~ we can quickly move into Kosovo when Milosevic accepts ~~our~~ conditions.

- Search and Visit. Appreciate Schroeder's dilemma, ~~with this,~~ ^u urge you to accept letting him opt out until he can ~~go back to~~ ^{get} the Bundestag ~~to get~~ cover.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0842-M (1.42)
10/2/2018 KBM

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER D'ALEMA

Need for Unity
(8)

Military Campaign Working

- Wanted to touch base this week on Kosovo. Should be encouraged by what we're seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic's policies.
- No question ~~that~~ our air campaign and economic pressure are having an effect. ~~There is also some evidence that~~ Milosevic himself is realizing ~~the amount of~~ damage being inflicted.
How much
- We need to ~~continue to~~ sustain ~~the~~ air campaign. Make clear to Milosevic ~~that~~ it will be relentless and ~~it~~ will intensify *Qe* until he meets NATO's conditions.
- Need also to increase pressure on Milosevic in other ways. I know ~~that~~ NATO's maritime visit and search regime will create ~~an~~ additional burden for Italy, but hope for your full support.
- Must make clear to Milosevic that he cannot outlast NATO. Unity is paramount. Must not let him think that we're desperate for a diplomatic solution or are willing to compromise our conditions.

D'Alema Initiative

- Have been briefed on your proposal for a pause following a UN Security Council resolution. I might be willing to consider such a step if -- and that's a big if -- Moscow and Beijing agree to a resolution that fulfills NATO and G-8 conditions. It would also have to be clear that we would resume air operations automatically if there is no verifiable withdrawal right after.

Update Planning

- Must also plan for success. Need to move forward quickly to approve updated plan for KFOR and to raise the additional forces that will be required.

SECRET

Reason: 1.5(b)(d)
Declassify On: 5/20/09

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0862-m (1.43)
10/2/2018 KBH

- Saw Vedrine's comments about a UN-mandated force for Kosovo made up of NATO, Russia, and "neutral" contingents. We have always said we would seek a UN mandate, but have to reiterate concerns about uncoordinated force without NATO command and control. Refugees will not go back without NATO at core of international security force.
- Deploying a force into a non-permissive environment is a much tougher issue that we need to deal with in the next several weeks. What are your thoughts on forced-entry option?
- We need to discuss this privately -- and not air any differences in public. Our strength is in unity. We cannot public debate over ground forces to make Milosevic think we're divided in our purpose or faltering in our determination.

Chinese Embassy

- We are preparing a further report on the Chinese embassy bombing; prepared to have NATO submit its own report, but contents and delivery means should be carefully coordinated.

Humanitarian

- Believe that we are meeting the immediate needs of the refugees, but I know that you share my concern about the conditions of the up to 700,000 displaced people inside Kosovo, particularly as winter approaches.
- You expressed interest in humanitarian airdrops early on. I think you are aware that we hope to start civilian airdrops, with an NGO and a private contractor, shortly. We would welcome your involvement in this initiative. ✓

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
WITH DUTCH PRIME MINISTER KOK

~~Need for Unity~~

~~Air Campaign, D~~

- Want to get status report on your political situation; appreciate your public statement that domestic developments will not affect Kosovo cooperation and diplomacy.

Air Campaign, Diplomacy Warheads

- Should be encouraged by what we're seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic's policies.
- No question ~~that our~~ air campaign and economic pressure are *wor/ing* having an effect. ~~There is also some evidence that~~ Milosevic himself is realizing ~~the amount of damage~~ being inflicted. *how much*
- ~~We~~ need to continue to sustain the air campaign. Make clear to Milosevic ~~that~~ it will be relentless and ~~it~~ will intensify *Q* until he meets NATO's conditions.
- Must make clear to Milosevic that he cannot outlast NATO. Unity is paramount. Must not let him think that we're desperate for a diplomatic solution or are willing to compromise our conditions.
- Must also plan for success. Need to move forward quickly to approve updated plan for KFOR and to raise the additional forces that will be required to move into Kosovo when Belgrade accepts our conditions.
- Need to look hard for additional military police and gendarmes to establish secure environment. ~~Wonder whether you could make available some of your superb~~ Maree Chausee?
- Deploying a force without Belgrade's ~~permission~~ *OK (mah-RAY show-SAY)* is a much tougher issue ~~that~~ we need to deal with in the next several weeks. *te*
- ~~We~~ need to discuss this privately ~~and not air any differences in public. Our strength is in unity. We can not~~ *and* public debate over ground forces ~~to~~ make Milosevic think we're divided in our purpose or faltering in our determination. *let*

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
WITH BRITISH PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR

- Cook had an effective visit here, appreciate your efforts to manage the public dimension. We should be encouraged by what we're seeing in Serbia. Demonstrations in two cities. Military desertions, including a recent incident when up to 1000 reservists left their unit. Local officials attacked for supporting Milosevic's policies.
- Am calling Chirac, Schroeder, D'Alema, Kok, others to say:
 - As we move ahead on the military and diplomatic fronts, we need to talk about any differences privately.
 - Publicly, we need to show the same uncompromising unity that we demonstrated at the NATO Summit. If Milosevic senses fissures, he will think he can outlast us.
 - Only a clear demonstration of common resolve will bring him to accept our conditions so we can end the conflict on our terms -- not his.
 - Air campaign and economic pressure are working ^{some} evidence Milosevic is realizing how much damage being inflicted.
 - Need to sustain air campaign. Make clear to Milosevic it will be relentless and will intensify until he meets NATO's conditions.
 - Should use G-8 process to bring Russia along while reinforcing NATO's conditions; avoid creating unnecessary fissures with Russia; work out any problems in Quint before exposing allied differences in front of Russia.
- As we discussed, NATO needs to move forward quickly with updating KFOR and generating additional forces so we can quickly move into Kosovo when Milosevic accepts conditions.
- Search and Visit. Appreciate Schroeder's dilemma, urge you to accept letting him opt out until he can get Bundestag cover.

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5(b) (d)
Declassify on: 5/20/09

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been blocking agreement to the operation. The UK, for its part, does not want to approve the operation if a NATO country opts out. We are pressing the UK to allow Germany to opt out, at least for now, so that the operation can commence.

UK Domestic situation. Blair held sway on a key vote on welfare reform with a 40-vote margin (310-270), the smallest to date. Sixty-five Labour MPs voted against it, with others abstaining. This was embarrassing, but reflected the tensions between traditional and "new" labour, and highlighted that Blair is beginning to face harder going on his domestic agenda. This also helps explain some of his anxiety over making faster progress on Kosovo.

Schroeder. Following his meeting in Italy with D'Alema Tuesday, Schroeder told the NAC Wednesday that NATO's dual strategy of air strikes and diplomacy is working. He said there is no need to add, and Germany would not support, a "third element" either in the form of a pause or planning for ground troops. This fueled press stories questioning Alliance unity. Schroeder also called for a comprehensive and precise report ^{on} the Chinese Embassy bombing. Some German officials are concerned by our perceived influence with Ahtisaari, the next EU president; the EU co-opted him as their special envoy in part as a way of keeping Bonn's hand in the peace effort. Schroeder met with Ahtisaari May 17 and expressed strong support at the May 19 NAC for the Talbott-Ahtisaari-Chernomyrdin troika. On the humanitarian front, the Interior Minister announced that Germany would double its intake of refugees to 20,000. As described above, Germany continues to block agreement to the maritime visit-and-search regime for national legal reasons. ✓

Chirac. Chirac has been steadfast in his support of our air campaign, and he (and Jospin as well) has defended it vigorously to the French public and parliament. Where France has been less helpful is in supporting planning for KFOR at NATO, out of concern that (i) moving ahead with formal NATO plans for a force would exclude the Russians and; (ii) taking such a step would in fact be a subterfuge for planning a non-permissive entry. We have taken the position that it is essential to proceed with "planning for success" in case we have to implement an agreement on short notice. We have also argued that a formal NATO force generation process is necessary to do this properly.