
Clinton Presidential Records Mandatory Declassification Review

This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were released in full.

To: The Secretary
From: Strobe Talbott
Subject: Your Meeting with FM Kozyrev

Kozyrev has suggested that you and he use your one-hour meeting on Thursday morning to concentrate on the future and the big picture. That's probably a good idea. It will give you a chance to engage with him on some problems looming not just between our governments but with Kozyrev's own apparent attitude and role.

Quite simply and bluntly, he's become part of the problem rather than part of the solution. You've seen Toby's rather alarming report on her private talk with Kozyrev last month in Moscow; I had a 1-on-1 lunch with him in which he sounded some of the same themes, albeit in more muted tones.

Basically, Kozyrev seems to have concluded that both his own interests and Russia's require a tougher, more nationalistic line -- one that could translate into policies that will require a stern response from us and that will certainly make it harder for us to carry out our strategy of fostering Russia's integration into the West.

This is a puzzling, disturbing development. It also has a dimension of near -- or at least potential -- tragedy to it. During the long, difficult period that the Soviet Union and the Soviet system were expiring, Kozyrev was not just a constructive force but quite a heroic one. He championed the USSR's, then Russia's, aspiration to be a modern, civilized state. He risked a lot and suffered a lot during that period.

I, for one, don't understand what has caused him to shift positions in such a basic way, but I can guess. It is certainly connected with the backlash against reform and the West that were so evident in the Dec. 12 elections and will no doubt be evident in the new Parliament. It also has to do with Kozyrev's decision to run for the Duma from a constituency -- Murmansk -- that has a large military population. (It's a consummate irony that Kozyrev and Zhirinovskiy would be the big winners in that district.) And it also stems from his feeling of continuing vulnerability to the conservatives, who will never trust or forgive him no matter how hardline his positions.

In any event, beyond the psychodrama that is playing out here, there are very real, and quite disturbing, implications for policy, since Kozyrev still has a lot of influence on Yeltsin. When the Vice President was in Moscow, we saw a vivid example of how Kozyrev can obstruct desirable developments and spin Yeltsin in the wrong direction. Kozyrev tried his best to block my suggestion of taking Mamedov to Kiev for what turned out to be a key trilateral meeting (fortunately, Chernomyrdin overruled him on the spot); and he then got to Yeltsin just before the VP came to the Kremlin. Kozyrev got Yeltsin to open the meeting with a blast -- in front of the TV

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

[2014-0905-M 1.27]

cameras -- at the Ukrainians for the perfidy and at the Americans for their naivete (that word again!). It was hardly a helpful prelude to the Kiev expedition. We've got some reason to believe that Kozyrev has not been helpful this week as we've moved to closure on the trilateral deal.

Anyway, there are severe limits on what we can do about all this, but it still makes your session with him all the more important -- and tricky.

The basic message, I think, should be this:

- o Start with some soothing words. The underlying premise of our policy toward Russia remains firm: we think the overall trends are favorable; reform will prevail; and that is a credit to President Yeltsin and the key members of his team, yourself (Kozyrev) prominently included.

- o We hope it is apparent how resolute we are in our determination to work with Russia toward its full integration into the community of democratic nations.

- One dramatic piece of evidence: President Clinton's Partnership for Peace proposal, which -- in the face of considerable pressure in another direction -- opens the door wide to Russia and preserves the principle of inclusiveness.

- Another example: In his meeting with President Yeltsin, President Clinton is right now laying out some proposals that we are making to the G-7 in order to make the international financial institutions more responsive to the social dimension of Russian reform.

- o So we're on course, Andrei, but the seas are rough, and they could get rougher. I'm particularly concerned about the danger that forces mistrustful of the U.S. and the West in your political environment are on the rise -- and that those mistrustful of Russia are on the rise in ours.

- o We understand that Russian domestic politics are a big factor in Russian foreign policy. That's part of democracy.

- o You must understand that a version of the same principle holds on our side: we have to take account of our domestic constituencies, their interests and their perceptions, in the way we formulate and implement our foreign policy.

- o We've got a troublesome interaction developing -- indeed, a potential vicious cycle. During the Cold War, you and I both saw examples of how hardliners in the US and USSR played off of each other.

- That was unhelpful when our countries were on opposite

sides of a great geopolitical and ideological struggle; it would be downright tragic if it were to happen again now that we're essentially on the same side.

o I've followed some of the harsh -- and I believe profoundly mischievous, or at least wrong-headed -- things being said by some of your politicians and commentators about our motives and actions.

o I'm sure you know that our Administration is under attack for being naive about the fundamental nature of Russia. The particularly ugly word "appeasement" has even cropped up in recent weeks.

o We've got to work together to deprive both these groups of ammunition.

-- For us, that means taking care to accommodate your interests in both the substance and the presentation of our policy -- to emphasize cooperation wherever possible, and consultation on all issues.

-- For you, it means building on the good work we're already doing in a number of areas.

The Ukraine is the most dramatic and immediate example of that. I know how decisively you've been involved as we've brought the trilateral deal to closure. It's not only going to be good for Russian-Ukrainian relations, but it's going to serve to underscore your government's willingness to work through these problems in a multilateral fashion.

1. Russia's New Parliament: On the Eve

Basic issues such as who will chair the Duma and even where the parliament will meet are still unresolved, despite the opening tomorrow of the Federal Assembly. Yeltsin has put forward draft procedural rules that expand his freedom of action with respect to the legislative branch beyond the considerable powers already provided him in the new constitution, but he lacks the votes to get these rules approved in parliament.

Blocs struggle over Duma chair

Leaders of Duma blocs still have not agreed on a candidate to chair the body. On January 6 First Deputy Prime Minister Gaydar said Russia's Choice was quitting the talks, and charged that extreme nationalists and communists were collaborating to take control of key positions in parliament. Deputy Prime Minister Shakhray, whose Party of Russian Unity and Accord boycotted the talks, has accused the four major blocs (Communists, Agrarians, Liberal Democrats, and Russia's Choice) of "unprincipled dealing." He is seeking the support of non-party deputies in his bid for the chairmanship. Ambassador Lukin and former Deputy Foreign Minister Adamishin are among those mentioned as compromise choices, but they apparently lack the support of the Communists and Zhirinovskiy's party.

In the Federation Council, where the role of parties is likely to be much weaker, First Deputy Prime Minister Shumeyko is the candidate of Russia's Choice for the chairmanship. Some anti-Yeltsin deputies are working to form regionally based coalitions, and one has proposed that deputies refuse to elect a chairman and create a different leadership structure from the one stipulated in the constitution.

Dispute over location

On December 2 Yeltsin decreed that the Duma would sit in the former CMEA building and the Federation Council in the Russian press center. All major parliamentary blocs, including Russia's Choice, objected, expressing a preference for the White House or a location in the Kremlin; the Duma's organizational committee has rejected the CMEA building as inappropriate. On January

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2014-0905-M (1.45)
2/27/2017 KBM

~~TOP SECRET~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

5 presidential chief of staff Filatov told Ambassador Pickering the two chambers would hold separate opening sessions. Less than a week before parliament convenes, it was still unclear where the deputies would meet.

Proposed parliamentary rules and staff

Yeltsin's legislative-proposals committee is preparing draft rules for the Federal Assembly that aim to prevent the Duma's leadership from developing into an alternative power center rivaling the president, as the Supreme Soviet's chairman and presidium did. The committee has allocated a strong role to the parties and parliamentary committees while giving each chamber a chairman with very limited powers. Under these rules a conference of the Duma -- made up of the chamber's chairman and his deputies, committee chairmen, and leaders of the parliamentary blocs -- would set the lower house's agenda, in consultation with the executive branch.

Parliamentary blocs would be able to recall deputies elected from party lists for failure to observe party discipline. In addition, Yeltsin has created a support staff for parliament, headed by one of his supporters.

But parliament must approve the proposed rules. Efforts to assert the independence of the legislative branch will have the support not only of the Communists, but also of some reformers, such as Yavlinskiy, who are critical of the government. Yeltsin may find he can neither set the procedures of the parliament or determine the composition of its support staff.

Political alignments within parliament

Relative party strength is still unclear in the Duma, where only half the deputies were elected from party lists. A Yeltsin aide told Embassy Moscow on January 6 the Duma would be split more or less evenly between pro- and anti-reform forces. In the Federation Council the jockeying for power between the center and the regions will create different alignments from those likely to form in the lower house. There will be greater emphasis in the Duma on economic reform and foreign policy as the opposition there tries to assert its influence over the government. Key issues in the upper house will include claims by the regions to economic powers.

Armed with a fresh popular mandate, deputies in both chambers, including some reformists, will seek to escape from the constitutional and procedural straitjacket Yeltsin is trying to impose on the legislative branch. Communists and hard-line nationalists will use the Federal Assembly as a pulpit to rally opposition to Yeltsin and the government's reform policies, and thus try to overcome parliament's lack of formal powers. Yeltsin will find the argument of democratic legitimacy, which he used in his struggle with the Supreme Soviet, turned against him.

Basic questions such as the parliament's leadership, procedures, and location are likely to be unresolved by the time you arrive in Moscow, as the political issue of the Federal Assembly's powers moves into the foreground.

~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

2. Algeria: Islamists Divided

Deep-seated rivalries plague the Islamist camp in Algeria, and the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) is losing its former dominance. More extreme groups now call the tune on armed resistance. The groups are unlikely to be able to unite against the regime anytime soon.

Algeria's Islamist opposition spans a spectrum from still-legal parties -- with little, if any, popular appeal -- to violent extremist splinters such as the Armed Islamic Group (AIG) that has claimed responsibility for attacks on foreigners. The FIS occupies the ideological middle ground.

FIS a shadow of its former self

The FIS made a strong showing in the June 1990 municipal elections and in the aborted December 1991 parliamentary vote; now banned, it probably retains the greatest popular following. Though it still probably plays an important role in mosques, charitable organizations, and on college campuses, its influence seems less relevant in the armed struggle against the regime and within the Islamist opposition. Since its legal dissolution the FIS has exerted little control over the proliferation of armed extremist groups.

Even before its troubles with the regime, the FIS was plagued with internal divisions, functioning less as a

~~TOP SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: ~~BEYRLE~~ SIT
SIT: SUM2 VAX

BURZAS
Coblenmoetter

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 101544Z JAN 94

FM AMEMBASSY MINSK

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2590
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 0036
RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY 0037
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1274

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE MINSK 000035
BRUSSELS/PRAGUE PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATELY TO
NSC BEYRLE

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: OVIP (CLINTON, WILLIAM J.), PINR, BO
SUBJECT: BIO ON PEOPLE'S ACCORD PARTY DEPUTY
CHIEF LOIKO

1. POST SUBMITS BIO DATA FOR LEONID LOIKO,
DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE PEOPLE'S ACCORD PARTY.
LOIKO IS A POSSIBILIITY FOR INCLUSION IN
PRESIDENT CLINTON'S JANUARY 15 MEETING WITH
THE DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION IN BELARUS.

(PEOPLE'S ACCORD PARTY CHAIRMAN GENNADIY
KARPENKO WILL REPORTEDLY BE OUT OF THE
COUNTRY DURING THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT.)
EMBASSY SUPPORTS THE INCLUSION OF LOIKO AS
THE REPRESENTATIVE OF A CENTRIST PARTY OF
GROWING IMPORTANCE.

2. LEONID VIKENTYEVICH LOIKO, ONE OF THREE
DEPUTY CHAIRMEN FOR THP: PARTY OF PEOPLE'S
ACCORD, IS RESPONSIBLE FOR PARTY IDEOLOGY
INCLUDING THE DEVELOPMENT OF PARTY PLATFORMS
AND PROGRAMS. HE IS CURRENTLY AN ASSOCIATE
PROFESSOR AT THE BELARUSIAN STATE UNIVERSITY
IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DIPLOMACY. LOIKO IS
CHIEF EDITOR OF THE BELARUSIAN HISTORICAL
JOURNAL "THE BELARUSIAN PAST" ("BELARUSKAYA
MINUSHCHYNA") AS WELL AS THE EDITOR OF
PEOPLE'S ACCORD PARTY NEWSPAPER "ACCORD"
("ZGODA"). ACCORDING TO WHAT LOIKO TOLD US
IN A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION JANUARY 10, HE
SERVED AS AN ADVISER (SOVETNIK) AT THE SOVIET
EMBASSY IN POLAND FROM 1981-1986. LOIKO WAS
BORN IN 1944; IN 1970 HE WAS GRADUATED FROM
THE BELARUSIAN STATE UNIVERSITY. AFTER.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0905-M (1.52)
2/27/2017 KBH

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

GRADUATION, LOIKO WORKED FOR A TIME IN THE UNIVERSITY'S HISTORY DEPARTMENT. LOIKO IS NOT/NOT A SUPREME SOVIET DEPUTY.

3. THE PEOPLE'S ACCORD PARTY, FOUNDED IN APRIL 1992 AND HEADED BY GENNADIY KARPENKO, IS PRESENTLY QUITE SMALL, WITH SLIGHTLY LESS THAN FOUR THOUSAND MEMBERS. THE PARTY HAS 5 SEATS IN PARLIAMENT, BUT CLAIMS THAT OVER THIRTY DEPUTIES REGULARLY SUPPORT PARTY POSITIONS (THROUGH THE SO-CALLED "ACCORD FACTION"). THE PARTY CONSIDERS ITSELF TO BE "OF THE CENTER" BUT ADVOCATES A MUCH QUICKER ADOPTION OF MARKET-ORIENTED REFORMS. PRIME MINISTER KEBICH REPORTEDLY OFFERED THE POST OF DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR ECONOMIC REFORM TO PARTY HEAD KARPENKO AT THE END OF 1993. ACCORDING TO RUMORS AT THE SUPREME SOVIET, KARPENKO, HAS DECIDED TO ACCEPT, BUT HAS NOT YET MADE ANY PUBLIC STATEMENT TO THIS EFFECT.

SWARTZ

BT

#0035

NNNN

<MSGID> M0817984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 04

PRT: FUERTH SIT TRIP

SIT: BEYRLE BRANSCUM BURNS FILE FORSYTHE GOTTEMOELLER POTTS SUM2 VAX WALSH W

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 111736Z JAN 94

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6157
INFO RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 3954
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY 7029
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY MINSK 6377
RUEHSD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHCH/AMEMBASSY CHISINAU 4365
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 4484
RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU 3499
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 3902
RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN 5414
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 4896
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 2497
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI 4932
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 3986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000768
WHITE HOUSE PASS PRESIDENT'S PARTY FOR S/NIS/TALBOTT
AND NSC/BURNS
DEPT FOR S/NIS, D, P, C, E, S/P, PA, EUR/ICA
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, EFIN, RS
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT YELTSIN "REFORMS" HIS REFORM CABINET
SUMMARY

1. PRESIDENT YELTSIN SIGNED A LONG-AWAITED DECREE
JANUARY 10 THAT REDUCES THE NUMBER OF DEPUTY PRIME
MINISTERS, SLASHES THE NUMBER OF MINISTRIES AND FEDERAL
AGENCIES, AND FORMALLY SUBORDINATES THE "POWER
MINISTRIES" TO THE PRESIDENT. THE NEW CABINET, WHEN
NAMED, PROBABLY WILL INCLUDE WELL-KNOWN REFORMERS SUCH
AS YEGOR GAYDAR. THE RESHUFFLE APPEARS DESIGNED TO
STREAMLINE THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS BEFORE THE NEW
PARLIAMENT -- EXPECTED TO BE SHARPLY CRITICAL OF
GOVERNMENT POLICIES -- GETS DOWN TO WORK. WHETHER IT
PRESAGES MAJOR CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT REFORM POLICIES
MAY NOT BE KNOWN UNTIL MINISTERIAL APPOINTMENTS ARE
MADE NEXT WEEK.

END SUMMARY

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2014-0905-17 (1.46)
2/27/2017 KBM

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04

2. PRESIDENT YELTSIN UNVEILED THE FIRST PART OF HIS LONG-PROMISED GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION ON JANUARY 10. ACCORDING TO HIS DECREE:

- THERE WILL BE FOUR DEPUTY PRIME MINISTERS IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT INSTEAD OF THE CURRENT NINE, WITH TWO HAVING THE STATUS OF "FIRST" DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER (THERE ARE CURRENTLY THREE); YELTSIN GAVE PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN -- CERTAIN TO REMAIN IN OFFICE -- A WEEK TO NAME THE FOUR DEPUTIES.
- THE NUMBER OF MINISTRIES IS REDUCED FROM THIRTY TO TWENTY-THREE.
- THERE WILL BE FORTY-FOUR STATE COMMITTEES AND FEDERAL AGENCIES INSTEAD OF THE CURRENT ONE HUNDRED TWENTY.
- THE SO-CALLED "POWER MINISTRIES" -- DEFENSE, INTERIOR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE -- ARE DIRECTLY SUBORDINATED TO THE PRESIDENT (THIS CODIFIES THE PREVIOUS, INFORMAL PRACTICE FOLLOWED SINCE THE SOVIET ERA). THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARDS SERVICE, THE GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION AGENCY, THE ARCHIVE SERVICE, AND THE TELEVISION AND BROADCAST SERVICE ARE ALSO UNDER THE PRESIDENT.

PERSONNEL SHUFFLE SOON

3. ALTHOUGH NO PORTFOLIOS HAVE YET BEEN FILLED THE MOSCOW RUMOR MILL IS FULL OF SPECULATION ABOUT WHO THE MINISTERS WILL BE IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT:

- CHERNOMYRDIN PROTEGE OLEG SOSKOVETS AND MARKET REFORM ARCHITECT YEGOR GAYDAR ARE EXPECTED TO REMAIN AS FIRST DEPUTY PRIME MINISGERS. FIRST DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER VLADIMIR SHUMEYKO, ACCORDING TO ONE PRESS REPORT, HAS ASKED YELTSIN TO REMAIN IN THE GOVERNMENT WHILE HE SEEKS ELECTION AS CHAIRMAN OF THE PARLIAMENT'S UPPER HOUSE, THE FEDERATION COUNCIL. GOVERNMENT SOURCES REPORT THAT ALEKSANDR ZAVERYUKHA, NOW RASPONSIBLE FOR AGRICULTURE, MAY ALSO BECOME A FIRST DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER.
- THE FATE OF FINANCE MINISTER AND DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER BORIS FEDOROV IS UNCERTAIN. WHILE SOME OBSERVERS BELIEVE HE WILL STAY, OTHERS BELIEVE HE WILL BE FORCED OUT DUE TO HIS PUBLIC DISAGREEMENTS OVER BUDGETARY POLICY WITH CENTRAL BANK CHAIRMAN VIKTOR GERASHCHENKO, WHO ENJOYS CHERNOMYRDIN'S SUPPORT. (FEDOROV STAFFERS TOLD EMBOFFS IN RECENT DAYS THAT THEY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 000768

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

2

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04

WHITE HOUSE PASS PRESIDENT'S PARTY FOR S/NIS/TALBOTT
 AND NSC/BURNS
 DEPT FOR S/NIS, D, P, C, E, S/P, PA, EUR/ISCA
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, EFIN, RS
 SUBJECT: PRESIDENT YELTSIN "REFORMS" HIS REFORM CABINE
 BELIEVE THEIR BOSS WILL REMAIN AS FINANCE MINISTER, BUT
 LOSE HIS POST AS DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER).
 -- ANATOLIY CHUBAYS IS EXPECTED TO REMAIN IN THE
 GOVERNMENT AS PRIVATIZATION CZAR, BUT IS ALSO EXPECTED
 TO LOSE HIS JOB AS DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER.

 READING THE ELECTION RETURNS

4. YELTSIN AND CHARNOYRDIRIN HAVE SAID IN RECENT WEEKS
 THEY HOPE THESE CHANGES WILL IMPROVE GOVERNMENT
 EFFICIENCY. MORE IMPORTANTLY, HOWEVER, THE MOVES
 RESPOND TO OTHER PRESSING CONCERNS:
 -- THE DECISION OF SOME MINISTERS TO WORK EXCLUSIVELY
 IN THE NEW LEGISLATURE (DEPUTY PRIME MINISTERS
 SHAKHRAI SHOKHIN APPARENTLY WILL LEAVE THE GOVERNMENT
 ENTIRELY, ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS).
 -- THE DECEMBER ELECTION RESULTS, WHICH OBSERVERS
 INTERPRET AS A CALL BY VOTERS FOR A SLOWING OF ECONOMIC
 REFORM.
 -- A CLEARING OF THE DECKS BEFORE THE NEW LEGISLATURE,
 WIDELY EXPECTED TO BE HOSTILE TO THE GOVERNMENT'S
 COURSE, GETS DOWN TO SERIOUS WORK.
5. IF THE NEW PARLIAMENT DOES TURN OUT TO BE CRITICAL
 OF THE GOVERNMENT, THE NEW CONSTITUTION GIVES THE
 PRESIDENT AND GOVERNMENT STRONG INSTRUMENTS FOR
 COUNTERING THE WILL OF THE DEPUTIES:
 -- ACCORDING TO THE NEW CONSTITUTION, PERSONNEL CHANGES
 CAN BE MADE INDEPENDENT OF THE DUMA. EXCEPT FOR THE
 PRIME MINISTER, THE LEGISLATURE DOES NOT CONFIRM
 INDIVIDUAL MINISTERS. THEY MAY ONLY PRESSURE FOR
 CHANGES BY VOTING "NO CONFIDENCE" IN THE GOVERNMENT AS
 A WHOLE (FOR THIS THERE NEED ONLY BE A SIMPLE MAJORITY
 OF DUMA DEPUTIES).
 -- THE PRESIDENT MAY IGNORE THE FIRST "NO CONFIDENCE"
 VOTE, AND ONLY IF THREE MONTHS LATER THE DUMA PASSES
 ANOTHER ONE WILL THE GOVERNMENT HAVE TO RESIGN.
 -- IF THE GOVERNMENT DOES RESIGN AND THE DUMA THREE
 TIMES REJECTS YELTSIN'S NEW CANDIDATE FOR PRIME
 MINISTER, THE PRESIDENT DISSOLVES THE DUMA AND
 SCHEDULES NEW ELECTIONS. (HOWEVER, THE PRESIDENT MAY
 NOT DISSOLVE THE DUMA WITHIN ONE YEAR OF ITS ELECTION.)

3

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04

ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENTS AHEAD?

6. THE GOVERNMENT RESHUFFLE SHOWS THAT YELTSIN APPARENTLY HOPES TO RETAIN THE SERVICES OF BOTH "RADICALS" LIKE GAYDAR AND "PRAGMATISTS" LIKE SOSKOVETS, RESERVING FOR HIMSELF THE ROLE OF SYNTHESIZING AND RECONCILING THESE TWO WINGS. THIS LIKELY WILL RESULT IN A CONTINUATION OF THE SOMETIMES INCONSISTENT POLICIES THAT HAVE MARKED RUSSIA'S ECONOMIC REFORM FOR THE PAST TWO YEARS. WHETHER THE CHANGES PORTEND MAJOR CHANGES OF ECONOMIC COURSE WILL DEPEND ON HOW YELTSIN AND CHERNOMYRDIN FILL OUT THE NEW GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES.

PICKERING

BT

#0768

NNNN

<MSGID> M0820074

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: SIT SODERBERG TRIP

SIT: ANDREASEN AOKI BELL BEYRLE BURNS FILE GOTTEMOELLER HARRIS PONEMAN SUM2

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 112019Z JAN 94

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 6175

RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE NIACT IMMEDIATE 0610

INFO RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV IMMEDIATE 2503

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE MOSCOW 000778

S/S PLEASE PASS TO PRESIDENT'S AND SECRETARY'S PARTY

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, TSPL, KTTC, ECON, RS, US

SUBJECT: PROPOSED BILATERAL AGREEMENTS/STATEMENTS

- FOR PRESIDENT'S MOSCOW VISIT

1. BASED ON DISCUSSIONS WITH MFA, THE FOLLOWING IS THE LATEST LIST OF PROPOSED BILATERAL STATEMENTS/AGREEMENTS FOR THE MOSCOW SUMMIT. LIST IS CURRENT AS OF JANUARY 11, 10:00PM MOSCOW TIME. UNLESS OTHERWISE INFORMED, WE PLAN TO PROVIDE THIS LIST TO THE RUSSIANS AT 9:00AM MOSCOW TIME ON JANUARY 12..

2. ITEM FOR SIGNATURE BY THE PRESIDENTS:

-- MOSCOW SUMMIT DECLARATION

-- (TRILATERAL STATEMENT WILL, OF COURSE, BE PART OF SEPARATE TRILATERAL MEETING/CEREMONY)

3. STATEMENTS TO BE ISSUED BY THE PRESIDENTS:

-- JOINT DECLARATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

-- NON-PROLIFERATION JOINT STATEMENT

-- COCOM JOINT STATEMENT (GOR HAS STILL NOT AGREED THAT THIS STATEMENT WILL BE ISSUED BY PRESIDENTS.

GOR PREFERS IT BE ISSUED BY FOREIGN MINISTERS.

ISSUE TO BE DISCUSSED FURTHER IN U/S DAVIS MOSCOW MEETINGS ON JANUARY 12).

4. ITEMS FOR SIGNATURE BY SECRETARY OF STATE AND FOREIGN MINISTER:

-- EXPORT CONTROL STATEMENT (MEMORANDUM OF INTENT ON BILATERAL COOPERATION IN EXPORT CONTROL)

-- AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENT

-- COOPERATION IN THE FIELDS OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH AGREEMENT

-- (TENTATIVE) RADIATION HEALTH EFFECTS AGREEMENT (GOR AGENCY CHIEF WHO WAS TO SIGN AGREEMENT WITH

AMBASSADOR PICKERING SUDDENLY TAKEN SERIOUSLY ILL;

GOR HAS ASKED THAT U.S. CONSIDER THIS AGREEMENT FOR

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2014-0905-m (1.39)

2/27/2017 KBH

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

SIGNATURE BETWEEN CHRISTOPHER/KOZYREV AS
ALTERNATIVE.)

5. STATEMENT TO BE ISSUED BY SECRETARY OF STATE
AND FOREIGN MINISTER:

-- MIDDLE EAST STATEMENT

6. ITEMS FOR SIGNATURE BY AMBASSADOR PICKERING AND
GOR OFFICIALS:

-- WYOMING CHEMICAL WEAPONS BILATERAL MEMORANDUM OF
UNDERSTANDING

-- RADIATION HEALTH EFFECTS AGREEMENT (IF NOT SIGNED
BY FOREIGN MINISTERS)

7. OTHER ITEM FOR SIGNATURE:

-- HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM (HEU) CONTRACT TO BE
SIGNED BY U.S. ENRICHMENT CORP. CHIEF TIMBERS AND
GOR TECHNICAL AGENCY CHIEF.

8. LATEST SCENARIO IS THAT PRESIDENTS, SECRETARY
CHRISTOPHER, AND FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV WILL SIGN
AGREEMENTS ON FRIDAY MORNING, JANUARY 14 AT A
CEREMONY AT THE END OF THE SECOND EXPANDED BILATERAL
DISCUSSION SESSION. ITEMS TO BE SIGNED BY OTHERS
WILL BE DONE SEPARATELY PRIOR TO THE JANUARY 14
SESSION.

PICKERING

BT

#0778

NNNN

<MSGID> M0820714