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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memcon	re. Meeting with Russian FM Ivanov (4 pages)	09/24/1998	P1/b(1) KBH 9/21/2018

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Ivanov])
OA/Box Number: 2060

FOLDER TITLE:

9806559

2014-0940-M
rs1138

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9806559
RECEIVED: 24 SEP 98 15

TO: KENNEY, K

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 29 SEP 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

MEMCON

PERSONS: IVANOV, IGOR

SUBJECT: TELCON W/ RUSSIAN FOMIN IVANOV ON 24 SEP

ACTION: RICE SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 30 SEP 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PASCUAL

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

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DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

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COMMENTS: _____

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DATE

9/29

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DOC 2 OF 2

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KKM NARA, Date 5/11/2018
2014-0940-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
002

Z 98092818 FOR DECISION
X 98092915 RICE SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 980929 KENNEY, K

National Security Council
The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
15 Cosgriff			
Rice	1/3	Ⓟ 9/28 7/29	Rice Done js
Davies		Ⓟ	
Kerrick	2	Ⓟ	
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	Ⓟ 9/29	D
Records Mgt.	5	SWD 9/29	JHDK

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: *Ivanov Memo*

98 SEP 28 pm 3:55

Exec Sec Office has diskette used

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # ~~6559~~ 6559
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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
13 Cosgriff			
Rice	1/3	Ⓡ 9/28 7/27	R. H. [Signature]
Davies		Ⓢ	
Kerrick	2		
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	Ⓢ 9/29	D
Records Mgt.	5	Ⓢ 9/29	D+HX

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: *Ivanov Memcom*

98 SEP 28 pm 3:59


Exec Sec Office has diskette *yes*

September 29, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation between the President
and Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov (✓)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation between the President
and Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov is provided for the
information of the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary. It must
be distributed via NODIS channels. It may also be sent to our
embassy in Moscow for Ambassador Collins. (✓)


Glyn T. Davies
For: Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 b,d
Declassify On: 9/23/08

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KGM/NARA, Date 5/11/2018
2014-0740-M

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0940-M (1.01)
5/11/2018 KBM

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Russian Foreign Minister
Igor Ivanov (S)

PARTICIPANTS: U.S. Participants
The President
Secretary of Treasury Robert Rubin
Chief of Staff Erskine Bowles
National Security Advisor Samuel R. Berger
Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott
Ambassador at Large and Special Advisor
to the Secretary of State for NIS
Steven Sestanovich
Deputy National Security Advisor
James Steinberg
Carlos Pascual, Special Assistant to the
President and Sr. Director

Russian Participants
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov
Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Mamedov
Russian Ambassador to the United States
Yuri Vorontsov
Sergei Berezhkov (Russian Interpreter)

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: September 24, 1998, 11:10-11:35 a.m. EST
Oval Office

Foreign Minister Ivanov: President Yeltsin asked me to bring this letter to you and stress the importance of Russian-American relations and the great impulse that was provided by the Moscow Summit. He is pleased that you concluded important agreements that will take our security relationship into the twenty-first century. (S)

President Yeltsin also asked me to tell you that the Yeltsin-Primakov team will follow a course of democratic reform. There is no doubt about this. There will be difficulties on the economic side. We are not hiding this. We will take measures

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to gradually pull the economy out of its current crisis. I won't dwell on what those measures are now, but we recognize that Russia is part of the world economy. (S)

We have an active stake in cooperating with others and the international financial institutions. Prime Minister Primakov's first statement was that we would abide by our international commitments. He said that the decisions of August 17 were a mistake. (Note: On August 17, Russia announced that it would devalue its currency and default on some of its debt.) We are holding talks now with the IMF, with the World Bank, with commercial banks, with the European Union and with the Paris Club. We hope to find an acceptable solution that will allow Russia to comply with its international obligations. We greatly appreciate the support we are getting from the United States.

(S)

We will have the same kind of continuity on foreign policy. Foundations have been laid for our strategic partnership thanks to the work of our two Presidents. This is contributing to international stability. I've had talks with Secretary Albright. We've agreed that we will cooperate on all topics. We may have our disagreements, but we will not allow these disagreements to escalate into confrontation. In the end, we share the same objectives -- a stable world and mutually beneficial cooperation. (S)

Over the past days, we have discussed Kosovo. We want to demonstrate unity. This has often been hard for us to do. At 3:00 this morning, I received a call from President Yeltsin. He is following the situation closely. He asked me to say that we have now launched a process toward reaching a political settlement. (S)

Kosovo has great proximity to us. He told me to reiterate that we must first move toward a political settlement. We know from experience that no military solution will work. By the domino theory, we know that military force will lead to escalation in the Balkans. Two times the Balkans have been the source of two world wars this century. We now know how explosive it can be.

(S)

Yesterday, we agreed to send a troika from the United States, the EU and Russia to put pressure on the ground in Belgrade in order to put an end to hostilities and address the humanitarian situation. (Note: the Russians advanced this proposal at a Contact Group meeting the day before, but no decision was taken

at that time.) We want to coordinate with Ambassador Hill's successful efforts. (S)

The President: The UN resolution is important. We want to work together. This is how we ended the conflict in Bosnia. We need to reach a critical solution in Kosovo. I am hopeful that we will be able to do so. The U.N. resolution was a good start. (S)

Let me talk about a couple of other things. I understand why it is so difficult for you to get START II through your Duma. President Yeltsin and I discussed this when I was in Moscow. He also explained to me why START III is so important for Russia. We have signed off in our government on all the necessary documents to negotiate START III. We want to do that quickly, but we need a signal from the DUMA that it will go forward first. We want to work hard on START III if the Duma gives a signal that it will approve START II. (S)

On Iran, this is an area in which we have made progress but much more needs to be done. It affects the security of both Russia and the United States. We're getting signals that Russian cooperation with Iran is still continuing. This affects the way our Congress looks at our relationship with Russia and the flexibility we have to help you in other areas. (S)

On economics, I want to be in a position to help. I also want to be able to get others to help you, as well. I want to be able to support an economic revival in Russia. But nothing we can do will help unless investments stay in Russia once they're made. It can't be like the first IMF installment. (S)

I understand your government's desire to address social problems. But laws need to be passed to keep money in Russia -- tax reform, promoting property rights, especially in the energy area, and other things -- and these laws can be consistent with dealing with the social questions before you. I hope enough will be done to justify international support. If measures are not taken, any external money will otherwise just go right out. (S)

Foreign Minister Ivanov: First, on START II. Primakov is working hard toward ratification. He had a meeting with all factions. I won't go into all the details. We will work for early ratification. I will work with the Defense Minister. I can't give you dates at this point. We intend to deal with this issue and we see its importance. (S)

On Iran, we want to maintain good contacts with you. We want to consider your concerns in a constructive spirit. (S)

On economics, we understand that we can't get money for nothing. Initial measures were announced today to prevent an outflow of money. We also want to take legal measures to create the conditions for \$80-100 billion that left the country to go back on a sound legal basis. We understand we are liable for creating such a legal foundation. We also know that the faster we do this, the bigger the investments will be in Russia. (S)

We have an opportunity before us. Primakov received 70 percent of the Duma vote. That gives us hope to be able to pass important laws including tax policy. (S)

Mr. Berger: Mr. President, I think you have another appointment waiting. (U)

The President: I believe it was your birthday yesterday. He was 53. He looks younger than I do even though he is a year older. (U)

Mr. Berger: I told Minister Ivanov that he'll age five years in the next year of being Foreign Minister. (U)

Minister Ivanov: If I am Foreign Minister in a year, I will come back to U.S. to celebrate. (U)

(Note: At the end of the meeting, Mr. Ivanov presented President Clinton with pictures of President and Mrs. Clinton's visit to Moscow in early September.) (U)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9806559
DATE 29 SEP 98

SUBJECT: TELCON W/ RUSSIAN FOMIN IVANOV ON 24 SEP
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
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Initials: KKM Date: 5/11/2018
2014-0940-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

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6559

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

September 25, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

(Handwritten initials)

FROM: CARLOS PASCUAL

for

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with Russian Foreign
Minister Igor Ivanov on September 24, 1998

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KSM/NARA, Date 5/11/2018
2014-0940-M

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the
September 24 meeting between the President and Russian Foreign
Minister Igor Ivanov.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Glyn Davies to transmit the Memorandum of
Conversation at Tab A to State.

Approve (b) Disapprove _____

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the
record.

Approve (b) Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to State

Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 b,d

Declassify On: 9/23/08

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