

Blinken, Antony J.

From: Naplan, Steven J.
To: Blinken, Antony J.
Cc: /R, Record at A1; Gray, Wendy E.; Naplan, Steven J.
Subject: Chris., Donilon, Steinberg comments on Iraq statement ~~(SECRET)~~
Date: Monday, September 02, 1996 11:07PM
Priority: High

Donilon called in and asked me to transmit to you the collective commentary of Christopher, Donilon and Steinberg re POTUS Iraq statement.

(These comments are based on their review of an 8pm draft).

1. uncomfortable with language that reads "summary executions reported." they object to the word "reported." Either say the executions happened or leave it out.

✓ 2. make it clear that we are talking about SADDAM's army, not simply the Iraqi army.

3. Christopher especially wanted the wording to reflect our concern that Iraqi aggression is not limited to Irbil alone, and that Saddam appears poised to do more.

4. change usage of "defiance" to "brutal acts of AGGRESSION."

5. Christopher especially wants language that makes it clear that U.S. attacks are hitting "militarily significant targets" in Iraq.

6. they do not want the Kurdish factions to be characterized as "warring."

7. where the figure "40%" is used, they say leave it out. As an amount, it sounded "weak."

8. Donilon wants you to check with Berger on this one: re UN resolution 986, they want the language to make it very clear that SADDAM's actions undermined and jeopardized UN 986 and the ability for Iraqis to receive aid. Put the responsibility squarely on Saddam.

9. change "achieved objectives" to "furthered objectives."

10. Donilon said they had a "strong idea, an important concept" to add to the statement:

use language that holds out the prospect of more action. something like, "we will take actions we deem necessary in the manner of our own choosing and as circumstances warrant." State would like to see an element of unpredictability added to the remarks.

Blinken, Antony J.

From: Baker, James E.
To: Blinken, Antony J.; Grummons, Stephen R.
Cc: /R, Record at A1; Baker, James E.; Kreczko, Alan J.
Subject: Iraq Statement ~~(SECRET)~~
Date: Monday, September 02, 1996 11:56AM

Alan has three suggested edits on the attached document.

1. That if we do make use of the term "punish" that it be linked to a motivation/purpose consistent with international law, i.e., in order to reduce his ability to threaten or deter. . . , rather than as a separate motivational purpose. Better yet to "respond to." Note: Alan made this point directly with Mr. Lake yesterday in the context of the memo to the President.
2. "Aggression" is usually associated with acts between states. Recommend "resort to violence" instead.
3. Reference to UN security council resolutions is helpful from our perspective in first sentence, unless it will be problematic with our allies, i.e., inconsistent with their position during consultations.

These are suggestions. First is most important. Thank you. <<File Attachment: IRAQSTAT.DOC>>

~~SECRET~~

9/2/96 1 a.m.

PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON
STATEMENT ON IRAQ
SEPTEMBER XX, 1996

XX days ago, despite clear warnings from the international community and in violation of UN Security Council Resolutions, Iraqi forces attacked and seized the Kurdish-controlled city of Irbil in Northern Iraq. This act requires a strong response. It has received one. At XX hours, American [and British] [aircraft and] missiles began the operation that will send this message to Saddam Hussein: when you abuse your own people or terrorize your neighbors, you will pay a price.

The fact that one Kurdish group invited the Iraqis to intervene does not justify Iraq's aggression resort to violence. We have been working hard over the past XX months to secure a cease-fire between the warring Kurdish factions. The Iraqi attack adds fuel to this factional fire -- and threatens to spark instability throughout the region.

Accordingly, early this morning, I ordered America's armed forces to strike Iraq. Our objectives are clear and limited: to punish [alt: respond to] Saddam Hussein for his aggression [alt: acts of violence] and in order -to reduce his ability to threaten his neighbors and America's interests.

First, we are extending the No Fly Zone in Southern Iraq [and establishing a Free Fly Zone in Western Iraq.] This will severely restrict Iraq's ability to conduct offensive air operations in the region.

Second, we are destroying Surface to Air Missile defenses in Southern Iraq to protect the safety of our aircraft enforcing this expanded No Fly Zone.

Third, as a practical matter, there must be a suspension of U.N. Security Council Resolution 986, which allows Iraq to sell limited amounts of oil to purchase food and medicine for its people -- including the Kurds. Irbil, the city seized by the Iraqis, is a key distribution center for that aid. Until we are sure these humanitarian supplies can get to those who need them, the plan cannot go forward -- and the Iraqi government will be denied the new resources it has been expecting.

Saddam Hussein's motivations may change. But his methods are always the same: violence and aggression. Against the Kurds. Against other ethnic minorities. Against Iraq's neighbors.

As it was in Operation Desert Storm, and then again two years ago when Iraq massed its forces on Kuwait's border, America's answer to Iraqi recklessness must be strong and immediate. It must make Saddam pay a real price for his action. It must reduce his ability to strike out at his neighbors. And it must increase America's ability to contain Iraq over the long term. The steps we are taking today will achieve all of these objectives. In short, they serve America's strategic interests.

Time and again, Saddam Hussein has made clear his disdain for civilized behavior. He has brutalized his own people... attacked his neighbors... supported terrorism... and sought to acquire weapons of mass destruction. America's policy is equally clear: when our interests and the

security of our friends and allies are threatened, we will act -- and with appropriate force whenever necessary. That is what we are doing this morning in Iraq.

I know that the thoughts and prayers of all Americans are with our military men and women who are conducting this operation. God bless them -- and the nation they are serving.

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2015-0040-M(1.04)
02/27/2020 KDE

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Asia Trip

The central purpose of my 10-day trip to China, Thailand, Vietnam, Korea and Japan was to present a strategic overview of U.S. long-term foreign policy objectives toward the Asia Pacific region, which would provide a context in which we could address specific issues. I stressed that the nations of the region, particularly the United States and its allies, shared a common national interest in promoting a prosperous and stable China, one that could help establish international rules of conduct that promote regional stability and prosperity. At the same time, with China's steady emergence as a great power, it was important for all my interlocutors to hear of your continued commitment to sustained American political, economic and military engagement in Asia. I explained that this engagement is not directed at any country but rather is a force for regional stability and economic integration, and a brake against the reemergence of traditional rivalries and a new regional arms race. In every capital, including Beijing, I met strong agreement for the proposition that we shared a common strategic interest in maintaining a strong American presence in the region. (With all, but especially the Chinese, interest based assurances and arguments are much the most effective.)

China

In a seven-hour discussion with Liu Huaqiu, and in each session with top leaders, I developed the engagement theme and your vision of a 21st century in which great powers act in their mutual interest to increase cooperation, avoid chaos and strengthen economic growth. The alternative was a return to the habits of the 19th Century, in which great powers were permanent rivals, engaged in a zero-sum game of power and dominance. The United States could survive and flourish in either system, I noted, but preferred cooperation to rivalry. I also emphasized that the United States had no interest in containing China and that we wished to see a strong China -- one that was secure, prosperous and stable.

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5(b)(d)
Declassify On: July 17, 2006

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

I believe Liu, Foreign Minister Qian and to a certain extent President Jiang Zemin share this vision, which offers the prospect of rooting U.S.-China relations in a strategic framework that allows us to solve problems pragmatically. These three recognize that implementation of the understandings (albeit not formal agreements) with Liu reached last March -- defining how each side would pursue the four tough issues of IPR, ring magnets, nonproliferation and Taiwan -- helped produce the MFN vote, which represented a deepening consensus in the American public in favor of engagement with China. We agreed to continue this effort in addressing market-access concerns, WTO membership, permanent MFN prospects, human rights and nonproliferation. High-level meetings led by State and Defense as well as the economic agencies will be paced through the remainder of the year. The Chinese were forthcoming on increasing military-to-military contacts. However, they demurred for the time being on resuming an informal human rights dialogue, even one focused initially on rule of law concerns. (We also passed a list of medical prisoners for whom we urged release; the Chinese accepted the list but were noncommittal.) We will continue to press on this.

In discussions of regional matters, Liu reiterated China's commitment to participating in the Four-Party talks on Korea, albeit in a low profile manner. Significantly, Liu told me that China had made clear to the North that it must deal directly with the South to settle the conflict on the peninsula and not hold out hope for a separate deal delivered by the United States.

Finally, while we agreed it would be useful to exchange State visits over the next two years, each side recognizes that realizing these visits depends on achieving continued progress on core issues. Overall, the public Chinese reaction to my trip was extremely positive. We are now in a better position to make progress on the many difficult issues that lie ahead.

Thailand

A short stop in Bangkok confirmed the value of taking the time to tend to even long-standing, healthy alliance relationships. The Prime Minister outlined his willingness to move forward on a tax treaty (an American business priority); more aggressively press the SLORC to enter a dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi; actively engage Cambodian leaders on the importance of sustaining the government coalition through elections; and urge an ASEAN contribution of around \$3 million for KEDO.

Vietnam

I could not have been more pleased with the reception given the U.S. team and the attitude of Vietnamese leaders toward the future of U.S.-Vietnam relations. As I had done in China, I elaborated your view of our strategic interest in a strong, prosperous Vietnam increasingly integrated into regional political and economic institutions. Beyond securing a renewed commitment to MIA accounting cooperation, both sides agreed to move forward on a number of fronts simultaneously, including resuming a quiet human rights dialogue, reaching agreement quickly on refugee resettlement procedures, initiating modest military contacts, resolving several diplomatic and consular operational concerns and advancing economic exchanges through concluding a trade agreement and providing Ex-Im Bank and perhaps OPIC financing. Your measured approach to normalizing relations over the past three years is about to realize substantial benefits to American security and economic interests as well as the Vietnamese people.

Korea

I had very productive talks in Seoul on the U.S.-ROK joint effort to launch the Four-Party Peace Proposal announced by you and President Kim in April. In trying to create an environment that induces the North to accept the talks, we and the South, while occasionally disagreeing on tactics, are in lockstep on the basic approach. We shared gloomy assessments of the situation in the North. We discussed next steps to gain the North's acceptance of a joint U.S.-ROK briefing on the Four-Party Proposal, in which we would give vague assurances of sanctions relief as an inducement to DPRK participation. However, we also agreed that the DPRK should not be rewarded for merely attending the talks, but only for participating in a meaningful way. In the meantime, the ROK agreed to explore nonofficial forms of assistance as a gesture of good will.

Japan

The Japanese were anxious to learn the results of our discussions with China, Korea and Vietnam. They were reassured U.S.-China relations appear stronger and that we were able to assuage Chinese fears about the U.S.-Japan joint security declaration and the review of defense guidelines. In particular, Chinese leaders seemed receptive to the argument that a close U.S.-Japan alliance would discourage the reemergence of traditional regional rivalries and would undercut those in Japan favoring remilitarization.

Tokyo will be helpful in Korea peninsula issues but pressed us on the need for Congressional funding of KEDO. I assured them it was a top priority. On bilateral security issues, September looms as an important month for the Okinawa bases issue. Japanese public expectations about the return of Futenma are creating political difficulties for Hashimoto, and he may be looking for further progress on Okinawa coming out of a summit meeting with you in New York. They are anxious to see such a meeting scheduled at the time of his attendance at the UNGA session late in the month.

Blinken, Antony J.

From: Bell, Robert G.
Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 1997 3:36 PM
To: Blinken, Antony J.; Samore, Gary S.; Clarke, Richard A.; Beers, Rand R.; Leavy, David C.; @DEFENSE - Defense Policy
Cc: Harris, Elisa D.; @DEFENSE - Defense Policy
Subject: RE: BW INITIATIVE ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~

Joe (Bouchard):

Pls. give Elisa a sentence that POTUS could use in State of the Union, keying off FY99 DoD budget decisions made IAW QDR, that says (in effect): "...and in the defense budget that I will submit for FY 1999 I have increased spending for BW/CW defensive equipment and programs by ...(about \$1B) ..." (applause). Thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: Blinken, Antony J.
Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 1997 3:26 PM
To: Samore, Gary S.; Bell, Robert G.; Clarke, Richard A.; Beers, Rand R.; Leavy, David C.
Cc: Harris, Elisa D.; @DEFENSE - Defense Policy
Subject: RE: BW INITIATIVE ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~

For purposes of showing we have a package of stuff, its fine to include recent initiative, even if already public (though of course, new initiatives would be great, too)

-----Original Message-----

From: Samore, Gary S.
Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 1997 2:15 PM
To: Bell, Robert G.; Clarke, Richard A.; Beers, Rand R.; Blinken, Antony J.; Leavy, David C.
Cc: Harris, Elisa D.; @DEFENSE - Defense Policy
Subject: RE: BW INITIATIVE ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~

maybe we can recycle some of the same food from the pantry.

-----Original Message-----

From: Bell, Robert G.
Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 1997 2:13 PM
To: Samore, Gary S.; Clarke, Richard A.; Beers, Rand R.; Blinken, Antony J.; Leavy, David C.
Cc: Harris, Elisa D.; @DEFENSE - Defense Policy
Subject: RE: BW INITIATIVE ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~

Wilco. (Maybe we should have "held" the vaccination announcement? Also, the QDR was already the "hook" for announcing a \$1billion (that's billion with a "b") plus up for DoD chem/bio defenses. So we've "been to that pantry" twice already in the last six months). Will think anew, as they say.

-----Original Message-----

From: Samore, Gary S.
Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 1997 12:24 PM
To: Clarke, Richard A.; Bell, Robert G.; Beers, Rand R.; Blinken, Antony J.; Leavy, David C.
Cc: Samore, Gary S.; Harris, Elisa D.
Subject: BW INITIATIVE ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~
Importance: High

Bob, Dick, Rand,

Jim S. has asked me to work with you on a memo to Sandy on a possible BW initiative that might be announced at the State of the Union. My piece is proposals to strengthen BWC and international BW nonpro efforts (e.g., a possible P-8 initiative), but the memo will also need input on issues that your directorates are responsible for (counterterrorism, CBW civil defense and National Coordinator, military defense and counterproliferation, intel, etc.).

Elisa will be in touch. Jim would like the memo by COB Friday. Thanks. Gary

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Blinken, Antony J.

From: Bell, Robert G.
Sent: Monday, January 26, 1998 11:26 AM
To: Andreasen, Steven P.; Blinken, Antony J.
Subject: RE: State of Union foreign Policy Section [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

Tony: good short suggestion from Steve.

-----Original Message-----

From: Andreasen, Steven P.
Sent: Monday, January 26, 1998 11:14 AM
To: Bell, Robert G.
Subject: RE: State of Union foreign Policy Section [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]
Importance: High

Bob -- I have one suggested edit to your excellent mark up below: under (1); insert after "rogue states" two words: "and others". Then, add after "develop" two more words, "or improve". So the sentence would read: **By ending all nuclear testing, we can help prevent the deployment of more advanced and dangerous nuclear weapons by the declared nuclear powers and make it more difficult for rogue states and others to develop or improve such devices.** That way, we capture all three groups: nuclear weapon states, rogue states; and "threshold" states (i.e., India, Pakistan and Israel). If you agree with these edits, please forward to Blinken. Thanks. Steve.

-----Original Message-----

From: Bell, Robert G.
Sent: Monday, January 26, 1998 10:23 AM
To: Blinken, Antony J.
Cc: Andreasen, Steven P.
Subject: RE: State of Union foreign Policy Section [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

Tony: As written, I think the para on CTB is acceptable. I would, however, suggest a few tweaks without adding length or additional sentences -- just for sake of precision (I recognize there is a tension between my efforts on the Hill to be very clear as to what we are claiming CTB can and cannot do and speechwriters interest in using simple, widely understood terms, such as "arms race" (I term I prefer never to use, but more importantly, a term that "turns off" conservative Republicans -- the audience we are trying to influence here). So, I recommend:

1. revise 2d sentence as follows:

By ending all nuclear testing, we can help prevent the deployment of more advanced and dangerous nuclear weapons by the declared nuclear powers and make it more difficult for rogue states to develop such devices.

2. Just talked to Crowe. Can't get Vessey (though we may later this year - he's written Crowe long letter stating his concerns, but I'm fairly sure he will not come against treaty). Endorsement sentence should read (final/final) as follows:

Tonight, I am pleased to announce that the CTB and its accompanying Safeguards package has been endorsed by four distinguished former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: General David Jones, Admiral William Crowe, General Colin Powell and General John Shalikashvili. [note: to achieve maximum effect, make sure to advise POTUS not/not to pause after he says "Joint Chiefs of Staff..." but to get right to listing the four.]

3. I think the point to emphasize (especially to legislators) in the final sentence is not the claim that CTB "has strong bipartisan support" (THAT is what our ratification efforts will determine -- and remember, it was specifically opposed in the 1996 Republican party platform), but rather that this is a treaty the PEOPLE support. So, I'd suggest:

This treaty is overwhelmingly supported by the American people and I ask the Senate to give it their favorable advice and consent this session. [note: Senate does not "ratify" - it gives advice and consent. Also, I'd say "this session" vice "this year" since you have already said "this year" in preamble to Foreign Policy section.

-----Original Message-----

From: Blinken, Antony J.
Sent: Monday, January 26, 1998 9:17 AM
To: @SENIORS - Senior Directors
Subject: State of Union foreign Policy Section [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]
Importance: High

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