

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. email	Carlos Pascual to Sandy Berger; re: Berger-Kokoshin Message (1 page)	07/28/1998	P1/b(1)
001b. talking points	re: Berger-Kokoshin Message (1 page)	07/28/1998	P1/b(1)
002. email	Bruce Riedel to Sandy Berger; re: POTUS Meeting with Jewish Groups (1 page)	07/28/1998	P1/b(1), P5
003. email	Stephen Flanagan to Sandy Berger; re: Offer from Jimmy Carter on Albania (2 pages)	07/28/1998	P1/b(1), P5
004. email	Gregory Schulte to Sandy Berger; re: Kosovo (1 page)	07/28/1998	P1/b(1)
005a. note	Bob Bell & Carlos Pascual to Sandy Berger; re: Lebed's Threats in Krasnoyarsk (1 page)	circa, 07/1998	P1/b(1), P5
005b. article	re: Lebed (1 page)	08/25/1998	P1/b(1)
006. email	William Wechsler to Sandy Berger; re: St. Kitts (2 pages)	07/28/1998	P1/b(1)
007. email	Kathleen Cooper to Sandy Berger; re: Prince Bandar Meeting Requests [1 page RELEASED ON APPEAL] (1 page)	07/27/1998	P5
008a. email	Bruce Riedel to Sharon Storey; re: Meeting (1 page)	07/28/1998	P1/b(1), P5
008b. email	Sharon Storey to Bruce Riedel; re: Meeting (1 page)	07/27/1998	P1/b(1)
008c. email	Bruce Riedel to Sandy Berger; re: Meeting (1 page)	07/27/1998	P1/b(1), P5

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Samuel Berger (National Security Advisor)
OA/Box Number: 1485

FOLDER TITLE:

SRB Emails & Notes, 1/98-7/98 [1]

2006-0191-F

jp232

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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009. talking points	re: Korea Briefing (4 pages)	circa, 07/24/1998	P1/b(1)
010. talking points	re: Satellite Licensing Process (3 pages)	circa, 07/1998	P1/b(1), P5
011. email	Brenda Hilliard to Intelligence Programs & Legislative Affairs; re: Meeting with Senator Kerry (1 page)	07/27/1998	P1/b(1)
012. letter	Sandy Berger et al to Senator Lott/Daschle/4 Conferees; re: FY 1999 Defense Authorization Bill (2 pages)	circa, 07/1998	P1/b(1)
013. email	Charles Pritchard to Sandy Berger; re: Japan Update - Obuchi Wins (partial) [1 page RELEASED ON APPEAL] (page)	07/24/1998	P5
014. note	Sandy Berger to John Podesta; re: Berenson [1 page RELEASED ON APPEAL] (page)	circa, 07/1998	P5
015a. email	Gerard Gallucci to Sharon Storey; re: Meeting Request for Sandy Berger with President-Elect Mahaud of Ecuador (1 page)	07/24/1998	P1/b(1), P5
015b. email	Gerard Gallucci to Sandy Berger; re: Meeting Request for Sandy Berger with President-Elect Mahaud of Ecuador (1 page)	07/24/1998	P1/b(1), P5
016. email	Edward Rice to Sandy Berger; re: Daley Unhappy About Colombia Delegation [1 page RELEASED ON APPEAL] (page)	07/23/1998	P5
017a. email	Eric Schwartz to Sandy Berger; re: Food Aid (1 page)	07/27/1998	P1/b(1)
017b. memo	To Sandy Berger; re: Summary of IWG on Food Aid, Seeks Approval of Course of Action (2 pages)	circa, 07/1998	P1/b(1), P5

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018a. email	James Baker to Sandy Berger; re: Executive Order Letter (1 page)	07/25/1998	P1/b(1), P5
018b. email	Gary Samore to Sandy Berger; re: Executive Order Letter (2 pages)	07/25/1998	P1/b(1)
019. executive order	re: Amendment to Executive Order 12938 (4 pages)	eirea; 07/1998	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
020. talking points	re: Points for Domenici (2 pages)	eirea; 07/1998	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
021. note	re: Duplicate of No. 14 [1 page RELEASED ON APPEAL] (page)	eirea; 07/1998	P5
022. memo	re: Taipei (1 page)	07/24/1998	P1/b(1)
023. memo	Nancy McEldowney to Sandy Berger; re: Game Plan for the Open Door (incomplete) (1 page)	07/23/1998	P1/b(1), P5 VZ 9/21/2023
024. email	Mara Rudman to Nina Haehigian, Robert Malley, and Sandy Berger; re: Legislative Update - Week Ahead [2 pages RELEASED ON APPEAL] (page)	07/25/1998	P5
025. email	Gary Samore to Sandy Berger; re: Korea Update (1 page)	07/24/1998	P1/b(1), P5 VZ 9/21/2023
026. email	Neil Kingsley to Sandy Berger; re: Update on Russia Financial Situation [1 page RELEASED ON APPEAL] (page)	07/24/1998	P5
027. email	Jason Greer to Sandy Berger; re: Saudi Concern (1 page)	07/21/1998	P1/b(1)

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028. email	Eric Schwartz to Sandy Berger; re: Northern Ireland [1 page RELEASED ON APPEAL] (- page)	07/24/1998	P5
029. email	Charles Pritchard to Sandy Berger; re: Japan Meeting Between Albright & Obuchi [1 page RELEASED ON APPEAL] (- page)	07/24/1998	P5

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TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

On November 14, 1994, in light of the danger of the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons (weapons of mass destruction) and of the means of delivering such weapons, using my authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), I declared a national emergency and issued Executive Order No. 12938. Because the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, I have renewed the national emergency declared in Executive Order No. 12938 annually, most recently on November 14, 1997. Pursuant to section 204(b) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703(b) and section 201 of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1631), I hereby report to the Congress that I have exercised my statutory authority to issue an Executive Order that amends Executive Order No. 12938 in order more effectively to respond to the worldwide threat of weapons of mass destruction proliferation activities.

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The amendment of section 4 of Executive Order 12938 strengthens the original Executive Order in several significant ways.

First, the amendment broadens the type of proliferation activity that is subject to potential penalties. Executive Order 12938 covers contributions to the efforts of any foreign country, project, or entity to use, acquire, design, produce or stockpile chemical or biological weapons. This amendment adds potential penalties for contributions to foreign programs for nuclear weapons and missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. For example, the new amendment authorizes the imposition of measures against foreign entities that materially assist Iran's missile program.

Second, the amendment lowers the requirements for imposing penalties. Executive Order 12938 required a finding that a foreign person "knowingly and materially" contributed to a foreign CBW program. The amendment removes the "knowing" requirement as a basis for determining potential penalties. Therefore, the Secretary of State need only determine that the foreign person made a "material" contribution to a weapons of mass destruction or missile program to apply the specified sanctions. (At the same time, the Secretary of State will have discretion regarding the scope of sanctions so that a truly unwitting party will not be unfairly punished.)

Third, the amendment expands the original Executive Order to include "attempts" to contribute to foreign proliferation activities, as well as actual contributions. This will allow imposition of penalties even in cases where foreign persons make an unsuccessful effort to contribute to weapons of mass destruction and missile programs or where authorities block a transaction before it is consummated.

Fourth, the amendment expressly expands the range of potential penalties to include the prohibition of United States Government assistance to the foreign person, as well as United States Government procurement and imports into the United States, which were specified by the original Executive Order. Moreover, section 4(b) broadens the scope of the United States Government procurement limitations to include a bar on the procurement of technology, as well as goods or services from any foreign person described in section 4(a). Section 4(d) broadens the scope of import limitations to include a bar on imports of any technology or services produced or provided by any foreign person described in section 4(a).

Finally, this amendment gives the United States Government greater flexibility and discretion in deciding how and to what extent to impose penalties against foreign persons that assist proliferation programs. This provision authorizes the Secretary of State, who will act in consultation with the heads of other

interested agencies, to determine the extent to which these measures should be imposed against entities contributing to foreign weapons of mass destruction or missile programs. The Secretary of State will act to further the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States, including principally our nonproliferation objectives. Prior to imposing measures pursuant to this provision, the Secretary of State will take into account the likely effectiveness of such measures in furthering the interests of the United States and the costs and benefits of such measures. This approach provides the necessary flexibility to tailor our responses to specific situations.

I have authorized these actions in view of the danger posed to the national security and foreign policy of the United States by the continuing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. I am enclosing a copy of the Executive Order that I have issued exercising these authorities.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

Points for Domenici

→ GARY -
Please follow up
w/ Lyons or Flint

Plutonium Disposition

-- Agree with you that plutonium disposition is one of the top issues on the U.S.-Russia agenda.

-- In Moscow today, the Vice President and Kiriyenko announced a bilateral U.S.-Russian agreement that provides for U.S. assistance build pilot scale project in Russia to convert plutonium weapons pits to oxide. (Cost about \$40 m.)

-- We have also proposed to the Russians that President Clinton and Yeltsin issue a summit statement committing both sides to dispose of the 50 tons of weapons plutonium that each side has declared excess to its military needs.

-- Ultimately, we would like to dispose of this material by burning as MOX and by storing as vitrified waste, but we recognize that this will be very costly and time consuming.

-- Your idea of an initial project to at least dismantle the weapons pits is very interesting.

-- This would serve our immediate objective of making the material unusable directly in weapons, while we work on the longer term problems associated with ultimate disposition.

--- Would like to work with you to get Russians and Congress on board.

-- Suggest that Pete LYONS and Gary Samore get together to discuss this idea further.

existing
storage
facility
being
built

USEC Privatization

-- Know you met with Jim Steinberg and Betsy Moler and others to discuss your reservations about USEC privatization.

-- We take this very seriously, but we believe that the Russians have too strong an economic interest to walk away from the HEU Agreement, or from their broader engagement with us.

-- We got very strong and specific commitments from USEC re: Uranium sales prior to privatization. Believe you have a copy.

-- So far, reaction from Russians has been mild. The Vice President explained to Kiriyenko the steps that we are taking to protect the HEU Agreement and to encourage conclusion of an agreement between Russia and the Western companies to market the Russian natural uranium. His team is also discussing with Adamov.

-- Russians are prepared to resume their negotiations with the Western companies.

-- Let's keep in touch on this. Work together to ensure that HEU Agreement is not jeopardized.

July 23, 1998

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SANDY BERGER

THROUGH: DON BANDLER AND STEVE FLANAGAN

FROM: NANCY McELDOWNNEY

SUBJECT: Game Plan for the Open Door

With the Solana and Constantinescu meetings behind us, we want to use the next few weeks to reach decisions on our policy and tactical approach to the Open Door element of the summit. We have scheduled a Restricted Small Group at Jim's level for July 29 and plan to move quickly thereafter to place the issue before Principals. We would appreciate your reactions to the approach that follows.

I. The Policy Setting

As you know, there is a widespread (but not unanimous) view in the interagency, strategic community and among allies that none of the self-selected aspirants will be ready for an invitation by April '99. As we saw with President Constantinescu, even the most vocal aspirants sense this mood and are lowering expectations at home. Over the past months we have been insistent that the President's prerogative to make the decision on second round and open door policy be respected and preserved. Sustaining that message became more difficult after the POTUS-Prodi discussion (which resonated in Washington and around the alliance), but Don and Marc reaffirmed that message in June consultations with key allies.

Over the past month, Strobe has promoted the idea that POTUS signal to Yeltsin on September 1 that there will be no new invitations at the Washington summit. Per our earlier notes to you, his rationale is that this would have a positive impact on relations with Russia at a sensitive juncture, and greatly increase prospects for an early (e.g., December) CFE framework agreement. However, at Jim's last restricted meeting no one thought we could do all we would need to do - hold a restricted group session and Principals meeting (or two), get POTUS' signal to Yeltsin on September 1 that there will be no new invitations at the Washington summit. Per our earlier notes to you, his rationale is that this would have a positive impact on relations with Russia at a sensitive juncture, and greatly increase prospects for an early (e.g., December) CFE framework agreement. However, at Jim's last restricted meeting no one thought we could do all we would need to do - hold a restricted group session and Principals meeting (or two), get POTUS' signal to Yeltsin on September 1 that there will be no new invitations at the Washington summit.

→ Nancy -
I think this is good. Principal questions:
1) lot more "process" for NATO, which has not done terribly well w/ EAPC, NATO-Russia, NATO-Ukraine.
2) Get realistic that these things will happen? We can be better off w/ fewer initiatives pursued more vigorously?
3) & with forward to next installment on outreach especially to you + Das. I think we should handle Yeltsin.

O'Brien, Penelope R.

From: Samore, Gary S.
Sent: Friday, July 24, 1998 11:01 AM
To: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc: Pritchard, Charles (Jack) L.; Samore, Gary S.
Subject: Korea Update - South Korean Reaction ~~[SECRET]~~

→ GARY/JACK -
keep me posted.
chance of leak
merits after
briefings Wed/Thurs
②

Please pass to Jim Steinberg and Sandy Berger: from Jack and Gary:

Steve Bosworth briefed Foreign Minister Park and National Security Advisor Lim as instructed on our concerns about the Agreed Framework and Congressional reaction to recent intelligence briefings, as well as our intended approach to the problem with North Korea.

Initial reaction was calm, but Bosworth expects further reaction over the weekend as senior policy makers consult with one another. Bosworth anticipates further questions about what was briefed to Congress (if it was more than what has been shared with the ROKG) and the need to confront the DPRK on this matter. In a separate cable, Bosworth reported that the ROKG views August and September as pivotal in the ROKG efforts to engage the North. August 15 is the 50th anniversary of liberation from Japanese colonial rule and Kim Chong il may assume the last remaining title (President) September 9. The South requests that we not have any high level bilateral meetings prior to August 15 (which works with our plans) and that we consult closely on our wheat contribution to North Korea.

We were scheduled to meet with the South Koreans in Hawaii August 6-7, but thought it might be better to reschedule the meeting in Seoul. The South Koreans are opposed to a change in venue, fearing too much press speculation about the change after the venue was decided in cabinet session. We will not push the issue and continue on with Hawaii as the meeting location.

Now that Bosworth has made the initial contact with Lim and Park, we believe it is important for you to call in Korean Ambassador Lee and share with him the same information, before you meet with the Congressional delegation. We know your schedule is tight, but you should also consider inviting your counterpart Lim Dong Won to Washington. That may not be possible in the near-term, but you should follow-up Bosworth's contact with Lim by placing a call yourself after your meeting with Congressional leaders. You could ask Ambassador Lee to help set that up. While Steve Bosworth is terrific, we believe you should establish a White House-Blue House relationship with Lim. It will pay dividends in the future.

COMMENT: We anticipate that the ROK will be very nervous about confronting the DPRK at this time and may try to dissuade us from moving ahead. However, it will be politically difficult for the ROK to change its position on not providing funds to KEDO for HFO.

E-mailed
7/25/98 @
4:30pm
MOP

②

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PER E.O. 13526
2015-0041-M (1.06)
RZ 6/1/2023

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002. email	Gwenyth Todd to Sandy Berger; re; Iraq Update (1 page)	07/24/1998	P1/b(1)
003. email	Thomas Countryman to Sandy Berger; re: Appointment Request - Ehud Barak (1 page)	07/23/1998	P1/b(1), P5
004. email	Antony Blinken to Sandy Berger; re: Albright Op/Ed on Russia [1 page RELEASED ON APPEAL] (- page)	07/23/1998	P5
005. email	Steven Naplan to Sandy Berger; re: Baha'i Executed in Iran Presidential Statement [1 page RELEASED ON APPEAL] (- page)	07/23/1998	P5
006a. email	Joseph Marty to Philip Crowley & Sandy Berger; re: Request for Charlie Rose for Tonight [1 page RELEASED ON APPEAL] (- page)	07/23/1998	P5
006b. email	Philip Crowley to Sandy Berger; re: Request for Charlie Rose for Tonight [1 page RELEASED ON APPEAL] (- page)	07/23/1998	P5
007. email	Eric Schwartz to Sandy Berger; re: ICC Follow-Up (1 page)	07/21/1998	P1/b(1), P5
008. memo	Madeleine Albright to POTUS; re: Night Note - Recent Results of Your Foreign Policy Intervention [partial] [50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(1)] (1 page)	07/16/1998	P1/b(1) , P3/b(3) VZ 9/21/2023
009a. email	James Covey to Sandy Berger; re: Appointment Request (1 page)	07/20/1998	P1/b(1), P5
009b. email	Penelope O'Brien to James Covey; re: Appointment Request (1 page)	07/20/1998	P1/b(1)

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010. analysis	re: Saudi Arabia (1 page)	07/21/1998	P1/b(1)
011. email	Erica Barks-Ruggles to Sandy Berger; re: Scheduling Request - President of Sierra Leone (1 page)	07/18/1998	P1/b(1), P5
012a. email	Charles Pritchard to Sandy Berger; re: Agenda for Meeting on North Korea (1 page)	07/20/1998	P1/b(1)
012b. list	re: Agenda for Meeting on North Korea (1 page)	07/20/1998	P1/b(1)
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014. letter	Mary McCarthy to Sandy Berger; re: Briefing on the Hill (1 page)	07/17/1998	P1/b(1)
015. email	John Dowling to Sandy Berger; re: Appointment Request for Next Week (1 page)	07/17/1998	P1/b(1), P5
016. email	re: Duplicate of 009c (1 page)	07/17/1998	P1/b(1), P5
017. email	Donald Bandler to Sandy Berger; re: Rohatyn Berger Meeting Request [1 page RELEASED ON APPEAL] (- page)	07/17/1998	P5
018. email	Scott Busby to Sandy Berger; re: White House Participants in Your Meeting with Berensons [1 page RELEASED ON APPEAL] (- page)	07/17/1998	P5
019a. email	Elisa Harris to Sandy Berger; re: Justice Views on CWC/Constitution [1 page RELEASED ON APPEAL] (- page)	07/16/1998	P5

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Samuel Berger (National Security Advisor)
OA/Box Number: 1485

FOLDER TITLE:

SRB Emails & Notes, 1/98-7/98 [2]

2006-0191-F
ip235

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
019b. email	James Baker to Sandy Berger; re: Justice Views on CWC/Constitution [1 page RELEASED ON APPEAL] (- page)	07/16/1998	P5
019e. letter	L. Anthony Sutin to Newt Gingrich; re: Justice Views on CWC/Constitution [2 pages RELEASED ON APPEAL] (- page)	07/07/1998	P5
020. email	Richard Ragan to Sandy Berger; re: Food Assistance Announcement (1 page)	07/17/1998	P1/b(1), P5
021. note	Sandy Berger to Don; re: New Zealand (1 page)	07/20/1998	P1/b(1)
022. note	Sandy Berger to Richard Clarke; re: Critical Infrastructure (1 page)	07/20/1998	P1/b(1)
023. note	Sandy Berger to Jeff; re: China (1 page)	07/20/1998	P1/b(1)
024. note	Sandy Berger to Richard Clarke; re: Department of Justice (1 page)	07/20/1998	P1/b(1)
025. note	Sandy Berger to Eric; re: Lee (1 page)	07/20/1998	P1/b(1)
026. note	Sandy Berger to Gary & Carlos; re: Letter to Kokosnin (2 pages)	07/20/1998	P1/b(1)
027. letter	Mary McCarthy to Sandy Berger & Jim Steinberg; re: Briefings (1 page)	07/14/1998	P1/b(1)
028. note	Sandy Berger to Bob Bell & Richard Clarke; re: Kerrey (1 page)	circa, 07/1998	P1/b(1)
029. email	Thomas Countryman to Kathleen Cooper & Sandy Berger; re: Sharansky Participants [1 page RELEASED ON APPEAL] (- page)	07/20/1998	P5

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
030. list	re: Democratic & Republican Party Nominees to Board of United States Institute of Peace (1 page)	07/13/1998	P2, P5, P6/b(6)
031. email	Charles Pritchard to Sandy Berger; re: Japan [1 page RELEASED ON APPEAL] (- page)	07/15/1998	P5
032. email	David Leavy to Philip Crowley & Sandy Berger; re: Interview Request from Bob Epstein, Lifestyle Magazine [1 page RELEASED ON APPEAL] (- page)	07/15/1998	P5
033. email	Philip Crowley to Sandy Berger; re: Sperling Breakfast/Defense Writers Group [1 page RELEASED ON APPEAL] (- page)	07/10/1998	P5
034. notes	re: Iran (1 page)	circa, 07/1998	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. memo	Madeleine Albright to POTUS; re: Night Note - Recent Results of Your Foreign Policy Intervention [partial] [50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(1)] (1 page)	07/16/1998	P3/b(3)

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0041-M (1.08)
6/1/23 VL

(b)(3)

DECL: 07/16/18

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Madeleine K. Albright *UKA*

SUBJECT: Night Note: Recent Results of Your Foreign Policy Intervention

We are observing first-hand how your decisive personal involvement in foreign affairs achieves quick results in resolving some of our most challenging problems. I have seen evidence this week of how your trip to China and your meetings last month with French Prime Minister Jospin have made specific positive impacts.

EU Commission officials have said that your visit to China has changed international perceptions of that transforming country and highlighted the beginnings of a major power shift in the Asia-Pacific region. They believe you have succeeded in changing the discourse on China, which is no longer viewed as the last vestige of the Cold War, but is now seen as a newly emerging power moving gradually in the right direction. EU officials are already beginning to reassess the European approach to China in light of your historic trip.

Similarly, your engagement of French Prime Minister Jospin during his Washington visit has led his aides to make glowing comments about the excellent rapport you established with the Prime Minister. The French side was struck by your wide awareness of various issues, your interest in their views, and your attention to European affairs, particularly social policy. Jospin aides extolled your excellent personal rapport with Jospin and described you as a leader possessed of understanding and initiative, who conducts a careful and balanced policy. The French feel they accomplished their primary objective during the visit -- to enhance mutual understanding. This improved bilateral atmosphere and the personal relationship you developed during his visit will no doubt prove invaluable as we work with France on Iraq, NATO, and other potentially difficult issues.

Your personal attention to these strategically important relationships is paying real dividends.

(b)(3)

Classified by: Secretary Madeleine K. Albright
Reason: 1.5 (B) and (D)

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. note	Jeff B. to Sandy; re: Golf Date (1 page)	07/08/1998	Personal Misfile
002. memo	Donald Kerrick to Sandy Berger; re: Visit of Tunisian Defense Minister (1 page)	07/01/1998	P1/b(1), P5
003a. analysis	re: Mexico (1 page)	07/11/1998	P1/b(1)
003b. photograph	re: Iran (1 page)	07/11/1998	P1/b(1)
004. note	re: Turkey/Cyprus - Threat/Counter-Threat (1 page)	07/11/998	P1/b(1)
005. note	re: No Delay on Russian S-300 Missile Sale to Cyprus (1 page)	07/13/1998	P1/b(1)
006a. email	Mary McCarthy to Sandy Berger; re: Saudi Arabia (1 page)	07/10/1998	P1/b(1), P5
006b. cable	re: Saudi Arabia (1 page)	circa, 07/1998	P1/b(1)
007. email	Bruce Riedel to Sandy Berger; re: Fowler-Abdallah (1 page)	07/13/1998	P1/b(1)
008. email	Mary McCarthy to Sandy Berger; re: Meeting with Senator Kerrey (1 page)	07/10/1998	P1/b(1), P5
009a. email	Daniel Benjamin to Robert Malley; re: Message to Crown Prince (1 page)	07/08/1998	P1/b(1)
009b. letter	POTUS to Crown Prince Abdallah; re: Usama bin Laden (1 page)	circa, 07/1998	P1/b(1)

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SRB Emails & Notes, 1/98-7/98 [4]

2006-0191-F

jp236

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Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010. email	James Gagnon to Sandy Berger & Nina Hachigian; re: Indonesia (1 page)	07/03/1998	P1/b(1), P5
011. email	Mara Rudman to Robert Malley et al; re: July-August Calendar-Legislative Alert [3 pages RELEASED ON APPEAL] (- page)	07/03/1998	P5
012. email	Charles Pritchard to Donald Kerrick; re: Korea - Getting Beyond Old Think (2 pages)	07/03/1998	P1/b(1), P5
013a. email	Charles Pritchard to Sandy Berger; re: Korea - Getting Beyond Old Think (1 page)	07/06/1998	P1/b(1), P5
013b. email	re: Duplicate of No. 012 (2 pages)	07/03/1998	P1/b(1), P5
014a. email	Glyn Davies to Sandy Berger; re: Call to Yeltsin (1 page)	07/09/1998	P1/b(1)
014b. email	Lyle Harrison to White House Situation Room; re: Call to Yeltsin (1 page)	07/09/1998	P1/b(1)
015a. email	Jeffrey Bader to Andrew Weiss & Sandy Berger; re: Possible Jiang Visit to Moscow in Early September (1 page)	07/09/1998	P1/b(1)
015b. email	Andrew Weiss to Sandy Berger; re: Possible Jiang Visit to Moscow in Early September (1 page)	07/08/1998	P1/b(1), P5
016. email	Charles Pritchard to Sandy Berger; re: Hashimoto Visit Update [3 pages RELEASED ON APPEAL] (- page)	07/06/1998	P5
017. email	Sandra Kristoff to Sandy Berger; re: Guidance Needed on Laney Trip (1 page)	07/06/1998	P1/b(1), P5

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018a. email	Joseph Marty to Sandy Berger; re: Crown Prince of Ras al Khaimah (1 page)	07/09/1998	P1/b(1)
018b. email	Bruce Riedel to Sandy Berger; re: Crown Prince of Ras al Khaimah (1 page)	07/06/1998	P1/b(1), P5
019. report	Dick Clarke to APNSA; re: Weekly Report (2 pages)	07/03/1998	P1/b(1)
020a. letter	Christopher Meyer to Sandy Berger; re: Storage (1 page)	07/06/1998	P1/b(1)
020b. letter	Tony Blair to POTUS; re: Storage (1 page)	07/03/1998	P1/b(1)
021. memo	re: Japan & Transport Aircraft (2 pages)	06/22/1998	P1/b(1)
022. email	James Dobbins to Sandy Berger; re: Cuba (1 page)	06/22/1998	P1/b(1)
023a. email	Bruce Riedel to Sandy Berger & Donald Kerrick; re: Issues for Decision by SRB (1 page)	07/07/1998	P1/b(1)
023b. email	Thomas Countryman to Robert Malley & Sandy Berger; re: Issues for Decision by SRB (1 page)	07/07/1998	P1/b(1), P5
024a. email	Miriam Spiro to Sandy Berger; re: Request for Call with Prime Minister Prodi (1 page)	07/07/1998	P1/b(1)
024b. email	Lyle Harrison to Sandy Berger; re: Request for Call with Prime Minister Prodi (1 page)	07/06/1998	P1/b(1)
025. email	Eric Schwartz to Sandy Berger; re: ICC Update - Urgent (2 pages)	07/06/1998	P1/b(1), P5

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026a. email	Charles Pritchard to Sandy Berger; re: Latest Letter to Stanley (1 page)	06/22/1998	P1/b(1), P5
026b. email	Penelope O'Brien & Sandy Berger to Charles Pritchard; re: Latest Letter to Stanley (2 pages)	06/22/1998	P1/b(1)
026c. email	Charles Pritchard to Sandy Berger; re: Latest Letter to Stanley (2 pages)	06/19/1998	P1/b(1)
027. email	James Covey to Sandy Berger; re: Solana's Phone Call to Sandy (2 pages)	06/23/1998	P1/b(1)
028. email	Richard Clarke to Sandy Berger; re: Terrorism (1 page)	06/19/1998	P1/b(1)
029a. email	James Gagnon to Sandy Berger et al; re: Indonesia - Habibie Desire to Visit U.S. (1 page)	06/19/1998	P1/b(1)
029b. email	Mary Friedrich to James Gagnon et al; re: Indonesia - Habibie Desire to Visit U.S. (1 page)	06/19/1998	P1/b(1)
029c. email	James Gagnon to Sandy Berger; re: Indonesia - Habibie Desire to Visit U.S. (1 page)	06/19/1998	P1/b(1), P5
030. email	re: Duplicate of No. 026c (1 page)	06/19/1998	P1/b(1)
031a. note	Mary McCarthy to Sandy Berger; re: Daily Summary (1 page)	06/18/1998	P1/b(1)
031b. briefing paper	re: Iran (1 page)	06/18/1998	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
032. note	Don & Nancy to Sandy Berger & Jim Steinberg; re: Consulting with Key Allies on NATO Summit Issues (3 pages)	06/18/1998	P1/b(1), P5
033a. memo	Sandy Berger to POTUS; re: U.S. Assistance to Middle East [Released in Part] (2 pages)	06/15/1998	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
033b. article	re: [Middle East] (1 page)	05/08/1998	P1/b(1)
034a. analysis	Rob to Sandy Berger; re: Middle East Peace Process (4 pages)	06/22/1998	P1/b(1), P5
034b. article	re: Palestine Authority/Israel (2 pages)	06/16/1998	P1/b(1)
035. memo	re: Inspections (1 page)	06/18/1998	P1/b(1)
036. memo	re: Russia (1 page)	06/18/1998	P1/b(1)

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
033a. memo	Sandy Berger to POTUS; re: U.S. Assistance to Middle East [Released in Part] (2 pages)	06/15/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Samuel Berger (National Security Advisor)
OA/Box Number: 1485

FOLDER TITLE:

SRB Emails & Notes, 1/98-7/98 [4]

2006-0191-F

jp236

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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U-16-98

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 15, 1998

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: U.S. Assistance to Middle East

Background

On the margins of the May 8 PDB article, EO 13526 1.4c, 1.4(d)
EO 13526 1.4c, 1.4(d) you asked me to explore this as a possible source for more aid elsewhere, including the Palestinian Authority.

Discussion

In January, Israeli Finance Minister Ne'eman proposed phasing out economic assistance (ESF) to Israel over ten to twelve years, beginning in FY99 or 2000, and adding half the reduction to our military assistance (FMF). In other words, ESF would be phased down from \$1.2 billion annually to zero, while FMF would grow from \$1.8 to \$2.4 billion.

Secretary Albright has sought to accelerate the Israeli proposal in order to allow us to meet other Middle East priorities in FY99, as well as to free up funds for other worldwide needs in later years, within the Congressional cap for total Middle East aid and the \$1 billion cut Congress has proposed for total foreign aid. Our preferred approach would be to begin the phase-out in FY99, and front-load it by cutting Israeli ESF by \$150 million and increasing FMF by \$50 million in the first year. Stu Eizenstat and Martin Indyk have so far been unable to reach agreement with Ne'eman on this approach. Ne'eman claims his own consultations with key appropriators (Callahan, McConnell) have shown that Congress is ready to accept his original proposal with only minor modifications (a ten-year phase-out beginning in FY99). At the same time, he is seeking to use his proposal to wriggle out of Netanyahu's promise to you to give back \$50 million in FY98 for transfer to Jordan.

Copied
Berger
DSC will read
COS

*Discuss before you go
to Congress - only
corrected (what
to go (what)
Pitt agreed to*

6/20
→ Tom
Bruce
Jiji
@

Declassified in Part

SECRET

Reason: 1.5(b)(d)
Declassify On: 5/26/08

Per E.O. 13526
2015-0041-M (1.09)

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

6/1/2023 VZ

Meanwhile, we have engaged the Egyptians to discuss a gradual, though not total, cut-back in Egyptian ESF. (Ideally, we would begin with a \$100 million cut in FY99, maintaining the 2/3 ratio of Egypt/Israel ESF.) We have emphasized the need for Egypt to match Israel in articulating a coherent rationale for restructuring our aid program. So far, Egyptian thinking has not advanced beyond waiting to see what Israel gets and then asking for the same. They now realize that Congress is unlikely to approve any increase in Egyptian FMF, but they still argue for at least a token increase.

The phase-down of ESF will greatly increase our foreign aid flexibility in the out-years. However, it is in FY99 that we face the greatest crunch, as we seek to increase aid to Jordan (from \$25 to \$150 million in ESF, without the complicated "give-backs" from Egypt and Israel), the Palestinians (from \$75 to \$100 million) and the Middle East North Africa Bank (\$52.5 million for our first installment of capitalization).

We will not be able to meet those priorities without a more front-loaded reduction in Israeli ESF than Ne'eman says he has worked out with the Congress. If we don't get that, we will either have to reduce Egyptian ESF by more than the Israeli cut, or give up on our other priorities in the Middle East. These priorities are sufficiently important that we should not simply accept Ne'eman's terms without arguing strongly for our preferred approach.

*argue
for our
preferred approach
to Ne'eman*

Key members are ready to front-load the reductions if we reach an agreement with Israel, but are not willing to expend any political capital to convince Ne'eman to go along with us. Ne'eman believes he can get more working the Hill than compromising with us, although he faces skepticism about his requests for a costly debt repayment scheme, relief from their promise of \$50 million for Jordan, and permission to spend FMF outside of the United States. In turn, we need to communicate clearly our preference for a more front-loaded approach and get the Congress to recognize clearly the effect on other Middle East aid programs of the Israeli approach. This may gain us some additional flexibility for meeting our other aid priorities.

We have proceeded cautiously so far in order to avoid giving credence to Israeli press claims that we have tied this issue to our disagreement with Netanyahu over the peace process. We should soon, however, present our ideas formally to Congress.

Tab A PDB Article: [redacted] EO 13526 1.4c, 1.4(d)
[redacted] EO 13526 1.4c, 1.4(d)

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. email	Eric Schwartz to Sandy Berger; re: KR Developments (2 pages)	05/16/1998	P1/b(1)
001b. cable	American Embassy, Phnom Penh to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C.; re: Three Top KR Leaders (2 pages)	05/16/1998	P1/b(1)
002a. email	Mara Rudman to Sandy Berger; re: Handling Gingrich Visit to Allenby Site (1 page)	05/14/1998	P1/b(1)
002b. cable	Secretary of State, Washington, D.C. to American Embassy, Tel Aviv; re: Handling Gingrich Visit to Allenby Site (4 pages)	05/13/1998	P1/b(1)
003. notes	re: Sandy Berger Notes (1 page)	circa, 05/1998	P1/b(1)
004. draft	re: Foreign Policy Q's and A's - Presidential Press Conference with Italian Prime Minister Prodi (17 pages)	05/05/1998	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
005. note	Sandy Berger to Mary McCarthy; re: Iran (1 page)	05/06/1998	P1/b(1)
006. email	To NSC Legal Advisor; re: Recusal (1 page)	04/14/1998	P6/b(6)
007. email	Richard Clarke to Sandy Berger; re: Terrorism [Released in Part] (1 page)	04/29/1998	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
008. email	Robert Kyle to Sandy Berger et al; re: Business Community Sanctions Case [1 page RELEASED ON APPEAL] (1 page)	04/29/1998	P5
009. email	David Sherman to Sandy Berger; re: Request (1 page)	04/28/1998	P1/b(1)
010. email	Donald Kerrick to Sandy Berger; re: Foreign Policy Meeting (1 page)	04/29/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Samuel Berger (National Security Advisor)
OA/Box Number: 1485

FOLDER TITLE:

SRB Emails & Notes, 1/98-7/98 [8]

2006-0191-F
jp239

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
011a. email	M. Kay Joshi to APNSA Special Assistants; re: Meeting (1 page)	04/27/1998	P1/b(1)
011b. email	Kathleen Cooper to M. Kay Joshi; re: Meeting (1 page)	04/27/1998	P1/b(1)
011c. email	M. Kay Joshi to NE/South Asia; re: Meeting (1 page)	04/27/1998	P1/b(1)
011d. email	Richard Saunders to M. Kay Joshi; re: Meeting (1 page)	04/27/1998	P1/b(1)
011e. email	M. Kay Joshi to NE/South Asia; re: Meeting (1 page)	04/27/1998	P1/b(1)
012. email	Joseph Marty to Sandy Berger; re: Iraq & Iran (1 page)	05/01/1998	P1/b(1)
013. email	Mara Rudman to Sandy Berger et al; re: Meeting with Senator Thomas on China [1 page RELEASED ON APPEAL] (1 page)	04/25/1998	P5
014. email	William Courtney to Sandy Berger; re: Proposed Meeting (1 page)	04/25/1998	P1/b(1), P5
015. email	Kelly Letts to Eric Schwartz & Sandy Berger; re: Meeting with Human Rights NGO Leaders [1 page RELEASED ON APPEAL] (1 page)	04/18/1998	P5
016. email	Richard Clarke to Sandy Berger; re: Iran & U.S. (1 page)	05/14/1998	P1/b(1)
017. email	Stephen Flanagan to Sandy Berger & James Steinberg; re: 2nd Half Visits - Havel vs. New NATO Members (1 page)	04/13/1998	P1/b(1), P5
018a. email	Donald Bandler to Sandy Berger; re: Policy Content of Berlin Speech (1 page)	04/21/1998	P1/b(1)

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 National Security Council
 Samuel Berger (National Security Advisor)
 OA/Box Number: 1485

FOLDER TITLE:

SRB Emails & Notes, 1/98-7/98 [8]

2006-0191-F

jp239

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
018b. note	Don Bandler to Sandy Berger; re: The President's Berlin Speech (4 pages)	04/21/1998	P1/b(1), P5
019. notes	re: Sandy Berger Handwritten Notes - List (1 page)	circa, 04/1998	P1/b(1)
020a. email	Richard Clarke to Eric Schwartz & Sandy Berger; re: AmeriCares (1 page)	04/18/1998	P1/b(1)
020b. email	Eric Schwartz to Sandy Berger; re: AmeriCares (1 page)	04/18/1998	P1/b(1), P5
021. email	Jeffrey Bader to Sandy Berger; re: Wei Jingsheng Request for Meeting with POTUS (1 page)	04/20/1998	P1/b(1), P5
022. analysis	re: China - Reform & WTO (1 page)	04/20/1998	P1/b(1)
023. email	Carlos Pascual to Sandy Berger; re: Ukraine Questions (1 page)	04/04/1998	P1/b(1)
024. email	Jeffrey DeLaurentis to Sandy Berger; re: Cuba (1 page)	04/06/1998	P1/b(1), P5
025. email	Jamie Metzler to Sandy Berger; re: Iraqi Public Diplomacy (1 page)	04/09/1998	P1/b(1), P5
026. email	Donald Bandler to Sandy Berger; re: French Drop Satellite Program (1 page)	04/09/1998	P1/b(1), P5
027. email	Eric Schwartz to Sandy Berger; re: Pol Pot (1 page)	04/06/1998	P1/b(1)
028. email	Eric Schwartz to Sandy Berger; re: Suggested Guidance on Pol Pot (1 page)	04/06/1998	P1/b(1), P5

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Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
029. email	Donald Bandler to Sandy Berger; re: Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus Issues (2 pages)	04/07/1998	P1/b(1), P5
030. email	Eric Schwartz to Sandy Berger; re: International Criminal Court (1 page)	04/10/1998	P1/b(1)
031. email	Jason Greer to Sandy Berger; re: Released (1 page)	04/06/1998	P1/b(1)

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Feb '98 license

1. LORAL - Bernie Schwartz - license to satellite
o followed recommendation of State & Defense / ACDA [not dot]
o NOT handled specially.

05/05/98 8:45p.m.

DRAFT

Foreign Policy Q's and A's

Presidential Press Conference With Italian Prime Minister Prodi

May 6, 1998



I. PRODI VISIT

II. OTHER ISSUES:

MEPP

o Netanyahu will not come if preconditions (acceptance of 13%)

MEPP

Kosovo

Cyprus

Ireland

Iran

Iraq

Russia

Nigeria

Indonesia

China

Cuba

PDDs

proliferation (NO)

don't lean too far forward - Congress

abandoned terrorism

cut aid?

no. cannot impose peace.

can only give our best judgment of way forward

accepted; SN is the problem

very difficult issues

each party has to make own judgment about security

given best ideas

consequences in region

peace process moving forward better than one not moving forward for everyone

no ultimatum
only judgment of circumstances required to begin final status negotiations - SN's objective which we share

what on table?
v.s. ideas.
not discuss in public

what if no Monday?
remain committed to peace process
premature to speculate think this approach strategic opp to forward

I. PRODI VISIT

CAVALESE/COURT CASE

Do you think the pilots and the airmen should be punished?

- Not appropriate for me to comment on pending matter. I have full confidence in our military system of justice under the (Uniform Code of Military Justice).

*opening of military
7J (ART 32) hearing.
Defense lawyers arguing
that do case results
from Prodi / Wt pressure*

*• Not aware of any
Wt involvement*

CAVALESE/COMPENSATION

Why isn't the USG paying more compensation to the families of the Cavalese victims?

- As with all accidents resulting from NATO military training, compensation is handled under the NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Under this process, claims for damages are being submitted to Italy, and we will reimburse Italy for 75% of each claim approved.
- The United States has also agreed to reimburse Italy for 75% of a special payment of approximately \$60,000 to each family.

*• Handed thru
normal processes*

*• Inappropriate for
me to comment.*

CAVALESE/COOPERATION

Why didn't the US cooperate fully in the investigation?

- There was no lack of cooperation. On the contrary, the Italian magistrate investigating the incident publicly praised the excellent cooperation he received from U.S. military authorities. The report released by the joint committee investigating the incident was widely praised as fair and thorough.

BASING AGREEMENTS - RENEGOTIATION

Why won't the United States renegotiate its basing agreements with Italy now that the Cold War is over and the bases are no longer needed?

- Our basing agreements have served both our nations well for years. We continue to update our agreements as appropriate and as missions and operational needs change.
- U.S. forces use bases in Italy in order to fulfill NATO missions, including, for example, those relating to implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords.

U.S. POSITION ON EMU/ECONOMIC RIFTS

What is the U.S. position on EMU?

- I congratulated PM Prodi on Italy's entry into EMU. It is a historic achievement and he deserves credit for making it happen.
- I believe that Italy, Europe and the United States can benefit from a successful EMU underpinned by sound economic policies. Indeed, a successful EMU has the potential to benefit the entire transatlantic economic relationship.

IRAQ

Do the United States and Italy differ on how best to address threats posed by Saddam Hussein? Is it true that the United States was afraid to ask permission to use Italian bases during recent crises?

- There is no fundamental difference between Italy and the United States on Iraq. Italy understood that the threat to use force was critical in our effort to force Saddam Hussein to comply with his international obligations. Italy supported UN and U.S. efforts, shares our satisfaction with the results of Kofi Annan's mission, and agrees that we will all be watching for Saddam to implement his commitments.

IRAN

State report stems from
for terrorism; intel
community

principal state
sponsor of
state terrorism

During his recent visit to Iran, Italian Foreign Minister Dini said that Iran no longer supports terrorism and dismissed U.S. concerns about its development of weapons of mass destruction and opposition to the MEPP. How do you feel about this explicit rejection of the U.S. position on each of these issues?

Dini - change
significant.
Time

- Prime Minister Prodi and I discussed Iran. We both are encouraged by some of the statements from President Khatami and want to see Iran rejoin the community of nations. We differ somewhat in our assessments of how much change has occurred in Teheran, as well as how best to promote additional change. But we share the same goal and are consulting closely.
- Italy agrees that, in order for Iran to rejoin the international community, it must abide by international norms. That means ceasing support for international terrorism, halting efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction and abandoning support of elements seeking to undermine the Middle East Peace Process.

Is the administration reassessing its Iran policy in light of conciliatory statements by Iranian President Khatami, including his call for increased people-to-people exchanges between the United States and Iran?

- We are encouraged by some of the statements from Iran and want to support change. But U.S. policy is based on Iranian deeds. So far, there has not been a pattern of change that could justify changing the basic elements of U.S. policy.
- We favor official dialogue with Teheran, but are also considering ways to increase people-to-people contacts.
- If we see change, we'll respond appropriately.

ILSA

What is the status of the administration's consideration of ILSA sanctionability in connection with the involvement of Total, Gazprom, and Petronas in the South Pars gas field project?

- We are continuing to review the facts of this case and the implications under ILSA. At this point, no decisions have been made.

ITALY-LIBYA RELATIONS

How does the United States view Italy's increasingly warm relations with Libya? Will the ruling of the court at the Hague make it easier for the United States to accept the Italian approach?

- The reasons why Libya is subject to sanctions are well known.
- Libya must fully comply with the resolutions of the Security Council, including surrendering for trial in the United States or Scotland the two men charged with the attack on Pan Am 103.
- The recent ruling by the International Court of Justice does not change Libya's obligation to fully comply with the resolutions, nor does it weaken our resolve to see to it that Libya does comply. The court's ruling was on a narrow procedural matter, which does not affect or even address the merits of the case. We remain convinced that Libya's legal claims against the United States and the UK are not valid.
- I hope that Italy would use its contacts with Tripoli to make clear what Libya must do to comply with UNSC resolutions.

LIBYA: ITALIAN SANCTIONS VIOLATIONS

What is your reaction to the flight of two Italian private aircraft to Libya?

- These flights were a violation of UN sanctions against Libya. The Italian government has told us that it will seek to prosecute those involved, both for violations of UN sanctions and Italian aviation regulations.
- The Italian government has also reported these flights to the UN Sanctions Committee. We will pursue a strong statement by the Sanctions Committee concerning this violation.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS, ARMAMENTS

Is the United States hiding nuclear weapons and other armaments at its bases in Italy?

- The United States Government has long pursued a policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons in any given location, or in specific countries in order to help keep nuclear weapons secure from those who might seek to steal them and practice nuclear terrorism.
- The United States maintains forces and materiel in Italy to meet NATO requirements, in accordance with the NATO treaty and the NATO status of forces agreement.

UN SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM

Isn't it unfair of the United States to support Security Council seats for Germany and Japan but not Italy?

- We support expansion but to no more than 20-21 seats. We want to work with Italy to find the right formula.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION

Italy is one of the major havens for the theft of intellectual property. Are you satisfied with all that the government is doing to deal with the problem?

- Years of cooperation with Italian law enforcement on this problem have resulted in lower piracy losses to U.S. industry. However, Italy still has one of the highest piracy rates in Europe. More needs to be done, including passing the tougher anti-piracy legislation currently before parliament. I am also concerned about a new film law that restricts U.S. access to TV programs.

SILVIA BARALDINI

Now that the highest level of the Italian Government has requested the U.S. Government to release Silvia Baraldini, won't the United States finally release her?

- We are aware that the case of convicted Italian citizen Silvia Baraldini continues to be a concern of Italian Government.
- This is a matter for the Attorney-General, who has been in contact with the government of Italy.

Background: Italian national Silvia Baraldini was convicted in 1984 of criminal conspiracy for her role in the criminal organization known as the "Family," which planned and committed a series of offenses, including armed robbery and murder. Ms. Baraldini was convicted of conspiracy in the murder of two law enforcement officers and an armored truck guard, as well as attempted armed robbery and kidnapping in connection with the escape of a prisoner. She was sentenced to forty years in prison and received an additional three years after refusing to testify in connection with investigations into a series of terrorist bombings. The Italian Government has on five occasions requested her transfer to Italy. Justice has each time denied the request based on the serious nature of her offenses and the concern that she serve a sentence approximating that which the U.S. courts and the U.S. Parole Commission have decided is appropriate. Ms. Baraldini's lawyer was recently in contact with Justice regarding possible conditions for a transfer.

II. OTHER ISSUES

MEPP

Where are we in the peace process now? What's next? 7

- Secretary Albright had good talks with Netanyahu and Arafat in London and made progress in narrowing the gaps.
- We didn't achieve a breakthrough but we did make some progress which could facilitate an agreement in the coming days. We will remain vigorously engaged with the parties on trying to come to closure.
- We want to maintain the momentum. I have invited the two leaders to come to Washington Monday to start the final status negotiations on the basis of the ideas we've put forward. Chairman Arafat has accepted our ideas in principle. Prime Minister Netanyahu will consult with his cabinet now on those ideas and our invitation.
- I believe there is a strategic opportunity here to advance the process forward and we hope the parties will do so. It would be a great loss for all sides if this opportunity is lost. }

What progress was achieved?

- We are trying to put together a package that meets the needs of both sides.
- We have discussed a number of issues within the context of the four part agenda we laid out last year.
- The package is taking shape but there are still critical issues to be resolved in the coming days if we are to achieve a breakthrough.
- I don't think our goal is served by discussing the details in public.

What is Netanyahu's reaction to the US ideas?

The Prime Minister has responded positively in some areas.

We are continuing to work creatively and constructively to overcome the remaining areas of difference and produce an agreement.

I believe the Prime Minister wants to find a way forward and we are engaged in working with him to do so.

We want to give the Prime Minister some time to work his own government. We are interested in an agreement that achieves results, not an outcome in which one party says yes and the other can't move ahead.

What are these ideas and when will you make them public?

- I'm not going to get into the details of our thinking. The parties are fully aware of our ideas. Discussing the details in public would not be helpful.

Are you asking Israel to withdraw from 13% of the West Bank as the condition for the Washington talks?

- I am not going to get into numbers or details of our ideas.

Are you watering down your proposals in response to Israel's position on security?

- As the Secretary said we are not watering them down. We are trying to reach agreement.

Are you trying to pressure Netanyahu by conditioning a meeting on agreement to your ideas?

- No, as the Secretary said, her discussions with the Prime Minister were helpful and constructive. Our ideas are balanced and do not threaten Israel's security needs.
- In the end, it is up to Israel to decide what is best for its interests.

Do you plan to delay his European trip?

- No, our invitation is for Monday and the President departs Tuesday.

The Prime Minister will be in the US later this month for an AIPAC conference. Will he see the President?

- We have invited the leaders to Washington on May 11 if we can resolve the outstanding issues from London.
- Otherwise I have no plans at present to see the Prime Minister separately.

What about Arafat? What's his position?

- Chairman Arafat accepted our ideas in principle. He is now consulting with other Arab leaders on the process.

KOSOVO

Contact Group actions thus far seem to have no impact on continuing Serbian use of force against the Albanian majority. What further sanctions are you going to impose?

- US and Contact Group have made clear the necessity for no-precondition negotiations between Belgrade and Kosovo Albanians leading to meaningful autonomy.
- In Rome Contact Group approved assets and, if no progress by this weekend, an investment ban.
- If Milosevic fails to engage, will deepen his country's isolation and deprive his people of the chance to rebuild their economy.

Have you repeated the so-called "Christmas warning" – the threat to use force against Serbia if Serbia attacks the Albanians in Kosovo?

- Deeply concerned about Serbia's use of force of Kosovo.
- Nothing ruled out.

CYPRUS

The Cyprus peace process looks like a failure. What is next for Holbrooke and U.S. involvement?

- I sent Dick Holbrooke to the region to help facilitate the search for a settlement on Cyprus. But this can only work if both sides are prepared to negotiate seriously. We cannot impose a solution, and we cannot achieve a settlement -- only the two parties themselves can do that.
- We're not giving up. Our Special Cyprus Coordinator, Tom Miller, will be returning to Cyprus later this month to continue our efforts to promote a settlement.

IRELAND

Have you made a decision not to go to Ireland in May following the G-7 meeting?

- I have no plans to go at this point.

IRAN

Is the administration reassessing its Iran policy in light of conciliatory statements by Iranian President Khatami, including his call for increased people-to-people exchanges between the U.S. and Iran?

- I appreciate the new tone emanating from Iran and want to encourage change. But U.S. policy is based on Iranian deeds. So far, there has not been a pattern of change that could justify changing the basic elements of U.S. policy. If we see change, we'll respond appropriately

IRAQ

What about the recent Iraqi demands that sanctions be lifted soon?

- The international community, as represented by the Security Council, will decide if and when Iraq has complied with all relevant Security Council resolutions. Only then will the Security Council consider lifting sanctions.
- Iraq knows that it is obliged by Security Council resolutions and its agreement with the U.N. to provide not only immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to UNSCOM, but to cooperate fully with the U.N.'s efforts to ensure that its weapons of mass destruction program is destroyed and cannot be re-constituted.

RUSSIA

There are increasing reports that Russia is either unwilling or unable to stop the export of technology to Iran, to India, to Cyprus. We keep referring to them as a partner, but they don't seem to be cooperating with us at all. Are you concerned about Russia's behavior and would you support sanctions if Russia continues its present course?

- We have been discussing our concerns over missile cooperation with Russia for some time. We have made some significant progress, but important work needs to be done.
- One important accomplishment was Russia's decision earlier this year to establish "catch all" authority, putting into place new authority to stop transfers of the full range of goods and services to programs of weapons of mass destruction and foreign missile programs. This executive order is now in force.
- Current sanctions laws are adequate to deal with activities inconsistent with Russia's MTCR commitments. And we already have adequate discretionary authority to impose other penalties if this becomes necessary.
- My Administration will not hesitate to implement existing sanctions laws if the legal thresholds have been crossed. Nor will it be shy about the discretionary use of other penalties if we decide this would be useful in cutting off missile-related assistance to Iran by Russian entities.

NIGERIA

General Abacha is prepared to run as the only candidate in a referendum in Nigeria and to cancel elections. Do you think your misstatement at your press conference in South Africa about what he was required to do emboldened him to ignore the international community about the need for a fair and open transition to civilian leadership?

- No. I do not think that General Abacha or anyone else should be able to misinterpret what has been our policy for the last three years: to press for the return of stable, democratic, civilian government in Nigeria that respects the rights of its people.

- Abacha and the government of Nigeria committed themselves to holding an open, transparent process resulting in a civilian, democratically elected government, and we have repeatedly called upon the Government of Nigeria to honor that commitment.
- This means conducting a credible process that includes free political activity, release of political prisoners, freedom of the press, and free, fair and transparent elections.
- A referendum on a single candidate is not a free, fair and democratic election. We do not see how such a process could lead to a democratic government.

What is your reaction to the death penalties handed down by Nigeria's Special Military Tribunal April 28?

- These verdicts and death sentences were the product of a closed military proceeding which totally failed to achieve minimum standards of due process.
- There is no way to know if the defendants had access to counsel of their own choice, the opportunity to confront their accusers, or the right to present and contest evidence.
- This appears to violate internationally recognized standards of justice and human rights.
- Gen. Abacha and his government should show respect for the fundamental tenets of due process and the rule of law for all of the accused. This would help reduce the growing political tensions in Nigeria.

INDONESIA

Students in Jakarta appear to be heading for a confrontation with President Suharto. They want him to step down, which he clearly won't do. If there is violence, would you favor withdrawing IMF support for Indonesia?

- The rapid recovery of the Indonesian economy is in the interest of both the United States and the Indonesian people.

- That is why I have supported vigorous implementation of the economic reforms Indonesia has agreed to with the IMF. It also is why we are providing assistance to relieve the suffering of those Indonesian citizens most affected by the financial crisis.
- It is important for Indonesia's citizens to have the freedom to express their views peacefully. We have urged the Indonesian authorities to allow peaceful demonstrations and expressions of free speech and to show restraint when maintaining order. The government and people of Indonesia understand clearly the importance the United States attaches to respect for basic human rights and free speech.

CHINA TRIP

What are your goals for the upcoming China trip?

- I want to take advantage of the momentum that was created last October when President Jiang visited Washington and follow up on progress we made in several important areas.
- I believe we have turned around the U.S.-China relationship in the last year through our efforts to positively and constructively engage China on a broad range of common interests. That effort has already paid dividends. Developing a relationship that allows us to routinely engage in a strategic dialogue and work to resolve such issues as non-proliferation, human rights, trade, the rule of law and energy and the environment is important to both us and the region.
- As we get closer to the trip, we will have more to say about our specific goals.

Why won't you stop in Tokyo as part of the trip?

- China is a huge country, and this is going to be a long trip.

- Our relations with Japan are critically important. That is why I have been there twice, and why Secretary Albright was there this week. I will see Hashimoto in Birmingham. Hope he can make a visit here this year.

Are you satisfied that China is living up to the agreements that it has made with respect to cooperation on proliferation concerns? Is there a risk that commercial space deals with jeopardize our security?

- Promoting commercial space activity with China is part of our broader engagement policy, which includes creating a stronger basis for U.S.-Chinese cooperation on missile nonproliferation issues.
- Missile nonproliferation is one of the key issues we discuss with China. We have been considering ways to encourage China to strengthen its control of missile-related exports, just as we made progress last year with China on curtailing nuclear proliferation. No one is proposing any offers of direct or indirect access to missile technology.
- When China violates U.S. laws, we have imposed sanctions, as we did in 1993. The basis for the waiver of these sanctions in 1994 was additional Chinese nonproliferation commitments.

What did Secretary Albright mean about possible lifting of Tiananmen sanctions if China opens its markets? Is our China policy totally trade-driven?

- Our policy is not trade driven. Secretary Albright is in China to kick off preparations for my trip in June and has been discussing the full range of issues with her Chinese counterparts, including non-proliferation, trade, human rights, energy and the environment. Any consideration of lifting of sanctions would be done in the context of Chinese responsiveness to concerns we have, especially on human rights.

CUBA

Do you have any comment on the story in the New York Times about the plot to assassinate Castro and CANF's alleged involvement?

- As this is an ongoing investigation by the Department of Justice and the FBI, I would prefer not to comment and refer any further questions to those two agencies.

Didn't you hold a "private meeting" at a Miami fundraiser with CANF leaders last December, shortly after federal investigators had begun to examine the group's possible role in a plot to kill Castro?

(DOUG SOSNIK SHOULD REVIEW THIS ANSWER -- HE WAS AT THE EVENT)

- I had a brief conversation with two members of the CANF board in the course of a larger political event in a private residence in Miami. I and members of my Administration officials often meet with representatives of Cuban-American organizations.

PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVES

There are reports that you either have approved or will approve new PDDs on fighting germ warfare, cyber-terrorism and other new threats. What are these new emerging dangers? How vulnerable is the United States to a biological warfare attack?

- I have requested an ongoing review of unconventional threats, such as weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and computer warfare.
- I want to wait until that review is completed before I decide what the next steps ought to be. I can say that we take these threats very, very seriously and are committed to doing what is necessary to counter them.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. email	Richard Clarke to Sandy Berger; re: Terrorism [Released in Part] (1 page)	04/29/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Samuel Berger (National Security Advisor)
OA/Box Number: 1485

FOLDER TITLE:

SRB Emails & Notes, 1/98-7/98 [8]

2006-0191-F
jp239

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Scott-Perez, Marilyn L.

From: Clarke, Richard A.
Sent: Wednesday, April 29, 1998 5:03 PM
To: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc: McCarthy, Mary O.
Subject: FOR SANDY: TERRORISM AND TENET [TOP SECRET]

Sandy,

George wants to talk to you about terrorism in his meeting with you on Friday:

EO 13526 1.4c

EO 13526 1.4c

George is bringing my CIA counterpart to the meeting. Therefore, i think you would be well served to invite me.

Invite Dick to terrorism Discussions *A*

Tell Dick to go play in traffic *A*

RAC

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
2015-0041-M (1.12)
6/1/2023 VZ

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Sandy Berger to POTUS; re: Taliban & Usama bin Ladin (2 pages)	eirea; 09/03/1998	P1/b(1), P5 KDE 12/17/19
001b. briefing paper	re: Situation Room Morning Summary (1 page)	08/25/1998	P1/b(1)
002a. fax cover sheet	Steve Simon to Chris Ross et al; re: Meeting (1 page)	09/03/1998	P1/b(1), P6/b(6), b(7)(C), b(7)(F)
002b. agenda	re: Topics to be Discussed (1 page)	09/03/1998	P1/b(1)
003a. memo	William Wechsler to Sandy Berger; re: POTUS Meeting with Blair (1 page)	09/02/1998	P1/b(1)
003b. memo	Sandy Berger to POTUS; re: Pressing Blair (2 pages)	eirea; 09/02/1998	P1/b(1), P5
003c. talking points	re: Points to Be Made for Meeting with Prime Minister Tony Blair (2 pages)	circa, 09/02/1998	P1/b(1)
004a. fax cover sheet	Dick Clarke to Larry Gaber et al; re: Rescheduled Meeting (2 pages)	09/01/1998	P1/b(1), P6/b(6), b(7)(C), b(7)(E), b(7)(F)
004b. memo	Richard Clarke to Members of Special Coordination Group on International Crime; re: Rescheduled Meeting [Released in Part] [50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(1)] (1 page)	09/01/1998	P1/b(1), P3/b(3), b(7)(E) VZ 9/21/2023
005a. memo	Richard Clarke to Sylvia Mathews; re: Funding in Emergency Supplemental (1 page)	09/01/1998	P1/b(1), P5
005b. memo	re: PDD-62 [Released in Part] (1 page)	n.d.	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 National Security Council
 Richard A. Clarke (Transnational Threats (TNT))
 OA/Box Number: 1758

FOLDER TITLE:

September Chron - 1998 [3]

2006-0191-F
 jp242

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006a. letter	Richard Clarke to Mr. Flanders; re: Purchase (1 page)	09/02/1998	Personal Misfile
006b. check	re: Personal Check (1 page)	09/01/1998	Personal Misfile
006c. email	Carolyn Dollar to Charles Green; re: Phone Call (1 page)	08/25/1998	Personal Misfile
006d. check	re: Personal Check (1 page)	09/01/1998	Personal Misfile
007a. title page	re: U.S. Policy on Terrorism (1 page)	n.d.	P1/b(1)
007b. list	re: Presidential Policy on Counter-Terrorism (1 page)	1995	P1/b(1)
007c. list	re: Presidential Policy on Terrorism (1 page)	1998	P1/b(1)
007d. list	re: Counter-Terrorism Policy (1 page)	n.d.	P1/b(1)
007e. report	re: Presidential Policy on Terrorism (14 pages)	1998	P1/b(1)
007f. report	re: U.S. Policy on Counter-Terrorism (10 pages)	1995	P1/b(1)
008a. profile sheet	re: Taliban & Usama bin Ladin (2 pages)	08/26/1998	P1/b(1)
008b. memo	re: Duplicate of 001b (2 pages)	09/08/1998	P1/b(1), P5 VZ 9/21/2013
008c. memo	re: Duplicate of 001a (1 page)	09/03/1998	P1/b(1)

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Clinton Presidential Records
 National Security Council
 Richard A. Clarke (Transnational Threats (TNT))
 OA/Box Number: 1758

FOLDER TITLE:

September Chron - 1998 [3]

2006-0191-F
ip242

RESTRICTION CODES

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- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008d. memo	re: Duplicate of 001a (1 page)	09/03/1998	P1/b(1)
008e. memo	re: Duplicate of 001a (1 page)	08/26/1998	P1/b(1)
008f. memo	Sandy Berger to POTUS; re: Taliban & Usama bin Ladin (1 page)	eirea; 09/03/1998	P1/b(1), P5 VZ 9/21/2023
008g. memo	re: Duplicate of 001b (incomplete) (1 page)	eirea; 09/03/1998	P1/b(1), P5 VZ 9/21/2023
008h. memo	re: Duplicate of 008f (1 page)	eirea; 09/03/1998	P1/b(1), P5 VZ 9/21/2023

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September Chron - 1998 [3]

2006-0191-F

jp242

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0041-M (1.18)
6/1/2023 VL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Pressing Blair for Actions Against Usama Bin Laden Associates in the United Kingdom

Because of the peculiarities of British law, the United Kingdom has long been a relative safe haven for supporters and associates of Middle East terrorists. In the weeks since the embassy bombings, both President Mubarak and Crown Prince Abdullah have asked us to urge the British to take action against terrorists operating from their soil.

By the time you meet with Tony Blair, he is expected to have pushed a new anti-terrorism law through an emergency session of parliament. The Queen is expected to approve it on Saturday. Although the new law's focus is on Northern Ireland, it also includes measures that will give the government new authorities to combat global terrorism. Most significant is the provision that makes it illegal to conspire to commit terrorism abroad.

In your meeting with Blair, you should strongly encourage him to immediately begin using this new provision against associates of Usama Bin Laden and other Islamic extremists. We have strong evidence that Bin Laden cells exist in London, that they are actively engaged in conspiracies abroad, and that they often use British financial institutions to move money destined to assist terrorists. Talking points are at Tab A.

On a related matter, we are beginning to make progress on implementing your executive order blocking the assets of Usama Bin Laden and his associates held in U.S. banks. Bank of America has identified and frozen a number of accounts under the control of Salah El Din Idris, the present owner of El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries Company, at their London and Jersey (Channel Islands) branches. When these accounts were first blocked last week, they held slightly over \$10 million. Since then, additional deposits have been made to bring the total

~~TOP SECRET~~

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Reason: 1.5 (c) (d)
Declassify On: 09/02/08

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blocked up to about \$25 million. It seems that Idris has not attempted a withdrawal and therefore may not yet be aware that his funds have been blocked.

It is unclear what will happen when Idris becomes aware of this blocking action. The most problematic scenario involves him taking legal action against our blocking order in British courts, where there is little legal precedent for such a case. While Treasury urges that you not discuss this specific matter with Blair, we have included general talking points on the need for the UK to cooperate fully with our efforts to freeze terrorists' financial assets.

Attachment

Tab A Talking Points for your Meeting with PM Blair

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004b. memo	Richard Clarke to Members of Special Coordination Group on International Crime; re: Rescheduled Meeting [Released in Part] [50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(1)] (1 page)	09/01/1998	P1/b(1), P3/b(3), b(7)(E)

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National Security Council
Richard A. Clarke (Transnational Threats (TNT))
OA/Box Number: 1758

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2006-0191-F
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
2015-0041-M (1.22)
6/1/2023 VZ

September 1, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE SPECIAL COORDINATION GROUP ON
INTERNATIONAL CRIME

FROM: RICHARD A. CLARKE *RF*

SUBJECT: SCG Meeting Rescheduled

SCG Rescheduled: The SCG meeting postponed on Tuesday, September 1, 1998 has been rescheduled and will be this Friday September 4, 1998. Please note that the Money Laundering Sub-Group report to the SCG originally scheduled for this SCG will not take place at this time. The agenda, meeting time, location, and topics are as follows:

SCG Agenda for Friday, September 4, 1998 10:00-12:00

Where: OEOB, Room 552

Participants: SCG Members (plus one)

Agenda: 10:00 Opening - Richard A. Clarke
10:05 Continued Diplomatic Initiatives &
Institutional Development Sub-Group Report:
Corruption Brief/VP Conference (State)
10:35 Update on Russia/CIS Policy Paper (State/Justice)
10:50 Briefing on the status of EO 13526, 1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(7)e
11:05 Nigeria/Africa Sub-Group Report (State/Justice)
11:50 Other Business/Closing Remarks -
Richard A. Clarke

All participating agencies are reminded that they should arrange access to OEOB for all of their participants by providing their full names, DOBs and SSNs NLT 3PM the day prior to the session to Ms. Carolyn Dollar at 202-456-9361.

Questions concerning the items above may be directed to Director William Wechsler at 202-456-9351 or Director Fred Rosa at 202-456-9361.

Copy: SCG Sub-Group Chairs; Departmental SCG Coordinators

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005b. memo	re: PDD-62 [Released in Part] (1 page)	n.d.	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Richard A. Clarke (Transnational Threats (TNT))
OA/Box Number: 1758

FOLDER TITLE:

September Chron - 1998 [3]

2006-0191-F

jp242

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

SECRET

FEMA. FEMA shall be the lead agency for consequence management planning and coordination. Transition from the crisis management phase to the consequence management phase shall be as agreed by the Attorney General, the FBI Director and the FEMA Director, or their designees. (S)

The U.S. Secret Service. The Secret Service shall be the lead agency for security design/planning and implementation, and will identify and coordinate the appropriate Secret Service anti-terrorism measures and counterterrorism assets (and, if necessary, the assets of other agencies in mutual agreement with those agencies) that will be needed to effect the overall security requirement. (including [redacted] EO 13526 1.4g

[redacted] EO 13526 1.4g and other activities required by their statutory Federal Criminal investigations.) (S)

The FEMA Director, U.S. Secret Service Director, and FBI Director shall ensure that their respective lead agency responsibilities are fully coordinated and effectively implemented. Unless mutually agreed upon between the Directors or their designees, the Secret Service and the FBI will maintain full command and control of their respective agency assets in all circumstances and incidents.

Defense, State, Energy, HHS, Transportation and EPA shall, consistent with their authorities and appropriations, make available specialized units in support of security operations, crisis management, and consequence management. (S)

The Attorney General and Secretary of the Treasury, in cooperation with other concerned Principals including the Director/OMB, should within 120 days submit for my approval a plan to implement this decision. The plan should, inter alia, cover (S)

-- Command/control arrangements of the FBI, Secret Service, FEMA, DOI and other relevant agencies; (S)

-- how to achieve quickly an air space security capability centered on the enforcement arms of the Treasury (U.S. Secret Service and U.S. Customs Service); (S)

-- any required changes in funding and/or legislative authorities. (U)

Declassified under the Authority of the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel, E.O. 13526, 5.3(b)(3) ISCAP Appeal 2013-003, No. 1 March 18, 2014 1015-0091-M (1.25)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 8, 1998

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2014-0845-N (1.01)

2/27/2017 KBH

2015-0041-M (K30)

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER *SB*

SUBJECT: Taliban Guarantees Regarding Usama bin Ladin

You asked about a report that the Taliban had gotten Usama bin Ladin to agree not to stage additional attacks from Afghanistan.

The Taliban have repeatedly assured the United States and Saudi Arabia that they would restrain bin Ladin from attacking us or the Saudis from his base in Afghanistan. These assurances came after bin Ladin's move to Qandahar in early 1997, after his late 1997 interview in which he threatened the United States, and in May 1988 after his speech broadcast from Khost. The Taliban also claimed to have extracted a promise from bin Ladin not to attack in a letter from him late last year. Despite these assurances, UBL continued to plan attacks, surveil targets, deploy attack teams, smuggle and stockpile weapons and explosives while a "guest" of the Taliban.

Until now, the Taliban had little incentive to enforce restrictions on bin Ladin, since they share his ideology and rely on his resources. This said, it is not clear that the Taliban leadership understands the full reach of bin Ladin's operational capabilities, despite the fact that he has used Taliban communications now and then to contact his operatives; they may believe that by keeping him in Afghanistan they are actually constraining his ability to attack.

The attacks against Khost, however, clearly caught the Taliban's attention. On August 22, Mullah Omar joined a phone call initiated by one of his subordinates to a mid-level State Department official, in which Omar proposed a dialogue regarding bin Ladin. We accepted, sent them a paper on bin Ladin, his terrorist network and the threat he poses to U.S. interests, and are now waiting for his emissary to meet our people in Islamabad. Although the dialogue is not likely to result in Taliban action against bin Ladin, Omar's interest in it might

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Reason: 1.5 (c)

Declassify on: 8/26/08

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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reflect tensions within the Taliban on the issue of haven for bin Ladin.

In any case, the Taliban track record on assurances makes their latest assurances unpersuasive. Mullah Omar remains in firm control of the movement and continues to refer privately to bin Ladin as a "water jar," (i.e., a life giving force). Thus, he would not be inclined, at this point, to do what we require: expel bin Ladin to us or the Saudis.

Attachment

Tab A August 25 Morning Summary

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*→ Simon
what about
Omar's overture
to U.S.? Response.
Status, Follow up.
R*

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Taliban Guarantees Regarding Usama bin Ladin

You asked about a report (Tab A) that the Taliban had gotten Usama bin Ladin to agree not to stage additional attacks from Afghanistan.

The Taliban have repeatedly assured the United States and Saudi Arabia that they would restrain bin Ladin from attacking us or the Saudis from his base in Afghanistan. These assurances came after bin Ladin's move to Qandahar in early 1997, after his late 1997 interview in which he threatened the United States, and in May 1988 after his speech broadcast from Khost. The Taliban also claimed to have extracted a promise from bin Ladin not to attack in a letter from him late last year. Despite these assurances, UBL continued to plan attacks, surveil targets, deploy attack teams, smuggle and stockpile weapons and explosives while a "guest" of the Taliban.

Until now, the Taliban had little incentive to enforce restrictions on bin Ladin, since they share his ideology and rely on his resources. This said, it is not clear that the Taliban leadership understands the full reach of bin Ladin's operational capabilities, despite the fact that he has used Taliban communications now and then to contact his operatives; they may believe that by keeping him in Afghanistan they are actually constraining his ability to attack.

In any case, the Taliban track record on assurances makes their latest claims unpersuasive. Mullah Omar, who is in firm control of the movement, continues to refer to bin Ladin as a "water jar," (i.e., a life giving force) and will not do the only thing he can to prevent renewed attacks launched essentially by phone calls: expel bin Ladin to the United States or the Saudis.

Attachment
Tab A August 25 Morning Summary

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (c)
Declassify On: 8/26/08

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PER E.O. 13526

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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1006-0191-F (5.27)

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5958 REDQ

w/ Top Secret
Code word attachment

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WASHINGTON

Remove
Code word portions of
attachment.
Done

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PER E.O. 13526
2015-0041-04 (1.3a)
6/1/2023 VZ
706-0911-5 (5.38)

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Taliban Guarantees Regarding Usama bin Ladin

You asked about a report that the Taliban had gotten Usama bin Ladin to agree not to stage additional attacks from Afghanistan.

The Taliban have repeatedly assured the U.S. and Saudi Arabia that they would restrain bin Ladin from attacking us or the Saudis from his base in Afghanistan. These assurances came after bin Ladin's move to Qandahar in early 1997, after his late 1997 interview in which he threatened the U.S., and in May 1988 after his speech broadcast from Khost. The Taliban also claimed to have extracted a promise from bin Ladin not to attack in a letter from him late last year. Despite these assurances, UBL continued to plan attacks, surveil targets, deploy attack teams, smuggle and stockpile weapons and explosives while a "guest" of the Taliban.

Spell out

Spec
04

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w/ Top Secret code word

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Reason: 1.5 (c)

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yes spell out U.S.
yes spell out U.S.

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2014-6051-W (1.30)
6/1/2023 VZ
2006-0141-F (5.09)

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Taliban Guarantees Regarding Usama bin Ladin

(Tab A)

You asked about a report that the Taliban had gotten Usama bin Ladin to agree not to stage additional attacks from Afghanistan.

The Taliban have repeatedly assured the U.S. and Saudi Arabia that they would restrain bin Ladin from attacking us or the Saudis from his base in Afghanistan. These assurances came after bin Ladin's move to Qandahar in early 1997, after his late 1997 interview in which he threatened the U.S., and in May 1988 after his speech broadcast from Khost. The Taliban ^{also} claimed to have extracted a promise from bin Ladin not to attack in a letter from him late last year. Despite these assurances, UBL continued to plan attacks, surveil targets, deploy attack teams, smuggle and stockpile weapons and explosives while a "guest" of the Taliban.

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the United States

Attachment
Tab A August 25 Morning Summary

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (c)

Declassify on 8/26/08

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Richard A. Clarke to Michael Deich; re: OMB/NSC Budget Review [2 pages RELEASED ON APPEAL] (page)	09/23/1998	P5
002a. fax cover sheet	Richard A. Clarke to Thomas Pickering et al; re: Security (1 page)	09/24/1998	P1/b(1)
002b. memo	Richard A. Clarke to Thomas Pickering & Bonnie Cohen; re: Security (2 pages)	09/23/1998	P1/b(1), P5
003. memo	Richard A. Clarke to Group; re: Establishment of Subgroup (1 page)	09/09/1998	P1/b(1)
004a. fax cover sheet	Richard A. Clarke to Jonathan Winer et al; re: Organized Crime in Russia (1 page)	10/01/1998	P1/b(1)
004b. memo	From Richard A. Clarke; re: Organized Crime in Russia [50 U.S.C. § 3507] (1 page)	09/30/1998	P1/b(1), P3/b(3) VZ 9/21/2023
005. memo	Richard A. Clarke to Sylvia Matthews; re: Counter Narcotics Supplemental [1 page RELEASED ON APPEAL] (page)	09/29/1998	P5
006a. profile sheet	William Wechsler & Richard A. Clarke to Sandy Berger; re: POTUS Meeting with Tony Blair (2 pages)	09/02/1998	P1/b(1)
006b. memo	William Wechsler to Sandy Berger; re: POTUS Meeting with Tony Blair (1 page)	09/02/1998	P1/b(1)
006c. memo	Sandy Berger to POTUS; re: Pressing Blair to Take Action (2 pages)	09/02/1998	P1/b(1), P5 VZ 9/21/2023
006d. talking points	re: Summary Points to be Made for Meeting with Prime Minister Tony Blair [Released in Part] (1 page)	09/02/1998	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 National Security Council
 Richard A. Clarke (Transnational Threats (TNT))
 OA/Box Number: 1758

FOLDER TITLE:

September Chron - 1998 [9]

2006-0191-F
 jp248

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006e. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Meeting with Prime Minister Tony Blair (2 pages)	09/02/1998	P1/b(1)
006f. memo	Sandy Berger to POTUS; re: Pressing Blair to Take Action (incomplete) (1 page)	09/02/1998	P1/b(1), P5 VZ 9/21/2023
006g. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Meeting with Prime Minister Tony Blair (1 page)	09/02/1998	P1/b(1)
006h. talking points	re: Summary Points to be Made for Meeting with Prime Minister Tony Blair [Released in Part] (1 page)	09/02/1998	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
006i. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Meeting with Prime Minister Tony Blair (1 page)	09/02/1998	P1/b(1)
007a. fax cover sheet	Dick Clarke to Larry Gaber et al; re: Meeting of Special Coordination Group on International Crime (2 pages)	10/01/1998	P1/b(1), P6/b(6), b(7)(C), b(7)(E), b(7)(F)
007b. agenda	re: Points to be Discussed in Meeting of Special Coordination Group on International Crime (1 page)	10/05/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 National Security Council
 Richard A. Clarke (Transnational Threats (TNT))
 OA/Box Number: 1758

FOLDER TITLE:

September Chron - 1998 [9]

2006-0191-F
 jp248

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004b. memo	From Richard A. Clarke; re: Organized Crime in Russia [50 U.S.C. § 3507] (1 page)	09/30/1998	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Richard A. Clarke (Transnational Threats (TNT))
OA/Box Number: 1758

FOLDER TITLE:

September Chron - 1998 [9]

2006-0191-F
jp248

RESTRICTION CODES

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

~~SECRET~~

September 30, 1998

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2015-0041-m (1,36)
6/1/2023 VZ

MEMORANDUM FOR [REDACTED] (b)(3)
DIRECTOR, DCI
CRIME AND NARCOTICS CENTER
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

FROM: RICHARD A. CLARKE *RAC*
SUBJECT: Organized Crime in Russia

In our SCG review of Russian organized crime, several points were made about the connection between criminal activities and the economic crisis in Russia. For instance, it was reported that organized crime is responsible for 40% of Russian GNP and capital flows out of Russia; 70-80% of private businesses in Russia pay extortion fees of about 10-20% of their revenues; all major economic sectors are affected by organized crime activities; and the corrupting influence of organized crime discourages political leaders from making positive economic decisions.

I would like an intelligence estimate of the role of Russian organized crime in the current economic crisis in Russia. This estimate should include organized crime's role in the underlying weaknesses of the Russian economy and political system, the direct and indirect role of organized crime in the onset of the recent crises, and problems organized crime poses to those attempting to confront the continuing economic problems facing Russia.

cc: Jonathan Winer
Mark Richard
Carlos Pascual

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0041-M (1.40)
6/1/2013 VZ

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Pressing Blair for Actions Against Usama Bin Laden Associates in the United Kingdom

Because of the peculiarities of British law, the United Kingdom has long been a relative safe haven for supporters and associates of Middle East terrorists. In the weeks since the embassy bombings, both President Mubarak and Crown Prince Abdullah have asked us to urge the British to take action against terrorists operating from their soil.

By the time you meet with Tony Blair, he is expected to have pushed a new anti-terrorism law through an emergency session of parliament. The Queen is expected to approve it on Saturday. Although the new law's focus is on Northern Ireland, it also includes measures that will give the government new authorities to combat global terrorism. Most significant is the provision that makes it illegal to conspire to commit terrorism abroad.

In your meeting with Blair, you should strongly encourage him to immediately begin using this new provision against associates of Usama Bin Laden and other Islamic extremists. We have strong evidence that Bin Laden cells exist in London, that they are actively engaged in conspiracies abroad, and that they often use British financial institutions to move money destined to assist terrorists.

On a related matter, we are beginning to make progress on implementing your executive order blocking the assets of Usama Bin Laden and his associates held in U.S. banks. Bank of America has identified and frozen a number of accounts under the control of Salah El Din Idris, the present owner of El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries company, at their London and Jersey (Channel Islands) branches. When these accounts were first blocked last week, they held slightly over \$10 million. Since then, additional deposits have been made to bring the total

~~TOP SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (c) (d)
Declassify On: 09/02/08

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

blocked up to about \$25 million. It seems that Idris has not attempted a withdrawal and therefore may not yet be aware that his funds have been blocked.

It is unclear what will happen when Idris becomes aware of this blocking action. The most problematic scenario involves him taking legal action against our blocking order in British courts, where there is little legal precedent for such a case. While Treasury urges that you not discuss this specific matter with Blair, we have included general talking points on the need for the UK to cooperate fully with our efforts to freeze terrorists' financial assets.

Attachment

Tab A Talking Points for your Meeting with PM Blair

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006d. talking points	re: Summary Points to be Made for Meeting with Prime Minister Tony Blair [Released in Part] (1 page)	09/02/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 National Security Council
 Richard A. Clarke (Transnational Threats (TNT))
 OA/Box Number: 1758

FOLDER TITLE:

September Chron - 1998 [9]

2006-0191-F
jp248

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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SUMMARY POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR

- EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(c), 1.4(d)
- Congratulations on your new anti-terrorism law. Especially pleased to see that it is now illegal under British law to conspire to commit terrorism abroad.
- Extremely important to use this law against associates of Usama Bin Laden in the UK.
- Strong evidence that Bin Laden cells exist in London.
- After the strikes against Bin Laden, I ordered that all of Bin Laden's assets held in U.S. banks and their overseas branches be frozen. I ask that your government cooperate with our efforts if the evidence leads to London branches of U.S. banks.
- Ask that your government seek to freeze any such assets that may be held in British banks.

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
2015-0041-M (1.41)
6/1/2023 VZ

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Classified by: Samuel R. Berger
Reason: 1.5 (c) (d)
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2015-0041-11 (1,46)

6/1/2013 VL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Pressing Blair for Actions Against Usama Bin Laden Associates in the United Kingdom

Because of the peculiarities of British law, the United Kingdom has long been a relative safe haven for supporters and associates of Middle East terrorists. In the weeks since the embassy bombings, both President Mubarak and Crown Prince Abdullah have asked us to urge the British to take action against terrorists operating from their soil.

By the time you meet with Tony Blair, he is expected to have pushed a new anti-terrorism law through an emergency session of parliament. The Queen is expected to approve it on Saturday. Although the new law's focus is on Northern Ireland, it also includes measures that will give the government new authorities to combat global terrorism. Most significant is the provision that makes it illegal to conspire to commit terrorism abroad.

In your meeting with Blair, you should strongly encourage him to immediately begin using this new provision against associates of Usama Bin Laden and other Islamic extremists. We have strong evidence that Bin Laden cells exist in London, that they are actively engaged in conspiracies abroad, and that they often use British financial institutions to move money destined to assist terrorists. ~~Talking points are at Tab A.~~

On a related matter, we are beginning to make progress on implementing your executive order blocking the assets of Usama Bin Laden and his associates held in U.S. banks. Bank of America has identified and frozen a number of accounts under the control of Salah El Din Idris, the present owner of El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries Company, at their London and Jersey (Channel Islands) branches. When these accounts were first blocked last week, they held slightly over \$10 million. Since then, additional deposits have been made to bring the total

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006h. talking points	re: Summary Points to be Made for Meeting with Prime Minister Tony Blair [Released in Part] (1 page)	09/02/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Richard A. Clarke (Transnational Threats (TNT))
OA/Box Number: 1758

FOLDER TITLE:

September Chron - 1998 [9]

2006-0191-F
jp248

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.


PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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6/1/2023 VZ

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Reason: 1.5 (c) (d)
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. list	re: Hotel Accommodations (1 page)	02/18/1998	P6/b(6), b(7)(C), b(7)(F)
001b. memo	Kenneth McKune to Jim Reynolds et al; re: Meeting in London (2 pages)	02/17/1998	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
002a. fax cover sheet	Richard A. Clarke to Suan rice et al; re: Summary of Conclusions - Peacekeeping Core Group (1 page)	02/24/1998	P1/b(1)
002b. memo	Richard A. Clarke to Members of Peacekeeping Core Group; re: Summary of Conclusions - February 24, 1998 Meeting (2 pages)	02/24/1998	P1/b(1)
003. memo	Jamie Metzl & Carolyn Dollar to Officer-in-Charge; re: Request for Appointments (2 pages)	02/24/1998	P1/b(1), P6/b(6)
004a. fax cover sheet	Eric Schwartz & Jamie Metzl to Joseph Duffey et al; re: Summary of Conclusions & Announcement of Meeting for February 28, 1998 (2 pages)	02/23/1998	P1/b(1)
004b. memo	Jamie Metzl to Members of International Public Information Interagency Working Group in Iraq [Released in Part] (1 page)	02/23/1998	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
005a. paper	re: Discussion Paper for NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on Unconventional Threats to the United States (9 pages)	01/24/1998	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
005b. memo	POTUS to VPOTUS et al; re: Presidential Decision Directive - Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland & Americans Overseas (12 pages)	circa, 01/1998	P1/b(1)
005c. fax cover sheet	NSC to Mona Sutphen; re: Notice of Meeting - Unconventional Threats Against the U.S. (partial) (1 page)	circa, 02/1998	b(2)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 National Security Council
 Richard A. Clarke (Transnational Threats (TNT))
 OA/Box Number: 1381

FOLDER TITLE:

February Chron - 1998 [4]

2006-0191-F
 jp271

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

2041

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015By. VR NARA, Date 6/1/20232015-0041-M~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Decl. 2/16/03

February 17, 1998

TO: DOJ - Jim Reynolds
FBI - Dale Watson
NSC - Steven Simon
FAA - David Leach

FROM: S/CT - Kenneth McKune, Acting ✓

SUBJECT: Meeting of Counterterrorism Experts of the Eight in London
March 5-6

The USG delegation to the March 5-6 Meeting of Counterterrorism Experts of the Eight in London will be led by Gordon Gray of this office. I invite you or your nominee to take part in the delegation. Since the Lockerbie issue is the only agenda item on aviation, I would appreciate it if Embassy London's CASLO, Elizabeth Mullikan, could attend that portion of the discussion.

A UK-provided draft agenda is attached.

S/CT will hold a delegation preparatory meeting in Room 2507 on Friday, February 27 at 11 am.

Please advise John Spiegel at 647-8941 who will attend the preparatory meeting; we need the social security number and date of birth for those without a State Department building pass. For those traveling to London, we need passport numbers and hotel reservation requests for the country clearance cable. Please reply by noon on Friday, February 20.

I am looking forward to seeing you at the delegation meeting on February 27.

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DRAFT AGENDA

(approximate timings to be inserted later)

Introduction

- * Chairman's welcome
- * Approval of agenda

International terrorist trends

- * Recent incidents
- * Current trends

Progress reports and possible future action

- * Progress on the 25 Points
- * Developments in national legislation
- * Report from the G8 Crime Experts' Group
- * Promotion of cooperation in regional and other fora
- * Counter-terrorism Technology Conference, 11-12 December
- * Seminar on Terrorist Arms Trafficking, 9-10 February
- * Seminar on Chemical & Biological Terrorism, 23-24 March
- * Directory of Counter-Terrorism Competences: wider use

Instruments against international terrorism

- * Ratification of 11 international conventions on terrorism (including UN Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing, opened for signature on 12 January)
- * Draft nuclear terrorism convention
- * Aviation security: 'ten years on from Lockerbie' (ICAO measures) - presentation by Transec

G8 coordinated action

- * Action against terrorist fund-raising - presentation by TFF?
- * National terrorist crisis management procedures
- * Guidelines on handling hostage incidents and ransom demands
- * Response to multinational hostage incidents
- * Export controls on explosives and terrorism-related items - presentation by DTI?
- * Meeting of G8 counter-terrorism practitioners - possible themes (eg terrorist fund-raising)

Wrap-up

- * Chairman's conclusions
- * Discussion of draft report for G8 Foreign Ministers

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004b. memo	Jamie Metzl to Members of International Public Information Interagency Working Group in Iraq [Released in Part] (1 page)	02/23/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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National Security Council
Richard A. Clarke (Transnational Threats (TNT))
OA/Box Number: 1381

FOLDER TITLE:

February Chron - 1998 [4]

2006-0191-F
jp271

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Per E.O. 13526
2015-0041-M (1.60)
6/1/2023 VZ

February 23, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC INFORMATION
INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON IRAQ

THROUGH: ERIC SCHWARTZ *ES*
FROM: JAMIE METZLER *JM*
SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions - February 23, 1998
Meeting on International Public Information (IPI)
Strategies for Iraq

It was agreed that the following steps will be taken:

- USIA agreed to prepare a detailed proposal for a Presidential interview with select Arab journalists. EO 13526.1.4c, (b)(3)
EO 13526.1.4c, (b)(3)
- USIA agreed to prepare a themes paper based on recent polling data which suggests issues of particular concern to foreign audiences which need to be addressed by senior U.S. officials.
- USIA agreed to update its post-strike plan to take account of recent political developments.
- NSC agreed to follow up on the proposal for an Albright or Berger Op-Ed making key public diplomacy points for worldwide distribution by USIA.
- NSC agreed to seek visual images of 986 activity for inclusion in IPI materials.
- JCS agreed to prepare a short "thought piece" on what the USG can do to repair international relations "bridges" damaged in the past weeks and sow the seeds for any potential future U.S. enforcement action in the future.
- State-PA agreed to update its public diplomacy themes cable as appropriate to account for changes in U.S. policy following the Annan agreement.

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DISCUSSION PAPER FOR
NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS TO THE
UNITED STATES (U)

References: (1) Report of President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection; (2) Draft PDD-XX; (3) Draft PDD-YY

This discussion paper addresses how the US Government should be structured to respond to the emerging, unconventional threats to US territory and Americans abroad. The paper is keyed to the latest drafts of PDD-XX and PDD-YY, attached. These drafts have changed from previous versions based upon informal interagency coordination.

1.0 Background

There are increased concerns about our vulnerability to unconventional threats because:

- o The margin of U.S. military superiority over potential enemies is so great that it may force such enemies to look for unconventional ways to attack us, such as attacks in the homeland to intimidate us and to degrade our military response;

- o Many of our potential enemies have access to unconventional means including terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and cyber warfare capabilities; they could use these unconventional methods of attack singly or in combination;

- o Our potential enemies include non-state actors such as terrorist groups and international organized criminal syndicates, some of which are capable of posing the same level of unconventional threat as nations;

- o Federal agencies, state and local governments, and private sector institutions all have significant vulnerabilities to unconventional attacks;

- o The increasing interdependence of elements of our government, military, economy, and society on a set of interrelated, interdependent infrastructures could make the scope and effects of unconventional attacks extremely damaging.

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Classified by: Glyn T. Davies

Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassified on: 01-24-08

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2016 0041-M (1.62)

6/1/2023 VZ

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1.1 Expressions of Concern: These concerns have been expressed by the President, the Congress, senior Administration officials, and panels, most notably the Marsh Commission.

The President: Over the last three years the President has repeated his personal concern, as in these examples:

"New technologies make our borders vulnerable to terrorists and dangerous weapons.... Every day millions of people use laptops, modems, CD ROMs, (but) technology can be used for good or evil.... these forces make us even more vulnerable to the organized forces of destruction, the forces of terror.... The technological revolution can bring more and more problems to our shores.... Today the threat to our security is not just in an enemy silo, but in a briefcase or in the car bomb of a terrorist."

"Certain national infrastructures are so vital that their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on the defense or economic security of the United States.... Because many of these critical infrastructures are owned and operated by the private sector, it is essential that the government and private sector work together to develop a strategy for protecting them and assuring their continued operation."

And in Tuesday's State of the Union:

"We must combat an unholy axis of new threats from terrorists, international criminals.... These 21st century predators feed on technology and the free flow of information and ideas and people. And they will be all the more lethal if weapons of mass destruction fall into their hands."

Congress: The Congress has, on several occasions, indicated its interest in the further integration and coordination of these issues.

o The Senate Appropriations Committee required the Administration to submit by the end of 1998 a comprehensive interdepartmental plan for dealing with critical infrastructure protection, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction vulnerability in the U.S.

o The Intelligence Authorization called for the establishment within the NSC of a new "Committee on Transnational Threats" to be chaired by the APNSA, the primary function of which would be to "coordinate and direct the activities of the USG relating to combating transnational threats."

o The Defense Authorization mandated that the President designate an individual to serve in the Executive Office of the President as the National Coordinator on Proliferation Matters

to advise on non-proliferation of WMD, including issues related to terrorism, arms control, and international organized crime, and to coordinate nonproliferation research efforts.

Senior Administration Officials: The Attorney General, Secretary of Defense, and others have addressed this issue:

"The front lines are no longer overseas; it can just as well be in any American city."
William Cohen, 25 November 1997

"The evolving security environment has significant implications for how the national security apparatus operates. The distinction between foreign and domestic policies are less pronounced than in the past. The United States faces a panoply of threats that require smooth interaction among diplomatic, military, law enforcement, and consequence management organizations. Our national security apparatus must be flexible and responsive to meet the kinds of challenges this nation will face in the foreseeable future."
William Cohen, 15 December 1997

"We will develop an effective capability to detect, prevent, defeat and manage consequences of nuclear, biological and chemical material and weapons used by terrorists. Let me explain briefly some of the means by which we seek to accomplish these objectives....A Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection has been created....as part of this effort, an Information Protection Task force has been created. It is a multi-agency effort to identify and coordinate existing expertise and capability, in the government and the private sector, relative to critical infrastructure protection"
Janet Reno, 13 May 1997

Panels and Commissions: There have been numerous reports, both within and outside of the government, that have addressed these issues and recommended additional efforts, coordination and integration:

o The December 1997 report of the National Defense Panel which stressed the need for increased emphasis, comprehensive planning, and interagency coordination on homeland defense, focusing on the interrelated dangers of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and consequence management, and information warfare and attacks on critical infrastructures.

o The October 1997 report of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (Marsh Commission) recommended that the administration coordinate critical infrastructure protection through an office in the NSC, create a interdepartmental support office located in Commerce, formalize a "lead agency" management process, and create a public/private information sharing and analysis center.

o The March 1997 report of the Livermore Study Group on Terrorist Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Woolsey-Nye report) called for a National Coordinator reporting to the Vice President and supported by a planning staff.

o The Brown Commission on U.S. Intelligence for the Twenty-First Century recommended the creation of a coordinator on the NSC and a permanent support staff to address terrorism, WMD proliferation, narcotics trafficking, and international organized crime.

o The 1996 report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Information Warfare-Defense recommended establishing a center for intelligence, indication and warning, and threat assessment within the Defense Department and also recommended possibly establishing an additional public/private center for indications and warning.

o The Commission on the Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces recommended that the office of the Vice President be charged with integrating the nation's response capabilities and that a permanent multiagency planning staff be established.

2.0 Proposed Directives and Structure

2.1 The PDDs: A pair of Presidential Decision Directives have been drafted in response to these concerns and proposals:

o PDD-XX: The purpose of this directive is twofold. First, it is a vehicle for the President to re-emphasize the importance he personally attaches to addressing the unconventional threats to the homeland and to Americans abroad. Second, the directive establishes an improved system for interagency coordination and accountability, by strengthening the Lead Agency approach and specifying ten program areas. There would be clear responsibility for policy development and implementation for each program.

o PDD-YY: This directive elaborates policy on one of the ten program areas, the protection of critical infrastructure. A separate Directive is required because no Administration has ever enunciated a comprehensive and detailed policy and program in this area. The Directive incorporates the work of the Marsh Commission. The central concept incorporated in this PDD is that of a Public/Private Partnership leading to the greatest possible voluntary cooperation between the government and the private sector to reduce vulnerabilities. Two other key

concepts are an outreach program of Education and Awareness and the creation of a National Infrastructure Protection Plan.

2.2 The Structure: The two Directives use an interagency structure to address the unconventional threats by building on the current interagency system and by adding specific, new Critical Infrastructure organizations.

o IWGs: The existing IWGs for Counter-terrorism, Critical Infrastructure Protection, Continuity of Government Operations, and WMD Counter-terrorism Consequence Management would be the core of the interagency system. These IWGs would each meet at the Assistant Secretary-level or above and be chaired by a Special Assistant to the President (NSC) with the designation National Coordinator for Security, Critical Infrastructure and Counter-Terrorism. The National Coordinator, as the chair of the groups, may convene joint meetings as appropriate. When the DC or PC meets to consider counter-terrorism, security or infrastructure protection issues, the National Coordinator would join the meeting as a full member.

o IPC: An Infrastructure Protection Center would be created in the Department of Justice, FBI. The Center would provide a warning, assessment, and crisis management focus for infrastructure and, particularly, cyber attacks.

o ISAC: The USG would encourage the private sector to create an Information Sharing and Analysis Center to address cyber and other critical infrastructure issues. The USG would facilitate and, as appropriate, participate in the ISAC. The rationale for a private sector entity is that (a) infrastructures are largely owned and operated by the private sector, (b) infrastructures are increasingly interdependent requiring a means of sharing and assessing vulnerabilities and other protection information across sectors, (c) the private sector needs a locus for its own activities in support of the Government effort, and (d) the private sector may be reluctant, at least initially, to share vulnerability and competitive information with the Government.

In addition, the PDD carries forward the Commission recommendations for an Advisory Council and a small interagency National Plan Coordination staff (NPC). The NPC staff would coordinate the integration of the various components of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, which will be developed by the various Lead Agencies. The NPC staff would also coordinate the government-wide outreach and Education and

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Awareness efforts. The NPC staff in the directive is, however, half the size of the current Transition Office and has a sunset provision following the creation of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan.

3.0 Issues for Discussion

3.1 Integration of Unconventional Threat Responses: As noted in sections 1.0 and 2.0 above, the President, Congress, and expert panels have seen a commonality among the unconventional threats to the homeland and Americans abroad. Currently the USG structure does not integrate these threats for policy development, implementation, or crisis management below the Deputy Secretary level in most agencies. The National Coordinator, in his role as the chair of the related IWGs, would be responsible for ensuring such coordination, and for raising these issues for consideration by the Deputies or Principals, as appropriate.

These Directives do not create a structure similar to the "Drug Czar," which is a separate organization in the Executive Office of the President, has a staff of 200, and is headed by a Cabinet Rank officer subject to Senate confirmation. Instead, the directives employ and strengthen the Lead Agency approach, and designate a senior officer within the NSC staff system to coordinate the work of the IWGs.

Alternatives to the PDDs would be to:

- o Have the IWGs report to a new senior coordinating group on these issues which would report directly to the Principals Committee
- o Merge the existing four IWGs into the terrorism IWG
- o Create a new agency within the Executive Office of the President, similar to the "Drug Czar"
 - or, conversely, have separate several senior NSC Staff officers, each with one or two assistants, to serve as the White House point of contact for each of the types of Unconventional Threats.

3.2 Single Lead Agency for Critical Infrastructure: The two draft directives assign specific Lead Agency functions to several departments. There is not a single Lead Agency. Coordination among the departments is facilitated by an

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interagency National Plan Coordination Support Staff, for which the Commerce Department would serve as Executive Agent.

An Alternative Approach to this distributed approach would be to place a single department, specifically the Justice Department, in the role of Lead Agency. Justice has objected to an approach which does not designate a single Lead Agency. Justice is creating a large, well-funded Infrastructure Protection Center (IPC) within the FBI, as one of the offices reporting to a Deputy Assistant Director of the Bureau.

In the Alternative Approach, the IPC could perform the role of two other components in PDD-YY, the National Plan Coordination staff and the Information Sharing and Analysis Center.

3.2.1 The Information Sharing and Analysis Center: Based on the work of the Commission and the IWG, draft PDD-YY proposes that the USG work with the private sector to develop a complementary analysis entity to the proposed Justice Department Information Protection Center (IPC). The proposed private sector counter-part could be called the Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC).

While the USG can not create the ISAC, the PDD would have the USG urge and facilitate its creation and make suggestions about how it might work. The rationale for the ISAC would be:

- o The various sectors of the commercial, private infrastructures each have their own industry/trade groups that could address infrastructure issues, but there is no such group that serves as a venue for all sectors to develop education and awareness programs, fund research, or develop policies;

- o Some parts of the private sector have demonstrated a reluctance to share proprietary information with the Justice Department and FBI; these companies might be more willing to participate in vulnerability analyses and report on problems if the reports were going to an industry owned and operated institute which could filter the information provided to DOJ/FBI.

The Alternative Approach would rely upon the FBI's IPC to perform this liaison with the private sector. This approach would avoid the USG giving the appearance of condoning a non-governmental entity as the locus for reporting crimes. The private sector could develop some entity on its own, but the USG would not actively encourage or facilitate it.

3.2.2 The National Plan Coordination (NPC) support staff:
The draft PDD-YY directs that the Commission Transition Office be reduced in size by roughly half to 20 professionals, be redesignated the National Plan Coordination support staff, and be given a "sunset clause" or limited duration of 36 months (the period during which the National Infrastructure Protection Plan would be under development). The draft PDD assigns the staff office to the Commerce Department as Executive Agent beginning in FY99 (until then it would continue in DOD).

The rationale for the Office is that this new and complex issue spills over any one department and requires full time coordination of the work of many departments and agencies. The tasks of the office would be:

- o Coordinate the development of the sector plans and their integration into the National Infrastructure Protection Plan;
- o Coordinate the development of a U.S. Government Protection Plan from the submissions of the CIOs of each department and agency;
- o Coordinate outreach to the public and the sectors; implement the Education & Awareness recommendations of the Commission;
- o Serve as Executive Secretary of the Interagency Working Group on Critical Infrastructure Protection;
- o Conclude the classification, publication, and disposition of the Commission's documentation.

The draft PDD places the Office in the Department of Commerce as Executive Agent. The rationale for that assignment is the belief that the private sector reaction to the PDD implementing the Commission's recommendations would be more favorable if the organization demonstrates USG appreciation for the private sector's role in critical infrastructure protection, the need for effective business rationale for USG's expectations of private sector protection efforts, and to further encourage understanding of the breadth of the issues involved (business, defense, law enforcement, intelligence, etc.). Without that assignment, the PDD would seem to treat the Critical Infrastructure issue exclusively as a national security/law enforcement problem.

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The Alternative Approach would rely upon the only large infrastructure staff in the USG to perform these roles for the rest of the government, i.e. the FBI's IPC. In addition 3-4 NSC staffers would be reassigned from their current duties to work with the IPC and the Interagency Working Group. The IPC would:

- o Coordinate the portions of the National Plan initially drafted by each of the Departments with a Lead Sector liaison function;

- o Review the individual department and agency's cyber security and protection plans for their own internal operations.

3.3 Extension of Executive Order: Whether the NPC support staff is created or the FBI's IPC takes on that role, there is the separate issue of whether to extend the Commission Transition Office and the current Advisory Committee while the new PDDs are coming into effect. The Staff Director has proposed that the Executive Order creating these organizations be amended to have an end date of September 30. This amendment would permit the staff to conclude the classification and distribution of their voluminous files and report, finalize on-going contract research, and respond to the numerous requests for information and briefings on the Commission. It would also extend the Advisory Committee until new appointments could be completed.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Len Hawley to Don Kerrick et al; re: Daily Status report on Coalition Building for Iraq Crisis (1 page)	02/19/1998	P1/b(1)
001b. lists	re: Summary of U.S. Coalition as of 02/19/1998 (1 page)	02/19/1998	P1/b(1)
001c. talking points	re: Updated Press Guidance (1 page)	02/19/1998	P1/b(1)
001d. lists	re: Military Coalition Update (8 pages)	02/19/1998	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
002a. fax cover sheet	Richard A. Clarke to Dr. Edward Warner; re: Requirements (1 page)	02/18/1998	P1/b(1)
002b. memo	Richard A. Clarke to Dr. Edward Warner; re: Requirements (1 page)	02/18/1998	P1/b(1)
002c. outline	re: Gulf War (1 page)	02/18/1998	P1/b(1)
003a. memo	Sandy Berger to VPOTUS et al; re: Possible Information Warfare Attack (3 pages)	02/17/1998	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
003b. memo	Sandy Berger to POTUS; re: Possible Information Warfare Attack (2 pages)	02/16/1998	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
004a. fax cover sheet	Eric Schwartz & Jamie Metzl to Joseph Duffey et al; re: International Public Information Strategy for Iraq - Summary of Conclusions (2 pages)	02/17/1998	P1/b(1)
004b. memo	Jamie Metzl to Members of International Public Information Interagency Working Group on Iraq [Released in Part] (2 pages)	02/17/1998	P1/b(1), P3/b(3) VZ 9/21/2023

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 National Security Council
 Richard A. Clarke (Transnational Threats (TNT))
 OA/Box Number: 1381

FOLDER TITLE:

February Chron - 1998 [7]

2006-0191-F
jp274

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005a. fax cover sheet	Jamie Metzl to Edmund Hull et al; re: Scheduled Meeting [National Security Act - Section 6 of P.L. 86-36, 50 USC 402] (2 pages)	02/17/1998	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)
005b. fax cover sheet	Jamie Metzl to Richard Ragan et al; re: General Assessment Meeting (1 page)	02/17/1998	P1/b(1)
006a. memo	Jamie Metzl to Sandy Berger; re: Worldnet on Iraq (2 pages)	02/14/1998	P1/b(1), P5 VZ 9/21/2023
006b. notes	re: Worldnet Broadcast - Background Notes on Interlocutors & Potential Areas of Discussion [3 pages RELEASED ON APPEAL] (page)	02/17/1998	P5
007a. memo	Glyn T. Davies to Leon Fuerth et al; re: Iraqi Access to Information (2 pages)	02/13/1998	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
007b. fax cover sheet	National Security Council to Mona Sutphen; re: Notice of Meeting - Iraqi Access to Information (partial) (1 page)	circa, 02/1998	b(2)
007c. email	Joseph Marty to Jennifer Poole; re: Clearnee (1 page)	02/12/1998	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
007d. email	Jennifer Poole to NE/South Asia; re: Clearnee (1 page)	02/12/1998	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
008a. memo	Len Hawley to Don Kerrick et al; re: Daily Status Report on Coalition Building for Iraq Crisis (1 page)	02/13/1998	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
008b. lists	re: Summary of U.S. Coalition as of 02/13/1998 (1 page)	02/13/1998	P1/b(1)
008c. talking points	re: Updated Press Guidance (2 pages)	circa, 02/1998	P1/b(1)

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008d. lists	re: Military Coalition Update (9 pages)	02/13/1998	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023

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National Security Council
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Classified by: Multiple Sources

Declassify On: March 1, 2003



Military Coalition Update

Prepared by PM/ISP

PM Iraq Task Force

U. S. Department of State

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0041-M (1.67)
6/1/2023 RC

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POC: S. Jones @ 202-647-4059

e:/pmisp/jonessl/iraq/update.ppt

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Updated: 2/19/98 8:38 AM

Page 1



Partner Countries in Military Coalition

Countries which have committed to send military contributions to the region.

- ❑ **Argentina:** GOA committed to send medical and sanitation teams. Bed-down issues still being worked.
- ❑ **Australia:** Sending 2 707 aircraft tankers, 80 RAAF personnel, and 110-120 SAS troops. Integration plan approved by CINC. Bed-down in Kuwait and Oman being worked by GOA. **GOK has given country clearance to the SAS teams**
- ❑ **Belgium:** **Belgian frigate on way to area, expected to reach Suez about March 4.** Military action only if GOB believes all political efforts have failed. POTUS phone call on 2/15. Parliamentary debate as soon as today.
- ❑ **Canada:** Sending frigate (*HMCS TORONTO*) and 2 C-130 aircraft. Integration plan approved by CINC. Expect bed-down in Bahrain. Canada has requested anthrax vaccine before sending troops to region. DOD working overall anthrax policy. **Deputy FM expected 2/19 for high level discussions.**
- ❑ **Denmark:** Working possible contributions of frigate, tanker aircraft, special ops teams, and chemical decontamination units.
- ❑ **Hungary:** On February 17, Parliament approved GoH offer of support. Blanket use of Airspace. Use of Hungarian airfields. Deployment of Medical team of 50 personnel. Approved up to 300 million forints (USD 1.46 million to cover cost of assistance.) Working deployment issues.
- ❑ **Kuwait:** Accepted additional ground troops. Modalities for third countries approaching the GoK developed. Calling up reserves. Deploying units for exercises. No invitation to coalition partners to support handling of refugees, yet.

Partner Countries in Military Coalition

Countries which have committed to send military contributions to the region.



- ❑ **Netherlands:** NL sending a frigate to the Gulf but military participation requires further GoN decision. Embassy of Netherlands called POTUS asking him to announce GON's active support. Parliamentary hearing on February 19. CINC has integrated NL frigate into operational plans.
- ❑ **New Zealand:** Sending a supply ship, two P-3 aircraft, and 20 SAS troops for SAR. Working bed down with CENTCOM. Will work with Kuwait and Bahrain or Oman.
- ❑ **Poland:** Support pledged for a chemical decontamination company. Advance team ready to depart Poland. Working logistics and bed-down issues with CENTCOM. Also working payment issues, queries for additional support for Polish mission in Baghdad, and possible logistics support from Ukraine.
- ❑ **Romania:** **Reported parliamentary support for deployment. Formal request to Parliament pending. Willing to offer medical unit, Decon unit, and Military Policemen**
- ❑ **Senegal:** President Diouf told the Ambassador that Senegal will support the U.S. if military action is necessary. He will instruct armed forces leadership to arrange for provision of symbolic unit, possibly medical in nature. GOS made public statement calling on Iraq to abide by all UNSC resolutions.
- ❑ **United Kingdom:** Has carrier and ground-based aircraft in region. House of Commons gave overwhelming support to HMG on use of "all necessary means." FCO has sent instructions to posts in the EU to approach host governments and seek military contributions in the way of logistics, medical, decontamination, or ships, especially minesweeping ships. Countries approached closely match USG list but also include Italy and Finland.

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Tier One Countries Military Support Pending



- ❑ **Bahrain:** GoB says that public statement was “has not authorized” air strikes from its territory, rather than “will not allow” as carried by English language press. (Arabic press got it right.) Wording chosen to put more pressure on diplomatic solution. Need to watch bed-down issues closely as Bahrain feels they are getting overloaded.
- ❑ **Bangladesh:** Already has approximately 2700 mercenary troops in Kuwait and 773 with UNIKOM. FM noncommittal, pending PM response. Waiting for meeting with PM. GOB sensitive to IN and PK.
- ❑ **Czech Republic:** Expect formal parliamentary commitment NLT 2/17.
- ❑ **Germany:** Public announcement that German bases can be used for strikes against Iraq. Waiting additional force commitments.
- ❑ **Norway:** Parliament will decide on material contributions on Feb. 19. Contributions include: 2 C-130s with flight crews and support personnel. (if necessary, can configure 1 as medevac aircraft with longer lead-time), Possible naval forces (1 mine command and control, one mine hunter, and naval special forces). Would prefer to receive request for Naval forces as part of Nato coordinated deployment/diversion.
- ❑ **Ukraine:** Working offer of heavy airlift support. Possibility that Ukraine could provide lift to the area for Poland, Czech Republic, and Romania.



Tier Two Countries

Military Support Approach Being Evaluated

- ❑ **Austria:** POTUS phone call on 2/15. Chancellor Klima told charge that he views U.S. threats of military strike as a component of reaching a negotiated solution. Does not see "exit strategy" should use of force begin.
- ❑ **Baltic States:** Issued a joint statement of support. Considering approach.
- ❑ **Bulgaria:** Concern with Russian pressure, but willing to provide overflight and decon or Medical unit if asked. Would need parliamentary approval.
- ❑ **Finland:** UK has approached.
- ❑ **Honduras:** Formal approach pending. Sent troops in the Gulf War.
- ❑ **Italy:** Approached by UK for military contribution. Overflight issues "manageable." GOI looking at allowing bases to be used for strikes against Iraq. Reports of Italian frigate preparing to deploy. GOI indicates that Italy will stand by U.S.
- ❑ **Japan:** Public statements by PM and FM calling for Iraq to immediately and unconditionally accept UNSCOM inspections.
- ❑ **Korea:** Foreign Ministry public statement that Iraq must comply with UNSC resolutions, but no statement of support for military action yet.



Tier Two Countries

Military Support Approach Being Evaluated

- ❑ **Philippines** FM told Charge that public support for military action not possible without UN resolution authorizing such action
- ❑ **Portugal**: Blanket overflight and use of Lajes approved. Considering approach for more formal military contributions.
- ❑ **Spain**: Blanket overflight given. Considering approach for more formal contributions.
- ❑ **Trinidad and Tobago**. Instructions being drafted.
- ❑ **Turkey**: Request from GOT for Patriot battery or other AAW support. Have asked OSD/JCS to look into options so we can answer questions. MFA quoted: “other than operation Northern Watch, we do not provide any support to the U.S. President urges diplomatic solution.

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Tier Three Countries Military Support Not Expected



- **Brazil:** Government responded that they could give public support only. Constitution makes deployment of forces nearly impossible. They will not send troops to the coalition. **FM has confirmed that Brazil will not send troops.**
- **Chile:** Although Chile provides airlift support for UNSCOM, they will not contribute to the coalition.
- **Ethiopia:** Formal approach resulted in public support but no military contribution. Letter from SecState being prepared to follow-up.

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Military Basing/Overflight Support

Countries Providing Basing or Overflight Support to Coalition



- ❑ **Bahrain**: Headquarters for FIFTH Fleet. AEF basing. Overflight. Probable bed-down for Canadian forces.
- ❑ **Egypt**: Logistics staging at Cairo West.
- ❑ **Germany**: Use of air bases
- ❑ **Hungary**: Overflight and air bases
- ❑ **Iceland**: Use of air bases
- ❑ **Italy**: Overflight. Possible base use.
- ❑ **Kuwait**: Overflight, basing, bed-down of coalition forces.
- ❑ **Oman**: Overflight, basing, bed-down of Australian aircraft.
- ❑ **Portugal**: Blanket overflight. Use of Lajes air base.
- ❑ **Saudi Arabia**: Bed-down of support forces. Overflight with some restrictions. Expanded overflight being worked.
- ❑ **Spain**: Overflight
- ❑ **Turkey**: Basing support for Operation Northern Watch
- ❑ **UAE**: Overflight. Basing.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 17, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

SUBJECT: Possible Information Warfare Attack

Summary: As some of you know, an unusual computer hacking effort has been underway against the Department of Defense. FBI now believes that it has identified the source of at least one of the intrusions and has an active law enforcement investigation underway. As for the rest of the intrusions, we do not yet know whether they are simply pranks or a foreign intelligence service preparing for a serious destructive attack. They do, however, highlight the need for a major effort at cyber protection. As the President has requested, we will shortly be sending him the comprehensive Presidential Decision Directive we have all been working on to begin that process.

What Happened: Beginning on February 3 and accelerating over last weekend, DoD discovered that computer systems of various military installations had been probed and compromised. While all intrusions were not identical, there were some similarities. In many instances, the computer systems were manipulated, possibly in an attempt to conceal the origin and nature of the intrusions, and "back doors" were planted so the intruders could return undetected. In some cases, they also planted "sniffers" that could monitor traffic on the system and potentially steal log-ins, IDs, and passwords of legitimate users. This level of control was not achieved for all affected systems. The intruders may have obtained passwords associated with the Air Force network that carries critical, though unclassified, logistics information.

These intrusions are still continuing and, to date, DoD has identified eleven systems as compromised. These include air base computer systems at Andrews, Columbus, Kirkland, Maxwell, Kelly,

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Classified by: Glyn T. Davies

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 02-10-08

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PER E.O. 13526

2015-0041-M (1.70)

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Lackland, Shaw, and MacDill (the headquarters of Central Command and Special Operations Command). The Air Force, having been the first to discover the intrusions, worked with the other services to identify similar intrusions at Pearl Harbor and Okinawa. In the experience of DoD, this level of activity is highly unusual.


Based on inquiries from DoD, it appears that similar activity has taken place in the publicly-accessible web server servicing the Israeli Parliament. An internet service provider in the United Arab Emirates also appears to have been compromised, and was probably used in attempts to access DoD sites. Numerous university computer sites in the United States appear to have been exploited in similar fashion. Internet service providers near those universities also appear to have been exploited.

Significance of these Events: FBI has made great progress in the last few days and now believes it has identified the source of at least one of the intrusions. However, it is far too early to come to any firm conclusions about the nature of all of the intrusions. Our information and evidence is spotty and our intelligence is only developing. It maybe that all of the intrusions are no more than the activities of a few hackers with trivial intentions.

However, we cannot dismiss the possibility that at least some of the intrusions may be part of a structured and coordinated information warfare campaign. Indeed, the specific type of targets and activities discovered so far are very similar to those we might expect prior to a serious attack against key U.S. military information systems. If the worst-case scenario unfolds and the military's information systems become seriously compromised and are then fully exploited by persons with hostile intentions, the resulting cyber attack could significantly degrade the capabilities of the military's transportation, finance, medical, personnel, and logistics systems. DoD assures us, however, that even under such a worst-case scenario the effect of such attacks on our military capabilities in Southwest Asia would not be debilitating.

What Steps We Have Taken: An intensive interagency process is being coordinated by NSC to identify the sources and scope of these intrusions, to learn the intentions of the intruders, and to assess more carefully the potential consequences of these activities. DoD is intensively monitoring its systems and has taken certain remedial actions to safeguard the integrity and availability of their systems; Justice is assisting DoD with legal advice and operational support; and the Intelligence

Community is using its assets to identify the scope and nature of the attack. Further updates will be provided as necessary.


Samuel R. Berger
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Attachment: Glossary of Terms

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 16, 1998

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL R. BERGER *SRB*

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Intrusions are still continuing and, to date, DoD has identified eleven systems as compromised. These include air base computer systems at Andrews, Columbus, Kirkland, Maxwell, Kelly, Lackland, Shaw, and MacDill (the headquarters of Central Command and Special Operations Command). In the experience of DoD, this level of activity is highly unusual. The Air Force, having been

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Declassify On: 02-10-08

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DIV-041-M (1.73)

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the first to discover the intrusions, worked with the other services to identify similar intrusions at Pearl Harbor and Okinawa. In at least one instance, the intruder(s) successfully re-entered a computer system DoD thought it had secured.

Based on inquiries from DoD, it appears that similar activity has taken place in the publicly-accessible web server servicing the Israeli Parliament. An internet service provider in the United Arab Emirates also appears to have been compromised, and was probably used in attempts to access DoD sites. Numerous university computer sites in the United States appear to have been exploited in similar fashion. Internet service providers near those universities also appear to have been exploited.

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Per E.O. 13526
2015-0041-M (1.77)
6/1/2023 VZ

February 17, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC INFORMATION
INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON IRAQ


THROUGH: ERIC SCHWARTZ *ES*
FROM: JAMIE METZL *JM*
SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions - February 17, 1998
Meeting on International Public Information (IPI)
Strategies for Iraq

It was agreed that the following steps will be taken:

- NSC-Planning will coordinate with USIA to facilitate the filming and dissemination of the Presidential statement on 986.
- NSC-Global agreed to follow up with USAID regarding the humanitarian aid equivalence of Saddam's palace spending since sanctions were imposed.
- JCS agreed to meet with USIA to further develop its matrix of scheduled and proposed IPI activities for the various agencies.
- USIA agreed to follow-up with the USIA representative at USUN to acquire photographs of 986 aid being delivered in Iraq.
- USIA agreed to continue organizing WorldNet and Foreign Press Center events for U.S. officials and designated U.S. surrogates, and to provide a schedule of planned and proposed events of this nature.
- NSC-Planning agreed to follow-up on the Richardson Op-Ed piece. If rights to this editorial can be granted, USIA will disseminate the article internationally.
- USIA agreed to report on its assessment by posts of the effectiveness of U.S. Public Diplomacy efforts.
- State-NEA agreed to update the paper outlining the themes of the U.S. Public Diplomacy effort to consider more recent

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events and USIA polling information. USIA agreed to provide comments to USIA on how these themes might be revised.

- DOD agreed to prepare and distribute a public affairs fact sheet on chem-bio equipment being provided to Arab allies.
- USIA and JCS agreed to prepare a detailed post-strike Public Diplomacy plan.
- USIA agreed to prepare a public diplomacy event proposal for NSA Berger.
- JCS agreed to seek information from UK IPI counterparts regarding potentially complementary IPI activities.
-  EO 13526 1.4c, (b)(3)
- State-NEA/PA agreed to work with NSC-Public Affairs to ensure that State is receiving daily Iraq guidance in a manner conducive to easy dispatch to posts.
- State-NEA/PA agreed to provide information to the Iraq IPI IWG on DOS Public Diplomacy efforts.

Chronic

February 14, 1998

INFORMATION

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PER E.O. 13526
2013-0792-M (1.01)
2/6/2015 (20)

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ERIC SCHWARTZ *ES*

FROM: JAMIE METZL *JM*

SUBJECT: Worldnet on Iraq - Tuesday, February 17, 1998
11:00am-12:00pm, OEOB 489

You have agreed to a Worldnet satellite interview with journalists from Paris, Cairo, Ankara, and Riyadh on Tuesday in the OEOB studio. This interview will be broadcast simultaneously at to invited groups U.S. Embassies and on television networks worldwide. The topic is "U.S. Policy Towards Iraq."

Format: The format of the interview will be similar to that of a press conference. The program will begin with a brief opening comment by the Worldnet moderator, followed by a short video on U.S. efforts to achieve a diplomatic solution to the weapons inspection issue.



After the video, the host will introduce you and ask you a scripted question regarding the U.S. position towards Iraq. Tony Blinken is preparing this question and its answer, and will provide that information to you separately. Following this response, participants in Paris, Cairo, Ankara, and Riyadh will each receive one opening question, followed by a 12-minute time block for each site.

Questions and comments from the international journalists are live and unedited. The broadcast is one-way video, two way audio. This means that you will hear but not see the international participants. All questions will be simultaneously translated for you.

Based on recent Worldnet interviews on this subject, you should expect challenging and provocative questions. It is also expected that the nature of questions may vary according to the nationalities of the interviewers. USIA has attempted to predict

as best it can what type of questions might be asked by each geographic bloc. This information is summarized at Tab A.

Comment on Themes: USIA and CIA analysts tell us that the "man in the street" in the Arab world has little personal sympathy for Saddam, and probably recognizes him for what he is. However, Arab people are very critical of U.S. policy for two reasons: first, they see that the international isolation of Saddam has hurt the Iraqi people; and second, they believe that neither continued isolation nor a U.S. bombing campaign will change matters - i.e., neither will remove Saddam from power. Thus, they see force as only contributing to the suffering of the Iraqi people. You will have to address both these issues: first, by describing our concern about the Iraqi people, and second, by explaining why our policy toward Iraq (even if it doesn't result in the immediate elimination of Saddam) serves the region. The key points of our international Public Diplomacy effort are summarized at Tab B.

Concurrence by:  
Tony Blinken, Joe Marty

Attachments

- Tab A Background Notes on Interviewers and Anticipated Areas of Discussion
- Tab B Summary of U.S. Public Diplomacy Themes

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

20132

February 13, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MS. MONA SUTPHEN
Executive Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

DR. GORDON ADAMS
Associate Director for
National Security and
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

COL. JAMES N. MATTIS
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JAMES E. STEINER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Iraqi Access to Information

At the recent Principals' Committee meeting on Iraq, a question was raised about access by Iraqis to news and information. In response to that query, we provide the following information, which has been provided by CIA.

Freedom of speech and press in Iraq is severely curtailed. The media - print and electronic - is government owned and controlled. Government censorship is extensive. Iraqis listen to domestic and foreign radio and television programming - almost 50 percent domestic and fifty percent foreign. Iraq's 22 million people are served by 16 AM and one FM radio stations, and by 13 television stations. There are an estimated 4.5 million radios and 1.5 million televisions in use in Iraq.

Iraqis usually tune in to Iraqi radio and television primarily for music and cultural programming. For news, they listen to one of three foreign Arabic language radio stations - the Voice of America, the BBC, or Radio Monte Carlo. Many Iraqis view VOA as trustworthy, objective, and credible. Many Baghdad residents also listen to an Israeli-Arabic radio station. The favorite

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Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: 02-12-08

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PER E.O. 13526

2015-05-11-M (1.84)

4/7/23 RZ

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also listen to an Israeli-Arabic radio station. The favorite television station appears to be the Qatar-based al-Jazirah Television.

Government officials, ruling elites, and middle class Iraqis have satellite dishes and are able to receive CNN and Russian television broadcasts. Possession of satellite dishes is officially illegal in Iraq, though selected regime officials and those with connections to the regime reportedly have access to satellite broadcasts. Many dishes are presumably hidden.



Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Poole, Jennifer C.

From: Marty, Joseph H.
Sent: Thursday, February 12, 1998 8:54 PM
To: Poole, Jennifer C.; @NESASIA - NE/South Asia
Cc: Metzl, Jamie F.; @CROSS - Cross Hatches
Subject: RE: Clearance requested on Package 20132 ~~{CONFIDENTIAL}~~

[007c]

Clear

—Original Message—

From: Poole, Jennifer C.
Sent: Thursday, February 12, 1998 8:34 PM
To: @NESASIA - NE/South Asia
Cc: Metzl, Jamie F.; @CROSS - Cross Hatches
Subject: Clearance requested on Package 20132 ~~{CONFIDENTIAL}~~

[007d]

NESA: Your clearance is requested on the attached package. If you make changes, please use the Track Changes function. Thank you.

<< File: 1056 - IPI Iraq Davies memo to PC drafted mmetzl.doc >> << File: 1056 - IPI Iraq memo to Davies on Iraqi info - metzl.doc >> << File: 1056 IPI Iraq - Davies memo to PC by mmetzl.doc >>

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 6/1/2023
2015-0041-m

CONFIDENTIAL

February 13, 1998
10:25 AM

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR Don Kerrick

NSC Regional Offices (Africa, Asia, Cent Europe,
Europe, InterAmerica, NESAs, and RUE)

NSC Functional Offices (Global, Defense, Strat
Planning, Democracy, Intel, and Press)

FROM: Len Hawley

SUBJECT: State-PM Daily Status Report on Coalition
Building for the Iraq Crisis

Attached is the Friday overnight status report on our efforts to
build a coalition for hostilities against Iraq.

*Please contact Scott Jones at State PM (647-4059) if you have
specific questions about a country. He is the central
clearinghouse for information on the effort.*

If the roster does not change significantly, your office will get
another update Monday.

Also, attached is the updated press guidance.

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Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 02/13/08

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

By VR NARA, Date 6/1/23

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COALITION UPDATE

2/13/98 18:39

COALITON PARTNER COUNTRIES

COUNTRY	REQUEST	RESPONSE/CONTRIBUTION	BED-DOWN
Argentina	DOS	Government announcement of solidarity with USA and commitment to send medical and sanitation teams.	TBD
Australia**	DOS/DOD/POTUS	2 tankers, SAS, medical teams.	Oman/Kuwait
Canada**	DOS/DOD/POTUS	1 Frigate, 2 aircraft	Bahrain (?)
Denmark	DOS/DOD	Working possible contributions of fighter aircraft, transport aircraft, frigate, special ops, chem detection	TBD
Hungary	DOS/DOD	Stron announcement that HU is ready to join international forces. Working contribution details.	TBD
Kuwait	DOS/DOD	Strong public support and military forces on alert.	N/A
New Zealand	DOS/DOD/POTUS	Working on details to send 2 P-3 aircraft, SAS forces, and ship.	TBD
Poland	DOS/DOD	Support pledged. Expect SAR boat and medical teams. Public press reports on this are in Polish press.	TBD
United Kingdom**	DOS/DOD/POTUS	Carrier, aircraft, etc.	At Sea

** ACCEPTED BY CINC

NOTE: SEVERAL POTENTIAL PARTNERS HAVE INQUIRED REGARDING AVAILABILITY OF ANTHRAX VACCINE BEFORE THEIR TROOPS ARE SENT TO THE REGION. CANADA HAS INDICATED THAT THEIR TROOPS WILL NOT/NOT DEPLOY WITHOUT PROTECTION. OTHERS HAVE ALSO REQUESTED VACCINE. OSD/JCS NOTIFIED AND REQUESTED TO WORK THIS PROBLEM AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE.

Produced by PM/ISP
POC is S. Jones
202-647-4059

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2015 9041-M (1.88)
4/17/23 VL

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FROM DEPARTMENT OF STATE 4A (FRI) 2.13.98 19:39/ST. 19:39/NO. 3760637500 P. 2



COALITION UPDATE

2/13/98 18:39

TIER ONE COUNTRIES
(MILITARY SUPPORT PENDING)

COUNTRY	REQUEST	RESPONSE/CONTRIBUTION	BED-DOWN
Bahrain	DOS/DOD	Strong support of bed-down requirements. With USG on most issues. No public announcement	N/A
Czech Republic	DOS/DOD	Very strong support from Czech government. Expect formal commitment by 2/17. Looking at decon teams.	TBD
Germany	DOD/DOS	No response to request. Public announcement that German bases could be used for strikes. German Security Advisor scheduled to meet with P and NSA on 2/12. Specific requests being put forward with OSD input.	TBD
Netherlands	DOS/DOD/POTUS	Cabinet discussions ongoing. Dutch frigate enroute to Alexandria, Egypt to await further orders. Embassy urges low profile until government debate over.	At Sea
Norway	DOS/DOD	Parliament debate in progress. MOD discussing potential contributions with DATT	TBD
Romania	DOS	Informal offer of field hospital, NBC unit, auxiliary forces or smaller, symbolic forces.	TBD

(FRI) 2.13.98 19:39/ST. 19:39/NO. 3760637500 P 3

FROM DEPARTMENT OF STATE 4A

e:/pmisp/jones/lraq/coalit.xls

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202-647-4059

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COALITION UPDATE

2/13/98 18:39

TIER TWO COUNTRIES
(MILITARY SUPPORT APPROACH BEING EVALUATED)

COUNTRY	REQUEST	RESPONSE/CONTRIBUTION	BED-DOWN
Bangladesh	PENDING	Mercenary troops in Kuwait now. Post feels a request has a good likelihood of acceptance. PM/ISP working approach to country.	TBD
Belgium	PENDING	Public divided on response	TBD
France	PENDING	MOD Studying potential military options.	TBD
Honduras	PENDING	Sent troops in Gulf War.	TBD
Italy	NOT MADE	Overflight issues manageable. May be a growing consensus that military strikes are inevitable. Some reports that Italy preparing to send military forces, to include a frigate.	TBD
Portugal	PENDING	Blanket overflight clearances granted.	TBD
Senegal	PENDING	Studying approach options	TBD
Spain	PENDING/POTUS	Blanket overflight clearances granted. POTUS wants to make a phone call thanking Spain for overflight rights. Expect that on 2/12.	TBD
Ukraine	PENDING	Informal offer of heavy lift (aircraft) support. Evaluating nature of offer.	TBD

(FRI) 2.13.98 19:39/ST. 19:39/NO. 3760637500 P 4

FROM DEPARTMENT OF STATE 4A

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COALITION UPDATE

2/13/98 18:39

TIER THREE COUNTRIES
(MILITARY SUPPORT DOUBTFUL)

COUNTRY	REQUEST	RESPONSE/CONTRIBUTION	BED-DOWN
Brazil	DOS	Public Support only. No combat troops.	N/A
Chile	DOS	Chile not expected to contribute	TBD
Ethiopia	DOS	Public Support only. No troops. AF/E working on letter to PM from SecState to thank for political support and press again for a contribution.	TBD

FROM DEPARTMENT OF STATE 4A (FRI) 2.13.98 19:39/ST. 19:39/NO. 3760637500 P 5

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(5)

COALITION UPDATE

2/13/98 18:39

BASING AND OVERFLIGHT COUNTRIES

COUNTRY	BASE/OVRFLT	DESCRIPTION OF SUPPORT
Bahrain	BASE/OVRFLT	Bed-down of AEF, NAVCENT, and other support forces
Egypt	BASE	Logistics staging
Germany	BASE/OVRFLT	Use of airbases
Iceland	BASE	Use of airbases
Italy	OVRFLT	Overflight -- possible airbases
Kuwait	BASE/OVRFLT	Significant bed-down
Oman	BASE/OVRFLT	Basing and overflight
Portugal	OVRFLT	Blanket overflight
Saudi Arabia	BASE/OVRFLT	Bed-down of support forces
Spain	OVRFLT	Blanket overflight
UAE	BASE/OVRFLT	Basing of tankers and overflight

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(FRI) 2.13.98 19:40/ST. 19:39/NO. 3760637500 P 6

FROM DEPARTMENT OF STATE 4A

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COALITION BUILDING

PM/ISP Status as of 02/13/98 7:08:01 PM

(BOLD updates indicate recent additions)

NOTE: SEVERAL POTENTIAL PARTNERS HAVE INQUIRED REGARDING THE AVAILABILITY OF ANTHRAX VACCINE BEFORE THEIR TROOPS ARE SENT TO THE REGION. CANADIAN STATEMENTS IN PARLIAMENT INDICATE THAT THEIR TROOP WILL NOT/NOT BE DEPLOYED WITHOUT PROTECTION. OTHER NATIONS, INCLUDING CZECH REPUBLIC AND POLAND, HAVE ALSO ASKED ABOUT THE VACCINE. OSD/JCS HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED AND REQUESTED TO WORK THIS PROBLEM AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE. THE FEAR IS THAT ALL PARTNERS AND POTENTIAL PARTNERS WILL SEEK VACCINE BEFORE DEPLOYING TROOPS AND WE MUST BE PREPARED TO QUICKLY ASSURE THEM IN THIS REGARD OR FACE EMBARRASSMENT.

PARTNERS:

Argentina:

- Strong statement from FM on support for international forces.
- Expect medical and sanitation teams.

Australia:

- POTUS Phone Call to PM on 6 Feb.
- Australia committed to sending 2 707 tanker aircraft, SAS, Intel teams.
- Close ongoing liaison between OSD/CENTCOM. Australian LNO at CENTCOM.
- Press statements out indicating active Australian support of military action.
- PM has agreed to make calls to garner coalition support.
- CINC has accepted Australia. Bed-down of 707's planned in Oman, SAS unit in Kuwait.

Canada:

- Committed to send frigate HMCS TORONTO from the Med and 2 KC-130 aircraft.
- Working closely with DATT/OSD to coordinate offers. CENTCOM liaison made.
- Public announcement made.
- Canadian KC-130 would probably go to Bahrain. (tentative)
- Canada approached us regarding anthrax vaccine. (About 400 needed) They will not/not deploy forces to the region until their people are inoculated.

Denmark:

- Strong, positive response to our request. News conference received major play in the country where DA announced their commitment.
- Working details of military forces. Possible contributions include fighter aircraft, C-130, corvette, fisheries inspection vessel, minesweeper. Special ops unit, chemical detection unit.

Hungary:

- MFA announced ready to join other countries in international action to force Iraqi compliance.
- MOD preparing draft resolution for 16-18 Feb parliamentary discussions to support USC position.

Kuwait:

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 e:/pmisp/jonessl/iraq/coalupd.doc

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- Ongoing significant buildup in Kuwait.
- No specific response to request for active force participation but it is assumed.
- Working bed-down coordination issues.
- Strong support issued.

New Zealand:

- **New Zealand agrees to send forces to include 2 P-3 aircraft, SAS forces, HMNZ ENDEAVOR.**

Poland:

- Polish liaison with DOD has already started.
- We need to be sensitive to Polish concerns regarding their position of taking care of American interests in Baghdad. 11 dependents in Baghdad that will have to be taken out at the right time, preferably (from the Poles) in phases; **61 AMCITs total.**
- **Poland seeking SATPHONES and advance warning to evacuate Baghdad.**
- Have told military at OSD that they will send a SAR rescue ship and decon unit. They will probably need lift for the decon unit.
- **They want anthrax vaccine.**
- **Issue of payment under review; is SOFA needed?**
- **Parliamentary approval for deployment needed with two weeks advance notification required.**

United Kingdom:

- Strong support
- Carrier in the Gulf
- Urging Washington embassy to initiate parallel coalition building discussions.
- **UK expected to begin active lobbying of EU countries for military support beginning week of 2/16.**

FIRST TIER COUNTRIES
(Military Support Pending)

Bahrain:

- Significant build up ongoing
- AEF + 3 B-1 Bombers
- Home port for NAVCENT
- CENTCOM temporary office in Manama
- No response on request for additional forces
- Still looking for legal cover --- sensitivity to sovereignty concerns.

Czech Republic:

- **Czechs have asked for anthrax vaccine through mil-mil channels.**
- **Strong statements of support from MFA and will seek approval of parliament to deploy forces week of 2/16.**
- **Expect decontamination and medical teams.**

Germany:

- No specific response to request

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e:/pmisp/jones1/iraq/coalupd.doc

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- Over the weekend, Germany announced that bases in Germany could be used for strikes against Iraq. (Unlikely)
- P and NSA meeting with German NSA on 2/12. Meeting will seek direct German participation in coalition.

Netherlands:

- POTUS phone call to PM 8 February.
- Mil-Mil discussions indicate possibility of F-16 aircraft, C-130 aircraft, KC-10 tanker aircraft, and a Patriot or Hawk battery.
- Dutch sending a frigate to wait further orders in Egypt.
- **Debate in Dutch cabinet on use of force on 13 Feb; parliament to be informed of decision over the weekend --no significant opposition expected.**
- **Embassy urges low profile until official government position reached.**

Norway:

- GON has "not ruled out" use of force.
- MOD prefers to back US military efforts. MOD has discussed potential war reserve material, hospitals, and 1-2 C-130's. Ground troops unlikely.
- GON wants specific request. Working with OSD/CENTOM to develop menu package.
- **Parliament expected to authorize military support.**

Romania:

- **Demarche made on USG request to provide forces on 2/12.**
- **Chief of General Staff made tentative offer of non-combatant forces. --- medical field hospital, NBC unit, auxiliary forces.**
- **Or offer of smaller, symbolic forces.**

Second Tier Countries
(Military Support Approach Being Evaluated)

Bangladesh:

- Bangladesh already has about 1400 mercenaries in Kuwait.
- Informal probing by post indicates GOB may be sympathetic to a request for forces.
- Preparing demarche.
- **OSD evaluating whether it desires an approach for military support.**

Belgium:

- Public opinion on Iraq is "mixed", making overt support for military action difficult.
- **MFA expected to authorize overflights and transit flights.**
- **Seeks UN statement that military force is only reasonable option.**
- **If all else fails, military will be ready to join coalition once political decision is made.**

France:

- GOF continues to be focused on a diplomatic solution.
- DATT reports that French MOD are considering options to include French aircraft already on the ground in SWA, deploy additional aircraft to the region to support possible military action.

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e:/pmisp/jones1/iraq/coalupd.doc

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- Prefers diplomatic solution but has yet to reach GOI position on use of force and sending troops.
- Ongoing sensitivity from gondola accident.
- Overflight issues are "manageable."
- Emerging consensus that Italy may soon be asked to participate and that military strikes may be necessary if diplomatic efforts fail.
- **Post sees increasing likelihood that Italian bases can be used.**

Portugal:

- Although not formally approached, GOP looking at ways to "facilitate" movement of military forces to Gulf.
- GOP favors diplomatic solution
- Press accounts depict Portugal as part of the "hard core" military group.
- **MFA grants blanket overflights and landing rights for Operation SOUTHERN WATCH aircraft during the next 90 days.**

Senegal:

- Country desk thinks Senegal might be responsive to a request. Vetting idea with OSD.
- Preparing demarche for post.

Spain:

- DATT liaison indicates strong interest.
- Spain has given umbrella permission for flight operations through Rota and Moron for Iraq contingency operations.

Ukraine:

- Informal reporting from post after high-level meetings from visiting DoS delegation indicate Ukraine is offering heavy lift air transport to the operation.
- Perhaps lift could be used to bring Eastern European contingents to the area.

THIRD TIER COUNTRIES
(Military Support Doubtful)

Brazil:

- Wants a diplomatic solution.
- Will not send forces to region.
- Constitutional problems hinder ability of Brazil to send forces overseas.

Chile:

- **Chile is not expected to respond favorably to our request for military support.**

Ethiopia:

- PM promises political and diplomatic support but will not/not send a troop contingent. Concern about reaction in the Arab world cited.
- Working a letter to PM from SecState.

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e:/pmisp/jones1/iraq/coalupd.doc

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. letter	Richard A. Clarke to David Leclair; re: Addition to Staff [1 page RELEASED ON APPEAL] (1 page)	01/30/1998	P5
002. talking points	re: Talking Points for POTUS Prime Minister Blair Meeting (2 pages)	circa, 02/1998	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2007
003. list	re: UNIKOM Issues - Iraq Pol-Mil Plan (1 page)	circa, 02/1998	P1/b(1)
004a. memo	William Wechsler to James Steinberg; re: Deputies Committee Meeting on PDDs on Counter-Terrorism & Critical Infrastructure Protection (6 pages)	02/02/1998	P1/b(1), P5
004b. paper	re: Discussion Paper for NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on Unconventional Threats to U.S. (9 pages)	01/24/1998	P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2007
004c. memo	For VPOTUS et al - Presidential Decision Directive; re: Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland & Americans Overseas (12 pages)	circa, 02/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Richard A. Clarke (Transnational Threats (TNT))
OA/Box Number: 1381

FOLDER TITLE:

February Chron - 1998 [12]

2006-0191-F

10279

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TALKING POINTS FOR POTUS-PM BLAIR MEETING

Security Council Expansion

Background: We are working with the P3&2 Group (US, UK, FR & Japan, Germany) in New York to hammer out a framework resolution for Security Council reform in 1998. There are two contentious issues. First, size of expansion - we are holding at 21 seats, while everyone else wants 24. Second, veto for new permanent members - we are firm that the veto question should not be considered until the new Council membership is determined. On the home front, we do not want action on Security Council reform to jeopardize timely Hill action of UN arrears legislation this Spring.

On the 24 seat debate, the UK is concerned that without progress this year, Germany will join Italy in pushing for one or more rotating seats for the EU—a move that threatens Britain's permanent seat on the Council. UK is pressing us to accept a 24 seat expansion.

On the veto issue, the UK agrees with us on deferring this question until the Council's new members have been determined.

Talking Points:

- I am determined to maintain momentum on Security Council expansion this year. However, early action on Council expansion in New York, especially if it is controversial with Congress, would jeopardize passage of UN arrears legislation this Spring. Nonetheless, I do not intend to allow this initiative to lead to a dead end.
- Therefore, we need to slow down the P3&2 process, giving us time to pass UN arrears legislation this Spring. This must be done without inducing any adverse action on Security Council reform, especially among EU members. The process is manageable, and we will collaborate with you over the coming weeks to orchestrate our efforts.
- Regarding the 21 seat limitation, I recognize we face opposition to our firm stand to preserve the Council's efficiency. However, as we see in the continuing Iraqi-UNSCOM crisis, Security Council efficiency is a decisive factor in responding to threats to international peace and security.

- As long as we focus the international debate on regional representation within the Council, I am confident we can overcome opposition to the 21 seat limitation.
- Regarding extension of the veto, it is premature to consider this critical issue without resolution on the remaining questions.
- The P3&2 Group is making progress toward resolving those remaining questions. Hopefully, we can have a framework resolution passed in the General Assembly in 1998.

UN Arrears

Background: UK has been consistently harsh in its criticism of the U.S. regarding our failure to pay UN arrears. The Brits have taken a tough line on full and unconditional payment of the \$1.5 billion we owe the UN.

Talking Points

- I was upset that Congress blocked our plan to pay about \$1 billion of our UN arrears because of domestic politics. We had worked long and hard with Senator Helms and other Republicans and I thought we had a deal.
- I intend to get supplemental legislation passed before May. My proposal includes over \$1.0 billion in arrears payments and only those conditions that all nations would agree to--most of them involving questions of national sovereignty.
- Congress will demand reductions in our assessment rates, once the arrears legislation is passed. I am seeking less controversial scale reductions of 22% in the Regular Budget and 25% for Peacekeeping at the UN.
- Once we get the legislation passed this Spring, I will need UK's help, especially with the EU, to have the General Assembly take action in June to allow us to pay our arrears.
- UK's influence will be decisive. We've put a tremendous amount of effort into closing the gap between what Congress will provide and what the General Assembly will accept. It will be a contentious debate, but progress can be made if we work together.

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DISCUSSION PAPER FOR
NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS TO THE
UNITED STATES (U)

References: (1) Report of President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection; (2) Draft PDD-XX; (3) Draft PDD-YY

This discussion paper addresses how the US Government should be structured to respond to the emerging, unconventional threats to US territory and Americans abroad. The paper is keyed to the latest drafts of PDD-XX and PDD-YY, attached. These drafts have changed from previous versions based upon informal interagency coordination.

1.0 Background

There are increased concerns about our vulnerability to unconventional threats because:

- o The margin of U.S. military superiority over potential enemies is so great that it may force such enemies to look for unconventional ways to attack us, such as attacks in the homeland to intimidate us and to degrade our military response;

- o Many of our potential enemies have access to unconventional means including terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and cyber warfare capabilities; they could use these unconventional methods of attack singly or in combination;

- o Our potential enemies include non-state actors such as terrorist groups and international organized criminal syndicates, some of which are capable of posing the same level of unconventional threat as nations;

- o Federal agencies, state and local governments, and private sector institutions all have significant vulnerabilities to unconventional attacks;

- o The increasing interdependence of elements of our government, military, economy, and society on a set of interrelated, interdependent infrastructures could make the scope and effects of unconventional attacks extremely damaging.

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2015-0041-M (1.93)
6/1/2023 v2

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Classified by: Glyn T. Davies

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassified on: 01-24-08

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1.1 Expressions of Concern: These concerns have been expressed by the President, the Congress, senior Administration officials, and panels, most notably the Marsh Commission.

The President: Over the last three years the President has repeated his personal concern, as in these examples:

“New technologies make our borders vulnerable to terrorists and dangerous weapons....Every day millions of people use laptops, modems, CD ROMs, (but) technology can be used for good or evil....these forces make us even more vulnerable to the organized forces of destruction, the forces of terror....The technological revolution can bring more and more problems to our shores.... Today the threat to our security is not just in an enemy silo, but in a briefcase or in the car bomb of a terrorist.”

“Certain national infrastructures are so vital that their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on the defense or economic security of the United States....Because many of these critical infrastructures are owned and operated by the private sector, it is essential that the government and private sector work together to develop a strategy for protecting them and assuring their continued operation.”

And in Tuesday's State of the Union:

“We must combat an unholy axis of new threats from terrorists, international criminals.... These 21st century predators feed on technology and the free flow of information and ideas and people. And they will be all the more lethal if weapons of mass destruction fall into their hands.”

Congress: The Congress has, on several occasions, indicated its interest in the further integration and coordination of these issues.

o The Senate Appropriations Committee required the Administration to submit by the end of 1998 a comprehensive interdepartmental plan for dealing with critical infrastructure protection, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction vulnerability in the U.S.

o The Intelligence Authorization called for the establishment within the NSC of a new “Committee on Transnational Threats” to be chaired by the APNSA, the primary function of which would be to “coordinate and direct the activities of the USG relating to combating transnational threats.”

o The Defense Authorization mandated that the President designate an individual to serve in the Executive Office of the President as the National Coordinator on Proliferation Matters

to advise on non-proliferation of WMD, including issues related to terrorism, arms control, and international organized crime, and to coordinate nonproliferation research efforts.

Senior Administration Officials: The Attorney General, Secretary of Defense, and others have addressed this issue:

“The front lines are no longer overseas; it can just as well be in any American city.”
William Cohen, 25 November 1997

“The evolving security environment has significant implications for how the national security apparatus operates. The distinction between foreign and domestic policies are less pronounced than in the past. The United States faces a panoply of threats that require smooth interaction among diplomatic, military, law enforcement, and consequence management organizations. Our national security apparatus must be flexible and responsive to meet the kinds of challenges this nation will face in the foreseeable future.”
William Cohen, 15 December 1997

“We will develop an effective capability to detect, prevent, defeat and manage consequences of nuclear, biological and chemical material and weapons used by terrorists. Let me explain briefly some of the means by which we seek to accomplish these objectives....A Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection has been created....as part of this effort, an Information Protection Task force has been created. It is a multi-agency effort to identify and coordinate existing expertise and capability, in the government and the private sector, relative to critical infrastructure protection”
Janet Reno, 13 May 1997

Panels and Commissions: There have been numerous reports, both within and outside of the government, that have addressed these issues and recommended additional efforts, coordination and integration:

o The December 1997 report of the National Defense Panel which stressed the need for increased emphasis, comprehensive planning, and interagency coordination on homeland defense, focusing on the interrelated dangers of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and consequence management, and information warfare and attacks on critical infrastructures.

o The October 1997 report of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (Marsh Commission) recommended that the administration coordinate critical infrastructure protection through an office in the NSC, create a interdepartmental support office located in Commerce, formalize a "lead agency" management process, and create a public/private information sharing and analysis center.

o The March 1997 report of the Livermore Study Group on Terrorist Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Woolsey-Nye report) called for a National Coordinator reporting to the Vice President and supported by a planning staff.

o The Brown Commission on U.S. Intelligence for the Twenty-First Century recommended the creation of a coordinator on the NSC and a permanent support staff to address terrorism, WMD proliferation, narcotics trafficking, and international organized crime.

o The 1996 report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Information Warfare-Defense recommended establishing a center for intelligence, indication and warning, and threat assessment within the Defense Department and also recommended possibly establishing an additional public/private center for indications and warning.

o The Commission on the Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces recommended that the office of the Vice President be charged with integrating the nation's response capabilities and that a permanent multiagency planning staff be established.

2.0 Proposed Directives and Structure

2.1 The PDDs: A pair of Presidential Decision Directives have been drafted in response to these concerns and proposals:

o PDD-XX: The purpose of this directive is twofold. First, it is a vehicle for the President to re-emphasize the importance he personally attaches to addressing the unconventional threats to the homeland and to Americans abroad. Second, the directive establishes an improved system for interagency coordination and accountability, by strengthening the Lead Agency approach and specifying ten program areas. There would be clear responsibility for policy development and implementation for each program.

o PDD-YY: This directive elaborates policy on one of the ten program areas, the protection of critical infrastructure. A separate Directive is required because no Administration has ever enunciated a comprehensive and detailed policy and program in this area. The Directive incorporates the work of the Marsh Commission. The central concept incorporated in this PDD is that of a Public/Private Partnership leading to the greatest possible voluntary cooperation between the government and the private sector to reduce vulnerabilities. Two other key

concepts are an outreach program of Education and Awareness and the creation of a National Infrastructure Protection Plan.

2.2 The Structure: The two Directives use an interagency structure to address the unconventional threats by building on the current interagency system and by adding specific, new Critical Infrastructure organizations.

o IWGs: The existing IWGs for Counter-terrorism, Critical Infrastructure Protection and WMD Counter-terrorism Consequence Management would be the core of the interagency system. These IWGs would each meet at the Assistant Secretary-level or above and be chaired by a Special Assistant to the President (NSC) with the designation National Coordinator for Security, Critical Infrastructure and Counter-Terrorism. A new IWG, Security of Essential Government Operations, will also be created and chaired by the National Coordinator, as a complement to the existing IWG on Continuity of Government Operations. The National Coordinator, as the chair of the groups, may convene joint meetings as appropriate. When the DC or PC meets to consider counter-terrorism, security or infrastructure protection issues, the National Coordinator would join the meeting as a full member.

o IPC: An Infrastructure Protection Center would be created in the Department of Justice, FBI. The Center would provide a warning, assessment, and crisis management focus for infrastructure and, particularly, cyber attacks.

o ISAC: The USG would encourage the private sector to create an Information Sharing and Analysis Center to address cyber and other critical infrastructure issues. The USG would facilitate and, as appropriate, participate in the ISAC. The rationale for a private sector entity is that (a) infrastructures are largely owned and operated by the private sector, (b) infrastructures are increasingly interdependent requiring a means of sharing and assessing vulnerabilities and other protection information across sectors, (c) the private sector needs a locus for its own activities in support of the Government effort, and (d) the private sector may be reluctant, at least initially, to share vulnerability and competitive information with the Government.

In addition, the PDD carries forward the Commission recommendations for an Advisory Council and a small interagency National Plan Coordination staff (NPC). The NPC staff would coordinate the integration of the various components of the

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National Infrastructure Protection Plan, which will be developed by the various Lead Agencies. The NPC staff would also coordinate the government-wide outreach and Education and Awareness efforts. The NPC staff in the directive is, however, half the size of the current Transition Office and has a sunset provision following the creation of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan.

3.0 Issues for Discussion

3.1 Integration of Unconventional Threat Responses: As noted in sections 1.0 and 2.0 above, the President, Congress, and expert panels have seen a commonality among the unconventional threats to the homeland and Americans abroad. Currently the USG structure does not integrate these threats for policy development, implementation, or crisis management below the Deputy Secretary level in most agencies. The National Coordinator, in his role as the chair of the related IWGs, would be responsible for ensuring such coordination, and for raising these issues for consideration by the Deputies or Principals, as appropriate.

These Directives do not create a structure similar to the "Drug Czar," which is a separate organization in the Executive Office of the President, has a staff of 200, and is headed by a Cabinet Rank officer subject to Senate confirmation. Instead, the directives employ and strengthen the Lead Agency approach, and designate a senior officer within the NSC staff system to coordinate the work of the IWGs.

Alternatives to the PDDs would be to:

- o Have the IWGs report to a new senior coordinating group on these issues which would report directly to the Principals Committee
- o Merge the existing four IWGs into the terrorism IWG
- o Create a new agency within the Executive Office of the President, similar to the "Drug Czar"

-- or, conversely, have separate several senior NSC Staff officers, each with one or two assistants, to serve as the White House point of contact for each of the types of Unconventional Threats.

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3.2 Single Lead Agency for Critical Infrastructure: The two draft directives assign specific Lead Agency functions to several departments. There is not a single Lead Agency. Coordination among the departments is facilitated by an interagency National Plan Coordination Support Staff, for which the Commerce Department would serve as Executive Agent.

An Alternative Approach to this distributed approach would be to place a single department, specifically the Justice Department, in the role of Lead Agency. Justice has objected to an approach which does not designate a single Lead Agency. Justice is creating a large, well-funded Infrastructure Protection Center (IPC) within the FBI, as one of the offices reporting to a Deputy Assistant Director of the Bureau.

In the Alternative Approach, the IPC could perform the role of two other components in PDD-YY, the National Plan Coordination staff and the Information Sharing and Analysis Center.

3.2.1 The Information Sharing and Analysis Center: Based on the work of the Commission and the IWG, draft PDD-YY proposes that the USG work with the private sector to develop a complementary analysis entity to the proposed Justice Department Information Protection Center (IPC). The proposed private sector counter-part could be called the Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC).

While the USG can not create the ISAC, the PDD would have the USG urge and facilitate its creation and make suggestions about how it might work. The rationale for the ISAC would be:

- o The various sectors of the commercial, private infrastructures each have their own industry/trade groups that could address infrastructure issues, but there is no such group that serves as a venue for all sectors to develop education and awareness programs, fund research, or develop policies;

- o Some parts of the private sector have demonstrated a reluctance to share proprietary information with the Justice Department and FBI; these companies might be more willing to participate in vulnerability analyses and report on problems if the reports were going to an industry owned and operated institute which could filter the information provided to DOJ/FBI.

The Alternative Approach would rely upon the FBI's IPC to perform this liaison with the private sector. This approach

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would avoid the USG giving the appearance of condoning a non-governmental entity as the locus for reporting crimes. The private sector could develop some entity on its own, but the USG would not actively encourage or facilitate it.

3.2.2 The National Plan Coordination (NPC) support staff: The draft PDD-YY directs that the Commission Transition Office be reduced in size by roughly half to 20 professionals, be redesignated the National Plan Coordination support staff, and be given a "sunset clause" or limited duration of 36 months (the period during which the National Infrastructure Protection Plan would be under development). The draft PDD assigns the staff office to the Commerce Department as Executive Agent beginning in FY99 (until then it would continue in DOD).

The rationale for the Office is that this new and complex issue spills over any one department and requires full time coordination of the work of many departments and agencies. The tasks of the office would be:

- o Coordinate the development of the sector plans and their integration into the National Infrastructure Protection Plan;
- o Coordinate the development of a U.S. Government Protection Plan from the submissions of the CIOs of each department and agency;
- o Coordinate outreach to the public and the sectors; implement the Education & Awareness recommendations of the Commission;
- o Serve as Executive Secretary of the Interagency Working Group on Critical Infrastructure Protection;
- o Conclude the classification, publication, and disposition of the Commission's documentation.

The draft PDD places the Office in the Department of Commerce as Executive Agent. The rationale for that assignment is the belief that the private sector reaction to the PDD implementing the Commission's recommendations would be more favorable if the organization demonstrates USG appreciation for the private sector's role in critical infrastructure protection, the need for effective business rationale for USG's expectations of private sector protection efforts, and to further encourage understanding of the breadth of the issues involved (business, defense, law enforcement, intelligence, etc.). Without that

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assignment, the PDD would seem to treat the Critical Infrastructure issue exclusively as a national security/law enforcement problem.

The Alternative Approach would rely upon the only large infrastructure staff in the USG to perform these roles for the rest of the government, i.e. the FBI's IPC. In addition 3-4 NSC staffers would be reassigned from their current duties to work with the IPC and the Interagency Working Group. The IPC would:

- o Coordinate the portions of the National Plan initially drafted by each of the Departments with a Lead Sector liaison function;

- o Review the individual department and agency's cyber security and protection plans for there own internal operations.

3.3 Extension of Executive Order: Whether the NPC support staff is created or the FBI's IPC takes on that role, there is the separate issue of whether to extend the Commission Transition Office and the current Advisory Committee while the new PDDs are coming into effect. The Staff Director has proposed that the Executive Order creating these organizations be amended to have an end date of September 30. This amendment would permit the staff to conclude the classification and distribution of their voluminous files and report, finalize on-going contract research, and respond to the numerous requests for information and briefings on the Commission. It would also extend the Advisory Committee until new appointments could be completed.