

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

DC0024 DC Meeting on China, April 27, 1993 [1]

Staff Office-Individual:

Records Management

Original OA/ID Number:

3994

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
43	4	5	1	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. paper	re: Economic Effects of Conditioning or Ending MFN for China (3 pages)	05/14/1993	P1/b(1) VZ 10/25/2019
002a. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of DC Meeting on China [partial] (1 page)	04/27/1993	P3/b(3) KDF 3/11/2020
002b. minutes	re: Minutes of DC Meeting on China (10 pages)	04/27/1993	P1/b(1)
003a. email	R. Nicholas Burns to Mary Emery et al. re: Russia Assistance Package (1 page)	05/06/1993	P1/b(1) VZ 10/25/2019
003b. minutes	re: Minutes of DC Meeting on China (10 pages)	04/27/1993	P1/b(1)
004a. memo	Kent Wiedemann to Anthony Lake re: Status of China's Action on Core Concerns and Report on Non-MFN Leverage over China (1 page)	05/06/1993	P1/b(1) KDF 3/11/2020
004b. report	re: China: Status Report, Non-MFN Leverage [partial] (7 pages)	05/03/1993	P1/b(1) VZ 10/25/2019
004c. note	re: Comments by Eric Schwartz [partial] (1 page)	05/00/1993	P1/b(1) KDF 3/11/2020
005a. memo	Kent Wiedemann to Anthony Lake re: China: Looking Toward a Deputies Committee Meeting (6 pages)	04/26/1993	P1/b(1)
005b. memo	Marc Grossman to William Itoh. [partial] [CIA Act] (1 page)	04/20/1993	P3/b(3)
005c. paper	re: Interagency Working Group for East Asia and the Pacific: Advancing PRC Responsiveness on U.S. Core Concerns (8 pages)	04/20/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3994

FOLDER TITLE:

DC0024 DC Meeting on China, April 27, 1993 [1]

2015-0221-M

rs1195

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005d. list	re: Human Rights (4 pages)	04/00/1993	P1/b(1) VZ 10/25/2019

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3994

FOLDER TITLE:

DC0024 DC Meeting on China, April 27, 1993 [1]

2015-0221-M
rs1195

RESTRICTION CODES

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TO: ITOH

FROM: GROSSMAN, M

DOC DATE: 14 MAY 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
INTL TRADE

MFN
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FOLLOW UP TO 27 APR DC MTG ON CHINA / ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF
CONDITIONING OR ENDING MFN

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE DATE: 19 MAY 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WIEDEMANN

LOGREF: 9320035 9320130

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC0024

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

ITOH
KENNEY
KRISTOFF
PRIMOSCH
WIEDEMANN

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: NSWEA DOC 1 OF 1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001

X 93051514 FOR RECORD PURPOSES



20520
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

May 14, 1993

~~SECRET/NODIS~~
DECL:OADR

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM ITOH
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: China: Economic Effects of Conditioning or
Ending MFN

The Deputies Committee April 27 requested the attached paper, which considers the possible economic effects of conditioning or ending MFN for China.

for Eileen A. Malley
for Marc Grossman
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By WJ-NARA, Date 1/26/2015
2015-0221-M

ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF CONDITIONING OR ENDING MFN FOR CHINA

In considering the IWG paper on engaging China prior to the President's MFN decision, the Deputies Committee April 27 requested the State Department prepare an analysis of the effects of conditioning or ending MFN for China. This paper reviews this issue.

- o A policy of placing conditions on MFN requires the U.S. to convince China that we would be willing to jeopardize a mutually beneficial trading relationship to achieve our core objectives. China is actively working to increase the benefits to the U.S. in this relationship to make it more costly for us to actually revoke its MFN status.
- o China publicly has declared that any conditions on MFN are unacceptable. It argues that China's economy will continue to grow and warns the U.S. risks losing its market in China.
- o In 1992 China was our seventh largest trading partner with U.S. exports of \$7.5 billion and imports from China of \$25.7 billion for a \$18.3 billion deficit, the second largest next to Japan. Despite a projected 25 percent growth in U.S. exports and a slowdown to 10 percent growth in U.S. imports in 1993, the deficit would likely still increase to around \$19.0 billion this year.

EFFECTS ON CHINA

- o The primary effect of conditioning MFN on China is the maintenance of political and psychological pressure on the leadership. China needs to gain access to U.S. technology and "know-how" to help achieve its development goals.
- o More important, access to the United States market is the primary leverage exerted by our threat to revoke MFN status. Over 30 percent of China's 1992 exports went to the U.S.
 - The effectiveness of U.S. leverage is diminished by the fact that in eleven of China's top 25 exports to the U.S., China remains the lowest cost supplier even when charged the higher, non-MFN duties and is the second lowest cost supplier in an additional five categories. These products account for one half of China's total exports to the U.S.
- o A CIA analysis estimates that loss of MFN would lead to a 7.5 to 15 percent drop in China's global export earnings in the first year and throw 6.5 to 13 million people out of work. The bulk of these losses would affect Guangdong province and its Hong Kong/Taiwan-funded factories.

~~SECRET/NO DIS~~

- o China would lose competitiveness in key categories like textiles and apparel where non-MFN tariffs are high (70 to 90 percent) but would still be a market force in footwear, luggage and consumer electronics where non-MFN tariffs are in the 20 to 35 percent range.
 - For example, the unit cost of Chinese-made rubber footwear is \$1.77. The average unit cost of imports from other LDCs is \$6.68. Adding the 35 percent duty raises the cost of the Chinese footwear to \$2.39, still far cheaper than the competition.
 - Additionally, China can counteract the economic effects of higher U.S. tariffs by devaluing its currency to maintain export competitiveness. China currently practices a multiple currency system which overvalues the renminbi for official imports and undervalues it for exports.
- o The economic effects of the loss of MFN would slow down China's modernization and development program in the short-run; however, China has the tools to ameliorate or compensate for this loss over time.

EFFECTS ON THE UNITED STATES

- o This Administration's fundamental goal for trade policy is economic growth and the creation of high wage jobs for American workers. American industry understands that taking advantage of the opportunities in China is a key to economic growth and job creation.
- o Conditioning MFN increases the risk and uncertainty of doing business in China. In the past this has caused importers to front load order, boosting the growth rate for Chinese exports. It has also discouraged the Chinese from dealing with U.S. exporters and investors where longer term relationships must be developed and based upon trust.
- o China, whose export-led growth gives it the foreign exchange necessary to modernize its backward infrastructure, will be the world's most important and fastest growing market in the 1990s for computers, telecommunications, oil drilling equipment, machine tools, power generation equipment, aircraft, and construction/mining equipment.

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- o -- China has implemented a strategy of enlisting U.S. business to lobby for unconditional MFN renewal by offering contracts to U.S. firms in these key growth sectors. For many U.S. firms, China is a market they "cannot afford not to be in".
- o Withdrawing MFN could force importers to raise prices on low-cost Chinese goods, adversely affecting both consumers and manufacturers.
 - China now supplies almost five percent of total U.S. imports and 60 to 70 percent of U.S. imports of footwear, luggage, radio/tape players, hair dryers, coffee makers, and stuffed toys.
 - Approximately \$5 billion in Chinese exports are used as components in U.S. manufactures, making U.S. products more competitive. Imports from China also support large numbers of job in retail and service industries. Increased tariffs for these products would force many U.S. firms out of business.

EFFECTS ON HONG KONG

- o Conditioning MFN could have a serious, negative impact on the 900 American companies in Hong Kong, many with investments in China in addition to our \$7 billion investment in Hong Kong.
- o Hong Kong could lose as many as 60,000 jobs and up to \$16 billion in overall trade if MFN is withdrawn, according to British officials.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

TO: BERGER

FROM: SAEED
WIEDEMANN

DOC DATE: 27 JUL 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R DC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 27 APR DC MTG ON CHINA

ACTION: BERGER APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 31 JUL 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SAEED LOGREF: 9320035 9320130

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0024 CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BLOXTON
KRISTOFF
NSC CHRON
SAEED
WIEDEMANN

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: NSKDB DOC 1 OF 1

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526

~~SECRET~~

*DECLD
GUE 19/20/93*

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001

Z 93072822 FOR DECISION
X 93080319 BERGER APPROVED RECOM

Rec'd 7/28 10:17am
 National Security Council
 The White House

JWR
 7/28

PROOFED BY: WA LOG # 20826
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG WA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<u>W</u> DepExecSec	<u>1</u>	<u>nan</u>	
ExecSec			
Staff Director			
D/APNSA	<u>2</u>	<u>prb</u>	<u>why did this take 3 months?</u>
APNSA			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>8/3</u>	<u>file</u>
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
 (Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

Be sure Asia Directorate sees this about not

20 JUL 93 10:14

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Exec Sec's Office has deleted

1200 121 1011 1011
National Security Council
The White House

JWR
7/28

PROOFED BY: LOG # 20526
URGENT NOT PROOFED: SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT
BYPASSED WW DESK: DOCLOG AT AO

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	<u>1</u>	<u>nan</u>	
ExecSec			
Staff Director			
D/APNSA	<u>2</u>	<u>prb</u>	<u>why did this take 3 months?</u>
APNSA			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>@ 8/3</u>	<u>fill</u>
NSC Secretariat			

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cc: VP McLarty Other

Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)

Be sent Asia Directorate seen ch above not

COMMENTS:

20 JUL 93 10:14

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Exec Sec's Office has dispatch

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of DC Meeting on China [partial] (1 page)	04/27/1993	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3994

FOLDER TITLE:

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2015-0221-M
rs1195

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~~SECRET~~

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20826

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D C 20508

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: April 27, 1993

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 5:30pm - 7:00pm

Subject: Summary of Conclusions of DC Meeting on China (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

THE VICE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE

Leon Fuerth

STATE

Peter Tarnoff
Winston Lord

TREASURY

Rick Inderfurth
Jeff Shafer

DOD

Frank Wisner
Charles Freeman

CIA

Douglas MacEachin
[REDACTED]

JCS

David Jeremiah
Frank Bowman

COMMERCE

Frank Vargo
Don Forrest

USTR

Ira Wolf
Charlene Barshefsky

WHITE HOUSE

Samuel Berger

NSC

Kent Wiedemann
Ferial Ara Saeed

NEC

Bob Kyle

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

China's progress on human rights has been modest but not inconsequential. In the remaining weeks we need to identify key areas for progress and engage in modest reciprocal gestures. (S)

Sending an emissary to Beijing before June makes sense; this would be Winston Lord or someone of equal stature and authority. State will produce a paper on the pros and cons of this; we will get the President's views afterwards. (S)

The priorities in the IWG paper are right, except on trade; USTR will provide new language. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0221-M (1.02)
03/11/2020 KDE

- The strategy of continuous, high-level visits for the purpose of broad engagement needs to be refined to reflect the need for progress on our core concerns (human rights, nonproliferation and trade). (S)
- We should decide the level of contact in accordance with our objectives on a given issue and confined to the agenda at hand. (S)
- We need to identify the purpose of each visit and what we hope to achieve. Otherwise, sending high-level visitors seriatim risks sending a mixed message to the Chinese and the wrong signal to Congress. (S)
- We are moving from virtually no engagement to selective engagement in direct support of key U.S. interests. (S)
- The IWG should take on the role of managing our strategy. We should look to it as the central decision-making mechanism and coordinator on a range of actions with China, including trade retaliation and level and coordination of official visits. (S)
- The IWG should develop a longer-term strategy, looking at the next five years, of engagement with China. (S)
- We need another draft of the paper soon that reflects these points. (S)
- The DC will meet again to review this paper. (S)

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. minutes	re: Minutes of DC Meeting on China (10 pages)	04/27/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3994

FOLDER TITLE:

DC0024 DC Meeting on China, April 27, 1993 [1]

2015-0221-M
rs1195

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

20826

July 27, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: KENT WIEDEMANN *[Handwritten initials]*

FROM: FERAL ARA SAEB *[Handwritten initials]*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for April 27 China DC

The NSC Deputies Committee met April 27 on China policy. The Minutes, at Tab II, were filed for the record. The Summary of Conclusions, at Tab I, were not.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Summary of Conclusions be filed for the record.

Approve *[Handwritten initials]* Disapprove _____

[Handwritten note: w/ changes]

Attachments

- Tab I Summary of Conclusions
- Tab II Minutes

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By WIK NARA, Date 1/26/15
2015-0221-M

TO: BERGER

FROM: SAEED
WIEDEMANN

DOC DATE: 28 APR 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R DC
MINUTES

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MINUTES FOR 27 APR DC MTG ON CHINA

ACTION: BERGER APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 01 MAY 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SAEED LOGREF: 9320035 9320130

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0024 CODES:

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E.O. 13526

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By WK NARA, Date 1/24/15

2015-0221-M

02KJ
9/20/93

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001 WIEDEMANN
001 BERGER
001

Z 93043018 FOR DECISION
Z 93043018 FOR REDO
Z 93050416 FOR DECISION
X 93060208 BERGER APPROVED RECOM

Rec'd 4/29 6:53pm

National Security Council
The White House

JWR
4/29 1925L

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 20437
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG W52 A10

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ExecSec	_____	_____	_____
Staff Director	_____	_____	_____
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APNSA	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
<u>Wiedemann</u>	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>A-Redo</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

National Security Council
The White House

rec'd 5/4
7:30 PM

JWR
5/6 1210 L.

PROOFED BY: ASK LOG # 20437 REDO
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG WA AVO _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<u>W</u> DepExecSec	<u>4</u>	<u>WJR</u>	_____
ExecSec	_____	_____	_____
Staff Director	_____	_____	_____
D/APNSA	<u>5</u>	<u>ok</u>	_____
APNSA	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>6</u>	_____	<u>File</u>
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

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cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

4 MAY 95 4:22

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

06-May-1993 11:54 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: R. Nicholas Burns
(BURNS)

SUBJECT: Russia Assistance Package

Please pass to Tony and Sandy today

You may receive a call today or tomorrow from Christopher, Wharton or Atwood on funding options for the \$1.8 billion assistance package we announced in Tokyo. They are concerned that we may opt to fund the package through offsets which would have a serious impact on other foreign aid accounts.

OMB has drawn up preliminary tables on possible FY-93 and 94 offsets to pay for the Tokyo package and had wanted to distribute them to agencies this week. At our request, OMB agreed to withhold the tables until we have decided that is the route we want to take. We will hold an interagency meeting (NSC, State, OMB and Treasury) today to discuss our legislative strategy and the best way (whether through offsets or a supplemental request) to fund the package. We will report to both of you after this meeting, and will want your green light before beginning any interagency discussion of offsets.

You can assure Christopher et al. that State has already been involved in our discussions with OMB, and will remain involved in each step of this process.

Distribution:

FOR: Mary C. Emery	(EMERY)
FOR: Wilma G. Hall	(HALL)
FOR: Kristen K. Cicio	(CICIO)
FOR: Katherine M. Mathis	(MATHIS)
FOR: James W. Reed	(REED)
CC: Records	(RECORDS)
CC: Toby T. Gati	(GATI)
CC: Richard Clarke	(CLARKE)
CC: Randy R. Beers	(BEERS)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VR NARA, Date 7/15/2019
2015-0221-01 (1.05)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

06-May-1993 16:18 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Randy R. Beers
(BEERS)

SUBJECT: Hill Call on African Aid

Please pass to Tony and Sandy,

I understand that Tony received a phone call from someone on the Hill regarding Aid for Africa. I believe this phone call is a result of the same roomer that caused Nick Burns to alert Tony that Atwood, Wharton, Christopher may call.

OMB has been looking at options to pay for Russian aid without a supplemental. One approach for finding money is to run a printout of all the funds that are appropriated but not obligated and funds that are obligated but not expended. Because AID takes a long time to plan programs and to spend the money after the program is agreed to with a host government, AID money will show up prominently on such a printout, and Africa is AID's largest geographic assistance account. Hence OMB, internally, has noted that there is money in AID, particularly in Africa, that is hypothetically available to offset the Russian aid package.

Word of this leaked to AID and the Hill. Ernie Wilson has also received a phone call from an HFAC staffer on this subject.

The answer to the phone call is that no decisions have been made, all options are on the table, no final decisions will be made without talking to the Hill.

With the story on the Hill, it will quite possibly appear in the press as well.

Distribution:

FOR: Toby T. Gati	(GATI)
FOR: R. Nicholas Burns	(BURNS)
FOR: Richard A. Clarke	(CLARKER)
FOR: Mary C. Emery	(EMERY)
FOR: Wilma G. Hall	(HALL)
FOR: Kristen K. Cicio	(CICIO)
FOR: Katherine M. Mathis	(MATHIS)
FOR: James W. Reed	(REED)
CC: Records	(RECORDS)

May 6, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR SANDY BERGER AND BO CUTTER

FROM: BOB FAUVER AND HELEN WALSH *HW*

SUBJECT: Aid for Russia

We understand that the effort underway to find the \$1.8 billion pledged for Russia is looking at reducing the FY 1994 amounts proposed for the multilateral development banks. We know there are no easy choices, but strongly believe that cutting the MDBs would be unwise, and hope you will consider the following points in your deliberations:

- o The MDBs are the most cost effective way to provide foreign assistance, largely because we can leverage our contribution off other donors' contributions. For every \$1 we pay in, we get at least \$6 in foreign aid.
- o U.S. firms have received more than their share of exports that flow from MDB procurement. So, MDB contributions help the U.S. economy.
- o The amounts in the budget for the MDBs represent international commitments that have already been made. We're already in arrears on our MDB contributions. If we want to propose any kind of IFI reform -- let alone ask the multilaterals to assume a greater role in the issues we care about (environment, good governance, basic human needs) -- we have to be members in good standing and demonstrate that we live up to our commitments.
- o The 18% nominal increase in the budget for the International Development Association is for the poorest of the poor. It is below what the World Bank was seeking. It is needed because (1) there are now a dozen more eligible members, including many FSU countries; and (2) we need to adjust for inflation and the depreciation of the dollar since the last replenishment. If we reduce our IDA budget commitment, you should expect loud complaints from the World Bank and most IDA recipients (especially African countries), who will understandably argue that they are being hurt by our focus on Russia. Also, this could reopen the contentious debate we had with China last year over its share of IDA relative to India's. (We managed to paper it over last year, in part because of our increased commitment.)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 28, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
THROUGH: KENT WIEDEMANN *FWB*
FROM: FERAL ARA SAEED *FWB*
SUBJECT: Minutes of the China DC Meeting

The NSC Deputies Committee met April 27 on China policy. The Minutes, at Tab I, are submitted for the record.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Minutes be filed for the record.

Approve *FWB* Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Minutes

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. minutes	re: Minutes of DC Meeting on China (10 pages)	04/27/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3994

FOLDER TITLE:

DC0024 DC Meeting on China, April 27, 1993 [1]

2015-0221-M
rs1195

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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TO: ITOH

FROM: GROSSMAN, M

DOC DATE: 03 APR 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
DC

MFN

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: STATE FOLLOW UP PAPER TO 27 APR DC MTG ON CHINA

ACTION: OBE PER WIEDEMANN DUE DATE: 07 MAY 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WIEDEMANN LOGREF: 9320035 9320130

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0024 PRD0011 CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
PRIMOSCH
WIEDEMANN
WRIGHT

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA CLOSED BY: NSKDB DOC 1 OF 1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 WIEDEMANN
001

Z 93050409 APPROPRIATE ACTION
X 93060213 OBE PER WIEDEMANN

TO: ITOH

FROM: GROSSMAN, M

DOC DATE: 03 APR 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
DC

MFN

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: CHINA - STATUS RPT ON NON-MFN LEVERAGE OF DC ON 28 APR

ACTION: APPROPRIATE ACTION DUE DATE: 07 MAY 93 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: WIEDEMANN

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION
WIEDEMANN

FOR CONCURRENCE
PRIMOSCH

FOR INFO
GROSS
ITOH
KENNEY
MERCHANT
ROSNER
WRIGHT

*Cheryl
please print out*

G: NONMFN

COMMENTS: *This action is OBE.*
Cheryl

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA CLOSED BY: DOC 1 OF 1

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. EDWARD KNIGHT
Executive Secretary
Department of Treasury

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Executive Director for
Policy Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

COL. MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. PATTY MCHUGH
Director, Executive
Secretariat
Department of Commerce

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. BOWMAN CUTTER
Deputy Assistant to the
President for Economic
Policy

CAPT. H. L. SHEFFIELD
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Status of China's Action on Core Concerns, and
Report on Non-MFN Leverage over China (S)

Tab A conveys a paper tasked at the Deputies' Committee meeting
on China on April 28, which reports on actions China has taken in
the recent past in response to U.S. concerns over human rights,
proliferation and trade. (S)

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A China: Status Report, Non-MFN Leverage

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By NARA, Date 1/26/15

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 6, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: KENT WIEDEMANN

SUBJECT: Status of China's Action on Core Concerns, and Report on Non-MFN Leverage over China

Tab A conveys a paper tasked at the Deputies' Committee meeting on China of April 28, which reports on actions China has taken in the recent past in response to U.S. concerns over human rights, proliferation and trade. The paper is thorough, fair and very useful. Tab II contains Eric Schwartz's critique of the papers analysis on human rights. It forms a valuable backdrop generally to Win Lord's forthcoming trip to China, as well as to our continuing consultations on the Hill.

Despite the objective judgment that China has indeed taken some steps in the right direction, Win Lord's and my chat with Mitchell and Pelosi on May 3 showed that those actions have already been heavily discounted in that quarter. New troubling information which points with more (though not absolutely conclusive) certainty to Chinese sale of M-11 missiles to Pakistan will place more stress on the proliferation issue, and require us to take a hard look at the possible impact of this information on MFN as well as on invocation of the Helms Amendment which could also gut Chinese exports to the U.S. On the other hand, I think the paper might have given a bit more positive spin on the successful application of our MOU designed to stem trade in prison-labor-made goods. I have asked State to prepare a separate analysis on that issue, which of course many in Congress--including Pelosi--regard as a major problem.

Concurrences by: Bob Kyle, ^{PK} Jeremy Rosner, Eric Schwartz

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to distribute the attachment at Tab A to the Deputies' Committee on China.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Itoh/Counterparts Memorandum
- Tab A China: Status Report, Non-MFN Leverage
- Tab II Eric Schwartz Critique



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Staff

20457

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

DECL:OADR

May, 3, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM ITOH
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: China: Status Report, Non-MFN Leverage

The Deputies Committee April 28 requested the attached paper, which reviews the status of Chinese actions in core areas of concern to the United States. The paper also considers tools available to the U.S. for influencing Chinese behavior besides MFN. Your assistance in distributing this paper to the other members of the Deputies Committee would be appreciated.

Marc Grossman
for
- Marc Grossman
- Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *MN* NARA, Date *1/26/15*

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

2015-0221-m

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004b. report	re: China: Status Report, Non-MFN Leverage [partial] (7 pages)	05/03/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3994

FOLDER TITLE:

DC0024 DC Meeting on China, April 27, 1993 [1]

2015-0221-M
rs1195

RESTRICTION CODES

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SECRET/NODIS

CHINA: STATUS REPORT, NON-MFN LEVERAGE

During its April 27 meeting to consider steps for managing relations with China before the June 3 MFN deadline, the Deputies Committee requested that the State Department prepare a paper reviewing in greater detail Chinese responsiveness in core areas of concern to the U.S. The DC also requested that the paper comment on sources of leverage other than MFN at the USG's disposal. This paper responds to the DC's request.

I. CORE CONCERN STATUS REPORT

Secretary Christopher March 3 explained to outgoing PRC Ambassador Zhu Qizhen the need for further Chinese progress on core U.S. concerns before the President's MFN decision. On March 16, Ambassador Roy met with Vice Foreign Minister Tian Zengpei to detail these concerns, which fall into three areas, human rights, nonproliferation, and trade. Chinese responses to date have been modest but not inconsequential. Beijing has been attempting to position itself for the MFN decision since the beginning of the year, but its actions reveal PRC unwillingness fully to address our positions. The following points review Chinese responses, if any, to our core concerns:

Human Rights

- o Prisoner Accounting/Amnesty. China since January 20 has freed seven leading political prisoners. The Chinese have also told us (and dissidents have confirmed) that all but a limited number of those arrested for peaceful protests at the time of Tiananmen have been released. Others remain jailed for violent acts committed during that time. China has given no sign it intends a general amnesty or a comprehensive accounting of the hundreds, if not thousands, of political prisoners.
- o Release of Religious Prisoners. Since December 1992, China has freed the Bishop of Lanzhou and 19 other Catholic clerics; only one known Catholic priest remains in detention. China also has exercised restraint in responding to the rapid growth in evangelical Protestantism. However, members of non-officially sanctioned churches continue to be subjected to harassment, discrimination and occasional arrest.

Declassified in Part

Per E.O. 13526

VZ 07/15/2019

2015-0221-M (1.09)

SECRET/NODIS

- o Access to Prisons, Cessation of Torture. China has not agreed to grant access to Chinese prisoners by a third party, such as the ICRC, and we continue to receive reports of torture. However, Public Security Minister Tao Siju April 8 informed Senator Robb he had recommended approving ICRC access.
- o Tibet. In contrast to the recent past, 1992-93 has been quiet in Tibet, with only some small protests over Tibetan independence and religious freedom. Very tight control continues, although the Chinese authorities have responded to demonstrations with greater restraint. Reports of abuse of prisoners continue. Senator Pell visited Lhasa and tourism is flourishing. However, the unimpeded influx of non-Tibetan Chinese has raised tensions and threatens Tibetan culture. Despite our urging, the Chinese have not re-engaged in direct dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his representatives.
- o Exit Permits/Human Rights Dialogue. The Chinese have reaffirmed the validity of their promise that anyone who was not the subject of a pending criminal charge could receive an exit permit. However, implementation has been slow for the small number of outstanding blocked passport cases. The U.S. has not encountered an instance of outright Chinese refusal to issue a passport, but some cases have dragged on for too long. Premier Li Peng, in recent meetings with U.S. visitors, has reaffirmed China's willingness to engage in a human rights dialogue with the U.S. It is not yet clear, however, what practical steps China is willing to take to restart a formal dialogue.
- o Stop VOA Jamming. Beijing continues its sporadic and somewhat ineffective jamming of VOA.

Nonproliferation

- o MTCR Assurances. In response to our concern about the possible transfer of the M-11 missile to Pakistan, the Chinese have assured us they are honoring their MTCR commitment. In his April 7 meeting with Senator Robb, VFM Liu Huaqiu reaffirmed Foreign Minister Qian's February 1992 commitment, with specific reference to M-9s and M-11s; Premier Li Peng also provided reassurances of China's MTCR commitments. However, Beijing has not responded to our repeated requests for information on the November 1992 shipment to Pakistan. General assurances are clearly unsatisfactory

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)

- o Revised MTCR Guidelines. The Chinese have not responded to our long-standing request to agree to abide by the revised MTCR Guidelines announced January 7, 1993.
- o NSG, AG. We have long urged China to adhere to the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines and the Australia Group's chemical and biological controls lists. Despite VFM Liu's statement last fall that China was studying the NSG Guidelines, China has given no indication that it will soon adopt them. Similarly, China does not appear ready to adopt Australia Group controls. While Beijing has listened to our concerns about sensitive sales to Iran of CW-related technology by PRC companies, it has not to our knowledge taken steps to terminate those sales.
- o Constrain Nuclear Cooperation. We have no indications that China has violated its commitments since signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. However, China has not responded to our concerns and is pressing forward with the sale -- albeit, under IAEA safeguards -- of reactors and other nuclear equipment to countries such as Pakistan and Iran.
- o CWC ACME, BWC. In January, China was an original signatory to the Chemical Weapons convention, a major step toward meeting our nonproliferation concerns. China continues to cite the U.S. sale of F-16s to Taiwan as an obstacle to its return to the Arms Control for the Middle East (ACME) process. It has not budged from its long-standing position that its activities are already fully consistent with the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).

Trade

- o Implement MOUs. Having reached agreements with China on protection of intellectual property rights, market access and banning products produced by prison labor, we are now focused on Chinese implementation of those agreements. Progress is being made on implementation of the IPR MOU. The Chinese have recently improved cooperation on the prison labor MOU. However, there are fundamental differences in interpretation on the market access agreement, such as permitting annual import increments on certain products of interest to the U.S. and improving transparency in China's trade regime. Recent talks on these issues have failed to make progress.
- o Textile Fraud. Beijing over the last year has been increasingly sensitive to U.S. textile fraud concerns. China responded to a U.S. request in March 1993 by issuing

joint regulations mandating cooperation between the customs and commodity inspection services in enforcing counter-transshipment rules. Beijing's actions lag far behind its assurances, however, and textile fraud remains a serious problem.

- o Open Services Market. China has recently agreed to permit individual foreign banking, accounting, legal, and insurance companies to begin limited operations in China, but structural changes in barriers to China's service market will require the creation of a new legal and regulatory framework.
- o Increasing U.S. Exports. Chinese buying missions to the U.S. this year will sign contracts worth over \$2 billion, including major deals with U.S. automobile, aircraft, and oil equipment manufacturers. However, the deficit is likely to increase despite a 25 percent growth rate for U.S. exports this year.

Other Areas

In the following areas, Chinese actions likely reflect Beijing's interest in signalling its desire for improved relations and maintaining MFN:

- o Official U.S. Visitors. The Chinese have gone out of their way to welcome senior U.S. visitors. Besides Senator Robb, former President Nixon recently visited China; Senator Helms' SFRC staffer Bill Triplett, whom Beijing last year denied a visa, also just completed a visit.
- o Call for Improved Relations. In public statements, media coverage of U.S. issues, and senior meetings with Americans since last fall's American elections, China has continuously expressed interest in improving relations with the United States.
- o POW/MIA. A Chinese POW/MIA delegation in March visited DoD POW/MIA facilities in Hawaii and provided new evidence on two U.S. airmen lost over Chinese territory during the Vietnam War. The Chinese are giving "serious consideration" to our proposal to send survey teams to four crash sites.
- o M/V Eastwood and Returned Illegal Immigrants. Beijing was generally very cooperative in facilitating the return to China of 525 illegal immigrants found in the Pacific on the M/V Eastwood, a Panamanian-registered vessel chartered by

alien smugglers. We are seeking clarification regarding a small number of the returnees who are in detention in Fujian Province.

- o Peace Corps. Nearly four years after China suspended establishment of the Peace Corps program in the wake of Tiananmen, a country director is in Sichuan planning for the summer arrival of 20 volunteers to teach English. This follows continuous U.S. pressure on Beijing since the end of 1989 to move forward with the program.
- o Satellite Security Agreement. Beijing February 11 concluded an agreement with the U.S. enhancing bilateral cooperation on safeguarding access to U.S. technology in satellites to be launched on PRC rockets.
- o North Korea. Although opposed to UNSC sanctions, Beijing has stated its opposition to North Korea's acquiring nuclear weapons, supported consensus on a UNSC Presidential statement on the issue, and informally conveyed to Pyongyang the U.S. willingness to meet with the North Koreans. China has refrained from linking its cooperation on North Korea to the MFN issue and is actively discussing resolution with other P-5 members.

II. BEYOND MFN: U.S. POLICY RESOURCES

The threatened cancellation of China's MFN status has been the leading U.S. resource for pressing for change in China since Tiananmen. It is by no means the only resource, however, and it suffers from a major shortcoming: while MFN cancellation would hurt Beijing, it could also seriously harm Western oriented and pro-capitalist elements in China as well as Hong Kong and damage a range of U.S. interests. Fortunately, the USG has at its disposal many other options for leverage in dealing with China. In fact, U.S. China policy successes since Tiananmen have often reflected the complementary influence of the MFN threat and use of the other options.

Statutory Resources

By mandating restrictions on U.S.-PRC economic and trade relations and sanctions for certain behavior, U.S. law offers a variety of means to pressure China for progress and to respond in a targeted manner to unacceptable Chinese actions.

- o Trade - Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 identifies steps to secure adequate market access and intellectual property protection for U.S. exports. This was the USG's

key source of leverage in securing Chinese agreement to the market access and IPR MOUs. We could invoke 301, if the Chinese fail to implement these agreements or fail to open their market to U.S. service industries.

- o Proliferation Law - The U.S. has already sanctioned China once for improper transfers to Pakistan of missile-related technology; if it determines that China is engaged in further transfers, the USG will have to take the much broader action required by the Helms Amendment. Other provisions of U.S. law cover other aspects of proliferation (e.g., of nuclear weapons, CBW, destabilizing arms to Iran and Iraq, etc.).
- o Nuclear Cooperation - Legal restrictions based on nuclear nonproliferation and human rights concerns now prevent significant U.S. nuclear commerce with China. (Nuclear power is an area of major interest to U.S. nuclear vendors and service companies.)
- o Exchange Rates - Under section 3004 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Treasury has determined that China is manipulating its exchange rate to prevent balance of payments adjustment and gain unfair competitive advantage in international trade. Treasury must negotiate with the Chinese to ensure that they take action to address this problem.
- o International Financial Institutions - Section 701(a) of the IFI Act requires the U.S. to oppose proposals for financing projects in countries with a pattern of gross violation of human rights, unless they are directed to basic human needs. Since Tiananmen, the U.S. has opposed by abstention votes on non-basic human needs projects for China.
- o Narcotics Certification - The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, requires the President to certify that major drug producing or transit countries, including China, have cooperated fully with the U.S. or taken adequate drug control steps of their own. Decertification would require the U.S. to withhold most forms of assistance and to oppose any loans from multilateral development banks.

Tiananmen Sanctions

The U.S. is the only country that maintains significant Tiananmen-related sanctions against China. Legally-mandated sanctions include a ban on the export of U.S. Munitions List goods and services to China and nuclear exchanges; an embargo

on licenses for civilian exports to military and police end-users; and restrictions on IFI lending. Other sanctions carried out by Executive Order and policy include opposition to China-specific proposals for easing COCOM controls; a suspension in Trade Development Administration (TDA) and Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) activities; and a limitation on high-level exchanges.

The President can lift most of these sanctions on a case-by-case basis in the national interest, or more broadly if he certifies human rights improvements. Therefore, the sanctions can provide both positive and negative leverage.

Nearly four years after Tiananmen, these sanctions remain a statement of U.S. concern over PRC human rights conditions. They also possess significant tactical value: the U.S. can selectively relax them as incentives for improved Chinese behavior. The IWG paper which the Deputies Committee discussed April 27, for instance, proposes limited waivers for EXIMBANK lending, satellite exports, and TDA activities as a means to encourage Chinese progress. Because many of the sanctions undercut U.S. trade and other interests, relaxation can be beneficial to the U.S. As the lifting of most of the sanctions depends on human rights improvements, the Executive Branch for now is restricted to utilizing those sanctions which can be relaxed on an ad hoc basis through Presidential waiver.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004c. note	re: Comments by Eric Schwartz [partial] (1 page)	05/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART

PER E. O. 13526

2015-0221-M (1.10) 03/11/2020 KDE

Comments by Eric Schwartz:

In my view, the paper's depiction of human rights progress is exaggerated. For example, the paper states that "the Chinese have told us (and dissidents have confirmed) that all but a limited number of those arrested for peaceful protests at the time of Tiananmen have been released." Human rights groups disagree and

EO 13526 1.4c

Similarly, the paper speaks in passing of "improved cooperation on the prison labor MOU," but does not mention restrictions on U.S. access to facilities. According to Asia Watch's Washington Representative, the MOU has been rendered "almost useless." Even on the M/V Eastwood case (in which the Chinese agreed to the repatriation of about 525 of their nationals), Chinese cooperation is overstated. The paper does not mention that at least 45 were detained upon return (we believe, but we do not know, that most have now been released); nor does it mention that the Chinese have told us that the fate of returnees is none of our business.

EO 13526 1.4c

Kent's observation on Eric Schwartz's comments:

The [redacted] quote does not detract from the generally recognized fact that most of those arrested as a result of Tiananmen-related activities have been released; it has long been believed that the majority of such persons were released within a few months of Tiananmen. In response to U.S. pressure, China has by now released nearly all those student leaders on the most-wanted list who were ultimately located and arrested. Human rights progress is real and not exaggerated in the State paper. It is, however, accurate to say that human rights abuses are still very serious, especially the lack of protection of the rights of freedom of speech and assembly.

On the way the Chinese have cooperated on the prison-labor export MOU, Eric does not note that whether or not we get into prisons to verify suspicion about production, Customs slaps an embargo on the associated suspected import. If the Chinese don't cooperate, it costs them, not our principles or the spirit of the MOU.

The handling of about 90 percent of the illegal aliens on the M/V Eastwood generally was good; Eric's observation about the other 10 could possibly be true, but is of the "glass is half empty" kind when applied to an unprecedented type of cooperation on an increasingly thorny migration issue.

TO: LAKE

FROM: WIEDEMANN

DOC DATE: 26 MAR 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
NON PROLIFERATION

MFN
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DISCUSSION PAPER & REQUEST FOR 27 APR DC MTG ON CHINA

ACTION: NFAR PER EXEC SEC

DUE DATE: 29 APR 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WIEDEMANN

LOGREF: 9320035 9320130

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC0024

PRD0011

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
EXECSEC
NSC CHRON
WIEDEMANN

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA CLOSED BY: NSJDA DOC 1 OF 1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE
001

Z 93042616 FOR DECISION
X 93042709 NFAR PER EXEC SEC

Return
will not
be sent

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: WJA LOG # 20416
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG MB A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<u>10</u> DepExecSec	<u>1</u>	<u>WJA</u>	
ExecSec	<u>2</u>	<u>WJA</u>	
Staff Director	<u>3</u>	<u>WJA</u>	
D/APNSA	<u>4</u>		
APNSA			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>		<u>NFA</u>
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

NOV 27 11 55

For 1/27 DC meeting

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

5B - 1
Is this adequate
for tomorrow? will
read out all but kent's
memo? NS

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005a. memo	Kent Wiedemann to Anthony Lake re: China: Looking Toward a Deputies Committee Meeting (6 pages)	04/26/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 3994

FOLDER TITLE:

DC0024 DC Meeting on China, April 27, 1993 [1]

2015-0221-M
rs1195

RESTRICTION CODES**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

April 20, 1993

000 4/21

2

~~SECRET/NODIS~~
DECL:OADR

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM ITOH
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: China Policy Paper

The Interagency Working Group on China has approved the attached paper proposing tactical steps for managing the U.S. relationship with China prior to the President's June 3 MFN decision. We recommend that a Deputies Committee meeting be convened to consider the paper's suggestions.

Marc Grossman
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By WJL NARA, Date 1/24/14
2015-0221-M

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005b. memo	Marc Grossman to William Itoh. [partial] [CIA Act] (1 page)	04/20/1993	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3994

FOLDER TITLE:

DC0024 DC Meeting on China, April 27, 1993 [1]

2015-0221-M
rs1195

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Drafted: EAP/CM: CAHart ^{gr}
SECMPOL7719 4/12/93 7-9141

Cleared: EAP: WLord ✓

IWG Clearances:

State: Peter Tomsen
NSC: Kent Wiedemann
DOD: ADM William Pendley
JCS: ADM Frank L. Bowman
Commerce: Peter Cashman
USTR: Ira Wolf
CIA: (b)(3)
Treasury: Meg Lundsager

WR

[005b]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005c. paper	re: Interagency Working Group for East Asia and the Pacific: Advancing PRC Responsiveness on U.S. Core Concerns (8 pages)	04/20/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3994

FOLDER TITLE:

DC0024 DC Meeting on China, April 27, 1993 [1]

2015-0221-M
rs1195

RESTRICTION CODES

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CHINESE POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS PRISONERS

RELEASED SINCE JANUARY 20, 1993

Wang Xizhe -- Released January 28 two years before completing a 14-year sentence for pro-democracy activities. One of the most prominent of the Democracy Wall movement activists.

Gao Shan -- Released January 28 four months before completing four-year sentence. Former aide to ex-Premier Zhao Ziyang.

Wang Dan -- Released on February 17 five months prior to completing a four-year sentence for role as one of the student leaders of the Tiananmen protests.

Guo Haifeng -- Released on February 17 four months prior to completing a four-year sentence for role as student leader in 1989 pro-democracy movement.

Li Guiren -- Released February 18 a year prior to completing five-year sentence. Released on medical parole. Editor and publisher detained in June of 1989 for trying to organize a strike of publishing house employees and writing "provocative slogans" calling for the removal of top Chinese leaders.

Fu Shenqi -- Released February 26 with sentence of two years deprivation of political rights. Prosecutor had requested prison sentence. Shanghai dissident detained in April 1991 for underground pro-democracy magazine.

Zhang Rujun -- Released from February 26 with sentence of one year deprivation of political rights. Prosecutor had requested prison sentence. Shanghai dissident detained in April 1991.

Pei Ronggui -- Released March 31 five months prior to completing a five-year sentence. Catholic priest arrested for his involvement in an April 18, 1989 clash between police and "underground" Catholics in Hebei province.

Prominent Political Prisoners Still in Jail:

Wei Jingsheng -- Democracy Wall activist and probably China's most prominent political prisoner. Detained in 1979. Due to be released in 1994.

Xu Wenli -- Democracy Wall activist detained in 1981. Due to be released in 1996.

Wang Milu -- Catholic Bishop detained in 1983. Due to be released this year.

Yulo Dawa
Tsering -- Tibetan monk and political activist detained in 1987. Due to be released in 1997.

Ren Wanding -- Long-time political activist most recently detained in 1989. Due to be released in 1996.

Wang Juntao -- Long-time political activist most recently detained in 1989. Due to be released in 2002.

Chen Ziming -- Long-time political activist most recently detained in 1989. Due to be released in 2002.

Liu Gang -- Student activist detained in 1989. Due to be released in 1995.

Bao Tong -- Former top aide to ex-Premier Zhao Ziyang. Detained in 1989. Due to be released in 1996.

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Bao Tong -- Former top aide to ex-Premier Zhao Ziyang. Detained in 1989. Due to be released in 1996.

- o April 9-15. Gao Yan, Governor of Jilin Province, is leading a delegation to Little Rock, New York and Washington. The delegation plans to spend \$40 million for fertilizer, steel, and other projects. Jilin recently spent \$10 million on telecommunications equipment from AT&T. (Beijing 11711).
- o May 2-14. Zhou Mingchen, President of Ceroilfoods, is planning to visit Cargill, Continental, and USDA for grain consultations. Previous visits have led to significant wheat purchases.
- o Early May. Mofert Vice Minister Tong Zhiguang and Sinochem officials will participate in a buying mission aimed at fertilizer and other commodities from the southern U.S.

CHINA'S BUY AMERICA CAMPAIGN

Chinese leaders have gone out of their way in meetings with Codels and other U.S. visitors to signal an interest in doing more business with U.S. companies. At least eight buying missions have either visited the U.S. since the beginning of the year or are scheduled to arrive this spring. These missions have the potential to generate billions of dollars of exports of aircraft, autos, satellites, oil drilling equipment, aviation electronics, wheat, fertilizer, and other U.S. products.

- o February 7-14. AT&T hosted State Planning Commission Vice Chairman Ye Qing on a visit to AT&T's headquarters and various manufacturing sites. The trip led to signing on February 23 of a cooperation agreement opening up China's lucrative market for digital switching equipment to a new AT&T joint venture.
- o March 10-24. Liu Jiyuan, Vice Minister of the Ministry of Aerospace Industries, met with Hughes Space Communications on a cooperation agreement that could lead to purchase of five satellites over five years. Value of this purchase could exceed \$750 million.
- o March 15-29. Li Zhao, Deputy Director General of CAAC, visited Boeing to discuss purchasing or leasing up to 40 aircraft valued at \$1 billion.
- o April 3-8. Wang Tao, President of the China National Petroleum Corporation, leads a delegation to Louisiana, Texas, and Washington, D.C. to encourage U.S. companies to participate in the opening of the Tarim Basin to oil exploration and development by foreign companies. The delegation also expects to purchase \$200 million worth of U.S. oil exploration equipment.
- o April 7-17. Wang Shumin, Deputy Director General of the State Council, will lead a joint civilian-military team for talks on airspace management. He will also meet with Boeing, McDonnell Douglas, and other companies on modernization of China's air traffic control system.
- o April 7-24. State Planning Commission Vice Chairman Gan Ziyu leads a mission to buy cars from GM, Ford, and Chrysler. Purchases are expected to exceed that of a similar mission last summer which bought 7000 vehicles. Gan will also visit Boeing in Seattle, where a \$600 million contract is expected to be signed.

HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA

The Chinese are focused intensely on the opportunity to host the 2000 summer Olympics. During a March IOC visit, Beijing pulled out all the stops in making the capital city presentable. It also signaled its willingness to clean up its political act by releasing five high-profile political prisoners in the month preceding the IOC visit. The Chinese know that their human rights record is a major obstacle to getting the Olympic nod. A decision to hold the games in Beijing could do what reformers have failed at through the centuries; it could actually change China.

Despite remarkable economic growth in the last decade, integration into the world economy, and the slow but steady relaxation of many social and cultural controls, China remains a communist state which instinctively responds to domestic political challenges with repression. Hundreds, perhaps thousands remain in detention for the peaceful expression of their political or religious views. There is no figure for political prisoners, but the Chinese have said that 3,560 persons are detained for "counterrevolutionary crimes". This figure includes a number of high profile dissidents and those who committed violent acts during the Tiananmen and earlier protests. However, recent evidence suggests the vast majority of those arrested for nonviolent offenses during Tiananmen and the earlier Democracy Wall movement have been released.

Chinese officials state there are about 1.1 million inmates in prisons and labor reform camps, but the actual figure could be closer to 2 to 3 million. Reports by the Ministry of Public Security indicate that an additional 700,000 persons are detained each year for minor offenses and "anti-social" behavior. Of these, Chinese officials say about 160,000 are in labor reeducation camps with the remainder in detention centers serving shorter sentences. None of these figures can be confirmed. The only thing we know for sure is that the prison and labor camp population is much reduced from the Mao era.

Critics of the Chinese prison system, like former inmate Harry Wu, say that it is a huge forced-labor gulag where physical abuse of prisoners is common and minimum standards of nutrition and medical care are ignored. These critics note that while the practice of requiring released prisoners to remain at the prison site or to continue to work in the prison factory is much less prevalent than before, thousands of persons probably remain in that status. In addition, released prisoners have a difficult time finding work or returning to school. Some take advantage of the new opportunities in the growing free market sector of China's economy. Others have been less fortunate.

The government keeps a close watch on dissidents and potential political activists, such as students at the more elite universities. Freedom of expression, such as exists, is limited to nonpolitical or nonreligious subjects. Some strides have been made in creating a modern legal system to deal with the new situation in the economic sphere. But individuals accused of political and/or common crimes have neither due process nor adequate opportunity to defend themselves. The majority arrested for common criminal offenses are sentenced by administrative procedures to labor camps or reeducation centers. Those tried by courts (for serious offenses) are presumed guilty and trials are more sentencing procedures with the length of sentence often determined by the defendant's demeanor. Execution for capital offenses is common and it is estimated hundreds were carried out last year.

Nevertheless, the rush toward freedom in economic arrangements has spilled over in other areas. One example is the implementation of the nation-wide family planning program. Although physical compulsion is occasionally threatened, the more common practice is to persuade through a mix of economic and social penalties and rewards. But with many workers and farmers able to control their own economic future independent of the government, these pressures are often ineffective. There are reports of massive underreporting of births as local officials try to hide their failures to meet the quotas established by their superiors.

Beijing has become extremely sensitive to foreign critiques of its human rights record. In a break with its past, it has answered with the publication of "white papers" on human rights, the criminal justice system, and Tibet. It has also responded by releasing several high-profile political prisoners and allowing a number of its most vocal opponents to leave the country.

The Chinese have made a systematic effort to clear up major Catholic cases, motivated by a desire to improve relations with the Vatican and by a belief that the Vatican will influence the IOC's selection of a host for the 2000 games. Based upon information by individuals in regular contact with the underground Catholic church, we believe there is only one Catholic cleric still in prison, although a number of those who have been released remain subject to severe restrictions. These restrictions include house arrest and limited or no contact with family or former parishioners. The rapid growth of the Protestant church, especially evangelical "house churches," has led to arrests; but in 1991 we were aware of only 17 specific cases of Protestants in detention. Buddhists have made a strong revival. Religious affiliation of all kinds is growing despite periodic harassment of believers, interception of the religious literature from abroad, and

official discouragement of nongovernment approved religious organizations.

In another bellwether of political trends, Beijing has eased restrictions on writers and artists. Trimming of government subsidies has forced cultural and propaganda organs to "face the market" resulting in intensified competition and livelier programming and news coverage. Advertising is beginning to come of age and newspapers increasingly feature articles that cater to popular tastes, while stopping well short of presenting dissenting political views. Beijing now has three highly competitive radio stations offering talk shows, jazz and rock and roll and Beijing television regularly shows American reruns such as "Hunter" and "Falcon Crest." The party still dictates what is permissible with penalties for those who transgress its prescribed bounds, but it is less able in this "information age" to tightly control culture. The continuing march of economic reforms and economic growth in China will increase the popular demand for more openness and political relaxation.

Although Tibet has been quiet in the past year, repression remains harsh for those who openly support the Dalai Lama or protest, peacefully or otherwise, on behalf of Tibetan independence. Because religion and politics cannot be separated in Tibet, this results in various levels of control on the practice of Tibetan religion. An undetermined number of monks and other Tibetans remain in jail for past peaceful demonstrations. A further complication has been the migration of Han and Hui (Muslim) Chinese seeking economic opportunities made possible by the easing of internal travel controls.

This influx of Chinese is not the result of a deliberate government policy, but it is threatening over the long run to damage Tibet's unique cultural identity. Recent visits by U.S. officials to Tibet and neighboring provinces have yielded no evidence of government plans to resettle large numbers of Chinese in areas where Tibetans live. The vast area of the Tibetan plateau, where Tibet's largest population centers are located, is a moon-like landscape with little arable land at an altitude of 12,000 feet or higher. Most Han immigration has taken place in the adjoining provinces around the periphery of the "Tibetan Autonomous Region." These provinces, traditionally part of "Greater Tibet," have had a large Han population for over a century. More recent arrivals, especially in the capital of Lhasa, are small traders and merchants, part of the huge "floating population" phenomena which has been made possible by economic reform and the easing of internal immigration controls throughout China.

It is unclear just how much Beijing will bend on human rights issues to keep its Olympic hopes alive or to obtain

unconditional MFN from the United States. Legislation which was vetoed by President Bush last year (but endorsed by candidate Clinton) covered nonproliferation, trade and human rights issues. On the latter, it required significant progress by the Chinese in preventing violations of internationally recognized human rights in China and Tibet including a full accounting of Tiananmen-era detainees, in preventing exports of products made by prisoners and labor camp detainees, in terminating religious persecution and releasing leaders and members of religious groups incarcerated as a result of the expression of their religious beliefs, in removing restrictions on freedom of the press and VOA broadcasts and in terminating intimidation and harassment of Chinese citizens in the U.S.

The U.S. government has publicly urged the Chinese to grant access to prisons to an international organization like the International Committee of the Red Cross, to restrain its security forces in dealing with peaceful demonstrations in Tibet and to establish a serious dialogue with the Dalai Lama. In diplomatic channels, we have urged the Chinese to account for and release all individuals detained during the Democracy Wall (1978-79) and Tiananmen (1989) demonstrations as well as the period afterwards and to release all imprisoned for their religious beliefs. We have also requested the Chinese to stop jamming VOA.

Human Rights

- TO REFLECT INTERNATIONAL NORMS, CHINA SHOULD:
- ACCOUNT FOR AND RELEASE ALL INDIVIDUALS IMPRISONED OR DETAINED FOR THE PEACEFUL EXPRESSION OF THEIR POLITICAL VIEWS, INCLUDING AMNESTY FOR THOSE INVOLVED IN THE DEMOCRACY WALL AND TIANAMEN PROTESTS, AND THOSE arrested since WHO WISH ONLY TO EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS AND ASSOCIATE FREELY.
- RELEASE ALL THOSE IMPRISONED FOR THEIR RELIGIOUS BELIEFS, INCLUDING CATHOLIC PRIESTS, PROTESTANT MINISTERS, TIBETAN MONKS, AND OTHER RELIGIOUS LEADERS. HARASSMENT OF RELIGIOUS BELIEVERS GENERATES SERIOUS DOUBTS ABOUT CHINA'S AVOWED COMMITMENT TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION.
- GRANT ACCESS TO A RESPECTED THIRD PARTY, SUCH AS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, TO ARRANGE IMPARTIAL VERIFICATION OF CONDITIONS IN CHINESE PRISONS. CHINA'S REFUSAL TO PERMIT INTERNATIONAL MONITORING OF PRISON CONDITIONS GENERATES DOUBTS REGARDING ASSURANCES THAT SUCH MONITORING IS UNNECESSARY.
- INVESTIGATE PROMPTLY REPORTS OF TORTURE AND ABUSE OF PRISONERS, AND MAKE PUBLIC THE RESULTS. CHINESE LAW ALREADY PROHIBITS TORTURE AND ABUSE OF PRISONERS, BUT A RANGE OF CREDIBLE SOURCES PROVIDE EVIDENCE THAT TORTURE AND ABUSE OF PRISONERS CONTINUE IN CHINESE PRISONS.
- TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS TO INSURE THAT THE SECURITY AUTHORITIES IN TIBET DO NOT RESORT TO VIOLENCE OR SUPPRESS PEACEFUL DISSENT WHEN MAINTAINING PUBLIC ORDER. THERE IS STRONG EVIDENCE THAT CHINESE AUTHORITIES IN TIBET CONTINUE TO USE EXCESSIVE FORCE IN RESPONDING TO PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATIONS.
- REINVIGORATE THE DIALOGUE WITH THE DALAI LAMA OR HIS REPRESENTATIVES, AS PEACE AND STABILITY IN TIBET DEPEND ON SUBSTANTIVE DIALOGUE BETWEEN BEIJING AND TIBETAN LEADERS.
- FULFILL COMMITMENTS TO FORMER SECRETARY BAKER TO ISSUE EXIT PERMITS TO CHINESE CITIZENS NOT FACING CRIMINAL CHARGES.
- CONTINUE GOVERNMENT-LEVEL DISCUSSIONS AND EXCHANGES OF INFORMATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES, INCLUDING MEETINGS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AT APPROPRIATE LEVELS.
- PERMIT IMMEDIATELY THE VOICE OF AMERICA TO BROADCAST WITHOUT INTERFERENCE, AS PROVIDED BY INTERNATIONAL LAW. THERE IS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR CHINA'S JAMMING OF VOA BROADCASTS, TO WHICH CHINESE CITIZENS HAD FREE ACCESS BEFORE TIANANMEN.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By YL NARA, Date 7/6/2014
2015-0721 -WA (1.14)

Nonproliferation

- REAFFIRM YOUR [FOREIGN MINISTER QIAN'S] UNDERTAKINGS TO FORMER SECRETARY BAKER ON MTCR, INCLUDING THE SPECIFIC COMMITMENT THAT CHINA WILL NOT TRANSFER M-9 AND M-11 MISSILES.
- RESPOND IMMEDIATELY TO THE U.S. REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE NOVEMBER 1992 TRANSFER OF MISSILE-RELATED EQUIPMENT TO PAKISTAN, IF IT HOPES TO AVERT A SERIOUS THREAT TO THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. THE U.S. MAY SOON HAVE TO DECIDE WHETHER THIS TRANSFER REQUIRES THE IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS, as well as AFFECTING OUR APPROACH TO MFN.
- UNDERSCORE THE PRC'S SUPPORT FOR RESPONSIBLE INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR BY PUBLICLY ANNOUNCING ITS COMMITMENT TO ABIDE BY THE REVISED MTCR GUIDELINES ANNOUNCED JANUARY 7, 1993 WHICH REFLECT U.S. EFFORTS TO EXCLUDE REQUIREMENTS THAT WOULD BE ONEROUS FOR CHINA AND THE OTHER STATES WHICH HAVE VOLUNTARILY AGREED TO ABIDE BY THE MTCR.
- ANNOUNCE ADOPTION OF THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP [NSG] GUIDELINES, WHICH NOW INCLUDE A FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS REQUIREMENT AS A CONDITION FOR SUPPLYING SIGNIFICANT nUCLEAR ITEMS. CHINA IS THE ONLY MAJOR SUPPLIER OF CIVILIAN NUCLEAr TECHNOLOGY WHICH HAS NOT ADOPTED THESE GUIDELINES.
- JOIN OTHER RESPONSIBLE SUPPLIERS OF SENSITIVE GOODS BY ADOPTING THE AUSTRALIA GROUP'S CONTROL LISTS FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRECURSORS AND DUAL-USE CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL EQUIPMENT. CHINA HAS COMMITTED ITSELF TO OPPOSE THE PROLIFERATION OF BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS AS A SIGNATORY TO THE BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTIONS.
- AVOID NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH IRRESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENTS SUCH AS IRAN AND PAKISTAN. MAJOR POWERS HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO TAKE THE LEAD IN PROMOTING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND STABILITY.

Trade

- IMPLEMENT PROMPTLY AND THOROUGHLY CHINA'S MEMORANDA OF UNDERSTANDING COVERING PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, MARKET ACCESS, AND PRISON LABOR. THE USG AND AMERICAN COMPANIES ARE CAREFULLY FOLLOWING CHINA'S COMPLIANCE IN THIS AREA.
- CONTINUE TO OPEN CHINA'S MARKET, AND TAKE POSITIVE MEASURES TO FACILITATE INCREASED IMPORTS FROM THE U.S., ITS LARGEST MARKET. CHINA CANNOT EXPECT TO RETAIN FULL ACCESS TO THE U.S. MARKET IF IT DOES NOT CONTINUE TO OPEN ITS MARKET. THE STEADILY GROWING TRADE DEFICIT SUFFERED BY THE U.S. SIDE CANNOT BE SUSTAINED. A FURTHER OPENING IN CHINA'S SERVICES MARKET, INCLUDING ACCESS FOR U.S. INSURANCE, TRAVEL, LEGAL AND BANKING SERVICE FIRMS, IN ADDITION TO COMMODITIES AND MANUFACTURED GOODS, IS CRITICAL.

o TAKE CONCRETE STEPS TO CONTROL TEXTILE FRAUD, INCLUDING THE PRACTICES OF FALSE LABELING, TRANSSHIPMENT, AND QUOTA EVASION. ILLEGAL TRADING ACTIVITIES BY PRC TEXTILE FIRMS UNDERCUT SUPPORT FOR THE RELATIONSHIP AND ENDANGER BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR MANAGING THIS IMPORTANT AREA OF TRADE.

CORE INITIATIVES (NONPAPER)

Human Rights:

- (1) provide a full accounting for and the early release of all those imprisoned or detained for the peaceful expression of their political views, including amnesty for those involved in the democracy wall and tiananmen protests.
- (2) release imprisoned religious figures, including catholic priests, protestant ministers, tibetan monks, and other religious leaders.
- (3) grant access to chinese prisoners by reputable third parties, such as the international committee of the red cross, promptly investigate reports of torture and abuse of prisoners and make public the results.
- (4) insure that security authorities avoid violence in dealing with peaceful demonstrations in tibet; reinvigorate the dialogue with the dalai lama or his representatives.
- (5) fulfill all the commitments made to former secretary baker to issue exit permits to chinese citizens not facing criminal charges and continue government-level discussions on human rights issues, including meetings between government officials at appropriate levels.
- (6) Permit the voice of america to broadcast without interference.

Nonproliferation:

- (1) reaffirm foreign minister qian's undertakings to former secretary baker on mtrc, including the specific commitment that china will not transfer m-11 and m-9 missiles. respond to the u.s. request for clarification of the november 1992 transfer of missile-related equipment to pakistan.
- (2) agree to abide by the revised mtrc guidelines announced january 7, 1993.
- (3) join with other states in adhering to the nuclear suppliers group guidelines, including full-scope safeguards, and the australia group's control lists for chemical weapons precursors and dual-use chemical and biological equipment.
- (4) avoid nuclear cooperation with irresponsible governments.

Trade:

(1) implement commitments made in bilateral agreements covering protection of intellectual property rights, market access and prison labor.

(2) take steps to control textile fraud, including the practices of false labeling, transshipment, and quota evasion.

(3) further open china's services market, including access for U.S. insurance, travel, legal and banking service firms.

(4) Take measures that seek to further increase access for U.S. exports to China.

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Folder Title:

DC0024 DC Meeting on China, April 27, 1993 [2]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. cable	re: US-China Core Issues Checklist: Current Status (12 pages)	04/15/1993	P1/b(1) <i>VDE 3/11/2020</i>
001b. draft	Proposed Agenda for Deputies Committee Meeting on China. (1 page)	04/00/1993	P1/b(1) <i>VDE 3/11/2020</i>
002a. list	re: Deputies Committee Meeting, Tuesday, April 27, 1993 [partial] (1 page)	04/27/1993	P3/b(3)
002b. agenda	Deputies Committee Meeting, April 27, 1993 [Record ID: 9320394] (1 page)	04/26/1993	P1/b(1) <i>VDE 3/11/2020</i>
002c. paper	re: Interagency Working Group for East Asia and the Pacific: Advancing PRC Responsiveness on US Core Concerns (7 pages)	04/20/1993	P1/b(1)

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FOLDER TITLE:

DC0024 DC Meeting on China, April 27, 1993 [2]

2015-0221-M

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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MESSAGE REF. NO.: BEIJING 12669 LOU
DATE: 4/15/93 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SUBJECT: US CHINA ISSUES CHECKLIST: ~~SECRET~~
CURRENT STATUS ~~TOP SECRET~~

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Department of State Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By WML/NARA, Date 1/29/15
2015-0221-M



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PAGE 01 BEIJIN 12669 01 OF 08 151145Z

@ACTION: EAP(01)

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, ETRD, PARM, CH
SUBJECT: US-CHINA CORE ISSUES CHECKLIST: CURRENT STATUS

REF: A) STATE 76951, B) BEIJING 9140
-- C) STATE 98363, D) BEIJING 10525

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY AND COMMENT

2. WITH ONLY A FEW WEEKS REMAINING UNTIL WE MUST MAKE FINAL DECISIONS ON HOW TO HANDLE CHINA'S MFN STATUS THIS YEAR, WE HAVE TAKEN A PRELIMINARY LOOK AT THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE CHINESE SIDE HAS TAKEN ACTIONS THAT ARE RELEVANT TO THE LIST OF CORE US CONCERNS PRESENTED TO THEM ON MARCH 16 (WITH TWO SUBSEQUENT ADDITIONS). WE ALSO CONSIDER WHERE WE ARE MOST LIKELY TO BE ABLE TO SECURE FURTHER CHINESE ACTIONS BY THE SECOND HALF OF MAY. FINALLY, WE CONSIDER THE LIST OF CHINESE AREAS OF CONCERN AND SUGGEST WAYS WE MIGHT RESPOND.

3. OVERALL, OUR REVIEW INDICATES THAT THE SITUATION IS VASTLY IMPROVED OVER THE STATE OF AFFAIRS TWO YEARS AGO, BUT WITH SIGNIFICANT GAPS IN IMPORTANT AREAS OF US CONCERN. AS IMMEDIATE TARGETS WE SHOULD PRESS TO SECURE A BREAKTHROUGH ON INTERNATIONAL ACCESS TO PRISONERS, CHINESE ADHERENCE TO THE REVISED MTCR GUIDELINES, AND IMPROVED CHINESE COMPLIANCE WITH THE MARKET ACCESS MOU. WHILE THE CHINESE WILL NOT HAVE SATISFIED ALL OF OUR CONCERNS, SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN THESE AREAS WOULD BE A MEANINGFUL ACCOMPLISHMENT. TO PUT IN PLACE ARRANGEMENTS FOR FURTHER DIALOGUE AND PROGRESS ON UNRESOLVED ISSUES, WE SHOULD ALSO SEEK CHINESE AGREEMENT TO RESUMPTION OF OUR HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE, OR AT LEAST TO A VISIT BY A SENIOR US OFFICIAL WITH RESPONSIBILITIES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES. SIMILARLY,

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By 12 NARA, Date 7/12/2015
2015-028-11 (1.15)



WE SHOULD SEEK AGREEMENT ON ANOTHER ROUND OF MTCR TALKS. (WE MAY BE BEDEVILED HERE BY CHINESE COUNTER PROPOSALS THAT WE AGREE TO A DIALOGUE ON THE AUGUST 17 COMMUNIQUE.) ASIDE FROM THESE PRIMARY GOALS, WE SHOULD CONTINUE SEEKING MOVEMENT IN OTHER AREAS ON AS BROAD A FRONT AS POSSIBLE. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

US LIST OF CORE CONCERNS (REF A)

HUMAN RIGHTS

4. SIX OF OUR CORE CONCERNS INVOLVE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES. HERE WE HAVE SEEN SUBSTANTIAL CHINESE ACTIONS, ALBEIT SHORT OF THE SWEEPING RESOLUTION OF TIANANMEN-RELATED CASES THAT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL FROM OUR STANDPOINT. THE ACCUMULATION OF SMALL STEPS, HOWEVER, ADDS UP TO A PICTURE THAT IS DRAMATICALLY IMPROVED OVER THE SITUATION TWO YEARS AGO, WHEN MANY OF THE TIANANMEN DETAINEES WERE STILL BEING HELD WITHOUT TRIAL. WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD PRESS HARD FOR A BREAKTHROUGH ON THE ISSUE OF INTERNATIONAL ACCESS TO CHINESE PRISONERS, WHERE THE CHINESE FOR THE FIRST TIME HAVE SHOWN A HINT OF FLEXIBILITY. ALTHOUGH NOT ON OUR LIST OF CORE CONCERNS, WE SHOULD ALSO MENTION HERE CHINA'S GROWING RESPONSIVENESS TO US ON POW/MIA MATTERS, AS REFLECTED IN THE CONCRETE DATA MADE AVAILABLE DURING THE VISIT OF THE CHINESE TEAM TO HAWAII A FEW WEEKS AGO. WE TAKE A MORE DETAILED LOOK AT EACH OF OUR SPECIFIC AREAS OF HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERN BELOW.

(1) PROVIDE A FULL ACCOUNTING FOR AND THE EARLY RELEASE OF ALL THOSE IMPRISONED OR DETAINED FOR THE PEACEFUL EXPRESSION OF THEIR POLITICAL VIEWS, INCLUDING AMNESTY FOR THOSE INVOLVED IN THE DEMOCRACY WALL AND TIANANMEN PROTESTS.

-- RECENT EVIDENCE INDICATES THAT THE VAST MAJORITY OF THOSE DETAINED/ARRESTED/TRIED FOR NON-VIOLENT CRIMES ASSOCIATED WITH THE DEMOCRACY WALL AND 1989 DEMOCRACY MOVEMENTS HAVE BEEN FREED. ACCORDING TO DISSIDENT SOURCES, ONLY A COUPLE OF DEMOCRACY WALL ACTIVISTS AND A SMALL NUMBER (A DOZEN OR MORE IN BEIJING, EVEN FEWER IN OTHER CITIES WHERE WE HAVE AVAILABLE ESTIMATES) OF 1989 DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT ACTIVISTS STILL REMAIN IN CUSTODY. NEVERTHELESS, A NUMBER OF WELL-KNOWN DEMOCRACY WALL AND TIANANMEN PRISONERS REMAIN IN CUSTODY SERVING LONG SENTENCES, AND THE CHINESE HAVE NOT RESPONDED TO OUR DESIRE FOR A FULL ACCOUNTING FOR THESE CASES. OUR BEST EFFORTS TO OBTAIN DETAILED ACCOUNTING HAVE YIELDED ONLY GENERAL RESPONSES. IN THE ABSENCE OF DETAILED INFORMATION CONCERNING THE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE DETAINED AND SENTENCED, WE CAN ONLY MAKE ROUGH ESTIMATES OF THE SITUATION. IN ADDITION, A LARGER, BUT INDETERMINATE, NUMBER OF PERSONS CONVICTED OF VIOLENT CRIMES IN THE 1989 MOVEMENT ARE STILL IN CUSTODY.

-- ADDITIONAL PRISONERS MAY BE RELEASED OVER THE NEXT SIX WEEKS, WHETHER ON PAROLE, EARLY COMMUTATION OF THEIR SENTENCES, OR FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT. WE SHOULD CONTINUE PRESSING FOR THE MAXIMUM NUMBER. STILL OTHERS WILL SOON COMPLETE THEIR FOUR YEAR SENTENCES, RESULTING BY THE END



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OF THE SUMMER IN THE RESOLUTION OF ALL BUT THE HANDFUL OF REMAINING HARD CORE CASES SENTENCED TO LENGTHY PRISON TERMS, SUCH AS 1989 ACTIVISTS CHEN ZIMING AND WANG JUNTAO. SUCH A "DE FACTO" AMNESTY IS MORE LIKELY THAN A GENERAL AMNESTY, GIVEN THE CONTINUING RESISTANCE WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT TO A STEP THAT WOULD BE SEEN AS REVERSING THE VERDICT ON THE TIANANMEN INCIDENT. REVERSAL OF THAT VERDICT IS POSSIBLE, EVEN PROBABLE, WITH THE PASSAGE OF TIME, BUT IT IS UNLIKELY IN THE SHORT TERM UNLESS DENG HIMSELF WERE TO GIVE THE ORDER, WHICH WE CONSIDER UNLIKELY.

(2) RELEASE IMPRISONED RELIGIOUS FIGURES, INCLUDING CATHOLIC PRIESTS, PROTESTANT MINISTERS, TIBETAN MONKS AND OTHER RELIGIOUS LEADERS.

-- THE CHINESE HAVE MADE A SYSTEMATIC EFFORT TO CLEAR UP MAJOR CATHOLIC CASES IN RECENT MONTHS, MOTIVATED IN PART BY A DESIRE TO REMOVE AN OBSTACLE TO CLOSER TIES (AND POSSIBLE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS) WITH THE VATICAN. ACCORDING TO CREDIBLE OUTSIDE REPORTS, AT PRESENT ONLY TWO CATHOLIC CLERGY REMAIN IN DETENTION, THOUGH A NUMBER OF OTHER CATHOLIC PRIESTS AND BISHOPS ARE RESTRICTED IN THEIR MOVEMENTS (HOUSE ARREST, INABILITY TO LEAVE THEIR PLACE OF RESIDENCE, ETC).

-- WE HAVE SEEN NO OBSERVABLE PROGRESS ON THE RELEASE OF PROTESTANTS, BUT THE VAST MAJORITY OF THESE CASES DO NOT COME TO OUR ATTENTION. WE WERE ONLY AWARE OF 17 NAMED CASES OF PROTESTANTS UNDER DETENTION IN 1991, AND THE DOMESTIC CLIMATE HAS BECOME RELATIVELY MORE PERMISSIVE SINCE THEN. THE RAPID GROWTH OF THE PROTESTANT CHURCH IN AREAS SUCH AS HENAN, ESPECIALLY THE EVANGELICAL HOUSE CHURCHES, HAS LED TO SOME ARRESTS AND DETENTIONS BUT MOSTLY OF SHORT DURATION. SIGNIFICANTLY, FOR THE MOMENT, THE RAPID GROWTH OF EVANGELICAL PROTESTANTISM HAS NOT LED TO A COMPARABLE GROWTH IN REPRESSIVE MEASURES BY THE AUTHORITIES. AS A RESULT, CHURCH MEMBERSHIP IS RISING RAPIDLY.

-- WE ALSO CANNOT POINT TO ANY PATTERN OF RELEASE OF TIBETAN MONKS OR OTHER RELIGIOUS LEADERS. POLITICAL ACTIVISM IS STILL HIGH AMONG TIBETAN MONKS, AND WE STILL HEAR REPORTS OF ARRESTS AND DETENTIONS. NEVERTHELESS, RECENT VISITORS TO TIBET HAVE OBSERVED THAT TEMPLES AND MONASTERIES ARE FLOURISHING.

(3) GRANT ACCESS TO CHINESE PRISONERS BY REPUTABLE THIRD PARTIES, SUCH AS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS. PROMPTLY INVESTIGATE REPORTS OF TORTURE AND ABUSE OF PRISONERS AND MAKE PUBLIC THE RESULTS.

-- WE HAVE NOW SEEN THE FIRST SIGN OF CHINESE FLEXIBILITY ON THIS ISSUE IN MINISTER OF PUBLIC SECURITY TAO SIJU'S APRIL 8 STATEMENT TO SENATOR ROBB THAT THE QUESTION OF FOREIGN ACCESS TO PRISONERS IS UNDER CONSIDERATION. WE SHOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO TRANSLATE HIS ENCOURAGING SIGNAL INTO PRACTICAL PROVISIONS FOR OUTSIDE VISITS, WHETHER BY THE ICRC OR OTHER REPUTABLE ORGANIZATIONS. A BREAKTHROUGH IN THIS HIGH PRIORITY AREA WOULD REPRESENT



SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN IMPROVING THE STATUS OF PRISONERS.

-- THE CHINESE HAVE LONG INSISTED THAT TORTURE AND ABUSE OF PRISONERS IS IMPERMISSIBLE AND THAT VIOLATORS WILL BE INVESTIGATED AND PUNISHED. IN REALITY, THEY HAVE RESORTED TO DENIALS AND SELECTIVE RELEASES OF INFORMATION ON THE NUMBERS OF TORTURE CASES PROSECUTED INSTEAD OF TAKING CREDIBLE MEASURES TO CURB SUCH PRACTICES. PROVISIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL ACCESS TO PRISONERS WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVE OUR ABILITY TO VERIFY REPORTS OF TORTURE AND ABUSE. WHENEVER CREDIBLE REPORTS OF TORTURE AND ABUSE COME TO OUR ATTENTION, WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT THE CHINESE TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO ADDRESS INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS.

(4) INSURE THAT SECURITY AUTHORITIES AVOID VIOLENCE IN DEALING WITH PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATIONS IN TIBET; REINVIGORATE THE DIALOGUE WITH THE DALAI LAMA OR HIS REPRESENTATIVES.

-- TIBET HAS BEEN QUIET FOR MOST OF THE PAST YEAR, IN CONTRAST WITH THE PERIOD FROM 1987-91. AS PART OF THEIR DECLARED POLICY OF EXTENDING ECONOMIC REFORM AND OPENNESS TO TIBET, ANNOUNCED IN MID-1992, THE CHINESE HAVE TAKEN STEPS TO EXPAND TOURISM, PERMITTED A VISIT BY A CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION, AND ADOPTED A MORE NUANCED APPROACH TO "KEEPING THE LID ON" IN LHASA. UNIFORMED OR VISIBLY ARMED POLICE IN THE BARKHOR AREA AROUND THE JOKHANG TEMPLE HAVE BEEN REPLACED BY PLAINCLOTHES SECURITY PERSONNEL. THE TEST OF BEIJING'S WILLINGNESS TO AVOID VIOLENCE IN DEALING WITH PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATIONS IN TIBET WILL ONLY COME IF THEY FACE NEW MANIFESTATIONS OF UNREST. FOR THE MOMENT, THE SITUATION THERE IS AT LEAST

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SUPERFICIALLY IMPROVED.

-- QUIET CONTACTS BETWEEN BEIJING AND THE DALAI LAMA'S CAMP HAVE CONTINUED IN RECENT YEARS. HOWEVER, RESUMPTION OF AN ACTIVE DIALOGUE HAS FOUNDERED OVER DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES OVER WHETHER DISCUSSION OF INDEPENDENCE FOR TIBET MUST BE SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDED FROM THE AGENDA. SINCE OUR POSITION ON THE STATUS OF TIBET IS CLEAR, WE ARE WELL POSITIONED TO CONTINUE PRESSING BOTH SIDES TO ADDRESS THEIR DIFFERENCES THROUGH DIALOGUE RATHER THAN CONFRONTATIONAL TACTICS.

(5) FULFILL ALL THE COMMITMENTS MADE TO FORMER SECRETARY BAKER TO ISSUE EXIT PERMITS TO CHINESE CITIZENS NOT FACING CRIMINAL CHARGES AND CONTINUE GOVERNMENT-LEVEL DISCUSSIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES, INCLUDING MEETINGS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AT APPROPRIATE LEVELS.

-- THE CHINESE HAVE REAFFIRMED THE VALIDITY OF THIS COMMITMENT, BUT IMPLEMENTATION HAS BEEN SPOTTY. THEY HAVE ISSUED PASSPORTS TO SEVERAL DIFFICULT CASES, BUT OFTEN THE PACE HAS BEEN GLACIAL. THERE ARE ONLY A SMALL NUMBER OF OUTSTANDING BLOCKED PASSPORT CASES, THOUGH NEW ONES KEEP ARISING. WE HAVE NOT YET ENCOUNTERED AN INSTANCE OF OUTRIGHT CHINESE REFUSAL TO ISSUE A PASSPORT, BUT CASES



SUCH AS THAT OF HOU XIAOTIAN HAVE DRAGGED ON TOO LONG. WE SHOULD KEEP UP PRESSURE IN THIS AREA. JUDGING FROM THE CHINESE RESPONSE TO LISTS PASSED BY RECENT CODELS, WE MAY BE ABLE TO ACHIEVE FURTHER PROGRESS ON INDIVIDUAL CASES OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS.

-- IN SEVERAL RECENT MEETINGS WITH US VISITORS, PREMIER LI PENG HAS REAFFIRMED CHINESE WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE IN A DIALOGUE WITH THE UNITED STATES ON HUMAN RIGHTS. WE HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO GET CONFIRMATION FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTRY THAT THIS MEANS THE CHINESE DECISION LAST FALL, IN RESPONSE TO OUR SALE OF F-16S TO TAIWAN, TO SUSPEND THE HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE WITH US HAS BEEN RESCINDED. IN OUR VIEW, WE SHOULD SEEK TO GET CHINESE AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE OVER THE NEXT FEW WEEKS TO A VISIT EITHER BY UNDER SECRETARY WIRTH OR BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY-DESIGNATE SHATTUCK, ONCE CONFIRMED. WE ARE NOT SATISFIED WITH THE QUALITY OF OUR PREVIOUS DIALOGUE IN THIS CHANNEL AND SEE MERIT IN SEEKING TO RAISE THE LEVEL OF THIS DIALOGUE TO THE UNDER SECRETARY FOR GLOBAL AFFAIRS, PERHAPS AS PART OF AN AGENDA OF BROADER ISSUES, INCLUDING THE ENVIRONMENT, TERRORISM, AND ANTI-NARCOTICS. THIS WOULD MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE CHINESE TO STALL OUR EFFORTS TO SCHEDULE MEETINGS ON HUMAN RIGHTS. WE SHOULD AIM TO ENGAGE THE CHINESE AT THE LEVEL OF VICE FOREIGN MINISTER LIU HUAQIU. AT THE SAME TIME, WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE REGULAR VISITS HERE BY A/S SHATTUCK, WHETHER OR NOT AS PART OF AN IDENTIFIED DIALOGUE CHANNEL.

(6) PERMIT THE VOICE OF AMERICA TO BROADCAST WITHOUT INTERFERENCE.

-- SPORADIC AND OFTEN INEFFECTIVE JAMMING OF CHINESE AND TIBETAN LANGUAGE (BUT NOT ENGLISH OR CANTONESE) VOA BROADCASTS HAS CONTINUED SINCE 1989. IN MOST MAJOR URBAN AREAS, PERSISTENT CHINESE LISTENERS CAN FIND A VOA CHINESE LANGUAGE FREQUENCY WHICH IS INTELLIGIBLE, AND WE HAVE EVIDENCE OF LISTENERS IN TIBET. WE CONTINUE TO RAISE THIS ISSUE WITH THE CHINESE AT EVERY OPPORTUNITY BUT HAVE NEVER RECEIVED A SATISFACTORY EXPLANATION OF THE CHINESE RATIONALE FOR CONTINUING AN INEFFECTIVE PRACTICE THAT BURDENS THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. WE THINK THIS ISSUE SHOULD REMAIN ON OUR AGENDA AS LONG AS THE JAMMING CONTINUES. HOWEVER, GIVING THE ISSUE TOO HIGH PRIORITY COULD RESULT IN EXPLICIT CHINESE LINKAGE TO THE ISSUE OF RADIO FREE ASIA.

NONPROLIFERATION

5. THE RECORD HERE IS MIXED. THE CHINESE HAVE REAFFIRMED THEIR MTCR UNDERTAKINGS, BUT HAVE NOT PROVIDED THE REQUESTED INFORMATION ON THE PAKISTAN SHIPMENT OR ACCEPTED THE REVISED MTCR GUIDELINES. WE SEE POSSIBILITIES FOR EVENTUAL PROGRESS ON SOME OF THE NONPROLIFERATION ISSUES, BUT SUBSTANTIAL TIME MAY BE REQUIRED TO OVERCOME CHINESE RESISTANCE TO ACCEPTING GUIDELINES SET BY GROUPS OF WHICH CHINA IS NOT A MEMBER. WE SEE MERIT IN A TWO-PRONGED STRATEGY: A) SEEK NEAR-TERM CHINESE AGREEMENT TO ANOTHER ROUND OF CONSULTATIONS ON MTCR (MODELED ON THE VISIT A YEAR AGO BY THEN PM A/S CLARKE); AND B) CONTINUE BEST EFFORTS TO SECURE CHINESE ACTION ON OUR OTHER PROLIFERATION CONCERNS. SPECIFICS FOLLOW.



(1) REAFFIRM FOREIGN MINISTER QIAN'S UNDERTAKINGS TO FORMER SECRETARY BAKER ON MTCR, INCLUDING THE SPECIFIC COMMITMENT THAT CHINA WILL NOT TRANSFER M-11 AND M-9 MISSILES. RESPOND TO THE US REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE NOVEMBER 1992 TRANSFER OF MISSILE-RELATED EQUIPMENT TO

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PAKISTAN.

-- IN HIS MEETING WITH SENATOR ROBB ON APRIL 7, VFM LIU HUAQIU SPECIFICALLY REAFFIRMED FOREIGN MINISTER QIAN'S COMMITMENT TO SECRETARY BAKER, INCLUDING SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE M-11 AND M-9 MISSILES. ON SEVERAL RECENT OCCASIONS, PREMIER LI PENG HAS ALSO REITERATED THE ASSURANCE THAT CHINA IS ABIDING BY ITS MTCR COMMITMENTS. THE CHINESE HAVE NOT, HOWEVER, GIVEN ANY INDICATION THAT THEY WILL BE RESPONSIVE TO OUR REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON THE NOVEMBER 1992 SHIPMENT TO PAKISTAN. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS THEM FOR THIS INFORMATION BUT SHOULD HAVE NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE PROSPECTS. CHINESE PROVISION OF THIS INFORMATION WOULD BREAK A LONG-STANDING CHINESE PRACTICE OF RETICENCE ON MATTERS INVOLVING PAKISTAN.

(2) AGREE TO ABIDE BY THE REVISED MTCR GUIDELINES ANNOUNCED JANUARY 7, 1993.

-- WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR CHINESE ADHERENCE TO THESE GUIDELINES, BUT TO BRING THEM ON BOARD MAY REQUIRE A MORE FREQUENT PATTERN OF CONSULTATIONS WITH THEM ON MTCR MATTERS THAN OCCURRED UNDER THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION. WE ALSO NEED GREATER CLARITY IN OUR POSITION ON PRC MEMBERSHIP IN THE MTCR. NEVERTHELESS, WE THINK WE HAVE AN OUTSIDE CHANCE TO GET NEAR TERM CHINESE MOVEMENT ON THIS ISSUE AND SHOULD MAKE THE EFFORT.

(3) JOIN WITH OTHER STATES IN ADHERING TO THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP GUIDELINES, INCLUDING FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS, AND THE AUSTRALIA GROUP'S CONTROL LISTS FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRECURSORS AND DUAL-USE CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL EQUIPMENT.

-- CHINA IS NOT LIKELY IN THE NEAR TERM TO ADOPT THE NSG GUIDELINES, AND SPECIFICALLY THE FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS REQUIREMENT, IF ONLY BECAUSE OF ITS PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH PAKISTAN, WHICH WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE UNDER FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS. NEVERTHELESS, LAST FALL, VFM LIU INDICATED CHINA HAS STUDYING THIS QUESTION, AND WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS HARD. EVEN CHINESE AGREEMENT TO ABIDE BY PART OF THE NSG GUIDELINES WOULD BE A SIGNIFICANT STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. HOWEVER, CHINESE OPPOSITION TO REGIMES IT IS NOT PART OF WILL CONTINUE. MOVEMENT BY THE NSG TO GIVE CHINA A VOICE WOULD HELP THE PROCESS.

-- AS A SIGNATORY OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION, CHINA COULD AGREE TO THE AUSTRALIA GROUP'S CONTROL LISTS AT MINIMAL COST. HERE AGAIN, WITHOUT SOME MOVE TO OPEN UP THE REGIME TO THE PRC, THEY WILL BE RESISTANT TO AGREEING TO ITS GUIDELINES. NEVERTHELESS, WE SHOULD PRESS HARD IN THIS AREA.



(4) AVOID NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH IRRESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENTS.

-- THIS HAS PHRASED PRIMARILY WITH IRAN IN MIND SINCE CHINA HAS NO NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH NORTH KOREA. CHINA IS IN COMPETITION WITH RUSSIA FOR THE SUPPLY OF NUCLEAR REACTORS TO IRAN, WHICH COMPLICATES THE PICTURE. UNLESS THE CHINESE WERE TO LOSE OUT IN THIS COMPETITION, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO PERSUADE CHINA TO ABANDON ITS CURRENT PEACEFUL NUCLEAR PROGRAMS WITH IRAN. NEVERTHELESS, AT LEAST SOME IN CHINA ARE AWARE OF THE RISKS OF NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH GOVERNMENTS LIKE IRAN, AND WE WERE MAKING PROGRESS IN RESTRAINING SUCH COOPERATION UNTIL OUR F-16 SALE TO TAIWAN. THE ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF OUR POSITION REMAIN AS STRONG AS EVER. INDEED, THEY WERE UNWITTINGLY MADE BY PREMIER LI PENG IN HIS MEETING WITH SENATOR ROBB WHEN HE CONTENTED (WITH REFERENCE TO THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR PROBLEM) THAT THE SUPPLIER OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY SHOULD BEAR EQUAL RESPONSIBILITY WITH THE RECIPIENT FOR THE SUPPLY OF EQUIPMENT THAT IS USED IN A NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM. AS A RESULT, WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS HARD TO LIMIT CHINESE NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH IRAN.

(5) CHINA SHOULD ANNOUNCE ITS WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PERM FIVE MIDDLE EAST ARMS CONTROL (ACME) PROCESS.

-- THE CHINESE LINKED THEIR WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ACME TALKS TO OUR SALE OF F-16S TO TAIWAN AND WILL RESPOND TO PRESSURE ON THIS ISSUE BY REITERATING THEIR REQUEST FOR CONSULTATIONS ON OUR ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN. IF WE CAN FIND A WAY OF ADDRESSING THIS CHINESE REQUEST THAT STOPS SHORT OF AGREEING TO ADVANCE CONSULTATIONS, WE WILL BE IN A STRONGER POSITION TO PRESS THE CHINESE TO RESUME PARTICIPATION IN ACME.

(6) THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION FORBIDS THE DEVELOPMENT OR POSSESSION OF OFFENSIVE BW CAPABILITIES; THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT SHOULD TAKE CONCRETE STEPS TO INSURE ITS ACTIONS ARE FULLY CONSISTENT WITH ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CONVENTION.

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 05 OF 08 BEIJING 012669

CHINA HAS ALREADY ANNOUNCED IT IS DOING THIS AND WILL BE WILLING TO REPEAT THAT IT IS IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE BW CONVENTION. IN THE SHORT RUN, WE BELIEVE CHINA WILL GO NO FURTHER THAN REPEATING ITS EARLIER LANGUAGE.

TRADE

6. WE ARE GENERALLY SATISFIED WITH CHINESE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION MOU, AND THEY HAVE RECENTLY MOVED TOWARD MORE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRISON LABOR MOU. WE CAN ALSO POINT TO POSITIVE STEPS ON MOST OF THE OTHER ISSUES, EVEN THOUGH PROBLEMS REMAIN. OUR LARGEST STUMBLING BLOCK AT THE MOMENT IS CHINA'S INADEQUATE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MARKET ACCESS MOU. WE HAVE A FULL COURT PRESS ON THE CHINESE NOW TO ADDRESS OUR MARKET ACCESS CONCERNS AND THINK THIS SHOULD REMAIN THE FOCUS OF OUR EFFORTS. SPECIFICS FOLLOW.



(1) IMPLEMENT COMMITMENTS MADE IN BILATERAL AGREEMENTS COVERING PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, MARKET ACCESS AND PRISON LABOR.

-- INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: CHINA HAS COMPLIED WITH THE LETTER OF THE US-CHINA MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY. WITH EACH CHRONOLOGICAL MARKER, CHINA HAS PASSED LEGISLATION/REGULATIONS OR JOINED IPR CONVENTIONS, AS REQUIRED IN THE MOU. THE USG'S PRIMARY CONCERN SHOULD BE TO CONTINUE MONITORING CHINESE COMPLIANCE AND TO ASSESS ANY PROBLEMS OF IMPLEMENTATION OR ENFORCEMENT AFFECTING US RIGHTS HOLDERS.

-- THERE ARE A FEW AREAS WHERE COMMITMENTS MADE UNDER THE MOU HAVE NOT YET BEEN COMPLETELY IMPLEMENTED. ONE LAPSE IS THE NATIONAL COPYRIGHT ADMINISTRATION'S ACQUIESCENCE IN THE SALE OF UNAUTHORIZED COPIES OF FOREIGN WORKS PRODUCED BEFORE THE DATE CHINA ENTERED INTO INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AGREEMENTS (MARCH 17, 1992 FOR US-CHINA BILATERAL COPYRIGHT RELATIONS). A DEADLINE FOR ENDING THIS ACTIVITY HAS BEEN PROPOSED FOR SOMETIME THIS YEAR, BUT THE EXACT DATE IS STILL UNFIXED. WE SHOULD PRESS TO HAVE THE COPYRIGHT AUTHORITIES SET THIS DEADLINE SOON.

-- IN THE AREA OF PATENTS, THE PRC PATENT OFFICE PROMISED IN A DECEMBER ROUND OF CONSULTATIONS WITH USTR THAT IT WOULD ISSUE A PATENT OFFICE ORDER TO MAKE CHINA'S REGIME ON COMPULSORY LICENSING COMPLETELY CONSISTENT WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE IPR MOU. TO DATE, HOWEVER, THIS ORDER HAS NOT APPEARED. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS TO HAVE THIS DONE SOON.

-- MARKET ACCESS: THE CHINESE HAVE ADHERED TO MANY PARTS OF THE MOU WITH RESPECT TO: INCREASING TRANSPARENCY, OPENING UP THEIR TELECOMMUNICATIONS SWITCHING MARKET, AND REDUCING TARIFFS ON ITEMS OF INTEREST TO US EXPORTERS. THEY ARE STILL DEFICIENT IN SUPPLYING INFORMATION TO US ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE APPROVAL SYSTEM FOR IMPORT QUOTAS AND IMPORT CONTROLS. THE CHINESE HAVE NOT GIVEN US A NEW OFFER ON QUOTAS AFTER WE REJECTED THEIR 10-20 PERCENT INCREASE OFFER. THEY HAVE ALSO NOT GIVEN US ANY OFFER ON ITEMS COVERED BY "CONTROLS." THE VISIT BY USTR REPRESENTATIVES FOR TALKS ON THESE ISSUES APRIL 21-23 WILL BE A TEST OF CHINESE WILLINGNESS TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING. HOWEVER, EARLY SIGNS ARE THAT THEY DO NOT ACCEPT THE USG'S POSITION THAT MORE IS REQUIRED OF THEM UNDER THE MOU. WE ARE UNDERTAKING A SERIES OF MEETINGS WITH CONCERNED MINISTRIES IN ADVANCE OF THE USTR VISIT TO CONVINCE THE CHINESE THAT THEY ARE IN FACT OBLIGATED TO ADDRESS OUR CONCERNS. WE EXPECT USTR WILL FOLLOW UP ON THE APRIL 21-23 TALKS WITH A ROUND OF SENIOR LEVEL NEGOTIATIONS IN MAY, WHICH WOULD HOPEFULLY LEAD TO A CONSENSUS ON MOU IMPLEMENTATION.

-- PRISON LABOR: UNTIL RECENTLY, THE CHINESE WERE DRAGGING THEIR FEET ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MOU. IN RECENT MONTHS, HOWEVER, CHINESE PERFORMANCE HAS IMPROVED. THEY PROVIDED HELPFUL INFORMATION CONCERNING A NUMBER OF CASES OF US CONCERN, AND AGREED TO ADDITIONAL PRISON VISITS. THE VISIT OF A CHINESE PRISON LABOR DELEGATION TO THE UNITED STATES IN FEBRUARY ALSO CONTRIBUTED TO A MORE COOPERATIVE ATTITUDE ON THE CHINESE SIDE. MOJ, MOFTEC AND



MFA OFFICIALS ALL ACCOMPANIED US DURING OUR TWO MOST RECENT PRISON VISITS, PRISON OFFICIALS FREELY ANSWERED OUR QUESTIONS, AND WE WERE ALLOWED ACCESS TO SALES RECORDS FROM PRIOR YEARS. ADDITIONAL RECORDS WE SOUGHT TO REVIEW ARE BEING PROVIDED NEXT WEEK.

-- WE CURRENTLY HAVE PENDING WITH MOJ A REQUEST TO REVISIT THE JINMA DIESEL ENGINE FACILITY AND REQUESTS TO VISIT THE OTHER FOUR FACILITIES TO WHICH WE WERE DENIED ACCESS IN OUR FIRST FIVE REQUESTS FOR VISITS. WE BELIEVE THAT THE CHINESE SIDE SHOULD BE ABLE TO MEET THESE

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 06 OF 08 BEIJING 012669

REQUESTS WITHIN THE NEXT SIX WEEKS. OUR PERCEPTION OF CONTINUED IMPROVEMENT IN THE LEVEL OF THEIR COOPERATION WILL DEPEND ON HOW THESE REQUESTS ARE HANDLED.

(2) TAKE STEPS TO CONTROL TEXTILE FRAUD, INCLUDING THE PRACTICES OF FALSE LABELING, TRANSSHIPMENT AND QUOTA EVASION.

-- OVER THE PAST YEAR, THE PRC HAS BEEN INCREASINGLY RESPONSIVE TO THE MAJOR US TEXTILE CONCERN: TEXTILE FRAUD. THEY HAVE TAKEN ACTION ON US-PROVIDED LEADS, CLOSING DOWN A FEW CHINESE TEXTILE PRODUCERS, AND FOR THE FIRST TIME EVER, THEY HAVE PROVIDED LEADS. THE PRC ESTABLISHED A TEXTILES INVESTIGATION GROUP LAST FALL AND HAS CONDUCTED A NUMBER OF INVESTIGATIONS. THEY HAVE PUBLISHED SEVERAL REGULATIONS REGARDING TEXTILE TRANSSHIPMENTS, INCLUDING A COMMODITY INSPECTION REGULATION.

-- THE CHINESE COULD ESTABLISH A LAW WITH CRIMINAL PENALTIES FOR TRANSSHIPMENTS BEYOND THE MINIMAL CIVIL FINES CURRENTLY AVAILABLE, AND THEY COULD INCREASE THE NUMBER OF INVESTIGATIONS AND EXPAND ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES. THESE ACTIONS ARE NOT LIKELY TO OCCUR WITHIN THE NEXT SIX MONTHS BUT HAVE ALWAYS BEEN MENTIONED IN ANY DISCUSSION OF TRANSSHIPMENTS WITH THE CHINESE. AS AN IMMEDIATE TARGET, OUR BEST BET WOULD BE TO SEEK THEIR AGREEMENT TO SET UP A TEXTILE TRANSSHIPMENT TASK FORCE WHICH COULD IMPROVE THEIR ENFORCEMENT RECORD OVER THE NEAR TO MEDIUM TERM. ALL OF THIS POSITIVE ACTIVITY, WE SHOULD NOTE, MAY NOT SPARE CHINA FROM MASSIVE QUOTA CHARGES LEVIED BY THE USG TO COMPENSATE FOR PROVEN ILLEGAL TRANSSHIPMENTS.

(3) FURTHER OPEN CHINA'S SERVICES MARKET, INCLUDING ACCESS FOR US INSURANCE, TRAVEL, LEGAL AND BANKING SERVICE FIRMS.

-- INSURANCE GIANT AIG WAS RECENTLY ALLOWED TO OPEN A BRANCH IN SHANGHAI, THOUGH IT IS RESTRICTED IN THE TYPES OF PRODUCTS IT CAN OFFER HERE. BANK OF AMERICA HAS OPENED A BRANCH IN GUANGZHOU AND OTHER BANKS HAVE OPENED BRANCHES IN SHANGHAI. HOWEVER, ALL FOREIGN BANKS ARE HAMPERED BY THEIR LACK OF ACCESS TO RENMINBI DEPOSITS. THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT IS WORKING ON A LAW TO LIBERALIZE THE MARKET FOR LEGAL SERVICES IN CHINA, REPORTEDLY BASED ON THE JAPANESE LAW. IN THE MEANTIME, AFTER MANY YEARS OF CONDUCTING LEGAL BUSINESS IN CHINA ON AN INFORMAL BASIS,



COUDERT BROTHERS LAST YEAR BECAME THE FIRST LEGAL FIRM TO GAIN PERMISSION FOR A REGISTERED OFFICE IN BEIJING.

-- WE HAVE NO DIRECT BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS ON SERVICES UNDERWAY WITH THE CHINESE AT THIS TIME, ALTHOUGH IN 1992 UNDER THE TERMS OF OUR BILATERAL MARITIME AGREEMENT, WE SUCCESSFULLY SECURED FOR US OCEAN SHIPPERS THE RIGHT TO SET UP FILL-SERVICE BRANCH OFFICES IN CHINA. THE FOCUS OF THE USTR-LED MARKET OPENING TALKS THUS FAR HAS BEEN ON THE GOODS SECTOR.

(4) TAKE MEASURES THAT SEEK TO FURTHER INCREASE ACCESS FOR US EXPORTS TO CHINA.

-- IN A MOVE CLEARLY INTENDED TO ADDRESS US CONCERNS ABOUT THE TRADE IMBALANCE AND TO IMPROVE ACCESS FOR US EXPORTS TO THE CHINA MARKET, THE PRC HAS SENT OR HAS IN TRAIN EIGHT BUYING MISSIONS TO THE UNITED STATES SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR TO PURCHASE CARS, AIRPLANES, SATELLITES, PETROLEUM EXPLORATION EQUIPMENT AND GRAIN. IN TOTO THESE MISSIONS ARE IN THE PROCESS OF PURCHASING GOODS AND/OR SERVICES VALUED IN THE BILLIONS OF DOLLARS. FORD HAS BEEN QUOTED AS SAYING IT HAS SOLD MORE CARS IN CHINA IN THE PAST TWO YEARS THAN IN JAPAN, WHERE THEY HAVE BEEN TRYING TO BREAK INTO THE MARKET FOR OVER TEN YEARS. CHINESE BUSINESS VISITORS TO THE UNITED STATES HAVE ALMOST DOUBLED SINCE DENG XIAOPING MADE HIS TRIP TO SOUTHERN CHINA IN JANUARY 1992.

CONCERNS OF THE CHINESE SIDE

7. WHEN VFM LIU HUAQIU RESPONDED ON MARCH 31 TO OUR EARLIER PRESENTATION OF CORE CONCERNS, HE SOUGHT TO INTRODUCE AN ELEMENT OF RECIPROCITY BY COUNTERING WITH A LIST OF SEVEN CHINESE CONCERNS (REF D). AS IN THE CASE OF THE CORE US CONCERNS, THE CHINESE LIST CONSISTED OF WELL KNOWN CHINESE POSITIONS. WE HAVE TAKEN A LOOK AT THIS LIST AND OFFER BELOW SOME THOUGHTS ON HOW WE MIGHT RESPOND.

(1) THE US SIDE SHOULD IN HANDLING ITS RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN, STRICTLY COMPLY WITH THE PRINCIPLES ENSHRINED IN THE THREE SINO-US JOINT COMMUNIQUEES AND REFRAIN FROM CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES OF AN OFFICIAL NATURE WITH THE TAIWAN AUTHORITIES; GIVE AN EARLY AND POSITIVE RESPONSE TO

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 07 OF 08 BEIJING 012669

CHINA'S PROPOSAL FOR CONSULTATION ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMUNIQUE OF 17 AUGUST 1982 AND RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF THE US SALE OF F-16S TO TAIWAN IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF THAT COMMUNIQUE.

-- US RESPONSE: THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION HAS, OF COURSE, ALREADY CONFIRMED THAT ITS POLICY TOWARD CHINA WILL CONTINUE TO BE GUIDED BY THE THREE SINO-AMERICAN JOINT COMMUNIQUEES. WE THINK THE CHINESE REALISTICALLY UNDERSTAND THAT WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO AGREE TO ADVANCE CONSULTATIONS ON OUR ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN. THEY ARE EQUALLY AWARE THAT THEY CAN RAISE CONCERNS OVER



IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AUGUST 17 COMMUNIQUE WITH US ANY TIME THEY CHOOSE TO, AS THEY HAVE REPEATEDLY OVER THE YEARS. AT THE SAME TIME, UNLESS WE OURSELVES WISH TO SEEK CHANGES IN THE AUGUST 17 COMMUNIQUE, WE SEE LITTLE MERIT IN GETTING LOCKED INTO CONSULTATIONS WITH THE CHINESE ON THIS QUESTION. AT SOME POINT DOWN THE ROAD, HOWEVER, WE MIGHT FIND IT USEFUL TO CONSULT WITH THE CHINESE ON BROAD SECURITY ISSUES, INCLUDING THE SUBJECT OF ARMS SALES. SUCH TALKS, FOR EXAMPLE, COULD BE FOCUSED ON GENERAL ISSUES IN ARMS SALES IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT. OR THEY COULD BE BROADER IN SCOPE AND TAKE THE FORM OF OVERALL "SECURITY/STRATEGIC" TALKS THAT WOULD ALLOW US TO RAISE ISSUES SUCH AS MILITARY BUDGETS, WHILE ALLOWING THE CHINESE TO RAISE MATTERS OF CONCERN TO THEM INCLUDING TAIWAN ARMS SALES, US TROOPS DEPLOYMENTS, ETC. SUCH FORA WOULD ENABLE US TO ADDRESS ARMS SALES ISSUES OF CONCERN TO EACH SIDE, WITHOUT HAVING THE TALKS FOCUSED ON TAIWAN ARMS SALES IN PARTICULAR.

-- WE ALSO DO NOT THINK THE CHINESE HAVE ANY REALISTIC EXPECTATION THAT WE WILL CANCEL THE F-16 SALE TO TAIWAN. HOWEVER, THEY WILL CONTINUE TO USE THIS ISSUE AS REVERSE LEVERAGE ON US, RAISING IT WHENEVER WE INSIST THAT THEY ADDRESS OR CONSULT ON ISSUES OF CONCERN TO US. ACCORDINGLY, WE SHOULD NOT ASSUME THAT WE CAN DISPOSE OF THIS ISSUE IN THE SHORT TERM, AND IT COULD PROVE TO BE A COMPLICATION AS WE CONTINUE TO ENGAGE THE CHINESE ON PROLIFERATION ISSUES. ACCORDINGLY, OUR BEST STRATEGY MAY BE TO BE REASONABLE BUT FIRM IN OUR RESPONSE, ACCOMMODATING THEM WHERE WE CAN, BUT KEEPING CLEARLY IN MIND OUR OWN BOTTOM LINES.

(2) STOP INTERFERING IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF CHINA UNDER THE PRETEXT OF THE SO-CALLED HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE IN TIBET;

-- US RESPONSE: GIVEN OUR CLEAR POSITION ON TIBET, WE CAN TAKE THE HIGH GROUND ON THIS QUESTION. OUR LEGITIMATE HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS IN TIBET REPRESENT COMMON CONCERNS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND DO NOT CONSTITUTE INTERFERENCE IN CHINA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. WE CAN AND SHOULD STICK TO THAT POSITION.

(3) HONOR THE BASIC PRINCIPLES GOVERNING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND REFRAIN FROM INTERFERING IN THE AFFAIRS OF HONG KONG;

-- US RESPONSE: WE CAN RESTATE OUR POSITION THAT THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG IS FOR THE UK AND THE PRC TO DECIDE, WITH DUE REGARD FOR THE INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE OF HONG KONG. BUT WE MUST ALSO REMIND BEIJING A) THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS SUBSTANTIAL INTERESTS IN HONG KONG; B) THAT WE ARE IN FAVOR OF DEMOCRACY AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE; AND C) THAT OUR APPROACH DOES NOT CONSTITUTE INTERFERENCE IN HONG KONG'S AFFAIRS.

(4) GIVE UP THE ATTEMPT TO SET UP AN ANTI-CHINA RADIO STATION;

-- US RESPONSE: OUR RESPONSE HERE SHOULD BE BASED ON ADMINISTRATION POLICY.

(5) STOP USING THE UNITED NATIONS OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL



ORGANIZATIONS AS A FORUM TO ATTACK CHINA ON THE SO-CALLED HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTION;

-- US RESPONSE: OUR POSITION SHOULD REMAIN THAT INSISTING ON ADHERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL NORMS ON HUMAN RIGHTS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE ATTACKS ON PARTICULAR COUNTRIES. HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES ARE A LEGITIMATE SUBJECT OF INTERNATIONAL CONCERN, AS EVIDENCED BY THE PRC'S ADHERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTIONS AND ITS ISSUANCE OF A WHITE PAPER ON THE SUBJECT. WE WILL CONTINUE TO EXPRESS OUR VIEWS ON THIS QUESTION, INCLUDING, AS APPROPRIATE, IN VARIOUS UNITED NATIONS FORA.

(6) STRICTLY OBSERVE THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

-- WE CAN REAFFIRM OUR OFTEN STATED POSITION THAT THE

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 08 OF 08 BEIJING 012669

AMERICAN MARKET IS THE MOST OPEN AND TRANSPARENT IN THE WORLD AND THAT WE HAVE EVERY INTENTION OF IMPLEMENTING TRADE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

(7) FULLY HONOR THE COMMITMENT MADE BY THE UNITED STATES IN THE SINO-US MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON MARKET ACCESS TO "STAUNCHLY SUPPORT" THE RESUMPTION OF CHINA'S STATUS AS A CONTRACTING PARTY TO THE GATT AND TO "SIGNIFICANTLY" LIBERALIZE CONTROLS ON HI-TECH EXPORTS TO CHINA;

-- THIS, OF COURSE, CONTINUES TO BE OUR POSITION. WE CAN REFER TO THE VISIT OF AUSTR DOUG NEWKIRK TO CHINA IN FEBRUARY TO DISCUSS CHINA'S GATT ACCESSION, OUR WILLINGNESS TO MEET WITH THE CHINESE IN GENEVA BEFORE THE SCHEDULED GATT TALKS, AND OUR MANY DISCUSSIONS WITH CHINESE GATT OFFICIALS IN BEIJING AS EVIDENCE OF OUR STAUNCH SUPPORT. HOWEVER, WE MUST AT THE SAME TIME EMPHASIZE THAT OUR STAUNCH SUPPORT IS FOR CHINA'S GATT ACCESSION UNDER AN ACCEPTABLE PROTOCOL.

-- WE HAVE ACTED ON SEVERAL LICENSES OF CONCERN TO CHINA AND CONTINUE TO SUPPORT SIGNIFICANT LIBERALIZATION OF THE EXPORT CONTROLS ON HI-TECH EXPORTS TO CHINA WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF COCOM. WE ARE ACTIVELY WORKING TO LIBERALIZE THE OVERALL COCOM REGIME WHICH WILL HAVE A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON HI-TECH EXPORTS TO CHINA.

-- WE ARE ALSO WORKING ON SPECIFIC NATIONAL INTEREST EXCEPTIONS FOR PRODUCTS OF PARTICULAR INTEREST TO AMERICAN EXPORTERS. WE HAVE ALREADY OBTAINED WAIVERS FOR MANY SATELLITE LAUNCHES AND ARE NOW WORKING TO COMPLETE THE SALE OF A CRAY SUPERCOMPUTER TO THE CHINESE METEOROLOGICAL INSTITUTE. THUS, ALONG WITH OUR EFFORTS IN COCOM, WE CAN SAY THAT WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK TO APPROVE HIGH TECH EXPORTS TO CHINA ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS. ROY

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TAB Y

April 22, 1993

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE UNITED STATES CHINA ACT OF 1993
AS INTRODUCED BY SENATE MAJORITY LEADER GEORGE J. MITCHELL**

This bill follows the framework of H.R. 5318, last year's bill which passed both Houses of Congress and was vetoed by President Bush.

The bill grants renewal of MFN trade status to China from July 3, 1993 until July 3, 1994. In order to renew MFN after July 1994, the President would have to indicate that China had:

(1) taken appropriate actions to adhere to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in China and Tibet.

(2) allowed unrestricted emigration of political and religious prisoners.

(3) provided an acceptable accounting and release of Chinese citizens detained, accused, or sentenced as a result of the nonviolent expression of their political beliefs.

(4) taken effective, verifiable action to prevent export of products to the U.S. manufactured by forced labor and complied with the provisions of last year's bilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which permits unrestricted access by U.S. Customs officials to places where such goods are produced.

Additionally, the President would need to indicate that the Chinese Government had made overall significant progress in:

- * ceasing religious persecution in China and Tibet.
- * ceasing financial and other incentives to encourage non-Tibetans to relocate in Tibet.
- * ceasing unfair and discriminatory trade practices against American businesses and in providing U.S. exporters fair access to Chinese markets.
- * adhering to the guidelines and parameters of the MTCR, NPT, and Australian Group on chemical and biological arms.
- * adhering to the Joint declaration on Hong Kong
- * cooperating with U.S. efforts to account for POW/MIA's from the Korean and Vietnam conflicts.
- * ceasing jamming of VOA broadcasts.
- * allowing international human rights monitors access to trials and places of detention.

If the President makes a positive indication regarding these conditions in his June 3, 1994 request for extension of MFN trade status for the People's Republic of China, Congress would agree to renewal for another year. If he could not make positive indications of improvement, then favorable MFN tariffs would cease for products exported by state-owned enterprises, but would continue for products exported by private and joint venture enterprises.

* The Secretary of the Treasury determines the identity of state-owned enterprises.

The only caveat on the President's freedom of action in making an indication of positive progress in regard to conditions described in the section on "overall significant progress" is that he may not make a positive indication if the Chinese have transferred ballistic missiles or missile launchers for the M-9 or M-11 missiles to Syria, Iran, or Pakistan; or transferred equipment or technology to another country which could be used to manufacture a nuclear explosive device.

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103D CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. _____

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. MITCHELL introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on _____

A BILL

To extend to the People's Republic of China renewal of nondiscriminatory (most-favored-nation) treatment provided certain conditions are met.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the "United States-China
5 Act of 1993".

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND POLICY.**

7 (a) **FINDINGS.**—The Congress makes the following
8 findings:

9 (1) On June 4, 1989, thousands of Chinese citi-
10 zens courageously demonstrated that they were pre-

1 .pared to risk their lives and futures in pursuit of
2 democratic freedom and respect for human rights.

3 (2) The People's Republic of China, as a mem-
4 ber of the United Nations Security Council, is obli-
5 gated to respect and uphold the United Nations
6 Charter and Universal Declaration of Human
7 Rights.

8 (3) Despite the massive demonstration for self-
9 determination and fundamental principles of human
10 rights and despite the People's Republic of China's
11 membership in the United Nations, the Government
12 of the People's Republic of China continues to fla-
13 grantly violate internationally recognized standards
14 of human rights, and engages in---

15 (A) torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrad-
16 ing treatment or punishment;

17 (B) arbitrary arrest, unacknowledged de-
18 tention without charges and trial, and jailing of
19 persons solely for the nonviolent expression of
20 their political views; and

21 (C) use of prison labor to produce cheap
22 products for export to countries, including the
23 United States, in violation of international labor
24 treaties and United States law.

1 (4) The Government of the People's Republic of
2 China continues to deny Chinese citizens and others,
3 who have supported the prodemocracy movement,
4 the right of free emigration despite having pledged
5 to do so in 1991.

6 (5) The Government of the People's Republic of
7 China continues to use military and police forces to
8 intimidate and repress the Tibetan people seeking
9 political and religious freedom, and continues to vio-
10 late the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention
11 by encouraging the resettlement of large numbers of
12 Chinese in occupied Tibet.

13 (6) The Government of the People's Republic of
14 China continues to engage in unfair trade practices
15 against the United States by raising tariffs, employ-
16 ing taxes as a surcharge on tariffs, using discrimina-
17 tory customs rates, imposing import quotas and
18 other quantitative restrictions, barring the importa-
19 tion of certain items, using licensing and testing re-
20 quirements to limit imports, and falsifying country
21 of origin documentation to transship textiles and
22 other items to the United States through Hong
23 Kong and third countries.

24 (7) Although the Government of the People's
25 Republic of China has pledged to adhere to the

1 guidelines and parameters of the Missile Technology
2 Control Regime, there are continuing reports of Chi-
3 nese transfers of military technology covered by such
4 Regime to the Middle East, Africa, and Asia

5 (8) The Government of the People's Republic of
6 China continues to unjustly restrict and imprison re-
7 ligious leaders and members of religious groups who
8 do not adhere to the dogma and control of state-
9 sponsored religious organizations.

10 (9) It is the policy and practice of the Govern-
11 ment of the People's Republic of China's Communist
12 Party to control all trade unions and suppress and
13 harass members of the independent labor union
14 movement.

15 (10) The Government of the People's Republic
16 of China continues to harass and restrict the activi-
17 ties of accredited journalists and to restrict broad-
18 casts by the Voice of America.

19 (b) POLICY.—It is the sense of the Congress that—

20 (1) with respect to the actions of the People's
21 Republic of China in the areas of human rights,
22 weapons proliferation, and unfair trade practices,
23 the President should take such action as is necessary
24 to achieve the purposes of this Act, including

1 (A) urging the Communist Chinese leaders
2 to release all political and religious prisoners in
3 China and Tibet, and to cease forcing the large-
4 scale influx of Chinese settlers into Tibet which
5 is threatening the survival of the Tibetan cul-
6 ture;

7 (B) conducting diplomatic negotiations
8 with the Government of the People's Republic
9 of China to encourage them to allow inter-
10 national human rights and humanitarian orga-
11 nizations access to prisoners in China and
12 Tibet;

13 (C) directing the United States Trade Rep-
14 resentative to take necessary and appropriate
15 action pursuant to section 301 of the Trade Act
16 of 1974 and the Memorandum of Understand-
17 ing between the Governments of the United
18 States and People's Republic of China concern-
19 ing market access, signed October 10, 1992,
20 with respect to the continuing unfair trade
21 practices of the People's Republic of China that
22 are discriminatory and unreasonably restrict
23 United States commerce; and

24 (D) encouraging members of the Missile
25 Technology Control Regime and other countries

1 to develop a common policy concerning the Peo-
2 ple's Republic of China's transfer of missile
3 technology to other countries;

4 (2) sanctions being applied against the People's
5 Republic of China on the date of the enactment of
6 this Act should be continued and strictly enforced;
7 and

8 (3) the President should direct the Secretary of
9 Commerce to consult with American business lead-
10 ers, having significant trade with or investments in
11 the People's Republic of China, to encourage them
12 to adopt a voluntary code of conduct that--

13 (A) follows internationally recognized
14 human rights principles;

15 (B) ensures that the employment of Chi-
16 nese citizens is not discriminatory in terms of
17 sex, ethnic origin, or political belief;

18 (C) refrains from knowingly using prison
19 labor;

20 (D) recognizes workers right to organize
21 and bargain collectively; and

22 (E) discourages mandatory political indoc-
23 trination on business sites.

1 **SEC. 3. MINIMUM STANDARDS WHICH THE GOVERNMENT**
2 **OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA MUST**
3 **MEET TO CONTINUE TO RECEIVE NON-**
4 **DISCRIMINATORY MOST-FAVORED-NATION**
5 **TREATMENT.**

6 Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, the
7 President may not recommend continuation of a waiver
8 for the 12-month period beginning July 3, 1994, under
9 section 402(d) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C.
10 2432(d)) for the People's Republic of China, unless the
11 President reports in the document required to be submit-
12 ted by such section that the government of that country—

13 (1) has taken appropriate actions to begin ad-
14 hering to the provisions of the Universal Declaration
15 of Human Rights in China and Tibet;

16 (2) is allowing unrestricted emigration of the
17 citizens who desire to leave China for reasons of po-
18 litical or religious persecution to join family mem-
19 bers abroad, or for other valid reasons;

20 (3) has provided an acceptable accounting and
21 release of—

22 (A) Chinese citizens detained, accused, or
23 sentenced as a result of the nonviolent expres-
24 sion of their political beliefs in relation to
25 events which occurred during and after the vio-

1 lent repression of demonstrations in Tiananmen
2 Square on June 4, 1989; and

3 (B) other citizens detained, accused, or
4 sentenced for the nonviolent expression of their
5 political beliefs or for peacefully exercising their
6 internationally guaranteed rights of freedom of
7 speech, association, and assembly;

8 (4) has taken effective, verifiable action to pre-
9 vent export of products to the United States manu-
10 factured wholly or in part by convict, forced, or in-
11 dentured labor and has complied with the terms of
12 the Memorandum of Understanding signed on Au-
13 gust 7, 1992, by allowing, without limitation or re-
14 striction, United States Customs officials to visit
15 places suspected of producing such goods for export;
16 and

17 (5) has made overall significant progress in—

18 (A) ceasing religious persecution and lift-
19 ing restrictions on freedom of religious belief in
20 the People's Republic of China and Tibet;

21 (B) releasing leaders and members of reli-
22 gious groups detained, imprisoned, or under
23 house arrest for expression of their religious be-
24 liefs;

1 (C) ceasing financial and other incentives
2 to encourage non-Tibetans to relocate in Tibet,
3 including development and other projects which
4 bring in substantial numbers of non-Tibetan
5 workers;

6 (D) ceasing unfair and discriminatory
7 trade practices which restrict and unreasonably
8 burden American business;

9 (E) providing United States exporters fair
10 access to Chinese markets, including lowering
11 tariffs, removing nontariff barriers, and increas-
12 ing the purchase of United States goods and
13 services;

14 (F) adhering to the guidelines and param-
15 eters of the Missile Technology Control Regime
16 and the controls adopted by the Nuclear Suppli-
17 ers Group and the Australian Group on Chemi-
18 cal and Biological Arms;

19 (G) adhering to the Joint Declaration on
20 Hong Kong that was entered into between the
21 United Kingdom and the People's Republic of
22 China;

23 (H) cooperating with United States efforts
24 to obtain an acceptable accounting of United
25 States military personnel who are listed as pris-

1 oners of war or missing in action as a result of
2 their service in—

3 (i) the Korean conflict; or

4 (ii) the Vietnam conflict;

5 (I) ceasing the jamming of Voice of Amer-
6 ica broadcasts; and

7 (J) providing international human rights
8 and humanitarian groups access to prisoners,
9 trials, and places of detention.

10 **SEC. 4. REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT.**

11 If the President recommends in 1994 that the waiver
12 referred to in section 3 be continued for the People's Re-
13 public of China, the President shall state in the document
14 required to be submitted to the Congress by section 402(d)
15 of the Trade Act of 1974, the extent to which the Govern-
16 ment of the People's Republic of China has complied with
17 the provisions of section 3, during the period covered by
18 the document.

19 **SEC. 5. NONDISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT FOR PRODUCTS**
20 **FROM NONSTATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES.**

21 (a) **IN GENERAL.**—Notwithstanding any other provi-
22 sions of law, if nondiscriminatory treatment is not granted
23 to the People's Republic of China by reason of the occur-
24 rence of an event described in subsection (b), nondiscrim-
25 inatory treatment shall—

1 (1) continue to apply to any good that is pro-
2 duced or manufactured by a person that is not a
3 state-owned enterprise of the People's Republic of
4 China, but

5 (2) not apply to any such good that is marketed
6 or otherwise exported by a state-owned enterprise of
7 the People's Republic of China.

8 Nondiscriminatory treatment under this section shall be
9 in effect for the same period of time the waiver referred
10 to in section 3 would have been effective had it taken ef-
11 fect.

12 (b) **EVENTS.**—An event described in this subsection
13 means—

14 (1) the President fails to request the waiver re-
15 ferred to in section 3 and reports to the Congress
16 that such failure was a result of the President's in-
17 ability to report that the People's Republic of China
18 has met the standards described in such section; or

19 (2) the President requests the waiver referred
20 to in section 3, but a disapproval resolution de-
21 scribed in subsection (c)(1) is enacted into law.

22 (c) **DISAPPROVAL RESOLUTION.**—

23 (1) **IN GENERAL.**—For purposes of this section,
24 the term "resolution" means only a joint resolution
25 of the two Houses of Congress, the matter after the

1 resolving clause of which is as follows: "That the
2 Congress does not approve the extension of the au-
3 thority contained in section 402(c) of the Trade Act
4 of 1974 recommended by the President to the Con-
5 gress on _____ with respect to the Peo-
6 ple's Republic of China because the Congress does
7 not agree that the People's Republic of China has
8 met the standards described in section 3 of the Unit-
9 ed States-China Act of 1993", with the blank space
10 being filled with the appropriate date.

11 (2) APPLICABLE RULES.—The provisions of
12 sections 153 (other than paragraphs (3) and (4) of
13 subsection (b) of such section) and 402(d)(2) (as
14 modified by this subsection) of the Trade Act of
15 1974 shall apply to a resolution described in para-
16 graph (1).

17 (d) DETERMINATION OF DUTY STATUS OF ENTER-
18 PRISES.—

19 (1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (2),
20 the Secretary of the Treasury shall determine which
21 persons are state-owned enterprises of the People's
22 Republic of China for purposes of this Act and com-
23 pile and maintain a list of such persons.

1 (2) DEFINITIONS AND SPECIAL RULES.—For
2 purposes of making the determination required by
3 paragraph (1), the following definitions apply:

4 (A)(i) The term “state-owned enterprise of
5 the People’s Republic of China” means a person
6 affiliated with or wholly owned, controlled, or
7 subsidized by the Government of the People’s
8 Republic of China and whose means of produc-
9 tion, products, and revenues are owned or con-
10 trolled by a central or provincial government
11 authority. A person shall be considered to be
12 state-owned if—

13 (I) the person’s assets are primarily
14 owned by a central or provincial govern-
15 ment authority;

16 (II) a substantial proportion of the
17 person’s profits are required to be submit-
18 ted to a central or provincial government
19 authority;

20 (III) the person’s production, pur-
21 chases of inputs, and sales of output, in
22 whole or in part, are subject to state, sec-
23 toral, or regional plans; or

1 (IV) a license issued by a government
2 authority classifies the person as state-
3 owned.

4 (ii) Any person that—

5 (I) is a qualified foreign joint venture
6 or is licensed by a governmental authority
7 as a collective, cooperative, or private en-
8 terprise; or

9 (II) is wholly owned by a foreign per-
10 son,

11 shall not be considered to be state-owned.

12 (B) The term “qualified foreign joint ven-
13 ture” means any person —

14 (i) which is registered and licensed in
15 the agency or department of the Govern-
16 ment of the People’s Republic of China
17 concerned with foreign economic relations
18 and trade as an equity, cooperative, con-
19 tractual joint venture, or joint stock com-
20 pany with foreign investment;

21 (ii) in which the foreign investor part-
22 ner and a person of the People’s Republic
23 of China share profits and losses and joint-
24 ly manage the venture;

1 (iii) in which the foreign investor
2 partner holds or controls at least 25 per-
3 cent of the investment and the foreign in-
4 vestor partner is not substantially owned
5 or controlled by a state-owned enterprise of
6 the People's Republic of China;

7 (iv) in which the foreign investor part-
8 ner is not a person of a country the gov-
9 ernment of which the Secretary of State
10 has determined under section 6(j) of the
11 Export Administration Act of 1979 to have
12 repeatedly provided support for acts of
13 international terrorism; and

14 (v) which does not use state-owned
15 enterprises of the People's Republic of
16 China to export its good or services.

17 (C) The term "person" means a natural
18 person, corporation, partnership, enterprise, in-
19 strumentality, agency, or other entity.

20 (D) The term "foreign investor partner"
21 means—

22 (i) a natural person who is not a citi-
23 zen of the People's Republic of China; and

24 (ii) a corporation, partnership, enter-
25 prise, instrumentality, agency, or other en-

1 tity that is organized under the laws of a
2 country other than the People's Republic
3 of China and 50 percent or more of the
4 outstanding capital stock or beneficial in-
5 terest of such entity is owned (directly or
6 indirectly) by natural persons who are not
7 citizens of the People's Republic of China.

8 (e) **PETITION FOR CHANGE IN DUTY STATUS.**—Any
9 person who believes that a person should be included on
10 or excluded from the list compiled by the Secretary under
11 subsection (d)(1) may request that the Secretary review
12 the status of such person.

13 **SEC. 6. AFFECT OF GATT ENTRY ON MFN STATUS.**

14 Notwithstanding the entry of the People's Republic
15 of China into the General Agreement on Tariffs and
16 Trade, most-favored-nation treatment with respect to the
17 products of the People's Republic of China shall continue
18 to be governed by title IV of the Trade Act of 1974 and
19 the provisions of this Act.

20 **SEC. 7. SANCTIONS BY OTHER COUNTRIES.**

21 If the President decides not to seek a continuation
22 of a waiver in 1994 under section 402(d) of the Trade
23 Act of 1974 for the People's Republic of China, the Presi-
24 dent shall, during the 30-day period beginning on the date
25 that the President would have recommended to the Con-

1 gress that such a waiver be continued, undertake efforts
2 to ensure that members of the General Agreement on Tar-
3 iffs and Trade take similar action with respect to the Peo-
4 ple's Republic of China.

5 **SEC. 8. DEFINITIONS.**

6 For purposes of this Act:

7 (1) **DETAINED AND IMPRISONED.**—The terms
8 “detained” and “imprisoned” include, but are not
9 limited to, incarceration in prisons, jails, labor re-
10 form camps, labor reeducation camps, and local po-
11 lice detention centers.

12 (2) **ACCEPTABLE ACCOUNTING.**—The term “ac-
13 ceptable accounting” includes—

14 (A) providing information regarding the lo-
15 cation of any person being held,

16 (B) the legal status of such person,

17 (C) if convicted, the sentence of such per-
18 son, and

19 (D) if released, when and with what re-
20 strictions.

21 (3) **CONVICT, FORCED, OR INDENTURED**
22 **LABOR.**—The term “convict, forced, or indentured
23 labor” has the meaning given such term by section
24 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1307).

1 (4) VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONALLY RECOG-
2 NIZED STANDARDS OF HUMAN RIGHTS.—The term
3 “violations of internationally recognized standards of
4 human rights” includes, but is not limited to, tor-
5 ture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
6 punishment, prolonged detention without charges
7 and trial, causing the disappearance of persons by
8 the abduction and clandestine detention of those per-
9 sons, secret judicial proceedings, and other flagrant
10 denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security of
11 any person.

12 (5) MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME.—
13 The term “Missile Technology Control Regime”
14 means the agreement, as amended, between the
15 United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Re-
16 public of Germany, France, Italy, Canada, and
17 Japan, announced on April 16, 1987, to restrict sen-
18 sitive missile-relevant transfers based on an annex of
19 missile equipment and technology.

20 (6) SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS.—(A) The term
21 “significant progress” in section 3, means the imple-
22 mentation of measures that will meaningfully reduce,
23 or lead to the end of, the practices identified in such
24 section.

1 (B) With regard to section 3(5)(E), progress
2 may not be determined to be "significant progress"
3 if, after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
4 President determines that the People's Republic of
5 China has transferred—

6 (i) ballistic missiles or missile launchers for
7 the M-9 or M-11 weapons systems to Syria,
8 Pakistan, or Iran; or

9 (ii) material, equipment, or technology that
10 would contribute significantly to the manufac-
11 ture of a nuclear explosive device to another
12 country and that the material, equipment, or
13 technology is to be used by such country in the
14 manufacture of such device.

103D CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. _____

To extend to the People's Republic of China renewal of nondiscriminatory (most-favored-nation) treatment provided certain conditions are met.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Ms. PELOSI introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee
on _____

A BILL

To extend to the People's Republic of China renewal of nondiscriminatory (most-favored-nation) treatment provided certain conditions are met.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the "United States-China
5 Act of 1993".

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND POLICY.**

7 (a) **FINDINGS.**—The Congress makes the following
8 findings:

1 (1) On June 4, 1989, thousands of Chinese citi-
2 zens courageously demonstrated that they were pre-
3 pared to risk their lives and futures in pursuit of
4 democratic freedom and respect for human rights.

5 (2) The People's Republic of China, as a mem-
6 ber of the United Nations Security Council, is obli-
7 gated to respect and uphold the United Nations
8 Charter and Universal Declaration of Human
9 Rights.

10 (3) Despite the massive demonstration for self-
11 determination and fundamental principles of human
12 rights and despite the People's Republic of China's
13 membership in the United Nations, the Government
14 of the People's Republic of China continues to fla-
15 grantly violate internationally recognized standards
16 of human rights, and engages in—

17 (A) torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrad-
18 ing treatment or punishment;

19 (B) arbitrary arrest, unacknowledged de-
20 tention without charges and trial, and jailing of
21 persons solely for the nonviolent expression of
22 their political views; and

23 (C) use of prison labor to produce cheap
24 products for export to countries, including the

1 United States, in violation of international labor
2 treaties and United States law.

3 (4) The Government of the People's Republic of
4 China continues to deny Chinese citizens and others,
5 who have supported the prodemocracy movement,
6 the right of free emigration despite having pledged
7 to do so in 1991.

8 (5) The Government of the People's Republic of
9 China continues to use military and police forces to
10 intimidate and repress the Tibetan people seeking
11 political and religious freedom, and continues to vio-
12 late the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention
13 by encouraging the resettlement of large numbers of
14 Chinese in Tibet.

15 (6) The Government of the People's Republic of
16 China continues to engage in unfair trade practices
17 against the United States by raising tariffs, employ-
18 ing taxes as a surcharge on tariffs, using discrimina-
19 tory customs rates, imposing import quotas and
20 other quantitative restrictions, barring the importa-
21 tion of certain items, using licensing and testing re-
22 quirements to limit imports, and falsifying country
23 of origin documentation to transship textiles and
24 other items to the United States through Hong
25 Kong and third countries.

1 (7) Although the Government of the People's
2 Republic of China has pledged to adhere to the
3 guidelines and parameters of the Missile Technology
4 Control Regime, there are continuing reports of Chi-
5 nese transfers of military technology covered by such
6 Regime to the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.

7 (8) The Government of the People's Republic of
8 China continues to unjustly restrict and imprison re-
9 ligious leaders and members of religious groups who
10 do not adhere to the dogma and control of state-
11 sponsored religious organizations.

12 (9) It is the policy and practice of the Govern-
13 ment of the People's Republic of China's Communist
14 Party to control all trade unions and suppress and
15 harass members of the independent labor union
16 movement.

17 (10) The Government of the People's Republic
18 of China continues to harass and restrict the activi-
19 ties of accredited journalists and to restrict broad-
20 casts by the Voice of America.

21 (b) POLICY.—It is the sense of the Congress that—

22 (1) with respect to the actions of the People's
23 Republic of China in the areas of human rights,
24 weapons proliferation, and unfair trade practices,

1 the President should take such action as is necessary
2 to achieve the purposes of this Act, including—

3 (A) urging the Communist Chinese leaders
4 to release all political and religious prisoners in
5 China and Tibet, and to cease forcing the large-
6 scale influx of Chinese settlers into Tibet which
7 is threatening the survival of the Tibetan cul-
8 ture;

9 (B) conducting diplomatic negotiations
10 with the Government of the People's Republic
11 of China to encourage them to allow inter-
12 national human rights and humanitarian orga-
13 nizations access to prisoners in China and
14 Tibet;

15 (C) directing the United States Trade Rep-
16 resentative to take necessary and appropriate
17 action pursuant to section 301 of the Trade Act
18 of 1974 and the Memorandum of Understand-
19 ing between the Governments of the United
20 States and People's Republic of China concern-
21 ing market access, signed October 10, 1992,
22 with respect to the continuing unfair trade
23 practices of the People's Republic of China that
24 are discriminatory and unreasonably restrict
25 United States commerce; and

1 (D) encouraging members of the Missile
2 Technology Control Regime and other countries
3 to develop a common policy concerning the Peo-
4 ple's Republic of China's transfer of missile
5 technology to other countries;

6 (2) sanctions being applied against the People's
7 Republic of China on the date of the enactment of
8 this Act should be continued and strictly enforced;
9 and

10 (3) the President should direct the Secretary of
11 Commerce to consult with American business lead-
12 ers, having significant trade with or investments in
13 the People's Republic of China, to encourage them
14 to adopt a voluntary code of conduct that—

15 (A) follows internationally recognized
16 human rights principles;

17 (B) ensures that the employment of Chi-
18 nese citizens is not discriminatory in terms of
19 sex, ethnic origin, or political belief;

20 (C) refrains from knowingly using prison
21 labor;

22 (D) recognizes workers right to organize
23 and bargain collectively; and

24 (E) discourages mandatory political indoc-
25 trination on business sites.

1 SEC. 3. MINIMUM STANDARDS WHICH THE GOVERNMENT
2 OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA MUST
3 MEET TO CONTINUE TO RECEIVE NON-
4 DISCRIMINATORY MOST-FAVORED-NATION
5 TREATMENT.

6 Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, the
7 President may not recommend continuation of a waiver
8 for the 12-month period beginning July 3, 1994, under
9 section 402(d) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C.
10 2432(d)) for the People's Republic of China, unless the
11 President reports in the document required to be submit-
12 ted by such section that the government of that country—

13 (1) has taken appropriate actions to begin ad-
14 hering to the provisions of the Universal Declaration
15 of Human Rights in China and Tibet;

16 (2) is allowing unrestricted emigration of the
17 citizens who desire to leave China for reasons of po-
18 litical or religious persecution to join family mem-
19 bers abroad, or for other valid reasons;

20 (3) has provided an acceptable accounting for
21 and release of Chinese citizens detained, accused, or
22 sentenced as a result of the nonviolent expression of
23 their political beliefs in relation to events which oc-
24 curred during and after the violent repression of
25 demonstrations in Tiananmen Square on June 4,
26 1989, and has provided an acceptable accounting for

1 and release of other citizens detained, accused, or
2 sentenced for the nonviolent expression of their po-
3 litical beliefs or for peacefully exercising their inter-
4 nationally guaranteed rights of freedom of speech,
5 association, and assembly;

6 (4) has taken effective, verifiable action to pre-
7 vent export of products to the United States manu-
8 factured wholly or in part by convict, forced, or in-
9 dentured labor and has complied with the terms of
10 the Memorandum of Understanding signed on Au-
11 gust 7, 1992, by allowing, without limitation or re-
12 striction, United States Customs officials to visit
13 places suspected of producing such goods for export;
14 and

15 (5) has made overall significant progress in—

16 (A) ceasing religious persecution and lift-
17 ing restrictions on freedom of religious belief in
18 the People's Republic of China and Tibet and
19 ceasing to threaten the survival of the Tibetan
20 culture;

21 (B) releasing leaders and members of reli-
22 gious groups detained, imprisoned, or under
23 house arrest for expression of their religious be-
24 liefs;

1 (C) ceasing unfair and discriminatory
2 trade practices which restrict and unreasonably
3 burden American business;

4 (D) providing United States exporters fair
5 access to Chinese markets, including lowering
6 tariffs, removing nontariff barriers, and increas-
7 ing the purchase of United States goods and
8 services;

9 (E) adhering to the guidelines and param-
10 eters of the Missile Technology Control Regime
11 and the controls adopted by the Nuclear Suppli-
12 ers Group and the Australian Group on Chemi-
13 cal and Biological Arms;

14 (F) adhering to the Joint Declaration on
15 Hong Kong that was entered into between the
16 United Kingdom and the People's Republic of
17 China;

18 (G) cooperating with United States efforts
19 to obtain an acceptable accounting of United
20 States military personnel who are listed as pris-
21 oners of war or missing in action as a result of
22 their service in—

23 (i) the Korean conflict; or

24 (ii) the Vietnam conflict;

1 (H) ceasing the jamming of Voice of Amer-
2 ica broadcasts; and

3 (I) providing international human rights
4 and humanitarian groups access to prisoners,
5 trials, and places of detention.

6 **SEC. 4. REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT.**

7 If the President recommends in 1994 that the waiver
8 referred to in section 3 be continued for the People's Re-
9 public of China, the President shall state in the document
10 required to be submitted to the Congress by section 402(d)
11 of the Trade Act of 1974, the extent to which the Govern-
12 ment of the People's Republic of China has complied with
13 the provisions of section 3, during the period covered by
14 the document.

15 **SEC. 5. NONDISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT FOR PRODUCTS**
16 **FROM NONSTATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES.**

17 (a) **IN GENERAL.**—Notwithstanding any other provi-
18 sions of law, if nondiscriminatory treatment is not granted
19 to the People's Republic of China by reason of the occur-
20 rence of an event described in subsection (b), non-
21 discriminatory treatment shall—

22 (1) continue to apply to any good that is pro-
23 duced or manufactured by a person that is not a
24 state-owned enterprise of the People's Republic of
25 China, but

1 (2) not apply to any such good that is marketed
2 or otherwise exported by a state-owned enterprise of
3 the People's Republic of China.

4 Nondiscriminatory treatment under this section shall be
5 in effect for the same period of time the waiver referred
6 to in section 3 would have been effective had it taken ef-
7 fect.

8 (b) EVENTS.—An event described in this subsection
9 means—

10 (1) the President fails to request the waiver re-
11 ferred to in section 3 and reports to the Congress
12 that such failure was a result of the President's in-
13 ability to report that the People's Republic of China
14 has met the standards described in such section; or

15 (2) the President requests the waiver referred
16 to in section 3, but a disapproval resolution de-
17 scribed in subsection (c)(1) is enacted into law.

18 (c) DISAPPROVAL RESOLUTION.—

19 (1) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of this section,
20 the term "resolution" means only a joint resolution
21 of the two Houses of Congress, the matter after the
22 resolving clause of which is as follows: "That the
23 Congress does not approve the extension of the au-
24 thority contained in section 402(c) of the Trade Act
25 of 1974 recommended by the President to the Con-

1 gress on _____ with respect to the People's Re-
2 public of China because the Congress does not agree
3 that the People's Republic of China has met the
4 standards described in section 3 of the United
5 States-China Act of 1993", with the blank space
6 being filled with the appropriate date.

7 (2) APPLICABLE RULES.—The provisions of
8 sections 153 (other than paragraphs (3) and (4) of
9 subsection (b) of such section) and 402(d)(2) (as
10 modified by this subsection) of the Trade Act of
11 1974 shall apply to a resolution described in para-
12 graph (1).

13 (d) DETERMINATION OF DUTY STATUS OF ENTER-
14 PRISES.—

15 (1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (2),
16 the Secretary of the Treasury shall determine which
17 persons are state-owned enterprises of the People's
18 Republic of China for purposes of this Act and com-
19 pile and maintain a list of such persons.

20 (2) DEFINITIONS AND SPECIAL RULES.—For
21 purposes of making the determination required by
22 paragraph (1), the following definitions apply:

23 (A)(i) The term "state-owned enterprise of
24 the People's Republic of China" means a person
25 affiliated with or wholly owned, controlled, or

1 subsidized by the Government of the People's
2 Republic of China and whose means of produc-
3 tion, products, and revenues are owned or con-
4 trolled by a central or provincial government
5 authority. A person shall be considered to be
6 state-owned if—

7 (I) the person's assets are primarily
8 owned by a central or provincial govern-
9 ment authority;

10 (II) a substantial proportion of the
11 person's profits are required to be submit-
12 ted to a central or provincial government
13 authority;

14 (III) the person's production, pur-
15 chases of inputs, and sales of output, in
16 whole or in part, are subject to state, sec-
17 toral, or regional plans; or

18 (IV) a license issued by a government
19 authority classifies the person as state-
20 owned.

21 (ii) Any person that—

22 (I) is a qualified foreign joint venture
23 or is licensed by a governmental authority
24 as a collective, cooperative, or private en-
25 terprise; or

1 (II) is wholly owned by a foreign per-
2 son,
3 shall not be considered to be state-owned.

4 (B) The term "qualified foreign joint ven-
5 ture" means any person—

6 (i) which is registered and licensed in
7 the agency or department of the Govern-
8 ment of the People's Republic of China
9 concerned with foreign economic relations
10 and trade as an equity, cooperative, con-
11 tractual joint venture, or joint stock com-
12 pany with foreign investment;

13 (ii) in which the foreign investor part-
14 ner and a person of the People's Republic
15 of China share profits and losses and joint-
16 ly manage the venture;

17 (iii) in which the foreign investor
18 partner holds or controls at least 25 per-
19 cent of the investment and the foreign in-
20 vestor partner is not substantially owned
21 or controlled by a state-owned enterprise of
22 the People's Republic of China;

23 (iv) in which the foreign investor part-
24 ner is not a person of a country the gov-
25 ernment of which the Secretary of State

1 has determined under section 6(j) of the
2 Export Administration Act of 1979 to have
3 repeatedly provided support for acts of
4 international terrorism; and

5 (v) which does not use state-owned
6 enterprises of the People's Republic of
7 China to export its good or services.

8 (C) The term "person" means a natural
9 person, corporation, partnership, enterprise, in-
10 strumentality, agency, or other entity.

11 (D) The term "foreign investor partner"
12 means—

13 (i) a natural person who is not a citi-
14 zen of the People's Republic of China; and

15 (ii) a corporation, partnership, instru-
16 mentality, enterprise, agency, or other en-
17 tity that is organized under the laws of a
18 country other than the People's Republic
19 of China and 50 percent or more of the
20 outstanding capital stock or beneficial in-
21 terest of such entity is owned (directly or
22 indirectly) by natural persons who are not
23 citizens of the People's Republic of China.

24 (e) PETITION FOR CHANGE IN DUTY STATUS.—Any
25 person who believes that a person should be included on

1 or excluded from the list compiled by the Secretary under
2 subsection (d)(1) may request that the Secretary review
3 the status of such person.

4 **SEC. 6. EFFECT OF GATT ENTRY ON MFN STATUS.**

5 Notwithstanding the entry of the People's Republic
6 of China into the General Agreement on Tariffs and
7 Trade, most-favored-nation treatment shall not be auto-
8 matically conferred on the products of the People's Repub-
9 lic of China unless the People's Republic of China satisfies
10 the standards described in section 3 and complies with sec-
11 tion 402 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2432).

12 **SEC. 7. SANCTIONS BY OTHER COUNTRIES.**

13 If the President decides not to seek a continuation
14 of a waiver in 1994 under section 402(d) of the Trade
15 Act of 1974 for the People's Republic of China, the Presi-
16 dent shall, during the 30-day period beginning on the date
17 that the President would have recommended to the Con-
18 gress that such a waiver be continued, undertake efforts
19 to ensure that members of the General Agreement on Tar-
20 iffs and Trade take similar action with respect to the Peo-
21 ple's Republic of China.

22 **SEC. 8. DEFINITIONS.**

23 For purposes of this Act:

24 (1) **DETAINED AND IMPRISONED.**—The terms
25 “detained” and “imprisoned” include, but are not

1 limited to, incarceration in prisons, jails, labor re-
2 form camps, labor reeducation camps, and local po-
3 lice detention centers.

4 (2) ACCEPTABLE ACCOUNTING.—The term “ac-
5 ceptable accounting” includes—

6 (A) providing information regarding the lo-
7 cation of any person being held,

8 (B) the legal status of such person,

9 (C) if convicted, the sentence of such per-
10 son, and

11 (D) if released, when and with what re-
12 strictions.

13 (3) CONVICT, FORCED, OR INDENTURED
14 LABOR.—The term “convict, forced, or indentured
15 labor” has the meaning given such term by section
16 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1307).

17 (4) VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONALLY REC-
18 OGNIZED STANDARDS OF HUMAN RIGHTS.—The
19 term “violations of internationally recognized stand-
20 ards of human rights” includes, but is not limited
21 to, torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
22 or punishment, prolonged detention without charges
23 and trial, causing the disappearance of persons by
24 the abduction and clandestine detention of those per-
25 sons, secret judicial proceedings, and other flagrant

1 denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security of
2 any person.

3 (5) MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME.—
4 The term “Missile Technology Control Regime”
5 means the agreement, as amended, between the
6 United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Re-
7 public of Germany, France, Italy, Canada, and
8 Japan, announced on April 16, 1987, to restrict sen-
9 sitive missile-relevant transfers based on an annex of
10 missile equipment and technology.

11 (6) SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS.—(A) The term
12 “significant progress” in section 3, means the imple-
13 mentation of measures that will meaningfully reduce,
14 or lead to the end of, the practices identified in such
15 section.

16 (B) With regard to section 3(5)(E), progress
17 may not be determined to be “significant progress”
18 if, after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
19 President determines that the People’s Republic of
20 China has transferred—

21 (i) ballistic missiles or missile launchers for
22 the M-9 or M-11 weapons systems to Syria,
23 Pakistan, or Iran; or

24 (ii) material, equipment, or technology that
25 would contribute significantly to the manufac-

1 ture of a nuclear explosive device to another
2 country and that the material, equipment, or
3 technology is to be used by such country in the
4 manufacture of such device.

Proposed Agenda for Deputies' Committee Meeting on China

1. Opening remarks by Sandy Berger, stressing that meeting must focus on two issues: tactics for encouraging maximum response from China to our concerns before we must make a decision on MFN; and, in view of the inevitability of renewal only under conditions, we shall need to decide a) what conditions make sense, and b) how should we manage relations with Congress on the issue? On the last point, a major issue is whether we seek to renew MFN conditionally through executive action, or accept legislated conditions.
2. Exposition of options by Peter Tarnoff and Winston Lord
3. Discussion
4. Conclusions by Sandy Berger.

List of Participating Agencies

State
DOD
JCS
USTR
Commerce
Treasury
CIA

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 26 APR 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
MFN
IWG

NON PROLIFERATION
DC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 27 APR DC MTG ON CHINA

ACTION: ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 24 APR 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WIEDEMANN LOGREF: 9320035 9320130

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0024 PRD0011 CODES:

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

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001 WIEDEMANN	Z	93042112	PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE
002 BERGER	Z	93042620	FOR DECISION
002	X	93042620	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
002 ITOH	Z	93042620	FOR SIGNATURE
003	X	93042620	ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

<u>DOC</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR ACTION</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR INFO</u>
003	930426	FUERTH, L	
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003	930426	GROSSMAN, M	
003	930426	LAUDER, J	
003	930426	KNIGHT, E	
003	930426	TYSON, L	
003	930426	SHERFIELD, M	
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003	930426	MATHEWS, S	

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. list	re: Deputies Committee Meeting, Tuesday, April 27, 1993 [partial] (1 page)	04/27/1993	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 3994

FOLDER TITLE:

DC0024 DC Meeting on China, April 27, 1993 [2]

2015-0221-M
rs1196

RESTRICTION CODES**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING
TUESDAY, APRIL 27, 1993
5:30 P.M. - 6:30 P.M.
SITUATION ROOM

WHITE HOUSE

Samuel R. Berger

OVP

Leon Fuerth

STATE

Peter Tarnoff
Winston Lord

DOD

Frank Wisner
Charles Freeman

JCS

David Jeremiah
Frank Bowman

CIA

(b)(3)

COMMERCE

Frank Vargo

USTR

Charlene Barshefsky
Ira Wolf

TREASURY

Lawrence Summers
Jeff Shafer

CEA

Laura Tyson
Joseph Stiglitz

NEC

Bob Kyle

NSC

Kent Wiedemann
Sandy Kristoff

National Security Council
The White House

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Staff Director	_____	_____	_____
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APNSA	_____	_____	_____
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NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>	<u>PTM</u>	<u>R</u>
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FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH <i>(initials)</i>	_____	_____	_____
(NAME)	(PHONE NUMBER)	(ROOM NO.)	
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NOTICE OF DC MEETING		LOG # 20394	
TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	_____	_____
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	_____	_____
TREASURY	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	_____	_____
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	_____	_____
JCS	SECRETARY	_____	_____
COMMERCE	DIRECTOR, EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT	_____	_____
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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By *NW* NARA, Date 1/24/15

2016-0221-M

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WASHINGTON, DC 20506

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WASHINGTON, DC 20520

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NATIONAL ECONOMIC COUNCIL
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MS. SILVIA MATHEWS NATIONAL ECONOMIC COUNCIL 2ND FLOOR WEST WING WHITE HOUSE	4/27/93	9:05	<u>Sylvia M. Mathews</u> COPY: 1 _____

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 26, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Executive Director for
Policy Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. EDWARD KNIGHT
Executive Secretary
Department of Treasury

DR. LAURA D. TYSON
Chair, President's Council
of Economic Advisors

COL. MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

CAPT. H. L. SHEFFIELD
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MS. PATTY MCHUGH
Director, Executive Secretariat
Department of Commerce

MS. SILVIA MATHEWS
Special Assistant to the
Assistant for the President
for Economic Policy

SUBJECT: Meeting of the Deputies Committee on China (S)

The Deputies Committee will meet on Tuesday, April 27, 1993,
5:30 - 6:30 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. Attendance
will be limited to principals plus one. (S)

The purpose of the meeting is to decide tactics to encourage
positive Chinese responses to overcome proliferation, and trade
concerns, before MFN comes up for renewal on June 3.
Congressional strategy on MFN will be a major topic for
discussion. An agenda is attached at Tab A and the policy paper
at Tab B. (S)



William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachments

- Tab A Agenda
- Tab B Policy Paper
- Tab C Draft House Bill on China MFN

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By Wk NARA, Date 4/26/5

2015-0221-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: April 27, 1993
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 5:30 - 6:30 p.m.

CHINA

Agenda

- I. Introduction Samuel R. Berger
- II. Presentation of Paper State
- III. Trade and Legislative Issues USTR
- IV. Proliferation Concerns CIA
- V. Discussion All
- VI. Conclusion Samuel R. Berger

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

April 20, 1993

20394

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DECL:OADR

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM ITOH
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: China Policy Paper

The Interagency Working Group on China has approved the attached paper proposing tactical steps for managing the U.S. relationship with China prior to the President's June 3 MFN decision. We recommend that a Deputies Committee meeting be convened to consider the paper's suggestions.

M. Grossman
for Marc Grossman
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated

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Department of State Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By WIK NARA, Date 1/24/15
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002c. paper	re: Interagency Working Group for East Asia and the Pacific: Advancing PRC Responsiveness on US Core Concerns (7 pages)	04/20/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3994

FOLDER TITLE:

DC0024 DC Meeting on China, April 27, 1993 [2]

2015-0221-M
rs1196

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

CHINESE POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS PRISONERS

RELEASED SINCE JANUARY 20, 1993

- Wang Xizhe -- Released January 28 two years before completing a 14-year sentence for pro-democracy activities. One of the most prominent of the Democracy Wall movement activists.
- Gao Shan -- Released January 28 four months before completing four-year sentence. Former aide to ex-Premier Zhao Ziyang.
- Wang Dan -- Released on February 17 five months prior to completing a four-year sentence for role as one of the student leaders of the Tiananmen protests.
- Guo Haifeng -- Released on February 17 four months prior to completing a four-year sentence for role as student leader in 1989 pro-democracy movement.
- Li Guiren -- Released February 18 a year prior to completing five-year sentence. Released on medical parole. Editor and publisher detained in June of 1989 for trying to organize a strike of publishing house employees and writing "provocative slogans" calling for the removal of top Chinese leaders.
- Fu Shenqi -- Released February 26 with sentence of two years deprivation of political rights. Prosecutor had requested prison sentence. Shanghai dissident detained in April 1991 for underground pro-democracy magazine.
- Zhang Rujun -- Released from February 26 with sentence of one year deprivation of political rights. Prosecutor had requested prison sentence. Shanghai dissident detained in April 1991.
- Pei Ronggui -- Released March 31 five months prior to completing a five-year sentence. Catholic priest arrested for his involvement in an April 18, 1989 clash between police and "underground" Catholics in Hebei province.

Prominent Political Prisoners Still in Jail:

Wei Jingsheng -- Democracy Wall activist and probably China's most prominent political prisoner. Detained in 1979. Due to be released in 1994.

Xu Wenli -- Democracy Wall activist detained in 1981. Due to be released in 1996.

Wang Milu -- Catholic Bishop detained in 1983. Due to be released this year.

Yulo Dawa
Tsering -- Tibetan monk and political activist detained in 1987. Due to be released in 1997.

Ren Wanding -- Long-time political activist most recently detained in 1989. Due to be released in 1996.

Wang Juntao -- Long-time political activist most recently detained in 1989. Due to be released in 2002.

Chen Ziming -- Long-time political activist most recently detained in 1989. Due to be released in 2002.

Liu Gang -- Student activist detained in 1989. Due to be released in 1995.

Bao Tong -- Former top aide to ex-Premier Zhao Ziyang. Detained in 1989. Due to be released in 1996.

- o April 9-15. Gao Yan, Governor of Jilin Province, is leading a delegation to Little Rock, New York and Washington. The delegation plans to spend \$40 million for fertilizer, steel, and other projects. Jilin recently spent \$10 million on telecommunications equipment from AT&T. (Beijing 11711).
- o May 2-14. Zhou Mingchen, President of Ceroilfoods, is planning to visit Cargill, Continental, and USDA for grain consultations. Previous visits have led to significant wheat purchases.
- o Early May. Mofert Vice Minister Tong Zhiguang and Sinochem officials will participate in a buying mission aimed at fertilizer and other commodities from the southern U.S.

CHINA'S BUY AMERICA CAMPAIGN

Chinese leaders have gone out of their way in meetings with Codels and other U.S. visitors to signal an interest in doing more business with U.S. companies. At least eight buying missions have either visited the U.S. since the beginning of the year or are scheduled to arrive this spring. These missions have the potential to generate billions of dollars of exports of aircraft, autos, satellites, oil drilling equipment, aviation electronics, wheat, fertilizer, and other U.S. products.

- o February 7-14. AT&T hosted State Planning Commission Vice Chairman Ye Qing on a visit to AT&T's headquarters and various manufacturing sites. The trip led to signing on February 23 of a cooperation agreement opening up China's lucrative market for digital switching equipment to a new AT&T joint venture.
- o March 10-24. Liu Jiyuan, Vice Minister of the Ministry of Aerospace Industries, met with Hughes Space Communications on a cooperation agreement that could lead to purchase of five satellites over five years. Value of this purchase could exceed \$750 million.
- o March 15-29. Li Zhao, Deputy Director General of CAAC, visited Boeing to discuss purchasing or leasing up to 40 aircraft valued at \$1 billion.
- o April 3-8. Wang Tao, President of the China National Petroleum Corporation, leads a delegation to Louisiana, Texas, and Washington, D.C. to encourage U.S. companies to participate in the opening of the Tarim Basin to oil exploration and development by foreign companies. The delegation also expects to purchase \$200 million worth of U.S. oil exploration equipment.
- o April 7-17. Wang Shumin, Deputy Director General of the State Council, will lead a joint civilian-military team for talks on airspace management. He will also meet with Boeing, McDonnell Douglas, and other companies on modernization of China's air traffic control system.
- o April 7-24. State Planning Commission Vice Chairman Gan Ziyu leads a mission to buy cars from GM, Ford, and Chrysler. Purchases are expected to exceed that of a similar mission last summer which bought 7000 vehicles. Gan will also visit Boeing in Seattle, where a \$600 million contract is expected to be signed.

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H.L.C.

103D CONGRESS
1ST SESSION**H. R.** _____

To extend to the People's Republic of China renewal of nondiscriminatory (most-favored-nation) treatment provided certain conditions are met.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Ms. PELOSI introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on _____

A BILL

To extend to the People's Republic of China renewal of nondiscriminatory (most-favored-nation) treatment provided certain conditions are met.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the "United States-China
5 Act of 1993".

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND POLICY.**

7 (a) **FINDINGS.**—The Congress makes the following
8 findings:

.F:\M\PELOSI\PELOSI.040

H.L.C.

2

1 (1) On June 4, 1989, thousands of Chinese citi-
2 zens courageously demonstrated that they were pre-
3 pared to risk their lives and futures in pursuit of
4 democratic freedom and respect for human rights.

5 (2) The People's Republic of China, as a mem-
6 ber of the United Nations Security Council, is obli-
7 gated to respect and uphold the United Nations
8 Charter and Universal Declaration of Human
9 Rights.

10 (3) Despite the massive demonstration for self-
11 determination and fundamental principles of human
12 rights and despite the People's Republic of China's
13 membership in the United Nations, the Government
14 of the People's Republic of China continues to fla-
15 grantly violate internationally recognized standards
16 of human rights, and engages in—

17 (A) torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrad-
18 ing treatment or punishment;

19 (B) arbitrary arrest, unacknowledged de-
20 tention without charges and trial, and jailing of
21 persons solely for the nonviolent expression of
22 their political views; and

23 (C) use of prison labor to produce cheap
24 products for export to countries, including the

F:\M\PELOSI\PELOSI.040

H.L.C.

3

1 United States, in violation of international labor
2 treaties and United States law.

3 (4) The Government of the People's Republic of
4 China continues to deny Chinese citizens and others,
5 who have supported the prodemocracy movement,
6 the right of free emigration despite having pledged
7 to do so in 1991.

8 (5) The Government of the People's Republic of
9 China continues to use military and police forces to
10 intimidate and repress the Tibetan people seeking
11 political and religious freedom, and continues to vio-
12 late the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention
13 by encouraging the resettlement of large numbers of
14 Chinese in Tibet.

15 (6) The Government of the People's Republic of
16 China continues to engage in unfair trade practices
17 against the United States by raising tariffs, employ-
18 ing taxes as a surcharge on tariffs, using discrimina-
19 tory customs rates, imposing import quotas and
20 other quantitative restrictions, barring the importa-
21 tion of certain items, using licensing and testing re-
22 quirements to limit imports, and falsifying country
23 of origin documentation to transship textiles and
24 other items to the United States through Hong
25 Kong and third countries.

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1 (7) Although the Government of the People's
2 Republic of China has pledged to adhere to the
3 guidelines and parameters of the Missile Technology
4 Control Regime, there are continuing reports of Chi-
5 nese transfers of military technology covered by such
6 Regime to the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.

7 (8) The Government of the People's Republic of
8 China continues to unjustly restrict and imprison re-
9 ligious leaders and members of religious groups who
10 do not adhere to the dogma and control of state-
11 sponsored religious organizations.

12 (9) It is the policy and practice of the Govern-
13 ment of the People's Republic of China's Communist
14 Party to control all trade unions and suppress and
15 harass members of the independent labor union
16 movement.

17 (10) The Government of the People's Republic
18 of China continues to harass and restrict the activi-
19 ties of accredited journalists and to restrict broad-
20 casts by the Voice of America.

21 (b) POLICY.—It is the sense of the Congress that—

22 (1) with respect to the actions of the People's
23 Republic of China in the areas of human rights,
24 weapons proliferation, and unfair trade practices,

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1 the President should take such action as is necessary
2 to achieve the purposes of this Act, including—

3 (A) urging the Communist Chinese leaders
4 to release all political and religious prisoners in
5 China and Tibet, and to cease forcing the large-
6 scale influx of Chinese settlers into Tibet which
7 is threatening the survival of the Tibetan cul-
8 ture;

9 (B) conducting diplomatic negotiations
10 with the Government of the People's Republic
11 of China to encourage them to allow inter-
12 national human rights and humanitarian orga-
13 nizations access to prisoners in China and
14 Tibet;

15 (C) directing the United States Trade Rep-
16 resentative to take necessary and appropriate
17 action pursuant to section 301 of the Trade Act
18 of 1974 and the Memorandum of Understand-
19 ing between the Governments of the United
20 States and People's Republic of China concern-
21 ing market access, signed October 10, 1992,
22 with respect to the continuing unfair trade
23 practices of the People's Republic of China that
24 are discriminatory and unreasonably restrict
25 United States commerce; and

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1 (D) encouraging members of the Missile
2 Technology Control Regime and other countries
3 to develop a common policy concerning the Peo-
4 ple's Republic of China's transfer of missile
5 technology to other countries;

6 (2) sanctions being applied against the People's
7 Republic of China on the date of the enactment of
8 this Act should be continued and strictly enforced;
9 and

10 (3) the President should direct the Secretary of
11 Commerce to consult with American business lead-
12 ers, having significant trade with or investments in
13 the People's Republic of China, to encourage them
14 to adopt a voluntary code of conduct that—

15 (A) follows internationally recognized
16 human rights principles;

17 (B) ensures that the employment of Chi-
18 nese citizens is not discriminatory in terms of
19 sex, ethnic origin, or political belief;

20 (C) refrains from knowingly using prison
21 labor;

22 (D) recognizes workers right to organize
23 and bargain collectively; and

24 (E) discourages mandatory political indoctrination
25 on business sites.

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1 SEC. 3. MINIMUM STANDARDS WHICH THE GOVERNMENT
2 OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA MUST
3 MEET TO CONTINUE TO RECEIVE NON-
4 DISCRIMINATORY MOST-FAVORED-NATION
5 TREATMENT.

6 Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, the
7 President may not recommend continuation of a waiver
8 for the 12-month period beginning July 3, 1994, under
9 section 402(d) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C.
10 2432(d)) for the People's Republic of China, unless the
11 President reports in the document required to be submit-
12 ted by such section that the government of that country—

13 (1) has taken appropriate actions to begin ad-
14 hering to the provisions of the Universal Declaration
15 of Human Rights in China and Tibet;

16 (2) is allowing unrestricted emigration of the
17 citizens who desire to leave China for reasons of po-
18 litical or religious persecution to join family mem-
19 bers abroad, or for other valid reasons;

20 (3) has provided an acceptable accounting for
21 and release of Chinese citizens detained, accused, or
22 sentenced as a result of the nonviolent expression of
23 their political beliefs in relation to events which oc-
24 curred during and after the violent repression of
25 demonstrations in Tiananmen Square on June 4,
26 1989, and has provided an acceptable accounting for

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1 and release of other citizens detained, accused, or
2 sentenced for the nonviolent expression of their po-
3 litical beliefs or for peacefully exercising their inter-
4 nationally guaranteed rights of freedom of speech,
5 association, and assembly;

6 (4) has taken effective, verifiable action to pre-
7 vent export of products to the United States manu-
8 factured wholly or in part by convict, forced, or in-
9 dentured labor and has complied with the terms of
10 the Memorandum of Understanding signed on Au-
11 gust 7, 1992, by allowing, without limitation or re-
12 striction, United States Customs officials to visit
13 places suspected of producing such goods for export;
14 and

15 (5) has made overall significant progress in—

16 (A) ceasing religious persecution and lift-
17 ing restrictions on freedom of religious belief in
18 the People's Republic of China and Tibet and
19 ceasing to threaten the survival of the Tibetan
20 culture;

21 (B) releasing leaders and members of reli-
22 gious groups detained, imprisoned, or under
23 house arrest for expression of their religious be-
24 liefs;

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1 (C) ceasing unfair and discriminatory
2 trade practices which restrict and unreasonably
3 burden American business;

4 (D) providing United States exporters fair
5 access to Chinese markets, including lowering
6 tariffs, removing nontariff barriers, and increas-
7 ing the purchase of United States goods and
8 services;

9 (E) adhering to the guidelines and param-
10 eters of the Missile Technology Control Regime
11 and the controls adopted by the Nuclear Suppli-
12 ers Group and the Australian Group on Chemi-
13 cal and Biological Arms;

14 (F) adhering to the Joint Declaration on
15 Hong Kong that was entered into between the
16 United Kingdom and the People's Republic of
17 China;

18 (G) cooperating with United States efforts
19 to obtain an acceptable accounting of United
20 States military personnel who are listed as pris-
21 oners of war or missing in action as a result of
22 their service in—

23 (i) the Korean conflict; or

24 (ii) the Vietnam conflict;

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1 (H) ceasing the jamming of Voice of Amer-
2 ica broadcasts; and

3 (I) providing international human rights
4 and humanitarian groups access to prisoners,
5 trials, and places of detention.

6 **SEC. 4. REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT.**

7 If the President recommends in 1994 that the waiver
8 referred to in section 3 be continued for the People's Re-
9 public of China, the President shall state in the document
10 required to be submitted to the Congress by section 402(d)
11 of the Trade Act of 1974, the extent to which the Govern-
12 ment of the People's Republic of China has complied with
13 the provisions of section 3, during the period covered by
14 the document.

15 **SEC. 5. NONDISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT FOR PRODUCTS**
16 **FROM NONSTATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES.**

17 (a) **IN GENERAL.**—Notwithstanding any other provi-
18 sions of law, if nondiscriminatory treatment is not granted
19 to the People's Republic of China by reason of the occur-
20 rence of an event described in subsection (b), non-
21 discriminatory treatment shall—

22 (1) continue to apply to any good that is pro-
23 duced or manufactured by a person that is not a
24 state-owned enterprise of the People's Republic of
25 China, but

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1 (2) not apply to any such good that is marketed
2 or otherwise exported by a state-owned enterprise of
3 the People's Republic of China.

4 Nondiscriminatory treatment under this section shall be
5 in effect for the same period of time the waiver referred
6 to in section 3 would have been effective had it taken ef-
7 fect.

8 (b) EVENTS.—An event described in this subsection
9 means—

10 (1) the President fails to request the waiver re-
11 ferred to in section 3 and reports to the Congress
12 that such failure was a result of the President's in-
13 ability to report that the People's Republic of China
14 has met the standards described in such section; or

15 (2) the President requests the waiver referred
16 to in section 3, but a disapproval resolution de-
17 scribed in subsection (c)(1) is enacted into law.

18 (c) DISAPPROVAL RESOLUTION.—

19 (1) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of this section,
20 the term "resolution" means only a joint resolution
21 of the two Houses of Congress, the matter after the
22 resolving clause of which is as follows: "That the
23 Congress does not approve the extension of the au-
24 thority contained in section 402(c) of the Trade Act
25 of 1974 recommended by the President to the Con-

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1 gress on _____ with respect to the People's Re-
2 public of China because the Congress does not agree
3 that the People's Republic of China has met the
4 standards described in section 3 of the United
5 States-China Act of 1993", with the blank space
6 being filled with the appropriate date.

7 (2) APPLICABLE RULES.—The provisions of
8 sections 153 (other than paragraphs (3) and (4) of
9 subsection (b) of such section) and 402(d)(2) (as
10 modified by this subsection) of the Trade Act of
11 1974 shall apply to a resolution described in para-
12 graph (1).

13 (d) DETERMINATION OF DUTY STATUS OF ENTER-
14 PRISES.—

15 (1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (2),
16 the Secretary of the Treasury shall determine which
17 persons are state-owned enterprises of the People's
18 Republic of China for purposes of this Act and com-
19 pile and maintain a list of such persons.

20 (2) DEFINITIONS AND SPECIAL RULES.—For
21 purposes of making the determination required by
22 paragraph (1), the following definitions apply:

23 (A)(i) The term "state-owned enterprise of
24 the People's Republic of China" means a person
25 affiliated with or wholly owned, controlled, or

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1 subsidized by the Government of the People's
2 Republic of China and whose means of produc-
3 tion, products, and revenues are owned or con-
4 trolled by a central or provincial government
5 authority. A person shall be considered to be
6 state-owned if—

7 (I) the person's assets are primarily
8 owned by a central or provincial govern-
9 ment authority;

10 (II) a substantial proportion of the
11 person's profits are required to be submit-
12 ted to a central or provincial government
13 authority;

14 (III) the person's production, pur-
15 chases of inputs, and sales of output, in
16 whole or in part, are subject to state, sec-
17 toral, or regional plans; or

18 (IV) a license issued by a government
19 authority classifies the person as state-
20 owned.

21 (ii) Any person that—

22 (I) is a qualified foreign joint venture
23 or is licensed by a governmental authority
24 as a collective, cooperative, or private en-
25 terprise; or

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1 (II) is wholly owned by a foreign per-
2 son,

3 shall not be considered to be state-owned.

4 (B) The term "qualified foreign joint ven-
5 ture" means any person—

6 (i) which is registered and licensed in
7 the agency or department of the Govern-
8 ment of the People's Republic of China
9 concerned with foreign economic relations
10 and trade as an equity, cooperative, con-
11 tractual joint venture, or joint stock com-
12 pany with foreign investment;

13 (ii) in which the foreign investor part-
14 ner and a person of the People's Republic
15 of China share profits and losses and joint-
16 ly manage the venture;

17 (iii) in which the foreign investor
18 partner holds or controls at least 25 per-
19 cent of the investment and the foreign in-
20 vestor partner is not substantially owned
21 or controlled by a state-owned enterprise of
22 the People's Republic of China;

23 (iv) in which the foreign investor part-
24 ner is not a person of a country the gov-
25 ernment of which the Secretary of State

1 has determined under section 6(j) of the
2 Export Administration Act of 1979 to have
3 repeatedly provided support for acts of
4 international terrorism; and

5 (v) which does not use state-owned
6 enterprises of the People's Republic of
7 China to export its good or services.

8 (C) The term "person" means a natural
9 person, corporation, partnership, enterprise, in-
10 strumentality, agency, or other entity.

11 (D) The term "foreign investor partner"
12 means—

13 (i) a natural person who is not a citi-
14 zen of the People's Republic of China; and

15 (ii) a corporation, partnership, instru-
16 mentality, enterprise, agency, or other en-
17 tity that is organized under the laws of a
18 country other than the People's Republic
19 of China and 50 percent or more of the
20 outstanding capital stock or beneficial in-
21 terest of such entity is owned (directly or
22 indirectly) by natural persons who are not
23 citizens of the People's Republic of China.

24 (e) PETITION FOR CHANGE IN DUTY STATUS.—Any
25 person who believes that a person should be included on

1 or excluded from the list compiled by the Secretary under
2 subsection (d)(1) may request that the Secretary review
3 the status of such person.

4 **SEC. 6. EFFECT OF GATT ENTRY ON MFN STATUS.**

5 Notwithstanding the entry of the People's Republic
6 of China into the General Agreement on Tariffs and
7 Trade, most-favored-nation treatment shall not be auto-
8 matically conferred on the products of the People's Repub-
9 lic of China unless the People's Republic of China satisfies
10 the standards described in section 3 and complies with sec-
11 tion 402 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2432).

12 **SEC. 7. SANCTIONS BY OTHER COUNTRIES.**

13 If the President decides not to seek a continuation
14 of a waiver in 1994 under section 402(d) of the Trade
15 Act of 1974 for the People's Republic of China, the Presi-
16 dent shall, during the 30-day period beginning on the date
17 that the President would have recommended to the Con-
18 gress that such a waiver be continued, undertake efforts
19 to ensure that members of the General Agreement on Tar-
20 iffs and Trade take similar action with respect to the Peo-
21 ple's Republic of China.

22 **SEC. 8. DEFINITIONS.**

23 For purposes of this Act:

24 (1) **DETAINED AND IMPRISONED.**—The terms
25 “detained” and “imprisoned” include, but are not

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1 limited to, incarceration in prisons, jails, labor re-
2 form camps, labor reeducation camps, and local po-
3 lice detention centers.

4 (2) ACCEPTABLE ACCOUNTING.—The term “ac-
5 ceptable accounting” includes—

6 (A) providing information regarding the lo-
7 cation of any person being held,

8 (B) the legal status of such person,

9 (C) if convicted, the sentence of such per-
10 son, and

11 (D) if released, when and with what re-
12 strictions.

13 (3) CONVICT, FORCED, OR INDENTURED
14 LABOR.—The term “convict, forced, or indentured
15 labor” has the meaning given such term by section
16 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1307).

17 (4) VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONALLY REC-
18 OGNIZED STANDARDS OF HUMAN RIGHTS.—The
19 term “violations of internationally recognized stand-
20 ards of human rights” includes, but is not limited
21 to, torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
22 or punishment, prolonged detention without charges
23 and trial, causing the disappearance of persons by
24 the abduction and clandestine detention of those per-
25 sons, secret judicial proceedings, and other flagrant

1 denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security of
2 any person.

3 (5) MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME.—

4 The term “Missile Technology Control Regime”
5 means the agreement, as amended, between the
6 United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Re-
7 public of Germany, France, Italy, Canada, and
8 Japan, announced on April 16, 1987, to restrict sen-
9 sitive missile-relevant transfers based on an annex of
10 missile equipment and technology.

11 (6) SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS.—(A) The term
12 “significant progress” in section 3, means the imple-
13 mentation of measures that will meaningfully reduce,
14 or lead to the end of, the practices identified in such
15 section.

16 (B) With regard to section 3(5)(E), progress
17 may not be determined to be “significant progress”
18 if, after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
19 President determines that the People’s Republic of
20 China has transferred—

21 (i) ballistic missiles or missile launchers for
22 the M-9 or M-11 weapons systems to Syria,
23 Pakistan, or Iran; or

24 (ii) material, equipment, or technology that
25 would contribute significantly to the manufac-

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
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1 ture of a nuclear explosive device to another
2 country and that the material, equipment, or
3 technology is to be used by such country in the
4 manufacture of such device.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 26, 1993



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: KENT WIEDEMANN *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on China

The objective of this meeting is to decide tactics to encourage positive Chinese responses to overcome human rights proliferation, and trade concerns, before MFN comes up for renewal on June 3. Congressional strategy on MFN will be a major topic for discussion.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to forward the announcement to his counterparts.

Approve Disapprove

Attachments

- Tab I Itoh/Counterparts Memorandum
- Tab A Proposed Agenda
- Tab B China Policy Paper

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title: DC0030 DC Meeting on China Most Favored Nation, May 19, 1993 [1]				
Staff Office-Individual: Records Management				
Original OA/ID Number: 3995				
Row: 43	Section: 4	Shelf: 5	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. paper	re: China: MFN Decision and Implementation (5 pages)	05/18/1993	P1/b(1)
001b. paper	re: Conditions on MFN for China: Options for an Executive Order and Legislative Strategy (5 pages)	05/15/1993	P1/b(1) KDC 3/11/2020
001c. draft	Executive Order Options 1, 2, & 3 (6 pages)	05/15/1993	P1/b(1) KDC 3/11/2020
001d. paper	re: M-11 Missile Issue (4 pages) <i>partial release</i>	05/00/1993	P1/b(1) <i>KDC 3/11/2020</i>
001e. memo	Kent Wiedemann to Samuel Berger re: China: MFN Decision and Implementation [incomplete copy] (1 page)	05/15/1993	P1/b(1)
001f. memo	Kent Wiedemann to Samuel Berger re: China: MFN Decision and Implementation (7 pages)	05/15/1993	P1/b(1)
001g. paper	re: China: MFN Decision and Implementation (5 pages)	05/00/1993	P1/b(1)
002. minutes	re: Minutes of the DC Meeting on China MFN (7 pages) <i>partial release</i>	05/19/1993	P1/b(1) <i>b(3) KDC 3/11/2020</i>
003a. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of the DC Meeting on China: MFN (2 pages) <i>partial release</i>	05/19/1993	P1/b(1) <i>b(3) KDC 3/11/2020</i>
003b. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of the DC Meeting on China: MFN (2 pages) <i>partial release</i>	05/19/1993	P1/b(1) <i>b(3) KDC 3/11/2020</i>
003c. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of the DC Meeting on China: MFN (2 pages) <i>partial release</i>	05/19/1993	P1/b(1) <i>b(3) KDC 3/11/2020</i>
003d. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of the DC Meeting on China: MFN (2 pages) <i>partial release</i>	05/19/1993	P1/b(1) <i>b(3) KDC 3/11/2020</i>

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003e. minutes	re: Minutes of DC Meeting on China MFN (7 pages) <i>partial release</i>	05/19/1993	b(1) b(3) KDF 3/11/2020

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 3995

FOLDER TITLE:

DC0030 DC Meeting on China Most Favored Nation, May 19, 1993 [1]

2015-0221-M
rs1201

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TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 18 MAY 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
DC

MFN
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 19 MAY DC MTG ON CHINA MFN

ACTION: KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 18 MAY 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WIEDEMANN

LOGREF: 9320537

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC0030

CODES:

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FOR CONCURRENCE

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002 BERGER	Z 93051721 REDO FOR DECISION
002	X 93052015 ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/S
003 BERGER	Z 93051814 FOR DECISION
003	X 93051821 BERGER APPROVED RECOM
004	X 93051821 KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES
005	X 93052516 ADD-ON / FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

<u>DOC</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR ACTION</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR INFO</u>
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004	930518	FUERTH, L	
004	930518	GROSSMAN, M	
004	930518	KNIGHT, E	
004	930518	SHERFIELD, M	
004	930518	MONTGOMERY, F	
004	930518	LAUDER, J	
004	930518	INDERFURTH, K	
004	930518	TYSON, L	
004	930518	SHEFFIELD, H	
004	930518	CUTTER, W	

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DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

FROM: <u>National Security Council</u>	PHONE: <u>202-456-2291</u>	ROOM: <u>WHSR</u>
SUBJECT: <u>Notice of Meeting</u>	ON 19 MAY 3:30 PM	PAGES: <u>36</u>

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

20518

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
<u>USUN New York</u>	<u>Mr. Rick Inderfurth</u>	<u>212-415-4016</u>	<u>212-415-4177</u>

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MESSAGE NO. 0961 CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES 37

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(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION DC MTG ON CHINA MFN
LOG # 20518

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
COMMERCE	PATTY MCHUGH	_____	_____
TREASURY	EDWARD KNIGHT	_____	_____
<u>CIA</u>	<u>JOHN LAUDER</u>	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
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MESSAGE NO. 0901 CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES 34

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (202) 456-2585 WH/WEST WING
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION DC MTG ON CHINA MFN

LOG # 20518

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
COMMERCE	PATTY MCHUGH		
TREASURY	EDWARD KNIGHT		
<i>A</i> CIA	JOHN LAUDER		

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MESSAGE NO. 0961 CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES 34

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (202) 456-2585 WH/WEST WING
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION DC MTG ON CHINA MFN

LOG # 20518

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
COMMERCE	PATTY MCHUGH		
TREASURY	EDWARD KNIGHT		
<u>CIA</u>	<u>JOHN LAUDER</u>		

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COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS
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5-19-93 10AM Liz Lindemuth

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TREASURY

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COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
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CIA

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JCS

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 18, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the United States to the
United Nations

MR. EDWARD KNIGHT
Executive Secretary
Department of Treasury

DR. LAURA D. TYSON
Chair, Council of Economic
Advisors

COL. MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense


CAPT. H. L. SHEFFIELD
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Executive Director for Policy
Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

MR. BOWMAN CUTTER
Deputy Assistant to the
President for Economic
Policy

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on China MFN ~~(S)~~

A Deputies Committee Meeting is scheduled for Wednesday, May 19, 3:30 - 5:00pm, White House Situation Room. Attached are discussion papers to be used for the DC. ~~(S)~~


William H. Ito
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab A Discussion Paper
Tab B Grossman/Lake Memorandum dated May 15, 1993
Tab C Mitchell/Pelosi Letter to Winston Lord dated May 14
Tab D M-11 Paper Prepared by Office of Nonproliferation, NSC
Tab E U.S. Policy Instruments Beyond MFN

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May 15, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: China: MFN Conditions and Congressional Strategy

The attached paper discusses renewal of China's MFN status in 1994. It reviews three options for MFN conditionality. USTR supports a fourth option: non-conditionality. The following paper also recommends a legislative strategy aimed at keeping Congress and the Executive branch in unison in handling the MFN issue.

Marc Grossman
Marc Grossman
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated.

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By VL NARA, Date 7/15/2014
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(secmpol 7896, 7-9141, 5/15/93)

cleared: EAP:PTomsen
HA:JBishop
H:RBradtke
PM:REinhorn
EB:JShelton
L:JBorek
P:ERevere
NSC:KWiedemann

AC

CONDITIONS ON MFN FOR CHINA:
OPTIONS FOR AN EXECUTIVE ORDER AND LEGISLATIVE STRATEGY

SUMMARY

There are three options for executive branch conditions on renewal of China's MFN status in June 1994:

- Detailed, comprehensive conditions on human rights and prison labor, with the need for progress on nonproliferation and other trade issues addressed through existing law;
- Generally stated conditions with specifics spelled out in the President's report to Congress; and
- Conditions on human rights only.

On balance, the first and second options provide the greatest advantages with regard to the domestic and foreign policy issues in play. While Option 1 would offer the easiest prospects of obtaining congressional support, Option 2 would be the most effective in generating Chinese progress in the areas of U.S. concern.

No matter which option is selected, intensive consultations with Congress in the weeks ahead, coordinated by the Department of State's Bureau for Legislative Affairs and involving the President, are essential to maintaining executive branch-congressional unity on this issue. Attached are three executive order options (Tab A), a draft Jackson-Vanik transmittal document to Congress and report to Congress regarding China MFN (Tab B), and a draft Presidential Jackson-Vanik waiver determination (Tab C). After congressional consultations, a Presidential statement will be prepared for delivery at the Executive Order signing ceremony. The statement will put our MFN conditionality in the broader context of our China policy and include reference to our readiness to move Sino-American relations to a new and higher level, depending on Chinese actions.

BASIC PREMISES

Executive conditions are preferable to legislative action because they preserve executive prerogatives and flexibility in achieving our foreign policy goals with respect to China. In addition, an Executive Order better manifests the President's determination to pursue improvements in China's policies than do the Presidential statements in the annual MFN reports to Congress the past few years. At the same time, we should look for ways to get beyond MFN conditions and to use other methods to address U.S. concerns with regard to China in the future.

Senator Mitchell and Representative Pelosi have indicated privately their willingness to accept Executive Branch conditionality that addresses core congressional concerns including: release and accounting of political prisoners; adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; compliance with the 1992 MOU on prison labor; access to prisoners, trials, and places of detention; cessation of VOA jamming; and significant progress in protecting Tibetan culture. They have also indicated that the Executive Order must address nonproliferation concerns and unfair trade practices, but have pointed out that the President already has mechanisms available in law to pursue these objectives.

The three options call for overall, significant progress, as determined by the President, in Chinese actions regarding our concerns. If a year from now China has made progress in the three areas, without retrogression in any that would outweigh the progress made, the President should be in a position to reward that improved behavior. We cannot realistically require 100% satisfaction on all our standards. Our goal is to attain maximum possible Chinese movement in the three areas of concern.

OPTIONS FOR CONDITIONS

Option 1 - Comprehensive Conditions: This option (see Tab A) is the closest match to congressional concerns as privately expressed by Mitchell and Pelosi. The conditions in all three areas of U.S. concern--human rights, trade, and nonproliferation--are included in the Executive Order, but MFN renewal is specifically conditioned only on a core group of human rights concerns and prison labor. The Executive Order would refer to the use of other enforcement mechanisms, already available in law and in executive determinations, to address nonproliferation and other trade concerns.

Option 1

Pros: Provides strong pressure on China to address specific U.S. concerns. It closely reflects concerns of Mitchell-Pelosi and would be likely to secure the broadest congressional support. It would be most preferred by human rights groups and would project maximum resolve by the Administration. It also moves U.S. policy away from complete reliance on denial of MFN regarding nonproliferation and trade.

Cons: This specifically detailed approach on human rights and prison labor may diminish--not increase--the chances for a constructive Chinese response and for progress over the next year. Indeed, the Chinese may be less inclined to move forward on the basis that they will be seen by domestic and foreign audiences to be bowing to foreign pressure on the specific items enumerated. Lack of progress might thereby increase the chances that the President would not be able to extend the Jackson-Vanik waiver in 1994, since requirements may not have been met.

Option 2 - General Conditions: This option (see Tab A) provides more generally worded conditions in the three areas of human rights, trade, and nonproliferation, and therefore sets targets easier for the Chinese to hit. To satisfy the Administration's and Congress' concerns that we have specific goals in mind for improvement in China's behavior as laid out in Option 1, we would spell them out in strong and detailed language in the President's annual report to Congress (Tab B). The Presidential statement at the time of the Executive Order signing could repeat the details.

Option 2

Pros: Generally worded, these conditions would provide maximum flexibility to the Administration. Despite the more general language, the utilization of an Executive Order on MFN conditions would represent the toughest approach yet by any Administration in placing pressure on China to act in the three areas. The lack of detail in the Executive Order would be less offensive to China and perhaps induce relatively more Chinese concessions over the next year. Also, in diplomatic channels, we would continue to press China on the more detailed agenda. Japan, the Europeans, and other friendly or allied governments would prefer this approach.

Cons: Congressional elements will complain that the Administration has not gone far enough. Human rights and other interest groups would charge the Administration and Congress with backing away from its previous position. The projection of resolve on Chinese human rights abuses would be less than in Option 1.

Option 3 - Human Rights Conditions Only: Under this option (Tab A), the U.S. would impose conditions only on China's human rights behavior. We would include all human rights-related conditions listed in Option 1, but not address trade and nonproliferation. We would note in the Presidential report to Congress that this approach does not indicate a lessening in Administration concern for our goals in nonproliferation and trade, which the President remains determined to pursue. Rather, we would use levers other than MFN to pursue them. Policy tools available to the U.S. to press for change in China's trade and nonproliferation policies include: section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act (market access and intellectual property rights); the Helms Amendment and other U.S. laws concerning proliferation and nuclear cooperation; section 3004 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (exchange rate and economic policies); and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (narcotics cooperation). Remaining Tiananmen-related sanctions would provide additional leverage for advancing U.S. goals across the full range of concerns.

In sum, human rights would gain unique emphasis as the one area of conditionality under MFN. We would use non-MFN incentives and disincentives to seek needed progress on trade and nonproliferation.

Option 3

- Pros: This option would focus the undiluted leverage of MFN on human rights, the most important U.S. concern (including in Congress) and the one most logically associated with the spirit of Jackson-Vanik. It would provide the Administration greater flexibility in managing relations with China.
- Cons: This option would probably be the most difficult to sell on the Hill. Congressional and other advocates of nonproliferation and trade could insist on their areas being included in the Executive Order, pressing the Executive Branch to negotiate adding these areas to the Executive Order. Though the conditions would be fewer, human rights standards are the most difficult for China to meet; thus, the likelihood of termination of MFN might be increased.

LEGISLATIVE STRATEGY

Whatever specific conditionality option is chosen, it is critical that the Administration speak with one voice in presenting our position to Congress. The Department of State's Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs (H) should have the overall responsibility for managing legislative strategy, working with the substantive and legislative offices of the White House, NSC, NEC, State, USTR, Commerce, Treasury, and USDA. H will receive input for legislative strategy from all interested agencies and offices and coordinate with them on the timing of Hill briefings, meetings, and hearings. (The Trade Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee is likely to hold a hearing.) H will also ensure that these agencies and offices are informed of congressional developments.

Once the President has decided upon a conditionality option, we will begin a series of meetings with Congress. The State Department will take the lead in representing the Administration in these meetings. We envisage initial, quiet meetings with Senator Mitchell, Representative Pelosi, and Chairmen Rostenkowski and Gibbons to seek their support for our conditionality package. We would then move to more formal meetings to include a bipartisan White House-leadership

meeting, followed by more detailed briefings with key committees, including House Ways and Means, Senate Finance, House Foreign Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations, and with other individual members influential on this issue. Throughout the process, the State Department would also ensure that there is close coordination with the Congressional leadership.

After consultations have been completed, we will assess the results and recommend a strategy for involving senior Administration officials as necessary. This may well be an appropriate point for a White House meeting with key members to build congressional support. Assuming our approach receives congressional support, we would request that the President invite key Senators and Representatives to the White House for a public ceremony to sign the Executive Order.

Attachments:

- Tab A - Executive Order Options
- Tab B - Draft Transmittal Letter and Report to Congress
- Tab C - Draft Presidential Determination

- - - - -

DESIGNATION OF CONDITIONS FOR RENEWAL OF
MOST FAVORED NATION STATUS FOR THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN 1994

WHEREAS, the Congress and the American people have expressed deep concern about the appropriateness of unconditional most favored nation trading status for the People's Republic of China;

WHEREAS, I share the concerns of the Congress and the American people regarding this important issue, particularly with respect to China's record on human rights, non-proliferation, and trade;

WHEREAS, I have carefully weighed the advisability of conditioning China's most favored nation status as a means of achieving progress in these areas;

WHEREAS, I have concluded that the public interest would be best served by a continuation of the waiver of the application of sections 402 (a) and (b) of the Trade Act of 1974 (the Act) on China's most favored nation status for an additional twelve months with renewal thereafter subject to the conditions below;

MINDFUL of my authority to recommend waivers under section 402(d) of the Act;

NOW, THEREFORE, by the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, I hereby order as follows:

Section 1. The Secretary of State (hereinafter, the "Secretary") shall exercise primary authority within the executive branch regarding all matters relating to the extension of most favored nation status for the People's Republic of China.

Section 2. All executive departments and agencies shall, in accordance with such instructions and procedures as the Secretary may prescribe, promptly and regularly inform the Department of State concerning information and activities within their jurisdiction that may be relevant to the issue of most favored nation status for China.

Section 3. The Secretary or other appropriate officials of the Department of State shall be the sole executive branch spokesperson regarding most favored nation status for China, and he shall promptly initiate, coordinate, and supervise appropriate consultations within the executive branch and with the Congress concerning this issue.

Section 4. In considering whether to propose to me that I recommend the extension of China's most favored nation status for the twelve month period beginning June 3, 1994, the Secretary shall take into account whether China has made overall, significant progress with respect to the following areas:

- Respecting the fundamental human rights recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, including freedom of emigration; freedom of thought, conscience and religion; freedom of opinion and expression; and freedom of peaceful assembly and association.
- Providing an acceptable accounting for and release of Chinese citizens imprisoned or detained for the peaceful expression of their political views, including Democracy Wall and Tiananmen activists.
- Taking effective actions to ensure that prisoners are not being mistreated and are receiving necessary medical treatment, such as by granting access to Chinese prisons and places of detention by international humanitarian organizations.
- Protecting Tibet's distinctive religious and cultural heritage.
- Ceasing the jamming of Voice of America broadcasts.
- Complying with the terms of China's 1992 bilateral agreement with the U.S. on prison labor.

Section 5. The Secretary, and other appropriate officials of the U.S. government, shall also use the full force of relevant legislation and executive determinations, as appropriate, to ensure that China abides by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Missile Technology Control Regime guidelines and parameters, and its other non-proliferation commitments, as well as fair and non-discriminatory trade practices toward American business.

Section 6. The Secretary shall submit his findings to me before June 3, 1994.

Section 7. This Order is not intended to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by a party against the United States, its agencies, its offices, or employees, or by any other entity of person.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

THE WHITE HOUSE,
_____, 1993

EXECUTIVE ORDER (OPTION 2)

- - - - -

**DESIGNATION OF CONDITIONS FOR RENEWAL OF
MOST FAVORED NATION STATUS FOR THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN 1994**

WHEREAS, the Congress and the American people have expressed deep concern about the appropriateness of unconditional most favored nation trading status for the People's Republic of China;

WHEREAS, I share the concerns of the Congress and the American people regarding this important issue, particularly with respect to China's record on human rights, non-proliferation, and trade;

WHEREAS, I have carefully weighed the advisability of conditioning China's most favored nation status as a means of achieving progress in these areas;

WHEREAS, I have concluded that the public interest would be best served by a continuation of the waiver of the application of sections 402 (a) and (b) of the Trade Act of 1974 (the Act) on China's most favored nation status for an additional twelve months with renewal thereafter subject to the conditions below;

MINDFUL of my authority to recommend waivers under section 402(d) of the Act;

NOW, THEREFORE, by the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, I hereby order as follows:

Section 1. The Secretary of State (hereinafter, the "Secretary") shall exercise primary authority within the executive branch regarding all matters relating to the extension of most favored nation status for the People's Republic of China.

Section 2. All executive departments and agencies shall, in accordance with such instructions and procedures as the Secretary may prescribe, promptly and regularly inform the Department of State concerning information and activities within their jurisdiction that may be relevant to the issue of most favored nation status for China.

Section 3. The Secretary or other appropriate officials of the Department of State shall be the sole executive branch spokesperson regarding most favored nation status for China, and he shall promptly initiate, coordinate, and supervise appropriate consultations within the executive branch and with the Congress concerning this issue.

Section 4. In considering whether to propose to me that I recommend the extension of China's most favored nation status for the twelve month period beginning June 3, 1994, the Secretary shall take into account whether China has made overall, significant progress in the following areas:

Human Rights

- Ensuring freedom to emigrate and travel abroad.
- Releasing prisoners of conscience, including Democracy Wall and Tiananmen activists, and religious leaders.
- Protecting Tibet's distinctive religious and cultural heritage.
- Insuring humane treatment of prisoners, such as by allowing access to prisons by international humanitarian organizations.

Non-proliferation

- Participating actively and constructively in international efforts to combat proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and abiding by commitments it has accepted.

Trade

- Implementing its bilateral agreements by:
 - o Providing U.S. exporters fair access to Chinese markets.
 - o Preventing exports to the U.S. of goods made by prison labor.
 - o Protecting intellectual property rights.

Section 5. The Secretary shall submit his findings to me before June 3, 1994.

Section 6. This Order is not intended to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by a party against the United States, its agencies, its offices, or employees, or by any other entity of person.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

EXECUTIVE ORDER (OPTION 3)

- - - - -

**DESIGNATION OF CONDITIONS FOR RENEWAL OF
MOST FAVORED NATION STATUS FOR THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN 1994**

WHEREAS, the Congress and the American people have expressed deep concern about the appropriateness of unconditional most favored nation trading status for the People's Republic of China;

WHEREAS, I share the concerns of the Congress and the American people regarding this important issue, particularly with respect to China's record on human rights, non-proliferation, and trade;

WHEREAS, I have carefully weighed the advisability of conditioning China's most favored nation status as a means of achieving progress in these areas;

WHEREAS, I have concluded that the public interest would be best served by a continuation of the waiver of the application of sections 402 (a) and (b) of the Trade Act of 1974 (the Act) on China's most favored nation status for an additional twelve months with renewal thereafter subject to the conditions below;

MINDFUL of my authority to recommend waivers under section 402(d) of the Act;

NOW, THEREFORE, by the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, I hereby order as follows:

Section 1. The Secretary of State (hereinafter, the "Secretary") shall exercise primary authority within the executive branch regarding all matters relating to the extension of most favored nation status for the People's Republic of China.

Section 2. All executive departments and agencies shall, in accordance with such instructions and procedures as the Secretary may prescribe, promptly and regularly inform the Department of State concerning information and activities within their jurisdiction that may be relevant to the issue of most favored nation status for China.

Section 3. The Secretary or other appropriate officials of the Department of State shall be the sole executive branch spokesperson regarding most favored nation status for China, and he shall promptly initiate, coordinate, and supervise appropriate consultations within the executive branch and with the Congress concerning this issue.

Section 4. In considering whether to propose to me that I recommend the extension of China's most favored nation status for the twelve month period beginning June 3, 1994, the Secretary shall take into account whether China has made overall, significant progress in the following areas:

Human Rights

- Respecting the fundamental human rights recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
- Complying with China's commitment to allow its citizens, regardless of their political views, freedom to emigrate and travel abroad (excepting those who are imprisoned, have criminal proceedings pending against them, or have received court notices concerning civil cases).
- Providing an acceptable accounting for and release of Chinese citizens imprisoned or detained for the peaceful expression of their political views, including Democracy Wall and Tiananmen activists.
- Ceasing religious persecution, particularly by releasing leaders and members of religious groups detained or imprisoned for expression of their religious beliefs.
- Taking effective actions to ensure that prisoners are not being mistreated and are receiving necessary medical treatment, such as by granting access to Chinese prisons by international humanitarian organizations.
- Seeking to resume dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his representatives, and taking measures to protect Tibet's distinctive religious and cultural heritage.
- Ceasing the jamming of Voice of America broadcasts.

Section 5. The Secretary shall submit his findings to me before June 3, 1994.

Section 6. This Order is not intended to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by a party against the United States, its agencies, its offices, or employees, or by any other entity of person.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

Mr. Speaker/Mr. President:

Pursuant to subsection 402(d)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, 19 U.S.C. 2432(d)(1) ("the Act"), I hereby submit the attached report concerning the continuation of a waiver of application of subsections (a) and (b) of section 402 of the Act to the People's Republic of China. The report explains my reasons for having determined that continuation of the waiver currently in effect for the People's Republic of China will substantially promote the objectives of section 402. In addition, I am also transmitting herewith for your further information a copy of an Executive Order which enumerates the specific conditions which I have established with respect to a further extension of the waiver next year for the period beginning June 3, 1994.

William J. Clinton

REPORT TO CONGRESS CONCERNING EXTENSION OF WAIVER
AUTHORITY FOR THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Pursuant to subsection 402(d)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974 (hereinafter "the Act"), having determined that further extension of the waiver authority granted by subsection 402(c) of the Act for the twelve month period beginning June 3, 1994 will substantially promote the objectives of section 402, I have today determined that continuation of the waiver currently applicable to China will also substantially promote the objectives of section 402 of the Act.

Freedom of Emigration Determination

In FY 1992, 26,711 U.S. immigrant visas were issued in China. The U.S. numerical limitation for immigrants from China was fully met. The principal restraint on increased emigration continues to be the capacity and willingness of other nations to absorb Chinese immigrants, not Chinese policy. After considering all the relevant information, I have concluded that continuing the MFN waiver will preserve the gains already achieved on freedom of emigration and encourage further progress. There, thus, continues to be progress in freedom of emigration from China; we will continue to urge more progress.

Chinese Foreign Travel Policies

In FY 1992, 75,758 U.S. visas were issued worldwide to tourists and business visitors from China, a 35 percent increase over FY 1991 and a 76 percent increase over FY 1988. Foreign travel by Chinese-government sponsored businessmen alone increased by 48 percent in FY 1992, reflecting Deng Xiaoping's policies of accelerating China's opening to the outside world.

In FY 1992, 18,908 student visas (including exchange students) were issued, a decline from FY 1991 of 14 percent but still 8 percent greater than FY 1988. The decline was probably the result in part of a recent new directive requiring Chinese college graduates educated at state expense to work for five years before applying for privately-funded overseas study. A drop in funding from recession-strapped U.S. schools and relatives may also have played a role.

Chinese students continue to return from overseas for visits without any apparent problem. With the exception of student activist Shen Tong, we are not aware of any case in which Chinese living in the U.S. who returned to China for visits after June 1989 were prevented from leaving again. Shen was detained in September 1991 and then expelled from China two months later for trying to establish a Beijing chapter of his Fund for Chinese Democracy.

Human Rights Issues

As detailed in the Department's annual human rights report, China's human rights practices remain repressive and fall far short of internationally-accepted norms. Freedoms of speech, assembly, association, and religion are sharply restricted.

China understands that the Clinton Administration has made human rights a cornerstone of our foreign policy. We have already repeatedly raised our concerns with the Chinese authorities and we intend to press at every opportunity for observance of internationally accepted standards of human rights practice.

We have made numerous requests for information on specific human rights cases. China has provided information on some of these cases but further and more complete responses are necessary. The Chinese recently released, prior to completion of their sentences, several prominent dissidents whom we had identified on lists provided to them. These included not only Tiananmen-era demonstrators but also Democracy Wall (circa 1979) activists. We hope this is the first step toward a broad and general amnesty for all prisoners of conscience.

The Chinese promised then Secretary Baker in 1991 that all Chinese citizens, regardless of their political views, have the right to travel abroad. The only exceptions are citizens who are imprisoned, have criminal proceedings pending against them, or have received court notices concerning civil cases. A number of prominent dissidents, despite long delays, have been able to leave China. Some others have not. Those who have been able to obtain exit permits in the past year include labor leader Han Dongfang, writers Wang Ruowang and Bai Hua, scientist Wen Yuankai, journalists Wang Ruoshui, Zhang Weiguo, and Zhu Xingqing, and scholar Liu Qing. Others, like Hou Xiaotian, Yu Haocheng, and Li Honglin, continue to face difficulties in obtaining exit permission. We continue to press the Chinese on these and other cases. **(Should Executive Order option 2 with general conditionality be accepted, detailed and specific benchmarks would be placed at the end of this document, per pages 6-8.)**

Our goal is the release of all those held solely for the peaceful expression of their political and religious views. In November 1991, the Chinese confirmed to Secretary Baker the release of 133 prisoners on a list presented them earlier in June of that year. Since then, the Chinese have released additional political prisoners, including Han Dongfang, Wang Youcai, Luo Haixing, Xiong Yan, Yang Wei, Wang Zhixin, Zhang Weiguo, Wang Dan, Wang Xizhe, Gao Shan, Bao Zunxin, and a number of Catholic clergy and lesser known activists. We continue to press for a general amnesty and for permission for international humanitarian organizations to have access to Chinese prisons. We have also pressed for improvement in the conditions of those in Chinese prisons.

China has recently and for the first time admitted publicly that domestic human rights policies are a legitimate topic of international discussion. China has hosted human rights delegations from France, Australia, the U.K., and Germany. China sent several delegations to the U.S. and Europe, as well as Southeast Asia, to study foreign human rights practices and issued a "white paper" maintaining that basic human rights are observed in China and arguing that a country's human rights record should be viewed in light of its own history and culture. We reject this limited definition of human rights but believe it is a significant step forward that China is willing to debate human rights issues with its international critics.

The U.S. continually raises with the Chinese government the need for protection of Tibet's distinctive religion and culture. We are concerned about China's heavy-handed suppression of political demonstrations in the Tibetan Autonomous Region. Demonstrations, on a smaller scale than in past years, continue to result in instances of brutal beatings and long detentions. China has admitted some foreign observers to Tibet and to the main Lhasa prison. Diplomatic reports state that the Chinese Government is providing funds for rebuilding monasteries and that monks are now provided more leeway in their religious practices. In recent years, an increasing number of non-Tibetan Chinese have moved to the Tibetan Autonomous Region in search of economic opportunity. We will continue to monitor closely reports that the PRC is encouraging involuntary emigration by non-Tibetan Chinese to areas traditionally settled by Tibetans. So far, we have found no evidence of a Chinese government policy to this effect.

Non-Proliferation Issues

China's support for global nonproliferation initiatives has increased substantially since the beginning of 1992. In March 1992, China acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and adhered to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines and parameters. In January 1993, Beijing became an original signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). China now is a party to all of the leading nonproliferation agreements. These commitments have influenced Chinese behavior: Beijing has refrained from selling certain sensitive items because of proliferation concerns, and nonproliferation as an issue appears to receive more senior consideration in Chinese policy-making circles.

At the same time, certain sensitive Chinese exports raise questions about PRC compliance with these commitments. At present, the greatest concern involves reports that China in November 1992 transferred MTCR-class M-11 missiles or related equipment to Pakistan. Such a transfer would violate China's MTCR commitment and trigger powerful sanctions under U.S. missile proliferation law. There also are reports that China is exercising inadequate control over sensitive nuclear, chemical, and missile technology exports to countries of proliferation concern. Even if these sales do not violate PRC obligations, they raise questions about China's appreciation of the importance of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their ballistic missile delivery systems.

We are also concerned that China has withdrawn from the Middle East arms control (ACME) talks. The U.S. holds that, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China has a special responsibility to continue in these talks.

Seeking full Chinese compliance with multilateral obligations and support for international nonproliferation goals is a top Administration priority. **(Following terminology will be added to the report here if option 2 is chosen: Conditioning China's MFN status on PRC nonproliferation behavior is therefore a sensible and effective means to exercise U.S. influence. In addition to the MFN conditions, the U.S. will also not hesitate to employ the resources under U.S. law and executive determinations -- including the imposition of sanctions -- if the PRC engages in irresponsible transfers.)**

Trade Issues, Including Prison Labor

Reciprocal granting of MFN tariff status was a key element cementing the normalization of Sino-U.S. relations by providing a framework for major expansion of our economic and trade

relations. In 1992, bilateral trade topped \$33 billion, with Chinese exports of \$25.8 billion and U.S. exports of \$7.5 billion. China was our fastest growing export market in Asia in 1992 as U.S. exports to China rose by 19 percent. In turn, the United States remains China's largest export market, absorbing about 30 percent of China's total exports.

China maintains multiple, overlapping barriers to imports in an effort to protect non-competitive, state-owned industries. China also has recognized that its development goals cannot be achieved without gradually reducing protection and opening its domestic market to the stimulus for change brought by import competition.

Our market access agreement, signed October 10, 1992, if implemented by the PRC, will increase opportunities for U.S. exports by phasing-out 70 to 80 percent of China's non-tariff trade barriers over the next four years. The regular consultation process required by this agreement allows us to monitor implementation and take appropriate action should China violate its commitments. Progress has been made in opening the market to U.S. products but we still need to resolve several issues regarding implementation.

A large part of our skyrocketing bilateral trade deficit with China (from \$2.8 billion in 1987 to \$18.3 billion in 1992) in part results from the shifting of labor-intensive assembly operations out of other Asian trading partners to China. Products we once imported from Taiwan and Hong Kong are now assembled in and exported from China. Our bilateral deficit with China is largely counterbalanced by reduced bilateral deficits with these other trading partners.

Recently, the Chinese have indicated an interest in doing more business with U.S. companies. As U.S. corporate executives are arriving in droves to explore new commercial opportunities in Beijing, at least eight Chinese delegations have been or will soon be dispatched to the U.S. with orders to "buy American". These missions have the potential to generate billions of dollars of exports of aircraft, autos, satellites, oil drilling equipment, aviation electronics, wheat, fertilizer, and other U.S. products.

Still, the large and growing U.S.-China trade deficit is unacceptable. The over \$40 billion trade surplus China has accumulated with the United States since June 1989 has very destructive to American industries, particularly the textile and footwear sectors, resulting in the loss of American jobs. It is therefore essential that the PRC implement the market access agreement we have negotiated, which would produce a much greater equilibrium and fairness in Sino-American trade.

Prison Labor

China officially banned the export of products produced by prison labor in October 1991. In August 1992, we signed a Memorandum of Understanding under which the Chinese agreed to investigate cases we presented and to allow U.S. officials access to suspect facilities in China.

The U.S. has presented the Chinese government information on 16 cases of alleged use of prison labor. The Chinese have reported back on all 16 cases, admitting that in four cases they were forced to correct the fact that prisoners were being used to produce goods exports in violation of Chinese law. U.S. officials have visited three prisons and have standing requests to visit five others, including a revisit to one facility.

In the past two years, U.S. Customs has aggressively expanded its enforcement of U.S. laws banning the import of prison labor products. Customs has issued over twenty orders banning suspected Chinese goods from entering the U.S., achieved one court conviction of a U.S. company for importing prison made machine tools and seized suspected equipment in another case. Since the Prison Labor Memorandum of Understanding was signed last August, there has been no indication that goods allegedly produced by prison labor have entered the U.S. Talks with China will continue on the full enforcement of the provisions of the prison labor MOU.

Conditions for Renewal in 1994

China has made progress in recent years in the areas of human rights, nonproliferation, and trade. Nevertheless, I believe more progress is necessary and possible in each of these three areas. In considering the optimal method of encouraging further progress on these issues, I have decided to issue the attached Executive Order which outlines the areas in which China, in order to receive positive consideration for a renewal of MFN in 1994, will have to make additional significant progress in the next twelve months.

(Following is additional language to be used if option 2 for the Executive Order -- general conditions -- is selected.)

In considering whether China has done this, specific benchmarks will include:

Human Rights

- Respecting the fundamental human rights recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
- Complying with China's commitment to allow its citizens, regardless of their political views, freedom to emigrate and travel abroad (excepting those who are imprisoned, have criminal proceedings pending against them, or have received court notices concerning civil cases).
- Providing an acceptable accounting for and release of Chinese citizens imprisoned or detained for the peaceful expression of their political views, including Democracy Wall and Tiananmen activists.
- Ceasing religious persecution, particularly by releasing leaders and members of religious groups detained or imprisoned for expression of their religious beliefs.
- Taking effective actions to ensure that prisoners are not being mistreated and are receiving necessary medical treatment, such as by granting access to Chinese prisons by international humanitarian organizations.
- Seeking to resume dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his representatives, and taking measures to protect Tibet's distinctive religious and cultural heritage.
- Ceasing the jamming of Voice of America broadcasts.

Trade

- Complying with the terms of China's 1992 bilateral agreement with the U.S. on prison labor.
- Fulfilling China's commitments in the 1992 bilateral agreement with the U.S. on market access.
- Implementing China's commitments in the 1992 bilateral agreement with the U.S. on intellectual property rights.

Nonproliferation

- Limiting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, including by implementation of its international commitments to abide by Missile Technology Control Regime guidelines and parameters, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological Weapons Convention.
- Taking additional measures to enhance international efforts to combat proliferation, such as accepting controls adopted by the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Australia Group and participating in international discussions in the area of non-proliferation.

In addition to issuing this executive order, the Administration will use tools under existing legislation and executive determinations to encourage further progress in these areas. These tools include section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act to ensure improved market access and protection of intellectual property rights. In the non-proliferation area, various provisions of U.S. law contain strong measures against irresponsible transfers of equipment and technologies related to weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

(Following is additional language to be used if option 3 for the Executive Order -- human rights conditions only -- is selected.)

The attached Executive Order establishes specific conditions for China in the key area of human rights. I wish to make clear my continuing and strong determination to pursue objectives in the areas of nonproliferation and trade, utilizing other instruments available, including appropriate legislation and executive determinations. For example, various provisions of U.S. law contain strong measures against irresponsible proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and nuclear weapons technology. These include missile proliferation sanctions under the National Defense Authorization Act. Using these tools as necessary, we will continue to press China to implement its commitments to abide by international standards and agreements in the non-proliferation area.

In the area of trade, the Clinton Administration will continue to press for full and faithful implementation of bilateral agreements with China on market access, intellectual property rights, and prison labor. Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act is a powerful instrument to ensure our interests are protected and advanced in the areas of market access and intellectual property rights. The Administration also will also continue to implement vigorously the provisions of the Tariff Act of 1930 to prevent importation of goods made by forced labor.

The White House
Washington, 1993
Presidential Determination
No. _____

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Determination Under Subsection 402(d)(1) of the
Trade Act of 1974, as amended -- Continuation of
Waiver Authority

Pursuant to the authority vested in me under the Trade Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-618), (88 Stat. 1978), (hereinafter "the Act"), I determine, pursuant to subsection 402(d)(1) of the Act, 19 U.S.C. 2432(d)(1), that the further extension of the waiver authority granted by subsection 402(c) of the Act will substantially promote the objectives of section 402 of the Act. I further determine that the continuation of the waiver applicable to the People's Republic of China will substantially promote the objectives of section 402 of the Act.

This determination shall be published in the Federal Register.

William Clinton

United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, DC 20510-7010

May 14, 1993

The Honorable Winston Lord
Assistant Secretary For East Asian & Pacific Affairs
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Thank you for the opportunity to meet to express the concerns of Congress regarding United States-China policy and most-favored-nation (MFN) status for China. We look forward to hearing about your trip to China.

As we discussed, there are three major areas of Congressional concern relating to China and MFN: human rights, weapons-nuclear technology proliferation, and unfair trade practices. If part of our goal is to make legislation unnecessary, it is necessary that an executive order substantively address each of these areas.

In regard to human rights, which as you know is the major driving force behind our legislative efforts, it is our considered opinion that the following must be included in a Presidential Executive Order accompanying a request for a waiver of Jackson-Vanik requirements regarding renewal of MFN status for China:

- * Release and acceptable accounting of those persons detained, accused, or sentenced because of the nonviolent expression of their political beliefs
- * adherence to the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights in China and Tibet, which includes freedom of emigration and return, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of opinion and expression, and freedom of peaceful assembly and association
- * compliance with the 1992 bilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) regarding the export to the United States of products manufactured by forced labor. (However, it would be more acceptable to renegotiate the agreement to more accurately reflect continuing Congressional concerns)
- * providing access by international human rights and humanitarian groups to prisoners, trials and places of detention
- * ceasing the jamming of Voice of America broadcasts

The Dalai Lama's recent visit to Washington has significantly heightened Congressional interest regarding the survival of the Tibetan people, we hope that the policy toward China requires:

- * significant progress in ceasing to threaten the survival of the Tibetan culture

The President's Executive Order should appropriately address the need for visible Chinese progress in ceasing unfair and discriminatory trade practices against American businesses; as well as demand that they honor their commitments to adhere to the controls, guidelines and parameters of the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Australian Group on Chemical & Biological Arms. However, we understand that the President has available options already in law, which provide meaningful ways to address these important issues within the framework of an executive order.

Much has been reported recently about the impact of possible loss of jobs from conditioning MFN for China. More emphasis should be placed on the loss of American jobs resulting from unfair Chinese trade practices and the trade deficit. For example, it should be remembered that the over \$40 billion trade deficit China has accumulated with the United States since the Tianenmen Square massacre, has been extremely destructive to American industries particularly the textile and footwear industries.

It is our belief that it is important to the future of the United States - China relationship for the Administration and the Congress to send a unified message to the Chinese government. We look forward to continuing to work with you on developing such a message, which will assist in establishing a more equitable bilateral relationship with China. We wish to again reiterate our desire to meet with the President to help formulate a unified China policy which reflects our fundamental values and protects our national interests.

Sincerely,

Nancy Pelosi

Nancy Pelosi

George Mitchell

George J. Mitchell

Section 5 :

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001d. paper	re: M-11 Missile Issue [partial] (3 pages)	05/00/1993	P1/b(1)

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OA/Box Number: 3995

FOLDER TITLE:

DC0030 DC Meeting on China Most Favored Nation, May 19, 1993 [1]

2015-0221-M
rs1201

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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M-11 MISSILE ISSUE

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

PER E. O. 13526

2015-0221-M (1.19) 03/11/2020 KDE

We need to decide how to deal with the M-11 issue and other potentially-sanctionable Chinese proliferation activities, including their implications for the upcoming MFN decision. This paper discusses the relevant proliferation cases, the legal requirements we face and their possible consequences, and next steps on sanctions both within the Administration and with Congress. (TS)

EO 13526 1.4c, 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6), 3.5c

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Sanctions Legislation

In November 1990, Congress included missile sanctions provisions in the FY 1991 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) in an effort to stem the spread of missile-related technology. Under these provisions, sanctions must be imposed when it is determined that a foreign person, after November 5, 1990, knowingly exported, transferred or otherwise engaged in the trade of any MTCR equipment or technology that contributes to the design, development, or production of MTCR-class missiles in a non-MTCR country. The authority to impose these sanctions was delegated by the President to the Secretary of State and redelegated to the Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs. (TS)

The sanction for transfers of MTCR Category 1 items (complete missile systems as well as major subsystems such as rocket stages, engines, guidance sets and re-entry vehicles) is a minimum two-year ban on all U.S. Government contracts and all dual-use and munitions list licenses to the foreign entity. Upon an additional determination that the transfer has "substantially" contributed to the design, etc., of MTCR-class missiles, imports must be halted. Sanctionable activity also includes conspiring to engage, attempting to engage or facilitating such exports, transfers or trade. (TS)

In June 1991, sanctions were imposed against one Pakistani and two Chinese entities for their role in the transfer of an M-11 training missile and launcher to Pakistan. Since these sanctions appeared to have no practical effect, Senator Jesse Helms successfully lobbied for tougher sanctions provisions. The Helms amendment broadened the list of entities subject to sanctions in Non-Market Economies, excluding members of the former Warsaw Pact (i.e. China, North Korea, Cuba and Vietnam), to include not only the entity that engaged in the sanctionable activity, but also all activities of the government relating to the development or production of missile equipment or technology, and all government activities affecting the development or production of electronics, space systems or equipment, and military aircraft in that country. Prior to this amendment, these activities were sanctioned only if the specific offending entity in a country could not be identified. (TS)

Thus far, this part of the NDAA has not been triggered by a sanctions determination. It would raise several interpretive questions:

- What are "government" as opposed to "private" activities in a country like China?
- What is the scope of the "electronics," "space systems or equipment," or "military aircraft" industry? (TS)

The legislative history provides no insight into what was intended by this language. It would not, however, be possible to interpret this provision as applying only to missile-related

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electronics, etc., as a prior section of the NDAA already sanctions all activities relating to missile production. (TS)

It should be noted that the Helms amendment only applies to sanctions imposed under the Arms Export Control Act. Accordingly, the sanctions on government contracts, munitions list exports, and imports would apply to all government activities related to electronics, etc. However, since dual-use export sanctions are applied under the Export Administration Act, which Helms did not amend, those sanctions would apply only to the offending entity. (TS)

The statute contains limited waiver authority ("essential to the national security"), but provides no authority to delay, solely on foreign policy grounds, decisions on whether sanctionable activity has taken place. Delays can be justified to obtain necessary intelligence assessments. State has also previously taken the position that short delays can be justified to ascertain whether a foreign government is prepared to take certain steps that could allow a waiver. (TS)

Although detailed analyses of the Helms amendment's impact on U.S.-China trade have yet to be completed, preliminary information suggests that roughly \$2 - 3 billion in potential exports (electronics and satellites) of U.S. goods to China could be at stake. This could affect AT&T, IBM, Motorola, Hughes and other U.S. firms, among others, who do business in China. Subsequent retaliatory actions by the Chinese could raise the financial costs even higher. (TS)

More broadly, the imposition of sanctions could undercut U.S. efforts to promote Chinese political and economic reform, and jeopardize Chinese cooperation with the U.S. on a host of global and regional issues, including the North Korean nuclear program, Cambodia and Bosnia. Conceivably, sanctions with major financial impact could also trigger a Chinese decision to go forward with missile and other arms sales which in the past had been restrained as a result of carrots proffered by the U.S. (TS)

Next Steps

China's proliferation behavior, particularly the M-11 issue, raises questions relating to both sanctions and to MFN. State has begun the interagency process for making a sanctions determination on the M-11. A decision to impose sanctions would

EO 13526 1.4c, 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6), 3.5c

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E.O. 12958 1.4(c), 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6)

Step 1: Shift the Burden of Proof to the Chinese.

EO 13526 1.4c, 3.3(b)(6)

Step 2: Restrict U.S.-China Trade.

EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

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By mandating restrictions on U.S.-PRC economic and trade relations and sanctions for certain behavior, U.S. law offers a variety of means to pressure China for progress and to respond in a targeted manner to unacceptable Chinese actions.

- o Trade - Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 identifies steps to secure adequate market access and intellectual property protection for U.S. exports. This was the USG's key source of leverage in securing Chinese agreement to the market access and IPR MOUs. We could invoke 301, if the Chinese fail to implement these agreements or fail to open their market to U.S. service industries.
- o Proliferation Law - The U.S. has already sanctioned China once for improper transfers to Pakistan of missile-related technology; if it determines that China is engaged in further transfers, the USG will have to take the much broader action required by the Helms Amendment. Other provisions of U.S. law cover other aspects of proliferation (e.g., of nuclear weapons, CBW, destabilizing arms to Iran and Iraq, etc.).
- o Nuclear Cooperation - Legal restrictions based on nuclear nonproliferation and human rights concerns now prevent significant U.S. nuclear commerce with China. (Nuclear power is an area of major interest to U.S. nuclear vendors and service companies.)
- o Exchange Rates - Under section 3004 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Treasury has determined that China is manipulating its exchange rate to prevent balance of payments adjustment and gain unfair competitive advantage in international trade. Treasury must negotiate with the Chinese to ensure that they take action to address this problem.
- o International Financial Institutions - Section 701(a) of the IFI Act requires the U.S. to oppose proposals for financing projects in countries with a pattern of gross violation of human rights, unless they are directed to basic human needs. Since Tiananmen, the U.S. has opposed by abstention votes on non-basic human needs projects for China.
- o Narcotics Certification - The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, requires the President to certify that major drug producing or transit countries, including China, have cooperated fully with the U.S. or taken adequate drug control steps of their own. Decertification would require the U.S. to withhold most forms of assistance and to oppose any loans from multilateral development banks.

Tiananmen Sanctions

The U.S. is the only country that maintains significant Tiananmen-related sanctions against China. Legally-mandated sanctions include a ban on the export of U.S. Munitions List goods and services to China and nuclear exchanges; an embargo

on licenses for civilian exports to military and police end-users; and restrictions on IFI lending. Other sanctions carried out by Executive Order and policy include opposition to China-specific proposals for easing COCOM controls; a suspension in Trade Development Administration (TDA) and Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) activities; and a limitation on high-level exchanges.

The President can lift most of these sanctions on a case-by-case basis in the national interest, or more broadly if he certifies human rights improvements. Therefore, the sanctions can provide both positive and negative leverage.

Nearly four years after Tiananmen, these sanctions remain a statement of U.S. concern over PRC human rights conditions. They also possess significant tactical value: the U.S. can selectively relax them as incentives for improved Chinese behavior. The IWG paper which the Deputies Committee discussed April 27, for instance, proposes limited waivers for EXIMBANK lending, satellite exports, and TDA activities as a means to encourage Chinese progress. Because many of the sanctions undercut U.S. trade and other interests, relaxation can be beneficial to the U.S. As the lifting of most of the sanctions depends on human rights improvements, the Executive Branch for now is restricted to utilizing those sanctions which can be relaxed on an ad hoc basis through Presidential waiver.

Exc Sec has disk
20518 add-on

May 18, 1993

*Advance copy
S. Berger*

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: KENT WIEDEMANN *KW*

SUBJECT: Dispatch of Discussion Papers for DC Meeting,
Wednesday, May 19, 3:30pm

The attached package is to be distributed to the participants of the Deputies Committee meeting to be held Wednesday, May 19 at 3:30 - 5:00pm.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memorandum at Tab I to his counterparts.

Approve Disapprove

*Subject to revisions
w/ TAB I (A)*

Attachments

- Tab I Itoh/Counterparts Memorandum
- Tab A Discussion Paper
- Tab B Grossman/Lake Memorandum dated May 15, 1993
- Tab C Mitchell/Pelosi Letter to Winston Lord dated May 14
- Tab D M-11 Paper Prepared by Office of Nonproliferation, NSC
- Tab E U.S. Policy Instruments Beyond MFN


~~SECRET~~ with

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20518 add-on

May 18, 1993



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: KENT WIEDEMANN *Sh for*

SUBJECT: Dispatch of Discussion Papers for DC Meeting,
Wednesday, May 19, 3:30pm

The attached package is to be distributed to the participants of the Deputies Committee meeting to be held Wednesday, May 19 at 3:30 - 5:00pm.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memorandum at Tab I to his counterparts.

Approve *SRB per KC* Disapprove

Attachments

- Tab I Itoh/Counterparts Memorandum
- Tab A Discussion Paper
- Tab B Grossman/Lake Memorandum dated May 15, 1993
- Tab C Mitchell/Pelosi Letter to Winston Lord dated May 14
- Tab D M-11 Paper Prepared by Office of Nonproliferation, NSC
- Tab E U.S. Policy Instruments Beyond MFN

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *VL* NARA, Date *7/5/2014*
2015-0721-21

~~SECRET~~ with

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachment

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001e. memo	Kent Wiedemann to Samuel Berger re: China: MFN Decision and Implementation [incomplete copy] (1 page)	05/15/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 3995

FOLDER TITLE:

DC0030 DC Meeting on China Most Favored Nation, May 19, 1993 [1]

2015-0221-M
rs1201

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 14, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: KENT WIEDEMANN *KW*

SUBJECT: Discussion Paper for Deputies/Principals' Meeting
on China MFN Strategy

Tab A conveys a discussion paper on options on China MFN. This would form the basis for a Principals or Deputies Committee meeting early next week.

Concurrences by: Bob Kyle, Jeremy Rosner, Dan Poneman, Eric Schwartz

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve scheduling a Principals/Deputies Committee meeting.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab A Discussion Paper
- Tab B Core List of U.S. Concerns
- Tab C Winston Lord's Cable from Beijing
- Tab D U.S. Policy Instruments Beyond MFN
- Tab E M-11 Missiles Issue: Determining Sanction Threshold
- Tab F Executive Summary of Mitchell/Pelosi Bill
- Tab G Executive Order Options 1, 2, and 3

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001f. memo	Kent Wiedemann to Samuel Berger re: China: MFN Decision and Implementation (7 pages)	05/15/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 3995

FOLDER TITLE:

DC0030 DC Meeting on China Most Favored Nation, May 19, 1993 [1]

2015-0221-M
rs1201

RESTRICTION CODES**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001g. paper	re: China: MFN Decision and Implementation (5 pages)	05/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 3995

FOLDER TITLE:

DC0030 DC Meeting on China Most Favored Nation, May 19, 1993 [1]

2015-0221-M
rs1201

RESTRICTION CODES**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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TO: BERGER

FROM: SAEED
WIEDEMANN

DOC DATE: 21 MAY 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
DC

MFN
MINUTES

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MINUTES FOR 19 MAY DC MTG ON CHINA MFN

ACTION: BERGER APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 22 MAY 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SAEED LOGREF: 9320518

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0030 CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CICIO
NSC CHRON
SAEED
WIEDEMANN
WRIGHT

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 7/12/2019
2015-0721-01

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB CLOSED BY: NSKDB DOC 1 OF 1

ock'd 10/25/93
gls

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001

Z 93052120 FOR DECISION
X 93052619 BERGER APPROVED RECOM

JWR
6/3

~~Rec'd 5/22 4:30pm~~ JWR
~~Rec'd 6/2 2:25pm~~
National Security Council
The White House
~~5/24 0915L~~
Rec'd 6/3 6:00pm

PROOFED BY: WJA LOG # 20537 ADD-ON
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG WA A/O 01

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	_____	_____	_____
<i>WJA</i> ExecSec	<u>1</u>	<u>WJA</u>	_____
Staff Director	_____	_____	_____
D/APNSA	<u>2</u>	<u>WJA</u>	_____
APNSA	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen <u>WJA</u>	<u>Fyfe</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>	<u>WJA</u>	<u>R</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~SECRET~~

20537 A01

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

May 21, 1993

SRB

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SANDY BERGER

THROUGH: KENT WIEDEMANN

FROM: FERIAAL ARA SAEED

SUBJECT: Minutes of the China MFN DC Meeting

The NSC Deputies met May 19 on China MFN policy. The Minutes, at Tab I, are submitted for the record.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Minutes be filed for the record.

Approve

Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Minutes

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By RL NARA, Date 7/15/2019
2015-0721-01

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

TO: BERGER

FROM: SAEED
WIEDEMANN

DOC DATE: 21 MAY 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
DC

MFN
MINUTES

PERSONS:

JOC

SUBJECT: MINUTES FOR 19 MAY DC MTG ON CHINA MFN

ACTION: BERGER APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 22 MAY 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SAEED LOGREF: 9320518

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0030 CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
CICIO
NSC CHRON
SAEED
WIEDEMANN
WRIGHT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 7/15/2009
2045-0721 -m

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB CLOSED BY: NSKDB DOC 1 OF 1

OCM
10/25/93
[Signature]

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001

Z 93052120 FOR DECISION
X 93052619 BERGER APPROVED RECOM

Rec 120 5121 8:52
JWR
5/21 0920

National Security Council
The White House

20537

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # _____
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG QDA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<u>ce</u> DepExecSec	<u>1</u>	<u>Wak</u>	
ExecSec			
Staff Director			
D/APNSA	<u>2</u>	<u>B. M</u>	
APNSA			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>		<u>Fals</u>
NSC Secretariat			<u>[Signature]</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS: 5/26 note changes

23 MAY 93 8:23

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Exec Sec has diskette

National Security Council
The White House

REC'D 5/21 8:52
JWR
5/21 0920

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # **20537**
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM **PRS** NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG **DDA** A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<i>cc</i> DepExecSec	<u>1</u>	<i>Wak</i>	
ExecSec			
Staff Director			
D/APNSA	<u>2</u>	<i>B. M.</i>	
APNSA			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>		<i>Fals</i>
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS: *5/26 note changes*

21 MAY 93 8:23

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Exec Sec has diskette

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 20, 1993



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ~~ANTHONY LAKE~~ ^{SAMUEL SANDY BERGER}

THROUGH: KENT WIEDEMANN ^{MSK}

FROM: FERAL ARA SAEED ^{MS}

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies' Committee Meeting on China MFN

Attached for your approval is a Summary of Conclusions from the May 19 Deputies Committee meeting on China MFN.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the Summary of Conclusions from the Deputies Committee at Tab I and authorize Will Itoh to transmit the summary to agencies participating in the meeting.

Approve MSK Disapprove _____

as modified

Attachment
Tab I Summary of Conclusions

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. minutes	re: Minutes of the DC Meeting on China MFN [partial] (3 pages)	05/19/1993	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 3995

FOLDER TITLE:

DC0030 DC Meeting on China Most Favored Nation, May 19, 1993 [1]

2015-0221-M
rs1201

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: May 19, 1993
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 3:30pm - 5:00pm

SUBJECT: Minutes of the DC Meeting on China MFN (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

THE VICE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE

Leon Fuerth

USTR

Ira Wolf

STATE

Peter Tarnoff
Peter Tomsen
Wendy Sherman

USUN

Rick Inderfurth

TREASURY

Jeffrey Schaeffer
James Fall

CEA

Joseph Stiglitz
Sherif Lotfi

DOD


Frank Wisner
Robert Ellis

WHITE HOUSE

Samuel Berger

NSC

Kent Wiedemann
Jeremy Rosner
Ferial Ara Saeed



(b)(3)

NEC

Bob Kyle
Michael Punke

JCS

David Jeremiah
Frank Bowman

COMMERCE

Timothy Hauser
William Clements

Minutes

Mr. Berger: At the last China DC, we agreed MFN should be conditioned and that we prefer executive to legislative conditions. Now, we must determine the nature of the conditions and our strategy. The current focus on MFN as the only instrument of pressure with China should be shifted to include other means of influence. There may be a rough period ahead; not unconnected is the M-11 issue and a decision on whether to invoke Helm's Amendment sanctions. (S)

~~SECRET~~

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Time is short. We must reach agreement with Congress before it adjourns for Memorial Day. To do that we must, hopefully by Friday, have a decision by the President on conditions to propose to Congress, so that on Monday we can begin seeking consensus with the Hill.

Let's start the discussion with a summary of where things stand with China. Peter Tarnoff can give us a report on Win Lord's recent mission. I don't think we got much of a response. This is implicit in the papers from State. (S)

Mr. Tarnoff: Win Lord reiterated "general specifics" of what we want in the three core areas. We got virtually nothing by way of formal commitments. The Chinese did not say, "we hear you and we'll do something". They held the line on all the issues except trade; we do have a dialogue there. At dinner one evening they mentioned upcoming prisoner releases, but in good conscience I can't say there has been sufficient progress. (S)

Mr. Berger: Given the President's position during the campaign and since that, in the absence of significant progress in the three areas of concern, he would support MFN conditionality, how do we view the conditionality options presented in State's paper? What's the scope of the executive order? How should we treat nonproliferation and trade? Should we (1) include them in our conditions, as is in option 2; (2) refer to them, as in Option 1 which notes the Secretary of State will enforce laws with respect to nonproliferation and trade; or, (3) not mention these two issues at all. (S)

We have looming over the horizon the question of the Helms Amendment and M-11 sales to Pakistan - for which CIA's National Intelligence Estimate indicates there is strong evidence. (S)

(b)(3)

More evidence is coming in each day. (S)

Mr. Berger: The Helm's Amendment appears to give some discretion with respect to pulling the trigger. However, once the trigger is pulled, \$2-3 billion in trade would be at risk. Counsel is considering whether the President could take a more targeted approach. This will be an issue down the pike, but one that influences our decision of whether to include trade and nonproliferation in our conditions or simply refer to them. (S)

Mr. Tarnoff: I support the latter. That would keep the Executive Order close to the original intent of Jackson-Vanik. Mitchell and Pelosi agree. Otherwise, we would have competing legislation; on proliferation would we then resort to MFN or the Helms Amendment? The same problem would occur on the trade side. (S)

Mr. Berger: In other words, you'd handle this the way Option 1 does, by referencing nonproliferation and trade. (S)

Mr. Cutter: I would be interested in hearing Joe Stiglita's views on trade conditionality. (S)

~~SECRET~~

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Mr. Stiglita: Suspending MFN would impose large economic costs on the U.S., including job losses. It would probably not promote - or might not promote - human rights. The language in State's paper leaves unclear the definition of progress. Must China satisfy our concerns in all three areas or are we flexible? (S)

Mr. Berger: Each area has a different Congressional constituency. Pelosi leads the human rights coalition; Helms and Biden lead on nonproliferation and Mitchell's main concern has been trade. (S)

Mr. Wolfe: We need to get China policy out of the MFN context. Option 1 helps; it starts the process moving in that direction. (S)

Mr. Wisner: I'm inclined to think Option 1 is our best route. My question is, how would the Chinese react? Do we have a sense from the field on consequences? If Option 1 is read as heavily human rights and refers the other core issues to existing laws, how will the Chinese read that? (S)

Mr. Thomsen: First, they would see this as the toughest Administration yet. They would regard parts of Option 1 as American dictation of their internal policy, for instance the language on "freedom of peaceful association". This standard is not achievable by the Chinese, even if placed in the context of "overall significant progress". Still, while they would object, the conditions are sufficiently general. More detail would be unhelpful and could backfire a year from now. (S)

Mr. Berger: Is there general consensus that the way Option 1 deals with nonproliferation and trade is preferable? That we have effective instruments to deal with both these concerns? We have the Helms Amendment on the nonproliferation side and Section 301 on trade. We do not have particularly good legislative mechanisms on human rights; this is why Congress continues to focus on MFN. (S)

Ms. Sherman: Mitchell and Pelosi are comfortable with splitting off nonproliferation and trade for the very reasons you've stated. If the human rights conditions are not acceptable to the Chinese but are to Congress, then we need to deal with that. (S)

Mr. Wiedemann: As the summer progresses and Mitchell and Pelosi are hit by the Republicans and the annual resolution of disapproval which has a 90-day fuse, they might be forced back to legislative conditions. To keep them on board we must go as far as we can on human rights. (S)

Mr. Berger: The problem on non-proliferation will be Biden. We need to explain to him that we take the M-11 issue seriously and plan to pursue it. Let's come back to that. There seems to be a consensus that splitting off trade and nonproliferation - subject to the Hill's agreement - and referencing enforcement of existing laws pertaining to these concerns the way Option 1 does, makes sense. (S)

Mr. Fuerth: The Vice-President when he was Senator supported a broader interpretation of MFN conditionality, but he did not oppose the final compromise last year and would not feel "tripped up" on his voting record. However, we need to demonstrate we plan to use the law. (S)

Mr. Wolfe: We can show credibility by including a presidential statement covering the three core areas. (S)

Mr. Berger: Do we all agree that we include a statement? (S)

Mr. Fuerth: We must demonstrate our application of the law. If we "roar" and nothing happens, the Hill would feel it had been taken for a ride. (S)

Ms. Sherman: The Hill is convinced the M-11 was sold to Pakistan, but sees this as separable from MFN. If we have a presidential statement that makes reference to existing sanctions, and if we tell the Hill we are on a separate track with respect to the M-11, then this should not be a problem. (S)

Mr. Berger: What about the second issue: the level of specificity or generality of human rights conditions. On the one hand, we need enough to satisfy Congress and make clear to the PRC we're serious. On the other, the standards must be reachable given Joe Stiglitz's comments on the importance of the overall economic relationship and the consequences of revoking MFN, which few on the Hill want to see happen. We should not box the President into a position. (S)

Mr. Cutter: Option 1, Section 4 boxes us in. (S)

Mr. Fuerth: I can't figure out the allocation of conditions between Options 1 and 3. Option 2 has compositional logic, but what is the intent behind the differences between Options 1 and 3? Option 3 theoretically concentrates on human rights, and thus one would expect the fullest treatment of that issue, but in fact the conditions in Option 1 are the most comprehensive. The other allocations are confusing as well. Whereas Option 1 includes the requirement of access to PRC prisons, Option 3 mentions access to prisons or places of detention. Why more precision in Option 3 than Option 1? (S)

Mr. Berger: You've pointed out some important differences that cut to the core of the question of whether we want general or specific conditions. (S)

Mr. Kyle: The level of specificity sets us up for the future. Vagueness this year would allow vagueness next year. This argues for more generality. We could treat specifics in a speech. (S)

Mr. Tarnoff: We could blend the two; have a general Executive Order and specific public language aimed at both the human rights community and the Chinese, to make clear what we're after. (S)

Mr. Wisner: In dealing with the Chinese, the less we lay out in public the better off we'll be. The opposite is what Pelosi needs to keep her coalition together. (S)

Ms. Sherman: If the President's statement acknowledges letters have been exchanged with the Chinese requiring specifics, that would allow Pelosi to keep her coalition together. (S)


Mr. Berger: No matter where, once we go on record we are bound. (S)

Mr. Fuerth: We need to preserve maximum flexibility. Also, Option 2 on human rights makes no reference to the American agenda and represents a disconnect with the campaign. (S)

Mr. Berger: You're right. I'm not sure of the logic behind the items selected in Option 2. (S)

Mr. Fuerth: Option 1 is close to a strait-jacket unless the Chinese have a sudden spiritual conversion. We cannot completely abandon the President's principles. (S)

Mr. Berger: The order of magnitude of conditions in Option 2 is better, but it doesn't cover some broad territory. Can we task the IWG over the next 24 hours to draft human rights conditions that embody all our concerns, are sharper than those in Option 2 and as comprehensive as those in Option 1? (S)

 We should consider how this will play in China. Human rights is the most difficult area because it threatens their very system and the regime. (S)

Mr. Inderfurth: Perhaps we should have a general statement of each condition followed by an explanation outlining specifics. (S)

Mr. Wiedemann: The Hill would consider the explanations to be part of the Executive Order. Also, Option 1 already narrows down our concerns to 5 or 6 generally-stated human rights conditions. (S)

Mr. Berger: But it's phrased in way that the President must either cut off MFN or issue a waiver that stretches the credibility of the facts. (S)

Ms. Sherman: We could change "overall significant progress" to "overall progress". (S)

Mr. Berger: That brings us back to specificity. Do we prefer a general statement of conditions covering a range of concerns on human rights? That would require another iteration here. (S)

Mr. Wiedemann: Option 1 conforms to the Mitchell/Pelosi language and reflects the views of Asia Watch and other NGOs. (S)

Mr. Berger: But the conditions listed in Option 1, do we expect those things could happen by next year in China? (S)

Mr. Wiedemann: I've spent more time in China than anyone in this room over the course of three separate tours there. China is changing. Information is more widely available, journals that never existed before have appeared in the last few years. New, grass-roots associations and professional groupings are developing that are pro-democratic. Satellite dishes are permitted and China receives broadcasts from Hong Kong. Clearly, the climate is more open today than it has ever been in the past. (S)

As to Option 1, it reflects the Hill's recommendations. I believe the President could determine "significant progress" in each of the areas required. The toughest would be China's adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Even the U.S. cannot meet that standard in terms of equal pay for equal work, to cite one example. On prisoner releases, the prison terms of most Tiananmen-era dissidents will be up soon as will those of the 1979 Democracy Wall activists. China's Minister of Public Security has said the issue of inspections of prisons by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is under consideration. It is a possibility because ICRC only reports to the host government and not to anyone else. The Tibet condition doesn't challenge PRC sovereignty. Voice of America already gets through so allowing the broadcasts is a small step. (S)

Mr. Cutter: That is a wonderful argument for Option 2, which would increase the President's discretion. (S)

Mr. Wiedemann: The President's image and values are best protected by Option 1. As Leon Fuerth said, the President has gone on record pressing China to democratize and criticizing George Bush for coddling tyrants. He supports Pelosi, and Pelosi feels strongly about this list. This would be the easiest option to sell to the Hill. (S)

Mr. Berger: Let's take another crack at an Option 2 that deals with the deficiencies of current Option 2. The second iteration should be true to the President's commitment to promote human rights in China. (S)

Mr. Cutter: Could we include a statement indicating the President has instructed the Secretary to use other sanctions? Groups come in to see us, business groups, and while they understand what we are doing, the impact is harmful to them. (S)

Mr. Berger: MFN revocation is a blunt weapon; most people want to keep the gun loaded but not fire it. Should we use the Jackson-Vanik phrasing in the Executive Order, i.e. that the President shall consider whether extension of MFN will promote the objectives of the order (i.e. human rights)? (There was general assent). (S)

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Mr. Fuerth: Perhaps we need to include something on the environmental degradation in Tibet. (S)

Mr. Berger: I believe the consensus is that we should move away from MFN being the pivotal point of the relationship. We have environmental problems with Russia and Japan, but we deal with those in other ways. (S)

Mr. Fuerth: In those countries the problem reflects internal domestic policies; in Tibet the problem is Chinese imperialism. (S)

Mr. Berger: The problem is serious enough that it should be elevated out of the MFN framework. (S)

Let me recap today's meeting. We are going to condition MFN, and we agreed: (1) to an Executive Order; (2) to develop a new Option 2; (3) to break out nonproliferation and trade, but make reference to enforcement of existing laws; (4) to prepare a letter amplifying the President's views; (5) to track the Jackson-Vanik formulation that MFN would be renewed if doing so supports the objectives of the executive order, i.e. promoting human rights supports our objectives. (S)

Let's also agree to: (1) a tele-conference on Thursday to discuss the new option; we will then take our consensus to principals for a decision; (2) restrict ourselves to one channel of communication with the Hill. Wendy Sherman should be our "Field Marshall". Though we all know the players well, separate channels risk a mixed message. Wendy will regulate contacts. (S)

-- End of Meeting --

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of the DC Meeting on China: MFN [partial] (1 page)	05/19/1993	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 3995

FOLDER TITLE:

DC0030 DC Meeting on China Most Favored Nation, May 19, 1993 [1]

2015-0221-M
rs1201

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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20537

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee Meeting

DATE: May 19, 1993
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 3:30pm - 5:00pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of the DC Meeting on China: MFN
(S)

PARTICIPANTS:

THE VICE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE

Leon Fuerth

STATE

Peter Tarnoff
Peter Tomsen

TREASURY

Jeffrey Schaeffer
James Fall

DOD

Frank Wisner
Robert Ellis

(b)(3)

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Jeremy Rosner
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NEC

Bob Kyle
Michael Punke

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- MFN should be conditioned. (S)
- The conditions should be placed in an executive order rather than in legislation. Key members of Congress support this approach including Mitchell and Pelosi. (S)
- We should seek language, subject to congressional consultation, stating that renewal of MFN will help achieve the objectives of the executive order, similar to the formulation used in Jackson-Vanik. (S)

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Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

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2015-0221-m(1.25)
03/11/2020 KDE

- The conditions we select and their level of specificity also require congressional consultation consensus. Conditions must be realistic, i.e. balancing need to press China for human rights progress with consideration of what is achievable. (S)
- Human rights should be the focus of our conditions, with nonproliferation and trade de-linked from MFN. We have other tools to deal with these concerns (e.g. Helms Amendment and Section 301) and should reflect this in the executive order by indicating the Secretary of State vigorously will enforce laws on nonproliferation and trade. (S)
- The approach of Option 2, which is human rights-focused and based on the recent Mitchell/Pelosi letter, is preferable to the other options and would allow us to use existing legislation to deal with nonproliferation and trade. (S)
- Option 2 of State's paper, however, should be revised to sharpen the human rights conditions and make them as comprehensive as Option One's. (S)
- A letter from the President, amplifying his views on the three core concerns, would be included with the Jackson-Vanik waiver notification package to Congress to underscore the need for progress in each of the three core areas. (S)
- On Thursday there will be a teleconference to discuss the revised option, then take a consensus to principals for their review and decision. (S)
- On Friday we would anticipate a decision by the President on the conditions we will discuss with Congress. (S)
- Early next week, we will seek consensus with the Hill on our conditions. We must reach agreement before Congress leaves for Memorial Day. (S)
- Assistant Secretary Sherman will lead our efforts on the Hill. Agencies should no longer meet with Senate and Congressional staffers independently on this issue. (S)
- Looming on the horizon and potentially affecting our choice of conditions is the decision over whether we have sufficient evidence to sanction China for transferring the M-11 to Pakistan. If we were to invoke the Helms Amendment sanctions, some \$2-\$3 billion in trade could be affected. Counsel has been asked to look into potential application of the Helms amendment. (S)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of the DC Meeting on China: MFN [partial] (1 page)	05/19/1993	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 3995

FOLDER TITLE:

DC0030 DC Meeting on China Most Favored Nation, May 19, 1993 [1]

2015-0221-M
rs1201

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee Meeting

DATE: May 19, 1993
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 3:30pm - 5:00pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of the DC Meeting on China: MFN
(S)

PARTICIPANTS:

THE VICE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE

Leon Fuerth

STATE


Peter Tarnoff
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Bob Kyle
Michael Punke

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- MFN should be conditioned. (S)
- The conditions should be placed in an executive order rather than in legislation. Key members of Congress support this approach including Mitchell and Pelosi. (S)
- We should ^{see} include language, ^{subject to Congressional consultation,} stating renewal of MFN will help achieve the objectives of the executive order, similar to the formulation used in Jackson-Vanik. ~~(S)~~ ^{that}
- Both the conditions we select and their level of specificity require congressional ^{consultation} consensus. Conditions must be ^{also}

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2015-0821-M (126)
03/11/2020 KDE

e. balancing need to press China for human realistic, ~~If the end result of this process were MFN revocation, that would damage our own economy through lost exports and jobs.~~ rights progress with consideration of what is achievable.

-- Human rights should be the focus of our conditions, with nonproliferation and trade de-linked from MFN. We have other tools to deal with these concerns (Helms Amendment and Section 301) and ~~can~~ reflect this in the executive order by indicating the Secretary of State will enforce laws on nonproliferation and trade. (S)

-- The approach of Option 2, which is *should* *majority* *e.g.* human rights-focused and based on the recent Mitchell/Pelosi letter, is preferable to the other options and would allow us to use existing legislation to deal with nonproliferation and trade. (S)

-- Option 2 of State's paper, however, should be revised to sharpen the human rights conditions and make them as comprehensive as Option One's. (S)

-- A letter from the President, amplifying his views on the three core concerns, would be included with the Jackson-Vanik waiver notification package to Congress to underscore the need for progress in each of the three core areas. (S)

-- On Thursday there will be a teleconference to discuss the *revised option,* ~~options,~~ then take a consensus to principals for their review and decision. (S)

-- On Friday we would anticipate a decision by the President on the conditions we will ~~propose~~ to Congress. (S)

-- *Early next week,* ~~On Monday~~ we will seek consensus with the Hill on our conditions. We must reach agreement before Congress leaves for Memorial Day. *discuss with* *on this issue.* (S)

-- Assistant Secretary Sherman will lead our efforts on the Hill. Agencies should no longer meet with Senate and Congressional staffers independently. (S)

-- Looming on the horizon and potentially affecting our choice of conditions is the decision over whether we have sufficient evidence to sanction China for transferring the M-11 to Pakistan. If we were to invoke the Helms Amendment sanctions, some \$2-\$3 billion in trade would be affected. Counsel has been asked to look into ~~a more targeted approach.~~ (S)

(E)

potential application of the Helms amendment.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003c. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of the DC Meeting on China: MFN [partial] (1 page)	05/19/1993	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 3995

FOLDER TITLE:

DC0030 DC Meeting on China Most Favored Nation, May 19, 1993 [1]

2015-0221-M
rs1201

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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~~SECRET~~

20537

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee Meeting

DATE: May 19, 1993
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 3:30pm - 5:00pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of the DC Meeting on China: MFN
(S)

PARTICIPANTS:

THE VICE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE
Leon Fuerth

COMMERCE
Timothy Hauser
William Clements

STATE
Peter Tarnoff
Peter Tomsen

USTR
Ira Wolf

TREASURY
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(b)(3)

NSC
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JCS
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Frank Bowman

NEC
Bob Kyle
Michael Punke

Summary of Conclusions

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PER E.O. 13526
2015-0221-m (1.07)
03/11/2020 KDE

It was agreed that:

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- The conditions should be placed in an executive order rather than in legislation. Key members of Congress support this approach including Mitchell and Pelosi. (S)
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~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

- The conditions we select and their level of specificity also require congressional consultation consensus. Conditions must be realistic, i.e. balancing need to press China for human rights progress with consideration of what is achievable. (S)
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003d. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of the DC Meeting on China: MFN [partial] (1 page)	05/19/1993	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 3995

FOLDER TITLE:

DC0030 DC Meeting on China Most Favored Nation, May 19, 1993 [1]

2015-0221-M
rs1201

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D C 20508

Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee Meeting

DATE: May 19, 1993
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 3:30pm - 5:00pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of the DC Meeting on China: MFN
(S)

PARTICIPANTS:

THE VICE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE

Leon Fuerth

STATE


Peter Tarnoff
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TREASURY

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- We should ^{seek} include language, stating renewal of MFN will help achieve the objectives of the executive order, similar to the formulation used in Jackson-Vanik. ^{subject to Congressional consultation,} (S) that
- ~~Both~~ The conditions we select and their level of specificity require congressional consensus. Conditions must be. ^{consultation}

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2015-0221-M(128)
03/11/2020 KDE

also

e. balancing need to press China for human realistic, ~~If the end result of this process were MFN revocation, that would damage our own economy through lost exports and jobs.~~ *rights progress with consideration of what is achievable.*

- Human rights should be the focus of our conditions, with nonproliferation and trade de-linked from MFN. We have other tools to deal with these concerns (Helms Amendment and Section 301) and ~~can~~ *should* reflect this in the executive order by indicating the Secretary of State will enforce laws on nonproliferation and trade. (S) *e.g.*
- The approach of Option 2, which is *majority* human rights-focused and based on the recent Mitchell/Pelosi letter is preferable to the other options and would allow us to use existing legislation to deal with nonproliferation and trade. (S)
- Option 2 of State's paper, however, should be revised to sharpen the human rights conditions and make them as comprehensive as Option One's. (S)
- A letter from the President, amplifying his views on the three core concerns, would be included with the Jackson-Vanik waiver notification package to Congress to underscore the need for progress in each of the three core areas. (S)
- On Thursday there will be a teleconference to discuss the ~~options~~, *revised option,* then take a consensus to principals for their review and decision. (S)
- On Friday we would anticipate a decision by the President on the conditions we will ~~propose~~ *discuss with* to Congress. (S)
- ~~On Monday~~ *early next week,* we will seek consensus with the Hill on our conditions. We must reach agreement before Congress leaves for Memorial Day. (S) *on this issue.*
- Assistant Secretary Sherman will lead our efforts on the Hill. Agencies should no longer meet with Senate and Congressional staffers independently. (S)
- Looming on the horizon and potentially affecting our choice of conditions is the decision over whether we have sufficient evidence to sanction China for transferring the M-11 to Pakistan. If we were to invoke the Helms Amendment sanctions, some \$2-\$3 billion in trade would be affected. Counsel has been asked to look into a ~~more targeted~~ approach. (S) *E*

potential application of the Helms Amendment.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003e. minutes	re: Minutes of DC Meeting on China MFN [partial] (3 pages)	05/19/1993	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 3995

FOLDER TITLE:

DC0030 DC Meeting on China Most Favored Nation, May 19, 1993 [1]

2015-0221-M
rs1201

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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20537

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON D C 20506

Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: May 19, 1993
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 3:30pm - 5:00pm

SUBJECT: Minutes of the DC Meeting on China MFN (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

THE VICE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE

Leon Fuerth

STATE

Peter Tarnoff
Peter Tomsen
Wendy Sherman

TREASURY

Jeffrey Schaeffer
James Fall

DOD

Frank Wisner
Robert Ellis

(b)(3)

JCS

David Jeremiah
Frank Bowman

COMMERCE

Timothy Hauser
William Clements

USTR

Ira Wolf

USUN

Rick Inderfurth

CEA

Joseph Stiglita
Sherif Lotfi

WHITE HOUSE

Samuel Berger

NSC

Kent Wiedemann
Jeremy Rosner
Ferial Ara Saeed

NEC

Bob Kyle
Michael Punke

Minutes

Mr. Berger: At the last China DC, we agreed MFN should be conditioned and that we prefer executive to legislative conditions. Now, we must determine the nature of the conditions and our strategy. The current focus on MFN as the only instrument of pressure with China should be shifted to include other means of influence. There may be a rough period ahead; not unconnected is the M-11 issue and a decision on whether to invoke Helm's Amendment sanctions. (S)

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Time is short. We must reach agreement with Congress before it adjourns for Memorial Day. To do that we must, hopefully by Friday, have a decision by the President on conditions to propose to Congress, so that on Monday we can begin seeking consensus with the Hill.

Let's start the discussion with a summary of where things stand with China. Peter Tarnoff can give us a report on Win Lord's recent mission. I don't think we got much of a response. This is implicit in the papers from State. (S)

Mr. Tarnoff: Win Lord reiterated "general specifics" of what we want in the three core areas. We got virtually nothing by way of formal commitments. The Chinese did not say, "we hear you and we'll do something". They held the line on all the issues except trade; we do have a dialogue there. At dinner one evening they mentioned upcoming prisoner releases, but in good conscience I can't say there has been sufficient progress. (S)

Mr. Berger: Given the President's position during the campaign and since that, in the absence of significant progress in the three areas of concern, he would support MFN conditionality, how do we view the conditionality options presented in State's paper? What's the scope of the executive order? How should we treat nonproliferation and trade? Should we (1) include them in our conditions, as is in option 2; (2) refer to them, as in Option 1 which notes the Secretary of State will enforce laws with respect to nonproliferation and trade; or, (3) not mention these two issues at all. (S)

We have looming over the horizon the question of the Helms Amendment and M-11 sales to Pakistan - for which CIA's National Intelligence Estimate indicates there is strong evidence. (S)

(b)(3)

More evidence is coming in each day. (S)

Mr. Berger: The Helm's Amendment appears to give some discretion with respect to pulling the trigger. However, once the trigger is pulled, \$2-3 billion in trade would be at risk. Counsel is considering whether the President could take a more targeted approach. This will be an issue down the pike, but one that influences our decision of whether to include trade and nonproliferation in our conditions or simply refer to them. (S)

Mr. Tarnoff: I support the latter. That would keep the Executive Order close to the original intent of Jackson-Vanik. Mitchell and Pelosi agree. Otherwise, we would have competing legislation; on proliferation would we then resort to MFN or the Helms Amendment? The same problem would occur on the trade side. (S)

Mr. Berger: In other words, you'd handle this the way Option 1 does, by referencing nonproliferation and trade. (S)

Mr. Cutter: I would be interested in hearing Joe Stiglita's views on trade conditionality. (S)

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Mr. Stiglitz: Suspending MFN would impose large economic costs on the U.S., including job losses. It would probably not promote - or might not promote - human rights. The language in State's paper leaves unclear the definition of progress. Must China satisfy our concerns in all three areas or are we flexible? (S)

Mr. Berger: Each area has a different Congressional constituency. Pelosi leads the human rights coalition; Helms and Biden lead on nonproliferation and Mitchell's main concern has been trade. (S)

Mr. Wolfe: We need to get China policy out of the MFN context. Option 1 helps; it starts the process moving in that direction. (S)

Mr. Wisner: I'm inclined to think Option 1 is our best route. My question is, how would the Chinese react? Do we have a sense from the field on consequences? If Option 1 is read as heavily human rights and refers the other core issues to existing laws, how will the Chinese read that? (S)

Mr. Thomsen: First, they would see this as the toughest Administration yet. They would regard parts of Option 1 as American dictation of their internal policy, for instance the language on "freedom of peaceful association". This standard is not achievable by the Chinese, even if placed in the context of "overall significant progress". Still, while they would object, the conditions are sufficiently general. More detail would be unhelpful and could backfire a year from now. (S)

Mr. Berger: Is there general consensus that the way Option 1 deals with nonproliferation and trade is preferable? That we have effective instruments to deal with both these concerns? We have the Helms Amendment on the nonproliferation side and Section 301 on trade. We do not have particularly good legislative mechanisms on human rights; this is why Congress continues to focus on MFN. (S)

Ms. Sherman: Mitchell and Pelosi are comfortable with splitting off nonproliferation and trade for the very reasons you've stated. If the human rights conditions are not acceptable to the Chinese but are to Congress, then we need to deal with that. (S)

Mr. Wiedemann: As the summer progresses and Mitchell and Pelosi are hit by the Republicans and the annual resolution of disapproval which has a 90-day fuse, they might be forced back to legislative conditions. To keep them on board we must go as far as we can on human rights. (S)

Mr. Berger: The problem on non-proliferation will be Biden. We need to explain to him that we take the M-11 issue seriously and plan to pursue it. Let's come back to that. There seems to be a consensus that splitting off trade and nonproliferation - subject to the Hill's agreement - and referencing enforcement of existing laws pertaining to these concerns the way Option 1 does, makes sense. (S)

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Mr. Fuerth: The Vice-President when he was Senator supported a broader interpretation of MFN conditionality, but he did not oppose the final compromise last year and would not feel "tripped up" on his voting record. However, we need to demonstrate we plan to use the law. (S)

Mr. Wolfe: We can show credibility by including a presidential statement covering the three core areas. (S)

Mr. Berger: Do we all agree that we include a statement? (S)

Mr. Fuerth: We must demonstrate our application of the law. If we "roar" and nothing happens, the Hill would feel it had been taken for a ride. (S)

Ms. Sherman: The Hill is convinced the M-11 was sold to Pakistan, but sees this as separable from MFN. If we have a presidential statement that makes reference to existing sanctions, and if we tell the Hill we are on a separate track with respect to the M-11, then this should not be a problem. (S)

Mr. Berger: What about the second issue: the level of specificity or generality of human rights conditions. On the one hand, we need enough to satisfy Congress and make clear to the PRC we're serious. On the other, the standards must be reachable given Joe Stiglitz's comments on the importance of the overall economic relationship and the consequences of revoking MFN, which few on the Hill want to see happen. We should not box the President into a position. (S)

Mr. Cutter: Option 1, Section 4 boxes us in. (S)

Mr. Fuerth: I can't figure out the allocation of conditions between Options 1 and 3. Option 2 has compositional logic, but what is the intent behind the differences between Options 1 and 3? Option 3 theoretically concentrates on human rights, and thus one would expect the fullest treatment of that issue, but in fact the conditions in Option 1 are the most comprehensive. The other allocations are confusing as well. Whereas Option 1 includes the requirement of access to PRC prisons, Option 3 mentions access to prisons or places of detention. Why more precision in Option 3 than Option 1? (S)

Mr. Berger: You've pointed out some important differences that cut to the core of the question of whether we want general or specific conditions. (S)

Mr. Kyle: The level of specificity sets us up for the future. Vagueness this year would allow vagueness next year. This argues for more generality. We could treat specifics in a speech. (S)

Mr. Tarnoff: We could blend the two; have a general Executive Order and specific public language aimed at both the human rights community and the Chinese, to make clear what we're after. (S)

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Mr. Wisner: In dealing with the Chinese, the less we lay out in public the better off we'll be. The opposite is what Pelosi needs to keep her coalition together. (S)

Ms. Sherman: If the President's statement acknowledges letters have been exchanged with the Chinese requiring specifics, that would allow Pelosi to keep her coalition together. (S)

Mr. Berger: No matter where, once we go on record we are bound. (S)

Mr. Fuerth: We need to preserve maximum flexibility. Also, Option 2 on human rights makes no reference to the American agenda and represents a disconnect with the campaign. (S)

Mr. Berger: You're right. I'm not sure of the logic behind the items selected in Option 2. (S)

Mr. Fuerth: Option 1 is close to a strait-jacket unless the Chinese have a sudden spiritual conversion. We cannot completely abandon the President's principles. (S)

Mr. Berger: The order of magnitude of conditions in Option 2 is better, but it doesn't cover some broad territory. Can we task the IWG over the next 24 hours to draft human rights conditions that embody all our concerns, are sharper than those in Option 2 and as comprehensive as those in Option 1? (S)

[REDACTED] We should consider how this will play in China. Human rights is the most difficult area because it threatens their very system and the regime. (S)

Mr. Inderfurth: Perhaps we should have a general statement of each condition followed by an explanation outlining specifics. (S)

Mr. Wiedemann: The Hill would consider the explanations to be part of the Executive Order. Also, Option 1 already narrows down our concerns to 5 or 6 generally-stated human rights conditions. (S)

Mr. Berger: But it's phrased in way that the President must either cut off MFN or issue a waiver that stretches the credibility of the facts. (S)

Ms. Sherman: We could change "overall significant progress" to "overall progress". (S)

Mr. Berger: That brings us back to specificity. Do we prefer a general statement of conditions covering a range of concerns on human rights? That would require another iteration here. (S)

Mr. Wiedemann: Option 1 conforms to the Mitchell/Pelosi language and reflects the views of Asia Watch and other NGOs. (S)

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Mr. Berger: But the conditions listed in Option 1, do we expect those things could happen by next year in China? (S)

Mr. Wiedemann: I've spent more time in China than anyone in this room over the course of three separate tours there. China is changing. Information is more widely available, journals that never existed before have appeared in the last few years. New, grass-roots associations and professional groupings are developing that are pro-democratic. Satellite dishes are permitted and China receives broadcasts from Hong Kong. Clearly, the climate is more open today than it has ever been in the past. (S)

As to Option 1, it reflects the Hill's recommendations. I believe the President could determine "significant progress" in each of the areas required. The toughest would be China's adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Even the U.S. cannot meet that standard in terms of equal pay for equal work, to cite one example. On prisoner releases, the prison terms of most Tiananmen-era dissidents will be up soon as will those of the 1979 Democracy Wall activists. China's Minister of Public Security has said the issue of inspections of prisons by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is under consideration. It is a possibility because ICRC only reports to the host government and not to anyone else. The Tibet condition doesn't challenge PRC sovereignty. Voice of America already gets through so allowing the broadcasts is a small step. (S)

Mr. Cutter: That is a wonderful argument for Option 2, which would increase the President's discretion. (S)

Mr. Wiedemann: The President's image and values are best protected by Option 1. As Leon Fuerth said, the President has gone on record pressing China to democratize and criticizing George Bush for coddling tyrants. He supports Pelosi, and Pelosi feels strongly about this list. This would be the easiest option to sell to the Hill. (S)

Mr. Berger: Let's take another crack at an Option 2 that deals with the deficiencies of current Option 2. The second iteration should be true to the President's commitment to promote human rights in China. (S)

Mr. Cutter: Could we include a statement indicating the President has instructed the Secretary to use other sanctions? Groups come in to see us, business groups, and while they understand what we are doing, the impact is harmful to them. (S)

Mr. Berger: MFN revocation is a blunt weapon; most people want to keep the gun loaded but not fire it. Should we use the Jackson-Vanik phrasing in the Executive Order, i.e. that the President shall consider whether extension of MFN will promote the objectives of the order (i.e. human rights)? (There was general assent). (S)

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Mr. Fuerth: Perhaps we need to include something on the environmental degradation in Tibet. (S)

Mr. Berger: I believe the consensus is that we should move away from MFN being the pivotal point of the relationship. We have environmental problems with Russia and Japan, but we deal with those in other ways. (S)

Mr. Fuerth: In those countries the problem reflects internal domestic policies; in Tibet the problem is Chinese imperialism. (S)

Mr. Berger: The problem is serious enough that it should be elevated out of the MFN framework. (S)

Let me recap today's meeting. We are going to condition MFN, and we agreed: (1) to an Executive Order; (2) to develop a new Option 2; (3) to break out nonproliferation and trade, but make reference to enforcement of existing laws; (4) to prepare a letter amplifying the President's views; (5) to track the Jackson-Vanik formulation that MFN would be renewed if doing so supports the objectives of the executive order, i.e. promoting human rights supports our objectives. (S)

Let's also agree to: (1) a tele-conference on Thursday to discuss the new option; we will then take our consensus to principals for a decision; (2) restrict ourselves to one channel of communication with the Hill. Wendy Sherman should be our "Field Marshall". Though we all know the players well, separate channels risk a mixed message. Wendy will regulate contacts. (S)

-- End of Meeting --

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MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

DC0030 DC Meeting on China Most Favored Nation, May 19, 1993 [2]

Staff Office-Individual:

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Original OA/ID Number:

3995

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
43	4	5	2	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. paper	re: China: MFN Decision and Implementation (8 pages)	05/00/1993	P1/b(1)
001b. list	re: Core Initiatives (Nonpaper) (2 pages)	05/00/1993	P1/b(1) <i>✓</i>
001c. cable	re: EAP Assistant Secretary Lord's May 12 Meeting (8 pages)	05/13/1993	P1/b(1) <i>KDE 3/11/2020</i>
001d. paper	re: M-11s: Determining the Threshold for Sanctions (4 pages) <i>partial release</i>	05/00/1993	P1/b(1) <i>KDE 3/11/2020</i>
001e. draft	Executive Order Options 1, 2, & 3. [Duplicate of rs1201_001c] (7 pages)	05/15/1993	P1/b(1) <i>KDE 3/11/2020</i>
002a. memo	Marc Grossman to Kristie Kenney re: [China MFN Discussion Papers] (1 page)	05/24/1993	P1/b(1)
002b. paper	re: China: MFN Decision and Implementation (5 pages)	05/00/1993	P1/b(1)
002c. paper	re: Conditions on MFN and China: Options for an Executive Order and Legislative Strategy (5 pages)	05/00/1993	P1/b(1) <i>KDE 3/11/2020</i>
002d. draft	Executive Order Options 1, 2, & 3. [Duplicate of rs1201_001c] (7 pages)	05/15/1993	P1/b(1) <i>KDE 3/11/2020</i>
002e. draft	Report to Congress Concerning Extension of Waiver Authority for the People's Republic of China (8 pages)	05/00/1993	P1/b(1)
002f. paper	re: M-11 Missile Issue (4 pages) <i>partial release</i>	05/00/1993	P1/b(1) <i>KDE 3/11/2020</i>
003a. memo	Kent Wiedemann to Samuel Berger re: China: MFN Decision and Implementation (7 pages)	05/15/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
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FOLDER TITLE:

DC0030 DC Meeting on China Most Favored Nation, May 19, 1993 [2]

2015-0221-M
rs1202

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. list	Invitees to the Deputies Committee Meeting, May 19, 1993. [partial] [CIA Act] (1 page)	05/00/1993	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3995

FOLDER TITLE:

DC0030 DC Meeting on China Most Favored Nation, May 19, 1993 [2]

2015-0221-M
rs1202

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: BERGER

FROM: WIEDEMANN

DOC DATE: 14 MAY 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
INTL TRADE
PC

MFN
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 19 MAY DC MTG ON CHINA MFN STRATEGY

ACTION: ORIGINAL RETURNED TO FILE DUE DATE: 18 MAY 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WIEDEMANN

LOGREF: 9320537

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC0030

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB CLOSED BY: NSWEA DOC 1 OF 5

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICERCAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER	Z	93051421	FOR DECISION
001	X	93061010	ORIGINAL RETURNED TO FILE
002 BERGER	Z	93051721	REDO FOR DECISION
002	X	93052015	ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/S
003 BERGER	Z	93051814	FOR DECISION
003	X	93051821	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
004	X	93051821	KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES
005	X	93052516	ADD-ON / FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

<u>DOC</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR ACTION</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR INFO</u>
004	930518	FUERTH, L	
004	930518	GROSSMAN, M	
004	930518	KNIGHT, E	
004	930518	SHERFIELD, M	
004	930518	MONTGOMERY, F	
004	930518	LAUDER, J	
004	930518	INDERFURTH, K	
004	930518	TYSON, L	
004	930518	SHEFFIELD, H	
004	930518	CUTTER, W	

National Security Council
The White House

3/15 Rec'd 09:40 am
JWR
5/15 1030L

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 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM ~~NSC~~ NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 14 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<u>11</u> DepExecSec	<u>1</u>	<u>Wau</u>	
ExecSec			
Staff Director			
D/APNSA	<u>2</u>	Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen <u>OBE</u>	
APNSA			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>B 6/10</u>	<u>R</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>	<u>Bmm</u>	

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

10:07:00 3/15


cc: NS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Exec Sec has diskette

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 14, 1993



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: KENT WIEDEMANN *KW*

SUBJECT: Discussion Paper for Deputies/Principals' Meeting on China MFN Strategy

Tab A conveys a discussion paper on options on China MFN. This would form the basis for a Principals or Deputies Committee meeting early next week.

Concurrences by: Bob Kyle, Jeremy Rosner, Dan Poneman, Eric Schwartz

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve scheduling a Principals/Deputies Committee meeting.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab A Discussion Paper
- Tab B Core List of U.S. Concerns
- Tab C Winston Lord's Cable from Beijing
- Tab D U.S. Policy Instruments Beyond MFN
- Tab E M-11 Missiles Issue: Determining Sanction Threshold
- Tab F Executive Summary of Mitchell/Pelosi Bill
- Tab G Executive Order Options 1, 2, and 3

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *VL* NARA, Date *7/15/2009*
2015-0221-m

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Divider Title: TAB A

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. paper	re: China: MFN Decision and Implementation (8 pages)	05/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management

OA/Box Number: 3995

FOLDER TITLE:

DC0030 DC Meeting on China Most Favored Nation, May 19, 1993 [2]

2015-0221-M
rs1202

RESTRICTION CODES**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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Divider Title: TAB B

CORE INITIATIVES (NONPAPER)

Human Rights:

- (1) provide a full accounting for and the early release of all those imprisoned or detained for the peaceful expression of their political views, including amnesty for those involved in the democracy wall and tiananmen protests.
- (2) release imprisoned religious figures, including catholic priests, protestant ministers, tibetan monks, and other religious leaders.
- (3) grant access to chinese prisoners by reputable third parties, such as the international committee of the red cross, promptly investigate reports of torture and abuse of prisoners and make public the results.
- (4) insure that security authorities avoid violence in dealing with peaceful demonstrations in tibet; reinvigorate the dialogue with the dalai lama or his representatives.
- (5) fulfill all the commitments made to former secretary baker to issue exit permits to chinese citizens not facing criminal charges and continue government-level discussions on human rights issues, including meetings between government officials at appropriate levels.
- (6) Permit the voice of america to broadcast without interference.

Nonproliferation:

- (1) reaffirm foreign minister qian's undertakings to former secretary baker on mtr, including the specific commitment that china will not transfer m-11 and m-9 missiles. respond to the u.s. request for clarification of the november 1992 transfer of missile-related equipment to pakistan.
- (2) agree to abide by the revised mtr guidelines announced january 7, 1993.
- (3) join with other states in adhering to the nuclear suppliers group guidelines, including full-scope safeguards, and the australia group's control lists for chemical weapons precursors and dual-use chemical and biological equipment.
- (4) avoid nuclear cooperation with irresponsible governments.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By RS NARA, Date 9/19/2016
2015-0721-11

Trade:

(1) implement commitments made in bilateral agreements covering protection of intellectual property rights, market access and prison labor.

(2) take steps to control textile fraud, including the practices of false labeling, transshipment, and quota evasion.

(3) further open china's services market, including access for U.S. insurance, travel, legal and banking service firms.

(4) Take measures that seek to further increase access for U.S. exports to China.

\\

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Divider Title: TAB C

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

13-May-1993 12:28 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

WIEDEMANN@A1@OEOB
RAGLE@A1@OEOB

FROM: White House Situation Room
(WHSR@A1@WHSR)

SUBJECT: EAP ASSISTANT SECRETARY LORD'S MAY 12 MEETING

<DIST>
PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH KENNEY LAKE REED SIT SODERBERG
SIT: FILE RAGLE SUM SUM2 WHSR_SPECIAL WIEDEMANN

<PREC>
IMMEDIATE
<CLAS>

~~SECRET~~

<OSRI>
RUEHC
<DTG>
131612Z MAY 93
<ORIG>
SECSTATE WASHDC

<TO>

INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5143
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0124

<SUBJ>
EAP ASSISTANT SECRETARY LORD'S MAY 12 MEETING
WITH PRC ACTING FM TIAN ZENGPEI

<TEXT>
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 05 STATE 146570
NODIS

NSC EYES ONLY LAKE/ITOH CIA EYES ONLY WOOLSEY
FOLLOWING BEIJING 16090 DATED MAY 13 1993 SENT SECSTATE
WASHDC BEING REPEATED FOR YOUR INFO.

QUOTE
~~SECRET~~ BEIJING 016090
NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, US, CH
SUBJECT: EAP ASSISTANT SECRETARY LORD'S MAY 12 MEETING
WITH PRC ACTING FM TIAN ZENGPEI

1. ~~S~~ ENTIRE TEXT.
SUMMARY

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0221-M(1.32)
03/11/2020 KDE

2. DURING A ONE HOUR MEETING ON MAY 12 WITH PRC VICE FOREIGN MINISTER AND ACTING MINISTER TIAN ZENGPEI, EAP A/S LORD EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT WITH HIS MAY 11 MEETINGS WITH VFM LIU HUAQIU. EMPHASIZING THE NEED FOR CHINESE ACTION TO ALLAY U.S. CONCERNS ABOUT THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP, LORD EXPLAINED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NEXT FEW WEEKS IN U.S.-PRC RELATIONS, LAID OUT KEY U.S. CONCERNS AND POINTED OUT AREAS WHERE CHINA NEEDED TO TAKE ACTION TO ADVANCE THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. HIGHLIGHTING POINTS MADE IN HIS MAY 11 MEETINGS WITH LIU, LORD SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT TO CHART THE COURSE FOR BILATERAL RELATIONS OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS, BUT THERE WAS ALSO AN URGENT NEED FOR POSITIVE CHINESE ACTIONS OVER THE NEXT FEW WEEKS TO HELP THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS RESOLVE PENDING TRADE AND MFN QUESTIONS. HE EXPLAINED THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AN EXECUTIVE ORDER AND CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION VIS-A-VIS THE RENEWAL OF CHINA'S MFN STATUS. SEEKING ADDITIONAL AVENUES FOR ACHIEVING PROGRESS IN U.S.-PRC RELATIONS, LORD PROPOSED NEW AREAS OF BILATERAL COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND THROUGH GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT WORKING GROUPS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND NONPROLIFERATION.

3. FALLING BACK ON STANDARD CHINESE POSITIONS, TIAN SAID CHINA HAD ACHIEVED MORE THAN ANY OTHER COUNTRY CONCERNING HUMAN RIGHTS DURING RECENT DECADES BECAUSE THE PRC HAD ENDED THE MISERY OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE AS A SEMI-COLONIAL STATE AND BROUGHT TO THEM THE RIGHT TO SUBSISTENCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. NOTING THAT CHINA AND THE U.S. HAD DIFFERENT VIEWS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, HE CALLED ON BOTH SIDES TO PUT ASIDE THEIR DIFFERENCES AND WORK TOWARD ADVANCING THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP IN A LONG-TERM AND BROADER CONTEXT. ECHOING COMMENTS MADE BY VFM LIU DURING LORD'S MAY 11 MEETINGS, TIAN SAID THERE SHOULD BE MORE CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE U.S. AND CHINA IN ORDER TO IMPROVE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING. HE SUGGESTED THAT BOTH SIDES AVOID RAISING ISSUES BASED ON HEARSAY AND EXERTING PRESSURE ON THE OTHER SIDE. HE ASSERTED THAT CHINA HAD ALSO DONE A LOT TO IMPROVE BILATERAL RELATIONS, WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO, AND HOPED THAT THE U.S. WOULD RECIPROCATE.

4. IN RESPONSE, LORD PRESSED FOR CHINA'S IMMEDIATE RESPONSE -- PREFERABLY WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS -- ON HIS SUGGESTIONS AND PROPOSALS, NOTING THAT WHILE HIS CHINA VISIT HAD BEEN A DISAPPOINTMENT, BOTH SIDES STILL NEEDED TO PLAN FOR THE FUTURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP. HE ALSO URGED A RAPID, POSITIVE RESPONSE BY THE CHINESE ON THE ISSUE OF INTERNATIONAL ACCESS TO CHINESE PRISONS.
END SUMMARY

5. EAP ASSISTANT SECRETARY WINSTON LORD MET FOR ONE HOUR ON MAY 12 WITH PRC VICE FOREIGN MINISTER AND ACTING SECRETARY TIAN ZENGPEI. TIAN WAS ACCOMPANIED BY MFA NORTH AMERICAN/OCEANIAN AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT DEPUTY DIRECTOR YANG

JIECHI, U.S. DIVISION DIRECTOR LU SHUMIN AND DEPUTY DIVISION CHIEFS CHEN MINGMING AND MA XUESONG (INTERPRETER). A/S LORD WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR ROY, DCM HALLFORD, EAP/CM DIRECTOR PERITO, EAP SPECIAL ASSISTANT FITTS, ACTING POLCOUNS YOUNG, INTERPRETER BROWN AND POLOFF.

6. AFTER AN EXCHANGE OF PLEASANTRIES, A/S LORD SAID THE NEW ADMINISTRATION, AS INDICATED IN PRESIDENT CLINTON'S LETTER TO PRC PRESIDENT JIANG ZEMIN, WANTED TO RESTORE THE MOMENTUM TO U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS. IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR BOTH COUNTRIES AND THE REST OF THE WORLD THAT THE U.S. AND CHINA IMPROVED THEIR BILATERAL RELATIONS. SHARING COMMON INTERESTS, THE U.S AND CHINA HAVE COOPERATED IN HELPING TO RESOLVE MANY REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS, SUCH AS THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR PROBLEM. LORD SAID THE U.S.

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 05 STATE 146570
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NSC EYES ONLY LAKE/ITOH CIA EYES ONLY WOOLSEY
WOULD LIKE TO CHART A NEW RELATIONSHIP OVER THE COMING YEARS, BUT THERE WAS ALSO AN URGENT NEED FOR POSITIVE ACTION DURING THE UPCOMING WEEKS BECAUSE OF DEBATE IN CONGRESS ON RENEWAL OF CHINA'S MFN STATUS.
THE MFN DEBATE

7. LORD REMARKED THAT THE U.S. HAS NOTED RECENT POSITIVE ACTIONS ON THE PART OF CHINA, BUT MORE WORK NEEDED TO BE DONE SO THAT THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS COULD WORK TOGETHER TO RESOLVE MFN AND OTHER TRADE QUESTIONS. HE ADVISED THAT CONSULTATIONS ON A FINAL APPROACH ON THE MFN QUESTION WOULD BEGIN WITHIN DAYS. LORD EXPLAINED THAT THIS WAS WHY HE HAD BEEN SENT BY THE PRESIDENT TO CHINA -- AS A LAST EFFORT TO ELICIT IMMEDIATE RESULTS BEFORE CONSULTATIONS WITH CONGRESS. HE TOLD TIAN THAT, REALISTICALLY, WE WERE FACING THE RENEWAL OF MFN WITH SOME CONDITIONS ATTACHED. BUT THERE WERE TWO METHODS THROUGH WHICH MFN COULD BE RENEWED. THE FIRST, THROUGH A PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE ORDER, ALLOWED FOR RENEWAL WITH UNILATERAL CONDITIONS THAT CHINA WOULD NEED TO MEET DURING THE UPCOMING YEAR. THE SECOND, THROUGH LEGISLATION, COULD CONSIST OF LEGISLATION ALREADY TABLED OR NEW LEGISLATION THAT COULD BE MORE RESTRICTIVE. LORD SAID THE EXECUTIVE ORDER APPROACH WOULD BE MORE PREFERABLE FOR CHINA AND FOR THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION, SINCE IT PROVIDED MORE FLEXIBILITY.

DISAPPOINTING MEETINGS WITH VFM LIU HUAQIU

8. A/S LORD TOLD TIAN THAT, FRANKLY, DESPITE THE FACT THAT U.S. CONCERNS HAD BEEN PRESENTED TO THE CHINESE ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS SINCE MARCH, HIS MAY 11 MEETINGS WITH VFM LIU HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTING. THE U.S. HAD EMPHASIZED DURING RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH PRC OFFICIALS ON THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP -- INCLUDING A MEETING BETWEEN TIAN AND AMBASSADOR ROY -- THAT EFFORTS WERE NEEDED ON BOTH SIDES. IN DESCRIBING U.S CONCERNS AND AREAS WHERE THE

U.S. BELIEVED PROGRESS COULD BE MADE, THE U.S., IN ALMOST EVERY CASE, HAD ASKED CHINA TO TAKE ACTIONS WHICH CONCERNED THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PAST AGREEMENTS, ADHERENCE TO AGREEMENTS TO WHICH CHINA WAS A PARTY, OR PRINCIPLES EMBODIED WITHIN THE PRC CONSTITUTION.

9. LORD EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD BEEN LOOKING BEYOND THE MFN DEBATE TO DISCUSSIONS ON STRUCTURING U.S.-PRC RELATIONS IN THE FUTURE AND ADDRESSING CONCERNS OF BOTH SIDES. BUT THE DISAPPOINTING MAY 11 TALKS RAISED CONCERNS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP. BRIEFLY REVISITING POINTS RAISED WITH VFM LIU, LORD SAID THE U.S. HAD TAKEN STEPS TO MOVE THE RELATIONSHIP FORWARD, SUCH AS APPROVING WAIVERS FOR SATELLITE EXPORT LICENSES FOR CHINA AND MAJOR EXIMBANK LOANS IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN BILATERAL TRADE RELATIONS. THE U.S. WAS ALSO PREPARED TO CONSIDER BILATERAL COOPERATION IN NEW AREAS, SUCH AS THE ENVIRONMENT AND NONPROLIFERATION.

NEW AREAS FOR BILATERAL COOPERATION

10. ON THE ENVIRONMENT, A/S LORD SUGGESTED THE U.S. AND CHINA BEGIN DISCUSSIONS ON AN AGENDA FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION THAT COULD MEET GLOBAL CHALLENGES TO THE BENEFIT OF BOTH COUNTRIES. HE SAID HE HAD PERSONALLY TALKED TO FORMER SENATOR AND UNDER SECRETARY FOR GLOBAL AFFAIRS WIRTH ABOUT BILATERAL COOPERATION, AND WAS ENCOURAGED BY THE PROSPECTS FOR JOINT ACTIVITIES IN AREAS SUCH AS ALTERNATE FUELS AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE. HERE THE U.S. MIGHT BE ABLE TO SHARE OR SELL U.S. CLEAN COAL TECHNOLOGY. OTHER POSSIBLE AREAS OF COOPERATION MENTIONED WERE PROTECTION OF WETLANDS -- WHERE THE U.S. COULD PROVIDE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE -- AND PROTECTION OF FORESTS, PANDAS AND WILDLIFE. THE U.S. COULD ALSO ASSIST CHINA IN ADDRESSING ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS ALONG THE YANGTZE RIVER, INCLUDING THOSE RELATED TO THE PROPOSED THREE GORGES PROJECT. CHINA AND THE U.S. COULD WORK TOGETHER ON INTERNATIONAL TREATIES, SUCH AS THAT CONCERNING BIODIVERSITY, THE CONVENTION ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL TIMBER AGREEMENT.

11. IN OTHER AREAS OF MUTUAL CONCERN, LORD SAID THAT THE UNDERSECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS WAS CONSIDERING A TRIP TO CHINA TO DISCUSS THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY AND OTHER NONPROLIFERATION MATTERS. THE NEW ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS WAS ALSO INTERESTED IN VISITING CHINA IN JULY, 1993 FOLLOWING THE COMPLETION OF THE WORLD HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE. LORD SAID THAT WITH NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN DATA SHARING PROJECT, COOPERATION IN THE FIELDS

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NSC EYES ONLY LAKE/ITOH CIA EYES ONLY WOOLSEY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COULD MOVE TO A HIGHER LEVEL. NOTING CHINA'S QUESTIONS ABOUT THE NEW MTCR REGIME, A/S LORD SUGGESTED A VISIT TO CHINA BY A GROUP OF U.S. EXPERTS WHO COULD EXPLAIN THE REGIME'S CHANGES.

12. LORD SAID THAT BOTH SIDES NEEDED TO ENVISAGE HOW TO MANAGE THE ISSUES THAT WOULD REMAIN AFTER MFN WAS RESOLVED. HE SUGGESTED THAT GIVEN THE LIKELIHOOD OF MFN RENEWED WITH CONDITIONS, CHINA AND THE U.S. SHOULD BEGIN TO CONSIDER WAYS TO MAKE PROGRESS DURING THE ENSUING YEAR ON HUMAN RIGHTS, TRADE AND NONPROLIFERATION ISSUES. WITH PROGRESS ON THESE ISSUES, THE U.S. COULD MOVE FORWARD AGAIN WITH MFN RENEWAL IN JUNE, 1994. THIS WAS IN OUR MUTUAL INTEREST.

WORKING GROUPS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND NONPROLIFERATION

13. A/S LORD PROPOSED TO TIAN THAT THE U.S. AND CHINA ESTABLISH BILATERAL, GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT WORKING GROUPS TO DEAL WITH OUTSTANDING ISSUES IN THE AREA OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND NONPROLIFERATION. THE WORKING GROUPS WOULD BE CO-CHAIRLED AT THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY LEVEL, MEET PERIODICALLY IN THE TWO CAPITALS OR NEW YORK TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION AND REVIEW PROGRESS IN ADDRESSING THESE ISSUES. THE WORKING GROUP ON HUMAN RIGHTS WOULD BE CHAIRED, ON THE U.S. SIDE, BY THE A/S FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. LORD SAID WHILE IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT CHINA DECIDE ON THE COMPOSITION OF ITS OWN WORKING GROUP TEAM, THE U.S. BELIEVED IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR THE CHINESE SIDE TO INCLUDE REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE MINISTRIES OF PUBLIC SECURITY AND JUSTICE AND THE RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS BUREAU.

14. THE WORKING GROUP ON NONPROLIFERATION WOULD BE CHAIRED ON THE U.S. SIDE BY THE A/S FOR POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS. A/S LORD SUGGESTED THAT IN ADDITION TO MFA OFFICIALS, THE CHINESE SHOULD CONSIDER INCLUDING EXPERTS FROM PRC CIVILIAN AND MILITARY AGENCIES IN ITS WORKING GROUP TEAM.

15. LORD EXPRESSED HOPE THAT THE WORKING GROUPS COULD ATTAIN CONCRETE PROGRESS AND COMPILE A RECORD OF ACHIEVEMENT TO ASSIST IN RESOLVING THE 1994 MFN DEBATE AND IN ADVANCING THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. NOTING THAT A THIRD KEY AREA -- TRADE -- HAD NOT BEEN AN AREA SUGGESTED FOR A WORKING GROUP, LORD EXPLAINED THAT THERE ALREADY EXISTED SEVERAL MECHANISMS AND COMMITTEES TO RESOLVE OUTSTANDING TRADE ISSUES.

16. IN CONCLUSION, LORD SAID THAT HE HAD LAID OUT THE ABOVEMENTIONED SUGGESTIONS IN AN EFFORT TO ARRIVE AT MEASURES TO ADVANCE U.S.-PRC BILATERAL RELATIONS. HE REPEATED THAT HE WAS DISAPPOINTED WITH THE RESULTS OF HIS BEIJING MEETINGS. WITH THE KEY U.S. CONCERNS AND GOALS FOR U.S.-CHINA BILATERAL RELATIONS INDICATED WELL IN ADVANCE OF THE VISIT, THERE WAS, UNFORTUNATELY, NO PROGRESS TO REPORT BACK TO WASHINGTON. LORD REMARKED THAT LOOKING AHEAD, HE HOPED THE CHINESE WOULD SERIOUSLY CONSIDER THE WORKING GROUP AND OTHER PROPOSALS IN ORDER TO MOVE THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP FORWARD.

TIAN'S RESPONSE

17. IN REPLY, TIAN SAID THAT HE HAD PAID ATTENTION TO A/S LORD'S PRESENTATION AND SUGGESTIONS. READING CAREFULLY

FROM A PREPARED TEXT, HE NOTED THAT CHINA ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO SINO-U.S RELATIONS AND BELIEVED THAT NORMAL BILATERAL RELATIONS WERE IN THE INTEREST OF AND WOULD BENEFIT BOTH COUNTRIES. IMPROVED SINO-U.S. RELATIONS WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO PEACE, SECURITY AND STABILITY IN THE ASIA PACIFIC AREAS AND THE REST OF THE WORLD. ECHOING COMMENTS MADE BY VFM LIU THE PREVIOUS DAY, TIAN COMPARED PRESIDENT CLINTON'S EMPHASIS ON REVITALIZING THE U.S. ECONOMY TO CHINA'S FOCUS ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND REFORM. HE ALSO NOTED THE COMPLEMENTARITY OF THE TWO COUNTRIES' ECONOMIES. POINTING TO CHANGES IN THE WORLD SINCE THE OPENING OF SINO-U.S. RELATIONS TWENTY YEARS AGO, TIAN SAID THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WERE GREATER IN 1972 THAN TODAY.

18. TIAN SAID IT WAS NO SECRET THAT THERE WERE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE VIEWS OF CHINA AND THE U.S. BUT IT WAS ALSO TRUE THAT THERE WAS MUCH COMMON GROUND AND SHARED INTERESTS. HE STATED THAT HE VERY MUCH APPRECIATED HEARING FROM AMBASSADOR ROY DURING THEIR EARLIER MEETING THE U.S. PERSPECTIVE ON THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AND THE NEED TO SOLVE NEAR-TERM ISSUES SUCH AS MFN RENEWAL. BUT BOTH SIDES NEEDED TO GO BEYOND THE NEAR-TERM AND CONSIDER SINO-U.S. RELATIONS IN A LONG-TERM AND BROADER CONTEXT. TIAN REMARKED THAT BOTH SIDES ALSO NEEDED TO PAY ATTENTION TO THE PROPER HANDLING OF DIFFERENCES. HE SAID HE

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NSC EYES ONLY LAKE/ITOH CIA EYES ONLY WOOLSEY BELIEVED THAT ENHANCED CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES WOULD HELP THE U.S. AND CHINA TO BETTER UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER IN ORDER TO FIND ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS. IF THERE WERE UNRESOLVABLE DIFFERENCES, THEN THOSE DIFFERENCES SHOULD BE PUT ASIDE. BUT, TIAN DECLARED, BOTH SIDES SHOULD MAKE SURE THAT DIFFERENCES AND PROBLEMS DO NOT SET BACK THE RELATIONSHIP OR RESULT IN STAGNATION. IN DEALING WITH PROBLEMS, BOTH SIDES SHOULD PROCEED FROM THE PRINCIPLES OF MUTUAL RESPECT, NONINTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS, EQUALITY AND MUTUAL BENEFIT.

TIAN ON HUMAN RIGHTS

19. TIAN SAID HE BELIEVED THAT GENERALLY THE PEOPLES OF THE COUNTRIES DID NOT KNOW EACH OTHER WELL. HE STATED THAT PRESIDENT CLINTON HAD SET FORTH HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY AS TWO OF THE PILLARS OF HIS ADMINISTRATION. BUT, WORLDWIDE, CHINA HAD DONE THE MOST WORK OVER RECENT DECADES TO ENCOURAGE HUMAN RIGHTS. RELATING CHINA'S POSITION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, TIAN POSTULATED THAT HUMAN RIGHTS COULD NOT BE DIVORCED FROM A COUNTRY'S NATURAL CONDITIONS AND HISTORICALLY BACKGROUND. CONTINUING, HE SAID CHINA HAD BEEN A SEMI-COLONIAL COUNTRY FOR ONE HUNDRED YEARS PRIOR TO THE FOUNDING OF THE PRC IN 1949. AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE MISERABLE AND DEPENDENT LIFE OF THE CHINESE AT THE TIME, HE RELATED THE FAMILIAR STORY OF THE PARK IN SHANGHAI THAT DISPLAYED A SIGN BARRING DOGS AND

CHINESE FROM ENTERING. ONLY AFTER SEVERAL DECADES OF "STRUGGLE BY PROGRESSIVE CHINESE" WAS THE SITUATION CHANGED. LOOKING BACK OVER HISTORY, TIAN MAINTAINED, A COUNTRY MUST BE INDEPENDENT BEFORE IT CAN TALK ABOUT RIGHTS FOR ITS PEOPLE. CHINA HAD EMBARKED ON AN INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY FOR THIS REASON, BASED ON CAREFUL CONSIDERATION OF CHINA'S HISTORY. HE EXPLAINED THAT CHINA HAD COME TO REALIZE THAT PEOPLE MUST ENJOY THE RIGHT TO SUBSISTENCE AND PURSUE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN ORDER TO END THEIR SUFFERING. PEOPLE IN COMPARATIVELY RICH COUNTRIES SUCH AS THE U.S. COULD NOT UNDERSTAND THIS CONCEPT, TIAN OBSERVED.

20. CONTINUING, TIAN SAID BY STRESSING THE ABOVEMENTIONED POINTS HE WAS NOT SAYING THAT CHINA WAS NOT PAYING ATTENTION TO THE OTHER ASPECTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS -- BECAUSE CHINA WAS PAYING ATTENTION. TO ILLUSTRATE CHINA'S EFFORTS IN THIS AREA, TIAN POINTED TO PROGRESS IN DEVELOPING CHINA'S LEGAL SYSTEM AND IN ADVANCING DEMOCRACY. UNDER CHINA'S LAWS AND CONSTITUTION, THE CHINESE PEOPLE WERE PROVIDED WITH FUNDAMENTAL GUARANTEES OF THEIR RIGHTS. HE CLAIMED THAT THERE WERE ADEQUATE PROVISIONS FOR PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE, AND PROGRESS WAS STILL BEING MADE. TIAN SAID HE HAD MADE HIS REMARKS TO EXPLAIN HIS ASSERTION THAT CHINA HAD DONE MORE THAN ANY OTHER COUNTRY OVER THE LAST DECADES IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS. CHINA, THEREFORE, WAS THE MOST QUALIFIED TO TALK ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS.

21. RETURNING TO U.S.-PRC RELATIONS, TIAN REITERATED HIS APPEAL FOR MORE BILATERAL EXCHANGES -- BASED ON EQUALITY -- TO IMPROVE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE U.S. AND CHINA. HE SUGGESTED THAT EACH SIDE AVOID RAISING ISSUES BASED ON HEARSAY AND EXERTING PRESSURE ON THE OTHER SIDE. SUCH ACTIONS WERE UNHELPFUL FOR THE PROPER HANDLING OF ISSUES. CONCLUDING HIS REMARKS, TIAN SAID HE WAS NOT SAYING THAT EVERYTHING IN CHINA WAS PERFECT; IMPROVEMENTS WERE STILL NEEDED. BUT, HE WANTED TO GIVE EXAMPLES TO SHOW THE DIFFERENCE IN VIEW BETWEEN THE U.S. AND CHINA. EVEN IF BOTH SIDES COULD NOT AGREE, DIFFERENCES SHOULD NOT BECOME OBSTACLES TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF SINO-U.S. RELATIONS.

22. TIAN SAID CHINA APPRECIATED THE NEW U.S. ADMINISTRATION'S STATEMENT REAFFIRMING U.S. ADHERENCE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE THREE JOINT COMMUNIQUEES AND THE ONE CHINA POLICY, AND EXPRESSING WILLINGNESS TO IMPROVE SINO-U.S. RELATIONS. TIAN RESTATED HIS CALL FOR EFFORTS TO IMPROVE BILATERAL RELATIONS IN A BROADER CONTEXT BY TRANSCENDING DIFFERENCES. CHINA HAD ALREADY DONE A LOT TO IMPROVE SINO-U.S. RELATIONS AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO, TIAN AVERRED. HE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT THE CHINESE ACTION WOULD BE RECIPROCATED BY THE U.S. SIDE, AND THAT HOPES AND EXPECTATIONS WOULD BE PUT INTO PRACTICE AND BECOME REALITY. WITH CONCERTED EFFORT, TIAN SAID, SINO-U.S. RELATIONS COULD BE IMPROVED AND FURTHER DEVELOPED. AS FOR THE SPECIFIC ISSUES RAISED BY A/S LORD, VFM LIU AND LORD

HAD ALREADY DISCUSSED THEM, AND HE, TIAN, AGREED WITH WHAT HAD BEEN SAID BY LIU. HE TOLD LORD THAT HIS SUGGESTIONS FOR NEW AREAS OF COOPERATION WOULD BE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED BY THE CHINESE SIDE.

LORD PRESSES FOR REPLY ON WORKING GROUP PROPOSAL

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NODIS

NSC EYES ONLY LAKE/ITOH CIA EYES ONLY WOOLSEY

23. IN THE FINAL MINUTES OF THE MEETING, LORD PRESSED TIAN FOR A RESPONSE WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS ON THE PROPOSED WORKING GROUPS AND ENVIRONMENTAL SECTOR COOPERATION, IN ADDITION TO A COMMITMENT FROM THE CHINESE TO CONTINUE A DIALOGUE AND NEGOTIATIONS ON BILATERAL TRADE ISSUES. HE ALSO REQUESTED THAT CHINA, AS HAD BEEN RAISED IN PREVIOUS MEETINGS BETWEEN AMBASSADOR ROY AND CHINESE OFFICIALS, GRANT ACCESS TO AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION SUCH AS THE RED CROSS TO CHINA'S PRISONS. LORD NOTED THAT LIU HAD NOT BEEN CLEAR ON THE STATUS OF THIS REQUEST. A RAPID RESPONSE ON THESE ISSUES WOULD BE IN THE MUTUAL INTEREST OF BOTH COUNTRIES, LORD EMPHASIZED. HE ADDED THAT WE FACED A DIFFICULT SITUATION AS A RESULT OF THE DISAPPOINTING VISIT TO CHINA, BUT IT WAS TIME TO LOOK TOWARD THE FUTURE AND PLAN FOR MANAGING THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. TIAN AGREED TO SEND THE SPECIFIC REQUESTS TO THE APPROPRIATE PRC OFFICIALS FOR A RESPONSE.

24. THIS CABLE HAS BEEN CLEARED BY A/S LORD.

ROY

UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

BT

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SECTION: 01 OF 05

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SECTION: 03 OF 05

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Divider Title: **TAB D**

Statutory Resources

By mandating restrictions on U.S.-PRC economic and trade relations and sanctions for certain behavior, U.S. law offers a variety of means to pressure China for progress and to respond in a targeted manner to unacceptable Chinese actions.

- o Trade - Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 identifies steps to secure adequate market access and intellectual property protection for U.S. exports. This was the USG's key source of leverage in securing Chinese agreement to the market access and IPR MOUs. We could invoke 301, if the Chinese fail to implement these agreements or fail to open their market to U.S. service industries.
- o Proliferation Law - The U.S. has already sanctioned China once for improper transfers to Pakistan of missile-related technology; if it determines that China is engaged in further transfers, the USG will have to take the much broader action required by the Helms Amendment. Other provisions of U.S. law cover other aspects of proliferation (e.g., of nuclear weapons, CBW, destabilizing arms to Iran and Iraq, etc.).
- o Nuclear Cooperation - Legal restrictions based on nuclear nonproliferation and human rights concerns now prevent significant U.S. nuclear commerce with China. (Nuclear power is an area of major interest to U.S. nuclear vendors and service companies.)
- o Exchange Rates - Under section 3004 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Treasury has determined that China is manipulating its exchange rate to prevent balance of payments adjustment and gain unfair competitive advantage in international trade. Treasury must negotiate with the Chinese to ensure that they take action to address this problem.
- o International Financial Institutions - Section 701(a) of the IFI Act requires the U.S. to oppose proposals for financing projects in countries with a pattern of gross violation of human rights, unless they are directed to basic human needs. Since Tiananmen, the U.S. has opposed by abstention votes on non-basic human needs projects for China.
- o Narcotics Certification - The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, requires the President to certify that major drug producing or transit countries, including China, have cooperated fully with the U.S. or taken adequate drug control steps of their own. Decertification would require the U.S. to withhold most forms of assistance and to oppose any loans from multilateral development banks.

Tiananmen Sanctions

The U.S. is the only country that maintains significant Tiananmen-related sanctions against China. Legally-mandated sanctions include a ban on the export of U.S. Munitions List goods and services to China and nuclear exchanges; an embargo

on licenses for civilian exports to military and police end-users; and restrictions on IFI lending. Other sanctions carried out by Executive Order and policy include opposition to China-specific proposals for easing COCOM controls; a suspension in Trade Development Administration (TDA) and Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) activities; and a limitation on high-level exchanges.

The President can lift most of these sanctions on a case-by-case basis in the national interest, or more broadly if he certifies human rights improvements. Therefore, the sanctions can provide both positive and negative leverage.

Nearly four years after Tiananmen, these sanctions remain a statement of U.S. concern over PRC human rights conditions. They also possess significant tactical value: the U.S. can selectively relax them as incentives for improved Chinese behavior. The IWG paper which the Deputies Committee discussed April 27, for instance, proposes limited waivers for EXIMBANK lending, satellite exports, and TDA activities as a means to encourage Chinese progress. Because many of the sanctions undercut U.S. trade and other interests, relaxation can be beneficial to the U.S. As the lifting of most of the sanctions depends on human rights improvements, the Executive Branch for now is restricted to utilizing those sanctions which can be relaxed on an ad hoc basis through Presidential waiver.

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Divider Title: TAB E

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001d. paper	re: M-11s: Determining the Threshold for Sanctions [partial] (3 pages)	05/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3995

FOLDER TITLE:

DC0030 DC Meeting on China Most Favored Nation, May 19, 1993 [2]

2015-0221-M
rs1202

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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M-11s: DETERMINING THE THRESHOLD FOR SANCTIONS

We need to decide how to deal with the M-11 issue and other potentially-sanctionable Chinese proliferation activities, including their implications for the upcoming MFN decision. This paper discusses the relevant proliferation cases, the legal requirements we face and their possible implications, policy options on sanctions and MFN, and the steps we need to take both within the Administration and with Congress in the days ahead.

EO 13526 1.4c, 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6)

Sanctions Legislation

In November 1990, Congress included missile sanctions provisions in the FY 1991 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) in an effort to stem the spread of missile-related technology. Under these provisions, sanctions must be imposed when it is determined

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that a foreign person, after November 5, 1990, knowingly exported, transferred or otherwise engaged in the trade of any MTCR equipment or technology that contributes to the design, development, or production of MTCR-class missiles in a non-MTCR country. The authority to impose these sanctions was delegated by the President to the Secretary of State and redelegated to the Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs.

The sanction for transfers of MTCR Category 1 items (complete missile systems as well as major subsystems such as rocket stages, engines, guidance sets and re-entry vehicles) is a minimum two year ban on all U.S. Government contracts and all dual-use and munitions list licenses to the foreign entity. Upon an additional determination that the transfer has "substantially" contributed to the design, etc., of MTCR-class missiles, imports must be halted. Sanctionable activity also includes conspiring to engage, attempting to engage or facilitating such exports, transfers or trade.

In June 1991, sanctions were imposed against one Pakistani and two Chinese entities for their role in the transfer of an M-11 training missile and launcher to Pakistan. Since these sanctions appeared to have no practical effect, Senator Jesse Helms successfully lobbied for tougher sanctions. The Helms amendment broadened the list of entities subject to sanctions in Non-Market Economies, excluding members of the former Warsaw Pact, (i.e., China, North Korea, Cuba and Vietnam) to include not only the entity that engaged in the sanctionable activity, but also all activities of the government relating to the development or production of missile equipment or technology, and all government activities affecting the development or production of electronics, space systems or equipment, and military aircraft in that country. Prior to this amendment, these activities were sanctioned only if the specific offending entity in a country could not be identified.

Thus far, this part of the NDAA has not been triggered by a sanctions determination. It would raise several interpretive questions:

- What are "government" as opposed to "private" activities in a country like China?
- What is the scope of the "electronics," "space systems or equipment," or "military aircraft" industry?

(The legislative history provides no insight into what was intended by this language. It would not, however, be possible to interpret this provision as applying only to missile-related electronics, etc., as a prior section of the NDAA already sanctions all activities relating to missile production.)

It should be noted that the Helms amendment only applies to sanctions imposed under the Arms Export Control Act. Accordingly, the sanctions on government contracts, munitions list exports, and imports would apply to all government

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activities related to electronics, etc. However, since dual-use export sanctions are applied under the Export Administration Act, which Helms did not amend, those sanctions would apply only to the offending entity.

The statute contains limited waiver authority ("essential to the national security"), but provides no authority to delay, solely on foreign policy grounds, decisions on whether sanctionable activity has taken place. Delays can be justified to obtain necessary intelligence assessments. State has also previously taken the position that short delays can be justified to ascertain whether a foreign government is prepared to take certain steps that could allow a waiver.

Although detailed analyses of the Helms amendment's impact on U.S.-China trade have yet to be completed, preliminary information suggests that at least \$2 billion in exports (electronics and satellites) of U.S. goods to China could be at stake. This would affect AT&T, IBM, Motorola, Hughes and other U.S. firms, among others, who do business in China. Subsequent retaliatory actions by the Chinese could raise the financial costs even higher.

More broadly, the imposition of sanctions could undercut U.S. efforts to promote Chinese political and economic reform, and jeopardize Chinese cooperation with the U.S. on a host of global and regional issues, including the North Korean nuclear program, Cambodia and Bosnia. Conceivably, sanctions with major financial impact could also trigger a Chinese decision to go forward with missile sales which in the past had been restrained as a result of carrots proffered by the U.S.

Options

China's proliferation behavior, particularly the M-11 issue, raises questions relating to both sanctions and to MFN. The first three sanctions options below describe possible outcomes; any actual decisions would only be taken under normal interagency procedures leading to a State Department determination. The fourth option could be decided even without a formal sanctions determination.

Four options are available: .

Option 1: Impose Sanctions.

EO 13526 1.4c, 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6)

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Option 2: Do Not Impose Sanctions Now.

EO 13526 1.4c, 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6)

Option 3: Shift the Burden of Proof to the Chinese.

EO 13526 1.4c, 3.3(b)(6)

Option 4: Restrict U.S.-China Trade Without Imposing Statutory Sanctions.

EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

If this option is chosen we would recommend that sanctions be applied to China's satellite launch services which have \$200 million in pending U.S. contracts, and \$550 million under negotiations.

Implementing Strategy

Irrespective of which options are chosen on the questions of sanctions and MFN, we will need to develop a strategy for implementing these decisions on the Hill. In the period immediately before and after the sanctions and MFN options are selected, we will need to work closely with the Hill. Intelligence officials have testified on China's proliferation behavior before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. We will need to ensure that the relevant committees, their chairmen, and the Congressional leadership are properly briefed on the judgments reflected in the NIE, and are consulted before and after we make our sanctions and MFN decisions. Whatever decisions are made, there is value in making them sooner rather than later, and thus getting credit for showing leadership on these difficult questions.

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Divider Title: **TAB F**

SUMMARY OF THE UNITED STATES-CHINA ACT OF 1993

Introduced by Senator Mitchell and Representative Pelosi

This bill would renew Most Favored Nation (MFN) treatment for China on the condition that China:

- * Provides an acceptable accounting and release of people in China and Tibet detained, accused, or sentenced as a result of the nonviolent expression of their political beliefs.
- * Takes appropriate actions to adhere to the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and allows unrestricted emigration of citizens wanting to leave for political or religious reasons.
- * Takes action to prevent export of prison-made goods and
- * Makes overall significant progress in:
 - * ceasing religious persecution in China and Tibet,
 - * ceasing to threaten the survival of the Tibetan culture,
 - * ceasing unfair trade practices,
 - * adhering to guidelines of the MTCR and Nuclear Suppliers Group. If China transfers missiles or launchers for the M-9 or M-11 to Syria, Pakistan or Iran, or material or technology contributing to produce a nuclear explosive device, the President may not indicate significant progress has been made.
 - * adhering to the Joint Declaration on Hong Kong,
 - * ceasing jamming of VOA broadcasts,
 - * allowing human rights monitors access to trials and places of detention,
 - * cooperating in an acceptable accounting of U.S. servicemen who disappeared or are missing as a result of the wars in Korea or Vietnam.

The Chinese government's failure to meet the conditions would result in revocation of MFN for all articles produced, manufactured, marketed or otherwise exported by a Chinese state-owned enterprise.

Articles produced by private enterprises and foreign joint ventures would continue to receive MFN treatment.

Non-state sector persons or entities believing they have been wrongly designated as state-owned would be able to request a review by the Treasury Department. Conversely, individuals knowing of state-owned enterprises not so designated by Treasury would be able to request review to have their designation changed.

April 22, 1993

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE UNITED STATES CHINA ACT OF 1993
AS INTRODUCED BY SENATE MAJORITY LEADER GEORGE J. MITCHELL**

This bill follows the framework of H.R. 5318, last year's bill which passed both Houses of Congress and was vetoed by President Bush.

The bill grants renewal of MFN trade status to China from July 3, 1993 until July 3, 1994. In order to renew MFN after July 1994, the President would have to indicate that China had:

(1) taken appropriate actions to adhere to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in China and Tibet.

(2) allowed unrestricted emigration of political and religious prisoners.

(3) provided an acceptable accounting and release of Chinese citizens detained, accused, or sentenced as a result of the nonviolent expression of their political beliefs.

(4) taken effective, verifiable action to prevent export of products to the U.S. manufactured by forced labor and complied with the provisions of last year's bilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which permits unrestricted access by U.S. Customs officials to places where such goods are produced.

Additionally, the President would need to indicate that the Chinese Government had made overall significant progress in:

- * ceasing religious persecution in China and Tibet.
- * ceasing financial and other incentives to encourage non-Tibetans to relocate in Tibet.
- * ceasing unfair and discriminatory trade practices against American businesses and in providing U.S. exporters fair access to Chinese markets.
- * adhering to the guidelines and parameters of the MTCR, NPT, and Australian Group on chemical and biological arms.
- * adhering to the Joint declaration on Hong Kong
- * cooperating with U.S. efforts to account for POW/MIA's from the Korean and Vietnam conflicts.
- * ceasing jamming of VOA broadcasts.
- * allowing international human rights monitors access to trials and places of detention.

If the President makes a positive indication regarding these conditions in his June 3, 1994 request for extension of MFN trade status for the People's Republic of China, Congress would agree to renewal for another year. If he could not make positive indications of improvement, then favorable MFN tariffs would cease for products exported by state-owned enterprises, but would continue for products exported by private and joint venture enterprises.

* The Secretary of the Treasury determines the identity of state-owned enterprises.

The only caveat on the President's freedom of action in making an indication of positive progress in regard to conditions described in the section on "overall significant progress" is that he may not make a positive indication if the Chinese have transferred ballistic missiles or missile launchers for the M-9 or M-11 missiles to Syria, Iran, or Pakistan; or transferred equipment or technology to another country which could be used to manufacture a nuclear explosive device.

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Divider Title: **TAB G**

EXECUTIVE ORDER (OPTION 1)

DESIGNATION OF CONDITIONS FOR RENEWAL OF
MOST FAVORED NATION STATUS FOR THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN 1994

WHEREAS, the Congress and the American people have expressed deep concern about the appropriateness of unconditional most favored nation trading status for the People's Republic of China;

WHEREAS, I share the concerns of the Congress and the American People regarding this important issue, particularly with respect to China's record on human rights, nonproliferation, and trade;

WHEREAS, I have carefully weighed the advisability of conditioning China's most favored nation status as a means of achieving progress in these three areas;

WHEREAS, I have concluded that the public interest would be best served by a continuation of the waiver on Most Favored Nation for twelve months with renewal thereafter or with in twenty four months, subject to the conditions below;

MINDFUL of my authority to recommend waivers under section 402(d) of trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2432(d));

NOW THEREFORE, by the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, I hereby order as follows:

Section 1. The Secretary of State (hereinafter, the "Secretary") shall exercise primary authority within the executive branch regarding all matters relating to the extension of most favored nation status for the People's Republic of China.

Section 2. All executive departments and agencies shall, in accordance with such instructions and procedures as the Secretary may prescribe, promptly and regularly inform the Department of State concerning information and activities within their jurisdiction that may be relevant to the issue of most favored nation status for China.

Section 3. The Secretary shall be the sole executive branch spokesperson regarding most favored nation status for China, and he shall promptly initiate, coordinate, and supervise appropriate consultations within the executive branch and with Congress concerning this issue.

Section 4. In considering whether to propose to me that I recommend the extension of China's most favored nation status for the twelve month period beginning June 3, 1994 the Secretary shall take into account (not recommend renewal of a waiver unless) whether China has made overall, significant progress in the following areas:

Human Rights

- Respecting the fundamental human rights recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
- Complying with China's commitment to allow its citizens, regardless of their political views, freedom to emigrate, and travel abroad (excepting those who are imprisoned, have criminal proceedings pending against them, or have received court notices concerning civil cases).
- Providing an acceptable accounting for and release of Chinese citizens imprisoned or detained for the peaceful expression of their political views, including Democracy Wall and Tiananmen activists.
- Ceasing religious persecution, particularly by releasing leaders and members of religious groups detained or imprisoned for expression of their religious beliefs.
- Taking effective actions to ensure that prisoners are not being mistreated and are receiving necessary medical treatment, such as by granting access to Chinese prisons by international humanitarian organizations.
- Seeking to resume dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his representatives, and taking measures to protect Tibet's distinctive religious and cultural heritage.
- Ceasing the jamming of Voice of America broadcasts.

Trade

- Complying with the terms of China's 1992 bilateral agreement with the U.S. on prison labor.
- Fulfilling China's commitments in the 1992 bilateral agreement with the U.S. on market access.
- Implementing China's commitments in the 1992 bilateral agreement with the U.S. on intellectual property rights.

Nonproliferation

- Limiting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, including by implementation of its international commitments to abide by Missile Technology Control Regime guidelines and parameters, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological Weapons Convention.
- Taking additional measures to enhance international efforts to combat proliferation, such as by accepting controls adopted by the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Australia Group.

Section 5. The Secretary shall submit his findings to me before June 3, 1994.

Section 6. This Order is not intended to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by a party against the United States, its agencies, its office, or employees, or by any other entity of person.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
_____, 1993

EXECUTIVE ORDER (OPTION 2)

DESIGNATION OF CONDITIONS FOR RENEWAL OF
MOST FAVORED NATION STATUS FOR THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN 1994

WHEREAS, the Congress and the American people have expressed deep concern about the appropriateness of unconditional most favored nation trading status for the People's Republic of China;

WHEREAS, I share the concerns of the Congress and the American People regarding this important issue, particularly with respect to China's record on human rights, nonproliferation, and trade;

WHEREAS, I have carefully weighed the advisability of conditioning China's most favored nation status as a means of achieving progress in these three areas;

WHEREAS, I have concluded that the public interest would be best served by a continuation of the waiver on Most Favored Nation for twelve months with renewal thereafter or with in twenty four months, subject to the conditions below;

MINDFUL of my authority to recommend waivers under section 402(d) of trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2432(d));

NOW THEREFORE, by the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, I hereby order as follows:

Section 1. The Secretary of State (hereinafter, the "Secretary") shall exercise primary authority within the executive branch regarding all matters relating to the extension of most favored nation status for the People's Republic of China.

Section 2. All executive departments and agencies shall, in accordance with such instructions and procedures as the Secretary may prescribe, promptly and regularly inform the Department of State concerning information and activities within their jurisdiction that may be relevant to the issue of most favored nation status for China.

Section 3. The Secretary shall be the sole executive branch spokesperson regarding most favored nation status for China, and he shall promptly initiate, coordinate, and supervise appropriate consultations within the executive branch and with Congress concerning this issue.

Section 4. In considering whether to propose to me that I recommend the extension of China's most favored nation status for the twelve month period beginning June 3, 1994 the Secretary shall take into account (not recommend renewal of a waiver unless) whether China has made overall, significant progress in the following areas:

Human Rights

- Ensuring freedom to emigrate and travel abroad.
- Releasing prisoners of conscience, including Democracy Wall and Tiananmen activists, and religious leaders.
- Protecting Tibet's distinctive religious and cultural heritage.
- Insuring humane treatment of prisoners, such as by allowing access to prisons by international humanitarian organizations.

Nonproliferation

- Participating actively and constructively in international efforts to combat proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and abiding by commitments in agreements it has accepted.

Trade

- Implementing its bilateral agreements by:
 - o Providing U.S. exporters fair access to Chinese markets.
 - o Preventing exports to the U.S. of goods made by prisons labor.
 - o Protecting intellectual property rights.

Section 5. The Secretary shall submit his findings to me before June 3, 1994.

Section 6. This Order is not intended to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by a party against the United States, its agencies, its offices, or employees, or by any other entity of person.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

THE WHITE HOUSE,
_____, 1993

EXECUTIVE ORDER (OPTION 3)

DESIGNATION OF CONDITIONS FOR RENEWAL OF
MOST FAVORED NATION STATUS FOR THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN 1994

WHEREAS, the Congress and the American people have expressed deep concern about the appropriateness of unconditional most favored nation trading status for the People's Republic of China;

WHEREAS, I share the concerns of the Congress and the American People regarding this important issue, particularly with respect to China's record on human rights, nonproliferation, and trade;

WHEREAS, I have carefully weighed the advisability of conditioning China's most favored nation status as a means of achieving progress in these three areas;

WHEREAS, I have concluded that the public interest would be best served by a continuation of the waiver on Most Favored Nation for twelve months with renewal thereafter or with in twenty four months, subject to the conditions below;

MINDFUL of my authority to recommend waivers under section 402(d) of trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2432(d));

NOW THEREFORE, by the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, I hereby order as follows:

Section 1. The Secretary of State (hereinafter, the "Secretary") shall exercise primary authority within the executive branch regarding all matters relating to the extension of most favored nation status for the People's Republic of China.

Section 2. All executive departments and agencies shall, in accordance with such instructions and procedures as the Secretary may prescribe, promptly and regularly inform the Department of State concerning information and activities within their jurisdiction that may be relevant to the issue of most favored nation status for China.

Section 3. The Secretary shall be the sole executive branch spokesperson regarding most favored nation status for China, and he shall promptly initiate, coordinate, and supervise appropriate consultations within the executive branch and with Congress concerning this issue.

Section 4. In considering whether to propose to me that I recommend the extension of China's most favored nation status for the twelve month period beginning June 3, 1994 the Secretary shall take into account (not recommend

renewal of a waiver unless) whether China has made overall, significant progress in the following areas:

Human Rights

- Respecting the fundamental human rights recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
- Complying with China's commitment to allow its citizens, regardless of their political views, freedom to emigrate, and travel abroad (excepting those who are imprisoned, have criminal proceedings pending against them, or have received court notices concerning civil cases).
- Providing an acceptable accounting for and release of Chinese citizens imprisoned or detained for the peaceful expression of their political views, including Democracy Wall and Tiananmen activists.
- Ceasing religious persecution, particularly by releasing leaders and members of religious groups detained or imprisoned for expression of their religious beliefs.
- Taking effective actions to ensure that prisoners are not being mistreated and are receiving necessary medical treatment, such as by granting access to Chinese prisons by international humanitarian organizations.
- Seeking to resume dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his representatives, and taking measures to protect Tibet's distinctive religious and cultural heritage.
- Ceasing the jamming of Voice of America broadcasts.

Section 5. The Secretary shall submit his findings to me before June 3, 1994.

Section 6. This Order is not intended to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by a party against the United States, its agencies, its offices, or employees, or by any other entity of person.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

THE WHITE HOUSE,
_____, 1993

TO: KENNEY

FROM: GROSSMAN, M

DOC DATE: 24 MAY 93
SOURCE REF: 9311189

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
DC

MFN
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FOLLOW UP PAPER RE 19 MAY DC MTG ON CHINA MFN

ACTION: ADD-ON / FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE DATE: 18 MAY 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WIEDEMANN

LOGREF: 9320537

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC0030

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

KENNEY
NSC CHRON
WIEDEMANN

COMMENTS: _____

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER	Z 93051421 FOR DECISION
002 BERGER	Z 93051721 REDO FOR DECISION
002	X 93052015 ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/S
003 BERGER	Z 93051814 FOR DECISION
003	X 93051821 BERGER APPROVED RECOM
004	X 93051821 KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES
005	X 93052516 ADD-ON / FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

<u>DOC</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR ACTION</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR INFO</u>
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004	930518	GROSSMAN, M	
004	930518	KNIGHT, E	
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004	930518	MONTGOMERY, F	
004	930518	LAUDER, J	
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004	930518	TYSON, L	
004	930518	SHEFFIELD, H	
004	930518	CUTTER, W	

National Security Council
The White House

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*cc: Wiedeman
Poneman*

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	Marc Grossman to Kristie Kenney re: [China MFN Discussion Papers] (1 page)	05/24/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3995

FOLDER TITLE:

DC0030 DC Meeting on China Most Favored Nation, May 19, 1993 [2]

2015-0221-M
rs1202

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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INTERAGENCY DOCUMENT
Department of State
Executive Secretariat

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May 18, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. MARC GROSSMAN -
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the United States to the
United Nations

MR. EDWARD KNIGHT
Executive Secretary
Department of Treasury

DR. LAURA D. TYSON
Chair, Council of Economic
Advisors

COL. MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

CAPT. H. L. SHEFFIELD
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Executive Director for Policy
Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

MR. BOWMAN CUTTER
Deputy Assistant to the
President for Economic
Policy

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on China MFN (S)

A Deputies Committee Meeting is scheduled for Wednesday, May 19, 3:30 - 5:00pm, White House Situation Room. Attached are discussion papers to be used for the DC. (S)

William H. Itoh
William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachments

- Tab A Discussion Paper
- Tab B Grossman/Lake Memorandum dated May 15, 1993
- Tab C Mitchell/Pelosi Letter to Winston Lord dated May 14
- Tab D M-11 Paper Prepared by Office of Nonproliferation, NSC
- Tab E U.S. Policy Instruments Beyond MFN

~~SECRET with~~

~~TOP SECRET attachment~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *VR* NARA, Date *7/15/20*
2015-0711-M

~~TOP SECRET~~

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. paper	re: China: MFN Decision and Implementation (5 pages)	05/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3995

FOLDER TITLE:

DC0030 DC Meeting on China Most Favored Nation, May 19, 1993 [2]

2015-0221-M
rs1202

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CONDITIONS ON MFN FOR CHINA:
OPTIONS FOR AN EXECUTIVE ORDER AND LEGISLATIVE STRATEGY

SUMMARY

There are three options for executive branch conditions on renewal of China's MFN status in June 1994:

- Detailed, comprehensive conditions on human rights and prison labor, with the need for progress on nonproliferation and other trade issues addressed through existing law;
- Generally stated conditions with specifics spelled out in the President's report to Congress; and
- Conditions on human rights only.

On balance, the first and second options provide the greatest advantages with regard to the domestic and foreign policy issues in play. While Option 1 would offer the easiest prospects of obtaining congressional support, Option 2 would be the most effective in generating Chinese progress in the areas of U.S. concern.

No matter which option is selected, intensive consultations with Congress in the weeks ahead, coordinated by the Department of State's Bureau for Legislative Affairs and involving the President, are essential to maintaining executive branch-congressional unity on this issue. Attached are three executive order options (Tab A), a draft Jackson-Vanik transmittal document to Congress and report to Congress regarding China MFN (Tab B), and a draft Presidential Jackson-Vanik waiver determination (Tab C). After congressional consultations, a Presidential statement will be prepared for delivery at the Executive Order signing ceremony. The statement will put our MFN conditionality in the broader context of our China policy and include reference to our readiness to move Sino-American relations to a new and higher level, depending on Chinese actions.

BASIC PREMISES

Executive conditions are preferable to legislative action because they preserve executive prerogatives and flexibility in achieving our foreign policy goals with respect to China. In addition, an Executive Order better manifests the President's determination to pursue improvements in China's policies than do the Presidential statements in the annual MFN reports to Congress the past few years. At the same time, we should look for ways to get beyond MFN conditions and to use other methods to address U.S. concerns with regard to China in the future.

Senator Mitchell and Representative Pelosi have indicated privately their willingness to accept Executive Branch conditionality that addresses core congressional concerns including: release and accounting of political prisoners; adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; compliance with the 1992 MOU on prison labor; access to prisoners, trials, and places of detention; cessation of VOA jamming; and significant progress in protecting Tibetan culture. They have also indicated that the Executive Order must address nonproliferation concerns and unfair trade practices, but have pointed out that the President already has mechanisms available in law to pursue these objectives.

The three options call for overall, significant progress, as determined by the President, in Chinese actions regarding our concerns. If a year from now China has made progress in the three areas, without retrogression in any that would outweigh the progress made, the President should be in a position to reward that improved behavior. We cannot realistically require 100% satisfaction on all our standards. Our goal is to attain maximum possible Chinese movement in the three areas of concern.

OPTIONS FOR CONDITIONS

Option 1 - Comprehensive Conditions: This option (see Tab A) is the closest match to congressional concerns as privately expressed by Mitchell and Pelosi. The conditions in all three areas of U.S. concern--human rights, trade, and nonproliferation--are included in the Executive Order, but MFN renewal is specifically conditioned only on a core group of human rights concerns and prison labor. The Executive Order would refer to the use of other enforcement mechanisms, already available in law and in executive determinations, to address nonproliferation and other trade concerns.

Option 1

Pros: Provides strong pressure on China to address specific U.S. concerns. It closely reflects concerns of Mitchell-Pelosi and would be likely to secure the broadest congressional support. It would be most preferred by human rights groups and would project maximum resolve by the Administration. It also moves U.S. policy away from complete reliance on denial of MFN regarding nonproliferation and trade.

Cons: This specifically detailed approach on human rights and prison labor may diminish--not increase--the chances for a constructive Chinese response and for progress over the next year. Indeed, the Chinese may be less inclined to move forward on the basis that they will be seen by domestic and foreign audiences to be bowing to foreign pressure on the specific items enumerated. Lack of progress might thereby increase the chances that the President would not be able to extend the Jackson-Vanik waiver in 1994, since requirements may not have been met.

Option 2 - General Conditions: This option (see Tab A) provides more generally worded conditions in the three areas of human rights, trade, and nonproliferation, and therefore sets targets easier for the Chinese to hit. To satisfy the Administration's and Congress' concerns that we have specific goals in mind for improvement in China's behavior as laid out in Option 1, we would spell them out in strong and detailed language in the President's annual report to Congress (Tab B). The Presidential statement at the time of the Executive Order signing could repeat the details.

Option 2

Pros: Generally worded, these conditions would provide maximum flexibility to the Administration. Despite the more general language, the utilization of an Executive Order on MFN conditions would represent the toughest approach yet by any Administration in placing pressure on China to act in the three areas. The lack of detail in the Executive Order would be less offensive to China and perhaps induce relatively more Chinese concessions over the next year. Also, in diplomatic channels, we would continue to press China on the more detailed agenda. Japan, the Europeans, and other friendly or allied governments would prefer this approach.

Cons: Congressional elements will complain that the Administration has not gone far enough. Human rights and other interest groups would charge the Administration and Congress with backing away from its previous position. The projection of resolve on Chinese human rights abuses would be less than in Option 1.

Option 3 - Human Rights Conditions Only: Under this option (Tab A), the U.S. would impose conditions only on China's human rights behavior. We would include all human rights-related conditions listed in Option 1, but not address trade and nonproliferation. We would note in the Presidential report to Congress that this approach does not indicate a lessening in Administration concern for our goals in nonproliferation and trade, which the President remains determined to pursue. Rather, we would use levers other than MFN to pursue them. Policy tools available to the U.S. to press for change in China's trade and nonproliferation policies include: section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act (market access and intellectual property rights); the Helms Amendment and other U.S. laws concerning proliferation and nuclear cooperation; section 3004 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (exchange rate and economic policies); and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (narcotics cooperation). Remaining Tiananmen-related sanctions would provide additional leverage for advancing U.S. goals across the full range of concerns.

In sum, human rights would gain unique emphasis as the one area of conditionality under MFN. We would use non-MFN incentives and disincentives to seek needed progress on trade and nonproliferation.

Option 3

Pros: This option would focus the undiluted leverage of MFN on human rights, the most important U.S. concern (including in Congress) and the one most logically associated with the spirit of Jackson-Vanik. It would provide the Administration greater flexibility in managing relations with China.

Cons: This option would probably be the most difficult to sell on the Hill. Congressional and other advocates of nonproliferation and trade could insist on their areas being included in the Executive Order, pressing the Executive Branch to negotiate adding these areas to the Executive Order. Though the conditions would be fewer, human rights standards are the most difficult for China to meet; thus, the likelihood of termination of MFN might be increased.

LEGISLATIVE STRATEGY

Whatever specific conditionality option is chosen, it is critical that the Administration speak with one voice in presenting our position to Congress. The Department of State's Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs (H) should have the overall responsibility for managing legislative strategy, working with the substantive and legislative offices of the White House, NSC, NEC, State, USTR, Commerce, Treasury, and USDA. H will receive input for legislative strategy from all interested agencies and offices and coordinate with them on the timing of Hill briefings, meetings, and hearings. (The Trade Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee is likely to hold a hearing.) H will also ensure that these agencies and offices are informed of congressional developments.

Once the President has decided upon a conditionality option, we will begin a series of meetings with Congress. The State Department will take the lead in representing the Administration in these meetings. We envisage initial, quiet meetings with Senator Mitchell, Representative Pelosi, and Chairmen Rostenkowski and Gibbons to seek their support for our conditionality package. We would then move to more formal meetings to include a bipartisan White House-leadership

meeting, followed by more detailed briefings with key committees, including House Ways and Means, Senate Finance, House Foreign Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations, and with other individual members influential on this issue. Throughout the process, the State Department would also ensure that there is close coordination with the Congressional leadership.

After consultations have been completed, we will assess the results and recommend a strategy for involving senior Administration officials as necessary. This may well be an appropriate point for a White House meeting with key members to build congressional support. Assuming our approach receives congressional support, we would request that the President invite key Senators and Representatives to the White House for a public ceremony to sign the Executive Order.

Attachments:

- Tab A - Executive Order Options
- Tab B - Draft Transmittal Letter and Report to Congress
- Tab C - Draft Presidential Determination



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DECL:OADR

May 15, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: China: MFN Conditions and Congressional Strategy

The attached paper discusses renewal of China's MFN status in 1994. It reviews three options for MFN conditionality. USTR supports a fourth option: non-conditionality. The following paper also recommends a legislative strategy aimed at keeping Congress and the Executive branch in unison in handling the MFN issue.

M. Grossman
Marc Grossman
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *VL* NARA, Date *7/15/2014*
2015-0221-WX

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John
drafted: EAP/CM:ACarlson/H:RBradtke
(secmpol 7896, 7-9141, 5/15/93)

cleared: EAP:PTomsen
HA:JBishop
H:RBradtke
PM:REinhorn
EB:JShelton
L:JBorek
P:ERevere
NSC:KWiedemann

John

- - - - -

**DESIGNATION OF CONDITIONS FOR RENEWAL OF
MOST FAVORED NATION STATUS FOR THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN 1994**

WHEREAS, the Congress and the American people have expressed deep concern about the appropriateness of unconditional most favored nation trading status for the People's Republic of China;

WHEREAS, I share the concerns of the Congress and the American people regarding this important issue, particularly with respect to China's record on human rights, non-proliferation, and trade;

WHEREAS, I have carefully weighed the advisability of conditioning China's most favored nation status as a means of achieving progress in these areas;

WHEREAS, I have concluded that the public interest would be best served by a continuation of the waiver of the application of sections 402 (a) and (b) of the Trade Act of 1974 (the Act) on China's most favored nation status for an additional twelve months with renewal thereafter subject to the conditions below;

MINDFUL of my authority to recommend waivers under section 402(d) of the Act;

NOW, THEREFORE, by the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, I hereby order as follows:

Section 1. The Secretary of State (hereinafter, the "Secretary") shall exercise primary authority within the executive branch regarding all matters relating to the extension of most favored nation status for the People's Republic of China.

Section 2. All executive departments and agencies shall, in accordance with such instructions and procedures as the Secretary may prescribe, promptly and regularly inform the Department of State concerning information and activities within their jurisdiction that may be relevant to the issue of most favored nation status for China.

Section 3. The Secretary or other appropriate officials of the Department of State shall be the sole executive branch spokesperson regarding most favored nation status for China, and he shall promptly initiate, coordinate, and supervise appropriate consultations within the executive branch and with the Congress concerning this issue.

Section 4. In considering whether to propose to me that I recommend the extension of China's most favored nation status for the twelve month period beginning June 3, 1994, the Secretary shall take into account whether China has made overall, significant progress with respect to the following areas:

- Respecting the fundamental human rights recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, including freedom of emigration; freedom of thought, conscience and religion; freedom of opinion and expression; and freedom of peaceful assembly and association.
- Providing an acceptable accounting for and release of Chinese citizens imprisoned or detained for the peaceful expression of their political views, including Democracy Wall and Tiananmen activists.
- Taking effective actions to ensure that prisoners are not being mistreated and are receiving necessary medical treatment, such as by granting access to Chinese prisons and places of detention by international humanitarian organizations.
- Protecting Tibet's distinctive religious and cultural heritage.
- Ceasing the jamming of Voice of America broadcasts.
- Complying with the terms of China's 1992 bilateral agreement with the U.S. on prison labor.

Section 5. The Secretary, and other appropriate officials of the U.S. government, shall also use the full force of relevant legislation and executive determinations, as appropriate, to ensure that China abides by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Missile Technology Control Regime guidelines and parameters, and its other non-proliferation commitments, as well as fair and non-discriminatory trade practices toward American business.

Section 6. The Secretary shall submit his findings to me before June 3, 1994.

Section 7. This Order is not intended to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by a party against the United States, its agencies, its offices, or employees, or by any other entity of person.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

THE WHITE HOUSE,
_____, 1993

EXECUTIVE ORDER (OPTION 2)

DESIGNATION OF CONDITIONS FOR RENEWAL OF
MOST FAVORED NATION STATUS FOR THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN 1994

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Section 4. In considering whether to propose to me that I recommend the extension of China's most favored nation status for the twelve month period beginning June 3, 1994, the Secretary shall take into account whether China has made overall, significant progress in the following areas:

Human Rights

- Ensuring freedom to emigrate and travel abroad.
- Releasing prisoners of conscience, including Democracy Wall and Tiananmen activists, and religious leaders.
- Protecting Tibet's distinctive religious and cultural heritage.
- Insuring humane treatment of prisoners, such as by allowing access to prisons by international humanitarian organizations.

Non-proliferation

- Participating actively and constructively in international efforts to combat proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and abiding by commitments it has accepted.

Trade

- Implementing its bilateral agreements by:
 - o Providing U.S. exporters fair access to Chinese markets.
 - o Preventing exports to the U.S. of goods made by prison labor.
 - o Protecting intellectual property rights.

Section 5. The Secretary shall submit his findings to me before June 3, 1994.

Section 6. This Order is not intended to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by a party against the United States, its agencies, its offices, or employees, or by any other entity of person.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

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Human Rights

- Respecting the fundamental human rights recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
- Complying with China's commitment to allow its citizens, regardless of their political views, freedom to emigrate and travel abroad (excepting those who are imprisoned, have criminal proceedings pending against them, or have received court notices concerning civil cases).
- Providing an acceptable accounting for and release of Chinese citizens imprisoned or detained for the peaceful expression of their political views, including Democracy Wall and Tiananmen activists.
- Ceasing religious persecution, particularly by releasing leaders and members of religious groups detained or imprisoned for expression of their religious beliefs.
- Taking effective actions to ensure that prisoners are not being mistreated and are receiving necessary medical treatment, such as by granting access to Chinese prisons by international humanitarian organizations.
- Seeking to resume dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his representatives, and taking measures to protect Tibet's distinctive religious and cultural heritage.
- Ceasing the jamming of Voice of America broadcasts.

Section 5. The Secretary shall submit his findings to me before June 3, 1994.

Section 6. This Order is not intended to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by a party against the United States, its agencies, its offices, or employees, or by any other entity of person.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

Mr. Speaker/Mr. President:

Pursuant to subsection 402(d)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, 19 U.S.C. 2432(d)(1) ("the Act"), I hereby submit the attached report concerning the continuation of a waiver of application of subsections (a) and (b) of section 402 of the Act to the People's Republic of China. The report explains my reasons for having determined that continuation of the waiver currently in effect for the People's Republic of China will substantially promote the objectives of section 402. In addition, I am also transmitting herewith for your further information a copy of an Executive Order which enumerates the specific conditions which I have established with respect to a further extension of the waiver next year for the period beginning June 3, 1994.

William J. Clinton

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002e. draft	Report to Congress Concerning Extension of Waiver Authority for the People's Republic of China (8 pages)	05/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3995

FOLDER TITLE:

DC0030 DC Meeting on China Most Favored Nation, May 19, 1993 [2]

2015-0221-M
rs1202

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

The White House
Washington, 1993
Presidential Determination
No. _____

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Determination Under Subsection 402(d)(1) of the
Trade Act of 1974, as amended -- Continuation of
Waiver Authority

Pursuant to the authority vested in me under the Trade Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-618), (88 Stat. 1978), (hereinafter "the Act"), I determine, pursuant to subsection 402(d)(1) of the Act, 19 U.S.C. 2432(d)(1), that the further extension of the waiver authority granted by subsection 402(c) of the Act will substantially promote the objectives of section 402 of the Act. I further determine that the continuation of the waiver applicable to the People's Republic of China will substantially promote the objectives of section 402 of the Act.

This determination shall be published in the Federal Register.

William Clinton

United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, DC 20510-7010

May 14, 1993

The Honorable Winston Lord
Assistant Secretary For East Asian & Pacific Affairs
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Thank you for the opportunity to meet to express the concerns of Congress regarding United States-China policy and most-favored-nation (MFN) status for China. We look forward to hearing about your trip to China.

As we discussed, there are three major areas of Congressional concern relating to China and MFN: human rights, weapons-nuclear technology proliferation, and unfair trade practices. If part of our goal is to make legislation unnecessary, it is necessary that an executive order substantively address each of these areas.

In regard to human rights, which as you know is the major driving force behind our legislative efforts, it is our considered opinion that the following must be included in a Presidential Executive Order accompanying a request for a waiver of Jackson-Vanik requirements regarding renewal of MFN status for China:

- * Release and acceptable accounting of those persons detained, accused, or sentenced because of the nonviolent expression of their political beliefs
- * adherence to the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights in China and Tibet, which includes freedom of emigration and return, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of opinion and expression, and freedom of peaceful assembly and association
- * compliance with the 1992 bilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) regarding the export to the United States of products manufactured by forced labor. (However, it would be more acceptable to renegotiate the agreement to more accurately reflect continuing Congressional concerns)
- * providing access by international human rights and humanitarian groups to prisoners, trials and places of detention
- * ceasing the jamming of Voice of America broadcasts

The Dalai Lama's recent visit to Washington has significantly heightened Congressional interest regarding the survival of the tibetan people, we hope that the policy toward China requires:

- * significant progress in ceasing to threaten the survival of the Tibetan culture

The President's Executive Order should appropriately address the need for visible Chinese progress in ceasing unfair and discriminatory trade practices against American businesses; as well as demand that they honor their commitments to adhere to the controls, guidelines and parameters of the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Australian Group on Chemical & Biological Arms. However, we understand that the President has available options already in law, which provide meaningful ways to address these important issues within the framework of an executive order.

Much has been reported recently about the impact of possible loss of jobs from conditioning MFN for China. More emphasis should be placed on the loss of American jobs resulting from unfair Chinese trade practices and the trade deficit. For example, it should be remembered that the over \$40 billion trade deficit China has accumulated with the United States since the Tiananmen Square massacre, has been extremely destructive to American industries particularly the textile and footwear industries.

It is our belief that it is important to the future of the United States - China relationship for the Administration and the Congress to send a unified message to the Chinese government. We look forward to continuing to work with you on developing such a message, which will assist in establishing a more equitable bilateral relationship with China. We wish to again reiterate our desire to meet with the President to help formulate a unified China policy which reflects our fundamental values and protects our national interests.

Sincerely,

Nancy Pelosi

Nancy Pelosi

George Mitchell

George J. Mitchell

Section 5 :

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002f. paper	re: M-11 Missile Issue [partial] (3 pages)	05/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3995

FOLDER TITLE:

DC0030 DC Meeting on China Most Favored Nation, May 19, 1993 [2]

2015-0221-M
rs1202

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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TOP SECRET

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART

PER E. O. 13526

2015-0221-M (1.38) 03/11/2020 KDE

M-11 MISSILE ISSUE

We need to decide how to deal with the M-11 issue and other potentially-sanctionable Chinese proliferation activities, including their implications for the upcoming MFN decision. This paper discusses the relevant proliferation cases, the legal requirements we face and their possible consequences, and next steps on sanctions both within the Administration and with Congress. (TS)

EO 13526 1.4c, 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6), 3.5c

TOP SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

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Sanctions Legislation

In November 1990, Congress included missile sanctions provisions in the FY 1991 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) in an effort to stem the spread of missile-related technology. Under these provisions, sanctions must be imposed when it is determined that a foreign person, after November 5, 1990, knowingly exported, transferred or otherwise engaged in the trade of any MTCR equipment or technology that contributes to the design, development, or production of MTCR-class missiles in a non-MTCR country. The authority to impose these sanctions was delegated by the President to the Secretary of State and redelegated to the Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs. (TS)

The sanction for transfers of MTCR Category 1 items (complete missile systems as well as major subsystems such as rocket stages, engines, guidance sets and re-entry vehicles) is a minimum two-year ban on all U.S. Government contracts and all dual-use and munitions list licenses to the foreign entity. Upon an additional determination that the transfer has "substantially" contributed to the design, etc., of MTCR-class missiles, imports must be halted. Sanctionable activity also includes conspiring to engage, attempting to engage or facilitating such exports, transfers or trade. (TS)

In June 1991, sanctions were imposed against one Pakistani and two Chinese entities for their role in the transfer of an M-11 training missile and launcher to Pakistan. Since these sanctions appeared to have no practical effect, Senator Jesse Helms successfully lobbied for tougher sanctions provisions. The Helms amendment broadened the list of entities subject to sanctions in Non-Market Economies, excluding members of the former Warsaw Pact (i.e. China, North Korea, Cuba and Vietnam), to include not only the entity that engaged in the sanctionable activity, but also all activities of the government relating to the development or production of missile equipment or technology, and all government activities affecting the development or production of electronics, space systems or equipment, and military aircraft in that country. Prior to this amendment, these activities were sanctioned only if the specific offending entity in a country could not be identified. (TS)

Thus far, this part of the NDAA has not been triggered by a sanctions determination. It would raise several interpretive questions:

- What are "government" as opposed to "private" activities in a country like China?
- What is the scope of the "electronics," "space systems or equipment," or "military aircraft" industry? (TS)

The legislative history provides no insight into what was intended by this language. It would not, however, be possible to interpret this provision as applying only to missile-related

electronics, etc., as a prior section of the NDAA already sanctions all activities relating to missile production. (TS)

It should be noted that the Helms amendment only applies to sanctions imposed under the Arms Export Control Act. Accordingly, the sanctions on government contracts, munitions list exports, and imports would apply to all government activities related to electronics, etc. However, since dual-use export sanctions are applied under the Export Administration Act, which Helms did not amend, those sanctions would apply only to the offending entity. (TS)

The statute contains limited waiver authority ("essential to the national security"), but provides no authority to delay, solely on foreign policy grounds, decisions on whether sanctionable activity has taken place. Delays can be justified to obtain necessary intelligence assessments. State has also previously taken the position that short delays can be justified to ascertain whether a foreign government is prepared to take certain steps that could allow a waiver. (TS)

Although detailed analyses of the Helms amendment's impact on U.S.-China trade have yet to be completed, preliminary information suggests that roughly \$2 - 3 billion in potential exports (electronics and satellites) of U.S. goods to China could be at stake. This could affect AT&T, IBM, Motorola, Hughes and other U.S. firms, among others, who do business in China. Subsequent retaliatory actions by the Chinese could raise the financial costs even higher. (TS)

More broadly, the imposition of sanctions could undercut U.S. efforts to promote Chinese political and economic reform, and jeopardize Chinese cooperation with the U.S. on a host of global and regional issues, including the North Korean nuclear program, Cambodia and Bosnia. Conceivably, sanctions with major financial impact could also trigger a Chinese decision to go forward with missile and other arms sales which in the past had been restrained as a result of carrots proffered by the U.S. (TS)

Next Steps

China's proliferation behavior, particularly the M-11 issue, raises questions relating to both sanctions and to MFN. State has begun the interagency process for making a sanctions determination on the M-11. A decision to impose sanctions would

EO 13526 1.4c, 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6), 3.5c

EO 13526 1.4c, 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6)

Step 1: Shift the Burden of Proof to the Chinese.

EO 13526 1.4c, 3.3(b)(6)

Step 2: Restrict U.S.-China Trade.

EO 13526 1.4c, 3.3(b)(6)

EO 13526 1.4c, 3.3(b)(6)

By mandating restrictions on U.S.-PRC economic and trade relations and sanctions for certain behavior, U.S. law offers a variety of means to pressure China for progress and to respond in a targeted manner to unacceptable Chinese actions.

- o Trade - Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 identifies steps to secure adequate market access and intellectual property protection for U.S. exports. This was the USG's key source of leverage in securing Chinese agreement to the market access and IPR MOUs. We could invoke 301, if the Chinese fail to implement these agreements or fail to open their market to U.S. service industries.
- o Proliferation Law - The U.S. has already sanctioned China once for improper transfers to Pakistan of missile-related technology; if it determines that China is engaged in further transfers, the USG will have to take the much broader action required by the Helms Amendment. Other provisions of U.S. law cover other aspects of proliferation (e.g., of nuclear weapons, CBW, destabilizing arms to Iran and Iraq, etc.).
- o Nuclear Cooperation - Legal restrictions based on nuclear nonproliferation and human rights concerns now prevent significant U.S. nuclear commerce with China. (Nuclear power is an area of major interest to U.S. nuclear vendors and service companies.)
- o Exchange Rates - Under section 3004 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Treasury has determined that China is manipulating its exchange rate to prevent balance of payments adjustment and gain unfair competitive advantage in international trade. Treasury must negotiate with the Chinese to ensure that they take action to address this problem.
- o International Financial Institutions - Section 701(a) of the IFI Act requires the U.S. to oppose proposals for financing projects in countries with a pattern of gross violation of human rights, unless they are directed to basic human needs. Since Tiananmen, the U.S. has opposed by abstention votes on non-basic human needs projects for China.
- o Narcotics Certification - The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, requires the President to certify that major drug producing or transit countries, including China, have cooperated fully with the U.S. or taken adequate drug control steps of their own. Decertification would require the U.S. to withhold most forms of assistance and to oppose any loans from multilateral development banks.

Tiananmen Sanctions

The U.S. is the only country that maintains significant Tiananmen-related sanctions against China. Legally-mandated sanctions include a ban on the export of U.S. Munitions List goods and services to China and nuclear exchanges; an embargo

on licenses for civilian exports to military and police end-users; and restrictions on IFI lending. Other sanctions carried out by Executive Order and policy include opposition to China-specific proposals for easing COCOM controls; a suspension in Trade Development Administration (TDA) and Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) activities; and a limitation on high-level exchanges.

The President can lift most of these sanctions on a case-by-case basis in the national interest, or more broadly if he certifies human rights improvements. Therefore, the sanctions can provide both positive and negative leverage.

Nearly four years after Tiananmen, these sanctions remain a statement of U.S. concern over PRC human rights conditions. They also possess significant tactical value: the U.S. can selectively relax them as incentives for improved Chinese behavior. The IWG paper which the Deputies Committee discussed April 27, for instance, proposes limited waivers for EXIMBANK lending, satellite exports, and TDA activities as a means to encourage Chinese progress. Because many of the sanctions undercut U.S. trade and other interests, relaxation can be beneficial to the U.S. As the lifting of most of the sanctions depends on human rights improvements, the Executive Branch for now is restricted to utilizing those sanctions which can be relaxed on an ad hoc basis through Presidential waiver.

TO: BERGER

FROM: WIEDEMANN

DOC DATE: 15 MAY 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
DC

MFN
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 19 MAY DC MTG ON CHINA MFN

ACTION: ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/S DUE DATE: 18 MAY 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WIEDEMANN

LOGREF: 9320537

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC0030

CODES:

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003 BERGER	Z 93051814 FOR DECISION
003	X 93051821 BERGER APPROVED RECOM
004	X 93051821 KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES
005	X 93052516 ADD-ON / FOR RECORD PURPOSES

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004	930518	FUERTH, L	
004	930518	GROSSMAN, M	
004	930518	KNIGHT, E	
004	930518	SHERFIELD, M	
004	930518	MONTGOMERY, F	
004	930518	LAUDER, J	
004	930518	INDERFURTH, K	
004	930518	TYSON, L	
004	930518	SHEFFIELD, H	
004	930518	CUTTER, W	

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. memo	Kent Wiedemann to Samuel Berger re: China: MFN Decision and Implementation (7 pages)	05/15/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3995

FOLDER TITLE:

DC0030 DC Meeting on China Most Favored Nation, May 19, 1993 [2]

2015-0221-M
rs1202

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. list	Invitees to the Deputies Committee Meeting, May 19, 1993. [partial] [CIA Act] (1 page)	05/00/1993	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3995

FOLDER TITLE:

DC0030 DC Meeting on China Most Favored Nation, May 19, 1993 [2]

2015-0221-M
rs1202

RESTRICTION CODES

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DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING
WEDNESDAY, MAY 19, 1993
3:30 P.M. - 5:00 P.M.
SITUATION ROOM

DC 30

WHITE HOUSE

Samuel R. Berger

OVP

Leon Fuerth

STATE

Peter Tarnoff
Peter Tomsen
Wendy Sherman

DOD

Frank Wisner
Robert Ellis

JCS

David Jeremiah
Frank Bowman

CIA

(b)(3)

[003b]

USUN

Rick Inderfurth

USTR

Charlene Barshefsky
Ira Wolf

NEC

Bo Cutter (maybe)
Bob Kyle

TREASURY

Jeffrey Schaefer ✓
James Fall

CEA

Joseph Stiglitz ✓
Sherif Lotfi

COMMERCE

Timothy Hauser
Sue Eckert

NSC

Kent Wiedemann
Ferial Saeed
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TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 26 JUL 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R MFN
 DC SOC
 MINUTES

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS & MINUTES FOR 21 JUL DC MTG ON CHINA

ACTION: KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 26 JUL 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SAEED LOGREF:

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0043 CODES:

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By Wk NARA, Date 1/26/15
2015-0221-M

*OCP of
11/5/93
ad*

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

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CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001
002

Z 93072220 FOR DECISION
X 93072613 BERGER APPROVED RECOM
X 93072613 KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

<u>DOC</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR ACTION</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR INFO</u>
002	930726	FUERTH, L	
002	930726	GROSSMAN, M	
002	930726	KNIGHT, E	
002	930726	SHERFIELD, M	
002	930726	DAS, A	
002	930726	MONTGOMERY, F	
002	930726	LAUDER, J	
002	930726	INDERFURTH, K	
002	930726	TYSON, L	
002	930726	PATRICK, T	
002	930726	CUTTER, W	

Rec'd 7/23 9:00am
National Security Council
The White House

JWR
7/22

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<u>W</u> DepExecSec	<u>1/4</u>	<u>W</u>	
ExecSec			
Staff Director			
D/APNSA	<u>2</u>	<u>Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen</u>	
APNSA	<u>3</u>	<u>copy provided</u>	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>		
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____

COMMENTS:

22 JUL 93 5:12

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

cc: NS ← copy of "summary" for NS, please. Thanks, KK

ExecSec office has desked

Kec'd 7/23 9:00am

JWR
7/22

National Security Council
The White House

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ExecSec			
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West Wing Desk	5		
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

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COMMENTS:

cc: NS ← copy of "summary" for NS, please. Thanks, KK

22 JUL 93 12:12

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

ExecSec Office has dispatched.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9320805
DATE 26 JUL 93

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 21 JUL DC
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	_____	_____	_____ COPY: 1 _____
MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	_____	_____	_____ COPY: 1 _____
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PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

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DTG: _____

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MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES 3

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH _____
 (NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION _____ SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS _____

LOG # 20805

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
TREASURY	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
COMMERCE	MR. ANTHONY DAS		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

FROM: <u>National Security Council</u>	PHONE: <u>202-456-2291</u>	ROOM: <u>WHSR</u>
SUBJECT: <u>Notice of Meeting</u>	<u>SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS</u>	PAGES: <u>3</u>

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

20805

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
<u>USUN New York</u>	<u>Mr. Rick Inderfurth</u>	<u>212-415-4016</u>	<u>212-415-4177</u>

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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2015-0221-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 26, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. EDWARD KNIGHT
Executive Secretary
Department of Treasury

BG MICHAEL SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. ANTHONY DAS
Deputy Executive Secretary
Department of Commerce

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Executive Director for
Policy Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the United States to the
United Nations

DR. LAURA TYSON
Chair, Council of Economic
Advisors

COL. T.R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. BO CUTTER
Deputy Assistant to the
President for Economic
Policy

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of DC Meeting on China (S)

The Deputies Committee meeting on China strategy was held on July 21 at 3:30 p.m. Attached please find the Summary of Conclusions for that meeting. (S)

for Kristie Q. Keane
William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By WR-NARA, Date 1/24/15
2015-0221-M

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 22, 1993



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: KENT WIEDEMANN *FWs f*

FROM: FERIAAL ARA SAEED *FWs*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions and Minutes of DC Meeting on China

The NSC Deputies Committee met on July 21 to discuss China strategy post-MFN. The Summary of Conclusions, attached at Tab A, is submitted to be forwarded to all listed counterparts. The Minutes, at Tab II, are submitted for the record.

RECOMMENDATION

- (1) That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memorandum to agency counterparts, forwarding the Summary of Conclusions.

Approve *ret as modified* _____ Disapprove _____

- (2) That the Minutes be filed for the record.

Approve *W* _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum from Will Itoh to Agency Counterparts
- Tab A Summary of Conclusions
- Tab II Minutes

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. minutes	re: Minutes of DC Meeting on China [partial] (1 page)	07/21/1993	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3995

FOLDER TITLE:

DC0043 DC Meeting on China, July 21, 1993 [1]

2015-0221-M

rs1198

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D C 20508

Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: July 21, 1993
LOCATION: Room 208 OEOB
TIME: 3:30 pm - 5:30 pm

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0221-M(1.41)
03/11/2020 KDE

SUBJECT: Minutes of DC Meeting on China (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

The Vice President's Office

Leon Fuerth
Rich Sanders

White House

Samuel R. Berger

State

Peter Tarnoff
Winston Lord

CIA

Douglas MacEachin

Treasury

James Fall

CEA

Joseph Stiglitz

DOD

Charles Freeman
Stanley Roth

JCS

Michael Ryan
Frank Bowman

Commerce

Jeff Garten
Frank Vargo

NSC

Kent Wiedemann
Ferial Ara Saeed

USTR

Charlene Barshefsky
Ira Wolfe

NEC

Bowman Cutter
Michael Punke

Minutes

Mr. Berger: State has done a good paper suggesting where we go from here, the best way to proceed and generally describing the key elements of a strategy. I have a number of questions, but I'd like Winston to describe where we are. (S)

Mr. Lord: The President is anxious to see a China strategy. He has brought up the issue of where we are going with China, noting that a year passes more quickly than we think. It is important that we get something to the President quickly. (S)

Our strategy is essentially engagement across the board. We are also ready for some reciprocal steps within the obvious political constraints, bearing in mind more engagement and high-level meetings will appear to legitimate the regime. The sequence of

visits must be planned, as well as the level of meetings and whether we move forward with military exchanges. (S)

China is important but we, the executive and congressional branches, have serious problems with its practices. We can address problems through intensive engagement moving up the ladder directly to their leadership and jumping over the bureaucrats. The political reality is, however, some may feel we should go up the ladder gradually. (S)

We have six to eight months to achieve progress. In January or February, Congress will ask how we're doing. Congress is crucial to maintain leverage. The last Administration did not have executive-congressional unity. The consensus we have forged is fragile and some may still criticize that we are being soft. On the other hand, there are ten CODELS going to China this summer; Pelosi, Gephardt and Gibbons to name a few. Nonetheless, we cannot take congressional support for granted. (S)

Factors we should be sensitive to include the M-11 issue, which could have a broad ripple effect on our strategy. There is also the succession problem. Deng is fading physically; there is intensified jockeying for the succession. The general view is that they will be more "macho" with us under these circumstances. Also, three months ago, China was an economic miracle; now they may be in for some serious problems. Tibet is a wild card. (S)

Mr. Berger. Win accurately describes the President's interest in China. On the economic and military fronts, China looms large on the horizon and is an important actor. (S)

It is also important to understand the President is serious about the MFN decision and the link between human rights and market access. This is not like the last Administration where they maneuvered to get around Congress. Our strategy must reflect the requirement for overall significant progress in the executive order and that without this we are prepared to lift MFN. (S)

My question is whether there is inherent in this strategy a mixed message to the PRC. We're proposing to escalate, in level and quantity, our dialogue with China. Is there a danger here, Win, that China will interpret such broad, high-level engagement as a sign that we're not serious about MFN revocation? (S)

Mr. Lord. First, if we do not have significant progress, we should cut-off MFN. As to the strategy of high-level engagement, we're not starting off with a Summit meeting or a Presidential visit. The idea is to send out at the Assistant Secretary and Under Secretary levels, officials to engage on MFN issues and hold out the carrot of higher-level meetings. (S)

Mr. Berger. If you're suggesting that Perry visit after there's been progress, I did not get that impression from the paper. (S)

Mr. Lord. Perry is debatable. The others are sub-Cabinet level. (S)

Mr. Berger. Then that notion of phasing should be in the next iteration of the paper. On our core concerns, we will engage at an appropriate level. But before we go in robustly with Bentsen, Brown and Kantor, we need to assess timing and progress. (S)

Mr. Freeman. I'd like to answer your first question of whether this sends a mixed message. Yes, it does, to Congress and the Chinese. Unless the high-level visits revolve around specific problems, that will be the case. (S)

There are things we want and do not want the Chinese to do. That said, perhaps the idea of high-level visits is not a bad one. The level of the traveller should be keyed to solving problems; we should not constrain ourselves if we feel only a senior official can accomplish the job. However, on military travel, perhaps we want a gradual escalation instead of leaping immediately forward. (S)

Mr. Tarnoff. I agree. There is a difference between the military-to-military contacts, which do not appear to address our core concerns, and the core issues. Levels are important. If you get up to the Deputy Secretary level, that is giving a status to the relationship not confined to the agenda. The political signal becomes larger than the issue itself. (S)

Mr. Fuerth. We have leverage beyond official visits. If progress on human rights is required for MFN renewal, we should persuade business that that is our requirement. When the PRC picks up that we are talking to business about the real prospect of MFN revocation, they will get the message very clearly. (S)

Mr. Berger. You're right. However, despite the tremendous value of having business carrying that message, it will get modulated in the delivery. (S)

Mr. Fuerth. As a member of the Senate Staff, I experienced the full-court-press of U.S. businesses affected by MFN. Shoe manufacturers came to my office to tell me how they would be hurt if MFN were withdrawn. It seems clear we must persuade our domestic political forces. (S)

Mr. Berger. We should do this in a concerted way through high-level contact conveying our seriousness. (S)

Ms. Barshefsky. The sympathy of the business community for our approach ends where the real threat of MFN revocation begins. Everyone on the Hill is not happy about the MFN link. If we start to stress now that revocation of MFN is a real possibility, the Chinese and Congress (those not happy with the MFN link) would see this as a substantial escalation of the threat. (S)

Mr. Berger. If we're serious about revocation, we owe it to business to tell them that and must convey this to the PRC. (S)

Mr. Fuerth. Perhaps we could talk to business early, get them thinking about the need to engage now to minimize the threat later. If we do not, they will seek a full-court press to block the President with Congress. (S)

Mr. Berger. Conditionality is confined to human rights progress; the conditions are reasonable. We jettisoned those elements that were intrusive. This laid the basis for the business community to be comfortable with our approach. (S)

Mr. Wolfe. We need to confront what business would be willing to do. In the early part of this year, I suggested to the AmCham in Hong Kong that they get involved. Their reaction was very bitter; I was accused of being a human rights fanatic. There are real risks to that approach. (S)

Mr. Cutter. The risks are close to zero. They are as smart as we are. The decision is up in June. It is far better to brief them on the nature of the decision. My soundings with the AmCham were positive. We're better off telling them this is real and defining for them what progress is. (S)

Mr. Berger. The consensus seems to be we should engage the business community. Let's return to the issue of government-to-government engagement. The factors are, we need engagement around our core concerns, but at what level. Is this determined by progress? What it will take to solve problems? Is there a distinction between our core concerns and other areas of cooperation? (S)

Mr. Stiglitz. We should broaden the scope of engagement beyond our core concerns. We can convey messages on the importance of human rights in the context of cooperative interaction. (S)

Mr. Berger. Is anyone concerned about that approach? (S)

Mr. Tarnoff. We have core and other concerns. On global issues, for instance, the environment and population, the PRC can play a role. Engagement is in our interests to elicit their cooperation on those issues. (S)

Mr. Berger. We need to distinguish between the level of contact necessary to solve problems on core issues and that level useful for broader engagement. In non-core areas, we should go slower and start at a lower level, or we will confuse the Chinese. (S)

Mr. Tarnoff. We may not want to do much on population and the environment, but we are concerned about PRC behavior in these areas. (S)

Mr. Berger. But do we go to China in a "deal with the problem" mode or "what can we do together" mode? (S)

Mr. Tarnoff. If there are opportunities for progress, we go. (S)

Mr. Freeman. Over the coming decade, China will have one of the largest global economies. If Chinese behavior on the environment is not brought to international standards, the consequences will be appalling. This issue does not fall neatly into core or non-core. (S)

Mr. Fyerth. I agree, there are problems with their behavior on the environmental front. They dump coal and carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. Another problem is the Three Gorges Dam; a Stalin-style flood control project that is highly controversial from a human rights and environmental perspective. (S)

Mr. Cutter. We're better off with broad engagement. I don't think the visits will confuse them; the message on human rights is unqualified. It was a big help with the Japan framework that Tim Wirth had discussions with the Japanese that reinforced our economic message. If we get no progress, we can cut back our contact. (S)

Mr. MacEachin. It's good to broaden the agenda, but if we raise too many concerns and don't differentiate between those that are really core and those that are not, we will have problems. The issue of their behavior toward the environment cannot shut down the relationship; the M-11 can. (S)

Mr. Freeman. There are only two countries that can put an ICBM on U.S. soil, Russia and China. Of these, there is only one whose military budget has increased and with which we have serious disputes, China. Given the greater role of the PRC in the world and their force projection capabilities, it would be irresponsible not to have military-to-military contact. (S)

The PLA has autonomy in Chinese decision-making and it will play a key role in the succession. There is no political-military bureau in the Foreign Ministry and they have no Lynn Davis. The PLA drives the decisions that produce M-11s and install M-11s. Issues in the export control area are also related to the PLA. The PLA plays a distinct and important role on regional issues such as Northeast Asian security; its role is central with respect to Korea, Japan, the U.S., Russia, the Taiwan Straits, the South China Sea (Spratlys), Russian-Chinese arms competition and Central Asia. Their purview includes China in the UNSC and Cambodia peacekeeping. Therefore, military-to-military dialogue, between JCS and its counterparts, CINCPAC, etc., are at the core of our national security concerns. (S)

There are good human rights reasons for opening this channel of dialogue; after all, they rolled the tanks, albeit reluctantly, during Tiananmen. (S)

Mr. Berger. This discussion has evolved from the paper in an instructive direction. The paper implies contact for contact's sake. This is different from contact for a purpose. We are also distinguishing level and appropriateness; focusing on the three core areas and identifying two others -- the environment and military-to-military. The consensus is, we do not want wholesale re-engagement, but re-engagement for progress. (S)

Mr. Freeman. China's Defense Ministry is not the Foreign Ministry. That's the problem. Assuming we do not get a snapshot of M-11s this week, there is a case for Perry to engage. (S)

Mr. Berger. I'm more comfortable with going slower. (S)

Mr. Ryan. We should engage our allies; this would reinforce our seriousness. ~~(S)~~

Mr. Berger. Even when our allies, such as Japan, do not agree with our approach? ~~(S)~~

Mr. Freeman. The Japanese can play a positive role on legal reform. China does not have a communist legal system; it is a Chinese system dressed up in Marxist-Leninist garb. Japan can contribute because its way of approaching litigation and problem-solving is more similar to China's than ours is; Japan can contribute in a way we cannot. ~~(S)~~

Ms. Barshefsky. The paper focuses on incentives. There ought to be discussion of sticks. Keep in mind, the trade agenda is contentious and will get more so in the short-term: (1) we have the October 10 market access deadline; (2) no IPR enforcement -- piracy is rampant, particularly in the coastal areas, and the private sector is looking into ways to pay for enforcement since the PRC government is doing nothing; (3) we have a problem with textile transshipments of some \$2-\$4 billion annually; (4) our textile agreement expires in December. To the extent other (non-trade) trips are planned, we need to make sure we do not work at cross-purposes. ~~(S)~~

Mr. Berger. I can envision a scenario in which we retaliate on trade, for M-11s and exchange rate manipulation; how do we manage that kind of scenario? ~~(S)~~

Mr. Cutter. The paper is skimpy on economics. China will have the world's second largest economy. Yet, we have no economic strategy. The peculiar nature of the PRC economy requires an economic strategy. We should have a paper outlining our economic stakes. The overall strategy must be actively managed; there should be a study group that monitors the totality of problems, nature of visits. ~~(S)~~

Mr. Berger. That's a good point. The danger here is that every agency will make decisions in a vacuum, without regard to overall impact. The IWG has to play a different role, of implementation. ~~(S)~~

Mr. Wiedemann. We need an integrated strategy. On the trade side there are the 301 actions, but also carrots in the form of our helping China's accession to the GATT. On nonproliferation, there are many reasons the Chinese are peddling weapons while risking sizeable commercial sales. A major reason is the disconnect between the Chinese military and the overall bureaucracy. We need to tell them they'll lose money on satellite launches if China Great Wall continues to sell weapons. ~~(S)~~

Mr. Freeman. China is going through a fantastic transition; they are not able to control provincial activity. As Winston said, they are facing an economic slump and have only crude tools to address it. They have no institutions. Strategically, we ought to help China develop a banking system, a customs service. This

raises the dilemma of timing; when do we address our longer-term strategic interests? (S)

Mr. Stiglitz. We need a nuanced approach; the process of trying to create institutions will be difficult. (S)

Mr. Berger. The problem is, you cannot move too far from identifiable U.S. interests in the short-term as long as you have the threshold issue of human rights, which requires progress or there will be a jolt in the relationship. If you start helping them develop a legal and banking system, you risk sending a mixed message. (S)

Mr. Cutter. The flip side of that argument is also true. The issues related to their need for a banking system will not disappear. We can make the point that the jolt will hurt them. (S)

Mr. Berger. Win, what do you think? (S)

Mr. Lord. We can work both fronts. We should brief business and Congress that we are serious about MFN. We should be more systematic about contact. Broader contact does not muddy the message. (S)

Mr. Fall. Treasury has had negotiations with China at the Under Secretary level on exchange market activities -- since we classified the PRC an exchange rate manipulator. Ironically, the Chinese welcome that dialogue because it allows them to learn about institution-building. (S)

One other point; the President suggested to Secretary Bentsen that he meet with APEC Finance Ministers. That dialogue with China would be in a multilateral context. (S)

Mr. Berger. We are in a transitional year. We hope to liberate our policy from its current MFN focus. We recognize we have a broad range of interests, but we have a big obstacle out there. By definition, the policy this year must be less expansionist and must embrace our human rights focus. (S)

Mr. Cutter. The purpose of this year's policy is to take a year's perspective to set us up for maximum progress, so we can convince the Chinese we are serious and prepare the relevant constituencies. (S)

Mr. Berger. We are moving to selective engagement. That's where we are this year. The conversation suggests otherwise. (S)

Mr. Fuerth. In recognition of China's emergence as a major force, our policy should create an interlocking network of interests acceptable to us and compatible with the world system. This is not a one year policy, but good strategy. (S)

Mr. Berger. I think the President would like to see something that will drive a thoughtful analysis of the policy. We need: (1) to draft another iteration of this paper soon that embodies the thrust of this discussion; (2) to task the IWG: (a) to

develop a longer-term strategy over the next five years that describes our interests and leverage; and, (b) to manage the strategy over the next twelve months so that there is a central decision-making body on all China issues, including retaliation, visits etc. (S)

We should recognize that MFN/human rights is the threshold issue, and we must ensure the PRC understands this. Congress and the business community should be enlisted in that process. We could expand the range of our contact with the PRC to include not just our core three concerns but some other areas; the two that come to mind are the environment and a military dialogue. There may be others. The level of contact needs to be decided in terms of the issues themselves, consistent with our management of the strategy and selective engagement. (S)

Mr. Fuerth. The annex on Tibet should be re-examined. The rest of the paper is adequate but the treatment of Tibet is flawed. (S)

Mr. Lord. I don't know if we can draft a five-year strategy. (S)

Mr. Berger. We should have various people project how China's economy and military will look in five years. This may be a process, rather than a drafting exercise. (S)

Mr. Fuerth. We do not need a five-year program but something that conveys general coherence and scope. We need to "toilet train" China before it grows up. (S)

Mr. Freeman. We should start with the identification of key interests; especially in those areas that are changing. (S)

Mr. Stiglitz. CEA could help identify the economic issues. (S)

Mr. Berger. The paper ought to focus on the next few months. (S)

- End of Meeting -

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. draft	re: Minutes of DC Meeting on China [partial] (1 page)	07/21/1993	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3995

FOLDER TITLE:

DC0043 DC Meeting on China, July 21, 1993 [1]

2015-0221-M
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: July 21, 1993
LOCATION: Room 208 OEOB
TIME: 3:30 pm - 5:30 pm

SUBJECT: Minutes of DC Meeting on China (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

The Vice President's Office

Leon Fuerth
Rich Sanders

State

Peter Tarnoff
Winston Lord

Treasury

James Fall

DOD

Charles Freeman
Stanley Roth

Commerce

Jeff Garten
Frank Vargo

USTR

Charlene Barshefsky
Ira Wolfe

White House

Samuel R. Berger

CIA

Douglas MacEachin
(b)(3)

CEA

Joseph Stiglitz

JCS

Michael Ryan
Frank Bowman

NSC

Kent Wiedemann
Ferial Ara Saeed

NEC

Bowman Cutter
Michael Punke

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-02-11 (142)
3/11/2020:KOE

Minutes

Mr. Berger: State has done a good paper suggesting where we go from here, the best way to proceed and generally describing the key elements of a strategy. I have a number of questions, but I'd like Winston to describe where we are. (S)

Mr. Lord: The President is anxious to see a China strategy. He has brought up the issue of where we are going with China, noting that a year passes more quickly than we think. It is important that we get something to the President quickly. (S)

Our strategy is essentially engagement across the board. We are also ready for some reciprocal steps within the obvious political constraints, bearing in mind more engagement and high-level meetings will appear to legitimate the regime. The sequence of

visits must be planned, as well as the level of meetings and whether we move forward with military exchanges. (S)

China is important but we, the executive and congressional branches, have serious problems with its practices. We can address problems through intensive engagement moving up the ladder directly to their leadership and jumping over the bureaucrats. The political reality is, however, some may feel we should go up the ladder gradually. (S)

We have six to eight months to achieve progress. In January or February, Congress will ask how we're doing. Congress is crucial to maintain leverage. The last Administration did not have executive-congressional unity. The consensus we have forged is fragile and some may still criticize that we are being soft. On the other hand, there are ten CODELS going to China this summer; Pelosi, Gephardt and Gibbons to name a few. Nonetheless, we cannot take congressional support for granted. (S)

Factors we should be sensitive to include the M-11 issue, which could have a broad ripple effect on our strategy. There is also the succession problem. Deng is fading physically; there is intensified jockeying for the succession. The general principle *view* is *that* they will be more "macho" with us under these circumstances. Also, three months ago, China was an economic miracle; now they may be in for some serious problems. Tibet is a wild card. (S)

Mr. Berger. Win accurately describes the President's interest in China. On the economic and military fronts, China looms large on the horizon and is an important actor. (S)

It is also important to understand the President is serious about the MFN decision and the link between human rights and market access. This is not like the last Administration where they maneuvered to get around Congress. Our strategy must reflect the requirement for overall significant progress in the executive order and that without this we are prepared to lift MFN. (S)

My question is *whether* *is there* inherent in this strategy a mixed message to the PRC? We're proposing to escalate, in level and quantity, our dialogue with China. Is there a danger here, Win, that China will interpret such broad, high-level engagement as a sign that we're not serious about MFN revocation? (S)

Mr. Lord. First, if we do not have significant progress, we should cut-off MFN. As to the strategy of high-level engagement, we're not starting off with a Summit meeting or a Presidential visit. The idea is to send out at the Assistant Secretary and Under Secretary levels, officials to engage on MFN issues and hold out the carrot of higher-level meetings. (S)

Mr. Berger. If you're suggesting that Perry visit after there's been progress, I did not get that impression from the paper. (S)

Mr. Lord. Perry is debatable. The others are sub-Cabinet level. (S)

Mr. Berger. Then that notion of phasing should be in the next iteration of the paper. On our core concerns, we will engage at an appropriate level. But before we go in robustly with Bentsen, Brown and Kantor, we need to assess timing and progress. ~~(S)~~

Mr. Freeman. I'd like to answer your first question of whether this sends a mixed message. Yes, it does, to Congress and the Chinese. Unless the high-level visits revolve around specific problems, that will be the case. ~~(S)~~

There are things we want and do not want the Chinese to do. That said, perhaps the idea of high-level visits is not a bad one. The level of the traveller should be keyed to solving problems; we should not constrain ourselves if we feel only a senior official can accomplish the job. However, on military travel, perhaps we want a gradual escalation instead of leaping immediately forward. ~~(S)~~

Mr. Tarnoff. I agree. There is a difference between the military-to-military contacts, which do not appear to address our core concerns, and the core issues. Levels are important. If you get up to the Deputy Secretary level, that is giving a status to the relationship not confined to the agenda. The political signal becomes larger than the issue itself. ~~(S)~~

Mr. Fuerth. We have leverage beyond official visits. If progress on human rights is required for MFN renewal, we should persuade business that that is our requirement. When the PRC picks up that we are talking to business about the real prospect of MFN revocation, they will get the message very clearly. ~~(S)~~

Mr. Berger. You're right. However, despite the tremendous value of having business carrying that message, it will get modulated in the delivery. ~~(S)~~

Mr. Fuerth. As a member of the Senate Staff, I experienced the full-court-press of U.S. businesses affected by MFN. Shoe manufacturers came to my office to tell me how they would be hurt if MFN were withdrawn. It seems clear we must persuade our domestic political forces. ~~(S)~~

Mr. Berger. We should do this in a concerted way through high-level contact conveying our seriousness. ~~(S)~~

Ms. Barshefsky. The sympathy of the business community for our approach ends where the real threat of MFN revocation begins. Everyone on the Hill is not happy about the MFN link. If we start to stress now that revocation of MFN is a real possibility, the Chinese and Congress (those not happy with the MFN link) would see this as a substantial escalation of the threat. ~~(S)~~

Mr. Berger. If we're serious about revocation, we owe it to business to tell them that and must convey this to the PRC. ~~(S)~~

Mr. Fuerth. Perhaps we could talk to business early, get them thinking about the need to engage now to minimize the threat later. If we do not, they will seek a full-court press to block the President with Congress. ~~(S)~~

Mr. Berger. Conditionality is confined to human rights progress; the conditions are reasonable. We jettisoned those elements that were intrusive. This laid the basis for the business community to be comfortable with our approach. (S)

Mr. Wolfe. We need to confront what business would be willing to do. In the early part of this year, I suggested to the AmCham in Hong Kong that they get involved. Their reaction was very bitter; I was accused of being a human rights fanatic. There are real risks to that approach. (S)

Mr. Cutter. The risks are close to zero. They are as smart as we are. The decision is up in June. It is far better to brief them on the nature of the decision. My soundings with the AmCham were positive. We're better off telling them this is real and defining for them what progress is. (S)

Mr. Berger. The consensus seems to be we should engage the business community. Let's return to the issue of government-to-government engagement. The factors are, we need engagement around our core concerns, but at what level. Is this determined by progress? What it will take to solve problems? Is there a distinction between our core concerns and other areas of cooperation? (S)

Mr. Stiglitz. We should broaden the scope of engagement beyond our core concerns. We can convey messages on the importance of human rights in the context of cooperative interaction. (S)

Mr. Berger. Is anyone concerned about that approach? (S)

Mr. Tarnoff. We have core and other concerns. On global issues, for instance, the environment and population, the PRC can play a role. Engagement is in our interests to elicit their cooperation on those issues. (S)

Mr. Berger. We need to distinguish between the level of contact necessary to solve problems on core issues and that level useful for broader engagement. In non-core areas, we should go slower and start at a lower level, or we will confuse the Chinese. (S)

Mr. Tarnoff. We may not want to do much on population and the environment, but we are concerned about PRC behavior in these areas. (S)

Mr. Berger. But do we go to China in a "deal with the problem" mode or "what can we do together" mode? (S)

Mr. Tarnoff. If there are opportunities for progress, we go. (S)

Mr. Freeman. Over the coming decade, China will have one of the largest global economies. If Chinese behavior on the environment is not brought to international standards, the consequences will be appalling. This issue does not fall neatly into core or non-core. (S)

Mr. Fuerth. I agree, there are problems with their behavior on the environmental front. They dump coal and carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. Another problem is the Three Gorges Dam; a Stalin-style flood control project that is highly controversial from a human rights and environmental perspective. (S)

Mr. Cutter. We're better off with broad engagement. I don't think the visits will confuse them; the message on human rights is unqualified. It was a big help with the Japan framework that Tim Wirth had discussions with the Japanese that reinforced our economic message. If we get no progress, we can cut back our contact. (S)

Mr. MacEachen. It's good to broaden the agenda, but if we raise too many concerns and don't differentiate between those that are really core and those that are not, we will have problems. The issue of their behavior toward the environment cannot shut down the relationship; the M-11 can. (S)

Mr. Freeman. There are only two countries that can put an ICBM on U.S. soil, Russia and China. Of these, there is only one whose military budget has increased and with which we have serious disputes, China. Given the greater role of the PRC in the world and their force projection capabilities, it would be irresponsible not to have military-to-military contact. (S)

The PLA has autonomy in Chinese decision-making and it will play a key role in the succession. There is no political-military bureau in the Foreign Ministry and they have no Lynn Davis. The PLA drives the decisions that produce M-11s and install M-11s. Issues in the export control area are also related to the PLA. The PLA plays a distinct and important role on regional issues such as Northeast Asian security; its role is central with respect to Korea, Japan, the U.S., Russia, the Taiwan Straits, the South China Sea (Spratlys), Russian-Chinese arms competition and Central Asia. Their purview includes China in the UNSC and Cambodia peacekeeping. Therefore, military-to-military dialogue, between JCS and its counterparts, CINCPAC, etc., are at the core of our national security concerns. (S)

There are good human rights reasons for opening this channel of dialogue; after all, they rolled the tanks, albeit reluctantly, during Tiananmen. (S)

Mr. Berger. This discussion has evolved from the paper in an instructive direction. The paper implies contact for contact's sake. This is different from contact for a purpose. We are also distinguishing level and appropriateness; focusing on the three core areas and identifying two others -- the environment and military-to-military. The consensus is, we do not want wholesale re-engagement, but re-engagement for progress. (S)

Mr. Freeman. China's Defense Ministry is not the Foreign Ministry. That's the problem. Assuming we do not get a snapshot of M-11s this week, there is a case for Perry to engage. (S)

Mr. Berger. I'm more comfortable with going slower. (S)

Mr. Ryan. We should engage our allies; this would reinforce our seriousness. (S)

Mr. Berger. Even when our allies, such as Japan, do not agree with our approach? (S)

Mr. Freeman. The Japanese can play a positive role on legal reform. China does not have a communist legal system; it is a Chinese system dressed up in Marxist-Leninist garb. Japan can contribute because its way of approaching litigation and problem-solving is more similar to China's than ours is; Japan can contribute in a way we cannot. (S)

Ms. Barshefsky. The paper focuses on incentives. There ought to be discussion of sticks. Keep in mind, the trade agenda is contentious and will get more so in the short-term: (1) we have the October 10 market access deadline; (2) no IPR enforcement -- piracy is rampant, particularly in the coastal areas, and the private sector is looking into ways to pay for enforcement since the PRC government is doing nothing; (3) we have a problem with textile transshipments of some \$2-\$4 billion annually; (4) our textile agreement expires in December. To the extent other (non-trade) trips are planned, we need to make sure we do not work at cross-purposes. (S)

Mr. Berger. I can envision a scenario in which we retaliate on trade, for M-11s and exchange rate manipulation; how do we manage that kind of scenario? (S)

Mr. Cutter. The paper is skimpy on economics. China will have the world's second largest economy. Yet, we have no economic strategy. The peculiar nature of the PRC economy requires an economic strategy. We should have a paper outlining our economic stakes. The overall strategy must be actively managed; there should be a study group that monitors the totality of problems, nature of visits. (S)

Mr. Berger. That's a good point. The danger here is that every agency will make decisions in a vacuum, without regard to overall impact. The IWG has to play a different role, of implementation. (S)

Mr. Wiedemann. We need an integrated strategy. On the trade side there are the 301 actions, but also carrots in the form of our helping China's accession to the GATT. On nonproliferation, there are many reasons the Chinese are peddling weapons while risking sizeable commercial sales. A major reason is the disconnect between the Chinese military and the overall bureaucracy. We need to tell them they'll lose money on satellite launches if China Great Wall continues to sell weapons. (S)

Mr. Freeman. China is going through a fantastic transition; they are not able to control provincial activity. As Winston said, they are facing an economic slump and have only crude tools to address it. They have no institutions. Strategically, we ought to help China develop a banking system, a customs service. This

raises the dilemma of timing; when do we address our longer-term strategic interests? (S)

Mr. Stiglitz. We need a nuanced approach; the process of trying to create institutions will be difficult. (S)

Mr. Berger. The problem is, you cannot move too far from identifiable U.S. interests in the short-term as long as you have the threshold issue of human rights, which requires progress or there will be a jolt in the relationship. If you start helping them develop a legal and banking system, you risk sending a mixed message. (S)

Mr. Cutter. The flip side of that argument is also true. The issues related to their need for a banking system will not disappear. We can make the point that the jolt will hurt them. (S)

Mr. Berger. Win, what do you think? (S)

Mr. Lord. We can work both fronts. We should brief business and Congress that we are serious about MFN. We should be more systematic about contact. Broader contact does not muddy the message. (S)

Mr. Fall. Treasury has had negotiations with China at the Under Secretary level on exchange market activities -- since we classified the PRC an exchange rate manipulator. Ironically, the Chinese welcome that dialogue because it allows them to learn about institution-building. (S)

One other point; the President suggested to Secretary Bentsen that he meet with APEC Finance Ministers. That dialogue with China would be in a multilateral context. (S)

Mr. Berger. We are in a transitional year. We hope to liberate our policy from its current MFN focus. We recognize we have a broad range of interests, but we have a big obstacle out there. By definition, the policy this year must be less expansionist and must embrace our human rights focus. (S)

Mr. Cutter. The purpose of this year's policy is to take a year's perspective to set us up for maximum progress, so we can convince the Chinese we are serious and prepare the relevant constituencies. (S)

Mr. Berger. We are moving to selective engagement. That's where we are this year. The conversation suggests otherwise. (S)

Mr. Fuerth. In recognition of China's emergence as a major force, our policy should create an interlocking network of interests acceptable to us and compatible with the world system. This is not a one year policy, but good strategy. (S)

Mr. Berger. I think the President would like to see something that will drive a thoughtful analysis of the policy. We need: (1) another iteration of this paper soon that embodies the thrust of this discussion; (2) to task the IWG: (a) to develop a longer-

to draft

term strategy over the next five years that describes our interests and leverage; and, (b) to manage the strategy over the next twelve months so that there is a central decision-making body on all China issues, including retaliation, visits etc. (S)

We should recognize that MFN/human rights is the threshold issue, and we must ensure the PRC understands this. Congress and the business community should be enlisted in that process. We could expand the range of our contact with the PRC to include not just our core three concerns but some other areas; the two that come to mind are the environment and a military dialogue. There may be others. The level of contact needs to be decided in terms of the issues themselves, consistent with our management of the strategy and selective engagement. (S)

Mr. Fuerth. The annex on Tibet should be re-examined. The rest of the paper is adequate but the treatment of Tibet is flawed. (S)

Mr. Lord. I don't know if we can draft a five-year strategy. (S)

Mr. Berger. We should have various people project how China's economy and military will look in five years. This may be a process, rather than a drafting exercise. (S)

Mr. Fuerth. We do not need a five-year program but something that conveys general coherence and scope. We need to "toilet train" China before it grows up. (S)

Mr. Freeman. We should start with the identification of key interests; especially in those areas that are changing. (S)

Mr. Stiglitz. CEA could help identify the economic issues. (S)

Mr. Berger. The paper ought to focus on the next few months. (S)

- End of Meeting -

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Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001c. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on China [partial] (1 page)	07/21/1993	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
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FOLDER TITLE:

DC0043 DC Meeting on China, July 21, 1993 [1]

2015-0221-M
rs1198

RESTRICTION CODES

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

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PER E.O. 13526
2015-0221-F(143)
03/11/2020 KDE

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: July 21, 1993

LOCATION: Room 208 OEOB

TIME: 3:30 p.m. - 5:30 p.m.

Subject: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committees Meeting
on China (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

The Vice President's Office

Leon Fuerth
Rick Sanders

State

Peter Tarnoff
Winston Lord

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Michael Ryan
Frank Bowman

NSC

Kent Wiedemann
Ferial Ara Saeed

NEC

Bowman Cutter
Michael Punke

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- If, by next year, we do not have overall significant progress on human rights as indicated in the President's May 28 executive order, we are prepared to revoke MFN. (S)
- MFN/human rights is the threshold issue for the next nine to twelve months; we must ensure the PRC understands this. Our constituencies, Congress and business, can help us deliver this message. (S)

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Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

- We should meet with these constituencies early to explain the seriousness of our MFN stance and enlist their support. (S)
- The strategy of continuous, high-level visits for the purpose of broad engagement needs to be refined to reflect the need for progress on our core concerns (human rights, nonproliferation and trade) and other areas of special importance (e.g. military-to-military contacts, environment). (S)
- We should decide the level of contact in accordance with our objectives on a given issue and confined to the agenda at hand. (S)
- We need to identify the purpose of each visit and what we hope to achieve. Otherwise, sending high-level visitors seriatim risks sending a mixed message to the Chinese and the wrong signal to Congress. (S)
- We are moving from virtual non-engagement since Tianamen Square to selective engagement in support of key U.S. interests. (S)
- The IWG should take on the role of managing our strategy. We should look to it as the central decision-making mechanism and coordinator on a range of actions with China, including trade retaliation and level and coordination of official visits. (S)
- We need another draft of the paper soon that reflects these points. (S)
- The DC will meet again to review this paper. (S)
- Thereafter, the IWG should develop a longer-term strategy toward China, reflecting broader economic, strategic and political developments and U.S. interests over the next five years. (S)

^{should}
We ~~must~~ meet with these constituencies early to explain the seriousness of our MFN stance and enlist their support. (S)

-- The strategy of continuous, high-level visits for the purpose of broad engagement needs to be refined to reflect the need for progress on our core concerns (human rights, nonproliferation and trade) (S)

-- We should decide the level of contact in accordance with our objectives on a given issue and confined to the agenda at hand. (S)

-- We need to identify the purpose of each visit and what we hope to achieve. Otherwise, sending high-level visitors seriatim risks sending a mixed message to the Chinese and the wrong signal to Congress. (S)

-- We are moving from virtually ^{non-}no engagement to selective engagement in ~~direct~~ support of key U.S. interests. (S)

and other areas of special importance (e.g. military-to-military contacts, environment)

-- The IWG should take on the role of managing our strategy. We should look to it as the central decision-making mechanism and coordinator on a range of actions with China, including trade retaliation and level and coordination of official visits. (S)

-- ^{Thereafter, the} IWG should develop a longer-term strategy, ^{looking} at ~~the next five years, of engagement with China~~ (S)

-- We need another draft of the paper soon that reflects these points. (S)

-- The DC will meet again to review this paper. (S)

Pinco
Tiananmen
Square

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2015-0221-M(1.41)
3/11/2020 KDE

focus
China, reflecting
broader
economic, strategic
and political
development in
China, and U.S.
interests over the
next five years.

TO: BERGER

FROM: SAEED
WIEDEMANN

DOC DATE: 20 JUL 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
HUMAN RIGHTS
INTL TRADE

MFN
NON PROLIFERATION
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 21 JUL DC MTG RE CHINA

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER

DUE DATE: 23 JUL 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SAEED

LOGREF: 9320791 9320805

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC0043

CODES:

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FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
SAEED
WIEDEMANN

COMMENTS: _____

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 7/15/2019
2015-0821-da

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001

Z 93072019 FOR INFORMATION
X 93072210 NOTED BY BERGER

Rec'd 7/21 7:30am

JWR

National Security Council
The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<u>W</u> DepExecSec	<u>1</u>	<u>Kalk</u>	
ExecSec			
Staff Director			
D/APNSA	<u>2</u>	<u>Deputy Natl Sec Advisor</u>	
APNSA	<u>3</u>	<u>cy provided</u> <u>has seen</u>	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>B 7/22</u>	<u>(initials)</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>		

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

DC mtg paper for 7/21

20 JUL 93 2:53

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

cc: NS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 20, 1993

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: KENT WIEDEMANN *JK*FROM: FERIAAL ARA SAEED *AS*

SUBJECT: China DC Meeting, Wednesday, July 21 at 3:30 p.m.

Tomorrow's meeting should start us on setting the course of our China policy until the end of this year. One meeting may not be enough. Your goal is to convey the urgency of immediate interagency agreement on a strategy we can take to the President for approval. We suggest you make the following points:

Guiding Points for Discussion:

- o The President has said he wants to make every day count. By the end of this month we must have a strategy in place.
- o State's paper makes a start, but we have a great deal of work to do to turn this into a real strategy we can take to the President for approval.
- o We need action now. Allowing China to delay until MFN season will make the issue difficult to manage next summer.
- o Our top priorities are human rights, nonproliferation and trade/economics (including market access, GATT and APEC). The next tranche of issues are regional, encompassing security, North Korea, Cambodia, Burma, South Asian tensions and out there but not unrelated, Chinese migration.
- o State's paper is heavy on how we need China. But China also needs us; as a counter-weight to Japan and because we are its largest single market, absorbing a third of its exports.
- o The political situation in China is indeterminate. The succession, an overheated economy and diminishing central control over trade and weapons sales affects China's ability to respond in the way we want.
- o It is important that each high-level visitor to Beijing aim for specific objectives. Our people must either relay directly to senior Chinese officials our bottom line positions, or return with concrete progress that will lay the basis for obtaining the results we seek.

The Discussion Paper:

- o The core of this paper is its proposals for engagement:
 - (1) The number and frequency of high-level visits to China seem excessive in light of Congressional sensitivities and the need to avoid looking overly anxious to the Chinese. The DC should determine: (1) whether some of this business could be conducted in Washington, on the margins of multilateral events or by inviting PRC officials here; and, (2) whether each of the proposed Beijing visits promotes specific objectives which address our core concerns.
 - (2) The schedule of visits looks okay until October. We could reduce the number of visits after that. For instance, Davis could cover Gallucci's and ACDA's brief, and Wirth could engage on environmental and other global issues in Washington through diplomatic channels. How do we justify sending USIA's Duffy to Beijing? Lewis and Christopher visits in December?
 - (3) The visits are also bunched into a six month period; we should think of spreading them out over nine months.
 - (4) Congress will support high-level meetings so long as we show we are advancing U.S. national interests and not conducting "business as usual". That distinction is the litmus test. Otherwise, the Chinese and Congress will draw the wrong conclusions.
 - (5) We should carefully scrutinize the idea of reconvening the JCCT, the JEC and Joint S&T meetings. Suspension of these events was the first sanction announced after Tiananmen and reconvening these bodies would be politically meaningful to Congress and the Chinese. We might want to use the meetings as signals, but we should know we are doing so.

Generally refers to uniformed military. Army Ch. of Staff was set to visit PRC

(6) Military-to-military contacts are important. We need to build our knowledge of China's military capability and intentions. Direct contact also may be the only way to press them on weapons sales. However, given the sensitivity of re-opening our military dialogue, we should consider reducing the level from Deputy Defense Secretary Perry to A/S Freeman (who is well-prepared).

just after Tiananmen -- visit was obviously cancelled. JW

- o The paper proposes we extend carrots. However, we must recognize that the high-level visits are carrots to the extent they serve the PRC leadership's desire for legitimation. We should consider restoring TDA as the paper proposes, tied to progress; this would help address our bilateral trade deficit. Similarly, selling China the Cray computer would be a humanitarian gesture and of benefit to U.S. companies.
- o The M-11 issue may be an opportunity to wrest further cooperation on international nonproliferation efforts.

TO: LAKE
BERGER

FROM: SAEED
WIEDEMANN

DOC DATE: 26 JUL 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FOLLOW UP PAPER FOR 21 JUL DC MTG RE CHINA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 29 JUL 93 STATUS: C
 STAFF OFFICER: SAEED LOGREF: 9320791 9320798
 FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0043 CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BERGER
NSC CHRON
SAEED
WIEDEMANN

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 7/15/7019
2015-0221-m

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: NSMEM DOC 1 OF 1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE
001

Z 93072612 FOR INFORMATION
X 93072912 NOTED BY LAKE

Rec'd 7/27 4:20pm
 National Security Council
 The White House

JWR
 7/27

PROOFED BY: MEH LOG # 20816
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM ~~FOUO~~ NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG MEH A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<i>MMB</i> DepExecSec	<u>1</u>	<u>MEH</u>	NSC <u>I</u>
ExecSec			
Staff Director	<u>2</u>	<u>MEH</u>	<u>Other</u>
D/APNSA	<u>3</u>	<u>MEH</u>	<u>Revised</u>
APNSA	<u>4</u>	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	<u>for</u>
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>		<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
 (Date/Time)

27 JUL 93 11:30
 COMMENTS:

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

[Handwritten signature]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0221-M (1.46)
3/11/2020 KDR
INFORMATION

July 26, 1993



MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: KENT WIEDEMANN *MSK*

FROM: FERAL ARA SAEED *FMS*

SUBJECT: Meeting on China Strategy Paper

*Natl Sec Advisor
has seen*

On Saturday July 24, Mr. Berger convened a small group to discuss the next iteration of a China strategy paper, following-up on the Deputies Committee meeting of July 21 on China policy. In attendance were NEC (Mr. Cutter), State (Peter Tomsen and Don Keyser), Defense (Charles Freeman and Stanley Roth) and NSC (Kent Wiedemann and Ferial Ara Saeed).

State will draft a paper outlining a strategy for implementing the President's MFN executive order this year. To guide drafting, we distributed the discussion paper at Tab I, which we prepared for Saturday's meeting.

Saeed

The group agreed on the following points:

- o The IWG or another group, similar to the one coordinating Japan trade policy, should implement and manage our China strategy. Its first task should be to craft an integrated plan of action to ensure China responds positively to the conditions of our MFN executive order. This group would also decide which senior officials travel to China and when, coordinate Administration decisions and actions to ensure these are systematic.
- o We should enlist the business community to promote U.S. policy, as our NSC discussion paper suggests, but must be realistic about how much business will do to convey our concerns to the Chinese.

We should pre-brief all CODELS to China so they support our joint executive-congressional goals for change in China.

we shouldn't be encouraging CODELS, but briefing them

o We should encourage more CODELS and ask that they include business representatives; the cross-fertilization of ideas would be helpful and this is a good way to promote exports.

o The IWG should look at export controls and how to handle policy towards China in that area so that we promote U.S. exports while protecting legitimate national security interests.

let's ✓
get strategy
right
first;
then
decide
tactics

- o A tactical "whack" on China -- in retaliation for a trade problem -- could help demonstrate to the Chinese we are resolved to respond if China steps out of line.
- o We should tell China we oppose the Murkowski amendment to the State Authorization bill (a copy at Tab A). This amendment seeks to allow more arms sales to Taiwan, in abrogation of our 1982 communique with China. Our opposing it would demonstrate the principle that we adhere to our commitments -- the three U.S.-China communique in this case -- and we expect the same of China.
- o If we need to sanction China on the M-11 issue, we might consider the route we've taken with Russia and Israel; using their transgression as leverage for progress on our overall non-proliferation objectives. By not imposing Helms sanctions in the short run -- which hurt us as much as they hurt China -- we could elicit progress important to our interests. Wiedemann will work with Poneman on this; we would need the support of key members of Congress -- Biden in particular.

must follow the law
simple waiver will not work 2d X

Attachments

- Tab I NSC Discussion Paper
- Tab A Murkowski Amendment to the State Authorization Bill

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Divider Title: TAB I

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. paper	re: China Strategy for 1993: Implementation of the President's MFN Executive Order (5 pages)	07/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3995

FOLDER TITLE:

DC0043 DC Meeting on China, July 21, 1993 [1]

2015-0221-M
rs1198

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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Divider Title: TAB A

Mr. Murkowski

Viz:

1 At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following
2 new sanction:

3 SEC. _____. APPLICABILITY OF TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT.

4 Section 3 of the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301) is
5 amended by adding at the end the following:

6 "(d) The provisions of Subsection (a) and (b) of this
7 section shall supersede any provision of the August 17,
8 1982, Joint United States-China Communique related to these
9 matters and regulations, directives, and policies based
10 thereon."

TO: LAKE

FROM: GROSSMAN, M

DOC DATE: 02 AUG 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R

DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FOLLOW UP PAPER FOR 21 JUL DC MTG RE CHINA

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE DATE: 06 AUG 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE

LOGREF: 9320791 9320798

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC0043

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

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FOR INFO

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ITOH
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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 7/15/2019
2015-0211-m

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA CLOSED BY: NSJDA DOC 1 OF 1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001

X 93080311 FOR RECORD PURPOSES



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET/NODIS~~
DECL:OADR


August 2, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: China Policy Paper

A Deputies Committee meeting on China strategy held July 21 reviewed the Department of State's paper (previously concurred in by the Interagency Working Group on East Asia) entitled "China Strategy for 1993-1994: Implementing the President's MFN Executive Order." We subsequently revised the paper to incorporate suggestions made at the Deputies Committee meeting.

The attached paper reflects those changes, and adds an Executive Summary.


for Marc Grossman
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

PER E. O. 13526

2015-0221-M (1.48) 03/11/2020 KDE

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. paper	re: China Strategy for 1993-1994: Implementing the President's MFN Executive Order [partial] (4 pages)	08/02/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3995

FOLDER TITLE:

DC0043 DC Meeting on China, July 21, 1993 [1]

2015-0221-M
rs1198

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Grossman/Lake Memorandum Forwarding China Policy Paper

drafted: EAP/CM: DWKeyser (SECMDR 1114 -- 8/2/93) 7-6803

cleared: EAP: PTomsen
P: Under Secretary Tarnoff

STATE CLEARANCES:

EAP:WLord
D:JWarlick
P:WStanton
T:JBarker
C:RMPerito
E:ADerse
S/P:LKeene
S/NIS:VNewland
EAP/RA/TC:JBorich
EAP/RA:BGray
NEA/RA:LWard
SA/RA:MClemmon
H:AKirkpatrick
EB/BTA/ODC:DRMoran
HA:PHotze
INR/EAP/CH:JJTkacik
IO/UNP:DRRasmussen
L/EAP:JDKovar
OES/ENV:APSchifferdecker
PM/PNW:VCarutenuto
PM/PRO:EMonroe
PM/DRSA:TJLyng

OK

IWG Clearances:

NSC: Kent Wiedemann
DOD: Robert Ellis
JCS: Phil Gay
Commerce: Peter Cashman
USTR: Ira Wolf

Treasury: Meg Lundsager
USIA: George Beasley
ACDA: Joe Smaldone

OK

CHINA STRATEGY FOR 1993-1994:
IMPLEMENTING THE PRESIDENT'S MFN EXECUTIVE ORDER

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Overview: U.S. Interests and Strategy in China

Constructive U.S. engagement with China is essential to realize the President's vision for a new Pacific community; to deal effectively with regional security issues including Hong Kong's 1997 transition and Taiwan's status; to sustain our efforts internationally to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; to promote more democratic and open societies globally; to boost American economic and job growth through a healthy trade relationship with China; and to deal with such thorny issues as alien smuggling and environmental degradation.

China is an emerging great power with the potential to contribute enormously to regional and global stability and economic prosperity. It is also grappling with huge problems; an antiquated political system that could buckle or break during the looming succession struggle; a large and increasing "floating" population of over one hundred million; an overheated economy; and a gradual deterioration in central control over the provinces which is feeding the centrifugal tendencies in China which have often led to regional separation in China's history. The results of a problem - ridden succession would have a deleterious affect on stability in China and the region generally.

The challenge to U.S. policy is to channel China's building momentum into constructive channels, bolstering prospects for political and economic liberalization internally as well responsible Chinese policies externally in the maintenance of world peace and stability, in non-proliferation, trade, and the environment. The ascendancy of the market oriented sector in China is striking at the core of the communist system, creating new and influential constituencies and interest groups pressing for political and economic relaxation. It is in the U.S. interest to see this evolution continue. Externally, U.S. support for an involved and engaged China, not an isolated China, as called for by President Clinton in his July 10 Seoul speech, would accelerate this positive and historic evolution underway in China.

Pursuant to these goals, the United States should engage creatively with the Chinese in pursuit of our objectives enunciated in the President's May 28 Executive Order on MFN. Earlier in the year, a Presidential China policy review (NSC-11 summary at tab 3) laid the intellectual and strategic foundation for our reengagement, identifying as core U.S. interests China's continued economic growth, its integration into the world community, its cooperation in building a new international order, and its peaceful evolution toward a more democratic and humane society. In the next ten months before MFN renewals, we

need to achieve sufficient concrete progress to permit a Presidential finding that China's MFN status should be extended.

As we chart our course, we should bear in mind the element of time. Frontloading of our talks is essential for two reasons: (1) Deng Xiaoping's increasingly precarious health inspires Chinese leadership caution, and reflexive nationalistic impulses, as the succession drama begins to unfold; and (2) the Chinese are attuned to the content, nuances and pressures of the annual MFN debate, and are determined -- also for reasons of "face" and nationalism -- to avoid any impression they caved to Washington to retain their MFN status.

Our Tactics for 1993-1994

We begin our reengagement with China from a position of domestic strength: the strategy, philosophy and specific goals contained in the May 28 Executive Order followed extremely close and harmonious consultations with the Congress. There is consensus that human rights progress is our top priority; that the specific areas named in the E.O are the correct ones; that these are appropriately linked to 1994 MFN extension for China; and that China's MFN status should be preserved if possible. There is also broad support for our approach to proliferation and economic/trade concerns: pressing ahead through all available mechanisms and channels, at the level necessary to do the job, but delinking Chinese performance from MFN renewal.

We will implement our strategy through meticulous, regular management by a senior interagency working group. Periodic meetings will be held to assess progress, to review strategy, to consider carrots and sticks which might be employed, to plot and undertake post-mortems on high-level visits, and to approve proposed Cabinet secretary and deputy exchanges.

Human Rights

It is therefore imperative that we engage rapidly with the Chinese. Our general approach should be to explain to China our desire for a constructive, mutually beneficial relationship; to reiterate our interest in a stable and economically prosperous China; and to offer inducements necessary to inspire a serious dialogue including Chinese concessions. But our first priority, and our sharpest message to the Chinese, must be human rights: we are (as Americans) serious about achieving progress, and without this progress MFN cannot and will not be renewed. All dialogue with the Chinese -- certainly Executive Branch, and optimally Congressional and business also -- should make that simple point clearly and consistently. Secretary Christopher underscored it to Foreign Minister Qian in Singapore recently; Assistant Secretary (Human Rights) John Shattuck will elaborate it during planned discussions in Beijing in early September; and we will emphasize it strongly in anticipated sessions with the Chinese.

at the fall UNGA, at the Seattle APEC leaders conference, and in the course of our planned resumption of military-to-military dialogue. We will also brief Congressional and corporate leaders in advance of their China trips -- both to enlist their understanding of our policy, and to urge that they reinforce our own message.

Nonproliferation/Strategic Issues

With the cessation of U.S.-China military contacts, isolation has bred suspicion within the PLA about U.S. intentions. China through the 1990's will pose only a limited direct threat to the U.S.; we must, however, ensure that ongoing military modernization does not change this calculus. China's modernization evokes rising security concerns among its neighbors -- including Taiwan. Aside from the economic consequences, Hong Kong's reversion to China in 1997 will add considerably to China's ability to project power into the East Asian region. Furthermore, China is a worrisome exporter of sensitive technologies and military systems; its cooperation (in the U.N. and regionally) is required to strengthen and expand nonproliferation regimes in the Middle East, South Asia and elsewhere; and it is a significant nuclear power, whose participation in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) we solicit and require. Currently, we face a major decision point as evidence builds that Beijing may have transferred M-11 missiles or related equipment to Pakistan last year in contravention of its commitment to abide by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Finally, as China enters a sensitive political transition period in which the armed forces will play a crucial role -- for stability or otherwise -- we need to broaden our exposure to Chinese military leaders and their thinking.

To accomplish these complex and interrelated objectives, we need to engage senior Chinese security policy civilian leaders as well as military leaders. Key decision making authority on the entire array of strategic and nonproliferation issues outlined above rests with a small group of senior military officers and defense civilians in their sixties and seventies. Under Secretary Davis launched our senior-level dialogue in Beijing on July 26-27, pressing for a solution of the M-11 transfer contretemps, emphasizing that the U.S. seeks a cooperative relationship, but noting that our law obliges us to impose sanctions if the MTCR guidelines and parameters were exceeded. We will need to follow up that opening round with an intensive effort to settle the M-11 issue ideally in a way that advances our cooperation in such nonproliferation areas as, MTCR, the Nuclear Suppliers' Group, the CTBT, restraining arms proliferation in the Middle East, and influencing the North Koreans to forego their nuclear ambitions (the Chinese have already been helpful in this endeavor). We will plan to resume a strategic dialogue (i.e., on common regional security concerns) in the fall through a visit to China by Defense Assistant Secretary Freeman and an accompanying flag officer.

This delegation would, of course, press our human rights agenda in the course of its presentation to Chinese defense/military interlocutors.

Economic/Commercial Issues

China is our seventh-ranking trade partner, and some 143,000 American jobs are already dependent on U.S. exports. A successful U.S. effort to boost American economic and job growth through international commerce hinges importantly on our ability to win an expanding share of the booming China market. Chinese imports of U.S. goods in 1992 totalled \$7.5 billion, up 19 percent over 1991. But because Chinese exports to the U.S. rose even more rapidly, the U.S. trade deficit grew to \$18.3 billion. China presents increasing high technology trade opportunities -- which Japan and other western countries are pursuing successfully in the absence of U.S. competition. American businesses complain that they are competitively disadvantaged by the array of formal and informal post-Tiananmen sanctions: cessation of TDA financing and OPIC guarantees, export controls (and further sanctions imposed legislatively) on high-tech items (e.g., a Cray computer sale long held up for the Chinese State Meteorological Agency) and nuclear industry plants and components, and further controls on satellite launch services and dual-use items. We are negotiating with the Chinese currently on market access and China's entry into GATT. Illegal Chinese textile transshipments loom as a major, and growing dilemma for us -- even as our ability to deal with the problem is hampered by the adverse implications of any U.S. countermeasures for Hong Kong and Taiwan interests.

In the coming months, an interagency group should create a U.S. trade strategy to deal with China, as we have for Japan early in this Administration. A review of our export control regime could be part of the exercise. Sequenced Sino-American visits beginning in the summer and fall would implement it, including a trip to China by senior USTR officials (perhaps Mr. Kantor), Commerce officials (possibly Secretary Brown under the right circumstances), and Treasury officials to begin to deal with these issues. The annual meeting of the Sino-American Joint Committee on Commerce and Trade will be hosted by Secretary Brown in November in Washington.

We should recognize that implementing this strategy will be very difficult and complex. The Chinese are always hard to move on human rights issues, and they have recently cracked down on some dissidents in Shanghai and elsewhere. The M-11 problem casts a large, immediate shadow. Our trade deficit continues to balloon. Tibet, Taiwan, and Hong Kong -- all relating to Chinese notions of sovereignty -- could cause new strains in our relations. And the political jockeying for succession to Deng could limit Chinese flexibility. Such elements will make progress in negotiations arduous, and could inflame Congressional attitudes.

Attachments

- Tab 1 Annex I - China Policy Strategy Paper
- Tab 2 Annex II - Notional Schedule for Senior-Level Dialogue
- Tab 3 Annex III - Excerpts from NSC-11 (3/93):U.S. Objectives
- Tab 4 Annex IV - Human Rights Policy
- Tab 5 Annex V - U.S. Policy Toward Tibet

CHINA STRATEGY FOR 1993-1994: Executive Summary

drafted: EAP/CM:DWKeyser:dwk (SECMDR 1107) 7/29/93

cleared: EAP: WLord
PTomsen

CHINA STRATEGY FOR 1993-1994:
IMPLEMENTING THE PRESIDENT'S MFN EXECUTIVE ORDER

I. OVERVIEW: U.S. INTERESTS IN CHINA

When President Carter made the decision to normalize diplomatic relations with Beijing effective January 1979, his premise -- stated publicly -- was that the United States has an enduring interest in a stable and modernizing China. That premise has not altered despite the disappearance of a common security threat, sweeping change in global political alignments, significant evolution of China's political/economic system, and the emergence of China as a regional -- prospectively global -- economic and military force.

In his recent speeches at Waseda University in Tokyo and at the National Assembly in Seoul, President Clinton elaborated a new, ambitious vision for U.S. involvement with the Asia and Pacific region, which included an engaged -- not isolated -- China. The President called for creation of a New Pacific Community built on shared strength, shared prosperity and a shared commitment to democratic values. In so doing, he cited specific priorities including stronger efforts to combat proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; new regional dialogues on a broad spectrum of security challenges; and support for more democratic, more open societies.

Comprehensive U.S. engagement with China is the sine qua non for realization of the President's vision for a New Pacific Community. Clearly, our efforts to deal effectively with proliferation and to launch successfully an Asian regional security dialogue will hinge upon the extent and conviction of China's involvement. More broadly, regional stability and progress -- including Hong Kong's 1997 transition and the status of Taiwan -- will be intimately linked with China's course during the 1990s. US policy should be geared to channeling China's building momentum into constructive channels bolstering, rather than undermining, regional and global stability, creation of a more effective, enduring non-proliferation regime and a liberalized world trading system. A successful U.S. effort to boost American economic and job growth through exports will depend upon a healthy trade relationship with China.

The stakes are enormous. If China holds successfully to its present course, it will emerge early in the next century as

a budding superpower. But if China's reformist, market-oriented and outward-looking policies falter or fail, one can foresee a different and distressing prospect for the world's most dynamic region: Chinese domestic instability, growing concerns in the region regarding China's intentions, economic disruption of commercial relationships, a deteriorating Chinese migration/refugee dilemma, an impulse among China's neighbors to plan for the worst through arms buildups, and a shattered architecture for dealing peacefully and collegially with regional and transnational issues.

Presidential Review Directive/NSC-11, completed in March, systematically developed the case for comprehensive engagement with China and laid the intellectual and policy foundation for the President's May 28 Executive Order on MFN for China. PRD/NSC-11 identified the following core U.S. interests in China: continued Chinese economic growth, increased integration into the world community, cooperation in building a new international order, and peaceful change toward a more democratic, humane society. The President's May 28 Executive Order spelled out more concrete policy goals for the year leading up to the 1994 decision on further extension of China's MFN status.

In sum: our long-range strategy toward China must be animated by a conceptual framework designed to permit achievement of U.S. national security objectives through engagement with this important emerging power; our tactical approach over the next year must lay the cornerstone for such engagement through concrete progress keyed to the areas specified in the President's May 28 Executive Order.

II. STRATEGY FOR THE NEXT YEAR

The Agenda:

The President's May 28 MFN Executive Order -- taken after unprecedentedly close and harmonious consultations with the Congressional leadership -- and his parallel MFN report to the Congress specify that 1994 MFN renewal will be conditioned upon certification of overall, significant progress on human rights. The President delinked proliferation and commercial issues from the 1994 MFN decision, but directed that our core national objectives in these areas be vigorously pursued through existing channels and utilizing all available leverage. It is crucial that we achieve progress in these areas on the merits; furthermore, as a practical matter,

failure to do so will impede our ability to manage successfully next year's Congressional MFN debate even in the event of certifiable human rights gains. Additionally, we need to address urgently with the Chinese through appropriate diplomatic and law enforcement channels the growing problem of illegal migration. Finally, there exists a rich agenda -- and difficult challenges -- to pursue with the Chinese in such areas as environmental protection, U.N. peacekeeping/peacemaking operations, and regional security issues.

The Element of Time:

We are obliged to register meaningful progress on our human rights agenda in sufficient time to permit a favorable determination on extension of China's MFN status. This means that we need results no later than early spring 1994, but optimally much earlier. First, members of Congress have made clear that they will call hearings at that time to weigh for themselves the success of the Administration's approach; some have hinted at an intent to call for a mid-year review in December. Secondly, the Chinese themselves are more likely to be responsive earlier than later, for a pair of reasons: (a) because they are now attuned to the content and nuances of the annual MFN debate, and determined to avoid any impression that they have caved to U.S. pressure "solely" to retain MFN status; and (b) because Deng Xiaoping's increasingly precarious health inspires Chinese leadership caution as the succession drama begins to unfold.

This argues for early engagement with the Chinese. This should be done at the levels of seniority necessary to achieve our objectives. It also means we should front-load our agenda. We should concomitantly brief Congress soon on our thinking, so as to answer or mute any criticism that we have embarked on a "business-as-usual" approach. This should not be a hard sell; members of Congress have increasingly come to see the merit in a policy of careful engagement. Some six to eight Congressional delegations are finalizing plans for August travel to China. It is particularly important that we avail ourselves of the opportunity of their travel: to outline in detail our conceptual framework, and to prime travelling members to deliver tough and concrete messages identical to our own.

Sharpening the Message:

It is imperative that we speak with one voice in: (a) underscoring our desire for a constructive, mutually beneficial

relationship; (b) reiterating our interest in a stable and economically prosperous China; (c) offering necessary inducements to inspire a serious dialogue, and meaningful Chinese concessions; and, without pulling punches, (d) conveying clearly to the Chinese that human rights is our overriding priority since they will lose MFN absent significant overall progress in the areas specified by the President.

Such a message must be delivered unambiguously and consistently; by Executive Branch and Congressional visitors alike; and to a broad spectrum and multiple levels of Chinese leaders.

Channels and Mechanisms for Dialogue:

Our objective is progress; we should employ the channels -- and level of seniority -- essential to achieve it. Conversely, we cannot afford to waste motion, blur the message, and indulge in dialogue at high levels which does not promise commensurate results.

It follows, inter alia, from this logic that:

- Cabinet-level dialogue with the Chinese should occur only when this is the best tactic (as it sometimes is) to force action.
- Military-to-military dialogue should be resumed, at appropriate (e.g., Assistant Secretary of Defense, with a party to include a flag officer) levels, given the importance of our nonproliferation, regional security, and Taiwan Strait interests, and given the reality that our desired interlocutors -- Chinese senior military leaders -- only rarely make themselves available for U.S. civilians.
- USG visitors to China should be selected with an eye to authoritativeness rather than quantity, and with an explicit goal in each instance of achieving progress on a core agenda item.
- Resurrection of the three U.S.-China joint commissions (Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade; Joint Economic Commission; and Joint Commission on Science and Technology) should be predicated on their accomplishment of specific objectives, and deferred insofar as they promise merely the ceremonial or the vague.

Carrots and Sticks:

The process of engagement unfolding over the next year, in implementation of the President's Executive Order, should be conceived as a protracted and complex negotiating process. That is, the Chinese have consistently resisted offering concessions where they see no gains for themselves. From our perspective, the Chinese will in fact gain significantly from unilateral initiatives in the areas we have identified: a substantially improving human rights record will produce a more benign international image; meticulous observation of international nonproliferation regimes will enhance China's own security in the long run; and progress on our trade agenda will facilitate China's entry into GATT and expand its commercial opportunities in the U.S. and elsewhere. We should make this case repeatedly to the Chinese.

Chinese diplomatic strategy has tended to intricate tradeoffs and explicit quid pro quos. Chinese leaders have not been shy about presenting their own agenda, and indeed their own concept for precise linkage of our core interests with China's principal goals. We should be vigilant against Chinese offers designed to draw us into a classically (time-consuming) negotiation situation.

MFN renewal is, of course, our principal leverage, and the primary inducement to an improved Chinese performance on human rights. We might also consider employing, when appropriate, the following illustrative types of bargaining chips:

- GATT accession: We could accelerate the pace of our negotiations.
- High-tech sales: We might, for example, approve sale of the Cray computer to the Chinese State Meteorological Agency as a "humanitarian gesture" (in support of Chinese weather forecasting to avert natural disasters).
- Trade incentives: Reopening of TDA funding is particularly attractive inasmuch as U.S. business competitiveness in the Chinese market would be enhanced. Later, given proper conditions, we might offer to restore Chinese eligibility for OPIC guarantees.

- High Level Dialogue: Vice Premier/Foreign Minister Qian Qichen's attendance at UNGA, and President Jiang Zemin's prospective attendance at the November APEC leaders meeting in Seattle suggest possibilities: special attention during their visits, an invitation to Washington, a meeting with the President, and so on. Given sufficient progress we might hold in reserve an invitation to another Chinese leader, perhaps senior Vice Premier Zhu Rongji, to pay an official visit to the U.S. early in 1994.

On the "stick" side, besides the ultimate weapon of MFN revocation (albeit a single-shot, non-repeating weapon) we have available options including:

- Special 301: This might be employed in connection with failure to implement the IPR agreement, or on textile transshipments. We should consider the tactical advantage in wielding 301: a method both to send a firm message to China, and to permit us to avoid sending a sterner message with predictable adverse consequences for our own commercial and strategic interests.
- Legislation on Transfer of Nuclear Materials: Along with executive determinations, U.S. laws specify sanctions in violation of NPT commitments.
- Helms Amendment Sanctions for an M-11 Category I Transfer: If invoked, this amendment would block a significant range of Chinese exports to the U.S.
- Chinese Olympics: Should China be chosen as host, we will gain six years of leverage through the possibility that the US would refuse to participate, because of PRC human rights practices. The Chinese will assume that, as before the 1990 Moscow games, many other nations would follow a U.S. lead in pulling out.

Imposing any of these sanctions, however, carries risks: of Chinese retaliation deleterious to our own larger interests; of complicating our efforts to implement the President's MFN

Executive Order; and of prejudicing our chances to engage the Chinese constructively on a broad spectrum of issues.

Managing the Process:

The importance of the issues, as well as the complexity of the options, suggest that it would be advantageous to manage implementation of our China strategy via periodic review by a senior-level steering group. Such policy review should include: regular (perhaps quarterly) IWG assessment of progress; ad hoc IWG consideration of significant proposed visits to China (or dialogue elsewhere with the Chinese) and assessment of outcomes; particularly careful vetting of proposed military-to-military dialogue, with NSC approval required for any dialogue at or above the assistant secretary level or flag officer rank; and NSC approval for any Cabinet secretary or deputy secretary visit to China.

III. CHINESE REALITIES

U.S. policy over the next year will have to accommodate important, potentially disruptive events in the PRC. Even if paramount leader Deng Xiaoping does not die or become incapacitated, his gradual physical decline will continue, and maneuvering over the succession will reduce Beijing's capacity to make tough decisions on sensitive policy questions. Second, the overheated, semi-reformed PRC economy will soon undergo a major correction, as authorities are forced to use clumsy administrative techniques to cool surging inflation and other distortions. While some growth will continue and the reform program as a whole survive, these economic measures will complicate the succession struggle, slow key reforms, inhibit efforts to penetrate the Chinese market, and foment some popular discontent. Widespread instability is unlikely: burned once, the PRC authorities have learned a lesson from Tiananmen and will be especially vigilant. Under the best circumstances, however, U.S. policy goals -- especially those regarding human rights -- may be harder to sell in Beijing. The PRC delegation's obstructionism at the Vienna human rights conference presages Beijing's attitude in this area.

At the same time, China is feeling its new strength. Both double-digit economic growth and revived military modernization are boosting Beijing's prominence in the region. U.S. leverage is declining as China's strengthens and as Beijing's economic bonds to the other dynamic Asian economies and the EC continue to deepen. Strategically, we are no longer needed as a

counterweight to the Soviets, although China still tacitly supports our military presence in the region as a hedge against Japan.

IV. THE PROCESS: SETTING IN MOTION OUR CHINA STRATEGY FOR 1993-4

We should move swiftly, in light of the considerations outlined above, to set in motion our strategy for achieving U.S. China policy objectives over the nine months remaining before the MFN decision. Synergistic advantages will accrue from moving concurrently in five areas: (1) NSC channel, (2) Department of State and Embassy Beijing channel, (3)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6) (4) Congressional and business channels, and (5) high-level engagement, in Beijing and elsewhere. The process will necessarily be a dynamic one, adjusting and even altering direction as dictated by periodic assessments of results. The following outline is therefore intended to be illustrative rather than definitive.

A. NSC Channel.

National Security Adviser Lake, with Assistant Secretary Lord, would launch the strategy from the White House by calling in Chinese Ambassador Li Daoyu to outline our approach, our objectives, and our set of proposed visits and exchanges over the coming six months. In that discussion, NSA Lake would underscore the need for concrete, significant progress well in advance of next year's MFN renewal debate, and in advance of any Congressional mid-term review.

B. State Department/Embassy Beijing Channel.

EAP Assistant Secretary Ambassador Lord and Ambassador Roy in Beijing would play the critical roles in implementing and assessing the strategy as it unfolds. They would regularly deliver our core message (to Ambassador Li Daoyu and to Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu respectively) on human rights and other principal concerns associated with renewal of MFN; preview for Ambassador Li and VFM Liu our objectives in advance of each high-level meeting with the Chinese; assure that all senior Executive Branch officials preparing for dialogue with the Chinese understand and convey that message; and encourage members of Congress and American businessmen to articulate that same message in their separate dialogues with Chinese leaders.

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

D. Principal Constituencies: Business and Congress.

Our strategy should be to engage Congress and the business community early, and candidly, in our effort to drive home to the Chinese our core message: MFN will not be renewed absent progress on the human rights agenda specified in the President's Executive Order. Other elements of our strategy should also be briefed, as appropriate, emphasizing always that our goal is a constructive, mutually beneficial relationship.

Such a strategy serves multiple purposes: winning good will (if not always complete support) from those briefed; raising the odds that our core message will be delivered with clarity to the PRC by a broad spectrum of China's American guests and interlocutors; and reinforcing the gravity of our own message that MFN revocation is a serious matter (since the Chinese will understand that we have briefed other constituencies, and sought to maintain a strong sense of common purpose).

For the business community, we need to be realistic: relatively few corporate executives will be prepared to argue strenuously for a better Chinese human rights performance on the merits, but a significant number might be impelled to argue for a better performance lest MFN be withdrawn and their own commercial interests damaged.

With respect to the Hill, to those who have been skeptical of our resolve, our briefings will underscore our commitment to act. At the same time, it will energize those whose constituents have a strong stake in preservation of MFN. The result will be a multiplier effect on the Chinese (who will note that pro-MFN-extension members of Congress are running

scared) and will, through activation of the non-revocation forces, provide the President greater maneuvering room prior to June 3, 1994 with respect to the precise calculus of "significant overall progress" achieved to that point.

We should take the following implementing actions:

- Beginning in August, schedule meetings with Ambassador Lord for CEOs of companies represented by the U.S.-China Task Force and U.S.-China Business Council.
- Assure that we reach the maximum possible number of members of Congress (and staff members) planning travel to China during the August recess. The NSC and Department of State should closely coordinate their efforts in this respect.
- Continue, at regular intervals, to brief key Hill members and staffers on the results of our policy of engagement with China.

E. High-Level Visits.

(1) HUMAN RIGHTS

Policy

Chinese human rights practices violate internationally-recognized standards of behavior established in fundamental instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which China, as a U.N. member, has accepted. PRC compliance with these obligations would serve both Chinese and U.S. interests. Without seeking to (or imagining that it could) impose its political system and values on the PRC, the U.S. nevertheless has compelling practical and humanitarian reasons for promotion of Chinese democracy and human rights. An arbitrary, closed Chinese political system over time will be incapable of meeting the challenges of economic and social development, a prerequisite for PRC and regional stability. Democracy also is necessary for China effectively to manage increasingly important global issues, such as trade disputes, refugees/migration, the environment, narcotics, and terrorism. Over time, a more open and democratic China will be an easier country with which to deal and a better partner for the U.S. strategically, politically and in economic terms. An increasingly democratic China will coincide with the emerging democratic trend in Asia, including in Taiwan and South Korea.

Our dialogue with China must underscore, consistently, the requirement that Beijing satisfy the specific conditions in the President's May 28 MFN Executive Order: implementing the prison labor MOU and assuring freedom of emigration, plus (1) adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; (2) accounting for political/religious prisoners from the Democracy Wall and Tiananmen movements; (3) access to prisoners by impartial, respected international organizations; (4) protection of Tibet's distinctive religious and cultural heritage; (5) unimpeded radio and television broadcasts into China.

Process

- o Fall: Assistant Secretary (HA) Shattuck visit to China. Shattuck would emphasize our core message -- no MFN renewal without significant progress; lay out, ideally prioritized, all that we require to demonstrate such progress; stress the particular importance of international access (e.g., by the ICRC) to Chinese prisons, release/accounting of prisoners, and progress toward freedom of expression, assembly and religion; and seek to engage the Chinese in a continuing, frequent dialogue on our human rights agenda.
- o Secretary Christopher meeting with Foreign Minister Qian at UNGA (and possibly in Washington). The Secretary would touch upon all major bilateral and global issues, but on human rights would reiterate the Shattuck message and -- hopefully -- note progress or the potential for same. In that eventuality, he might invite FM Qian to Washington for discussions and a meeting with the President.
- o Visit to Beijing by Under Secretary of State Wirth -- if sufficient progress had been achieved, and assuming that our environmental agenda might also be thereby advanced.
- o Late 1993: President Jiang Zemin (prospectively) represents China at APEC leaders meeting in Seattle. The President, and other APEC partners, can press Jiang for progress in our core concern areas.
- o Early 1994: Visit by Secretary Christopher to Beijing -- only if dramatic progress had been achieved, or the promise of such guaranteed.

(2) NONPROLIFERATION/MILITARY/STRATEGIC

Policy

-- General. China through the 1990s would pose only a limited direct military threat to the U.S.; the U.S. has an interest in ensuring that PRC military modernization does not change this calculus. The U.S. has stated, as a matter of national policy, its "abiding interest" in a peaceful resolution of the situation in the Taiwan Strait; from that interest there follows a need to monitor the activities and intentions of the Chinese military. U.S. policies should continue to promote good PRC-Taiwan relations. A confrontations between the two could force a U.S. response and raise the spectre of some form of U.S. re-involvement in a Chinese civil war. Similar considerations for U.S. military and security planners arise with respect to the 1997 Hong Kong reversion, and the complex territorial dispute in the South China Sea.

With the cessation of U.S.-China military-to-military contacts following June 1989, isolation has bred suspicion, which in turn may be prompting both sides to conceptualize the other as a potential or real enemy. It is important to understand Chinese military attitudes and strategic thinking -- all the more so at a time when the PLA is destined to play a significant role in the political succession to Deng -- and to counter such tendencies through resumed contact. If we are to attract China into substantive regional security talks -- and structures -- it is imperative to enlist early on the sympathetic understanding of the Chinese military command.

Our objective ought not be the resumption of U.S.-China military technological cooperation (i.e., in support of China's modernization of its defensive weapons systems). With the Soviet/Russian threat vanished, with uncertainties and worries among China's neighbors, with obvious political and security implications for Taiwan, and without any political consensus in the U.S. favoring such cooperation, there is no overriding national purpose served by placing this on our agenda.

As with human rights and trade, we should coordinate closely with U.S. allies, particularly Japan and the EC, to parallel our pressures.

-- Nonproliferation. With an export-driven economic strategy and a military-industrial complex dependent in part on off-budget revenues, China is a worrisome exporter of sensitive technologies and military systems. Many of our nonproliferation efforts, such as in the Middle East, require PRC cooperation. The U.S. faces a decision point in the near future as evidence builds that Beijing may have transferred

M-11 missiles or related equipment to Pakistan. We need to deal with China's significant and worrisome military and nuclear supplier relationship with Iran. China's participation is required to follow through on the President's Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty initiative.

Process

- o Late July: Visit by Under Secretary Davis to Beijing. The principal mission was twofold: (1) to brief the Chinese on the President's CTBT initiative, seeking Chinese participation in the nuclear testing moratorium and willingness to enter into negotiations aimed at a Treaty, and (2) to press home our concerns that China may have transferred M-11 components to Pakistan last November in violation of its commitment to abide by MTCR guidelines and parameters. U/S Davis evidently made little headway on the M-11 issue, with the Chinese insisting, as they have previously, that their MTCR commitment was solemn and remains firm, and that no transfer in violation of that commitment occurred.

- o Fall: An interagency process would lead to a determination on sanctions. We should also set a strategy to achieve the following:
 - obtaining Chinese agreement to tighten adherence to the MTCR

 - inducing China to participate in South Asian regional security talks with the U.S., India, Pakistan and Russia (when such talks would explicitly have on the table Indian and Pakistani missile systems, whether domestically produced or imported)

 - exploring Chinese willingness to resume unconditionally the ACME (Arms Control in the Middle East) talks

 - pressing China to adopt the Nuclear Supplier's Group Guidelines

- o A visit to China by South Asia Assistant Secretary Raphel -- assuming that the Chinese are cooperating on the South Asia nuclear strategy. The

visit would focus principally on modalities for a five-power conference on security on the Indian sub-continent. A/S Raphael would also press our nonproliferation concerns generally.

- o Visit to China by DOD A/S Freeman, aimed at renewing dialogue on strategic issues and pressing for resolution of our proliferation concerns. It would be the vehicle for resumption of uniformed military-to-military contacts, through inclusion in the Freeman party of at least one flag officer. As with other high-level visits, A/S Freeman would utilize the opportunity to press our human rights and other concerns on his Chinese military interlocutors.
- o Late 1993 or early 1994: Assuming Chinese responsiveness to the Freeman visit -- as measured by significant progress on nonproliferation issues, a visit by DOD Deputy Secretary Perry and/or a senior JCS officer might be scheduled. The purpose would be as described above under "policy"; the specific agenda would be shaped according to our principal requirements at the time. Whether or not such high-level visits are warranted and thus possible, we should move to initiate lower-level military-to-military exchanges.

(3) ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL

Policy

China is already our seventh ranking trade partner, and as many as 143,000 American jobs are dependent on U.S. exports. According to some calculations, at current relative growth rates total Chinese output could exceed Japan's by the end of the decade. China's importance as a trading partner is therefore certain to expand further. A successful U.S. effort to boost American economic and job growth through international commerce depends on a healthy trade relationship with the PRC. China is an important market for U.S. grain, aircraft, fertilizer, cotton, electric machinery and computers, wood, pulp and paper, professional and scientific equipment, iron, and steel; Chinese imports of U.S. goods in 1992 totalled \$7.5 billion, up 19 percent over 1991. Because Chinese exports to the U.S. rose even more rapidly, however, the U.S. trade deficit grew to \$18.3 billion. The U.S. is also one of China's leading sources of foreign investment, although relatively weak

growth since 1989 may put the U.S. at a comparative disadvantage to China's Asian trading partners.

China presents increasing high technology trade opportunities, which other Western countries are pursuing in the absence of a larger U.S. presence. U.S. producers in the aerospace, computer and telecommunications industries are some of the highest volume U.S. exporters to China, and they are eager to expand their current markets.

The PRC has made important moves to accommodate the global trading system. But China nevertheless maintains a broad range of trading practices which conflict with international standards, and the process of drawing Beijing fully into the global trading order is likely to be protracted and contentious.

The rise of a Greater China through the ongoing integration of the economies of southern China, Taiwan and Hong Kong also influences U.S. interests. While in certain respects beneficial to regional stability and prosperity, this process has reduced our ability to pressure China economically without harming Hong Kong and Taiwan, and it complicates important trade issues, such as prevention of illegal textile transshipments.

Process: As sketched above, all exchanges would feature -- prominently -- our core message on human rights and renewal of MFN.

- o Fall: Overseen by the NEC, an interagency process will create a commercial/trade strategy for dealing with China, similar to the one done for Japan.

Deputy USTR Barshefsky visits China. The principal objective would be to address IPR implementation, and to make sufficient progress in market access talks to avert the need for imposing trade sanctions on the anniversary of our market access agreement and the statutory deadline for action. Depending on progress, we might float -- or offer on the spot -- the possibility of accelerating our negotiations over China's GATT entry.

- o Secretary Bentsen participation in World Bank/IMF meeting. The Secretary would seek to engage the Chinese on an important issue (though not a core agenda one): exchange rate manipulation. Revivification of the Joint Economic Commission (JEC) ought not be considered unless specific goals and

prospective achievements can be identified well in advance. He would also deliver a hard-hitting message -- speaking with the authority of a senior Administration official as well as a long-time, respected U.S. Senator -- on human rights.

- o Late 1993: Business delegation to China led by Commerce Secretary Brown and/or resumption of the JCCT in Seattle following the APEC leaders conference (a scenario proposed by the Chinese). In either case, close vetting by the IWG group and approval by NSC would be required to establish that core interests were being advanced. Secretary Brown would presumably have neither the time nor the inclination to lead a business delegation to China were there not the solid prospect of resulting contracts for participating firms. In the case of a JCCT, the forum would need in effect to be reinvented -- that is, altered from the ceremonial gathering of years past to an issues- and results-oriented conclave. One possibility -- assuming that this chip had not been played during USTR discussions -- and a logical one for trade talks in a JCCT chaired by Secretary Brown, would be to propose an initial TDA project, to support U.S. interests bidding on the potentially lucrative Guangzhou metro project. Such a project fits our desired profile: high-tech, high revenue, and downstream potential estimated by some in the \$300 million range.

V. CONCLUSION: A DIFFICULT CHALLENGE

We should recognize that implementing this strategy will be very difficult and complex. The Chinese are always hard to move on human rights issues, and they have recently cracked down on some dissidents in Shanghai and elsewhere. The M-11 problem casts a large, immediate shadow. Our trade deficit continues to balloon. Tibet, Taiwan, and Hong Kong -- all relating to Chinese notions of sovereignty -- could cause new strains in our relations. And the political jockeying for succession to Deng could limit Chinese flexibility. Such elements will make progress in negotiations arduous, and could inflame Congressional attitudes.

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SECMDR 1105 7/28/93 7-6803

Cleared: EAP:WLord
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All other clearances assumed from IWG process, and Deputies Committee Meeting. See EAP/CM Hart draft 6/15/93 and following. Participants in that process were:

D:JWarlick
P:AO'Neil
T:JBarker
C:RMPerito
E:ADerse
S/P:LKeene
S/NIS:VNewland
EAP/RA/TC:JBorich
EAP/RA:BGray
NEA/RA:LWard
SA/RA:MClemmon
H:AKirkpatrick
EB/BTA/ODC:DRMoran
HA:PHotze
INR/EAP/CH:JJTkacik
IO/UNP:DRRasmussen
L/EAP:JDKovar
OES/ENV:APSchifferdecker
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IWG Clearances:

NSC: Kent Wiedemann
DOD Robert Ellis
JCS: Phil Gay
Commerce: Peter Cashman
USTR: Ira Wolf

Treasury: Meg Lundsager
USIA: George Beasley
ACDA: Joe Smaldone

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ANNEX II

NOTIONAL SCHEDULE
SENIOR USG MEETINGS WITH CHINESE
JULY - DECEMBER 1993

[NOTE: The following is intended to be illustrative rather than a compendium of visits already planned or deemed essential. Please see text of paper for justification and sequencing considerations. END NOTE.]

July 25 Secretary Christopher met with Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Qian at ASEAN PMC (Singapore)

July 26-27 Under Secretary (T) of State Dr. Davis met in Beijing with Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu and others to discuss proliferation issues.

August- USTR Kantor and/or Deputy USTR Barskefsky market access bilateral in Beijing September

Sept. 1-13 Assistant Secretary (HA) Shattuck will visit China, including Lhasa, to press our human rights message.

September SA Assistant Secretary Raphael visit to China to explore cooperation on proliferation on South Asian subcontinent.

September Secretary Christopher meets with Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Qian during UNGA (New York); possible invitation to Washington

September-October DOD A/S Freeman, accompanied by flag officer, hold security bilaterals in Beijing

September-October Secretary Bentsen participation in World Bank/IMF talks.

October Under Secretary Wirth holds talks in Beijing on human rights, democracy, environment

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- 2 -

October USIA Director Joseph Duffey visits Beijing: emphasizes need for freedom of broadcasting, underscores human rights agenda, and discusses possible new areas for cultural cooperation

October-November Commerce Secretary Brown leads trade delegation to China, or chairs JCCT in Seattle

November Acting ACDA Director Graham visits China to follow up on arms control, regional security initiatives

November Chinese President Jiang Zemin attends APEC leaders meeting in Seattle; possible bilateral with President and/or possible visit to Washington

December-January DOD Deputy Secretary Perry visits China -- assuming sufficient progress -- to follow up on security dialogue. Senior JCS officer may attend.

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ANNEX III

EXCERPT FROM NSC-11, "U.S. POLICY TOWARD CHINA":
U.S. CHINA POLICY OBJECTIVES

1. Global Cooperation

- o Retain Chinese support for key ongoing UN efforts to preserve international peace in former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Somalia, and Cambodia.
- o Seek Chinese assistance in influencing responsible North Korean behavior with regard to nuclear arms development and continuing cooperation with Seoul.
- o Obtain Chinese cooperation in updating the United Nations system to meet changing international conditions.
- o Enhance cooperation with China on addressing global issues.

2. Asian Peace and Stability

- o Reinforce PRC support for Asian stability and encourage China to limit its military modernization to that necessary for defensive purposes.
- o Involve China in multilateral dialogue and mechanisms to promote peace and security in Northeast, Southeast, and South Asia, with a goal of establishing an intensive East Asian security forum.
- o Assure regional friends and allies that the U.S. will support peace and stability in Asia. Back our assurances with a continued strong military presence and a much greater economic presence in the region.
- o Defuse prospects for conflict regarding Taiwan, the Spratly Islands, and other possible flash points.

3. Proliferation

- o Create a regular nonproliferation dialogue with the PRC to exchange views, voice concerns, and improve mutual understanding.
- o Ensure full PRC compliance with existing obligations under the MTCR, the NPT, and other regimes and agreement to cease sensitive technology transfers to Pakistan, Iran, and other countries of proliferation concern.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

- o Obtain new or updated Chinese nonproliferation commitments, especially the adoption of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG) Guidelines and acceptance of the revised MTCR Guidelines.
- o Encourage the Chinese to establish effective controls on the export of sensitive technology.

4. Arms Control

- o Initiate an intensive, high-level bilateral dialogue with China on nuclear arms control, leading to PRC participation in multilateral initiatives.
- o Secure Chinese support for nuclear testing restraint.
- o Engage China in cooperation on nuclear weapons safety.
- o Secure a freeze in the size of Chinese nuclear forces and a commitment not to introduce MIRVed ICBMs.
- o Obtain full Chinese compliance with BWC and CWC obligations and restraint in conventional force modernization.

5. Human Rights

In the interest of improving human rights conditions for the Chinese people, the U.S. should seek the following:

- o A complete PRC accounting of Chinese citizens detained, accused or sentenced for the non-violent expression of their political beliefs during the Democracy Wall and Tiananmen periods and a commitment to release all those imprisoned for the peaceful expression of their political and religious views;
- o Chinese permission for regular and systematic access to Chinese prisons by the ICRC or another international organization, particularly to political prisoners where there are questions of poor treatment.
- o China's public reaffirmation of its commitment to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and its human rights obligations under the UN Charter.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

- o PRC support for the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
- o Beijing's agreement to reestablish a formal government-to-government human rights dialogue and give positive consideration to establishing a bilateral human rights commission.
- o Assurance that China's population control program refrains from coercive practices.
- o An end to Chinese harassment of unofficial religious groups of all faiths.
- o An end to the already rather ineffective jamming of VOA broadcasts.
- o As a humanitarian matter, secure full cooperation on resolving U.S. POW/MIA cases.

6. Trade and Investment

- o Encourage full Chinese acceptance of international trade and investment standards as well as compliance with and full implementation of our bilateral IPR, market access, and prison labor MOUs.
- o Seek elimination of barriers to U.S. goods and services and removal of impediments to foreign representative offices.
- o Secure a strict prohibition of improper trading practices, especially illegal textile transshipment and other forms of textile fraud.
- o Assist China's entry into GATT if Beijing satisfies membership requirements, including foreign exchange liberalization, and simultaneous entry of Taiwan is possible.
- o Promote full liberalization of China's foreign exchange regime, including a market-determined exchange rate, in order to prevent denial of U.S. access to Chinese markets by non-trade means and to facilitate adjustment in China's external balances.
- o Reevaluate the export control levels for high technology trade with China.

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- 4 -

7. Taiwan

- o Encourage political forces in Taiwan to pursue their interests by means other than an assertion of independence.
- o Continue to encourage Taiwan and the PRC to further their accommodation, with the hope of an eventual outcome acceptable to the people of both sides.
- o Work with the PRC, Taiwan, and other countries to increase joint membership in appropriate international organizations.
- o Establish rules for engagement which will advance U.S. commercial and other interests in Taiwan while satisfying Beijing that the U.S. remains committed to the one China formulae described in the three communiques.
- o Reassess and modify as necessary the guidelines for arms sales to Taiwan.

8. Hong Kong

- o Make clear U.S. support for increased democracy, warning against actions by the Chinese which could harm Hong Kong's economy or impair the rights and welfare of its citizens.
- o Continue to treat the decolonization process as primarily a UK-PRC issue.
- o In keeping with the goals of the McConnell Act, encourage fulfillment of the 1984 Joint Declaration's guarantee that the Hong Kong SAR will enjoy a high degree of autonomy following reversion to China through appropriate representations to Beijing and formalization of U.S. commercial, legal, and other links with the Hong Kong Government.

9. Tibet

- o Promote dialogue between the Dalai Lama and Beijing.
- o Seek protection of Tibetan human rights and preservation of Tibetan culture, but avoid challenging China's claim to the region.

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- 5 -

- o Obtain a full PRC accounting and release of Tibetans imprisoned for their political and religious beliefs and press for releases and humane treatment of prisoners.

10. Illegal Immigration

- o Upgrade U.S. communication and cooperation with PRC, Hong Kong, and Taiwan to work for solutions to the issue.
- o Intercept illegal immigrants before they reach U.S. soil; establish procedures for repatriation, refugee processing, third country settlement, etc., to prevent large scale illegal entry into the U.S. of Chinese economic migrants.

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Annex IV

Human Rights Strategy

Background

China's market-oriented economic reforms are rapidly producing a new society of increasing pluralism and openness to the outside world. Nonetheless, there still exists the still powerful reality of China's past: a communist party supported by a large security apparatus and determined to hold on to political control whatever the cost.

Our task is to fashion a policy which will spur further improvements in the human rights situation in China, as we nurture the growing domestic constituencies and infrastructure that are China's best hope for systemic change. We can support this process by expanding the range of our contacts, moving beyond the limitations of high-level official meetings, and finding ways to support the "revolution from below" which is the real force for change in China today.

We also need a strategy to nudge China's communist officialdom into accelerating the pace of political reform. To maintain MFN, China will have to improve its human rights performance. To accomplish this, we need to persuade Chinese officials at all levels to focus on human rights problems and on the steps they must take to resolve or avoid these problems.

Communicate a Sense of Urgency

Our strategy must be clear and it must be vigorously implemented. It should have several components:

-- We need to reinvigorate our bilateral exchanges. Visits to China by senior Department officials concerned with human rights will force the Chinese to focus on these issues and the need for measurable progress over the coming year. In our discussions, we will remind the Chinese that we are under time constraints and that the relationship must move forward or, under the weight of serious bilateral concerns, face a significant downturn. We must communicate a sense of urgency. Every exchange must emphasize our core human rights initiatives as contained in the President's Executive Order:

- 1) Freedom of emigration;
- 2) Compliance with the 1992 bilateral agreement concerning prison labor;

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- 2 -

- 3) Adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
- 4) Releasing and providing an acceptable accounting for Chinese citizens imprisoned or detained for the nonviolent expression of their political and religious beliefs, including such expression of beliefs in connection with the Democracy Wall and Tiananmen Square movements;
- 5) Ensuring humane treatment of prisoners, such as by allowing access to prisons by international humanitarian and human rights organization;
- 6) Protecting Tibet's distinctive religious and cultural heritage; and
- 7) Permitting international radio and television broadcasts into China.

In the context of the strategy for engaging the PRC during the remainder of 1993, we should in particular press for Chinese approval of ICRC access to prison. This would be a tangible step forward by the Beijing authorities and an achievable goal in the context of a human rights full-court press.

We must draw a bottom line for the Chinese. They must understand that the President is fully prepared to withdraw MFN unless there is "overall, significant progress" in this area by next year.

While the Chinese will resist making concessions, the "carrot" that can promote progress is the prospect of ever-increasing levels of official contact between Chinese and American officials.

--Human Rights Assistant Secretary John Shattuck plans to travel to China in August to explain the provisions of the MFN decision and what is needed to preserve MFN in 1994. We should follow up this visit with other high-level contacts to reinforce our message.

-- We need to broaden the U.S. side of the dialogue through Congressional delegations, including outside experts. The Chinese are keenly aware of the role Congress plays. We should work closely with such delegations, not only to

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- 3 -

"speak with one voice," but to impress upon the Chinese the importance of the legislative-executive consensus in creating a firm bases upon which to expand our bilateral relations.

-- Expand cooperation and exchanges in areas which are likely to contribute to the long-term improvement in human rights such as with the fast developing legal community. As the Chinese grow into their new international role, legal reform becomes essential. We can enter through this "open door" to provide assistance in the development of civil and criminal legal systems.

-- Coordinate with other governments and with NGO's to obtain maximum leverage in changing Chinese behavior. By focusing on those initiatives where broad international consensus exists for action--such as curbing physical abuse of prisoners and assuring that they obtain adequate medical attention--we are likely to see steady progress.

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Annex V

U.S. Policy Towards Tibet

Tibet presents us with special problems. First, Chinese suspicions of U.S. motives in Tibet are linked to the legacy of active U.S. support, during the 1950's and 1960's, for Tibetan insurgents opposing PRC control. Secondly, our support for religious freedom in Tibet must take into account Tibet's tradition of combining religious and political power and its ongoing agitation for independence. Thirdly, many aspects of Tibet's traditional, pre-modern culture are undergoing change as a result of a modernization process made inevitable by domestic economic reform and the opening to the outside world. Tibet's society, religion and history are little understood in the U.S. This has led to romanticized views of Tibet among domestic U.S. audiences, views which have a powerful influence upon policy.

Our role must be to convince the Chinese that resolution of the Tibetan problem is essential if there is to be a long-term, healthy relationship between the U.S. and China. We can only do this by making clear to the Chinese that we will not in any way try to shape or dictate the terms of the compromise nor will we do anything to undermine the compromise by giving encouragement to Tibetan independence activists. But we must also make clear that Tibet, unlike for instance Taiwan, is not a problem whose solution can be deferred. Once the Dalai Lama passes from the scene or, as he has threatened, removes himself from the process, then the best and perhaps only chance for peaceful compromise is gone. And the consequences for China, for Tibet, and for the U.S. will be great.

The Embassy argues for a U.S. Tibetan policy which is both realistic and active. Such a policy would have several components:

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- 2 -

1. American values and American public sentiment require us vigorously to promote respect for human rights.
2. However, it is not in U.S. national interest to support Tibetan independence in the face of Chinese claims to sovereignty and particularly when every U.N. member nation supports the Chinese position. We would be responsible for encouraging separatist elements in Tibet to rebel and risk sparking ethnic violence.
3. We must sensitize Beijing to the problems created by the movement of Han Chinese into Tibet. There is no conclusive evidence that this influx of economic migrants is a result of an official government policy. Nevertheless, the Han compete with Tibetans for economic opportunity and their growing presence is rapidly altering the distinctive cultural and religious life of Tibet. The fear among Tibetans, as articulated recently by the Dalai Lama in exile, is that the ongoing demographic changes will "further reduce Tibetans into an insignificant minority in their own country." But we should also recognize that this phenomenon is limited mainly to Lhasa, and the Dalai Lama considers large parts of China to be part of Tibet.
4. We must persuade both sides to renew the dialogue between the Dalai Lama and the PRC with the goal of genuine autonomy for Tibet within China.

The Chinese believe that the Tibetans, like most other minority groups in China, will settle down once foreigners stop intervening. Tibetan activists believe that through foreign intervention (economic sanctions, international condemnation of China, etc.) Tibet can become independent. Both sides are wrong. The problems facing Tibet can only be resolved through negotiation and eventual compromise.

Compromise will not be easy to reach. It will require the Chinese to accept the that there is a nearly indestructible core of Tibetan resistance which will always struggle against rule from Beijing. Tibetans must accept that the concept of a "Greater Tibet," which would include large sections of neighboring Chinese provinces where Tibetans are and have been outnumbered by Han and other minorities for generations, is not achievable. Tibet is a small corner of a great power triangle. The survival of Tibetan culture and society will always depend upon compromise, especially with China.

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DOC DATE: 20 JUL 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
DC
MFN

EO
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 21 JUL DC MTG RE CHINA

ACTION: KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 22 JUL 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WIEDEMANN

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COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS
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WASHINGTON, DC 20500

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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
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DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
COMMERCE	DIRECTOR, EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		

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
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

July 19, 1993



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: KENT WIEDEMANN *KW*

FROM: FERIAI ARA SAEED *AS*

SUBJECT: Notice of Deputies Committee Meeting on China

Tab I conveys a meeting notice for a Deputies Committee meeting on China strategy to decide next steps to implement the President's May 28 executive order.

An agenda is at Tab A. The discussion paper is at Tab B.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memorandum to counterparts at Tab I.

Approve *W* *as modified* Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Itoh Memo to Counterparts
- Tab A Agenda
- Tab B Policy Paper

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

July 20, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR

LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

Mr. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. EDWARD KNIGHT
Executive Secretary
Department of Treasury

BG. MICHAEL SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. ANTHONY A. DAS
Deputy Executive Secretary
Department of Commerce

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Executive Director for
Policy Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the United States
to the United Nations

DR. LAURA TYSON
Chair, President's Council
of Economic Advisors

COL. T.R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. BOWMAN CUTTER
Deputy Assistant to the
President for Economic
Policy

SUBJECT: Meeting of the Deputies Committee on China ~~LS~~

The Deputies Committee will meet on Wednesday, July 21, 1992,
3:30 p.m. - 5:00 p.m. in the White House Situation Room.
Attendance will be limited to principals plus one. ~~LS~~

Our purpose is to decide on U.S. strategy toward China over the
next year, implementing the President's MFN Executive Order of
May 28. An agenda is at Tab A. The discussion paper is at Tab
B. ~~LS~~

for Kristie Akenney
William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab A Agenda
Tab B Discussion Paper

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By *VL* NARA, Date *7/15/2011*
2015-0221-01

TAB A

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: July 21, 1993
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 5:00 p.m. - 6:30 p.m.

CHINA

Agenda

- I. Introduction Samuel R. Berger
- II. Presentation of Strategy Paper. State
- III. Discussion All Participants
- IV. Conclusion Samuel R. Berger

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By 12 NARA, Date 7/15/2015
2015-0721-M

TAB B



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM ITOH
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: China Policy Paper

The Interagency Working Group on East Asia has reviewed the attached paper proposing steps to engage China over the next few months to obtain early progress on our core concerns. We recommend that a Deputies Committee meeting be convened to consider the paper's recommendation.

Marc Grossman
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated

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ENGAGING CHINA IN 1993:
PRESSING FOR EARLY PROGRESS ON CORE CONCERNS

I. NEXT STEPS IN THE CHINA RELATIONSHIP

The President's MFN decision has reestablished a solid consensus on China policy for the first time since Tiananmen. Renewal of MFN in 1994 requires progress on specific human rights concerns and Chinese compliance with trade and nonproliferation agreements. This approach enjoys broad support in Congress and favorable reactions from business and human rights groups.

The new unity on U.S. China policy creates an opportunity to engage Beijing over the next few months. With its confidence in the Executive Branch restored, Congress is more likely to accept new initiatives, as long as it is consulted and the new steps are logically consistent with overall strategy and are shown to serve U.S. interests. This we intend to do. Congress will likely review progress early next year and expect the USG to have achieved significant progress by next June.

China is loath to take steps which appear to buckle to foreign pressure. Given the Executive Order's enumeration of U.S. human rights demands, Beijing will become less inclined to appear responsive as next spring's MFN debate nears. Therefore, we should press the Chinese hard to make as much progress as possible in earlier months leading up to next June.

II. U.S. Priorities

The President's MFN Executive Order clearly lays out the human rights concerns which must be addressed. In addition, we face challenges in nonproliferation, trade and confronting the problem of illegal Chinese migration. The following are the key issues which demand our immediate attention:

1. Human Rights: satisfaction of Executive Order conditions and concerns cited in the President's MFN report to Congress.
2. Nonproliferation: responding to the reported Chinese M-11 transfer to Pakistan.

3. Trade: implementing the Market Access MOU, controlling textile transshipments, and stopping prison labor exports.
4. Migration: stanching the surge in illegal migration from China.

For a comprehensive list of U.S. concerns, please see Annex IV, which repeats policy objectives identified in PRD-11, "U.S. Policy toward China".

III. CHINESE REALITIES

U.S. policy over the next year will have to accommodate important, potentially disruptive events in the PRC. Even if paramount leader Deng Xiaoping does not die or become incapacitated, his gradual physical decline will continue, and maneuvering over the succession will reduce Beijing's capacity to make tough decisions on sensitive policy questions. Second, the overheated, semi-reformed PRC economy will soon undergo a major correction, as authorities are forced to use clumsy administrative techniques to cool surging inflation and other distortions. While some growth will continue and the reform program as a whole survive, this will complicate the succession struggle, slow key reforms, and foment popular discontent. However, widespread instability is unlikely: burned once, the PRC authorities have learned a lesson from Tiananmen and will be especially vigilant. Under the best circumstances, however, U.S. policy goals -- especially those regarding human rights -- may be harder to sell in Beijing. The PRC delegation's obstructionism at the Vienna human rights conference presages Beijing's attitude in this area.

At the same time, China is feeling its new strength. Both double-digit economic growth and revived military modernization are boosting Beijing's prominence in the region. U.S. leverage is declining as China's strengthens and as Beijing's economic bonds to Asia and the EC continue to deepen. Strategically, we are no longer needed as a counterweight to the Soviets, although China still tacitly supports our military presence in the region as a hedge against Japan.

IV. STRATEGY

The chief means by which the U.S. can encourage Chinese responsiveness is through intensified contact with the Chinese at a senior level. This will allow us to convey our case to the highest Chinese authorities. A carefully planned, ongoing, senior-level discussion will encourage the Chinese bureaucracy

to focus on American concerns. This approach offers the best means to press U.S. demands and secure the results contained in the MFN Executive Order and the accompanying report to Congress.

The USG should carefully plan each of these meetings to secure maximum concrete Chinese progress in areas of concern. Agencies should review U.S. goals in their areas, anticipate Chinese expectations, and consider all means available to advance the U.S. agenda. As appropriate, the China IWG should convene to coordinate preparations for each high-level meeting, setting specific objectives which we need to achieve.

Lasting concerns about Chinese behavior properly constrain U.S. engagement with the PRC. Tiananmen and other sanctions remain in place. As the Chinese move to meet our concerns in human rights, nonproliferation, and trade, we should be prepared to take reciprocal steps (for example, piecemeal lifting of sanctions in areas where Beijing makes progress). If the Chinese assess that the U.S. is not addressing their concerns in a reciprocal way, they will not make concessions themselves.

In some areas, U.S. gestures to encourage Chinese progress could serve U.S. as well as Chinese interests. For example, with an effective security regime in place the long-delayed Cray computer sale to the State Meteorological Administration would both reward and encourage positive Chinese behavior and secure a lucrative contract for a U.S. exporter. Similarly, Tiananmen sanctions on the Trade and Development Agency (TDA) merely place U.S. exporters at a competitive disadvantage while failing to influence China. The USG should undertake a thorough review of its trade practices to maintain effective pressure on Beijing, identify possible incentives for further Chinese progress, and eliminate needless burdens on U.S. companies.

The M-11 controversy may force the U.S. eventually to confront Beijing with tough new sanctions. To the maximum extent possible, the U.S. should manage this and other disputes in a way that credibly addresses U.S. concerns, but also advances our interests, including in the nonproliferation area. In the absence of a major setback -- such as a second Tiananmen -- the USG should seek to prevent any single dispute from crippling the entire relationship.

V. OPPORTUNITIES FOR SENIOR-LEVEL DIALOGUE

During the next six months, the U.S. should use an accelerated tempo of senior level exchanges to promote Chinese responsiveness to core U.S. concerns. Exchanges at this level

will allow us to bypass mid-level bureaucrats who are often unable to convey U.S. positions to their leadership. To the extent that Beijing is willing to take substantial steps to address U.S. concerns, we should be prepared to reciprocate, in particular in areas (e.g., commercial) that serve U.S. interests. Repeated engagement will provide opportunities to unveil their decisions. The more senior the contact, the more likely the Chinese are to take such action.

The following meetings would permit the U.S. to advance its full agenda in a balanced manner. Annex III offers a purely notional schedule of these meetings.

Human Rights. While declining the U.S. proposal to establish a working group on human rights, the Chinese have welcomed Assistant Secretary Shattuck to visit Beijing in August. This will be the first such meeting since China's announcement last September that it would find it difficult to continue the human rights dialogue if the U.S. proceeded with its F-16 sale to Taiwan. These discussions could set the stage for a follow-on visit by Under Secretary Wirth, who would discuss human rights and initiate a dialogue on transnational issues, including illegal migration, environmental matters, and the increasingly important narcotics challenge.

Nonproliferation and Security. Beijing has welcomed Under Secretary Davis to visit China to discuss the President's CTBT decision and other nonproliferation issues. Dr. Davis will use her July 26-27 visit to press for cooperation across a range of nonproliferation issues. A working-level USG missile experts team will visit Beijing the week before to brief on changes in the MTCR Guidelines. Besides discussing the CTB with Beijing, Dr. Davis will also strongly press U.S. concerns about the reported Chinese M-11 transfer to Pakistan, making clear that PRC unwillingness to satisfy our concerns will lead to sanctions.

Reviving the annual ACDA dialogue with the Chinese will complement our nonproliferation objectives. Then ACDA Director Lehman made the first post-Tiananmen visit to China last August to discuss the draft Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Restarting the ACDA annual dialogue will provide an opportunity to review important CWC and other arms control issues. Acting ACDA Director Graham could make the trip to Beijing in the fall.

To reinforce our nonproliferation initiative, we should initiate a dialogue on broader security issues. This would permit us to probe PRC military intentions and capabilities and explore options for multilateral security dialogue. During her visit to Beijing, U/S Davis could initiate these discussions in

meetings with the PRC military, including through an intelligence presentation on our long-term concerns about Iran. We should then revive the Assistant Secretary-level PM dialogue with the Chinese. The U.S. will insist that regular, substantive nonproliferation exchanges be part of this broader security dialogue.

Military-to-Military Contacts. Besides representing a way to engage the key Chinese decision makers on our nonproliferation agenda, military contacts are essential to advance other important U.S. concerns, such as regional security and human rights. The non-statutory Tiananmen limit on working-level military-to-military contacts has been lifted, and senior military contacts should proceed on a case-by-case basis to engage on specific U.S. concerns. The USG should build on mid-level military education visits to China with exchanges on regional security studies and professional skills in non-lethal fields which advance our long-term goals, such as military law and financial accounting. As the next step in a bilateral dialogue on security and nonproliferation issues, Deputy Secretary of Defense Perry should visit Beijing in October or November. It will be important to brief Congress in advance so that the symbolism of the Deputy Secretary's visit is not misunderstood.

Trade. The bilateral dialogue benefits from an existing institutional structure, including: the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT), co-chaired by the Secretary of Commerce; the Joint Commission of Science and Technology (JCST), co-chaired by the President's Science and Technology Advisor; and the Joint Economic Commission (JEC), co-chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury. The JEC has not convened since 1986, and the JCST has not met since before Tiananmen. The JCCT reconvened during Commerce Secretary Franklin's visit to Beijing in December 1992.

Important U.S. interests -- including promotion of U.S. exports and creation of jobs in the U.S. -- would benefit from meetings of these three commissions. It is the USG's turn to host the JCCT and JCST; given the length of time since the last session, the JEC could occur in either capital.

In addition to this formal structure, continuing U.S.-PRC discussions to implement the market access MOU provide another important opportunity to engage the Chinese at a senior level. Deputy USTR Barshevsky is scheduled to travel to Beijing in August. Consideration should be given to having USTR Kantor lead a U.S. team to press for Chinese responsiveness, including on access for U.S. services companies, prior to the October 10 Section 301 deadline.

Secretary Bentsen's schedule probably precludes his chairing a meeting of the JEC until after the beginning of 1994. He might, however, be able to hold productive discussions with his counterpart in Washington at the annual World Bank/IMF meetings in late September/early October. With regard to the JCCT, the Chinese have recommended holding a session in late November in Seattle, after the APEC meeting. In addition, Secretary Brown may lead a business promotion delegation to China following a proposed October 17-19 Secretarial telecommunications event in Singapore. The President's Science and Technology Advisor Dr. Gibbons could round out these exchanges by chairing a meeting of the JCST in Beijing in November.

USIA. USIA Director Joe Duffy will visit China in late October to review Agency operations in China and to press the Chinese on the free flow of information, including the jamming of certain VOA broadcasts.

Regional Issues. The USG has a strong interest in Chinese support for U.S. regional initiatives. We should therefore identify opportunities for exchanges on regional questions. SA Assistant Secretary Raphael, for instance, could visit Beijing in early September to brief on the next round of U.S.-Indian Regional Security and Nonproliferation bilaterals and to seek support for a South Asia missile nonproliferation initiative. Opportunities for discussion of the Middle East peace talks and CIS developments may also arise. S/P Director Lewis could visit Beijing or host a Chinese policy planning team at the end of the year.

Secretary of State. The July 21 meeting of the ASEAN PMC will provide a useful first opportunity for Secretary Christopher to meet Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Qian. The Secretary could review plans for dialogue and reassure the Chinese of U.S. willingness to move forward, if China makes progress on our core concerns. A follow-on meeting could be held in late September on the margins of the UNGA. If sufficient progress has been made, we could advance the dialogue an important step by inviting the Foreign Minister to Washington for follow-up discussions, possibly including a call on President Clinton. Again assuming progress on our core agenda and the prospect for accelerating that progress, we should consider scheduling a visit by the Secretary to Beijing in late 1993 or early 1994.

VI. COOPERATION WITH CONGRESS

The Clinton Administration's China policy depends on Congressional support. To ensure that the Congressional

leadership fully understands and accepts the need for the high-level dialogue suggested above, Administration representatives should brief key legislators on where we stand with the Chinese and how this plan fits into our strategy for securing PRC progress in areas of core concern.

The intensity of the dialogue anticipated by this strategy could generate accusations from some quarters that the USG is returning to "business as usual" with Beijing, despite serious remaining bilateral differences. Continuing engagement with Congress as this plan unfolds will therefore be essential. It is noteworthy that some ten Congressional delegations plan to travel to China during the August recess, an indicator that increasing numbers of Members of Congress have accepted the philosophy and strategy expressed in the President's May 28 Executive Order. As senior officials develop plans and in so doing meet with the Chinese, their agencies should take the initiative to brief concerned Members of Congress on U.S. goals and strategy. They should underscore the point that dialogue connotes a determined effort to advance the President's policy and to achieve concrete results on our core agenda.

The Administration should work closely with Members of Congress and their staff to promote the effectiveness of Congressional delegations in pressing China for progress on core issues. Pre-departure briefings in Washington would be an especially useful means to inform CODELs on the status of U.S. policy initiatives, problems in the bilateral relationship, and conditions in the PRC.

Attachments

- Tab 1 Annex I - Tibet Policy
- Tab 2 Annex II - Human Rights Policy
- Tab 3 Annex III - Future U.S. Visits
- Tab 4 Annex IV - NSC-11: U.S. China Objectives

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Annex I

U.S. Policy Towards Tibet

During the Dalai Lama's visit this April, our Embassy in Beijing provided a thoughtful analysis of our current policy on Tibet and proposed a more active U.S. role. Beyond humanitarian concerns, which are the heart of our present policy, a hard look at Tibet might suggest our national interests there do not justify such a role. But U.S. public sentiment, especially as it is projected by Congress, invests in Tibet the potential to effect a major disruption in Sino-American relations. If nothing else, our recent experience with Congressional leaders in determining the final language for the E.O. on extension of MFN status for China makes this clear. Good relations between the U.S. and China are absolutely essential if we are to play any role in Tibet's future.

Tibet presents us with special problems. First, Chinese suspicions of U.S. motives in Tibet are linked to the legacy of active U.S. support, during the 1950's and 1960's, for Tibetan insurgents opposing PRC control. Secondly, our support for religious freedom in Tibet must take into account Tibet's tradition of combining religious and political power and its ongoing agitation for independence. Thirdly, many aspects of Tibet's traditional, pre-modern culture are undergoing change as a result of a modernization process made inevitable by domestic economic reform and the opening to the outside world. Tibet's society, religion and history are little understood in the U.S. This has led to romanticized views of Tibet among domestic U.S. audiences, views which have a powerful influence upon policy.

Our role must be to convince the Chinese that resolution of the Tibetan problem is essential if there is to be a long-term, healthy relationship between the U.S. and China. We can only do this by making clear to the Chinese that we will not in any way try to shape or dictate the terms of the compromise nor will we do anything to undermine the compromise by giving encouragement to Tibetan independence activists. But we must also make clear that Tibet, unlike for instance Taiwan, is not a problem whose solution can be deferred. Once the Dalai Lama passes from the scene or, as he has threatened, removes himself from the process, then the best and perhaps only chance for peaceful compromise is gone. And the consequences for China, for Tibet, and for the U.S. will be great.

The Embassy argues for a U.S. Tibetan policy which is both realistic and active. Such a policy would have several components:

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1. American values and American public sentiment require us vigorously to promote respect for human rights.
2. However, it is not in U.S. national interest to support Tibetan independence in the face of Chinese claims to sovereignty and particularly when every U.N. member nation supports the Chinese position. We would be responsible for encouraging separatist elements in Tibet to rebel and risk sparking ethnic violence.
3. We must sensitize Beijing to the problems created by the movement of Han Chinese into Tibet. There is no conclusive evidence that this influx of economic migrants is a result of an official government policy. Nevertheless, the Han compete with Tibetans for economic opportunity and their growing presence is rapidly altering the distinctive cultural and religious life of Tibet. The fear among Tibetans, as articulated recently by the Dalai Lama in exile, is that the ongoing demographic changes will "further reduce Tibetans into an insignificant minority in their own country." But we should also recognize that this phenomenon is limited mainly to Lhasa, and the Dalai Lama considers large parts of China to be part of Tibet.
4. We must persuade both sides to renew the dialogue between the Dalai Lama and the PRC with the goal of genuine autonomy for Tibet within China.

The Chinese believe that the Tibetans, like most other minority groups in China, will settle down once foreigners stop intervening. Tibetan activists believe that through foreign intervention (economic sanctions, international condemnation of China, etc.) Tibet can become independent. Both sides are wrong. The problems facing Tibet can only be resolved through negotiation and eventual compromise.

Compromise will not be easy to reach. It will require the Chinese to accept that there is a nearly indestructible core of Tibetan resistance which will always struggle against rule from Beijing. Tibetans must accept that the concept of a "Greater Tibet," which would include large sections of neighboring Chinese provinces where Tibetans are and have been outnumbered by Han and other minorities for generations, is not achievable. Tibet is a small corner of a great power triangle. The survival of Tibetan culture and society will always depend upon compromise, especially with China.

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- 3 -

While any Chinese leader or government can negotiate such a compromise, only one Tibetan can deliver the Tibetan side--the Dalai Lama.

In our expanded dialogue with Beijing, we should take advantage of every opportunity to press the Chinese on Tibetan human rights problems. We should:

- urge the Chinese to use restraint in dealing with peaceful demonstrations in Tibet;
- encourage improved treatment of prisoners, the end of abuses, and torture and ICRC access to Tibetan prisons;
- promote religious freedom in Tibet, particularly the lifting of limits on the number of monks;
- urge improved access for foreign visitors and particularly human rights groups to Tibet and;
- encourage the Chinese to resume their dialogue with the Dalai Lama.

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Annex II

Human Rights Strategy

Background

China's market-oriented economic reforms are rapidly producing a new society of increasing pluralism and openness to the outside world. Nonetheless, there still exists the still powerful reality of China's past: a communist party supported by a large security apparatus and determined to hold on to political control whatever the cost.

Our task is to fashion a policy which will spur further improvements in the human rights situation in China, as we nurture the growing domestic constituencies and infrastructure that are China's best hope for systemic change. We can support this process by expanding the range of our contacts, moving beyond the limitations of high-level official meetings, and finding ways to support the "revolution from below" which is the real force for change in China today.

We also need a strategy to nudge China's communist officialdom into accelerating the pace of political reform. To maintain MFN, China will have to improve its human rights performance. To accomplish this, we need to persuade Chinese officials at all levels to focus on human rights problems and on the steps they must take to resolve or avoid these problems.

Communicate a Sense of Urgency

Our strategy must be clear and it must be vigorously implemented. It should have several components:

-- We need to reinvigorate our bilateral exchanges. Visits to China by senior Department officials concerned with human rights will force the Chinese to focus on these issues and the need for measurable progress over the coming year. In our discussions, we will remind the Chinese that we are under time constraints and that the relationship must move forward or, under the weight of serious bilateral concerns, face a significant downturn. We must communicate a sense of urgency. Every exchange must emphasize our core human rights initiatives as contained in the President's Executive Order:

- 1) Freedom of emigration;
- 2) Compliance with the 1992 bilateral agreement concerning prison labor;

- 3) Adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
- 4) Releasing and providing an acceptable accounting for Chinese citizens imprisoned or detained for the nonviolent expression of their political and religious beliefs, including such expression of beliefs in connection with the Democracy Wall and Tiananmen Square movements;
- 5) Ensuring humane treatment of prisoners, such as by allowing access to prisons by international humanitarian and human rights organization;
- 6) Protecting Tibet's distinctive religious and cultural heritage; and
- 7) Permitting international radio and television broadcasts into China.

In the context of the strategy for engaging the PRC during the remainder of 1993, we should in particular press for Chinese approval of ICRC access to prison. This would be a tangible step forward by the Beijing authorities and an achievable goal in the context of a human rights full-court press.

We must draw a bottom line for the Chinese. They must understand that the President is fully prepared to withdraw MFN unless there is "overall, significant progress" in this area by next year.

While the Chinese will resist making concessions, the "carrot" that can promote progress is the prospect of ever-increasing levels of official contact between Chinese and American officials.

--Human Rights Assistant Secretary John Shattuck plans to travel to China in August to explain the provisions of the MFN decision and what is needed to preserve MFN in 1994. We should follow up this visit with other high-level contacts to reinforce our message.

-- We need to broaden the U.S. side of the dialogue through Congressional delegations, including outside experts. The Chinese are keenly aware of the role Congress plays. We should work closely with such delegations, not only to

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- 3 -

"speak with one voice," but to impress upon the Chinese the importance of the legislative-executive consensus in creating a firm bases upon which to expand our bilateral relations.

-- Expand cooperation and exchanges in areas which are likely to contribute to the long-term improvement in human rights such as with the fast developing legal community. As the Chinese grow into their new international role, legal reform becomes essential. We can enter through this "open door" to provide assistance in the development of civil and criminal legal systems.

-- Coordinate with other governments and with NGO's to obtain maximum leverage in changing Chinese behavior. By focusing on those initiatives where broad international consensus exists for action--such as curbing physical abuse of prisoners and assuring that they obtain adequate medical attention--we are likely to see steady progress.

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ANNEX III

NOTIONAL SCHEDULE
SENIOR USG MEETINGS WITH CHINESE
JULY - DECEMBER 1993

July 25 Secretary Christopher meets with Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Qian at ASEAN PMC (Singapore)

July 26-27 Dr. Davis (Beijing)

August Assistant Secretary Shattuck (Beijing)

August USTR Kantor for market access bilaterals (Beijing)

September SA Assistant Secretary Raphel (Beijing)

September Secretary Bentsen, consultations with PRC Finance Minister (Washington)

September Secretary Christopher meets with Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Qian during UNGA (New York)

September Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Qian visits Washington

October Under Secretary Wirth (Beijing)

October Deputy Secretary Perry, security bilaterals (Beijing)

October Secretary Brown leads trade delegation (Beijing)

October USIA Director Joe Duffy (Beijing)

November Acting ACDA Director Graham (Beijing)

November Secretary Brown cochairs JCCT (Seattle)

November President's Science and Technology Advisor Gibbons cochairs JCST (Washington)

December S/P Director Lewis (Beijing or Washington)

December Secretary Christopher (Beijing)

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ANNEX IV

EXCERPT FROM NSC-11, "U.S. POLICY TOWARD CHINA":
U.S. CHINA POLICY OBJECTIVES

1. Global Cooperation

- o Retain Chinese support for key ongoing UN efforts to preserve international peace in former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Somalia, and Cambodia.
- o Seek Chinese assistance in influencing responsible North Korean behavior with regard to nuclear arms development and continuing cooperation with Seoul.
- o Obtain Chinese cooperation in updating the United Nations system to meet changing international conditions.
- o Enhance cooperation with China on addressing global issues.

2. Asian Peace and Stability

- o Reinforce PRC support for Asian stability and encourage China to limit its military modernization to that necessary for defensive purposes.
- o Involve China in multilateral dialogue and mechanisms to promote peace and security in Northeast, Southeast, and South Asia, with a goal of establishing an intensive East Asian security forum.
- o Assure regional friends and allies that the U.S. will support peace and stability in Asia. Back our assurances with a continued strong military presence and a much greater economic presence in the region.
- o Defuse prospects for conflict regarding Taiwan, the Spratly Islands, and other possible flash points.

3. Proliferation

- o Create a regular nonproliferation dialogue with the PRC to exchange views, voice concerns, and improve mutual understanding.
- o Ensure full PRC compliance with existing obligations under the MTCR, the NPT, and other regimes and agreement to cease sensitive technology transfers to Pakistan, Iran, and other countries of proliferation concern.

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- o Obtain new or updated Chinese nonproliferation commitments, especially the adoption of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG) Guidelines and acceptance of the revised MTCR Guidelines.
- o Encourage the Chinese to establish effective controls on the export of sensitive technology.

4. Arms Control

- o Initiate an intensive, high-level bilateral dialogue with China on nuclear arms control, leading to PRC participation in multilateral initiatives.
- o Secure Chinese support for nuclear testing restraint.
- o Engage China in cooperation on nuclear weapons safety.
- o Secure a freeze in the size of Chinese nuclear forces and a commitment not to introduce MIRVed ICBMs.
- o Obtain full Chinese compliance with BWC and CWC obligations and restraint in conventional force modernization.

5. Human Rights

In the interest of improving human rights conditions for the Chinese people, the U.S. should seek the following:

- o A complete PRC accounting of Chinese citizens detained, accused or sentenced for the non-violent expression of their political beliefs during the Democracy Wall and Tiananmen periods and a commitment to release all those imprisoned for the peaceful expression of their political and religious views;
- o Chinese permission for regular and systematic access to Chinese prisons by the ICRC or another international organization, particularly to political prisoners where there are questions of poor treatment.
- o China's public reaffirmation of its commitment to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and its human rights obligations under the UN Charter.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

- o PRC support for the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
- o Beijing's agreement to reestablish a formal government-to-government human rights dialogue and give positive consideration to establishing a bilateral human rights commission.
- o Assurance that China's population control program refrains from coercive practices.
- o An end to Chinese harassment of unofficial religious groups of all faiths.
- o An end to the already rather ineffective jamming of VOA broadcasts.
- o As a humanitarian matter, secure full cooperation on resolving U.S. POW/MIA cases.

6. Trade and Investment

- o Encourage full Chinese acceptance of international trade and investment standards as well as compliance with and full implementation of our bilateral IPR, market access, and prison labor MOUs.
- o Seek elimination of barriers to U.S. goods and services and removal of impediments to foreign representative offices.
- o Secure a strict prohibition of improper trading practices, especially illegal textile transshipment and other forms of textile fraud.
- o Assist China's entry into GATT if Beijing satisfies membership requirements, including foreign exchange liberalization, and simultaneous entry of Taiwan is possible.
- o Promote full liberalization of China's foreign exchange regime, including a market-determined exchange rate, in order to prevent denial of U.S. access to Chinese markets by non-trade means and to facilitate adjustment in China's external balances.
- o Reevaluate the export control levels for high technology trade with China.

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7. Taiwan

- o Encourage political forces in Taiwan to pursue their interests by means other than an assertion of independence.
- o Continue to encourage Taiwan and the PRC to further their accommodation, with the hope of an eventual outcome acceptable to the people of both sides.
- o Work with the PRC, Taiwan, and other countries to increase joint membership in appropriate international organizations.
- o Establish rules for engagement which will advance U.S. commercial and other interests in Taiwan while satisfying Beijing that the U.S. remains committed to the one China formulae described in the three communiques.
- o Reassess and modify as necessary the guidelines for arms sales to Taiwan.

8. Hong Kong

- o Make clear U.S. support for increased democracy, warning against actions by the Chinese which could harm Hong Kong's economy or impair the rights and welfare of its citizens.
- o Continue to treat the decolonization process as primarily a UK-PRC issue.
- o In keeping with the goals of the McConnell Act, encourage fulfillment of the 1984 Joint Declaration's guarantee that the Hong Kong SAR will enjoy a high degree of autonomy following reversion to China through appropriate representations to Beijing and formalization of U.S. commercial, legal, and other links with the Hong Kong Government.

9. Tibet

- o Promote dialogue between the Dalai Lama and Beijing.
- o Seek protection of Tibetan human rights and preservation of Tibetan culture, but avoid challenging China's claim to the region.

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- 5 -

- o Obtain a full PRC accounting and release of Tibetans imprisoned for their political and religious beliefs and press for releases and humane treatment of prisoners.

10. Illegal Immigration

- o Upgrade U.S. communication and cooperation with PRC, Hong Kong, and Taiwan to work for solutions to the issue.
- o Intercept illegal immigrants before they reach U.S. soil; establish procedures for repatriation, refugee processing, third country settlement, etc., to prevent large scale illegal entry into the U.S. of Chinese economic migrants.

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20791

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR

LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

Mr. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. EDWARD KNIGHT
Executive Secretary
Department of Treasury

BG. MICHAEL SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. ANTHONY A. DAS
Deputy Executive Secretary
Department of Commerce

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Executive Director for
Policy Coordination
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Office of the Representative
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to the United Nations

DR. LAURA TYSON
Chair, President's Council
of Economic Advisors

COL. T.R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. BOWMAN CUTTER
Deputy Assistant to the
President for Economic
Policy

SUBJECT: Meeting of the Deputies Committee on China (8)

The Deputies Committee will meet on Wednesday, July 21, 1992,
3:30 p.m. - 5:00 p.m. in the White House Situation Room.

Attendance will be limited to principals plus one. (8)

Our purpose is to decide on ^{U.S} a strategy ^{toward China over the next year,} to implement the
President's MFN Executive Order of May 28. An agenda is at
Tab A. The discussion paper is at Tab B. (8)

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab A Agenda
Tab B Discussion Paper

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. paper	re: Core Points: China Strategy for 1993-1994 (4 pages)	07/00/1993	P1/b(1)
001b. memo	Proposed Meetings. (1 page)	08/06/1993	P1/b(1) <i>KDE 3/11/2020</i>
001c. paper	re: China Strategy for 1993-1994: Implementing the President's MFN Executive Order (29 pages) <i>partial release</i>	07/00/1993	P1/b(1) <i>KDE 3/11/2020</i>
001d. paper	re: China Strategy for 1993-1994: Implementing the President's MFN Executive Order (36 pages) <i>partial release</i>	07/00/1993	P1/b(1) <i>KDE 3/11/2020</i>
002. memo	Name [partial] [CIA Act] (1 page)	07/19/1993	P3/b(3)
003. paper	re: Engaging China in 1993: Pressing for Early Progress on Core Concerns (20 pages) <i>partial release</i>	07/19/1993	P1/b(1) <i>KDE</i> <i>b(3) 3/11/2020</i>

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
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FOLDER TITLE:

DC0043 DC Meeting on China, July 21, 1993 [2]

2015-0221-M
rs1199

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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TO: LAKE

FROM: SAEED
ZEGART
KRISTOFF

DOC DATE: 06 AUG 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
INTL TRADE

MFN
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: CHINA STRATEGY PAPER RE REQUEST FOR PC OR DC MTG

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE

DUE DATE: 10 AUG 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SAEED

LOGREF: 9320791 9320798

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC0043 PRD0011

CODES:

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 7/15/2014
2015-0221-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE
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Z 93080714 FOR DECISION
X 93082517 NOTED BY LAKE

REC'D 2:20 pm 8/7

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 20871
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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	_____	_____	_____
ExecSec	<u>1</u>	<u>W</u>	_____
Staff Director	<u>2</u>	<u>us</u>	_____
D/APNSA	<u>3</u>	<u>Natl Sec Advisor has seen</u>	_____
APNSA	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>	<u>Bm</u>	<u>R</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Exec Secs office has disabled

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 6, 1993



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: SANDRA J. KRISTOFF, ACTING ^{FMS}

FROM: FERIAAL ARA SAEED/AMY ZEGART ^{FMS AZ}

Not Sec Advisor
has seen

SUBJECT: China Strategy Paper

The State Department has drafted a strategy for achieving China's compliance with the President's MFN executive order of May 28. An executive summary and complete strategy paper are at Tab B. For your convenience, we have highlighted core points of this strategy at Tab A.

The strategy reflects the views of our July 21 Deputies Committee meeting on next steps with China. However, we would like to give Deputies or Principals an opportunity to comment on the final paper emanating from this meeting before we send it forward for the President's approval.

Concurrences by: ^{FMS} Bob Fauver, Dan Poneman, Bob Bell

RECOMMENDATION

- (1) That we hold a Deputies or Principals Committee meeting to approve the strategy paper at Tab B.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab A NSC Core Points of China Strategy Paper
- Tab B China Strategy Paper and Executive Summary

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PROPOSED MEETINGS

[Note: At the end of July, Secretary Christopher met with Foreign Minister Qian at the ASEAN PMC and Under Secretary of State Davis visited Beijing, where she discussed proliferation issues with Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu and other Chinese officials.]

- August USTR Kantor and/or Deputy USTR Barshefsky hold market access bilateral in Beijing.
- September Assistant Secretary (HA) Shattuck travels to China, including Lhasa, to press human rights.
- September SA Assistant Secretary Raphael visits China to explore cooperation on proliferation in South Asia.
- September Secretary Christopher meets with Foreign Minister Qian during UNGA; possible invitation to Washington.
- September-
October DOD Assistant Secretary Freeman and a flag officer hold security bilaterals in Beijing.
- September-
October Secretary Bentsen participates in World Bank/IMF talks; possible meeting with PRC counterpart.
- October Under Secretary Wirth holds talks in Beijing on human rights, democracy, environment.
- October USIA Director Joseph Duffey visits Beijing to seek freedom of broadcasting, to underscore human rights agenda and discuss possible new areas for cultural cooperation.
- October-
November Commerce Secretary Brown leads trade delegation to China or chairs JCCT in Seattle (around time of APEC ministerial).
- November Chinese President Jiang Zemin attends APEC leaders meeting in Seattle; possible bilateral with President and/or possible visit to Washington.
- November Acting ACDA Director Graham visits China to follow up on arms control, regional security initiatives.
- December DOD Deputy Secretary Perry visits China, assuming sufficient progress, to follow up on security dialogue. Senior JCS officer may attend.

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2015-0221-M (1.51) 03/11/2020 KDE

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CHINA STRATEGY FOR 1993-1994:
IMPLEMENTING THE PRESIDENT'S MFN EXECUTIVE ORDER

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Overview: U.S. Interests and Strategy in China

Constructive U.S. engagement with China is essential to realize the President's vision for a New Pacific Community; to deal effectively with regional security issues including Hong Kong's 1997 transition and Taiwan's status; to sustain our efforts internationally to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; to promote more democratic and open societies globally; to boost American economic and job growth through a healthy trade relationship with China; and to deal with such thorny issues as alien smuggling and environmental degradation.

China is an emerging great power with the potential to contribute enormously to regional and global stability and economic prosperity. It is also grappling with huge problems: an antiquated political system that could buckle or break during the looming succession struggle; a large and increasing "floating" population of over one hundred million workers (one out of every eleven Chinese) who move from job to job (and are unaccounted for in national labor and economic statistics); an overheated economy; and a gradual deterioration in central control over the provinces. A problem-ridden succession would seriously affect stability in China and the region generally.

The challenge to U.S. policy is to channel China's building momentum into constructive channels, bolstering prospects for political and economic liberalization internally as well responsible Chinese policies externally in the maintenance of world peace and stability, in non-proliferation, trade and the environment. The ascendancy of the market-oriented sector in China is striking at the core of the communist system, creating new and influential constituencies and interest groups pressing for political and economic relaxation. It is in the U.S. interest to see this evolution continue. Externally, U.S. support for an involved and engaged China, not an isolated China, as called for by President Clinton in his July 10 Seoul speech, would accelerate this positive and historic evolution underway in China.

Pursuant to these goals, the United States should engage creatively with the Chinese in pursuit of our objectives enunciated in the President's May 28 Executive Order on MFN. Earlier in the year, a Presidential China policy review (NSC-11

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summary at tab 3) laid the intellectual and strategic foundation for our re-engagement, identifying as core U.S. interests China's continued economic growth, its integration into the world community, its cooperation in the post-Cold War international order, and its peaceful evolution toward a more democratic society. In the next ten months before MFN renewal, we need to achieve sufficient concrete progress to permit a Presidential finding that China's MFN status should be extended.

As we chart our course, we should bear in mind the element of time. Front-loading our talks is essential for two reasons: (1) Deng Xiaoping's increasingly precarious health inspires Chinese leadership caution, and reflexive nationalistic impulses, as the succession drama begins to unfold; and (2) the Chinese are attuned to the content, nuances and pressures of the annual MFN debate, and are determined -- also for reasons of "face" and nationalism -- to avoid any impression they caved to Washington to retain their MFN status.

Our Tactics for 1993-1994

We begin our re-engagement with China from a position of domestic strength: the strategy, philosophy and specific goals contained in the May 28 Executive Order followed extremely close and harmonious consultations with the Congress. There is consensus that human rights progress is our top priority; that the specific areas named in the E.O. are the correct ones; that these are appropriately linked to 1994 MFN extension for China; and that China's MFN status should be preserved if possible. There is also broad support for our approach to proliferation and economic/trade concerns: pressing ahead through all available mechanisms and channels, at the level necessary to do the job, but de-linking Chinese performance from MFN renewal.

We will implement our strategy through meticulous, regular management by a senior interagency working group. Periodic meetings will be held to assess progress, review strategy, consider carrots and sticks which might be employed, undertake a post-mortem on each high-level visit and approve proposed Cabinet secretary and deputy exchanges.

Human Rights

It is imperative that we engage rapidly with the Chinese. Our general approach should be to explain to China our desire for a constructive, mutually beneficial relationship; to reiterate our interest in a stable and economically prosperous China; and to offer inducements necessary to inspire a serious dialogue

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including Chinese concessions. But our first priority, and our sharpest message to the Chinese, must be human rights: we are (as Americans) serious about achieving progress, and without this progress MFN cannot and will not be renewed. All dialogue with the Chinese -- certainly Executive Branch, and optimally Congressional and business also -- should make that simple point clearly and consistently. Secretary Christopher underscored it to Foreign Minister Qian in Singapore recently; Assistant Secretary (Human Rights) John Shattuck will elaborate it during planned discussions in Beijing in early September; and we will emphasize it strongly in anticipated sessions with the Chinese at the fall UNGA, at the Seattle APEC leaders conference, and in the course of our planned resumption of military-to-military dialogue. We will also brief Congressional and corporate leaders in advance of their China trips -- both to enlist their understanding of our policy, and to urge that they reinforce our own message.

Nonproliferation/Strategic Issues

With the cessation of U.S.-China military contacts, isolation has bred suspicion within the PLA about U.S. intentions. China through the 1990's will pose only a limited direct threat to U.S. security interests in Asia; we must, however, ensure that ongoing military modernization does not change this calculus. China's modernization evokes rising security concerns among its neighbors, including Taiwan. Aside from the economic consequences, Hong Kong's reversion to China in 1997 will add considerably to China's ability to project power into the East Asian region. Furthermore, China is a potential exporter of sensitive technologies and military systems; its cooperation (in the U.N. and regionally) is required to strengthen and expand nonproliferation regimes in the Middle East, South Asia and elsewhere; and it is a declared nuclear state, whose participation in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) we solicit and require. Currently, we face a major decision point as evidence builds that Beijing may have transferred M-11 missiles or related equipment to Pakistan last year in contravention of its commitment to abide by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Finally, as China enters a sensitive political transition period in which the armed forces will play a crucial role -- for stability or otherwise -- we need to broaden our exposure to Chinese military leaders and their thinking.

To accomplish these complex and interrelated objectives, we need to engage senior Chinese security policy civilian leaders as well as military leaders. Key decision making authority on the entire array of strategic and nonproliferation issues outlined above rests with a small group of senior military officers and

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defense civilians in their sixties and seventies. Under Secretary Davis launched our senior-level dialogue in Beijing on July 26-27, pressing for a solution of the M-11 transfer contretemps, emphasizing that the U.S. seeks a cooperative relationship, but noting that our law obliges us to impose sanctions if the MTCR guidelines and parameters were exceeded. We will need to follow up that opening round with an intensive effort to settle the M-11 issue, ideally in a way that advances our cooperation in such nonproliferation areas as MTCR, the Nuclear Suppliers' Group, the CTBT, restraining arms proliferation in the Middle East, and influencing the North Koreans to forego their nuclear ambitions (the Chinese may have already been helpful in this endeavor). We will plan to resume a strategic dialogue (i.e., on common regional security concerns) in the fall through a visit to China by Defense Assistant Secretary Freeman and an accompanying flag officer. This delegation would, of course, press our human rights agenda in the course of its presentation to Chinese defense/military interlocutors.

Economic/Commercial Issues

China is our seventh-ranking trade partner, and some 143,000 American jobs are already dependent on U.S. exports. A successful U.S. effort to boost American economic and job growth through international commerce hinges importantly on our ability to win an expanding share of the booming China market. Chinese imports of U.S. goods in 1992 totalled \$7.5 billion, up 19 percent over 1991. But because Chinese exports to the U.S. rose even more rapidly, the U.S. trade deficit grew to \$18.3 billion. China presents increasing high technology trade opportunities -- which Japan and other western countries are pursuing successfully in the absence of U.S. competition. American businesses complain they are competitively disadvantaged by the array of formal and informal post-Tiananmen sanctions: cessation of TDA financing and OPIC guarantees, export controls (and further sanctions imposed legislatively) on high-tech items (e.g., a Cray computer sale long held up for the Chinese State Meteorological Agency) and nuclear industry plants and components, and further controls on satellite launch services and dual-use items. We are negotiating with the Chinese currently on market access and China's entry into GATT. Illegal Chinese textile transshipments loom as a major and growing dilemma for us -- even as our ability to deal with the problem is hampered by the adverse implications of any U.S. countermeasures for Hong Kong and Taiwan interests.

In the coming months, an interagency group co-chaired by NSC/NEC should create a U.S. economic and trade strategy to deal with China. A review of our export control regime could be part

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of the exercise. Sequenced Sino-American visits beginning in the summer and fall would implement it, including a trip to China by senior USTR officials (perhaps Ambassador Kantor), Commerce officials (Secretary Brown, under the right circumstances), and Treasury officials to begin to deal with these issues. The annual meeting of the Sino-American Joint Committee on Commerce and Trade will be hosted by Secretary Brown in November in Washington.

We should recognize that implementing this strategy will be very difficult and complex. The Chinese are always hard to move on human rights issues, and they have recently cracked down on some dissidents in Shanghai and elsewhere. The M-11 problem casts a large, immediate shadow. Our trade deficit continues to balloon. Tibet, Taiwan, and Hong Kong -- all relating to Chinese notions of sovereignty -- could cause new strains in our relations. And the political jockeying for succession to Deng could limit Chinese flexibility. Such elements will make progress in negotiations arduous and could inflame Congressional attitudes.

Attachments

Annex I - Notional Schedule for Senior-Level Dialogue
Annex II - U.S. Policy Toward Tibet

drafted: EAP/CM:DWKeyser:dwk (SECMDR 1107) 7/29/93
cleared: EAP: WLord
PTomsen

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CHINA STRATEGY FOR 1993-1994:
IMPLEMENTING THE PRESIDENT'S MFN EXECUTIVE ORDER

I. OVERVIEW: U.S. INTERESTS IN CHINA

When President Carter made the decision to normalize diplomatic relations with Beijing effective January 1979, his premise -- stated publicly -- was that the United States has an enduring interest in a stable and modernizing China. That premise has not altered despite the disappearance of a common security threat, sweeping change in global political alignments, significant evolution of China's political/economic system, and the emergence of China as a regional -- prospectively global -- economic and military force.

In his recent speeches at Waseda University in Tokyo and at the National Assembly in Seoul, President Clinton elaborated a new, ambitious vision for U.S. involvement with the Asia and Pacific region which included an engaged -- not isolated -- China. The President called for creation of a New Pacific Community built on shared strength, shared prosperity and a shared commitment to democratic values. In so doing, he cited specific priorities including stronger efforts to combat proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; new regional dialogues on a broad spectrum of security challenges; and support for more democratic, more open societies.

Comprehensive U.S. engagement with China is the sine qua non for realization of the President's vision for a New Pacific Community. Clearly, our efforts to deal effectively with proliferation and to launch successfully an Asian regional security dialogue will hinge upon the extent and conviction of China's involvement. More broadly, regional stability and progress -- including Hong Kong's 1997 transition and the status of Taiwan -- will be intimately linked with China's course during the 1990s. U.S. policy should be geared to channeling China's building momentum into constructive channels bolstering, rather than undermining, regional and global stability, creation of a more effective, enduring non-proliferation regime and a liberalized world trading system. A successful U.S. effort to boost American economic and job growth through exports will depend upon a healthy trade relationship with China.

The stakes are enormous. If China holds successfully to its present course, it will emerge early in the next century as a budding superpower. But if China's reformist, market-oriented and outward-looking policies falter or fail, one can foresee a different and distressing prospect for the world's most dynamic region: Chinese domestic instability, growing concerns in the region regarding China's intentions, economic disruption of commercial relationships, a deteriorating Chinese migration/refugee dilemma, an impulse among China's neighbors to

SECRET/NODIS

-2-

plan for the worst through arms buildups and a shattered architecture for dealing peacefully and collegially with regional and transnational issues.

Presidential Review Directive/NSC-11, completed in March, systematically developed the case for comprehensive engagement with China and laid the intellectual and policy foundation for the President's May 28 Executive Order on MFN for China. PRD/NSC-11 identified the following core U.S. interests in China: continued Chinese economic growth, increased integration into the world community, cooperation in building a new international order and peaceful change toward a more democratic, humane society. The President's May 28 Executive Order spelled out more concrete policy goals for the year leading up to the 1994 decision on further extension of China's MFN status.

In sum, our long-range strategy toward China must be animated by a conceptual framework designed to permit achievement of U.S. national security objectives through engagement with this important emerging power. Our tactical approach over the next year must lay the cornerstone for such engagement through concrete progress keyed to the areas specified in the President's May 28 Executive Order.

II. STRATEGY FOR THE NEXT YEAR

The Agenda:

The President's May 28 MFN Executive Order -- taken after unprecedented close and harmonious consultations with the Congressional leadership -- and his parallel MFN report to the Congress specify that 1994 MFN renewal will be conditioned upon certification of overall, significant progress on human rights. The President de-linked proliferation and commercial issues from the 1994 MFN decision, but directed that our core national objectives in these areas be vigorously pursued through existing channels and utilizing all available leverage. It is crucial that we achieve progress in these areas on the merits; furthermore, as a practical matter, failure to do so will impede our ability to manage successfully next year's Congressional MFN debate even in the event of certifiable human rights gains.

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-3-

Additionally, we need to address urgently with the Chinese through appropriate diplomatic and law enforcement channels the growing problem of illegal migration. Finally, there exists a rich agenda -- and difficult challenges -- to pursue with the Chinese in such areas as environmental protection, U.N. peacekeeping/ peacemaking operations and regional security issues.

The Element of Time:

We are obliged to register meaningful progress on our human rights agenda in sufficient time to permit a favorable determination on extension of China's MFN status. This means that we need results no later than early spring 1994, but optimally much earlier. First, members of Congress have made clear that they will call hearings at that time to weigh for themselves the success of the Administration's approach; some have hinted at an intent to call for a mid-year review in December. Second, the Chinese themselves are more likely to be responsive earlier than later, for a pair of reasons: (a) because they are now attuned to the content and nuances of the annual MFN debate and determined to avoid any impression that they have caved to U.S. pressure "solely" to retain MFN status; and (b) because Deng Xiaoping's increasingly precarious health inspires Chinese leadership caution as the succession drama begins to unfold.

This argues for early engagement with the Chinese. This should be done at the levels of seniority necessary to achieve our objectives. It also means we should front-load our agenda. We should concomitantly brief Congress soon on our thinking, so as to answer or mute any criticism that we have embarked on a "business-as-usual" approach. This should not be a hard sell; members of Congress have increasingly come to see the merit in a policy of careful engagement. Some six to eight Congressional delegations are finalizing plans for August travel to China. It is particularly important that we avail ourselves of the opportunity of their travel -- to outline in detail our conceptual framework and to prime travelling members to deliver tough and concrete messages identical to our own.

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Sharpening the Message:

It is imperative that we speak with one voice in: (a) underscoring our desire for a constructive, mutually beneficial relationship; (b) reiterating our interest in a stable and economically prosperous China; (c) offering necessary inducements to inspire a serious dialogue and meaningful Chinese concessions; and, without pulling punches, (d) conveying clearly to the Chinese that human rights is our overriding priority since they will lose MFN absent significant overall progress in the areas specified by the President.

Such a message must be delivered unambiguously and consistently, by Executive Branch and Congressional visitors alike, to a broad spectrum and multiple levels of Chinese leaders.

Channels and Mechanisms for Dialogue:

Our objective is progress; we should employ the channels and level of seniority essential to achieve it. We cannot afford to waste motion, blur the message, and indulge in dialogue at high levels which does not promise commensurate results.

It follows, inter alia, from this logic that:

- Cabinet-level dialogue with the Chinese should occur only when this is the best tactic to force action.
- Military-to-military dialogue should be resumed, at appropriate (e.g., Assistant Secretary of Defense, with a party to include a flag officer) levels, given the importance of our nonproliferation, regional security, and Taiwan Strait interests, and given the reality that our desired interlocutors -- Chinese senior military leaders -- only rarely make themselves available for U.S. civilians.
- USG visitors to China should be selected with an eye to authoritativeness rather than quantity, and with an explicit goal in each instance of achieving progress on a core agenda item.

SECRET/NODIS

-5-

- Resurrection of the three U.S.-China joint commissions (Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade; Joint Economic Commission; and Joint Commission on Science and Technology) should be predicated on their accomplishment of specific objectives, and deferred insofar as they promise merely the ceremonial or the vague.

Carrots and Sticks:

The process of engagement unfolding over the next year, in implementation of the President's Executive Order, should be conceived as a protracted and complex negotiating process. That is, the Chinese have consistently resisted offering concessions where they see no gains for themselves. From our perspective, the Chinese will in fact gain significantly from unilateral initiatives in the areas we have identified: a substantially improving human rights record will produce a more benign international image; meticulous observation of international nonproliferation regimes will enhance China's own security in the long run; and progress on our trade agenda will facilitate China's entry into GATT and expand its commercial opportunities in the U.S. and elsewhere. We should make this case repeatedly to the Chinese.

Chinese diplomatic strategy has tended to rely on intricate tradeoffs and explicit quid pro quos. Chinese leaders have not been shy about presenting their own agenda, and indeed their own concept for precise linkage of our core interests with China's principal goals. We should be vigilant against Chinese offers designed to draw us into a classically time-consuming negotiation situation.

MFN renewal is, of course, our principal leverage, and the primary inducement to an improved Chinese performance on human rights. We might also consider employing, when appropriate, the following illustrative types of bargaining chips:

- High-tech sales: We might, for example, approve sale of the Cray computer to the Chinese State Meteorological Agency as a "humanitarian gesture" (in support of Chinese weather forecasting to avert natural disasters).

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-6-

- Trade incentives: Reopening of TDA funding is particularly attractive inasmuch as U.S. business competitiveness in the Chinese market would be enhanced. Later, given proper conditions, we might offer to restore Chinese eligibility for OPIC guarantees.
- GATT accession: We could accelerate the pace of our negotiations.
- High Level Dialogue: Vice Premier/Foreign Minister Qian Qichen's attendance at UNGA, and President Jiang Zemin's prospective attendance at the November APEC leaders meeting in Seattle suggest possibilities: special attention during their visits, an invitation to Washington, a meeting with the President, and so on. Given sufficient progress we might hold in reserve an invitation to another Chinese leader, perhaps senior Vice Premier Zhu Rongji, to pay an official visit to the U.S. early in 1994.

On the "stick" side, besides the ultimate weapon of MFN revocation (albeit a single-shot, non-repeating weapon) we have available options including:

- Special 301: This might be employed in connection with failure to implement the IPR agreement, or on textile transshipment. We should consider the tactical advantage in wielding 301 -- a method which sends a firm message to China and permits us to avoid sending a sterner message with predictable adverse consequences for our own commercial and strategic interests.
- Legislation on Transfer of Nuclear Materials: Along with executive determinations, U.S. laws specify sanctions in violation of NPT commitments.
- Helms Amendment Sanctions for an M-11 Category I Transfer: If invoked, this amendment would block a significant range of Chinese exports to the U.S.
- Chinese Olympics: Should China be chosen as host, we will gain six years of leverage through the possibility

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-7-

that the U.S. would refuse to participate because of PRC human rights practices. The Chinese will assume that, as before the 1990 Moscow games, many other nations would follow a U.S. lead in pulling out.

Imposing any of these sanctions, however, carries risks: of Chinese retaliation deleterious to our own larger interests; of complicating our efforts to implement the President's MFN Executive Order; and of prejudicing our chances to engage the Chinese constructively on a broad spectrum of issues.

Managing the Process:

The importance of the issues, as well as the complexity of the options, suggest that it would be advantageous to manage implementation of our China strategy via periodic review by a senior-level steering group. Such policy review should include: regular (perhaps quarterly) IWG assessment of progress; ad hoc IWG consideration of significant proposed visits to China (or dialogue elsewhere with the Chinese) and assessment of outcomes; particularly careful vetting of proposed military-to-military dialogue, with NSC approval required for any dialogue at or above the assistant secretary level or flag officer rank; and NSC approval for any Cabinet secretary or deputy secretary visit to China.

III. CHINESE REALITIES

U.S. policy over the next year will have to accommodate important, potentially disruptive events in the PRC. Even if paramount leader Deng Xiaoping does not die or become incapacitated, his gradual physical decline will continue, and maneuvering over the succession will reduce Beijing's capacity to make tough decisions on sensitive policy questions. In addition, the overheated, semi-reformed PRC economy will soon undergo a major correction, as authorities are forced to use clumsy administrative techniques to cool surging inflation and other distortions. While some growth will continue and the reform program as a whole survive, these economic measures will complicate the succession struggle, slow key reforms, inhibit efforts to penetrate the Chinese market, and foment some popular

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- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

SECRET/NODIS

-8-

discontent. Widespread instability is unlikely: burned once, the PRC authorities have learned a lesson from Tiananmen and will be especially vigilant. Under the best circumstances, however, U.S. policy goals -- especially those regarding human rights -- may be harder to sell in Beijing. The PRC delegation's obstructionism at the Vienna human rights conference presages Beijing's attitude in this area.

At the same time, China is feeling its new strength. Both double-digit economic growth and revived military modernization are boosting Beijing's prominence in the region. U.S. leverage is declining as China's strengthens and as Beijing's economic bonds to the other dynamic Asian economies and the EC continue to deepen. Strategically, we are no longer needed as a counterweight to the Soviets, although China still tacitly supports our military presence in the region as a hedge against Japan.

IV. THE PROCESS: SETTING IN MOTION OUR CHINA STRATEGY FOR 1993-4

We should move swiftly, in light of the considerations outlined above, to set in motion our strategy for achieving U.S. China policy objectives over the nine months remaining before the MFN decision. Synergistic advantages will accrue from moving concurrently in five areas: (1) NSC channel, (2) Department of State and Embassy Beijing channel, (3) [REDACTED] (4) Congressional and business channels, and (5) High-level engagement, in Beijing and elsewhere. The process will necessarily be a dynamic one, adjusting and even altering direction as dictated by periodic assessments of results. The following outline is therefore intended to be illustrative rather than definitive.

A. NSC Channel

National Security Adviser Lake, with Assistant Secretary Lord, would launch the strategy from the White House by calling in Chinese Ambassador Li Daoyu to outline our approach, objectives and set of proposed visits and exchanges over the coming six months. NSA Lake would underscore the need for concrete, significant progress well in advance of next year's MFN renewal debate and any Congressional mid-term review.

SECRET/NODIS

SECRET/NODIS

- 9 -

B. State Department/Embassy Beijing Channel

EAP Assistant Secretary Ambassador Lord and Ambassador Roy in Beijing would play the critical roles in implementing and assessing the strategy as it unfolds. They would regularly deliver our core message (to Ambassador Li Daoyu and to Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu respectively) on human rights and other principal concerns associated with renewal of MFN; preview for Ambassador Li and VFM Liu our objectives in advance of each high-level meeting with the Chinese; assure that all senior Executive Branch officials preparing for dialogue with the Chinese understand and convey that message; and encourage members of Congress and American businessmen to articulate that same message in their separate dialogues with Chinese leaders.

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6)

D. Principal Constituencies: Business and Congress

Our strategy should be to engage Congress and the business community early and candidly in our effort to drive home to the Chinese our core message: MFN will not be renewed absent progress on the human rights agenda specified in the President's Executive Order. Other elements of our strategy should also be briefed, as appropriate, emphasizing always that our goal is a constructive, mutually beneficial relationship.

SECRET/NODIS

Such a strategy serves multiple purposes: winning good will (if not always complete support) from those briefed; raising the odds that our core message will be delivered with clarity to the PRC by a broad spectrum of China's American guests and interlocutors; and reinforcing the gravity of our own message that MFN revocation is a serious matter (since the Chinese will understand that we have briefed other constituencies, and sought to maintain a strong sense of common purpose).

For the business community, we need to be realistic. Relatively few corporate executives will be prepared to argue strenuously for a better Chinese human rights performance on the merits, but a significant number might be impelled to argue for a better performance lest MFN be withdrawn and their own commercial interests damaged.

With respect to the Hill, to those who have been skeptical of our resolve, our briefings will underscore our commitment to act. At the same time, it will energize those whose constituents have a strong stake in preservation of MFN. The result will be a multiplier effect on the Chinese (who will note that pro-MFN-extension members of Congress are running scared) and will, through activation of the non-revocation forces, provide the President greater maneuvering room prior to June 3, 1994 with respect to the precise calculus of "significant overall progress" achieved to that point.

We should take the following implementing actions:

- Beginning in August, schedule meetings with Ambassador Lord for CEOs of companies represented by the U.S.-China Task Force and U.S.-China Business Council.
- Assure that we reach the maximum possible number of members of Congress (and staff members) planning travel to China during the August recess. The NSC and Department of State should closely coordinate their efforts in this respect.
- Continue, at regular intervals, to brief key Hill members and staffers on the results of our policy of engagement with China.

E. High-Level Visits

(1) HUMAN RIGHTS

Policy

Chinese human rights practices violate internationally-recognized standards of behavior established in fundamental instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which China, as a U.N. member, has accepted. PRC compliance with these obligations would serve both Chinese and U.S. interests. Without seeking to (or imagining that it could) impose its political system and values on the PRC, the U.S. nevertheless has compelling practical and humanitarian reasons for promotion of Chinese democracy and human rights. An arbitrary, closed Chinese political system over time will be incapable of meeting the challenges of economic and social development, a prerequisite for PRC and regional stability. Democracy also is necessary for China effectively to manage increasingly important global issues such as trade disputes, refugees/migration, the environment, narcotics and terrorism. Over time, a more open and democratic China will be an easier country with which to deal and a better partner for the U.S. strategically, politically and in economic terms. An increasingly democratic China will coincide with the emerging democratic trend in Asia, including in Taiwan and South Korea.

Our dialogue with China must underscore consistently the requirement that Beijing satisfy the specific conditions in the President's May 28 MFN Executive Order: implementing the prison labor MOU and assuring freedom of emigration, plus (1) adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; (2) accounting for political/religious prisoners from the Democracy Wall and Tiananmen movements; (3) access to prisoners by impartial, respected international organizations; (4) protection of Tibet's distinctive religious and cultural heritage; (5) unimpeded radio and television broadcasts into China.

Process

- o Fall: Assistant Secretary (HA) Shattuck visit to China. Shattuck would emphasize our core message -- no MFN

SECRET/NO DIS

-12-

renewal without significant progress; lay out, ideally prioritized, all that we require to demonstrate such progress; stress the particular importance of international access (e.g., by the ICRC) to Chinese prisons, release/accounting of prisoners, and progress toward freedom of expression, assembly and religion; and seek to engage the Chinese in a continuing, frequent dialogue on our human rights agenda.

- o Secretary Christopher meeting with Foreign Minister Qian at UNGA (and possibly in Washington). The Secretary would touch upon all major bilateral and global issues, but on human rights would reiterate the Shattuck message and -- hopefully -- note progress or the potential for same. In that eventuality, he might invite FM Qian to Washington for discussions and a meeting with the President.
- o Visit to Beijing by Under Secretary of State Wirth -- if sufficient progress had been achieved, and assuming that our environmental agenda might also be thereby advanced.
- o Late 1993: President Jiang Zemin (prospectively) represents China at APEC leaders meeting in Seattle. The President and other APEC partners can press Jiang for progress in our core concern areas.
- o Early 1994: Visit by Secretary Christopher to Beijing -- only if dramatic progress had been achieved, or the promise of such guaranteed.

(2) NONPROLIFERATION/MILITARY/STRATEGIC

Policy

-- General. China through the 1990s would pose only a limited direct military threat to U.S. interests in Asia; the U.S. has an interest in ensuring that PRC military modernization does not change this calculus. The U.S. has stated, as a matter of national policy, its "abiding interest" in a peaceful resolution of the situation in the Taiwan Strait; from that interest there follows a need to monitor the activities and

SECRET/NO DIS

SECRET/NODIS

-13-

intentions of the Chinese military. U.S. policies should continue to promote good PRC-Taiwan relations. A confrontation between the two could force a U.S. response and raise the specter of some form of U.S. re-involvement in a Chinese civil war. Similar considerations for U.S. military and security planners arise with respect to the 1997 Hong Kong reversion, and the complex territorial dispute in the South China Sea.

With the cessation of U.S.-China military-to-military contacts following June 1989, isolation has bred suspicion, which in turn may be prompting both sides to conceptualize the other as a potential or real enemy. It is important to understand Chinese military attitudes and strategic thinking -- all the more so at a time when the PLA is destined to play a significant role in the political succession to Deng -- and to counter such tendencies through resumed contact. If we are to attract China into substantive regional security talks and structures, it is imperative to enlist early on the sympathetic understanding of the Chinese military command.

Our objective ought not be the resumption of U.S.-China military technological cooperation (i.e., in support of China's modernization of its defensive weapons systems). With the Soviet/Russian threat vanished, with uncertainties and worries among China's neighbors, with obvious political and security implications for Taiwan, and without any political consensus in the U.S. favoring such cooperation, there is no overriding national purpose served by placing this on our agenda.

As with human rights and trade, we should coordinate closely with U.S. allies, particularly Japan and the EC, to parallel our pressures.

-- Nonproliferation. With an export-driven economic strategy and a military-industrial complex dependent in part on off-budget revenues, China exports sensitive technologies and military systems. Many of our nonproliferation efforts, such as in the Middle East, require PRC cooperation. The U.S. faces a decision point in the near future as evidence builds that Beijing may have transferred M-11 missiles or related equipment to Pakistan. We need to deal with China's significant and worrisome military and nuclear supplier relationship with Iran. China's participation

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is required to follow through on the President's Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty initiative.

Process

- o Fall: Another circuit of bilaterals headed by Under Secretary Davis to Beijing. The principal mission of her late July mission was: (1) to brief the Chinese on the President's CTBT initiative, seeking Chinese participation in the nuclear testing moratorium and willingness to enter into negotiations aimed at a Treaty, and (2) to press home our concerns that China may have transferred M-11 components to Pakistan last November in violation of its commitment to abide by MTCR guidelines and parameters. U/S Davis made little headway on the M-11 issue, with the Chinese insisting, as they have previously, that their MTCR commitment was solemn and remains firm, and that no transfer in violation of that commitment occurred.

- o Fall: An interagency process would lead to a determination on sanctions. We should also set a strategy to achieve the following:
 - obtaining Chinese agreement to tighten adherence to the MTCR.

 - inducing China to participate in South Asian regional security talks with the U.S., India, Pakistan and Russia (when such talks would explicitly have on the table Indian and Pakistani missile systems, whether domestically produced or imported).

 - exploring Chinese willingness to resume unconditionally the ACME (Arms Control in the Middle East) talks.

 - pressing China to adopt the Nuclear Supplier's Group Guidelines.

- o A visit to China by South Asia Assistant Secretary Raphel, assuming the Chinese are cooperating on the

South Asia nuclear strategy. The visit would focus principally on modalities for a five-power conference on security on the Indian sub-continent. A/S Raphael would also press our nonproliferation concerns generally.

- o Visit to China by DOD A/S Freeman aimed at renewing dialogue on strategic issues and pressing for resolution of our proliferation concerns. It would be the vehicle for resumption of uniformed military-to-military contacts, through inclusion in the Freeman party of at least one flag officer. As with other high-level visits, A/S Freeman would utilize the opportunity to press our human rights and other concerns on his Chinese military interlocutors.

- o Late 1993 or early 1994: Assuming Chinese responsiveness to the Freeman visit, as measured by significant progress on nonproliferation issues, a visit by DOD Deputy Secretary Perry and/or a senior JCS officer might be scheduled. The purpose would be as described above under "policy." The specific agenda would be shaped according to our principal requirements at the time. Whether or not such high-level visits are warranted and thus possible, we should move to initiate lower-level military-to-military exchanges.

(3) ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL

Policy

China is already our seventh ranking trade partner, and as many as 143,000 American jobs are dependent on U.S. exports. According to some calculations, at current relative growth rates total Chinese output could exceed Japan's by the end of the decade. China's importance as a trading partner is therefore certain to expand further. A successful U.S. effort to boost American economic and job growth through international commerce depends on a healthy trade relationship with the PRC. China is an important market for U.S. grain, aircraft, fertilizer, cotton, electric machinery and computers, wood, pulp and paper, professional and scientific equipment, iron, and steel; Chinese imports of U.S. goods in 1992 totalled \$7.5 billion, up 19

percent over 1991. Because Chinese exports to the U.S. rose even more rapidly, however, the U.S. trade deficit grew to \$18.3 billion. The U.S. is also one of China's leading sources of foreign investment, although relatively weak growth since 1989 may put the U.S. at a comparative disadvantage to China's Asian trading partners.

China presents increasing high technology trade opportunities which other Western countries are pursuing in the absence of a larger U.S. presence. U.S. producers in the aerospace, computer and telecommunications industries are some of the highest volume U.S. exporters to China, and they are eager to expand their current markets.

The PRC has made important moves to accommodate the global trading system, although China nevertheless maintains a broad range of trading practices which conflict with international standards. The process of drawing Beijing fully into the global trading order is likely to be protracted and contentious.

The rise of a Greater China through the ongoing integration of the economies of southern China, Taiwan and Hong Kong also influences U.S. interests. While in certain respects beneficial to regional stability and prosperity, this process has reduced our ability to pressure China economically without harming Hong Kong and Taiwan and complicates important trade issues such as prevention of illegal textile transshipments.

Process: As sketched above, all exchanges would feature prominently our core message on human rights and renewal of MFN.

- o Fall: Overseen by the NEC, an interagency process will create a commercial/trade strategy for dealing with China, similar to the one done for Japan.

Deputy USTR Barshefsky visits China. The principal objective would be to address IPR implementation, and to make sufficient progress in market access talks to avert the need for imposing trade sanctions on the anniversary of our market access agreement and the statutory deadline for action. Depending on progress, we might

float -- or offer on the spot -- the possibility of accelerating our negotiations over China's GATT entry.

- o Secretary Bentsen participates in World Bank/IMF meeting. The Secretary would seek to engage the Chinese on an important issue (though not a core agenda one): exchange rate manipulation. Revivification of the Joint Economic Commission (JEC) ought not be considered unless specific goals and prospective achievements can be identified well in advance. He would also deliver a hard-hitting message -- speaking with the authority of a senior Administration official as well as a long-time, respected U.S. Senator -- on human rights.
- o Late 1993: Business delegation to China led by Commerce Secretary Brown and/or resumption of the JCCT in Seattle following the APEC leaders conference (a scenario proposed by the Chinese). In either case, close vetting by the IWG group and approval by NSC would be required to establish that core interests were being advanced. Secretary Brown would presumably have neither the time nor the inclination to lead a business delegation to China were there not the solid prospect of resulting contracts for participating firms. In the case of a JCCT, the forum would need in effect to be reinvented -- that is, altered from the ceremonial gathering of years past to an issues- and results-oriented conclave. One possibility -- assuming that this chip had not been played during USTR discussions -- and a logical one for trade talks in a JCCT chaired by Secretary Brown, would be to propose an initial TDA project to support U.S. interests bidding on the potentially lucrative Guangzhou metro project. Such a project fits our desired profile: high-tech, high revenue, and downstream potential estimated by some in the \$300 million range.

V. CONCLUSION: A DIFFICULT CHALLENGE

We should recognize that implementing this strategy will be very difficult and complex. The Chinese are always hard to move on human rights issues, and they have recently cracked down on

SECRET/NODIS

-18-

some dissidents in Shanghai and elsewhere. The M-11 problem casts a large, immediate shadow. Our trade deficit continues to balloon. Tibet, Taiwan, and Hong Kong -- all relating to Chinese notions of sovereignty -- could cause new strains in our relations. And the political jockeying for succession to Deng could limit Chinese flexibility. Such elements will make progress in negotiations arduous, and could inflame Congressional attitudes.

SECRET/NODIS

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-19-

Drafted: EAP/CM: DWKeyser
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Cleared: EAP:WLord
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All other clearances assumed from IWG process and Deputies
Committee Meeting. See EAP/CM Hart draft 6/15/93 and following.
Participants in that process were:

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EAP/RA:BGray
NEA/RA:LWard
SA/RA:MClemmon
H:AKirkpatrick
EB/BTA/ODC:DRMoran
HA:PHotze
INR/EAP/CH:JJTkacik
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USTR: Ira Wolf

Treasury: Meg Lundsager
USIA: George Beasley
ACDA: Joe Smaldone

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ANNEX I

NOTIONAL SCHEDULE
SENIOR USG MEETINGS WITH CHINESE
JULY - DECEMBER 1993

[NOTE: The following is intended to be illustrative rather than a compendium of visits already planned or deemed essential. Please see text of paper for justification and sequencing considerations. END NOTE.]

July 25	Secretary Christopher met with Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Qian at ASEAN PMC (Singapore)
July 26-27	Under Secretary (T) of State Dr. Davis met in Beijing with Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu and others to discuss proliferation issues.
August-	USTR Kantor and/or Deputy USTR Barskefsky market access bilateral in Beijing September
Sept. 1-13	Assistant Secretary (HA) Shattuck will visit China, including Lhasa, to press our human rights message.
September	SA Assistant Secretary Raphael visit to China to explore cooperation on proliferation on South Asian subcontinent.
September	Secretary Christopher meets with Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Qian during UNGA (New York); possible invitation to Washington
September-October	DOD A/S Freeman, accompanied by flag officer, hold security bilaterals in Beijing
September-October	Secretary Bentsen participation in World Bank/IMF talks.
October	Under Secretary Wirth holds talks in Beijing on human rights, democracy, environment

SECRET/NO DIS

SECRET/NODIS

- 2 -

October USIA Director Joseph Duffey visits Beijing: emphasizes need for freedom of broadcasting, underscores human rights agenda, and discusses possible new areas for cultural cooperation

October-November Commerce Secretary Brown leads trade delegation to China, or chairs JCCT in Seattle

November Acting ACDA Director Graham visits China to follow up on arms control, regional security initiatives

November Chinese President Jiang Zemin attends APEC leaders meeting in Seattle; possible bilateral with President and/or possible visit to Washington

December-January DOD Deputy Secretary Perry visits China -- assuming sufficient progress -- to follow up on security dialogue. Senior JCS officer may attend.

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Annex II

U.S. Policy Towards Tibet

Tibet presents us with special problems. First, Chinese suspicions of U.S. motives in Tibet are linked to the legacy of active U.S. support, during the 1950's and 1960's, for Tibetan insurgents opposing PRC control. Secondly, our support for religious freedom in Tibet must take into account Tibet's tradition of combining religious and political power and its ongoing agitation for independence. Thirdly, many aspects of Tibet's traditional, pre-modern culture are undergoing change as a result of a modernization process made inevitable by domestic economic reform and the opening to the outside world. Tibet's society, religion and history are little understood in the U.S. This has led to romanticized views of Tibet among domestic U.S. audiences, views which have a powerful influence upon policy.

Our role must be to convince the Chinese that resolution of the Tibetan problem is essential if there is to be a long-term, healthy relationship between the U.S. and China. We can only do this by making clear to the Chinese that we will not in any way try to shape or dictate the terms of the compromise nor will we do anything to undermine the compromise by giving encouragement to Tibetan independence activists. But we must also make clear that Tibet, unlike for instance Taiwan, is not a problem whose solution can be deferred. Once the Dalai Lama passes from the scene or, as he has threatened, removes himself from the process, then the best and perhaps only chance for peaceful compromise is gone. And the consequences for China, for Tibet, and for the U.S. will be great.

The Embassy argues for a U.S. Tibetan policy which is both realistic and active. Such a policy would have several components:

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- 2 -

1. American values and American public sentiment require us vigorously to promote respect for human rights.
2. However, it is not in U.S. national interest to support Tibetan independence in the face of Chinese claims to sovereignty and particularly when every U.N. member nation supports the Chinese position. We would be responsible for encouraging separatist elements in Tibet to rebel and risk sparking ethnic violence.
3. We must sensitize Beijing to the problems created by the movement of Han Chinese into Tibet. There is no conclusive evidence that this influx of economic migrants is a result of an official government policy. Nevertheless, the Han compete with Tibetans for economic opportunity and their growing presence is rapidly altering the distinctive cultural and religious life of Tibet. The fear among Tibetans, as articulated recently by the Dalai Lama in exile, is that the ongoing demographic changes will "further reduce Tibetans into an insignificant minority in their own country." But we should also recognize that this phenomenon is limited mainly to Lhasa, and the Dalai Lama considers large parts of China to be part of Tibet.
4. We must persuade both sides to renew the dialogue between the Dalai Lama and the PRC with the goal of genuine autonomy for Tibet within China.

The Chinese believe that the Tibetans, like most other minority groups in China, will settle down once foreigners stop intervening. Tibetan activists believe that through foreign intervention (economic sanctions, international condemnation of China, etc.) Tibet can become independent. Both sides are wrong. The problems facing Tibet can only be resolved through negotiation and eventual compromise.

Compromise will not be easy to reach. It will require the Chinese to accept the that there is a nearly indestructible core of Tibetan resistance which will always struggle against rule from Beijing. Tibetans must accept that the concept of a "Greater Tibet," which would include large sections of neighboring Chinese provinces where Tibetans are and have been outnumbered by Han and other minorities for generations, is not achievable. Tibet is a small corner of a great power triangle. The survival of Tibetan culture and society will always depend upon compromise, especially with China.

CONFIDENTIAL

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- 3 -

While any Chinese leader or government can negotiate such a compromise, only one Tibetan can deliver the Tibetan side--the Dalai Lama.

In our expanded dialogue with Beijing, we should take advantage of every opportunity to press the Chinese on Tibetan human rights problems. We should:

- urge the Chinese to use restraint in dealing with peaceful demonstrations in Tibet;
- encourage improved treatment of prisoners, the end of abuses, and torture and ICRC access to Tibetan prisons;
- promote religious freedom in Tibet, particularly the lifting of limits on the number of monks;
- urge improved access for foreign visitors and particularly human rights groups to Tibet and;
- encourage the Chinese to resume their dialogue with the Dalai Lama.

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-1-

CHINA STRATEGY FOR 1993-1994:
IMPLEMENTING THE PRESIDENT'S MFN EXECUTIVE ORDER

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Overview: U.S. Interests and Strategy in China

Constructive U.S. engagement with China is essential to realize the President's vision for a new Pacific community; to deal effectively with regional security issues including Hong Kong's 1997 transition and Taiwan's status; to sustain our efforts internationally to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; to promote more democratic and open societies globally; to boost American economic and job growth through a healthy trade relationship with China; and to deal with such thorny issues as alien smuggling and environmental degradation.

China is an emerging great power with the potential to contribute enormously to regional and global stability and economic prosperity. It is also grappling with huge problems; an antiquated political system that could buckle or break during the looming succession struggle; a large and increasing "floating" population of over one hundred million; an overheated economy; and a gradual deterioration in central control over the provinces which is feeding the centrifugal tendencies in China which have often led to regional separation in China's history. The results of a problem-ridden succession would have a deleterious affect on stability in China and the region generally.

The challenge to U.S. policy is to channel China's building momentum into constructive channels, bolstering prospects for political and economic liberalization internally as well responsible Chinese policies externally in the maintenance of world peace and stability, in non-proliferation, trade, and the environment. The ascendancy of the market oriented sector in China is striking at the core of the communist system, creating new and influential constituencies and interest groups pressing for political and economic relaxation. It is in the U.S. interest to see this evolution continue. Externally, U.S. support for an involved and engaged China, not an isolated China, as called for by President Clinton in his July 10 Seoul speech, would accelerate this positive and historic evolution underway in China.

Pursuant to these goals, the United States should engage creatively with the Chinese in pursuit of our objectives enunciated in the President's May 28 Executive Order on MFN. Earlier in the year, a Presidential China policy review (NSC-11 summary at tab 3) laid the intellectual and strategic foundation for our reengagement, identifying as core U.S. interests China's continued economic growth, its integration into the world community, its cooperation in building a new international order, and its peaceful evolution toward a more democratic and humane society. In the next ten months before MFN renewals, we

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need to achieve sufficient concrete progress to permit a Presidential finding that China's MFN status should be extended.

As we chart our course, we should bear in mind the element of time. Frontloading of our talks is essential for two reasons: (1) Deng Xiaoping's increasingly precarious health inspires Chinese leadership caution, and reflexive nationalistic impulses, as the succession drama begins to unfold; and (2) the Chinese are attuned to the content, nuances and pressures of the annual MFN debate, and are determined -- also for reasons of "face" and nationalism -- to avoid any impression they caved to Washington to retain their MFN status.

Our Tactics for 1993-1994

We begin our reengagement with China from a position of domestic strength: the strategy, philosophy and specific goals contained in the May 28 Executive Order followed extremely close and harmonious consultations with the Congress. There is consensus that human rights progress is our top priority; that the specific areas named in the E.O are the correct ones; that these are appropriately linked to 1994 MFN extension for China; and that China's MFN status should be preserved if possible. There is also broad support for our approach to proliferation and economic/trade concerns: pressing ahead through all available mechanisms and channels, at the level necessary to do the job, but delinking Chinese performance from MFN renewal.

We will implement our strategy through meticulous, regular management by a senior interagency working group. Periodic meetings will be held to assess progress, to review strategy, to consider carrots and sticks which might be employed, to plot and undertake post-mortems on high-level visits, and to approve proposed Cabinet secretary and deputy exchanges.

Human Rights

It is therefore imperative that we engage rapidly with the Chinese. Our general approach should be to explain to China our desire for a constructive, mutually beneficial relationship; to reiterate our interest in a stable and economically prosperous China; and to offer inducements necessary to inspire a serious dialogue including Chinese concessions. But our first priority, and our sharpest message to the Chinese, must be human rights: we are (as Americans) serious about achieving progress, and without this progress MFN cannot and will not be renewed. All dialogue with the Chinese -- certainly Executive Branch, and optimally Congressional and business also -- should make that simple point clearly and consistently. Secretary Christopher underscored it to Foreign Minister Qian in Singapore recently; Assistant Secretary (Human Rights) John Shattuck will elaborate it during planned discussions in Beijing in early September; and we will emphasize it strongly in anticipated sessions with the Chinese

at the fall UNGA, at the Seattle APEC leaders conference, and in the course of our planned resumption of military-to-military dialogue. We will also brief Congressional and corporate leaders in advance of their China trips -- both to enlist their understanding of our policy, and to urge that they reinforce our own message.

Nonproliferation/Strategic Issues

With the cessation of U.S.-China military contacts, isolation has bred suspicion within the PLA about U.S. intentions. China through the 1990's will pose only a limited direct threat to the U.S.; we must, however, ensure that ongoing military modernization does not change this calculus. China's modernization evokes rising security concerns among its neighbors -- including Taiwan. Aside from the economic consequences, Hong Kong's reversion to China in 1997 will add considerably to China's ability to project power into the East Asian region. Furthermore, China is a worrisome exporter of sensitive technologies and military systems; its cooperation (in the U.N. and regionally) is required to strengthen and expand nonproliferation regimes in the Middle East, South Asia and elsewhere; and it is a significant nuclear power, whose participation in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) we solicit and require. Currently, we face a major decision point as evidence builds that Beijing may have transferred M-11 missiles or related equipment to Pakistan last year in contravention of its commitment to abide by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Finally, as China enters a sensitive political transition period in which the armed forces will play a crucial role -- for stability or otherwise -- we need to broaden our exposure to Chinese military leaders and their thinking.

To accomplish these complex and interrelated objectives, we need to engage senior Chinese security policy civilian leaders as well as military leaders. Key decision making authority on the entire array of strategic and nonproliferation issues outlined above rests with a small group of senior military officers and defense civilians in their sixties and seventies. Under Secretary Davis launched our senior-level dialogue in Beijing on July 26-27, pressing for a solution of the M-11 transfer contretemps, emphasizing that the U.S. seeks a cooperative relationship, but noting that our law obliges us to impose sanctions if the MTCR guidelines and parameters were exceeded. We will need to follow up that opening round with an intensive effort to settle the M-11 issue ideally in a way that advances our cooperation in such nonproliferation areas as, MTCR, the Nuclear Suppliers' Group, the CTBT, restraining arms proliferation in the Middle East, and influencing the North Koreans to forego their nuclear ambitions (the Chinese have already been helpful in this endeavor). We will plan to resume a strategic dialogue (i.e., on common regional security concerns) in the fall through a visit to China by Defense Assistant Secretary Freeman and an accompanying flag officer.

This delegation would, of course, press our human rights agenda in the course of its presentation to Chinese defense/military interlocutors.

Economic/Commercial Issues

China is our seventh-ranking trade partner, and some 143,000 American jobs are already dependent on U.S. exports. A successful U.S. effort to boost American economic and job growth through international commerce hinges importantly on our ability to win an expanding share of the booming China market. Chinese imports of U.S. goods in 1992 totalled \$7.5 billion, up 19 percent over 1991. But because Chinese exports to the U.S. rose even more rapidly, the U.S. trade deficit grew to \$18.3 billion. China presents increasing high technology trade opportunities -- which Japan and other western countries are pursuing successfully in the absence of U.S. competition. American businesses complain that they are competitively disadvantaged by the array of formal and informal post-Tiananmen sanctions: cessation of TDA financing and OPIC guarantees, export controls (and further sanctions imposed legislatively) on high-tech items (e.g., a Cray computer sale long held up for the Chinese State Meteorological Agency) and nuclear industry plants and components, and further controls on satellite launch services and dual-use items. We are negotiating with the Chinese currently on market access and China's entry into GATT. Illegal Chinese textile transshipments loom as a major, and growing dilemma for us -- even as our ability to deal with the problem is hampered by the adverse implications of any U.S. countermeasures for Hong Kong and Taiwan interests.

In the coming months, an interagency group should create a U.S. trade strategy to deal with China, as we have for Japan early in this Administration. A review of our export control regime could be part of the exercise. Sequenced Sino-American visits beginning in the summer and fall would implement it, including a trip to China by senior USTR officials (perhaps Mr. Kantor), Commerce officials (possibly Secretary Brown under the right circumstances), and Treasury officials to begin to deal with these issues. The annual meeting of the Sino-American Joint Committee on Commerce and Trade will be hosted by Secretary Brown in November in Washington.

We should recognize that implementing this strategy will be very difficult and complex. The Chinese are always hard to move on human rights issues, and they have recently cracked down on some dissidents in Shanghai and elsewhere. The M-11 problem casts a large, immediate shadow. Our trade deficit continues to balloon. Tibet, Taiwan, and Hong Kong -- all relating to Chinese notions of sovereignty -- could cause new strains in our relations. And the political jockeying for succession to Deng could limit Chinese flexibility. Such elements will make progress in negotiations arduous, and could inflame Congressional attitudes.

Attachments

- Tab 1 Annex I - China Policy Strategy Paper
- Tab 2 Annex II - Notional Schedule for Senior-Level Dialogue
- Tab 3 Annex III - Excerpts from NSC-11 (3/93):U.S. Objectives
- Tab 4 Annex IV - Human Rights Policy
- Tab 5 Annex V - U.S. Policy Toward Tibet

CHINA STRATEGY FOR 1993-1994: Executive Summary

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CHINA STRATEGY FOR 1993-1994:
IMPLEMENTING THE PRESIDENT'S MFN EXECUTIVE ORDER

I. OVERVIEW: U.S. INTERESTS IN CHINA

When President Carter made the decision to normalize diplomatic relations with Beijing effective January 1979, his premise -- stated publicly -- was that the United States has an enduring interest in a stable and modernizing China. That premise has not altered despite the disappearance of a common security threat, sweeping change in global political alignments, significant evolution of China's political/economic system, and the emergence of China as a regional -- prospectively global -- economic and military force.

In his recent speeches at Waseda University in Tokyo and at the National Assembly in Seoul, President Clinton elaborated a new, ambitious vision for U.S. involvement with the Asia and Pacific region, which included an engaged -- not isolated -- China. The President called for creation of a New Pacific Community built on shared strength, shared prosperity and a shared commitment to democratic values. In so doing, he cited specific priorities including stronger efforts to combat proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; new regional dialogues on a broad spectrum of security challenges; and support for more democratic, more open societies.

Comprehensive U.S. engagement with China is the sine qua non for realization of the President's vision for a New Pacific Community. Clearly, our efforts to deal effectively with proliferation and to launch successfully an Asian regional security dialogue will hinge upon the extent and conviction of China's involvement. More broadly, regional stability and progress -- including Hong Kong's 1997 transition and the status of Taiwan -- will be intimately linked with China's course during the 1990s. US policy should be geared to channeling China's building momentum into constructive channels bolstering, rather than undermining, regional and global stability, creation of a more effective, enduring non-proliferation regime and a liberalized world trading system. A successful U.S. effort to boost American economic and job growth through exports will depend upon a healthy trade relationship with China.

The stakes are enormous. If China holds successfully to its present course, it will emerge early in the next century as

a budding superpower. But if China's reformist, market-oriented and outward-looking policies falter or fail, one can foresee a different and distressing prospect for the world's most dynamic region: Chinese domestic instability, growing concerns in the region regarding China's intentions, economic disruption of commercial relationships, a deteriorating Chinese migration/refugee dilemma, an impulse among China's neighbors to plan for the worst through arms buildups, and a shattered architecture for dealing peacefully and collegially with regional and transnational issues.

Presidential Review Directive/NSC-11, completed in March, systematically developed the case for comprehensive engagement with China and laid the intellectual and policy foundation for the President's May 28 Executive Order on MFN for China. PRD/NSC-11 identified the following core U.S. interests in China: continued Chinese economic growth, increased integration into the world community, cooperation in building a new international order, and peaceful change toward a more democratic, humane society. The President's May 28 Executive Order spelled out more concrete policy goals for the year leading up to the 1994 decision on further extension of China's MFN status.

In sum: our long-range strategy toward China must be animated by a conceptual framework designed to permit achievement of U.S. national security objectives through engagement with this important emerging power; our tactical approach over the next year must lay the cornerstone for such engagement through concrete progress keyed to the areas specified in the President's May 28 Executive Order.

II. STRATEGY FOR THE NEXT YEAR

The Agenda:

The President's May 28 MFN Executive Order -- taken after unprecedentedly close and harmonious consultations with the Congressional leadership -- and his parallel MFN report to the Congress specify that 1994 MFN renewal will be conditioned upon certification of overall, significant progress on human rights. The President delinked proliferation and commercial issues from the 1994 MFN decision, but directed that our core national objectives in these areas be vigorously pursued through existing channels and utilizing all available leverage. It is crucial that we achieve progress in these areas on the merits; furthermore, as a practical matter,

failure to do so will impede our ability to manage successfully next year's Congressional MFN debate even in the event of certifiable human rights gains. Additionally, we need to address urgently with the Chinese through appropriate diplomatic and law enforcement channels the growing problem of illegal migration. Finally, there exists a rich agenda -- and difficult challenges -- to pursue with the Chinese in such areas as environmental protection, U.N. peacekeeping/peacemaking operations, and regional security issues.

The Element of Time:

We are obliged to register meaningful progress on our human rights agenda in sufficient time to permit a favorable determination on extension of China's MFN status. This means that we need results no later than early spring 1994, but optimally much earlier. First, members of Congress have made clear that they will call hearings at that time to weigh for themselves the success of the Administration's approach; some have hinted at an intent to call for a mid-year review in December. Secondly, the Chinese themselves are more likely to be responsive earlier than later, for a pair of reasons: (a) because they are now attuned to the content and nuances of the annual MFN debate, and determined to avoid any impression that they have caved to U.S. pressure "solely" to retain MFN status; and (b) because Deng Xiaoping's increasingly precarious health inspires Chinese leadership caution as the succession drama begins to unfold.

This argues for early engagement with the Chinese. This should be done at the levels of seniority necessary to achieve our objectives. It also means we should front-load our agenda. We should concomitantly brief Congress soon on our thinking, so as to answer or mute any criticism that we have embarked on a "business-as-usual" approach. This should not be a hard sell; members of Congress have increasingly come to see the merit in a policy of careful engagement. Some six to eight Congressional delegations are finalizing plans for August travel to China. It is particularly important that we avail ourselves of the opportunity of their travel: to outline in detail our conceptual framework, and to prime travelling members to deliver tough and concrete messages identical to our own.

Sharpening the Message:

It is imperative that we speak with one voice in: (a) underscoring our desire for a constructive, mutually beneficial

relationship; (b) reiterating our interest in a stable and economically prosperous China; (c) offering necessary inducements to inspire a serious dialogue, and meaningful Chinese concessions; and, without pulling punches, (d) conveying clearly to the Chinese that human rights is our overriding priority since they will lose MFN absent significant overall progress in the areas specified by the President.

Such a message must be delivered unambiguously and consistently; by Executive Branch and Congressional visitors alike; and to a broad spectrum and multiple levels of Chinese leaders.

Channels and Mechanisms for Dialogue:

Our objective is progress; we should employ the channels -- and level of seniority -- essential to achieve it. Conversely, we cannot afford to waste motion, blur the message, and indulge in dialogue at high levels which does not promise commensurate results.

It follows, inter alia, from this logic that:

- Cabinet-level dialogue with the Chinese should occur only when this is the best tactic (as it sometimes is) to force action.
- Military-to-military dialogue should be resumed, at appropriate (e.g., Assistant Secretary of Defense, with a party to include a flag officer) levels, given the importance of our nonproliferation, regional security, and Taiwan Strait interests, and given the reality that our desired interlocutors -- Chinese senior military leaders -- only rarely make themselves available for U.S. civilians.
- USG visitors to China should be selected with an eye to authoritativeness rather than quantity, and with an explicit goal in each instance of achieving progress on a core agenda item.
- Resurrection of the three U.S.-China joint commissions (Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade; Joint Economic Commission; and Joint Commission on Science and Technology) should be predicated on their accomplishment of specific objectives, and deferred insofar as they promise merely the ceremonial or the vague.

Carrots and Sticks:

The process of engagement unfolding over the next year, in implementation of the President's Executive Order, should be conceived as a protracted and complex negotiating process. That is, the Chinese have consistently resisted offering concessions where they see no gains for themselves. From our perspective, the Chinese will in fact gain significantly from unilateral initiatives in the areas we have identified: a substantially improving human rights record will produce a more benign international image; meticulous observation of international nonproliferation regimes will enhance China's own security in the long run; and progress on our trade agenda will facilitate China's entry into GATT and expand its commercial opportunities in the U.S. and elsewhere. We should make this case repeatedly to the Chinese.

Chinese diplomatic strategy has tended to intricate tradeoffs and explicit quid pro quos. Chinese leaders have not been shy about presenting their own agenda, and indeed their own concept for precise linkage of our core interests with China's principal goals. We should be vigilant against Chinese offers designed to draw us into a classically (time-consuming) negotiation situation.

MFN renewal is, of course, our principal leverage, and the primary inducement to an improved Chinese performance on human rights. We might also consider employing, when appropriate, the following illustrative types of bargaining chips:

- GATT accession: We could accelerate the pace of our negotiations.
- High-tech sales: We might, for example, approve sale of the Cray computer to the Chinese State Meteorological Agency as a "humanitarian gesture" (in support of Chinese weather forecasting to avert natural disasters).
- Trade incentives: Reopening of TDA funding is particularly attractive inasmuch as U.S. business competitiveness in the Chinese market would be enhanced. Later, given proper conditions, we might offer to restore Chinese eligibility for OPIC guarantees.

- High Level Dialogue: Vice Premier/Foreign Minister Qian Qichen's attendance at UNGA, and President Jiang Zemin's prospective attendance at the November APEC leaders meeting in Seattle suggest possibilities: special attention during their visits, an invitation to Washington, a meeting with the President, and so on. Given sufficient progress we might hold in reserve an invitation to another Chinese leader, perhaps senior Vice Premier Zhu Rongji, to pay an official visit to the U.S. early in 1994.

On the "stick" side, besides the ultimate weapon of MFN revocation (albeit a single-shot, non-repeating weapon) we have available options including:

- Special 301: This might be employed in connection with failure to implement the IPR agreement, or on textile transshipments. We should consider the tactical advantage in wielding 301: a method both to send a firm message to China, and to permit us to avoid sending a sterner message with predictable adverse consequences for our own commercial and strategic interests.
- Legislation on Transfer of Nuclear Materials: Along with executive determinations, U.S. laws specify sanctions in violation of NPT commitments.
- Helms Amendment Sanctions for an M-11 Category I Transfer: If invoked, this amendment would block a significant range of Chinese exports to the U.S.
- Chinese Olympics: Should China be chosen as host, we will gain six years of leverage through the possibility that the US would refuse to participate, because of PRC human rights practices. The Chinese will assume that, as before the 1990 Moscow games, many other nations would follow a U.S. lead in pulling out.

Imposing any of these sanctions, however, carries risks: of Chinese retaliation deleterious to our own larger interests; of complicating our efforts to implement the President's MFN

Executive Order; and of prejudicing our chances to engage the Chinese constructively on a broad spectrum of issues.

Managing the Process:

The importance of the issues, as well as the complexity of the options, suggest that it would be advantageous to manage implementation of our China strategy via periodic review by a senior-level steering group. Such policy review should include: regular (perhaps quarterly) IWG assessment of progress; ad hoc IWG consideration of significant proposed visits to China (or dialogue elsewhere with the Chinese) and assessment of outcomes; particularly careful vetting of proposed military-to-military dialogue, with NSC approval required for any dialogue at or above the assistant secretary level or flag officer rank; and NSC approval for any Cabinet secretary or deputy secretary visit to China.

III. CHINESE REALITIES

U.S. policy over the next year will have to accommodate important, potentially disruptive events in the PRC. Even if paramount leader Deng Xiaoping does not die or become incapacitated, his gradual physical decline will continue, and maneuvering over the succession will reduce Beijing's capacity to make tough decisions on sensitive policy questions. Second, the overheated, semi-reformed PRC economy will soon undergo a major correction, as authorities are forced to use clumsy administrative techniques to cool surging inflation and other distortions. While some growth will continue and the reform program as a whole survive, these economic measures will complicate the succession struggle, slow key reforms, inhibit efforts to penetrate the Chinese market, and foment some popular discontent. Widespread instability is unlikely: burned once, the PRC authorities have learned a lesson from Tiananmen and will be especially vigilant. Under the best circumstances, however, U.S. policy goals -- especially those regarding human rights -- may be harder to sell in Beijing. The PRC delegation's obstructionism at the Vienna human rights conference presages Beijing's attitude in this area.

At the same time, China is feeling its new strength. Both double-digit economic growth and revived military modernization are boosting Beijing's prominence in the region. U.S. leverage is declining as China's strengthens and as Beijing's economic bonds to the other dynamic Asian economies and the EC continue to deepen. Strategically, we are no longer needed as a

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counterweight to the Soviets, although China still tacitly supports our military presence in the region as a hedge against Japan.

IV. THE PROCESS: SETTING IN MOTION OUR CHINA STRATEGY FOR 1993-4

We should move swiftly, in light of the considerations outlined above, to set in motion our strategy for achieving U.S. China policy objectives over the nine months remaining before the MFN decision. Synergistic advantages will accrue from moving concurrently in five areas: (1) NSC channel, (2) Department of State and Embassy Beijing channel, (3) [REDACTED] (4) Congressional and business channels, and (5) high-level engagement, in Beijing and elsewhere. The process will necessarily be a dynamic one, adjusting and even altering direction as dictated by periodic assessments of results. The following outline is therefore intended to be illustrative rather than definitive.

A. NSC Channel.

National Security Adviser Lake, with Assistant Secretary Lord, would launch the strategy from the White House by calling in Chinese Ambassador Li Daoyu to outline our approach, our objectives, and our set of proposed visits and exchanges over the coming six months. In that discussion, NSA Lake would underscore the need for concrete, significant progress well in advance of next year's MFN renewal debate, and in advance of any Congressional mid-term review.

B. State Department/Embassy Beijing Channel.

EAP Assistant Secretary Ambassador Lord and Ambassador Roy in Beijing would play the critical roles in implementing and assessing the strategy as it unfolds. They would regularly deliver our core message (to Ambassador Li Daoyu and to Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu respectively) on human rights and other principal concerns associated with renewal of MFN; preview for Ambassador Li and VFM Liu our objectives in advance of each high-level meeting with the Chinese; assure that all senior Executive Branch officials preparing for dialogue with the Chinese understand and convey that message; and encourage members of Congress and American businessmen to articulate that same message in their separate dialogues with Chinese leaders.

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6)

D. Principal Constituencies: Business and Congress.

Our strategy should be to engage Congress and the business community early, and candidly, in our effort to drive home to the Chinese our core message: MFN will not be renewed absent progress on the human rights agenda specified in the President's Executive Order. Other elements of our strategy should also be briefed, as appropriate, emphasizing always that our goal is a constructive, mutually beneficial relationship.

Such a strategy serves multiple purposes: winning good will (if not always complete support) from those briefed; raising the odds that our core message will be delivered with clarity to the PRC by a broad spectrum of China's American guests and interlocutors; and reinforcing the gravity of our own message that MFN revocation is a serious matter (since the Chinese will understand that we have briefed other constituencies, and sought to maintain a strong sense of common purpose).

For the business community, we need to be realistic: relatively few corporate executives will be prepared to argue strenuously for a better Chinese human rights performance on the merits, but a significant number might be impelled to argue for a better performance lest MFN be withdrawn and their own commercial interests damaged.

With respect to the Hill, to those who have been skeptical of our resolve, our briefings will underscore our commitment to act. At the same time, it will energize those whose constituents have a strong stake in preservation of MFN. The result will be a multiplier effect on the Chinese (who will note that pro-MFN-extension members of Congress are running

scared) and will, through activation of the non-revocation forces, provide the President greater maneuvering room prior to June 3, 1994 with respect to the precise calculus of "significant overall progress" achieved to that point.

We should take the following implementing actions:

- Beginning in August, schedule meetings with Ambassador Lord for CEOs of companies represented by the U.S.-China Task Force and U.S.-China Business Council.
- Assure that we reach the maximum possible number of members of Congress (and staff members) planning travel to China during the August recess. The NSC and Department of State should closely coordinate their efforts in this respect.
- Continue, at regular intervals, to brief key Hill members and staffers on the results of our policy of engagement with China.

E. High-Level Visits.

(1) HUMAN RIGHTS

Policy

Chinese human rights practices violate internationally-recognized standards of behavior established in fundamental instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which China, as a U.N. member, has accepted. PRC compliance with these obligations would serve both Chinese and U.S. interests. Without seeking to (or imagining that it could) impose its political system and values on the PRC, the U.S. nevertheless has compelling practical and humanitarian reasons for promotion of Chinese democracy and human rights. An arbitrary, closed Chinese political system over time will be incapable of meeting the challenges of economic and social development, a prerequisite for PRC and regional stability. Democracy also is necessary for China effectively to manage increasingly important global issues, such as trade disputes, refugees/migration, the environment, narcotics, and terrorism. Over time, a more open and democratic China will be an easier country with which to deal and a better partner for the U.S. strategically, politically and in economic terms. An increasingly democratic China will coincide with the emerging democratic trend in Asia, including in Taiwan and South Korea.

Our dialogue with China must underscore, consistently, the requirement that Beijing satisfy the specific conditions in the President's May 28 MFN Executive Order: implementing the prison labor MOU and assuring freedom of emigration, plus (1) adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; (2) accounting for political/religious prisoners from the Democracy Wall and Tiananmen movements; (3) access to prisoners by impartial, respected international organizations; (4) protection of Tibet's distinctive religious and cultural heritage; (5) unimpeded radio and television broadcasts into China.

Process

- o Fall: Assistant Secretary (HA) Shattuck visit to China. Shattuck would emphasize our core message -- no MFN renewal without significant progress; lay out, ideally prioritized, all that we require to demonstrate such progress; stress the particular importance of international access (e.g., by the ICRC) to Chinese prisons, release/accounting of prisoners, and progress toward freedom of expression, assembly and religion; and seek to engage the Chinese in a continuing, frequent dialogue on our human rights agenda.
- o Secretary Christopher meeting with Foreign Minister Qian at UNGA (and possibly in Washington). The Secretary would touch upon all major bilateral and global issues, but on human rights would reiterate the Shattuck message and -- hopefully -- note progress or the potential for same. In that eventuality, he might invite FM Qian to Washington for discussions and a meeting with the President.
- o Visit to Beijing by Under Secretary of State Wirth -- if sufficient progress had been achieved, and assuming that our environmental agenda might also be thereby advanced.
- o Late 1993: President Jiang Zemin (prospectively) represents China at APEC leaders meeting in Seattle. The President, and other APEC partners, can press Jiang for progress in our core concern areas.
- o Early 1994: Visit by Secretary Christopher to Beijing -- only if dramatic progress had been achieved, or the promise of such guaranteed.

(2) NONPROLIFERATION/MILITARY/STRATEGIC

Policy

-- General. China through the 1990s would pose only a limited direct military threat to the U.S.; the U.S. has an interest in ensuring that PRC military modernization does not change this calculus. The U.S. has stated, as a matter of national policy, its "abiding interest" in a peaceful resolution of the situation in the Taiwan Strait; from that interest there follows a need to monitor the activities and intentions of the Chinese military. U.S. policies should continue to promote good PRC-Taiwan relations. A confrontations between the two could force a U.S. response and raise the spectre of some form of U.S. re-involvement in a Chinese civil war. Similar considerations for U.S. military and security planners arise with respect to the 1997 Hong Kong reversion, and the complex territorial dispute in the South China Sea.

With the cessation of U.S.-China military-to-military contacts following June 1989, isolation has bred suspicion, which in turn may be prompting both sides to conceptualize the other as a potential or real enemy. It is important to understand Chinese military attitudes and strategic thinking -- all the more so at a time when the PLA is destined to play a significant role in the political succession to Deng -- and to counter such tendencies through resumed contact. If we are to attract China into substantive regional security talks -- and structures -- it is imperative to enlist early on the sympathetic understanding of the Chinese military command.

Our objective ought not be the resumption of U.S.-China military technological cooperation (i.e., in support of China's modernization of its defensive weapons systems). With the Soviet/Russian threat vanished, with uncertainties and worries among China's neighbors, with obvious political and security implications for Taiwan, and without any political consensus in the U.S. favoring such cooperation, there is no overriding national purpose served by placing this on our agenda.

As with human rights and trade, we should coordinate closely with U.S. allies, particularly Japan and the EC, to parallel our pressures.

-- Nonproliferation. With an export-driven economic strategy and a military-industrial complex dependent in part on off-budget revenues, China is a worrisome exporter of sensitive technologies and military systems. Many of our nonproliferation efforts, such as in the Middle East, require PRC cooperation. The U.S. faces a decision point in the near future as evidence builds that Beijing may have transferred

M-11 missiles or related equipment to Pakistan. We need to deal with China's significant and worrisome military and nuclear supplier relationship with Iran. China's participation is required to follow through on the President's Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty initiative.

Process

- o Late July: Visit by Under Secretary Davis to Beijing. The principal mission was twofold: (1) to brief the Chinese on the President's CTBT initiative, seeking Chinese participation in the nuclear testing moratorium and willingness to enter into negotiations aimed at a Treaty, and (2) to press home our concerns that China may have transferred M-11 components to Pakistan last November in violation of its commitment to abide by MTCR guidelines and parameters. U/S Davis evidently made little headway on the M-11 issue, with the Chinese insisting, as they have previously, that their MTCR commitment was solemn and remains firm, and that no transfer in violation of that commitment occurred.

- o Fall: An interagency process would lead to a determination on sanctions. We should also set a strategy to achieve the following:
 - obtaining Chinese agreement to tighten adherence to the MTCR

 - inducing China to participate in South Asian regional security talks with the U.S., India, Pakistan and Russia (when such talks would explicitly have on the table Indian and Pakistani missile systems, whether domestically produced or imported)

 - exploring Chinese willingness to resume unconditionally the ACME (Arms Control in the Middle East) talks

 - pressing China to adopt the Nuclear Supplier's Group Guidelines

- o A visit to China by South Asia Assistant Secretary Raphel -- assuming that the Chinese are cooperating on the South Asia nuclear strategy. The

visit would focus principally on modalities for a five-power conference on security on the Indian sub-continent. A/S Raphel would also press our nonproliferation concerns generally.

- o Visit to China by DOD A/S Freeman, aimed at renewing dialogue on strategic issues and pressing for resolution of our proliferation concerns. It would be the vehicle for resumption of uniformed military-to-military contacts, through inclusion in the Freeman party of at least one flag officer. As with other high-level visits, A/S Freeman would utilize the opportunity to press our human rights and other concerns on his Chinese military interlocutors.
- o Late 1993 or early 1994: Assuming Chinese responsiveness to the Freeman visit -- as measured by significant progress on nonproliferation issues, a visit by DOD Deputy Secretary Perry and/or a senior JCS officer might be scheduled. The purpose would be as described above under "policy"; the specific agenda would be shaped according to our principal requirements at the time. Whether or not such high-level visits are warranted and thus possible, we should move to initiate lower-level military-to-military exchanges.

(3) ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL

Policy

China is already our seventh ranking trade partner, and as many as 143,000 American jobs are dependent on U.S. exports. According to some calculations, at current relative growth rates total Chinese output could exceed Japan's by the end of the decade. China's importance as a trading partner is therefore certain to expand further. A successful U.S. effort to boost American economic and job growth through international commerce depends on a healthy trade relationship with the PRC. China is an important market for U.S. grain, aircraft, fertilizer, cotton, electric machinery and computers, wood, pulp and paper, professional and scientific equipment, iron, and steel; Chinese imports of U.S. goods in 1992 totalled \$7.5 billion, up 19 percent over 1991. Because Chinese exports to the U.S. rose even more rapidly, however, the U.S. trade deficit grew to \$18.3 billion. The U.S. is also one of China's leading sources of foreign investment, although relatively weak

growth since 1989 may put the U.S. at a comparative disadvantage to China's Asian trading partners.

China presents increasing high technology trade opportunities, which other Western countries are pursuing in the absence of a larger U.S. presence. U.S. producers in the aerospace, computer and telecommunications industries are some of the highest volume U.S. exporters to China, and they are eager to expand their current markets.

The PRC has made important moves to accommodate the global trading system. But China nevertheless maintains a broad range of trading practices which conflict with international standards, and the process of drawing Beijing fully into the global trading order is likely to be protracted and contentious.

The rise of a Greater China through the ongoing integration of the economies of southern China, Taiwan and Hong Kong also influences U.S. interests. While in certain respects beneficial to regional stability and prosperity, this process has reduced our ability to pressure China economically without harming Hong Kong and Taiwan, and it complicates important trade issues, such as prevention of illegal textile transshipments.

Process: As sketched above, all exchanges would feature -- prominently -- our core message on human rights and renewal of MFN.

- o Fall: Overseen by the NEC, an interagency process will create a commercial/trade strategy for dealing with China, similar to the one done for Japan.

Deputy USTR Barshefsky visits China. The principal objective would be to address IPR implementation, and to make sufficient progress in market access talks to avert the need for imposing trade sanctions on the anniversary of our market access agreement and the statutory deadline for action. Depending on progress, we might float -- or offer on the spot -- the possibility of accelerating our negotiations over China's GATT entry.

- o Secretary Bentsen participation in World Bank/IMF meeting. The Secretary would seek to engage the Chinese on an important issue (though not a core agenda one): exchange rate manipulation. Revivification of the Joint Economic Commission (JEC) ought not be considered unless specific goals and

prospective achievements can be identified well in advance. He would also deliver a hard-hitting message -- speaking with the authority of a senior Administration official as well as a long-time, respected U.S. Senator -- on human rights.

- o Late 1993: Business delegation to China led by Commerce Secretary Brown and/or resumption of the JCCT in Seattle following the APEC leaders conference (a scenario proposed by the Chinese). In either case, close vetting by the IWG group and approval by NSC would be required to establish that core interests were being advanced. Secretary Brown would presumably have neither the time nor the inclination to lead a business delegation to China were there not the solid prospect of resulting contracts for participating firms. In the case of a JCCT, the forum would need in effect to be reinvented -- that is, altered from the ceremonial gathering of years past to an issues- and results-oriented conclave. One possibility -- assuming that this chip had not been played during USTR discussions -- and a logical one for trade talks in a JCCT chaired by Secretary Brown, would be to propose an initial TDA project, to support U.S. interests bidding on the potentially lucrative Guangzhou metro project. Such a project fits our desired profile: high-tech, high revenue, and downstream potential estimated by some in the \$300 million range.

V. CONCLUSION: A DIFFICULT CHALLENGE

We should recognize that implementing this strategy will be very difficult and complex. The Chinese are always hard to move on human rights issues, and they have recently cracked down on some dissidents in Shanghai and elsewhere. The M-11 problem casts a large, immediate shadow. Our trade deficit continues to balloon. Tibet, Taiwan, and Hong Kong -- all relating to Chinese notions of sovereignty -- could cause new strains in our relations. And the political jockeying for succession to Deng could limit Chinese flexibility. Such elements will make progress in negotiations arduous, and could inflame Congressional attitudes.

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SECMDR 1105 7/28/93 7-6803

Cleared: EAP:WLord
EAP:PTomsen

All other clearances assumed from IWG process, and Deputies Committee Meeting. See EAP/CM Hart draft 6/15/93 and following. Participants in that process were:

D:JWarlick
P:AO'Neil
T:JBarker
C:RMPerito
E:ADerse
S/P:LKeene
S/NIS:VNewland
EAP/RA/TC:JBorich
EAP/RA:BGray
NEA/RA:LWard
SA/RA:MClemmon
H:AKirkpatrick
EB/BTA/ODC:DRMoran
HA:PHotze
INR/EAP/CH:JJTkacik
IO/UNP:DRRasmussen
L/EAP:JDKovar
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NSC: Kent Wiedemann
DOD Robert Ellis
JCS: Phil Gay
Commerce: Peter Cashman
USTR: Ira Wolf

Treasury: Meg Lundsager
USIA: George Beasley
ACDA: Joe Smaldone

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ANNEX II

NOTIONAL SCHEDULE
SENIOR USG MEETINGS WITH CHINESE
JULY - DECEMBER 1993

[NOTE: The following is intended to be illustrative rather than a compendium of visits already planned or deemed essential. Please see text of paper for justification and sequencing considerations. END NOTE.]

July 25 Secretary Christopher met with Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Qian at ASEAN PMC (Singapore)

July 26-27 Under Secretary (T) of State Dr. Davis met in Beijing with Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu and others to discuss proliferation issues.

August- USTR Kantor and/or Deputy USTR Barskefsky market access bilateral in Beijing September

Sept. 1-13 Assistant Secretary (HA) Shattuck will visit China, including Lhasa, to press our human rights message.

September SA Assistant Secretary Raphel visit to China to explore cooperation on proliferation on South Asian subcontinent.

September Secretary Christopher meets with Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Qian during UNGA (New York); possible invitation to Washington

September-October DOD A/S Freeman, accompanied by flag officer, hold security bilaterals in Beijing

September-October Secretary Bentsen participation in World Bank/IMF talks.

October Under Secretary Wirth holds talks in Beijing on human rights, democracy, environment

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- 2 -

October USIA Director Joseph Duffey visits Beijing: emphasizes need for freedom of broadcasting, underscores human rights agenda, and discusses possible new areas for cultural cooperation


October- November Commerce Secretary Brown leads trade delegation to China, or chairs JCCT in Seattle

November Acting ACDA Director Graham visits China to follow up on arms control, regional security initiatives

November Chinese President Jiang Zemin attends APEC leaders meeting in Seattle; possible bilateral with President and/or possible visit to Washington

December- January DOD Deputy Secretary Perry visits China -- assuming sufficient progress -- to follow up on security dialogue. Senior JCS officer may attend.

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ANNEX III

EXCERPT FROM NSC-11, "U.S. POLICY TOWARD CHINA":
U.S. CHINA POLICY OBJECTIVES

1. Global Cooperation

- o Retain Chinese support for key ongoing UN efforts to preserve international peace in former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Somalia, and Cambodia.
- o Seek Chinese assistance in influencing responsible North Korean behavior with regard to nuclear arms development and continuing cooperation with Seoul.
- o Obtain Chinese cooperation in updating the United Nations system to meet changing international conditions.
- o Enhance cooperation with China on addressing global issues.

2. Asian Peace and Stability

- o Reinforce PRC support for Asian stability and encourage China to limit its military modernization to that necessary for defensive purposes.
- o Involve China in multilateral dialogue and mechanisms to promote peace and security in Northeast, Southeast, and South Asia, with a goal of establishing an intensive East Asian security forum.
- o Assure regional friends and allies that the U.S. will support peace and stability in Asia. Back our assurances with a continued strong military presence and a much greater economic presence in the region.
- o Defuse prospects for conflict regarding Taiwan, the Spratly Islands, and other possible flash points.

3. Proliferation

- o Create a regular nonproliferation dialogue with the PRC to exchange views, voice concerns, and improve mutual understanding.
- o Ensure full PRC compliance with existing obligations under the MTCR, the NPT, and other regimes and agreement to cease sensitive technology transfers to Pakistan, Iran, and other countries of proliferation concern.

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CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

- o Obtain new or updated Chinese nonproliferation commitments, especially the adoption of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG) Guidelines and acceptance of the revised MTCR Guidelines.
- o Encourage the Chinese to establish effective controls on the export of sensitive technology.

4. Arms Control

- o Initiate an intensive, high-level bilateral dialogue with China on nuclear arms control, leading to PRC participation in multilateral initiatives.
- o Secure Chinese support for nuclear testing restraint.
- o Engage China in cooperation on nuclear weapons safety.
- o Secure a freeze in the size of Chinese nuclear forces and a commitment not to introduce MIRVed ICBMs.
- o Obtain full Chinese compliance with BWC and CWC obligations and restraint in conventional force modernization.

5. Human Rights

In the interest of improving human rights conditions for the Chinese people, the U.S. should seek the following:

- o A complete PRC accounting of Chinese citizens detained, accused or sentenced for the non-violent expression of their political beliefs during the Democracy Wall and Tiananmen periods and a commitment to release all those imprisoned for the peaceful expression of their political and religious views;
- o Chinese permission for regular and systematic access to Chinese prisons by the ICRC or another international organization, particularly to political prisoners where there are questions of poor treatment.
- o China's public reaffirmation of its commitment to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and its human rights obligations under the UN Charter.

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- 3 -

- o PRC support for the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
- o Beijing's agreement to reestablish a formal government-to-government human rights dialogue and give positive consideration to establishing a bilateral human rights commission.
- o Assurance that China's population control program refrains from coercive practices.
- o An end to Chinese harassment of unofficial religious groups of all faiths.
- o An end to the already rather ineffective jamming of VOA broadcasts.
- o As a humanitarian matter, secure full cooperation on resolving U.S. POW/MIA cases.

6. Trade and Investment

- o Encourage full Chinese acceptance of international trade and investment standards as well as compliance with and full implementation of our bilateral IPR, market access, and prison labor MOUs.
- o Seek elimination of barriers to U.S. goods and services and removal of impediments to foreign representative offices.
- o Secure a strict prohibition of improper trading practices, especially illegal textile transshipment and other forms of textile fraud.
- o Assist China's entry into GATT if Beijing satisfies membership requirements, including foreign exchange liberalization, and simultaneous entry of Taiwan is possible.
- o Promote full liberalization of China's foreign exchange regime, including a market-determined exchange rate, in order to prevent denial of U.S. access to Chinese markets by non-trade means and to facilitate adjustment in China's external balances.
- o Reevaluate the export control levels for high technology trade with China.

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CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

7. Taiwan

- o Encourage political forces in Taiwan to pursue their interests by means other than an assertion of independence.
- o Continue to encourage Taiwan and the PRC to further their accommodation, with the hope of an eventual outcome acceptable to the people of both sides.
- o Work with the PRC, Taiwan, and other countries to increase joint membership in appropriate international organizations.
- o Establish rules for engagement which will advance U.S. commercial and other interests in Taiwan while satisfying Beijing that the U.S. remains committed to the one China formulae described in the three communiqués.
- o Reassess and modify as necessary the guidelines for arms sales to Taiwan.

8. Hong Kong

- o Make clear U.S. support for increased democracy, warning against actions by the Chinese which could harm Hong Kong's economy or impair the rights and welfare of its citizens.
- o Continue to treat the decolonization process as primarily a UK-PRC issue.
- o In keeping with the goals of the McConnell Act, encourage fulfillment of the 1984 Joint Declaration's guarantee that the Hong Kong SAR will enjoy a high degree of autonomy following reversion to China through appropriate representations to Beijing and formalization of U.S. commercial, legal, and other links with the Hong Kong Government.

9. Tibet

- o Promote dialogue between the Dalai Lama and Beijing.
- o Seek protection of Tibetan human rights and preservation of Tibetan culture, but avoid challenging China's claim to the region.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 5 -

- o Obtain a full PRC accounting and release of Tibetans imprisoned for their political and religious beliefs and press for releases and humane treatment of prisoners.

10. Illegal Immigration

- o Upgrade U.S. communication and cooperation with PRC, Hong Kong, and Taiwan to work for solutions to the issue.
- o Intercept illegal immigrants before they reach U.S. soil; establish procedures for repatriation, refugee processing, third country settlement, etc., to prevent large scale illegal entry into the U.S. of Chinese economic migrants.

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Annex IV

Human Rights Strategy

Background

China's market-oriented economic reforms are rapidly producing a new society of increasing pluralism and openness to the outside world. Nonetheless, there still exists the still powerful reality of China's past: a communist party supported by a large security apparatus and determined to hold on to political control whatever the cost.

Our task is to fashion a policy which will spur further improvements in the human rights situation in China, as we nurture the growing domestic constituencies and infrastructure that are China's best hope for systemic change. We can support this process by expanding the range of our contacts, moving beyond the limitations of high-level official meetings, and finding ways to support the "revolution from below" which is the real force for change in China today.

We also need a strategy to nudge China's communist officialdom into accelerating the pace of political reform. To maintain MFN, China will have to improve its human rights performance. To accomplish this, we need to persuade Chinese officials at all levels to focus on human rights problems and on the steps they must take to resolve or avoid these problems.

Communicate a Sense of Urgency

Our strategy must be clear and it must be vigorously implemented. It should have several components:

-- We need to reinvigorate our bilateral exchanges. Visits to China by senior Department officials concerned with human rights will force the Chinese to focus on these issues and the need for measurable progress over the coming year. In our discussions, we will remind the Chinese that we are under time constraints and that the relationship must move forward or, under the weight of serious bilateral concerns, face a significant downturn. We must communicate a sense of urgency. Every exchange must emphasize our core human rights initiatives as contained in the President's Executive Order:

- 1) Freedom of emigration;
- 2) Compliance with the 1992 bilateral agreement concerning prison labor;

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CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

- 3) Adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
- 4) Releasing and providing an acceptable accounting for Chinese citizens imprisoned or detained for the nonviolent expression of their political and religious beliefs, including such expression of beliefs in connection with the Democracy Wall and Tiananmen Square movements;
- 5) Ensuring humane treatment of prisoners, such as by allowing access to prisons by international humanitarian and human rights organization;
- 6) Protecting Tibet's distinctive religious and cultural heritage; and
- 7) Permitting international radio and television broadcasts into China.

In the context of the strategy for engaging the PRC during the remainder of 1993, we should in particular press for Chinese approval of ICRC access to prison. This would be a tangible step forward by the Beijing authorities and an achievable goal in the context of a human rights full-court press.

We must draw a bottom line for the Chinese. They must understand that the President is fully prepared to withdraw MFN unless there is "overall, significant progress" in this area by next year.

While the Chinese will resist making concessions, the "carrot" that can promote progress is the prospect of ever-increasing levels of official contact between Chinese and American officials.

--Human Rights Assistant Secretary John Shattuck plans to travel to China in August to explain the provisions of the MFN decision and what is needed to preserve MFN in 1994. We should follow up this visit with other high-level contacts to reinforce our message.

-- We need to broaden the U.S. side of the dialogue through Congressional delegations, including outside experts. The Chinese are keenly aware of the role Congress plays. We should work closely with such delegations, not only to

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

"speak with one voice," but to impress upon the Chinese the importance of the legislative-executive consensus in creating a firm bases upon which to expand our bilateral relations.

-- Expand cooperation and exchanges in areas which are likely to contribute to the long-term improvement in human rights such as with the fast developing legal community. As the Chinese grow into their new international role, legal reform becomes essential. We can enter through this "open door" to provide assistance in the development of civil and criminal legal systems.

-- Coordinate with other governments and with NGO's to obtain maximum leverage in changing Chinese behavior. By focusing on those initiatives where broad international consensus exists for action--such as curbing physical abuse of prisoners and assuring that they obtain adequate medical attention--we are likely to see steady progress.

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Annex V

U.S. Policy Towards Tibet

Tibet presents us with special problems. First, Chinese suspicions of U.S. motives in Tibet are linked to the legacy of active U.S. support, during the 1950's and 1960's, for Tibetan insurgents opposing PRC control. Secondly, our support for religious freedom in Tibet must take into account Tibet's tradition of combining religious and political power and its ongoing agitation for independence. Thirdly, many aspects of Tibet's traditional, pre-modern culture are undergoing change as a result of a modernization process made inevitable by domestic economic reform and the opening to the outside world. Tibet's society, religion and history are little understood in the U.S. This has led to romanticized views of Tibet among domestic U.S. audiences, views which have a powerful influence upon policy.

Our role must be to convince the Chinese that resolution of the Tibetan problem is essential if there is to be a long-term, healthy relationship between the U.S. and China. We can only do this by making clear to the Chinese that we will not in any way try to shape or dictate the terms of the compromise nor will we do anything to undermine the compromise by giving encouragement to Tibetan independence activists. But we must also make clear that Tibet, unlike for instance Taiwan, is not a problem whose solution can be deferred. Once the Dalai Lama passes from the scene or, as he has threatened, removes himself from the process, then the best and perhaps only chance for peaceful compromise is gone. And the consequences for China, for Tibet, and for the U.S. will be great.

The Embassy argues for a U.S. Tibetan policy which is both realistic and active. Such a policy would have several components:

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- 2 -

1. American values and American public sentiment require us vigorously to promote respect for human rights.
2. However, it is not in U.S. national interest to support Tibetan independence in the face of Chinese claims to sovereignty and particularly when every U.N. member nation supports the Chinese position. We would be responsible for encouraging separatist elements in Tibet to rebel and risk sparking ethnic violence.
3. We must sensitize Beijing to the problems created by the movement of Han Chinese into Tibet. There is no conclusive evidence that this influx of economic migrants is a result of an official government policy. Nevertheless, the Han compete with Tibetans for economic opportunity and their growing presence is rapidly altering the distinctive cultural and religious life of Tibet. The fear among Tibetans, as articulated recently by the Dalai Lama in exile, is that the ongoing demographic changes will "further reduce Tibetans into an insignificant minority in their own country." But we should also recognize that this phenomenon is limited mainly to Lhasa, and the Dalai Lama considers large parts of China to be part of Tibet.
4. We must persuade both sides to renew the dialogue between the Dalai Lama and the PRC with the goal of genuine autonomy for Tibet within China.

The Chinese believe that the Tibetans, like most other minority groups in China, will settle down once foreigners stop intervening. Tibetan activists believe that through foreign intervention (economic sanctions, international condemnation of China, etc.) Tibet can become independent. Both sides are wrong. The problems facing Tibet can only be resolved through negotiation and eventual compromise.

Compromise will not be easy to reach. It will require the Chinese to accept the fact that there is a nearly indestructible core of Tibetan resistance which will always struggle against rule from Beijing. Tibetans must accept that the concept of a "Greater Tibet," which would include large sections of neighboring Chinese provinces where Tibetans are and have been outnumbered by Han and other minorities for generations, is not achievable. Tibet is a small corner of a great power triangle. The survival of Tibetan culture and society will always depend upon compromise, especially with China.

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CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

While any Chinese leader or government can negotiate such a compromise, only one Tibetan can deliver the Tibetan side--the Dalai Lama.

In our expanded dialogue with Beijing, we should take advantage of every opportunity to press the Chinese on Tibetan human rights problems. We should:

- urge the Chinese to use restraint in dealing with peaceful demonstrations in Tibet;
- encourage improved treatment of prisoners, the end of abuses, and torture and ICRC access to Tibetan prisons;
- promote religious freedom in Tibet, particularly the lifting of limits on the number of monks;
- urge improved access for foreign visitors and particularly human rights groups to Tibet and;
- encourage the Chinese to resume their dialogue with the Dalai Lama.

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TO: ITOH

FROM: GROSSMAN, M

DOC DATE: 19 JUL 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
DC

IWG
MFN

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: CHINA POLICY PAPER FOR DC MTG ON 21 JUL

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE DATE: 24 JUL 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE

LOGREF: 9320791 9320798

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC0043

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

- FROMAN
- GROSS
- ITOH
- KENNEY
- KRECKO
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- WOLIN

COMMENTS: _____

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 7/25/2019
2015-0721-2A

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001

X 93072107 FOR RECORD PURPOSES



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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DECL:OADR

July 19, 1993

20799

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM ITOH
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: China Policy Paper

The Interagency Working Group on East Asia has reviewed the attached paper proposing steps to engage China over the next few months to obtain early progress on our core concerns. We recommend that a Deputies Committee meeting be convened to consider the paper's recommendation.

Marc Grossman
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By NR NARA, Date 7/15/2019
2015-0721-01

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002. memo	Name [partial] [CIA Act] (1 page)	07/19/1993	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3995

FOLDER TITLE:

DC0043 DC Meeting on China, July 21, 1993 [2]

2015-0221-M
rs1199

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Drafted: EAP/CM: CAHart
SECMPOL 8278; SECMDR 1045; SECMDR 1067 7/19/93 7-9141

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CIA: (b)(3)
Treasury: Meg Lundsager
USIA: George Beasly
ACDA: Joe Smaldone

JK

[002]

ENGAGING CHINA IN 1993:
PRESSING FOR EARLY PROGRESS ON CORE CONCERNS

I. NEXT STEPS IN THE CHINA RELATIONSHIP

The President's MFN decision has reestablished a solid consensus on China policy for the first time since Tiananmen. Renewal of MFN in 1994 requires progress on specific human rights concerns and Chinese compliance with trade and nonproliferation agreements. This approach enjoys broad support in Congress and favorable reactions from business and human rights groups.

The new unity on U.S. China policy creates an opportunity to engage Beijing over the next few months. With its confidence in the Executive Branch restored, Congress is more likely to accept new initiatives, as long as it is consulted and the new steps are logically consistent with overall strategy and are shown to serve U.S. interests. This we intend to do. Congress will likely review progress early next year and expect the USG to have achieved significant progress by next June.

China is loath to take steps which appear to buckle to foreign pressure. Given the Executive Order's enumeration of U.S. human rights demands, Beijing will become less inclined to appear responsive as next spring's MFN debate nears. Therefore, we should press the Chinese hard to make as much progress as possible in earlier months leading up to next June.

II. U.S. Priorities

The President's MFN Executive Order clearly lays out the human rights concerns which must be addressed. In addition, we face challenges in nonproliferation, trade and confronting the problem of illegal Chinese migration. The following are the key issues which demand our immediate attention:

1. Human Rights: satisfaction of Executive Order conditions and concerns cited in the President's MFN report to Congress.
2. Nonproliferation: responding to the reported Chinese M-11 transfer to Pakistan.

3. Trade: implementing the Market Access MOU, controlling textile transshipments, and stopping prison labor exports.
4. Migration: stanching the surge in illegal migration from China.

For a comprehensive list of U.S. concerns, please see Annex IV, which repeats policy objectives identified in PRD-11, "U.S. Policy toward China".

III. CHINESE REALITIES

U.S. policy over the next year will have to accommodate important, potentially disruptive events in the PRC. Even if paramount leader Deng Xiaoping does not die or become incapacitated, his gradual physical decline will continue, and maneuvering over the succession will reduce Beijing's capacity to make tough decisions on sensitive policy questions. Second, the overheated, semi-reformed PRC economy will soon undergo a major correction, as authorities are forced to use clumsy administrative techniques to cool surging inflation and other distortions. While some growth will continue and the reform program as a whole survive, this will complicate the succession struggle, slow key reforms, and foment popular discontent. However, widespread instability is unlikely: burned once, the PRC authorities have learned a lesson from Tiananmen and will be especially vigilant. Under the best circumstances, however, U.S. policy goals -- especially those regarding human rights -- may be harder to sell in Beijing. The PRC delegation's obstructionism at the Vienna human rights conference presages Beijing's attitude in this area.

At the same time, China is feeling its new strength. Both double-digit economic growth and revived military modernization are boosting Beijing's prominence in the region. U.S. leverage is declining as China's strengthens and as Beijing's economic bonds to Asia and the EC continue to deepen. Strategically, we are no longer needed as a counterweight to the Soviets, although China still tacitly supports our military presence in the region as a hedge against Japan.

IV. STRATEGY

The chief means by which the U.S. can encourage Chinese responsiveness is through intensified contact with the Chinese at a senior level. This will allow us to convey our case to the highest Chinese authorities. A carefully planned, ongoing, senior-level discussion will encourage the Chinese bureaucracy

to focus on American concerns. This approach offers the best means to press U.S. demands and secure the results contained in the MFN Executive Order and the accompanying report to Congress.

The USG should carefully plan each of these meetings to secure maximum concrete Chinese progress in areas of concern. Agencies should review U.S. goals in their areas, anticipate Chinese expectations, and consider all means available to advance the U.S. agenda. As appropriate, the China IWG should convene to coordinate preparations for each high-level meeting, setting specific objectives which we need to achieve.

Lasting concerns about Chinese behavior properly constrain U.S. engagement with the PRC. Tiananmen and other sanctions remain in place. As the Chinese move to meet our concerns in human rights, nonproliferation, and trade, we should be prepared to take reciprocal steps (for example, piecemeal lifting of sanctions in areas where Beijing makes progress). If the Chinese assess that the U.S. is not addressing their concerns in a reciprocal way, they will not make concessions themselves.

In some areas, U.S. gestures to encourage Chinese progress could serve U.S. as well as Chinese interests. For example, with an effective security regime in place the long-delayed Cray computer sale to the State Meteorological Administration would both reward and encourage positive Chinese behavior and secure a lucrative contract for a U.S. exporter. Similarly, Tiananmen sanctions on the Trade and Development Agency (TDA) merely place U.S. exporters at a competitive disadvantage while failing to influence China. The USG should undertake a thorough review of its trade practices to maintain effective pressure on Beijing, identify possible incentives for further Chinese progress, and eliminate needless burdens on U.S. companies.

The M-11 controversy may force the U.S. eventually to confront Beijing with tough new sanctions. To the maximum extent possible, the U.S. should manage this and other disputes in a way that credibly addresses U.S. concerns, but also advances our interests, including in the nonproliferation area. In the absence of a major setback -- such as a second Tiananmen -- the USG should seek to prevent any single dispute from crippling the entire relationship.

V. OPPORTUNITIES FOR SENIOR-LEVEL DIALOGUE

During the next six months, the U.S. should use an accelerated tempo of senior level exchanges to promote Chinese responsiveness to core U.S. concerns. Exchanges at this level

will allow us to bypass mid-level bureaucrats who are often unable to convey U.S. positions to their leadership. To the extent that Beijing is willing to take substantial steps to address U.S. concerns, we should be prepared to reciprocate, in particular in areas (e.g., commercial) that serve U.S. interests. Repeated engagement will provide opportunities to unveil their decisions. The more senior the contact, the more likely the Chinese are to take such action.

The following meetings would permit the U.S. to advance its full agenda in a balanced manner. Annex III offers a purely notional schedule of these meetings.

Human Rights. While declining the U.S. proposal to establish a working group on human rights, the Chinese have welcomed Assistant Secretary Shattuck to visit Beijing in August. This will be the first such meeting since China's announcement last September that it would find it difficult to continue the human rights dialogue if the U.S. proceeded with its F-16 sale to Taiwan. These discussions could set the stage for a follow-on visit by Under Secretary Wirth, who would discuss human rights and initiate a dialogue on transnational issues, including illegal migration, environmental matters, and the increasingly important narcotics challenge.

Nonproliferation and Security. Beijing has welcomed Under Secretary Davis to visit China to discuss the President's CTBT decision and other nonproliferation issues. Dr. Davis will use her July 26-27 visit to press for cooperation across a range of nonproliferation issues. A working-level USG missile experts team will visit Beijing the week before to brief on changes in the MTCR Guidelines. Besides discussing the CTB with Beijing, Dr. Davis will also strongly press U.S. concerns about the reported Chinese M-11 transfer to Pakistan, making clear that PRC unwillingness to satisfy our concerns will lead to sanctions.

Reviving the annual ACDA dialogue with the Chinese will complement our nonproliferation objectives. Then ACDA Director Lehman made the first post-Tiananmen visit to China last August to discuss the draft Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Restarting the ACDA annual dialogue will provide an opportunity to review important CWC and other arms control issues. Acting ACDA Director Graham could make the trip to Beijing in the fall.

To reinforce our nonproliferation initiative, we should initiate a dialogue on broader security issues. This would permit us to probe PRC military intentions and capabilities and explore options for multilateral security dialogue. During her visit to Beijing, U/S Davis could initiate these discussions in

meetings with the PRC military, including through an intelligence presentation on our long-term concerns about Iran. We should then revive the Assistant Secretary-level PM dialogue with the Chinese. The U.S. will insist that regular, substantive nonproliferation exchanges be part of this broader security dialogue.

Military-to-Military Contacts. Besides representing a way to engage the key Chinese decision makers on our nonproliferation agenda, military contacts are essential to advance other important U.S. concerns, such as regional security and human rights. The non-statutory Tiananmen limit on working-level military-to-military contacts has been lifted, and senior military contacts should proceed on a case-by-case basis to engage on specific U.S. concerns. The USG should build on mid-level military education visits to China with exchanges on regional security studies and professional skills in non-lethal fields which advance our long-term goals, such as military law and financial accounting. As the next step in a bilateral dialogue on security and nonproliferation issues, Deputy Secretary of Defense Perry should visit Beijing in October or November. It will be important to brief Congress in advance so that the symbolism of the Deputy Secretary's visit is not misunderstood.

Trade. The bilateral dialogue benefits from an existing institutional structure, including: the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT), co-chaired by the Secretary of Commerce; the Joint Commission of Science and Technology (JCST), co-chaired by the President's Science and Technology Advisor; and the Joint Economic Commission (JEC), co-chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury. The JEC has not convened since 1986, and the JCST has not met since before Tiananmen. The JCCT reconvened during Commerce Secretary Franklin's visit to Beijing in December 1992.

Important U.S. interests -- including promotion of U.S. exports and creation of jobs in the U.S. -- would benefit from meetings of these three commissions. It is the USG's turn to host the JCCT and JCST; given the length of time since the last session, the JEC could occur in either capital.

In addition to this formal structure, continuing U.S.-PRC discussions to implement the market access MOU provide another important opportunity to engage the Chinese at a senior level. Deputy USTR Barshevsky is scheduled to travel to Beijing in August. Consideration should be given to having USTR Kantor lead a U.S. team to press for Chinese responsiveness, including on access for U.S. services companies, prior to the October 10 Section 301 deadline.

Secretary Bentsen's schedule probably precludes his chairing a meeting of the JEC until after the beginning of 1994. He might, however, be able to hold productive discussions with his counterpart in Washington at the annual World Bank/IMF meetings in late September/early October. With regard to the JCCT, the Chinese have recommended holding a session in late November in Seattle, after the APEC meeting. In addition, Secretary Brown may lead a business promotion delegation to China following a proposed October 17-19 Secretarial telecommunications event in Singapore. The President's Science and Technology Advisor Dr. Gibbons could round out these exchanges by chairing a meeting of the JCST in Beijing in November.

USIA. USIA Director Joe Duffy will visit China in late October to review Agency operations in China and to press the Chinese on the free flow of information, including the jamming of certain VOA broadcasts.

Regional Issues. The USG has a strong interest in Chinese support for U.S. regional initiatives. We should therefore identify opportunities for exchanges on regional questions. SA Assistant Secretary Raphel, for instance, could visit Beijing in early September to brief on the next round of U.S.-Indian Regional Security and Nonproliferation bilaterals and to seek support for a South Asia missile nonproliferation initiative. Opportunities for discussion of the Middle East peace talks and CIS developments may also arise. S/P Director Lewis could visit Beijing or host a Chinese policy planning team at the end of the year.

Secretary of State. The July 21 meeting of the ASEAN PMC will provide a useful first opportunity for Secretary Christopher to meet Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Qian. The Secretary could review plans for dialogue and reassure the Chinese of U.S. willingness to move forward, if China makes progress on our core concerns. A follow-on meeting could be held in late September on the margins of the UNGA. If sufficient progress has been made, we could advance the dialogue an important step by inviting the Foreign Minister to Washington for follow-up discussions, possibly including a call on President Clinton. Again assuming progress on our core agenda and the prospect for accelerating that progress, we should consider scheduling a visit by the Secretary to Beijing during the first half of 1994.

VI. COOPERATION WITH CONGRESS

The Clinton Administration's China policy depends on Congressional support. To ensure that the Congressional

leadership fully understands and accepts the need for the high-level dialogue suggested above, Administration representatives should brief key legislators on where we stand with the Chinese and how this plan fits into our strategy for securing PRC progress in areas of core concern.

The intensity of the dialogue anticipated by this strategy could generate accusations from some quarters that the USG is returning to "business as usual" with Beijing, despite serious remaining bilateral differences. Continuing engagement with Congress as this plan unfolds will therefore be essential. It is noteworthy that some ten Congressional delegations plan to travel to China during the August recess, an indicator that increasing numbers of Members of Congress have accepted the philosophy and strategy expressed in the President's May 28 Executive Order. As senior officials develop plans and in so doing meet with the Chinese, their agencies should take the initiative to brief concerned Members of Congress on U.S. goals and strategy. They should underscore the point that dialogue connotes a determined effort to advance the President's policy and to achieve concrete results on our core agenda.

The Administration should work closely with Members of Congress and their staff to promote the effectiveness of Congressional delegations in pressing China for progress on core issues. Pre-departure briefings in Washington would be an especially useful means to inform CODELS on the status of U.S. policy initiatives, problems in the bilateral relationship, and conditions in the PRC.

Attachments

- Tab 1 Annex I - Tibet Policy
- Tab 2 Annex II - Human Rights Policy
- Tab 3 Annex III - Future U.S. Visits
- Tab 4 Annex IV - NSC-11: U.S. China Objectives

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DC0043 DC Meeting on China, July 21, 1993 [2]

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Annex I

U.S. Policy Towards Tibet

During the Dalai Lama's visit this April, our Embassy in Beijing provided a thoughtful analysis of our current policy on Tibet and proposed a more active U.S. role. Beyond humanitarian concerns, which are the heart of our present policy, a hard look at Tibet might suggest our national interests there do not justify such a role. But U.S. public sentiment, especially as it is projected by Congress, invests in Tibet the potential to effect a major disruption in Sino-American relations. If nothing else, our recent experience with Congressional leaders in determining the final language for the E.O. on extension of MFN status for China makes this clear. Good relations between the U.S. and China are absolutely essential if we are to play any role in Tibet's future.

Tibet presents us with special problems. First, Chinese suspicions of U.S. motives in Tibet are linked to the legacy of active U.S. support, during the 1950's and 1960's, for Tibetan insurgents opposing PRC control. Secondly, our support for religious freedom in Tibet must take into account Tibet's tradition of combining religious and political power and its ongoing agitation for independence. Thirdly, many aspects of Tibet's traditional, pre-modern culture are undergoing change as a result of a modernization process made inevitable by domestic economic reform and the opening to the outside world. Tibet's society, religion and history are little understood in the U.S. This has led to romanticized views of Tibet among domestic U.S. audiences, views which have a powerful influence upon policy.

Our role must be to convince the Chinese that resolution of the Tibetan problem is essential if there is to be a long-term, healthy relationship between the U.S. and China. We can only do this by making clear to the Chinese that we will not in any way try to shape or dictate the terms of the compromise nor will we do anything to undermine the compromise by giving encouragement to Tibetan independence activists. But we must also make clear that Tibet, unlike for instance Taiwan, is not a problem whose solution can be deferred. Once the Dalai Lama passes from the scene or, as he has threatened, removes himself from the process, then the best and perhaps only chance for peaceful compromise is gone. And the consequences for China, for Tibet, and for the U.S. will be great.

The Embassy argues for a U.S. Tibetan policy which is both realistic and active. Such a policy would have several components:

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1. American values and American public sentiment require us vigorously to promote respect for human rights.
2. However, it is not in U.S. national interest to support Tibetan independence in the face of Chinese claims to sovereignty and particularly when every U.N. member nation supports the Chinese position. We would be responsible for encouraging separatist elements in Tibet to rebel and risk sparking ethnic violence.
3. We must sensitize Beijing to the problems created by the movement of Han Chinese into Tibet. There is no conclusive evidence that this influx of economic migrants is a result of an official government policy. Nevertheless, the Han compete with Tibetans for economic opportunity and their growing presence is rapidly altering the distinctive cultural and religious life of Tibet. The fear among Tibetans, as articulated recently by the Dalai Lama in exile, is that the ongoing demographic changes will "further reduce Tibetans into an insignificant minority in their own country." But we should also recognize that this phenomenon is limited mainly to Lhasa, and the Dalai Lama considers large parts of China to be part of Tibet.
4. We must persuade both sides to renew the dialogue between the Dalai Lama and the PRC with the goal of genuine autonomy for Tibet within China.

The Chinese believe that the Tibetans, like most other minority groups in China, will settle down once foreigners stop intervening. Tibetan activists believe that through foreign intervention (economic sanctions, international condemnation of China, etc.) Tibet can become independent. Both sides are wrong. The problems facing Tibet can only be resolved through negotiation and eventual compromise.

Compromise will not be easy to reach. It will require the Chinese to accept the that there is a nearly indestructible core of Tibetan resistance which will always struggle against rule from Beijing. Tibetans must accept that the concept of a "Greater Tibet," which would include large sections of neighboring Chinese provinces where Tibetans are and have been outnumbered by Han and other minorities for generations, is not achievable. Tibet is a small corner of a great power triangle. The survival of Tibetan culture and society will always depend upon compromise, especially with China.

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- 3 -

While any Chinese leader or government can negotiate such a compromise, only one Tibetan can deliver the Tibetan side--the Dalai Lama.

In our expanded dialogue with Beijing, we should take advantage of every opportunity to press the Chinese on Tibetan human rights problems. We should:

- urge the Chinese to use restraint in dealing with peaceful demonstrations in Tibet;
- encourage improved treatment of prisoners, the end of abuses, and torture and ICRC access to Tibetan prisons;
- promote religious freedom in Tibet, particularly the lifting of limits on the number of monks;
- urge improved access for foreign visitors and particularly human rights groups to Tibet and;
- encourage the Chinese to resume their dialogue with the Dalai Lama.

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Annex II

Human Rights Strategy

Background

China's market-oriented economic reforms are rapidly producing a new society of increasing pluralism and openness to the outside world. Nonetheless, there still exists the still powerful reality of China's past: a communist party supported by a large security apparatus and determined to hold on to political control whatever the cost.

Our task is to fashion a policy which will spur further improvements in the human rights situation in China, as we nurture the growing domestic constituencies and infrastructure that are China's best hope for systemic change. We can support this process by expanding the range of our contacts, moving beyond the limitations of high-level official meetings, and finding ways to support the "revolution from below" which is the real force for change in China today.

We also need a strategy to nudge China's communist officialdom into accelerating the pace of political reform. To maintain MFN, China will have to improve its human rights performance. To accomplish this, we need to persuade Chinese officials at all levels to focus on human rights problems and on the steps they must take to resolve or avoid these problems.

Communicate a Sense of Urgency

Our strategy must be clear and it must be vigorously implemented. It should have several components:

-- We need to reinvigorate our bilateral exchanges. Visits to China by senior Department officials concerned with human rights will force the Chinese to focus on these issues and the need for measurable progress over the coming year. In our discussions, we will remind the Chinese that we are under time constraints and that the relationship must move forward or, under the weight of serious bilateral concerns, face a significant downturn. We must communicate a sense of urgency. Every exchange must emphasize our core human rights initiatives as contained in the President's Executive Order:

- 1) Freedom of emigration;
- 2) Compliance with the 1992 bilateral agreement concerning prison labor;

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- 2 -

- 3) Adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
- 4) Releasing and providing an acceptable accounting for Chinese citizens imprisoned or detained for the nonviolent expression of their political and religious beliefs, including such expression of beliefs in connection with the Democracy Wall and Tiananmen Square movements;
- 5) Ensuring humane treatment of prisoners, such as by allowing access to prisons by international humanitarian and human rights organization;
- 6) Protecting Tibet's distinctive religious and cultural heritage; and
- 7) Permitting international radio and television broadcasts into China.

In the context of the strategy for engaging the PRC during the remainder of 1993, we should in particular press for Chinese approval of ICRC access to prison. This would be a tangible step forward by the Beijing authorities and an achievable goal in the context of a human rights full-court press.

We must draw a bottom line for the Chinese. They must understand that the President is fully prepared to withdraw MFN unless there is "overall, significant progress" in this area by next year.

While the Chinese will resist making concessions, the "carrot" that can promote progress is the prospect of ever-increasing levels of official contact between Chinese and American officials.

--Human Rights Assistant Secretary John Shattuck plans to travel to China in August to explain the provisions of the MFN decision and what is needed to preserve MFN in 1994. We should follow up this visit with other high-level contacts to reinforce our message.

-- We need to broaden the U.S. side of the dialogue through Congressional delegations, including outside experts. The Chinese are keenly aware of the role Congress plays. We should work closely with such delegations, not only to

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- 3 -

"speak with one voice," but to impress upon the Chinese the importance of the legislative-executive consensus in creating a firm bases upon which to expand our bilateral relations.

-- Expand cooperation and exchanges in areas which are likely to contribute to the long-term improvement in human rights such as with the fast developing legal community. As the Chinese grow into their new international role, legal reform becomes essential. We can enter through this "open door" to provide assistance in the development of civil and criminal legal systems.

-- Coordinate with other governments and with NGO's to obtain maximum leverage in changing Chinese behavior. By focusing on those initiatives where broad international consensus exists for action--such as curbing physical abuse of prisoners and assuring that they obtain adequate medical attention--we are likely to see steady progress.

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ANNEX III

NOTIONAL SCHEDULE
SENIOR USG MEETINGS WITH CHINESE
JULY - DECEMBER 1993

July 25	Secretary Christopher meets with Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Qian at ASEAN PMC (Singapore)
July 26-27	Dr. Davis (Beijing)
August	Assistant Secretary Shattuck (Beijing)
August	USTR Kantor for market access bilaterals (Beijing)
September	SA Assistant Secretary Raphel (Beijing)
September	Secretary Bentsen, consultations with PRC Finance Minister (Washington)
September	Secretary Christopher meets with Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Qian during UNGA (New York)
September	Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Qian visits Washington
October	Under Secretary Wirth (Beijing)
October	Deputy Secretary Perry, security bilaterals (Beijing)
October	Secretary Brown leads trade delegation (Beijing)
October	USIA Director Joe Duffy (Beijing)
November	Acting ACDA Director Graham (Beijing)
November	Secretary Brown cochairs JCCT (Seattle)
November	President's Science and Technology Advisor Gibbons cochairs JCST (Washington)
December	S/P Director Lewis (Beijing or Washington)

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ANNEX IV

EXCERPT FROM NSC-11, "U.S. POLICY TOWARD CHINA":
U.S. CHINA POLICY OBJECTIVES

1. Global Cooperation

- o Retain Chinese support for key ongoing UN efforts to preserve international peace in former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Somalia, and Cambodia.
- o Seek Chinese assistance in influencing responsible North Korean behavior with regard to nuclear arms development and continuing cooperation with Seoul.
- o Obtain Chinese cooperation in updating the United Nations system to meet changing international conditions.
- o Enhance cooperation with China on addressing global issues.

2. Asian Peace and Stability

- o Reinforce PRC support for Asian stability and encourage China to limit its military modernization to that necessary for defensive purposes.
- o Involve China in multilateral dialogue and mechanisms to promote peace and security in Northeast, Southeast, and South Asia, with a goal of establishing an intensive East Asian security forum.
- o Assure regional friends and allies that the U.S. will support peace and stability in Asia. Back our assurances with a continued strong military presence and a much greater economic presence in the region.
- o Defuse prospects for conflict regarding Taiwan, the Spratly Islands, and other possible flash points.

3. Proliferation

- o Create a regular nonproliferation dialogue with the PRC to exchange views, voice concerns, and improve mutual understanding.
- o Ensure full PRC compliance with existing obligations under the MTCR, the NPT, and other regimes and agreement to cease sensitive technology transfers to Pakistan, Iran, and other countries of proliferation concern.

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- 2 -

- o Obtain new or updated Chinese nonproliferation commitments, especially the adoption of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG) Guidelines and acceptance of the revised MTCR Guidelines.
- o Encourage the Chinese to establish effective controls on the export of sensitive technology.

4. Arms Control

- o Initiate an intensive, high-level bilateral dialogue with China on nuclear arms control, leading to PRC participation in multilateral initiatives.
- o Secure Chinese support for nuclear testing restraint.
- o Engage China in cooperation on nuclear weapons safety.
- o Secure a freeze in the size of Chinese nuclear forces and a commitment not to introduce MIRVed ICBMs.
- o Obtain full Chinese compliance with BWC and CWC obligations and restraint in conventional force modernization.

5. Human Rights

In the interest of improving human rights conditions for the Chinese people, the U.S. should seek the following:

- o A complete PRC accounting of Chinese citizens detained, accused or sentenced for the non-violent expression of their political beliefs during the Democracy Wall and Tiananmen periods and a commitment to release all those imprisoned for the peaceful expression of their political and religious views;
- o Chinese permission for regular and systematic access to Chinese prisons by the ICRC or another international organization, particularly to political prisoners where there are questions of poor treatment.
- o China's public reaffirmation of its commitment to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and its human rights obligations under the UN Charter.

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- o PRC support for the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
- o Beijing's agreement to reestablish a formal government-to-government human rights dialogue and give positive consideration to establishing a bilateral human rights commission.
- o Assurance that China's population control program refrains from coercive practices.
- o An end to Chinese harassment of unofficial religious groups of all faiths.
- o An end to the already rather ineffective jamming of VOA broadcasts.
- o As a humanitarian matter, secure full cooperation on resolving U.S. POW/MIA cases.

6. Trade and Investment

- o Encourage full Chinese acceptance of international trade and investment standards as well as compliance with and full implementation of our bilateral IPR, market access, and prison labor MOUs.
- o Seek elimination of barriers to U.S. goods and services and removal of impediments to foreign representative offices.
- o Secure a strict prohibition of improper trading practices, especially illegal textile transshipment and other forms of textile fraud.
- o Assist China's entry into GATT if Beijing satisfies membership requirements, including foreign exchange liberalization, and simultaneous entry of Taiwan is possible.
- o Promote full liberalization of China's foreign exchange regime, including a market-determined exchange rate, in order to prevent denial of U.S. access to Chinese markets by non-trade means and to facilitate adjustment in China's external balances.
- o Reevaluate the export control levels for high technology trade with China.

7. Taiwan

- o Encourage political forces in Taiwan to pursue their interests by means other than an assertion of independence.
- o Continue to encourage Taiwan and the PRC to further their accommodation, with the hope of an eventual outcome acceptable to the people of both sides.
- o Work with the PRC, Taiwan, and other countries to increase joint membership in appropriate international organizations.
- o Establish rules for engagement which will advance U.S. commercial and other interests in Taiwan while satisfying Beijing that the U.S. remains committed to the one China formulae described in the three communiqués.
- o Reassess and modify as necessary the guidelines for arms sales to Taiwan.

8. Hong Kong

- o Make clear U.S. support for increased democracy, warning against actions by the Chinese which could harm Hong Kong's economy or impair the rights and welfare of its citizens.
- o Continue to treat the decolonization process as primarily a UK-PRC issue.
- o In keeping with the goals of the McConnell Act, encourage fulfillment of the 1984 Joint Declaration's guarantee that the Hong Kong SAR will enjoy a high degree of autonomy following reversion to China through appropriate representations to Beijing and formalization of U.S. commercial, legal, and other links with the Hong Kong Government.

9. Tibet

- o Promote dialogue between the Dalai Lama and Beijing.
- o Seek protection of Tibetan human rights and preservation of Tibetan culture, but avoid challenging China's claim to the region.

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- 5 -

- o Obtain a full PRC accounting and release of Tibetans imprisoned for their political and religious beliefs and press for releases and humane treatment of prisoners.

10. Illegal Immigration

- o Upgrade U.S. communication and cooperation with PRC, Hong Kong, and Taiwan to work for solutions to the issue.
- o Intercept illegal immigrants before they reach U.S. soil; establish procedures for repatriation, refugee processing, third country settlement, etc., to prevent large scale illegal entry into the U.S. of Chinese economic migrants.

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001b. fax cover sheet	From Michelle Bloxton [partial] (1 page)	07/21/1993	P3/b(3)
001c. paper	re: Engaging China in 1993: Pressing for Early Progress on Core Concerns (20 pages) <i>partial release</i>	07/00/1993	P1/b(1) <i>KDE 3/11/2020</i> b(3)
002. memo	Name [partial] [CIA Act] (1 page)	08/02/1993	P3/b(3)
003. paper	re: China Strategy for 1993-1994: Implementing the President's MFN Executive Order (36 pages) <i>partial release</i>	08/02/1993	P1/b(1) <i>KDE 3/11/2020</i>

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2015-0221-M
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REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS

III

To: **Officer-in-Charge**
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB

Please admit the following appointments on July 21, 1993

for Samuel R. Berger of NSC
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY)

PLEASE NOTE: THERE HAS BEEN YET ANOTHER CHANGE MADE TO OUR PREVIOUS REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS: 1) Frank Vargo's Birthdate is
(b)(6), (b)(7)c So Sorry - Thanks! Michelle

STATE

Peter Tarnoff
Winston Lord

DOD

Charles Freeman
Stanley Roth

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

JCS

Michael Ryan
Frank Bowman

CIA

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)c

[001a]

TREASURY

James Fall

USTR

Charlene Barsheffky
Ira Wolf

COMMERCE

Jeff Garten
Frank Vargo

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

DRIVERS

MATTHEW TURNER
ROBERT WILLIS
EPHRAIM WILLIAMS

Building White House

Requested by Michelle Bloxton

Room No. 208 OEOB

Room No. Grd Flr/WW Telephone 6534

Time of Meeting 3:30 p.m.

Date of Request July 21, 1993

(Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to five (5) names or less)
APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742

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DC0043 DC Meeting on China, July 21, 1993 [3]

2015-0221-M
rs1200

RESTRICTION CODES

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

FAX TRANSMITTAL SHEET

OFFICE OF THE STAFF DIRECTOR

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

FROM: Michelle Bloxton

PHONE: (202) 456-6536

TO	FAX NUMBER	PHONE NUMBER
<u>Administration (Tricia)</u>	<u>x-1655</u>	<u>x-2861</u>

NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING COVER SHEET 1

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

PLEASE CLEAR THE FOLLOWING VEHICLES FOR A MEETING TODAY
WEDNESDAY, JULY 21, 1993 AT 3:30PM:

MATTHEW TURNER (DOD)	TAG # DC 089-939
<u>(b)(3)</u>	
EPHRAIM WILLIAMS (STATE)	TAG # SO 402

[001b]

Thanks! Michelle

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OF CALL**

Previous editions usable

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OF (Organization)

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RETURNED YOUR CALL WISHES AN APPOINTMENT

MESSAGE

*Patsy - no one
for today can
attend.*

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KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
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AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION OF DC MTG ON 21 JUL RE CHINA

ACTION: KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 22 JUL 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WIEDEMANN

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By 12 NARA, Date 7/19/2014
2014-DEZI-04

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NSC LOG # 20791

FROM: National Security Council *(initials)* PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR
 SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting PAGES: 25

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
<u>USUN New York</u>	<u>Mr. Rick Inderfurth</u>	<u>212-415-4016</u>	<u>212-415-4177</u>

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
 If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES 25

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) 456-6534 (PHONE NUMBER) _____ (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NOTIFICATION OF DC MEETING

LOG # 20791

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
TREASURY	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
COMMERCE	DIRECTOR, EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		

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20791

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

July 20, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR

LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

Mr. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. EDWARD KNIGHT
Executive Secretary
Department of Treasury

BG. MICHAEL SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. ANTHONY A. DAS
Deputy Executive Secretary
Department of Commerce

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Executive Director for
Policy Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the United States
to the United Nations

DR. LAURA TYSON
Chair, President's Council
of Economic Advisors

COL. T.R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. BOWMAN CUTTER
Deputy Assistant to the
President for Economic
Policy

SUBJECT: Meeting of the Deputies Committee on China (S)

The Deputies Committee will meet on Wednesday, July 21, 1992,
3:30 p.m. - 5:00 p.m. in the White House Situation Room.
Attendance will be limited to principals plus one. (S)

Our purpose is to decide on U.S. strategy toward China over the
next year, implementing the President's MFN Executive Order of
May 28. An agenda is at Tab A. The discussion paper is at Tab
B. (S)

for Kristie Akenney
William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachments
Tab A Agenda
Tab B Discussion Paper

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *VZ* NARA, Date *7/15/2014*
2015-0221-M

TAB A

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: July 21, 1993
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 5:00 p.m. - 6:30 p.m.

CHINA

Agenda

- I. Introduction Samuel R. Berger
- II. Presentation of Strategy Paper. State
- III. Discussion All Participants
- IV. Conclusion Samuel R. Berger

TAB B



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET/NODIS~~
DECL:OADR

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM ITOH
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: China Policy Paper

The Interagency Working Group on East Asia has reviewed the attached paper proposing steps to engage China over the next few months to obtain early progress on our core concerns. We recommend that a Deputies Committee meeting be convened to consider the paper's recommendation.

Marc Grossman
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By RL NARA, Date 7/15/2019
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20791

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 19, 1993



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
THROUGH: KENT WIEDEMANN *mt*
FROM: FERIAL ARA SAEED *ms*
SUBJECT: Notice of Deputies Committee Meeting on China

Tab I conveys a meeting notice for a Deputies Committee meeting on China strategy to decide next steps to implement the President's May 28 executive order.

An agenda is at Tab A. The discussion paper is at Tab B.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memorandum to counterparts at Tab I.

Approve *mt* Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Itoh Memo to Counterparts
Tab A Agenda
Tab B Policy Paper

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *RL* NARA, Date *7/15/2006*
225-0721-M

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ENGAGING CHINA IN 1993:
PRESSING FOR EARLY PROGRESS ON CORE CONCERNS

I. NEXT STEPS IN THE CHINA RELATIONSHIP

The President's MFN decision has reestablished a solid consensus on China policy for the first time since Tiananmen. Renewal of MFN in 1994 requires progress on specific human rights concerns and Chinese compliance with trade and nonproliferation agreements. This approach enjoys broad support in Congress and favorable reactions from business and human rights groups.

The new unity on U.S. China policy creates an opportunity to engage Beijing over the next few months. With its confidence in the Executive Branch restored, Congress is more likely to accept new initiatives, as long as it is consulted and the new steps are logically consistent with overall strategy and are shown to serve U.S. interests. This we intend to do. Congress will likely review progress early next year and expect the USG to have achieved significant progress by next June.

China is loath to take steps which appear to buckle to foreign pressure. Given the Executive Order's enumeration of U.S. human rights demands, Beijing will become less inclined to appear responsive as next spring's MFN debate nears. Therefore, we should press the Chinese hard to make as much progress as possible in earlier months leading up to next June.

II. U.S. Priorities

The President's MFN Executive Order clearly lays out the human rights concerns which must be addressed. In addition, we face challenges in nonproliferation, trade and confronting the problem of illegal Chinese migration. The following are the key issues which demand our immediate attention:

1. Human Rights: satisfaction of Executive Order conditions and concerns cited in the President's MFN report to Congress.
2. Nonproliferation: responding to the reported Chinese M-11 transfer to Pakistan.

3. Trade: implementing the Market Access MOU, controlling textile transshipments, and stopping prison labor exports.
4. Migration: stanching the surge in illegal migration from China.

For a comprehensive list of U.S. concerns, please see Annex IV, which repeats policy objectives identified in PRD-11, "U.S. Policy toward China".

III. CHINESE REALITIES

U.S. policy over the next year will have to accommodate important, potentially disruptive events in the PRC. Even if paramount leader Deng Xiaoping does not die or become incapacitated, his gradual physical decline will continue, and maneuvering over the succession will reduce Beijing's capacity to make tough decisions on sensitive policy questions. Second, the overheated, semi-reformed PRC economy will soon undergo a major correction, as authorities are forced to use clumsy administrative techniques to cool surging inflation and other distortions. While some growth will continue and the reform program as a whole survive, this will complicate the succession struggle, slow key reforms, and foment popular discontent. However, widespread instability is unlikely: burned once, the PRC authorities have learned a lesson from Tiananmen and will be especially vigilant. Under the best circumstances, however, U.S. policy goals -- especially those regarding human rights -- may be harder to sell in Beijing. The PRC delegation's obstructionism at the Vienna human rights conference presages Beijing's attitude in this area.

At the same time, China is feeling its new strength. Both double-digit economic growth and revived military modernization are boosting Beijing's prominence in the region. U.S. leverage is declining as China's strengthens and as Beijing's economic bonds to Asia and the EC continue to deepen. Strategically, we are no longer needed as a counterweight to the Soviets, although China still tacitly supports our military presence in the region as a hedge against Japan.

IV. STRATEGY

The chief means by which the U.S. can encourage Chinese responsiveness is through intensified contact with the Chinese at a senior level. This will allow us to convey our case to the highest Chinese authorities. A carefully planned, ongoing, senior-level discussion will encourage the Chinese bureaucracy

to focus on American concerns. This approach offers the best means to press U.S. demands and secure the results contained in the MFN Executive Order and the accompanying report to Congress.

The USG should carefully plan each of these meetings to secure maximum concrete Chinese progress in areas of concern. Agencies should review U.S. goals in their areas, anticipate Chinese expectations, and consider all means available to advance the U.S. agenda. As appropriate, the China IWG should convene to coordinate preparations for each high-level meeting, setting specific objectives which we need to achieve.

Lasting concerns about Chinese behavior properly constrain U.S. engagement with the PRC. Tiananmen and other sanctions remain in place. As the Chinese move to meet our concerns in human rights, nonproliferation, and trade, we should be prepared to take reciprocal steps (for example, piecemeal lifting of sanctions in areas where Beijing makes progress). If the Chinese assess that the U.S. is not addressing their concerns in a reciprocal way, they will not make concessions themselves.

In some areas, U.S. gestures to encourage Chinese progress could serve U.S. as well as Chinese interests. For example, with an effective security regime in place the long-delayed Cray computer sale to the State Meteorological Administration would both reward and encourage positive Chinese behavior and secure a lucrative contract for a U.S. exporter. Similarly, Tiananmen sanctions on the Trade and Development Agency (TDA) merely place U.S. exporters at a competitive disadvantage while failing to influence China. The USG should undertake a thorough review of its trade practices to maintain effective pressure on Beijing, identify possible incentives for further Chinese progress, and eliminate needless burdens on U.S. companies.

The M-11 controversy may force the U.S. eventually to confront Beijing with tough new sanctions. To the maximum extent possible, the U.S. should manage this and other disputes in a way that credibly addresses U.S. concerns, but also advances our interests, including in the nonproliferation area. In the absence of a major setback -- such as a second Tiananmen -- the USG should seek to prevent any single dispute from crippling the entire relationship.

V. OPPORTUNITIES FOR SENIOR-LEVEL DIALOGUE

During the next six months, the U.S. should use an accelerated tempo of senior level exchanges to promote Chinese responsiveness to core U.S. concerns. Exchanges at this level

will allow us to bypass mid-level bureaucrats who are often unable to convey U.S. positions to their leadership. To the extent that Beijing is willing to take substantial steps to address U.S. concerns, we should be prepared to reciprocate, in particular in areas (e.g., commercial) that serve U.S. interests. Repeated engagement will provide opportunities to unveil their decisions. The more senior the contact, the more likely the Chinese are to take such action.

The following meetings would permit the U.S. to advance its full agenda in a balanced manner. Annex III offers a purely notional schedule of these meetings.

Human Rights. While declining the U.S. proposal to establish a working group on human rights, the Chinese have welcomed Assistant Secretary Shattuck to visit Beijing in August. This will be the first such meeting since China's announcement last September that it would find it difficult to continue the human rights dialogue if the U.S. proceeded with its F-16 sale to Taiwan. These discussions could set the stage for a follow-on visit by Under Secretary Wirth, who would discuss human rights and initiate a dialogue on transnational issues, including illegal migration, environmental matters, and the increasingly important narcotics challenge.

Nonproliferation and Security. Beijing has welcomed Under Secretary Davis to visit China to discuss the President's CTBT decision and other nonproliferation issues. Dr. Davis will use her July 26-27 visit to press for cooperation across a range of nonproliferation issues. A working-level USG missile experts team will visit Beijing the week before to brief on changes in the MTCR Guidelines. Besides discussing the CTB with Beijing, Dr. Davis will also strongly press U.S. concerns about the reported Chinese M-11 transfer to Pakistan, making clear that PRC unwillingness to satisfy our concerns will lead to sanctions.

Reviving the annual ACDA dialogue with the Chinese will complement our nonproliferation objectives. Then ACDA Director Lehman made the first post-Tiananmen visit to China last August to discuss the draft Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Restarting the ACDA annual dialogue will provide an opportunity to review important CWC and other arms control issues. Acting ACDA Director Graham could make the trip to Beijing in the fall.

To reinforce our nonproliferation initiative, we should initiate a dialogue on broader security issues. This would permit us to probe PRC military intentions and capabilities and explore options for multilateral security dialogue. During her visit to Beijing, U/S Davis could initiate these discussions in

meetings with the PRC military, including through an intelligence presentation on our long-term concerns about Iran. We should then revive the Assistant Secretary-level PM dialogue with the Chinese. The U.S. will insist that regular, substantive nonproliferation exchanges be part of this broader security dialogue.

Military-to-Military Contacts. Besides representing a way to engage the key Chinese decision makers on our nonproliferation agenda, military contacts are essential to advance other important U.S. concerns, such as regional security and human rights. The non-statutory Tiananmen limit on working-level military-to-military contacts has been lifted, and senior military contacts should proceed on a case-by-case basis to engage on specific U.S. concerns. The USG should build on mid-level military education visits to China with exchanges on regional security studies and professional skills in non-lethal fields which advance our long-term goals, such as military law and financial accounting. As the next step in a bilateral dialogue on security and nonproliferation issues, Deputy Secretary of Defense Perry should visit Beijing in October or November. It will be important to brief Congress in advance so that the symbolism of the Deputy Secretary's visit is not misunderstood.

Trade. The bilateral dialogue benefits from an existing institutional structure, including: the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT), co-chaired by the Secretary of Commerce; the Joint Commission of Science and Technology (JCST), co-chaired by the President's Science and Technology Advisor; and the Joint Economic Commission (JEC), co-chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury. The JEC has not convened since 1986, and the JCST has not met since before Tiananmen. The JCCT reconvened during Commerce Secretary Franklin's visit to Beijing in December 1992.

Important U.S. interests -- including promotion of U.S. exports and creation of jobs in the U.S. -- would benefit from meetings of these three commissions. It is the USG's turn to host the JCCT and JCST; given the length of time since the last session, the JEC could occur in either capital.

In addition to this formal structure, continuing U.S.-PRC discussions to implement the market access MOU provide another important opportunity to engage the Chinese at a senior level. Deputy USTR Barshevsky is scheduled to travel to Beijing in August. Consideration should be given to having USTR Kantor lead a U.S. team to press for Chinese responsiveness, including on access for U.S. services companies, prior to the October 10 Section 301 deadline.

Secretary Bentsen's schedule probably precludes his chairing a meeting of the JEC until after the beginning of 1994. He might, however, be able to hold productive discussions with his counterpart in Washington at the annual World Bank/IMF meetings in late September/early October. With regard to the JCCT, the Chinese have recommended holding a session in late November in Seattle, after the APEC meeting. In addition, Secretary Brown may lead a business promotion delegation to China following a proposed October 17-19 Secretarial telecommunications event in Singapore. The President's Science and Technology Advisor Dr. Gibbons could round out these exchanges by chairing a meeting of the JCST in Beijing in November.

USIA. USIA Director Joe Duffy will visit China in late October to review Agency operations in China and to press the Chinese on the free flow of information, including the jamming of certain VOA broadcasts.

Regional Issues. The USG has a strong interest in Chinese support for U.S. regional initiatives. We should therefore identify opportunities for exchanges on regional questions. SA Assistant Secretary Raphael, for instance, could visit Beijing in early September to brief on the next round of U.S.-Indian Regional Security and Nonproliferation bilaterals and to seek support for a South Asia missile nonproliferation initiative. Opportunities for discussion of the Middle East peace talks and CIS developments may also arise. S/P Director Lewis could visit Beijing or host a Chinese policy planning team at the end of the year.

Secretary of State. The July 21 meeting of the ASEAN PMC will provide a useful first opportunity for Secretary Christopher to meet Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Qian. The Secretary could review plans for dialogue and reassure the Chinese of U.S. willingness to move forward, if China makes progress on our core concerns. A follow-on meeting could be held in late September on the margins of the UNGA. If sufficient progress has been made, we could advance the dialogue an important step by inviting the Foreign Minister to Washington for follow-up discussions, possibly including a call on President Clinton. Again assuming progress on our core agenda and the prospect for accelerating that progress, we should consider scheduling a visit by the Secretary to Beijing in late 1993 or early 1994.

VI. COOPERATION WITH CONGRESS

The Clinton Administration's China policy depends on Congressional support. To ensure that the Congressional

leadership fully understands and accepts the need for the high-level dialogue suggested above, Administration representatives should brief key legislators on where we stand with the Chinese and how this plan fits into our strategy for securing PRC progress in areas of core concern.

The intensity of the dialogue anticipated by this strategy could generate accusations from some quarters that the USG is returning to "business as usual" with Beijing, despite serious remaining bilateral differences. Continuing engagement with Congress as this plan unfolds will therefore be essential. It is noteworthy that some ten Congressional delegations plan to travel to China during the August recess, an indicator that increasing numbers of Members of Congress have accepted the philosophy and strategy expressed in the President's May 28 Executive Order. As senior officials develop plans and in so doing meet with the Chinese, their agencies should take the initiative to brief concerned Members of Congress on U.S. goals and strategy. They should underscore the point that dialogue connotes a determined effort to advance the President's policy and to achieve concrete results on our core agenda.

The Administration should work closely with Members of Congress and their staff to promote the effectiveness of Congressional delegations in pressing China for progress on core issues. Pre-departure briefings in Washington would be an especially useful means to inform CODELs on the status of U.S. policy initiatives, problems in the bilateral relationship, and conditions in the PRC.

Attachments

- Tab 1 Annex I - Tibet Policy
- Tab 2 Annex II - Human Rights Policy
- Tab 3 Annex III - Future U.S. Visits
- Tab 4 Annex IV - NSC-11: U.S. China Objectives

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Annex I

U.S. Policy Towards Tibet

During the Dalai Lama's visit this April, our Embassy in Beijing provided a thoughtful analysis of our current policy on Tibet and proposed a more active U.S. role. Beyond humanitarian concerns, which are the heart of our present policy, a hard look at Tibet might suggest our national interests there do not justify such a role. But U.S. public sentiment, especially as it is projected by Congress, invests in Tibet the potential to effect a major disruption in Sino-American relations. If nothing else, our recent experience with Congressional leaders in determining the final language for the E.O. on extension of MFN status for China makes this clear. Good relations between the U.S. and China are absolutely essential if we are to play any role in Tibet's future.

Tibet presents us with special problems. First, Chinese suspicions of U.S. motives in Tibet are linked to the legacy of active U.S. support, during the 1950's and 1960's, for Tibetan insurgents opposing PRC control. Secondly, our support for religious freedom in Tibet must take into account Tibet's tradition of combining religious and political power and its ongoing agitation for independence. Thirdly, many aspects of Tibet's traditional, pre-modern culture are undergoing change as a result of a modernization process made inevitable by domestic economic reform and the opening to the outside world. Tibet's society, religion and history are little understood in the U.S. This has led to romanticized views of Tibet among domestic U.S. audiences, views which have a powerful influence upon policy.

Our role must be to convince the Chinese that resolution of the Tibetan problem is essential if there is to be a long-term, healthy relationship between the U.S. and China. We can only do this by making clear to the Chinese that we will not in any way try to shape or dictate the terms of the compromise nor will we do anything to undermine the compromise by giving encouragement to Tibetan independence activists. But we must also make clear that Tibet, unlike for instance Taiwan, is not a problem whose solution can be deferred. Once the Dalai Lama passes from the scene or, as he has threatened, removes himself from the process, then the best and perhaps only chance for peaceful compromise is gone. And the consequences for China, for Tibet, and for the U.S. will be great.

The Embassy argues for a U.S. Tibetan policy which is both realistic and active. Such a policy would have several components:

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1. American values and American public sentiment require us vigorously to promote respect for human rights.
2. However, it is not in U.S. national interest to support Tibetan independence in the face of Chinese claims to sovereignty and particularly when every U.N. member nation supports the Chinese position. We would be responsible for encouraging separatist elements in Tibet to rebel and risk sparking ethnic violence.
3. We must sensitize Beijing to the problems created by the movement of Han Chinese into Tibet. There is no conclusive evidence that this influx of economic migrants is a result of an official government policy. Nevertheless, the Han compete with Tibetans for economic opportunity and their growing presence is rapidly altering the distinctive cultural and religious life of Tibet. The fear among Tibetans, as articulated recently by the Dalai Lama in exile, is that the ongoing demographic changes will "further reduce Tibetans into an insignificant minority in their own country." But we should also recognize that this phenomenon is limited mainly to Lhasa, and the Dalai Lama considers large parts of China to be part of Tibet.
4. We must persuade both sides to renew the dialogue between the Dalai Lama and the PRC with the goal of genuine autonomy for Tibet within China.

The Chinese believe that the Tibetans, like most other minority groups in China, will settle down once foreigners stop intervening. Tibetan activists believe that through foreign intervention (economic sanctions, international condemnation of China, etc.) Tibet can become independent. Both sides are wrong. The problems facing Tibet can only be resolved through negotiation and eventual compromise.

Compromise will not be easy to reach. It will require the Chinese to accept the that there is a nearly indestructible core of Tibetan resistance which will always struggle against rule from Beijing. Tibetans must accept that the concept of a "Greater Tibet," which would include large sections of neighboring Chinese provinces where Tibetans are and have been outnumbered by Han and other minorities for generations, is not achievable. Tibet is a small corner of a great power triangle. The survival of Tibetan culture and society will always depend upon compromise, especially with China.

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- 3 -

While any Chinese leader or government can negotiate such a compromise, only one Tibetan can deliver the Tibetan side--the Dalai Lama.

In our expanded dialogue with Beijing, we should take advantage of every opportunity to press the Chinese on Tibetan human rights problems. We should:

- urge the Chinese to use restraint in dealing with peaceful demonstrations in Tibet;
- encourage improved treatment of prisoners, the end of abuses, and torture and ICRC access to Tibetan prisons;
- promote religious freedom in Tibet, particularly the lifting of limits on the number of monks;
- urge improved access for foreign visitors and particularly human rights groups to Tibet and;
- encourage the Chinese to resume their dialogue with the Dalai Lama.

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Annex II

Human Rights Strategy

Background

China's market-oriented economic reforms are rapidly producing a new society of increasing pluralism and openness to the outside world. Nonetheless, there still exists the still powerful reality of China's past: a communist party supported by a large security apparatus and determined to hold on to political control whatever the cost.

Our task is to fashion a policy which will spur further improvements in the human rights situation in China, as we nurture the growing domestic constituencies and infrastructure that are China's best hope for systemic change. We can support this process by expanding the range of our contacts, moving beyond the limitations of high-level official meetings, and finding ways to support the "revolution from below" which is the real force for change in China today.

We also need a strategy to nudge China's communist officialdom into accelerating the pace of political reform. To maintain MFN, China will have to improve its human rights performance. To accomplish this, we need to persuade Chinese officials at all levels to focus on human rights problems and on the steps they must take to resolve or avoid these problems.

Communicate a Sense of Urgency

Our strategy must be clear and it must be vigorously implemented. It should have several components:

-- We need to reinvigorate our bilateral exchanges. Visits to China by senior Department officials concerned with human rights will force the Chinese to focus on these issues and the need for measurable progress over the coming year. In our discussions, we will remind the Chinese that we are under time constraints and that the relationship must move forward or, under the weight of serious bilateral concerns, face a significant downturn. We must communicate a sense of urgency. Every exchange must emphasize our core human rights initiatives as contained in the President's Executive Order:

- 1) Freedom of emigration;
- 2) Compliance with the 1992 bilateral agreement concerning prison labor;

- 3) Adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
- 4) Releasing and providing an acceptable accounting for Chinese citizens imprisoned or detained for the nonviolent expression of their political and religious beliefs, including such expression of beliefs in connection with the Democracy Wall and Tiananmen Square movements;
- 5) Ensuring humane treatment of prisoners, such as by allowing access to prisons by international humanitarian and human rights organization;
- 6) Protecting Tibet's distinctive religious and cultural heritage; and
- 7) Permitting international radio and television broadcasts into China.

In the context of the strategy for engaging the PRC during the remainder of 1993, we should in particular press for Chinese approval of ICRC access to prison. This would be a tangible step forward by the Beijing authorities and an achievable goal in the context of a human rights full-court press.

We must draw a bottom line for the Chinese. They must understand that the President is fully prepared to withdraw MFN unless there is "overall, significant progress" in this area by next year.

While the Chinese will resist making concessions, the "carrot" that can promote progress is the prospect of ever-increasing levels of official contact between Chinese and American officials.

--Human Rights Assistant Secretary John Shattuck plans to travel to China in August to explain the provisions of the MFN decision and what is needed to preserve MFN in 1994. We should follow up this visit with other high-level contacts to reinforce our message.

-- We need to broaden the U.S. side of the dialogue through Congressional delegations, including outside experts. The Chinese are keenly aware of the role Congress plays. We should work closely with such delegations, not only to

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- 3 -

"speak with one voice," but to impress upon the Chinese the importance of the legislative-executive consensus in creating a firm bases upon which to expand our bilateral relations.

-- Expand cooperation and exchanges in areas which are likely to contribute to the long-term improvement in human rights such as with the fast developing legal community. As the Chinese grow into their new international role, legal reform becomes essential. We can enter through this "open door" to provide assistance in the development of civil and criminal legal systems.

-- Coordinate with other governments and with NGO's to obtain maximum leverage in changing Chinese behavior. By focusing on those initiatives where broad international consensus exists for action--such as curbing physical abuse of prisoners and assuring that they obtain adequate medical attention--we are likely to see steady progress.

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ANNEX III

NOTIONAL SCHEDULE
SENIOR USG MEETINGS WITH CHINESE
JULY - DECEMBER 1993

July 25	Secretary Christopher meets with Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Qian at ASEAN PMC (Singapore)
July 26-27	Dr. Davis (Beijing)
August	Assistant Secretary Shattuck (Beijing)
August	USTR Kantor for market access bilaterals (Beijing)
September	SA Assistant Secretary Raphel (Beijing)
September	Secretary Bentsen, consultations with PRC Finance Minister (Washington)
September	Secretary Christopher meets with Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Qian during UNGA (New York)
September	Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Qian visits Washington
October	Under Secretary Wirth (Beijing)
October	Deputy Secretary Perry, security bilaterals (Beijing)
October	Secretary Brown leads trade delegation (Beijing)
October	USIA Director Joe Duffy (Beijing)
November	Acting ACDA Director Graham (Beijing)
November	Secretary Brown cochaurs JCCT (Seattle)
November	President's Science and Technology Advisor Gibbons cochaurs JCST (Washington)
December	S/P Director Lewis (Beijing or Washington)
December	Secretary Christopher (Beijing)

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ANNEX IV

EXCERPT FROM NSC-11, "U.S. POLICY TOWARD CHINA":
U.S. CHINA POLICY OBJECTIVES

1. Global Cooperation

- o Retain Chinese support for key ongoing UN efforts to preserve international peace in former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Somalia, and Cambodia.
- o Seek Chinese assistance in influencing responsible North Korean behavior with regard to nuclear arms development and continuing cooperation with Seoul.
- o Obtain Chinese cooperation in updating the United Nations system to meet changing international conditions.
- o Enhance cooperation with China on addressing global issues.

2. Asian Peace and Stability

- o Reinforce PRC support for Asian stability and encourage China to limit its military modernization to that necessary for defensive purposes.
- o Involve China in multilateral dialogue and mechanisms to promote peace and security in Northeast, Southeast, and South Asia, with a goal of establishing an intensive East Asian security forum.
- o Assure regional friends and allies that the U.S. will support peace and stability in Asia. Back our assurances with a continued strong military presence and a much greater economic presence in the region.
- o Defuse prospects for conflict regarding Taiwan, the Spratly Islands, and other possible flash points.

3. Proliferation

- o Create a regular nonproliferation dialogue with the PRC to exchange views, voice concerns, and improve mutual understanding.
- o Ensure full PRC compliance with existing obligations under the MTCR, the NPT, and other regimes and agreement to cease sensitive technology transfers to Pakistan, Iran, and other countries of proliferation concern.

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- o Obtain new or updated Chinese nonproliferation commitments, especially the adoption of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG) Guidelines and acceptance of the revised MTCR Guidelines.
- o Encourage the Chinese to establish effective controls on the export of sensitive technology.

4. Arms Control

- o Initiate an intensive, high-level bilateral dialogue with China on nuclear arms control, leading to PRC participation in multilateral initiatives.
- o Secure Chinese support for nuclear testing restraint.
- o Engage China in cooperation on nuclear weapons safety.
- o Secure a freeze in the size of Chinese nuclear forces and a commitment not to introduce MIRVed ICBMs.
- o Obtain full Chinese compliance with BWC and CWC obligations and restraint in conventional force modernization.

5. Human Rights

In the interest of improving human rights conditions for the Chinese people, the U.S. should seek the following:

- o A complete PRC accounting of Chinese citizens detained, accused or sentenced for the non-violent expression of their political beliefs during the Democracy Wall and Tiananmen periods and a commitment to release all those imprisoned for the peaceful expression of their political and religious views;
- o Chinese permission for regular and systematic access to Chinese prisons by the ICRC or another international organization, particularly to political prisoners where there are questions of poor treatment.
- o China's public reaffirmation of its commitment to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and its human rights obligations under the UN Charter.

- o PRC support for the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
- o Beijing's agreement to reestablish a formal government-to-government human rights dialogue and give positive consideration to establishing a bilateral human rights commission.
- o Assurance that China's population control program refrains from coercive practices.
- o An end to Chinese harassment of unofficial religious groups of all faiths.
- o An end to the already rather ineffective jamming of VOA broadcasts.
- o As a humanitarian matter, secure full cooperation on resolving U.S. POW/MIA cases.

6. Trade and Investment

- o Encourage full Chinese acceptance of international trade and investment standards as well as compliance with and full implementation of our bilateral IPR, market access, and prison labor MOUs.
- o Seek elimination of barriers to U.S. goods and services and removal of impediments to foreign representative offices.
- o Secure a strict prohibition of improper trading practices, especially illegal textile transshipment and other forms of textile fraud.
- o Assist China's entry into GATT if Beijing satisfies membership requirements, including foreign exchange liberalization, and simultaneous entry of Taiwan is possible.
- o Promote full liberalization of China's foreign exchange regime, including a market-determined exchange rate, in order to prevent denial of U.S. access to Chinese markets by non-trade means and to facilitate adjustment in China's external balances.
- o Reevaluate the export control levels for high technology trade with China.

7. Taiwan

- o Encourage political forces in Taiwan to pursue their interests by means other than an assertion of independence.
- o Continue to encourage Taiwan and the PRC to further their accommodation, with the hope of an eventual outcome acceptable to the people of both sides.
- o Work with the PRC, Taiwan, and other countries to increase joint membership in appropriate international organizations.
- o Establish rules for engagement which will advance U.S. commercial and other interests in Taiwan while satisfying Beijing that the U.S. remains committed to the one China formulae described in the three communiques.
- o Reassess and modify as necessary the guidelines for arms sales to Taiwan.

8. Hong Kong

- o Make clear U.S. support for increased democracy, warning against actions by the Chinese which could harm Hong Kong's economy or impair the rights and welfare of its citizens.
- o Continue to treat the decolonization process as primarily a UK-PRC issue.
- o In keeping with the goals of the McConnell Act, encourage fulfillment of the 1984 Joint Declaration's guarantee that the Hong Kong SAR will enjoy a high degree of autonomy following reversion to China through appropriate representations to Beijing and formalization of U.S. commercial, legal, and other links with the Hong Kong Government.

9. Tibet

- o Promote dialogue between the Dalai Lama and Beijing.
- o Seek protection of Tibetan human rights and preservation of Tibetan culture, but avoid challenging China's claim to the region.

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- 5 -

- o Obtain a full PRC accounting and release of Tibetans imprisoned for their political and religious beliefs and press for releases and humane treatment of prisoners.

10. Illegal Immigration

- o Upgrade U.S. communication and cooperation with PRC, Hong Kong, and Taiwan to work for solutions to the issue.
- o Intercept illegal immigrants before they reach U.S. soil; establish procedures for repatriation, refugee processing, third country settlement, etc., to prevent large scale illegal entry into the U.S. of Chinese economic migrants.

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Drafted:EAP/CM:CAHart
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FROM: GROSSMAN, M

DOC DATE: 02 AUG 93
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SUBJECT: CHINA POLICY PAPER

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
August 2, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: China Policy Paper

A Deputies Committee meeting on China strategy held July 21 reviewed the Department of State's paper (previously concurred in by the Interagency Working Group on East Asia) entitled "China Strategy for 1993-1994: Implementing the President's MFN Executive Order." We subsequently revised the paper to incorporate suggestions made at the Deputies Committee meeting.

The attached paper reflects those changes, and adds an Executive Summary.


for Marc Grossman
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated

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Grossman/Lake Memorandum Forwarding China Policy Paper

drafted: EAP/CM: DWReyser (SECMDR 1114 -- 8/2/93) 7-6803

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CHINA STRATEGY FOR 1993-1994:

IMPLEMENTING THE PRESIDENT'S MFN EXECUTIVE ORDER

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Overview: U.S. Interests and Strategy in China

Constructive U.S. engagement with China is essential to realize the President's vision for a new Pacific community; to deal effectively with regional security issues including Hong Kong's 1997 transition and Taiwan's status; to sustain our efforts internationally to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; to promote more democratic and open societies globally; to boost American economic and job growth through a healthy trade relationship with China; and to deal with such thorny issues as alien smuggling and environmental degradation.

China is an emerging great power with the potential to contribute enormously to regional and global stability and economic prosperity. It is also grappling with huge problems; an antiquated political system that could buckle or break during the looming succession struggle; a large and increasing "floating" population of over one hundred million; an overheated economy; and a gradual deterioration in central control over the provinces which is feeding the centrifugal tendencies in China which have often led to regional separation in China's history. The results of a problem-ridden succession would have a deleterious affect on stability in China and the region generally.

The challenge to U.S. policy is to channel China's building momentum into constructive channels, bolstering prospects for political and economic liberalization internally as well responsible Chinese policies externally in the maintenance of world peace and stability, in non-proliferation, trade, and the environment. The ascendancy of the market oriented sector in China is striking at the core of the communist system, creating new and influential constituencies and interest groups pressing for political and economic relaxation. It is in the U.S. interest to see this evolution continue. Externally, U.S. support for an involved and engaged China, not an isolated China, as called for by President Clinton in his July 10 Seoul speech, would accelerate this positive and historic evolution underway in China.

Pursuant to these goals, the United States should engage creatively with the Chinese in pursuit of our objectives enunciated in the President's May 28 Executive Order on MFN. Earlier in the year, a Presidential China policy review (NSC-11 summary at tab 3) laid the intellectual and strategic foundation for our reengagement, identifying as core U.S. interests China's continued economic growth, its integration into the world community, its cooperation in building a new international order, and its peaceful evolution toward a more democratic and humane society. In the next ten months before MFN renewals, we

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need to achieve sufficient concrete progress to permit a Presidential finding that China's MFN status should be extended.

As we chart our course, we should bear in mind the element of time. Frontloading of our talks is essential for two reasons: (1) Deng Xiaoping's increasingly precarious health inspires Chinese leadership caution, and reflexive nationalistic impulses, as the succession drama begins to unfold; and (2) the Chinese are attuned to the content, nuances and pressures of the annual MFN debate, and are determined -- also for reasons of "face" and nationalism -- to avoid any impression they caved to Washington to retain their MFN status.

Our Tactics for 1993-1994

We begin our reengagement with China from a position of domestic strength: the strategy, philosophy and specific goals contained in the May 28 Executive Order followed extremely close and harmonious consultations with the Congress. There is consensus that human rights progress is our top priority; that the specific areas named in the E.O are the correct ones; that these are appropriately linked to 1994 MFN extension for China; and that China's MFN status should be preserved if possible. There is also broad support for our approach to proliferation and economic/trade concerns: pressing ahead through all available mechanisms and channels, at the level necessary to do the job, but delinking Chinese performance from MFN renewal.

We will implement our strategy through meticulous, regular management by a senior interagency working group. Periodic meetings will be held to assess progress, to review strategy, to consider carrots and sticks which might be employed, to plot and undertake post-mortems on high-level visits, and to approve proposed Cabinet secretary and deputy exchanges.

Human Rights

It is therefore imperative that we engage rapidly with the Chinese. Our general approach should be to explain to China our desire for a constructive, mutually beneficial relationship; to reiterate our interest in a stable and economically prosperous China; and to offer inducements necessary to inspire a serious dialogue including Chinese concessions. But our first priority, and our sharpest message to the Chinese, must be human rights: we are (as Americans) serious about achieving progress, and without this progress MFN cannot and will not be renewed. All dialogue with the Chinese -- certainly Executive Branch, and optimally Congressional and business also -- should make that simple point clearly and consistently. Secretary Christopher underscored it to Foreign Minister Qian in Singapore recently; Assistant Secretary (Human Rights) John Shattuck will elaborate it during planned discussions in Beijing in early September; and we will emphasize it strongly in anticipated sessions with the Chinese

at the fall UNGA, at the Seattle APEC leaders conference, and in the course of our planned resumption of military-to-military dialogue. We will also brief Congressional and corporate leaders in advance of their China trips -- both to enlist their understanding of our policy, and to urge that they reinforce our own message.

Nonproliferation/Strategic Issues

With the cessation of U.S.-China military contacts, isolation has bred suspicion within the PLA about U.S. intentions. China through the 1990's will pose only a limited direct threat to the U.S.; we must, however, ensure that ongoing military modernization does not change this calculus. China's modernization evokes rising security concerns among its neighbors -- including Taiwan. Aside from the economic consequences, Hong Kong's reversion to China in 1997 will add considerably to China's ability to project power into the East Asian region. Furthermore, China is a worrisome exporter of sensitive technologies and military systems; its cooperation (in the U.N. and regionally) is required to strengthen and expand nonproliferation regimes in the Middle East, South Asia and elsewhere; and it is a significant nuclear power, whose participation in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) we solicit and require. Currently, we face a major decision point as evidence builds that Beijing may have transferred M-11 missiles or related equipment to Pakistan last year in contravention of its commitment to abide by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Finally, as China enters a sensitive political transition period in which the armed forces will play a crucial role -- for stability or otherwise -- we need to broaden our exposure to Chinese military leaders and their thinking.

To accomplish these complex and interrelated objectives, we need to engage senior Chinese security policy civilian leaders as well as military leaders. Key decision making authority on the entire array of strategic and nonproliferation issues outlined above rests with a small group of senior military officers and defense civilians in their sixties and seventies. Under Secretary Davis launched our senior-level dialogue in Beijing on July 26-27, pressing for a solution of the M-11 transfer contretemps, emphasizing that the U.S. seeks a cooperative relationship, but noting that our law obliges us to impose sanctions if the MTCR guidelines and parameters were exceeded. We will need to follow up that opening round with an intensive effort to settle the M-11 issue ideally in a way that advances our cooperation in such nonproliferation areas as, MTCR, the Nuclear Suppliers' Group, the CTBT, restraining arms proliferation in the Middle East, and influencing the North Koreans to forego their nuclear ambitions (the Chinese have already been helpful in this endeavor). We will plan to resume a strategic dialogue (i.e., on common regional security concerns) in the fall through a visit to China by Defense Assistant Secretary Freeman and an accompanying flag officer.

This delegation would, of course, press our human rights agenda in the course of its presentation to Chinese defense/military interlocutors.

Economic/Commercial Issues

China is our seventh-ranking trade partner, and some 143,000 American jobs are already dependent on U.S. exports. A successful U.S. effort to boost American economic and job growth through international commerce hinges importantly on our ability to win an expanding share of the booming China market. Chinese imports of U.S. goods in 1992 totalled \$7.5 billion, up 19 percent over 1991. But because Chinese exports to the U.S. rose even more rapidly, the U.S. trade deficit grew to \$18.3 billion. China presents increasing high technology trade opportunities -- which Japan and other western countries are pursuing successfully in the absence of U.S. competition. American businesses complain that they are competitively disadvantaged by the array of formal and informal post-Tiananmen sanctions: cessation of TDA financing and OPIC guarantees, export controls (and further sanctions imposed legislatively) on high-tech items (e.g., a Cray computer sale long held up for the Chinese State Meteorological Agency) and nuclear industry plants and components, and further controls on satellite launch services and dual-use items. We are negotiating with the Chinese currently on market access and China's entry into GATT. Illegal Chinese textile transshipments loom as a major, and growing dilemma for us -- even as our ability to deal with the problem is hampered by the adverse implications of any U.S. countermeasures for Hong Kong and Taiwan interests.

In the coming months, an interagency group should create a U.S. trade strategy to deal with China, as we have for Japan early in this Administration. A review of our export control regime could be part of the exercise. Sequenced Sino-American visits beginning in the summer and fall would implement it, including a trip to China by senior USTR officials (perhaps Mr. Kantor), Commerce officials (possibly Secretary Brown under the right circumstances), and Treasury officials to begin to deal with these issues. The annual meeting of the Sino-American Joint Committee on Commerce and Trade will be hosted by Secretary Brown in November in Washington.

We should recognize that implementing this strategy will be very difficult and complex. The Chinese are always hard to move on human rights issues, and they have recently cracked down on some dissidents in Shanghai and elsewhere. The M-11 problem casts a large, immediate shadow. Our trade deficit continues to balloon. Tibet, Taiwan, and Hong Kong -- all relating to Chinese notions of sovereignty -- could cause new strains in our relations. And the political jockeying for succession to Deng could limit Chinese flexibility. Such elements will make progress in negotiations arduous, and could inflame Congressional attitudes.

Attachments

- Tab 1 Annex I - China Policy Strategy Paper
- Tab 2 Annex II - Notional Schedule for Senior-Level Dialogue
- Tab 3 Annex III - Excerpts from NSC-11 (3/93):U.S. Objectives
- Tab 4 Annex IV - Human Rights Policy
- Tab 5 Annex V - U.S. Policy Toward Tibet

CHINA STRATEGY FOR 1993-1994: Executive Summary

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CHINA STRATEGY FOR 1993-1994:
IMPLEMENTING THE PRESIDENT'S MFN EXECUTIVE ORDER

I. OVERVIEW: U.S. INTERESTS IN CHINA

When President Carter made the decision to normalize diplomatic relations with Beijing effective January 1979, his premise -- stated publicly -- was that the United States has an enduring interest in a stable and modernizing China. That premise has not altered despite the disappearance of a common security threat, sweeping change in global political alignments, significant evolution of China's political/economic system, and the emergence of China as a regional -- prospectively global -- economic and military force.

In his recent speeches at Waseda University in Tokyo and at the National Assembly in Seoul, President Clinton elaborated a new, ambitious vision for U.S. involvement with the Asia and Pacific region, which included an engaged -- not isolated -- China. The President called for creation of a New Pacific Community built on shared strength, shared prosperity and a shared commitment to democratic values. In so doing, he cited specific priorities including stronger efforts to combat proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; new regional dialogues on a broad spectrum of security challenges; and support for more democratic, more open societies.

Comprehensive U.S. engagement with China is the sine qua non for realization of the President's vision for a New Pacific Community. Clearly, our efforts to deal effectively with proliferation and to launch successfully an Asian regional security dialogue will hinge upon the extent and conviction of China's involvement. More broadly, regional stability and progress -- including Hong Kong's 1997 transition and the status of Taiwan -- will be intimately linked with China's course during the 1990s. US policy should be geared to channeling China's building momentum into constructive channels bolstering, rather than undermining, regional and global stability, creation of a more effective, enduring non-proliferation regime and a liberalized world trading system. A successful U.S. effort to boost American economic and job growth through exports will depend upon a healthy trade relationship with China.

The stakes are enormous. If China holds successfully to its present course, it will emerge early in the next century as

a budding superpower. But if China's reformist, market-oriented and outward-looking policies falter or fail, one can foresee a different and distressing prospect for the world's most dynamic region: Chinese domestic instability, growing concerns in the region regarding China's intentions, economic disruption of commercial relationships, a deteriorating Chinese migration/refugee dilemma, an impulse among China's neighbors to plan for the worst through arms buildups, and a shattered architecture for dealing peacefully and collegially with regional and transnational issues.

Presidential Review Directive/NSC-11, completed in March, systematically developed the case for comprehensive engagement with China and laid the intellectual and policy foundation for the President's May 28 Executive Order on MFN for China. PRD/NSC-11 identified the following core U.S. interests in China: continued Chinese economic growth, increased integration into the world community, cooperation in building a new international order, and peaceful change toward a more democratic, humane society. The President's May 28 Executive Order spelled out more concrete policy goals for the year leading up to the 1994 decision on further extension of China's MFN status.

In sum: our long-range strategy toward China must be animated by a conceptual framework designed to permit achievement of U.S. national security objectives through engagement with this important emerging power; our tactical approach over the next year must lay the cornerstone for such engagement through concrete progress keyed to the areas specified in the President's May 28 Executive Order.

II. STRATEGY FOR THE NEXT YEAR

The Agenda:

The President's May 28 MFN Executive Order -- taken after unprecedentedly close and harmonious consultations with the Congressional leadership -- and his parallel MFN report to the Congress specify that 1994 MFN renewal will be conditioned upon certification of overall, significant progress on human rights. The President delinked proliferation and commercial issues from the 1994 MFN decision, but directed that our core national objectives in these areas be vigorously pursued through existing channels and utilizing all available leverage. It is crucial that we achieve progress in these areas on the merits; furthermore, as a practical matter,

failure to do so will impede our ability to manage successfully next year's Congressional MFN debate even in the event of certifiable human rights gains. Additionally, we need to address urgently with the Chinese through appropriate diplomatic and law enforcement channels the growing problem of illegal migration. Finally, there exists a rich agenda -- and difficult challenges -- to pursue with the Chinese in such areas as environmental protection, U.N. peacekeeping/peacemaking operations, and regional security issues.

The Element of Time:

We are obliged to register meaningful progress on our human rights agenda in sufficient time to permit a favorable determination on extension of China's MFN status. This means that we need results no later than early spring 1994, but optimally much earlier. First, members of Congress have made clear that they will call hearings at that time to weigh for themselves the success of the Administration's approach; some have hinted at an intent to call for a mid-year review in December. Secondly, the Chinese themselves are more likely to be responsive earlier than later, for a pair of reasons: (a) because they are now attuned to the content and nuances of the annual MFN debate, and determined to avoid any impression that they have caved to U.S. pressure "solely" to retain MFN status; and (b) because Deng Xiaoping's increasingly precarious health inspires Chinese leadership caution as the succession drama begins to unfold.

This argues for early engagement with the Chinese. This should be done at the levels of seniority necessary to achieve our objectives. It also means we should front-load our agenda. We should concomitantly brief Congress soon on our thinking, so as to answer or mute any criticism that we have embarked on a "business-as-usual" approach. This should not be a hard sell; members of Congress have increasingly come to see the merit in a policy of careful engagement. Some six to eight Congressional delegations are finalizing plans for August travel to China. It is particularly important that we avail ourselves of the opportunity of their travel: to outline in detail our conceptual framework, and to prime travelling members to deliver tough and concrete messages identical to our own.

Sharpening the Message:

It is imperative that we speak with one voice in: (a) underscoring our desire for a constructive, mutually beneficial

relationship; (b) reiterating our interest in a stable and economically prosperous China; (c) offering necessary inducements to inspire a serious dialogue, and meaningful Chinese concessions; and, without pulling punches, (d) conveying clearly to the Chinese that human rights is our overriding priority since they will lose MFN absent significant overall progress in the areas specified by the President.

Such a message must be delivered unambiguously and consistently; by Executive Branch and Congressional visitors alike; and to a broad spectrum and multiple levels of Chinese leaders.

Channels and Mechanisms for Dialogue:

Our objective is progress; we should employ the channels -- and level of seniority -- essential to achieve it. Conversely, we cannot afford to waste motion, blur the message, and indulge in dialogue at high levels which does not promise commensurate results.

It follows, inter alia, from this logic that:

- Cabinet-level dialogue with the Chinese should occur only when this is the best tactic (as it sometimes is) to force action.
- Military-to-military dialogue should be resumed, at appropriate (e.g., Assistant Secretary of Defense, with a party to include a flag officer) levels, given the importance of our nonproliferation, regional security, and Taiwan Strait interests, and given the reality that our desired interlocutors -- Chinese senior military leaders -- only rarely make themselves available for U.S. civilians.
- USG visitors to China should be selected with an eye to authoritativeness rather than quantity, and with an explicit goal in each instance of achieving progress on a core agenda item.
- Resurrection of the three U.S.-China joint commissions (Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade; Joint Economic Commission; and Joint Commission on Science and Technology) should be predicated on their accomplishment of specific objectives, and deferred insofar as they promise merely the ceremonial or the vague.

Carrots and Sticks:

The process of engagement unfolding over the next year, in implementation of the President's Executive Order, should be conceived as a protracted and complex negotiating process. That is, the Chinese have consistently resisted offering concessions where they see no gains for themselves. From our perspective, the Chinese will in fact gain significantly from unilateral initiatives in the areas we have identified: a substantially improving human rights record will produce a more benign international image; meticulous observation of international nonproliferation regimes will enhance China's own security in the long run; and progress on our trade agenda will facilitate China's entry into GATT and expand its commercial opportunities in the U.S. and elsewhere. We should make this case repeatedly to the Chinese.

Chinese diplomatic strategy has tended to intricate tradeoffs and explicit quid pro quos. Chinese leaders have not been shy about presenting their own agenda, and indeed their own concept for precise linkage of our core interests with China's principal goals. We should be vigilant against Chinese offers designed to draw us into a classically (time-consuming) negotiation situation.

MFN renewal is, of course, our principal leverage, and the primary inducement to an improved Chinese performance on human rights. We might also consider employing, when appropriate, the following illustrative types of bargaining chips:

- GATT accession: We could accelerate the pace of our negotiations.
- High-tech sales: We might, for example, approve sale of the Cray computer to the Chinese State Meteorological Agency as a "humanitarian gesture" (in support of Chinese weather forecasting to avert natural disasters).
- Trade incentives: Reopening of TDA funding is particularly attractive inasmuch as U.S. business competitiveness in the Chinese market would be enhanced. Later, given proper conditions, we might offer to restore Chinese eligibility for OPIC guarantees.

- High Level Dialogue: Vice Premier/Foreign Minister Qian Qichen's attendance at UNGA, and President Jiang Zemin's prospective attendance at the November APEC leaders meeting in Seattle suggest possibilities: special attention during their visits, an invitation to Washington, a meeting with the President, and so on. Given sufficient progress we might hold in reserve an invitation to another Chinese leader, perhaps senior Vice Premier Zhu Rongji, to pay an official visit to the U.S. early in 1994.

On the "stick" side, besides the ultimate weapon of MFN revocation (albeit a single-shot, non-repeating weapon) we have available options including:

- Special 301: -This might be employed in connection with failure to implement the IPR agreement, or on textile transshipments. We should consider the tactical advantage in wielding 301: a method both to send a firm message to China, and to permit us to avoid sending a sterner message with predictable adverse consequences for our own commercial and strategic interests.
- Legislation on Transfer of Nuclear Materials: Along with executive determinations, U.S. laws specify sanctions in violation of NPT commitments.
- Helms Amendment Sanctions for an M-11 Category I Transfer: If invoked, this amendment would block a significant range of Chinese exports to the U.S.
- Chinese Olympics: Should China be chosen as host, we will gain six years of leverage through the possibility that the US would refuse to participate, because of PRC human rights practices. The Chinese will assume that, as before the 1990 Moscow games, many other nations would follow a U.S. lead in pulling out.

Imposing any of these sanctions, however, carries risks: of Chinese retaliation deleterious to our own larger interests; of complicating our efforts to implement the President's MFN

Executive Order; and of prejudicing our chances to engage the Chinese constructively on a broad spectrum of issues.

Managing the Process:

The importance of the issues, as well as the complexity of the options, suggest that it would be advantageous to manage implementation of our China strategy via periodic review by a senior-level steering group. Such policy review should include: regular (perhaps quarterly) IWG assessment of progress; ad hoc IWG consideration of significant proposed visits to China (or dialogue elsewhere with the Chinese) and assessment of outcomes; particularly careful vetting of proposed military-to-military dialogue, with NSC approval required for any dialogue at or above the assistant secretary level or flag officer rank; and NSC approval for any Cabinet secretary or deputy secretary visit to China.

III. CHINESE REALITIES

U.S. policy over the next year will have to accommodate important, potentially disruptive events in the PRC. Even if paramount leader Deng Xiaoping does not die or become incapacitated, his gradual physical decline will continue, and maneuvering over the succession will reduce Beijing's capacity to make tough decisions on sensitive policy questions. Second, the overheated, semi-reformed PRC economy will soon undergo a major correction, as authorities are forced to use clumsy administrative techniques to cool surging inflation and other distortions. While some growth will continue and the reform program as a whole survive, these economic measures will complicate the succession struggle, slow key reforms, inhibit efforts to penetrate the Chinese market, and foment some popular discontent. Widespread instability is unlikely: burned once, the PRC authorities have learned a lesson from Tiananmen and will be especially vigilant. Under the best circumstances, however, U.S. policy goals -- especially those regarding human rights -- may be harder to sell in Beijing. The PRC delegation's obstructionism at the Vienna human rights conference presages Beijing's attitude in this area.

At the same time, China is feeling its new strength. Both double-digit economic growth and revived military modernization are boosting Beijing's prominence in the region. U.S. leverage is declining as China's strengthens and as Beijing's economic bonds to the other dynamic Asian economies and the EC continue to deepen. Strategically, we are no longer needed as a

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counterweight to the Soviets, although China still tacitly supports our military presence in the region as a hedge against Japan.

IV. THE PROCESS: SETTING IN MOTION OUR CHINA STRATEGY FOR 1993-4

We should move swiftly, in light of the considerations outlined above, to set in motion our strategy for achieving U.S. China policy objectives over the nine months remaining before the MFN decision. Synergistic advantages will accrue from moving concurrently in five areas: (1) NSC channel, (2) Department of State and Embassy Beijing channel, (3) [REDACTED] (4) Congressional and business channels, and (5) high-level engagement, in Beijing and elsewhere. The process will necessarily be a dynamic one, adjusting and even altering direction as dictated by periodic assessments of results. The following outline is therefore intended to be illustrative rather than definitive.

A. NSC Channel.

National Security Adviser Lake, with Assistant Secretary Lord, would launch the strategy from the White House by calling in Chinese Ambassador Li Daoyu to outline our approach, our objectives, and our set of proposed visits and exchanges over the coming six months. In that discussion, NSA Lake would underscore the need for concrete, significant progress well in advance of next year's MFN renewal debate, and in advance of any Congressional mid-term review.

B. State Department/Embassy Beijing Channel.

EAP Assistant Secretary Ambassador Lord and Ambassador Roy in Beijing would play the critical roles in implementing and assessing the strategy as it unfolds. They would regularly deliver our core message (to Ambassador Li Daoyu and to Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu respectively) on human rights and other principal concerns associated with renewal of MFN; preview for Ambassador Li and VFM Liu our objectives in advance of each high-level meeting with the Chinese; assure that all senior Executive Branch officials preparing for dialogue with the Chinese understand and convey that message; and encourage members of Congress and American businessmen to articulate that same message in their separate dialogues with Chinese leaders.

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6)

D. Principal Constituencies: Business and Congress.

Our strategy should be to engage Congress and the business community early, and candidly, in our effort to drive home to the Chinese our core message: MFN will not be renewed absent progress on the human rights agenda specified in the President's Executive Order. Other elements of our strategy should also be briefed, as appropriate, emphasizing always that our goal is a constructive, mutually beneficial relationship.

Such a strategy serves multiple purposes: winning good will (if not always complete support) from those briefed; raising the odds that our core message will be delivered with clarity to the PRC by a broad spectrum of China's American guests and interlocutors; and reinforcing the gravity of our own message that MFN revocation is a serious matter (since the Chinese will understand that we have briefed other constituencies, and sought to maintain a strong sense of common purpose).

For the business community, we need to be realistic: relatively few corporate executives will be prepared to argue strenuously for a better Chinese human rights performance on the merits, but a significant number might be impelled to argue for a better performance lest MFN be withdrawn and their own commercial interests damaged.

With respect to the Hill, to those who have been skeptical of our resolve, our briefings will underscore our commitment to act. At the same time, it will energize those whose constituents have a strong stake in preservation of MFN. The result will be a multiplier effect on the Chinese (who will note that pro-MFN-extension members of Congress are running

scared) and will, through activation of the non-revocation forces, provide the President greater maneuvering room prior to June 3, 1994 with respect to the precise calculus of "significant overall progress" achieved to that point.

We should take the following implementing actions:

- Beginning in August, schedule meetings with Ambassador Lord for CEOs of companies represented by the U.S.-China Task Force and U.S.-China Business Council.
- Assure that we reach the maximum possible number of members of Congress (and staff members) planning travel to China during the August recess. The NSC and Department of State should closely coordinate their efforts in this respect.
- Continue, at regular intervals, to brief key Hill members and staffers on the results of our policy of engagement with China.

E. High-Level Visits.

(1) HUMAN RIGHTS

Policy

Chinese human rights practices violate internationally-recognized standards of behavior established in fundamental instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which China, as a U.N. member, has accepted. PRC compliance with these obligations would serve both Chinese and U.S. interests. Without seeking to (or imagining that it could) impose its political system and values on the PRC, the U.S. nevertheless has compelling practical and humanitarian reasons for promotion of Chinese democracy and human rights. An arbitrary, closed Chinese political system over time will be incapable of meeting the challenges of economic and social development, a prerequisite for PRC and regional stability. Democracy also is necessary for China effectively to manage increasingly important global issues, such as trade disputes, refugees/migration, the environment, narcotics, and terrorism. Over time, a more open and democratic China will be an easier country with which to deal and a better partner for the U.S. strategically, politically and in economic terms. An increasingly democratic China will coincide with the emerging democratic trend in Asia, including in Taiwan and South Korea.

Our dialogue with China must underscore, consistently, the requirement that Beijing satisfy the specific conditions in the President's May 28 MFN Executive Order: implementing the prison labor MOU and assuring freedom of emigration, plus (1) adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; (2) accounting for political/religious prisoners from the Democracy Wall and Tiananmen movements; (3) access to prisoners by impartial, respected international organizations; (4) protection of Tibet's distinctive religious and cultural heritage; (5) unimpeded radio and television broadcasts into China.

Process

- o Fall: Assistant Secretary (HA) Shattuck visit to China. Shattuck would emphasize our core message -- no MFN renewal without significant progress; lay out, ideally prioritized, all that we require to demonstrate such progress; stress the particular importance of international access (e.g., by the ICRC) to Chinese prisons, release/accounting of prisoners, and progress toward freedom of expression, assembly and religion; and seek to engage the Chinese in a continuing, frequent dialogue on our human rights agenda.
- o Secretary Christopher meeting with Foreign Minister Qian at UNGA (and possibly in Washington). The Secretary would touch upon all major bilateral and global issues, but on human rights would reiterate the Shattuck message and -- hopefully -- note progress or the potential for same. In that eventuality, he might invite FM Qian to Washington for discussions and a meeting with the President.
- o Visit to Beijing by Under Secretary of State Wirth -- if sufficient progress had been achieved, and assuming that our environmental agenda might also be thereby advanced.
- o Late 1993: President Jiang Zemin (prospectively) represents China at APEC leaders meeting in Seattle. The President, and other APEC partners, can press Jiang for progress in our core concern areas.
- o Early 1994: Visit by Secretary Christopher to Beijing -- only if dramatic progress had been achieved, or the promise of such guaranteed.

(2) NONPROLIFERATION/MILITARY/STRATEGIC

Policy

-- General. China through the 1990s would pose only a limited direct military threat to the U.S.; the U.S. has an interest in ensuring that PRC military modernization does not change this calculus. The U.S. has stated, as a matter of national policy, its "abiding interest" in a peaceful resolution of the situation in the Taiwan Strait; from that interest there follows a need to monitor the activities and intentions of the Chinese military. U.S. policies should continue to promote good PRC-Taiwan relations. A confrontations between the two could force a U.S. response and raise the spectre of some form of U.S. re-involvement in a Chinese civil war. Similar considerations for U.S. military and security planners arise with respect to the 1997 Hong Kong reversion, and the complex territorial dispute in the South China Sea.

With the cessation of U.S.-China military-to-military contacts following June 1989, isolation has bred suspicion, which in turn may be prompting both sides to conceptualize the other as a potential or real enemy. It is important to understand Chinese military attitudes and strategic thinking -- all the more so at a time when the PLA is destined to play a significant role in the political succession to Deng -- and to counter such tendencies through resumed contact. If we are to attract China into substantive regional security talks -- and structures -- it is imperative to enlist early on the sympathetic understanding of the Chinese military command.

Our objective ought not be the resumption of U.S.-China military technological cooperation (i.e., in support of China's modernization of its defensive weapons systems). With the Soviet/Russian threat vanished, with uncertainties and worries among China's neighbors, with obvious political and security implications for Taiwan, and without any political consensus in the U.S. favoring such cooperation, there is no overriding national purpose served by placing this on our agenda.

As with human rights and trade, we should coordinate closely with U.S. allies, particularly Japan and the EC, to parallel our pressures.

-- Nonproliferation. With an export-driven economic strategy and a military-industrial complex dependent in part on off-budget revenues, China is a worrisome exporter of sensitive technologies and military systems. Many of our nonproliferation efforts, such as in the Middle East, require PRC cooperation. The U.S. faces a decision point in the near future as evidence builds that Beijing may have transferred

M-11 missiles or related equipment to Pakistan. We need to deal with China's significant and worrisome military and nuclear supplier relationship with Iran. China's participation is required to follow through on the President's Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty initiative.

Process

- o Late July: Visit by Under Secretary Davis to Beijing. The principal mission was twofold: (1) to brief the Chinese on the President's CTBT initiative, seeking Chinese participation in the nuclear testing moratorium and willingness to enter into negotiations aimed at a Treaty, and (2) to press home our concerns that China may have transferred M-11 components to Pakistan last November in violation of its commitment to abide by MTCR guidelines and parameters. U/S Davis evidently made little headway on the M-11 issue, with the Chinese insisting, as they have previously, that their MTCR commitment was solemn and remains firm, and that no transfer in violation of that commitment occurred.
- o Fall: An interagency process would lead to a determination on sanctions. We should also set a strategy to achieve the following:
 - obtaining Chinese agreement to tighten adherence to the MTCR
 - inducing China to participate in South Asian regional security talks with the U.S., India, Pakistan and Russia (when such talks would explicitly have on the table Indian and Pakistani missile systems, whether domestically produced or imported)
 - exploring Chinese willingness to resume unconditionally the ACME (Arms Control in the Middle East) talks
 - pressing China to adopt the Nuclear Supplier's Group Guidelines
- o A visit to China by South Asia Assistant Secretary Raphel -- assuming that the Chinese are cooperating on the South Asia nuclear strategy. The

visit would focus principally on modalities for a five-power conference on security on the Indian sub-continent. A/S Raphel would also press our nonproliferation concerns generally.

- o Visit to China by DOD A/S Freeman, aimed at renewing dialogue on strategic issues and pressing for resolution of our proliferation concerns. It would be the vehicle for resumption of uniformed military-to-military contacts, through inclusion in the Freeman party of at least one flag officer. As with other high-level visits, A/S Freeman would utilize the opportunity to press our human rights and other concerns on his Chinese military interlocutors.
- o Late 1993 or early 1994: Assuming Chinese responsiveness to the Freeman visit -- as measured by significant progress on nonproliferation issues, a visit by DOD Deputy Secretary Perry and/or a senior JCS officer might be scheduled. The purpose would be as described above under "policy"; the specific agenda would be shaped according to our principal requirements at the time. Whether or not such high-level visits are warranted and thus possible, we should move to initiate lower-level military-to-military exchanges.

(3) ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL

Policy

China is already our seventh ranking trade partner, and as many as 143,000 American jobs are dependent on U.S. exports. According to some calculations, at current relative growth rates total Chinese output could exceed Japan's by the end of the decade. China's importance as a trading partner is therefore certain to expand further. A successful U.S. effort to boost American economic and job growth through international commerce depends on a healthy trade relationship with the PRC. China is an important market for U.S. grain, aircraft, fertilizer, cotton, electric machinery and computers, wood, pulp and paper, professional and scientific equipment, iron, and steel; Chinese imports of U.S. goods in 1992 totalled \$7.5 billion, up 19 percent over 1991. Because Chinese exports to the U.S. rose even more rapidly, however, the U.S. trade deficit grew to \$18.3 billion. The U.S. is also one of China's leading sources of foreign investment, although relatively weak

growth since 1989 may put the U.S. at a comparative disadvantage to China's Asian trading partners.

China presents increasing high technology trade opportunities, which other Western countries are pursuing in the absence of a larger U.S. presence. U.S. producers in the aerospace, computer and telecommunications industries are some of the highest volume U.S. exporters to China, and they are eager to expand their current markets.

The PRC has made important moves to accommodate the global trading system. But China nevertheless maintains a broad range of trading practices which conflict with international standards, and the process of drawing Beijing fully into the global trading order is likely to be protracted and contentious.

The rise of a Greater China through the ongoing integration of the economies of southern China, Taiwan and Hong Kong also influences U.S. interests. While in certain respects beneficial to regional stability and prosperity, this process has reduced our ability to pressure China economically without harming Hong Kong and Taiwan, and it complicates important trade issues, such as prevention of illegal textile transshipments.

Process: As sketched above, all exchanges would feature -- prominently -- our core message on human rights and renewal of MFN.

- o Fall: Overseen by the NEC, an interagency process will create a commercial/trade strategy for dealing with China, similar to the one done for Japan.

Deputy USTR Barshefsky visits China. The principal objective would be to address IPR implementation, and to make sufficient progress in market access talks to avert the need for imposing trade sanctions on the anniversary of our market access agreement and the statutory deadline for action. Depending on progress, we might float -- or offer on the spot -- the possibility of accelerating our negotiations over China's GATT entry.

- o Secretary Bentsen participation in World Bank/IMF meeting. The Secretary would seek to engage the Chinese on an important issue (though not a core agenda one): exchange rate manipulation. Revivification of the Joint Economic Commission (JEC) ought not be considered unless specific goals and

prospective achievements can be identified well in advance. He would also deliver a hard-hitting message -- speaking with the authority of a senior Administration official as well as a long-time, respected U.S. Senator -- on human rights.

- o Late 1993: Business delegation to China led by Commerce Secretary Brown and/or resumption of the JCCT in Seattle following the APEC leaders conference (a scenario proposed by the Chinese). In either case, close vetting by the IWG group and approval by NSC would be required to establish that core interests were being advanced. Secretary Brown would presumably have neither the time nor the inclination to lead a business delegation to China were there not the solid prospect of resulting contracts for participating firms. In the case of a JCCT, the forum would need in effect to be reinvented -- that is, altered from the ceremonial gathering of years past to an issues- and results-oriented conclave. One possibility -- assuming that this chip had not been played during USTR discussions -- and a logical one for trade talks in a JCCT chaired by Secretary Brown, would be to propose an initial TDA project, to support U.S. interests bidding on the potentially lucrative Guangzhou metro project. Such a project fits our desired profile: high-tech, high revenue, and downstream potential estimated by some in the \$300 million range.

V. CONCLUSION: A DIFFICULT CHALLENGE

We should recognize that implementing this strategy will be very difficult and complex. The Chinese are always hard to move on human rights issues, and they have recently cracked down on some dissidents in Shanghai and elsewhere. The M-11 problem casts a large, immediate shadow. Our trade deficit continues to balloon. Tibet, Taiwan, and Hong Kong -- all relating to Chinese notions of sovereignty -- could cause new strains in our relations. And the political jockeying for succession to Deng could limit Chinese flexibility. Such elements will make progress in negotiations arduous, and could inflame Congressional attitudes.

Drafted: EAP/CM: DWKeyser
SECMDR 1105 7/28/93 7-6803

Cleared: EAP:WLord
EAP:PTomsen

All other clearances assumed from IWG process, and Deputies Committee Meeting. See EAP/CM Hart draft 6/15/93 and following. Participants in that process were:

D:JWarlick
P:AO'Neil
T:JBarker
C:RMPerito
E:ADerse
S/P:LKeene
S/NIS:VNewland
EAP/RA/TC:JBorich
EAP/RA:BGray
NEA/RA:LWard
SA/RA:MClemmon
H:AKirkpatrick
EB/BTA/ODC:DRMoran
HA:PHotze
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L/EAP:JDKovar
OES/ENV:APSchifferdecker
PM/PNW:VCarutenuto
PM/PRO:EMonroe
PM/DRSA:TJLyng

IWG Clearances:

NSC: Kent Wiedemann
DOD: Robert Ellis
JCS: Phil Gay
Commerce: Peter Cashman
USTR: Ira Wolf
FOIA 526 (b) (7)
Treasury: Meg Lundsager
USIA: George Beasley
ACDA: Joe Smaldone

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ANNEX II

NOTIONAL SCHEDULE
SENIOR USG MEETINGS WITH CHINESE
JULY - DECEMBER 1993

[**NOTE:** The following is intended to be illustrative rather than a compendium of visits already planned or deemed essential. Please see text of paper for justification and sequencing considerations. END NOTE.]

July 25	Secretary Christopher met with Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Qian at ASEAN PMC (Singapore)
July 26-27	Under Secretary (T) of State Dr. Davis met in Beijing with Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu and others to discuss proliferation issues.
August-	USTR Kantor and/or Deputy USTR Barskefsky market access bilateral in Beijing September
Sept. 1-13	Assistant Secretary (HA) Shattuck will visit China, including Lhasa, to press our human rights message.
September	SA Assistant Secretary Raphael visit to China to explore cooperation on proliferation on South Asian subcontinent.
September	Secretary Christopher meets with Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Qian during UNGA (New York); possible invitation to Washington
September-October	DOD A/S Freeman, accompanied by flag officer, hold security bilaterals in Beijing
September-October	Secretary Bentsen participation in World Bank/IMF talks.
October	Under Secretary Wirth holds talks in Beijing on human rights, democracy, environment

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- 2 -

October USIA Director Joseph Duffey visits Beijing: emphasizes need for freedom of broadcasting, underscores human rights agenda, and discusses possible new areas for cultural cooperation

October- Commerce Secretary Brown leads trade delegation
November to China, or chairs JCCT in Seattle

November Acting ACDA Director Graham visits China to follow up on arms control, regional security initiatives

November Chinese President Jiang Zemin attends APEC leaders meeting in Seattle; possible bilateral with President and/or possible visit to Washington

December- DOD Deputy Secretary Perry visits China --
January assuming sufficient progress -- to follow up on security dialogue. Senior JCS officer may attend.

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ANNEX III

EXCERPT FROM NSC-11, "U.S. POLICY TOWARD CHINA":
U.S. CHINA POLICY OBJECTIVES

1. Global Cooperation

- o Retain Chinese support for key ongoing UN efforts to preserve international peace in former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Somalia, and Cambodia.
- o Seek Chinese assistance in influencing responsible North Korean behavior with regard to nuclear arms development and continuing cooperation with Seoul.
- o Obtain Chinese cooperation in updating the United Nations system to meet changing international conditions.
- o Enhance cooperation with China on addressing global issues.

2. Asian Peace and Stability

- o Reinforce PRC support for Asian stability and encourage China to limit its military modernization to that necessary for defensive purposes.
- o Involve China in multilateral dialogue and mechanisms to promote peace and security in Northeast, Southeast, and South Asia, with a goal of establishing an intensive East Asian security forum.
- o Assure regional friends and allies that the U.S. will support peace and stability in Asia. Back our assurances with a continued strong military presence and a much greater economic presence in the region.
- o Defuse prospects for conflict regarding Taiwan, the Spratly Islands, and other possible flash points.

3. Proliferation

- o Create a regular nonproliferation dialogue with the PRC to exchange views, voice concerns, and improve mutual understanding.
- o Ensure full PRC compliance with existing obligations under the MTCR, the NPT, and other regimes and agreement to cease sensitive technology transfers to Pakistan, Iran, and other countries of proliferation concern.

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- 2 -

- o Obtain new or updated Chinese nonproliferation commitments, especially the adoption of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG) Guidelines and acceptance of the revised MTCR Guidelines.
- o Encourage the Chinese to establish effective controls on the export of sensitive technology.

4. Arms Control

- o Initiate an intensive, high-level bilateral dialogue with China on nuclear arms control, leading to PRC participation in multilateral initiatives.
- o Secure Chinese support for nuclear testing restraint.
- o Engage China in cooperation on nuclear weapons safety.
- o Secure a freeze in the size of Chinese nuclear forces and a commitment not to introduce MIRVed ICBMs.
- o Obtain full Chinese compliance with BWC and CWC obligations and restraint in conventional force modernization.

5. Human Rights

In the interest of improving human rights conditions for the Chinese people, the U.S. should seek the following:

- o A complete PRC accounting of Chinese citizens detained, accused or sentenced for the non-violent expression of their political beliefs during the Democracy Wall and Tiananmen periods and a commitment to release all those imprisoned for the peaceful expression of their political and religious views;
- o Chinese permission for regular and systematic access to Chinese prisons by the ICRC or another international organization, particularly to political prisoners where there are questions of poor treatment.
- o China's public reaffirmation of its commitment to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and its human rights obligations under the UN Charter.

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- 3 -

- o PRC support for the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
- o Beijing's agreement to reestablish a formal government-to-government human rights dialogue and give positive consideration to establishing a bilateral human rights commission.
- o Assurance that China's population control program refrains from coercive practices.
- o An end to Chinese harassment of unofficial religious groups of all faiths.
- o An end to the already rather ineffective jamming of VOA broadcasts.
- o As a humanitarian matter, secure full cooperation on resolving U.S. POW/MIA cases.

6. Trade and Investment

- o Encourage full Chinese acceptance of international trade and investment standards as well as compliance with and full implementation of our bilateral IPR, market access, and prison labor MOUs.
- o Seek elimination of barriers to U.S. goods and services and removal of impediments to foreign representative offices.
- o Secure a strict prohibition of improper trading practices, especially illegal textile transshipment and other forms of textile fraud.
- o Assist China's entry into GATT if Beijing satisfies membership requirements, including foreign exchange liberalization, and simultaneous entry of Taiwan is possible.
- o Promote full liberalization of China's foreign exchange regime, including a market-determined exchange rate, in order to prevent denial of U.S. access to Chinese markets by non-trade means and to facilitate adjustment in China's external balances.
- o Reevaluate the export control levels for high technology trade with China.

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- 4 -

7. Taiwan

- o Encourage political forces in Taiwan to pursue their interests by means other than an assertion of independence.
- o Continue to encourage Taiwan and the PRC to further their accommodation, with the hope of an eventual outcome acceptable to the people of both sides.
- o Work with the PRC, Taiwan, and other countries to increase joint membership in appropriate international organizations.
- o Establish rules for engagement which will advance U.S. commercial and other interests in Taiwan while satisfying Beijing that the U.S. remains committed to the one China formulae described in the three communiqués.
- o Reassess and modify as necessary the guidelines for arms sales to Taiwan.

8. Hong Kong

- o Make clear U.S. support for increased democracy, warning against actions by the Chinese which could harm Hong Kong's economy or impair the rights and welfare of its citizens.
- o Continue to treat the decolonization process as primarily a UK-PRC issue.
- o In keeping with the goals of the McConnell Act, encourage fulfillment of the 1984 Joint Declaration's guarantee that the Hong Kong SAR will enjoy a high degree of autonomy following reversion to China through appropriate representations to Beijing and formalization of U.S. commercial, legal, and other links with the Hong Kong Government.

9. Tibet

- o Promote dialogue between the Dalai Lama and Beijing.
- o Seek protection of Tibetan human rights and preservation of Tibetan culture, but avoid challenging China's claim to the region.

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- 5 -

- o Obtain a full PRC accounting and release of Tibetans imprisoned for their political and religious beliefs and press for releases and humane treatment of prisoners.

10. Illegal Immigration

- o Upgrade U.S. communication and cooperation with PRC, Hong Kong, and Taiwan to work for solutions to the issue.
- o Intercept illegal immigrants before they reach U.S. soil; establish procedures for repatriation, refugee processing, third country settlement, etc., to prevent large scale illegal entry into the U.S. of Chinese economic migrants.

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Annex IV

Human Rights Strategy

Background

China's market-oriented economic reforms are rapidly producing a new society of increasing pluralism and openness to the outside world. Nonetheless, there still exists the still powerful reality of China's past: a communist party supported by a large security apparatus and determined to hold on to political control whatever the cost.

Our task is to fashion a policy which will spur further improvements in the human rights situation in China, as we nurture the growing domestic constituencies and infrastructure that are China's best hope for systemic change. We can support this process by expanding the range of our contacts, moving beyond the limitations of high-level official meetings, and finding ways to support the "revolution from below" which is the real force for change in China today.

We also need a strategy to nudge China's communist officialdom into accelerating the pace of political reform. To maintain MFN, China will have to improve its human rights performance. To accomplish this, we need to persuade Chinese officials at all levels to focus on human rights problems and on the steps they must take to resolve or avoid these problems.

Communicate a Sense of Urgency

Our strategy must be clear and it must be vigorously implemented. It should have several components:

-- We need to reinvigorate our bilateral exchanges. Visits to China by senior Department officials concerned with human rights will force the Chinese to focus on these issues and the need for measurable progress over the coming year. In our discussions, we will remind the Chinese that we are under time constraints and that the relationship must move forward or, under the weight of serious bilateral concerns, face a significant downturn. We must communicate a sense of urgency. Every exchange must emphasize our core human rights initiatives as contained in the President's Executive Order:

- 1) Freedom of emigration;
- 2) Compliance with the 1992 bilateral agreement concerning prison labor;

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- 2 -

- 3) Adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
- 4) Releasing and providing an acceptable accounting for Chinese citizens imprisoned or detained for the nonviolent expression of their political and religious beliefs, including such expression of beliefs in connection with the Democracy Wall and Tiananmen Square movements;
- 5) Ensuring humane treatment of prisoners, such as by allowing access to prisons by international humanitarian and human rights organization;
- 6) Protecting Tibet's distinctive religious and cultural heritage; and
- 7) Permitting international radio and television broadcasts into China.

In the context of the strategy for engaging the PRC during the remainder of 1993, we should in particular press for Chinese approval of ICRC access to prison. This would be a tangible step forward by the Beijing authorities and an achievable goal in the context of a human rights full-court press.

We must draw a bottom line for the Chinese. They must understand that the President is fully prepared to withdraw MFN unless there is "overall, significant progress" in this area by next year.

While the Chinese will resist making concessions, the "carrot" that can promote progress is the prospect of ever-increasing levels of official contact between Chinese and American officials.

--Human Rights Assistant Secretary John Shattuck plans to travel to China in August to explain the provisions of the MFN decision and what is needed to preserve MFN in 1994. We should follow up this visit with other high-level contacts to reinforce our message.

-- We need to broaden the U.S. side of the dialogue through Congressional delegations, including outside experts. The Chinese are keenly aware of the role Congress plays. We should work closely with such delegations, not only to

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- 3 -

"speak with one voice," but to impress upon the Chinese the importance of the legislative-executive consensus in creating a firm bases upon which to expand our bilateral relations.

-- Expand cooperation and exchanges in areas which are likely to contribute to the long-term improvement in human rights such as with the fast developing legal community. As the Chinese grow into their new international role, legal reform becomes essential. We can enter through this "open door" to provide assistance in the development of civil and criminal legal systems.

-- Coordinate with other governments and with NGO's to obtain maximum leverage in changing Chinese behavior. By focusing on those initiatives where broad international consensus exists for action--such as curbing physical abuse of prisoners and assuring that they obtain adequate medical attention--we are likely to see steady progress.

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Annex V

U.S. Policy Towards Tibet

Tibet presents us with special problems. First, Chinese suspicions of U.S. motives in Tibet are linked to the legacy of active U.S. support, during the 1950's and 1960's, for Tibetan insurgents opposing PRC control. Secondly, our support for religious freedom in Tibet must take into account Tibet's tradition of combining religious and political power and its ongoing agitation for independence. Thirdly, many aspects of Tibet's traditional, pre-modern culture are undergoing change as a result of a modernization process made inevitable by domestic economic reform and the opening to the outside world. Tibet's society, religion and history are little understood in the U.S. This has led to romanticized views of Tibet among domestic U.S. audiences, views which have a powerful influence upon policy.

Our role must be to convince the Chinese that resolution of the Tibetan problem is essential if there is to be a long-term, healthy relationship between the U.S. and China. We can only do this by making clear to the Chinese that we will not in any way try to shape or dictate the terms of the compromise nor will we do anything to undermine the compromise by giving encouragement to Tibetan independence activists. But we must also make clear that Tibet, unlike for instance Taiwan, is not a problem whose solution can be deferred. Once the Dalai Lama passes from the scene or, as he has threatened, removes himself from the process, then the best and perhaps only chance for peaceful compromise is gone. And the consequences for China, for Tibet, and for the U.S. will be great.

The Embassy argues for a U.S. Tibetan policy which is both realistic and active. Such a policy would have several components:

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- 2 -

1. American values and American public sentiment require us vigorously to promote respect for human rights.
2. However, it is not in U.S. national interest to support Tibetan independence in the face of Chinese claims to sovereignty and particularly when every U.N. member nation supports the Chinese position. We would be responsible for encouraging separatist elements in Tibet to rebel and risk sparking ethnic violence.
3. We must sensitize Beijing to the problems created by the movement of Han Chinese into Tibet. There is no conclusive evidence that this influx of economic migrants is a result of an official government policy. Nevertheless, the Han compete with Tibetans for economic opportunity and their growing presence is rapidly altering the distinctive cultural and religious life of Tibet. The fear among Tibetans, as articulated recently by the Dalai Lama in exile, is that the ongoing demographic changes will "further reduce Tibetans into an insignificant minority in their own country." But we should also recognize that this phenomenon is limited mainly to Lhasa, and the Dalai Lama considers large parts of China to be part of Tibet.
4. We must persuade both sides to renew the dialogue between the Dalai Lama and the PRC with the goal of genuine autonomy for Tibet within China.

The Chinese believe that the Tibetans, like most other minority groups in China, will settle down once foreigners stop intervening. Tibetan activists believe that through foreign intervention (economic sanctions, international condemnation of China, etc.) Tibet can become independent. Both sides are wrong. The problems facing Tibet can only be resolved through negotiation and eventual compromise.

Compromise will not be easy to reach. It will require the Chinese to accept the fact that there is a nearly indestructible core of Tibetan resistance which will always struggle against rule from Beijing. Tibetans must accept that the concept of a "Greater Tibet," which would include large sections of neighboring Chinese provinces where Tibetans are and have been outnumbered by Han and other minorities for generations, is not achievable. Tibet is a small corner of a great power triangle. The survival of Tibetan culture and society will always depend upon compromise, especially with China.

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- 3 -

While any Chinese leader or government can negotiate such a compromise, only one Tibetan can deliver the Tibetan side--the Dalai Lama.

In our expanded dialogue with Beijing, we should take advantage of every opportunity to press the Chinese on Tibetan human rights problems. We should:

- urge the Chinese to use restraint in dealing with peaceful demonstrations in Tibet;
- encourage improved treatment of prisoners, the end of abuses, and torture and ICRC access to Tibetan prisons;
- promote religious freedom in Tibet, particularly the lifting of limits on the number of monks;
- urge improved access for foreign visitors and particularly human rights groups to Tibet and;
- encourage the Chinese to resume their dialogue with the Dalai Lama.

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LOG 9520158
DATE 14 FEB 95

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS OF 6 FEB DC MTG RE CHINA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
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U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
ROOM 416, WINDER BUILDING
600 17TH STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20506

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER
ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
2201 C STREET NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319

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MR. BOWMAN CUTTER
NATL ECONOMIC COUNCIL
ROOM 231
OLD EXECUTIVE OFC BLDG

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MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS
WASHINGTON, DC 20505

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DR. LAURA D. TYSON COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS ROOM 314, OE0B WASHINGTON, DC 20500	<u>2/15/95</u>	<u>11:30am</u>	<u>A. H. Williams</u> PRINT LAST NAME: <u>Alice H. Williams</u> COPY: <u>1</u>
COL. T. R. PATRICK JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>

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MS. JANE WALES
OFFICE OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY POLICY
ROOM 494
OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG
WASHINGTON, DC 20500

2/15/95

11:10AM

J. Ward

PRINT LAST NAME:

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PAGE 03 OF 03 PAGES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR

February 14, 1995

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

AMB. RICK INDERFUERTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the United
Nations

Mr. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. W. BOWMAN CUTTER
Deputy Assistant to the
President for Economic
Policy

MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

DR. LAURA D. TYSON
Chair, President's Council
of Economic Advisors

MR. ANTHONY A. DAS
Executive Secretary
Department of Commerce

MS. JANE WALES
Associate Director for
National Security and
International Affairs
Office of Science and
Technology Policy


DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for
National Security
& International Affairs

COL T.R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Executive Director for
Policy Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

SUBJECT: Summary and Conclusions of the Deputies' Committee
Meeting on China Policy (8)

Attached is the Summary of Conclusions from the Deputies' meeting
of Monday, February 6, 1995. (8)


Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on China Policy [partial] (1 page)	02/06/1995	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 4000

FOLDER TITLE:

DC 0169 DC Meeting on China Policy, February 6, 1995

2015-0221-M
rs1203

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~

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20158

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON D C 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of NSC Deputies' Committee

DATE: February 6, 1995
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 4:00 - 5:45 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies' Committee Meeting
on China Policy (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

Samuel R. Berger

USTR:

Charlene Barshevsky
Lee Sands

The Vice President's Office:

William Wise
Dana Marshall

NEC:

W. Bowman Cutter
Robert D. Kyle
Michael Punke

State:

Peter Tarnoff
Winston Lord
Daniel Tarullo

CIA:

Douglas MacEachin
[REDACTED]

DOD:

John Deutch
Walter Slocombe

JCS:

William Owens
Wesley Clark

Treasury:

Meg Lundsager

CEA:

Joseph Stiglitz
Lael Brainard

Commerce:

Jeffrey Garten
David Rothkopf

NSC:

Stanley O. Roth
Robert L. Suettinger

USUN:

David Scheffer
James O'Brien

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

KOE 3/11/2000

2015-0221-M (1.56)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

Relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China are likely to go through a difficult period -- lasting from several months to perhaps several years -- due to hardening attitudes and political uncertainty in China surrounding the imminent passing of Deng Xiaoping. (S)

In these circumstances, it is less likely that the United States and China will be able to sustain progress across a range of our interests. Moreover, due to the possibility that relations may actually take a downward turn in some areas, such as human rights, trade and non-proliferation, public and Congressional calls for more punitive action toward China are likely to increase. (S)

The United States should take the following steps to position itself for this more difficult period in relations:

- The "comprehensive engagement" strategy should be continued, but with more caution and sensitivity on the part of all agencies. Travel to China -- particularly at the Assistant Secretary level and above -- must be seen to support overall U.S. policy objectives, as determined by the Deputies. The State Department IWG should continue to review carefully all requests for high-level travel to China to determine that the purpose and pace of visits are appropriate.
- The Administration should endeavor publicly and with the Chinese to place bilateral relations in an appropriate strategic context, to provide "strategic reassurance" to both the Chinese government and the American public as to the goals of our policy toward China. State Department should work toward this end in upcoming public testimony and give consideration to a senior-level speech on the specific issue of China policy.
- In implementing the above point, it was agreed that Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord would travel to China in late February or early March to discuss the larger issues in the relationship. Undersecretary of State Tarnoff also will invite China's Deputy Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu to the United States to continue their periodic discussions of major bilateral issues. State will also review the advisability of a meeting between Secretary Christopher and China's Foreign Minister Qian Qichen.
- Agencies should coordinate a legislative strategy to increase Congressional understanding of our policy objectives toward China, to deal effectively with Congressional initiatives that run counter to those objectives, and to lower expectations of

what U.S. policy can accomplish with China in current circumstances.

- The U.S. should make an effort to coordinate our overall approach more with other countries, particularly the European Union and Japan. While we do this on some issues, such as human rights and GATT/WTO, we have not done so on other issues, such as IPR. The end result occasionally is that the United States pays the price for taking the lead in bringing China's practices into line with international standards, while other countries share mainly in the benefits. A better effort at communicating our larger goals might pay dividends. State will look into this. ~~(S)~~

With respect to the question of "Business Principles" for operating in China that have been under consideration since last May, the Deputies agreed we will postpone announcing our approach until after the Intellectual Property Rights negotiations have been completed in late February. ~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

20158

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506



February 7, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: STANLEY O. ROTH *SOR*

FROM: ROBERT L. SUETTINGER *RL*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of the Deputies' Committee Meeting on China Policy

Attached at Tab A is the Summary of Conclusions of the Deputies' meeting held on February 6, 1995.

Concurrence by: Bob Kyle *RL*

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize William Itoh to sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve *ml* Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to Counterparts
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *WK* NARA, Date *1/26/15*
2015-0221-M

TO: SENS

FROM: BRILL, K

DOC DATE: 14 FEB 95
SOURCE REF: 9502520

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R

DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: STATE FOLLOW UP PAPER FOR 6 FEB DC MTG ON CHINA - UPCOMING HIGH
VISIBILITY VISITS TO & FM CHINA

ACTION: NFAR PER ROTH

DUE DATE: 18 FEB 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ROTH

LOGREF: 9520147 9520158

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC0169

CODES:

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COMMENTS: CY FWD TO BERGER PER ROTH

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Z 95021509 PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE

001

X 95021614 NFAR PER ROTH

TO: SENS

FROM: BRILL, K

DOC DATE: 14 FEB 95
SOURCE REF: 9502520

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R

DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: RPT TO DC ON UPCOMING HIGH VISIBILITY VISITS TO & FM CHINA

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE

DUE DATE: 18 FEB 95

STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: ROTH

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

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ROTH

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ITOH
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WALES

COMMENTS:

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Stanley ROTH

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DATE _____

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Washington, D.C. 20520


February 14, 1995

~~SECRET~~
DECL:OADR

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW D. SENS
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Report to the Deputies Committee on Upcoming
High-Visibility Visits to and from China

On February 6 the Deputies Committee agreed that the State Department should prepare a memorandum discussing the advantages and disadvantages, as well as timing, of potential high-visibility visits to and from China over the next six months. We attach an analysis of such high-profile and political sensitive visits and a thumbnail sketch of other important visits under consideration (or already approved.)



Kenneth C. Brill
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

- Tab 1 - Memorandum on Potential High-Visibility Visits
- Tab 2 - Memorandum on Other Important Visits

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. paper	re: Potential High Visibility Visits to/from China, February-July 1995 (7 pages)	02/14/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 4000

FOLDER TITLE:

DC 0169 DC Meeting on China Policy, February 6, 1995

2015-0221-M
rs1203

RESTRICTION CODES

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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 03 FEB 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
AGENDA

DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION / AGENDA & DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 6 FEB DC MTG ON CHINA
POLICY

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 07 FEB 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ROTH LOGREF: 9520158 9520201

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC0169 CODES:

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FOR CONCURRENCE

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- SUETTINGER

COMMENTS: _____

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RECORD ID: 9520147

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CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER	Z 95020317 FOR DECISION
001	X 95020317 BERGER APPROVED RECOM
002	X 95020318 SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES
003	X 95020319 SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION DISPATCH FOR INFO

002	950203	FUERTH, L	
002	950203	BRILL, K	
002	950203	NYE, J	
002	950203	MCALEER, R	
002	950203	DAS, A	
002	950203	ADAMS, G	
002	950203	MONTGOMERY, F	
002	950203	CUTTER, W	
002	950203	GARTHOFF, D	
002	950203	INDERFURTH, K	
002	950203	WALES	
002	950203	PATRICK, T	
002	950203	STARR, B	
003	950203	FUERTH, L	
003	950203	BRILL, K	
003	950203	NYE, J	
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**National Security Council
The White House**

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Soderberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
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Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

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cc: _____

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

National Security Council
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NSC Secretariat		<u>MBN 2/3</u>	<u>N</u>
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A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

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		PRINT LAST NAME: <u>George</u>

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N
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1800
2/3/95

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASOR: RLH

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: 0245 CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL TOTAL: 4
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	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
B	State	Exec Sec		
K	Treasury	Exec Sec		
N	Defense	Exec Sec		
L	Commerce	Exec Sec		
A	CIA	Exec Sec		
D	JCS	Exec Sec		

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(PHONE NUMBER)

(ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: 6 Feb. DC Mtg Re China

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TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
B State	Exec Sec	_____	_____
T Treasury	Exec Sec	_____	_____
N Defense	Exec Sec	_____	_____
L Commerce	Exec Sec	_____	_____
A CIA	Exec Sec	_____	_____
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213
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B State	Exec Sec		
K Treasury	Exec Sec		
N Defense	Exec Sec		
L Commerce	Exec Sec		
A CIA	Exec Sec		
D JCS	Exec Sec		

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TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
B State	Exec Sec		
K Treasury	Exec Sec		
N Defense	Exec Sec		
L Commerce	Exec Sec		
A CIA	Exec Sec		
D JCS	Exec Sec		

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B	<u>State</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	_____	_____
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N	<u>Defense</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	_____	_____
L	<u>Commerce</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	_____	_____
A	<u>CIA</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	_____	_____
D	<u>JCS</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	_____	_____
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B	<u>State</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	_____	_____
K	<u>Treasury</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	_____	_____
N	<u>Defense</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	_____	_____
L	<u>Commerce</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	_____	_____
A	<u>CIA</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	_____	_____
D	<u>JCS</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	_____	_____
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20147

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 3, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs
Office of the Vice President

Mr. KENNETH BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

COLONEL ROBERT P. McALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. ANTHONY A. DAS
Executive Secretary
Department of Commerce

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National
Security and International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Executive Director for Policy
Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

MR. W. BOWMAN CUTTER
Deputy Assistant to the President for
Economic Policy

MR. DOUGLAS GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By WK NARA, Date 1/26/15

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
MS. JANE WALES
Associate Director for National
Security and International Affairs

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MS. BARBARA STARR
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on China (C)

A Deputies meeting to discuss China will be held on Monday, February 6, from 4:00 - 5:00 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. Participation will be limited to Principal plus one. An agenda is at Tab A.



William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A

Agenda

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. agenda	re: National Security Council Deputies Committee Meeting [partial] (1 page)	02/06/1995	P1/b(1)

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- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING.

DATE: February 6, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 4:00 - 5:00 p.m.

- I. EO 13526 1.4c
- II. An Overview of the Relationship:State
What are our objectives/interests during this period?
- III. Discussion of General Goals/TacticsAll
- IV. Status of IPR Talks.....USTR
- V. Status of UN Resolution.....State
- VI. Bilateral Visits.....All

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2015-0221-M 05266 KDC

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20147
add/on

February 3, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs
Office of the Vice President

Mr. KENNETH BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

COLONEL ROBERT P. McALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. ANTHONY A. DAS
Executive Secretary
Department of Commerce

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National
Security and International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Executive Director for Policy
Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

MR. W. BOWMAN CUTTER
Deputy Assistant to the President for
Economic Policy

MR. DOUGLAS GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
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
MS. JANE WALES
Associate Director for National
Security and International Affairs

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MS. BARBARA STARR
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on China ~~ACT~~

In addition to the agenda sent earlier today, the attached discussion paper is for your use in preparing for the China meeting which will be held on Monday, February 6, from 4:00 - 5:00 p.m. in the White House Situation Room.


William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Discussion Paper



Revised

~~SECRET~~
DECL:OADR

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Results of the Meeting of the Interagency Working Group on China, January 10, 1995

Assistant Secretary Winston Lord chaired a meeting of the China Interagency Working Group (IWG) on Tuesday, January 10. Attached is a summary report of that meeting. Also included in the report is a list of still pending issues which we believe might provide an appropriate agenda for a Deputies Committee meeting. The IWG proposed that this meeting be held during the week of January 16.

Kenneth C. Brill
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

- Tab 1 - Results of the IWG
- Tab 2 - List of Planned and Notional Visits
- Tab 3 - Notional Economic Outline
- Tab 4 - Notional Security Outline

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. paper	re: Results of the Meeting of the Interagency Working Group on China, January 10, 1995 (10 pages)	01/10/1995	P1/b(1)

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DC 0169 DC Meeting on China Policy, February 6, 1995

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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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20147

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 3, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: STANLEY O. ROTH *SR*

FROM: ROBERT L. SUETTINGER *RS*

SUBJECT: Deputies Meeting on China, Monday, ^{Feb}~~January~~ 6, 1995
4:00 - 5:00 p.m.

Attached at Tab I is a proposed meeting notice for the Deputies' meeting on China. An agenda for the meeting is a Tab A.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize William Itoh to sign the memorandum at Tab I and approve the agenda at Tab A.

Approve *RS* Disapprove _____

Attachment

- Tab I Memorandum for Signature
- Tab A Agenda

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PAGE 03 OF 03 PAGES

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<i>L</i> Commerce	<i>Exec Sec</i>		
<i>A</i> CIA	<i>Exec Sec</i>		
<i>D</i> JCS	<i>Exec Sec</i>		

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001. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of NSC/NEC Deputies Meeting on China MFN (2 pages) <i>partial release</i>	05/03/1995	P1/b(1) <i>YDE 3/11/2020</i> <i>b(3)</i>
002a. agenda	Agenda for Deputies China MFN Meeting. (1 page)	05/03/1995	P1/b(1) <i>YDE 3/11/2020</i>
002b. paper	USTR Strategy Paper: Strategy on MFN for China Deputies Committee. (5 pages)	05/02/1995	P1/b(1)
002c. paper	USTR Strategy Paper: Congressional Strategy for China MFN. (5 pages)	05/02/1995	P1/b(1)
003a. memo	For Sandy Berger and Bo Cutter from Kathryn Mack. Subject: Deputies Meeting on China MFN. [Record ID: 9520565] (2 pages)	05/02/1995	P1/b(1) <i>YDE 3/11/2020</i>
003b. paper	Duplicate of 002b. (5 pages)	05/02/1995	P1/b(1)
003c. paper	Duplicate of 002c. (5 pages)	05/02/1995	P1/b(1)
003d. paper	Duplicate of 003c [page 5 only] (1 page)	05/02/1995	P1/b(1)

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SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS OF 3 MAY NSC / NEC DC MTG ON CHINA MFN

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 08 MAY 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: MACK LOGREF: 9520565 9520568

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DR LAURA D'ANDREA TYSON
NATL ECONOMIC COUNCIL
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OLD EXECUTIVE OFC BLDG
ATTN: BO CUTTER

5-12-95 12noon Lindemuth
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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC OF NSC/NEC DC MTO
ON CHINA MFN NSC LOG # 20582

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CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
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FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting SOC DC MTG ON CHINA PAGES: 3

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 10, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Assistant USTR for Policy
Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

DR. LAURA D. TYSON
Chair, President's Council of
Economic Advisers

MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

MR. W. BOWMAN CUTTER
Deputy Assistant to the
President for Economic Policy

COL. ROBERT P. McALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. DOUGLAS GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MS. CHERYL M. CARTER
Acting Executive Secretary
Department of Commerce


COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the United
Nations

MS. SUSAN BROPHY
Deputy Assistant to the
President and Deputy
Director for Legislative
Affairs

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of NSC/NEC Deputies Meeting
on China MFN ~~(S)~~

Attached is a Summary of Conclusions of the NSC/NEC Deputies
meeting on China MFN, which met on May 3, 1995, from 11:15 a.m. -
12:15 p.m. in OEOB, Room 208. ~~(S)~~


Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of NSC/NEC Deputies Meeting on China MFN [partial] (1 page)	05/03/1995	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
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FOLDER TITLE:

DC0197 DC Meeting on China MFN (Most Favored Nation), May 3, 1995

2015-0221-M
rs1204

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of NSC/NEC Deputies Committee
DATE: May 3, 1995
LOCATION: Room 208, OEOB
TIME: 11:15 a.m. - 12:15 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of NSC/NEC Deputies Meeting on
China MFN (G)

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR

Sandy Berger
W. Bowman Cutter

CEA

Martin Baily
Lael Brainard

OVP

Leon Fuerth
Dana Marshall

NEC

Kathryn Mack
Michael Froman
Michael Punke

STATE

Peter Tarnoff
Al Larson
Wendy Sherman

CIA

David Cohen

TREASURY

James Fall
Meg Lundsager

JCS

David McIlvoy
Thomas Arnold

DEFENSE

John Deutch
John B. Hall

White House

Susan Brophy

COMMERCE

Tim Hauser
David Forest

NSC

Robert Suettinger
Bill Danvers

USUN

David Scheffer
James O'Brien

USTR

Charlene Barshefsky
Lee Sands
Deborah Lehr

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3/11/2000 KDE

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- USTR and State would prepare talking points and Qs and As regarding U.S. human rights policy toward China and why we should grant China MFN trading status, circulating them for agency comment and clearance by May 10.
- USTR, working with State and Susan Brophy, will be responsible for Congressional strategy, developing a specific plan by May 10 setting forth who should contact whom.
- Mort Halperin and John Shattuck will develop a strategy for dealing with human rights groups.
- Tom Ross at NSC will coordinate press strategy.
- Commerce, working with USTR, will take the lead on developing a business strategy. (C)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

20582

May 4, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SANDY BERGER
BO CUTTER

THROUGH: ROBERT KYLE 

FROM: KATHRYN MACK 

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of NSC/NEC Deputies on
China MFN

Attached at Tab I is the proposed Memorandum to Agencies on the meeting of NSC/NEC Deputies on China MFN, which met on May 3, 1995. A Summary of Conclusions of the meeting is at Tab A.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the Memorandum to Agencies at Tab I.

Approve  Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusion

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By WR NARA, Date 1/24/15
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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

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001 BERGER
001
002

Z 95050218 FOR DECISION
X 95050219 BERGER APPROVED RECOM
X 95050219 DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

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002 950502 NYE, J
002 950502 MCALEER, R
002 950502 CARTER, C
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DR LAURA D'ANDREA TYSON NATL ECONOMIC COUNCIL VIA ROOM 231 OLD EXECUTIVE OFC BLDG ATTN: BO CUTTER	<u>5/3</u>	<u>4:50</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
		PRINT LAST NAME:	<u>Weinstein</u>
			COPY: <u>1</u>
COL. T. R. PATRICK JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME:	_____
			COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
BROPHY, S	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME:	_____
			COPY: <u>1</u>

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB
PAGE 02 OF 02 PAGES

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KRM Date: 11/13/2021
2015-0221-M

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

**WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM**

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: _____ CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOTAL: 14
(PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (202) 456-9425 WH SITROOM
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Notification / Agenda & Briefing Paper for
3 May DC Meeting on China MFN NSC LOG # 20568

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>PHONE NUMBE</u>
<u>State</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>Treasury</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>DOD</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>Commerce</u>	<u>Acting Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>CIA</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>JCS</u>	<u>Secretary, Joint Staff</u>	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

REMARKS:

National Security Council
The White House

Rec'd 5/2
6:30pm

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____ LOG # 20568 A/O _____
 DOCLOG DRS SYSTEM: PRS NSC INT

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL / DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	1/3	D/A	_____
Dohse			_____
Sens			_____
Soderberg	2	Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	_____
Berger			_____
Lake	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	4 5	DRS 5/2	_____
West Wing Desk			_____
NSC/Rm			_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Special Dispatch Instructions:

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

May 2, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs
Office of the Vice President

MR. KENNETH BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. BENJAMIN NYE
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

COLONEL ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. CHERYL CARTER
Acting Executive Secretary
Department of Commerce

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Executive Director for Policy
Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

MR. W. BOWMAN CUTTER
Deputy Assistant to the President for
Economic Policy

MR. DOUGLAS GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency


DR. LAURA D. TYSON
Chair Presidents Council on
Economic Advisers

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MS. SUSAN BROPHY
Deputy Assistant to the
President and Deputy
Director for Legislative Affairs

SUBJECT: Agenda and Background Papers for Deputies Meeting
 on China MFN ~~(S)~~

Attached is an agenda and two USTR strategy papers for the
Deputies meeting on China MFN; this meeting is scheduled for
11:15-12:15p.m. on Wednesday, May 3, 1995 in OEOB Room 208. ~~(S)~~


Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab A Agenda

Tab B USTR Strategy Papers

AGENDA FOR DEPUTIES CHINA MFN MEETING

May 3, 1995
11:15 - 12:15
Room 208 OEOB

- I. Opening Comments (NEC/NSC)
- II. General Message (USTR/State)
- III. Strategy Timeline (USTR)
- IV. Congressional Strategy
- V. Other Considerations
 - Human Rights Groups
 - Business Liaison
 - Diplomatic Strategy
 - Press
 - Overall Organization

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. paper	USTR Strategy Paper: Strategy on MFN for China Deputies Committee. (5 pages)	05/02/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 4001

FOLDER TITLE:

DC0197 DC Meeting on China MFN (Most Favored Nation), May 3, 1995

2015-0221-M
rs1204

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002c. paper	USTR Strategy Paper: Congressional Strategy for China MFN. (5 pages)	05/02/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 4001

FOLDER TITLE:

DC0197 DC Meeting on China MFN (Most Favored Nation), May 3, 1995

2015-0221-M
rs1204

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

20568

May 2, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ROBERT KYLE *RK*
FROM: KATHRYN MACK *KM*
SUBJECT: Deputies Meeting on China MFN, Wednesday, May 3,
1995 11:15-12:15 p.m.

Attached at Tab I is a proposed meeting notice for the Deputies' meeting on China MFN. An agenda for the meeting is at Tab A. USTR strategy papers are at Tab B.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memorandum at Tab I and approve the agenda and strategy papers at Tabs A and B.

Approve *AK* _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum for Signature
Tab A Agenda
Tab B USTR Strategy Papers

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9520565
RECEIVED: 01 MAY 95 19

TO: BERGER
CUTTER, W

FROM: MACK
KYLE

DOC DATE: 01 MAY 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
INTL TRADE
DC

MFN
HUMAN RIGHTS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 3 MAY NSC / NEC DC MTG ON CHINA MFN

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER

DUE DATE: 04 MAY 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KYLE

LOGREF: 9520568 9520582

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC0197

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
KYLE
MACK
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB

CLOSED BY: NSMEC

DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By WA NARA, Date 1/24/10
2015-02-21-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9520565

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001

Z 95050218 FOR INFORMATION
X 95050315 NOTED BY BERGER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

National Security Council
The White House

Exec Sec Office has diskette NO LOG # 20565 A/O _____
 DOCLOG ORB SYSTEM: PRS (NSC) INT

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL /DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	_____	_____	_____
Dohse	<u>1</u>	_____	_____
Sens	_____	_____	_____
Soderberg	<u>copy</u>	_____	_____
Berger	<u>2</u>	Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	_____
Lake	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>MCC 5/3</u>	<u>N</u>
NSC/Rm	_____	_____	_____
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A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: DC Notes on China MFN
S/B, 11:15 a.m.

Special Dispatch Instructions:

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

20565

May 2, 1995

NOTED

**Deputy Nat Sec Advisor
has seen**

MEMORANDUM FOR SANDY BERGER
BO CUTTER

THROUGH: ROBERT KYLE *RR*

FROM: KATHRYN MACK *KM*

RE: Deputies Meeting on China MFN

You will be chairing a Deputies meeting on the China MFN issue Wednesday, May 3 at 11:15 in room 208 of the OEOB. The purpose of this meeting is to begin to get us focused on the upcoming China MFN debate. There are several points that you may want to make in your introduction:

1. It is in our interest to make this debate as low key as possible. Even if we win the vote, much of the press will be negative.
2. We should be able to win the vote. In the House, 272 returning members voted against the fast-track vote (an up or down vote on disapproving the granting of MFN) and 219 returning members opposed the Pelosi bill (the compromise bill).
3. We should seek to ensure that there is only one vote (on the fast-track resolution). We want to avoid a compromise bill like Pelosi's last year, which would increase attention on the issue. The business community reports Drier and Kolby are seeking this approach from Gingrich. We will need to get the support of the Congressional leadership on this strategy, with the exception perhaps of Pelosi and Gephardt.
4. Managing other China-related issues is important. This process will have to take into account other China issues, such as Lee's visit and the China Women's Conference, because frictions from the MFN issue could easily spill over.

*Another
vehicle -*

??

AGENDA FOR MEETING

I. General Message and Approach to MFN Debate

In the paper attached at Tab A, the USTR has developed both a message and a timeline to be used in the debate. The message would emphasize traditional human rights concerns, and would also outline the broader dimensions of our human rights strategy * (e.g., how the IPR agreement helps establish the rule of law in China). It will be important to strike the right balance between broadening the message and not having commercial diplomacy presume to engulf with human rights.

2. Congressional Strategy

The USTR has also drafted a Congressional strategy paper (attached at Tab B) that we think makes sense. Nancy Leamond should be put in charge of developing a more specific plan setting forth precisely who should contact whom (with talking points).

3. Other Organizational Issues

Human Rights Groups: You might charge Mort Halperin with drafting a strategy to handle these groups.

Business Liaison: USTR will take the lead on this issue. They should provide an update on what they have done to date and what the strategy is for the future.

Diplomatic Strategy: State could be asked to develop this strategy.

Press Strategy: NSC and USTR could take the lead on this strategy.

Overall Organization: NSC/NEC under the guidance of Berger and Cutter could provide the overall coordination of this effort. Susan Brophy and Bob Kyle could be responsible for assembling agencies for White House meetings, as appropriate, and Nancy Leamond and USTR could be responsible for the day to day issues.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. paper	Duplicate of 002b. (5 pages)	05/02/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 4001

FOLDER TITLE:

DC0197 DC Meeting on China MFN (Most Favored Nation), May 3, 1995

2015-0221-M
rs1204

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003c. paper	Duplicate of 002c. (5 pages)	05/02/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 4001

FOLDER TITLE:

DC0197 DC Meeting on China MFN (Most Favored Nation), May 3, 1995

2015-0221-M
rs1204

RESTRICTION CODES**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003d. paper	Duplicate of 003c [page 5 only] (1 page)	05/02/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 4001

FOLDER TITLE:

DC0197 DC Meeting on China MFN (Most Favored Nation), May 3, 1995

2015-0221-M
rs1204

RESTRICTION CODES

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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MR MARKER

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting Nuclear Cooperation with China (2 pages)	02/12/1996	P1/b(1)
002a. paper	re: China 825 Sanctions (4 pages)	02/07/1996	P1/b(1)
002b. paper	re: Possible Nuclear Nonproliferation Sanctions against China (2 pages)	02/00/1996	P1/b(1) <i>UPE 3/11/2020</i>

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DC0257 DC Meeting on China Nuclear Cooperation, February 12, 1996

2015-0221-M
rs1197

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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TO: BERGER

FROM: SAMORE

DOC DATE: 08 MAR 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NON PROLIFERATION
EXPORT CONTROLS
DC

CHINA P R
PAKISTAN
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 7 FEB DC MTG ON CHINA NUCLEAR COOPERATION

ACTION: BERGER APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 10 FEB 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SAMORE

LOGREF: 9620128 9620129

FILES: IFM 0

NSCP: DC0257

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

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FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BAKER JANE
BASS
BERGER
KRECKO
LAKE
NSC CHRON
SAMORE

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSKDB CLOSED BY: NSDRS DOC 1 OF 1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001

Z 96031218 FOR DECISION
X 96031809 BERGER APPROVED RECOM

**National Security Council
The White House**

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 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG HP A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<u>SD</u> Harmon	_____	_____	_____
Dohse	<u>1</u>	<u>D</u>	_____
Sens	_____	_____	_____
Soderberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	<u>2</u>	<u>svr</u>	_____
Lake	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>PRS 3/10</u>	<u>N/R</u>
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A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette VP

National Security Council
The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>SD</i> Harmon	_____	_____	_____
Dohse	<u>1</u>	<u>D</u>	_____
Sens	_____	_____	_____
Soderberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	<u>2</u>	<u>svr</u>	_____
Lake	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>APB 3/10</u>	<u>N/R</u>
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A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

20130

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

March 8, 1996

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

FROM:

GARY SAMORE *GS*

SUBJECT:

Summary of Conclusions of Deputies' Committee
Meeting on Nuclear Cooperation with China

Attached at Tab I is the Summary of Conclusions of the Deputies' Committee meeting held on February 7, 1996.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew D. Sens to file the Summary attached at Tab I for record purposes.

Approve *AS* Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~

Reason: Reason: 1.5 (b) (c) (d)
Declassify On: January 30, 1996

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By WK NARA, Date 1/26/15
2015-0221-M

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting Nuclear Cooperation with China (2 pages)	02/12/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 4002

FOLDER TITLE:

DC0257 DC Meeting on China Nuclear Cooperation, February 12, 1996

2015-0221-M
rs1197

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: BERGER

FROM: SAMORE
PONEMAN

DOC DATE: 07 FEB 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
SANCTIONS

NON PROLIFERATION
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 7 FEB DC MTG ON CHINA NUCLEAR COOPERATION

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER

DUE DATE: 10 FEB 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SAMORE

LOGREF: 9620128 9620130

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC0257

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BAKER JANE
KRECZKO
KRISTOFF
NSC CHRON
PONEMAN
SAMORE
SODERBERG

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA CLOSED BY: NSKDB DOC 1 OF 1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001

Z 96020714 FOR INFORMATION
X 96020717 NOTED BY BERGER

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 20129

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG JDA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<u>WJ</u> Harmon			
Dohse	<u>1</u>	<u>D</u>	
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger	<u>2</u>	Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>WB</u> 2/7	<u>N</u>
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

CC:

COMMENTS: DC Mats 2/7

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

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20129

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

February 7, 1996


ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: DANIEL PONEMAN *DP*

FROM: GARY SAMORE *GS*

SUBJECT: Briefing Paper for Deputies' Committee Meeting --
February 7, 1996



Attached at Tab I is a Briefing Paper for the Deputies' Committee meeting to be held February 7.

Concurrence by: *NA* Sandra Kristoff, Alan Kreczko

Attachment
Tab I Briefing Paper

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Reason: 1.5 (b) (c) (d)
Declassify On: February 7, 2006

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. paper	re: China 825 Sanctions (4 pages)	02/07/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 4002

FOLDER TITLE:

DC0257 DC Meeting on China Nuclear Cooperation, February 12, 1996

2015-0221-M
rs1197

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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POSSIBLE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION SANCTIONS AGAINST CHINA

The following sanctions laws could apply based on China's cooperation with Pakistan's unsafeguarded nuclear program. Many were created or amended in the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 ("NPPA").

NPPA Section 821: No USG procurement from private entities that knowingly and materially contribute through exports to the acquisition of nuclear weapons or unsafeguarded special nuclear material by a nonnuclear-weapon state.

NPPA Section 824: Banking sanctions against financial institutions that knowingly, directly, and materially contribute through the provision of financing to the acquisition of nuclear weapons or unsafeguarded special nuclear material by a nonnuclear-weapon state.

NPPA Section 825: EXIMBANK sanctions against countries that willfully aid or abet a nonnuclear-weapons state to acquire nuclear weapons or unsafeguarded special nuclear material. (Section 2(b)(4) of the EXIMBANK Act, as amended by section 825 of NPPA.)

Symington Amendment: Economic and military assistance prohibited to countries that deliver or receive nuclear enrichment equipment, materials, or technology. (Arms Export Control Act, sec. 101, as amended by NPPA.)

Glenn Amendment: Imposes broad sanctions on countries that transfer to a nonnuclear-weapon state "any design information or component" that is important to nuclear weapons development and known by the transferor to be intended for such use. The sanctions include economic and military assistance, EXIM, CCC, U.S. opposition in international financial institutions, no loans by U.S. banks, and export restrictions. The waiver standard is whether sanctions would have a "serious adverse effect on vital United States interests." (Section 102 of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended by NPPA.)

NPPA Section 822: Prohibits sales or leases under the Arms Export Control Act to any country that is in material breach of commitments to the U.S. under international treaties or agreements concerning nonproliferation (e.g., the NPT).

Related to the question of U.S. sanctions is whether China's activities constitute a violation of its obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, specifically (1) its

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-2-

obligation "not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce" a nonnuclear-weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, or (2) its obligation not to provide "equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material" to any nonnuclear-weapon state except subject to safeguards. Art. I and III(2).

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TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 07 FEB 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
DC

NON PROLIFERATION
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 7 FEB DC MTG ON CHINA NUCLEAR COOPERATION

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 09 FEB 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PONEMAN

LOGREF: 9620129 9620130

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC0257

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001
002

Z 96020619 FOR DECISION
X 96020709 BERGER APPROVED RECOM
X 96020709 DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT





DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

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002 960207 BURNS, W
002 960207 CUTTER, W
002 960207 NYE, J
002 960207 MCALEER, R
002 960207 BACA, B
002 960207 LAVIN, A
002 960207 INDERFURTH, R
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002 960207 YANNUZZI, R
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 Harmon	<u>1</u>		<u>A Tab I</u>
Dohse	<u>3</u>		
Sens			
Soderberg	<u>copy</u>		
Berger	<u>2</u>	<u>pw</u>	
Lake		Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>		<u>P N</u>
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COMMENTS:

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PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

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PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

[Handwritten signature]
FEB 17 9 57 AM '96

PRECEDENCE: _____

IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____
DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO: 242 CLASSIFICATION: SECRET PAGES: 3
(Including Cover)
FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (202) 456-9425 WH SITUATION ROOM
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Notification & Agenda of DC MTG
on Nuclear Cooperation w/China NSC LOG # 20128

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
<u>State</u>	<u>EXECSSEL</u>	_____	_____
<u>Treasury</u>	<u>EXECSSEL</u>	_____	_____
<u>DOD</u>	<u>EXECSSEL</u>	_____	_____
<u>Commerce</u>	<u>EXECSSEL</u>	_____	_____
<u>Energy</u>	<u>Ann Levin</u>	_____	_____
<u>US/UN-State</u>	<u>Amb Rick Indurath</u>	_____	_____
<u>ACDA</u>	<u>EXECSSEL</u>	_____	_____
<u>CIA</u>	<u>EXECSSEL</u>	_____	_____
<u>JCS</u>	<u>Col F.C. Wilson</u>	_____	_____

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2015-0221-M

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PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO: 242

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

PAGES: 3

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK
(NAME)

(202) 456-9425
(PHONE NUMBER)

WH SITUATION ROOM
(ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Notification & Agenda of DC MTG
on Nuclear Cooperation w/China NSC LOG# 20128

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
<u>State</u>	<u>EXECSSEL</u>		
<u>Treasury</u>	<u>EXECSSEL</u>		
<u>DOD</u>	<u>EXECSSEL</u>		
<u>Commerce</u>	<u>EXECSSEL</u>		
<u>Energy</u>	<u>Ann Lavin</u>		
<u>US/UN-State</u>	<u>Amb Rick Indefurth</u>		
<u>ACDA</u>	<u>EXECSSEL</u>		
<u>CIA</u>	<u>EXECSSEL</u>		
<u>IGS</u>	<u>Col F.C. Wilson</u>		

REMARKS:

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2015-0221-M

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-7 FEB 96 10 19
NMCC/JCS

S. Murphy

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PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____
DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO: 242 CLASSIFICATION: **SECRET** PAGES: 3
(Including Cover)
FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (202) 456-9425 WH SITUATION ROOM
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Notification & Agenda of DC MTG
on Nuclear Cooperation w/China NSC LOG# 20128

	TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
B	State	EXECSEL		
K	Treasury	EXESEL		
N	DOD	EXESEL		
L	Commerce	EXESEL		
I	Energy	Ann Lavin		
B	US/UN-State	Amb Rick Indefurth		
B	ACDA	EXESEL		
A	CIA	EXESEL		
D	JCS	Col F.C. Wilson		

REMARKS:

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2015-0221-M

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*I
OK 1017
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PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____
DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO: 242 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ PAGES: 3
(Including Cover)
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(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Notification & Agenda of DC MTG
on Nuclear Cooperation w/China NSC LOG# 20128

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
<u>State</u>	<u>EXECSEL</u>	_____	_____
<u>Treasury</u>	<u>EXESEL</u>	_____	_____
<u>DOD</u>	<u>EXESEL</u>	_____	_____
<u>Commerce</u>	<u>EXESEL</u>	_____	_____
<u>Energy</u>	<u>Ann Lavin</u>	_____	_____
<u>US/UN-State</u>	<u>Amb Rick Indefurth</u>	_____	_____
<u>ACDA</u>	<u>EXESEL</u>	_____	_____
<u>CIA</u>	<u>EXECSEL</u>	_____	_____
<u>JCS</u>	<u>Col F.C. Wilson</u>	_____	_____

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Initials: WPK Date: 1/26/15
2015-0221-M

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IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____
DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO: 242

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PAGES: 3
(Including Cover)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME)

(202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER)

WH SITUATION ROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Notification & Agenda of DC MTG on Nuclear Cooperation w/China NSCLOG# 20128

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
State	EXECSEL		
Treasury	EXESEL		
DOD	EXESEL		
Commerce	EXESEL		
Energy	Ann Lavin		
US/UN-State	Amb Rick Indurata		
ACDA	EXESEL		
CIA	EXESEL		
JCS	Col F.C. Wilson		

REMARKS:

TIME OF TRANSMISSION:

TIME OF RECEIPT:

N
957

196 FEB 27 AM 9:57

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1. [Signature]

PRECEDENCE: _____

IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____
DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO: 242 CLASSIFICATION: **SECRET** PAGES: 3
 (Including Cover)
 FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITUATION ROOM (ROOM NO.)
 MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Notification & Agenda of DC MTG
on Nuclear Cooperation w/China NSC LOG# 20128

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TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
State	EXECSSEL		
Treasury	EXECSSEL		
DOD	EXECSSEL		
Commerce	EXECSSEL		
Energy	Ann Lavin		
US/UN-State	Amb Rick Indefurth		
ACDA	EXECSSEL		
CIA	EXECSSEL		
JCS	Col F.C. Wilson		

REMARKS:

TIME OF TRANSMISSION:

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K-7
2-7-96
0955
1. New York

PRECEDENCE: _____

IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO: 242 CLASSIFICATION: **SECRET** PAGES: 3
 (Including Cover)
 FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (202) 456-9425 WH SITUATION ROOM
 (NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)
 MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Notification & Agenda of DC MTG
on Nuclear Cooperation w/China NSC LOG# 20128

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TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
State	EXECSSEL		
Treasury	EXECSSEL		
DOD	EXECSSEL		
Commerce	EXECSSEL		
Energy	Ann Lavin		
US/UN-State	Amb Rick Indurath		
ACDA	EXECSSEL		
CIA	EXECSSEL		
JCS	Col F. C. Wilson		

REMARKS:

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Initials: WR Date: 1/26/15
2015-0221-M

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

**WHITE HOUSE
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PRECEDENCE

- FLASH
- IMMEDIATE
- PRIORITY
- ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

109 # 20128

FROM: National Security Council ^{ONS} PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR
 SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting PAGES: 3

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

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USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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Initials: WR Date: 1/26/15

2015-0221-11


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20128

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

February 6, 1996



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: DANIEL PONEMAN *DP*

FROM: GARY SAMORE *GS for*

SUBJECT: Deputies' Committee Meeting on Nuclear Cooperation
with China *(S)*

Attached at Tab I is a proposed meeting notice for tomorrow's
Deputies' Committee meeting on China. An agenda for the meeting
is at Tab A. *(S)*

Concurrence by: Sandra Kristoff *GS for*

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew D. Sens to sign the memorandum at Tab I
and approve the agenda at Tab A. (U)

Approve *AK* Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum for Signature
- Tab A Agenda

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (b) (c) (d)
Declassify On: 2006

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
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2015-0221.M

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20128

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

February 7, 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the United
Nations

MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MS. BARBARA STARR
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency

MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

MR. W. BOWMAN CUTTER
Deputy Assistant to the
President for Economic
Policy

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MS. BETTIE BACA
Executive Secretary
Department of Commerce


COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MS. ANN LAVIN
Director, Executive Secretariat
Department of Energy

SUBJECT: Meeting of the Deputies Committee on Nuclear
Cooperation with China (C)

A Deputies Committee meeting will be held on Wednesday,
February 7, 1996, from 2:00 to 3:00 p.m., in the White House
Situation Room. Attendance will be principals plus one. (S)

An agenda is attached. Deputies may refer to the State
Department discussion paper on this subject that was circulated
for the Nonproliferation IWG meeting today. (U)


Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

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Classified by: Andrew D. Sens
Reason: 1.5(b) (c) (d)
Declassify On: February 7, 2006

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By WF NARA, Date 1/26/15
2015-0221-M

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: February 7, 1996
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 2:00 - 3:00 p.m.

NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH CHINA

Agenda

- I. Introduction NSC
- II. Intelligence Update CIA
- III. Legal Considerations State
- IV. Diplomatic Options State
- V. Discussion All
- VI. Conclusion NSC

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Sandra Kristoff to Samuel Berger re: China Deputies Committee Meeting (3 pages)	02/12/1996	P1/b(1) <i>KDE 3/11/2020</i>
002. paper	re: 1996 China Policy Issue Priorities (12 pages)	02/10/1996	P1/b(1) <i>KDE 3/11/2020</i>

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- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: BERGER

FROM: KRISTOFF

DOC DATE: 12 FEB 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
DC

TAIWAN

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 12 FEB DC MTG ON CHINA

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER

DUE DATE: 15 FEB 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KRISTOFF

LOGREF: 9620148

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC0258

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By VL NARA, Date 7/15/2014
2015-0711M

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X 96022008 NOTED BY BERGER

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National Security Council
The White House

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Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>PRU 2/20</u>	<u>A</u>
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cc:

COMMENTS:

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 12, 1996

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
FROM: SANDRA J. KRISTOFF *SK*
SUBJECT: China Deputies Committee Meeting

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

NOTED

Principals asked the NSC Deputies to identify: **key issues** for engagement with the Chinese; **priorities** among those key issues; and within each issue, **U.S. core concerns**. The paper before the Deputies is structured according to this task. It identifies **seven issues for continued engagement** (Taiwan, nonproliferation, human rights, trade and three "dialogue" areas) and provides alternative U.S. positions within each issue for consideration.

Your first objective is to secure agreement on **specific positions** for the U.S. to adopt. Clear policy positions are needed for the high-level emissary to offer a credible and sustainable "pragmatic balance for 1996" proposal to China.

A second objective is to establish the **White House and NSC as being in charge of China policy**. The agencies need to accept that all issues are not **equal** and that freelancing does not advance our overall objectives. Again, this is essential for the emissary to be effective.

A third objective is to set in motion appropriate follow-up activities. USTR will need to provide **details on IPR**, Defense on the agenda for **discussions at the Perry/Shali level**, etc. As you task out these next steps, you may want to consider offering a **Deputies meeting on China roughly every third week** from now through the MFN debate.

A fourth objective is to solicit ideas for a **proactive public affairs and Congressional strategy**. While interagency groups likely will be formed to devise action plans, the Deputies may have suggestions on actions their individual agencies are prepared to undertake.

The following are suggested points you may wish to use to lead the discussion.

Opening

- Need to report to tomorrow's PC our recommendations on U.S. priorities.
- Seek a realistic assessment of where an issue ranks in importance in U.S.-China relations and posture U.S. should assume to best advance our core objectives.
- Will convey to Chinese at high level our expectations.

Taiwan

- U.S.-PRC, U.S.-Taiwan and PRC-Taiwan communication channels are not effective. Restoration needed to avoid miscalculation, in particular in Taiwan Strait.
- Propose strong message to Taiwan against advancing its "political" agenda this year. Evidence our seriousness by holding the line on visits, international organization membership, arms sales. Cut back economic visits for 1996.
- Secure in return Beijing's agreement to curtail military actions.
- Underpinning this posture in one China policy. Must forestall further erosion -- speech by SecState, business community outreach, Congressional briefings.

Nonproliferation and Arms Control

- Although subject of separate process, two key elements of posture are: define shared principles for agreement that can form framework for handling individual problem areas; and preserve consistency of U.S. nonproliferation objectives across individual pending cases.

Human Rights

- Critical to determine scope and intensity of UNHRC activity as demarches already sent instructing bilateral approaches using last year's text.
- Do we co-sponsor and do we use higher than assistant secretary level representations?

- Propose co-sponsorship with constraints on intensity of effort.
- After the UNHRC meeting Deputies will assess what additional steps to seek from China as we move toward MFN debate.

Trade

- Decisions will set stage for MFN debate. Basic package: renew MFN on same terms as last year; use IPR as demonstration of Administration's effectiveness; put WTO on backburner.
- USTR should use interagency process to assist in crafting MFN points, IPR bottom lines and WTO stance.

New Areas of Cooperation

- Each of the dialogues is important to laying the groundwork for more strategic dialogue with China. Each track of activity should proceed apace, with regular reporting to Deputies.

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 10 FEB 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
HUMAN RIGHTS
AGENDA

TAIWAN
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION / AGENDA & DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 12 FEB DC MTG ON CHINA

ACTION: HARMON SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 14 FEB 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KRISTOFF

LOGREF: 9620150

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC0258

CODES:

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By VZ NARA, Date 7/15/2014
2015-0221-1a

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002	960210	BURNS, W	
002	960210	MCALEER, R	
002	960210	NYE, J	
002	960210	INDERFURTH, R	
002	960210	CUTTER, W	
002	960210	YANNUZZI, R	
002	960210	WILSON, F	
002	960210	MONTGOMERY, F	

National Security Council
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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

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COL ROBERT P. MCALEER
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ROOM 3E880
PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

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DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
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WASHINGTON, DC 20220

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WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319

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MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
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		PRINT LAST NAME:	<u>Williams</u>
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MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX+1</u>
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
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
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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Deputies Committee Meeting on China
NSC LOG # 20148

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State	Executive Secretary		
Defense	Executive Secretary		
Treasury	Executive Secretary		
USUN/State	Rick Inderfurth		736-7699
CIA	Executive Secretary		
JCS	Secretary		

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PRIORITY
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RELEASER:

JCS

DTG:

MESSAGE NO:

278

CLASSIFICATION:

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PAGES:

15/5

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK
(NAME)

(202) 456-9425

(PHONE NUMBER)

WH SITUATION ROOM

(ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION:

Deputies Committee Meeting on China

NSC LOG #

20148

TO (AGENCY)

DELIVER TO

DEPT/ROOM NO.

PHONE NUMBER

State

Executive Secretary

Defense

Executive Secretary

Treasury

Executive Secretary

USUN/State

Rick Inderfurth

736-7699

CIA

Executive Secretary

JCS

Secretary

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RELEASER: [Signature]

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N [Signature] 16:50 2/10/96

PRECEDENCE: X

IMMEDIATE PRIORITY ROUTINE

RELEASER: [Signature]

DTG:

MESSAGE NO: 278 CLASSIFICATION: SECRET PAGES: 15/15 (Including Cover) FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (202) 456-9425 WH SITUATION ROOM MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Deputies Committee Meeting on China NSC LOG # 20148

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REMARKS: UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS Initials: [Signature] Date: 7/17/2019

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 - PRIORITY
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DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting DC MTG on China PAGES: 2/15

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
USUN New York	Mr. Rick Inderfurth	212-415-4016	212-415-4177

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RL Date: 7/17/2019

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

20148

February 10, 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the United
Nations

MR. W. BOWMAN CUTTER
Deputy Assistant to the
President for Economic Policy

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency


COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Assistant USTR for Policy
Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting ~~(S)~~

There will be an NSC Deputies Committee meeting on China (excluding nonproliferation cases) on Monday, February 12, from 2:00 - 3:00 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the meeting. A discussion paper is attached at Tab B.

Please pass this memorandum only to those individuals from your agency who have received an invitation directly from the NSC to attend this meeting.


Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment

Tab A Agenda for the Meeting
Tab B Discussion Paper

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Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5(b) (d) (e)
Declassify On: 02/10/2006

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 7/15/2015
2015-0221-A

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: Monday, February 12, 1996
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:00 P.M. - 3:00 P.M.

China

Agenda

- I. Introduction.....Mr. Berger
- II. Decision Issues Discussion.....Mr. Berger

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 7/15/2014
2015-027-11

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-021-m(1.06)
KOE 3/11/2020

1996 CHINA POLICY
Issue Priorities

I. OVERARCHING APPROACH

Principals agreed we would seek a common understanding with the Chinese of how each side can manage and preserve the relationship over the next year to protect its core interests and avoid a dangerous downward spiral. This approach allows us to remain engaged with China on all issues, but requires us to identify key areas for early progress and choose key issues on which to show resolve and protect core U.S. interests.

II. ISSUES FOR 1996

Recommendations on objectives, policies and strategies for key issues follow. An appropriate and early, high-level dialogue with the Chinese is essential to bound the inevitable conflicts of 1996 within an overall context that (a) clarifies a mutual interest in preserving the long-term relationship and (b) establishes a clearer set of expectations for how both sides will proceed during 1996.

TAIWAN

Our objectives include:

- cessation of provocative actions in the Taiwan Strait by China and Taiwan;
- securing Taiwanese restraint in pressing its independent agenda on the U.S., at the same time the U.S. applies a tight standard to Taiwanese visa requests and efforts to gain U.S. support for other deviations from existing policy (e.g., UN membership); and
- rebuild support for the one China policy and the three Communiqués based on a credible rationale that reflects current realities.

Policy

We should take a three-pronged approach: convey at a senior level a clear, tough but fair line with Taiwan; affirm with Beijing the limits of our support for Taiwan objectives and the seriousness with which we would view a non-peaceful effort to

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deal with Taiwan; and engage in an intensive discussion with key members of Congress to build understanding and support for the one China policy.

The bottom line elements of our posture toward Taiwan:

- No unilateral change in the status of Taiwan.
- We will accept any resolution concerning Taiwan's status agreed by Taiwan and China.
- While we are prepared to support Taiwan membership in international organizations where membership is not restricted to internationally recognized states, for 1996 we will limit our support to WTO accession on appropriate terms.
- We will not support Taiwan's UN membership.
- We will continue to examine requests for transits on a case-by-case basis. Transits will be limited to no more than 48 hours and will not include any public events.
- Private visits will be rare, unofficial, limited to non-public events and, during 1996, will not be approved except for medical emergencies. Other visits will be limited to economic officials below cabinet level.
- Although we may want to consider a U.S. cabinet level visit to Taipei for the U.S.-ROC Business Council in late November, all other U.S. visits will be strictly limited to economic officials below cabinet level.
- Arms sales and military contacts will be limited to current levels.
- The U.S. will affirm with Beijing our efforts to: restrain Taiwan from undermining the one China policy and encourage Taiwan to avoid tensions in the Strait and resume the cross-Strait dialogue.
- The U.S. will include the above points in an understanding with China that it will refrain from force against Taiwan and curtail military exercises designed to intimidate or provoke Taiwan.

Strategy

A strategy for building support for our positions with Taiwan and the one China policy could include:

- A USG strategic interlocutor meets with a senior Chinese and Taiwanese representatives to deliver the China/Taiwan policy message.

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- A major policy speech by the Secretary of State laying out long-term goals and our approach to current problems, including Taiwan policy.
- Intensive efforts by the business community and others to strengthen the relationship and explain the rationale for the one China policy.
- Engagement of targeted members of Congress by senior USG officials.

NONPROLIFERATION/ARMS CONTROL

Our objectives are:

- securing greater Chinese adherence to the international nonproliferation regime and implementation of its nonproliferation and export control obligations; and
- securing China's cooperation and agreement to CTBT and FMCT.

Policy

- China has met some core U.S. objectives: NPT adherence, MTCR commitments, signed (but not ratified) CWC, but China's behavior is not always consistent with its commitments. Moreover, China has not yet been fully integrated into multilateral regimes: MTCR, Wassenaar Arrangements (COCOM follow-on).
- Prospects for progress on nuclear and missile technology transfers are problematic, especially with respect to Pakistan. The U.S. will act under applicable law if it determines that China has engaged in sanctionable activity.
- As a rising power with ambitions to modernize and expand its nuclear arsenal, Chinese cooperation and agreement is essential to achieve our global arms control objectives, such as CTBT and FMCT.

Strategy

- Identify nonproliferation and arms control issues where the U.S. and Chinese interests overlap and offer the possibility of cooperation (e.g., nuclear-free Korean peninsula, avoiding arms race in South Asia, promoting nuclear material security in former Soviet Union). High-level agreement on principles (e.g., North Korea adherence to NPT regime) for continuing discussions and coordinating actions, with follow-up expert-level talks.
- Determine individual sanctions/waiver issues in way that preserves the integrity of our nonproliferation policy and has

~~SECRET~~

greatest chance of advancing U.S. interests with China. A separate, parallel decision-making process on this issue is underway.

- Conclude negotiations in Geneva and obtain Chinese signature to CTBT this year.
- Communicate candidly with key members of Congress on Chinese activities; lay groundwork for possible legislative changes in 1997.

HUMAN RIGHTS

Our objectives are to:

- maintain the integrity of U.S. support for human rights, by clearly expressing our concerns publicly and privately;
- maintain pressure on the Chinese government to prevent further setbacks and obtain possible advances; and
- encourage reforms to expand pluralism and the rule of law in China.

Policy

- Advancement of human rights is a core element of U.S. foreign policy. We must oppose serious human rights violations to credibly reflect U.S. values and support those who aspire to greater freedom.
- China should be held to international standards guaranteeing the human rights of its citizens.
- Our goal with China is to encourage increased respect for the rule of law and international norms.
- This is a long-term process and punitive sanctions at times can be counter-productive. Human rights is a broad concept which includes creation of a more democratic society, respect for law and international standards and development of a civil society. The U.S. approach to these concepts differs from that of the Chinese, but the U.S. is not seeking to undermine the current Chinese government.

Strategy

Our immediate challenge is to devise an appropriate strategy for the UNHRC resolution. Whatever posture we adopt, however, we should inform the Chinese prior to the Commission vote of our intentions. We should assure the Chinese that we will not link human rights to any other issue such as MFN, and will resist efforts in the U.S. Congress to do so. We will not refrain,

however, from publicly criticizing China's serious human rights violations and we expect China to take steps demonstrating its commitment to the Universal Declaration.

Options include:

- Support, but not co-sponsor a resolution:
 - demarches to key capitals at below the foreign minister level;
 - active discussion, drafting and solicitation of support for the resolution at the head of delegation level in Geneva;
 - Assistant Secretary representations to counterparts in Washington and phone calls to counterparts in key countries.
- Co-sponsorship of UNHRC resolution:
 - work with co-sponsor to craft strong statement;
 - discussion of the resolution in high level meetings at the Deputy Secretary level;
 - increased Geneva presence at senior levels;
 - NSC senior director and A/S Shattuck meetings/phone calls with key countries and delegations in Geneva.
- Strongest effort to prevail:
 - Cabinet level contact with foreign ministers;
 - Vice Presidential calls and letters to key countries;
 - Presidential phone calls, letters, and meetings to pressure countries to change their votes and support the resolution.

TRADE ISSUES

The three issues of MFN renewal, IPR enforcement and WTO accession are inter-related. Decisions on priorities for one issue should be linked to decisions on the others.

MFN Renewal

We expect this year's debate on MFN to be intense, with efforts from the Congress to impose conditions or sanctions. Our objective is to secure renewal of MFN status for China free of conditions and partial sanctions.

Policy

- The President intends to renew MFN for China for the same reason as last year -- China's strategic and economic importance to the United States requires pursuit of a broad engagement policy and severing our economic relationship will

not promote human rights progress. It is likely to be counterproductive in human rights and strategic terms.

- Trade with China opens it to greater contact with the United States and over time promotes U.S. interests and values.
- Trade and our pursuit of U.S. interests in other problems issues are not mutually exclusive. Fostering trade also has fostered transparency, development of the courts system, concepts of contract and other basic rights.

Strategy

- A group led by the White House and USTR is beginning work now on specific measures that will strengthen support for MFN renewal (e.g. resolution of specific trade irritants such as market access and IPR, commercial deals) and build early Congressional support.
 - The group should craft simple, clear themes on MFN, coordinate delivery of the message to Congress.
 - Organize a China speakers series on Capitol Hill.
 - Encourage several Congressional missions to China to enhance understanding and support for the relationship.
 - Identify credible bipartisan public policy personages (perhaps previous administration officials) to help educate newer members of Congress.
- Identify key Governors who can be called on to advance MFN renewal with their Congressional delegations.
- Mobilize the business community (NAM, ECAT, U.S.-China Business Council) in support of our broad approach to China and encourage their activity with Congress.
- Brief the human rights community on our MFN goals and continued support for human rights dialogue with China.
- The President and/or Principals should deliver a major China policy speech describing our interests in a stable, mutually beneficial long term relationship with China.

IPR Enforcement

Our objective is to ensure Chinese compliance with the terms of the bilateral IPR agreement by closing down key pirate production facilities.

Policy

- The United States will insist that China implement its bilateral and international trade agreement obligations.
- China's leaders can take tough decisions in discrete sectors. The concrete steps the agreement requires, closing down pirated activities, are targeted and achievable.
- IPR enforcement is in China's national interest: weak intellectual property protection discourages foreign investment; Chinese owners of intellectual property seek effective defense from infringers.

Strategy

- With the prospect of sanctions already raised with the Chinese, we should now pursue private negotiations with the Chinese to meet their obligations, avoid public threats of retaliatory sanctions or defining a deadline.
- Target select measures for Chinese action (e.g., a subset of the factories with the most egregious pattern of piracy) that will permit us to assert progress if achieved, in combination with the enforcement measures that have already been taken.
- The need for or possibility of retaliation should be reassessed by the Deputies and Principals in March or early April before any further action is taken.

WTO Accession

In November, USTR presented China with a "roadmap" defining goals in 28 areas. China's initial response was positive but noncommittal. China is sending a senior official to the U.S. in February to present its official response.

Our objective is to achieve Chinese accession to the WTO on commercial terms.

Policy

- Ongoing negotiations on China's WTO accession are part of our overall strategy for creating a rules-based framework for our trade relations.
- China's participation in the WTO must occur on a sound, commercial basis.

Strategy

Option 1 - Action in 1996

- Await China's response to the "roadmap" and then begin serious negotiations on an accession package.
- Adopt a less rhetorically charged public posture.
- Show some greater flexibility on the requirements outlined in the "roadmap" (e.g., transition periods for phasing in obligations) in response to what is likely to be a minimally positive Chinese response, in order to facilitate China's accession to the WTO this year.
- Assign priorities to the issues raised in the roadmap, asking the Chinese to come back with positive offers in select areas.
- Bring to closure Taiwan's accession package and indicate we expect its accession to move forward.

Option 2 - Delay until 1997

- Acknowledge accession is not possible before 1997.
- Convey to the Chinese.
- Enlist and manage Japanese and EU support for delaying accession beyond this year.

NEW AREAS OF COOPERATION*Vice President's Sustainable Growth Initiative*

Our objectives include:

- encouraging Chinese development of environmentally sound energy policies;
- promoting the use of U.S. environmental and energy technology in China; and
- using China's interest in sustainable (including nuclear) energy cooperation to influence its behavior in related non-proliferation areas.

Policy

- China's decisions on energy, environment and economic development will have a profound effect beyond China's borders.

- Collaboration on projects involving sustainable development, energy and the environment offer opportunities for cooperation in technical areas of significant common concern.

Strategy

- Immediately develop this initiative.
 - Establish the Vice President as the coordinator.
 - Convey to China proposed terms of reference.
 - Convey to the Chinese that pursuit of this initiative will not depend on Chinese willingness to engage in dialogues on other subjects.
- Schedule first meeting for spring in Washington.
- The Vice President will participate in some fashion in this meeting.
 - Assess the possibility of Vice President travel to China for meetings there if initiative moves toward concrete cooperation.

Military-to-Military

Our objective is to promote improved trust and understanding between the U.S. and Chinese armed forces.

Policy

- A comprehensive approach to military exchanges produces a more realistic Chinese understanding of (a) U.S. goals and capabilities and (b) China's global and regional role and responsibilities.
- The potential value of engaging the PLA in a dialogue outweighs the political sensitivity of doing so.

Strategy

Option 1 - Move Slowly

- Continue military-to-military ties at currently planned levels, including maintaining the Defense Conversion Commission.
- Regular Deputies and Principals review of military contact programs to ensure consistency with overall U.S. policy goals.

Option 2 - Enhance the Dialogue

- Secretary Perry meets with the Chinese Defense minister in March.
- General Shalikashvili meets with counterparts in China as early as the spring.

Economic

Our objective is to intensify consultations between U.S. and Chinese economic agencies to help resolve bilateral economic and trade problems.

Policy

- Regular consultations can improve Chinese understanding of U.S. economic policies and needed Chinese reforms.

Strategy

- Immediately initiate consultations between CEA and the Chinese State Planning Commission on long-term growth issues.
- Secretary Rubin conducts bilateral session with China on side of mid-March Kyoto meeting of APEC finance ministers.
- Conduct Joint Economic Commission (JEC) meeting in May/June.
- Conduct Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) meeting in June/July.

III. COMMUNICATIONS CHALLENGES

A more aggressive public affairs approach and Congressional strategy are required.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

The public affairs program to build support for U.S. policy should track key calendar events, including Taiwan elections, the President's Japan trip, MFN vote, the Olympics, etc.

- Establish an NSC chaired interagency public affairs China action team.
- Asia policy speech by President prior to Japan trip; include China message in appropriate domestic speaking engagements.
- APNSA-level on-the-record meetings with key media public opinion makers.

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- Intensified schedule of major media market audio and electronic media outreach beyond Washington at the Assistant Secretary level.
- Speeches by senior policy makers in targeted U.S. cities.
- Placement of articles explaining U.S. policy in Asia print media, including articles by third party advocates. White House briefings of Asian press corps.

CONGRESSIONAL

Although the MFN issue turns on the Jackson-Vanik waiver timetable, a proactive approach with Congress on our China policy goals should begin now.

- Establish an interagency team to oversee contacts with members and staff.
- High-level meetings with Gingrich and Dole, including State, Defense, NSC and perhaps the Vice President and President.
- Prior to the March Taiwan elections, State, Defense, USTR and Intelligence senior staff brief key members and leadership of both chambers on consequences of visa legislation.
- Intense business community briefings, in particular of members from states where the MFN issue is controversial.
- Intense briefing of Congressional staff not routinely involved in China issues.
- Arrange briefings by "elder statesmen" for Republican members.
- Seek Taiwanese restraint in its lobbying activities.
- Work to focus members on a "sense of Congress" resolution; at the same time, build a House and Senate coalition to defeat a resolution of disapproval.

--Explore possibility of structuring a "third resolution" vote that gives members something to vote for short of outright disapproval but that also does not unconditionally support MFN renewal.

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Calendar of Action Events

February **First Annual Review of IPR Enforcement:** China is currently out of compliance on key provisions of the IPR agreement; sanctions of \$1 billion or more are possible.

March **Taiwan's Presidential Elections:** China may seek to influence the outcome through provocative military exercises in the Taiwan Straits.

April **UN Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) Meeting:** The United States must decide whether to co-sponsor a resolution critical of China and how hard to push it.

April Consultations with Taiwan on **arms sales**.

June **MFN Renewal:** Congress is likely to attempt to place conditions on renewal of Most Favored Nation trade status or impose partial sanctions.


July **F-16 Deliveries to Taiwan:** The delivery of U.S. F-16s sold to Taiwan in 1992 will begin in July, arousing renewed ire in Beijing.

July-Aug Taiwan "political" authorities may seek attendance at the **Olympic games** in which Taiwanese athletes are scheduled to participate.

September Taiwan may seek a visit in conjunction with **UNGA** meetings.

Undetermined Strong new evidence of Chinese **nonproliferation violations** could precipitate mandatory (and sizable) U.S. economic sanctions.

November APEC Economic Leaders meeting in Manila.



February 10, 1996

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

FROM: SANDRA KRISTOFF *

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on China, February 12, 1996

Attached at Tab A is the agenda and at Tab B the discussion paper for the Deputies meeting on China to be held February 12, 1996. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve AS Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
- Tab A Agenda
- Tab B Discussion Paper

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 2/2/06

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 7/15/2014
2015-0721-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

DC0279 DC Meeting on China MFN (Most Favored Nation), 1996

Staff Office-Individual:

Records Management

Original OA/ID Number:

4003

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
43	4	8	1	V

DC0279

5/6/96

"

China MFN"

China PR

Int'l Trade

MFN

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

DC0574 DC Meeting on China (Restricted), October 19, 1999

Staff Office-Individual:

Records Management

Original OA/ID Number:

3894

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
43	4	1	3	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of Restricted Deputies Committee Meeting on China (2 pages)	10/19/1999	P1/b(1) <i>VOE 3/11/2020</i>
001b. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of Restricted Deputies Committee Meeting on China (2 pages)	10/19/1999	P1/b(1) <i>VOE 3/11/2020</i>
002a. agenda	Restricted Deputies Committee Meeting on China, October 19, 1999 [Record ID: 9907628] (1 page)	10/19/1999	P1/b(1) <i>VOE 3/11/2020</i>
002b. draft	Draft of Agenda for Deputies Meeting. [Duplicate 002a] (1 page)	10/18/1999	P1/b(1)
002c. draft	Draft of Agenda for Deputies Meeting. [Duplicate 002a] (1 page)	10/18/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 National Security Council
 Records Management
 OA/Box Number: 3894

FOLDER TITLE:

DC0574 DC Meeting on China (Restricted), October 19, 1999

2015-0221-M
 rs1206

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

19 OCT 99 Restricted
"China"

SOC - 9907137
Still need

DC0574

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

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REDD

SUSPENSE

October 25, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES B. STEINBERG

THROUGH: JACK PRITCHARD, ACTING *by PR*

FROM: JAMES KEITH *JK*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Restricted Deputies
Committee Meeting on China

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions from the
restricted DC Meeting on China on October 19, 1999.

Concurrence by: Gary Samore *GS*, Miles Lackey (info), Malcolm
Lee *ML*

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the summary of conclusions and authorize
Robert Bradkte to sign the memorandum to agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to Agencies

Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: James Keith
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 10/25/09

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *JK* NARA, Date *7/15/09*

2018-0821-M

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Assistant USTR for Policy
Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. STEVE RICCHETTI
Deputy Chief of Staff
to the President

MR. NEAL COMSTOCK
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. MARIA I. CRIBBS
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

Ms. LAEL BRAINARD
Deputy Assistant to the
President for International
Economic Policy

MR. JIM DORSKIND
Executive Secretary
Executive Secretariat
Department of Commerce

COL. DAVID C. WHITE, USA
Secretary, Joint Staff

MS. STEPHANIE SYPTAK
Staff Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Restricted Deputies
Meeting on China (S)

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions for the
Restricted Deputies Committee meeting on China held on
October 19, 1999. Please pass to Deputies. (S)

Robert A. Bradtke
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Robert A. Bradtke
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 10/25/09

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By RL NARA, Date 07/18/2019

2015-0221-u

Attachment
Tab A

Summary of Conclusions

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

DRAFT

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Restricted Deputies Committee

DATE: October 19, 1999
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 1:30-3:15 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Restricted Deputies Committee
Meeting on China (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR

James Steinberg

CIA

John McLaughlin

OVP

Leon Fuerth
Ted Osius

NEC

Lael Brainard
Malcolm Lee

STATE

Thomas Pickering
Susan Shirk

JCS

Joseph Ralston

TREASURY

Ted Truman

NSC

Kenneth Lieberthal
Gary Samore
Miles Lackey
James Keith

DOD

Walter Slocombe
Kurt Campbell

COMMERCE

Timothy Hauser

USTR

Robert Novick

USUN

Robert Orr

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0221-M (1.67)
KDE 3/11/2020

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Robert A. Bradtke
Reason: 1.5(b)(d)
Declassify on: 10/25/09

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

1. Consultations will be necessary with Members of Congressional staff regarding preliminary understandings that might be announced in Beijing at the conclusion of Legal Adviser Andrews' talks. Such consultations would have to occur not later than COB October 20. (Action: NSC/State/DOD) (C)
2. An interagency effort will be required to ensure that we manage well the proposed Taiwan Security Enhancement Act as this Congressional session comes to a close. (Action: NSC) (C)
3. The October 25 Joint Economic Commission meeting in Beijing will provide an opportunity to assess China's economic situation and to review existing and new opportunities for technical assistance as follow-up to the June 1998 summit. (Action: Treasury) (C)
4. After Under Secretary Pickering, Under Secretary Slocombe, and Secretary Daley conclude their visits the Deputies should meet again to consider an action plan for the year ahead in U.S.-China relations. (Action: NSC) (C)
5. Secretary Daley will consider representing the USG at the December 20 Macao reversion ceremony. (Action: Commerce) (C)
6. A cabinet member other than Secretary Daley should represent the USG at the November 17-19 U.S.-ROC (Taiwan) Business Council Meeting in San Antonio, Texas. (Action: NSC) (C)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

SUSPENSE

October 20, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES B. STEINBERG

THROUGH: KENNETH LIEBERTHAL *KL*

FROM: JAMES KEITH *JK*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Restricted Deputies
Committee Meeting on China

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions from the
restricted DC Meeting on China on October 19, 1999.

Concurrence by: Gary Samore *JK*, Miles Lackey (info), Malcolm
Lee *ML*

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the summary of conclusions and authorize
Robert Bradkte to sign the memorandum to agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

- Tab I Memorandum to Agencies
- Tab A Summary of Conclusions

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

Staff Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Assistant USTR for Policy
Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

MR. NEAL COMSTOCK
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. MARIA I. CRIBBS
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

DR. LAEL BRAINARD
Deputy Assistant to the
President for International
Economic Policy

MR. JIM DORSKIND
Executive Secretary
Executive Secretariat
Department of Commerce

COL. DAVID C. WHITE, USA
Secretary, Joint Staff

MS. STEPHANIE SYPTAK

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Restricted Deputies
Meeting on China ~~(S)~~

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions for the
Restricted Deputies Committee meeting on China held on October
19, 1999. Please pass to Deputies.

Robert A. Bradtke
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Robert A. Bradtke
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 10/19/09

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By 12 NARA, Date 7/15/2019
2015-0221-04

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Restricted Deputies Committee

DATE: October 19, 1999

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 1:30-3:15 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Restricted DC Meeting on China

~~TS~~

PARTICIPANTS:

DRAFT

CHAIR

James B. Steinberg

CIA

John McLaughlin

OVP

Leon Fuerth
Ted Osius

NEC

Lael Brainard
Malcolm Lee

STATE

Under Secretary Pickering
Susan Shirk

JCS

General Ralston

WHITE HOUSE

James Steinberg

TREASURY

Ted Truman

NSC

Kenneth Lieberthal
Gary Samore
Miles Lackey
James Keith

DOD

Under Secretary Slocombe
Kurt Campbell

Commerce

Timothy Hauser

USTR

Robert Novak

USUN

Robert Orr

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0221-M (1.68)
3/11/2020 KDC

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

1. Consultations will be necessary with Members or Congressional staff regarding preliminary understandings that might be announced in Beijing at the conclusion of Legal Adviser Andrews' talks. Such consultations would have to occur not later than COB October 20. (Action: NSC/STATE/DOD) ~~(S)~~
2. An interagency effort will be required to ensure that we manage well the proposed Taiwan Security Enhancement Act as this Congressional session comes to a close. (Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~
3. The October 25 Joint Economic Commission meeting in Beijing will provide an opportunity to assess China's economic situation and to review existing and new opportunities for technical assistance as follow-up to the June, 1998 summit. (Action: Treasury) ~~(S)~~
4. After U/S Pickering, Secretary Slocombe, and Secretary Daley conclude their visits the Deputies should meet again to consider an action plan for the year ahead in U.S.-China relations. (Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~
5. Secretary Daley will consider representing the USG at the December 20 Macao reversion ceremony. (Action: Commerce) ~~(S)~~
6. A cabinet member other than Secretary Daley should represent the USG at the November 17-19 US-ROC (Taiwan) Business Council Meeting in San Antonio, Texas. (Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Robert Bradtke
Reason: 1.5(b)(d)
Declassify on: 10/19/09

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: BRADTKE

DOC DATE: 19 OCT 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
AGENDA

DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 19 OCT RESTRICTED DC MTG ON CHINA

ACTION: SARGEANT SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 18 OCT 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KEITH

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP: DC 0574

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BARTLETT
CROCKER
EXECSEC
KEITH
LIEBERTHAL
NSC CHRON
RUDMAN
SARGEANT
STEINBERG

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSVJD CLOSED BY: NSTSM DOC 2 OF 2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 STEINBERG
001
002

Z 99101817 FOR DECISION
X 99101911 STEINBERG APPROVED RECOM
X 99101911 SARGEANT SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 991019 FUERTH, L
002 991019 KENNEY, K
002 991019 COMSTOCK, N
002 991019 CRIBBS, M
002 991019 DORSKIND, J
002 991019 SYPTAK, S
002 991019 MONTGOMERY, F
002 991019 PODESTA, J
002 991019 WOLFE, T
002 991019 BRAINARD, L
002 991019 WHITE, D

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE**

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GIRE	_____	_____	_____
JACOBSON	_____	_____	_____
POWELL	<u>1</u>	<u>SP 10/18</u>	<u>no edits</u>
SARGEANT	<u>4</u>	<u>SP 10/19</u>	_____
BRADTKE	_____	_____	_____
RUDMAN	<u>2</u>	<u>curry</u>	_____
STEINBERG	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>done</u> <u>OK w/ cell D</u>
BERGER	_____	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	<u>4</u>	<u>(R) 10/19</u>	<u>D</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:
 99 OCT 18 PM 5:09

COMMENTS: Non e Agenda for
Oct 19 DC mtg

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE wp

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
GIRE	_____	_____	_____
JACOBSON	_____	_____	_____
POWELL	<u>1</u>	<u>SP 10/18</u>	<u>no edits</u>
SARGEANT	<u>4</u>	<u>SP 10/19</u>	_____
BRADTKE	_____	_____	_____
RUDMAN	<u>2</u>	<u>copy</u>	_____
STEINBERG	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>done</u> <u>ok up call</u>
BERGER	_____	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	<u>4</u>	<u>(2) 10/19</u>	<u>D</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:
 '99 OCT 18 pm 5:09

COMMENTS: NOM & Agenda for
Oct 19 DC mtg

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE wp

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

7628

October 19, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Assistant USTR for Policy
Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. JOHN PODESTA
Chief of Staff to the
President

MR. NEAL COMSTOCK
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. MARIA I. CRIBBS
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. LAEL BRAINARD
Deputy Assistant to the
President for International
Economic Policy

MR. JIM DORSKIND
Executive Secretary
Executive Secretariat
Department of Commerce

COL. DAVID C. WHITE, USA
Secretary, Joint Staff

MS. STEPHANIE SYPTAK
Staff Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

SUBJECT: Restricted Deputies Committee Meeting on China
(U)

There will be a restricted Deputies Committee meeting on China on
Tuesday, October 19, 1999 at 1:30 p.m. in the White House
Situation Room. A meeting agenda is attached. (S)


Robert A. Bradtke
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Robert A. Bradtke
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 10/18/09

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By RL NARA, Date 7/15/2015
2015-0221-1A

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RESTRICTED DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON CHINA

DATE: October 19, 1999
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 1:30-3:00 p.m.

AGENDA

- I. IntroductionNSC
- II. Review Current Status:
 - Brief Political OverviewCIA
 - China Economic Assessment.Treasury
 - NonproliferationState
 - Cross-Strait SituationState
 - Embassy Bombing Follow-UpState
 - Export Control CasesCommerce
 - Religious Freedom and Other Human Rights . . .State
 - Environment and Climate ChangeState
- III. Review of Visits and Upcoming Events
 - U/S Pickering and Legal Advisor Andrews . . .State
 - Secretary SummersTreasury
 - Secretary DaleyCommerce
 - Cabinet-level Representative to U.S.-ROC
 - Business Council Meeting, Nov. 17-19
in San Antonio, TexasNSC
 - Head-of-delegation for Reversion Ceremony
in Macao, December 20NSC
- IV. ConclusionNSC

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0221-M (379)
3/11/2020 KDE

CONFIDENTIAL

Classified by Robert A. Bradtke
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: 10/15/09

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9907628
DATE 19 OCT 99

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 19 OCT RESTRICTED DC MTG ON CHINA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506 OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u>
MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520 DEPARTMENT OF STATE	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
MR. NEAL COMSTOCK ROOM 3408, MAIN TREASURY BLDG 1500 PENNSYLVANIA AVE, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20220 DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
COL MARIA I. CRIBBS ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
MR. JIM DORSKIND EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 5516 14TH & CONSTITUTION AVE, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20230 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
MS. STEPHANIE SYPTAK USUN/W ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON D.C. 20520-6319 U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB
PAGE 01 OF 02 PAGES

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Initials: VL Date: 7/17/2009

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9907628
DATE 19 OCT 99

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 19 OCT RESTRICTED DC MTG ON CHINA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. FRED MONTGOMERY ROOM 416, WINDER BUILDING 600 17TH STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20506 U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u>
MR. JOHN PODESTA 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WHITE HOUSE	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u>
MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
MS LAEL BRAINARD 2ND FLOOR WEST WING NATL ECONOMIC COUNCIL	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u>
COL. DAVID C. WHITE SECRETARY JOINT STAFF ROOM 2E865, PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>

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PAGE 02 OF 02 PAGES

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DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC # 7628

FROM: <u>National Security Council</u>	PHONE: <u>202-456-9425</u>	ROOM: <u>WHSR</u>
SUBJECT: <u>NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 19 OCT RESTRICTED DC MTG ON CHINA</u>		PAGES: <u>3</u>
(w/ Cover)		

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
<u>USUN New York</u>	<u>Ms. Stephanie Syptak</u>	<u>212-415-4407</u>	<u>212-415-4177</u>

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Stephanie Syptak for hand delivery to Ambassador Holbrooke.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
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MESSAGE #: _____

FROM:	NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL	PH: 456-9425	ROOM: WWD
SUBJECT:	NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 19 OCT RESTRICTED DC MTG ON CHINA		
			PAGES: 3

PLEASE DELIVER TO:


<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DELIVER TO</u>	<u>ROOM</u>	<u>PHONE</u>
DOS	Exec Sec	_____	_____
TREASURY	Exec Sec	_____	_____
DOD	Exec Sec	_____	_____
USUN	Staff Asst to the Rep	_____	_____
CIA	Exec Sec	_____	_____
JCS	Secretary, Joint Staff	_____	_____

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

URGENT: Meeting scheduled for 1:30 p.m. TODAY

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Initials: W Date: 10/19/94

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 18, 1999



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES STEINBERG

THROUGH: KENNETH LIEBERTHAL *by JK*

FROM: JAMES KEITH *JK*

SUBJECT: Agenda for October 19 Restricted Deputies
Committee Meeting on China

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to agencies comprising an announcement and agenda for the October 19 restricted deputies committee meeting on China.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the agenda and authorize Bob Bradtke to sign the memorandum to agencies at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to Agencies
Tab A Agenda

*approved
w/changes*

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. draft	Draft of Agenda for Deputies Meeting. [Duplicate 002a] (1 page)	10/18/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3894

FOLDER TITLE:

DC0574 DC Meeting on China (Restricted), October 19, 1999

2015-0221-M
rs1206

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Assistant USTR for Policy
Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. JOHN PODESTA
Chief of Staff to the
President

MR. NEAL COMSTOCK
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. MARIA I. CRIBBS
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. LAEL BRAINARD
Deputy Assistant to the
President for International
Economic Policy

MR. JIM DORSKIND
Executive Secretary
Executive Secretariat
Department of Commerce

COL. DAVID C. WHITE, USA
Secretary, Joint Staff

*add
USUR*

SUBJECT: Restricted Deputies Committee Meeting on China

There will be a restricted Deputies Committee meeting on China on ~~Monday, October 18, 1999~~ at 10:00 a.m. in the White House Situation Room. A meeting agenda is attached.

Tuesday, Octo 19, 1999 1:30pm

Robert A. Bradtke
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

CONFIDENTIAL

Classified by: Robert A. Bradtke
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 10/18/09

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *R* NARA, Date *7/15/19*
2015-0221-11

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002c. draft	Draft of Agenda for Deputies Meeting. [Duplicate 002a] (1 page)	10/18/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3894

FOLDER TITLE:

DC0574 DC Meeting on China (Restricted), October 19, 1999

2015-0221-M
rs1206

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

MR MARKER

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Folder Title:
PC0034 PC Meeting on U.S. Response to Chinese Nuclear Test, September 24, 1993

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4006

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43	6	6	1	V

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of PC Meeting on U.S. Response (2 pages)	09/24/1993	P1/b(1)
002. minutes	re: Minutes of the PC Meeting on U.S. Reponse (8 pages)	09/24/1993	P1/b(1)
003a. memo	Steven Andreasen to Anthony Lake re: PC Meeting on U.S. Response to a Chinese Nuclear Test (4 pages) <i>partial release</i>	09/23/1993	P1/b(1) <i>KDE 3/11/2020</i>
003b. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Principals Committee Meeting on U.S. Response (3 pages)	09/23/1993	P1/b(1) KDE 3/11/2020
003c. paper	re: U.S. Response to a Chinese Nuclear Test (10 pages) <i>partial release</i>	09/18/1993	P1/b(1) <i>KDE 3/11/2020</i>
003d. memo	Secretary O'Leary to POTUS re: Regarding the Potential Chinese Nuclear Weapon Test (2 pages)	09/17/1993	P1/b(1) KDE 6/12/2015
003e. memo	re: U.S. Policy on Nuclear Testing (4 pages)	07/04/1993	P1/b(1)
003f. minutes	re: Minutes of PC Meeting on U.S. Policy on Nuclear Testing (13 pages)	06/01/1993	P1/b(1)
003g. list	re: Additional Tasking [partial] (1 page)	09/00/1993	P1/b(1), P3/b(3) <i>rz</i>
003h. email	Robert Bell to Anthony Lake re: O'Leary Call (1 page)	09/17/1993	P1/b(1) KDE 3/11/2020
003i. email	Bell to Lake re: DoE Letter (1 page)	09/17/1993	P1/b(1) rz
004a. paper	re: U.S. Response to a Chinese Nuclear Test (10 pages) <i>partial release</i>	09/18/1993	P1/b(1) <i>KDE 3/11/2020</i>

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 4006

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0034 PC Meeting on U.S. Reponse to Chinese Nuclear Test, September 24, 1993

2015-0221-M
rs1182

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004b. paper	re: U.S. Response to a Chinese Nuclear Test (10 pages)	09/18/1993	P1/b(1) KDE 3/11/2020

partial release

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 4006

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0034 PC Meeting on U.S. Reponse to Chinese Nuclear Test, September 24, 1993

2015-0221-M

rs1182

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 15 OCT 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
ARMS CONTROL
SOC

NUCLEAR TESTING
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 24 SEP PC MTG RE CHINESE NUCLEAR TESTING

ACTION: KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 18 OCT 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ANDREASEN LOGREF: 9320590 9320592

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0034 CODES: NUT CPR

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
ANDREASEN
BELL
KRECKO
MILLISON
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 7/15/2011
2015-0221-02

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: NSMEM DOC 2 OF 2

OCR of
11/29/93

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE
001
002

Z 93101417 FOR DECISION
X 93101507 LAKE APPROVED RECOM
X 93101507 KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 931015 FUERTH, L
002 931015 GROSSMAN, M
002 931015 MCALEER, R
002 931015 LAVIN, A
002 931015 LAUDER, J
002 931015 PATRICK, T
002 931015 STARR, B

National Security Council
The White House

*Recd 10/14
JWB 7PM
10/14*

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 21147
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG ASK A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	<u>1</u>	<u>WAW</u>	
ExecSec			
Staff Director			
D/APNSA	<u>2</u>	<u>WAW</u>	
APNSA	<u>3</u>	<u>Nat Sec Advisor has seen</u>	
Situation Room	<u>4</u>	<u>WAW</u>	<u>tab II</u>
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>		<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Exec Sec's Office has deleted.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9321147
DATE 15 OCT 93

SUBJECT: SOC FOR PC MTG OF 24 SEP
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~TOP SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

MR. LEON FUERTH
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
VIA LARRY BRANSCUM
ROOM 292, OEOB
WASHINGTON, DC 20506

DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
<u>15 Oct</u>	<u>0945</u>	<u>JH Beam</u>
		COPY: <u>1</u>

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

COPY: 1

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Initials: VL Date: 7/17/2019

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

IFG

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9321147
DATE 15 OCT 93

SUBJECT: SOC FOR PC MTG OF 24 SEP
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~TOP SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE TIME SIGNATURE

MR. LEON FUERTH
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
VIA LARRY BRANSCUM
ROOM 292, OEOB
WASHINGTON, DC 20506

15 Oct 0945 [Signature]

COPY: 1

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

10/15 1045A [Signature]

COPY: 1

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VL Date: 7/17/2019

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**WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM**

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

EYES ONLY


~~TOP SECRET~~

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES 3

FROM WILLIAM H ITOH 456-6534 _____
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SOC OF PC MTG ON CHINESE NUCLEAR TEST

NSC LOG # 21145

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	_____	_____
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	_____	_____
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	_____	_____
JCS	COL. PATRICK	_____	_____
			
DOE	ANN LAVIN	_____	_____
ACDA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VR Date: 7/17/99

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~~TOP SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

21147

October 15, 1993

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COLONEL ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. ANN LAVIN
Director, Executive Secretariat
Department of Energy

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COLONEL T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MS. BARBARA STARR
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of PC Meeting on U.S.
Response to a Chinese Nuclear Test ~~(TS)~~

The attached is for principals eyes only. The summary of
conclusions attached is for the PC meeting which was held on
September 24, 1993 in the Situation Room from 1:30 - 2:30 PM.

~~(S)~~

for Justice Kaney
William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Summary of Conclusions ~~(TS)~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 7/15/09
2015-0921-M

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of PC Meeting on U.S. Response (2 pages)	09/24/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 4006

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0034 PC Meeting on U.S. Reponse to Chinese Nuclear Test, September 24, 1993

2015-0221-M
rs1182

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

21147



October 13, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *RAB*

FROM: STEVEN ANDREASEN *SAA*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of September 24, 1993
PC Meeting on U.S. Response to a Chinese Nuclear
Test

Attached for your review is the "Summary of Conclusions" from the September 24, 1993, Principals Committee meeting on U.S. response to a Chinese nuclear test.

RECOMMENDATION

That you review the attached Summary of Conclusions at Tab I and authorize William Itoh to sign the memorandum to his counterparts at Tab II.

Approve *R* Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Summary of Conclusions
- Tab II Memorandum to Itoh Counterparts

*A bit behind
the curve?
*R**

~~TOP SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *VR* NARA, Date *7/15/2015*
2015-0721-01

TO: LAKE

FROM: ANDREASEN
BELL

DOC DATE: 13 OCT 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
ARMS CONTROL
MINUTES

NUCLEAR TESTING
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MINUTES FOR 24 SEP PC MTG ON US RESPONSE TO CHINESE NUCLEAR TEST

ACTION: LAKE APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 18 OCT 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ANDREASEN

LOGREF: 9320590 9320592

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: PC0034

CODES: NUT CPR

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
ANDREASEN
BELL
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By N NARA, Date 7/16/2015
2015-0711-M

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: NSASK DOC 1 OF 1

Handwritten:
JW Odr 00
11/29/93

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE
001

Z 93101417 FOR DECISION
X 93101815 LAKE APPROVED RECOM

Rec'd 10/15 12:25 pm

National Security Council
The White House

Jul
19/15

PROOFED BY: WA LOG # 21146

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG ASK A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<u>W</u> DepExecSec	<u>1</u>	<u>Wall</u>	_____
ExecSec	_____	_____	_____
Staff Director	_____	_____	_____
D/APNSA	<u>2</u>	<u>psb</u>	<u>not read</u>
APNSA	<u>3</u>	<u>Natl Sec Advisor has seen</u>	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>ASK 10/18</u>	<u>A</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>	<u>BAM</u>	<u>U R</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Ex Sec's Office has desked

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

21146



October 13, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *RGB*

FROM: STEVEN ANDREASEN *SPA*

SUBJECT: Minutes of September 24, 1993 PC Meeting on U.S.
Response to a Chinese Nuclear Test

Attached for your review are the Minutes from the September 24, 1993, Principals Committee meeting on U.S. response to a Chinese nuclear test.

RECOMMENDATION

That you review the attached Minutes at Tab I.

Approve *R* Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Minutes

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *VR* NARA, Date *7/15/2014*
205-0721-2

~~TOP SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. minutes	re: Minutes of the PC Meeting on U.S. Reponse (8 pages)	09/24/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 4006

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0034 PC Meeting on U.S. Reponse to Chinese Nuclear Test, September 24, 1993

2015-0221-M
rs1182

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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TO: LAKE

FROM: ANDREASEN
BELL

DOC DATE: 23 SEP 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
PC

NUCLEAR TESTING

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BRIEFING MEMO FOR 24 SEP PC MTG ON CHINESE NUCLEAR TESTING

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE

DUE DATE: 27 SEP 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ANDREASEN

LOGREF: 9320590 9320592

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: PC0034

CODES: NUT CPR

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
ANDREASEN
BELL
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB CLOSED BY: NSJEB DOC 1 OF 1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE
001

Z 93092317 FOR INFORMATION
X 93093008 NOTED BY LAKE

Rec'd 9/23 6:25pm

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 21065
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (M) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
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ExecSec	_____	_____	_____
Staff Director	_____	_____	_____
D/APNSA	<u>2</u>	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	_____
APNSA	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<i>JB 9/30</i>	<i>MR</i>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>	<i>BTM</i>	<i>MR</i>
_____	<u>4</u>	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

PC - Chinese Nuclear Testing

23 SEP 93 5:30

9/24 1330

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

cc: NS

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
.003a. memo	Steven Andreasen to Anthony Lake re: PC Meeting on U.S. Response to a Chinese Nuclear Test [partial] (2 pages)	09/23/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 4006

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0034 PC Meeting on U.S. Reponse to Chinese Nuclear Test, September 24, 1993

2015-0221-M
rs1182

RESTRICTION CODES

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~~TOP SECRET~~

21065


~~TOP SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20506

September 23, 1993

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

2015-0221-M (1.73) 3/11/2020 KDE



INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL *RGB*

FROM: STEVEN P. ANDREASEN *SAA*

SUBJECT: PC Meeting on U.S. Response to a Chinese Nuclear Test, September 24, 1993, the Situation Room, 1:30 - 2:30pm


Natl Sec Advisor has seen

Folder

I. PURPOSE

To consider the September 18 Decision Paper for Principals on "U.S. Response to a Chinese Nuclear Test."

II. BACKGROUND



EO 13526 1.4c

B. Relevant Factors

We identified five relevant factors in the Decision Paper for Principals. Briefly, they are:

- (1) Current U.S. policy. The President has said that if the moratorium is broken by another nation, he will "direct the Department of Energy to prepare to conduct additional tests while seeking approval to do so from Congress."
- (2) Rationale for current U.S. policy. During our policy review, we concluded that additional nuclear tests could help us prepare for a CTB and provide some additional improvements in safety and reliability.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~

However, the President determined that the price we would pay by being the first to break the moratorium outweighed these benefits. If, however, one or more other nations broke the moratorium, the U.S. would not forgo these benefits. This "No First Test" policy is consistent with Section (f) of the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell amendment, which automatically drops the prohibitions on testing if any state tests after September 30, 1996.

- (3) Need for a test plan. When the President submitted the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell report to Congress on August 9, he did not indicate what tests or how many tests he would propose should another state test. Options 1 and 2 of the Decision Paper provide two different test plans: a nine test proposal for FY 1994-1996 and a two test proposal for 1994 only.
- (4) Domestic considerations. Prior to the July 3 announcement, many Members of Congress urged the President not to break the moratorium. Although there was no public criticism of the President's stated intention to resume testing if another state tests, there is no question many members of Congress would object to a U.S. test in response to a Chinese test. In practice, the earliest the President could conduct a U.S. test under the law would be in late spring (assuming Congress does not pass a Joint Resolution of Disapproval). Accordingly, a proposal by the President to resume testing would clearly precipitate a protracted debate.

- (5) Foreign policy considerations.

EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

Many

states will encourage us not to follow the Chinese lead; others may view a continuation of our moratorium after a Chinese test as a retreat from our declared policy.

It is unclear how a resumption of testing will effect CTB negotiations, but there is no question that if any of the P-5 are testing in 1995, it will complicate NPT extension.

EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

C. Timing considerations

We assume that any of the options outlined in the Decision Paper should be announced and implemented immediately after

the Chinese test. A delay is unlikely to be advantageous since it would allow outside pressures to build and could give the impression we were following rather than leading. This is especially true if the President decides to hold to the policy line he articulated on July 3. Consultations with Congress should be held before the Chinese test, but only with a few key members and in the strictest of confidence.

D. Legal considerations

Alan Krezko has discussed legal issues associated with Option 2 with State and DOE, and the agencies concur that the approach we have outlined in the Decision Paper is consistent with the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell amendment. That said, it is complex, and other agencies (who will see the paper for the first time a day before the meeting) may be confused as to how we would implement the "two-test" plan under the law. Alan spent less time on Option 1 (which may be immaterial, as no agency is likely to support it), although he believes submitting an updated Report to Congress that includes the full 9-test plan is not precluded by the law.

E. Agency views

We know from your C-A-L meetings and our conversations with Under Secretary Davis that Secretary Christopher strongly supports Option 2, believing it is important for the President to do what he said he was going to do last July. Under Secretary Wisner recently told Bob Bell that he (Wisner) agreed with Christopher and expected Secretary Aspin would as well. Although we have no information at this time on the views of General Powell, we would expect he too would support Option 2, especially if State and NSC supported it.

Secretary O'Leary has recommended against resuming testing in response to a Chinese test (despite her earlier support for "No First Test"), and will argue that the "cost-benefit" analysis still favors our adhering to a moratorium. She may also repeat the argument first raised in her September 17 memorandum that testing would come at the expense of and delay stockpile stewardship. As we noted in the cover memo to the Secretary's letter we prepared for you, the \$12 million shift in resources that would be required to conduct one U.S. reliability test are less than 1-percent of the \$1.7 billion stewardship budget for FY 1994-1996. ACDA (the original champion of "No First Test") and the Science Advisor will support DOE.

III. PARTICIPANTS

A complete list will be provided to you on Friday morning.

IV. PRESS PLAN

None

V. SEQUENCE

- (1) You should begin the discussion with a brief summary of the issue and the steps we have taken to dissuade the Chinese from testing, noting that the President plans to say something about this in his UNGA speech next Monday.
- (2) You should then turn to Director Woolsey and ask him to brief on the status of the Chinese test, and to give his best estimate as to whether and when the test will occur. You should also ask him whether we think this is an isolated event or the first of a series of tests. Finally, you should ask him what he thinks the French will do if the Chinese test.
- (3) Next, you should turn to Bob Bell, who will briefly describe the five options (but not review the pros and cons, which are already addressed in the Decision Paper).
- (4) You should then lead a discussion of all participants, eliciting each agency's preferred option.
- (5) Finally, you will summarize conclusions and recommend any further actions, if necessary.

Attachments

- Tab I Agenda
- Tab II Points to be Made
- Tab III List of Participants
- Tab IV Decision Paper for Principals
- Tab V Secretary O'Leary's Memorandum to the President
- Tab VI Text of the President's July 3 Radio Address
- Tab VII PDD-11
- Tab VIII Minutes of June 1 PC Meeting

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON
U.S. RESPONSE TO A CHINESE NUCLEAR TEST

I. Introduction

- Thank you all for coming.
- Since the President signed PDD-11 on July 4, you and your agencies have been working hard to advance our dual objectives of maintaining a global testing moratorium and negotiating a comprehensive test ban.
- I think we have made excellent progress towards beginning CTB negotiations.
 - o As you know, on August 10, the CD voted, with the support of the United States, to give itself a mandate to negotiate a CTB starting in January.
 - o To be ready for these important negotiations, we have been consulting with the other four declared nuclear states and other key nations, both bilaterally and in the CD in Geneva.
 - o In particular, I want to thank Under Secretary Davis for her efforts in leading the Perm-5 bilateral consultations.
- We have also been working very hard to dissuade China from testing. Let me review what we have done:
 - o On July 2, the President sent a private letter to President Jiang Zemin of China urging China to join the moratorium on testing.
 - o In the President's July 3 radio address, he specifically called on the other nuclear powers to join us in a testing moratorium.
 - o The President directed Under Secretary of State Davis to go to Beijing to discuss nuclear testing issues and to urge China not to test. She did so on July 26.
 - o The President instructed our Ambassador in Beijing to deliver a demarche at the highest levels urging the Chinese not to test. He did so on August 28.
 - o We have sent demarches to 65 U.S. embassies instructing our officials to request that their host governments urge China not to test. At least 25 of these countries have done so, or have said that they will.

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- o We have instructed our Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to contact his colleagues and ask them to urge the Chinese not to test. He has done so. He has also communicated this directly with his Chinese counterpart.
 - o Finally, at last Friday's press availability with the Italian President, the President urged China not to test, and he plans to make the point again in his UNGA speech next Monday.
- Today, we are meeting to discuss what we should do if these efforts fail and China tests.

II. Intelligence Update

- Let me first turn to Director Woolsey for a brief update on the status of the Chinese test site.
- **[Director Woolsey gives briefing on status of test site.]**
- Jim [Woolsey], do you believe this will be a one-time test, or do you think this test is part of a larger program?
- Jim [Woolsey], what do you think the French and Russians will do if the Chinese test?
- Thank you Jim [Woolsey].

III. Options

- Now, I'd like to turn to Bob [Bell], who will briefly summarize the options described in the Decision Paper.
- **[Bob describes the options in the Decision Paper]**
- Thank you Bob. Does anyone have any questions on the options as Bob has described them, or believe there are other options we should consider?

IV. Discussion

- Perhaps the best way to proceed is to go around the room and ask each principal to describe his or her agency's recommendation.
- Let me begin with Secretary Christopher. **[Secretary Christopher explains his view; then go in sitting order from him, either clockwise or counter-clockwise as you prefer.]**

[QUESTIONS TO KEEP IN MIND AS PRINCIPALS GIVE THEIR VIEWS]

- Given that the President has already said publicly and in diplomatic communications that he would respond to another nation testing by directing DOE to prepare to conduct additional tests while seeking approval from Congress to do so, what would be the foreign policy impact of changing course three months later?
- The review concluded this summer -- and the President stated on July 3 -- that "additional nuclear tests could help us prepare for a test ban and provide for some additional improvements in safety and reliability." From a technical perspective, is everyone comfortable with the two test plans identified in the Decision paper?
- What would be the reaction on the Hill if we submitted Option 2 in response to a Chinese test? Would the reaction be more muted if France announced it would join China?
- What would be the impact of Option 2 on CTB negotiations and NPT extension?
- At the June PC, a number of Agencies including JCS, OSD and DOE, agreed that the President could certify as required by the H-E-M amendment that reliability testing was "vital" to our national security interests. Can the President still certify that?
- When should we notify Congress of our intentions: the day after a Chinese test, or later?

V. Summary

- [Summarize state of play as of end of meeting]

PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING
DATE: September 24, 1993
LOCATION: The Situation Room
TIME: 12:30 - 2:00

U.S. RESPONSE TO A CHINESE NUCLEAR TEST

Agenda

- I. Introduction.....NSC
- II. Intelligence Update.....CIA
- III. Options.....NSC
- IV. Discussion.....All participants
- V. Summary.....NSC

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 7/15/2015
2015-0721-n

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003c. paper	re: U.S. Response to a Chinese Nuclear Test [partial] (3 pages)	09/18/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
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FOLDER TITLE:

PC0034 PC Meeting on U.S. Reponse to Chinese Nuclear Test, September 24, 1993

2015-0221-M
rs1182

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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U.S. Response to a Chinese Nuclear Test 9/18/93

Issue for Decision

How should the US respond to a Chinese nuclear test. (S)

Background

EO 13526 3.5(c)

Relevant Factors

- Current U.S. policy. The President has clearly articulated to the Executive Branch, Congress, the public and other governments what he would do if another state breaks the testing moratorium:
 - o Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-11 (signed July 4, 1993), extended the current U.S. nuclear testing moratorium through the first annual Congressional reporting and authorization period established in the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell Amendment (i.e., through September 30, 1994) on the condition that no other state tests. PDD-11 stated that "If another state tests between now and September 30, 1994, [the President] will direct the Department of Energy to prepare to conduct additional tests and ask Congress for the authority to test pursuant to the H-E-M Amendment...". (S)
 - o The President articulated this policy in his July 3 radio address to the nation: "If, however, this moratorium is broken by another nation, I will direct the Department of Energy to prepare to conduct additional tests while seeking approval to do so from Congress." Similar language was used in Presidential letters and other communications with our allies and other states and in the Presidential report submitted to Congress on August 9, 1993. (S)
- Rationale for policy in PDD-11. During the course of the review of U.S. policy on nuclear testing and a CTB, the

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Administration determined that additional nuclear tests could help us prepare for a CTB and provide some additional improvements in safety and reliability. However, the President determined that these benefits would be outweighed by the price we would pay in conducting those tests now -- through undercutting of our nonproliferation goals. (C)

Specifically, the President determined that we would be in the strongest possible position to negotiate a CTB treaty and achieve indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty when it comes up for renewal in 1995 if no nuclear state was conducting nuclear tests at that time. If, however, China (and/or France) is (are) conducting nuclear tests, other non-nuclear nations will have a pretext for opposing an NPT extension whether or not the United States is conducting final nuclear tests. (S)

This policy is consistent with Section (f) of the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell Amendment, which automatically drops the prohibitions on U.S. testing if any foreign state tests after September 30, 1996. (S)

- The need for a test plan. The Administration has not indicated what tests or how many tests we would propose should another state test in this year's Section 507 Report to Congress submitted on August 9. Therefore, if we decide to seek approval from Congress to resume U.S. testing in response to a Chinese test, we would need to decide (a) what specific tests we want Congress to approve between now and September 30, 1994, and (b) whether we should indicate to Congress now what tests we would conduct in the following two years (October 1994 - September 1996) covered by the H-E-M Amendment. (S)
- Domestic considerations. During the Administration's review of U.S. policy on nuclear testing, a number of Members of Congress wrote the President encouraging him to extend the moratorium. The President's July 3 announcement to do so was well received on the Hill. At the time, there was no public criticism of the President's stated intention to resume testing if another state tests. (S)

That said, there is no question that many members of Congress do not believe a Chinese test is sufficient cause for the United States to resume testing. The arms control community and public interest groups seized with the testing issue are also likely to urge the President not to resume testing. (C)

If, following a Chinese test in late September, the President were to submit a test plan for safety improvement tests to Congress pursuant to the H-E-M Amendment, Congress must be afforded 90 legislative days to review the proposal before the U.S. test could occur. Assuming Congress remains in session until the end of October, the 90 day "clock" would not expire until late spring 1994. (C)

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The situation with regard to a proposed reliability test is more complicated. Under H-E-M, a reliability test requires a prior Presidential certification that the test is "vital to the national security interests of the United States". The certification must lie before Congress for sixty days before the test can be conducted. Moreover, the certification must be submitted "within the first sixty days after the beginning of any period covered by an annual report". (S)


H-E-M provides that the first annual report covers the period beginning on "the date on which a resumption of testing of nuclear weapons would be permitted under subsection (c)" of the statute, which is 90 qualified legislative (or "sessional") days after the submittal of the annual report to Congress. President Clinton informed Congress that President Bush's annual report to Congress submitted in January 1993 was legally defective and "has no bearing on the provisions contained in subsection (c)". Accordingly, the 90 day time-frame would be measured from August 9, when President Clinton's annual report was submitted. At that point (approximately March 1994), the President would have sixty days to submit his certification to Congress. The test could be conducted 60 additional "sessional" days thereafter (late May or early June), assuming Congress does not pass a Joint Resolution of Disapproval. (S)

For a UK test, H-E-M requires a prior Presidential "national interest" determination, which could be provided now. It does not impose any requirement that the U.K. test proposal lie before Congress for any particular time prior to being conducted. However, the U.K. test can only occur "within a period covered by an annual report." As explained above, this period does not begin until 90 "sessional" days after August 9 (approximately March 1994). (S)


It is unclear whether opponents of resumed testing would have the votes to pass a Joint Resolution of Disapproval in both Houses of Congress during this time, thereby preventing the President from conducting any proposed tests. However, there is no question we would be in a stronger position to defeat such a resolution than if we had proposed U.S. testing before any other state "broke" the moratorium. Much would depend, though, on the position Senators Hatfield, Exon and Mitchell took. (S)

-- Foreign policy considerations:

o



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EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

- o Russia. The Russians are unlikely to respond to a Chinese and/or French test with a test of their own. They would almost certainly resume testing if the United States did. (S)
- o Other states. Many states, including U.S. allies such as Canada, Germany and Japan, will encourage the U.S. not to follow China's lead, fearing that a U.S. resumption of testing would trigger another round of testing by the nuclear five. (S)

That said, given that our policy on this issue was clearly articulated by the President on July 3, other states may view a continuation of the U.S. moratorium in the wake of a Chinese test as a retreat or an indication that we never intended to follow through with our declared policy. (S)

- o CTB negotiations and NPT extension . We have already made encouraging progress in beginning the process of negotiating a CTB. We have conducted one, and in some cases two, series of bilateral consultations with the other four Perm-5 states. In addition, the CD voted with U.S. concurrence on August 10 to give itself a mandate to negotiate a CTB. Although it is unclear how testing would effect either the conduct or outcome of negotiations, a resumption of testing by any state will -- at a minimum -- disappoint key allies and other states who view any additional tests as inconsistent with our objective of achieving an early CTB. Also, if any of the declared nuclear powers are still testing in 1995, it will likely complicate NPT extension. (S)

Assumptions

- Any of the U.S. testing options discussed below should be implemented immediately after the Chinese test in order to avoid a protracted public debate on this issue. The Administration will be pressed to say what it intends to do as soon as the Chinese test is reported, and word of the Chinese preparations has already leaked, which is likely to

trigger an early domestic debate on this issue. In short, a delayed response is not in our interests, no matter what policy option is chosen:

- o if we plan to submit a test plan to Congress, then we should make that announcement before the "no-test" forces bring pressure to bear on the Executive Branch not to do so;
 - o if we plan not to submit a test plan to Congress, we should say so immediately to avoid the impression weeks later that we backed away from the policy position articulated in PDD-11 in response to outside pressure. (S)
- Both Options 1 and 2 (which involve submission of a test plan under Section 507) are consistent with the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell Amendment. (C)
- If consultations are to take place with Congress before announcing our policy, they should take place only with a few key members, and be held in the strictest of confidence. The purpose of such consultations would be to (a) brief the leadership on the impending Chinese test, and (b) solicit support for our preferred approach. (S)
- We would want to consult with the UK before implementing any of the approaches outlined below. (S)

Options

- Option 1: Respond with 9-test proposal for 1994-1996.
Announce that the President has directed the DOE to prepare to resume testing, and submit an updated Section 507 Report to the Congress that includes the three-year, 9-test plan proposed by DOE during Presidential Review 19. Under this approach, we would make clear that a final decision on whether to carry out the tests would be made (1) only after Congress approved the test plan and (2) any relevant considerations or developments were taken into account. For example, if China were to subsequently bow to international pressure and adopt a moratorium, we would not likely go through with our test. (S)

Pro

- o Consistent with the President's policy, which has been clearly articulated to the public and foreign governments. (S)
- o If approved, will allow us to resume testing for both reliability and safety reasons. (S)
- o Will allow the UK to conduct tests it viewed as important for its security. (S)

Con

- o Responding to one Chinese test with a three-year, 9-test plan will be perceived as "disproportionate." (S)
- o Will reopen the debate over the need for further reliability and safety tests with no immediate commitment to incorporate safety improvements. (S)
- o Preparing for and not conducting these tests (if Congress passes a Joint Resolution of Disapproval) will most likely draw resources away from our plan for stockpile stewardship with no technical gain. (S)
- o Will be opposed by many members of Congress, the arms control community and public interest groups. (S)
- o Will provide additional political cover for France to resume testing. (S)
- o May prompt Russia to test, whereas Chinese and/or French resumption would not. (S)
- o Will disappoint key allies and other states who view any more testing as inconsistent with our efforts to achieve a CTB. (S)
- o Could complicate our efforts to achieve an indefinite extension of the NPT. (S)

-- Option 2: Respond with 2-test proposal for 1994 only.

Announce that the President has directed the DOE to prepare to resume testing, and submit an updated Section 507 Report to the Congress that includes two tests -- one U.S. and one U.K. -- to be conducted between now and September 30, 1994. The U.S. test would be a reliability test, most likely of the W87 warhead. Make clear that any additional U.S. tests beyond FY 1994 (i.e., after September 30, 1994) would depend on whether China and/or France reverse their decision to conduct tests. Like Option 1, we would also make clear that a final decision on whether to carry out the tests would be made (1) only after Congress approved the test plan and (2) any relevant considerations or developments were taken into account. (S)

Pro

- o Like Option 1, consistent with the President's policy, which has been clearly articulated to the public and foreign governments. (S)
- o Approving one U.S. and one U.K. test between now and September 1994 shows maximum restraint, short of foregoing testing altogether. (S)

- o If approved, will allow the U.S. to conduct a reliability test that could provide a useful benchmark prior to entering a CTB. This avoids the issue of whether or not we need to incorporate safety improvements into the stockpile after completing the tests since the test would not relate to development of an improved-safety warhead. (S)
- o Will allow the UK to conduct one test it viewed as important for its security. (S)

Con

- o Like Option 1, preparing for and not conducting these tests (if Congress passes a Joint Resolution of Disapproval) will most likely draw resources away from our plan for stockpile stewardship with no technical gain. (S)
 - o Like Option 1, will be opposed by many members of Congress, the arms control community and public interest groups. (S)
 - o Like Option 1, will provide additional political cover for France to resume testing. (S)
 - o Like Option 1, may prompt Russia to test, whereas Chinese and/or French resumption would not. (S)
 - o Like Option 1, will disappoint key allies and other states who view any more testing as inconsistent with our efforts to achieve a CTB. (S)
 - o Could complicate our efforts to achieve an indefinite extension of the NPT. (S)
 - o Critics will argue that one solitary U.S. test and one U.K. test serves no practical purpose. (S)
- Option 3: Respond by announcing we are reviewing our options; proceed with testing only if France decides to test. Announce that we are reviewing our options and encouraging the Chinese to refrain from any further tests. If France follows with another test, proceed with Option 1 or 2. If France elects not to test, proceed with Option 4 or 5. (S)

Pro

- o Because we would not be resuming testing automatically, will be supported by many members of Congress, the arms control community and public interest groups. (S)
- o Avoids the possibility of having the President's test proposal repudiated by Congress. (S)

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- o Avoids providing political cover for both France and Russia to resume testing. (S)
- o Will be popular with key allies and other states who view any more testing as inconsistent with our efforts to achieve a CTB and indefinite extension of the NPT. (S)
- o In theory, preserves the option of responding to a French test (or additional Chinese tests); after such an event, the case for resuming U.S. testing may be stronger than it would be after a single Chinese test. (S)

Con

- o Could subject the President to criticism (both domestic and international) that he has failed to follow through with commitments he made only months ago. (S)
- o Undermines the credibility of future policy declarations. (S)
- o Remaining silent now will spark a "should we or shouldn't we" debate, drawing attention to the difference between our actions and our stated policy. (S)
- o A protracted public debate could narrow our options later, as anti-testing forces would mobilize support for extending the U.S. moratorium indefinitely. (S)

-- Option 4: Respond by announcing we will not respond to a Chinese test; reserve our options if France joins China.
Announce that we are encouraging the Chinese to refrain from any further tests and that the U.S. will not as a matter of policy resume testing in response to Chinese only tests. (S)

Pro

- o Because we are not resuming testing at this time, will be supported by many members of Congress, the arms control community and public interest groups. (S)
- o Avoids the possibility of having the President's test proposal repudiated by Congress. (S)
- o Avoids providing political cover for both France and Russia to resume testing. (S)
- o Implicitly focuses pressure on the French not to resume testing. (S)
- o Will be popular with key allies and other states who view any more testing as inconsistent with our efforts

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to achieve a CTB and indefinite extension of the NPT.
(S)

- o In theory, preserves the option of responding to a French test with a U.S. test; after such an event, the case for resuming U.S. testing may be stronger than it would be after a single Chinese test. (S)

Con

- o Could subject the President to criticism (both domestic and international) that he has failed to follow through with commitments he made only months ago. (S)
- o Undermines credibility of future U.S. policy declarations. (S)
- o Could be perceived as drawing a "second line in the sand," one that also will not trigger a U.S. response (e.g., if we are not willing to resume U.S. testing following a Chinese test, would we really respond to a French test with a U.S. test?). (S)
- o Could narrow our options later and make it more difficult to respond to a French test with a U.S. test, as anti-testing forces would mobilize support for extending the U.S. moratorium unconditionally. (S)

-- Option 5: Announce that we will not test in response to Chinese or French tests. Announce that we are encouraging the Chinese (and the French) to refrain from any further tests, but that the U.S. will not resume testing regardless of Chinese or French testing decisions. (S)

Pro

- o Because we are not resuming testing, will be supported by many members of Congress, the arms control community and public interest groups. (S)
- o Avoids the possibility of having the President's policy repudiated by Congress. (S)
- o Avoids providing political cover for both France and Russia to resume testing. (S)
- o Will be popular with key allies and other states who view any more testing as inconsistent with our efforts to achieve a CTB and indefinite extension of the NPT. (S)

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Con

- o Could subject the President to criticism that he has failed to follow through with commitments he made only months ago. (S)
- o Undermines the credibility of future policy declarations. (S)
- o Could narrow our options later, as anti-testing forces would mobilize support for extending the U.S. moratorium indefinitely. (S)

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The Secretary of Energy
Washington, DC 20585



September 17, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Through: The Honorable Anthony Lake, National Security Advisor

Regarding the potential Chinese nuclear weapon test

Urgent action is needed to reinforce your commitment to the moratorium on nuclear weapons testing in light of the evidence that China is preparing to test on October 5. Public leadership underlining the importance of the testing moratorium to achieving progress in the non-proliferation arena would stem any further erosion in adherence to the moratorium and might give the Chinese reason to rethink their testing plans.

Even if action by our government does not deter China from performing a nuclear test, strong international leadership on this issue will still serve us well in negotiations to achieve your goals of an indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and early agreement to a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. As you demonstrated on Monday, during this historic period of international realignment, the United States has the opportunity to lead the world to a more secure future.

Threatened renewal of nuclear testing by the United States in response to a Chinese test would be unlikely to have any affect on their plans. It would require six to nine months of advance work, both technical and procedural, before we could perform such a test or tests. Moreover, if we resume testing, it would likely have a domino effect, leading to testing by the other three primary nuclear weapons states. Pressure on Russian President Yeltsin to resume testing at this time would complicate his political situation at a sensitive moment.

Over the past few months, our nuclear weapons laboratories have become convinced that the stockpile stewardship program currently under development is the most effective way of ensuring the safety, reliability and performance of our remaining nuclear weapons consistent with your goal of achieving a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Preparing for nuclear testing now would come at the expense of delaying progress on the stewardship program designed to meet the challenge of maintaining our nuclear deterrent in a comprehensive test ban regime.

I remain convinced that your conclusion, announced in the July 3 radio address extending the nuclear testing moratorium, remains valid: the price we would pay for conducting additional nuclear tests outweighs the risks of continuing the moratorium.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Sanctioned disclosure subject to criminal and administrative sanctions:

Derivative Classifier: Carol Anne Kennedy

(1-11-82)
HR-74

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My recommendations are as follows:

- o Make a high-profile public statement on the importance of maintaining the nuclear testing moratorium, possibly tied to the signing of the Presidential Decision Directive concerning non-proliferation. It is important that such a statement occur *prior* to final backfilling of the Chinese test device which is expected to occur within a week.
- o Make direct contact with the Chinese leadership to express your personal concern about the implications of continued testing on our shared non-proliferation goals.
- o Privately and personally encourage other foreign leaders, including the Presidents of Russia and France, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, to directly contact the Chinese leadership expressing support for the continuation of the testing moratorium.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'J. M. [unclear]', written in a cursive style.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

Embargoed for Release
Until 10:06 A.M. EDT
Saturday, July 3, 1993

July 2, 1993

RADIO ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT

The Roosevelt Room

THE PRESIDENT: Good morning. Two hundred and seventeen years ago, our Founding Fathers declared our independence to secure the liberty and prosperity we celebrate every July 4th. Although our times and challenges are very different from those our Founders faced, these issues are still the enduring concerns of the American people today.

In a few days, I will represent the United States in Japan at the annual meeting of the major industrialized nations of the world to work for new global policies that create more American jobs, open markets for our products, and strengthen our security as we embrace the challenges of the this new world.

America commands respect on the world stage because we have taken aggressive steps to put our own economic house in order at a time when all the advanced nations are having real troubles with the economy.

Here in Washington the House and Senate have both passed versions of my economic plan to promote growth and to reduce the deficit by \$500 billion. The plan also has incentives for people to invest more in our economy to create jobs, and provides money for education and training in new technologies, and help the defense workers who have been laid off by defense cuts.

We've made a good beginning now. As this plan has progressed through the Congress, interest rates have continued to come down, mortgage rates are now below 7.5 percent, and nearly 1 million new jobs have been added to the economy since January, about the same number as came in in the previous three years.

Change is hard, though. Many people are still skeptical. Many of the opponents of my plan chant "tax and spend." But the truth is, it's not an old tax-and-spend plan. And the people who are attacking it are those who taxed the middle class, cut taxes on the wealthy, borrowed and spent our economy into a \$4 trillion debt in the last 12 years.

Our plan is fair. It has \$250 billion in spending cuts, and asks the upper 6 percent of Americans to pay 75 percent of the new taxes. It moves the working poor out of poverty. It enables me to attend this meeting of the other advanced nations with a record of real results that will encourage our competitors to take steps to revive their economies as well.

And that's important for every American, because we can't grow the United States economy as we ought to until we have cooperation from other nations and they're growing. Why? Because since 1987, two-thirds of our new jobs have come from exports. We live in a global economy. We have to compete all over the world. And we have to sell our products and services everywhere.

MORE

When we stepped up to the plate here at home to get our own house in order, it enabled us to make the global economy work for the people of the United States if others will do their part. And that's what we're working on now.

As I said, all the nations I'll be meeting with are facing difficult times. Their economies are even slower than ours. But we know that together we can grow. We can have a stronger economy and we can have more security.

I'd like to talk to you about that for a few minutes. Because of the vigilance, the democratic values, the military strength of the United States and our allies, we won the Cold War. Our inheritance, our victory is a new chance to rebuild our economies and solve our problems in each of our countries while we reduce military spending. But our profound responsibility remains to redefine what it means to preserve security in this post-Cold War era. We must be strong. We must be resolute. And we must be safe.

This great task has certainly changed with the passage of the Cold War. The technologies of mass destruction in the hands of Russia and the United States are being reduced. But technologies of mass destruction that just a few years ago were possessed only by a handful of nations, and still are possessed only by a few, are becoming more widely available. It is now theoretically possible for many countries to build missiles, to have nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. This is a new and different challenge that requires new approaches and new thinking.

During my campaign for President, I promised a wholehearted commitment to achieving a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. A test ban can strengthen our efforts worldwide to halt the spread of nuclear technology in weapons. Last year, the Congress directed that a test ban be negotiated by 1996. And it established an interim moratorium on nuclear testing while we reviewed our requirements for further tests. That moratorium on testing expires soon.

Congress said that after the moratorium expires, but before a test ban was achieved, the United States could carry out up to 15 nuclear tests to ensure the safety and reliability of our weapons. After a thorough review, my administration has determined that the nuclear weapons in the United States arsenal are safe and reliable.

Additional nuclear tests could help us prepare for a test ban and provide for some additional improvements in safety and reliability. However, the price we would pay in conducting those tests now by undercutting our own nonproliferation goals and ensuring that other nations would resume testing outweighs these benefits.

I have, therefore, decided to extend the current moratorium on United States nuclear testing at least through September of next year, as long as no other nation tests.

And I call on the other nuclear powers to do the same. If these nations will join us in observing this moratorium, we will be in the strongest possible position to negotiate a comprehensive test ban and to discourage other nations from developing their own nuclear arsenals.

If, however, this moratorium is broken by another nation, I will direct the Department of Energy to prepare to conduct additional tests while seeking approval to do so from Congress. I therefore expect the Department to maintain a capability to resume testing.

To assure that our nuclear deterrent remains unquestioned under a test ban, we will explore other means of maintaining our confidence in the safety, the reliability and the

performance of our own weapons. We will also refocus much of the talent and resources of our nation's nuclear labs on new technology to curb the spread of nuclear weapons and verify arms control treaties.

Beyond these significant actions, I am also taking steps to revitalize the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, so that it can play an active role in meeting the arms control and nonproliferation challenges of this new era. I am committed to protecting our people by deterring aggression and combatting terrorism. The work of combatting proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is difficult and unending, but it is an essential part of this task. It must be done.

Americans have earned the right on this Fourth of July weekend to enjoy life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness in the new era America did so much to create. This moment of opportunity is the reward for our vigilance and sacrifice during the long years of the Cold War.

We now have the freedom to concern ourselves, not merely with survival but with prosperity for ourselves and our children. We have the strength and the stature to lead the world into a future of greater security and global growth.

Because of the changes we have made, America can now fulfill the dreams and aspirations of the patriots who made our freedom possible more than 200 years ago. We can do them no greater honor than to make the most of what these times have to offer. Working together, we will.

Have a happy and safe holiday, and thanks for listening

END

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003e. memo	re: U.S. Policy on Nuclear Testing (4 pages)	07/04/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 4006

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0034 PC Meeting on U.S. Reponse to Chinese Nuclear Test, September 24, 1993

2015-0221-M
rs1182

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003f. minutes	re: Minutes of PC Meeting on U.S. Policy on Nuclear Testing (13 pages)	06/01/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 4006

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0034 PC Meeting on U.S. Reponse to Chinese Nuclear Test, September 24, 1993

2015-0221-M
rs1182

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003g. list	re: Additional Tasking [partial] (1 page)	09/00/1993	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

SECRET

Additional Tasking

- o I have one additional tasking.
- o During Presidential Review 19, we identified three reliability tests as part of a 9-test plan.
- o

E.O. 13526, 6.2(a)

- o I'd like DOE and DOD to get together and (a) confirm that this is the one test they would do, and (b) provide a one-page "technical" fact sheet, identifying the purpose of the test, what data would be gained, how much it would cost and when it could be conducted.

Released in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 07/15/2019 (1.87)
2015-0221-M

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
FER E.O. 13526

2015-0221-M(1.89)

3/11/2020 KDC

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

17-Sep-1993 17:16 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

VEIT@A1

FROM:

BELL
(BELL@MRGATE@OEOB)

SUBJECT:

O'Leary Call

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

17-Sep-1993 16:39 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

W. Anthony K. Lake (LAKE)

FROM:

Robert G. Bell
(BELL)

SUBJECT:

O'Leary Call

I am advised by senior officials at DOE that Secretary O'Leary is preparing a letter to the President recommending that are the earliest opportunity he warn the PRC not to test and (b) that if they do test that we not test. I have strongly urged DOE not to send the letter. I pointed out that it could leak, that we are planning to call a PC where the Secretary could register her views. I said that if Mrs. O'Leary is concerned that she will not get an opportunity to register DOE's recommendation then she should call you this evening to be reassured that we are planning a PC (which I now believe we will have to have by the end of next week, since the Post story has initiated the debate already.) I am especially concerned about this development because we heard from two other agencies (State and OSTP) that this letter was coming before I heard it from DOE. If the inter-agency knows about a letter, it will probably leak and become a headline, thereby delimiting our flexibility.

CC: Records
CC: Kristen K. Cicio
CC: Steven P. Andreasen

(RECORDS)
(CICIO)
(ANDREASEN)

DECLASSIFIED
FER E.O. 13526

21065
BB - Thanks.
A/see.



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

17-Sep-1993 17:46 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: VEIT@A1

FROM: BELL
(BELL@MRGATE@OEOB)

SUBJECT: DoE Letter (more)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

17-Sep-1993 17:35 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: W. Anthony K. Lake (LAKE)

FROM: Robert G. Bell
(BELL)

SUBJECT: DoE Letter (more)

I am now advised that Mrs. O'Leary is intent on sending the letter. She is coming to the White House for the 6:00 reception the President is hosting for the Congressional Black Caucus. If you attend she may seek you out. I have strongly recommended to DoE that if Mrs. O'Leary will not withhold the letter, DoE should strictly restrict distribution internal to DoE and strictly restrict knowledge of the letter within the Agency, to the extent that is still possible. The letter will be classified Secret, though that is of course no guarantee it will not leak.

CC: Records (RECORDS)
CC: Kristen K. Cicio (CICIO)
CC: Steven P. Andreasen (ANDREASEN)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By YK NARA, Date 7/15/2014
2015-0221-W (1.90)

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 22 SEP 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
ARMS CONTROL
AGENDA

NUCLEAR TESTING
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 24 SEP PC MTG ON US RESPONSE TO CHINESE
NUCLEAR TEST

ACTION: ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 22 SEP 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ANDREASEN

LOGREF: 9320590 9320592

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: PC0034

CODES: NUT CPR

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
ANDREASEN
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 7/15/2019
2015-0721-M

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: NSWEA DOC 2 OF 2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE
001
002

Z 93092010 FOR DECISION
X 93092217 LAKE APPROVED RECOM
X 93092217 ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 930922 FUERTH, L
002 930922 GROSSMAN, M
002 930922 MCALEER, R
002 930922 LAVIN, A
002 930922 ADAMS, G
002 930922 INDERFURTH, K
002 930922 LAUDER, J
002 930922 PATRICK, T
002 930922 STARR, B
002 930922 HAWKINS, D

Rec'd 9/20 10:35am

National Security Council
The White House

JWR
9/20

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 21038

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRR NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG GMA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<i>Link</i> DepExecSec	<u>1</u>	<u>WAL</u>	
ExecSec	<u>4</u>	<u>CE</u>	
Staff Director			
D/APNSA	<u>2</u>	<u>SK</u>	
APNSA	<u>3</u>	<u>HAS APPROVED</u>	<u>JWR</u>
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>		
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>	<u>Bm</u>	<u>R</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

CC: VP McLarty Other Steph
C. Millson

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS: memo to agencies
for Friday PC mtg

EYES ONLY

18 SEP 93 6:23

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Ex Sec has disburse

1FG

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WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319

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
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SUBJECT: <u>Notice of Meeting ON 24 SEP</u>		PAGES: <u>12</u>

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FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NOTIFICATION OF 24 SEP PC MTG
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TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
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MESSAGE NO. 1847 CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES 12

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NOTIFICATION OF 24 SEP PC MTG

21038

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
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MESSAGE NO. <u>1847</u>	CLASSIFICATION <u>TOP SECRET</u>	PAGES <u>12</u>
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 22, 1993

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MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the U.S.
Representative to the United
Nations

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COLONEL ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COLONEL T.R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MS. ANN LAVIN
Director, Executive
Secretariat
Department of Energy

MS. BARBARA STARR
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for
National Security &
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

MR. DAMAR HAWKINS
Executive Assistant
Office of Science and
Technology Policy

SUBJECT: U.S. Response to a Chinese Nuclear Test ~~(S)~~

The Principal's Committee will meet Friday, September 24, from 1:30 p.m. to 2:30 p.m. in the Situation Room to discuss the U.S. response to a Chinese nuclear test. The agenda and the Decision Paper on this issue (which should receive limited distribution within agencies) are attached. ~~(TS)~~



William Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachments
Agenda
Decision Paper

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Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 7/5/09
2015-0721-11

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PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING
DATE: September 24, 1993
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 1:30 - 2:30 pm.

U.S. RESPONSE TO A CHINESE NUCLEAR TEST

Agenda

- I. Introduction.....NSC
- II. Intelligence Update.....CIA
- III. Options.....NSC
- IV. Discussion.....All participants
- V. Summary.....NSC

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 07/15/2014
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004a. paper	re: U.S. Response to a Chinese Nuclear Test [partial] (3 pages)	09/18/1993	P1/b(1)

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2015-0221-M

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- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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U.S. Response to a Chinese Nuclear Test 9/18/93

Issue for Decision

How should the US respond to a Chinese nuclear test. (S)

Background

EO 13526 3.5(c)

Relevant Factors

- Current U.S. policy. The President has clearly articulated to the Executive Branch, Congress, the public and other governments what he would do if another state breaks the testing moratorium:
 - o Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-11 (signed July 4, 1993), extended the current U.S. nuclear testing moratorium through the first annual Congressional reporting and authorization period established in the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell Amendment (i.e., through September 30, 1994) on the condition that no other state tests. PDD-11 stated that "If another state tests between now and September 30, 1994, [the President] will direct the Department of Energy to prepare to conduct additional tests and ask Congress for the authority to test pursuant to the H-E-M Amendment..." (S)
 - o The President articulated this policy in his July 3 radio address to the nation: "If, however, this moratorium is broken by another nation, I will direct the Department of Energy to prepare to conduct additional tests while seeking approval to do so from Congress." Similar language was used in Presidential letters and other communications with our allies and other states and in the Presidential report submitted to Congress on August 9, 1993. (S)
- Rationale for policy in PDD-11. During the course of the review of U.S. policy on nuclear testing and a CTB, the

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Administration determined that additional nuclear tests could help us prepare for a CTB and provide some additional improvements in safety and reliability. However, the President determined that these benefits would be outweighed by the price we would pay in conducting those tests now -- through undercutting of our nonproliferation goals. (S)

Specifically, the President determined that we would be in the strongest possible position to negotiate a CTB treaty and achieve indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty when it comes up for renewal in 1995 if no nuclear state was conducting nuclear tests at that time. If, however, China (and/or France) is (are) conducting nuclear tests, other non-nuclear nations will have a pretext for opposing an NPT extension whether or not the United States is conducting final nuclear tests. (S)

This policy is consistent with Section (f) of the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell Amendment, which automatically drops the prohibitions on U.S. testing if any foreign state tests after September 30, 1996. (S)

-- The need for a test plan. The Administration has not indicated what tests or how many tests we would propose should another state test in this year's Section 507 Report to Congress submitted on August 9. Therefore, if we decide to seek approval from Congress to resume U.S. testing in response to a Chinese test, we would need to decide (a) what specific tests we want Congress to approve between now and September 30, 1994, and (b) whether we should indicate to Congress now what tests we would conduct in the following two years (October 1994 - September 1996) covered by the H-E-M Amendment. (S)

-- Domestic considerations. During the Administration's review of U.S. policy on nuclear testing, a number of Members of Congress wrote the President encouraging him to extend the moratorium. The President's July 3 announcement to do so was well received on the Hill. At the time, there was no public criticism of the President's stated intention to resume testing if another state tests. (S)

That said, there is no question that many members of Congress do not believe a Chinese test is sufficient cause for the United States to resume testing. The arms control community and public interest groups seized with the testing issue are also likely to urge the President not to resume testing. (S)

If, following a Chinese test in late September, the President were to submit a test plan for safety improvement tests to Congress pursuant to the H-E-M Amendment, Congress must be afforded 90 legislative days to review the proposal before the U.S. test could occur. Assuming Congress remains in session until the end of October, the 90 day "clock" would not expire until late spring 1994. (S)

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The situation with regard to a proposed reliability test is more complicated. Under H-E-M, a reliability test requires a prior Presidential certification that the test is "vital to the national security interests of the United States". The certification must lie before Congress for sixty days before the test can be conducted. Moreover, the certification must be submitted "within the first sixty days after the beginning of any period covered by an annual report". (E)

H-E-M provides that the first annual report covers the period beginning on "the date on which a resumption of testing of nuclear weapons would be permitted under subsection (c)" of the statute, which is 90 qualified legislative (or "sessional") days after the submittal of the annual report to Congress. President Clinton informed Congress that President Bush's annual report to Congress submitted in January 1993 was legally defective and "has no bearing on the provisions contained in subsection (c)". Accordingly, the 90 day time-frame would be measured from August 9, when President Clinton's annual report was submitted. At that point (approximately March 1994), the President would have sixty days to submit his certification to Congress. The test could be conducted 60 additional "sessional" days thereafter (late May or early June), assuming Congress does not pass a Joint Resolution of Disapproval. (E)


For a UK test, H-E-M requires a prior Presidential "national interest" determination, which could be provided now. It does not impose any requirement that the U.K. test proposal lie before Congress for any particular time prior to being conducted. However, the U.K. test can only occur "within a period covered by an annual report." As explained above, this period does not begin until 90 "sessional" days after August 9 (approximately March 1994). (E)

It is unclear whether opponents of resumed testing would have the votes to pass a Joint Resolution of Disapproval in both Houses of Congress during this time, thereby preventing the President from conducting any proposed tests. However, there is no question we would be in a stronger position to defeat such a resolution than if we had proposed U.S. testing before any other state "broke" the moratorium. Much would depend, though, on the position Senators Hatfield, Exon and Mitchell took. (E)

-- Foreign-policy considerations:

o

EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)



EO 13526.3.3(b)(6)

o

- o Russia. The Russians are unlikely to respond to a Chinese and/or French test with a test of their own. They would almost certainly resume testing if the United States did. (S)
- o Other states. Many states, including U.S. allies such as Canada, Germany and Japan, will encourage the U.S. not to follow China's lead, fearing that a U.S. resumption of testing would trigger another round of testing by the nuclear five. (S)

That said, given that our policy on this issue was clearly articulated by the President on July 3, other states may view a continuation of the U.S. moratorium in the wake of a Chinese test as a retreat or an indication that we never intended to follow through with our declared policy. (S)

- o CTB negotiations and NPT extension . We have already made encouraging progress in beginning the process of negotiating a CTB. We have conducted one, and in some cases two, series of bilateral consultations with the other four Perm-5 states. In addition, the CD voted with U.S. concurrence on August 10 to give itself a mandate to negotiate a CTB. Although it is unclear how testing would effect either the conduct or outcome of negotiations, a resumption of testing by any state will -- at a minimum -- disappoint key allies and other states who view any additional tests as inconsistent with our objective of achieving an early CTB. Also, if any of the declared nuclear powers are still testing in 1995, it will likely complicate NPT extension. (S)

Assumptions

- Any of the U.S. testing options discussed below should be implemented immediately after the Chinese test in order to avoid a protracted public debate on this issue. The Administration will be pressed to say what it intends to do as soon as the Chinese test is reported, and word of the Chinese preparations has already leaked, which is likely to

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trigger an early domestic debate on this issue. In short, a delayed response is not in our interests, no matter what policy option is chosen:

- o if we plan to submit a test plan to Congress, then we should make that announcement before the "no-test" forces bring pressure to bear on the Executive Branch not to do so;
 - o if we plan not to submit a test plan to Congress, we should say so immediately to avoid the impression weeks later that we backed away from the policy position articulated in PDD-11 in response to outside pressure. (S)
- Both Options 1 and 2 (which involve submission of a test plan under Section 507) are consistent with the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell Amendment. (S)
- If consultations are to take place with Congress before announcing our policy, they should take place only with a few key members, and be held in the strictest of confidence. The purpose of such consultations would be to (a) brief the leadership on the impending Chinese test, and (b) solicit support for our preferred approach. (S)
- We would want to consult with the UK before implementing any of the approaches outlined below. (S)

Options

- Option 1: Respond with 9-test proposal for 1994-1996. Announce that the President has directed the DOE to prepare to resume testing, and submit an updated Section 507 Report to the Congress that includes the three-year, 9-test plan proposed by DOE during Presidential Review 19. Under this approach, we would make clear that a final decision on whether to carry out the tests would be made (1) only after Congress approved the test plan and (2) any relevant considerations or developments were taken into account. For example, if China were to subsequently bow to international pressure and adopt a moratorium, we would not likely go through with our test. (S)

Pro

- o Consistent with the President's policy, which has been clearly articulated to the public and foreign governments. (S)
- o If approved, will allow us to resume testing for both reliability and safety reasons. (S)
- o Will allow the UK to conduct tests it viewed as important for its security. (S)

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Con

- o Responding to one Chinese test with a three-year, 9-test plan will be perceived as "disproportionate." (S)
- o Will reopen the debate over the need for further reliability and safety tests with no immediate commitment to incorporate safety improvements. (S)
- o Preparing for and not conducting these tests (if Congress passes a Joint Resolution of Disapproval) will most likely draw resources away from our plan for stockpile stewardship with no technical gain. (S)
- o Will be opposed by many members of Congress, the arms control community and public interest groups. (S)
- o Will provide additional political cover for France to resume testing. (S)
- o May prompt Russia to test, whereas Chinese and/or French resumption would not. (S)
- o Will disappoint key allies and other states who view any more testing as inconsistent with our efforts to achieve a CTB. (S)
- o Could complicate our efforts to achieve an indefinite extension of the NPT. (S)

-- Option 2: Respond with 2-test proposal for 1994 only.

Announce that the President has directed the DOE to prepare to resume testing, and submit an updated Section 507 Report to the Congress that includes two tests -- one U.S. and one U.K. -- to be conducted between now and September 30, 1994. The U.S. test would be a reliability test, most likely of the W87 warhead. Make clear that any additional U.S. tests beyond FY 1994 (i.e., after September 30, 1994) would depend on whether China and/or France reverse their decision to conduct tests. Like Option 1, we would also make clear that a final decision on whether to carry out the tests would be made (1) only after Congress approved the test plan and (2) any relevant considerations or developments were taken into account. (S)

Pro

- o Like Option 1, consistent with the President's policy, which has been clearly articulated to the public and foreign governments. (S)
- o Approving one U.S. and one U.K. test between now and September 1994 shows maximum restraint, short of foregoing testing altogether. (S)

- o If approved, will allow the U.S. to conduct a reliability test that could provide a useful benchmark prior to entering a CTB. This avoids the issue of whether or not we need to incorporate safety improvements into the stockpile after completing the tests since the test would not relate to development of an improved-safety warhead. (S)
- o Will allow the UK to conduct one test it viewed as important for its security. (S)

Con

- o Like Option 1, preparing for and not conducting these tests (if Congress passes a Joint Resolution of Disapproval) will most likely draw resources away from our plan for stockpile stewardship with no technical gain. (S)
 - o Like Option 1, will be opposed by many members of Congress, the arms control community and public interest groups. (S)
 - o Like Option 1, will provide additional political cover for France to resume testing. (S)
 - o Like Option 1, may prompt Russia to test, whereas Chinese and/or French resumption would not. (S)
 - o Like Option 1, will disappoint key allies and other states who view any more testing as inconsistent with our efforts to achieve a CTB. (S)
 - o Could complicate our efforts to achieve an indefinite extension of the NPT. (S)
 - o Critics will argue that one solitary U.S. test and one U.K. test serves no practical purpose. (S)
- Option 3: Respond by announcing we are reviewing our options; proceed with testing only if France decides to test. Announce that we are reviewing our options and encouraging the Chinese to refrain from any further tests. If France follows with another test, proceed with Option 1 or 2. If France elects not to test, proceed with Option 4 or 5. (S)

Pro

- o Because we would not be resuming testing automatically, will be supported by many members of Congress, the arms control community and public interest groups. (S)
- o Avoids the possibility of having the President's test proposal repudiated by Congress. (S)

- o Avoids providing political cover for both France and Russia to resume testing. (S)
- o Will be popular with key allies and other states who view any more testing as inconsistent with our efforts to achieve a CTB and indefinite extension of the NPT. (S)
- o In theory, preserves the option of responding to a French test (or additional Chinese tests); after such an event, the case for resuming U.S. testing may be stronger than it would be after a single Chinese test. (S)

Con

- o Could subject the President to criticism (both domestic and international) that he has failed to follow through with commitments he made only months ago. (S)
- o Undermines the credibility of future policy declarations. (S)
- o Remaining silent now will spark a "should we or shouldn't we" debate, drawing attention to the difference between our actions and our stated policy. (S)
- o A protracted public debate could narrow our options later, as anti-testing forces would mobilize support for extending the U.S. moratorium indefinitely. (S)

-- Option 4: Respond by announcing we will not respond to a Chinese test; reserve our options if France joins China. Announce that we are encouraging the Chinese to refrain from any further tests and that the U.S. will not as a matter of policy resume testing in response to Chinese only tests. (S)

Pro

- o Because we are not resuming testing at this time, will be supported by many members of Congress, the arms control community and public interest groups. (S)
- o Avoids the possibility of having the President's test proposal repudiated by Congress. (S)
- o Avoids providing political cover for both France and Russia to resume testing. (S)
- o Implicitly focuses pressure on the French not to resume testing. (S)
- o Will be popular with key allies and other states who view any more testing as inconsistent with our efforts

to achieve a CTB and indefinite extension of the NPT.
(S)

- o In theory, preserves the option of responding to a French test with a U.S. test; after such an event, the case for resuming U.S. testing may be stronger than it would be after a single Chinese test. (S)

Con

- o Could subject the President to criticism (both domestic and international) that he has failed to follow through with commitments he made only months ago. (S)
- o Undermines credibility of future U.S. policy declarations. (S)
- o Could be perceived as drawing a "second line in the sand," one that also will not trigger a U.S. response (e.g., if we are not willing to resume U.S. testing following a Chinese test, would we really respond to a French test with a U.S. test?). (S)
- o Could narrow our options later and make it more difficult to respond to a French test with a U.S. test, as anti-testing forces would mobilize support for extending the U.S. moratorium unconditionally. (S)

-- Option 5: Announce that we will not test in response to Chinese or French tests. Announce that we are encouraging the Chinese (and the French) to refrain from any further tests, but that the U.S. will not resume testing regardless of Chinese or French testing decisions. (S)

Pro

- o Because we are not resuming testing, will be supported by many members of Congress, the arms control community and public interest groups. (S)
- o Avoids the possibility of having the President's policy repudiated by Congress. (S)
- o Avoids providing political cover for both France and Russia to resume testing. (S)
- o Will be popular with key allies and other states who view any more testing as inconsistent with our efforts to achieve a CTB and indefinite extension of the NPT. (S)

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Con

- o Could subject the President to criticism that he has failed to follow through with commitments he made only months ago. (S)
- o Undermines the credibility of future policy declarations. (S)
- o Could narrow our options later, as anti-testing forces would mobilize support for extending the U.S. moratorium indefinitely. (S)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

21038

September 18, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL *RGB*
FROM: STEVEN P. ANDREASEN *SPA*
SUBJECT: Agenda and Paper for the September 24 PC Meeting
on U.S. Response to a Chinese Nuclear Test

The Principals Committee will meet Friday, September 24, 1993 from 12:30 to 2:00 in the Situation Room to consider the Decision Paper on "U.S. Response to a Chinese Nuclear Test."

We have prepared a notice of meeting memorandum from Will Itoh to participating agencies, along with an agenda and the Decision Paper.

Concurrences by: Alan Kreczko *SKK*

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the notice of meeting memorandum (Tab I) forwarding the agenda and Decision Paper to participating agencies.

Approve *Q* Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to Agencies
Tab A Agenda
Tab B Decision Paper

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *VL* NARA, Date *11/17/06*
205-0771-11

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

~~COLONEL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD~~ *McAleen*
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. ANN LAVIN
Director, Executive Secretariat
Department of Energy

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

~~CAPTAIN H. L. SHERFIELD~~ *T.R. Patrick*
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MS. BARBARA STARR
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

MR. DAMAR HAWKINS
Executive Assistant
Office of Science and Technology Policy

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National
Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

SUBJECT: ~~PC Meeting~~ → U.S. Response to a Chinese Nuclear Test *(S)*

The Principal's Committee will meet Friday, September 24, from 12:30 ^{pm} to 2:00 ^{pm} in the Situation Room to discuss the U.S. response to a Chinese nuclear test. The agenda for ~~Friday's meeting and the Decision Paper~~ on this issue (which should receive limited distribution within agencies) are attached. ()

William Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachments

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Declassify on: OADR ~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By RL NARA, Date 3/17/2019
2015-0221-m

PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING
DATE: September 24, 1993
LOCATION: The Situation Room
TIME: 12:30 - 2:00

U.S. RESPONSE TO A CHINESE NUCLEAR TEST

Agenda

- I. Introduction.....NSC
- II. Intelligence Update.....CIA
- III. Options.....NSC
- IV. Discussion.....All participants
- V. Summary.....NSC

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004b. paper	re: U.S. Response to a Chinese Nuclear Test [partial] (3 pages)	09/18/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 4006

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0034 PC Meeting on U.S. Reponse to Chinese Nuclear Test, September 24, 1993

2015-0221-M
rs1182

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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U.S. Response to a Chinese Nuclear Test 9/18/93

Issue for Decision

How should the US respond to a Chinese nuclear test. (S)

Background

EO 13526 3.5(c)

Relevant Factors

- Current U.S. policy. The President has clearly articulated to the Executive Branch, Congress, the public and other governments what he would do if another state breaks the testing moratorium:
 - o Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-11 (signed July 4, 1993), extended the current U.S. nuclear testing moratorium through the first annual Congressional reporting and authorization period established in the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell Amendment (i.e., through September 30, 1994) on the condition that no other state tests. PDD-11 stated that "If another state tests between now and September 30, 1994, [the President] will direct the Department of Energy to prepare to conduct additional tests and ask Congress for the authority to test pursuant to the H-E-M Amendment...". (S)
 - o The President articulated this policy in his July 3 radio address to the nation: "If, however, this moratorium is broken by another nation, I will direct the Department of Energy to prepare to conduct additional tests while seeking approval to do so from Congress." Similar language was used in Presidential letters and other communications with our allies and other states and in the Presidential report submitted to Congress on August 9, 1993. (S)
- Rationale for policy in PDD-11. During the course of the review of U.S. policy on nuclear testing and a CTB, the Administration determined that additional nuclear tests

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could help us prepare for a CTB and provide some additional improvements in safety and reliability. However, the President determined that these benefits would be outweighed by the price we would pay in conducting those tests now -- through undercutting of our nonproliferation goals. (S)

Specifically, the President determined that we would be in the strongest possible position to negotiate a CTB treaty and achieve indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty when it comes up for renewal in 1995 if no nuclear state was conducting nuclear tests at that time. If, however, China (and/or France) is (are) conducting nuclear tests, other non-nuclear nations will have a pretext for opposing an NPT extension whether or not the United States is conducting final nuclear tests. For this reason, the President decided in PDD-11 that if another nation broke the moratorium, we would test. (S)

This policy is consistent with Section (f) of the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell Amendment, which automatically drops the prohibitions on U.S. testing if any foreign state tests after September 30, 1996. (S)

-- The need for a test plan. The Administration has not indicated what tests or how many tests we would propose should another state test in this year's Section 507 Report to Congress submitted on August 9. Therefore, we would need to decide (a) what specific tests we want Congress to approve between now and September 30, 1994, and (b) whether we should indicate to Congress now what tests we would conduct in the following two years (October 1994 - September 1996) covered by the H-E-M Amendment. (S)

-- Domestic considerations. During the Administration's review of U.S. policy on nuclear testing, a number of Members of Congress wrote the President encouraging him to extend the moratorium. The President's July 3 announcement to do so was well received on the Hill. At the time, there was no public criticism of the President's stated intention to resume testing if another state tests. (S)

That said, there is no question that many members of Congress do not believe a Chinese test is sufficient cause for the United States to resume testing. The arms control community and public interest groups seized with the testing issue are also likely to urge the President not to resume testing. (S)

If, following a Chinese test in late September, the President were to submit a test plan for safety improvement tests to Congress pursuant to the H-E-M Amendment, Congress must be afforded 90 legislative days to review the proposal before the U.S. test could occur. Assuming Congress remains in session until the end of October, the 90 day "clock" would not expire until late spring 1994. (S)

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The situation with regard to a proposed reliability test is more complicated. Under H-E-M, a reliability test requires a prior Presidential certification that the test is "vital to the national security interests of the United States". The certification must lie before Congress for sixty days before the test can be conducted. Moreover, the certification must be submitted "within the first sixty days after the beginning of any period covered by an annual report". (E)

H-E-M provides that the first annual report covers the period beginning on "the date on which a resumption of testing of nuclear weapons would be permitted under subsection (c)" of the statute, which is 90 qualified legislative (or "sessional") days after the submittal of the annual report to Congress. President Clinton informed Congress that President Bush's annual report to Congress submitted in January 1993 was legally defective and "has no bearing on the provisions contained in subsection (c)". Accordingly, the 90 day time-frame would be measured from August 9, when President Clinton's annual report was submitted. At that point (approximately March 1994), the President would have sixty days to submit his certification to Congress. The test could be conducted 60 additional "sessional" days thereafter (late May or early June), assuming Congress does not pass a Joint Resolution of Disapproval. (E)

For a UK test, H-E-M requires a prior Presidential "national interest" determination, which could be provided now. It does not impose any requirement that the U.K. test proposal lie before Congress for any particular time prior to being conducted. However, the U.K. test can only occur "within a period covered by an annual report." As explained above, this period does not begin until 90 "sessional" days after August 9 (approximately March 1994). (E)

It is unclear whether opponents of resumed testing would have the votes to pass a Joint Resolution of Disapproval in both Houses of Congress during this time, thereby preventing the President from conducting any proposed tests. However, there is no question we would be in a stronger position to defeat such a resolution than if we had proposed U.S. testing before any other state "broke" the moratorium. Much would depend, though, on the position Senators Hatfield, Exon and Mitchell took. (E)

-- Foreign policy considerations:

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EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

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EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

- o Russia. The Russians are unlikely to respond to a Chinese and/or French test with a test of their own. They would almost certainly resume testing if the United States did. (S)
- o Other states. Many states, including U.S. allies such as Canada, Germany and Japan, will encourage the U.S. not to follow China's lead, fearing that a U.S. resumption of testing would trigger another round of testing by the nuclear five. (S)

That said, given that our policy on this issue was clearly articulated by the President on July 3, other states may view a continuation of the U.S. moratorium in the wake of a Chinese test as a retreat or an indication that we never intended to follow through with our declared policy. (S)

- o CTB negotiations and NPT extension. . . We have already made encouraging progress in beginning the process of negotiating a CTB. We have conducted one, and in some cases two, series of bilateral consultations with the other four Perm-5 states. In addition, the CD voted with U.S. concurrence on August 10 to give itself a mandate to negotiate a CTB. Although it is unclear how testing would effect either the conduct or outcome of negotiations, a resumption of testing by any state will -- at a minimum -- disappoint key allies and other states who view any additional tests as inconsistent with our objective of achieving an early CTB. Also, if any of the declared nuclear powers are still testing in 1995, it will likely complicate NPT extension. (S)

Assumptions

- Any of the U.S. testing options discussed below should be implemented immediately after the Chinese test in order to avoid a protracted public debate on this issue. The Administration will be pressed to say what it intends to do as soon as the Chinese test is reported, and word of the Chinese preparations has already leaked, which is likely to

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trigger an early domestic debate on this issue. In short, a delayed response is not in our interests, no matter what policy option is chosen:

- o if we plan to submit a test plan to Congress, then we should make that announcement before the "no-test" forces bring pressure to bear on the Executive Branch not to do so;
 - o if we plan not to submit a test plan to Congress, we should say so immediately to avoid the impression weeks later that we backed away from the policy position articulated in PDD-11 in response to outside pressure. (S)
- Both Options 1 and 2 (which involve submission of a test plan under Section 507) are consistent with the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell Amendment. (S)
- If consultations are to take place with Congress before announcing our policy, they should take place only with a few key members, and be held in the strictest of confidence. The purpose of such consultations would be to (a) brief the leadership on the impending Chinese test, and (b) solicit support for our preferred approach. (S)
- We would want to consult with the UK before implementing any of the approaches outlined below. (S)

Options

- Option 1: Respond with 9-test proposal for 1994-1996. ... Announce that the President has directed the DOE to prepare to resume testing, and submit an updated Section 507 Report to the Congress that includes the three-year, 9-test plan proposed by DOE during Presidential Review 19. Under this approach, we would make clear that a final decision on whether to carry out the tests would be made (1) only after Congress approved the test plan and (2) any relevant considerations or developments were taken into account. For example, if China were to subsequently bow to international pressure and adopt a moratorium, we would not likely go through with our test. (S)

Pro

- o Consistent with the President's policy, which has been clearly articulated to the public and foreign governments. (S)
- o If approved, will allow us to resume testing for both reliability and safety reasons. (S)
- o Will allow the UK to conduct tests it viewed as important for its security. (S)

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Con

- o Responding to one Chinese test with a three-year, 9-test plan will be perceived as "disproportionate." (S)
- o Will reopen the debate over the need for further reliability and safety tests with no immediate commitment to incorporate safety improvements. (S)
- o Preparing for and not conducting these tests (if Congress passes a Joint Resolution of Disapproval) will most likely draw resources away from our plan for stockpile stewardship with no technical gain. (S)
- o Will be opposed by many members of Congress, the arms control community and public interest groups. (S)
- o Will provide additional political cover for France to resume testing. (S)
- o May prompt Russia to test, whereas Chinese and/or French resumption would not. (S)
- o Will disappoint key allies and other states who view any more testing as inconsistent with our efforts to achieve a CTB. (S)
- o Could complicate our efforts to achieve an indefinite extension of the NPT. (S)

-- Option 2: Respond with 2-test proposal for 1994 only.

Announce that the President has directed the DOE to prepare to resume testing, and submit an updated Section 507 Report to the Congress that includes two tests -- one U.S. and one U.K. -- to be conducted between now and September 30, 1994. The U.S. test would be a reliability test, most likely of the W87 warhead. Make clear that any additional U.S. tests beyond FY 1994 (i.e., after September 30, 1994) would depend on whether China and/or France reverse their decision to conduct tests. Like Option 1, we would also make clear that a final decision on whether to carry out the tests would be made (1) only after Congress approved the test plan and (2) any relevant considerations or developments were taken into account. (S)

Pro

- o Like Option 1, consistent with the President's policy, which has been clearly articulated to the public and foreign governments. (S)
- o Approving one U.S. and one U.K. test between now and September 1994 shows maximum restraint, short of foregoing testing altogether. (S)

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- o If approved, will allow the U.S. to conduct a reliability test that could provide a useful benchmark prior to entering a CTB. This avoids the issue of whether or not we need to incorporate safety improvements into the stockpile after completing the tests since the test would not relate to development of an improved-safety warhead. (S)
- o Will allow the UK to conduct one test it viewed as important for its security. (S)

Con

- o Like Option 1, preparing for and not conducting these tests (if Congress passes a Joint Resolution of Disapproval) will most likely draw resources away from our plan for stockpile stewardship with no technical gain. (S)
- o Like Option 1, will be opposed by many members of Congress, the arms control community and public interest groups. (S)
- o Like Option 1, will provide additional political cover for France to resume testing. (S)
- o Like Option 1, may prompt Russia to test, whereas Chinese and/or French resumption would not. (S)
- o Like Option 1, will disappoint key allies and other states who view any more testing as inconsistent with our efforts to achieve a CTB. (S)
- o Could complicate our efforts to achieve an indefinite extension of the NPT. (S)
- o Critics will argue that one solitary U.S. test and one U.K. test serves no practical purpose. (S)

-- Option 3: Respond by announcing we are reviewing our options; proceed with testing only if France decides to test. Announce that we are reviewing our options and encouraging the Chinese to refrain from any further tests. If France follows with another test, proceed with Option 1 or 2. If France elects not to test, proceed with Option 4 or 5. (S)

Pro

- o Because we would not be resuming testing automatically, will be supported by many members of Congress, the arms control community and public interest groups. (S)
- o Avoids the possibility of having the President's test proposal repudiated by Congress. (S)

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- o Avoids providing political cover for both France and Russia to resume testing. (S)
- o Will be popular with key allies and other states who view any more testing as inconsistent with our efforts to achieve a CTB and indefinite extension of the NPT. (S)
- o In theory, preserves the option of responding to a French test (or additional Chinese tests); after such an event, the case for resuming U.S. testing may be stronger than it would be after a single Chinese test. (S)

Con

- o Could subject the President to criticism (both domestic and international) that he has failed to follow through with commitments he made only months ago. (S)
- o Undermines the credibility of future policy declarations. (S)
- o Remaining silent now will spark a "should we or shouldn't we" debate, drawing attention to the difference between our actions and our stated policy. (S)
- o A protracted public debate could narrow our options later, as anti-testing forces would mobilize support for extending the U.S. moratorium indefinitely. (S)

-- Option 4: Respond by announcing we will not respond to a Chinese test; reserve our options if France joins China....
Announce that we are encouraging the Chinese to refrain from any further tests and that the U.S. will not as a matter of policy resume testing in response to Chinese only tests.
(S)

Pro

- o Because we are not resuming testing at this time, will be supported by many members of Congress, the arms control community and public interest groups. (S)
- o Avoids the possibility of having the President's test proposal repudiated by Congress. (S)
- o Avoids providing political cover for both France and Russia to resume testing. (S)
- o Implicitly focuses pressure on the French not to resume testing. (S)

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- o Will be popular with key allies and other states who view any more testing as inconsistent with our efforts to achieve a CTB and indefinite extension of the NPT. (S)
- o In theory, preserves the option of responding to a French test with a U.S. test; after such an event, the case for resuming U.S. testing may be stronger than it would be after a single Chinese test. (S)

Con

- o Could subject the President to criticism (both domestic and international) that he has failed to follow through with commitments he made only months ago. (S)
- o Undermines credibility of future U.S. policy declarations. (S)
- o Could be perceived as drawing a "second line in the sand," one that also will not trigger a U.S. response (e.g., if we are not willing to resume U.S. testing following a Chinese test, would we really respond to a French test with a U.S. test?). (S)
- o Could narrow our options later and make it more difficult to respond to a French test with a U.S. test, as anti-testing forces would mobilize support for extending the U.S. moratorium unconditionally. (S)

-- Option 5: Announce that we will not test in response to Chinese or French tests. Announce that we are encouraging the Chinese (and the French) to refrain from any further tests, but that the U.S. will not resume testing regardless of Chinese or French testing decisions. (S)

Pro

- o Because we are not resuming testing, will be supported by many members of Congress, the arms control community and public interest groups. (S)
- o Avoids the possibility of having the President's policy repudiated by Congress. (S)
- o Avoids providing political cover for both France and Russia to resume testing. (S)
- o Will be popular with key allies and other states who view any more testing as inconsistent with our efforts to achieve a CTB and indefinite extension of the NPT. (S)

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- o In theory, preserves the option of responding to a second Chinese or French test; after such an event, the case for resuming U.S. testing may be stronger than it would be after a single Chinese test. (S)

Con

- o Could subject the President to criticism that he has failed to follow through with commitments he made only months ago. (S)
- o Undermines the credibility of future policy declarations. (S)
- o Could narrow our options later, as anti-testing forces would mobilize support for extending the U.S. moratorium indefinitely. (S)

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MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:
PC0041 PC Meeting on China, November 10, 1993

Staff Office-Individual:
Records Management

Original OA/ID Number:
4006

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
43	6	6	1	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions and Minutes of China Principals Committee Meeting (2 pages)	11/10/1993	P1/b(1)
001b. minutes	re: Summary of Conclusions and Minutes of China Principals Committee Meeting (9 pages) <i>partial release</i>	11/10/1993	P1/b(1) <i>KDE 3/11/2020</i>
001c. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions and Minutes of China Principals Committee Meeting (2 pages)	11/10/1993	P1/b(1)
001d. minutes	re: Summary of Conclusions and Minutes of China Principals Committee Meeting [incomplete copy] (3 pages) <i>partial release</i>	11/10/1993	P1/b(1) <i>KDE 3/11/2020</i>
002a. memo	Kent Wiedemann to Anthony Lake re: China PC Meeting, Nov. 10. Update on Key Decision Items (3 pages)	11/10/1993	P1/b(1) <i>KDE 3/11/2020</i>
002b. paper	re: Considerations for Resuming or Offering New USG Programs for China (6 pages)	11/00/1993	P1/b(1)
003a. memo	re: Principals Committee Meeting on China, Wednesday, November 10, 1993. [Record ID: 9321247] (2 pages)	11/09/1993	P1/b(1) <i>KDE 3/11/2020</i>
003b. agenda	re: NSC Principals Committee Meeting on China [partial] (1 page)	11/10/1993	P1/b(1) <i>KDE 2/11/2016</i>
003c. report	re: Bilateral Issues (7 pages)	11/00/1993	P1/b(1) <i>KDE 9/19/2016</i>
003d. paper	re: China Strategy for 1993-1994: Implementing the President's MFN Executive Order (24 pages) <i>partial release</i>	00/00/1993	P1/b(1) <i>KDE 3/11/2020</i>
003e. paper	re: U.S. Policy Towards Tibet [duplicate of Annex V at rs1199_001d, (1.52)] (3 pages)	00/00/1993	P1/b(1) <i>KDE 3/11/2020</i>

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 4006

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0041 PC Meeting on China, November 10, 1993

2015-0221-M
rs1183

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003f. paper	re: U.S. Non-Paper Delivered to Chinese (11 pages) <i>partial release</i>	09/24/1993	P1/b(1) <i>KDE 3/11/2020</i>
003g. cable	re: PRC Response to September 24 Non Paper (6 pages)	10/12/1993	P1/b(1) <i>KDE 3/11/2020</i>
003h. memo	Wiedemann to Lake re: China PC Meeting, November 10, 1993, 3:00P (3 pages)	11/06/1993	P1/b(1) <i>KDE 3/11/2020</i>
003i. draft	Memorandum to Principals [duplicate of 003a] (2 pages)	11/08/1993	P1/b(1) <i>KDE 3/11/2020</i>

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 4006

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0041 PC Meeting on China, November 10, 1993

2015-0221-M
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TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 02 DEC 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
SOC

PC
MINUTES

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS & MINUTES FOR 10 NOV PC MTG ON CHINA

ACTION: ITOH SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 26 NOV 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WIEDEMANN

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DOC 2 OF 2

*OCRed
Summary of Conclusion
minutes
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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

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Z 93112916 FOR DECISION
X 93120208 LAKE APPROVED RECOM
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002 931202 MONTGOMERY, F
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002 931202 CUTTER, W
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National Security Council
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21335

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D/APNSA	3	<i>SW</i>	
APNSA	4		
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MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 4

FROM WILLIAM H ITOH JB (NAME) 456-6534 (PHONE NUMBER) _____ (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS OF PC
MTG ON CHINA NSC LOG # 21335

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
<u>STATE</u>	<u>MR. MARC GROSSMAN</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	_____
<u>TREASURY</u>	<u>MR. Edward Knight</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	_____
<u>DOD</u>	<u>Col. Robert McAlaer</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	_____
<u>COMMERCE</u>	<u>MR. Anthony Das</u>	<u>Dep Exec Sec</u>	_____
<u>ENERGY</u>	<u>Ms. Ann Lavin</u>	<u>Director, Exec Sec</u>	_____
<u>CIA</u>	<u>MR. John Lauder</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	_____
<u>JCS</u>	<u>Col. T.R. Patrick</u>	<u>Secretary, JCS</u>	_____

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DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

FROM: <u>National Security Council</u>	PHONE: <u>202-456-2291</u>	ROOM: <u>WHSR</u>
SUBJECT: <u>SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS</u> <u>Meeting # 21335</u>		PAGES: <u>4</u>

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
<u>USUN New York</u>	<u>Mr. Rick Inderfurth</u>	<u>212-415-4016</u>	<u>212-415-4177</u>

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

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If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 2, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. EDWARD KNIGHT
Executive Secretary
Department of Treasury

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. ANTHONY A. DAS
Deputy Executive Secretary
Department of Commerce

MS. ANN LAVIN
Director, Executive Secretariat
Department of Energy

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Executive Director for Policy Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Permanent Representative
of the United States to the United Nations

MR. W. BOWMAN CUTTER
Deputy Assistant to the President for Economic
Policy

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of PC Meeting on China,
November 10, 1993 ~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~

2

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A PC meeting on China was held on November 10 at 3:00 p.m.
Attached please find the Summary of Conclusions for that meeting.
(S)

for Kristie A. Kenney
William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment

Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions and Minutes of China Principals Committee Meeting (2 pages)	11/10/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
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FOLDER TITLE:

PC0041 PC Meeting on China, November 10, 1993

2015-0221-M
rs1183

RESTRICTION CODES

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21335

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D C 20506

Summary of Conclusions and Minutes of
China Principals Committee Meeting

DATE: November 10, 1993
LOCATION: The Situation Room
TIME: 3:00-4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions and Minutes of China Principals
Committee Meeting

PARTICIPANTS:

The Vice President's Office:
Leon Fuerth

State:
Warren Christopher
Peter Tarnoff
Winston Lord

Treasury:
Lloyd Bentsen

DOD:
Frank Wisner
Stanley Ross

Commerce:
Ron Brown
Jeffrey Garten

Energy:
William White

USTR
Mickey Kantor
Charlene Barshefsky

USUN:
Madeleine Albright
David Scheffer

NEC:
Robert Rubin

CIA:
James Woolsey
Martin Petersen

JCS:
John Shalikashvili
Barry McCaffrey

White House:
Anthony Lake, Chairman
Samuel Berger

NSC:
Nancy Soderberg
Richard Schifter
Kent Wiedemann

Minutes

Mr. Lake: There may be important movement in U.S.-China relations. The President's forthcoming meeting with Jiang Zemin could be crucial; we must exploit the possibilities. (S)

There are two issues for the meeting: 1) to articulate our China strategy, we will probably circulate a PDD on China after the meeting; 2) we need to decide on tactics to relate incentives to Chinese performance. Should we make unilateral gestures now, or keep them in our quiver for bargaining? Regardless of whether we opt for linkages, should we reveal these gestures in Christopher's meeting next week with Foreign Minister Qian or save them for the President's meeting with Jiang Zemin? Finally,

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001b. minutes	re: Summary of Conclusions and Minutes of China Principals Committee Meeting [partial] (3 pages)	11/10/1993	P1/b(1)

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I would like to save five minutes at the end of the meeting to discuss coordination of our China policy. (S)

I will provide a brief review of the strategy approved by the President. We made a correction in our course. China perceived by the end of the summer that we were acting towards it only in punitive ways, and we were not getting far in resolving core issues. We described for the Chinese a series of high-level meetings to discuss comprehensively our relationship, and they welcomed it. We aimed at achieving results in three main areas: 1) human rights; 2) proliferation; and 3) trade. The Chinese seemed pleased by the shift in our course. We have seen hints of action on passports for Chai Ling's parents, ICRC visits and resolution of the M-11 problem. But important differences remain. (S)

All of us must urge on each other the need to make clear that contacts with China are not for the sake of contacts. The Chinese must understand that human rights progress is essential for MFN extension. Business leaders must carry this message, along with ourselves and Congress. That is our strategy. (S)

Director Woolsey:

EO 13526 1.4c, 3.5c

EO 13526 1.4c, 3.5c

1.4(c), 3.5c

As frictions over the M-11 mounts, elements of the leadership get grumpy. Others get grumpy over our human rights pressure. We have no willing advocates on China's internal debate on what to do with the U.S. relationship.

1.4(c), 3.5c

EO 13526 1.4c, 3.5c

Ambassador Albright: I wish to point out that we need to factor China into our UN strategy where they are very important. (S)

Secretary Brown: We must place a high priority on the economic side. China is the most important emerging market in the world. Kohl is going there next week. I hope we will keep these commercial considerations high on our priority list. MFN is in a box. I wish we were not in it, but I have no brilliant ideas as to how to get out of it. (S)

Secretary Bentsen: I will provide ideas as to how to get out. I am deeply disturbed by the consequences of loss of MFN. (S)

Mr. Wisner: Maybe we should address this issue as a general quest for a more stable world. China plays a key role in our economic progress, arms control and regional security. We should fit this fact into our strategy. The Chinese may move on our concerns if they perceive them in the context of a partnership. (S)

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Mr. Lake: We used that argument with them already, along with telling them that we place tremendous importance on bilateral relations. Chris, could you describe where we are now in our strategy? (S)

Secretary Christopher: Here is where we are: My meeting with Foreign Minister Qian in New York in late September formally kicked off the strategy. Shattuck met in Beijing with his counterpart on the full range of human rights issues. Secretary Espy had good meetings on agricultural trade issues. Charlene Barshefsky of USTR had tough meetings on trade, Chas Freeman of DoD had a good first round of meetings with the Chinese military, and Tarnoff hosted Deputy Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu in Washington last week. Three tiny but fairly significant steps on the Chinese side have emerged. They provided us information and artifacts from the wreck of a U.S. military cargo aircraft and crew that crashed in the Himalayas in 1943. They offered to permit our teams to go into south China to investigate Vietnam-era POW/MIA cases. They said they would consider positively talks with the ICRC aimed at possible visits to Chinese prisons by the ICRC. (S)

So there has been some progress and some disappointments. The human rights pressure is very real. Rep. Pelosi told me this morning that she is getting up a letter on which she already has 212 signatures to tell the President to push China on human rights. (S)

The questions I see immediately before us are what should the President and I say to our respective counterparts in Seattle next week in scheduled bilaterals? We at State suggest that China does not react well to trades. We further suggest that the President think in broad, strategic items, not engage in details of the issues. However, he must emphasize the need for early progress on human rights. I pointed out to Qian at our New York meeting that movement now would be inflated in public opinion, while movement later will tend to be discounted. I would plan to be a bit more detailed than the President in my dealings with the Chinese in Seattle, though I would not harangue them. We need to see that the President's meeting with Jiang goes well. I favor telling the Chinese about our decision to sell them the Cray supercomputer before that meeting. The President should not get into specific items of negotiation, but stick to a lofty plane. I would deal with the question of M-11 consultations. I believe China's joining the MTCR would be preferable to its just abiding by its guidelines and parameters. (S)

Mr. Lake: Let us go around table and have each agency say where they are in relations with China. When I described our change in course to Ambassador Li, I noted that press attention to the results of the President's policy would set tone for the relationship for the next several months. Progress on the ICRC or other human rights issues would help greatly in this regard. We promised the Chinese that if they make gestures, we will refrain from saying that they came as a result of U.S. pressure, but were fruits of dialogue and partnership. (S)

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Secretary Bentsen: There is incredibly rapid growth in China; inflation could pick up greatly. An austerity program is in effect, but it's loosening up -- this could lead to hyperinflation. It is essential to resume the Joint Economic Commission. I am planning to go to Beijing and Shanghai in January. On human rights, I would urge progress, but lift export sanctions that have the effect of ceding markets to competitors without hurting the Chinese (S).

I believe we should anticipate the need for alternatives to the MFN threat to get what we want, such as a more aggressive 301 policy, perhaps a kind of selective, limited MFN withdrawal, etc. Such actions would produce less serious consequences than a loss of MFN altogether. (S)

Mr. Lake: If we implement such alternatives now, it would signal that we are not serious about human rights. (S)

Secretary Bentsen: We could find ways to foreshadow those moves. (S)

Mr. Lake: Even a hint of such alternatives might just cause the Chinese to pocket the concession. (S)

Secretary Bentsen: It involves poker playing. (S)

Mr. Berger: We must be firm on our posture with China to stress that the President meant what he said about MFN and human rights. The Chinese are getting mixed messages from codels and business representatives. With this background noise, the Administration must be clear and consistent in its message on human rights and MFN. (S)

Secretary Bentsen: I would just caution, do not wait until just before the train wreck to consider alternatives to the MFN threat. (S)

Mr. Lord: We must also make it clear to the Chinese that we will not move the bar if they meet our conditions in the Executive Order. It contains two firm conditions -- free emigration and compliance with the prison-labor export MOU. Then there are five points requiring "significant overall progress": 1) release and account for political prisoners; 2) access to prisons by ICRC; 3) protect Tibet's culture, etc.; 4) permit international broadcasting; and 5) begin to take steps to adhere to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (relates to freedom of assembly, speech, religion, etc.). If we get overly concrete on criteria, we box ourselves in, but we must be specific enough to get meaningful results. Release of prisoners would have the most dramatic impact. John Shattuck gave the Chinese lists of sick prisoners who could be released on medical parole. We do not want to get too specific, i.e., ask for release of specific individuals, etc. We need to address desire for negotiations between the Chinese and the Dalai Lama. (S)

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Mr. Kantor: On MOUs, textiles, etc., the Chinese are not behaving normally or living up to agreements. We can use 301 and other measures to raise the level of pressure on China in the trade area. 38 percent of their market is here. Holding back on action makes us look weak to Congress. We can be resolute on trade actions, working with Congress as an asset. (S)

Secretary Bentsen: If you do not relate such actions to human rights, I agree -- there would then be rifle shots rather than an atomic bomb as it relates to the kind of pressure we need to apply to achieve our objectives. (S)

Mr. Lake: I tend to agree, but we must ensure that the timing is right for any such negative actions, as they may fit into our overall strategy. (Turning to Kantor) Does it help or hurt to release the Cray, and perhaps the two satellites under consideration? (S)

Mr. Kantor: I believe in carrots and sticks. We can isolate issues, move clearly on several fronts, using both incentives as well as disincentives. Toughness helps us on the Hill with Mitchell and Pelosi. (S)

Mr. Lake: In political-level meetings with the Chinese, we need to be clear in explaining in conceptual terms whatever actions we might be taking on the trade front. This approach will help ensure that any sanctions or pressure over trade problems can be isolated from the frictions on human rights and proliferation. (S)

Secretary Brown: We must have good coordination among the Principals as we head towards our Seattle meetings with the Chinese. I shall meet with Trade Minister Wu Yi. I want to hold a session of the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade as an export-promotion instrument. (S)

I support releasing the Cray supercomputer as well as deregulating balance-of-plant equipment for export to nuclear power projects. China presents an incredibly large, \$60 billion power market. We must be there if we are to create jobs and remain world-competitive. (S)

Given what I hear from the Hill, I see real divisions on China; people are really dug in on both sides of the issues. (S)

Mr. Lake: Ron, when you hold the JCCT, you should include someone on your delegation with a clear association to human rights. (S)

Secretary Brown: Sure, as I said, we need to coordinate to ensure that all our messages support the range of interests in our relationship with China. (S)

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Mr. Lake: It would relay a powerful argument -- to promote the commercial relationship, the President wants, needs progress on human rights. When we have meetings, we should mention publicly that we mentioned human rights. (S)

Secretary Brown: Right, but we also need, as Lloyd Bentsen said, to de-link trade from human rights. (S)

Mr. Lake: (To Woolsey): On tactics, what is your reading on how the Chinese would respond to a gesture on the Cray or on satellites? (S)

Director Woolsey:

14(c) 3.5c

EO 13526 1.4c, 3.5c

The Chinese would welcome any such gesture, but their ability to address our concerns is problematic. We cannot expect tangible results. The Party plenum begins tomorrow, which complicates the outlook. (S)

Mr. Wisner: DoD has set aside any ideas of defense technology exchange with China, but settled on political exchanges with the Chinese concentrating on the DPRK nuclear problem, missile proliferation (M-11s), arms control and peacekeeping. We have employed some limited gestures: NDU exchanges; Perry's intent to go to China to talk about defense conversion where the Chinese have something to teach us. Within our dialogue with the Chinese military, there is a seamless emphasis on human rights and trade concerns. (S)

Ambassador Albright: We deal with China on every sanctions resolution in the UN Security Council. It is essential that we calibrate our efforts on human rights to avoid harming essential cooperation on key UN matters. (S)

Mr. Lake: We should mention in public their cooperation in the UN. (S)

Ambassador Albright: The Chinese have invited me to visit China. We should consider my going. (S)

General Shalikashvili: It is important to have military-to-military relations with China. We hope to promote such ties, without giving up the responsibility to stress human rights. (S)

Mr. Lake: All of these contacts are in our interest, but we want to use them as levers at the same time. This presents us with a conceptual problem. (S)

Mr. Fuerth: Regarding China's hint at progress on the M-11s, it is not clear that we are geared up to explore whether China will move on a fast track. We should talk to the Chinese about our F-16 sale to Taiwan in the context of the M-11 problem. (S)

Director Woolsey:

EO 13526 1.4c

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EO 13526 1.4c, 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(2), 3.3(b)(4), 3.3(b)(6), 3.5c

Mr. Wisner: To achieve progress on M-11s, we need to look more broadly at overall security on the Subcontinent. (S)

Mr. Berger: Woolsey's remarks create an extra urgency to address this missile problem and its impact on relations. \$5 billion in U.S. exports to China are at stake in the question as to whether

EO 13526 1.4c, 3.5c

Mr. Lake: (to Woolsey): 1.4(c), 3.5c

EO 13526 1.4c, 3.5c

Director Woolsey: EO 13526 1.4c, 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(2), 3.3(b)(4), 3.5c

Mr. Fuerth: 1.4(c), 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(2), 3.3(b)(4), 3.3(b)(6)

EO 13526 1.4c, 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(2), 3.3(b)(4), 3.3(b)(6)

1.4(c), 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(2), 3.3(b)(4), 3.3(b)(6) We need to test on an accelerated basis China's willingness to resolve this issue. (S)

Mr. Lake: We all agree on the need for urgency. The issue is whether we just have the Chinese sign a written commitment to abide by the MTCR henceforth, or whether we also need an

EO 13526 1.4c

We cannot make a technical judgment in this meeting. Christopher must be tasked to get Lynn Davis to decide what we need to resolve the M-11 issue. (S)

On the broader issues, assuming we can get something from the Chinese, should we move now on the Cray and the satellites after congressional consultations? (S)

Mr. Lord: Satellites are the link to missiles, not the Cray. The Chinese have said that they will not move on missile proliferation until we have unilaterally lifted the M-11 sanctions. We cannot do that, but we can seek to give the Chinese a fig leaf in the form of the two satellites that are not on the munitions list. (S)

Secretary Christopher: It would be troublesome for me to engage on this matter with the Chinese next week if we believe a category I sanction is about to be declared. (S)

Mr. Berger: The Cray supercomputer is detached from the missile issue. There is a strong humanitarian argument for selling the Cray. As has been noted, the satellites are linked to progress

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on the M-11s. (S)

Mr. Lake: The Cray was raised by Deputy Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu last week. (S)

Mr. Wisner: After assessing national security implications, DoD can go along with the Cray sale. We believe we can convince Senator Glenn that the sale is justified and proper. (S)

Mr. Lake: (to Lord): If there is some way to convey that we are moving on the Cray without linking the action to a particular move on their part? (S)

Mr. Lord: Yes. (S)

Mr. Lake: Okay, we move on the Cray following successful consultations on the Hill. (S)

I am concerned about giving away two satellites without getting something in return. (S)

Mr. Berger: We should hold the decision because there are serious legal questions as to whether the two satellites in question are captured by the sanctions law. We now have interagency agreement that the two satellites under Commerce's licensing regime are not controlled by the sanctions legislation. (S)

Mr. Lake: Let us get an action memo to the President by the end of the week to get a decision on the satellites in the context of the M-11 issue, in time to guide Christopher in his talks with the Chinese foreign minister next week. (S)

Mr. Lake: Dick Schifter has suggested that the Shultz/Shevardnadze model for resolving tough problems fits the Chinese case. I wonder whether monthly stock-taking by Christopher and the Chinese foreign minister makes sense. (S)

Secretary Christopher: It is a good idea. Consultations on the Cray should be handled by Win Lord. He can cover Pelosi and others. (S)

Mr. Lake: On the matter of coordination of our policy on China, the Senior Steering Group (SSG) should produce a review every couple of weeks -- a status report on events and progress in key areas of the relationship. (S)

Our decision on the Cray will leak. Win Lord should be armed with appropriate press guidance. I also task State to prepare a memo for the President to lay out our strategy for dealing with the Chinese in Seattle next week -- covering both Christopher's meeting with the foreign minister on November 17 and the President's meeting with Jiang Zemin on November 19. Let me pass out generic statements on our China policy for use with the press, Congress and public, prepared by State (he does so). (S)

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Foreign governments should support us more in achieving our China goals. (S)

I am still bothered about just where we believe the human rights bar to be. (S)

Mr. Schifter: I will talk to Lord about it. (S)

Mr. Lake: Okay. We shall try to release the Cray in advance of next week's meetings, with an implicit link to China's granting prison visits to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Christopher will try to achieve progress on the M-11 problem, linked to our positive consideration of sale of the two Commerce satellites. (S)

-- End of Minutes --

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Special Advisor

November 24, 1993

SECRET

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: KENT M. WIEDEMANN *KM*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions and Minutes of China Principals Committee Meeting, November 10, 1993

The China Principals Committee Meeting was held on November 10, 1993. The Summary of Conclusions, attached at Tab A, is submitted to be forwarded to all listed counterparts. The Minutes, at Tab B, are submitted for the record.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the Memorandum to agency counterparts, forwarding the Summary of Conclusions and the Minutes to be filed for the record.

Approve *PK* Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum from Will Itoh to agency counterparts
- Tab A Summary of Conclusions
- Tab B Minutes

for files only

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Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *YZ* NARA, Date *7/15/2015*
7015-0221-M

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. EDWARD KNIGHT
Executive Secretary
Department of Treasury

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. ANTHONY A. DAS
Deputy Executive Secretary
Department of Commerce

MS. ANN LAVIN
Director, Executive Secretariat
Department of Energy

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Executive Director for Policy Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Permanent Representative
of the United States to the United Nations

MR. W. BOWMAN CUTLER
Deputy Assistant to the President for Economic
Policy

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions ~~and Minutes~~ of PC Meeting
on China, November 10, 1993 (S)

~~SECRET~~

2

~~SECRET~~

A PC meeting on China was held on November 10 at 3:00 p.m.
Attached please find the Summary of Conclusions and ~~Minutes~~ for
that meeting. (S)

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab A Summary of Conclusions
Tab B Minutes

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~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001c. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions and Minutes of China Principals Committee Meeting (2 pages)	11/10/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 4006

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0041 PC Meeting on China, November 10, 1993

2015-0221-M

rs1183

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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21335

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

Summary of Conclusions and Minutes of
China Principals Committee Meeting

DATE: November 10, 1993
LOCATION: The Situation Room
TIME: 3:00-4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions and Minutes of China Principals
Committee Meeting

PARTICIPANTS:

The Vice President's Office:
Leon Fuerth

State:
Warren Christopher
Peter Tarnoff
Winston Lord

Treasury:
Lloyd Bentsen

DOD:
Frank Wisner
Stanley Ross

Commerce:
Ron Brown
Jeffrey Garten

Energy:
William White

USTR
Mickey Kantor
Charlene Barshefsky

USUN:
Madeleine Albright
David Scheffer

NEC:
Robert Rubin

CIA:
James Woolsey
Martin Petersen

JCS:
John Shalikashvili
Barry McCaffrey

White House:
Anthony Lake, Chairman
Samuel Berger

NSC:
Nancy Soderberg
Richard Schifter
Kent Wiedemann

Minutes

Mr. Lake: There may be important movement in U.S.-China relations. The President's forthcoming meeting with Jiang Zemin could be crucial; we must exploit the possibilities. (S)

There are two issues for the meeting: 1) to articulate our China strategy; we will probably circulate a PDD on China after the meeting; 2) we need to decide on tactics to relate incentives to Chinese performance. Should we make unilateral gestures now, or keep them in our quiver for bargaining? Regardless of whether we opt for linkages, should we reveal these gestures in Christopher's meeting next week with Foreign Minister Qian or save them for the President's meeting with Jiang Zemin? Finally,

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PER E. O. 13526

2015-0221-M (2.01) KDE 3/11/2020

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Mr. Kantor: On MOUs, textiles, etc., the Chinese are not behaving normally or living up to agreements. We can use 301 and other measures to raise the level of pressure on China in the trade area. 38 percent of their market is here. Holding back on action makes us look weak to Congress. We can be resolute on trade actions, working with Congress as an asset. (S)

Secretary Bentsen: If you do not relate such actions to human rights, I agree -- there would then be rifle shots rather than an atomic bomb as it relates to the kind of pressure we need to apply to achieve our objectives. (S)

Mr. Lake: I tend to agree, but ^{we} must ensure that the timing is right for any such negative actions, as they may fit into our overall strategy. (Turning to Kantor) Does it help or hurt to release the Cray, and perhaps the two satellites under consideration? (S)

Mr. Kantor: I believe in carrots and sticks. We can isolate issues, move clearly on several fronts, using both incentives as well as disincentives. Toughness helps us on the Hill with Mitchell and Pelosi. (S)

Mr. Lake: In political-level meetings with the Chinese, we need to be clear in explaining in conceptual terms whatever actions we might be taking on the trade front. This approach will help ensure that any sanctions or pressure over trade problems can be isolated from the frictions on human rights and proliferation. (S)

Secretary Brown: We must have good coordination among the Principals as we head towards our Seattle meetings with the Chinese. I shall meet with Trade Minister Wu Yi. I want to hold a session of the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade as an export-promotion instrument. (S)

I support releasing the Cray supercomputer as well as deregulating balance-of-plant equipment for export to nuclear power projects. China presents an incredibly large, \$60 billion power market. We must be there if we are to create jobs and remain world-competitive. (S)

Given what I hear from the Hill, I see real divisions on China; people are really dug in on both sides of the issues. (S)

Mr. Lake: Ron, when you hold the JCCT, you should include someone on your delegation with a clear association to human rights. (S)

Secretary Brown: Sure, as I said, we need to coordinate to ensure that all our messages support the range of interests in our relationship with China. (S)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001d. minutes	re: Summary of Conclusions and Minutes of China Principals Committee Meeting [incomplete copy] [partial] (1 page)	11/10/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 4006

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0041 PC Meeting on China, November 10, 1993

2015-0221-M

rs1183

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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SECRET

EO 13526 1.4c, 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(2), 3.3(b)(4), 3.3(b)(6), 3.5c

Mr. Wisner: To achieve progress on M-11s, we need to look more broadly at overall security on the Subcontinent. (S)

Mr. Berger: Woolsey's remarks create an extra urgency to address this missile problem and its impact on relations. \$5 billion in U.S. exports to China are at stake in the question as to whether

EO 13526 1.4c, 3.5c

Mr. Lake: (to Woolsey): [redacted] 1.4(c), 3.5c

EO 13526 1.4c, 3.5c

Director Woolsey: [redacted] EO 13526 1.4c, 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(2), 3.3(b)(4), 3.5c

Mr. Fuerth: [redacted] 1.4(c), 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(2), 3.3(b)(4), 3.3(b)(6)

EO 13526 1.4c, 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(2), 3.3(b)(4), 3.3(b)(6)

[redacted] 1.4(c), 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(2), 3.3(b)(4), 3.3(b)(6) we need to test on an accelerated basis China's willingness to resolve this issue. (S)

Mr. Lake: We all agree on the need for urgency. The issue is whether we just have the Chinese signing a written commitment to abide by the MTCR henceforth, or whether we also need an

EO 13526 1.4c

We cannot make a technical judgment in this meeting. Christopher must be tasked to get Lynn Davis to decide what we need to resolve the M-11 issue. (S)

On the broader issues, assuming we can get something from the Chinese, should we move now on the Cray and the satellites after congressional consultations? (S)

Mr. Lord: Satellites are the link to missiles, not the Cray. The Chinese have said that they will not move on missile proliferation until we have unilaterally lifted the M-11 sanctions. We cannot do that, but we can seek to give the Chinese a fig leaf in the form of the two satellites that are not on the munitions list. (S)

Secretary Christopher: It would be troublesome for me to engage on this matter with the Chinese next week if we believe a category I sanction is about to be declared. (S)

Mr. Berger: The Cray supercomputer is detached from the missile issue. There is a strong humanitarian argument for selling the Cray. As has been noted, the satellites are linked to progress

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TO: LAKE

FROM: WIEDEMANN

DOC DATE: 10 NOV 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R PC
HUMAN RIGHTS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 10 NOV PC MTG ON CHINA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 13 NOV 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WIEDEMANN LOGREF: 9321247

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0041 CODES: CPR

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By PL NARA, Date 7/15/2005
2015-0221-11

COMMENTS: _____

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OCPR - d
Staff memo
12/15/93
PL

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

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001

X 93111111 NOTED BY LAKE

Rec'd 11:00 am 11/10

National Security Council
The White House

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URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	<u>Amw</u> 1	<u>Copy</u>	
ExecSec			
Staff Director	2	<u>Copy</u>	
D/APNSA	3		
APNSA	4	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5	<u>JB 11/11</u>	<u>X</u>
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

NOV 15 2001 11:40

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

November 10, 1993

INFORMATION



MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: KENT WIEDEMANN

SUBJECT: China PC Meeting, Nov. 10: Update on Key Decision Items

The PC on China has two primary purposes: to inform all the principals of the nature of the China strategy and implementation to date; and to decide whether and when to employ some available incentives to encourage Chinese responsiveness to our core concerns. The informational part of the agenda will flow quickly. Discussion should focus on the possible use of incentives to increase chances to win some progress on human rights and perhaps on the M-11 issue before the President's meeting with Jiang Zemin in Seattle on November 19, or soon after. This question relates to item V on the agenda of the PC meeting. We learned today that Christopher will not be prepared to lead discussion on this key item, so it will fall to you to do so.

Deputy Foreign Minister Liu told Tarnoff last week that a gesture on our part such as licensing a satellite would open the door to consultations on the M-11. You will recall his saying at lunch last Friday that China regards as important our licensing the Cray supercomputer for weather forecasting. On November 8, Foreign Minister Qian said publicly that China will now consider permitting the ICRC to visit Chinese prisons, an action that responds directly to a point in the MFN executive order, as does Liu's telling us last week that authorities are "positively considering" granting passports to the relatives of prominent dissident Chai Ling who is living here. There could be movement on China's adherence to the prison-labor MOU as well. What do we have to do to lock in these tantalizing concessions, and are there others we can elicit from the Chinese by the deft use of incentives and disincentives?

Incentives:

Tab I lists potential positive U.S. policy instruments, discusses their importance to us and to the Chinese in economic and political terms and notes the executive or congressional action required to apply the instrument. Generally those of most impact to the Chinese coincide with our interests and are relatively simple to apply; they do not involve lifting Tiananmen sanctions:

- o Approve the Cray sale
- o Satellite waiver(s)
- o Remove export controls on balance of (nuclear) plant

NSC staff argue for taking these actions now (after appropriate congressional consultation or action), without sending an obvious quid pro quo. With the ball then clearly in China's court to deliver on the human-rights and M-11 actions which they have foreshadowed, the President would have a tactical advantage in his meeting with Jiang. If we tell the Chinese in the next few days that we are prepared to take those actions, it is possible intensive negotiations next week could bring us within reach of an announcement in Seattle that serious M-11 negotiations will begin. We would also seek to exploit the improved atmosphere by strengthening Chinese support for a firmer approach to North Korea. These results would show our policy to be effective and a solid basis for moving on to solving other issues.

We believe State prefers that we wait until November 17 when Christopher meets his counterpart, and hold the Cray, satellites and balance-of-plant out as carrots to be given only when China delivers something first. On the other hand, these decisions stand on their own merits and we can defend them -- though it will be a hard sell for some in Congress. If we dangle them as prospective concessions, we risk a) Chinese failure to meet the conditions, forcing us to reverse a decision we have concluded is in our own interests and b) depriving ourselves of our best defense of these actions on the Hill by painting them as bargaining chips rather than decisions related to U.S. interests and based on neutral criteria (e.g., the Cray will save lives, falls below the proposed supercomputer threshold and will have matchless safeguards against diversion; the satellite decision reflects the best reading of the law). In addition, this tactic risks wasting time and a negative Chinese response to the you-go-first message inherent in it.

To seek to test the Chinese willingness to live up to the prison-labor MOU, we need to fulfill our part of the MOU--reporting honestly to the Congress and the public when our investigations turn up no evidence of violation. You need to seek agreement from the Principals that Customs must lift detention orders on two prisons with a clean bill of health on the issue, an action the Chinese say will lead to our being able to inspect several other prisons.

Disincentives:

Trade Concerns: Last week USTR placed China on the priority watch list over IPR enforcement concerns. China's textile agreement must be renewed by the end of this year and there are problems with textile transshipments. Much is at stake in this issue. 301 action could be imposed by USTR by the end of the year over the market access MOU. China's application to accede to the GATT is wrapped up in bilateral trade disputes. We recommend that you task the Senior Steering Group on China to

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analyze the status of our trade disputes and review USTR staff's plan for addressing those problems most effectively. It may be necessary for the Deputies or Principals to review the plan.

Proliferation Sanctions: The threat of Category I sanctions continues to hang over China (and Pakistan) if the IC finds conclusive evidence of M-11 missiles in Pakistan.

Christopher Leading the Negotiations:

You should raise Schifter's suggestion for seeking progress on human rights and other key matters of importance to the U.S. by placing the thorny issues in the context of a broad overall relationship overseen through relatively frequent meetings at the foreign-minister level-- a la the Shultz/Shevardnadze pattern which produced dramatic results with the Soviet Union. We believe the Principals should consider whether to recommend sending Christopher to Beijing soon after APEC, to build momentum for progress on human rights and other issues before the end of the year. He might be accompanied by senior officials to hold expert-level talks on human rights, proliferation and trade policy questions.

Concurrences by: Dan Pomeman

Copies distributed to: Bob Kyle, Bob Fauver, Alan Kreczko

Attachments

Tab I Incentives: "Considerations for Resuming or Offering New USG Programs for China"

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~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. paper	re: Considerations for Resuming or Offering New USG Programs for China (6 pages)	11/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 4006

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0041 PC Meeting on China, November 10, 1993

2015-0221-M
rs1183

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 09 NOV 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R PC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 10 NOV PC MTG ON CHINA

ACTION: KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 08 NOV 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WIEDEMANN LOGREF: 9321270

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0041 CODES: CPR

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FOR CONCURRENCE

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BERGER
LAKE
MILLISON
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PONEMAN
WIEDEMANN

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*OC R ed
Memo to Agencies
Agenda
12/15/93 Staff memo*

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 7/15/2015
2015-0221-m

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICERCAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE	Z 93110517 FOR DECISION
001	X 93110910 LAKE APPROVED RECOM
001 ITOH	Z 93110910 FOR SIGNATURE
002	X 93110913 KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

<u>DOC</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR ACTION</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR INFO</u>
002	931109	FUERTH, L	
002	931109	GROSSMAN, M	
002	931109	KNIGHT, E	
002	931109	MCALEER, R	
002	931109	DAS, A	
002	931109	MONTGOMERY, F	
002	931109	INDERFURTH, K	
002	931109	CUTTER, W	
002	931109	LAUDER, J	
002	931109	PATRICK, T	

TO: LAKE

FROM: WIEDEMANN

DOC DATE: 04 NOV 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R PC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION OF 10 NOV PC MTG ON CHINA

ACTION: FOR DECISION DUE DATE: 08 NOV 93 STATUS: X

STAFF OFFICER: WIEDEMANN LOGREF:

FILES: IFG NSCP: CODES:

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 7/17/13
2015-0221-M

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National Security Council
The White House

JWR
11/6

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<u>W</u> DepExecSec	<u>1/5</u>	<u>WAK</u>	<u>Sign Tab I</u>
ExecSec	_____	_____	_____
Staff Director	<u>2</u>	<u>copy</u>	_____
D/APNSA	<u>3</u>	<u>cy provided</u>	_____
APNSA	<u>4</u>	<u>Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen</u>	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>6</u>	<u>JB 1/9</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

5 NOV 93 4:33

cc: NS KAK-
Sandy asked that reference to Pres approval be removed.
Carly

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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WASHINGTON, DC 20520

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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
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MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
ROOM 416, WINDER BUILDING
600 17TH STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20506

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SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 10 NOV PC MTG ON CHINA
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MR. RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W -- ROOM 6333 DEPT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
MR. BOWMAN CUTTER NATL ECONOMIC COUNCIL ROOM 231 OLD EXECUTIVE OFC BLDG	11-9-93	2:45	<u>R. Waller</u> _____ COPY: <u>1</u>
MR. JOHN A. LAUDER CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
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PAGE 02 OF 02 PAGES

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MESSAGE NO. 2216 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 56

FROM WILLIAM H ITOH JB fw (NAME) 456-6534 (PHONE NUMBER) _____ (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE ON CHINA

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STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
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JCS	COL. PATRICK		
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MESSAGE NO. 2216 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 56

FROM WILLIAM H ITOH JB Fw 456-6534 _____
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE ON CHINA

10 NOV NSC LOG # 21247

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COMMERCE	MR. ANTHONY DAS	EXEC SEC	
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MESSAGE NO. 2216 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 56

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(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE ON CHINA
10 NOV NSC LOG # 21247

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MESSAGE NO. 2216 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 56

FROM WILLIAM H ITOH *JB fw* 456-6534 _____
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE ON CHINA
10 NOV NSC LOG # 21247

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STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
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FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR
 SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting PAGES: 56

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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November 9, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. EDWARD KNIGHT
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. ANTHONY A. DAS
Executive Secretary
Department of Commerce

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Executive Director for Policy
Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the U.S.
Representative to the United
Nations

MR. BOWMAN CUTTER
Deputy Assistant to the
President for Economic
Policy

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T.R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on China, Wednesday,
November 10, 1993 at 3:00 p.m. (6)

Attached at Tab A is an agenda for a Principals Committee Meeting on China, to be held Wednesday, November 10, 1993 at 3:00 p.m. The purpose of the meeting is to review the President's China policy and implementation process. Special focus will be on recent results of high-level visits to Beijing to pursue U.S. interests in the areas of human rights, nonproliferation and trade. Tactics for gaining early progress on human rights and other key issues will be decided, including application to China

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KDE 3/11/2020

of incentives and disincentives. At Tabs B and C are a Bilateral Issues Summary and the China Strategy Paper. Tab D is the U.S. Non-Paper of September 24 to Chinese Outlining our Approach and Tab E, the Chinese Response to our Non-Paper. (C)

for William H. Itoh
William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab A PC Meeting Agenda
Tab B Bilateral Issues Summary
Tab C China Strategy Paper
Tab D U.S. Non-Paper
Tab E China's Response to our Non-paper

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- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON CHINA

DATE: November 10, 1993
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 3:00 p.m.

CHINA

Agenda

- I. Introduction and Summary of China Strategy and Process of Implementation; lead-up to Nov. 19 Seattle meeting between the President and Jiang Zemin. NSC
- II. Analysis of gaps between U.S. and Chinese non-papers . STATE
- III. Reports on Recent High-level Exchanges . . . STATE/DOD/USTR
- IV.

EO 13526 1.4c
- V. Review of incentives and disincentives to move China on our agenda; seek decisions on specific actions where possible, at least in principle pending necessary Hill consultationsSTATE
- VI. Discussion of congressional strategy for managing China policy up through MFN next springSTATE
- VII. Summary of conclusions; next steps before President's meeting with Jiang; key objectives for that meeting. . . NSC

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2015-0221-M 05/26/16 KDE

(2.04)

Bilateral Issues

301 market access investigation

Background: The US delegation continued to press Beijing to live up to its memorandum of understanding commitments on increases in quota limits during 15 September meetings in Beijing.

Looking Ahead: Many other of China's market access commitments have a 31 December deadline.

Market access in services

Background: The United States has begun meeting with the Chinese to urge opening of the service sector.

Textile transshipments

Background: Beijing has enacted new legislation, but reporting indicates transshipments continue. The Sino-US bilateral textile agreement expires in December and Beijing is responding negatively to US demands to include anti-transshipment language in a new accord. Beijing is also threatening undefined retaliation if Washington reduces China's textile quota to cover previous years' overshippments.

Exchange rate manipulation

Background: The US Department of the Treasury announced in May that China continues to manipulate its exchange rate. Bilateral and multilateral consultations on this issue are continuing during China's GATT accession process.

Looking Ahead: The US Treasury Department is in the process of its latest review of China's exchange rate regime; the report is due out in late October.

Intellectual Property Rights

Comment: Beijing appears to be complying with its commitments to adopt new legislation under the January 1992 bilateral accord, but weak implementation of regulations continues to cause concern.

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Bilateral Issues (cont.)

Prison labor exports

Background: China and the United States signed the memorandum of understanding on prison labor exports in August 1992.

Looking Ahead: Beijing is pressing Washington to close two cases involving the Beijing First Labor Reform Unit before granting a meeting with the US Embassy on recent cases referred by the United States.

Human rights

Background: China decided in mid-August to prevent labor activist Han Dongfan from reentering the country and revoked his passport, and a Chinese journalist was prevented from leaving the country and detained in early October. Democracy Wall-era activist Wei Jingsheng was released from prison after serving 14 years of a 15-year sentence for revealing "military secrets." US Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs John Shattuck visited China in mid-October for official talks.

Missile Technology Control Regime

Background: China agreed to abide by the guidelines and parameters of MTCR upon the US lifting of sanctions on satellite technology effective on 23 March 1992. Following a July 1993 fact-finding mission to Beijing by US Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs Lynn Davis, the United States determined that China had shipped M-11-related equipment to Pakistan in violation of its MTCR commitment and, in August, imposed sanctions on the Chinese Ministries of Aerospace Industry and Defense. The sanctions prohibit for two years the export of controlled items to, contracts with, or imports from the sanctioned entities.

Bilateral Issues (cont.)

Sino-US space launch accord

Background: M-11 missile-related sanctions imposed on Beijing in August effectively prohibit the Chinese from fulfilling new contracts to launch US-manufactured satellites and block US exports to China of satellites and related components and technologies for up to two years. China, however, will be allowed to proceed with three launches of US-built satellites for which US export approval was granted before the imposition of sanctions.

Looking Ahead: Annual bilateral consultations on a 1989 Sino-US commercial launch trade accord are scheduled for November, during which talks on the extension or renewal of the pact--scheduled to expire in 1994--will commence.

US arms sales to Taiwan

Background: Beijing reacted sharply to last year's US F-16 sale to Taiwan, but limited its official response to a suspension of its participation in UN Perm-5 discussions on Middle East arms control. Recent additional US arms sales to Taiwan and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee vote to remove the ceiling on US arms sales to Taiwan evoked critical responses from China.

Comment: China does not consider the issue settled and, over the longer term, hopes to engage Washington in regular consultations on its future arms sales to Taiwan. To encourage such a dialogue, China is closely linking its missile proliferation behavior to US arms sales to Taiwan as a "regional arms control issue" of concern to China.

Chinese leaders may ignore the economic and diplomatic costs to Sino-US relations if they perceive that Taipei is openly moving toward independence or that foreign actions--including new arms sales to Taiwan--are directly challenging Beijing's claimed sovereignty over the island.

Multilateral Issues

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

Background: The 15th working party on China's GATT accession, which met 28 September-1 October, began to compile lists of issues for inclusion in the protocol. The United States met with its allies on the margins of the meeting to discuss a possible joint draft protocol.

In the third working party meetings on Taiwan's GATT accession in late June-early July, Taiwan requested a transition period for its sectors to adjust to GATT principles. In the fourth working party meetings held 12-15 October, Taiwan continued to resist bringing its trading policies in line with GATT rules, refusing, for example, to join the Government Procurement and Civil Aircraft Codes at the time of accession.

Looking Ahead: The next China working party will be held early next year. The next Taiwan working party will convene in Geneva in February or March 1994.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Background: Beijing acceded to the NPT in London on 9 March 1992.

Comment: NPT accession does not preclude nuclear cooperation with states such as Iran, which the US has said should not receive any type of nuclear assistance. In February, China and Iran finalized a contract for Beijing to supply two civilian power reactors in a deal likely worth \$1.5 billion. Given China's longstanding ties to Pakistan's weapons programs, we believe that Chinese nuclear specialists continue to have contact with Pakistanis involved in nuclear weapons development.

Looking Ahead: The United States supports a proposal that the Nuclear Suppliers Group mission to China scheduled for October respond to questions that China may have about the Zangger Committee (comprised of nuclear suppliers that are party to the NPT; China is not a Committee member).

Multilateral Issues (cont.)

Nuclear testing

Background: China carried out an underground nuclear test on 5 October. Beijing refuses to commit definitively to a nuclear testing moratorium, links its participation in a nuclear test ban to no-first-use assurances by all nuclear weapons states, and routinely calls for the "complete prohibition and thorough destruction" of all nuclear weapons.

Comment: China's decision to proceed with its testing program was driven by its need to modernize its nuclear force, built largely using 1960s and 1970s technology. Although Beijing has not rejected the possibility of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty that might take effect in the mid-to-late 1990s, it has raised obstacles to Chinese participation. At a minimum, Beijing will insist on its testing options and will continue to try to make a ban contingent on drastic future US-Russian nuclear arms reductions.

Chemical Weapons Convention

Background: China signed the CWC in January 1993 and is participating fully in the Preparatory Commission meetings which are scheduled for at least the next year and a half. Veteran Chinese arms control negotiator Li Changhe has been confirmed as Deputy Executive Secretary. The MFA reportedly expects the outcome of the PrepCom meetings to be acceptable and that Beijing will ratify the agreement. However, the Chinese Government has promised its military that it will withdraw from the convention before submitting to any inspection which would threaten China's security.

North Korean developments

Background: China cautiously supported UN Security Council efforts to persuade North Korea to return to the NPT, which succeeded on the eve of the 12 June deadline. Beijing has hosted two rounds of bilateral talks between US and North Korean officials on the issue of resolving remaining points of contention over P'yongyang's nuclear capabilities.

Multilateral Issues (cont.)

North Korean developments (cont.)

Comment: Above all, the Chinese want to prevent instability on the Korean Peninsula. Beijing secretly dispatched several senior delegations to P'yongyang during the nuclear impasse, and Politburo member Hu Jintao recently ended an official visit to North Korea, during which he may have discussed international concerns about the North's activities.

Arms Control in the Middle East

Background: No UN Perm-5 ACME meetings have been held since May 1992. China withdrew its participation in the ACME talks in August 1992 after the United States announced it would sell F-16 fighter aircraft to Taiwan.

Comment: China's decision to suspend--rather than unequivocally preclude--further ACME participation suggests Beijing is leaving open the option to return to the talks at some point.

Monitoring of sensitive technology transfers

Background: China in 1992 introduced several arms sales policymaking and technology transfer monitoring groups--such as the State Military Export Administration Commission (SMEAC), which it unveiled at the Sino-US "MTCR experts meeting" in March 1992. The SMEAC is reportedly administered by the Foreign Ministry, while other groups with such decisionmaking authority appear to have been weighted to gain military and defense industrial input. Chinese officials have claimed that Beijing has export controls in keeping with the CWC, which it signed in January 1993.

Multilateral Issues (cont.)

Comment: The absence of information from Beijing concerning the SMEAC and other monitoring groups since their introduction makes it difficult to confirm their effectiveness or even their existence on more than paper. For example, the inspection of the *Yin He* in early September appears to have alerted Beijing to gaps in its chemical oversight capabilities. It took nearly two weeks for the Chinese Government to respond to US demarches concerning the reported shipment of thiodiglycol, during which it conducted an internal investigation involving six ministries.

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

Background: China has accepted President Clinton's invitation to attend this November's leaders' summit during the APEC ministerial in Seattle. Beijing will accept Taiwan's participation at both the ministerial and summit, but only at a reduced level of representation.

Comment: Beijing wants to avoid lending political legitimacy to Taiwan authorities by allowing their representatives to participate in the meeting as equals with the Chinese. At the same time, the Chinese want a trouble-free summit and are probably gambling that, if push comes to shove, most if not all of the forum's other members will support Beijing on this issue. China is pleased that President Clinton will hold a bilateral meeting with President Jiang Zemin on the periphery of the leaders' summit.

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CHINA STRATEGY FOR 1993-1994:
IMPLEMENTING THE PRESIDENT'S MFN EXECUTIVE ORDER

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Overview: U.S. Interests and Strategy in China

Constructive U.S. engagement with China is essential to realize the President's vision for a New Pacific Community; to deal effectively with regional security issues including Hong Kong's 1997 transition and Taiwan's status; to sustain our efforts internationally to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; to promote more democratic and open societies globally; to boost American economic and job growth through a healthy trade relationship with China; and to deal with such thorny issues as alien smuggling and environmental degradation.

China is an emerging great power with the potential to contribute enormously to regional and global stability and economic prosperity. It is also grappling with huge problems: an antiquated political system that could buckle or break during the looming succession struggle; a large and increasing "floating" population of over one hundred million workers (one out of every eleven Chinese) who move from job to job (and are unaccounted for in national labor and economic statistics); an overheated economy; and a gradual deterioration in central control over the provinces. A problem-ridden succession would seriously affect stability in China and the region generally.

The challenge to U.S. policy is to channel China's building momentum into constructive channels, bolstering prospects for political and economic liberalization internally as well responsible Chinese policies externally in the maintenance of world peace and stability, in non-proliferation, trade and the environment. The ascendancy of the market-oriented sector in China is striking at the core of the communist system, creating new and influential constituencies and interest groups pressing for political and economic relaxation. It is in the U.S. interest to see this evolution continue. Externally, U.S. support for an involved and engaged China, not an isolated China, as called for by President Clinton in his July 10 Seoul speech, would accelerate this positive and historic evolution underway in China.

Pursuant to these goals, the United States should engage creatively with the Chinese in pursuit of our objectives enunciated in the President's May 28 Executive Order on MFN. Earlier in the year, a Presidential China policy review (NSC-11

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summary at tab 3) laid the intellectual and strategic foundation for our re-engagement, identifying as core U.S. interests China's continued economic growth, its integration into the world community, its cooperation in the post-Cold War international order, and its peaceful evolution toward a more democratic society. In the next ten months before MFN renewal, we need to achieve sufficient concrete progress to permit a Presidential finding that China's MFN status should be extended.

As we chart our course, we should bear in mind the element of time. Front-loading our talks is essential for two reasons: (1) Deng Xiaoping's increasingly precarious health inspires Chinese leadership caution, and reflexive nationalistic impulses, as the succession drama begins to unfold; and (2) the Chinese are attuned to the content, nuances and pressures of the annual MFN debate, and are determined -- also for reasons of "face" and nationalism -- to avoid any impression they caved to Washington to retain their MFN status.

Our Tactics for 1993-1994

We begin our re-engagement with China from a position of domestic strength: the strategy, philosophy and specific goals contained in the May 28 Executive Order followed extremely close and harmonious consultations with the Congress. There is consensus that human rights progress is our top priority; that the specific areas named in the E.O. are the correct ones; that these are appropriately linked to 1994 MFN extension for China; and that China's MFN status should be preserved if possible. There is also broad support for our approach to proliferation and economic/trade concerns: pressing ahead through all available mechanisms and channels, at the level necessary to do the job, but de-linking Chinese performance from MFN renewal.

We will implement our strategy through meticulous, regular management by a senior interagency working group. Periodic meetings will be held to assess progress, review strategy, consider carrots and sticks which might be employed, undertake a post-mortem on each high-level visit and approve proposed Cabinet secretary and deputy exchanges.

Human Rights

It is imperative that we engage rapidly with the Chinese. Our general approach should be to explain to China our desire for a constructive, mutually beneficial relationship; to reiterate our interest in a stable and economically prosperous China; and to offer inducements necessary to inspire a serious dialogue

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including Chinese concessions. But our first priority, and our sharpest message to the Chinese, must be human rights: we are (as Americans) serious about achieving progress, and without this progress MFN cannot and will not be renewed. All dialogue with the Chinese -- certainly Executive Branch, and optimally Congressional and business also -- should make that simple point clearly and consistently. Secretary Christopher underscored it to Foreign Minister Qian in Singapore recently; Assistant Secretary (Human Rights) John Shattuck will elaborate it during planned discussions in Beijing in early September; and we will emphasize it strongly in anticipated sessions with the Chinese at the fall UNGA, at the Seattle APEC leaders conference, and in the course of our planned resumption of military-to-military dialogue. We will also brief Congressional and corporate leaders in advance of their China trips -- both to enlist their understanding of our policy, and to urge that they reinforce our own message.

Nonproliferation/Strategic Issues

With the cessation of U.S.-China military contacts, isolation has bred suspicion within the PLA about U.S. intentions. China through the 1990's will pose only a limited direct threat to U.S. security interests in Asia; we must, however, ensure that ongoing military modernization does not change this calculus. China's modernization evokes rising security concerns among its neighbors, including Taiwan. Aside from the economic consequences, Hong Kong's reversion to China in 1997 will add considerably to China's ability to project power into the East Asian region. Furthermore, China is a potential exporter of sensitive technologies and military systems; its cooperation (in the U.N. and regionally) is required to strengthen and expand nonproliferation regimes in the Middle East, South Asia and elsewhere; and it is a declared nuclear state, whose participation in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) we solicit and require. On August 25, Under Secretary Davis sanctioned China for the transfer of certain proscribed items in the MTCR Annex which contribute to missile development. The sanctions require denial of new export licenses for a period of two years. We are prepared to enter into negotiations with China to resolve this issue and thus permit the U.S. to waive these sanctions. Finally, as China enters a sensitive political transition period in which the armed forces will play a crucial role -- for stability or otherwise -- we need to broaden our exposure to Chinese military leaders and their thinking.

To accomplish these complex and interrelated objectives, we need to engage senior Chinese security policy civilian leaders as

SECRET/NODIS

SECRET/NODIS

well as military leaders. Key decision making authority on the entire array of strategic and nonproliferation issues outlined above rests with a small group of senior military officers and defense civilians in their sixties and seventies. Under Secretary Davis launched our senior-level dialogue in Beijing on July 26-27, pressing for a solution of the M-11 transfer contretemps, emphasizing that the U.S. seeks a cooperative relationship, but noting that our law obliges us to impose sanctions if the MTCR guidelines and parameters were exceeded. Since the imposition of Category II sanctions, we will need to follow up with an intensive effort to settle the M-11 issue in a way that advances our cooperation in such nonproliferation areas as MTCR, the Nuclear Suppliers' Group, the CTBT, restraining arms proliferation in the Middle East, and influencing the North Koreans to forego their nuclear ambitions (the Chinese may have already been helpful in this endeavor). We will plan to resume a strategic dialogue (i.e., on common regional security concerns) in the fall through a visit to China by Defense Assistant Secretary Freeman and an accompanying flag officer. This delegation would, of course, press our human rights agenda in the course of its presentation to Chinese defense/military interlocutors.

Economic/Commercial Issues

China is our seventh-ranking trade partner, and some 143,000 American jobs are already dependent on U.S. exports. A successful U.S. effort to boost American economic and job growth through international commerce hinges importantly on our ability to win an expanding share of the booming China market. Chinese imports of U.S. goods in 1992 totalled \$7.5 billion, up 19 percent over 1991. But because Chinese exports to the U.S. rose even more rapidly, the U.S. trade deficit grew to \$18.3 billion. China presents increasing high technology trade opportunities -- which Japan and other western countries are pursuing successfully in the absence of U.S. competition. American businesses complain they are competitively disadvantaged by the array of formal and informal post-Tiananmen sanctions: cessation of TDA financing and OPIC guarantees, export controls (and further sanctions imposed legislatively) on high-tech items (e.g., a Cray computer sale long held up for the Chinese State Meteorological Agency) and nuclear industry plants and components, and further controls on satellite launch services and dual-use items. We are negotiating with the Chinese currently on market access and China's entry into GATT. Illegal Chinese textile transshipments loom as a major and growing dilemma for us -- even as our ability to deal with the problem is hampered by the adverse implications of any U.S. countermeasures for Hong Kong and Taiwan interests.

SECRET/NODIS

SECRET/NODIS

In the coming months, an interagency group co-chaired by NSC/NEC should create a U.S. economic and trade strategy to deal with China. A review of our export control regime could be part of the exercise. Sequenced Sino-American visits beginning in the summer and fall would implement it, including a trip to China by senior USTR officials (perhaps Ambassador Kantor), Commerce officials (Secretary Brown, under the right circumstances), and Treasury officials to begin to deal with these issues. The annual meeting of the Sino-American Joint Committee on Commerce and Trade will be hosted by Secretary Brown in November in Washington.

We should recognize that implementing this strategy will be very difficult and complex. The Chinese are always hard to move on human rights issues, and they have recently cracked down on some dissidents in Shanghai and elsewhere. The M-11 problem and sanctions cast a large, immediate shadow. Our trade deficit continues to balloon. Tibet, Taiwan, and Hong Kong -- all relating to Chinese notions of sovereignty -- could cause new strains in our relations. And the political jockeying for succession to Deng could limit Chinese flexibility. Such elements will make progress in negotiations arduous and could inflame Congressional attitudes.

Attachments

Annex I - Notional Schedule for Senior-Level Dialogue
Annex II - U.S. Policy Toward Tibet

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SECRET/NODIS

CHINA STRATEGY FOR 1993-1994:
IMPLEMENTING THE PRESIDENT'S MFN EXECUTIVE ORDER

I. OVERVIEW: U.S. INTERESTS IN CHINA

When President Carter made the decision to normalize diplomatic relations with Beijing effective January 1979, his premise -- stated publicly -- was that the United States has an enduring interest in a stable and modernizing China. That premise has not altered despite the disappearance of a common security threat, sweeping change in global political alignments, significant evolution of China's political/economic system, and the emergence of China as a regional -- prospectively global -- economic and military force.

In his recent speeches at Waseda University in Tokyo and at the National Assembly in Seoul, President Clinton elaborated a new, ambitious vision for U.S. involvement with the Asia and Pacific region which included an engaged -- not isolated -- China. The President called for creation of a New Pacific Community built on shared strength, shared prosperity and a shared commitment to democratic values. In so doing, he cited specific priorities including stronger efforts to combat proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; new regional dialogues on a broad spectrum of security challenges; and support for more democratic, more open societies.

Comprehensive U.S. engagement with China is the sine qua non for realization of the President's vision for a New Pacific Community. Clearly, our efforts to deal effectively with proliferation and to launch successfully an Asian regional security dialogue will hinge upon the extent and conviction of China's involvement. More broadly, regional stability and progress -- including Hong Kong's 1997 transition and the status of Taiwan -- will be intimately linked with China's course during the 1990s. U.S. policy should be geared to channeling China's building momentum into constructive channels bolstering, rather than undermining, regional and global stability, creation of a more effective, enduring non-proliferation regime and a liberalized world trading system. A successful U.S. effort to boost American economic and job growth through exports will depend upon a healthy trade relationship with China.

The stakes are enormous. If China holds successfully to its present course, it will emerge early in the next century as a budding superpower. But if China's reformist, market-oriented and outward-looking policies falter or fail, one can foresee a different and distressing prospect for the world's most dynamic region: Chinese domestic instability, growing concerns in the region regarding China's intentions, economic disruption of commercial relationships, a deteriorating Chinese migration/refugee dilemma, an impulse among China's neighbors to

SECRET/NODIS

-2-

plan for the worst through arms buildups and a shattered architecture for dealing peacefully and collegially with regional and transnational issues.

Presidential Review Directive/NSC-11, completed in March, systematically developed the case for comprehensive engagement with China and laid the intellectual and policy foundation for the President's May 28 Executive Order on MFN for China. PRD/NSC-11 identified the following core U.S. interests in China: continued Chinese economic growth, increased integration into the world community, cooperation in building a new international order and peaceful change toward a more democratic, humane society. The President's May 28 Executive Order spelled out more concrete policy goals for the year leading up to the 1994 decision on further extension of China's MFN status.

In sum, our long-range strategy toward China must be animated by a conceptual framework designed to permit achievement of U.S. national security objectives through engagement with this important emerging power. Our tactical approach over the next year must lay the cornerstone for such engagement through concrete progress keyed to the areas specified in the President's May 28 Executive Order.

II. STRATEGY FOR THE NEXT YEAR

The Agenda:

The President's May 28 MFN Executive Order -- taken after unprecedented close and harmonious consultations with the Congressional leadership -- and his parallel MFN report to the Congress specify that 1994 MFN renewal will be conditioned upon certification of overall, significant progress on human rights. The President de-linked proliferation and commercial issues from the 1994 MFN decision, but directed that our core national objectives in these areas be vigorously pursued through existing channels and utilizing all available leverage. It is crucial that we achieve progress in these areas on the merits; furthermore, as a practical matter, failure to do so will impede our ability to manage successfully next year's Congressional MFN debate even in the event of certifiable human rights gains.

SECRET/NODIS

Additionally, we need to address urgently with the Chinese through appropriate diplomatic and law enforcement channels the growing problem of illegal migration. Finally, there exists a rich agenda -- and difficult challenges -- to pursue with the Chinese in such areas as environmental protection, U.N. peacekeeping/ peacemaking operations and regional security issues.

The Element of Time:

We are obliged to register meaningful progress on our human rights agenda in sufficient time to permit a favorable determination on extension of China's MFN status. This means that we need results no later than early spring 1994, but optimally much earlier. First, members of Congress have made clear that they will call hearings at that time to weigh for themselves the success of the Administration's approach; some have hinted at an intent to call for a mid-year review in December. Second, the Chinese themselves are more likely to be responsive earlier than later, for a pair of reasons: (a) because they are now attuned to the content and nuances of the annual MFN debate and determined to avoid any impression that they have caved to U.S. pressure "solely" to retain MFN status; and (b) because Deng Xiaoping's increasingly precarious health inspires Chinese leadership caution as the succession drama begins to unfold.

This argues for early engagement with the Chinese. This should be done at the levels of seniority necessary to achieve our objectives. It also means we should front-load our agenda. We should concomitantly brief Congress soon on our thinking, so as to answer or mute any criticism that we have embarked on a "business-as-usual" approach. This should not be a hard sell; members of Congress have increasingly come to see the merit in a policy of careful engagement. Some six to eight Congressional delegations are finalizing plans for August travel to China. It is particularly important that we avail ourselves of the opportunity of their travel -- to outline in detail our conceptual framework and to prime travelling members to deliver tough and concrete messages identical to our own.

SECRET/NODIS

-4-

Sharpening the Message:

It is imperative that we speak with one voice in: (a) underscoring our desire for a constructive, mutually beneficial relationship; (b) reiterating our interest in a stable and economically prosperous China; (c) offering necessary inducements to inspire a serious dialogue and meaningful Chinese concessions; and, without pulling punches, (d) conveying clearly to the Chinese that human rights is our overriding priority since they will lose MFN absent significant overall progress in the areas specified by the President.

Such a message must be delivered unambiguously and consistently, by Executive Branch and Congressional visitors alike, to a broad spectrum and multiple levels of Chinese leaders.

Channels and Mechanisms for Dialogue:

Our objective is progress; we should employ the channels and level of seniority essential to achieve it. We cannot afford to waste motion, blur the message, and indulge in dialogue at high levels which does not promise commensurate results.

It follows, inter alia, from this logic that:

- Cabinet-level dialogue with the Chinese should occur only when this is the best tactic to force action.
- Military-to-military dialogue should be resumed, at appropriate (e.g., Assistant Secretary of Defense, with a party to include a flag officer) levels, given the importance of our nonproliferation, regional security, and Taiwan Strait interests, and given the reality that our desired interlocutors -- Chinese senior military leaders -- only rarely make themselves available for U.S. civilians.
- USG visitors to China should be selected with an eye to authoritativeness rather than quantity, and with an explicit goal in each instance of achieving progress on a core agenda item.

SECRET/NODIS

- Resurrection of the three U.S.-China joint commissions (Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade; Joint Economic Commission; and Joint Commission on Science and Technology) should be predicated on their accomplishment of specific objectives, and deferred insofar as they promise merely the ceremonial or the vague.

Carrots and Sticks:

The process of engagement unfolding over the next year, in implementation of the President's Executive Order, should be conceived as a protracted and complex negotiating process. That is, the Chinese have consistently resisted offering concessions where they see no gains for themselves. From our perspective, the Chinese will in fact gain significantly from unilateral initiatives in the areas we have identified: a substantially improving human rights record will produce a more benign international image; meticulous observation of international nonproliferation regimes will enhance China's own security in the long run; and progress on our trade agenda will facilitate China's entry into GATT and expand its commercial opportunities in the U.S. and elsewhere. We should make this case repeatedly to the Chinese.

Chinese diplomatic strategy has tended to rely on intricate tradeoffs and explicit quid pro quos. Chinese leaders have not been shy about presenting their own agenda, and indeed their own concept for precise linkage of our core interests with China's principal goals. We should be vigilant against Chinese offers designed to draw us into a classically time-consuming negotiation situation.

MFN renewal is, of course, our principal leverage, and the primary inducement to an improved Chinese performance on human rights. We might also consider employing, when appropriate, the following illustrative types of bargaining chips:

- High-tech sales: We might, for example, approve sale of the Cray computer to the Chinese State Meteorological Agency as a "humanitarian gesture" (in support of Chinese weather forecasting to avert natural disasters).

SECRET/NODIS

-6-

- Trade incentives: Reopening of TDA funding is particularly attractive inasmuch as U.S. business competitiveness in the Chinese market would be enhanced. Later, given proper conditions, we might offer to restore Chinese eligibility for OPIC guarantees.
- GATT accession: We could accelerate the pace of our negotiations.
- High Level Dialogue: Vice Premier/Foreign Minister Qian Qichen's attendance at UNGA, and President Jiang Zemin's prospective attendance at the November APEC leaders meeting in Seattle suggest possibilities: special attention during their visits, an invitation to Washington, a meeting with the President, and so on. Given sufficient progress we might hold in reserve an invitation to another Chinese leader, perhaps senior Vice Premier Zhu Rongji, to pay an official visit to the U.S. early in 1994.

On the "stick" side, besides the ultimate weapon of MFN revocation (albeit a single-shot, non-repeating weapon) we have available options including:

- Special 301: This might be employed in connection with failure to implement the IPR agreement, or on textile transshipment. We should consider the tactical advantage in wielding 301 -- a method which sends a firm message to China and permits us to avoid sending a sterner message with predictable adverse consequences for our own commercial and strategic interests.
- Legislation on Transfer of Nuclear Materials: Along with executive determinations, U.S. laws specify sanctions in violation of NPT commitments.
- Helms Amendment Sanctions for an M-11 Category I Transfer: If invoked, this amendment would block a significant range of Chinese exports to the U.S.

SECRET/NODIS

SECRET/NODIS

- 7 -

- Helms Amendment Category II: Invoked August 25; this denies new export licenses to sanctioned entities for two years.
- Chinese Olympics: Should China be chosen as host, we will gain six years of leverage through the possibility that the U.S. would refuse to participate because of PRC human rights practices. The Chinese will assume that, as before the 1990 Moscow games, many other nations would follow a U.S. lead in pulling out.

Imposing any of these sanctions, however, carries risks: of Chinese retaliation deleterious to our own larger interests; of complicating our efforts to implement the President's MFN Executive Order; and of prejudicing our chances to engage the Chinese constructively on a broad spectrum of issues.

Managing the Process:

The importance of the issues, as well as the complexity of the options, suggest that it would be advantageous to manage implementation of our China strategy via periodic review by a senior-level steering group. Such policy review should include: regular (perhaps quarterly) IWG assessment of progress; ad hoc IWG consideration of significant proposed visits to China (or dialogue elsewhere with the Chinese) and assessment of outcomes; particularly careful vetting of proposed military-to-military dialogue, with NSC approval required for any dialogue at or above the assistant secretary level or flag officer rank; and NSC approval for any Cabinet secretary or deputy secretary visit to China.

III. CHINESE REALITIES

U.S. policy over the next year will have to accommodate important, potentially disruptive events in the PRC. Even if paramount leader Deng Xiaoping does not die or become incapacitated, his gradual physical decline will continue, and maneuvering over the succession will reduce Beijing's capacity to make tough decisions on sensitive policy questions. In addition,

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SECRET/NODIS

-8-

the overheated, semi-reformed PRC economy will soon undergo a major correction, as authorities are forced to use clumsy administrative techniques to cool surging inflation and other distortions. While some growth will continue and the reform program as a whole survive, these economic measures will complicate the succession struggle, slow key reforms, inhibit efforts to penetrate the Chinese market, and foment some popular discontent. Widespread instability is unlikely: burned once, the PRC authorities have learned a lesson from Tiananmen and will be especially vigilant. Under the best circumstances, however, U.S. policy goals -- especially those regarding human rights -- may be harder to sell in Beijing. The PRC delegation's obstructionism at the Vienna human rights conference presages Beijing's attitude in this area.

At the same time, China is feeling its new strength. Both double-digit economic growth and revived military modernization are boosting Beijing's prominence in the region. U.S. leverage is declining as China's strengthens and as Beijing's economic bonds to the other dynamic Asian economies and the EC continue to deepen. Strategically, we are no longer needed as a counterweight to the Soviets, although China still tacitly supports our military presence in the region as a hedge against Japan.

IV. THE PROCESS: SETTING IN MOTION OUR CHINA STRATEGY FOR 1993-4

We should move swiftly, in light of the considerations outlined above, to set in motion our strategy for achieving U.S. China policy objectives over the nine months remaining before the MFN decision. Synergistic advantages will accrue from moving concurrently in five areas: (1) NSC channel, (2) Department of State and Embassy Beijing channel, (3) [REDACTED] (4) Congressional and business channels, and (5) High-level engagement, in Beijing and elsewhere. The process will necessarily be a dynamic one, adjusting and even altering direction as dictated by periodic assessments of results. The following outline is therefore intended to be illustrative rather than definitive.

SECRET/NODIS

SECRET/NODIS

-9-

A. NSC Channel

National Security Adviser Lake, with Assistant Secretary Lord, would launch the strategy from the White House by calling in Chinese Ambassador Li Daoyu to outline our approach, objectives and set of proposed visits and exchanges over the coming six months. NSA Lake would underscore the need for concrete, significant progress well in advance of next year's MFN renewal debate and any Congressional mid-term review.

B. State Department/Embassy Beijing Channel

EAP Assistant Secretary Ambassador Lord and Ambassador Roy in Beijing would play the critical roles in implementing and assessing the strategy as it unfolds. They would regularly deliver our core message (to Ambassador Li Daoyu and to Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu respectively) on human rights and other principal concerns associated with renewal of MFN; preview for Ambassador Li and VFM Liu our objectives in advance of each high-level meeting with the Chinese; assure that all senior Executive Branch officials preparing for dialogue with the Chinese understand and convey that message; and encourage members of Congress and American businessmen to articulate that same message in their separate dialogues with Chinese leaders.

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6)

SECRET/NODIS

D. Principal Constituencies: Business and Congress

Our strategy should be to engage Congress and the business community early and candidly in our effort to drive home to the Chinese our core message: MFN will not be renewed absent progress on the human rights agenda specified in the President's Executive Order. Other elements of our strategy should also be briefed, as appropriate, emphasizing always that our goal is a constructive, mutually beneficial relationship.

Such a strategy serves multiple purposes: winning good will (if not always complete support) from those briefed; raising the odds that our core message will be delivered with clarity to the PRC by a broad spectrum of China's American guests and interlocutors; and reinforcing the gravity of our own message that MFN revocation is a serious matter (since the Chinese will understand that we have briefed other constituencies, and sought to maintain a strong sense of common purpose).

For the business community, we need to be realistic. Relatively few corporate executives will be prepared to argue strenuously for a better Chinese human rights performance on the merits, but a significant number might be impelled to argue for a better performance lest MFN be withdrawn and their own commercial interests damaged.

With respect to the Hill, to those who have been skeptical of our resolve, our briefings will underscore our commitment to act. At the same time, it will energize those whose constituents have a strong stake in preservation of MFN. The result will be a multiplier effect on the Chinese (who will note that pro-MFN-extension members of Congress are running scared) and will, through activation of the non-revocation forces, provide the President greater maneuvering room prior to June 3, 1994 with respect to the precise calculus of "significant overall progress" achieved to that point.

Following is a notional schedule of implementing actions:

- Beginning in September, schedule meetings with Ambassador Lord for CEOs of companies represented by the U.S.-China Task Force and U.S.-China Business Council.

- Reach the maximum possible number of members of Congress (and staff members)-planning travel to China. The NSC and Department of State should closely coordinate their efforts in this respect.
- Continue, at regular intervals, to brief key Hill members and staffers on the results of our policy of engagement with China.

E. High-Level Visits

(1) HUMAN RIGHTS

Policy

Chinese human rights practices violate internationally-recognized standards of behavior established in fundamental instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which China, as a U.N. member, has accepted. PRC compliance with these obligations would serve both Chinese and U.S. interests. Without seeking to (or imagining that it could) impose its political system and values on the PRC, the U.S. nevertheless has compelling practical and humanitarian reasons for promotion of Chinese democracy and human rights. An arbitrary, closed Chinese political system over time will be incapable of meeting the challenges of economic and social development, a prerequisite for PRC and regional stability. Democracy also is necessary for China effectively to manage increasingly important global issues such as trade disputes, refugees/migration, the environment, narcotics and terrorism. Over time, a more open and democratic China will be an easier country with which to deal and a better partner for the U.S. strategically, politically and in economic terms. An increasingly democratic China will coincide with the emerging democratic trend in Asia, including in Taiwan and South Korea.

Our dialogue with China must underscore consistently the requirement that Beijing satisfy the specific conditions in the President's May 28 MFN Executive Order: implementing the prison labor MOU and assuring freedom of emigration, plus (1) adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; (2) accounting for political/religious prisoners from the Democracy Wall and

Tiananmen movements; (3) access to prisoners by impartial, respected international organizations; (4) protection of Tibet's distinctive religious and cultural heritage; (5) unimpeded radio and television broadcasts into China.

Notional Process

- o Fall: Assistant Secretary (HA) Shattuck visit to China. Shattuck would emphasize our core message -- no MFN renewal without significant progress; lay out, ideally prioritized, all that we require to demonstrate such progress; stress the particular importance of international access (e.g., by the ICRC) to Chinese prisons, release/accounting of prisoners, and progress toward freedom of expression, assembly and religion; and seek to engage the Chinese in a continuing, frequent dialogue on our human rights agenda.
- o Secretary Christopher meeting with Foreign Minister Qian at UNGA (and possibly in Washington). The Secretary would touch upon all major bilateral and global issues, but on human rights would reiterate the Shattuck message and -- hopefully -- note progress or the potential for same. In that eventuality, he might invite FM Qian to Washington for discussions and a meeting with the President.
- o Visit to Beijing by Under Secretary of State Wirth -- if sufficient progress had been achieved, and assuming that our environmental agenda might also be thereby advanced.
- o Late 1993: President Jiang Zemin (prospectively) represents China at APEC leaders meeting in Seattle. The President and other APEC partners can press Jiang for progress in our core concern areas.
- o Early 1994: Visit by Secretary Christopher to Beijing -- only if dramatic progress had been achieved, or the promise of such guaranteed.

SECRET/NO DIS

-13-

(2) NONPROLIFERATION/MILITARY/STRATEGIC

Policy

-- General. China through the 1990s would pose only a limited direct military threat to U.S. interests in Asia; the U.S. has an interest in ensuring that PRC military modernization does not change this calculus. The U.S. has stated, as a matter of national policy, its "abiding interest" in a peaceful resolution of the situation in the Taiwan Strait; from that interest there follows a need to monitor the activities and intentions of the Chinese military. U.S. policies should continue to promote good PRC-Taiwan relations. A confrontation between the two could force a U.S. response and raise the specter of some form of U.S. re-involvement in a Chinese civil war. Similar considerations for U.S. military and security planners arise with respect to the 1997 Hong Kong reversion, and the complex territorial dispute in the South China Sea.

With the cessation of U.S.-China military-to-military contacts following June 1989, isolation has bred suspicion, which in turn may be prompting both sides to conceptualize the other as a potential or real enemy. It is important to understand Chinese military attitudes and strategic thinking -- all the more so at a time when the PLA is destined to play a significant role in the political succession to Deng -- and to counter such tendencies through resumed contact. If we are to attract China into substantive regional security talks and structures, it is imperative to enlist early on the sympathetic understanding of the Chinese military command.

Our objective ought not be the resumption of U.S.-China military technological cooperation (i.e., in support of China's modernization of its defensive weapons systems). With the Soviet/Russian threat vanished, with uncertainties and worries among China's neighbors, with obvious political and security implications for Taiwan, and without any political consensus in the U.S. favoring such cooperation, there is no overriding national purpose served by placing this on our agenda.

As with human rights and trade, we should coordinate closely

SECRET/NO DIS

SECRET/NODIS

-14-

with U.S. allies, particularly Japan and the EC, to parallel our pressures.

-- Nonproliferation. With an export-driven economic strategy and a military-industrial complex dependent in part on off-budget revenues, China exports sensitive technologies and military systems. Many of our nonproliferation efforts, such as in the Middle East, require PRC cooperation. We need to deal with China's significant and worrisome military and nuclear supplier relationship with Iran. China's participation is required to follow through on the President's Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty initiative.

Notional Process

- o Fall: Possibly another circuit of bilaterals headed by Under Secretary Davis to Beijing. The principal mission of her late July mission was: (1) to brief the Chinese on the President's CTBT initiative, seeking Chinese participation in the nuclear testing moratorium and willingness to enter into negotiations aimed at a Treaty, and (2) to press home our concerns that China may have transferred M-11 components to Pakistan last November in violation of its commitment to abide by MTCR guidelines and parameters. Under Secretary Davis sanctioned China in August imposing Category II sanctions. We are developing a negotiating strategy to resolve this problem quickly so that we can move forward with our overall nonproliferation strategy.
- o Fall: An interagency process would implement our determination on and resolution of Category II sanctions. We should also set a strategy to achieve the following:
 - obtaining Chinese agreement to tighten adherence to the MTCR.
 - inducing China to participate in South Asian regional security talks with the U.S., India, Pakistan and Russia (when such talks would explicitly have on the table

SECRET/NODIS

SECRET/NODIS

-15-

Indian and Pakistani missile systems, whether domestically produced or imported).

-- exploring Chinese willingness to resume unconditionally the ACME (Arms Control in the Middle East) talks.

-- pressing China to adopt the Nuclear Supplier's Group Guidelines.

- o A visit to China by South Asia Assistant Secretary Raphel, assuming the Chinese are cooperating on the South Asia nuclear strategy. The visit would focus principally on modalities for a five-power conference on security on the Indian sub-continent. A/S Raphel would also press our nonproliferation concerns generally.
- o Visit to China by DOD A/S Freeman aimed at renewing dialogue on strategic issues and pressing for resolution of our proliferation concerns. It would be the vehicle for resumption of uniformed military-to-military contacts, through inclusion in the Freeman party of at least one flag officer. As with other high-level visits, A/S Freeman would utilize the opportunity to press our human rights and other concerns on his Chinese military interlocutors.
- o Late 1993 or early 1994: Assuming Chinese responsiveness to the Freeman visit, as measured by significant progress on nonproliferation issues, a visit by DOD Deputy Secretary Perry and/or a senior JCS officer might be scheduled. The purpose would be as described above under "policy." The specific agenda would be shaped according to our principal requirements at the time. Whether or not such high-level visits are warranted and thus possible, we should move to initiate lower-level military-to-military exchanges.

SECRET/NODIS

(3) ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL

Policy

China is already our seventh ranking trade partner, and as many as 143,000 American jobs are dependent on U.S. exports. According to some calculations, at current relative growth rates total Chinese output could exceed Japan's by the end of the decade. China's importance as a trading partner is therefore certain to expand further. A successful U.S. effort to boost American economic and job growth through international commerce depends on a healthy trade relationship with the PRC. China is an important market for U.S. grain, aircraft, fertilizer, cotton, electric machinery and computers, wood, pulp and paper, professional and scientific equipment, iron, and steel; Chinese imports of U.S. goods in 1992 totalled \$7.5 billion, up 19 percent over 1991. Because Chinese exports to the U.S. rose even more rapidly, however, the U.S. trade deficit grew to \$18.3 billion. The U.S. is also one of China's leading sources of foreign investment, although relatively weak growth since 1989 may put the U.S. at a comparative disadvantage to China's Asian trading partners.

China presents increasing high technology trade opportunities which other Western countries are pursuing in the absence of a larger U.S. presence. U.S. producers in the aerospace, computer and telecommunications industries are some of the highest volume U.S. exporters to China, and they are eager to expand their current markets.

The PRC has made important moves to accommodate the global trading system, although China nevertheless maintains a broad range of trading practices which conflict with international standards. The process of drawing Beijing fully into the global trading order is likely to be protracted and contentious.

The rise of a Greater China through the ongoing integration of the economies of southern China, Taiwan and Hong Kong also influences U.S. interests. While in certain respects beneficial to regional stability and prosperity, this process has reduced our ability to pressure China economically without harming Hong

SECRET/NODIS

-17-

Kong and Taiwan and complicates important trade issues such as prevention of illegal textile transshipments.

Process: As sketched above, all exchanges would feature prominently our core message on human rights and renewal of MFN.

- o Fall: Overseen by the NEC, an interagency process will create a commercial/trade strategy for dealing with China, similar to the one done for Japan.

Deputy USTR Barshefsky visits China. The principal objective would be to address IPR implementation, and to make sufficient progress in market access talks to avert the need for imposing trade sanctions on the anniversary of our market access agreement and the statutory deadline for action. Depending on progress, we might float -- or offer on the spot -- the possibility of accelerating our negotiations over China's GATT entry.

- o Secretary Bentsen participates in World Bank/IMF meeting. The Secretary would seek to engage the Chinese on an important issue (though not a core agenda one): exchange rate manipulation. Revivification of the Joint Economic Commission (JEC) ought not be considered unless specific goals and prospective achievements can be identified well in advance. He would also deliver a hard-hitting message -- speaking with the authority of a senior Administration official as well as a long-time, respected U.S. Senator -- on human rights.
- o Late 1993: Business delegation to China led by Commerce Secretary Brown and/or resumption of the JCCT in Seattle following the APEC leaders conference (a scenario proposed by the Chinese). In either case, close vetting by the IWG group and approval by NSC would be required to establish that core interests were being advanced. Secretary Brown would presumably have neither the time nor the inclination to lead a business delegation to China were there not the solid prospect of resulting contracts for participating firms. In the case of a JCCT, the forum would need in effect to be reinvented --

SECRET/NODIS

SECRET/NODIS

-18-

that is, altered from the ceremonial gathering of years past to an issues- and results-oriented conclave. One possibility -- assuming that this chip had not been played during USTR discussions -- and a logical one for trade talks in a JCCT chaired by Secretary Brown, would be to propose an initial TDA project to support U.S. interests bidding on the potentially lucrative Guangzhou metro project. Such a project fits our desired profile: high-tech, high revenue, and downstream potential estimated by some in the \$300 million range.

V. CONCLUSION: A DIFFICULT CHALLENGE

We should recognize that implementing this strategy will be very difficult and complex. The Chinese are always hard to move on human rights issues, and they have recently cracked down on some dissidents in Shanghai and elsewhere. The M-11 problem casts a large, immediate shadow. Our trade deficit continues to balloon. Tibet, Taiwan, and Hong Kong -- all relating to Chinese notions of sovereignty -- could cause new strains in our relations. And the political jockeying for succession to Deng could limit Chinese flexibility. Such elements will make progress in negotiations arduous, and could inflame Congressional attitudes.

SECRET/NODIS

SECRET/NOBIS

-19-

Drafted: EAP/CM: DWKeyser
SECMDR 1105 7/28/93 7-6803 -

Cleared: EAP:WLord
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All other clearances assumed from IWG process and Deputies Committee Meeting. See EAP/CM Hart draft 6/15/93 and following. Participants in that process were:

D:JWarlick
P:AO'Neil
T:JBarker
C:RMPerito
E:ADerse
S/P:LKeene
S/NIS:VNewland
EAP/RA/TC:JBorich
EAP/RA:BGray
NEA/RA:LWard
SA/RA:MClemmon
H:AKirkpatrick
EB/BTA/ODC:DRMoran
HA:PHotze
INR/EAP/CH:JJTkacik
IO/UNP:DRRasmussen
L/EAP:JDKovar
OES/ENV:APSchifferdecker
PM/PNW:VCarutenuto
PM/PRO:EMonroe
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IWG Clearances:

NSC: Kent Wiedemann
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JCS: Phil Gay
Commerce: Peter Cashman
ISTR: Ira Wolf

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Treasury: Meg Lundsager
USIA: George Beasley
ACDA: Joe Smaldone

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ANNEX I

**NOTIONAL SCHEDULE
SENIOR USG MEETINGS WITH CHINESE
JULY - DECEMBER 1993**

[NOTE: The following is intended to be illustrative rather than a compendium of visits already planned or deemed essential. Please see text of paper for justification and sequencing considerations. END NOTE.]

- July 25 Secretary Christopher met with Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Qian at ASEAN PMC (Singapore) (Accomplished)
- July 26-27 Under Secretary (T) of State Dr. Davis met in Beijing with Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu and others to discuss proliferation issues. (Accomplished)
- September USTR Kantor and/or Deputy USTR Barskefsky market access bilateral in Beijing September
- Assistant Secretary (HA) Shattuck will visit China, including Lhasa, to press our human rights message.
- SA Assistant Secretary Raphael visit to China to explore cooperation on proliferation on South Asian subcontinent.
- Secretary Christopher meets with Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Qian during UNGA (New York); possible invitation to Washington
- September-October DOD A/S Freeman, accompanied by flag officer, hold security bilaterals in Beijing
- Secretary Bentsen participation in World Bank/IMF talks.
- October Under Secretary Wirth holds talks in Beijing on human rights, democracy, environment

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October USIA Director Joseph Duffey visits Beijing: emphasizes need for freedom of broadcasting, underscores human rights agenda, and discusses possible new areas for cultural cooperation

October-
November Commerce Secretary Brown leads trade delegation to China, or chairs JCCT in Seattle

November Acting ACDA Director Graham visits China to follow up on arms control, regional security initiatives

 Chinese President Jiang Zemin attends APEC leaders meeting in Seattle; possible bilateral with President and/or possible visit to Washington

December-
January DOD Deputy Secretary Perry visits China -- assuming sufficient progress -- to follow up on security dialogue. Senior JCS officer may attend.

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Annex II

U.S. Policy Towards Tibet

Tibet presents us with special problems. First, Chinese suspicions of U.S. motives in Tibet are linked to the legacy of active U.S. support, during the 1950's and 1960's, for Tibetan insurgents opposing PRC control. Secondly, our support for religious freedom in Tibet must take into account Tibet's tradition of combining religious and political power and its ongoing agitation for independence. Thirdly, many aspects of Tibet's traditional, pre-modern culture are undergoing change as a result of a modernization process made inevitable by domestic economic reform and the opening to the outside world. Tibet's society, religion and history are little understood in the U.S. This has led to romanticized views of Tibet among domestic U.S. audiences, views which have a powerful influence upon policy.

Our role must be to convince the Chinese that resolution of the Tibetan problem is essential if there is to be a long-term, healthy relationship between the U.S. and China. We can only do this by making clear to the Chinese that we will not in any way try to shape or dictate the terms of the compromise nor will we do anything to undermine the compromise by giving encouragement to Tibetan independence activists. But we must also make clear that Tibet, unlike for instance Taiwan, is not a problem whose solution can be deferred. Once the Dalai Lama passes from the scene or, as he has threatened, removes himself from the process, then the best and perhaps only chance for peaceful compromise is gone. And the consequences for China, for Tibet, and for the U.S. will be great.

The Embassy argues for a U.S. Tibetan policy which is both realistic and active. Such a policy would have several components:

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1. American values and American public sentiment require us vigorously to promote respect for human rights.
2. However, it is not in U.S. national interest to support Tibetan independence in the face of Chinese claims to sovereignty and particularly when every U.N. member nation supports the Chinese position. We would be responsible for encouraging separatist elements in Tibet to rebel and risk sparking ethnic violence.
3. We must sensitize Beijing to the problems created by the movement of Han Chinese into Tibet. There is no conclusive evidence that this influx of economic migrants is a result of an official government policy. Nevertheless, the Han compete with Tibetans for economic opportunity and their growing presence is rapidly altering the distinctive cultural and religious life of Tibet. The fear among Tibetans, as articulated recently by the Dalai Lama in exile, is that the ongoing demographic changes will "further reduce Tibetans into an insignificant minority in their own country." But we should also recognize that this phenomenon is limited mainly to Lhasa, and the Dalai Lama considers large parts of China to be part of Tibet.
4. We must persuade both sides to renew the dialogue between the Dalai Lama and the PRC with the goal of genuine autonomy for Tibet within China.

The Chinese believe that the Tibetans, like most other minority groups in China, will settle down once foreigners stop intervening. Tibetan activists believe that through foreign intervention (economic sanctions, international condemnation of China, etc.) Tibet can become independent. Both sides are wrong. The problems facing Tibet can only be resolved through negotiation and eventual compromise.

Compromise will not be easy to reach. It will require the Chinese to accept the fact that there is a nearly indestructible core of Tibetan resistance which will always struggle against rule from Beijing. Tibetans must accept that the concept of a "Greater Tibet," which would include large sections of neighboring Chinese provinces where Tibetans are and have been outnumbered by Han and other minorities for generations, is not achievable. Tibet is a small corner of a great power triangle. The survival of Tibetan culture and society will always depend upon compromise, especially with China.

While any Chinese leader or government can negotiate such a compromise, only one Tibetan can deliver the Tibetan side--the Dalai Lama.

In our expanded dialogue with Beijing, we should take advantage of every opportunity to press the Chinese on Tibetan human rights problems. We should:

- urge the Chinese to use restraint in dealing with peaceful demonstrations in Tibet;
- encourage improved treatment of prisoners, the end of abuses, and torture and ICRC access to Tibetan prisons;
- promote religious freedom in Tibet, particularly the lifting of limits on the number of monks;
- urge improved access for foreign visitors and particularly human rights groups to Tibet and;
- encourage the Chinese to resume their dialogue with the Dalai Lama.

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2015-0221-M (2.07) 3/11/2020 KDE

U.S. Non-Paper
Delivered to Chinese, September 24, 1993

Introduction

We appreciate your coming here, Ambassador Li, so that we can share with you some thoughts about the U.S.-China relationship. We know that you will understand that this is an unusual meeting, and that there is a compelling reason for it. We do not plan to publicize it, and hope that you will do likewise.

President Clinton has recently completed his review of our China policy, and he personally directed that we hold this meeting today. This attests to his close personal attention to our bilateral relations; his desire -- as he told you, Mr. Ambassador, when you presented your credentials -- that our important relationship be a healthy and constructive one; and, frankly, his conclusion that we are in a period of drift and need urgently to put things back on track. He is disappointed by our lack of progress to date, and ready to seek common ground to avert a downward spiral in relations.

The President believes that we are at a crossroads, and that this is a time for plain speaking. His hope is that we can together chart a course to take us beyond our current difficulties -- toward a restoration of the cooperative, respectful and mutually beneficial ties we have enjoyed in the past.

This will require strenuous efforts by both sides. Let us review the basic principles of our policy, the current issues that plague our relationship, and the ways in which we believe we can restore momentum. In this we are, of course, prepared to talk with you about the issues you deem important as well as about the issues and disputes we have highlighted. What we envision here is not a dialogue of intricate linkage and explicit tradeoffs, but rather an organic process where positive movement in one area by one side will generate and reinforce progress by the other. It is imperative that we engage at the levels necessary to launch such an organic process.

U.S.-China Fundamentals

The world has changed almost beyond recognition in the two decades since our nations reestablished contact and ushered in a new era. But through several administrations of both political parties, as well as changes in China's leadership, we have steadily expanded our ties. This administration inherited and accepts unequivocally the three joint communiques as the bedrock of its one China policy. We will abide scrupulously by all

agreements and understandings contained in them.

The President sees a strong, stable, modernizing and prosperous China as being in the long-term U.S. national security interest. He seeks a bilateral relationship that accords with that fundamental interest. He wishes to resume a comprehensive relationship with China -- one which permits management of inevitable differences and frictions in a broader strategic context. Despite the problems which today beset our relationship, we do not lose sight of the realities: China is a major political, economic and military power in the world; China has emerged in the post-Cold War era as even more important and influential than previously; the U.S. and China do -- and must -- cooperate in the United Nations Security Council and other international forums to manage complex global issues; together we can represent a crucial force for stability in the Asian and Pacific region and beyond; and we can advance our shared strategic and economic interests through cooperation premised on mutual respect and mutual benefit.

Our rapidly developing economic ties have made a substantial contribution to the well-being of the people in both of our countries. China's rapid economic development, and its swift progress toward a market economy integrated with the international community, have commanded international attention and respect. Your leaders have frequently declared that our economies are almost uniquely complementary, and indeed they are. Our exports to China -- especially in high-tech fields like aircraft and electronics -- have accelerated the pace of your modernization effort while sustaining and creating employment opportunities for Americans. Conversely, your booming exports to the United States have earned hard currency for you while meeting the aspirations and needs of the American consumer. We have only begun to tap the potential of our flourishing economic relationship; American participation in development of your energy sector, and contribution of American technology and expertise in safeguarding the Chinese environment, hold great potential for future cooperation in our mutual interest.

China is central to resolution of the many complex problems emerging in the new world environment: bilaterally, in the United Nations Security Council, in Asian regional forums, and in ad hoc international groupings to address such transnational issues as environmental degradation, narcotics trafficking, and alien smuggling.

At the same time, we believe that the reverse is also true: that China accrues clear advantages from close and constructive ties with the U.S.: in its regional security posture, in its international role and prestige, and in its ability to develop its economy at a rapid pace. Surely unconstrained Chinese access to the U.S. market has been advantageous, as have the opportunities for so many talented Chinese scholars and professionals to obtain advanced scientific and technological

degrees in the U.S. and to acquire practical experience in U.S. laboratories, research institutions and businesses.

As we survey the unsettled global scene, we appreciate the unique contributions that a stable and prosperous China can make to management of new and unanticipated problems. For this reason we seek a relationship with China having an explicit strategic dimension -- albeit a strategic dimension suited to the new era. To this end we are prepared to resume periodic high-level discussions of strategic questions of mutual concern, and to encourage such discussions in both civilian and military channels. There is no dearth of issues to examine together: the ongoing consequences of the fragmentation of the former Soviet Union, the emergence of new and unstable nations in Central Asia, the rise of messianic Islamic fundamentalism, the means to avert a destabilizing arms buildup in South Asia and the Middle East, and the shape of a future security architecture for East Asia, to name but a few.

For all these reasons we have promoted China's participation in emerging regional security dialogues. China will join the ASEAN-sponsored ASEAN Regional Forum next year. We intend to with you development of a more restricted Northeast Asia dialogue involving China, Russia, North and South Korea, Japan and the United States. Indeed, we have already launched such a dialogue in unofficial academic circles.

Taiwan has emerged as a major economic force in the Asia Pacific region, and the U.S. -- as others -- takes due note of that reality. Within the context of our one China policy we have developed strong unofficial ties with Taiwan. But our fundamental policy toward Taiwan has not changed, and is still governed by the three communiquees and the Taiwan Relations Act. Hence, we can assure you the Administration vigorously opposes the Murkowski Amendment. The Administration also does not support Taiwan's efforts towards admission to the United Nations. With considerable difficulty we have arranged for Taiwan and Hong Kong to be represented at the ministerial level at the APEC leadership conference. As far as our arms sales to Taiwan are concerned, we have turned aside many requests and have confined our sales strictly to defensive weapons. We take seriously the matters you have raised with us over the past year and assure you of our intention to abide by the provisions of the August 17, 1982 joint communique. As Ambassador Roy told you several months ago, we are prepared to hold informal talks with you on this subject.

We have made clear that we consider Tibet a part of China, and urged the Chinese side as well as the Dalai Lama to seek resolution of problems through dialogue. We have also stated that the future of Hong Kong is to be worked out by China, the United Kingdom and the Hong Kong people.

All of these actions attest to our serious pursuit of a one

China policy.

At the same time it is no secret that we disagree, often strenuously, as a consequence of our differing social, political and value systems. And the current troubled phase of our relations dates back to the spring of 1989 when, before the whole world, your government used deadly force to quash peaceful demonstrations by many of your citizens. We believe firmly in the concept of universal human rights; and as a matter of national heritage and international obligation we promote and defend them. That is an enduring strain in the American national character, and an enduring theme in our foreign policy.

This is not a matter of our imposing American values; rather it is a matter of China respecting international obligations it has assumed under the United Nations Charter. Each country must seek its own way in light of its history and culture. But this should not be used as a pretext to violate basic international norms. Moreover, in an age of information, technology and interdependence, open societies and open political systems are required for sustained modernization and development.

We do not see China as an adversary to be cowed, contained or converted. That is not our goal. Nor could it be. We do ask for a serious and sustained dialogue; we believe that both sides will learn and benefit from this.

So we reiterate: the President's intention and desire is to solve pragmatically our bilateral disputes, and to forge a constructive, cooperative relationship predicated upon equality and mutual benefit.

Serious Threats to our Relations: MFN Debate Lies Close Ahead

Today our bilateral relationship is burdened with practical and psychological issues requiring immediate attention. To ignore them, or to assume that the passage of time will bring solutions, will propel our bilateral relationship into a prolonged downward spiral from which we will not easily recover.

We need progress urgently, and to achieve this we need both high-level contacts and the political will to make difficult decisions.

Last May the President took measured, restrained steps on China's trade status. With the cooperation of Congress he extended MFN for a year, tied only to reasonable, achievable conditions on human rights which we judged could occur naturally as a result of China's own decisions, given trends then underway. He extended MFN through Executive Order, and avoided legislation by Congress which would have imposed more rigid conditions. The President also shifted trade and non-proliferation issues away from MFN to other established channels. This approach reflected his goal of moving the annual MFN debate from the center of

American policy so as to create a broader framework for our relations.

We have been disappointed by China's response to date, and thus appear to have misjudged China's intent to maintain positive trends on human rights. The clock is ticking on China's eligibility for MFN renewal in 1994. President Clinton's May 28 Executive Order spared us an acrimonious policy debate this year. But make no mistake: the prerequisites for renewal specified in that Executive Order are genuine, and our failure to make progress together toward achieving them will foreordain a negative outcome to next year's MFN deliberations .

Already we have heard the first shots in the coming debate. The Administration was unable in formal testimony to point to clear cut progress in implementation of our prison labor MOU. After some positive gestures on political prisoners early in the year, we have witnessed some serious setbacks in this area in recent months. We -- and others -- have noted no real progress to date on the human rights criteria mentioned by the President in his May 28 MFN Executive Order. Indeed, overall there has been slippage.

It is imperative that we engage on these issues, and that we be able to point to gains, before opinions in the United States harden.

We want you to be clearly aware of the timetable driving our sense of urgency. We expect a mid-term Congressional review of China policy at the outset of 1994 which will put the spotlight on progress measured against the criteria identified in the President's Executive Order. The Department of State must prepare its first draft of the Congressionally-mandated annual human rights report by mid-October, and submit the final text by the end of January. Those milestones, taken together, mean that our practical deadline for achieving progress is early January. Following that, it will be very difficult to overcome an impression that little has been or can be achieved. Only the most dramatic actions would turn the tide of American popular opinion. And then we will be coping with the reality of China's loss of MFN eligibility, and the need -- contrary to our broader, enduring interests -- to undergo a period of estrangement.

This is why we attach such importance to an early, successful visit to China by Assistant Secretary Shattuck. We must have a serious dialogue, and we need to be able to point to concrete results. Mr. Shattuck will be prepared to elaborate when he meets on the margins of the UNGA with Assistant Minister Qin Huasun. But that meeting must be a prelude, not a substitute, for an October trip to Beijing.

We must state bluntly: China's MFN extension currently is in serious jeopardy. As of now the Administration could not possibly muster sufficient evidence to support a positive

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recommendation on renewal.

The Current Impasse: Other Issues

We are also distressed by the lack of progress -- indeed, by the appearance of retrogression -- on our nonproliferation and commercial agendas. While the President elected to separate these from the MFN issue, he charged his administration to seek progress through existing channels.

EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

3.3(b)(6) we were obliged under U.S. law to impose sanctions. That was not the outcome that we expected or desired. Nonetheless, we chose the most moderate sanctions permissible under U.S. law.

The U.S. Government wants to work with China promptly to identify and implement the conditions necessary for a temporary or permanent waiver of those sanctions. We share a common interest in preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Surely China cannot want to see the spread of dangerous weapons in its neighborhood. We ought to be able to agree on a way out of our current impasse. We request that you clarify the nature of your past transfer to Pakistan, work with us to assure that no transfer inconsistent with the MTCR takes place in the future, and formalize China's previous commitment to observe MTCR guidelines and parameters through signature of a binding bilateral accord which would grant China "MTCR adherent" status for purposes of U.S. law. We do not believe that this should be difficult. And there would be concrete benefits for China in such an approach: China would, for example, be able to have its views heard as MTCR regime partners deliberate any amendments to the regime.

We note your government's statements that you may be obliged to review that commitment in light of U.S. imposition of sanctions, and we ask that you consider seriously the consequences of any action which contravenes the MTCR. China's security cannot be enhanced in the long term by repeated and overt failure to observe the MTCR. And our troubled bilateral relationship cannot sustain a vicious cycle of reaction and counter-reaction involving sanctions, more arms transfers, and more sanctions.

In these matters the administration has little or no freedom of action. Our response to evidence that China has engaged in proliferation will be dictated solely by our law. It cannot be

altered or softened by the importance that we otherwise attach to strong and cooperative bilateral relations. But, as we have noted, the law permits waiver of sanctions if underlying issues are resolved to mutual satisfaction.

EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a growing problem of common concern. We must build a solid foundation to work together on this sharp challenge to global peace and stability.

There are other bilateral and multilateral problems which require our urgent attention and cooperation. These include several important economic issues.

It is imperative that we deal effectively with the burgeoning U.S. trade deficit with China. We understand that there are differences between us concerning the appropriate computation of our trade balance, but I must tell you that we cannot politically sustain a deficit which by our calculation now approaches \$20 billion. We need to work with special urgency on this problem, especially as we approach the first anniversary of our bilateral agreement on market access. It is good that we buy much from China; but China must open its market wider to our goods and

services. Success in opening your market more will help to generate momentum behind our work aimed at China's resumption of GATT membership as well as reduce bilateral frictions. We also require more conspicuous progress in implementation of our agreement on protection of intellectual property rights.

Concerns over China's trade practices are reinforced by other economic and commercial issues which, if not solved quickly, could also propel our relationship into a downward spiral characterized by sanctions and retaliation. Textiles is one conspicuous example, and we have recently held talks -- disappointing to us -- centering around the problems of transshipments and labelling.

But we wish to emphasize: our strong desire is to have constructive dialogue on these issues, and to work toward solutions which are reasonable and mutually beneficial.

The administration has been carefully reviewing our system of export controls with the intent of rationalizing and liberalizing some features of it. Without prejudging the outcome of this review, we see promise of expanded commercial cooperation in certain high technology areas. We are also looking into ways that the administration might lend more vigorous support to American firms seeking to expand exports to China.

We believe the prospect of cooperation on environmental issues is especially bright, and that American business can deliver precisely the goods and technologies that are suited to Chinese developmental needs and environmental requirements. We need to explore these possibilities.

We would stress that in both the non-proliferation and economic area we are not making new demands. We are merely seeking the faithful implementation of past agreements which would serve the interests of both countries.

Suffice it to say that our agenda is a full and complex one which will require the ingenuity and energy of our diplomats and specialists. Above all it will require political will by our leaders.

Maximizing the Chances for Progress

We are obliged to recognize the current reality: our relationship is under serious strain, our bilateral communications have become difficult and our mutual confidence has plummeted.

Despite this array of problems, misunderstandings and frictions, we now have before us an opportunity to take stock of our relationship and to devise together a scenario which carries hope of making genuine progress.

Now is the time to engage seriously. Next week Secretary Christopher will hold the annual UNGA bilateral with Foreign Minister Qian. This will afford an early opportunity for us to discuss our relationship in depth; we look forward to a serious, and concrete, discussion of the broad range of bilateral issues I am raising today, as well as international questions.

In the coming months we are prepared to undertake a series of high-level visits in both directions. We strongly urge that Assistant Secretary Shattuck continue his discussions on human rights by visiting China in October. That is indispensable to our laying the foundation for making necessary progress toward extension of China's MFN eligibility next spring.

Our concept also envisages visits by senior economic and commercial policy officials, as well as by senior officials responsible for military and security affairs. For example, we are considering sending to Beijing a delegation led by Assistant Secretary of Defense Freeman and including a flag-rank officer. We believe it very important to hear China's views on the emerging shape of the post-Cold War world, and to assure that we have understood each other clearly and left no room for misinterpretation regarding the other's motives and goals.

Treasury Secretary Bentsen has under consideration an early visit to China, as does Agriculture Secretary Espy. The potential benefits of such exchanges in expanding our economic cooperation go without saying. Exchanges of other senior level visits are also desirable from our point of view.

We are pleased that President Jiang Zemin will come to Seattle for the APEC leaders meeting in November. We are prepared to arrange a separate bilateral meeting with the President.

Both sides should exchange views on reinvigoration of the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade, as well as the Joint Economic Commission and the Joint Commission on Science and Technology, all of which hold potential to generate concrete results which are advantageous to us both. One particularly promising area for our cooperation is in the field of energy and the environment.

If both sides demonstrate the necessary political resolve, we can utilize these exchanges to reverse the present negative trend in Sino-U.S. ties and to lay the foundation for a constructive relationship in the future.

But to do this will require sincerity, a sense of urgency, and a commitment to achieving progress in the areas outlined. Here it is necessary to underscore once again the special urgency we attach to achieving progress on human rights. The matter is very simple: President Clinton's Executive Order dated May 28, 1993 states explicitly that renewal of China's MFN status in 1994

will depend upon significant, overall progress in the area of human rights. Furthermore, the key impressions as to progress -- or lack of it -- are already being formed. The Congress expects to hold a mid-year review of our progress toward meeting the President's MFN goals, so if we are to show something this must be within the next couple of months.

The areas of greatest concern are clearly specified in the President's Executive Order; it is not necessary to rehearse all of them here. We strongly urge you to consider carefully whether you ought not make an early positive decision in the most crucial areas: inviting an impartial international organization such as the Red Cross to visit Chinese prisons; issuing passports to those Chinese citizens eligible to receive them but who have not yet been able to obtain them; implementing fully our prison labor memorandum of understanding; closing the book once and for all on the 1989 Tiananmen tragedy by releasing and accounting for prisoners; and entering a sincere dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his designee.

These are the key things. Assistant Secretary Shattuck will be prepared to be more explicit when he visits China. If sufficient progress is registered in the core areas, that will take us through the MFN debate. We can assure you that we will not move the goalposts -- that is, come back at you with new requests for action -- and that we will work assiduously to remove the annual MFN debate as the central organizing principle for our dialogue that it has become since 1989. We wish to view our complex relationship as a totality, and to manage that relationship from a broader, more nuanced perspective.

Doing these things will move us a great distance toward the relationship we both seek. It will help smooth the way for next spring's MFN decision, and -- given sufficient progress -- may even permit us to regularize our discussions of human rights matters in the future in a context outside of MFN considerations. Such is our hope.

It should be added, in the spirit of candor, that some may be inclined to calculate that withdrawal of China's MFN eligibility is an empty threat owing to considerations including American business interests and implications for the Hong Kong and Taiwan economies. It is not an empty threat. There is no question but that failure to renew China's MFN status will also harm U.S. business interests. We would not welcome withdrawal of China's MFN eligibility, and are prepared to work hard to weather the current storm in our relations, but we will not be able to defend extension absent "significant, overall progress." It is important that this message be clearly conveyed to your government in Beijing.

We hope in any event that you will regard, as we do, the Christopher/Qian meeting next week as an opportunity for a new beginning, and that the Foreign Minister will come prepared to

survey conceptually as well as concretely the essential ingredients for progress.

In summary, today's meeting should be seen as clear evidence of President Clinton's personal interest in building a firm, comprehensive relationship based on mutual respect through which we pursue common strategic and economic goals. We regard a strong, prosperous, stable China as in our interests. We hope that your leaders want a good relations with the United States and an end to the series of confrontations which have plagued our ties in the past several years, including now. Let us jointly rededicate ourselves to firm, positive U.S.-China relations and an action plan necessary to achieve them. Some steps along the path to a positive new relationship will be difficult for you, as will be some of the steps we must take. For example the human rights steps we have raised in connection with our intent to move MFN from the center of the relationship may entail some problems for you, but the rewards will be great. Similarly, our intent to resume exchanges of senior-level visits, liberalize technology trade controls, and work closely with you to remove sanctions related to our missile proliferation concerns will meet internal opposition. The leaders of our two great countries should not be deterred by these difficulties. We owe it to our peoples and to the world to make all necessary efforts to overcome such obstacles.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

12-Oct-1993 14:26 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

WIEDEMANN@A1@OEOB
RAGLE@A1@OEOB
PONEMAN@A1@OEOB

FROM: White House Situation Room
(WHSR@A1@WHSR)

SUBJECT: PRC RESPONSE TO SEPTEMBER 24 NON-PAPER

<DIST>
SIT: PONEMAN RAGLE WHSR_SPECIAL WIEDEMANN

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IMMEDIATE

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SECSTATE WASHDC

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INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9314
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7874

<SUBJ>
PRC RESPONSE TO SEPTEMBER 24 NON-PAPER
ON US-PRC RELATIONS

<TEXT>
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 311111

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CIA EYES ONLY WOOLSEY
FOLLOWING BEIJING 036726 DATED OCT 11 1993 SENT ACTION
SECSTATE WASHDC BEING REPEATED FOR YOUR INFO.

QUOTE
~~SECRET~~ BEIJING 036726

NODIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, CH
SUBJECT: PRC RESPONSE TO SEPTEMBER 24 NON-PAPER
ON US-PRC RELATIONS

REF: STATE 294663
1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A CHINESE NON-PAPER ON US-PRC
RELATIONS HANDED BY VICE FOREIGN MINISTER LIU HUAQIU TO

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2015-0221-M (2.08)
3/11/2020 KDE

THE AMBASSADOR IN A MEETING ON OCTOBER 11. THE PAPER REPRESENTS THE CHINESE RESPONSE TO THE US NON-PAPER ON US-PRC RELATIONS THAT NSC ADVISOR LAKE GAVE PRC AMBASSADOR LI DAOYU ON SEPTEMBER 25 (REFTEL). THE TEXT OF A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT JIANG ZEMIN TO PRESIDENT CLINTON THAT VFM LIU GAVE THE AMBASSADOR AT THE SAME TIME IS BEING TRANSMITTED BY SEPTTEL.

3. BEGIN TEXT. (I) CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES ARE TWO GREAT COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD. AS COUNTRIES OF MAJOR INFLUENCE ON THE TWO SIDES OF THE PACIFIC OCEAN AND PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, THE TWO COUNTRIES SHARE AN UNSHIRKABLE AND IMPORTANT RESPONSIBILITY FOR PEACE, SECURITY, AND STABILITY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION AND THE WORLD AT LARGE. THE IMPORTANCE OF SINO-U.S. RELATIONS IS DETERMINED BY THEIR INTRINSIC VALUE. THE MAINTENANCE OF A STABLE AND LASTING RELATIONSHIP OF COOPERATION BETWEEN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES IS NOT DIRECTED AGAINST ANY THIRD COUNTRY. IT ACCORDS WITH THE FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS OF THE TWO PEOPLES AND IS WELCOMED BY PEOPLE AROUND THE WORLD.

4. (II) SINO-U.S. RELATIONS ENJOY A SOLID BASIS AND A BROAD PROSPECT OF DEVELOPMENT. CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES SHARE A BROAD RANGE OF COMMON INTERESTS ON MAJOR INTERNATIONAL ISSUES. ON SUCH QUESTIONS AS PROMOTING WORLD ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, IMPROVING HUMAN ENVIRONMENT AND MAINTAINING REGIONAL SECURITY, CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES ARE REQUIRED TO PLAY THEIR RESPECTIVE ROLES AND EXPAND THEIR COOPERATION. CHINA, THE BIGGEST DEVELOPING COUNTRY IN THE WORLD, IS NOW DEDICATED TO ITS MODERNIZATION DRIVE. WHILE THE UNITED STATES, THE WORLD'S BIGGEST DEVELOPED COUNTRY, IS FACED WITH THE TASK OF REVITALIZING ITS ECONOMY. IT THUS SERVES THE PRACTICAL INTERESTS OF BOTH COUNTRIES AND BOTH PEOPLES TO GIVE FULL PLAY TO THE STRONG COMPLEMENTARITY OF THEIR ECONOMIES AND STEP UP BILATERAL EXCHANGE AND COOPERATION IN THE ECONOMIC, TRADE, SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL FIELDS. THE CHINESE AND AMERICAN PEOPLES CHERISH A DEEP FRIENDSHIP TOWARDS EACH OTHER. TO ENHANCE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND EXCHANGE, LEARN FROM EACH OTHER'S STRONG POINTS, RESPECT EACH OTHER AND LIVE TOGETHER IN AMITY - THIS IS THE COMMON WISH OF THE TWO PEOPLES THAT NO FORCE CAN EVER CHANGE. THE DRASTIC CHANGES IN THE WORLD HAVE NOT CHANGED THESE UNDERLYING FACTORS IN SINO-U.S. RELATIONS.

5. (III) BOTH CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES ARE INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGN STATES. BECAUSE OF DIFFERENCES IN SOCIAL SYSTEM, IDEOLOGY, CULTURAL TRADITION AND HISTORY, IT IS NATURAL FOR THEM TO DISAGREE WITH EACH OTHER IN CERTAIN ASPECTS. IT IS NEITHER REALISTIC NOR BENEFICIAL FOR EITHER SIDE TO DEMAND UNIFORMITY FROM THE OTHER ACCORDING TO ITS OWN MORAL STANDARD OR VALUE JUDGMENT. SINO-U.S. RELATIONS HAVE NEVER BEEN BASED ON THE COMMONALITY OF SOCIAL SYSTEM OR IDEOLOGY, NOR HAS THIS EVER BEEN OUR GOAL. HISTORY HAS SHOWN THAT SO LONG AS BOTH SIDES HANDLE BILATERAL RELATIONS FROM A LONG-TERM AND

STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE, WE CAN EXPAND THE COMMON GROUND WHERE OUR INTERESTS CONVERGE AND ENHANCE OUR COOPERATION AND FRIENDSHIP WITH CONCERTED EFFORTS, AND PREVENT OUR DIFFERENCES FROM UNDERMINING THE BASIS OF BILATERAL RELATIONS.

6. (IV) THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT HAS ALL ALONG ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO SINO-U.S. RELATIONS AND PLACED THEM IN AN IMPORTANT POSITION IN ITS FOREIGN POLICY. CHINA HAS NEVER BEEN A THREAT TO U.S. SECURITY, NOR WILL IT EVER BECOME ONE. CHINA HAS ALWAYS APPROACHED SINO-U.S. RELATIONS FROM A LONG-TERM AND OVERALL POINT OF VIEW AND HAS NEVER DONE ANYTHING TO UNDERMINE US. INTERESTS OR HURT THE FEELINGS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. CHINA HAS EXERTED TREMENDOUS EFFORTS TO DEVELOP A SOUND AND STABLE SINO-U.S.

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RELATIONSHIP. AFTER MR. CLINTON BECAME U.S. PRESIDENT, CHINESE PRESIDENT JIANG ZEMIN CLEARLY POINTED OUT THAT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE THREE SINO-U.S. JOINT COMMUNIQUE, CHINA HOPES TO CULTIVATE A RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. THAT IS CHARACTERIZED BY MORE TRUST, LESS TROUBLE, CLOSER COOPERATION AND NO CONFRONTATION. THIS REALISTIC AND FORWARD-LOOKING POSITION OF OURS FULLY TESTIFIES TO OUR SINCERITY, FORESIGHT AND BROAD-MINDEDNESS.

7. BETTER AND CLOSER SINO-U.S. RELATIONS REQUIRE THE CONCERTED EFFORTS FROM BOTH SIDES. THE CURRENT STATE OF BILATERAL RELATIONS, WHICH IS NOT YET NORMAL, IS NOT CAUSED BY THE CHINESE SIDE, NOR IS IT SOMETHING WE WISH TO SEE. CERTAIN U.S. MOVES IN RECENT YEARS, PARTICULARLY THOSE TAKEN SINCE SEPTEMBER 1992, HAVE SERIOUSLY UNDERMINED CHINA'S SOVEREIGNTY, DIGNITY AND INTERESTS, WHICH CANNOT BUT AROUSE THE INDIGNATION AND REGRET OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE. EVEN UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, WE HAVE STILL DEMONSTRATED UTMOST RESTRAINT. WE HOPE THAT THE U.S. SIDE WILL SHOW WITH CONCRETE DEEDS THAT IT CARES FOR BETTER SINO-U.S. RELATIONS AND REFRAIN FROM DOING ANYTHING TO UNDERMINE BILATERAL RELATIONS SO AS TO PREVENT FURTHER DETERIORATION IN THESE RELATIONS.

8. (V) IN HIS LETTER PRESIDENT JIANG ZEMIN DATED SEPTEMBER 24, PRESIDENT CLINTON INDICATED HIS DEEP INTEREST IN GOOD AND CLOSE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AND EXPRESSED HOPES FOR CLOSER COOPERATION IN ADVANCING THE COMMON INTERESTS OF THE TWO SIDES IN ALL FIELDS. IN ITS NON-PAPER, THE U.S. SIDE ALSO EXPRESSES HOPES FOR A COMPREHENSIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA AND THE ADVANCEMENT OF SHARED STRATEGIC AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS THROUGH COOPERATION PREDICATED UPON EQUALITY AND MUTUAL BENEFIT. WE APPRECIATE THIS. ALL POSITIVE INITIATIVES FROM THE U.S. SIDE THAT CONTRIBUTE TO BETTER AND CLOSER SINO-U.S. RELATIONS WILL RECEIVE THE SUPPORT AND FAVORABLE RESPONSE FROM THE CHINESE SIDE.

9. (VI) SINO-U.S. RELATIONS ARE NOW AT THE CROSS-ROADS.

WHETHER THEY WILL GO IS A QUESTION WHICH NOT ONLY DEEPLY CONCERNS THE CHINESE AND AMERICAN PEOPLES, BUT ALSO ATTRACTS WIDESPREAD ATTENTION FROM THE PEOPLE IN THE REST OF THE WORLD. QUITE A FEW OPPORTUNITIES THAT COULD HAVE BEEN USED TO IMPROVE AND DEVELOP BILATERAL RELATIONS HAVE BEEN MISSED. NOW FOR THE INTERESTS OF OUR TWO PEOPLES AND THE PEOPLE OF THE WHOLE WORLD, WE MUST NOT SIT BY AND LET SLIP ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY. THE RECENT MEETING BETWEEN OUR FOREIGN MINISTERS IN NEW YORK WAS HELPFUL. CHINA'S INITIATIVES FOR FURTHER IMPROVING AND DEVELOPING SINO-U.S. RELATIONS CAN BE SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS:

10. (1) THE TWO SIDES PLACE THEIR BILATERAL RELATIONS ON A LONG-TERM AND BROAD STRATEGIC BASIS. IN HANDLING THE RELATIONS, WE SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THE LARGER PICTURE INSTEAD OF QUIBBLING OVER TRIVIALITIES. WE SHOULD SET OUT MINDS ON THE FUTURE AND THE 21ST CENTURY INSTEAD OF FOCUSING ON MATTERS OF MARGINAL IMPORTANCE OF THE MOMENT.

11. (2) THE TWO SIDES STRICTLY ABIDE BY THE PRINCIPLES OF THE THREE SINO-U.S. JOINT COMMUNIQUE, RESPECT EACH OTHER, REFRAIN FROM INTERFERENCE IN EACH OTHER'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS, KEEP THE BILATERAL ELATIONS CLEAR OF IDEOLOGICAL INTERFERENCE AND PRESERVE AND EXPAND COMMON INTERESTS. WITH REGARD TO THE EXISTING DISPUTES, THE TWO SIDES MAY CONDUCT CONSULTATIONS ON AN EQUAL FOOTING IN A SPIRIT OF MUTUAL RESPECT AND SEEKING COMMON GROUND WHILE PUTTING ASIDE DIFFERENCES. ONE SHOULD NOT ONLY THINK IN TERMS OF ITS OWN INTERESTS BUT ALSO ACCOMMODATE THE INTERESTS OF THE OTHER SIDE. AS A PRINCIPLE TO BE FOLLOWED, WHEN DISPUTE OR DISAGREEMENT OCCURS, BOTH SIDES SHOULD SHOW RESTRAINT AND WORK TO RESOLVE IT, AND NEITHER SHOULD ACT IN ANYWAY THAT WILL UNDERMINE THE SOVEREIGNTY AND DIGNITY OF THE OTHER OR HURT THE FEELINGS OF ITS PEOPLE, STILL LESS SHOULD IT RESORT TO SANCTIONS OR THREAT OF SANCTIONS.

12. (3) THE TWO SIDES MAKE JOINT EFFORTS TO PUT AN EARLY END TO THE PAST DISPUTES AND CLEAR THE WAY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF SINO-U.S. RELATIONS. FIRST, THE U.S. SIDE ENDS, IN A SUBSTANTIVE WAY, ITS SANCTIONS AGAINST CHINA PUT IN PLACE SINCE 1989 SO AS TO BRING BILATERAL RELATIONS COMPLETELY BACK TO NORMAL. SECOND, THE U.S. SIDE BRINGS AN END TO THE DISPUTE OVER THE "YIN HE" INCIDENT BY MAKING AN APOLOGY TO THE CHINESE SIDE AND COMPENSATING FOR THE CHINESE LOSSES. THIRD, THE U.S. SIDE LIFTS SANCTIONS AGAINST CHINA OVER THE SO-CALLED M-11 MISSILE ISSUE. FOURTH, THE U.S. SIDE STOPS ACTIVITIES TO SET UP THE ANTI-CHINA RADIO STATION.

13. (4) POSITIVE MEASURES SHOULD BE TAKEN TO REESTABLISH

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MUTUAL TRUST. FIRST, CONTACTS AND EXCHANGE OF VISITS AT THE TOP LEVEL SHOULD BE RESTORED. THE FORMAL MEETING IN SEATTLE BETWEEN PRESIDENT JIANG ZEMIN AND PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON IN NOVEMBER WILL BE A GOOD BEGINNING, AND IT SHOULD BE SEIZED AS AN OPPORTUNE MOMENT TO RESTORE THE

NORMAL CONTACTS, DIALOGUES AND EXCHANGE OF VISITS BETWEEN THE TOP LEADERS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES. SECOND, THE NUMBER OF CONTACT AND EXCHANGE OF VISITS BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES SHOULD BE INCREASED SO AS TO STEP UP OUR CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION ON THE BILATERAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ISSUES OF COMMON INTEREST. THIRD, EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE VARIOUS GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES AT DIFFERENT LEVELS AND IN DIFFERENT FIELDS SHOULD BE RESTORED AND STRENGTHENED SO AS TO SOLIDIFY THE BASIS OF SINO-U.S. RELATIONS.

14. (5) JOINT EFFORTS SHOULD BE MADE TO OPEN UP THE FUTURE OF SINO-U.S. RELATIONS. FIRST, THE ISSUE OF THE RECIPROCAL GRANTING OF MFN STATUS SHOULD BE SETTLED ONCE AND FOR ALL LEST IT INTERRUPTS THE GROWTH OF BILATERAL RELATIONS. SECOND, THE SINO-U.S. JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE AND JOINT COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY SHOULD BE RECONVENED THIS YEAR, SO THAT ALL THE THREE SINO-U.S. JOINT COMMITTEES WILL FULLY RESTORE THEIR NORMAL OPERATIONS. THIRD, THE UNITED STATES HONORS ITS COMMITMENTS TO STAUNCHLY SUPPORT CHINA'S RESUMPTION OF ITS STATUS AS A GATT CONTRACTING PARTY. FOURTH, THE U.S. SIDE SHOULD HANDLE THE TAIWAN QUESTION IN STRICT ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES LAID DOWN IN THE THREE SINO-U.S. JOINT COMMUNIQUE AND REFRAIN FROM ANY CONTACTS OR EXCHANGES OF AN OFFICIAL NATURE WITH THE TAIWAN AUTHORITIES AND FROM ANY SUPPORT TO THE ACTIVITIES FOR "TAIWAN INDEPENDENCE." FIFTH, THE U.S. SIDE SHOULD STRICTLY ABIDE BY THE COMMUNIQUE OF AUGUST 17 AND STOP TRANSFERRING SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO TAIWAN AND PROPERLY SETTLE THE QUESTION OF ITS SELLING OF F-16S TO TAIWAN IN KEEPING WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF THE COMMUNIQUE. THE TWO SIDES SHOULD ESTABLISH AS SOON AS POSSIBLE A CONSULTATION MECHANISM ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AUGUST 17 COMMUNIQUE. SIXTH, THE U.S. SIDE SHOULD STOP USING MATTERS THAT ARE PURELY CHINA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS, SUCH AS THE QUESTION OF TIBET, TO ATTACK CHINA AND INTERFERE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS. SEVENTH, EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE PARLIAMENTS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES SHOULD BE PROMOTED SO AS TO DEEPEN MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND BRING INTO PLAY THE POSITIVE ROLE OF THE TWO LEGISLATURES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF BILATERAL RELATIONS. EIGHTH, EFFORTS SHOULD BE MADE TO PROMOTE THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMY, TRADE, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE TWO COUNTRIES BY LIBERALIZING TECHNOLOGY EXPORT CONTROL, BROADENING BILATERAL COOPERATION, ENCOURAGING MUTUAL INVESTMENT AND IMPROVING INVESTMENT ENVIRONMENT. THE EXISTING PROBLEMS SHOULD BE SETTLED THROUGH CONSULTATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE THREE MEMORANDUMS OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. NINTH, CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES IN INTERNATIONAL FIELDS SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED AND EXPANDED.

15. (6) THE CHINESE SIDE WELCOMES VISITS TO CHINA BY U.S. TREASURY SECRETARY BENTSEN, AGRICULTURE SECRETARY ESPY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE SHATTUCK AND ASSISTANT

DEFENSE SECRETARY FREEMAN. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
UNDERSTANDING REACHED BY THE TWO FOREIGN MINISTERS DURING
THEIR MEETING, VICE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES
MAY MEET SOON IN BEIJING OR WASHINGTON TO HOLD
COMPREHENSIVE CONSULTATIONS ON SINO-U.S. RELATIONS.

ROY

UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 6, 1993

*SRB /
Get's decision.
R*



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: KENT WIEDEMANN *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: China PC Meeting, November 10, 1993, 3:00P

The China PC meeting next week was scheduled at Mickie Kantor's request, and reflected his and Bob Rubin's desire to review the China policy and implementation strategy (process) approved by the President on September 22 and outlined by you to Ambassador Li Daoyu on September 24. You do not need to be defensive. The strategy approved by the President and the derivative non-paper you delivered to the Chinese had been vetted in substance thoroughly by all agencies at the IWG and Deputies levels. No new ground was broken. ✓

Your Goals:

- o Keep the focus of the meeting on implementation of the President's engagement strategy. Explain that it is predicated on the need to arrest a downward spiral in relations which is harming our ability to achieve key U.S. objectives in nonproliferation, human rights and trade. Note the critical need for rapid action by China on human rights to place MFN out of danger. Explain the modalities and process of the new strategy -- more frequent dialogue at levels necessary to conduct important U.S. business.
- o China is used to disincentives in the relationship--sanctions, etc. Some carrots must also be applied, and it must be clear to the Chinese that if they respond to our clearly defined requirements in human rights, nonproliferation or trade, we will not raise the bar and ask for still more. The pot at the end of the rainbow is a strong relationship with us --including increased global cooperation, technology cooperation (and liberalization) and maintenance of China's access to their most important market--the U.S. If China cooperates fully, we have undertaken to do our best to move MFN from the center of the relationship and escape from the debilitating annual will-we-or-won't-we struggle that hangs as a yoke on productive relations, including important U.S. commercial interests.

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PER E.O. 13526
2015-0221-M (2.09)
3/11/2020 KDE

- o You should take time to underscore the need for all agencies to accept that their actions on China must be coordinated to fit within the strategy framework. The Senior Steering Group on China, established by the NSC and chaired by Winston Lord, is the primary coordinating mechanism. It will meet regularly at the NSC to take stock of policy results and developments, review agency plans for new action and any major public statements or press releases on China. Conference calls and teleconferences can deal with fast-breaking situations or the need for urgent decision by the SSG. It will refer major new issues to the Deputies for decision.

- o Review differences between U.S. and Chinese positions as shown in exchange of non-papers: problems center on China's resistance to our human rights, possible belief that we are not serious about either not raising the goal posts if China acted or withdrawing MFN if China stiffes us. Nonproliferation progress -- especially on the M-11 issue is complicated by China's linking it to our sale of F-16's to Taiwan and thus seeking to make our respective demands symmetrical elements of "regional security" issues. Solutions to trade problems are impeded by a host of factors ranging from lack of central control over provincial trade activities, typical third-world-style protectionism, growing competitive challenge of Europeans and Asians to our firms, Chinese resentment of our tendency to address trade disputes through unilateral sanctions, and misguided belief that we are renegeing on a commitment to support China's accession to the GATT without conditions.

- o Have relevant agencies make brief reports on early results of the process: assessments of the Shattuck, Espy, Barshefsky, Freeman visits to China, and this week's visit to Washington by Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu.

- o Review status of most critical issues: human rights, M-11s, IPR, textile transshipments, market access MOU and solicit ideas -- sticks and carrots -- for breaking impasses. Focus on whether significant progress is achievable before the President meets with Jiang Zemin (unlikely in ten days remaining before Seattle).
 - Carrots to be examined are: (proliferation) raise level of dialogue on 1982 Taiwan arms-sale communique, break loose licenses on Cray weather-forecasting computer; (trade and proliferation, perhaps human rights) lift post-Tiananmen sanctions blocking Trade and Development Agency and OPIC activity in China, liberalize technology export controls, license balance-of-plant equipment exports (non-nuclear power equipment elements for nuclear power plants); license two commercial satellites under Commerce Dept. license.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the U.S.
Representative to the United
Nations

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. BOWMAN CUTTER
Deputy Assistant to the
President for Economic
Policy

MR. EDWARD KNIGHT
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T.R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. ANTHONY A. DAS
Executive Secretary
Department of Commerce

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Executive Director for Policy
Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on China, Wednesday,
November 10, 1993 at 3:00 p.m. (C)

Attached at Tab A is an agenda for a Principals Committee Meeting on China, to be held Wednesday, November 10, 1993 at 3:00 p.m. ~~o'clock~~. The purpose of the meeting is to review the President's China policy and implementation process. Special focus will be on recent results of high-level visits to Beijing to pursue U.S. interests in the areas of human rights, nonproliferation and trade. Tactics for gaining early progress on human rights and other key issues will be decided, including application to China

of incentives and disincentives. At Tabs B and C are a Bilateral Issues Summary and the China Strategy Paper ~~as Approved by the President~~) No. Tab D is the U.S. Non-Paper of September 24 to Chinese Outlining our Approach and Tab E, the Chinese Response to our Non-Paper. (C)

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachments

- Tab A PC Meeting Agenda
- Tab B Bilateral Issues Summary
- Tab C China Strategy Paper ~~as Approved by the President~~
- Tab D U.S. Non-Paper
- Tab E China's Response to our Non-paper

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:
PC0058 PC Meeting on China, February 10, 1994

Staff Office-Individual:
Records Management

Original OA/ID Number:
4007

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. email	Kent Wiedemann to Cathy Millison. [partial] [CIA Act] (1 page)	02/10/1994	P3/b(3)
001b. draft	Name [partial] [CIA Act] (1 page)	02/10/1994	P3/b(3)
002. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of the PC Meeting on China (3 pages) <i>partial release</i>	02/10/1994	P1/b(1)-b(3) <i>VDE 8/11/2020</i>
003a. memo	Kent Wiedemann to Anthony Lake re: China Principals Meeting, Feb. 10 (3 pages)	02/09/1994	P1/b(1)
003b. agenda	Principals Committee Meeting on China, February 10, 1994 [Record ID: 9420092] [with marginalia] (1 page)	02/10/1994	P1/b(1) <i>VDE 8/11/2020</i>
003c. paper	re: Status of China Engagement Strategy: Discussion Paper for Principals Committee (27 pages)	02/08/1994	P1/b(1)
003d. cable	re: US China Relations at Mid Term (9 pages)	02/09/1994	P1/b(1) <i>VDE 3/11/2020</i>
003e. paper	re: Status of China Engagement Strategy: Discussion Paper for Principals Committee (28 pages)	02/08/1994	P1/b(1)
003f. note	[Sent via fax] David Brown to Kent Wiedemann. (1 page)	02/08/1994	P1/b(1)
004a. agenda	Principals Committee Meeting on China, February 10, 1994. [Record ID: 9420092] (1 page)	02/10/1994	P1/b(1) <i>VDE 8/11/2020</i>
004b. paper	re: Status of China Engagement Strategy. [Duplicate of 003e] (28 pages)	02/08/1994	P1/b(1)
004c. list	Principals Committee Meeting, February 10, 1994. [partial] [CIA Act] (1 page)	02/10/1994	P3/b(3)

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PC0058 PC Meeting on China, February 10, 1994

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004d. notes	re: [Kent Wiedemann's Notes of Minutes from China PC Meeting, 2/10/94] (16 pages) <i>partial release</i>	02/10/1994	P1/b(1) <i>KDE 3/11/2020</i>

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0058 PC Meeting on China, February 10, 1994

2015-0221-M

rs1184

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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TO: LAKE

FROM: WIEDEMANN

DOC DATE: 15 FEB 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
MINUTES

PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MINUTES FOR 10 FEB PC MTG ON CHINA

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE DATE: 18 FEB 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WIEDEMANN

LOGREF: 9420092 9420177

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: PC0058

CODES: CPR

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *[Signature]* NARA, Date *7/15/2019*
2015-0221-AM

COMMENTS: MINUTES FOR THIS MTG ARE INCOMPLETE. ONLY NOTES FM STAFF OFFICER ARE AVAILABLE FOR THE FILE. WIEDEMANN NOTEBOOK IS ATTACHED.

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB CLOSED BY: NSKDB DOC 1 OF 1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001

X 94040916 FOR RECORD PURPOSES



Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. email	Kent Wiedemann to Cathy Millison. [partial] [CIA Act] (1 page)	02/10/1994	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0058 PC Meeting on China, February 10, 1994

2015-0221-M
rs1184

RESTRICTION CODES

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Minutes - 20195

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

10-Feb-1994 13:00 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Kent M. Wiedemann

(WIEDEMANN)

FROM:

Cathy Millison
(MILLISON)

SUBJECT:

PARTICIPANTS AT TODAY'S PC MEETING

PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING
FEBRUARY 10, 1994
1:45 - 3:15 P.M.
SITUATION ROOM

Chair
Anthony Lake

White House
Samuel Berger
Nancy Soderberg

OVP
Leon Fuerth ✓

NSC
Kent Wiedemann

State
Warren Christopher
Winston Lord ✓

TREASURY
Secretary Lloyd Bentsen
Larry Summers ✓

DOD
Secretary William Perry ✓
Frank Wisner

COMMERCE
Secretary Ron Brown ✓
Jeffrey Garten

USTR
Ambassador Mickey Kantor ✓
Charlene Barshefsky

USUN
Rick Inderfurth ✓
David Scheffer ✓

CIA

(b)(3)

[001a]

JCS

Admiral David Jeremiah
Frank L. Bowman

NEC

Robert Rubin
W. Bowman Cutter

ACDA

John Holum

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

20195

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 15, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: KENT WIEDEMANN

SUBJECT: Minutes of Principals Committee Meeting on China
February 10, 1994 from 1:45 - 3:15 p.m.

Attached at Tab I are the Minutes for the PC Meeting on China on
February 10, 1994.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be approved and
filed for the record.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Minutes of PC Meeting

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 1.4
White House Guidelines, 1/21/2006
By VR NARA, D... 1/2019
2015-0221

SECRET
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

Clinton Presidential Records Digital Records Marker

This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

This marker identifies the place of a tabbed divider. Given our digitization capabilities, we are sometimes unable to adequately scan such dividers. The title from the original document is indicated below.

Divider Title: TAB I

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. draft	Name [partial] [CIA Act] (1 page)	02/10/1994	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0058 PC Meeting on China, February 10, 1994

2015-0221-M
rs1184

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D C 20508

Meeting of the National Security Council

DATE: February 10, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 1:40 - 3:15 P.M.

SUBJECT: Minutes of Principals Meeting on China (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

The Vice President's Office
Leon Fuerth

White House
Anthony Lake
Samuel Berger
Nancy Soderberg

State
Warren Christopher
Winston Lord

NSC
Kent Wiedemann

Treasury
Secretary Lloyd Bentsen
Larry Summers

DOD
Secretary William Perry
Frank Wisner

COMMERCE
Secretary Ron Brown
Jeffrey Garten

USTR
Ambassador Mickey Kantor
Charlene Barshefsky

USUN
Rick Inderfuert
David Scheffer

CIA

(b)(3)

[001b]

Minutes

Kent, underline speaker's name, e.g.

Mr. Anthony Lake:

TO: LAKE

FROM: WIEDEMANN

DOC DATE: 10 FEB 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
SOC

PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 10 FEB PC MTG ON CHINA

ACTION: OBE / STATUS OF ORIGINAL UNKNOWN DUE DATE: 14 FEB 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WIEDEMANN

LOGREF: 9420092 9420177

FILES: IFM C

NSCP: PC0058

CODES: CPR

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB

CLOSED BY: NSKDB

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *RL* NARA, Date *7/15/2014*
20150221-11

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~


20184

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 24, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: KENT WIEDEMANN 

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from Will Itoh to agency counterparts forwarding the Summary of Conclusions on the China PC of February 10, 1994.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the memo from Will Itoh to agency counterparts at Tab I forwarding the Summary of Conclusions at Tab A.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to Agency Counterparts
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By PL NARA, Date 7/15/2017
2015-0221-M

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. W. BOWMAN CUTTER
Deputy to the President
for Economic Policy

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. EDWARD KNIGHT
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

AMB. RICK INDERFUERTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the
United Nations

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. ANTHONY A. DAS
Executive Secretary
Department of Commerce

MS. BARBARA STARR
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Executive Director for Policy
Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions (S)

Attached at Tab A is the Summary of Conclusions for the
February 10, 1994 Principals Committee Meeting on China. (S)

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By 12 NARA, Date 7/15/2014

2015-0221 - m

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of the PC Meeting on China [partial] (1 page)	02/10/1994	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0058 PC Meeting on China, February 10, 1994

2015-0221-M
rs1184

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

20184

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0221-M (R.10)
3/11/2020 KDF

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: February 10, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 1:40 - 3:15 P.M.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of the PC Meeting on China (S)

The Vice President's Office:

Leon Fuerth

NEC:

Robert Rubin
W. Bowman Cutter

State:

Warren Christopher
Winston Lord

CIA:

James Woolsey

Treasury:

Secretary Lloyd Bentsen
Larry Summers

JCS:

Admiral David Jeremiah
Frank Bowman

DOD:

Secretary William Perry
Frank Wisner

ACDA

John Holum

Commerce:

Secretary Ron Brown
Jeffrey Garten

White House:

Samuel Berger
Nancy Soderberg

USTR:

Ambassador Mickey Kantor
Charlene Barshefsky

NSC:

Kent Wiedemann

USUN:

Rick Inderfurth
David Scheffer

Summary of Conclusions

- Participants agreed that they would frame choices for future action as we approach the decision on MFN renewal in late May, but defer strategic decisions pending further developments. (S)
- The Chinese, U.S. public and Congress must understand clearly that our policy of linking MFN renewal to human rights progress is firm and resolute. (S)
- Since we launched the strategy of engagement late last September, some significant -- though insufficient -- progress has been made. As things look now in May, the case for MFN will not be black or white. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

- Human rights: Release of two Tibetan and other political and religious activists. Some gains in John Shattuck's human rights dialogue, talks with the Chinese on prison inspections, Secretary Bentsen's success in gaining probable compliance with the prison-labor MOU and moderation of a dozen or so blocked passport cases are recent signs of positive action by China. There has also been some slippage -- passage of the eugenics law, arrest of foreign missionaries and some political dissidents. John Shattuck will return soon to Beijing under an agreement with the Chinese to pursue further progress on outstanding human rights issues related to the conditions in the President's Executive Order. In sum, there may yet be more progress, but there will likely also be some slippage. ~~(S)~~
- Non-proliferation: Cooperation on North Korea has so far been satisfactory. However, as yet there has been no progress on the serious outstanding question of Chinese adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Discussion on this key issue will recommence between Lynn Davis and her counterparts in Beijing in early March. ~~(S)~~
- Trade: USTR believes that China is making successful efforts to comply with the market-access MOU, is encouraged by new hints of enforcement of IPR laws, and sees as a step forward recent conclusion of a new multi-year textile agreement that reflects China's acceptance of a 15 percent cut in quotas. ~~(S)~~
- Although there are mixed messages from the Hill, opinion there -- at least in the House -- remains that China has failed to do enough to warrant renewal of MFN. Still, very few in Congress have any enthusiasm for withdrawing MFN in view of the potential consequences for important U.S. interests. ~~(S)~~
- Vital strategic and security issues would be affected, along with economic interests in China and the region. ~~(S)~~
- In coming weeks, thought must be given to when and how we will define more specifically what we need additionally from China to satisfy our human rights standards -- to a level sufficient to decide whether to de-link MFN from human rights if the Chinese were to measure up to the standard. ~~(S)~~
- Trends, not necessarily specific actions, are useful benchmarks of human-rights progress. Progress on Tibet would help; dialogue is needed by the Chinese and Tibetans. ~~(S)~~

SECRET

- If Chinese action on human rights justified delinking MFN from the issue, alternative instruments would have to be identified for use in leveraging continued human rights progress in China. (S)
- Lifting MFN as related to state enterprises had been suggested again recently by Rep. Pelosi and appealed to some in the Administration, though was seen to be fettered with legal and administrative complications. (S)
- A rifle shot approach to targeting human rights offenses is needed to replace the indiscriminate shotgun effect of MFN withdrawal. Leverage alternative to MFN requires more study. (S)
- Scheduled next steps are Shattuck's trip (March) and cabinet-level meetings in Washington of the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade and Joint S&T Commission (April). The JCCT will be advanced by a visit by U/S of Commerce Garten to Beijing this month. (S)
- All proposals by Senior U.S. officials to visit China in coming months must be studied and decided based on their contributions to securing the basis for MFN extension. (S)

SECRET

TO: LAKE

FROM: WIEDEMANN

DOC DATE: 09 FEB 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
HUMAN RIGHTS
INTL TRADE

PC
NON PROLIFERATION
MFN

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BRIEFING MEMO FOR 10 FEB PC MTG ON CHINA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE

DUE DATE: 12 FEB 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WIEDEMANN

LOGREF: 9420092 9420184

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: PC0058

CODES: CPR

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DARBY
MILLISON
NSC CHRON
SODERBERG
WIEDEMANN

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 7/15/2019
7 2015-0221-W

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB CLOSED BY: NSJDA DOC 1 OF 1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE
001

Z 94020920 FOR INFORMATION
X 94021110 NOTED BY LAKE

— Rec'd 2/9 7:37pm

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 20177
URGENT NOT PROOFED: AP SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG AP A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<u>AP</u> DepExecSec	<u>1</u>	<u>hall</u>	
ExecSec			
Staff Director			
D/APNSA	<u>2</u>	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
APNSA			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>		<u>NFA</u>
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS: PC mtg pkg, 2/10

cc: NS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. memo	Kent Wiedemann to Anthony Lake re: China Principals Meeting, Feb. 10 (3 pages)	02/09/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0058 PC Meeting on China, February 10, 1994

2015-0221-M
rs1184

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON CHINA

DATE: February 10, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 1:45 p.m. - 3:15 p.m.

AGENDA

- I. Introduction NSC
- II. Review of Comprehensive Strategy since November P.C. meeting, with emphasis on recent meetings with Foreign Minister Qian and Vice Foreign Minister Liu State
- III. Review of Secretary Bentsen's Beijing Visit Treasury
- IV. Prospects for Human Rights, Nonproliferation Progress State *win?*
- V. Status and Prospects of Trade Issues USTR
- VI. Review Congressional MFN Strategy State
- VII. Next Steps NSC

2 hours → ▲

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0821-M (4.12)
3/11/2020 KDE

*1. What is alternative to E.O. if delink?
2. What Chinese say?
3. What say if Chinese say what next year.*

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003c. paper	re: Status of China Engagement Strategy: Discussion Paper for Principals Committee (27 pages)	02/08/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0058 PC Meeting on China, February 10, 1994

2015-0221-M
rs1184

RESTRICTION CODES

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- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

09-Feb-1994 11:02 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

WIEDEMANN@A1@OEOB

FROM: White House Situation Room
(WHSR@A1@WHSR)

SUBJECT: US-CHINA RELATIONS AT MID-TERM

<DIST>

SIT: WHSR_SPECIAL WIEDEMANN

<PREC>

IMMEDIATE

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AMEMBASSY BEIJING

<TO>

SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4338

<SUBJ>

US-CHINA RELATIONS AT MID-TERM

<TEXT>

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIJING 004213

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PHUM, PREL, CH, US

SUBJECT: US-CHINA RELATIONS AT MID-TERM

REF: BEIJING 1089

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. THIS CABLE MAKES THE CASE FOR HOLDING OUT THE PROSPECT OF UNCONDITIONAL RENEWAL OF MFN FOR CHINA IF BEIJING CAN MEET SENSIBLY DEFINED CRITERIA FOR "OVERALL SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS" BY THE TIME OF THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION. IT ARGUES THAT THIS WILL MAXIMIZE INCENTIVES FOR THE CHINESE TO DO THEIR UTMOST TO MEET OUR HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS, BETTER POSITION US TO DEAL WITH ALTERNATIVE OUTCOMES, AND SERVE OUR LONGER TERM POLICY INTERESTS. WE BELIEVE THAT A/S SHATTUCK'S UPCOMING VISIT PROVIDES A TIMELY OPPORTUNITY TO INITIATE AN END GAME STRATEGY ON MFN DESIGNED TO CLARIFY OBJECTIVES AND FOCUS BEIJING'S EFFORTS. SUBSEQUENT HIGH LEVEL CONTACTS CAN REINFORCE THIS MESSAGE.

3. THE SECOND PART OF THE CABLE ASSESSES SOME OF THE

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2015-0221-M (2.13)

3/11/2020 KDE

ARGUMENTS FOR MAINTAINING CONDITIONAL MFN WHETHER OR NOT THE CHINESE MAKE OVERALL SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS. IT ARGUES THAT THE HUMAN RIGHTS TREND IN CHINA IS AGAIN IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION; THAT CURRENT CONDITIONS ON MFN SHOULD BE VIEWED AS THE PRICE CHINA MUST PAY TO REGAIN BIPARTISAN SUPPORT IN THE UNITED STATES FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS, NOT AS A "NORMAL" MEANS OF ADVANCING HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS; THAT WE CAN EXERT A POSITIVE INFLUENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA WITHOUT SUCH LINKAGE; AND THAT OUR HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS HELP DOCUMENT WHETHER CHINA IS BECOMING MORE OR LESS REPRESSIVE, NOT WHETHER IT IS DESERVING OF NON-DISCRIMINATORY TRADE TREATMENT. WE NOTE THE CONNECTION BETWEEN ECONOMIC PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IMPROVEMENTS IN CHINA. WE FAVOR KEEPING HUMAN RIGHTS AS A CORNERSTONE OF OUR APPROACH, BUT IN A BALANCED WAY THAT ENABLES US TO ARTICULATE OUR INTERESTS WITH RESPECT TO CHINA COHERENTLY AND OBJECTIVELY. WE OFFER THESE VIEWS IN THE HOPE THAT THEY WILL MAKE A CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRIBUTION TO CONSIDERATION OF THESE ISSUES IN WASHINGTON. END SUMMARY.

PART I: INTRODUCTION

4. ONE YEAR INTO THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION, AND WITH LESS THAN FOUR MONTHS REMAINING BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION ON MFN RENEWAL, WE HAVE PAUSED TO TAKE A LOOK AT OUR POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR DEALING WITH CHINA AND AT PROSPECTS DOWN THE ROAD. OUR CONCLUSION IS THAT WE ARE ON THE RIGHT TRACK: BOTH GOVERNMENTS ARE ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN ADDRESSING CORE ISSUES IN THE RELATIONSHIP IN A POSITIVE SPIRIT. BUT WE FACE A CHALLENGING END GAME THAT COULD COME UNRAVELED IN THE FACE OF REMAINING SERIOUS PROBLEMS, BOTH OF SUBSTANCE AND POLICY.

5. OF SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE, THE RELATIONSHIP IS STILL ACUTELY VULNERABLE TO THE POLITICAL WINDS STIRRED UP IN THE UNITED STATES BY THE TIANANMEN CRACKDOWN, AND TO THE VAGARIES OF THE REFORM PROCESS IN CHINA, WHERE CHINA'S LEADERS FACE THE DAUNTING TASK OF MANAGING RAPID ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CHANGE WHILE MAINTAINING STABILITY. FIGURATIVELY SPEAKING, THEY ARE RIDING THE CREST OF A WAVE WHICH CONSTANTLY THREATENS TO BREAK ON THE ROCKS OF CORRUPTION, GROWING INCOME DISPARITIES, WEAKENING CENTRAL CONTROL, A DISCREDITED IDEOLOGY, AND OUTMODED POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS. FAILURE OF REFORM IN CHINA WOULD INEVITABLY LEAD TO INSTABILITY, WHOSE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES COULD DWARF THOSE IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION AND CAST A PALL OVER PROSPECTS FOR THE POST COLD WAR WORLD. POSITIVE CHINESE POSTURE, INADEQUATE RESULTS TO DATE

6. OUR STRATEGY ON THE MFN QUESTION OVER THE NEXT FOUR MONTHS IS DIRECTLY RELEVANT TO THESE FACTORS. THE RESULTS TO DATE ARE BOTH EXCEPTIONAL AND INSUFFICIENT. ON THE ONE HAND, THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO ENGAGE CHINA AT HIGHER LEVELS LAST SEPTEMBER, COMBINED WITH THE STRONG AND CONSISTENT U.S. MESSAGE CONVEYED TO THE CHINESE AT ALL

LEVELS ON THE NEED FOR PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, HAS PRODUCED THE MOST FORWARD LEANING CHINESE POSTURE ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE LAST FIFTEEN YEARS. THIS COOPERATIVE POSTURE STANDS IN MARKED CONTRAST TO CHINA'S SURLY DEFENSIVENESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN DEALING WITH THE PREVIOUS U.S. ADMINISTRATION.

7. CHINA'S FORWARD LEANING POSTURE IS REFLECTED BOTH IN ACTIONS THE CHINESE HAVE TAKEN (E.G., RELEASING PROMINENT POLITICAL PRISONERS, DROPPING CHARGES AGAINST TIBETANS, BEGINNING A DIALOGUE WITH THE ICRC, AND COOPERATING ON THE PRISON LABOR MOU) AND IN CHINESE AFFIRMATION, DESPITE THEIR IRRITATION AT THE STRONG U.S. PRESSURE, THAT THEY WILL TAKE A "SERIOUS AND COOPERATIVE ATTITUDE" AND "DO ALL POSSIBLE UNDER CHINESE LAW" TO ADDRESS OUR CONCERNS. ON THE OTHER HAND, HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS CONTINUE, AND THE

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~ SECTION 02 OF 05 BEIJING 004213

NODIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, CH, US
SUBJECT: US-CHINA RELATIONS AT MID-TERM
ACTIONS TAKEN BY CHINA TO DATE TO MEET OUR CONCERNS FALL SHORT OF THE OVERALL SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS THAT WE SEEK. OUR STRATEGY MUST ADDRESS THIS SHORTFALL.
POLICY CONUNDRUMS: UNCONDITIONAL RENEWAL AND BOTTOM LINES

8. HERE WE FACE A DOUBLE POLICY CONUNDRUM.
-- ONLY BY INFORMING THE CHINESE THAT WE WILL SUPPORT UNCONDITIONAL RENEWAL OF MFN FOR 1994-95 IF THEY MAKE OVERALL SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS CAN WE MAXIMIZE INCENTIVES FOR CHINA TO TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS. IF THE CHINESE WERE TO TAKE THESE STEPS, HOWEVER, WE WOULD THEN HAVE TO PURSUE OUR HUMAN RIGHTS OBJECTIVES WITHOUT DIRECT LINKAGE TO OUR TRADE INTERESTS. CONVERSELY, FAILURE TO HOLD OUT THE PROSPECT OF UNCONDITIONAL MFN RENEWAL WILL COMPROMISE OUR ABILITY TO SECURE OVERALL SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS, QUITE LIKELY FORCING US TO CHOSE BETWEEN MFN WITHDRAWAL, WITH DETRIMENTAL CONSEQUENCES FOR THE REFORM PROCESS IN CHINA AND FOR U.S. ECONOMIC AND STRATEGIC INTERESTS, OR CONDITIONAL RENEWAL (UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE MFN LINKAGE COULD HAVE BOTH DIMINISHING EFFECTIVENESS AND NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES FOR OUR BURGEONING EXPORT INDUSTRIES IN THE CHINA MARKET).

-- THE SECOND POLICY CONUNDRUM IS THAT WE HAVE NOT YET DEFINED A BOTTOM LINE FOR THE CHINESE, EITHER IN TERMS OF WHAT THEY MUST DO, OR WHAT THEY WILL GAIN BY DOING IT. THE LONGER THIS SITUATION PERSISTS, THE MORE IT WILL UNDERCUT ATTAINMENT OF OUR OBJECTIVES AND RISK GRAVE CHINESE MISCALCULATIONS. IN ESSENCE, FAILURE TO DEFINE A BOTTOM LINE COULD BE EQUALLY DYSFUNCTIONAL, FROM A POLICY STANDPOINT, AS DEFINING AN ARBITRARY STANDARD FOR PROGRESS THAT TAKES NO ACCOUNT OF CHINESE REALITIES.
END GAME STRATEGY

9. HOW WE RESOLVE THESE CONUNDRUMS WILL DIRECTLY AFFECT

THE VIABILITY OF OUR POLICY IN TERMS OF TRANSLATING OUR COMMITMENT TO IMPROVEMENTS IN HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA INTO REALITY. IN THE ABSENCE OF CLEAR AND EXPLICIT SIGNALS ON OUR PART, THE CHINESE WILL REMAIN UNSURE AND DIVIDED OVER HOW AND WHETHER TO TRANSLATE "PROGRESS" INTO "OVERALL SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS." THIS WOULD DENY AMMUNITION TO THOSE MOST PREPARED TO PRESS FOR PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA AND SHARPLY INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD THAT BEIJING WILL RETREAT TO A CAUTIOUS END GAME STRATEGY FOCUSED ON DAMAGE LIMITATION RATHER THAN OVERALL SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS. SIMILARLY, SHOULD THE CHINESE MAKE DIFFICULT (FOR THEM) CONCESSIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, EXPECT UNCONDITIONAL MFN RENEWAL, BUT RECEIVE SOMETHING LESS, THEIR ANGER AND RESENTMENT WILL SERIOUSLY LIMIT OUR ABILITY TO PURSUE A CONSTRUCTIVE HUMAN RIGHTS STRATEGY WITH CHINA AFTER JUNE.

10. A/S SHATTUCK'S UPCOMING VISIT WIQLY OPPORTUNITY TO INITIATE AN END GAME STRATEGY DESIGNED TO CLARIFY OBJECTIVES AND FOCUS BEIJING'S EFFORTS. A VISIT BY U/S TARNOFF OR THE SECRETARY WOULD MAXIMIZE OUR LEVERAGE IN THE MOST CRUCIAL PERIOD IN THE PROCESS, ENABLING US TO ACKNOWLEDGE WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED, AND EMPHASIZE WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE.

11. THERE IS NO GUARANTEE, OF COURSE, THAT DEFINING AN EXPLICIT, REASONABLE BOTTOM LINE ON HUMAN RIGHTS FOR THE CHINESE THAT WOULD MAKE POSSIBLE UNCONDITIONAL MFN RENEWAL WOULD PRODUCE THE DESIRED RESULT. HOWEVER, A STRAIGHTFORWARD APPROACH WILL BEST POSITION US TO DEAL WITH THE RANGE OF POSSIBLE OUTCOMES -- UNCONDITIONAL RENEWAL, CONDITIONAL RENEWAL, OR WITHDRAWAL -- WITHOUT RISKING THE CHINESE PERCEPTION THAT WE ARE DEALING WITH THEM IN BAD FAITH. CERTAINLY, IF CHINA DOES NOT MEET THE TEST OF OVERALL SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, OUR INEVITABLE RESPONSE WILL DAMAGE U.S. ALONG WITH CHINESE INTERESTS. WE HAVE ACCEPTED THAT PRICE AS A TOKEN OF OUR COMMITMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS.

PART II: IMPLICATIONS OF LONGER TERM LINKAGE

12. EVEN IF THE CHINESE DO MAKE OVERALL SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS, ELEMENTS IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMUNITY ARE DETERMINED TO PRESERVE THE LINKAGE BETWEEN HUMAN RIGHTS AND MFN (BEYOND THE EMIGRATION PROVISIONS IN JACKSON-VANIK) AND WILL CONTEND THAT UNCONDITIONAL EXTENSION OF MFN WOULD REPRESENT AN ABANDONMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S COMMITMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS. ARGUMENTS ARE BEING ADVANCED THAT CHINA IS ACTUALLY RETROGRESSING ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THAT MFN LINKAGE TO HUMAN RIGHTS (BEYOND JACKSON-VANIK) IS BOTH "NORMAL" AND NECESSARY TO ENSURE PROGRESS, AND THAT OUR LATEST ANNUAL HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT ON CHINA DOCUMENTS THAT CHINESE PROGRESS IS INADEQUATE. THESE ARGUMENTS ARE SERIOUS AND SHOULD NOT BE BRUSHED ASIDE. NEVERTHELESS, IN OUR VIEW THEY ARE NOT CONSISTENT EITHER WITH THE CURRENT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 05 BEIJING 004213

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, CH, US
SUBJECT: US-CHINA RELATIONS AT MID-TERM
SITUATION, OR WITH THE RECORD OF THE PAST FIFTEEN YEARS.
IS THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN CHINA WORSENING?

13. REPORTS BY OUR CHINA POSTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS SHOW CLEARLY THAT HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES CONTINUE IN CHINA. HOWEVER, THERE IS NEAR UNANIMITY AMONG ALL SECTORS OF CHINESE OPINION THAT WE HAVE SAMPLED, INCLUDING VICTIMS OF POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS OPPRESSION, THAT OVER THE LAST TWO YEARS THE CLIMATE HAS BECOME MORE RELAXED, REPRESSIVE MEASURES HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED LESS SEVERELY, AND THE MEASURES THEMSELVES HAVE BECOME LESS EFFECTIVE. THE PATTERN IS NOT CONSISTENT FROM ONE MOMENT TO THE NEXT, OR IN DIFFERENT REGIONS OF CHINA, BUT THE TREND IS CLEAR, POSITIVE, AND NATIONWIDE IN ITS IMPACT. DISCUSSION IS FREER, RELIGIOUS PRACTICE IS MORE OPEN, THE SECURITY AUTHORITIES ARE RELYING MORE ON SHORT TERM DETENTIONS TO DISCOURAGE UNDESIRABLE BEHAVIOR THAN ON LONG TERM SENTENCES, AND CHINESE ARE INCREASINGLY USING THE IMPERFECT MECHANISMS OF CHINA'S BACKWARD LEGAL SYSTEM TO CHALLENGE ARBITRARY ACTIONS BY THE AUTHORITIES. ARE SPECIAL HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS "ABNORMAL"?

14. HERE THE RECORD IS CLEAR. ASIDE FROM THE PROVISIONS OF THE JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT, NO OTHER COUNTRY HAS SPECIAL HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS ATTACHED TO THEIR ELIGIBILITY FOR MFN STATUS. MFN STATUS WAS FIRST EXTENDED TO CHINA DURING THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION WHEN CHINA'S HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION, AS DOCUMENTED IN OUR HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, WAS FAR WORSE THAN AT PRESENT. CHINA'S MFN STATUS WAS RENEWED ANNUALLY FOR THE NEXT EIGHT YEARS WITHOUT SERIOUS CHALLENGE, AND WITHOUT REGARD FOR THE PERIODIC SWINGS BETWEEN GREATER AND LESSER OPENNESS IN CHINA'S DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT. ONLY FOLLOWING THE TIANANMEN CRACKDOWN DID STRONG OPPOSITION DEVELOP TO GRANTING CHINA NORMAL TARIFF TREATMENT. CHINA'S REPRESSIVE BEHAVIOR DURING AND AFTER TIANANMEN DESTROYED SUPPORT IN THE UNITED STATES FOR A POSITIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA, MAKING IT BOTH REASONABLE AND PROPER TO EXPECT CHINA TO DEMONSTRATE "OVERALL SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS" ON HUMAN RIGHTS AS THE PRICE IT MUST PAY TO REGAIN BIPARTISAN SUPPORT IN THE UNITED STATES FOR IMPROVING RELATIONS AND UNCONDITIONAL RENEWAL OF MFN. FOLLOWING CHINA'S DEFINITIVE REAFFIRMATION OF ITS REFORM AND OPENNESS POLICIES IN 1992, EXPECTATIONS THAT CHINA CAN MEET A REASONABLE STANDARD OF OVERALL SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS ARE BOTH REALISTIC AND CONSISTENT WITH CURRENT TRENDS. THE OUTCOME, HOWEVER, WILL DEPEND BOTH ON THE SIGNALS WE SEND AND ON INTERNAL CHINESE FACTORS THAT WE CAN INFLUENCE BUT NOT CONTROL.
IS LINKAGE NECESSARY FOR PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS?

15. THE ANSWER DOES NOT LIE ENTIRELY IN OUR HANDS. LINKAGE CANNOT PREVENT SHARP SETBACKS TO HUMAN RIGHTS, AS IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, IF DOMESTIC STABILITY ERODES AND CHINA'S LEADERS MOVE AWAY FROM REFORM AND OPENNESS. ON THE OTHER HAND, AS LONG AS WE KEEP HUMAN RIGHTS CONSIDERATIONS HIGH ON OUR AGENDA, WE CAN BE CONFIDENT THAT WE CAN BRING OUR INFLUENCE TO BEAR IN A POSITIVE MANNER THROUGH THE NORMAL MECHANISMS OF GOVERNMENTAL AND PRIVATE INTERACTION. EQUALLY RELEVANT, THE EXPERIENCE OF THE LAST FIFTEEN YEARS DEMONSTRATES THAT GOOD U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS ENHANCE THE ACCEPTABILITY OF OUR IDEAS AND VALUES WITHIN CHINA. INDEED, CHINA'S OPENNESS TO THE WESTERN WORLD OVER THE LAST DECADE AND A HALF HAS, MORE THAN ANY OTHER FACTOR, RADICALLY ALTERED CHINA'S DOMESTIC POLITICAL DEBATE AND FORCED CHINA'S COMMUNIST LEADERS TO MOVE AWAY FROM NARROW MARXIST-LENINIST-MAOIST CONCEPTS. WITH EACH ADDITIONAL YEAR OF REFORM AND OPENNESS, CHINA'S YOUNGER GENERATION, INFLUENCED BY EXPOSURE TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD, IS LESS WILLING TO ACCEPT CONSTRAINTS TO WHICH THEIR PARENTS HAD BECOME INURED.

IS THE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT INCONSISTENT WITH MFN RENEWAL?

16. IS THE RECENTLY RELEASED HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT ON CHINA INCONSISTENT WITH UNCONDITIONAL RENEWAL OF MFN? THE ANSWER IS THAT THE REPORT IS NOT, AND NEVER HAS BEEN INTENDED TO BE, DRAFTED FOR THAT PURPOSE. SINCE THE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS WERE INITIATED IN THE LATE 1970S, THE ANNUAL CHINA REPORT HAS DOCUMENTED HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES IN CHINA THAT FALL SHORT OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS. THAT SITUATION WILL CONTINUE FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. AS A COUNTRY WITH NEARLY 1.2 BILLION PEOPLE, AN ILLITERACY RATE OF 30 PERCENT, A VAST PEASANT POPULATION BARELY ABOVE THE SUBSISTENCE LEVEL, A LONG HISTORY OF REPRESSIVE GOVERNMENTS, A POORLY DEVELOPED LEGAL SYSTEM, AND A ONE PARTY POLITICAL SYSTEM DOMINATED BY THE COMMUNIST PARTY, OBJECTIVELY WRITTEN HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS ON CHINA WILL CONTINUE TO DOCUMENT INADEQUATE PROTECTION FOR HUMAN

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 04 OF 05 BEIJING 004213

NODIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, CH, US
SUBJECT: US-CHINA RELATIONS AT MID-TERM
RIGHTS IN CHINA. THE OBJECTIVITY OF THESE REPORTS WILL SUFFER IF THEY BECOME LINKED TO OTHER INTERESTS AND POLICY OBJECTIVES. WHAT THE REPORTS CAN HELP DOCUMENT IS WHETHER CHINA IS BECOMING MORE OR LESS REPRESSIVE, NOT WHETHER IT QUALIFIES FOR NON-DISCRIMINATORY TRADE TREATMENT.
ECONOMIC PROGRESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS ARE RELATED

17. THERE IS A LARGER ISSUE AT STAKE HERE, I.E. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS. CONDITIONS IN CHINA ARE NOW VASTLY BETTER FOR THE AVERAGE CHINESE CITIZEN THAN THEY WERE 15 YEARS AGO, BUT THERE HAS NOT BEEN COMPARABLE PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS. THE TWO

ISSUES CANNOT BE EQUATED, BUT THEY ALSO CANNOT BE DELINKED. WITHOUT ECONOMIC PROGRESS, AND WITHOUT CONTINUED OPENNESS TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD, THERE CAN BE NO REASONABLE PROSPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IMPROVEMENTS IN CHINA. CONVERSELY, IF CHINA'S POLICIES OF REFORM AND OPENNESS FAIL, HUMAN RIGHTS WILL SUFFER AS WELL.
BALANCE NEEDED IN OUR APPROACH

18. THIS IS NOT AN ARGUMENT FOR DOWNGRADING THE IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN OUR APPROACH TO CHINA. RATHER, IT IS AN ARGUMENT FOR BALANCE IN OUR APPROACH, A LONG TERM VIEW, AND AVOIDANCE OF RHETORICAL EXTREMES THAT MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO ARTICULATE OUR INTERESTS WITH RESPECT TO CHINA COHERENTLY AND OBJECTIVELY. AS WE HAVE SEEN OVER THE PAST YEAR, LINKING MFN TO HUMAN RIGHTS CAN, IN THE SHORT TERM, GIVE US ADDED LEVERAGE AND MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE PRESIDENT TO GAIN CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR HIS APPROACH. OVER TIME, HOWEVER, THE COSTS OF SUCH LINKAGE WILL MOUNT. NEITHER CHINA, NOR ANY OTHER COUNTRY, CAN BE EXPECTED TO MAKE OVERALL SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS YEAR AFTER YEAR. HISTORY DOES NOT MOVE IN STRAIGHT LINES. MFN STATUS CANNOT BE TURNED ON AND OFF AT WILL WITHOUT PLAYING HAVOC WITH OUR TRADE RELATIONS AND COMMERCIAL INTERESTS.
IMPORTANCE OF ARTICULATING OUR BROADER INTERESTS

19. MOREOVER, THE WORLD REMAINS A DANGEROUS PLACE, INSTABILITIES ABOUND, AND THE RAPID PACE OF GLOBAL CHANGE INCREASES UNCERTAINTIES ABOUT THE FUTURE. COMMON SENSE SUGGESTS THAT OUR INTERESTS WILL BE BEST SERVED IF CHINA REMAINS ON THE PATH OF REFORM AND MODERATION, AND IF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA PROVIDES A SOUND BASIS FOR COOPERATION IN PREVENTING, AND WHERE NECESSARY RESPONDING TO, DEVELOPMENTS ADVERSE TO OUR INTERESTS, WHETHER IN KOREA, THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, OR ELSEWHERE. IF SO, OUR POLICY MUST NOT ONLY HAVE THIS OBJECTIVE, BUT WE MUST BE CAPABLE OF ARTICULATING THIS OBJECTIVE TO CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, WITHOUT WHOSE SUPPORT OUR POLICY WILL LACK A SOUND BASE.

20. BROADER POLICY CONSIDERATIONS ARE AT STAKE AS WELL. OTHER COUNTRIES, VIRTUALLY WITHOUT EXCEPTION, HAVE RECOGNIZED THE POSITIVE CHANGES THAT HAVE OCCURRED IN CHINA OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS AND HAVE ADJUSTED THEIR POLICIES ACCORDINGLY. ASIAN COUNTRIES IN PARTICULAR HAVE EXPRESSED WITH GROWING FRANKNESS THEIR LONGER TERM CONCERNS ABOUT A CHINA GROWING IN WEALTH AND POWER AND THEIR BELIEF THAT POOR U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS WILL BE DETRIMENTAL TO THEIR INTERESTS. IF U.S. ACTIONS COME TO BE SEEN AS DAMAGING THE REFORM PROCESS IN CHINA, OUR ABILITY TO EXERCISE MORAL AND POLICY LEADERSHIP IN THIS REGION WILL BE UNDERMINED.

21. THE CURRENT HIGH LEVEL OF RHETORIC IN U.S. DISCUSSION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE IN CHINA CAN MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT TO ARTICULATE THESE FACTORS IN A COHERENT

MANNER. TO THE EXTENT THAT THIS HELPS US ACHIEVE THE GOAL OF "OVERALL SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS" IN THE SHORT TERM, THIS IS AN ACCEPTABLE COST. OVER THE LONGER TERM, OUR INTERESTS WILL NOT BE WELL SERVED IF WE ARE CONSTANTLY CONFRONTED WITH ARTIFICIAL CHOICES BETWEEN OUR ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS, OR IF WE MUST APPLY STANDARDS TO CHINA ON MFN THAT WE DO NOT APPLY TO OTHER COUNTRIES WHOSE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATIONS ARE COMPARABLE OR WORSE. SIMILARLY, WE NEED TO ASSESS FRANKLY THE DEGREE TO WHICH WE CAN, WITHOUT SEEMING TO UNDERCUT OUR HUMAN RIGHTS OBJECTIVES, ADDRESS SUCH QUESTIONS AS WHETHER SETBACKS TO THE REFORM PROCESS IN RUSSIA INCREASE CHINA'S STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE. IF WE CANNOT, THEN WE ARE PLACING OURSELVES IN A POLICY STRAITJACKET.

22. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT OUR APPROACH MUST BOTH TAKE INTO ACCOUNT, AND SEEK TO INFLUENCE, CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES. THIS MAKES IT ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT THAT WE ARTICULATE OUR POLICY TOWARD CHINA IN WAYS THAT ENCOMPASS THE TOTALITY OF OUR INTERESTS. IN ESSENCE THIS MEANS THAT WE MUST KEEP HUMAN RIGHTS AS A CORNER STONE, NOT A

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 05 OF 05 BEIJING 004213

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PHUM, PREL, CH, US

SUBJECT: US-CHINA RELATIONS AT MID-TERM

STUMBLING BLOCK, OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY. WE ARE WELL POSITIONED TO DO EXACTLY THAT IF WE CAN, IN THE WEEKS AND MONTHS AHEAD, MAXIMIZE INCENTIVES FOR CHINA TO MAKE THE OVERALL SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS THAT IS THE GOAL OF OUR POLICY. ROY

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003e. paper	re: Status of China Engagement Strategy: Discussion Paper for Principals Committee (28 pages)	02/08/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0058 PC Meeting on China, February 10, 1994

2015-0221-M
rs1184

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003f. note	[Sent via fax] David Brown to Kent Wiedemann. (1 page)	02/08/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 08 FEB 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R PC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION / AGENDA & DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 10 FEB PC MTG ON CHINA

ACTION: KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 27 JAN 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WIEDEMANN LOGREF: 9420177 9420184

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0058 CODES: CPR

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

LAKE
MILLISON
NSC CHRON
WIEDEMANN

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 7/15/2014
2015-024-11

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSASK CLOSED BY: NSASK DOC 2 OF 2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICERCAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE	Z 94020817 FOR DECISION
001	X 94020817 LAKE APPROVED RECOM
002	X 94020817 KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

<u>DOC</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR ACTION</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR INFO</u>
002	940208	FUERTH, L	
002	940208	GROSSMAN, M	
002	940208	MCALEER, R	
002	940208	DAS, A	
002	940208	MONTGOMERY, F	
002	940208	INDERFURTH, K	
002	940208	CUTTER, W	
002	940208	LAUDER, J	
002	940208	PATRICK, T	
002	940208	STARR, B	

rec'd 2/8
1:30 AM

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: JM LOG # 20092
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG JM WO _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<u>kl</u> DepExecSec	<u>1</u>	<u>Wah</u>	
ExecSec			
Staff Director			
<u>hfw</u> D/APNSA	<u>2</u>	<u>sk</u>	
APNSA	<u>3</u>		
<u>Kemner</u> Situation Room	<u>4</u>	<u>Natl Sec Advisor</u> has seen	<u>Tab I</u>
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>		<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS: PC mty on China,
2/10

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Exec Sec has dislette

PC

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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LOG 9420092
DATE 08 FEB 94

SUBJECT: AGENDA FOR PC MTG ON CHINA 10 FEB
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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WASHINGTON, DC 20506

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

<u>2/8/94</u>	<u>10:25pm</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
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WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

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ROOM 5854
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WASHINGTON, DC 20230

COPY: VIA FAX

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U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
ROOM 416, WINDER BUILDING
600 17TH STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20506

<u>2/9/94</u>	<u>07:20</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
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COPY: 1 _____

~~AMASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
USUN/W - AT [Signature] DAVID SCHEFFER
ROOM 6332 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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SUBJECT: AGENDA FOR PC MTG ON CHINA 10 FEB
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
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NATL ECONOMIC COUNCIL
ROOM 231
OLD EXECUTIVE OFC BLDG

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9 Feb 1345 [Signature]

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

COPY: 1

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600 17TH STREET, NW
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USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER
ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
2201 C STREET NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By: NARA, Date:~~

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PAGE 01 OF 02 PAGES

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SUBJECT: AGENDA FOR PC MTG ON CHINA 10 FEB
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MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 290, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	_____	_____	_____ COPY: <u>1</u>
MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	<u>2/8/94</u>	<u>10:55 PM</u>	<u>C. Holmes</u> COPY: <u>1</u>
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
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DATE 08 FEB 94

SUBJECT: AGENDA FOR PC MTG ON CHINA 10 FEB
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MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	_____	_____	_____ COPY: 1 _____
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MR. ANTHONY A. DAS DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 5854 14TH & CONSTITUTION AVE, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20230	_____	_____	_____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
MR. FRED MONTGOMERY U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE ROOM 416, WINDER BUILDING 600 17TH STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20506	<u>2/8/94</u>	<u>10:00 AM</u>	<u>Gloria Blue</u> _____ COPY: 1 _____
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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
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DATE 08 FEB 94

SUBJECT: AGENDA FOR PC MTG ON CHINA 10 FEB
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEGB

PAGE 02 OF 02 PAGES

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

1977 FEB -8 PM 6:53

TU 18: 33

Feb 8, 1977

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: *Ph*

DTG: *D*

MESSAGE NO. 0243 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 01

FROM WILLIAM H ITOH 456-6534 West Wing
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NOTIFICATION OF PC MTG ON CHINA

NSC LOG # 20092

B
B
N
D
A
K-1
B
L

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
TREASURY	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
ACDA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
COMMERCE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VC Date: 7/18/2014

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

**WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM**

1971 FEB -8 PM 8:13

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: *Ry B*
DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 0243 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 1

FROM WILLIAM H ITOH 456-6534 West Wing
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NOTIFICATION OF PC MTG ON CHINA
NSC LOG # 20092

B
B
N
D
A
K-1
B
L

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
TREASURY	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
ACDA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
COMMERCE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: JP Date: 7/15/2011

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

1994 FEB -8 PM 6:33

WASH FAX

-8 FEB 94 18 45z

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: *Phh*
DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 0243 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 01

FROM WILLIAM H ITCH 456-6534 West Wing
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NOTIFICATION OF PC MTG ON CHINA
NSC LOG # 20092

B
B
N
D
A
K-1
B
L

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
TREASURY	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
ACDA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
COMMERCE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: *R* Date: 7/14/2014

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
1997 FEB -8 PM 6:33

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

V-1
2-8
2020

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: *Phh*

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 0243 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 01

FROM WILLIAM H ITOH 456-6534 West Wing
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NOTIFICATION OF PC MTG ON CHINA

NSC LOG # 20092

B
B
N
D
A
K-1
B
L

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
TREASURY	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
ACDA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
COMMERCE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: *VR* Date: 7/17/04

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

1971 FEB -8 PM 6:33

L
2-9-91
0600

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: Phh
DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 0243 CLASSIFICATION **SECRET** PAGES 01

FROM WILLIAM H ITOM 456-6534 West Wing
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NOTIFICATION OF PC MTG ON CHINA
NSC LOG # 20092

B
B
N
D
A
K-1
B
L

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
TREASURY	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
ACDA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
COMMERCE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VZ Date: 7/17/94

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

N. EPR
1841 8 Feb 94

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: *[Signature]*

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 0243 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 01

FROM WILLIAM H ITOH 456-6534 West Wing
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NOTIFICATION OF PC MTG ON CHINA

NSC LOG # 20092

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
TREASURY	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
ACDA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
COMMERCE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

B
B
N
D
A
K-1
B
L

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VR Date: 7/19/2015

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT
WASH FAX

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

**WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM**

-8 FEB 94 18 43Z

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: Murphy

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 0242 CLASSIFICATION SECRET PAGES 30

FROM WILLIAM H ITOH 456-6534 West Wing
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NOTIFICATION OF PC MTG ON CHINA

NSC LOG # 20092

B
B
N
D
A
K-1
B
L

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
TREASURY	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
ACDA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
COMMERCE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: rz Date: 7/19/2019

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

N EPR
1841 8 FEB 94

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: Murphy

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 0242 CLASSIFICATION SECRET PAGES 30

FROM WILLIAM H ITOH 456-6534 West Wing
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NOTIFICATION OF PC MTG ON CHINA

NSC LOG # 20092

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
TREASURY	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
ACDA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
COMMERCE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

B
B
N
D
A
K-1
B
L

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RE Date: 7/11/2009

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

TU 18: 07

Feb 8, 1994

PRECEDENCE: ~~IMMEDIATE~~
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: Murphy

DTG: _____

(Handwritten initials)

MESSAGE NO. 0242 CLASSIFICATION **SECRET** PAGES 30

FROM WILLIAM H ITOH 456-6534 West Wing
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NOTIFICATION OF PC MTG ON CHINA

NSC LOG # 20092

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
TREASURY	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
ACDA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
COMMERCE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

B
B
N
D
A
K-1
B
L

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VR Date: 7/14/2009

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

B

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM 1977 FEB -9 PM 5:04

PRECEDENCE: ~~IMMEDIATE~~ PRIORITY ROUTINE

RELEASER: Murphy DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 0242 CLASSIFICATION SECRET PAGES 30

FROM WILLIAM H ITOH 456-6534 West Wing
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NOTIFICATION OF PC MTG ON CHINA
NSC LOG #20092

B
B
N
D
A
K-1
B
L

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
TREASURY	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
ACDA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
COMMERCE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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Initials: VL Date: 7/11/2009

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

**WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM**

K-1
2-8
1820

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: Murphy
DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 0242 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 30

FROM WILLIAM H ITOH 456-6534 West Wing
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NOTIFICATION OF PC MTG ON CHINA
NSC LOG #20092

B
B
N
D
A
K-1
B
L

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
TREASURY	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
ACDA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
COMMERCE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VR Date: 7/18/99

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

**WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM**

Lina
2/8/94

022 FEB -0 PM 5:24

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: Murphy
DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 0242 CLASSIFICATION **SECRET** PAGES 30

FROM WILLIAM H ITOH 456-6534 West Wing
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NOTIFICATION OF PC MTG ON CHINA
NSC LOG # 20092

B
B
N
D
A
K-1
B
L

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
TREASURY	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
ACDA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
COMMERCE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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TIME OF RECEIPT

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SITUATION ROOM**

- PRECEDENCE
- FLASH
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RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting PC MTG ON CHINA PAGES: 31

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
<u>USUN New York</u>	<u>Mr. Rick Inderfurth</u>	<u>212-415-4016</u>	<u>212-415-4177</u>

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeleine Albright
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VL Date: 7/10/09

~~SECRET~~
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. EDWARD KNIGHT
Executive Secretary
Department of Treasury

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. ANTHONY A. DAS
Executive Secretary
Department of Commerce

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Executive Director for Policy
Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

AMB. RICK INDERFUERTH
Office of the Representative of
the United States to the United Nations

MR. W. BOWMAN CUTTER
Deputy to the President for Economic Policy
National Economic Council

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MS. BARBARA STARR
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
2

There will be a Principals Committee Meeting on China, Thursday, February 10, from 1:45 - 3:15 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. Attached is the agenda for the meeting. A Discussion Paper is attached. Attendance is Principals plus one. (S)

for Kwoshi A. Kenney
William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab A Agenda
Tab B Discussion Paper

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

20092

PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON CHINA

DATE: February 10, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 1:45 p.m. - 3:15 p.m.

AGENDA

- | | |
|---|----------|
| I. Introduction | NSC |
| II. Review of Comprehensive Strategy since November P.C. meeting, with emphasis on recent meetings with Foreign Minister Qian and Vice Foreign Minister Liu | State |
| III. Review of Secretary Bentsen's Beijing Visit | Treasury |
| IV. Prospects for Human Rights, Nonproliferation Progress | State |
| V. Status and Prospects of Trade Issues | USTR |
| VI. Review Congressional MFN Strategy | State |
| VII. Next Steps | NSC |

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PER E.O. 13526
2015-0221-M (4.17)
3/11/2020 KDE

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004b. paper	re: Status of China Engagement Strategy. [Duplicate of 003e] (28 pages)	02/08/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0058 PC Meeting on China, February 10, 1994

2015-0221-M
rs1184

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

20092

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 8, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: KENT M. WIEDEMANN *KW*

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on China, Thursday,
February 10, 1994, 1:45 - 3:15 p.m.

Attached at Tab I is the memorandum to agencies for the subject meeting.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memo to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve *R* Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to Agencies
Tab A Agenda
Tab B Discussion Paper

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *VZ* NARA, Date *7/15/2014*

7015-0221-00

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004c. list	Principals Committee Meeting, February 10, 1994. [partial] [CIA Act] (1 page)	02/10/1994	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0058 PC Meeting on China, February 10, 1994

2015-0221-M
rs1184

RESTRICTION CODES

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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING
FEBRUARY 10, 1994
1:45 - 3:15 P.M.
SITUATION ROOM

Chair
Anthony Lake

White House
Samuel Berger
✓ Nancy Soderberg

OVP
Leon Fuerth

NSC
~~Kent Wiedemann~~

State
Warren Christopher
✓ Winston Lord

TREASURY
Secretary Lloyd Bentsen
✓ Larry Summers

DOD
~~Secretary William Perry~~
✓ Frank Wisner

COMMERCE
Secretary Ron Brown
✓ Jeffrey Garten

USTR
Ambassador Mickey Kantor
✓ Charlene Barshefsky

USUN
Rick Inderfurth
✓ David Scheffer

CIA

(b)(3)

[names marked through
as with Perry]

[004c]

JCS
Admiral David Jeremiah
✓ Frank L. Bowman

NEC
Robert Rubin
✓ W. Bowman Cutter

ACDA
✓ John Holum

CHINA PC - 2/10/54

WIRELOCK & WIRE WILL NOT SCRATCH DESKS OR SNAG CLOTHING

70-5000-1015

G: CHPC. MINUTES

Name WIEDEMAN
Book# CHINA PC
From _____
To _____



NOTE-PERFECT™

Reporter's

NOTEBOOK

4" x 8"

70 sheets white paper
Pitman/wide ruling
with faint interline



reorder # 25-281

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PER E. O. 13526
2015-0221-M (2.15) 3/11/2020 KDE

Belate - DoD in?
winner

China: don't think we
should use meeting
to come to strategic
strategic decisions

-- find out where we
are; frame choices,
but not come to
decisions

-- reason: interest
between lines, guides:
absolutely essential
to get more
not signal any
weakening

-- coming weeks:

-- what and how
we define more
specifically what we
want

-- as we prepared what
only to define the
take away, but
can't be too
in order to put

be more away for
some -- think
more for human
rights

-- if we think
need to be able to
tell Congress too
what else we will
work to foster human
rights

Th. Progress - not enough, see
Chris pages

-- started at UNCA --
greater engagement;
some significant
goals; follow-up
AHC especially

-- some work
h.v. step - 2
Tibetans: 3 demands
ICRC visit
prison labor
memo

-- unblocked projects

-- on new pos, agreed to
begin talks; ~~but~~
no ~~progress~~ results
yet

with Dean at end of
January thoroughly
discuss fund in case of
U.S. agreement -
plus work Korea

-- four days later met
with VPM Lin
-- in a talk
yielded no
progress

-- at point to
keep up pressure
-- that is
days going
back over their
issues

-- co-sponsor UNCTAD
resolution

-- Congress: appearance
still in favor of
leverage; thinking
would not be
get under way
on Bananas

-- met with CEO's
and in line to

let them know
President cannot
flink or Exec.
order - statute for
more vigorous legislation
-- negative; driver
channel will be
see their firms are
staying behind.
advis

-- not sure nor useful
to argue whether
statute will be
changed - may
not be amended

- perhaps, if we get
h.v.; just who
say it should be
pre-emptive understanding
statute; maybe we
can get it back to
pre 1989 where
revenue was
more

Blutgen - I cannot
copying line in
think; not top
leaders; not
accommodative or

- importance of
- primary aspects of...
- leading on financial
- services due attention
- to other areas which
- we have neglected
- more optimistic
- than Chris on
- Congress; but we
- shall be well off
- in 1960 or
- 1961.
- Nancy Pelosi
- says hope we don't
- have to withdraw,
- and doesn't state
- progress I do.
- we must make it
- clear to Chinese
- what they must do
- North Korea --
- what they do
- have important to
- us
- intergenerational
- class and agreement
- will lead to
- liberalization.
- I leader told me

- I feel uncomfortable
- to reform; wanted
- Fed. Reserve to
- come, other reformist
- assistance
- hope they can
- make more progress
- in h.r.; so we can
- debate.
- focuses also
- we know we can
- invest when you
- undermine credibility.
- with Bin Gwang
- 2 1/2 X the rest of
- world, we must be
- a part of it
- see movement in
- Japan, but except
- Chris' view that
- more difficult in
- Japan
- Chris' ^{to Bin Gwang} raising
- hurdle -- not very
- worried about now in
- future
- Ortega: think future
- the 2 hurdles -- now,
- had him in Sept. but
- we would ~~wait~~ do

-- severe difference between that level and higher level needed to decline
-- Fetsen - T, 1

TU: to win; say more or less h.r.?

-- say this covered well, will be more progress, but some more to some degree --
tailored zone

-- when you say rising for the public come away, think it impossible to get that much progress between now & then

Parry: coincide with Butts's arguments in addition to economic agreement, security agreements too. Security relationship is not a free but a way to experience freed Chavon in way

important to us;
non-pro, North Korea -- stakes high
TU - Korea's social
Russia would work more closely with China, USSR work with in an interest to work with China

Kander: progress in fabric; textiles -- spinning 15 to 20 per cent.

-- what access too - fighter fight now on trade, but we can't take it to the bank
talked to Pelosi

yes, today about a limited and sanction -- hit state sectors, e.g., reduce it from a nuclear region to something more credible

-- friends with her a long time

from looking at it
- come up in
congress; Pres.
killed it, but
complexed legal
aspects

Kantor: just want to
reject it, think
it should be
looked at

Berger: was in her
legislation, but
unworkable
- might look at
some other mechanism
other than what
to achieve accountability
on h.v. -- a
... rifle rather than a
shotgun
-- no legislation
now, but would
like to see whether
we can bootstrap
accountable by
withholding aid,
something like
that without of now

Brown: Study on
right track,
influenced by
presumption of
begin from daily
\$500 b. in welfare
programs for 2000,
Berger's remarks,
- what is appropriate
mechanism -- would
we see h.v. interests.

but do our long-run
economic interests

Kubin: only problem
with study's point
is that if you have
a better mechanism
you might not do
have after - Sweden,
etc.

- TL - work looking at
in substantive terms
rather sense; Have
- problem; can't
beat something with
nothing; must
give from something
if it we do look

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004d. notes	re: [Kent Wiedemann's Notes of Minutes from China PC Meeting, 2/10/94] [partial] (4 pages)	02/10/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0058 PC Meeting on China, February 10, 1994

2015-0221-M
rs1184

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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E.O. 13526 1.4c

E.O. 13526 1.4c

E.O. 13526 1.4c, 3.3(b)(6)

5.5.5.5.5.5.5.5.5.5.5.5.5.5.5.5

TL - Chris, have you
forgot of getting
your trip -- is
progress after
Shutlock as a
precondition

Perry - don't want to
wait -- do not
in favor

TL - don't want to
sell down out;
can't get hold of
WFO -- by looking
-- Perry - mil. relations
know help more
then a word

Birger - political message
of visits

Chris - wonder about

E.O. 13526 3.3(b)(6)

TL - go
-- do know where we
are

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. minutes	re: Minutes of PC Meeting on China (11 pages)	03/22/1994	P1/b(1)
001b. draft	re: Minutes of PC Meeting on China (10 pages)	03/22/1994	P1/b(1)
002. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Summary of PC Meeting on China, March 22, 1994 (2 pages)	03/23/1994	P1/b(1) <i>YDE 3/11/2020</i>
003a. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of PC Meeting on China (3 pages)	03/22/1994	P1/b(1) <i>YDE 3/11/2020</i>
003b. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of PC Meeting on China [incomplete copy] (2 pages)	03/22/1994	P1/b(1) <i>YDE 3/11/2020</i>
004. paper	re: China Policy: Proposed Next Steps (1 page)	03/21/1994	P1/b(1) <i>YDE 3/11/2020</i>
005. memo	Robert Suettinger to Anthony Lake re: Background Memorandum for China Principals Committee Meeting, March 22, 1994 (2 pages)	03/21/1994	P1/b(1) <i>YDE 3/11/2020</i>
006. agenda	Principals Committee Meeting on China, March 22, 1994. [Record ID: 9420373] (1 page)	03/21/1994	P1/b(1)

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Clinton Presidential Records
 National Security Council
 Records Management
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FOLDER TITLE:

PC0068 PC Meeting on China, March 22, 1994

2015-0221-M
rs1185

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

TO: BERGER

FROM: ROTH

DOC DATE: 22 DEC 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R PC
MINUTES

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: UNAPPROVED MINUTES FOR 22 MAR 1994 PC MTG ON CHINA

ACTION: OBE / MEMO NOT SENT FORWARD DUE DATE: 26 DEC 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ROTH LOGREF: 9420373 9420378

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0068 CODES: CPR

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

JOSHI
KRECKO
KRISTOFF
NSC CHRON
SODERBERG

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By 12 NARA, Date 7/15/19
2015-0221-m

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA CLOSED BY: NSKDB DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9521441

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001

X 96012917 OBE / MEMO NOT SENT FORWARD

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~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21441

December 22, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

FROM: STANLEY ROTH *SOR*

SUBJECT: Minutes for PC on China

Attached at Tab A are the minutes from the China PC meeting,
March 22, 1994.

RECOMMENDATION

That the minutes be filed for the record.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab A Minutes

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

Reason: 1.5(b)(d)
Declassify On: 12/22/2005

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. minutes	re: Minutes of PC Meeting on China (11 pages)	03/22/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0068 PC Meeting on China, March 22, 1994

2015-0221-M

rs1185

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. draft	re: Minutes of PC Meeting on China (10 pages)	03/22/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0068 PC Meeting on China, March 22, 1994

2015-0221-M
rs1185

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING

March 22, 1994

5:15 - 6:15 pm

Roosevelt Room

CHAIR

Anthony Lake

OVP

Leon Fuerth

STATE

Secretary Warren Christopher

TREASURY

Secretary Lloyd Bentsen

DOD

Deputy Secretary John Deutch

COMMERCE

Secretary Ronald Brown

USTR

Ambassador Mickey Kantor

USUN

Ambassador Madeleine Albright

CIA

Director James Woolsey

NEC

Robert Rubin

CEA

Laura Tyson

JCS

General John Shalikashvili

OSTP

John Gibbons

ACDA

Director John Holum

WHITE HOUSE

Samuel Berger

Nancy Soderberg

David Gergen

George Stephanopolous

NSC
Stanley Roth

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 23 MAR 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R

PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PRES BRIEFING MEMO OF 22 MAR PC MTG ON CHINA

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DUE DATE: 26 MAR 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ROTH

LOGREF: 9420373 9420378

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: PC0068

CODES: CPR

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DARBY
KRECZKO
MILLISON
NSC CHRON
ROTH
SODERBERG
WOLIN

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *VC* NARA, Date *7/15/2011*
2015-0221-M

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB CLOSED BY: NSASK DOC 2 OF 2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE
002 PRESIDENT
002

Z 94032320 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
Z 94032420 FOR INFORMATION
X 94032420 NOTED BY PRESIDENT

National Security Council
The White House

Rec'd 3/23
8:50 PM

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 20393
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: (M) SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (M) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<i>W</i> Reed	_____	_____	_____
Kenney	_____	_____	_____
Itoh	_____	_____	_____
Soderberg	<u>1</u>	<u>MM</u>	_____
<i>W</i> Berger	<u>3</u>	<u>sls</u>	_____
Lake	<u>4</u>	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	<u>gjm</u>	<u>Done</u> <u>W/W</u> <u>3/23</u>
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS: Summary of PC mtg
on China for POTUS
3/23 7:40

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Exec Sec has disublt
 W/ Podesta 2355
 3/23
 Copies have been sent to TL, SRB, NSW, NES, WNS, KAK + JWR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN ^{3/24}
20393

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 23, 1994 **MAR 23 P11:56**

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE *AL*

SUBJECT: Summary of PC Meeting on China March 22, 1994

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0821-M (2.21)
3/11/2020 KDE

The Principals met on March 22 to discuss China policy, with discussion focused on what can be done within the next few weeks to get as much progress as possible on the seven conditions in the Executive Order and to rally public support for your engagement strategy towards China.

It was agreed that:

- All government agencies have a basic interest in developing unity in what the Administration is saying and doing with respect to China. Such unity is essential in order to strengthen our bargaining position vis-a-vis the Chinese who will artfully play on any divisions within the Administration.
- It is counterproductive in the current "transparent" environment in Washington to begin discussing now how we would respond to a situation where there was not "overall significant progress." Any public hint of flexibility about less than total revocation of MFN benefits under a negative scenario would greatly reduce the Chinese incentive to be forthcoming on all seven conditions.
- Our Embassy in Beijing will take the lead in pushing China on all seven counts, but the State Department should review when and how other agencies could be used to talk to the Chinese Embassy in Washington.
- We should go ahead with two previously scheduled meetings in Washington next month: the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade and the Joint Science and Technology Commission. Both meetings will be used as opportunities to reaffirm to the Chinese the full dimension of our China policy: we recognize China's importance and the need to work together on a variety of common interests, but we also believe that China should adhere to internationally recognized human rights.

PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

~~SECRET~~

- For at least the next month, there was a consensus that there should not be any additional high-level visits to China. Specifically, it was decided that Adm. Larson (CINCPAC) should not visit China in April.
- There was a consensus that we need to do a better job of explaining to the press, the public and the Congress the progress that has been achieved thus far on human rights issues, using the guidance cleared by you on March 21. Agencies were tasked to provide examples of progress on issues within their respective jurisdictions for use in such a statement.
- It is key to consult closely with the Congress. We should seek "counter-type" statements from key players. For example, members who believe trade and human rights should be delinked should be encouraged to present this view to the Chinese, but also advise them that such delinkage can only occur after significant overall progress has been achieved this year. We will coordinate a strategy with State, Treasury and Commerce.
- We should seek to turn the business community's strong desire to renew MFN into an asset with the Chinese by convening small groups of members of the business community and indicating that we share the same goal: being in a position to renew Most-Favored Nation status. But the business community has to help us achieve our common goals by indicating in their discussions with the Chinese that the Administration is serious about the need for additional progress on human rights if MFN status is to be renewed.

The Principals recommend that you make a statement in the near future on China policy, emphasizing the overall strategic context for the policy and discussing the progress already achieved, not only on human rights, but on other issues as well. We will work a reference to China into your opening statement in the press conference but hope that you also use the question to reiterate you China policy.

It was also recommended that you demonstrate your continued engagement on this issue by periodically meeting with and talking to key players in the field on an off-the-record basis. This would send a reassuring signal of his engagement to the Chinese, as well as to the Congress. We are working intensively on our strategy with the Chinese, the public and the Congress over the next two months and will forward you our detailed recommendations shortly.

Current Redaction this

PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

20393

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 23, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: STANLEY ROTH *SL*

SUBJECT: Summary of PC Meeting on China March 22, 1994.

Attached at Tab I is a Memorandum for the President summarizing the PC Meeting on China held March 22, 1994.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum for the President

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *VL* NARA, Date *7/15/2009*
7015-0221-11

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

TO: LAKE

FROM: ROTH

DOC DATE: 23 MAR 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
SOC

PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 22 MAR PC MTG ON CHINA

ACTION: OBE PER APNSA OFFICE

DUE DATE: 26 MAR 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ROTH

LOGREF: 9420373 9420378

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: PC0068

CODES: CPR

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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KRECKO
MILLISON
NSC CHRON
ROTH
SODERBERG

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 7/15/2014
2015-0221-22

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJEB CLOSED BY: NSJDA DOC 1 OF 1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE
001

Z 94032312 FOR DECISION
X 94032810 OBE PER APNSA OFFICE

~~rec'd 3/23 2:37 pm~~
National Security Council 8:32 pm
The White House

PROOFED BY: JO LOG # 20388
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PBS NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG JO A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<i>clv</i> Reed	_____	_____	_____
Kenney	<u>1</u>	<u>Walt</u>	_____
Itoh	_____	_____	_____
Soderberg	_____	_____	_____
<i>mfw</i> Berger	<u>2</u>	NSC Advisor	_____
Lake	<u>3</u>	has seen	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>NR</u>
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS: CC: NS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Elec Sec has diskette

PROOFED BY: JB LOG # 20388
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PBS NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG JB A/O _____

cev

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Kenney	<u>1</u>	<u>W</u>	
Itoh			
Soderberg			
<i>W</i> Berger	<u>2</u>	NSC Advisor	
Lake	<u>3</u>	has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>		<u>NR</u>
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:


CC: NS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Exec Sec has diskette

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 23, 1994



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: STANLEY ROTH *SR*

SUBJECT: Summary of *C*onclusions

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from Will Itoh to agency counterparts forwarding the Summary of Conclusions on the China PC of March 22, 1994.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the memo from Will Itoh to agency counterparts at Tab I forwarding the Summary of Conclusions on the China PC of March 22, 1994.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

FILE

Attachments

- Tab I Memo to Agency Counterparts
- Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *VL* NARA, Date *7/15/2017*
2015-0721 -M

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. EDWARD KNIGHT
Executive Secretary
Department of Treasury

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. ANTHONY A. DAS
Executive Secretary
Department of Commerce

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Executive Director for Policy
Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

AMB. RICK INDERFUERTH
Office of the Representative of
the US to the United Nations

MR. W. BOWMAN CUTTER
Deputy to the President for Economic Policy
National Economic Council

MR. JOHN LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

DR. LAURA TYSON
Chair, President's Council of
Economic Advisors

MS. JANE WALES
Associate Director for International Affairs
Office of Science and Technology Policy

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MS. BARBARA STARR
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions ~~(S)~~

Attached at Tab A is the Summary of Conclusions for the
Principals Committee Meeting on China March 22, 1994. ~~(S)~~

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of NSC Principals Committee

DATE: March 22, 1994
LOCATION: Roosevelt Room
TIME: 5:15 - 6:15 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of PC Meeting on China (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

The Vice President's Office:
Leon Fuerth

NEC:
Robert Rubin

State:
Warren Christopher

CEA:
Laura Tyson

Treasury:
Lloyd Bentsen

JCS:
General John Shalikashvili

DOD:
John Deutch

OSTP:
John Gibbons

Commerce:
Ronald Brown

ACDA:
John Holum

USTR:
Micky Kantor

White House:
Anthony Lake
David Gergen
George Stephanopolous
Samuel Berger
Nancy Soderberg

USUN:
Madeleine Albright

CIA:
James Woolsey

NSC:
Stanley Roth

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The discussion would be focused on what can be done within the next few weeks to get as much progress as possible on the seven conditions in the Executive Order and to rally public support for the President's engagement strategy towards China. (S)
- All government agencies -- regardless of their individual positions on the desirability of linking trade and human rights -- have a basic interest in developing unity in what the Administration is saying and doing with respect to China. Such unity is

essential in order to strengthen our bargaining position vis-a-vis the Chinese, who will artfully play on any divisions within the Administration. (S)

- A common assumption underlying our short-term tactics is that it is impossible to predict where we will be a month from now, in terms of Chinese compliance or non-compliance. Furthermore, it is counterproductive in the current "transparent" environment in Washington to begin discussing now how we would respond to a situation where there was not "overall significant progress." Any public hint of flexibility about less than total revocation of MFN benefits under a negative scenario would greatly reduce the Chinese incentive to be forthcoming on all seven conditions. (S)
- As we seek more progress from China, it was agreed that our approach should be low key. Our Embassy in Beijing would take the lead in pushing China on all seven counts, but the State Department should review when and how other agencies could be used to talk to the Chinese Embassy in Washington. The State Department would also seek to keep track of high-level visitors from other countries going to China, and would make representations to their governments in advance of their trips to tell them that we are cognizant of their visits and hope they will not undermine our policy. Realistically, however, we cannot expect much support for our policy from our major competitors in the China market. (S)
- We would go ahead with two previously scheduled meetings in Washington next month: the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade, and the Joint Science and Technology Commission. Both meetings would be used as opportunities to reaffirm to the Chinese the full dimension of our China policy: We recognize China's importance and the need to work together on a variety of common interests, but we also believe that China should adhere to internationally recognized human rights.
- It was further decided that prebriefs to the press would begin in the next few days to explain the purpose of going forward with these meetings. (S)
- For at least the next month, there was a consensus that there should not be any additional high-level visits to China. Specifically, it was decided that Admiral Larson (CINCPAC) should not visit China in April. (S)

- There was a consensus that we need to do a better job of explaining to the press the progress that has been achieved thus far on human rights issues, using the guidance cleared by the President on March 21. The Principals Committee also recommends that the President make a statement in the near future on China policy, emphasizing the overall strategic context for the policy and discussing the progress already achieved, not only on human rights, but on other issues as well. Agencies were tasked to provide examples of progress on issues within their respective jurisdictions. The goal of the Presidential statement should be both to demonstrate our firmness on the need for human rights improvements and to have a calming effect on China (by making it clear our conditions are reasonable and not designed to destabilize the regime). ~~(S)~~
- The key to managing the Congress will be extensive consultations, some of which have already been done following Secretary Christopher's trip. We should seek "counter-type" statements from key players. The White House Legislative Affairs Office was tasked to take the lead in devising a Congressional consultation strategy to be launched in the near future. ~~(S)~~
- With the business community, we should seek to turn their strong desire to renew MFN into an asset with the Chinese. We should convene small groups of businessmen and indicate that we share the same goal: being in a position to renew Most-Favored Nation status. But they have to help us achieve our common goals by indicating, in their discussions with the Chinese, that the Administration is serious and that additional progress on human rights must occur if MFN status is to be renewed. ~~(S)~~
- Finally, the President should meet periodically with key players in the field on an off-the-record basis. This would send a reassuring signal of his engagement to the Chinese, as well as to Congress. ~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~

2

DECLASSIFIED
FER E.O. 13526
2015-0221-M(2-23)
3/11/2020 KDE

~~SECRET~~

essential in order to strengthen our bargaining position vis-a-vis the Chinese, who will artfully play on any divisions within the Administration. (S)

- A common assumption underlying our ~~very~~ short-term tactics is that it is impossible to predict where we will be a month from now, in terms of Chinese compliance or non-compliance. Furthermore, it is counterproductive in the current "transparent" environment in Washington to begin discussing now how we would respond to a situation where there was not "overall significant progress." Any public hint of flexibility about less than total revocation of MFN benefits under a negative scenario would ~~certainly get into the newspapers, and this would~~ greatly reduce the Chinese incentive to be forthcoming on all seven conditions. (S)
- As we seek more progress from China, it was agreed that our approach should be low key. Our Embassy in Beijing would take the lead in pushing China on all seven counts, but the State Department should review when and how other agencies could be used to talk to the Chinese Embassy in Washington. The State Department would also seek to keep track of high-level visitors from other countries going to China, and would make representations to their governments in advance of their trips to tell them that we are cognizant of their visits and hope they will not undermine our policy. Realistically, however, we cannot expect much support for our policy from our major competitors in the China market. (S)
- We would go ahead with two previously scheduled meetings in Washington next month: the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade, and the Joint Science and Technology Commission. Both meetings would be used as opportunities to reaffirm to the Chinese the full dimension of our China policy: We recognize China's importance and the need to work together on a variety of common interests, but we also believe that China should adhere to internationally recognized human rights.
- The bottom line is that if China does not make significant overall progress on human rights as outlined in the Executive Order, we will not renew Most-Favored Nation trading status. It was further decided that prebriefs to the press would begin in the next few days to explain the purpose of going forward with these meetings. (S)
- For at least the next month, there was a consensus that there should not be any additional high-level visits to China. Specifically, it was decided that Admiral Larson (CINCPAC) should not visit China in April. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-- There was a consensus that we need to do a better job of explaining to the press the progress that has been achieved thus far on human rights issues, using the guidance cleared by the President on March 21. The Principals Committee also recommends that the President make a statement in the near future on China policy, emphasizing the overall strategic context for the policy and discussing the progress already achieved, not only on human rights, but on other issues as well. Agencies were tasked to provide examples of progress on issues within their respective jurisdictions. The goal of the Presidential statement should be both to demonstrate our firmness on the need for human rights improvements and to have a calming effect on China (by making it clear our conditions are ~~modest and~~ reasonable and not designed to ~~overthrow~~ the regime). (S)

destabilize

-- The key to managing the Congress will be extensive consultations, some of which have already been done following Secretary Christopher's trip. We should seek "counter-type" statements from key players. ~~For example, members who believe trade and human rights should be delinked should be encouraged to present this view to the Chinese, but also advise them that such delinkage can only occur after significant overall progress has been achieved this year.~~ The White House Legislative Affairs Office was tasked to take the lead in devising a Congressional consultation strategy to be launched in the near future. (S)

no

-- With the business community, we should seek to turn their strong desire to renew MFN into an asset with the Chinese. We should convene small groups of businessmen and indicate that we share the same goal: being in a position to renew Most-Favored Nation status. But they have to help us achieve our common goals by indicating, in their discussions with the Chinese, that the Administration is serious and that additional progress on human rights must occur if MFN status is to be renewed. (S)

-- Finally, ~~it was deemed important that the President demonstrate his continued engagement on this issue by meeting periodically with key players in the field on an off-the-record basis.~~ This would send a reassuring signal of his engagement to the Chinese, as well as to Congress. (S)

should

TO: ITOH

FROM: GROSSMAN, M

DOC DATE: 21 MAR 94
SOURCE REF: 9406502

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
MFN

PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: STATE POLICY PAPER FOR 22 MAR PC MTG ON CHINA

ACTION: OBE PER WIEDEMANN

DUE DATE: 22 MAR 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WIEDEMANN

LOGREF: 9420373 9420378

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: PC0068

CODES: CPR

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

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FOR INFO

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By RL NARA, Date 7/15/2019
2015-0221-M

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSKDB CLOSED BY: NSJEB DOC 1 OF 1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 WIEDEMANN

Z 94032120 APPROPRIATE ACTION

001

X 94032510 OBE PER WIEDEMANN

TO: ITOH

FROM: GROSSMAN, M

DOC DATE: 21 MAR 94
SOURCE REF: 9406502

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
MFN

PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: STATE POLICY PAPER FOR 22 MAR PC MTG ON CHINA

ACTION: APPROPRIATE ACTION

DUE DATE: 22 MAR 94

STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: WIEDEMANN

LOGREF:

FILES: IFG

NSCP:

CODES: CPR

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

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WIEDEMANN

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ROSNER
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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VT NARA, Date 7/15/2015
2015-0721-01

COMMENTS: _____

OBE

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1



9406502

20380

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520


March 21, 1994

~~SECRET~~
DECL:OADR

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM ITOH
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Policy Paper for Principals Committee Meeting on
China March 22, 1994 (S)

This memorandum transmits a paper on next steps in U.S.
policy towards China for participants to consider at the
March 22 Principals Committee meeting on China.


Marc Grossman
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VC NARA, Date 7/15/2014
2015-0221-11

~~SECRET~~

CHINA POLICY: PROPOSED NEXT STEPS

We are in a policy implementation phase in the last two months leading up to our MFN decision. We need to project calm, unity, consistency and determination to the Chinese but also to our domestic audience including the media and Congress. We also need to ensure that the President will have flexibility at the time he makes his decision.

Domestic Front

- o The President speaks out on behalf of our policy.
- o Administration maintains a united front.
- o Continue our campaign with the media.
- o Continue intensive consultations and coordination with the Hill.
- o A mini-SSG to manage our strategy over the next two months.
 - Maintain continuity in policy; calibrate to extract maximum concessions from Chinese on Executive Order criteria.
 - Oversee study of MFN options.
 - Oversee study on ways to pursue human rights on China aside from using MFN.

Chinese Front

- o Continue implementing the engagement strategy.
- o Follow-up on each of the seven areas in the Executive Order in Beijing and Washington. (State has already compiled a detailed, specific implementation plan.)
 - Roy in Beijing, with carefully drawn instruction.
 - Lord with Chinese Ambassador in Washington.
- o Codels, high-level private visitors visiting China press for progress on the Executive Order.
- o Depending on intervening events, consider sending, in mid to late April, a USG official for a last push in Beijing. The official should not be above the under secretary level. Sending anyone sooner or higher to the Middle Kingdom would look weak, desperate.
- o Ensure that treatment of the JCCT and S&T Commission meetings in Washington during April is very low key.
- o No secret envoys or similar gimmicks.

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 21 MAR 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
MEDIA

PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: CHINA - PRESS GUIDANCE FOR 22 MAR PC MTG PARTICIPANTS

ACTION: BERGER SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 24 MAR 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CICIO

LOGREF: 9420373 9420378

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: PC0068

CODES: CPR

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MILLISON
NSC CHRON
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DOC 1 OF 1

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9420379

DOC ACTION OFFICER

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X 94032120 BERGER SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

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001 940321 CHRISTOPHER, W
001 940321 BENTSEN, L
001 940321 PERRY, W
001 940321 BROWN, R
001 940321 KANTOR, M
001 940321 ALBRIGHT, M
001 940321 WOOLSEY, R
001 940321 TYSON, L
001 940321 RUBIN, R
001 940321 SHALIKASHVILI, J
001 940321 HOLUM, J
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PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
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RELEASER: Murphy 0600
DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 516 CLASSIFICATION **UNCLASSIFIED** PAGES 5
FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION CHINA PRESS GUIDANCE
NSC LOG # 20379

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TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
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DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
TREASURY	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
COMMERCE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
ACDA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:
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RELEASER: *Murphy*

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MESSAGE NO. 516 CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES 5

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION CHINA PRESS GUIDANCE

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TREASURY	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
COMMERCE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
ACDA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

AGENCY OPS CENTERS: DELIVER TO ADDRESSEES AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE

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PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
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RELEASER: Murphy
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MESSAGE NO. 516 CLASSIFICATION **UNCLASSIFIED** PAGES 5
FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION CHINA PRESS GUIDANCE
NSC LOG # 20379

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JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
TREASURY	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
COMMERCE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
ACDA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:
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RELEASER: Murphy

DTG: _____

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MESSAGE NO. 516 CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED PAGES 5

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION CHINA PRESS GUIDANCE

NSC LOG # 20379

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
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CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
TREASURY	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
COMMERCE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
ACDA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:
AGENCY OPS CENTERS: DELIVER TO ADDRESSEES AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE

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PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: *Murphy*
DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 516 CLASSIFICATION **UNCLASSIFIED** PAGES 5
FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION CHINA PRESS GUIDANCE
NSC LOG # 20379

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JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
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ACDA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:
AGENCY OPS CENTERS: DELIVER TO ADDRESSEES AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE

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RELEASER: _____
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MESSAGE NO. 516 CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED PAGES 5

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION CHINA PRESS GUIDANCE

NSC LOG # 20379

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
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CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
TREASURY	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
COMMERCE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
ACDA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:
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RELEASER: Murphy
DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. <u>516</u>		CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED	PAGES <u>5</u>
FROM <u>WILLIAM H. ITOH</u> (NAME)	<u>(202) 456-2585</u> (PHONE NUMBER)	<u>West Wing Desk</u> (ROOM NO.)	
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION <u>CHINA PRESS GUIDANCE</u>			
NSC LOG # <u>20379</u>			
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- ROUTINE

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DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC LOG # 20379

FROM: National Security Council *WJH* PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR
 SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting CHINA PRESS GUIDANCE PAGES: 5

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
<u>USUN New York</u>	<u>Mr. Rick Inderfurth</u>	<u>212-415-4016</u>	<u>212-415-4177</u>

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
 If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON
March 21, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE
UNITED NATIONS
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ECONOMIC POLICY
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE 
SUBJECT: China Press Guidance

The President has approved the attached press guidance on China.

Attachment
Tab A China Press Guidance

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

China

Background

Secretary Christopher returned from China following meetings with President Jiang Zemin, Premier Li Peng and Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen. The Chinese reaction to his message on human rights was and continues to be generally negative. However, there were positive steps as well, including some movement on implementing our prison labor MOU, Chinese commitments on outstanding emigration cases and discussions regarding ICRC prison visits.

General Points

- Our policy never has been to isolate China. As President Clinton made clear in his November meeting with President Jiang, our objective is to strengthen the basis for improving the U.S.-China relationship by addressing issues that have caused severe strains since 1989. Since last year, we have engaged the Chinese at a high level on a broad range of issues, including human rights, which are important to improving relations.
- We will continue to develop this relationship in pursuit of our national interests, including enhancing respect for human rights, stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, opening markets, and cooperating on global issues, including the North Korean nuclear program.
- On human rights, the executive order issued by the President in May 1993, tying MFN renewal to human rights progress, was shaped in close consultation with the Congress. The specific conditions outlined in the executive order for renewal of most-favored nation trading status are reasonable, consistent and clear. We are asking China to follow basic standards of human rights that bind most nations of the world, regardless of region or history. The Chinese clearly understand our position, based in part on the straightforward message Secretary Christopher relayed during his visit to China last week.
- Contrary to the impression of some reporting, the Chinese took some constructive steps on this front during Secretary Christopher's visit.
 - They agreed to cooperate on ensuring that they do not ship goods to the U.S. made by prison labor.
 - They agreed to resolve the few outstanding emigration cases.
 - They provided more accounting on prisoners now being

held, and agreed to provide information on Tibetan prisoners.

-- They noted that expert-level talks with the International Red Cross on prison visits will begin soon.

-- They agreed to review information from us on the jamming of Voice of America broadcasts into the country.

-- More work clearly needs to be done in the two months remaining before the decision deadline. We will be watching their progress closely.

Q: Shouldn't Secretary Christopher have canceled his trip in light of the Chinese arrests of dissidents?

A: Secretary Christopher went to Beijing at the invitation of the Chinese government. The Secretary's purpose was to make sure that the Chinese government--at the highest levels--does not misunderstand U.S. policy. The core of this policy is to strengthen the foundation for building a stronger long-term relationship with China through a resolute insistence on overall significant human rights progress. Strong bipartisan majorities of both the Senate and the House have insisted since 1989 on conditioning MFN extension on human rights progress, and the Secretary gave the Chinese officials a letter from 275 Members of Congress reaffirming that position.

Q: Did the Chinese ask Secretary Christopher to postpone his visit?

A: This is absolutely incorrect. Foreign Minister Qian had reiterated the invitation to Secretary Christopher in their January meeting in Paris and the Chinese confirmed plans for the visit again in late February, asking only that the Secretary not arrive on March 10, the opening day of the National People's Congress. The Secretary obliged by arriving on March 11. We are puzzled at post-trip suggestions from Beijing that they did not want the Secretary to come.

Q: Is there dissension within the United States Government over China policy, particularly between those concerned with trade and those who focus on human rights?

A: Our policy has not changed. While we value our economic relationship with China and seek to strengthen it, we believe encouraging Beijing to follow basic, universally accepted standards of human rights is important to China's full integration into the global community. Indeed, our conditions for renewal of MFN trading status are reasonable, consistent, and clear. If there is not overall significant progress in meeting these standards, China's MFN status will not be renewed.

Q: Won't the denial of MFN status cost thousands of U.S. jobs?

A: Our goal is not to deny MFN status, but rather to achieve overall, significant progress on what we believe are reasonable, consistent, and clear conditions on human rights. Some progress was achieved during Secretary Christopher's trip. We are hopeful that enough additional progress will be forthcoming to enable us to renew MFN.

Q: [If pressed: Is it correct, as suggested in the press, that Whitewater led the White House to cancel important meetings on China, and to take a harder line than otherwise might have been the case?

A: No policy meetings on China were canceled; there were some lower level communications meetings that included China which were rescheduled. Nor has there been a change in the President's strategy that was adopted last summer--to engage the Chinese at a high level on a broad range of issues, in order to facilitate greater progress on human rights.

Q: Was it a mistake for Assistant Secretary of State Shattuck to meet with Chinese dissident Wei Jingsheng?

A: No. It would be utterly unacceptable and irregular for U.S. diplomats anywhere in the world to limit their contacts solely to individuals approved by host governments.

TO: LAKE

FROM: SUETTINGER
ROTH

DOC DATE: 21 MAR 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BRIEFING MEMO FOR 22 MAR PC MTG ON CHINA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 24 MAR 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SUETTINGER LOGREF: 9420373 9420379

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0068 CODES: CPR

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By V2 NARA, Date 7/15/2019
2015-0221 - M

COMMENTS: _____

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

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rec'd 3/22 7:30am
 National Security Council
 The White House

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A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
 (Date/Time)

COMMENTS: *PC mtg on China,*
3/22

cc: *WI/KK*

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

March 21, 1994

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: STANLEY ROTH *RA*

FROM: ROBERT L. SUETTINGER *RLS*

SUBJECT: Background Memorandum for China Principals
Committee Meeting, March 22, 1994

Clearly, the most important issue on the agenda is insuring some semblance of consensus, if not unanimity, on the current state of our policy toward China. In the aftermath of Secretary Christopher's rather bumpy ride in Beijing, lots of doubts have surfaced. State's position--that more was accomplished than has been credited in the press--is sound, but perhaps somewhat optimistic.

At the moment, our policy rests on two assumptions, both of which are open to question:

- 1) That consensus can be maintained within the USG, keeping the pressure on China to make the requisite concessions; and
- 2) That China will eventually come around and make enough concessions that we can declare sufficient progress has been made to renew MFN.

The consensus that existed after the Executive Order last May has frayed somewhat. Both human rights activists and business interests were critical of the US position during the Christopher visit, the former calling for the trip to be canceled after dissident arrests, the latter calling attention to the damage that would be done within the United States should MFN be revoked.

The recent Council on Foreign Relations meeting combined the economic case with the view of the "China hands" that human rights issues and MFN should not be linked.

On Capitol Hill, the middle--which supports the President--seems to be holding, but could probably stand reinforcement in the form of some kind of consultations with the White House. That would serve the dual purpose of bolstering confidence in Secretary Christopher as well as the policy.

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PER E.O. 13526
2015-0221-11 (225)
3/11/2020 LDE

There is also growing concern among the "strategic thinkers" that, in the face of North Korea's growing intransigence and hostility, we should avoid antagonizing Beijing, whose support we will clearly need to resolve the North Korea nuclear problem.

It will be essential, in the face of this situation, that the USG maintain a steady position. Any evidence of disputes will give Beijing cause to be less cooperative. But even within the administration, the gaps seem to be more evident, as the economic/trade departments become increasingly uncomfortable with the prospect that MFN could actually be revoked.

China's readiness to make concessions on the human rights issue remains in doubt. Although Foreign Minister Qian and President Jiang appeared to relent somewhat at the close of the Secretary's visit, Qian seemed to take a harder line over the weekend. The bottom line is that we simply don't know whether the Chinese are willing or able to move much. This uncertainty is driven by China's domestic political considerations, with Deng Xiaoping fading as a political force, and succession contenders feeling a need to be tough.

What we might want to consider is how best to put our case before the Chinese. The public hectoring approach--constantly saying they haven't done enough--is paying diminishing dividends, and we should abandon it. In fact, Secretary Christopher has recognized that this is the case. When asked whether progress has thus far been sufficient, he is no longer saying "no," but rather indicating that this issue will be assessed over the next two and one-half months.

It would be useful if State could produce a paper that lays out its strategy for continuing the effort to achieve "overall, significant" progress. It should make clear, in all seven areas of concern:

What has been accomplished;
What further we need to be able to declare progress has been sufficient; and
How we intend to elicit the additional progress.

Finally, we need to give consideration to the possibility that the Chinese will do just barely enough to satisfy minimal requirements, or will fail to meet the requirements altogether. In either case, we will need to be prepared to provide the President with the fullest range of options, including targeted sanctions or other strong measures that might make it feasible -- in terms of domestic politics and our credibility on these issues -- to renew MFN should the President want to do so. It may be premature, however, to discuss these issues in the Principals Committee, given the potential for leaks. If that is the case, you may wish to task us to develop these options as well as a congressional strategy.

Concurrence by: Eric Schwartz 

TO: LAKE

FROM: SUETTINGER

DOC DATE: 18 MAR 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
AGENDA

MFN
PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 22 MAR PC MTG ON CHINA

ACTION: LAKE APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 22 MAR 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WIEDEMANN

LOGREF: 9420378 9420379

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: PC0068

CODES: CPR

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *vr* NARA, Date *7/5/2019*
2018-0721m

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

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X 94032116 KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

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002 940321 DAS, A
002 940321 MONTGOMERY, F
002 940321 INDERFURTH, K
002 940321 LAUDER, J
002 940321 CUTTER, W
002 940321 TYSON, L
002 940321 WALES, J
002 940321 PATRICK, T
002 940321 STARR, B

TO: LAKE

FROM: SUETTINGER

DOC DATE: 18 MAR 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R PC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 22 MAR PC MTG ON CHINA

ACTION: FOR DECISION DUE DATE: 22 MAR 94 STATUS: X

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By WZ NARA, Date 7/15/2015
205-5721-11

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National Security Council
The White House

RCC 3/21
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<i>rsd</i> Berger	<u>2</u>	<u>(initials)</u>	_____
Lake	<u>3</u>	Natl Sec Advisor	_____
Kenney	<u>4</u>	has seen <u>(initials)</u>	<u>TAKI</u>
Situation Room	<u>5</u>	<u>(initials)</u> 3/21	<u>(initials)</u>
West Wing Desk	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
<u>cy pls for TONY LAKE & SANDY BERGER</u>			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

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(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:
Agenda for Mar 22
PC mtg

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Kyle - -
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Cathy

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LOG 9420373
DATE 21 MAR 94

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 22 MAR PC MTG ON CHINA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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DR. LAURA D. TYSON COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS ROOM 314, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20500	<u>3/22/94</u>	<u>2:28</u>	<u><i>OTW</i></u> COPY: <u>1</u>
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MR. MARC GROSSMAN
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

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MR. EDWARD S. KNIGHT
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
ROOM 3408, MAIN TREASURY
1500 PENNSYLVANIA AVE, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20220

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ROOM 3E880
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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
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WASHINGTON, DC 20230

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U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
ROOM 416, WINDER BUILDING
600 17TH STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20506

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DATE 21 MAR 94

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 22 MAR PC MTG ON CHINA
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MR. EDWARD S. KNIGHT DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY ROOM 3408, MAIN TREASURY 1500 PENNSYLVANIA AVE, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20220	_____	_____	_____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
MR. ANTHONY A. DAS DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 5854 14TH & CONSTITUTION AVE, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20230	_____	_____	_____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
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LOG 9420373
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SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 22 MAR PC MTG ON CHINA
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COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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DATE 21 MAR 94

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 22 MAR PC MTG ON CHINA
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ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319

COPY: VIA FAX

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS
WASHINGTON, DC 20505

COPY: VIA FAX

3-24-94 5pm Linderfelt
COPY: 1

MR. BOWMAN CUTTER
NATL ECONOMIC COUNCIL
ROOM 231
OLD EXECUTIVE OFC BLDG

COPY: 1

DR. LAURA D. TYSON
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS
ROOM 314, OEOB
WASHINGTON, DC 20500

COPY: 1

MS. JANE WALES
OFFICE OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY POLICY
ROOM 494
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WASHINGTON, DC 20500

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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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LOG 9420373
DATE 21 MAR 94

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 22 MAR PC MTG ON CHINA
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MR. JOHN A. LAUDER CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
MR. BOWMAN CUTTER NATL ECONOMIC COUNCIL ROOM 231 OLD EXECUTIVE OFC BLDG	_____	_____	_____ COPY: <u>1</u>
DR. LAURA D. TYSON COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS ROOM 314, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20500	_____	_____	_____ COPY: <u>1</u>
MS. JANE WALES OFFICE OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY POLICY ROOM 494 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20500	<u>3/22/94</u>	<u>2:35PM</u>	<u>J Anne Ward</u> COPY: <u>1</u>
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1994 MAR 21 PH 6:13

**WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM**

TIME OF RECEIPT

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3-22-94

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RELEASER: *[Signature]* **0600**
DTG: _____

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MESSAGE NO. 512 CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NOTIFICATION OF 22 MARCH PC MTG ON CHINA

NSC LOG # 20373

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TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
TREASURY	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
COMMERCE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
ACDA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:
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**WHITE HOUSE
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PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: [Signature]
DTG: _____

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MESSAGE NO. 512 CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NOTIFICATION OF 22 MARCH PC MTG ON CHINA
NSC LOG # 20373

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JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
TREASURY	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
COMMERCE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
ACDA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:
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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VK Date: 7/17/2014

TIME OF TRANSMISSION
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1994 MAR 21 PM 6:13

**WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM**

MAR 21 6 16 PM '94

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: [Signature]

DTG: _____

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MESSAGE NO. 512 CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NOTIFICATION OF 22 MARCH PC MTG ON CHINA

NSC LOG # 20373

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
TREASURY	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
COMMERCE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
ACDA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:
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TIME OF TRANSMISSION
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**WHITE HOUSE
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94 MAR 21 P6:22

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
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RELEASER: [Signature]

DTG: _____

SECRET

MESSAGE NO. 512 CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NOTIFICATION OF 22 MARCH PC MTG ON CHINA

NSC LOG # 20373

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
TREASURY	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
COMMERCE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
ACDA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

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REMARKS:

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1994 MAR 21 PM 6:13

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PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
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ROUTINE

RELEASER: *[Signature]*
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MESSAGE NO. 512 CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NOTIFICATION OF 22 MARCH PC MTG ON CHINA

NSC LOG # 20373

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TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
TREASURY	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
COMMERCE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
ACDA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS: RECEIVING OPS CENTERS: PLEASE DELIVER TO ADDRESSEES AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE.

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WHITE HOUSE
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1994 MAR 21 PM 6:13

**WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM**

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3-21-94

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: [Signature]
DTG: _____

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MESSAGE NO. 512 CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH (NAME) (202) 456-2585 (PHONE NUMBER) West Wing Desk (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NOTIFICATION OF 22 MARCH PC MTG ON CHINA

NSC LOG # 20373

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TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
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USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
TREASURY	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
COMMERCE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
ACDA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:
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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

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**WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM**

PRECEDENCE

- FLASH
- IMMEDIATE
- PRIORITY
- ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC LOG # 20373

FROM: National Security Council [Ⓢ] PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting CHINA PC DN 22 MAR PAGES: 2

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
<u>USUN New York</u>	<u>Mr. Rick Inderfurth</u>	<u>212-415-4016</u>	<u>212-415-4177</u>

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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Initials: rc Date: 7/17/2019

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20373

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

March 21, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR

LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

Mr. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. EDWARD KNIGHT
Executive Secretary
Department of Treasury

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. ANTHONY A. DAS
Executive Secretary
Department of Commerce

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Executive Director for Policy
Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

AMB. RICK INDERFUERTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the United
Nations

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. W. BOWMAN CUTTER
Deputy to the President for
Economic Policy
National Economic Council

DR. LAURA D. TYSON
Chair, President's Council of
Economic Advisors

MS. JANE WALES
Associate Director for
National Security and
International Affairs
Office of Science and
Technology Policy

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MS. BARBARA STARR
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on China (S)

There will be a Principals Committee Meeting on China, Tuesday, March 22, from 5:15 - 6:15 p.m. in the Roosevelt Room. Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the meeting. (S)

for Denise A. Kenney
William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 7/15/2014
2015-0221-M

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Tab A

[Illegible text]

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006. agenda	Principals Committee Meeting on China, March 22, 1994. [Record ID: 9420373] (1 page)	03/21/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 4007

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0068 PC Meeting on China, March 22, 1994

2015-0221-M
rs1185

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 18, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ROBERT SUETTINGER *RS*

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on China, Tuesday,
March 22, 1944, 5:15 - 6:15 p.m.

OK

Attached at Tab I is the memorandum to agencies for the subject meeting.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memo to the agencies at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to Agencies
Tab A Agenda

*RS - 3/21
I asked Will
on Thursday
to prepare
paper for this
meeting (since
neither Kurt
nor Stanley were
here). Just
checked and
they will have
2-3 pages over
in an hour or
so!*

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *VZ* NARA, Date *7/15/2017*
2015-0721-11

RS

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MR MARKER

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001a. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on China (2 pages) <i>partial release</i>	01/26/1996	<i>b(3)</i> P1/b(1) KDE 3/11/2020
001b. draft	re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on China (2 pages) <i>partial release</i>	01/26/1996	<i>b(3)</i> P1/b(1) KDE 3/11/2020
002a. memo	Robert Suettinger to Anthony Lake re: Principals Committee Meeting on China (2 pages)	01/26/1996	P1/b(1) KDE 3/11/2020
002b. list	re: Principals Committee Meeting, January 26, 1996 [partial] [CIA Act] (1 page)	01/26/1996	P3/b(3)

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Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3902

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0165 PC Meeting on China, January 26, 1996

2015-0221-M

rs1186

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: LAKE

FROM: KRISTOFF

DOC DATE: 31 JAN 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R PC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 26 JAN PC MTG ON CHINA

ACTION: LAKE APPROVED RECOM 1 DUE DATE: 03 FEB 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KRISTOFF LOGREF: 9620078 9620086

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0165 CODES: CPR

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BAKER JANE
BASS
KRECKO
KRISTOFF
LAKE
NSC CHRON
SODERBERG

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By YL NARA, Date 7/15/2009
2015 0721-02

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA CLOSED BY: NSMEC DOC 1 OF 1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE
001

Z 96013119 FOR DECISION
X 96020215 LAKE APPROVED RECOM 1

National Security Council
The White House

Rec'd 2/1

6:45a

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 20107
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS ~~NSD~~ INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG he A/O _____

B

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	_____	_____	_____
Dohse	_____	_____	_____
Sens	<u>1/3</u>	<u>ADS</u>	_____
Soderberg	<u>copy</u>	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Lake	<u>2</u>	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	Natl Sec Advisor	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>re 2/2</u>	<u>[initials]</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>5</u>	_____	<u>[initials]</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: Per Kristoff, it's up to Lake/Berger on whether to send soc to agencies. Memo attached if we do.

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

National Security Council
The White House

KCA 4/1

6:45a

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 20107

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSD INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG we AO _____

B

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	_____	_____	_____
Dohse	_____	_____	_____
Sens	<u>1/3</u>	<u>ADS</u>	_____
Soderberg	<u>copy</u>	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Lake	<u>2</u>	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	<u>Natl Sec Advisor</u>	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4/5</u>	<u>re 2/12</u>	<u>[initials]</u>
Records Mgt.	_____	_____	<u>[initials]</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: Per Kristoff, it's up to Lake/Berger on whether to send soc to agencies. Memo attached if we do.

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

20107

January 31, 1996

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: SANDRA KRISTOFF *SK*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of the Principals Committee Meeting on China

Attached at Tab A is the Summary of Conclusion of the Principals Committee meeting held on January 26, 1996.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you authorize Andrew Sens to file the summary of conclusions attached at Tab A for the record.

Approve *SK* Disapprove _____

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memorandum to agencies at Tab II forwarding the summary of conclusions.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *VZ* NARA, Date *7/15/2015*
1015-0221-42

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5(b) (d)
Declassify On: 1/31/2000

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on China [partial] (1 page)	01/26/1996	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3902

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0165 PC Meeting on China, January 26, 1996

2015-0221-M

rs1186

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~

20107

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of NSC Principals Committee

DATE: January 26, 1996

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 3:30 - 4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on China (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

Anthony Lake

ACDA:

John Holum

Office of the Vice President:

Leon Fuerth

JCS:

General Shalikashvili

State:

Secretary Warren Christopher
Peter Tarnoff

White House:

Samuel R. Berger
Nancy Soderberg

Treasury:

Secretary Robert Rubin
Lawrence Summers

NSC:

Sandra J. Kristoff
Robert Suettinger

Defense:

Secretary William Perry
Walter Slocombe

Commerce:

Secretary Ronald Brown

USUN:

Ambassador Madeleine Albright

USTR:

Ambassador Michael Kantor
Charlene Barshefsky

CEA:

Joseph Stiglitz

CIA:

John Deutch

(b)(3)

NEC:

Laura Tyson
W. Bowman Cutter

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Andrew Sens

Reason: 1.5(d) (b)

Declassify on: 1/31/00

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2015-0221-M (R.26)

3/11/2020 KDE

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

-- The most effective approach toward China this year would be that of managing the relationship through resolute focus on key priorities in order to make sufficient progress to avoid confrontation and lay the groundwork for a more ambitious approach in 1997. (S)

-- In identifying priorities within and among issues, the Deputies and Principals Committees would meet periodically to ensure consistency of action among agencies. (S)

-- A clear message at a high level should be delivered to China and Taiwan concerning our longer term goals and our immediate expectations for 1996. (S)

-- An activist strategy for dealing with Congress on MFN renewal should be given high priority. (S)

-- The U.S. posture for UNHRC action should be no more than and no less than that adopted in 1995. (S)

-- MFN and trade issues, including intellectual property rights and WTO membership, should be considered in tandem. (S)

-- The IWG on Nonproliferation should prepare recommendations on outstanding issues with China. (S)

-- Development of the sustainable growth initiative should proceed and be coordinated by the Office of the Vice President. (S)

-- The Joint Economic Committee and the Joint Committee on Commerce and Trade should be strengthened and proposals for initiating a dialogue between CEA and the State Planning Commission should move forward. (S)

-- The Deputies Committee would review a revised strategy paper which identifies specific steps to be taken in each issue area: trade, human rights, military to military contacts, economic dialogue, nonproliferation and Taiwan. (S)

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. draft	re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on China [partial] (1 page)	01/26/1996	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3902

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0165 PC Meeting on China, January 26, 1996

2015-0221-M
rs1186

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~

20107

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20504

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of NSC Principals Committee

DATE: January 26, 1996
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 3:30 - 4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on China (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
Anthony Lake

ACDA:
John Holum

Office of the Vice President:
Leon Fuerth

JCS:
General Shalikashvili

State:
Secretary Warren Christopher
Peter Tarnoff

White House:
Samuel R. Berger
Nancy Soderberg

Treasury:
Secretary Robert Rubin
Lawrence Summers

NSC:
Sandra J. Kristoff
Robert Suettinger

Defense:
Secretary William Perry
Walter Slocombe

Commerce:
Secretary Ronald Brown

USUN:
Ambassador Madeleine Albright

USTR:
Ambassador Michael Kantor
Charlene Barshefsky

CEA:
Joseph Stiglitz

CIA:
John Deutch

(b)(3)

NEC:
Laura Tyson
W. Bowman Cutter

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5(d) (b)
Declassify on: 1/31/00

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0821-M (2.27)
3/11/2020 KOE

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

-- The most effective approach toward China this year would be that of managing the relationship through resolute focus on key priorities in order to make sufficient progress to avoid confrontation and lay the groundwork for a more ambitious approach in 1997. ~~(S)~~

-- In identifying priorities within and among issues, the Deputies and Principals Committees would meet periodically to ensure consistency of action among agencies. ~~(S)~~

-- A clear message at a high level should be delivered to China and Taiwan concerning our longer term goals and our immediate expectations for 1996. ~~(S)~~

-- An activist strategy for dealing with Congress on MFN renewal should be given high priority. ~~(S)~~

-- The U.S. posture for UNHRC action should be no more than and no less than that adopted in 1995. ~~(S)~~

-- MFN and trade issues, including intellectual property rights and WTO membership, should be considered in tandem. ~~(S)~~

-- The IWG on Nonproliferation should prepare recommendations on outstanding issues with China. ~~(S)~~

-- Development of the sustainable growth initiative should proceed and be coordinated by the Office of the Vice President. ~~(S)~~

-- The Joint Economic Committee and the Joint Committee on Commerce and Trade should be strengthened and proposals for initiating a dialogue between CEA and the State Planning Commission should move forward. ~~(S)~~

-- The Deputies Committee would review a revised strategy paper which identifies specific steps to be taken in each issue area: trade, human rights, military to military contacts, economic dialogue, nonproliferation and Taiwan. ~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20107

January 31, 1996

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: SANDRA KRISTOFF *SK*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of the Principals
Committee Meeting on ~~North Korea~~.

China

Attached at Tab I is the Summary of Conclusion of the Principals
meeting held on January 26, 1996.

Committee

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to file the Summary attached at
Tab I for the record.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *VL* NARA, Date *2/15/2015*
2015-0221-m

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5(b)(d)
Declassify On: 1/31/2000

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

20107

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

DR. JOSEPH STIGLITZ
Chairman, President's Council
of Economic Advisors

MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the
President

MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. W. BOWMAN CUTTER
Deputy Assistant to the
President for Economic
Policy

MS. BETTIE BACA
Executive Secretary
Department of Commerce

MS. BARBARA STARR
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency


MR. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the
United Nations

COL. F.C. WILSON
Secretary of Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Assistant USTR for Policy
Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee
Meeting on China ~~(S)~~

Attached at Tab A for Principals' use is the summary of
conclusions of the Principals Committee meeting on China held on
Friday, January 26, 1996. ~~(S)~~



Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5(b)(d)
Declassify on: 1/30/00

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5(b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By  NARA, Date 7/15/2009
205-0721-M

TO: LAKE

FROM: SUETTINGER
KRISTOFF

DOC DATE: 26 JAN 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 26 JAN PC MTG ON CHINA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 30 JAN 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SUETTINGER LOGREF: 9620078

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0165 CODES: CPR

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

- BASS
- BERGER
- JOSHI
- KRECKO
- KRISTOFF
- NSC CHRON
- SODERBERG
- SUETTINGER

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VC NARA, Date 7/15/749
205-0221 -m

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSASK CLOSED BY: NSMEC DOC 1 OF 1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE
001

Z 96012615 FOR INFORMATION
X 96012617 NOTED BY LAKE

— rec'd 1/26 11:10a

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 20086
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG DB A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<u>LB</u> Harmon	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Dohse			
Sens.			
Soderberg	<u>copy</u>		
Berger	<u>2</u>	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>re 1/20</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette YES

—

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

20078

January 25, 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. BETTIE BACA
Executive Secretary
Department of Commerce

MR. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the
United Nations

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Assistant USTR for Policy
Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

DR. JOSEPH STIGLITZ
Chairman, President's Council
of Economic Advisors

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the
President

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency


MR. W. BOWMAN CUTTER
Deputy Assistant to the
President for Economic
Policy

MS. BARBARA STARR
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency

COL. F.C. WILSON
Secretary of Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting ~~(S)~~

Please pass this memorandum to the Principals for their eyes only. There will be a Principals Committee meeting on China on Friday, January 26, from 3:30 - 4:30 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the meeting. A discussion paper is attached at Tab B. Attendance is principals only. ~~(S)~~


Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab A Agenda for the Meeting
Tab B Discussion Paper

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5(b)(d)
Declassify On: 1/30/00

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By 12 NARA, Date 7/15/2014
2015-0721-A2

~~SECRET~~

January 23, 1996

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: SANDRA KRISTOFF *SK*
FROM: ROBERT SUETTINGER *RS*
SUBJECT: Notification of PC Meeting

Attached at Tab I is a notification for a PC meeting on China scheduled for January 26, 1996 from 3:30-4:30 in the situation room. The agenda for the meeting is at Tab A. The discussion paper ~~will be sent out separately.~~ *is at TAB B.*

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the notification at Tab A.

Approve *Q* Disapprove

Attachment

Tab I Notification of PC Meeting
Tab A Agenda

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20086

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

NOTED

January 26, 1996

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: SANDRA J. KRISTOFF *SJK*
FROM: ROBERT L. SUETTINGER *RLS*
SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting -- China

The Principals Meeting on China has a number of objectives that aren't on the formal agenda.

First among them is to establish the importance of the issue. The paper is an effort to take a more comprehensive approach to China -- to plan for what is going to be a difficult year with a difficult country. The various issues raised in the paper need decision, and all should be addressed. But more importantly, the question of China policy has taken on greater significance, and needs to be viewed by all the Principals in a strategic framework.

A second objective is to establish the White House as being in charge of China policy. Comprehensive engagement was and is the right policy decision, but it breaks into department-sized pieces in its implementation, and that has confused Beijing on occasion, as well as others. Only the NSC is in a position to manage an effort to prioritize problems.

A corollary is that, particularly in 1996, we must limit freelancing. Coordination of policy is essential, ad hoc linkages without consultation do damage -- what we are trying to avoid is mixed messages, from which the Chinese pick what they want to hear.

There are many more problems in the relationship than are covered in the decision paper. Many of these can be worked out once the general direction and structure of our policy is more clearly established. Some of these problems will probably be mentioned by various participants. Given the time constraints and the number of already controversial issues in the paper, you should try to avoid distractions.

There is one critical issue in the U.S.-China relationship not raised in the paper -- non-proliferation. There are several

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)
Declassify On: 1.6 X6

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0221-11 (2.28)
3/11/2020 VDE

cases pending within an established bureaucratic process -- they will be handled thoroughly and in accordance with the available evidence. There are, in fact, no decisions required by the Principals at this point. It may be useful to hear various opinions on related topics, including how best to convey to Beijing the seriousness of this issue.

You may wish to use the following points in a brief discussion of this subject.

- We are facing a large number of proliferation-related issues with China.
- Clearly non-proliferation is one of our major concerns with China. It deserves close and persistent attention.
- But often our policy seems to be driven by a parade of sanctions cases, instead of a broad-based view of how Chinese activities affect American interests, and how the continuing difficulties we have with China on these matters threatens to block useful areas of cooperation (e.g., peaceful nuclear cooperation, commercial satellite and space launch cooperation).
- Once we have a clearer idea on these issues of first principle, we will be in a better position to decide how hard to press the Chinese on their activities, and how hard to work for the sake of protecting the possibilities for increased cooperation in these areas.
- We will also be in a better position to make some of the close calls that come up in the sanctions area -- including when and to what extent to waive sanctions. Admittedly, our sanctions laws limit our discretion here, but they do not eliminate it.
- So I would like to ask the Deputies to come back to us with a recommendation on how to approach China on nonproliferation, integrated into our overall approach on other issues.
- Since not all of the specific sanctions cases have been reviewed interagency yet, in the first instance I would like to ask the Nonproliferation IWG to do that in support of the Deputies review.

Concurrences by: Dan Poneman *DP*

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. list	re: Principals Committee Meeting, January 26, 1996 [partial] [CIA Act] (1 page)	01/26/1996	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3902

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0165 PC Meeting on China, January 26, 1996

2015-0221-M

rs1186

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING
January 26, 1996
Situation Room
3:30 - 4:30 p.m.

CHAIR

Anthony Lake

OVP

Leon Fuerth

STATE

Secretary Warren Christopher
Peter Tarnoff

TREASURY

Secretary Robert Rubin
Lawrence Summers

DEFENSE

Secretary William Perry
(for a portion of meeting)
Walter Slocombe

COMMERCE

Secretary Ronald Brown

USUN

Ambassador Madeleine Albright

USTR

Ambassador Mickey Kantor

CEA

Joseph Stiglitz

CHIEF OF STAFF

Leon Panetta

CIA

John Deutch

(b)(3)

[002b]

NEC

Laura Tyson
W. Bowman Cutter

ACDA

John Holum

JCS

General Shalikashvili

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Folder Title:

PC0172 PC Meeting on China Sanctions, March 26, 1996

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Gary Samore to Anthony Lake and Laura Tyson re: March 26 PC on China 825 Sanctions (5 pages)	03/25/1996	P1/b(1)
001b. report	Table 1: EXIM Bank Options. (1 page)	03/25/1996	P1/b(1), P4/b(4)
001c. chart	Table 2: [Possible Sanctions] (1 page)	03/25/1996	P1/b(1)
001e. paper	re: China-Pakistan Cooperation (9 pages) <i>partial release</i>	03/25/1996	P1/b(1) <i>VOE 3/11/2020</i>
001f. paper	re: Legal Analysis: China Nonproliferation Sanctions (30 pages) <i>partial release</i>	03/25/1996	P1/b(1) <i>VOE 3/11/2020</i>
001g. draft	re: Justification for the National Interest Determination Regarding the People's Republic of China (1 page)	03/25/1996	P1/b(1) <i>VOE 3/11/2020</i>
002. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on China (2 pages) <i>partial release</i>	03/26/1996	P1/b(1) <i>VOE 3/11/2020</i>

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2015-0221-M

rs1187

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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TO: LAKE

FROM: SAMORE
PONEMAN

DOC DATE: 25 MAR 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
PC

SANCTIONS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 26 MAR PC MTG ON CHINA SANCTIONS

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE

DUE DATE: 29 MAR 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SAMORE

LOGREF: 9620230 9620296

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: PC0172

CODES: CPR SAN

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

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FOR INFO

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By YL NARA, Date 7/5/2019
2019-0221-02

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

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001 LAKE
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Lake	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Gary Samore to Anthony Lake and Laura Tyson re: March 26 PC on China 825 Sanctions (5 pages)	03/25/1996	P1/b(1)

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001b. report	Table 1: EXIM Bank Options. (1 page)	03/25/1996	P1/b(1), P4/b(4)

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001c. chart	Table 2: [Possible Sanctions] (1 page)	03/25/1996	P1/b(1)

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Reason: 1.5(b), (c), (d)

DECL: 3/25/2016

March 25, 1996

DISCUSSION PAPER

China-Pakistan Nuclear Cooperation Determination Under Section 825 of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act

Issues for Discussion

Whether China has willfully aided or abetted Pakistan to acquire a nuclear explosive device or unsafeguarded special nuclear material under Section 825 of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 (NPPA), thus requiring notification of Congress and the Export-Import Bank Board.

If so, whether to issue a national interest waiver for the Export-Import Bank Board to continue to extend credits to China: (1) without condition; (2) conditionally; or (3) to prohibit the extension of credit to the individual entity involved directly in the nuclear cooperation with Pakistan.

Export-Import Bank Sanctions

Section 825 of the NPPA requires the Secretary of State to report to Congress and to the Board of the Export-Import Bank if any country has "willfully aided or abetted any non-nuclear weapons state ... to acquire [a] nuclear explosive device or to acquire unsafeguarded special nuclear material" after June 29, 1994, the effective date of the NPPA.

Unlike other sanctions laws, this law does not establish a specific threshold of nuclear-related assistance that will trigger sanctions (e.g., that the proscribed transfer "materially" contribute to the recipient's program; that the entity making the transfer have the " requisite knowledge;" or even that there needs to be a specific activity, such as export of an item).

Upon receiving a report of a determination that sanctionable activity occurred, the Export-Import Bank Board "shall not give approval to guarantee, insure, or extend credit, or participate in the extension of credit in support of United States exports to such country unless the President determines that it is in the national interest" to continue such activities. Such a waiver must sit before Congress for 25 days of continuous session before it can take effect. This includes all periods during which neither chamber is recessed for more than three days. The cutoff of Board approvals begins immediately upon execution of the determination and notification of the Board.

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PER E. O. 13526

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The "national interest" waiver standard is one of the least stringent and permits a broad range of factors to be taken into account, including economic factors. This is different from waivers in other areas such as missile non-proliferation statutes, which do not permit the balancing of such factors.

If the President determines that a waiver is justified, it would be most beneficial to complete the waiver nearly simultaneously with a determination, as Congressional notification requirements (and the suspension of Export-Import Bank loans) are triggered once a determination is made. This would also minimize uncertainty for U.S. business.

Chinese Nuclear Cooperation with Pakistan

Cooperation between China and Pakistan on Pakistan's nuclear weapons program dates to the early 1970's. Chinese involvement made a substantial contribution to Pakistan's initial capabilities to fabricate weapons. Cooperation continued, albeit at less significant levels, after China joined the NPT in 1992.

1.4(c), 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6)

EO 13526 1.4c, 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6)

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China's Views

Chinese representatives state unequivocally that any cooperation with Pakistan is consistent with China's NPT obligations, which permit peaceful nuclear cooperation under safeguards.

EO 13526 1.4c, 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6)

The Chinese concluded the talks by noting that if the U.S. wanted to declare sanctions on the basis of completely false allegations it should go ahead and do it, that China can never accept unjustified sanctions, and sanctions will inevitably damage the bilateral relationship. Furthermore, the Chinese delegation specified that China wanted no sanctions at all, and determining that sanctions were warranted then waiving their imposition would still be a serious problem.

During the March 19-22 talks, the Chinese took a positive attitude toward future bilateral talks on export control and peaceful nuclear cooperation and indicated they were prepared to consider the U.S. proposed "ground rules" for nuclear cooperation with third countries. But they stressed that these future discussions would not be carried out under sanctions or the threat of sanctions.

The Legal Determination

A detailed legal analysis is attached at Tab 2. This section reviews briefly the key elements of the sanctions determination.

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5

Section 825 Determination and Waiver. Section 2(b)(4) of the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, as amended by Section 825 of the NPPA, requires suspension of credit by the Export-Import Bank to a country if the Secretary of State determines that a country engaged in certain activities. The statute identifies a number of activities that trigger sanctions, such as abrogating IAEA safeguards, detonating a nuclear explosive device, or willfully aiding or abetting a non-nuclear weapons state to acquire a nuclear explosive device or to acquire unsafeguarded special nuclear material.

One approach would be to make individual determinations on each of the activities outlined in the statute. The difficulty is that China's nuclear cooperation may contribute to Pakistan's acquiring both a nuclear explosive device and unsafeguarded special nuclear material. Furthermore, any determination that China aided Pakistan's acquiring a nuclear explosive device would make it difficult to avoid the political and policy judgment that China had violated the NPT. An alternative approach, which solves these problems and is legally available, is to make a determination without specifying the part of the statute which triggered the sanctions.

In the event of a waiver, the President will need to decide the breadth of the past and future Chinese activities that will be covered. The waiver could waive penalties for all actions that formed the basis of the determination and any similar future actions. (These future actions could still trigger sanctions under other sections of the NPPA or other sanctions laws.) Or, the waiver could be more narrowly defined, covering any past but not future actions.

The President will also need to provide a justification based on the national interest. Tab 3 provides a draft justification for a national interest waiver.

Willfulness. The statute requires that the aiding or abetting be "willful." This standard requires that the government of China was aware of as well as acquiesced to or approved of the nuclear cooperation with Pakistan. It is a lower standard than "knowing" which appears in other Sections of the NPPA (e.g., Section 821, "materially, and with requisite knowledge"; Section 824, "knowingly, materially and directly"). It does, however require a higher level of government complicity than the strict liability provisions of the Symington and Glenn amendments which require sanctions against countries that export or receive certain nuclear enrichment, materials or technology, but provide no statutory qualifier on the cooperation such as willful or knowing.

Senior Chinese government leaders have steadfastly denied any weapons-related cooperation with Pakistan, and have claimed that assistance is limited to Pakistan's civilian program


1.4(c), 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6)

EO 13526 1.4c, 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6)

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
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EO 13526 1.4c, 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6)

China says that it uses for export control purposes internationally agreed lists such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Zangger trigger list.

3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6)



EO 13526 1.4c, 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6)

EO 13526 1.4c, 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6)

Applicability of other Sanctions Provisions. At present, no other sanctions determinations must be reached as a legal matter based on the activities described

1.4(c)

EO 13526 1.4c

- NPPA Section 821 requires procurement sanctions on private entities. The entities here are government controlled, not private, so this sanction would not apply.
- NPPA Section 822 requires suspension of U.S. government sales or leases of defense articles or services to China in the event that the U.S. government determines that China is in material breach of its international non-proliferation commitments such as the NPT. This suspension does not extend to private sales or leases of defense articles or services. We are unaware of any relevant sales or leases by the U.S. government. Accordingly, it would be possible to decide to follow the practice under some other sanctions laws of not reaching a determination so long as no relevant sales or leases occur.
- NPPA Section 824 imposes sanctions on financial institutions that assist in proliferant export activities.
- The Symington Amendment prohibits economic and military assistance to countries that deliver or receive nuclear enrichment equipment, materials or technology except under full-scope IAEA safeguards. No such assistance to China is either underway or contemplated. Under consistent State Department practice, no sanctions determination is thus necessary under Symington for China.
- The Glenn Amendment imposes sanctions for transfer of a nuclear component or nuclear weapons design information after the enactment of the NPPA

EO 13526 1.4c

1.4(c)

EO 13526 1.4c

NPT Violation. There is no legal requirement for determining whether or not an NPT violation occurred. A determination under Section 825 that China provide unsafeguarded special nuclear material to Pakistan does not necessarily mean that China violated its NPT treaty provisions, but it will certainly raise this question from the press, the Chinese, and Congress.

Effect of a Sanctions Determination on South Asia

Pakistan acknowledges publicly its peaceful nuclear cooperation with China but denies any weapons-related cooperation. [redacted]

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6)

More recently, Ambassador Lodhi promised a further investigation into the "alleged" transfer so as to clear up "some type of misunderstanding."

Unlike most non-proliferation sanctions statutes, Section 825 imposes sanctions only on the provider and not the recipient. It will not lead directly to a Symington sanctions determination, given that the Symington standard (actual delivery or receipt of nuclear enrichment equipment, materials or technology) is higher than simply aiding or abetting. But it is unlikely that the Congress or the press will understand this distinction. And reaching a Section 825 determination will appear as an implicit condemnation of Pakistan and thereby undermine overall U.S.-Pakistani relations.

India likely will use a determination that China is assisting Pakistan's unsafeguarded nuclear program to justify further its own nuclear program.

The Chafee Amendment.

The Export-Import Bank generally may deny credit only for financial and commercial reasons. The Export-Import Bank Board thus requires a formal mechanism to preclude lending in cases such as those involving nuclear proliferation. One mechanism is Section 825 of the NPPA, discussed above; the second is the Chafee Amendment.

The Chafee Amendment adds a sentence to the general powers provision of Section (2)(b)(1)(B) of the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, and provides broad authority for the Executive Branch to require the Bank to withhold approvals for foreign policy reasons, including specifically to prevent nuclear proliferation.

This authority to withhold approvals has been delegated to the Secretary of State who may invoke it at any time, in consultation with other agencies, and without a waiting period. Generally, when the Secretary suspends Export-Import Bank approvals under the Chafee Amendment, the Secretary informs Congress, the Export-Import Bank, and the public of the suspension and the reasons for the suspension.

Options

- Conclude that insufficient evidence exists at present to sanction, because of an inability to demonstrate willfulness in the assistance on the behalf of the Chinese government. Direct the continued monitoring for evidence of additional transfers and cooperation.

--This could be combined with imposing targeted sanctions on CNEI [redacted]

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

[redacted] 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6)

as a policy matter through the Chafee Amendment.

- Postpone a sanctions determination for a specified time (e.g., through the April Ministerial), so as to provide more time to gain Chinese agreement to non-proliferation guidelines. Export-Import Bank loans would be formally suspended during this time, by invoking the Chafee Amendment.
- Sanction, waive without conditions, but limit the coverage of the waiver only to past Chinese cooperation with Pakistan. Any future misbehavior would provoke sanctions.
- Sanction, waive without conditions, with the waiver covering past Chinese nuclear cooperation with Pakistan and all similar actions in the future. At the same time, targeted sanctions would be imposed as a policy matter on CNEIC, using the Chafee amendment.
- Sanction, waive with a condition subsequent for imposing sanctions--after a period of time unless the Chinese agree to non-proliferation guidelines, or for as long as the Chinese maintain good non-proliferation behavior.
- Sanction, no waiver.


Analysis of the Options

Any option involving a sanctions determination will negatively affect the US-China relationship and risks ending the non-proliferation dialogue, the opportunity to implement the Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation agreement, and continued discussions to enhance the Chinese export control system.

A failure to find that sanctionable activity occurred under Section 825 could be criticized as being overly legalistic, and avoiding the implementation of U.S. law.

A conditional waiver continues business uncertainties and may compromise some Export-Import financial business. It imposes no immediate penalties on the China for past violations and will require the issue to be revisited. It might be seen by the Chinese as simply another way of imposing a deadline, thus not providing an atmosphere for continued non-proliferation discussions.

A targeted sanction attempts to balance the Administration's economic and non-proliferation priorities, focuses the costs on the entity responsible for the non-proliferation misbehavior, but will hurt American business more than the Chinese. Sanctions targeted on CNEIC would block \$500-900 million of Export-Import Bank financing associated with Qinshan II and III.

Tab 1  EO 13526 1.4c

Tab 2--Legal Analysis

Tab 3--Waiver Justification

TAB 1 [REDACTED] EO 13526 1.4c
To Be Provided Separately

SECRET

LEGAL ANALYSIS: CHINA NONPROLIFERATION SANCTIONS

SUMMARY

China's cooperative activities with Pakistan's unsafeguarded uranium enrichment program, as well as other elements of Pakistan's nuclear program, raise questions as to the applicability of a number of sanctions laws. In brief, this legal analysis concludes as follows (section numbers refer to the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 ("NPPA")):

1. Section 825: This provision amended section 2(b)(4) of the Export-Import Bank Act so that sanctions will apply if you conclude that China's assistance to Pakistan's unsafeguarded uranium enrichment program was "willful." This determination rests on the degree of involvement of the Chinese government and its connection to the entities involved in the relevant transfers. "Willfulness" also is the critical factor in determining whether sanctions are mandated as a result of Chinese assistance to Pakistan in acquiring a nuclear explosive device. If either of these activities were determined to have occurred, the EximBank sanctions would apply.

We believe that the President is not legally required to specify which part of this provision has been triggered. Moreover, if the President concludes that a waiver is in the U.S. "national interest" and should apply prospectively, he could decide that the waiver should apply to actions by China similar to those that formed the factual basis for the determination, regardless of which part of section 2(b)(4) those actions might themselves trigger. In L's view, this approach is legally available, but would not be prudent. Many in Congress would likely argue that, by waiving future activities related to nuclear weapons acquisition without a specific determination that China willfully aided or abetted such acquisition, the President would deprive Congress of the 25 continuous session days specified in the statute in order to permit Congress to consider the specific judgments of the President regarding which aspects of section 2(b)(4) have been triggered. (Discussion beginning page 3.)

2. Section 822(a): Under this section, a finding that China violated the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) would require a cutoff of U.S. government sales or leases of defense articles or services to China. There is evidence to support a determination by the President that China violated the NPT.

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However, the U.S. government does not currently sell or lease defense articles or services to China. Therefore, we are not legally required to decide whether China's actions trigger this provision so long as no such sales or leases are undertaken. (Discussion beginning page 20.)

3. Reporting Requirements: If the evidence leads to a determination that China has violated the NPT, the ACDA annual report should reflect that conclusion. However, in practice, we have not necessarily viewed this report as compelling us to reach final legal conclusions as to possible violations. (Discussion beginning page 22.)

4. Section 821: This section applies to proliferant export activities of private entities. We do not have sufficient information to conclude that the entities involved in the activities described in the INR tab were nongovernmental. Rather, these entities appear to have been either government agencies or corporations owned and closely controlled by the government. (Discussion beginning page 23.)

5. Section 824: This section applies to entities involved in financing proliferant export activities. We have no information concerning the financing of the activities described in the INR tab. (Discussion beginning page 25.)

6. Symington Amendment (section 101 of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended by section 826 of the NPPA): China is already treated as though it were subject to sanctions under this provision. Our practice in most Symington Amendment cases has been not to make a determination where, as here, no prohibited assistance to the offending country is contemplated. However, this issue might also be addressed in connection with Pakistan because the Symington Amendment applies to recipient countries as well as transferor countries. Some of the restrictions on assistance to Pakistan recently loosened by the Brown Amendment would again be applicable if Pakistan were determined to have received enrichment equipment after the enactment of the NPPA. (Discussion beginning page 25.)

7. Glenn Amendment (section 102 of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended by section 826 of the NPPA): We are aware of no evidence that China transferred components for a nuclear explosive device to Pakistan, nor is there sufficient evidence that China transferred any nuclear weapon design information after enactment of this provision. Accordingly, these issues need not be reached. (Discussion beginning page 27.)

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DISCUSSION

1. Section 825: EximBank Sanctions

Section 825 of the NPPA of 1994 amended the existing nuclear nonproliferations sanctions in section 2(b)(4) of the Export-Import Bank Act (EximBank Act) to add a new basis for sanctions. Specifically, it imposes EximBank sanctions against any country that has "willfully aided or abetted any non-nuclear-weapons state . . . to acquire [a] nuclear explosive device or to acquire unsafeguarded special nuclear material." (See attachment 1.)

In the event of a positive determination that China has "aided or abetted" Pakistan to acquire a nuclear explosive device or unsafeguarded special nuclear material, the Secretary of State is required to report such determination to the Board of Directors of the EximBank and the appropriate committees of Congress.*/ Upon receiving such a report, the Board of the EximBank --

. . . shall not give approval to guarantee, insure, or extend credit, or participate in the extension of credit in support of United States exports to such country unless the President determines that it is in the national interest for the Bank to guarantee, insure, or extend credit, or participate in the extension of credit in support of United States exports to such country and such determination has been reported to Congress not less than twenty-five days of continuous session of the Congress prior to the date of such approval.

The legal elements relevant to these sanctions and waiver determinations are described below.

Activities After Effective Date of NPPA

The "aided or abetted" provision should be interpreted as applying to activities taking place after the effective date of the NPPA. Section 831 of the NPPA defines the effective date as 60 days after enactment. The date of enactment was April 30, 1994, so the effective date was June 29, 1994.

*/ The appropriate committees have been deemed to include the House Committee on Banking, Finance & Urban Affairs, the Senate Banking Committee, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the House International Relations Committee.

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-4-

The language added by section 825 does not explicitly state that it will apply only to activities occurring after its enactment, as do the other clauses in section 2(b)(4) of the EximBank Act. However, the other clauses were added to the EximBank Act at a different time (October 26, 1977), so the absence of similar wording in the new "aided or abetted" clause is not dispositive. (Indeed, the older clauses explicitly apply to activities after enactment of "this paragraph" -- that is, after October 26, 1977 -- so the "aided or abetted" clause could not have used the same language in any event.)

There is nothing in the legislative record to indicate that we should not follow our practice of treating new sanctions as not applying to past conduct, particularly given the deterrent purpose of U.S. nonproliferation sanctions laws. Any Congressional intent to apply these sanctions to activities prior to enactment of the NPPA would certainly have been addressed during enactment, given the far-reaching consequences of applying the sanctions to past assistance to unsafeguarded programs in, for example, Israel, Argentina, or Brazil.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Prior L advice on the evidentiary standard in missile transfer cases would appear applicable in this case:

The sanctions law does not specify the evidentiary threshold that must be reached in order to support a determination that sanctionable activity has occurred. You therefore have considerable discretion to decide the degree of certainty you will require in order to make a determination that such activity has occurred.

Prior sanctions cases have been based on a high degree of certainty that the sanctionable activity had in fact occurred, falling somewhere between the traditional legal standards of "preponderance of the evidence" and "beyond a reasonable doubt." The application of a high standard in sanctions determinations is warranted because there are frequently serious foreign policy, economic (both domestic and foreign), and national security consequences that could arise from an erroneous determination.

Conclusive proof with respect to each element of a sanctions case, however, has not been required. As is the case in criminal prosecutions, circumstantial or indirect evidence from which a fact finder can reasonably infer the occurrence of the prohibited activity, may be relied upon.

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-5-

Ultimately, you should make a determination to impose sanctions whenever you are persuaded that sanctionable activity has occurred and are prepared to defend that finding. If you are not prepared to do so based on the evidence, then a determination would not be warranted. Conversely, . . . if you are not prepared to defend a deferral of sanctions, then you should proceed with a determination to impose sanctions.

A sanctions determination should be based on all relevant evidence available to the Executive Branch as a whole, including the information in the INR tab.

Nonnuclear-Weapon State Recipient

Section 825 requires that the assistance go to a "non-nuclear-weapon state." For purposes of section 825, this term is defined by reference to the relevant definition in the NPT, which recognizes only the U.S., Russia, France, the U.K., and China as nuclear-weapon states. Accordingly, the recipient of China's assistance in this case -- Pakistan -- is a nonnuclear-weapon state for purposes of the NPPA.

The "Aid or Abet" Standard

The "aid or abet" standard is used elsewhere in the NPPA, but is not defined. In two instances, it is used as a sanction termination standard with the qualifying phrase "as described in this subsection" -- that is, the offender must have ceased to aid or abet in the manner prohibited by that subsection. (This usage is derived directly from the Chemical and Biological Weapons sanctions, upon which portions of the NPPA were modeled.)

The definition of "aid" in Black's Law Dictionary, drawn from the criminal law context, is "to support, help, assist or strengthen." The definition of "abet" is "to encourage, incite, or set another on to commit a crime." The Black's Law Dictionary definitions of "aider" and "abettor" make explicit that this concept requires that the party be "aware of and consent to" the offending act. Unlike other standards for triggering sanctions in the NPPA, the "aid or abet" standard establishes no specific threshold of assistance (e.g., a requirement that a proscribed transfer "materially" contribute to the recipient's program, or that it be "important" to the development of nuclear weapons, or that it involve items specially suited for certain nuclear purposes). Indeed, this provision does not even require a specific triggering activity, such as an export.

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Activity by a "Country"

The sanction is triggered by activities of a "country." Under the Symington Amendment, we have taken the view that activities of a country include activities of the government as well as private activities the government fails to control.*/

In one Symington Amendment case where the issue of government involvement in a private transfer was analyzed, we concluded that the government must, at a minimum, have had the opportunity to control the transfer, whether by actual participation, approval, or acquiescence coupled with an opportunity to block the transfer. Involvement by a low-level government official may not suffice. Even involvement by a high-level government official may not suffice if the government had no reason to know of or suspect the activity or if the official acted in contravention of a clear, enforced government policy.**/ Significant factors would include the extent and level of government awareness of the activity and its reaction thereto.

Acquisition of Unsafeguarded Special Nuclear Material

One prong of section 825 pertains to countries that "willfully" aid or abet the recipient's efforts to "acquire unsafeguarded special nuclear material." Addressing the second quoted element first, if China's assistance has indeed been going to Pakistan's uranium enrichment program, then we should conclude that this element has been met, as Pakistan's program is not subject to safeguards and the term "acquire" must be

*/ The Symington Amendment prohibits most economic and military assistance to any country that delivers or receives nuclear enrichment equipment, materials or technology. See section 101 of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended by section 826 of the NPPA.

**/ Based on informal consultations with legal counsel in other interested agencies, it appears that ACDA would not agree with the proposition that "involvement by a high-level official may not suffice if the government had no reason to know of or suspect the activity."

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-7-

read to include "production" of special nuclear material by the recipient, not just purchase or theft from elsewhere.*/

Section 825 further requires that the country must have "willfully" aided or abetted. Congress's purpose in adding the "willfully" requirement appears to have been to confirm that, as indicated in the definition of "aid or abet," the country must be aware of and consent to the offending act. Congress did not wish to sanction a country if the government had no knowledge, involvement, or acquiescence with respect to the aiding or abetting activities.

Factors relevant to the determination of whether the government of China "willfully" aided or abetted Pakistan's efforts to acquire unsafeguarded special nuclear material would include the following:

Were any government agencies directly involved in the activities? Did they directly approve the activities? For each of the above, was the government's role known at policy levels of the government? Were the activities part of or consistent with government policy?

For any other entity involved in the activities, is such entity government-owned? How independent is the entity from the government? Are any officers of the entity government officials? Does the government direct or regulate the entity's affairs? Does the entity report its activities to the government? Would the entity meet the test for sovereign immunity or foreign mission treatment under U.S. law?

The determination of whether the government acted "willfully" should include an examination of the breadth and

*/ In the context of nuclear weapons, the term "acquire" is given a broad meaning both in the NPT -- "manufacture or otherwise acquire" -- and elsewhere in the NPPA -- "use, develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire." Moreover, the NPPA clearly meant to include "production" when it used identical language in section 821, which sanctions entities that export goods or technology that materially contribute to the recipient's "efforts to acquire unsafeguarded special nuclear material." Exports of goods or technology would more likely contribute to a country's efforts to "produce" special nuclear material than to its efforts to steal or purchase such material.

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duration of China's assistance to Pakistan's programs. There need not be any direct evidence of Chinese government intent with respect to a particular activity if the information, taken as a whole, indicates government endorsement of China's assistance to Pakistan's efforts to acquire unsafeguarded special nuclear material. In other words, even if we had no evidence that policy-level officials in the Chinese government were specifically aware, [REDACTED] 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6)

[REDACTED] 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6) the statutory willfulness standard could be satisfied by a conclusion that, based on the totality of the Chinese assistance program, the Chinese government had a policy or practice that endorsed such assistance. Also relevant to this determination would be past U.S. communication of its concerns to the Government of China, which would tend to rebut any claim that the Government was unaware of or did not endorse the cooperation with Pakistan. The results of discussions with the Government of China in February and March 1996 concerning Chinese nuclear transfers to Pakistan should also be taken into account.

Acquisition of a Nuclear Explosive Device

The other prong of section 825 pertains to countries that "willfully" aid or abet the recipient's efforts to "acquire [a] nuclear explosive device." This discussion will address the activities that are relevant to this determination and then the issue of willfulness.

Depending on the circumstances (such as the absence of safeguards), activities with theoretically peaceful uses may be legally relevant to this determination -- for example, uranium enrichment. For the reasons described below, section 825 cannot be read in such a way that only activities related to the design and construction of the weapon itself are relevant to the determination whether China aided or abetted Pakistan's acquisition of a nuclear explosive device.

First, in 1988, the U.S. imposed (and then waived) sanctions against Pakistan under the Solarz Amendment, which prohibits most economic or military assistance to any nonnuclear-weapon state that (through an agent or otherwise) exports illegally from the U.S. any material, equipment or technology that could contribute significantly to that country's ability to manufacture a nuclear explosive device. Section 102, Arms Export Control Act (the Solarz Amendment). In that case, the President found that the only plausible use for maraging steel in Pakistan was uranium enrichment and that the illegal export

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-9-

of 25 tons of maraging steel would have enabled Pakistan to increase its stockpile of nuclear weapons material. He therefore concluded that the export would have contributed significantly to Pakistan's ability to manufacture a nuclear explosive device. In view of this precedent, China's assistance to Pakistan's acquisition of unsafeguarded special nuclear material (by uranium enrichment or plutonium production) is relevant to the determination of assistance to Pakistan's acquisition of a nuclear explosive device.

Second, in other nuclear legislation, Congress has been quite clear when it intended to focus solely on nuclear weapons design and construction activities. For example, it has required sanctions for the transfer to a nonnuclear-weapon state of nuclear weapons design information or components that the President determines are important to nuclear weapons development and known by the transferor to be intended for such use. Section 102, Arms Export Control Act (the Glenn Amendment), as amended by section 826 of the NPPA. It has also required sanctions against any nonnuclear-weapon state that has engaged in "activities involving source or special nuclear material and having direct significance for the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear explosive devices." Section 129(1)(D) of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended.

Finally, the phrase "acquire [a] nuclear explosive device" is similar (if not identical) in scope to the NPT phrase "manufacture or otherwise acquire" nuclear explosive devices. In Congressional hearings on the NPT, an Administration witness testified that, while he could not give a comprehensive definition of the phrase "manufacture of a nuclear explosive device," the phrase would not, for example, include uranium enrichment by an NPT party as part of a safeguarded peaceful nuclear program.*/ The clear implication of this position was that such activities might result in an NPT violation in the absence of safeguards or where the activity was not part of a peaceful nuclear program.

*/ See Hearings: Nonproliferation Treaty, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 90th Congress, 2nd Session, 1968: (quoted in Shaker, The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (1980) at 251) (emphasis added). Other activities cited by the U.S. as permissible in connection with a safeguarded peaceful nuclear program included stockpiling fissionable material, development of a plutonium-fueled reactor (including research on the properties of plutonium metal), and development of fast breeder reactors.

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-10-

There is an argument that, by including both special nuclear material assistance and nuclear explosive device assistance as separate provisions triggering sanctions in the EximBank Act, Congress intended the clause on nuclear weapons assistance to encompass activities other than those related to the acquisition of unsafeguarded special nuclear material. The two triggering events were added to the statute at the same time in 1994, so it might be argued that Congress, rather than covering the same activities twice, meant to single out two forms of assistance. The legislative history offers no support for concluding that this was Congress's intent, however, and the statute can sensibly be applied to overlapping cases. A country could be acquiring unsafeguarded special nuclear material with no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons. Congress has in many statutes expressed a policy of discouraging unsafeguarded nuclear activities whether or not they are connected to a nuclear weapons program. For example, U.S. law severely restricts nuclear cooperation with countries that lack full-scope IAEA safeguards even in the absence of any suspicion of nuclear weapons activities. Section 123, Atomic Energy Act. Similarly, U.S. law imposes severe sanctions against countries that transfer or receive uranium enrichment equipment, materials, or technology outside safeguards regardless of the peaceful or nonpeaceful nature of the recipient's program. Section 101, Arms Export Control Act (the Symington Amendment), as amended by section 826 of the NPPA.

Thus, in determining whether China has aided or abetted Pakistan to acquire a nuclear explosive device, the Secretary of State should consider all of the available evidence, including information not directly involving nuclear weapons design, development, and manufacture. In evaluating the significance for nuclear weapons acquisition of any Chinese assistance to Pakistan's uranium enrichment program, the following factors would be relevant:

Is the uranium enrichment program safeguarded? Is it known to be connected to any peaceful nuclear activities (e.g., research or energy production)? Is it known to be connected to any known weapons-related activities? What level of enrichment does it produce (low-enriched, high-enriched, weapons grade)? Are there any nonweapons uses for that level of enrichment in the recipient country?

Similar factors would be relevant to an evaluation of Chinese assistance to Pakistan's plutonium production reactor program:

Is the reactor safeguarded? Is it known to be connected to any peaceful nuclear activities (e.g., research or energy

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-11-

production)? Is it known to be connected to any known weapons-related activities? Does the country have the capability to reprocess any produced plutonium? If so, is the reprocessing activity safeguarded, is it connected to any peaceful nuclear activities, or is it connected to any known weapons-related activities? Does the country have any nonweapons uses for separated plutonium?

A sanctions determination should be based on all relevant evidence available to the Executive Branch as a whole.

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6)

3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6) In addition, in evaluating whether China has "willfully" aided or abetted, the cooperation between China and Pakistan prior to the effective date of the sanctions law (June 29, 1994) may be relevant to China's state of knowledge concerning Pakistan's nuclear program. Similarly, U.S. communications of its concerns to the Government of China are relevant to whether China was aware of and endorsed any assistance to Pakistan, including discussions with the Government of China in February and March 1996.

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6)

3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6) there would appear to be a high degree of certainty that China, by assisting Pakistan's acquisition of unsafeguarded special nuclear material, has aided or abetted Pakistan to acquire a nuclear explosive device, given what is known to China about the purpose of Pakistan's enrichment program. If this is true, the remaining issue would be whether such aiding or abetting was "willful" on the part of China.

Factors relevant to this "willfulness" determination include many of those discussed in connection with aiding or abetting the acquisition of unsafeguarded special nuclear material:

Were any Chinese government agencies directly involved in the activities? Did they directly approve the activities? For each of the above, was the government's role known at policy levels of the government? Were the activities part of or consistent with Chinese government policy?

For any other Chinese entities involved in the activities, is such entity government-owned? How independent is the entity from the government? Are any officers of the entity government officials? Does the government direct the

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entity's affairs or regulate its affairs? Does the entity report its activities to the government? Would the entity meet the test for sovereign immunity under U.S. law?

In addition, the following factors would be relevant specifically to the nuclear explosive device determination:

Did the Chinese government believe that assistance to Pakistan's unsafeguarded uranium enrichment program and plutonium production program might not benefit Pakistan's nuclear weapons program?

Could the communications between nuclear weapons experts have involved subjects other than nuclear weapons development?

As with the "unsafeguarded special nuclear material" prong of section 825, the determination of whether the Chinese government acted "willfully" should include an examination of the breadth and duration of China's assistance to Pakistan's programs. There need not be any direct evidence of Chinese government intent with respect to a particular activity if the information, taken as a whole, indicates government endorsement of the assistance to Pakistan's efforts to acquire a nuclear explosive device.

What Determinations are Required

In the absence of evidence rebutting the information in the INR tab, there appears to be sufficient evidence that the Secretary of State should make a determination regarding the applicability of EximBank sanctions under section 825. The EximBank Act identifies a number of other proliferant activities that trigger sanctions in addition to those added by section 825, such as abrogating IAEA safeguards or a nonnuclear-weapon state's detonation of a nuclear explosive device. Any one of these activities triggers the sanctions described in the EximBank Act. This Act does not specifically require the Secretary to identify the clause or clauses he deems to have been triggered.

Accordingly, if the Secretary determined that one clause had been triggered, he would not be legally compelled to make a determination concerning any other clauses. Furthermore, the Secretary could determine generally that sanctions under section 2(b)(4) of the EximBank Act were required with respect to a specific country without specifying the clause or clauses

he deemed to have been triggered. (See sample determination, attachment 2.)

Some members of Congress would likely press for specification of the precise statutory basis for the EximBank sanctions. This might particularly be the case because, as discussed in section 2 of this analysis, a finding of aiding or abetting the acquisition of a nuclear explosive device has direct implications for China's compliance with the NPT.

Publication of Determination

In the event of a positive determination concerning China, the Secretary of State must report to the EximBank Board of Directors and the appropriate committees of Congress. Publication of the determination in the Federal Register is not required under the EximBank Act or the NPPA. The Department's practice has been to publish in the Federal Register Secretarial determinations under the "Chafee Amendment" to the EximBank Act even though the Act does not explicitly require such publication.*/ However, in the only prior case under section 2(b)(4) of the EximBank Act (involving Romania), the Acting Secretary's determination apparently was not published in the Federal Register (although President Bush's waiver determination was published in the Federal Register). Accordingly, the option of not publishing the Secretary's sanctions determination is legally available.

Scope of Sanctions

The EximBank sanctions apply from the date that the Secretary reports his determination to Congress and to the EximBank Board of Directors. This report should be made on the day that the determination is made. Upon receiving the report, the EximBank Board of Directors shall not "give approval to guarantee, insure, or extend credit, or participate in the extension of credit in support of United States exports to such country." EximBank will be primarily responsible for

*/ The Chafee Amendment authorizes determinations cutting off EximBank transactions for foreign policy reasons under section (2)(b)(1) of the Act. It has also been Department practice to publish determinations by the Secretary, including national interest determinations, for EximBank support for transactions involving "defense articles or services being sold primarily for anti-narcotics purposes." Section (2)(b)(6) of the Export-Import Bank Act.

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-14-

determining the scope of activities proscribed by this provision of the EximBank Act. As a preliminary matter, based on consultations between L and the general counsel's office at EximBank, it seems clear that the sanction would prohibit Board approval of EximBank final commitments. L will continue to consult with EximBank on the final interpretation of the scope of prohibited activities.

Waiver Standard

The President may waive the application of the EximBank nuclear sanctions if he determines that it is "in the national interest" for the Bank's activities to continue. The "national interest" waiver standard is relatively flexible (e.g., compared with "essential to the national interest") and relatively broad in terms of relevant factors (e.g., compared with "essential to the national security interest"). A broad range of factors may be taken into account, including economic factors. Accordingly, the President has a great deal of discretion in determining the "national interest" for purposes of this waiver.

This waiver does not have to be exercised on a case-by-case basis for each future EximBank approval, but may be exercised one time for all such approvals. Elsewhere in the same section of the EximBank Act, Congress required a Presidential national interest determination for EximBank activities in Marxist-Leninist countries, yet also required a "separate determination for each transaction" involving such countries if the value exceeded \$50 million. See section 2(b)(2) of the EximBank Act. Thus, Congress used unequivocal language in the EximBank Act when it intended a "separate determination" for each future transaction. Such language is absent in subsection 2(b)(4).

Discussed below are several specific issues that may arise depending on the desired scope of any waiver the President decides to issue. Some of these issues arise as a result of the options that have been discussed for the Secretary's sanctions determination -- such as making a determination under only one clause even though other clauses might also be triggered, or not identifying which specific clause in section 2(b)(4) has been triggered.

-- Must a Determination Be Made in Order for the President to Waive Sanctions?

There are several precedents under other statutes for the President to exercise a waiver authority without deciding definitively that a country has triggered a particular

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-15-

sanction. For example, under section 538 of the FY-95 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act -- which prohibited certain forms of assistance to countries that were not in compliance with sanctions against Serbia -- we exercised a national interest waiver authority in order to continue our programs for all European countries, without identifying which countries were violators. Similarly, under a provision in that same Act that prohibited assistance to NIS countries that violate the territorial integrity or national sovereignty of other NIS countries, we exercised a similar waiver authority for all NIS countries without identifying which NIS countries were violators.

That said, such precedents are not directly on point with section 2(b)(4), so we could be fairly criticized if we rely on them in this context. For example, in neither of these cases did a formal determination of the sanction's applicability have to be reported to the EximBank or the Congress, nor did the national interest waiver need to sit before the Congress before becoming effective. Some in Congress could object that they are entitled under the statute to have the specific judgment of the President regarding which aspects of section 2(b)(4) have been triggered in their consideration of the national interest waiver.*/ Regardless of the merits of these positions, a dispute with Congress on this issue could result in Congressional interest in new legislation to circumscribe this and possibly other waiver authorities.**/

*/ We have rejected similar assertions in other contexts -- e.g., the Executive branch has not considered itself required to specify which of three possible triggers is implicated under the War Powers Resolution when it submits reports to Congress under the Resolution regarding deployments of U.S. armed forces, even though Congress could argue that the President's judgment in this regard would be an important factor in Congressional consideration of possible legislative action.

**/ Based on informal consultations with legal counsel in other interested agencies, it appears that ACDA would conclude that the President is legally precluded from waiving sanctions in the absence of a sanctions determination. ACDA would take the position that the Secretary's report to Congress must specify the clause that is triggered -- e.g., the "aiding or abetting" clause -- but does not have to specify which part of that clause is triggered ("unsafeguarded special nuclear material" versus "nuclear explosive device").

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-- Can the Waiver Apply to Future Activities?

Under the sanctions laws for entities exporting goods or technology in the areas of chemical and biological weapons and missiles, the practice has been to reimpose sanctions if new violations are discovered, requiring a new waiver determination. On the other hand, there are precedents to support the conclusion that the President can frame a waiver that covers future activity. For example, President Reagan waived the Glenn Amendment for Pakistan in 1982. In 1994, Congress enacted section 822(b) of the FY-94/95 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, under which that waiver ceased to have "force or effect with respect to any grounds for the prohibition of assistance . . . arising on or after" June 1994. Language in the accompanying statement of managers described section 822(b) as limiting the scope of the determination, "which created an indefinite waiver of sanctions under [the Glenn Amendment] with respect to nuclear reprocessing activities in Pakistan." It thus appears that Congress viewed the 1982 waiver as indefinite. Congress's understanding at the time it acted to limit the 1982 waiver appears particularly pertinent in analyzing the EximBank provisions since those provisions and the limitations on the 1982 waiver were enacted in the same Part of the same Title of the FY-94/95 Foreign Relations Authorization Act (sections 822(b) and 825).*/

The Department appears to have specifically considered the applicability of a waiver to future activity in the context of waiving the Solarz Amendment in 1988. The State Department memorandum prepared in connection with that waiver states that "the President appears to have authority to waive for future as well as past Pakistani procurement." While the memorandum then notes that a permanent waiver could eliminate Pakistan's

*/ The Glenn Amendment prohibits most economic and military assistance to any country that delivers or receives nuclear reprocessing equipment, materials or technology. In the NPPA, Congress moved the Glenn Amendment from the Foreign Assistance Act to the Arms Export Control Act and, at the same time, required that the Glenn waiver determination be made in each fiscal year in which the assistance is to be furnished. See NPPA section 826 (reenacting the Glenn Amendment as section 102 of the Arms Export Control Act, with several amendments to the old text). While this change, like the language in section 822(b), signaled Congress's acceptance of our view that the Glenn waiver was a one-time waiver, it also reveals Congress's dissatisfaction with the result.

incentive to enforce its procurement orders and trigger Congressional criticism, and recommends that the Administration should therefore interpret its waiver as applicable only to past activity, the conclusion appears clear that such a limitation was imposed as a matter of policy, and not law.

We believe the President in this case, consistent with the EximBank Act, could issue a one-time waiver for a particular clause or for future activities of the kind that formed the factual basis for the sanctions determination. Absent legislative history to the contrary, we should not assume Congress intended to preclude the President from effectively waiving sanctions for a country engaged in a continuing practice of "aiding or abetting." Where, as here, the sanction cannot be instantaneously waived, the President would be hampered in just that way if we interpreted the sanction as having to be reimposed for each new infraction.

-- What is the Scope of Activities that the Waiver May Cover?

The precedents described above under the Glenn and Solarz Amendments appear consistent with a conclusion that a waiver could cover future activity under a particular provision of law, even if that activity was not identical to the original triggering event. For example, the language in the statement of managers identified above in the discussion of section 822(b) indicates that Congress viewed the Glenn Amendment waiver as having "created an indefinite waiver of sanctions under [the Glenn Amendment] with respect to nuclear reprocessing activities in Pakistan," without limit as to whether such activities were closely related -- or, indeed, at all related -- to the activities that formed the basis of the waiver.

Nevertheless, the practice in this regard appears inconsistent. For example, in one China case under the MTCR provisions of the Arms Export Control Act (section 71 *et seq.*), we imposed sanctions on an entity on which MTCR sanctions had previously been imposed and waived -- thus proceeding on the assumption that the earlier waiver did not cover unrelated future activity. However, there appears to have been no analysis at the time regarding the degree to which the subsequent activity would have to be related in order to be considered covered by the waiver.

We believe that the variations in practice under such waiver authorities support a conclusion that the Executive branch enjoys some discretion in deciding the degree to which subsequent activity would need to be related to the earlier

activity that was considered when the waiver was executed in order to be covered by the waiver:

- Can the Waiver Apply to Future Activities that Would Trigger a Different Portion or Clause of the Section of Law Than That Under Which Sanctions were Triggered?

Section 2(b)(4) contains a number of grounds for cutting off EximBank activities -- violation, abrogation or termination of IAEA safeguards; violation, abrogation or termination of an agreement for nuclear cooperation with the U.S.; detonation of a nuclear explosive device by a nonnuclear-weapon state; and willfully aiding or abetting a nonnuclear-weapon state to acquire unsafeguarded special nuclear material or to acquire a nuclear explosive device. The sanctions and the waiver standards are the same for all of these sanctions-triggering events.

It has been argued that a waiver could preclude the need for a new triggering determination for a separate portion of the statute in the event of a new activity that is similar to activities considered at the time the waiver was executed, but not then determined to have triggered the separate portion of the statute. For example, it has been argued that we might frame a waiver to cover future nuclear weapons-related assistance to Pakistan of a similar nature to that which has been evaluated to date without formally determining that China willfully aided or abetted Pakistan to acquire a nuclear explosive device. We might seek to accomplish this goal either by --

- drafting the determination to indicate that China has engaged in activities that require the imposition of sanctions under section 2(b)(4), without indicating specifically which portion of section 2(b)(4) has been triggered; or
- drafting the determination to indicate that China has assisted Pakistan to acquire unsafeguarded special nuclear material or a nuclear explosive device, thus treating the two components as a unit for these purposes.*/

*/ There is some support for treating this as a unit in the fact that they were incorporated into section 2(b)(4) pursuant to a single amendment under section 825 of the FY-94/95 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, which similarly seems to have treated them as a unit for purposes of the analogous sanctions established under section 821 of that Act.

In L's view, this approach would be legally available, but would not be prudent. Some members of Congress would likely take the view that waiving future activities related to nuclear weapons acquisition without a specific determination that China willfully aided or abetted nuclear weapons acquisition would deprive Congress of the 25 continuous session days specified in the statute for Congressional consideration of the President's determination. The Congressional reaction might be particularly strong in that assistance to a nuclear weapons program may present more serious security risks than assistance to the acquisition of unsafeguarded special nuclear material. Congress might respond by cutting back the waiver flexibility that we currently enjoy (such as the flexibility to waive future conduct of the same kind). The NPPA provides a recent example in which Congress reacted in just this way, modifying the Glenn Amendment waiver -- which we had treated as covering future violations of the same kind -- to require that it be made in each fiscal year in which assistance is to be provided. Congress thereby circumscribed our waiver authority based on some members' dissatisfaction with what they viewed as an overly broad interpretation.

In deciding whether to exercise the discretion to waive a broad scope of activities, the Administration must weigh the benefit of this approach (avoiding an explicit finding of nuclear weapons assistance) against the risk to Presidential and other waiver authorities. The Administration must also take into account the need to describe the scope of the waiver to Congress.

Waiver Procedures

A Presidential waiver will only be effective after the President's report of a waiver determination lies before Congress for 25 days of continuous session. The report should be addressed to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate. It might also be advisable to provide copies of the waiver determination to the "appropriate committees" that received the Secretary's determination triggering sanctions.

Continuity of a session of Congress is broken only by adjournment sine die (as at the end of a session). The 25-day count may also be interrupted by an adjournment of either House for more than three days. In the event of such an adjournment for more than 3 days, the 25-day count would resume as soon as both Houses were back in session.

During the 25-day period and thereafter, new legislation would have to be enacted to block the Presidential waiver.

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-20-

As with the Secretary's sanctions determination, there is no statutory requirement that the President's waiver determination be published in the Federal Register, although that was done when President Bush waived sanctions under section 2(b)(4) with respect to Romania.

EximBank Activities Before Waiver Takes Effect

During the 25 days of continuous session before a waiver becomes effective, the sanctions described in section 2(b)(4) would apply. EximBank will interpret the scope of activities it can undertake during that waiting period.

2. Section 822(a): Arms Export Control Act Sanctions

Section 822(a) of the NPPA added a new subsection 3(f) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) prohibiting --

. . . sales or leases . . . to any country that the President has determined is in material breach of its binding commitments to the United States under international treaties or agreements concerning the nonproliferation of nuclear explosive devices . . . and unsafeguarded special nuclear material.

This prohibition would cover sales and leases by the U.S. government of all defense articles and defense services, as those terms are defined in section 47 of the AECA.*/

If the Secretary of State were to find that China aided or abetted Pakistan to acquire a nuclear explosive device under section 825, it would be difficult not to conclude that China had violated its obligation under Article I of the NPT "not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce" any non-nuclear-weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons." The NPT Article I standard of "assist, encourage or induce" appears to set at least as low a threshold as "willfully aid or abet." Some early drafts of the NPT did not include "encourage or induce," but these broadening words were added in

*/ Although the new section 3(f) does not specify that the sales and leases must be "by the U.S. government" and "subject to the Arms Export Control Act," in the context of the rest of section 3 and in the absence of conflicting legislative history, this interpretation is appropriate. In other statutes, when Congress has intended to affect activities under other acts, it has expressed that intent explicitly.

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-21-

an amendment offered by the U.S. Shaker, The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, at 256. This Article I obligation, coupled with the Article II obligations of the nonnuclear-weapon states, has been deemed to embody the fundamental purpose of the NPT.

Even in the event that the Secretary does not reach the question under section 825 of assistance to Pakistan in acquiring a nuclear explosive device, there is sufficient evidence to present the issue to the President under section 822(a) whether China is in material breach of its nonproliferation commitment to the U.S. under Article I of the NPT. If the President determined that the sanctions in section 822(a) were triggered by such a breach, the Secretary of State could waive the prohibition to make arms sales (but not leases) up to specified dollar limits by satisfying the requirements of section 614(a)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act, including making a determination that "to do so is vital to the national security interests of the United States" and consulting with Congress.

As a legal matter, we need not reach the question of a material violation of the NPT for purposes of section 822(a). Under the Foreign Assistance Act, we have taken the view that the President does not have to make determinations that would result in a prohibition of assistance, since the government can assure that the country in question does not receive any proscribed assistance. For example, we have never made a determination against China for past transfers of enrichment equipment to Pakistan because China does not receive assistance prohibited under the Symington Amendment. This approach has occasionally created problems owing to the difficulty, in the absence of a specific determination, of ensuring department-wide awareness that assistance cannot be provided to a particular country.

Based on information provided by EAP and PM, it appears that the U.S. government does not currently make "sales or leases" of defense articles or defense services to China. Under such circumstances, the option is legally available not to reach a

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-22-

determination under section 822(a).*/ If that option were chosen, the relevant agencies (State and Defense, at a minimum) would have to take steps to ensure that no sales or leases were approved to China until a determination had been made under section 822(a) concerning China's compliance with its nonproliferation commitments to the United States.

In choosing this option, decision-makers should take into account the pressure that Congress may exert to address and resolve the issue of NPT compliance, whether under section 825, section 822(a), or the applicable Congressional reporting requirements (discussed below). It will be difficult not to address NPT compliance in any of these contexts and to represent to Congress in hearings that the issue need not be reached. Moreover, while Congress arguably has acquiesced in our practice of deferring Symington determinations concerning transfers of enrichment materials, equipment, or technology, it might take a different view where the underlying determination -- a material breach of nonproliferation commitments to the U.S. -- has legal significance apart from the question of sanctions.

3. Congressional Reporting Requirements

There are two Congressional reporting requirements that might be read to require a determination whether China has violated the NPT. The Pell Report -- an annual report prepared by ACDA and submitted to Congress by the President -- must include "a detailed assessment of the adherence of other nations to obligations undertaken in all arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements to which the U.S. is a participating state." Section 51, Arms Control and Disarmament Act. More specifically, the report must include:

. . . a discussion of any material noncompliance by foreign governments with their binding commitments to the United

*/ The NPT itself does not require specific determinations or procedures in the event of a possible violation. In the cases of Iraq and North Korea, referral to the U.N. Security Council was required not by the NPT but by the Statute of the IAEA, based on those countries' violations of their IAEA safeguards agreements. As a nuclear-weapons state, China has more limited safeguards obligations, which would not be affected in this case. Although referral to the Security Council is not compelled, a policy decision would be presented concerning how to react in the international sphere to the first violation by a nuclear-weapons state of one of the fundamental tenets of the NPT.

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States with respect to the prevention of the spread of nuclear explosive devices . . . or the acquisition by such states of unsafeguarded special nuclear material . . .

This report was due on January 31, but has not yet been submitted. In practice, we have not necessarily viewed the Pell report as compelling us to reach final legal conclusions concerning possible violations.

In addition, section 602(c) of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 requires that State, Defense, ACDA, Commerce, Energy, and the NRC keep the relevant committees of Congress "fully and currently informed with respect to their activities to carry out the purposes and policies of this Act and to otherwise prevent proliferation, and with respect to the current activities of foreign countries which are of significance from the proliferation standpoint." Although it would be prudent to offer a section 602(c) briefing if China were determined to have violated the NPT, we have not interpreted this briefing provision to require us to reach any legal conclusions.

As previously noted, the difficulty with not making a determination concerning China's compliance with the NPT arises not so much from any particular legal requirement, but from the cumulative impact of not addressing the issue under any of the relevant legal provisions -- section 825, section 822(a), or the reporting provisions.

4. Section 821: Sanctions Against Private Entities

Section 821 of the NPPA prohibits U.S. government procurement from any U.S. or foreign person that the President determines has "materially and with requisite knowledge contributed, through the export from the United States or any other country of any goods or technology, to the efforts of any individual, group, or non-nuclear-weapon state to acquire unsafeguarded special nuclear material."*/ This procurement sanction would also apply to any successor entity, to any parent or subsidiary entity that materially and with requisite knowledge assisted in the activities, and to any affiliate that materially and with requisite knowledge assisted in the

*/ The procurement sanction is subject to exceptions for existing contracts, certain defense articles or services, medical and humanitarian items, and products, services and technology that are essential to U.S. products or production.

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-24-

activities and is controlled in fact by the entity. The reported transfers to Pakistan of specialized ring magnets and maraging steel for use in Pakistan's unsafeguarded uranium enrichment program raise the question whether this sanction is applicable to the Chinese entities involved.

Section 821 applies to any "United States person" or "foreign person" that makes a sanctionable export. The term "foreign person" is defined to mean (1) "an individual who is not a citizen of the United States or an alien admitted for permanent residence to the United States," and (2) "a corporation, partnership, or other nongovernment entity which is created or organized under the laws of a foreign country or which has its principal place of business outside the United States."

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6)

All of these entities generate income and, like most Chinese state or quasi-state enterprises, are under pressure to become profitable. Our information suggests that the conduct of day-to-day business is probably left in the hands of entity officials, but overall policy comes from the state council and from Chinese law and regulation.

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-25-

Based on the available information, we cannot conclude that the exports were carried out by "nongovernment entities." Indeed, the information tends to support the opposite conclusion. However, new information identifying other entities involved in the exports -- or indicating that the entities identified to date are nongovernmental -- could compel a future determination under section 821.*/

5. Section 824: Sanctions Against Financial Institutions

Section 824 of the NPPA imposes banking sanctions against any U.S. or foreign person that knowingly, directly, and materially contributes through the provision of financing to the acquisition of nuclear weapons or unsafeguarded special nuclear material by a nonnuclear-weapon state. We have no information concerning the financing of the activities described in the INR tab.

6. Symington Amendment: Enrichment Transfers

The Symington Amendment prohibits most economic and military assistance to countries that transfer or receive "nuclear enrichment equipment, material, or technology" without applying appropriate safeguards. Because the "aided or abetted" determination under section 825 may be based on a conclusion that China transferred ring magnets to Pakistan, there could well be pressure to determine whether that transfer also triggers the Symington Amendment. In the past, although we have not made a Symington Amendment determination concerning China, we have insured that China does not receive the kinds of assistance prohibited under Symington. Based on this practice, a Symington Amendment determination is not required in this instance, as we will continue to insure that prohibited assistance is not provided to China.


*/ If we obtained such information, the issues under section 821 requiring further analysis would include: whether the exports constituted "goods or technology" within the NPPA definition; whether the exports "materially" contributed to Pakistan's efforts to acquire a nuclear explosive device or unsafeguarded special nuclear material; whether the Chinese entities contributed to these efforts knowingly; whether to delay imposition of the sanction to pursue consultations with the government of China; whether to terminate the sanction after the minimum 12-month period; whether to waive the sanction after the minimum 12-month period based on a "serious adverse effect on vital United States interests"; and whether the waiver could cover future activities.

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
However, the Symington Amendment issue might also be addressed in connection with Pakistan because it applies to recipient countries as well as transferor countries. The Brown Amendment recently loosened Pressler Amendment restrictions on economic and some military assistance to Pakistan. Some of these forms of assistance would again be subject to sanctions if Pakistan were determined to have received enrichment equipment after the enactment of the NPPA.

Under the Symington Amendment, we have previously found that nuclear enrichment equipment, at a minimum, includes items that are "especially designed or prepared." 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6)



EO 13526 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6)

3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6) Under similar circumstances, the U.S. would have not have allowed the export of this commodity to the recipient entity in Pakistan.*/ In addition, under the Symington Amendment, nuclear enrichment equipment can even



EO 13526 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6)

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-27-

include items that are not "especially designed or prepared" depending on the circumstances.

A determination that Pakistan received from China, especially designed or prepared enrichment equipment without safeguards would raise a serious question whether China had violated its obligation under Article III(2) of the NPT not to provide "equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material" to any nonnuclear-weapon state except subject to safeguards. The connection between Symington and Article III(2) is not in all cases as close as that between a determination of nuclear weapons assistance and Article I. For example, under appropriate circumstances, a finding under Symington could be based on transfers of items that are not "especially designed or prepared," in which case Article III(2) would not be violated.

Moreover, the question of what constitutes "especially designed or prepared" equipment is by no means clear under the Article III(2) of the NPT. The U.S. historically has taken a broad approach and has interpreted the international control lists (Zangger and NSG) as exemplary, not exhaustive. Not all members of Zangger and NSG have agreed with the U.S. view, and the bulk of NPT parties (including China) are not members of Zangger or NSG. On the other hand, the U.S. would have a difficult time continuing to argue for a broad interpretation of the international control lists

3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6)

If the President found that China had violated Article III(2) of the NPT, a cutoff of sales and leases of defense articles and defense services would be required under section 822(a) of the NPPA, as discussed in section 2 of this analysis.

7. Glenn Amendment: Weapons Components or Design Information

The Glenn Amendment imposes broad sanctions on countries that transfer to a nonnuclear-weapon state any nuclear weapon design information or component that the President determines is important to nuclear weapons development and known by the transferor to be intended for such use. (Section 102 of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended by section 826 of the NPPA.) Nonnuclear-weapon states that seek and receive such design information or components are also sanctioned. There is


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no available evidence that China transferred components for a nuclear explosive device to Pakistan.

3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6)




EO 13526 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6)

OTHER ISSUES

This legal analysis has focused on the provisions of law that appear relevant based on the information in the INR tab. Additional information could result in a reassessment of these provisions of law or a new evaluation of other provisions that do not now appear relevant. For example, new information concerning the entities involved in the Chinese exports to Pakistan could lead to a reassessment under sections 821 and 824.

3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6)



EO 13526 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6)

And information concerning Chinese assistance to Pakistan's reprocessing activities could require evaluation of the portion of the Glenn Amendment that pertains to transfers of reprocessing material, equipment, or technology (a provision that is not addressed in this legal analysis).

In addition, China's activities may have triggered section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act, which prohibits nuclear exports to any country found by the President to have --

. . . assisted, encouraged, or induced any nonnuclear-weapon state to engage in activities involving source or special nuclear material and having direct significance for the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear explosive devices, and has failed to take steps which, in the President's judgment, represent sufficient progress toward terminating such assistance, encouragement, or inducement.

This provision is already deemed to prevent any nuclear exports to China. (This result is further reinforced by the Tiananmen Square sanctions and a resolution of Congress establishing conditions on the implementation of the 1985 U.S.-China agreement for nuclear cooperation.) Because the sanctions are

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-29-

already deemed to apply, it is not necessary to address their applicability as a result of the recent activities.

Attachments: (1) Section 2(b)(4) of the Export-Import Bank Act
(2) Draft Sanctions Determination under Section 2(b)(4) of the Export-Import Bank Act

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Attachment 2

DETERMINATION UNDER SECTION 2(b)(4) OF THE
EXPORT-IMPORT BANK ACT OF 1945, AS AMENDED

I hereby determine that the imposition of sanctions pursuant to section 2(b)(4) of the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, as amended, is required with respect to the People's Republic of China.

This determination shall be effective today and shall be expeditiously reported to the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank and to appropriate committees of the Congress.

March (), 1996

TAB 3CONFIDENTIAL

JUSTIFICATION FOR THE NATIONAL INTEREST DETERMINATION REGARDING THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Pursuant to Section 2(b)(4) of the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, as amended, I have determined that it is in the national interest for the Export-Import Bank of the United States to guarantee, ensure, or extend credit or participate in the extension of credit in support of United States exports of goods and services to the People's Republic of China.

I made this determination because I believe it is essential to enable us to pursue with China a policy of comprehensive engagement, in which we seek to deal frankly and persistently with Chinese authorities to advance a wide range of important U.S. national interests, including promoting peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region, ensuring access of U.S. goods and services in the Chinese market, protecting U.S. intellectual property rights, promoting internationally recognized human rights, and pursuing law enforcement cooperation against terrorism, international criminal organizations, and alien smuggling. The deterioration of bilateral relations and contacts that would inevitably follow the suspension of Export-Import Bank transactions would seriously undermine our ability to pursue those interests. A continuation of Export-Import financing opportunities will reinforce that ability.

One of the highest national security priorities of my Administration has been to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their missile delivery systems. Given concerns that have arisen about possible Chinese transfers of sensitive goods and technologies, we have placed special importance on engaging with China to address these issues. A national interest determination permitting Export-Import transactions with China would, in my view, support U.S. efforts to work out arrangements with China that would preclude future Chinese activities covered by Section 2(b)(4) of the Export-Import Bank Act.

In the wake of my meeting with Chinese President Jiang Zemin last fall, the Chinese agreed to resume bilateral talks on removing the impediments to implementing the 1985 U.S.-China Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation. The U.S. goal in those talks is to resolve our concerns about Chinese activities with third countries in the nuclear field so that the legislative requirements can be fulfilled for proceeding with U.S.-Chinese nuclear cooperation. We held a round of talks in January, and continued discussions on China's fulfillment of the conditions for the Agreement during nuclear export control discussions held in Beijing March 19-22. We expect the delegations to meet again soon. Success in these negotiations would not only open up lucrative opportunities for U.S. firms in the rapidly expanding Chinese nuclear energy sector, but would also alleviate a major and long-standing proliferation concern.

The suspension of Ex-Im transactions with China would have a severely adverse impact on prospects for these bilateral talks, and indeed would probably result in their termination. On the other hand, proceeding with those transactions would give us the opportunity to engage constructively with the Chinese on our proliferation concerns and substantially increase the likelihood of resolving them.

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SANCTIONS
PC

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SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 26 MAR PC MTG ON CHINA SANCTIONS

ACTION: HARMON SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 26 MAR 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PONEMAN

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001	X 96032515 LAKE APPROVED RECOM
001 SENS	Z 96032515 FOR SIGNATURE
002	X 96032516 HARMON SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

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002	960325	PANETTA, L	
002	960325	YANNUZZI, R	
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002	960325	STARR, B	
002	960325	WILSON, F	

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FROM: PONEMAN

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The White House

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SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 26 MAR PC MTG ON CHINA & EXIM BANK
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ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
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3/26 702A. S. McElhenny

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<u>3/26/96</u>	<u>9:45 am</u>	<u>Carolyn Frank</u>
	PRINT LAST NAME:	<u>Frank</u>
		COPY: <u>1</u>

DR. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ
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ROOM 314
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8/25/96 5:30 Stiglitz

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3/26/96 1147

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION:

TIME OF RECEIPT:

198 MAR 25 PM 6 57

**WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM**

PRECEDENCE: X

IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
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RELEASER: _____
DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO: 662 CLASSIFICATION: **SECRET** PAGES: 4
(Including Cover)
FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (202) 456-9425 WH SITUATION ROOM
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: RETRANSMISSION OF NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 26 MARCH
PC MEETING ON CHINA NSC LOG # 20296

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>PHONE NUMBER</u>
<u>STATE</u>	<u>EXECUTIVE SECRETARY</u>	<u>ATTN: KATHLEEN</u>	

REMARKS: OPS CENTER: URGENT DELIVERY. STATE EXEC SEC CLAIMS NOT TO HAVE RECEIVED INITIAL TRANSMISSION OF THIS PAPER.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VZ Date: 7/25/2014

TIME OF TRANSMISSION:

TIME OF RECEIPT:

N

86 MAR 25 PM 4 34

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: X IMMEDIATE RELEASER: [Signature]
 PRIORITY DTG: _____
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MESSAGE NO: 661 CLASSIFICATION: **~~SECRET~~** PAGES: 25
(Including Cover)
FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (202) 456-9425 WH SITUATION ROOM
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 26 MARCH PC MTG ON CHINA
NSC LOG # 20296

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TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
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TREASURY	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	_____	_____
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	_____	_____
COMMERCE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	_____	_____
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR	_____	_____
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	_____	_____
ACDA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	_____	_____
JCS	SECRETARY, JOINT STAFF	_____	_____

REMARKS:

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VR Date: 7/15/05

TIME OF TRANSMISSION:

TIME OF RECEIPT:

96 MAR 25 PM 4 34

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

MAR 25 4:38 PM '96

PRECEDENCE: X

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ROUTINE

RELEASER: [Signature]
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MESSAGE NO: 661 CLASSIFICATION: SECRET PAGES: 25
(Including Cover)
FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (202) 456-9425 WH SITUATION ROOM
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 26 MARCH PC MTG ON CHINA
NSC LOG # 20296

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TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
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DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
COMMERCE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
ACDA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY, JOINT STAFF		

REMARKS:

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Initials: [Signature] Date: 7/19/2015

TIME OF TRANSMISSION:

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96 MAR 25 PM 4 34

**WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM**

PRECEDENCE: x

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RELEASER: _____
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MESSAGE NO: 661 CLASSIFICATION: **~~SECRET~~** PAGES: 25
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 (NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)
 MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 26 MARCH PC MTG ON CHINA
 NSC LOG # 20296

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<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>PHONE NUMBER</u>
<u>STATE</u>	<u>EXECUTIVE SECRETARY</u>	_____	_____
<u>TREASURY</u>	<u>EXECUTIVE SECRETARY</u>	_____	_____
<u>DOD</u>	<u>EXECUTIVE SECRETARY</u>	_____	_____
<u>COMMERCE</u>	<u>EXECUTIVE SECRETARY</u>	_____	_____
<u>USUN/STATE</u>	<u>OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR</u>	_____	_____
<u>CIA</u>	<u>EXECUTIVE SECRETARY</u>	_____	_____
<u>ACDA</u>	<u>EXECUTIVE SECRETARY</u>	_____	_____
<u>JCS</u>	<u>SECRETARY, JOINT STAFF</u>	_____	_____

REMARKS:

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Initials: VL Date: 7/11/2005

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96 MAR 25 PM 4 34

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

L
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PRECEDENCE: X

IMMEDIATE
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RELEASER: _____
DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO: 661 CLASSIFICATION: **~~SECRET~~** PAGES: 25
(Including Cover)
FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (202) 456-9425 WH SITUATION ROOM
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 26 MARCH PC MTG ON CHINA
NSC LOG # 20296

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<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>PHONE NUMBER</u>
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	_____	_____
TREASURY	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	_____	_____
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	_____	_____
COMMERCE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	_____	_____
USUN/STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR	_____	_____
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	_____	_____
ACDA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	_____	_____
JCS	SECRETARY, JOINT STAFF	_____	_____

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Initials: VR Date: 7/15/2009

TIME OF TRANSMISSION:

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**WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM**

25 MAR 96 16 43
NMCC/JCS

PRECEDENCE: X

IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: *RJL*
DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO: 661 CLASSIFICATION: **SECRET** PAGES: 25
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NSC LOG # 20296

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<u>STATE</u>	<u>EXECUTIVE SECRETARY</u>	_____	_____
<u>TREASURY</u>	<u>EXECUTIVE SECRETARY</u>	_____	_____
<u>DOD</u>	<u>EXECUTIVE SECRETARY</u>	_____	_____
<u>COMMERCE</u>	<u>EXECUTIVE SECRETARY</u>	_____	_____
<u>USUN/STATE</u>	<u>OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR</u>	_____	_____
<u>CIA</u>	<u>EXECUTIVE SECRETARY</u>	_____	_____
<u>ACDA</u>	<u>EXECUTIVE SECRETARY</u>	_____	_____
<u>JCS</u>	<u>SECRETARY, JOINT STAFF</u>	_____	_____

REMARKS:

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VZ Date: 7/19/2014

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ROUTINE

RELEASER: RS/LS

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC # 20296

FROM: <u>National Security Council</u>	PHONE: <u>202-456-9432</u>	ROOM: <u>WHSR</u>
SUBJECT: <u>Notice of Meeting 26 MARCH PC MTG ON CHINA</u>	PAGES: <u>4</u>	(w/ Cover)

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
<u>USUN New York</u>	<u>Mr. Rick Inderfurth</u>	<u>212-415-4016</u>	<u>212-415-4177</u>

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeleine Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

March 25, 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Assistant USTR for Policy
Coordination

MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

DR. JOSEPH STIGLITZ
Chairman, President's Council
on Economic Advisors

MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the
President

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MS. BETTIE BACA
Executive Secretary
Department of Commerce

MR. DANIEL TARULLO
Deputy Assistant to the
President for Economic Policy

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the United
Nations

MS. BARBARA STARR
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Meeting on China and Export-Import Bank Financing
(S)

A Principals' Committee meeting will be held on Tuesday,
March 26, 1996, from 2:30 to 3:30 p.m., in the White House
Situation Room to discuss next steps under Section 825 of the
Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994. Attendance will be
principals only. (S)

~~SECRET~~


Classified by: Andrew D. Sens
Reason: 1.5(b)(c)(d)
Declassify On: 1.6X1, X5

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 7/15/2019
2015-0721-M

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

An agenda is attached. State will separately circulate a discussion paper **FOR PRINCIPALS' EYES ONLY**.


Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL PRINCIPALS' COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: March 26, 1996
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 - 3:30 p.m.

CHINA

Agenda

- I. Introduction NSC
- II. Intelligence Update IC
- III. Diplomatic Update and Options State
- IV. Discussion All
- V. Conclusion NSC

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By 12 NARA, Date 7/15/2015
2015-0221-1a

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

March 25, 1996

20296

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: DANIEL PONEMAN *DP*

SUBJECT: Principals' Committee Meeting on China

*TL: State told Samore
Davis wanted to
check w/ the Secretary
before agreeing to
circulate paper for
PC, but I
did not want
to hold up
plug for
expected
call-back.
DP*

Attached at Tab I is a proposed meeting notice for the Principals' Committee meeting on China. An agenda for the Meeting is at Tab A.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew D. Sens to sign the memorandum at Tab I and approve the agenda at Tab A.

Approve *R* Disapprove

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum for Signature
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *W* NARA, Date *7/15/2019*
2015-0221-AA

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Daniel Poneman
Reason: 1.5(b) (c) (d)
Declassify On: 1.6X1, X5

~~SECRET~~

TO: LAKE

FROM: SAMORE
PONEMAN

DOC DATE: 26 MAR 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
PC

SANCTIONS
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 26 MAR PC MTG ON CHINA SANCTIONS

ACTION: LAKE APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 07 MAR 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SAMORE

LOGREF: 9620296 9620308

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: PC0172

CODES: CPR SAN

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FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

JOSHI
KRECZKO
LAKE
NSC CHRON
PONEMAN
SAMORE
SODERBERG
SUETTINGER

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSLA CLOSED BY: NSASK DOC 1 OF 1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE
001

Z 96040408 FOR DECISION
X 96040907 LAKE APPROVED RECOM

National Security Council
The White House

Rec'd 4/4
11am

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 20230
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG we A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>WJ</i> Harmon	_____	_____	_____
Dohse	<u>1</u>	<u>W</u>	_____
Sens	_____	_____	_____
Soderberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	<u>2</u>	<u>ovr</u>	<u>NOTE</u>
Lake	<u>3</u>	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	_____	_____	_____
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COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

Log # 20230

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

Fm SB To TR Date 4/8

Developments over weekend,
let's discuss.

@

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Berger	<u>2</u>	<u>ov</u>	<u>NOTE</u>
Lake	<u>3</u>	Nat'l Sec Advisor has seen	_____
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

20230

April 2, 1996

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: DANIEL PONEMAN *GS for*

FROM: GARY SAMORE *GS*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of the Principals Committee Meeting on China

Attached at Tab I is the Summary of Conclusions of the Principals meeting on China held on Tuesday, March 26, 1996.

Concurrence by: Bob Suettinger *RS*

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew D. Sens to file the Summary attached at Tab I for record purposes.

Approve *RS* Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5(b) (c) (d)
Declassify On: 1.6X1, X5

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *72* NARA, Date *7/15/2014*
2015-0221-11

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on China [partial] (2 pages)	03/26/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3902

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0172 PC Meeting on China Sanctions, March 26, 1996

2015-0221-M

rs1187

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

20230

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of NSC Principals Committee

DATE: March 26, 1996
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 p.m. - 3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on China

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Anthony Lake

Chief of Staff
Leon Panetta

Office of the Vice President
Bill Wise

National Economic Council
Daniel Tarullo

Department of State
Warren Christopher
Winston Lord

Central Intelligence Agency
John Deutch

Department of Treasury
Robert Rubin

ACDA
John Holum

Department of Defense
William Perry

Joint Chiefs of Staff
John Shalikashvili

Department of Commerce
Ronald Brown

White House
Sandy Berger
Nancy Soderberg

USUN
Madeleine Albright

NSC
Daniel Poneman
Robert Suettinger
Gary Samore

USTR
Charlene Barshefsky

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed:

- We face two options

1)

[Redacted] 3.3(b)(6)

[Redacted] 3.3(b)(6)
EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

~~SECRET~~

Classified by Andrew D. Sens
Reason: 1.5. (b) (c) (d)
Declassify on: 1.6X1.X5

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
2015-0221-M (2.35) 3/11/2020 KDE

~~SECRET~~
2

~~SECRET~~

EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

("825 option"); and 2)

3.3(b)(6)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

3.3(b)(6) use the Chafee Amendment

3.3(b)(6)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

("Chafee option").

- The Chafee option is more likely than the 825 option to preserve a basis for continuing to cooperate with China on nonproliferation issues.
- The Secretary of State will examine the factual and legal issues involved in deciding whether or not to make an 825 determination.

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MR MARKER

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on China (3 pages)	08/02/1996	P1/b(1)
002a. memo	Robert Suettinger to Anthony Lake and Laura Tyson re: Objectives for the Principals Meeting on China (7 pages)	07/31/1996	P1/b(1)
002b. agenda	NSC/NEC Principals Committee Meeting, August 1, 1996. Record ID: 96020714. [Duplicate of 003.] (1 page)	08/01/1996	P1/b(1)
003. agenda	NSC/NEC Principals Committee Meeting, August 1, 1996. Record ID: 96020714. (1 page)	08/01/1996	P1/b(1)

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TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 07 AUG 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
PC

CHINA TRADE
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 2 AUG PC MTG ON CHINA

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 08 AUG 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SUETTINGER

LOGREF: 9620713 9620714

FILES: IFM O

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001	X 96080714 LAKE APPROVED RECOM
002	X 96080714 DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

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002	960807	BURNS, W	
002	960807	MCALEER, R	
002	960807	BACA, B	
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002	960807	MONTGOMERY, F	
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002	960807	YANNUZZI, R	
002	960807	STIGLITZ, J	
002	960807	TARULLO, D	
002	960807	STARR, B	
002	960807	WILSON, F	

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Lake	<u>3</u>		
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SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 2 AUG PC MTG ON CHINA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE TIME SIGNATURE

MR. LEON E. PANETTA
WHITE HOUSE
1ST FLOOR, WEST WING
WASHINGTON, DC 20500

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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WASHINGTON, DC 20505

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MR. DANIEL TARULLO
NATL ECONOMIC COUNCIL
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8/8

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MS. BARBARA STARR
ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT AGENCY
ROOM 5933, NEW STATE
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20451

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PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001

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DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

TIME OF TRANSMISSION:
Aug 7 7 16 PM '96

TIME OF RECEIPT:

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'96 AUG 7 PM 3 07

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE:

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IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER:
DTG:

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE NO: 1731 CLASSIFICATION: PAGES: 7
(Including Cover)
FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (202) 456-9425 WH SITUATION ROOM
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Sec for 2 August PC Mtg on China
NSC LOG # 20733

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TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
<u>DOS</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
<u>Treasury</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
<u>DOD</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
<u>Commerce</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
<u>USUN</u>	<u>office of Ambassador</u>	<u> </u>	<u>736 7699</u>
<u>CIA</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
<u>ACDA</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
<u>JCS</u>	<u>Secretary, Joint Staff</u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VR Date: 7/19/2014

TIME OF TRANSMISSION:

TIME OF RECEIPT:

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'96 AUG 7 PM 3 07

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MESSAGE NO: 1731 CLASSIFICATION: _____ PAGES: 7
(Including Cover)
FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (202) 456-9425 WH SITUATION ROOM
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Soc for 2 August PC Mtg on China
NSC LOG# 20733

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
<u>DOS</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>Treasury</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>DOD</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>Commerce</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>USUN</u>	<u>office of Ambassador</u>	_____	<u>736 7699</u>
<u>CIA</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>ACDA</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>JCS</u>	<u>Secretary Joint Staff</u>	_____	_____

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: vr Date: 7/17/205

TIME OF TRANSMISSION:

TIME OF RECEIPT:

~~SECRET~~

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'96 AUG 7 PM 3 07

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PRIORITY
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RELEASER: BJP
DTG: _____

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE NO: 1731 CLASSIFICATION: _____ PAGES: 7
(Including Cover)
FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (202) 456-9425 WH SITUATION ROOM
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Sec for 2 August PC Mtg on China
NSC LOG # 20733

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TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
<u>DOS</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>Treasury</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>DOD</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>Commerce</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>USUN</u>	<u>office of Ambassador</u>	_____	<u>736 7699</u>
<u>CIA</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>ACDA</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>JCS</u>	<u>Secretary, Joint Staff</u>	_____	_____

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VL Date: 7/19/2015

TIME OF TRANSMISSION:

TIME OF RECEIPT:
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MESSAGE NO: 1731 CLASSIFICATION: _____ PAGES: 7
(Including Cover)
FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (202) 456-9425 WH SITUATION ROOM
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Sec for 2 August PC Mtg on China
NSC LOG # 20733

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TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
<u>DOS</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>Treasury</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>DOD</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>Commerce</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>USUN</u>	<u>office of Ambassador</u>	_____	<u>736 7699</u>
<u>CIA</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>ACDA</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>JCS</u>	<u>Secretary, Joint Staff</u>	_____	_____

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: W Date: 7/11/204

TIME OF TRANSMISSION:

TIME OF RECEIPT:

~~SECRET~~

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'96 AUG 7 PM 3 07

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE:

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 ROUTINE

RELEASER:

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SECRET

MESSAGE NO: 1731 CLASSIFICATION: _____ PAGES: 7
(Including Cover)
FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (202) 456-9425 WH SITUATION ROOM
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Sec for 2 August PC Mtg on China
NSC LOG # 20733

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TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
DOS	Executive Secretary		
Treasury	Executive Secretary		
DOD	Executive Secretary		
Commerce	Executive Secretary		
USUN	office of Ambassador		736 7699
CIA	Executive Secretary		
ACDA	Executive Secretary		
JCS	Secretary, Joint Staff		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VR Date: 7/15/2014

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
TIME OF TRANSMISSION:

TIME OF RECEIPT:

~~SECRET~~

'96 AUG 7 PM 3 07

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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8-7-96

PRECEDENCE: _____
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IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: BBP
DTG: _____

SECRET

MESSAGE NO: 1731 CLASSIFICATION: _____ PAGES: 7 ^{OK}
(Including Cover)
FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (202) 456-9425 WH SITUATION ROOM
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Sec for 2 August PC Mtg on China
NSC LOG # 20733

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
<u>DOS</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>Treasury</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>DOD</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>Commerce</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>USUN</u>	<u>office of Ambassador</u>	_____	<u>736 7699</u>
<u>CIA</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>ACDA</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>JCS</u>	<u>Secretary, Joint Staff</u>	_____	_____

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: W Date: 7/11/2015

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

**WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM**

PRECEDENCE
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IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE ✓

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC #

FROM: <u>National Security Council</u>	PHONE: <u>202-456-9432</u>	ROOM: <u>WHSR</u>
SUBJECT: <u>Notice of Meeting <i>SEC</i> for August 2 <i>PC</i></u>		PAGES: _____
<u><i>Mtg on china</i></u>		(w/ Cover)

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
<u>USUN New York</u>	<u>Mr. Rick Inderfurth</u>	<u>212-415-4016</u>	<u>212-415-4177</u>

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeleine Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: h Date: 7/15/2009

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

20733

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

August 5, 1996

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: SANDRA KRISTOFF *SK*

FROM: ROBERT L. SUETTINGER *RS*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of the Principals Committee Meeting on China

Attached at Tab A is the Summary of Conclusion of the Principals Committee meeting held on August 2, 1996.

Concurrences by: Bob *JK* Kyle, Eric *S* Schwartz, Dan Poneman *DP*

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memorandum to agencies at Tab I forwarding the summary of conclusions.

Approve *R* Disapprove

That you authorize Andrew Sens to file the summary of conclusions attached at Tab A for the record.

Approve *RS* Disapprove

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to Agencies
- Tab A Summary of Conclusions

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: *VR* Date: 7/19/2014

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5(b)(d)
Declassify On: 8/02/2006

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

20733

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. BETTIE BACA
Executive Secretary
Executive Secretariat
Department of Commerce

MR. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the
United Nations

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Assistant USTR for Policy
Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the
President

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

DR. JOSEPH STIGLITZ
Chairman
President's Council of
Economic Advisors

MR. DANIEL K. TARULLO
Deputy Assistant to the
President for Economic
Policy

MS. BARBARA STARR
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee
Meeting on China ~~(S)~~

Attached at Tab A for Principals' use is the summary of
conclusions of the Principals Committee meeting on China held on
Friday, August 2, 1996. ~~(S)~~


Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Robert L. Suettinger
Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)
Declassify On: 8/02/2006
Derived From: Multiple

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By 12 NARA, Date 7/15/2016
2015-0221-1A

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Attachment

Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on China (3 pages)	08/02/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3902

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0187 PC Meeting on China, August 2, 1996

2015-0221-M
rs1188

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: LAKE
TYSON, L

FROM: SUETTINGER
KRISTOFF

DOC DATE: 31 JUL 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
PC

CHINA TRADE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 2 AUG PC MTG ON CHINA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE W/ COMMENT

DUE DATE: 01 AUG 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SUETTINGER

LOGREF: 9620714 9620733

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: PC0187

CODES: CPR CHT

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BASS
BERGER
JOSHI
KRISTOFF
LAKE
NSC CHRON
SUETTINGER

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSVJD CLOSED BY: NSDRS DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 7/15/2019
7015-2221-14

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE
001

Z 96073113 FOR INFORMATION
X 96080507 NOTED BY LAKE W/ COMMENT

National Security Council
The White House

Y (6/4 7/3)
3:20pm

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 20713
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM ~~PRIS~~ NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG ✓ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	<u>1</u>	<u>JA</u>	_____
<i>9/28</i> Dohse	_____	_____	_____
Sens	_____	_____	_____
Soderberg	<u>Copy</u>	_____	_____
Berger	<u>2</u>	<u>OW</u>	_____
Lake	<u>3</u>	<u>Natl Sec Advisor</u>	_____
Situation Room	_____	<u>has seen</u>	<u>J</u>
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	_____	_____
Records Mgt.	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: Doc logged 8/3

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

National Security Council
The White House

rec'd 7/29
7:10AM

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 20714
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG KA A/O _____

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	<u>1/4</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>A-Tab I</u>
Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg		<u>copy</u>	
Berger	<u>2</u>	<u>SW</u>	
Lake	<u>3</u>		
Situation Room		Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	<u>7/30</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Nom + Agenda PC on
China 8/1

Exec Sec Office has diskette up _____

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	Robert Suettinger to Anthony Lake and Laura Tyson re: Objectives for the Principals Meeting on China (7 pages)	07/31/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3902

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0187 PC Meeting on China, August 2, 1996

2015-0221-M

rs1188

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. agenda	NSC/NEC Principals Committee Meeting, August 1, 1996. Record ID: 96020714. [Duplicate of 003.] (1 page)	08/01/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3902

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0187 PC Meeting on China, August 2, 1996

2015-0221-M
rs1188

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 30 JUL 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
PC

CHINA TRADE
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 2 AUG PC MTG ON CHINA

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 01 AUG 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SUETTINGER

LOGREF: 9620713 9620733

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: PC0187

CODES: CPR CHT

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

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FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

JOSHI
KRECZKO
KYLE
LAKE
NSC CHRON
SODERBERG
SUETTINGER

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VC NARA, Date 7/15/2009
2015-0721-11

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEC CLOSED BY: NSKDB DOC 2 OF 2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICERCAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE	Z 96072917 FOR DECISION
001	X 96073012 LAKE APPROVED RECOM
001 SENS	Z 96073012 FOR SIGNATURE
002	X 96073013 DOHSE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

<u>DOC</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR ACTION</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR INFO</u>
002	960730	FUERTH, L	
002	960730	BURNS, W	
002	960730	NYE, J	
002	960730	MCALEER, R	
002	960730	BACA, B	
002	960730	LAVIN, A	
002	960730	INDERFURTH, R	
002	960730	MONTGOMERY, F	
002	960730	PANETTA, L	
002	960730	YANNUZZI, R	
002	960730	STIGLITZ, J	
002	960730	TARULLO, D	
002	960730	STARR, B	
002	960730	WILSON, F	

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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LOG 9620714
DATE 30 JUL 96

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 1 AUG PC MTG ON CHINA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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PRINT LAST NAME: Bujold

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MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

DATE: 7-30-96 TIME: 6:20 PM SIGNATURE: *Anthony H Taylor*
PRINT LAST NAME: A Taylor

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7/31/96 7:37a Carolyn Frank

PRINT LAST NAME: Frank

COPY: ~~VIA FAX~~ 1

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
ROOM 416, WINDER BUILDING
600 17TH STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20506

7/30 3:10 Scoville

PRINT LAST NAME: Scoville

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WHITE HOUSE
1ST FLOOR, WEST WING
WASHINGTON, DC 20500

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
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COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS
ROOM 314
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7-30-96 3:35pm Williams

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COPY: 1

MR. DANIEL TARULLO
NATL ECONOMIC COUNCIL
ROOM 231
OLD EXECUTIVE OFC BLDG

7/30 3:38 Paneral

PRINT LAST NAME: Panerali

COPY: 1

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PAGE 02 OF 03 PAGES

CAROLYN
7/30 @ 15:10

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DATE 30 JUL 96

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 1 AUG PC MTG ON CHINA
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COL. F. C. WILSON JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>

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SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 1 AUG PC MTG ON CHINA
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PRINT LAST NAME:		Bujold
COPY: <u>1</u>		

MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
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ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
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DATE 30 JUL 96

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 1 AUG PC MTG ON CHINA
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ROOM 292, OEOB
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7/30 6:30pm J Farber Wood

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

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MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
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ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE
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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
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PAGE 01 OF 03 PAGES

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LOG 9620714
DATE 30 JUL 96

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 1 AUG PC MTG ON CHINA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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7/31/96 7:45a Carolyn Frank

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MR. LEON E. PANETTA
WHITE HOUSE
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DATE 30 JUL 96

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WASHINGTON, DC 20500

7/31 1600 P. Vellenga
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COPY: 1

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PAGE 02 OF 03 PAGES

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LOG 9620714
DATE 30 JUL 96

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 1 AUG PC MTG ON CHINA
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TIME

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WHITE HOUSE
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS
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COPY: 1

MR. DANIEL TARULLO
NATL ECONOMIC COUNCIL
ROOM 231
OLD EXECUTIVE OFC BLDG

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PRINT LAST NAME: Panerali

COPY: 1

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 02 OF 03 PAGES

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VR Date: 7/19/2015

TIME OF TRANSMISSION:

TIME OF RECEIPT:

'96 JUL 30 PM 2 03

**WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM**

Handwritten initials

PRECEDENCE: X

IMMEDIATE
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RELEASER: *[Signature]*
DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO: 1676 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ PAGES: 3
(Including Cover)
FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (202) 456-9425 WH SITUATION ROOM
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTIFICATION OF 1 AUG PC MTG ON CHINA
NSC LOG # 20714

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<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>PHONE NUMBER</u>
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	_____	_____
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	_____	_____
USUN @ STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR	_____	_____
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	_____	_____
JCS	SECRETARY, JOINT STAFF	_____	_____
TREASURY	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	_____	_____
COMMERCE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	_____	_____
ENERGY	DIRECTOR, EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT	_____	_____
ACDA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	_____	_____

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: R Date: 7/19/2016

TIME OF TRANSMISSION:

TIME OF RECEIPT:

'96 JUL 30 PM 2 03

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PRECEDENCE: X

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RELEASER: [Signature]
DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO: 1676

CLASSIFICATION:

~~SECRET~~

PAGES: 3
(Including Cover)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK
(NAME)

(202) 456-9425
(PHONE NUMBER)

WH SITUATION ROOM
(ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTIFICATION OF 1 AUG PC MTG ON CHINA

NSC LOG # 20714

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TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
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DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN @ STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY, JOINT STAFF		
TREASURY	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
COMMERCE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
ENERGY	DIRECTOR, EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT		
ACDA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION:

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'96 JUL 30 PM 2 03

**WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM**

PRECEDENCE: X

IMMEDIATE
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ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____
DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO: 1676 CLASSIFICATION: **~~SECRET~~** PAGES: 3
(Including Cover)
FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (202) 456-9425 WH SITUATION ROOM
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTIFICATION OF 1 AUG PC MTG ON CHINA
NSC LOG # 20714

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<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>PHONE NUMBER</u>
<u>STATE</u>	<u>EXECUTIVE SECRETARY</u>	_____	_____
<u>DOD</u>	<u>EXECUTIVE SECRETARY</u>	_____	_____
<u>USUN @ STATE</u>	<u>OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR</u>	_____	_____
<u>CIA</u>	<u>EXECUTIVE SECRETARY</u>	_____	_____
<u>JCS</u>	<u>SECRETARY, JOINT STAFF</u>	_____	_____
<u>TREASURY</u>	<u>EXECUTIVE SECRETARY</u>	_____	_____
<u>COMMERCE</u>	<u>EXECUTIVE SECRETARY</u>	_____	_____
<u>ENERGY</u>	<u>DIRECTOR, EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT</u>	_____	_____
<u>ACDA</u>	<u>EXECUTIVE SECRETARY</u>	_____	_____

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TIME OF RECEIPT:

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'96 JUL 30 PM 2 03

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

30 JUL 96 14 15 NMCC/JCS

PRECEDENCE: X

IMMEDIATE
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ROUTINE

RELEASER: [Signature]
DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO: 1676 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ PAGES: 3
(Including Cover)
FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (202) 456-9425 WH SITUATION ROOM
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTIFICATION OF 1 AUG PC MTG ON CHINA
NSC LOG # 20714

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TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
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DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	_____	_____
USUN @ STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR	_____	_____
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	_____	_____
JCS	SECRETARY, JOINT STAFF	_____	_____
TREASURY	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	_____	_____
COMMERCE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	_____	_____
ENERGY	DIRECTOR, EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT	_____	_____
ACDA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	_____	_____

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: n Date: 7/19/2005

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'96 JUL 30 PM 2 03

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

JUL 30 2 13 PM '96

PRECEDENCE: X

IMMEDIATE
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ROUTINE

RELEASER: [Signature]
DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO: 1676 CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ PAGES: 3
(Including Cover)
FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (202) 456-9425 WH SITUATION ROOM
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTIFICATION OF 1 AUG PC MTG ON CHINA
NSC LOG # 20714

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TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	_____	_____
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	_____	_____
USUN @ STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR	_____	_____
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	_____	_____
JCS	SECRETARY, JOINT STAFF	_____	_____
TREASURY	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	_____	_____
COMMERCE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	_____	_____
ENERGY	DIRECTOR, EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT	_____	_____
ACDA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	_____	_____

REMARKS:

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Initials: N Date: 7/17/99

TIME OF TRANSMISSION:

TIME OF RECEIPT:

'96 JUL 30 PM 2 03

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Handwritten notes: 7/31/96 2:35P

PRECEDENCE: X

IMMEDIATE PRIORITY ROUTINE

RELEASER: [Signature] DTG:

MESSAGE NO: 1676 CLASSIFICATION: SECRET PAGES: 3 (Including Cover) FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (202) 456-9425 WH SITUATION ROOM (NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTIFICATION OF 1 AUG PC MTG ON CHINA NSC LOG # 20714

Vertical distribution list: B, N, B, A, D, KI, L, I, B

Table with 4 columns: TO (AGENCY), DELIVER TO, DEPT/ROOM NO., PHONE NUMBER. Rows include STATE, DOD, USUN @ STATE, CIA, JCS, TREASURY, COMMERCE, ENERGY, ACDA.

REMARKS:

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION:

TIME OF RECEIPT:

'96 JUL 30 PM 2 03

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PRECEDENCE: X

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PRIORITY
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RELEASER: JM
DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO: 1676
FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK
(NAME)

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
(202) 456-9425
(PHONE NUMBER)

PAGES: 3
(Including Cover)
WH SITUATION ROOM
(ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: NOTIFICATION OF 1 AUG PC MTG ON CHINA

NSC LOG # 20714

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
USUN @ STATE	OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	SECRETARY, JOINT STAFF		
TREASURY	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
COMMERCE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
ENERGY	DIRECTOR, EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT		
ACDA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VL Date: 7/19/2019

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

**WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM**

PRECEDENCE

FLASH

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC #

20714

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-9432 ROOM: WHSR

SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting Aug 1 PC ON CHINA PAGES: 3
(w/ Cover)

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
<u>USUN New York</u>	<u>Mr. Rick Inderfurth</u>	<u>212-415-4016</u>	<u>212-415-4177</u>

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeleine Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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Initials: VL Date: 7/17/2009

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

20714

July 30, 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Assistant USTR for Policy
Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the
President

MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

DR. JOSEPH STIGLITZ
Chairman
President's Council of
Economic Advisors

MS. BETTIE BACA
Executive Secretary
Executive Secretariat
Department of Commerce

MR. DANIEL K. TARULLO
Deputy Assistant to the
President for Economic
Policy

MS. ANN LAVIN
Director, Executive
Secretariat
Department of Energy


MS. BARBARA STARR
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the United
Nations

COL. F. C. WILSON, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on China ~~(S)~~

There will be a Principals Committee meeting on China on August 1, 1996, from 2:30-3:30 p.m., in the Roosevelt Room. Attendance is principals plus one. An agenda is attached at Tab A.


Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Andrew D. Sens
Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)
Declassify On: 07/29/06

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 7/15/2017
705-0221-24

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. agenda	NSC/NEC Principals Committee Meeting, August 1, 1996. Record ID: 96020714. (1 page)	08/01/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3902

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0187 PC Meeting on China, August 2, 1996

2015-0221-M
rs1188

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

20714

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

July 29, 1996

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
LAURA TYSON

FROM: ROBERT SUETTINGER *RS*
ROBERT KYLE *RK*

SUBJECT: China PC Meeting on August 1, 1996

Attached at Tab I is a notification of a PC meeting on China scheduled for August 1, 1996, from 2:30 - 3:30 in the Roosevelt Room.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to transmit the Agenda for the PC at Tab I.

Approve *RS* Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Meeting Announcement
- Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *RL* NARA, Date *7/15/2019*
2015-0721-m

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)
Declassify On: July 29, 2006

~~SECRET~~

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

PC0204 PC Meeting on China - Limited Access, November 7, 1996

Staff Office-Individual:

Records Management

Original OA/ID Number:

3903

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
43	6	3	1	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Robert Suettinger to Anthony Lake and Laura Tyson re: Principals Committee Meeting on China (4 pages) <i>partial release</i>	11/05/1996	P1/b(1) <i>KDE 3/11/2020</i>
002. agenda	Principals Committee Meeting, November 7, 1996. [Record ID: 9621002] (1 page)	11/02/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3903

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0204 PC Meeting on China, November 7, 1996

2015-0221-M

rs1189

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: LAKE
TYSON, L

FROM: SUETTINGER
KRISTOFF

DOC DATE: 05 NOV 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 7 NOV PC MTG ON CHINA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 08 NOV 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: LAKE LOGREF: 9621002 9621029

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0204 CODES: CPR

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
KRISTOFF
KYLE
NSC CHRON
SAMORE
SCHWARTZ
SUETTINGER

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 7/15/2019
2015-0721-1m

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM CLOSED BY: NSTSM DOC 1 OF 1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE
001

Z 96110518 FOR INFORMATION
X 96110719 NOTED BY LAKE

National Security Council
The White House

rec'd 11/6
nam

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 21012
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (R) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<u>D</u> Harmon	_____	_____	_____
Dohse	<u>1</u>	<u>D</u>	_____
Sens	_____	_____	_____
Soderberg	<u>copy</u>	_____	_____
Berger	<u>2</u>	<u>OV</u>	<u>NOTE</u>
Lake	<u>3</u>	<u>Natl Sec Advisor</u>	_____
Situation Room	_____	<u>has seen</u>	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>(R) 11/7</u>	<u>N</u>
Records Mgt.	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'96 NOV 5 PM 6:30

Exec Sec Office has diskette nb

CFA 1080

From # 7309
to # 21012

Log # 21012

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

Fm SB To R Date 11/6

Key issue to decide is summit
schedule. I think State
proposal makes sense and
would be potent of some
boldness for 2^d term if
it came out of Clinton-Jiang
bilateral in Manila.

R

Fm _____ To _____ Date _____

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Robert Suettinger to Anthony Lake and Laura Tyson re: Principals Committee Meeting on China [partial] (2 pages)	11/05/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3903

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0204 PC Meeting on China, November 7, 1996

2015-0221-M
rs1189

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D C. 20504

21012
~~SECRET~~

November 5, 1996

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
LAURA TYSON

THROUGH: SANDRA J. KRISTOFF *SK*

FROM: ROBERT L. SUETTINGER *RS*

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on China

The PC meeting should work on two objectives: 1) Reviewing the various bilateral policy issues to ensure that all departments and agencies are aware of the state of play in advance of the Secretary of State's trip to China and the Manila APEC meeting; and 2) Moving toward a decision on summit meetings next year.

EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

Issues Review

Secretary Christopher's review of the issue areas in advance of his trip to Beijing should focus on a strategic overview, non-proliferation, human rights, Taiwan, and other "deliverables."

SECRET

Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)
Declassify On: 1.6 X6

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

2015-0221-M (2.40) 03/11/2020 KDE

Charlene Barshefsky will review the bidding on WTO negotiations and other trade issues, particularly the textile negotiations.

- Unlike his more abbreviated meetings with Vice Premier Qian Qichen, Secretary Christopher has an opportunity on his trip to focus on the strategic perspective in bilateral relations, much as Lake did in discussions with Liu Huaqiu. While we need to avoid allowing a strategic discussion to overshadow important issue areas, this sort of discussion provides the Chinese with a sense of being respected and taken seriously, an essential element of making progress. The Secretary will be able to announce during his visit that regular policy planning consultations will be carried out, as well as more frequent regional assessments at the Assistant Secretary level.
- The Secretary should review Undersecretary Davis's recent discussions of nonproliferation issues in Beijing. 3.3(b)(6)
we continue to move toward implementing the 1985 agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, 3.3(b)(6)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

The Secretary should recommend the most appropriate way for the President to handle this issue in his meetings with Jiang.

- ◊ The Secretary or ACDA Director Holum may raise the issue of a EO 13526 3.3(b)(6) chip that China has requested for use in its next generation of meteorological satellite.

EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

- We have seen no concrete evidence that the Chinese are prepared to make any positive actions on human rights issues, despite a serious effort on our part to reduce the level of confrontation involved in the annual UNHRC exercise. This meeting should not be a venue for discussing the Steinberg trip in detail, however, as the Chinese are still considering the issue, and more public revelations about it could prejudice the outcome. There should be a general discussion of the human rights dimension of the relationship and how it could be improved.
- The Taiwan issue has been quiescent in the last couple months, with China clearly focusing on Hong Kong transition issues and

reviving "peaceful reunification" themes. Tensions are significantly lower, which has led both sides to focus less on their widely different views of the issue. Lee Teng-hui has apparently shelved plans for nation-wide consultations on reunification, and is encouraging Taiwan businessmen to reduce their exposure in China. China shows no signs of undertaking new military exercises in the Strait. China clearly wants the U.S. to reiterate the Taiwan policy that enabled us to keep relations on an even keel this past year, including restrictions on high-level Taiwan visit to the U.S. and no new high-tech weapons systems being approved for Taiwan. Key questions to consider are whether the U.S. should continue to push both sides to resume a dialogue that neither appears to want at the moment, and what new pressures we should expect from Taiwan.

- China clearly has taken notice of U.S. efforts to move forward with trade issues in 1996, particularly WTO accession. In their curiously blinkered way, they assume big business pressures are behind this effort, and may feel they need to do little but sit back and enjoy the ride. Charlene Barshefsky should address the current state of play in the wake of recent meetings in Geneva, including recommendations on how both the Secretary and the President should handle the issue in upcoming meetings. Based on hints and statements by U.S. officials, the Chinese are expecting the President to make an announcement on a timetable when he meets Jiang in Manila. It is likely the question of permanent MFN will also be raised, and the planning process for this issue should also be discussed at the meeting.

◊ One other trade concern involves the renegotiation of the bilateral textile agreement, a process ongoing in Beijing. Although not expected to be controversial, a penalty imposed by the U.S. for illegal transshipments has aroused Chinese anger, and the agreement could be controversial by the time of the Manila meeting.

Scheduling Summits

The Chinese are expecting the Secretary to make some sort of announcement about summit meetings during his visit to Beijing, or at least promise that the President will do so. This PC should begin the process of planning such reciprocal visits. There are two assumptions that should be examined.


- Sequence: State has proposed informally, and many appear to accept the following sequence: Vice President Gore visits China in February or March to inaugurate the Sustainable Development Forum he and Premier Li Peng have established; President Jiang pays a state visit to the United States

sometime prior to the July Hong Kong transition; President Clinton pays a reciprocal visit to China in 1998. There are several problems with this sequence, not the least of which is that it has not been formally proposed to the Vice President.

- Deliverables: There is a widespread expectation that the U.S. will use Chinese eagerness for a summit meeting to exact payment, particularly on human rights-related issues. Several NGOs have specifically proposed, for example, that no summit should be held unless Wei Jingsheng is released. The PC should discuss what we should expect China to deliver in the context of summit planning, and what the best means is for ensuring they deliver it.

Moreover, the meeting should consider the pros and cons of delaying any announcements on summits at either Secretary Christopher's trip to Beijing or the Presidents' meeting in Manila.

Concurrence by:


Bob Kyle, Gary Samore, Eric Schwartz

RECOMMENDATION

That you use the above information in the Principals Committee Meeting on China.

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 02 NOV 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
AGENDA

PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 7 NOV PC MTG ON CHINA

ACTION: HARMON SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 05 NOV 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SUETTINGER

LOGREF: 9621012 9621029

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: PC0204

CODES: CPR

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

JOSHI
KRISTOFF
NSC CHRON
SODERBERG
SUETTINGER

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 7/17/2014
2015-0221-m

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM CLOSED BY: NSMEC DOC 2 OF 2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICERCAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE	Z 96110119 FOR DECISION
001	X 96110408 BERGER APPROVED RECOM
001 SENS	Z 96110408 FOR SIGNATURE
002	X 96110408 HARMON SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

<u>DOC</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR ACTION</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR INFO</u>
002	961102	FUERTH, L	
002	961102	BURNS, W	
002	961102	NYE, J	
002	961102	MATTIS, J	
002	961102	BACA, B	
002	961102	LAVIN, A	
002	961102	INDERFURTH, R	
002	961102	MONTGOMERY, F	
002	961102	PANETTA, L	
002	961102	YANNUZZI, R	
002	961102	STIGLITZ, J	
002	961102	TARULLO, D	
002	961102	STARR, B	
002	961102	WILSON, F	

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 21002
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (12) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	<u>1/3</u>	<u>JA JA</u>	_____
Dohse	_____	_____	_____
Sens	_____	_____	_____
Soderberg	<u>copy</u>	_____	_____
Berger	<u>2/1/96</u>	<u>ovr</u>	_____
Lake	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>APG 11/2</u>	<u>DFAX</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>5</u>	_____	<u>VIR</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: PC on November 7.
 '96 NOV 1 PM 7:18

Exec Sec Office has diskette 1/10

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

November 2, 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Assistant USTR for Policy
Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the
President

MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. JAMES N. MATTIS
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

DR. JOSEPH STIGLITZ
Chairman
President's Council of
Economic Advisors

MS. BETTIE BACA
Executive Secretary
Executive Secretariat
Department of Commerce

MR. DANIEL K. TARULLO
Deputy Assistant to the
President for Economic
Policy

MS. ANN LAVIN
Director, Executive
Secretariat
Department of Energy


MS. BARBARA STARR
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the United
Nations

COL. F.C. WILSON, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on China (S)

There will be a Principals Committee meeting on China on Thursday, November 7, from 3:30 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. in the White House situation Room. Attendance is Principals only - except for State, Treasury, Defense, USTR, CIA, NEC and JCS, which are principals plus one. Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the meeting. (S)


Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)
Declassify On: 1.6 X6

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By 12 NARA, Date 7/15/2017
2015-0721-AM

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. agenda	Principals Committee Meeting, November 7, 1996. [Record ID: 9621002] (1 page)	11/02/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3903

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0204 PC Meeting on China, November 7, 1996

2015-0221-M
rs1189

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

November 1, 1996

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: SANDRA J. KRISTOFF *SK*

FROM: ROBERT L. SUETTINGER *RLS*

SUBJECT: Notification of PC Meeting

Attached at Tab I is a notification for a PC meeting on China scheduled for November 7, 1996 from 3:30-5:00 in the Situation Room. The agenda for the meeting is at Tab A.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the notification at Tab A.

Approve *RLS* Disapprove _____

Attachment

- Tab I Notification of PC Meeting
- Tab A Agenda

TIME OF TRANSMISSION:

TIME OF RECEIPT:

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: _____
 X

IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____
DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO: _____ CLASSIFICATION: **SECRET** PAGES: 3
(Including Cover)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK ^{DB} (202) 456-9425 WH SITUATION ROOM
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Notification & Agenda for 7 Nov. PC
Meeting on China NSC LOG # 21002

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>PHONE NUMBER</u>
<u>State</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>Treasury</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>DOD</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>Commerce</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>DOE</u>	<u>Dir., Executive Secretariat</u>	_____	_____
<u>USUN</u>	<u>ofc. of the Rep. of the U.S. (Wash.)</u>	_____	<u>736-7699</u>
<u>CIA</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>ACDA</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>JCS</u>	<u>Secretary, Joint Staff</u>	_____	_____

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: R Date: 7/19/2019

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

**WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM**

PRECEDENCE

FLASH

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC # 21002

FROM: <u>National Security Council</u>	PHONE: <u>202-456-9432</u>	ROOM: <u>WHSR</u>
SUBJECT: <u>Notice of Meeting: 7 Nov. PC on China</u>	PAGES: <u>3</u>	(w/ Cover)

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
<u>USUN New York</u>	<u>Mr. Rick Inderfurth</u>	<u>212-415-4016</u>	<u>212-415-4177</u>

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeleine Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VR Date: 7/15/05

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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
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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Notification & Agenda for 7 Nov. PC Meeting on China
NSC LOG # 21002

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TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
<u>State</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>Treasury</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>DOD</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>Commerce</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>DOE</u>	<u>Dir., Executive Secretariat</u>	_____	_____
<u>USUN</u>	<u>ofc. of the Rep. of the U.S. (Wash.)</u>	_____	<u>736-7899</u>
<u>CIA</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>ACDA</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>JCS</u>	<u>Secretary, Joint Staff</u>	_____	_____

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Meeting on China

NSC LOG # 21002

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<u>State</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
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<u>DOD</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>Commerce</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>DOE</u>	<u>Dir., Executive Secretariat</u>	_____	_____
<u>USUN</u>	<u>ofc. of the Rep. of the U.S. (Wash.)</u>	_____	<u>736-7699</u>
<u>CIA</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
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ACDA	Executive Secretary		
JCS	Secretary, Joint Staff		

REMARKS:

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FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK
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WH SITUATION ROOM
(ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Notification & Agenda for 7 Nov. PC Meeting on China

NSC LOG # 21002

TO (AGENCY)

DELIVER TO

DEPT/ROOM NO.

PHONE NUMBER

State

Executive Secretary

Treasury

Executive Secretary

DOT

Executive Secretary

Commerce

Executive Secretary

DOE

Dir., Executive Secretariat

USUN

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736-7699

CIA

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Executive Secretary

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Secretary, Joint Staff

REMARKS:


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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Notification & Agenda for 7 Nov. PC Meeting on China

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TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
State	Executive Secretary		
Treasury	Executive Secretary		
DOD	Executive Secretary		
Commerce	Executive Secretary		
DOE	Dir., Executive Secretariat		
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ACDA	Executive Secretary		
JCS	Secretary, Joint Staff		

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Nov 2 9 33 PM '96

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Notification & Agenda for 7 Nov. PC Meeting on China NSC LOG # 21002

Table with 4 columns: TO (AGENCY), DELIVER TO, DEPT/ROOM NO., PHONE NUMBER. Rows include State, Treasury, DOD, Commerce, DOE, USUN, CIA, ACDA, JCS.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on China [partial] (2 pages)	03/07/1997	P1/b(1) <i>LOE 3/11/2020</i>
001b. draft	re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on China [partial] (1 page)	03/07/1997	P1/b(1) <i>LOE 3/11/2020</i>
001c. draft	re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on China [partial] (2 pages)	03/07/1997	P1/b(1) <i>LOE 3/11/2020</i>
002. memo	Robert Suettinger to Samuel Berger re: The Principals Meeting on China [partial] (1 page)	03/06/1997	P1/b(1) <i>LOE 3/11/2020</i>
003a. paper	re: China-Key Issues for Discussion and Decision, Principals Committee Meeting [partial] (2 pages)	03/07/1997	P1/b(1) <i>LOE 3/11/2020</i>
003b. draft	China-Key Issues for Discussion and Decision, Principals Committee Meeting [partial] (2 pages)	03/07/1997	P1/b(1) <i>LOE 3/11/2020</i>
004. memo	re: ACDA Comments on the China Paper for the March 4, 1997 Deputies Committee Meeting (2 pages)	03/04/1997	P1/b(1) <i>LOE 3/11/2020</i>
005a. paper	re: China Paper, Deputies Committee Meeting [partial] (2 pages)	03/04/1997	P1/b(1) <i>LOE 3/11/2020</i>
005b. draft	re: China Paper, Deputies Committee Meeting (7 pages)	03/07/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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 OA/Box Number: 3903

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0217 PC Meeting on China, March 7, 1997

2015-0221-M
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

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- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: HARMON

DOC DATE: 25 MAR 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R PC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 7 MAR PC MTG ON CHINA

ACTION: HARMON SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 11 MAR 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SUETTINGER LOGREF: 9720181 9720182

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0217 CODES: CPR

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By RL NARA, Date 7/15/2015
2015-0721 -m

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

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001
001 HARMON
002

Z 97031311 FOR DECISION
X 97032509 BERGER APPROVED RECOMS
Z 97032509 FOR SIGNATURE
X 97032510 HARMON SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE

DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 970325 FUERTH, L
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National Security Council
The White House

Rec'd 3/13/97 4:05pm
3/24/97 11:15am

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 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	<u>3/4</u>	<u>JA/PA</u>	<u>A-Tab I</u>
Brown Donse	<u>1</u>	<u>MB 3/13</u>	
Kerrick	<u>copy</u>	_____	
Steinberg	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>note</u>
Berger			<u>rec'd done 3/24</u>
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	<u>MC 3/25</u>	<u>D</u>
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A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette WFO

Log # 20201

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

Fm _____ To _____ Date _____

Sage
See 4/ model w/ clip -
I'm not sure we agreed on
"urgency + visible" to describe Geneva



Fm _____ To _____ Date _____

National Security Council
The White House

12WU 3/13/97 4:05pm
3/24/97 11:15am

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	<u>3/4</u>	<u>JA/PA</u>	<u>A-Tab I</u>
Brown Doherty	<u>1</u>	<u>NS 3/13</u>	
Kerrick	<u>copy</u>	_____	
Steinberg	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>note</u>
Berger			<u>rec'd done 3/24</u>
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	<u>MC 3/25</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette wp

Log # 20201

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

Fm _____ To _____ Date _____

Sage

See 4/ Mohd w/ clip -

I'm not sure we agreed on

"Virginia + visit" to describe Geneva



Fm _____ To _____ Date _____

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

20201

March 25, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

COL. JAMES N. MATTIS
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. BETTIE BACA
Executive Secretary
Executive Secretariat
Department of Commerce

MR. STUART SYMINGTON
Executive Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Assistant USTR for Policy
Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

DR. GORDON ADAMS
Associate Director for
National Security and
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

MR. ERSKINE BOWLES
Chief of Staff to the
President

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. DANIEL K. TARULLO
Assistant to the President for
International Economic
Policy

MS. BARBARA STARR
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee
Meeting on China

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Joyce Harmon
Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)
Declassify On: 1.6X6

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By NARA, Date 7/15/2019
2019-0721-11

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~~SECRET~~

Attached at Tab A, for Principals' use only, is the summary of conclusions of the Principals Committee meeting on China held on Friday, March 7, 1997. ~~(S)~~


Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on China [partial] (2 pages)	03/07/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3903

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0217 PC Meeting on China, March 7, 1997

2015-0221-M
rs1190

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

20201

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the Principals Committee

DATE: March 7, 1997
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 11:00 a.m. - 12:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on China ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR

Samuel Berger

CHIEF OF STAFF

No representative

OVP

Leon Fuerth
John Norris

CIA

George Tenet

EO 13526 3.5(c)

STATE

Secretary Madeleine Albright
Peter Tarnoff

NEC

Gene Sperling
Daniel Tarullo
Lael Brainard

TREASURY

Secretary Robert Rubin
Lawrence Summers

ACDA

John Holum
Lawrence Scheinman

DEFENSE

John White
Franklin Kramer

JCS

General John Shalikashvili
MG Robert Fogelsong

COMMERCE

Secretary William Daley
William Reinsch

WHITE HOUSE

Jim Steinberg

OMB

Nancy Schwartz

NSC

Sandy Kristoff
Gary Samore
Robert Malley
Robert Suettinger

USUN

David Goldwyn

USTR

Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky
Martha Cheng

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2015-0221-M (2.42) 03/11/2020 KDE

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SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The Principals agreed that:

- The Vice President should convey an overall message of continuity in U.S. policy when he visits China, taking available opportunities to reinforce our concerns on some of the issues discussed below. He should reiterate a general message on exchange of state visits, but not convey a specific date to President Jiang. (S)
 - ◊ In advance of the Vice President's visit, proposals for travel to China and Hong Kong should be coordinated with the NSC. (S)
- On Hong Kong, the Vice President should take the opportunity to discuss the issue in an international context, making clear to the Chinese what the international community expects by way of maintaining its commitments, and what the impact of failure to do so might have on international financial confidence. (S)

EO 13526 3.5(c)

- ◊ The State Department will make preparations to invite future Hong Kong Chief Executive C.H. Tung, Chief Secretary Anson Chan, and Democratic Party leader Martin Lee to Washington prior to July 1. It will also coordinate high-level U.S. visits to Hong Kong. (S)
- On human rights issues, our approach toward China should be broadened so that we focus both on individual cases and on broader internationally-accepted principles regarding the rule of law. These encompass both individual rights as well as issues relating to needed improvements in China's economic and trade regime. (S)
 - ◊ On Geneva and the UN Human Rights Commission resolution on China, the United States should be prepared to respond positively should the Chinese meet our four-point proposal. Barring that, we should proceed with a visible approach to the resolution, working with the EU and other like-minded governments. (S)
 - ◊ We should immediately send out cables to demarche UNHRC members, asking them not to commit to vote with China on a no-action motion or on the resolution itself. Our intent is to carry out a flexible and modulated campaign in Geneva. Assistant Secretary Shattuck was tasked to prepare an action plan for clearance with NSC on how we

intend to proceed at Geneva. Attention will be paid to keeping the Vice President's office informed of our plans, so that he can play an appropriate role on his visit to Beijing. (S)

- On nonproliferation issues, we should proceed with experts discussions scheduled for late March. The Vice President should make clear that if the Chinese meet the four requirements we have put forward for implementing the 1985 agreement on Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation, we are prepared to move ahead with the required Presidential certifications. The Vice President should make clear, however, that progress or retrogression on other proliferation issues will affect our political ability to defend the agreement. (S)
- With respect to trade issues, negotiations on China's accession to the World Trade Organization should proceed at the current intensified pace, but no deadlines should be set for completion. The Principals also agreed with the Deputies Committee proposal that we seek a one-year extension of China's Most-Favored-Nation trade status this year, rather than pushing for any significant change. (S)
 - ◊ The National Economic Council was asked to solicit interagency analysis of the U.S.-China trade situation, focusing on the causes of our trade deficit and lack of export growth. This should be completed prior to the Vice President's visit. An NEC Deputies Committee meeting will be held to discuss this and the related issue of Taiwan's WTO accession. (S)
- With respect to Taiwan arms sales, coordination needs to be improved between military, political and intelligence specialists on Taiwan's defense needs. This will enable us to respond to requests in a more effective and controlled way. Secretary Albright's recommendation of a Principals Committee meeting on Taiwan was noted. (S)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 7 MAR PC MTG ON CHINA
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PAGE 01 OF 03 PAGES

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MR. ERSKINE BOWLES 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500 WHITE HOUSE	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u>
MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
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(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee
Meeting on China March 7, 1997 NSC LOG # 20201

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Defense	Executive Secretary	_____	_____
Commerce	Executive Secretary	_____	_____
USUN/State	Stuart Symington	_____	736-7699
CIA	Executive Secretary	_____	_____
ACDA	Executive Secretary	_____	_____
JCS	Secretary	_____	_____

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NSC # 20201

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-9432 ROOM: WHSR
SUBJECT: ~~Notice of Meeting~~ SOC of PC Mtg. on China PAGES: 6
(w/ Cover)

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
<u>USUN New York</u>	<u>Mr. Stuart Symington</u>	<u>212-415-4016</u>	<u>212-415-4177</u>

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

March 12, 1997

Not done

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: SANDRA J. KRISTOFF *SK*

FROM: ROBERT L. SUETTINGER *RS*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of March 7, 1997 Principals Committee Meeting on China

Attached at Tab A is the Summary of Conclusion of the Principals Committee meeting on China held on March 7, 1997. We recommend the summary be circulated to agencies for Principals Only, as well as being filed for the record.

Concurrences by: *Rob for* Rob Malley, Gary Samore, Lael Brainard

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you *authorize Joyce Harmon to forward the letter at TAB I with* forward the summary of conclusions *via a memorandum* to agencies for Principals only.

Approve *RS* Disapprove _____

That you authorize Joyce Harmon to file the summary of conclusions attached at Tab A for the record.

Approve *RS* Disapprove _____

Attachment *TAB I Forwarding LTR*
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *YZ* NARA, Date *7/15/2014*
2015-0721-11

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Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)
Declassify On: 1.6 X6

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
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SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 7 MAR PC MTG ON CHINA
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
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001b. draft	re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on China [partial] (1 page)	03/07/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3903

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0217 PC Meeting on China, March 7, 1997

2015-0221-M
rs1190

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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
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SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The Principals agreed that:

- The Vice President should convey an overall message of continuity in U.S. policy when he visits China, taking available opportunities to reinforce our concerns on some of the issues discussed below. He should ~~only~~ reiterate a general message on state visits, ~~(not conveying a specific invitation to President Jiang. (S))~~ *but* *date*
- ◊ In advance of the Vice President's visit, proposals for travel to China and Hong Kong should be coordinated with the NSC. (S)
- On Hong Kong, the Vice President should take the opportunity to discuss the issue in an international context, making clear to the Chinese what the international community expects by way of maintaining its commitments, and what the impact of failure to do so might have on international financial confidence. (S)

exchange of



EO 13526 3.5(c)

- ◊ The State Department will make preparations to invite future Hong Kong Chief Executive C.H. Tung, Chief Secretary Anson Chan, and Democratic Party leader Martin Lee to Washington prior to July 1. It will also coordinate high-level U.S. visits to Hong Kong. (S)
- On human rights issues, *(both on individual cases and on broader)* our approach toward China should be broadened so that we focus ~~more on~~ internationally-accepted principles regarding the rule of law. These encompass both individual rights as well as issues relating to needed improvements in China's economic and trade regime. (S)
- ◊ On Geneva and the UN Human Rights Commission resolution on China, the United States should be prepared to respond positively should the Chinese ~~improve their offer on our four-point proposal.~~ Barring that, we should proceed with a ~~vigorous and~~ visible approach to the resolution, working with the EU and other like-minded governments. *meet our* (S)
- ◊ We should immediately send out cables to demarche UNHRC members, asking them not to commit to vote with China on a no-action motion or on the resolution itself. Our intent is to carry out a flexible and modulated campaign

SECRET

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in Geneva. Assistant Secretary Shattuck was tasked to prepare an action plan for clearance with NSC on how we intend to proceed at Geneva. Attention will be paid to keeping the Vice President's office informed of our plans, so that he can play an appropriate role on his visit to Beijing. (S)

- On nonproliferation issues, we should proceed with experts discussions scheduled for late March. The Vice President should make clear that if the Chinese meet the four requirements we have put forward for implementing the 1985 agreement on Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation, we are prepared to move ahead with the required Presidential certifications. The Vice President should make clear, however, that progress or retrogression on other proliferation issues will affect our political ability to defend the agreement. (S)
- With respect to trade issues, negotiations on China's accession to the World Trade Organization should proceed at the current intensified pace, but no deadlines should be set for completion. The Principals also agreed with the Deputies Committee proposal that we seek a one-year extension of China's Most-Favored-Nation trade status this year, rather than pushing for any significant change. (S)
 - ◊ The National Economic Council was asked to solicit interagency analysis of the U.S.-China trade situation, focusing on the causes of our trade deficit and lack of export growth. This should be completed prior to the Vice President's visit. An NEC Deputies Committee meeting will be held to discuss this and the related issue of Taiwan's WTO accession. (S)
- With respect to Taiwan arms sales, coordination needs to be improved between military, political and intelligence specialists on Taiwan's defense needs. This will enable us to respond to requests in a more effective and controlled way. Secretary Albright's recommendation of a Principals Committee meeting on Taiwan was noted. (S)

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Attached at Tab A, for Principals' use only, is the summary of conclusions of the Principals Committee meeting on China held on Friday, March 7, 1997. (S)

~~Joyce Harmon~~
~~Acting Executive Secretary~~

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *12* NARA, Date *7/15/2014*
2015-0721-07

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

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MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Assistant USTR for Policy
Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. ERSKINE BOWLES
Chief of Staff to the
President

MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. JAMES N. MATTIS
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. DANIEL K. TARULLO
Assistant to the President for
International Economic
Policy

MS. BETTIE BACA
Executive Secretary
Executive Secretariat
Department of Commerce

MS. BARBARA STARR
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency

MR. STUART SYMINGTON
Executive Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

COL. F. C. WILSON, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee
Meeting on China

Attached at Tab A, for Principals' use only, is the summary of
conclusions of the Principals Committee meeting on China held on
Friday, March 7, 1997. ~~(S)~~

Joyce Harmon
Acting Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Sandra J. Kristoff
Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)
Declassify On: 1.6 X6
Derived From: Multiple

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *N* NARA, Date *7/15/09*
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Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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001c. draft	re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on China [partial] (2 pages)	03/07/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3903

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0217 PC Meeting on China, March 7, 1997

2015-0221-M
rs1190

RESTRICTION CODES

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20201

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the Principals Committee

DATE: March 7, 1997

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 11:00 a.m. - 12:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions ¹¹⁻⁴⁻⁹⁷ of Principals Committee Meeting on China (~~S~~)

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR

Samuel Berger

OVP

Leon Fuerth

John Norris

STATE

Secretary Madeleine Albright

Peter Tarnoff

TREASURY

Secretary Robert Rubin

Lawrence Summers

DEFENSE

John White

Franklin Kramer

COMMERCE

Secretary William Daley

William Reinsch

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Nancy Schwartz

USUN

David Goldwyn

USTR

Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky

Martha Cheng

CHIEF OF STAFF

No representative

CIA

George Tenet

EO 13526 3.5(c)

NEC

Gene Sperling

Daniel Tarullo

Lael Brainard

ACDA

John Holum

Lawrence Scheinman

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General John Shalikashvili

MG Robert Fogelsong

WHITE HOUSE

Jim Steinberg

NSC

Sandy Kristoff

Gary Samore

Robert Malley

Robert Suettinger

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Reason: 1.5(b)(d)

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SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The Principals agreed that:

- The Vice President should convey an overall message of continuity in U.S. policy when he visits China, taking available opportunities to reinforce our concerns on some of the issues discussed below. He should only reiterate a general message on state visits, not conveying a specific invitation to President Jiang. (S)
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- On Hong Kong, the Vice President should take the opportunity to discuss the issue in an international context, making clear to the Chinese what the international community expects by way of maintaining its commitments, and what the impact of failure to do so might have on international financial confidence. (S)

EO 13526 3.5(c)

- ◊ The State Department will make preparations to invite future Hong Kong Chief Executive C.H. Tung, Chief Secretary Anson Chan, and Democratic Party leader Martin Lee to Washington prior to July 1. It will also coordinate high-level U.S. visits to Hong Kong. (S)
- On human rights issues, our approach toward China should be broadened so that we focus more on internationally-accepted principles regarding the rule of law. These encompass both individual rights as well as issues relating to needed improvements in China's economic and trade regime. (S)
 - ◊ On Geneva and the UN Human Rights Commission resolution on China, the U.S. ^{United States} should be prepared to respond positively should the Chinese improve their offer on our four-point proposal. Barring that, we should proceed with a vigorous and visible approach to the resolution, working with the EU and other like-minded governments. (S)
 - ◊ We should immediately send out cables to demarche UNHRC members, asking them not to commit to vote with China on a no-action motion or on the resolution itself. Our intent is to carry out a flexible and modulated campaign

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in Geneva. Assistant Secretary Shattuck was tasked to prepare an action plan for clearance with NSC on how we intend to proceed at Geneva. Attention will be paid to keeping the Vice President's office informed of our plans, so that he can play an appropriate role on his visit to Beijing. (S)

- On nonproliferation issues, we should proceed with experts discussions scheduled for late March. The Vice President should make clear that if the Chinese meet the four requirements we have put forward for implementing the 1985 agreement on Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation, we are prepared to move ahead with the required Presidential certifications. The Vice President should make clear, however, that progress or retrogression on other proliferation issues will affect our political ability to defend the agreement. (S)
- With respect to trade issues, negotiations on China's accession to the World Trade Organization should proceed at the current intensified pace, but no deadlines should be set for completion. The Principals also agreed with the Deputies Committee proposal that we seek a one-year extension of China's Most-Favored-Nation trade status this year, rather than pushing for any significant change. (S)
 - ◊ The National Economic Council was asked to solicit interagency analysis of the U.S.-China trade situation, focusing on the causes of our trade deficit and lack of export growth. This should be completed prior to the Vice President's visit. An NEC Deputies Committee meeting will be held to discuss this and the related issue of Taiwan's WTO accession. (S)
- With respect to Taiwan arms sales, coordination needs to be improved between military, political and intelligence specialists on Taiwan's defense needs. This will enable us to respond to requests in a more effective and controlled way. Secretary Albright's recommendation of a Principals Committee meeting on Taiwan was noted. (S)

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TO: BERGER

FROM: SUETTINGER
KRISTOFF

DOC DATE: 06 MAR 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 7 MAR PC MTG ON CHINA

ACTION: OBE / STATUS OF ORIGINAL UNKNOWN DUE DATE: 10 MAR 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SUETTINGER LOGREF: 9720181 9720182

FILES: IFM C NSCP: PC0217 CODES: CPR

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 7/15/2019
2015-0721-m

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM CLOSED BY: NSTMH DOC 1 OF 1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
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Z 97030619 FOR INFORMATION
X 97100314 OBE / STATUS OF ORIGINAL UNKNOWN

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

March 6, 1997

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: SANDRA J. KRISTOFF *SK*

FROM: ROBERT L. SUETTINGER *RS*

SUBJECT: The Principals Meeting on China

The purpose of the China Principals meeting is to map out a strategy for dealing with core issues in our bilateral relations through the two state visits. Achieving results for the state visits requires (1) agreement on what constitutes sufficient progress on U.S. core issues and (2) careful orchestration of the various high-level meetings to achieve that progress. The Deputies meeting discussion cleared out the underbrush, and you will be able to focus discussion on six issues (Vice President's trip, Hong Kong, human rights, nonproliferation, trade and Taiwan), each of which contains one or two decision points.

Introduction

You should open the meeting by describing the challenges we face this year in holding together a domestic consensus on China policy. Although our engagement strategy is working and should not change, there is growing sentiment in the public and on the Hill that China is not a suitable strategic partner, and we are not making sufficient progress on key issues (human rights, nonproliferation, trade) to merit positive steps towards Beijing. The Administration is being criticized for indecisiveness on tough issues (human rights), and for perceived protection of the strategic dialogue at the expense of problem-solving. Deft handling of the core issues, plus Hong Kong reversion, will be needed to minimize calls for cancellation of the state visits.

The first step is to agree on and promote a roadmap for handling U.S.-China issues through the two state visits. This roadmap emerges from a decision on whether to schedule the state visits; how to use high-level visits to advance core issues; and our substantive and procedural approach to China on each core issue.

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Reason: 1.5 (b) (d) 1.6 X6
Declassify On: March 7, 2007

<p>DECLASSIFIED IN PART PER E. O. 13526 2015-0221-M (2.48) 03/11/2020 KDE</p>

Issues/Questions

You asked for some background and optimal outcomes for the discussion. Our views follow, keyed to the main questions raised in the paper.

The Vice President's Visit: The main question is, should the Vice President convey informally specific timeframes for, and preferred sequencing of, the exchange of state visits?

The Chinese have indicated clearly their hope that President Jiang could visit the United States either before or after the Vancouver APEC Leaders Meeting November 24-25. We have avoided a specific response, in part due to the President's expressed interest in visiting China before that time, in part due to concern that intervening events, particularly Hong Kong transition problems, might cause us to reconsider the invitation.

We recommend the Vice President carry an invitation for Jiang to visit the United States before the APEC meeting (Thanksgiving immediately follows it). We also recommend the President make no plans to visit China before February 1998. Such an invitation sends an important message to China that we are committed to the course we have established, and that we expect the relationship will make the kind of progress in the next six months that will make the visit successful. Specific conditions are neither appropriate nor necessary -- the Chinese are fully aware of our message on this. If Hong Kong goes awry and American public opinion turns sharply against China, Jiang himself likely will seek to postpone a visit, to avoid exposing himself to embarrassment.

Hong Kong: Both the British and Hong Kong governments have expressed satisfaction with the way the United States has handled Hong Kong up to this point -- quiet reiteration of our understanding that China will honor its commitments, that we have both economic and human rights-related interests in Hong Kong, and that we are watching the situation closely. Beijing has responded appropriately to our expressed views, reacting irritably only when it has perceived we are questioning its sovereignty or interfering in its internal affairs. We believe China understands the Administration's position on the issue, although quiet discussions on our key concerns -- especially a clear but small set of "benchmarks" -- should proceed. In response to the question of what is the most effective way for the United States to influence Beijing's handling of Hong Kong's reversion, we believe you should focus on two issues.

Visits: We should try to lend support to the incoming Hong Kong government, as it will have to do most of the work of ensuring its own autonomy. This can best be done by inviting C.H. Tung to the United States prior to reversion, as well as Chief Secretary Anson Chan and Democratic Party leader Martin Lee. All three will play key roles and should have an opportunity to be heard, as well as to hear our views. Secretary Albright should accept Qian's invitation to lead the U.S. delegation to the handover ceremony. The U.K. government desires this, as well. Beyond that, we should eschew "symbolic" visits to Hong Kong that appear designed to heighten our involvement there.

Benchmarks: We should establish a set of benchmarks on which we will evaluate the success of the transition, and make sure that they are conveyed clearly, but quietly to Beijing. We should avoid citing them in public as it will only increase pressure to take retaliatory action in case the press or Congress determines our standards have not been met. Among the benchmarks should be: maintaining the integrity of the Legislative Council; organizing legislative elections within a year of turnover and allowing full access to run for office; retaining the existing government structure and slate of officials; and maintaining freedom of the press and association.

Human Rights: Although the larger issue is how we should proceed with our human rights agenda, the inevitable focus will be how to handle the UNHRC question.

Our current approach is the appropriate one. The ball is in China's court, and we should continue to be ready to address further changes in its position. While we do not expect further moves, they remain possible. Although we recognize our view is not shared by all, we believe that if China announces it will sign the two covenants and releases two additional dissidents plus Wang Dan, we should fall off the resolution. That would be, in our view, a defensible outcome.

If that does not happen, we should continue on the current course. We need not accelerate our efforts, as the EU is not anxious to do so, nor is Canada or Japan. This also will enable us to continue working on this agenda after the UNHRC is over. While China's current commentary on U.S. failures in human rights is pointed, it is not hostile, and indeed provides subjects for future dialogue.

Nonproliferation: There is a tension between (1) reliance on ongoing experts talks to achieve Chinese progress in the areas of chemical weapons, missiles and arms sales to Iran and (2) expectations that we will implement peaceful nuclear cooperation once the four conditions we identified have been met by China.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. memo	Robert Suettinger to Samuel Berger re: The Principals Meeting on China [partial] (1 page)	03/06/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3903

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0217 PC Meeting on China, March 7, 1997

2015-0221-M
rs1190

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

The key question is whether we are prepared to move forward on the PNE agreement in the face of less than acceptable Chinese action on other nonproliferation concerns.

You will recall that Lake, Christopher and you informed the Chinese we would go forward on PNE if the four conditions were met. Samore and we believe China will meet the conditions. While we can warn China that its actions in the non-nuclear areas could undermine domestic political support for peaceful nuclear cooperation, it would be inappropriate to change the conditions or back off our earlier pledge. At the same time we should be prepared to impose sanctions in response to Chinese violations of other non-nuclear nonproliferation statutes; [REDACTED] 3.3(b)(6)

[REDACTED] EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

Trade: Few of the agencies beyond USTR have a preferred strategy for continuing MFN, finishing the WTO accession and handling increasing pressure to move on Taiwan's WTO membership before that of the PRC. The question the meeting will focus on is how to approach MFN this year.

Because the consensus on China is fragile, we believe it would be impossible to secure more than an one-year extension of MFN. We can rely on last year's gameplan, and China is prepared to accept a one-year rollover. This allows us to continue to hold China to the commercially meaningful agreement test of WTO accession, essential to obtaining improved Chinese offers on rule-making and market access. With WTO accession in hand, prospects for permanent MFN improve significantly.

Taiwan: Although the Hong Kong transition is an issue of greater urgency and public attention, Taiwan issues will remain at the center of U.S.-China relations. Although Beijing clearly wants the issue on the back burner, recent actions by Taipei are aggravating to Beijing, and have reinforced its suspicions that Lee Teng-hui continues to move toward independence: The planned abolition of the Taiwan provincial government; the invitation to the Dalai Lama to visit Taiwan; nuclear waste shipments to North Korea; and the hard push to enter WTO ahead of the PRC. In that context, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan loom large on the bilateral agenda -- particularly the delivery in April of the first tranche of F-16s. Formal discussions with a Taiwan military delegation will take place next week, and the Taiwan media will play the issue aggressively.

The Principals should focus on what is the most effective way to ensure arms sales are consistent with U.S. policy commitments to Beijing and obligations to Taipei. DOD necessarily will take the lead in this discussion, but it should be framed in its broader

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context. Do increasing amounts of high-tech weapons -- which the PRC will ultimately match -- enhance Taiwan's long-term security? Or do they contribute to an incipient arms race that Taiwan ultimately will lose?

The goal should be to enhance our dialogue with Taiwan on larger strategic issues, and encourage it to re-engage with Beijing, rather than take steps that increase the likelihood the PRC will see military action as its only option. For our part, we should improve the decision-making process within the U.S. government regarding arms sales, rather than remaining vulnerable to Taiwan's whims and Congressional pressure.

Concurrence by:

Gary Samore, Rob Malley ^{N/R}

8/16/02

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9720196
RECEIVED: 06 MAR 97 11

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: HARMON

DOC DATE: 06 MAR 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R

PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 7 MAR PC MTG ON CHINA

ACTION: BROWN SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 10 MAR 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KRISTOFF LOGREF: 9720181 9720182

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0217 CODES: CPR

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

JOSHI
KERRICK
KRISTOFF
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By 12 NARA, Date 7/15/2019
2015-0721-24

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEC CLOSED BY: NSLA DOC 2 OF 2

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICERCAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001
002

Z 97030612 FOR DECISION
X 97030615 BERGER APPROVED RECOM
X 97030615 BROWN SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

<u>DOC</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR ACTION</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR INFO</u>
002	970306	FUERTH, L	
002	970306	BURNS, W	
002	970306	NYE, J	
002	970306	MATTIS, J	
002	970306	BACA, B	
002	970306	SYMINGTON, S	
002	970306	MONTGOMERY, F	
002	970306	ADAMS, G	
002	970306	BOWLES, E	
002	970306	YANNUZZI, R	
002	970306	TARULLO, D	
002	970306	STARR, B	
002	970306	WILSON, F	

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 20196
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG we A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
B Harmon			
Brown Donse	<u>copy/2</u>		
Kerrick			
Steinberg	<u>1</u>	Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk			
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

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Exec Sec Office has diskette yes _____

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20196

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

March 6, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

COL. JAMES N. MATTIS
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. BETTIE BACA
Executive Secretary
Executive Secretariat
Department of Commerce

MR. STUART SYMINGTON
Executive Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Assistant USTR for Policy
Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

DR. GORDON ADAMS
Associate Director for
National Security and
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

MR. ERSKINE BOWLES
Chief of Staff to the
President

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. DANIEL K. TARULLO
Assistant to the President for
International Economic
Policy

MS. BARBARA STARR
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: March 7 Principals Committee Meeting -- China (S)

Attached at Tab A is a discussion paper for use at the Principals
Committee Meeting on March 7 regarding China. (S)


Joyce A. Harmon
Acting Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Discussion Paper

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Classified by: Joyce Harmon
Reason: 1.5 (b) (d) 1.6 X6
Declassify On: March 7, 2007

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

2015-0221-M (2.49) 03/11/2020 KDE

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CHINA
KEY ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION AND DECISION
PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING

I. VICE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO CHINA

Issue: The Vice President's China trip is an opportunity to provide Beijing a roadmap for developing relations over the coming year. Chinese leadership is anxious the visit be successful; we, in turn, want to base that success on clear understandings of the ways in which each side will address core issues in 1997. Results could be announced at the state visits.

Question: Should the Vice President convey informally specific timeframes for, and preferred sequencing of, the exchange of state visits? In what ways can we reinforce the need for further problem-solving in advance of state visits?

Discussion: The domestic consensus in favor of engagement with China is fragile. To strengthen support for our policies, Chinese progress on several core issues is needed, including Hong Kong reversion, human rights, nonproliferation and trade. The state visits, agreed to in principle at the November Manila meetings, are a key vehicle for securing Chinese movement on U.S. concerns. China views the prospect of state visits as an important opportunity to put relations on a "normal" footing, i.e., high-level exchanges are regular and routine.

Proposing the timing/sequencing for state visits may be an incentive for China to act positively on core issues. However, agreeing now runs the risk that subsequent adverse events (e.g., Hong Kong reversion) could call into question the timing of the visits. Making state visits contingent on either specific or general progress by China might serve the same purpose, while avoiding domestic criticism that our policy is form (meetings) over substance (solving problems). At the same time, we have not linked, either publicly or privately, the exchange of state visits to progress on specific issues. Once the timing and sequencing is fixed, China may assume we will proceed with state visits, regardless of progress on core issues. In that event, we could face domestic pressure to cancel the state visits.

II. HONG KONG

Issue: China's fulfillment of its commitments to Hong Kong under the 1984 Sino-British agreement, as well as the manner in which it manages the transition, are emerging as major issues in sustaining support for engagement with China. Hong Kong is

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Classified by: Joyce Harmon
Reason: 1.5 (b) (d) 1.6 X6
Declassify on: March 7, 2007

increasingly seen as a symbol of China's policies on political and economic reform and human rights. A successful transition, in both fact and public perception, will enhance the respect and confidence given China by the international community. Chinese missteps will be magnified by the media and decrease confidence in the legitimacy of our engagement strategy.

Question: What is the most effective way for the United States to influence Beijing's handling of Hong Kong's reversion?

Discussion: China views Hong Kong as a national sovereignty issue not appropriate for discussion bilaterally. Nonetheless, Beijing acknowledges that the international community has a significant interest in Hong Kong's continued stability and prosperity. Our stance has been to indicate strong support for a smooth transition that preserves a high degree of autonomy for Hong Kong and its economic and political freedoms. This posture is criticized by some as being mere rhetoric in the face of anti-democratic decisions by Beijing, and domestic pressure to become more active in protecting Hong Kong's future is increasing.

Visits to Hong Kong by high-level U.S. officials could help demonstrate our interest in how Hong Kong reversion is handled and our support for a smooth transition. So would high-visibility visits to the United States by key Hong Kong transition leaders, such as C.H. Tung, Anson Chan and Martin Lee. At the same time, high-profile visits may risk the appearance of an effort to renegotiate the terms of the reversion or interfere in a domestic matter. We have little real leverage to effect a change in the specifics of the reversion. In addition, Hong Kong has not shown signs of anxiety about the reversion process: the stock market, property values and C.H. Tung's popularity are all on the upswing.

Approaching Chinese leadership directly to discuss Hong Kong benchmarks could produce a better understanding in Beijing of the types of actions we and others in the international community would be willing to recognize and acknowledge publicly as contributing to successful transition. However, public discussion of specific "benchmarks for success" might risk requiring us to act against China if one or more of the benchmarks are not met.

Similarly, a decision to attend the July 1 ceremonies could provide an incentive for Beijing's careful handling of Hong Kong. Once announced, however, it would be difficult to pull out of the ceremonies were China to fumble the transition.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. paper	re: China-Key Issues for Discussion and Decision, Principals Committee Meeting [partial] (2 pages)	03/07/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3903

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0217 PC Meeting on China, March 7, 1997

2015-0221-M
rs1190

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

III. HUMAN RIGHTS

Issue: We have agreed to move forward in the UNHRC to discuss with the EU a resolution against China. China has not met the four points we outlined for dropping a resolution.

Question: How should we proceed with our human rights agenda?

Discussion: China has taken several significant steps on our suggested four points (ICRC prison access discussions; medical paroles; signature and ratification of UN covenants; establishment of joint NGO forum); nonetheless, these steps fall short of our expectations, and Deputies agreed would not justify dropping support for the UNHRC resolution. Should we decide now (before the Vice President's visit) to sponsor the resolution in Geneva or continue to seek further progress before committing to go forward?

Human rights groups are urging us to press forward vigorously in Geneva to demonstrate the centrality of this issue in our bilateral relations. They suggest that a Geneva effort not commensurate with last year (high-level demarches in capitals and at bilateral meetings) will be criticized as "selling out" on our commitment to human rights. China expects us to attempt to avoid a confrontation, as agreed between the two Presidents, or at a minimum, to take into account steps it has taken. China also may be prepared to take additional steps to determine whether we are willing to modulate our Geneva posture or move to an alternative less confrontational than a resolution. Our response would affect our ability to re-engage China on human rights after the UNHRC session.

IV. NONPROLIFERATION

Issue: Our cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation issues has provided some recent successes. [REDACTED] 3.3(b)(6)

[REDACTED]
EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

Question: What is the most effective way to advance our nonproliferation goals in the four areas of interest to us (nuclear, CW, missiles, arms sales)? [REDACTED] 3.3(b)(6)

[REDACTED]
EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

Discussion: Our progress on nonproliferation issues with China varies by category. Progress in the nuclear area led us to

inform China we would make the necessary certification to Congress to implement the 1985 Peaceful Nuclear Energy agreement if it meets 3.3(b)(6) conditions (abide by May 1996 commitment not to assist unsafeguarded facilities, enact national nuclear export controls, EO 13526 3.3(b)(6) join the Zangger Group). Delaying certification on grounds other than failure to meet the 3.3(b)(6) conditions would dampen our ability to advance discussion on other proliferation issues. Domestic pressures to delay nuclear cooperation could develop, however, if China is perceived to be in violation of any U.S. nonproliferation statute.

We have been less successful in securing China's acceptance of international norms in the non-nuclear proliferation areas. Experts talks have been critical to clarifying positions and creating options for problem-solving. The underlying threat of sanctions also affects Beijing's estimate of the need to make nonproliferation commitments. 3.3(b)(6)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

V. TRADE

Issue: Our bilateral trade deficit with China, trade irritants (market access problems, trade agreement enforcement) and the difficulties in concluding a commercially meaningful WTO accession package threaten to impede our ability to secure Congressional support for permanent MFN.

Question: What is our strategy for MFN renewal, and how will it affect our negotiation of the WTO accession package? Shall we be prepared to move forward on Taiwan's WTO accession bid if we cannot reach agreement with the PRC?

Discussion: Congressional support for MFN is linked to several issues, including U.S. market access in China, the perception of China as an unfair trader, China's unwillingness to accept WTO standards, and concerns we are prepared to support WTO membership on less than commercially meaningful terms in the interests of "preserving overall relations." There is some criticism that we are sacrificing non-trade concerns in favor of improved commercial relations. China's mishandling of Hong Kong may affect this year's MFN debate. There is some Congressional support for moving ahead with Taiwan's WTO accession as a demonstration of our support for open markets and democracy. The Deputies recommended that we begin preparations for a one-year extension of MFN as we did last year, with no explicit linkage to the WTO negotiations. Deputies did not endorse setting a target date for PRC's WTO accession.

VI. TAIWAN

Issue: Taiwan issues are the most troublesome in U.S.-China relations, in particular in the area of U.S. arms sales to Taipei. In April, we will begin delivery of the 150 F-16's, and we expect Taiwan to request during the annual consultations increasingly sophisticated U.S. equipment.

Question: What is the most effective way to ensure arms sales are consistent with U.S. policy commitments to Beijing and obligations to Taipei?

Discussion: Our one China policy and the third communique commit us to support peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and reduce over time the quantity of arms sold to Taiwan. The Taiwan Relations Act obligates us to provide Taiwan an adequate self-defense. The tension between our commitment to China and our obligation to Taiwan has produced an opaque arms sales decision process that subjects us to complaints from both sides of the Strait and attracts significant attention on Capitol Hill. Up until now, we have refused to negotiate with China on arms sales to Taiwan; Beijing has explicitly linked the issue to its willingness to cooperate on nonproliferation issues, such as selling advanced conventional weapons to Iran.

Overly restricting our sales to Taiwan might tempt Beijing to believe a military solution to the Taiwan issue is possible. The 1996 missile exercises in the Strait demonstrate the extent of China's concern regarding Taiwan's moves toward independence. The missile exercises drew sharp Congressional responses in favor of defending Taiwan and halting engagement with China. Yet arming Taiwan with the most sophisticated weapons could prompt a destabilizing regional arms race with consequences for U.S. policies and military forces beyond Taiwan.

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Calendar of 1997 Action Events

March Vice President's visit to Beijing.
Annual arms sales consultations with Taiwan.
Dalai Lama visit to Taipei.

March-April UNHRC meeting.

Spring Visits to Washington by Martin Lee, Anson Chan,
C.H. Tung, and Dalai Lama.

April Begin delivery of 150 F-16's to Taiwan.

April-May Albright/Qian bilateral in Washington.

May General Shalikashvili's visit to Beijing.

June MFN Renewal.

July Hong Kong reversion to China.
Possible Albright/Qian meeting at time of ASEAN
PMC.

August Congressional action on President's June MFN
decision.

September Lee Teng-hui transit to Panama.
UNGA meetings - possible Albright/Qian meeting.
IMF annual meeting in Hong Kong (Rubin attends
with other Finance Ministers).
Commerce has proposed Beijing meeting of JCCT.

Sept-Oct Berger visit to Beijing.
JEC (Rubin) meeting in Beijing.
Party Congress in Beijing - Jiang Zemin's role
defined.

Fall Secretary Cohen's Visit to Beijing.

November APEC Leaders meeting in Vancouver -- possible
Albright/Qian meeting.

Fall 1997-
1998 Possible State visits.

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March 6, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
FROM: SANDRA J. KRISTOFF
SUBJECT: March 7 PC Meeting on China



Attached is a background paper for the PC meeting on China. It reflects the discussion by deputeies on March 4.

Concurrence by: Gary Samore, Rob Malley

RECOMMENDATION



That you authorize distribution of the paper.

Approve a Disapprove

Attachments

- Tab I Memo to Agencies
- Tab A Discussion Paper

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By V NARA, Date 7/15/2014
 2015-0221-m

Classified by: Sandra J. Kristoff
Reason: 1.5 (b) (d) 1.6 X6
Declassify On: March 7, 2007

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20/9/6

CHINA
KEY ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION AND DECISION
PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
2015-0221-M (2.50) 03/11/2020 KDB

I. VICE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO CHINA

Issue: The Vice President's China trip is an opportunity to provide Beijing a roadmap for developing relations over the coming year. Chinese leadership is anxious the visit be successful; we, in turn, want to base that success on clear understandings of the ways in which each side will address core issues in 1997. Results could be announced at the state visits.

Question: Should the Vice President convey informally specific timeframes for, and preferred sequencing of, the exchange of state visits? In what ways can we reinforce the need for further problem-solving in advance of state visits?

Discussion: The domestic consensus in favor of engagement with China is fragile. To strengthen support for our policies, Chinese progress on several core issues is needed, including Hong Kong reversion, human rights, nonproliferation and trade. The state visits, agreed to in principle at the November Manila meetings, are a key vehicle for securing Chinese movement on U.S. concerns. China views the prospect of state visits as an important opportunity to put relations on a "normal" footing, i.e., high-level exchanges are regular and routine.

Proposing the timing/sequencing for state visits may be an incentive for China to act positively on core issues. However, agreeing now runs the risk that subsequent adverse events (e.g., Hong Kong reversion) could call into question the timing of the visits. ~~In addition, making state visits contingent on either specific or general progress by China might serve the same purpose, while avoiding domestic criticism that our policy is form (meetings) over substance (solving problems).~~ Once the timing and sequencing is fixed, China may assume we will proceed with state visits, regardless of progress on core issues. In that event, we could face domestic pressure to cancel the state visits.

At the same time we have not linked, either publicly or privately, the exchange of state visits to progress on specific issues

II. HONG KONG

Issue: China's fulfillment of its commitments to Hong Kong under the 1984 Sino-British agreement, as well as the manner in which it manages the transition, are emerging as major issues in sustaining support for engagement with China. Hong Kong is

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At the same time, we have not linked, either publicly or privately, the exchange of state visits to progress on specific issues

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In The face of anti-democratic
decisions by Beijing.

Interest in how Hong Kong reversion
is handled and our

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increasingly seen as a symbol of China's policies on political and economic reform and human rights. A successful transition, in both fact and public perception, will enhance the respect and confidence given China by the international community. Chinese missteps will be magnified by the media and decrease confidence in the legitimacy of our engagement strategy.

Question: What is the most effective way for the United States to influence Beijing's handling of Hong Kong's reversion?

Discussion: China views Hong Kong as a national sovereignty issue not appropriate for discussion bilaterally. Nonetheless, Beijing acknowledges that the international community has a significant interest in Hong Kong's continued stability and prosperity. Our stance has been to indicate strong support for a smooth transition that preserves a high degree of autonomy for Hong Kong and its economic and political freedoms. This posture is criticized as being mere rhetoric and domestic pressure to become more active in protecting Hong Kong's future is increasing. Media reporting already postulates that a failed Hong Kong transition would require the United States to abandon comprehensive engagement.

by some
by some

In the
face
of anti-
democratic
decisions
by Beijing

interest in how the reversion is handled and our

Visits to Hong Kong by high-level U.S. officials would help demonstrate our support for a smooth transition. So would high-visibility visits to the United States by key Hong Kong transition leaders, such as C.H. Tung, Anson Chan and Martin Lee. At the same time, high-profile visits may risk the appearance of an effort to renegotiate the terms of the reversion or interfere in a domestic matter. We have little real leverage to effect a change in the specifics of the reversion. In addition, Hong Kong has not shown signs of anxiety about the reversion process: the stock market, property values and C.H. Tung's popularity are all on the upswing.

Approaching Chinese leadership directly to discuss Hong Kong benchmarks could produce a better understanding in Beijing of the types of actions we and others in the international community would be willing to recognize and acknowledge publicly as contributing to successful transition. However, public discussion of specific "benchmarks for success" might risk requiring us to act against China if one or more of the benchmarks are not met.

Similarly, a decision to attend the July 1 ceremonies could provide an incentive for Beijing's careful handling of Hong Kong. Once announced, however, it would be difficult to pull out of the ceremonies were China to fumble the transition.

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III. HUMAN RIGHTS

Issue: We have agreed to move forward in the UNHRC to discuss with the EU a resolution against China. China has not met the four points we outlined for dropping a resolution.

Question: How should we proceed with our human rights agenda?

Discussion: China has taken several significant steps on our suggested four points (ICRC prison access discussions; medical paroles; signature and ratification of UN covenants; establishment of joint NGO forum); nonetheless, these steps fall short of our expectations, and ~~would not justify dropping support for the UNHRC resolution. Should we decide now (before the Vice President's visit) to sponsor the resolution in Geneva or continue to seek further progress? The way in which we advance the resolution may affect whether China is willing to take further actions; China already is expressing doubts about our good faith in the discussions on the four points.~~

Deputies agreed
Deputies agreed

before committing to go forward.

before committing to go forward

Human rights groups are urging us to press forward vigorously in Geneva to demonstrate the centrality of this issue in our bilateral relations. They suggest that a Geneva effort not commensurate with last year (high-level demarches in capitals and at bilateral meetings) will be criticized as "selling out" on our commitment to human rights. China expects us to attempt to avoid a confrontation, as agreed between the two Presidents, or at a minimum, to take into account steps it has taken. China also may be prepared to take additional steps to determine whether we are willing to modulate our Geneva posture or move to an alternative less confrontational than a resolution. Our response would affect our ability to re-engage China on human rights after the UNHRC session.

IV. NONPROLIFERATION

Issue: Our cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation issues is increasingly successful.

has provided his product

Some recent successes
Some recent successes

[Redacted] 3.3(b)(6)

[Redacted] EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

Question: What is the most effective way to advance our nonproliferation goals in the four areas of interest to us (nuclear, CW, missiles, arms sales)?

[Redacted] 3.3(b)(6)

[Redacted] EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

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Discussion: Our progress on nonproliferation issues with China varies by category. Progress in the nuclear area led us to inform China we would make the necessary certification to Congress to implement the 1985 Peaceful Nuclear Energy agreement if it meets 3.3(b)(6) conditions (abide by May 1996 commitment not to assist unsafeguarded facilities, enact national nuclear export controls, EO 13526 3.3(b)(6) join the Langer Group). Delaying certification on grounds other than failure to meet the 3.3(b)(6) conditions would dampen our ability to advance discussion on other proliferation issues. Domestic pressures to delay nuclear cooperation could develop, however, if China is perceived to be in violation of any U.S. nonproliferation statute.

We have been less successful in securing China's acceptance of international norms in the non-nuclear proliferation areas. Experts talks have been critical to clarifying positions and creating options for problem-solving. The underlying threat of sanctions also affects Beijing's estimate of the need to make nonproliferation commitments. 3.3(b)(6)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

V. TRADE

Issue: Our bilateral trade deficit with China, trade irritants (market access problems, trade agreement enforcement) and the difficulties in concluding a commercially meaningful WTO accession package threaten to impede our ability to secure Congressional support for permanent MFN.

Question: What is our strategy for MFN renewal, and how will it affect our negotiation of the WTO accession package? Are we likely to face pressure from Taiwan to move forward on its WTO accession bid?

Shall we be prepared
Should we be prepared to
respond to
Taiwan's
Taiwan's

Discussion: Congressional support for MFN is linked to several issues, including U.S. market access in China, the perception of China as an unfair trader, China's unwillingness to accept WTO standards, and concerns we are prepared to support WTO membership on less than commercially meaningful terms in the interests of "preserving overall relations." There is some criticism that we are sacrificing non-trade concerns in favor of improved commercial relations. China's mishandling of Hong Kong may affect this year's MFN debate. There is some Congressional support for moving ahead with Taiwan's WTO accession as a demonstration of our support for open markets and democracy. The Deputies recommended that we begin preparations for a one-year

if we cannot reach agreement with the PRC
we cannot make agreement with PRC

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extension of MFN as we did last year, with no explicit linkage to the WTO negotiations.

*Deputies did not endorse setting a target date for
Deputies did not endorse setting a target date for Sec's Rec:*

VI. TAIWAN

WTO accession - WTO accession

Issue: Taiwan issues are the most troublesome in U.S.-China relations, in particular in the area of U.S. arms sales to Taipei. In April, we will begin delivery of the 150 F-16's, and we expect Taiwan to request during the annual consultations increasingly sophisticated U.S. equipment.

Question: What is the most effective way to ensure arms sales are consistent with U.S. policy commitments to Beijing and obligations to Taipei? ~~What options should we have to use, and transit~~

Discussion: Our one China policy and the third communique commit us to support peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and reduce over time the quantity of arms sold to Taiwan. The Taiwan Relations Act obligates us to provide Taiwan an adequate self-defense. The tension between our commitment to China and our obligation to Taiwan has produced an opaque arms sales decision process that subjects us to complaints from both sides of the Strait and attracts significant attention on Capitol Hill. Up until now, we have refused to negotiate with China on arms sales to Taiwan; Beijing has explicitly linked the issue to its willingness to cooperate on nonproliferation issues, such as selling advanced conventional weapons to Iran.

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DC

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PERSONS:

SUBJECT: ACDA COMMENTS RE 3 MAR DC MTG DISCUSSION PAPER ON CHINA

ACTION: NFAR PER KRISTOFF

DUE DATE: 07 MAR 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KRISTOFF

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X 97030516 NFAR PER KRISTOFF

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SOURCE REF: 9700547

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R DC
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PERSONS:

SUBJECT: ACDA COMMENTS ON 3 MARCH DC MTG PAPER ON CHINA

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OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

MAR 4 1997

**MEMORANDUM FOR MS. JOYCE A. HARMON
ACTING EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL**

**SUBJECT: ACDA COMMENTS ON THE MARCH 3, 1997 DEPUTIES COMMITTEE
MEETING PAPER ON CHINA ~~(S)~~**

Attached are ACDA's comments on the March 3, 1997 China Paper distributed in preparation for the March 4, 1997 Deputies Committee meeting. Please factor these comments into the paper being prepared for the Principals Committee meeting on China currently scheduled for Friday, March 7, 1997. ~~(S)~~

Barbara Starr
Barbara Starr
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated

DEX5234

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Derived from: March 3, 1997 NSC China Paper for March 4, 1997 Deputies Committee Meeting
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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Washington, D.C. 20451

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

ACDA COMMENTS ON THE CHINA PAPER
FOR THE MARCH 4, 1997 DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING

Please incorporate the following into the March 3, 1997 China Paper prepared for the Deputies Committee meeting held Tuesday, March 4, 1997:

Page 2, after Berger/Liu Meetings:

Holum/Li Meeting: In October 1996, ACDA Director Holum and Vice Foreign Minister Li agreed to resume a regular high-level arms control dialogue, supplemented by experts-level talks on arms control issues. Holum has invited Li to a meeting in Washington in the Fall of 1997. The objectives of this meeting should include persuading China to adopt positions more compatible with the United States on a Fissile Material Cutoff treaty, a treaty on anti-personnel landmines, on implementing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and on strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention. (S)

Page 8, as a fourth tick after "Missile Issues":

--Arms Control Issues. Pursue the expert-level talks the United States recently proposed to China on strategic arms control issues, arms control verification and confidence-building measures in a regional context. (S)

DEX5234-1

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Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)

Declassify on: March 4, 2007

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: HARMON

DOC DATE: 05 MAR 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R PC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 7 MAR PC MTG ON CHINA

ACTION: HARMON SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 04 MAR 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KRISTOFF LOGREF: 9720181 9720192

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001 HARMON	Z 97030510 FOR SIGNATURE
002	X 97030510 HARMON SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

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002	970305	MONTGOMERY, F	
002	970305	ADAMS, G	
002	970305	BOWLES, E	
002	970305	YANNUZZI, R	
002	970305	TARULLO	
002	970305	STARR, B	
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The White House

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Kerrick	<u>Copy</u>		
Steinberg	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Berger			
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

March 5, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

COL. JAMES N. MATTIS
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. BETTIE BACA
Executive Secretary
Executive Secretariat
Department of Commerce

MR. STUART SYMINGTON
Executive Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Assistant USTR for Policy
Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

DR. GORDON ADAMS
Associate Director for
National Security and
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

MR. ERSKINE BOWLES
Chief of Staff to the
President

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. DANIEL K. TARULLO
Assistant to the President for
International Economic
Policy

MS. BARBARA STARR
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting ~~(S)~~

There will be an NSC Principals Committee meeting on China on March 7, from 11:00 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the meeting. A discussion paper will be circulated separately.

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Attendance is limited to Principal plus one. Please pass this memorandum only to your agency's Principal.


Joyce A. Harmon
Acting Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab A

Agenda for the Meeting

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: March 7, 1997
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 11:00 a.m. - 12:30 p.m.

China

Agenda

- I. Introduction.....Mr. Berger
- II. Issues Discussion.....Mr. Berger

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

March 3, 1997

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: SANDRA J. KRISTOFF *SJK*

SUBJECT: NSC Principals Committee Meeting on March 7, 1997

Attached at Tab I is the notification for a Principals Committee Meeting to be held on March 7, 1997 from 11:00a.m. to 12:30p.m. in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Principal plus one. A discussion paper will be circulated separately.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Joyce Harmon to sign the notification at Tab

I

Approve *A* Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I PC Notification
- Tab A Agenda

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
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
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		COPY: 1	
MR. ERSKINE BOWLES 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500 WHITE HOUSE			
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MR. ERSKINE BOWLES 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500 WHITE HOUSE	3/6	8:50	<i>Lynn M. Moran</i>
		PRINT LAST NAME:	<u>MORCOS</u>
		COPY: 1	_____
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MAR 5 11 49 AM '97

**WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM**

PRECEDENCE: _____

IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: *BJ*
DTG: 085 5 MAR '97 11:15

MESSAGE NO: 0500/ CLASSIFICATION: SECRET PAGES: 4
 (Including Cover)
 FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (202) 456-9425 WH SITUATION ROOM
 (NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)
 MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Notification of PC Meeting on China
 NSC LOG # 2k000 20182

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>PHONE NUMBER</u>
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> State	Executive Secretary		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Treasury	Executive Secretary		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Defense	Executive Secretary		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Commerce	Executive Secretary		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> USUN/State	Stuart Symington		736-7699
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CIA	Executive Secretary		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ACDA	Executive Secretary		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DICS	Secretary		

REMARKS:

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION:

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

97 MAR -5 12:12

PRECEDENCE: _____

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ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: 085

5 MAR '97 11:45

MESSAGE NO: 0500/ CLASSIFICATION: **SECRET** PAGES: 4
 (Including Cover)
 FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK (202) 456-9425 WH SITUATION ROOM
 (NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)
 MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Notification of PC Meeting on China
 NSC LOG # 21022 20182

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> State	Executive Secretary	_____	_____
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Treasury	Executive Secretary	_____	_____
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Defense	Executive Secretary	_____	_____
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Commerce	Executive Secretary	_____	_____
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> USUN/State	Stuart Symington	_____	736-7699
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CIA	Executive Secretary	_____	_____
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<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DJCS	Secretary	_____	_____

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**-5 MAR 97 11 50
MCC/JCS**

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PRIORITY
ROUTINE**

RELEASER: *BJ*

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 (NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)
 MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Notification of PC Meeting on China
 NSC LOG # ~~2182~~ 20182

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>PHONE NUMBER</u>
<u>B State</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>X Treasury</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>N Defense</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>L Commerce</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>- USUN/State</u>	<u>Stuart Symington</u>	_____	<u>736-7699</u>
<u>A CIA</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>ACDA</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>D JCS</u>	<u>Secretary</u>	_____	_____

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3-5-97 2240

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MESSAGE NO: 0500/

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(PHONE NUMBER)

WH SITUATION ROOM
(ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Notification of PC Meeting on China

NSC LOG # 21822 20182

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>PHONE NUMBER</u>
<i>B</i> State	Executive Secretary	_____	_____
<i>X</i> Treasury	Executive Secretary	_____	_____
<i>W</i> Defense	Executive Secretary	_____	_____
<i>L</i> Commerce	Executive Secretary	_____	_____
<i>-</i> USUN/State	Stuart Symington	_____	736-7699
<i>A</i> CIA	Executive Secretary	_____	_____
ACDA	Executive Secretary	_____	_____
<i>D</i> JCS	Secretary	_____	_____

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DTG: 085 5 MAR '97 11:15

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(NAME)

(202) 456-9425
(PHONE NUMBER)

WH SITUATION ROOM
(ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Notification of PC Meeting on China

NSC LOG # ~~21022~~ 20182

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>PHONE NUMBER</u>
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> State	Executive Secretary	_____	_____
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Treasury	Executive Secretary	_____	_____
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Defense	Executive Secretary	_____	_____
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<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CIA	Executive Secretary	_____	_____
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ACDA	Executive Secretary	_____	_____
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DJS	Secretary	_____	_____

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TO: AGENCIES

FROM: HARMON

DOC DATE: 03 MAR 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
PC

DC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 4 MAR DC MTG ON CHINA

ACTION: HARMON SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 04 MAR 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KRISTOFF LOGREF: 9720182 9720192

FILES: IFM O NSCP: PC0217 CODES: CPR

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

KERRICK
KRISTOFF
NSC CHRON
STEINBERG

COMMENTS: 4 MAR DC MTG BECAME 7 MAR PC MTG

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *VR* NARA, Date *7/15/2015*
2015-0721-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 STEINBERG
001
002

Z 97030116 FOR DECISION
X 97030316 STEINBERG APPROVED RECOM
X 97030316 HARMON SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 970303 FUERTH, L
002 970303 BURNS, W
002 970303 NYE, J
002 970303 MATTIS, J
002 970303 BACA, B
002 970303 SYMINGTON, S
002 970303 MONTGOMERY, F
002 970303 ADAMS, G
002 970303 YANNUZZI, R
002 970303 TARULLO, D
002 970303 STARR, B
002 970303 WILSON, F

National Security Council
The White House

Rec'd 3/1
1:45

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 20181
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSD INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG RE A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>B</i> Harmon	1 1/3	Y YAA	A
Dohse			
Kerrick	1		
Steinberg	2		
Berger		Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	1 3/4		D
Records Mgt.			
Staff	1		

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:
 memo of Notification for
 Mar 4 DC meeting on
 China

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

20181

March 3, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Assistant USTR for Policy
Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

DR. GORDON ADAMS
Associate Director for
National Security and
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. JAMES N. MATTIS
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. DANIEL K. TARULLO
Assistant to the President for
International Economic
Policy

MS. BETTIE BACA
Executive Secretary
Executive Secretariat
Department of Commerce

MS. BARBARA STARR
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency

MR. STUART SYMINGTON
Executive Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

COL. F. C. WILSON, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting ~~(S)~~

There will be an NSC Deputies Committee meeting on China on Tuesday, March 4, from 10:00 - 11:00 a.m. in the White House Situation Room. Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the meeting. A discussion paper is attached at Tab B. ~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Joyce A. Harmon
Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)
Declassify On: March 4, 2007

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 7/15/2019
2015-0721-02

~~SECRET~~

Attendance is Principals plus one. Please distribute this memorandum only to those individuals who will be attending this meeting. ~~(S)~~


Joyce A. Harmon
Acting Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab A Agenda for the Meeting
Tab B Discussion Paper

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: March 4, 1997
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 10:00 - 11:00 a.m.

China

Agenda

- I. Introduction.....Mr. Steinberg
- II. Decision Issues Discussion.....Mr. Steinberg

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 White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
 By VR NARA, Date 7/15/2014
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MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE ROOM 3408, MAIN TREASURY BLDG 1500 PENNSYLVANIA AVE, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20220 DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY	_____	_____	_____
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DATE 03 MAR 97

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Notification of DC Mtg on China
4 Mar NSC LOG # 2d81

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FROM: <u>National Security Council</u>	PHONE: <u>202-456-9432</u>	ROOM: <u>WHSR</u>
SUBJECT: <u>Notice of Meeting on China 4 Mar</u>		PAGES: _____ (w/ Cover)

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SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

February 28, 1997



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES B. STEINBERG

FROM: SANDRA J. KRISTOFF *SK*

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on China, March 4, 1997

Attached at Tab A is the agenda and at Tab B the discussion paper for the Deputies Committee meeting on China to be held on March 4, 1997. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

Concurrences by: Gary Samore, Rob Malley, ^{PM} Bill Wise

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize the NSC Executive Secretary to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve *SK* Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
- Tab A Agenda
- Tab B Discussion Paper

- Need to do this as option
- H/L boundaries too thin + small
- Low effort

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

20181

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

COL. JAMES N. MATTIS
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. BETTIE BACA
Executive Secretary
Executive Secretariat
Department of Commerce

MR. STUART SYMINGTON
Executive Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Assistant USTR for Policy
Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

DR. GORDON ADAMS
Associate Director for
National Security and
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. DANIEL K. TARULLO
Assistant to the President for
International Economic
Policy

MS. BARBARA STARR
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting ~~(S)~~

There will be an NSC Deputies Committee meeting on China on
Tuesday, March 4, from 10:00 - 11:00a.m. in the White House
Situation Room. Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the meeting.
A discussion paper is attached at Tab B. ~~(S)~~

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Classified by: Sandra J. Kristoff
Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)
Declassify On: March 4, 2007

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By 12 NARA, Date 7/15/2014
2015-0721-AM

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2

~~SECRET~~

Attendance is ~~limited to~~ Principals plus one. Please ~~pass~~ ^{distribute} this memorandum only to those individuals ~~from your agency who have~~ ^{will be} received an invitation directly from the NSC to attend this meeting. ~~(S)~~ ^{ing}

Joyce A. Harmon
Acting Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab A

~~Agenda for the Meeting~~

Tab B

Discussion Paper

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: March 4, 1997
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 10:00 J - 11:00 a.m.

China

Agenda

- I. Introduction.....Mr. Steinberg
- II. Decision Issues Discussion.....Mr. Steinberg

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By 12 NARA, Date 7/15/2019
2015-0271-44

Classified by: ~~Sandra J. Kristoff~~ *Sandra J. Kristoff*
Reason: 1.5(b) (d)
Declassify On: March 4, 2007

**CHINA PAPER
DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING**

BROAD U.S. OBJECTIVES

A U.S. strategic interest is the emergence of China as a major power that is open and stable politically, open economically and non-aggressive militarily. Our success in working with China as a strong, prosperous partner in building a stable international order depends on sustained domestic support for (1) a revitalized, long-term relationship with China, and (2) our pragmatic problem-solving approach on specific issues.

Our bilateral relations, however, are vulnerable to buffeting by a number of unresolved issues during 1997. China has yet to recover politically from Tiananmen, and is in the earliest phase of an uncertain transition to the post-Deng era. Resistance to fundamental political change or dissent remains strong. China's reluctance to embrace international norms (human rights), rising sense of nationalism (the 1996 Taiwan Strait episode, Hong Kong's reversion), preoccupation with domestic issues (employment, efficiency of state enterprises), and relationship with Pakistan, Iran and other rogue states (nonproliferation issues) suggest that Beijing may not be willing to take in the near term the difficult steps necessary to address U.S. concerns. Although public and Congressional support for our China policy is growing, lack of progress on important issues inhibits our ability to develop a domestic constituency necessary to establish a longer-term basis for the relationship.

The planned exchange of state visits presents the best opportunity to secure Chinese movement over the next 12 months on issues of concern to us. This paper suggests a broad roadmap to the state visits with focus on advancing key bilateral issues.

THE ISSUES AND DECISIONS NEEDED

U.S.-China relations have begun to even out over the last nine months through initiation of a "strategic dialogue," a carefully orchestrated series of high-level exchanges, and attention to sensitivities on both sides. A sense of normalcy has been restored to the relationship. That said, the relationship remains fragile. We need to show progress on the issues outlined below to avoid erosion in our relations.

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Reason: 1.5(b)(d)
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**DECLASSIFIED IN PART
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2015-0221-M (2.52) 03/11/2020 KDE**

USING HIGH-LEVEL VISITS TO ADVANCE OUR PRIORITIES AND STRENGTHEN THE RELATIONSHIP

Deputies may wish to review the schedule of planned visits and discuss in general terms the broad objectives for each.

Exchange of State Visits -- Although the exchange of state visits has been announced, the sequencing and timing of the visits remains open. Jiang has indicated his desire to visit Washington in connection with the November 24-25 APEC leaders meeting in Vancouver, with an early 1998 reciprocal visit by the President. We should define now our preferred timing, sequencing and outcomes for the state visits.

Vice President -- March 24-28. Objectives for this visit might include: inauguration of the Sustainable Development Forum; conclusion of the Hong Kong consulate agreement; and agreement on the timing and sequencing of the state visits. The Vice President also could propose we begin a dialogue with Beijing on Hong Kong reversion issues; the dialogue would be intended to clarify each side's understanding of what is expected on July 1 and beyond (see discussion below).

Secretary Cohen -- Although no decision has been made regarding a Secretary of Defense visit to Beijing, such a visit in the fall may help advance a dialogue with the PLA. We would need to decide whether this visit should occur before or after the first state visit.

General Shalikashvili -- May 11-17 (tentative). Objectives might include agreement on ship visits to Hong Kong and on educational exchanges of personnel.

Albright/Qian Meetings -- Secretary Albright invited Qian to the United States in late April/May; Albright also will have opportunities to meet Qian in July at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, at UNGA in September and at a return visit to Beijing, perhaps in early 1998. Each of the Albright/Qian meetings might seek to resolve one or two discreet issues, such as law enforcement concerns (establishment of DEA and FBI offices) or portions of the nonproliferation agenda.

Berger/Liu Meetings -- While strategic issues are part of nearly all high-level meetings, the channel to Liu Huaqiu has been an effective and focused vehicle for maintaining the strategic dimension of the relationship. Liu has invited APNSA to Beijing for the next round of talks. That meeting should set up the outcomes for the state visits. Ideally, it should occur before China's party conclave, perhaps in September.

Options/Issues for Discussion/Decision**Timing and Sequencing of State Visits**

--The Vice President could convey to Jiang Zemin proposed dates for the Chinese state visit and the proposed timeframe for the President's return visit in early 1998. He also could suggest a time frame for the Berger-Liu meeting.

Results of State Visits

--Our objectives for the Jiang state visit, likely to occur in November 1997, could include:

- completion of the WTO accession package and announcement the U.S. will seek permanent MFN for China;
- agreement to establish DEA and FBI offices in Beijing;
- announcement of timetable for Chinese ratification of the two UN covenants; and
- announcement of implementation of the U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement.

--The President's visit to China could aim to achieve:

- extension of permanent MFN;
- announcement of the lifting of Tiananmen sanctions; and
- others as recommended by Deputies/Principals.

HONG KONG

The territory's reversion on July 1, 1997, will be marked by intense media coverage. We and others, including China, have a strategic interest in Hong Kong's continued stability and prosperity; we have limited influence, however, over the specifics of the reversion. Although China has committed to a smooth transfer, political missteps are likely, which could be magnified in the press and decrease confidence in the legitimacy of our overall approach to China.

Our general approach has been to indicate our strong support for a smooth transition that preserves a high degree of autonomy for Hong Kong and its economic and political freedoms.

Options/Issues for Discussion/Decision

Dialogue with Beijing

--Maintain our current policy direction, encouraging Beijing to follow through on its commitments and to avoid decisions that would weaken confidence in Hong Kong.

OR

--Initiate a quiet, private dialogue with Beijing to clarify each side's understanding of what constitutes fulfillment of the commitments to maintain one country, two systems. This dialogue could identify the types of steps the United States would view as important to a successful reversion, including: maintaining the integrity of the Legislative Council; organizing legislative elections within a year of turnover and allowing full access to run for office; retaining the existing government structure and slate of officials; and maintaining freedom of the press and association.

Hong Kong Visitors

--Welcome visits to the United States by key Hong Kong transition figures and provide appropriate access to senior U.S. government figures as follows:

- Chief Executive Designate Tung Chee-hwa to meet with the President and Secretary of State;
- Chief Secretary Anson Chan to see the Vice President;
- Democratic Party leader Martin Lee to visit the National Security Advisor with a Vice Presidential drop-by.

--Facilitate meetings with Congressional leaders for all three.

U.S. Visitors to Hong Kong

--Consider visits to Hong Kong by U.S. officials to demonstrate our support for Hong Kong's economic and political freedoms.

U.S. Bilateral Issues

--Resolve as quickly as possible outstanding Hong Kong-related issues, such as consular representation and ship visits. We should endeavor to have the Vice President sign the consular agreement and General Shalikashvili conclude an agreement on ship visits.

Representation at the July 1 Ceremonies

--China has invited the United States to attend the July 1 reversion ceremonies, and Foreign Minister Qian has indicated China would welcome Secretary Albright's participation. We should decide whether we will be represented and, if so, by whom.

- Send no Washington representatives.
- Send a delegation comprised of Congressional and private sector individuals.
- Send Administration team, with Cabinet-level head.

HUMAN RIGHTS

Basic political and religious rights are highly restricted, harsh treatment of dissidents is commonplace and the legal system is not sufficiently developed to provide the infrastructure necessary for the rule of law. Immediately ahead is the prospect of another confrontation in April on a resolution critical of China at the Geneva UN Human Rights Commission.

Our objective is initiation of a constructive, goal-oriented approach to human rights and rule of law issues, as well as an acceleration of trends toward domestic liberalization and reform.

Options/Issues for Discussion/DecisionUNHRC Resolution

--Co-sponsor. Begin to take steps to co-sponsor a UNHRC resolution with the EU, but remain open to further discussions with the Chinese. Review carefully draft resolution language to ensure fairness and objectivity.

--Demarche Levels. Focus our lobbying efforts on defeating a no-action motion, with *demarches commensurate with our efforts in 1996 (although this year there would be no involvement by the Vice President)* OR in light of positive PRC actions, *limit activities in support of the resolution to the Assistant Secretary level.*

--Dropping the Resolution. Are there circumstances under which we would be prepared to forego the resolution? For example, would we be prepared to do so if the Chinese were to announce that they will sign the two covenants by a date certain and

parole or release several more political prisoners, including Wei Jingsheng and/or Wang Dan?

The NGO Forum

-- Should we begin planning for an NGO forum -- e.g. identification of organizations, identification of appropriate topics, as well as for a resumption of human rights talks with China at the Assistant Secretary level?

TAIWAN

Taiwan issues remain the most troublesome in U.S.-China relations and still hold the potential for military conflict. There are two recurrent challenges to our one China policy and our unofficial relations with Taiwan: Taipei's "flexible diplomacy" and U.S. arms sales.

In 1997, we face particular problems with visits/transits of Taiwan authorities to the United States, including Lee Teng-hui's participation in various events in Central America that will entail U.S. transits, and the April delivery of the first of 150 F-16's.

Options/Issues for Discussion/Decision

Visits and Transits

--What further steps should we consider to ensure that Taiwan holds to our understanding that neither Lee Teng-hui, nor any of the other top three leaders in Taiwan, will make private visits to the United States in 1997?

--How can we best maintain strict guidelines on transits, including for Lee, if he travels to Panama in September? Should we inform Taiwan that we will not entertain any meetings between Lee and any U.S. officials attending the Panama Conference?

--Should we identify now a Cabinet-level official who will visit Taiwan in late 1997?

Arms Sales

--How can we most effectively control procedures for approval and announcement of arms sales to Taiwan to ensure they remain consistent with overall U.S. policy goals? Focus on current pipeline items rather than new sales of major arms? We also need to ensure that F-16 deliveries to Taiwan are carried out smoothly, and with a minimum of publicity, as outlined by DOD.

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005a. paper	re: China Paper, Deputies Committee Meeting [partial] (2 pages)	03/04/1997	P1/b(1)

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PC0217 PC Meeting on China, March 7, 1997

2015-0221-M
rs1190

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Nuclear Waste

--Should we press Taiwan more firmly to cancel its nuclear waste deal with North Korea, on grounds that it will negatively affect the situation on the Korean Peninsula?

OR

--Maintain our current position that Taiwan should not go forward with the nuclear waste shipment unless there is clear IAEA certification of safety?

NONPROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL

Nonproliferation cooperation has been increasing,

3.3(b)(6)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

Our objectives are PRC adherence to international nonproliferation norms (NPT, CWC, BWC, MTCR); establishment of a comprehensive and rigorous export control system for nuclear, CBW and missile-related items; and implementation of the 1985 U.S.-China Agreement on Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy. Building on Chinese cooperation to support the CTBT, we also seek to cooperate with China on international arms control efforts, such as negotiation of an international treaty prohibiting production of fissile material for nuclear weapons (the FMCT), and agreement on compliance measures to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).

*Options/Issues for Discussion/Decision*1985 PNE Agreement

--Should we use the Vice President's trip to establish a clear objective of implementing the 1985 Agreement on the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy by the time of a Jiang state visit? Or should we leave this issue in experts channels?

Experts Talks

--Nuclear Issues. Continue expert-level nuclear cooperation talks (next round on March 20-21) to bring about Chinese compliance with the following [redacted] conditions: Abide by the May 1996 commitment not to assist unsafeguarded nuclear facilities; enact national law or regulations to control nuclear-related exports; [redacted] EO 13526 3.3(b)(6) and join the Zangger (NPT) Suppliers Group. Should we also propose suitable cooperative projects, pending implementation of the full nuclear cooperation agreement? We plan to have one additional round of expert talks this summer to prepare for announcing implementation of the nuclear cooperation agreement.

EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

--Missile Issues. Continue expert-level missile talks (next round March 19, propose another round in summer) to establish clearer goals, priorities, means for missile non-proliferation cooperation, and in particular to clarify and strengthen China's October 1994 commitment to observe the MTCR guidelines. Although significant progress is unlikely by the state visits, we will seek Chinese agreement to incorporate the MTCR annexes into their missile export regulations.

High-level Meetings

--Use senior level meetings (Albright/Qian; Berger/Liu) to raise our concerns about Chinese conventional military assistance to Iran, while resisting Chinese linkage to Taiwan. Continue senior-level and expert-level discussions with China on international arms control issues, such as CTBT, FMCT and BWC.

TRADE

Our growing bilateral deficit with China threatens to become a domestic political issue affecting overall relations and efforts to obtain fast-track negotiating authority. Trade irritants, including market access restrictions, cast a shadow over support for permanent MFN, and we continue to be perceived by our allies as a major impediment to China's WTO membership.

China continues to resent our imposition of Tiananmen sanctions and U.S. business interests have called for lifting of the sanctions. Post-Tiananmen sanctions exist in the following categories:

Arms exports -- Prohibition of export of any item on U.S. Munitions list. The President is required to make national interest determination in or to waive this restriction, which has been done on several occasions already.

Arms imports -- From May 26, 1994, the President announced a ban on the import of Chinese-produced defense articles, specifically those on the ATF Munitions Control List.

Satellites -- Satellite exports for launch from China were suspended. Waivers have been granted upon a national interest determination by the President.

Crime control and detection equipment -- Licensing was suspended after 1989.

Export control liberalization -- We still formally oppose efforts to ease multilateral export controls on China.

Trade and Development Agency (TDA) and Overseas Private Insurance Corporation (OPIC) -- Activities have been suspended since 1989 under the Foreign Relations Authorization Act (1991) and Foreign Assistance Act, as amended. The Foreign Relations Act applies to all programs cited above, until the President either reports China has made progress on political reform that focuses on human rights, or grants a national interest waiver. The Foreign Assistance Act is applied on grounds that China does not implement "internationally recognized worker rights," and is a "gross violator of internationally recognized human rights." Each can be waived if assistance can be shown to benefit directly "needy" people in China.

Our objectives are WTO accession; extension of permanent MFN; and lifting of Tiananmen sanctions.

Options/Issues for Discussion/Decision

WTO Accession

--Is it realistic to aim for completing the WTO accession package by the time of the first state visit in the fall?

--Should we move forward quickly to complete Taiwan's accession package and "place it on the shelf," or draw out the Taiwan negotiation until the China accession package is complete? In either event, we should inform Taiwan we will not support any effort to proceed with its accession in advance of that of the PRC.

MFN

--We should consider our approach for this year's MFN effort, drawing from options that include legislative graduation, multiple year extension with possible snapback, permanent MFN (as with Russia) or a repeat of last year's effort (single year unconditioned extension). How should we separate China MFN from fast-track efforts?

Tiananmen Sanctions

--Lift all Tiananmen sanctions.

OR

--Lift TDA and OPIC sanctions.

Other Economic Dialogues

--Proceed with the Joint Economic Commission and Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade Cabinet-level meetings, and pursue efforts to expand areas of cooperation and facilitate a more balanced economic relationship.

MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACTS

Military contacts with the PRC are continuing on a steady path of improvement. In a post-Deng situation, this aspect of the relationship will take on increased importance, although it also will remain controversial.

Our objectives for military-to-military contacts are increased transparency in Chinese military planning; developing confidence-building measures and plans to reduce miscalculations and accidents between operational forces; expanding Chinese participation in multinational and multilateral military activities; and enhancing communication during times of tension.

*Options/Issues for Discussion/Decision*Exchanges and Access

--Press for improved balance and reciprocity in both the frequency of exchanges and access to facilities, making sure U.S. military visitors to China are accorded treatment and travel privileges similar to those provided PLA visitors here.

LAW ENFORCEMENT

We have proposed opening FBI and DEA offices in Beijing, in order to facilitate cooperation in combatting terrorism, international crime and narcotics trafficking. We also have an outstanding request for cooperation on the 1996 gun-smuggling case in California that involves several Chinese arms export enterprises. There are no treaties covering extradition or mutual legal assistance between the United States and China. China has resisted proposals for increasing cooperation on grounds that U.S. courts have granted protection to Chinese criminals sent here to testify (the "Goldfish" case), and that its own investigation of the gun-smuggling case has yet to be completed.

Options/Issues for Discussion/Decision

--Use Albright/Qian channel for pressing establishment of law enforcement offices.

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005b. draft	re: China Paper, Deputies Committee Meeting (7 pages)	03/07/1997	P1/b(1)

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National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3903

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0217 PC Meeting on China, March 7, 1997

2015-0221-M
rs1190

RESTRICTION CODES

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

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PRINT LAST NAME: Bujold

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520
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COPY: 1
3-3-97 535 SIGNATURE *Anthony Taylor*
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2201 C STREET, NW
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Initials: VL Date: 7/17/2019

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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DATE 03 MAR 97

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 4 MAR DC MTG ON CHINA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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3/3/97 5:35pm Glenn Blue

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MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
ROOM 416, WINDER BUILDING
600 17TH STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20506
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE

PRINT LAST NAME: BLUE

COPY: 1

3-3-97 5:30pm Dwight J Harper

Called 3/3
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
ROOM 238
OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG
WASHINGTON, DC 20503
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET

PRINT LAST NAME: HARPER

COPY: 1

es
MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS
WASHINGTON, DC 20505
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

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3-3-97 5:17pm Thomas

→
MR. DANIEL TARULLO
ROOM 231
OLD EXECUTIVE OFC BLDG
NATL ECONOMIC COUNCIL

PRINT LAST NAME: Hasman

COPY: 1

MS. BARBARA STARR
ROOM 5933, DEPT OF STATE
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20451
ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT AGENCY

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: VIA FAX

COL. F. C. WILSON
ROOM 2E865
PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

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SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 4 MAR DC MTG ON CHINA
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2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE
ROOM 3408, MAIN TREASURY BLDG
1500 PENNSYLVANIA AVE, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20220
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

COL JAMES N. MATTIS
ROOM 3E880
PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

MS. BETTIE BACA
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROOM 5516
14TH & CONSTITUTION AVE, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20230
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

MR. STUART SYMINGTON
USUN/W
ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON D.C. 20520-6319
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DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
3/4/97	1115	Noelle Bujold
		PRINT LAST NAME: Bujold
		COPY: 1
		PRINT LAST NAME:
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PAGE 01 OF 02 PAGES

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DATE 03 MAR 97

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 4 MAR DC MTG ON CHINA
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VIA NOELLE BUJOLD
ROOM 292, OEOB
WASHINGTON, DC 20506
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3/3/97 5:45pm Handwritten Signature

MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE
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WASHINGTON, DC 20220
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

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COL JAMES N. MATTIS
ROOM 3E880
PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

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MS. BETTIE BACA
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROOM 5516
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ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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PAGE 01 OF 02 PAGES

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SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 4 MAR DC MTG ON CHINA
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MR. FRED MONTGOMERY ROOM 416, WINDER BUILDING 600 17TH STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20506 U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME: _____	
		COPY: <u>1</u>	
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503 OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET	<u>3-3-97</u>	<u>5:30pm</u>	<u>Brinda J. Harper</u>
		PRINT LAST NAME: <u>HARPER</u>	
		COPY: <u>1</u>	
MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY	_____	_____	_____
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		COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>	
MR. DANIEL TARULLO ROOM 231 OLD EXECUTIVE OFC BLDG NATL ECONOMIC COUNCIL	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME: _____	
		COPY: <u>1</u>	
MS. BARBARA STARR ROOM 5933, DEPT OF STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20451 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT AGENCY	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME: _____	
		COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>	
COL. F. C. WILSON ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME: _____	
		COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>	


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PAGE 02 OF 02 PAGES

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		PRINT LAST NAME:	_____
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DR. GORDON M. ADAMS ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503 OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME:	_____
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MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY	_____	_____	_____
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MR. DANIEL TARULLO ROOM 231 OLD EXECUTIVE OFC BLDG NATL ECONOMIC COUNCIL	_____	_____	
		PRINT LAST NAME:	_____
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MS. BARBARA STARR ROOM 5933, DEPT OF STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20451 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT AGENCY	_____	_____	_____
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		COPY: VIA FAX	_____
COL. F. C. WILSON ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF	_____	_____	_____
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PAGE 02 OF 02 PAGES

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Mar 3 4 52 PM '97

**WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM**

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY
 ROUTINE

IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: [Signature]

MAR '97 16:47

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO: 480

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

PAGES: 17
(Including Cover)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK
(NAME)

(202) 456-9425
(PHONE NUMBER)

WH SITUATION ROOM
(ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Notification of DC Mtg on China
4 Mar NSC LOG # 2081

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TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
DOS	Exec Sec		
Treasury	Exec Sec		
DoD	Exec Sec		
Commerce	Exec Sec		
USUN	office of Ambassador		7699
CGA	Exec Sec		
AEDA	Exec Sec		
XS	Joint Staff		

REMARKS:

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Initials: vr Date: 7/11/2014

(7)

TIME OF TRANSMISSION:

~~SECRET~~

TIME OF RECEIPT:

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM



PRECEDENCE:

✓

IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

[Signature]
MAR '97 16:47

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO:

480

CLASSIFICATION:

~~SECRET~~

PAGES:

17

(Including Cover)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK

(NAME)

(202) 456-9425

(PHONE NUMBER)

WH SITUATION ROOM

(ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION:

Notification of D. Mtz on China

4 Mar

NSC LOG # 2081

TO (AGENCY)

DELIVER TO

DEPT/ROOM NO.

PHONE NUMBER

DOS

Exec Sec

TREASURY

Exec Sec

DoD

Exec Sec

Commerce

Exec Sec

USUN

Office of Ambassador

266 7699

CGA

Exec Sec

AEDA

Exec Sec

XS

Joint Staff

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Initials: VZ Date: 7/19/2019

(7)

TIME OF TRANSMISSION:

~~SECRET~~

TIME OF RECEIPT:

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3 MAR 97 17 10

NMCC/JCS

**WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM**

PRECEDENCE:

IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: *[Signature]*

3 MAR '97 16:47

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO: 480

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

PAGES: 17

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK
(NAME)

(202) 456-9425
(PHONE NUMBER)

WH SITUATION ROOM
(ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Notification of DC Mtg on China
4 Mar NSC LOG # 2081

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
DOS	Exec Sec		
Treasury	Exec Sec		
DOD	Exec Sec		
Commerce	Exec Sec		
USUN	Office of Ambassador		760 7699
CGA	Exec Sec		
AEDA	Exec Sec		
XS	Joint Staff		

REMARKS:

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VZ Date: 7/15/2014

⑦

TIME OF TRANSMISSION:

~~SECRET~~

TIME OF RECEIPT:

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

3-3-97

K-1
1715

PRECEDENCE:

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PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

MAR '97 16:47
DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO:

480

CLASSIFICATION:

~~SECRET~~

PAGES: 17

(Including Cover)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK
(NAME)(202) 456-9425
(PHONE NUMBER)WH SITUATION ROOM
(ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION:

Notification of Dr. H. on China
4 Mar

NSC LOG # 2081

TO (AGENCY)

DELIVER TO

DEPT/ROOM NO.

PHONE NUMBER

DAS

Exec Sec

Treasury

Exec Sec

DoD

Exec Sec

Commerce

Exec Sec

USUN

Office of Ambassador

762 7695

CIA

Exec Sec

AEDA

Exec Sec

JCS

Joint Staff

REMARKS:

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KZ Date: 7/15/2014

⑦

TIME OF TRANSMISSION:

~~SECRET~~

TIME OF RECEIPT:

**WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM**

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PRECEDENCE:

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ROUTINE

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DTG:

3 MAR '97 16:47
[Signature]

MESSAGE NO: 480

CLASSIFICATION: **SECRET**

PAGES: 17

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK
(NAME)

(202) 456-9425
(PHONE NUMBER)

WH SITUATION ROOM
(ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Notification of DC Mtg on China
4 Mar NSC LOG # 2d81

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
DOS	Exec Sec		
Treasury	Exec Sec		
DOD	Exec Sec		
Commerce	Exec Sec		
USUN	office of Ambassador		202 7699
CGA	Exec Sec		
AEDA	Exec Sec		
XS	Joint Staff		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: 12 Date: 7/15/2019

①

TIME OF TRANSMISSION:

~~SECRET~~

TIME OF RECEIPT:

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

2
17:05
BCD

PRECEDENCE:

IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER:

3 MAR '97 16:47
[Signature]

DTG:

MESSAGE NO:

480

CLASSIFICATION:

~~SECRET~~

PAGES: 17

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK
(NAME)

(202) 456-9425
(PHONE NUMBER)

WH SITUATION ROOM
(ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION:

Notification of DC Mtg on China
4 Mar
NSC LOG # 2081

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TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
DOS	Exec Sec		
Treasury	Exec Sec		
DOD	Exec Sec		
Commerce	Exec Sec		
USUN	Office of Ambassador		Rm 7699
CAF	Exec Sec		
AEDA	Exec Sec		
XCS	Joint Staff		

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7

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PC0272 PC Meeting on China, April 21, 1998

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3906

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
43	6	4	2	v

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. agenda	Principals Committee Meeting on China, April 21, 1998. [Record ID: 9820371] (1 page)	04/21/1998	P1/b(1)
001b. draft	Draft of 001a. [Record ID: 9820371] (1 page)	04/20/1998	P1/b(1)
001c. draft	Draft of 001a. [Record ID: 9820371] (1 page)	04/20/1998	P1/b(1)
001d. draft	Draft of 001a. [Record ID: 9820371] (1 page)	04/20/1998	P1/b(1)
002. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on China (3 pages) <i>partial release</i>	04/21/1998	P1/b(1) <i>KDE 3/11/2020</i> b(3)
003a. draft	re: Summary of Conclusions for Principals Committee Meeting on China [incomplete copy] (1 page)	04/21/1998	P1/b(1) <i>KDE 3/11/2020</i>
003b. draft	re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on China (3 pages) <i>partial release</i>	04/21/1998	P1/b(1) <i>KDE 3/11/2020</i> b(3)
003c. draft	re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on China (3 pages) <i>partial release</i>	04/21/1998	P1/b(1) <i>KDE 3/11/2020</i> b(3)

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PC0272 PC Meeting on China, April 21, 1998

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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 21 APR 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R PC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 21 APR PC MTG ON CHINA

ACTION: RICE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 23 APR 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BADER

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

PC0272

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BADER
BERGER
HELWEG
JOSHI
KERRICK
KRISTOFF
MALLEY
NSC CHRON
STEINBERG

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY TMAA DATE 4.21.98 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTTS CLOSED BY: NSTMH DOC 2 OF 2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICERCAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER	Z 98042108 FOR DECISION
001	X 98042111 BERGER APPROVED RECOM
001 DAVIES	Z 98042111 FOR SIGNATURE
002	X 98042111 RICE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

<u>DOC</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR ACTION</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR INFO</u>
002	980421	FUERTH, L	
002	980421	KENNEY, K	
002	980421	COMSTOCK, N	
002	980421	MATTIS, J	
002	980421	DORSKIND, J	
002	980421	SUTPHEN, M	
002	980421	MONTGOMERY, F	
002	980421	BOWLES, E	
002	980421	STEINER, J	
002	980421	SPERLING, G	
002	980421	MANNING, M	

National Security Council
The White House

4/20
901pm

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 20371
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG ~~NSC~~ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>com</i> Cosgriff			
Rice	1/4	Ⓢ 4/20 4/21	<i>[Signature]</i>
Davies			
Kerrick			
Steinberg	2	<i>[Signature]</i>	
Berger	3	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	TMA 4.21	D
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: *Note R*
Helweg

198 APR 24 pm 7:41
COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

~~SECRET~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

April 21, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Assistant USTR for Policy
Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. ERSKINE BOWLES
Chief of Staff to the
President

MR. NEAL COMSTOCK
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

MR. JAMES E. STEINER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. JAMES N. MATTIS
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. GENE SPERLING
Assistant to the President
for Economic Policy


MR. JIM DORSKIND
Executive Secretary
Executive Secretariat
Department of Commerce

COL. M. MANNING, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

MS. MONA SUTPHEN
Executive Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

SUBJECT: Principals' Committee Meeting on China ~~(S)~~

There will be a Principals Committee Meeting on China on Tuesday,
April 21, 1998, 4:00 p.m. - 5:30 p.m. in the White House Situation
Room. An agenda is attached. ~~(S)~~


Glyn T. Davies
For: Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

~~SECRET~~
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)
Declassify On: 04/20/08

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By RL NARA, Date 7/15/2019
2015-0221-11

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001a. agenda	Principals Committee Meeting on China, April 21, 1998. [Record ID: 9820371] (1 page)	04/21/1998	P1/b(1)

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OA/Box Number: 3906

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PC0272 PC Meeting on China, April 21, 1998

2015-0221-M
rs1191

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

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DATE 21 APR 98

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 21 APR PC MTG ON CHINA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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PAGE 01 OF 02 PAGES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

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DATE 21 APR 98

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 21 APR PC MTG ON CHINA
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MR. JAMES E. STEINER EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY	_____	_____	_____
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MR. GENE SPERLING 2ND FLOOR, WEST WING WHITE HOUSE	_____	_____	_____
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COL. MICHELLE MANNING ROOM 2E365 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF	_____	_____	_____
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DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB
PAGE 02 OF 02 PAGES

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SITUATION ROOM**

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IMMEDIATE
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ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO: _____ CLASSIFICATION: **~~SECRET~~** PAGES: 3
(Including Cover)

FROM: NSC West Wing Desk TMA (202) 456-9425 WH Situation Room
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Notification + Agenda for 21 Apr PC
mtg on China NSC LOG # 20371

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>PHONE NUMBER</u>
<u>State</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>Treasury</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>Defense</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>Commerce</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>USUN</u>	<u>David Goldwyn</u>	_____	_____
<u>CIA</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	_____	_____
<u>JCS</u>	<u>Secretary - Joint Staff</u>	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
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Initials: VR Date: 7/22/2019

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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**WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM**

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FLASH
IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC # 20371

FROM: <u>National Security Council</u> ^{TMA}	PHONE: <u>202-456-9425</u>	ROOM: <u>WHSR</u>
SUBJECT: <u>Notice of Meeting - 21 Apr PC on China</u>		PAGES: <u>3</u> (w/ Cover)

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
<u>USUN New York</u>	<u>Ms. Mona Sutphen</u>	<u>212-415-4029</u>	<u>212-415-4177</u>

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Mona Sutphen for hand delivery to Ambassador William Richardson.
If Ms. Sutphen is not available please deliver to Isabelle Watkins.

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VL Date: 7/22/06


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~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

20371

April 20, 1998



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: SANDRA J. KRISTOFF *[Handwritten signature]*

FROM: JEFFREY A. BADER *[Handwritten signature]*

SUBJECT: Agenda for PC Meeting on China on April 21, 1998

Attached at Tab I is the announcement and agenda for the April 21, 1998 Principals' Committee meeting on China.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the agenda and authorize Glyn T. Davies to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve *R* Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to Agencies
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *VR* NARA, Date *7/15/2015*
2015-0721 -m

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)
Declassify On: 04/20/08

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. draft	Draft of 001a. [Record ID: 9820371] (1 page)	04/20/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3906

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0272 PC Meeting on China, April 21, 1998

2015-0221-M
rs1191

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001c. draft	Draft of 001a. [Record ID: 9820371] (1 page)	04/20/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3906

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0272 PC Meeting on China, April 21, 1998

2015-0221-M
rs1191

RESTRICTION CODES

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Assistant USTR for Policy
Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. ERSKINE BOWLES
Chief of Staff to the
President

MR. NEAL COMSTOCK
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

MR. JAMES E. STEINER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. JAMES N. MATTIS
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. GENE SPERLING
Assistant to the President
for Economic Policy

MR. JIM DORSKIND
Executive Secretary
Executive Secretariat
Department of Commerce

COL. M. MANNING, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

MS. MONA SUTPHEN
Executive Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

SUBJECT: Principals' Committee Meeting on China (S)

There will be a Principals Committee Meeting on China on Tuesday,
April 21, 1998, 2:30 p.m. 4:00 p.m. in the White House Situation
Room. An agenda is attached. (S)

4:00-5:30

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)
Declassify On: 04/20/08

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 7/5/199
2015-0221M

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001d. draft	Draft of 001a. [Record ID: 9820371] (1 page)	04/20/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3906

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0272 PC Meeting on China, April 21, 1998

2015-0221-M
rs1191

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TO: AGENCIES

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 25 MAY 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R

PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 21 APR PC MTG ON CHINA

ACTION: COSGRIFF SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 30 APR 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PRITCHARD

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

PC0272

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

- BADER
- BAKER
- BARTLETT
- COSGRIFF
- HELWEG
- KERRICK
- KRISTOFF
- NSC CHRON
- STEINBERG

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY

GWP

DATE

5/26

BY HAND

W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSSWD

CLOSED BY: NSSWD

DOC 2 OF 2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICERCAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER	Z 98042720 FOR DECISION
001 PRITCHARD	Z 98042817 FOR FURTHER ACTION
002	X 98052516 COSGRIFF SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

<u>DOC</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR ACTION</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR INFO</u>
002	980525	FUERTH, L	
002	980525	KENNEY, K	
002	980525	COMSTOCK, N	
002	980525	MATTIS, J	
002	980525	DORSKIND, J	
002	980525	SUTPHEN, M	
002	980525	MONTGOMERY, F	
002	980525	BOWLES, E	
002	980525	STEINER, J	
002	980525	YELLEN, J	
002	980525	SPERLING, G	
002	980525	MANNING, M	
002	980525	GOLDWYN, D	

5/5

National Security Council
The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<u>Cosgriff</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Rice	<u>1</u>	<u>(R) 5/4</u>	
Davies			
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>(D) 5/4 w/cly</u>	
Steinberg	<u>3</u>		
Berger	<u>4</u>	<u>(C)</u>	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>6</u>		
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

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Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

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The White House**

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 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TS A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>K</i> Cosgriff	_____	_____	_____
Rice	<u>1</u>	_____	_____
Davies	_____	_____	_____
Kerrick	_____	_____	_____
Steinberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	_____	_____
Records Mgt.	_____	_____	_____
<u>Pritchard</u>	<u>3</u>	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'98 APR 27 AM 7:03

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LOG # 20396

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SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG TS AO _____

K

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Coegriff	_____	_____	_____
Rice	<u>1</u>	_____	_____
Devine	_____	_____	_____
Kerrick	_____	_____	_____
Steinberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	_____	_____
Records Mgt.	_____	_____	_____
<u>Pritchard</u>	<u>3</u>	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'98 APR 27 PM 7:03

Exec Sec Office has diskette *yo*

National Security Council
The White House

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 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TMA AO _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>Cosgriff</i> Cosgriff	<u>5</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____
Rice	<u>1</u>	<u>(R) 5/4</u>	_____
Davies	_____	_____	_____
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>(D) 5/4 w/cls</u>	_____
Steinberg	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
Berger	<u>4</u>	<u>(C)</u>	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>6</u>	_____	_____
Records Mgt.	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'90 MAY 4m 1:14

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 25, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Assistant USTR for Policy
Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. ERSKINE BOWLES
Chief of Staff to the
President

MR. NEAL COMSTOCK
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

MR. JAMES E. STEINER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. JAMES N. MATTIS
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

DR. JANET YELLEN
Chairman
President's Council of
Economic Advisors

MR. JIM DORSKIND
Executive Secretary
Executive Secretariat
Department of Commerce


MR. GENE SPERLING
Assistant to the President
for Economic Policy

MS. MONA SUTPHEN
Executive Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

COL. M. MANNING, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Principals Committee
Meeting on China ~~(S)~~

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions for the
Principals Committee Meeting on China on April 21, 1998. Please
distribute the memo to attendees. ~~(S)~~


Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)
Declassify On: 04/27/08

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By NR NARA, Date 7/15/2014
2015-0721-11

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on China [partial] (1 page)	04/21/1998	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3906

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0272 PC Meeting on China, April 21, 1998

2015-0221-M
rs1191

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: April 21, 1998
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 4:00 - 5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on China ~~(S)~~

Chair
Samuel Berger

USTR
Richard Fisher
Nancy Leamond

OVP
Leon Fuerth
John Norris

Chief of Staff
Erskine Bowles
John Podesta

State
Madeleine Albright
Thomas Pickering
Stanley Roth

CIA
John McLaughlin
(b)(3)

Treasury
Robert Rubin
Lawrence Summers

NEC
Gene Sperling

DOD
John Hamre
Frederick Smith

JCS
Hugh Shelton
David Weisman

Commerce
David Aaron
William Reinsch

White House
Jim Steinberg

CEA
Janet Yellen

NSC
Sandy Kristoff
Jeff Bader

USUN
Nancy Soderberg
Burgess Laird

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0221-M (2.547)
03/11/2020 KDE

~~SECRET~~
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)
Declassify On: 04/27/08

The Principals Committee agreed the following steps should be taken in preparation for the President's June trip to China:

- Secretary Albright will visit China April 29-30 and will concentrate on outlining the agenda items for the President's trip, including human rights, nonproliferation, economic issues, and the strategic dialogue. (S)
- Secretary Albright is authorized to sign the MOU establishing a Presidential direct communications link. (S)
- USTR will seek to negotiate an agreement on market access with the Chinese by the June summit to cover tariffs, non-tariff measures, and services. (S)
- USTR will consider whether to offer a road map to the Chinese covering the remaining WTO accession issues (rules) as it evaluates the results of Ambassador Barshefsky's April trip. (S)
- Treasury will hold a Joint Economic Commission meeting with the Chinese before the President's trip. (S)
- Treasury will explore with the Chinese possibilities for technical assistance to China's banking sector. (S)
- Treasury will consider sending a senior official to Beijing to brief the Chinese on the results of the G-8 meeting and as part of its ongoing effort to intensify discussions about the financial situation in East Asia. (S)
- Commerce will continue to negotiate an agreement on pre-license and post-shipment checks. (S)
- Commerce should prepare an initiative for cooperation with the Chinese on privatization of the housing market. (S)
- Commerce should work with the Chinese to identify commercial contracts that could be signed by the time of the President's trip. (S)
- OVP will seek from TDA a description of what it needs to do, and what legal basis would be required for such activities, to

have a clean energy/environment project ready for agreement by June.

- OVP will use the May 11 visit of a Chinese energy and environment delegation to identify projects that could be ready by the time of the President's trip. ~~(S)~~
- OVP should prepare a letter from the Vice President to Premier Zhu Rongji on the Energy and Environment Cooperation Initiative. ~~(S)~~
- The President's trip should be used to persuade the Chinese to participate in a meaningful way in the Kyoto Climate Change regime. Secretary Albright will discuss the issue during her forthcoming trip to China. ~~(S)~~
- NEC will explore possibilities to advance labor issues including a possible trip by Labor Secretary Herman and cooperation on child labor. ~~(S)~~
- The Department of Defense should continue its plans to host a visit by PLA Executive Vice Chairman Zhang Wannian in May; hold the first meeting under the Military Maritime Consultation Agreement in May; hold a joint table top exercise on humanitarian assistance; and seek exchanges on nuclear weapons safety issues. ~~(S)~~
- In the area of people-to-people cooperation, the interagency staff group should seek to advance a series of initiatives for the June summit, including exchange of high school students, expansion of the Peace Corps program, and increased cooperation under our Science & Technology protocols. ~~(S)~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9820396
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SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 21 APR PC MTG ON CHINA
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Initials: VR Date: 7/15/2014
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PAGE 01 OF 03 PAGES

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DATE 25 MAY 98

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 21 APR PC MTG ON CHINA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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MR. ERSKINE BOWLES 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500 WHITE HOUSE	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u>
MR. JAMES E. STEINER EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
DR. JANET YELLEN ROOM 314 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u>
MR. GENE SPERLING 2ND FLOOR, WEST WING WHITE HOUSE	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u>
COL. MICHELLE MANNING ROOM 2E865 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>

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LOG 9820396
DATE 25 MAY 98

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 21 APR PC MTG ON CHINA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

MR DAVID GOLDWYN
USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID GOLDWYN
ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
2201 C STREET NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319
U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

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PAGE 03 OF 03 PAGES

**WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM**

PRECEDENCE: _____

IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO: _____

CLASSIFICATION: **SECRET**

PAGES: _____
(Including Cover)

FROM: NSC West Wing Desk
(NAME)

(202) 456-9425
(PHONE NUMBER)

WH Situation Room
(ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions for 21 April
PC Mlg on China NSC LOG # 20396

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>PHONE NUMBER</u>
<u>State</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	_____	_____
<u>Treasury</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	_____	_____
<u>DoD</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	_____	_____
<u>Commerce</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	_____	_____
<u>USUN</u>	<u>David Goldwyn</u>	_____	_____
<u>USUN</u>	<u>Mona Sutphen</u>	_____	_____
<u>CIA</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	_____	_____
<u>JCS</u>	<u>Secretary</u>	_____	_____

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VL Date: 7/22/2019

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

**WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM**

PRECEDENCE
FLASH
IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____
DATE/TIME: _____
MESSAGE #: _____

NSC #

FROM: <u>National Security Council</u>	PHONE: <u>202-456-9425</u>	ROOM: <u>WHSR</u>
SUBJECT: <u>Notice of Meeting Summary of Conclusions for</u> <u>21 Apr PC Mtg on China</u>		PAGES: _____ (w/ Cover)

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
<u>USUN New York</u>	<u>Ms. Mona Sutphen</u>	<u>212-415-4029</u>	<u>212-415-4177</u>

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Mona Sutphen for hand delivery to Ambassador William Richardson.
If Ms. Sutphen is not available please deliver to Isabelle Watkins.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VZ Date: 7/19/2014

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

20396
redo

April 27, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH:

SANDRA J. KRISTOFF ^J

FROM:

JEFFREY A. BADER ^J

SUBJECT:

Summary of Conclusions for Principals Committee Meeting on China

Attached at Tab A is the Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee meeting on China held on April 21, 1998.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the summary of conclusions and authorize Glyn T. Davies to sign the memorandum to agencies at Tab I.

Approve *A* Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to Agencies

Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 7/15/2015
2015-0721-UN

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)

Declassify On: 04/27/08

~~SECRET~~

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 25 MAY 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R

PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 21 APR PC MTG ON CHINA

ACTION: ORIGINAL EDITS RETURNED TO NSC/RMO DUE DATE: 30 APR 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PRITCHARD

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

PC0272

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

- BADER
- BAKER
- BARTLETT
- COSGRIFF
- HELWEG
- KERRICK
- KRISTOFF
- NSC CHRON
- STEINBERG

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
 White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
 By VL NARA, Date 7/15/2015
 2015-0715-14

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSSWD CLOSED BY: NSSWD DOC 2 OF 2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICERCAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER	Z 98042720 FOR DECISION
001 PRITCHARD	Z 98042817 FOR FURTHER ACTION
002	X 98052516 COSGRIFF SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES
002	X 98052715 ORIGINAL EDITS RETURNED TO NSC/RMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

<u>DOC</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR ACTION</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR INFO</u>
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002	980525	FUERTH, L	
002	980525	KENNEY, K	
002	980525	COMSTOCK, N	
002	980525	MATTIS, J	
002	980525	DORSKIND, J	
002	980525	SUTPHEN, M	
002	980525	MONTGOMERY, F	
002	980525	BOWLES, E	
002	980525	STEINER, J	
002	980525	YELLEN, J	
002	980525	SPERLING, G	
002	980525	MANNING, M	
002	980525	GOLDWYN, D	

20396

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Back to Jack Pritchard.

(P)

20396

Redo

ED -

If you have
a problem, call
me.

Kristoff

— 20396

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Back to Jack Pritchard.

(R)

ED —

20396
Redo

If you have
a problem, call
me.

Kristoff

The Principals Committee agreed the following steps should be taken in preparation for the President's June trip to China:

- Secretary Albright will visit China April 29-30 and will concentrate on outlining the agenda items for the President's trip, including human rights, nonproliferation, economic issues, and the strategic dialogue. (S)
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. NEAL COMSTOCK
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

COL. JAMES N. MATTIS
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JIM DORSKIND
Executive Secretary
Executive Secretariat
Department of Commerce

MS. MONA SUTPHEN
Executive Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Principals Committee
Meeting on China ~~(S)~~

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions for the
Principals Committee Meeting on China on April 21, 1998. Please
pass to principals. ~~(S)~~

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)
Declassify On: 04/27/08

~~SECRET~~

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Assistant USTR for Policy
Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

MR. ERSKINE BOWLES
Chief of Staff to the
President

MR. JAMES E. STEINER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

DR. JANET YELLEN
Chairman
President's Council of
Economic Advisors

MR. GENE SPERLING
Assistant to the President
for Economic Policy

COL. M. MANNING, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 7/15/2015
2015-0721-04

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. draft	re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on China [partial] (1 page)	04/21/1998	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3906

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0272 PC Meeting on China, April 21, 1998

2015-0221-M
rs1191

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

20396

~~SECRET~~

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: April 21, 1998

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 4:00 - 5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on China ~~(S)~~

Chair

Samuel Berger

OVP

Leon Fuerth

John Norris

State

~~Secretary~~ Madeleine Albright

Thomas Pickering

Stanley Roth

Treasury

~~Secretary~~ Robert Rubin

Lawrence Summers

DOD

John Hamre

Frederick Smith

Commerce

David Aaron

William Reinsch

CEA

Janet Yellen

USUN

Nancy Soderberg

Burgess Laird

USTR

Richard Fisher

Nancy Leamond

Chief of Staff

Erskine Bowles

John Podesta

CIA

John McLaughlin

NEC

Gene Sperling

JCS

~~General~~ Hugh Shelton

David Weisman

White House

Jim Steinberg

NSC

Sandy Kristoff

Jeff Bader

~~SECRET~~

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Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)

Declassify On: 04/27/08

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PER E.O. 13526

2015-0221-M (2.56)

3/11/2020 KDE

~~SECRET~~

Summary of Conclusions

- Secretary Albright will concentrate on Presidential trip preparations, human rights, nonproliferation, economic issues, and strategic dialogue during her forthcoming trip to China. ~~(S)~~
- Secretary Albright will sign an MOU establishing a Presidential direct communications link during her trip. ~~(S)~~
- USTR will seek to negotiate an agreement on market access with the Chinese by June to cover tariffs, non-tariff measures, and services. ~~(S)~~
- USTR will consider whether to offer a road map to the Chinese covering the remaining WTO accession issues (rules) as it evaluates the results of Ambassador Barshefsky's April trip. ~~(S)~~
- Treasury plans to hold a Joint Economic Commission meeting with the Chinese before the President's trip. ~~(S)~~
- Treasury will explore with the Chinese possibilities for technical assistance to China's banking sector. ~~(S)~~
- Treasury will consider sending a senior official to Beijing after the G-8 meeting to brief the Chinese on the meeting's results as part of an ongoing effort to intensify discussions about the financial situation in East Asia. ~~(S)~~
- Commerce will continue to negotiate an agreement on pre-license and post-shipment checks. ~~(S)~~
- Commerce is preparing an initiative for cooperation with the Chinese on privatization of its housing market. ~~(S)~~
- Commerce is discussing with the Chinese commercial contracts that could be signed by the time of the President's trip. ~~(S)~~
- OVP will seek from TDA a description of what it needs to do, and what legal basis would be required for such activities, to have a clean energy/environment project ready for agreement by June. ~~(S)~~

- OVP will use the May 11 visit of a Chinese energy and environment delegation to identify projects that could be ready by the time of the President's trip. ~~(S)~~
- OVP is preparing a letter from the Vice President to Premier Zhu Rongji on the Energy and Environment Cooperation Initiative. ~~(S)~~
- We should use the President's trip to seek to persuade the Chinese to participate in a meaningful way in the Kyoto Climate Change regime. Secretary Albright will discuss the issue during her forthcoming trip to China. ~~(S)~~
- NEC will explore possibilities to advance labor issues including a possible trip by Labor Secretary Helman and cooperation on child labor. ~~(S)~~
- DOD plans 1) to host a visit by PLA Executive Vice Chairman Zhang Wannian in May; 2) to hold the first meeting under the Military Maritime Consultation Agreement in May; 3) to hold a joint table top exercise on humanitarian assistance; and 4) to seek exchanges on nuclear weapons safety issues. ~~(S)~~
- In the area of people-to-people cooperation, we are advancing initiatives including exchange of high school students, expansion of the Peace Corps program, and increased cooperation under our Science & Technology protocols. ~~(S)~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003c. draft	re: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on China [partial] (1 page)	04/21/1998	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3906

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0272 PC Meeting on China, April 21, 1998

2015-0221-M
rs1191

RESTRICTION CODES

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D C. 20504

20396

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: April 21, 1998
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 4:00 - 5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on China ~~(S)~~

Chair
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USTR
Richard Fisher
Nancy Leamond

OVP
Leon Fuerth
John Norris

Chief of Staff
Erskine Bowles
John Podesta

State
Madeleine Albright
Thomas Pickering
Stanley Roth

CIA
John McLaughlin
[REDACTED]

Treasury
Robert Rubin
Lawrence Summers

NEC
Gene Sperling

DOD
John Hamre
Frederick Smith

JCS
Hugh Shelton
David Weisman

Commerce
David Aaron
William Reinsch

White House
Jim Steinberg

CEA
Janet Yellen

NSC
Sandy Kristoff
Jeff Bader

USUN
Nancy Soderberg
Burgess Laird

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)
Declassify On: 04/27/08

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0221-M(257)
3/11/2020 KDE

The Principals Committee agreed the following steps should be taken in preparation for the President's June trip to China:

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- Commerce should work with the Chinese to identify commercial contracts that could be signed by the time of the President's trip. ~~(S)~~
- OVP will seek from TDA a description of what it needs to do, and what legal basis would be required for such activities, to have a clean energy/environment project ready for agreement by

June. OVP will use the May 11 visit of a Chinese energy and environment delegation to identify projects that could be ready by the time of the President's trip. (S)

- OVP should prepare a letter from the Vice President to Premier Zhu Rongji on the Energy and Environment Cooperation Initiative. (S)
- The President's trip should be used to persuade the Chinese to participate in a meaningful way in the Kyoto Climate Change regime. Secretary Albright will discuss the issue during her forthcoming trip to China. (S)
- NEC will explore possibilities to advance labor issues including a possible trip by Labor Secretary Herman and cooperation on child labor. (S)
- The Department of Defense should continue its plans to host a visit by PLA Executive Vice Chairman Zhang Wannian in May; hold the first meeting under the Military Maritime Consultation Agreement in May; hold a joint table top exercise on humanitarian assistance; and seek exchanges on nuclear weapons safety issues. (S)
- In the area of people-to-people cooperation, the interagency staff group should seek to advance a series of initiatives for the June summit, including exchange of high school students, expansion of the Peace Corps program, and increased cooperation under our Science & Technology protocols. (S)

MR MARKER

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Folder Title: PC0333 PC Meeting on China, February 3, 1999				
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001b. draft	Agenda. Duplicate of 001a. [Record ID: 9900523] (2 pages)	01/29/1999	P1/b(1) <i>VDE 3/11/2020</i>
002a. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of PC Meeting on China (2 pages)	02/03/1999	P1/b(1) <i>VDE 3/11/2020</i>
002b. draft	re: Summary of Conclusions of PC Meeting on China (3 pages)	02/03/1999	P1/b(1) <i>VDE 3/11/2020</i>
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2015-0221-M
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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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TO: AGENCIES

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 29 JAN 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
AGENDA

PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR PC MTG ON CHINA 3 FEB

ACTION: RICE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 01 FEB 99 STATUS: C

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 7/15/2019
2015-0211-m

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002 990129 MONTGOMERY, F
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002 990129 PODESTA, J
002 990129 HUPP, V
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Davies	<u>4</u>	<u>D 1/29</u>	_____
Kerrick	_____	_____	_____
Steinberg	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____
Berger	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

January 29, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Assistant USTR for Policy
Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. ROBERT D. KYLE
Associate Director for
National Security and
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

MR. NEAL COMSTOCK
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

MR. JOHN PODESTA
Chief of Staff to the
President

COL. JOSEPH REYNES, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. VICKI M. HUPP
Acting Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. JIM DORSKIND
Executive Secretary
Executive Secretariat
Department of Commerce

MS. LAEL BRAINARD
Deputy Assistant to the
President for International
Economic Policy

MS. AMBER BASKETTE
Staff Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

COL. M. MANNING, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on China ~~(S)~~

There will be a Principals Committee meeting on China on
Wednesday, February 3, 1999, from 5:00-6:30 p.m. in the White
House Situation Room. An agenda is attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

for Edward A. Reif
Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)
Declassify On: 1/26/09

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By NARA, Date 7/15/2014
2025-0721-01

NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON CHINA

DATE: Wednesday, February 3, 1999
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 5:00-6:30 p.m.

AGENDA

- I. Intelligence briefing (CIA)
- II. Zhu Rongji visit (NSC, State)
 - Overall plans (specific objectives and deliverables to be discussed under individual topics below)
 - Preparations (Secretary Albright's visit to China, Vice Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi visit to Washington)
- III. WTO and market access (USTR, Commerce)
 - Outcome of Fisher talks (USTR)
 - Status of preparation of U.S. proposal (USTR)
 - Next steps in negotiation (USTR)
 - Daley trip to China (Commerce)
- IV. Macroeconomic issues and sectoral cooperation (Treasury, Commerce, State)
 - Objectives for Summers trip (Treasury)
 - U.S. assistance/opportunities in banking, housing (Treasury, Commerce)
 - Civair (State)
- V. Energy and Environment (OVP)
 - Planning and deliverables for Forum on Environment and Development meeting
- VI. Human Rights (State)
 - Key U.S. priorities (e.g., prisoner releases, freedom of expression, rule of law, religion, Tibet) and strategy for advancing them
 - U.S. posture on resolution at UNHRC
- VII. Nonproliferation (State, Commerce)
 - Prospects for movement on MTCR (State)
 - Post-shipment checks (Commerce)

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3/11/2020 KDE

VIII. Military-military cooperation and strategic dialogue
(Defense, State)

- Possible travel by Secretary Cohen, CJCS Shelton
(Defense)
- How to enhance cooperation on Korea, South Asia, Iraq
(State)

IX. Congressional strategy (NSC)

X. Public outreach efforts (NSC)

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<u>CIA</u>	<u>Ex. Sec.</u>	_____	_____
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SUBJECT: <u>Notification + Agenda for PC mtg</u>		PAGES: <u>4</u>
<u>ON CHINA Feb 3rd</u>		(w/ Cover)

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
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

January 26, 1999



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: KENNETH L. LIEBERTHAL *K.L.*
FROM: JEFFREY A. BADER *JAB*
SUBJECT: Agenda for PC Meeting on China

*Jeff -
This is an
agenda for 3 hours.
Please pare
down.*

This memorandum requests your approval of an agenda for the February 3 PC meeting on China.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the agenda and authorize Glyn Davies to sign the memorandum to agencies at Tab I.

Approve Disapprove

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to Agencies
- Tab A Agenda

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

↓ move Down a few lines

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. NEAL COMSTOCK
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

COL. JOSEPH REYNES, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JIM DORSKIND
Executive Secretary
Executive Secretariat
Department of Commerce

MS. AMBER BASKETTE
Staff Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Assistant USTR for Policy
Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

MR. ROBERT D. KYLE
Associate Director for
National Security and
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

MR. JOHN PODESTA
Chief of Staff to the
President

MS. VICKI M. HUPP
Acting Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MS. LAEL BRAINARD
Deputy Assistant to the
President for International
Economic Policy

COL. M. MANNING, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: PC Meeting on China

There will be a PC meeting on China on Wednesday, February 3,
1999 from 5:00-6:30 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. An
agenda is attached at Tab A.

*skip an I
extra space or 2.*

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

2/15/99

Attachments
Tab A Agenda

NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON CHINA

DATE: Wednesday, February 3, 1999
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 5:00 - 6:30 p.m.

Line up AGENDA

Okay
Very Long Agenda

I. Intelligence briefing (CIA)

II. Zhu Rongji visit (NSC, State)

- Overall plans (specific objectives and deliverables to be discussed under individual topics below)
- Preparations (Secretary Albright's visit to China, Vice Yang Jiechi visit to Washington)

spell out FM

III. WTO and market access (USTR, Commerce)

- Outcome of Fisher talks (USTR)
- Status of preparation of U.S. proposal (USTR)
- Next steps in negotiation (USTR)
- Daley trip to China (Commerce)

Indens all Bullets

IV. Macroeconomic issues and sectoral cooperation (Treasury, Commerce, State)

- Objectives for Summers trip (Treasury)
- U.S. assistance/opportunities in banking, housing (Treasury, Commerce)
- Civair (State)

V. Energy and Environment (OVP)

- Planning and deliverables for Forum on Environment and Development meeting

VI. Human Rights (State)

- Key U.S. priorities (e.g., prisoner releases, freedom of expression, rule of law, religion, Tibet) and strategy for advancing them
- U.S. posture on resolution at UNHRC

VII. Nonproliferation (State, Commerce)

- Prospects for movement on MTCR (State)
- Post-shipment checks (Commerce)

Page Break

VIII. Military-military cooperation and strategic dialogue (Defense, State)

- Possible travel by Secretary Cohen, CJCS Shelton (Defense)

~~SECRET~~

2

- How to enhance cooperation on Korea, South Asia, Iraq (State)

IX. Congressional strategy (NSC)

X. Public outreach efforts (NSC)

~~SECRET~~

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 24 FEB 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
PC

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SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 3 FEB PC MTG ON CHINA

ACTION: COSGRIFF SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 27 FEB 99 STATUS: C

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002 990224 MONTGOMERY, F
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002 990224 PODESTA, J
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Kerrick	<u>Copy Done</u>		
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Berger	3		
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Kerrick			
Steinberg	<u>2</u>		
Berger	<u>3</u>		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>PR 2/24</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.			

Copy Done JB

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'99 FEB 23 nm 9:14

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1246

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

February 24, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. NEAL COMSTOCK
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

COL. JOSEPH REYNES, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JIM DORSKIND
Executive Secretary
Executive Secretariat
Department of Commerce

MS. AMBER BASKETTE
Staff Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Assistant USTR for Policy
Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

MR. ROBERT D. KYLE
Associate Director for
National Security and
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

MR. JOHN PODESTA
Chief of Staff to the
President

MS. VICKI M. HUPP
Acting Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MS. LAEL BRAINARD
Deputy Assistant to the
President for International
Economic Policy

MS. BARBARA STARR
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency

COL. M. MANNING, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Principals Committee
Meeting on China (C)


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn Davies
Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)
Declassify On: 2/22/09

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 7/15/2014
2014-0711-07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions for the Principals Committee meeting on China on February 3, 1999. Please pass to principals. ~~(C)~~


Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: February 3, 1999
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 6:00-7:20 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of PC Meeting on China ~~(C)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair

Samuel Berger

OVP

Leon Fuerth
Ted Osius

State

Secretary Madeleine Albright
Thomas Pickering
Susan Shirk

Treasury

Ted Truman
Daniel Zelikow

DOD

Walter Slocombe
Kurt Campbell

Commerce

Secretary William Daley
David Aaron

OMB

Sylvia Mathews

USUN

Peter Burleigh
(via SVTS from NY)

USTR

Richard Fischer
(via secure phone)
Robert Cassidy

Chief of Staff

John Podesta
Steve Ricchetti

CIA

John McLaughlin

NEC

Gene Sperling
Lael Brainard
Malcolm Lee

ACDA

John Holum

JCS

Robert Foglesong

White House

James Steinberg
Donald Kerrick
Larry Stein

NSC

Kenneth Lieberthal
Jeffrey Bader

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Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)
Declassify on: 2/22/09

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PER E.O. 13526
2015-0221-M (2-58)
3/11/2020 K09

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed as follows:

1. WTO. USTR's Robert Cassidy will hold talks with his Chinese counterpart the week of February 8 and later in February. USTR Ambassador Barshefsky will present a comprehensive WTO proposal to the Chinese March 3-4. The ultimate decision on whether the Chinese final offer is acceptable will be made by an interagency process. NEC and NSC will coordinate interagency review of WTO negotiations and begin review of permanent MFN strategy options. **(Action: USTR negotiation, NEC/NSC coordination)**

2. Commercial contracts. If they are ready, most contract signings should be announced during Secretary Daley's trip to China in late March. **(Action: Commerce)**

3. Civil aviation accord. The United States should strive to reach strong agreement with China by the time of Premier Zhu Rongji's visit. The next round of negotiations will be held February 24-25. **(Action: State and Transportation)**

4. Trade and Development Agency (TDA). State, OVP, and Commerce will identify economic sectors where TDA activity could provide substantial export opportunities for American business. Once identified, the Administration will hold consultations with Congress about intention to waive the sanction on TDA activities. **(Action: State, Commerce, coordinated by NSC/NEC)**

5. Overall coordination. Individual agency goals for the next three months will be coordinated in the context of the forthcoming visit by Premier Zhu Rongji. There are expected to be numerous visits to China by senior U.S. Government officials before Premier Zhu's arrival. The State Department will be responsible for assuring the visits, and the messages carried by visitors, are coordinated. **(Action: State, NSC coordination)**

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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DATE 24 FEB 99

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 3 FEB PC MTG ON CHINA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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MR. JIM DORSKIND EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 5516 14TH & CONSTITUTION AVE, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20230 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME:	_____
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MS. AMBER BASKETTE USUN/W ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON D.C. 20520-6319 U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS	_____	_____	_____
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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VL Date: 7/22/2019

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB
PAGE 01 OF 03 PAGES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9901246
DATE 24 FEB 99

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 3 FEB PC MTG ON CHINA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. FRED MONTGOMERY ROOM 416, WINDER BUILDING 600 17TH STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20506 U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u>
MR. ROBERT D. KYLE ATTN: MR MARK MAGEE VIA ROOM 238 OEOB OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u>
MR. JOHN PODESTA 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WHITE HOUSE	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u>
MS. VICKI M. HUPP EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
MS LAEL BRAINARD 2ND FLOOR WEST WING NATL ECONOMIC COUNCIL	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u>
MS. BARBARA STARR ROOM 5933, DEPT OF STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20451 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT AGENCY	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>

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PAGE 02 OF 03 PAGES

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DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9901246
DATE 24 FEB 99

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 3 FEB PC MTG ON CHINA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
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			PRINT LAST NAME: _____
			COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>

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PAGE 03 OF 03 PAGES

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WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

**WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM**

PRECEDENCE
FLASH
IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC # 1246

FROM: <u>National Security Council</u>	PHONE: <u>202-456-9425</u>	ROOM: <u>WHSR</u>
SUBJECT: <u>Summary of Conclusions for 3 Feb PC Mtg on China</u>		PAGES: <u>5</u> (w/ Cover)

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
<u>USUN New York</u>	<u>Ms. Amber Baskette</u>	<u>212-415-4029</u>	<u>212-415-4177</u>

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Amber Baskette for hand delivery to Ambassador Peter Burleigh.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Initials: VL Date: 7/22/2017

TIME OF TRANSMISSION:

TIME OF RECEIPT:

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: _____ IMMEDIATE RELEASER: _____
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 _____ X _____ ROUTINE DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO: _____ CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PAGES: 5
 (Including Cover)

FROM: NSC West Wing Desk (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH Situation Room (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions for 3 Feb PC Mtg on China

NSC LOG # 1246

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>PHONE NUMBER</u>
<u>DOS</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	_____	_____
<u>Treasury</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	_____	_____
<u>DOD</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	_____	_____
<u>Commerce</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	_____	_____
<u>USUN</u>	<u>Staff Asst to the Rep</u>	_____	_____
<u>CIA</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	_____	_____
<u>ACDA</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	_____	_____
<u>JCS</u>	<u>Secretary, Joint Staff</u>	_____	_____

REMARKS:

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 OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
 Initials: vr Date: 7/22/2014

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

February 22, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: JACK PRITCHARD *JR*

FROM: JEFFREY BADER *JB*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for PC Meeting on China

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions from the PC Meeting on China on February 3, 1999.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the summary of conclusions and authorize Glyn Davies to sign the memorandum to agencies at Tab I.

Approve *JB* Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to Agencies
- Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NSC
Letterhead

1246

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: February 3, 1999
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 6:00 - 7:20 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of PC Meeting on China (X)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Samuel Berger

CIA
John McLaughlin

OVP
Leon Fuerth
Ted Osius

ACDA
John Holum

Treasury State
Madeleine Albright
Thomas Pickering
Susan Shirk

JCS
Robert Foglesong

DOD
Walter Slocombe
Kurt Campbell

NSC
Kenneth Lieberthal
Jeffrey Bader

USUN
Peter Burleigh (via SVTS)

NEC
Gene Sperling
Lael Brainard
Malcolm Lee

OMB
Sylvia Matthews

White House
James Steinberg
Donald Kerrick
Larry Stein

Commerce
Secretary William Daley
David Aaron

USTR
Richard Fischer
(via SVTS from NY)
Robert Cassidy

Chief of Staff
John Podesta
Steve Ricchetti

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: ~~Jeff Bader~~ Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)
Declassify on: 2/22/09

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2015-0221-M (2.59)
3/11/2020 KDE

Chief of Staff
John Podesta
Steve Ricchetti

USTR
Richard Fischer (via secure phone)
← Robert Cassidy

Commerce
William Daley
David Aaron

Treasury
Ted Truman
Dan Zelikow

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed as follows:

1. WTO. USTR's Robert Cassidy will hold talks with his Chinese counterpart the week of February 8 and later in February. USTR Ambassador Barshefsky will present a comprehensive WTO proposal to the Chinese March 3-4. The ultimate decision on whether the Chinese final offer is acceptable will be made by an Interagency process. NEC will coordinate interagency review of WTO negotiations, begin review of permanent MFN strategy options.

Stat (Lead agency: ~~USTR~~ *NSC* negotiation, NEC coordination)

2. Commercial contracts. If they are ready, most contract signings should be announced during Secretary Daley's trip to China in late March. (Lead agency: Commerce)

3. Civil aviation accord. The United States should strive to reach strong agreement with China by the time of Premier Zhu Rongji's visit. The next round of negotiations will be held February 24-25. (Lead agencies: State and Transportation)

4. Trade and Development Agency (TDA). State, OVP, and Commerce will identify economic sectors where TDA activity could provide substantial export opportunities for American business. Once identified, the Administration will hold consultations with Congress about intention to waive the sanction on TDA activities. (Lead agencies: State, Commerce, coordinated by NSC/NEC)

5. Overall coordination. Individual agency goals for next three months will be coordinated in the context of the forthcoming visit by Premier Zhu Rongji. There are expected to be numerous visits to China by senior U.S. Government officials before Premier Zhu's arrival. The State Department will be responsible for assuring the visits, and the messages carried by

visitors, are coordinated. (Lead agency: State, NSC coordination)

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed as follows:

1. WTO. USTR's Robert Cassidy will hold talks with his Chinese counterpart the week of February 8 and later in February. USTR Ambassador Barshefsky will present a comprehensive WTO proposal to the Chinese March 3-4. The ultimate decision on whether the Chinese final offer is acceptable will be made by an interagency process. NEC ^{and NSC} will coordinate interagency review of WTO negotiations ^{and} begin review of permanent MFN strategy options. ✓

(~~Lead agency:~~ USTR negotiation, NEC/^{NSC} coordination)

Action

~~and work with NSC to~~

2. Commercial contracts. If they are ready, most contract signings should be announced during Secretary Daley's trip to China in late March. (~~Lead agency:~~ Commerce)

Action

3. Civil aviation accord. The United States should strive to reach strong agreement with China by the time of Premier Zhu Rongji's visit. The next round of negotiations will be held February 24-25. (~~Lead agencies:~~ State and Transportation)

Action

4. Trade and Development Agency (TDA). State, OVP, and Commerce will identify economic sectors where TDA activity could provide substantial export opportunities for American business. Once identified, the Administration will hold consultations with Congress about intention to waive the sanction on TDA activities. (~~Lead agencies:~~ State, Commerce, coordinated by NSC/NEC)

Action

5. Overall coordination. Individual agency goals for ^{the} next three months will be coordinated in the context of the forthcoming visit by Premier Zhu Rongji. There are expected to be numerous visits to China by senior U.S. Government officials before Premier Zhu's arrival. The State Department will be responsible for assuring the visits, and the messages carried by visitors, are coordinated. (~~Lead agency:~~ State, NSC coordination)

Action

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. agenda	Principals Committee Meeting on China, June 1, 1999 [Record ID: 9904135] (1 page)	05/28/1999	P1/b(1)
001b. draft	Agenda. [Duplicate of 002c] [Record ID: 9904165] (1 page)	05/28/1999	P1/b(1)
001c. draft	Agenda. [Duplicate of 002c] [Record ID: 9904165] (1 page)	05/28/1999	P1/b(1)
001d. draft	re: Principals Discussion Paper-China Policy (4 pages)	06/00/1999	P1/b(1) <i>KDE 3/11/2020</i>
001e. draft	Agenda. [Duplicate of 002c] [Record ID: 9904165] (1 page)	05/28/1999	P1/b(1)
001f. draft	re: Principals Discussion Paper-China Policy (3 pages)	06/00/1999	P1/b(1) <i>KDE 3/11/2020</i>
002a. memo	James Keith to Samuel Berger and Gene Sperling re: Checklist/Annotated Agenda for Principals Committee Meeting on China (5 pages) <i>partial release</i>	06/01/1999	P1/b(1) <i>KDE 3/11/2020</i>
002b. memo	James Keith to Samuel Berger and Gene Sperling re: Checklist/Annotated Agenda for Principals Committee Meeting on China (6 pages) <i>partial release</i>	06/01/1999	P1/b(1) <i>KDE 3/11/2020</i>
002c. agenda	Principals Committee Meeting on China, June 1, 1999. [Record ID: 9904165] (1 page)	05/28/1999	P1/b(1)
002d. paper	re: Principals Discussion Paper-China Policy (4 pages)	06/00/1999	P1/b(1) <i>KDE 3/11/2020</i>
003. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions for PC Meeting on China (3 pages)	06/01/1999	P1/b(1) <i>KDE 3/11/2020</i>

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- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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TO: BERGER
SPERLING, G

FROM: KEITH
HAMMONDS

DOC DATE: 28 MAY 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R PC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION OF PC MTG ON CHINA

ACTION: OBE / ORIGINALS RETURNED DUE DATE: 03 JUN 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ARVIZU LOGREF:

FILES: IFM NSCP: PC0352 CODES:

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FOR CONCURRENCE

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POWELL

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VC NARA, Date 7/15/2014
2015-0721-M

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POWELL	_____	_____	_____
RICE	<u>8</u>	_____	_____
DAVIES	<u>1</u>	<u>G 5/28</u>	_____
KERRICK	_____	_____	_____
STEINBERG	<u>2</u>	<u>J</u>	_____
BERGER	_____	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	<u>3</u>	<u>EMK 6/1</u>	<u>H/R</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>4</u>	<u>EMK</u>	<u>Agenda distributed at meeting</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

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CC: _____

COMMENTS: NOI + Agenda for PC on China

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 TO AGENCIES .
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 SURE LAEL
 HAS CLEARED -
 + WE NEED COMEBACK COPIES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<u>K</u> JACOBSON	_____	_____	_____
POWELL	_____	_____	_____
RICE	<u>8</u>	_____	_____
DAVIES	<u>1</u>	<u>G 5/28</u>	_____
KERRICK	_____	_____	_____
STEINBERG	<u>2</u>	<u>J</u>	_____
BERGER	_____	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	<u>3</u>	<u>EMK 6/1</u>	<u>H/R</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>4</u>	<u>EMK</u>	<u>Agenda distributed at meeting</u>
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 TO AGENCIES.
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 + WE NEED COMEBACK COPIES

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CC:

COMMENTS: NOM + Agenda for PC on China

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE up

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Assistant USTR for Policy
Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. JOHN PODESTA
Chief of Staff to the
President

MR. NEAL COMSTOCK
Executive Secretary
Department of Treasury

MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. JOSEPH REYNES, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. LARRY STEIN
Assistant to the President
and Director for
Legislative Affairs

MR. JIM DORSKIND
Executive Secretary
Executive Secretariat
Department of Commerce

MS. LAEL BRAINARD
Deputy Assistant to the
President for International
Economic Policy

MS. AMBER BASKETTE
Staff Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

COL. M. MANNING, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on China ~~(C)~~

There will be a Principals Committee Meeting on China on Tuesday, June 1, 1999, from 2:30 - 4:00 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. A meeting agenda and background paper is attached.

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda
Tab B Background Paper

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 5/28/09

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By 12 NARA, Date 7/15/2014
2015-0704-M

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. agenda	Principals Committee Meeting on China, June 1, 1999 [Record ID: 9904135] (1 page)	05/28/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3899

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0352 PC Meeting on China, June 1, 1999

2015-0221-M
rs1193

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

4135

May 28, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
GENE SPERLING

THROUGH: D. HOLLY HAMMONDS *DMH*

FROM: JAMES R. KEITH *JK*

SUBJECT: Agenda for June 1 Principals Committee Meeting on
China

Attached at Tab I is the announcement and agenda for the June 1
Principals Committee meeting on China.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the agenda and authorize Glyn Davies to sign
the memorandum to agencies at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to Agencies
Tab A Agenda

OK JS

*TAB B
Paper from
4165
attached
so JS
can sign
out.*

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *12* NARA, Date *7/15/2014*
2015-0721-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: James R. Keith
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 05/28/09

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. JOHN PODESTA
Chief of Staff to the
President

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. JOSEPH REYNES, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. LAEL BRAINARD
Deputy Assistant to the
President for International
Economic Policy

MR. JIM DORSKIND
Executive Secretary
Executive Secretariat
Department of Commerce

COL. M. MANNING, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

MS. AMBER BASKETTE
Staff Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

MR. LARRY STEIN
Assistant to the President
and Director for Legislative
Affairs

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Assistant USTR for Policy
Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

MR. NEAL COMSTOCK
Executive Secretary
Department of Treasury

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on China (c)

There will be a Principals Committee Meeting on China on
Tuesday, June 1, 1999, at 2:30 p.m. in the White House Situation
Room. ^{From 4:00} ~~Attendance is limited to principals only.~~ A meeting
agenda is attached. (c)

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

CONFIDENTIAL

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 5/28/09

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By: VR NARA, Date 8/15/2015
2015-0711-1

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. draft	Agenda. [Duplicate of 002c] [Record ID: 9904165] (1 page)	05/28/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3899

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0352 PC Meeting on China, June 1, 1999

2015-0221-M
rs1193

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

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001c. draft	Agenda. [Duplicate of 002c] [Record ID: 9904165] (1 page)	05/28/1999	P1/b(1)

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Principals Discussion Paper

CHINA POLICY

I. INTRODUCTION

The potent anti-foreign and nationalistic fervor that was unleashed in China in the aftermath of the May 7 accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade created long-lasting effects that will constrain U.S.-China relations for months if not years to come. Within such constraints, however, there is an opportunity in the months ahead -- beginning after the June 4 Tiananmen anniversary -- to repair some of the damage done to bilateral relations, re-establish a basis for cooperation on many regional and global issues, and, to a significant degree put behind us the bombing and subsequent attacks on our diplomatic facilities by Chinese demonstrators.

The first step will require presentation of a report on the Embassy bombing.

~~II. REPORT ON EMBASSY BOMBING~~

~~Issues for Decision~~

~~When will we send an envoy, what is the content of the report the envoy will deliver, and what is the composition of the delegation the envoy will lead?~~

~~Background~~

~~China has indicated that it will receive an envoy in the June 10-20 timeframe for the purpose of explaining the mistaken bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. We are assured that China will treat our envoy with respect. Beijing has signaled that it wants such a visit so that it can declare that the United States has answered its requests for apology and investigation. It may also declare that it is satisfied with U.S. assurances regarding possible punishment. That would in turn clear the way for re-engagement on WTO and gradual movement toward more normal relations, potentially culminating in a successful meeting between the President and Jiang Zemin in September in Auckland.~~

~~The Chinese evaluation of the envoy's report will determine whether this scenario can be realized. Beijing will be looking for a report that is sufficiently detailed and thorough so as to~~

demonstrate tangibly to a very skeptical audience the mistakes that led to the bombing.

U/S Pickering has been named in discussions with the Chinese as our envoy. The PC should confirm that choice and determine what staff support he should have in order to both present and explain our findings.

I ~~IV.~~ **WTO TALKS**

Issue for Decision

What is our strategy for closing a sound commercial deal?

Background

Premier Zhu has committed substantial personal prestige to getting a deal on China's accession to the WTO. He is motivated by the compatibility of WTO reforms with his own long-term objectives for strengthening the Chinese economy. China also seeks to get the deal done this year to avoid prolonged delay and to ensure a seat at the table as the next WTO round is launched at the Seattle ministerial in November/December. The world community will see our re-engagement in these talks as an affirmation that Washington and Beijing acknowledge shared interests and have the political will to advance them.

We can expect continued strong support for a WTO deal from the business community's export-oriented industries and agricultural sectors. Relevant businesses are engaged in a well-organized, well-funded, and tightly focused campaign to promote the WTO deal on the Hill and in the media. Hill perspectives have not clarified yet in the wake of the furor that arose over the release of the Cox Committee report, but it is clear that we have established considerable domestic support on the basis of the April 8 talks and publication of the USTR fact sheet. If we can regain momentum, we are close to a deal that would compare favorably with other countries at a similar stage of development. The PC's focus will be how to most effectively use the limited time between now and the President's meeting with Jiang in September to maximize our opportunity to conclude bilateral WTO talks with Beijing.

Government-to-government and business contacts indicate that the Chinese will not be prepared to re-engage in earnest until after the June 4 anniversary and after they receive a full explanation of the accidental bombing. The Chinese know that we stand ready

to re-engage. In this regard, Zhu Rongji's negotiating position clearly has been weakened by his failure to obtain a deal during his April visit and by subsequent tensions in Sino-U.S. relations.

11 ~~III. NORMAL TRADE RELATIONS~~

Issues for Decision

- (1) Annual Renewal: When should we transmit the President's recommendation for annual renewal? When we provide prior notice of transmittal to relevant committees what should we say about our preferred timing for a vote? What should we include in the public message announcing the President's decision?
- (2) Permanent NTR: Is one vote still an option? Can the fall legislative calendar accommodate consideration of permanent NTR?
- (3) Business Community: How can we most effectively maintain business' strong support?

Background

Annual Renewal: The President's decision must be transmitted no later than June 3. Ways and Means has scheduled a hearing June 8; Senate Finance will likely schedule its hearing at about the same time. The atmosphere created by release of the Cox Committee report has delayed telephone calls to the Hill to test support for renewal. We need to get a reading on Hill support. We anticipate a House vote on a joint resolution of disapproval before the August recess. Business supporters of renewal will be looking for an Administration statement affirming our intention to conclude a WTO deal and seek permanent NTR this year.

Permanent NTR: The relative merits of "one" versus "two" votes need to be discussed, i.e. if we reach a deal in July do we want to seek permanent NTR prior to the August recess? Discussion is necessary of how best to engage House and Senate leadership to convey strong Administration support for a WTO deal and permanent NTR this year. A bipartisan group of thirty Senators led by Senator Baucus wrote to the President expressing strong support for normalizing trade relations with China on a permanent basis if we are able to conclude a strong bilateral WTO agreement. The letter was signed and sent several days after the bombing in Belgrade. Helms, Feingold, Gilman, and Lantos wrote May 26 to recommend to the President that we set aside negotiations "in light of current events, and,

specifically, the recent incidents in and by China." Discreet consultation with Democratic staff in the House indicate that several key Members want to be supportive of a WTO deal and permanent NTR, but based on consultations with fellow House democrats they feel a need for a mechanism to address (1) labor and human rights concerns and (2) China's implementation of its trade commitments. In the wake of the release of the Cox Committee's report, many Congressional leaders and rank-and-file members have made statements indicating they do not believe U.S. trade interests with China should be affected by the espionage issue. Nevertheless, a general cooling of Congressional attitudes toward China could be a factor.

Business Community: It is critical that senior Administration officials maintain contact with business leaders to keep up the momentum of business support through the summer months. Business community representatives have questioned our continued commitment to seeking permanent NTR on the basis of a good WTO deal with China.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

MEMORANDUM FOR

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Security Affairs

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Assistant USTR for Policy
Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. JOHN PODESTA
Chief of Staff to the
President

MR. NEAL COMSTOCK
Executive Secretary
Department of Treasury

MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE
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Assistant to the President
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Executive Secretary
Executive Secretariat
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Staff Assistant to the
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to the United Nations

COL. M. MANNING, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on China ~~(C)~~

There will be a Principals Committee Meeting on China on
Tuesday, June 1, 1999, from 2:30 - 4:00 p.m. in the White House
Situation Room. Attendance is limited to principals only.
A meeting agenda is attached.

and background paper

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 5/28/09

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *W* NARA, Date *7/15/2014*
2015-0221-24

SECRET

Principals Discussion Paper

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Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (b), (d)
Declassify: 1.6x6

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0221-M (2.62)
LDE 3/11/2020

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TO: BERGER
SPERLING, G

FROM: KEITH
LIEBERTHAL
LEE

DOC DATE: 01 JUN 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BRIEFING MEMO FOR 1 JUN PC MTG ON CHINA

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER DUE DATE: 07 JUN 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: LIEBERTHAL LOGREF:

FILES: IFM NSCP: *PC0352* CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BAKER
JOSHI
KEITH
KERRICK
LEE
LIEBERTHAL
NSC CHRON
POWELL

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *RL* NARA, Date *7/15/2011*
2015-0221-M

COMMENTS: _____

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001

Z 99060111 FOR INFORMATION
X 99060118 NOTED BY BERGER

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE**

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4/65
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PBS INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TR A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
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BERGER	<u>3</u>	Natl Sec has seen	REVISED BY E-MAIL
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
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A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC: 98 JUN 1 10 52

COMMENTS: Background Papers for Jun 1 PC mtg

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 4105

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM (PBS) INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG TR A/O _____

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SEQUENCE TO

INITIAL/DATE

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has seen

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SITUATION ROOM

BY E-MAIL

WEST WING DESK

4

encl 6/1/98 copy N

RECORDS MGMT.

~~5~~

Attached
N

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

cc: JUN 1 am 9:23

COMMENTS:

Background Papers for
Jun 1 PC mtg

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

Millison, Cathy L.

From: Keith, James R.
Sent: Tuesday, June 01, 1999 11:29 AM
To: Sutphen, Mona K.; Hachigian, Nina L.; @APNSA; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary
Cc: @ASIA - Asian Affairs
Subject: Revised Annotated Agenda ~~{SECRET}~~
Importance: High

per discussion



4185PC Agnda June 1
ver 2.doc

**Natl Sec Advisor
has seen**

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By WZ NARA, Date 7/15/2019
2015-0221-m

June 1, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER
GENE SPERLING

THROUGH: KENNETH LIEBERTHAL
MALCOLM LEE

FROM: JAMES KEITH

SUBJECT: Checklist/Annotated Agenda for Principals'
Committee Meeting on China, Tuesday, June 1
2:30-4:00 p.m.

Background

I. Introduction State Lead (10 Minutes)

Points to Make:

- Madeleine will review where we stand after Embassy bombing and Chinese demonstrations against us and where we are headed in U.S.-China relations.
- China has frozen relationship pending resolution of the bombing issue. The Chinese leadership has used this issue to stoke anti-American nationalism, and the bombing crisis has crystallized divisions over U.S. policy within the leadership itself.
- First agenda item is our plan for getting past the bombing issue. Will take more time to put that in motion, and then will take time for us to gradually build back toward return to a more resilient relationship. Key target is mid-September President's meeting with Jiang in New Zealand.

--In interim, preserve room for Chinese to get back to normal in day-to-day relations. Let's not announce postponements or cancellations of visits or events. Quietly pull them off your calendars so they can be quietly put back on.

SECRET

Classified by: James Keith
Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)
Declassify On: 1.6x6

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

2015-0221-M (2.63) 3/11/2020 KDE

--Reason to believe we'll get back to more productive ties. Chinese have few alternatives and genuinely need our cooperation. Perhaps not the best way to have sent the message, but Cox Committee's report reminded Chinese that we do have leverage in this relationship and that PRC's access to our market can't be taken for granted.

- No question that Cox Committee's report has affected climate on Hill. But many Congressional leaders and rank-and-file members - including Congressman Cox - have made statements indicating they understand the need to keep our trade interests separate from the espionage issue. Likelihood is still that most Members will evaluate a WTO deal on its merits, and on its projected economic impact on their states and districts, rather than on other political issues in U.S. China relations.
- After overview of U.S.-China relations, Gene will address WTO/NTR. My strong desire is to get these talks reinstated in July. That is our avenue back to a more normal relationship that serves broad interests. Believe we have an opportunity with the Chinese to close a deal before Congress goes out in August. How we address annual NTR renewal this week and permanent NTR after we close a deal is another agenda item for us to discuss.
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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	James Keith to Samuel Berger and Gene Sperling re: Checklist/Annotated Agenda for Principals Committee Meeting on China [partial] (1 page)	06/01/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3899

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0352 PC Meeting on China, June 1, 1999

2015-0221-M
rs1193

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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III. Overview State/CIA Lead (10 minutes)

EO 13526 1.4c

After Tenet's briefing, you should invite principals to consider:

- Will have to let June 4 pass before we re-engage. Doesn't mean we'll help Chinese get past it; just need to be realistic about what is possible in next week or two. Should discuss our public posture regarding June 4 anniversary. Press Q&A should be as firm as necessary to accurately reflect substance. Don't see a need for extraordinary measures to bring attention to June 4. (FYI: MKA considering June 4 release of a statement critical of China's human rights practices in the context of broader support for engagement.)

IV. WTO Talks NEC/USTR Lead (20 minutes)

Gene should sketch out the history of our talks since April 8. Key points for Gene on status of talks:

- Came close, but several outstanding issues on April 8. Publication of April 8 fact sheet has created pressure on Zhu in Beijing, but has been vital in strengthening support for a deal in Congress, the press, and in the business community.
- Cassidy-led mission to Beijing in April helped clarify differences, and made clear to Chinese the basis for an agreement. Cassidy did not set forth bottom line positions, however.
- Since the accidental bombing in Belgrade, Chinese have made clear they will not re-engage before they receive full explanation.
- You can ask Charlene to give her sense of the state of play, including her recent meeting in Paris and how she wants to move forward.

- Alternative scenarios should be discussed, ranging from resumption of talks leading to signature of a deal in July to signature of deal at the September meeting between our Presidents. Should take account of possibility that the Chinese at best can get back to the deal available on 8 April.

V. Normal Trade Relations NSC/NEC/USTR (20 minutes)

You should lay out briefly what we have to decide:

- President's recommendation for annual renewal to be sent to the Hill June 3. Propose positive press statement reaffirming our goal to conclude and implement a strong WTO deal this year. Some believe we should not take on permanent NTR yet; need to sign a deal before we start selling it. Other views? Is one-vote scenario still a live option?
- Will ask Gene and Charlene and Larry Stein to address Hill consultations and steps we should take to maintain business' support. Need clear signals to both that we are focused and committed.
- Hill Consultations: WH Leg to begin calls testing support for renewal and probing permanent NTR if we get deal. Baucus and 29 other Senators sent letter to President supporting permanent NTR. Gephardt staff has told us privately Gephardt wants to support bringing China into WTO, but is looking for mechanisms to address labor, human rights and to ensure China lives up to its trade commitments. Helms, Feingold, Gilman, and Lantos have written urging we set aside current WTO talks.
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- Want to hear views on best strategy for timing of vote for annual renewal and how that fits into bigger picture (assuming a deal is signed) of passage of permanent NTR in time for November/December WTO ministerial in Seattle.

VI. Conclusion NSC/NEC (10 minutes)

- Extremely sensitive period in both countries that could determine direction of U.S.-China relations for years to come. Need a well-coordinated private and public approach to the Chinese in the months leading up to President's meeting with Jiang in September. We pull no punches, but at same time leave the Chinese public space to resume relations across the board.
- Report on Embassy bombing is necessary first step. If that can be handled successfully, believe we can take further steps to build toward September. WTO talks one element, may be others that we can develop; will have to judge possibility of other cabinet level visits and official exchanges after Pickering's trip.
- WTO deal is critical. Will boost economic reform and its proponents in China, help dramatically to stabilize bilateral relations, and has enthusiastic support of U.S. business community. Key is to consult closely with Hill and manage successfully the passage of permanent NTR.
- Other elements of the relationship may take longer to get back on track. September APEC Leaders Meeting and WTO will lay a foundation, but will have to keep working on all other aspects to ensure that entire agenda opens back up. Can't sustain this relationship on trade alone.

Attachments

Tab A Meeting Agenda

Tab B Discussion Paper

SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

4165



June 1, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER
GENE SPERLING

THROUGH: KENNETH LIEBERTHAL
MALCOLM LEE

FROM: JAMES KEITH

SUBJECT: Checklist/Annotated Agenda for Principals'
Committee Meeting on China, Tuesday, June 1
2:30-4:00 p.m.

Background

I. Introduction NSC/NEC Lead (10 Minutes)

Points to make:

- Need to review where we stand after Embassy bombing and Chinese demonstrations against us and where we are headed in U.S.-China relations.
- China has frozen relationship pending resolution of the bombing issue. The Chinese leadership has used this issue to stoke anti-American nationalism, and the bombing crisis has crystallized divisions over U.S. policy within the leadership itself.
- First agenda item is our plan for getting past the bombing issue. Will take until about June 10 to put that in motion, and then will take time for us to gradually build back toward return to a more resilient relationship. Key target is mid-September President's meeting with Jiang in New Zealand.

--In interim, preserve room for Chinese to get back to normal in day-to-day relations. Let's not announce postponements or cancellations of visits or events. Quietly pull them off your calendars so they can be quietly put back on.

SECRET

Classified by: James Keith
Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)
Declassify On: 1.6x6

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

2015-0221-M (2.66) 03/11/2020 KDE

--Reason to believe we'll get back to more productive ties. Chinese have few alternatives and genuinely need our cooperation. Perhaps not the best way to have sent the message, but Cox Committee's report reminded Chinese that we do have leverage in this relationship and that PRC's access to our market can't be taken for granted.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. memo	James Keith to Samuel Berger and Gene Sperling re: Checklist/Annotated Agenda for Principals Committee Meeting on China [partial] (1 page)	06/01/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
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FOLDER TITLE:

PC0352 PC Meeting on China, June 1, 1999

2015-0221-M
rs1193

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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II. CIA Overview . DCI Tenet Lead (10 minutes)

EO 13526 1.4c

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III. Report on Embassy Bombing NSC intro, followed by CIA, State (20 minutes)

- You should note that Pickering should be our envoy and should brief in Beijing as early as possible. He should travel with support staff from [redacted] DOD, and NSC. Will need to elicit commitment from Chinese that he will be treated with appropriate respect and dignity. Chinese will seek to use the report to demonstrate that Jiang and Zhu are on the right track with U.S.-China relations. Domestic pressure may dictate that Jiang has to leave the demand for "accountability" open. Expect that he will find a way to put this phase of the relationship behind us but will not firmly close the door on it.

EO 13526
1.4c, 3.3(b)(6)

EO 13526 1.4c

1.4(c)

State

could then comment on specific target dates for Pickering and indicate the direction of questions or challenges that the Chinese might throw at Pickering.

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- Report on Embassy bombing is necessary first step. If that can be handled successfully, believe we can take further steps to build toward September. WTO talks one element, may be others that we can develop; will have to judge possibility of other cabinet level visits and official exchanges after Pickering's trip. (SRB: OPTIONAL COMMENT YOU MAY WISH TO MAKE: Anticipate that Madeleine and I both might make trips this summer, Madeleine to initiate movement toward a more positive agenda and, later, I might go to prepare the way for the two Presidents' meeting in September.)
- WTO deal is critical. Will boost economic reform and its proponents in China, help dramatically to stabilize bilateral relations, and has enthusiastic support of U.S. business community. Key is to consult closely with Hill and manage successfully the passage of permanent NTR.

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Attachments

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Tab B Discussion Paper

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002c. agenda	Principals Committee Meeting on China, June 1, 1999. [Record ID: 9904165] (1 page)	05/28/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3899

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0352 PC Meeting on China, June 1, 1999

2015-0221-M
rs1193

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Principals ¹ Discussion Paper

CHINA POLICY

I. INTRODUCTION

The potent anti-foreign and nationalistic fervor that was unleashed in China in the aftermath of the May 7 accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade created long-lasting effects that will constrain U.S.-China relations for months if not years to come. Within such constraints, however, there is an opportunity in the months ahead - beginning after the June 4 Tiananmen anniversary - to repair some of the damage done to bilateral relations, re-establish a basis for cooperation on many regional and global issues, and, to a significant degree, put behind us the bombing and subsequent attacks on our diplomatic facilities by Chinese demonstrators.

II. REPORT ON EMBASSY BOMBING

Issues for Decision

When will we send an envoy, what is the content of the report the envoy will deliver, and what is the composition of the delegation the envoy will lead?

Background

China has indicated that it will receive an envoy in the June 10-20 timeframe for the purpose of explaining the mistaken bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. We are assured that China will treat our envoy with respect. Beijing has signaled that it wants such a visit so that it can declare that the U.S. has answered its requests for apology and investigation. It may also declare that it is satisfied with US assurances regarding possible punishment. That would in turn clear the way for re-engagement on WTO and gradual movement toward more normal relations, potentially culminating in a successful meeting between the President and Jiang Zemin in September in Auckland.

*spell out
U.S.*

The Chinese evaluation of the envoy's report will determine whether this scenario can be realized. Beijing will be looking for a report that is sufficiently detailed and thorough so as to

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Classified by: ~~James Keith~~
Reason: 1.5 (b), (d)
Declassify: 1.6x6

Glyn T. Davies

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2015-0221-M(2.6A)
3/11/2000 KDE

demonstrate tangibly to a very skeptical audience the mistakes that led to the bombing.

U/S Pickering has been named in discussions with the Chinese as our envoy. The PC should confirm that choice and determine what staff support he should have in order to both present and explain our findings.

II. WTO TALKS

Issue for Decision

What is our strategy for closing a sound commercial deal?

Background

Premier Zhu has committed substantial personal prestige to getting a deal on China's accession to the WTO. He is motivated by the compatibility of WTO reforms with his own long-term objectives for strengthening the Chinese economy. China also seeks to get the deal done this year to avoid prolonged delay and to ensure a seat at the table as the next WTO round is launched at the Seattle ministerial in November/December. The world community will see our re-engagement in these talks as an affirmation that Washington and Beijing acknowledge shared interests and have the political will to advance them.

We can expect continued strong support for a WTO deal from the business community's export-oriented industries and agricultural sectors. Relevant businesses are engaged in a well-organized, well-funded, and tightly focused campaign to promote the WTO deal on the Hill and in the media. Hill perspectives have not clarified yet in the wake of the furor that arose over the release of the Cox Committee report, but it is clear that we have established considerable domestic support on the basis of the April 8 talks and publication of the USTR fact sheet. If we can regain momentum, we are close to a deal that would compare favorably with other countries at a similar stage of development. The PC's focus will be how to most effectively use the limited time between now and the President's meeting with Jiang in September to maximize our opportunity to conclude bilateral WTO talks with Beijing.

Government-to-government and business contacts indicate that the Chinese will not be prepared to re-engage in earnest until after the June 4 anniversary and after they receive a full explanation of the accidental bombing. The Chinese know that we stand ready

to re-engage. In this regard, Zhu Rongji's negotiating position clearly has been weakened by his failure to obtain a deal during his April visit and by subsequent tensions in Sino-U.S. relations.

III. NORMAL TRADE RELATIONS

Issues for Decision

- (1) Annual Renewal: When should we transmit the President's recommendation for annual renewal? When we provide prior notice of transmittal to relevant committees what should we say about our preferred timing for a vote? What should we include in the public message announcing the President's decision?
- (2) Permanent NTR: Is one vote still an option? Can the fall legislative calendar accommodate consideration of permanent NTR?
- (3) Business Community: How can we most effectively maintain business' strong support?

Background

Annual Renewal: The President's decision must be transmitted no later than June 3. Ways and Means has scheduled a hearing June 8; Senate Finance will likely schedule its hearing at about the same time. The atmosphere created by release of the Cox Committee report has delayed telephone calls to the Hill to test support for renewal. We need to get a reading on Hill support. We anticipate a House vote on a joint resolution of disapproval before the August recess. Business supporters of renewal will be looking for an Administration statement affirming our intention to conclude a WTO deal and seek permanent NTR this year.

Permanent NTR: The relative merits of "one" versus "two" votes need to be discussed, i.e. if we reach a deal in July do we want to seek permanent NTR prior to the August recess? Discussion is necessary of how best to engage House and Senate leadership to convey strong Administration support for a WTO deal and permanent NTR this year. A bipartisan group of thirty Senators led by Senator Baucus wrote to the President expressing strong support for normalizing trade relations with China on a permanent basis if we are able to conclude a strong bilateral WTO agreement. The letter was signed and sent several days after the bombing in Belgrade. Helms, Feingold, Gilman, and Lantos wrote May 26 to recommend to the President that we set aside negotiations "in light of current events, and,

specifically, the recent incidents in and by China." Discreet consultation with Democratic staff in the House indicate that several key Members want to be supportive of a WTO deal and permanent NTR, but based on consultations with fellow House democrats they feel a need for a mechanism to address (1) labor and human rights concerns and (2) China's implementation of its trade commitments. In the wake of the release of the Cox Committee's report, many Congressional leaders and rank-and-file members have made statements indicating they do not believe U.S. trade interests with China should be affected by the espionage issue. Nevertheless, a general cooling of Congressional attitudes toward China could be a factor.

Business Community: It is critical that senior Administration officials maintain contact with business leaders to keep up the momentum of business support through the summer months. Business community representatives have questioned our continued commitment to seeking permanent NTR on the basis of a good WTO deal with China.

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 28 JUN 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
PC

SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SOC FOR 1 JUN PC MTG ON CHINA

ACTION: SARGEANT SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 08 JUN 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KEITH

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP: PC0352

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

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FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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POWELL
SARGEANT

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 7/15/2009
2076/0221-2

COMMENTS: _____

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DATE 6/20

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DOC 2 OF 2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001
002

Z 99060311 FOR DECISION
X 99062816 BERGER APPROVED RECOM
X 99062816 SARGEANT SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 990628 FUERTH, L
002 990628 KENNEY, K
002 990628 COMSTOCK, N
002 990628 CRIBBS, M
002 990628 DORSKIND, J
002 990628 BASKETTE, A
002 990628 MONTGOMERY, F
002 990628 PODESTA, J
002 990628 WOLFE, T
002 990628 BRAINARD, L
002 990628 MANNING, M
002 990628 STEIN, L

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE**

6/3

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 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PBS INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TTC A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
JACOBSON	_____	_____	_____
POWELL	_____	_____	_____
RICE	1/3	(R) 4/3/28	Supp new DoD data rec rebut JLH ng
DAVIES	_____	_____	_____
KERRICK	_____	_____	_____
STEINBERG	_____	_____	_____
BERGER	2	(R)	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	3	(R) 4/28	(D)
RECORDS MGMT.	1	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC: [unclear] 3 AM 8/28

COMMENTS: SOC PC on China
6/1
EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE 4498

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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CC: JUN 3 AM 9:20

COMMENTS: SOC PC on China
 6/1

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE 42

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

June 28, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Assistant USTR for Policy
Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. JOHN PODESTA
Chief of Staff to the
President

MR. NEAL COMSTOCK
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. MARIA I. CRIBBS
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. LAEL BRAINARD
Deputy Assistant to the
President for International
Economic Policy

MR. JIM DORSKIND
Executive Secretary
Executive Secretariat
Department of Commerce


COL. M. MANNING, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

MS. AMBER BASKETTE
Staff Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

MR. LARRY STEIN
Assistant to the President
and Director for
Legislative Affairs

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Principals Committee
Meeting on China (S)

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions for the
Principals Committee meeting on China on June 1. Please pass to
principals. (S)


Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 6/2/09

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By N NARA, Date 7/15/2014
2015-0721-M

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4198

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: June 1, 1999

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 2:30 - 4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for PC Meeting on China ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair

Samuel Berger
Gene Sperling

OVP

Leon Fuerth

State

Secretary Madeleine Albright
Stanley Roth

Treasury

Robert Rubin
Larry Summers

Chief of Staff

John Podesta
Steve Ricchetti

Defense

William Cohen

USUN

Peter Burleigh (via SVTS/NY)

CIA

George Tenet

JCS

Hugh Shelton

Commerce

David Aaron

USTR

Charlene Barshefsky

White House

Larry Stein

NSC

Kenneth Lieberthal
James Keith

NEC

Lael Brainard
Malcolm Lee

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Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

• **Bombing Report:**

- NSC (Lieberthal) and State (Roth) to take the lead in drafting recommendations for Principals regarding delivery of our report on the accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy. Recommendations to include who would be our envoy and who would accompany him, when and how we are to propose a date for that envoy to travel to China, how we are to elicit an assurance from the Chinese that they do not intend to humiliate publicly our envoy and that their intention is to use the report to begin to get beyond this phase in our relations. Consideration must be given to the point that the Chinese Embassy was in a declared area of armed conflict; we may need new guidance in association with the risks that non-combatants take by remaining in such areas. **(Action: NSC, State)** (S)
- CIA and DOD scheduled to testify June 10 on Chinese Embassy bombing before HPSI. Determination required on timing of that testimony as it relates to envoy's briefing in Beijing. **(Action: Further Discussion by Principals)** (S)

• **Annual NTR Renewal and Permanent NTR:**

- We need press and Congressional packages for June 3 rollout, including:

--NSC and NEC to draft statement for June 3 announcement of President's decision to renew NTR, drawing on the President's April 7 speech. The text should preview a June 4 Tiananmen statement and note that we seek permanent NTR in the context of a commercially meaningful WTO deal.

(Action: NSC, NEC) (C)

--Develop press Q&A and talking points for calls to Hill staff/members in anticipation of June 3 decision. **(Action: NSC, NEC, State)** (C)

- State to draft statement for June 4 anniversary of Tiananmen. **(Action: State)** (C)

- WHLA, working with NSC/NEC, to seek ideas from other interested parties regarding appropriate vehicle the House Democratic leadership could use to replace annual NTR debate, especially with regard to voicing of human rights concerns. (Action: WHLA) (S)
- WTO Talks:
 - Consultations with Hill and press: Administration to project desire to get a WTO deal done right; prefer it early but will manage either a one- or two-vote scenario; continue to see strong U.S. interest in a commercially meaningful deal. (Action: State, Commerce, USTR, NEC, NSC) (S)
 - When we re-engage with Chinese, keep in mind overlapping interests: advantageous to both of us to get it done early. USTR to consider message to Chinese on timetable to get deal done this year: Sasser in farewell calls? SecState or POTUS letter? (Action: USTR) (S)

World Bank/Tibet

- NEC, NSC, Treasury and State to consult to achieve a consensus on the World Bank project in China involving transfer of destitute people to an ethnic Tibetan county in Qinghai that already has Tibetan and other minorities. (Action: Treasury) (S)

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
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MESSAGE #: _____

NSC # 4198

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SUBJECT: <u>SOC FOR 1 JUN PC MTG ON CHINA</u>		PAGES: <u>5</u> (w/ Cover)

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<u>USUN New York</u>	<u>Ms. Amber Baskette</u>	<u>212-415-4029</u>	<u>212-415-4177</u>

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: SOC FOR 1 JUN PC MTG ON CHINA
NSC LOG # 4198

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Treasury	Exec Sec		
DOD	Exec Sec		
Commerce	Exec Sec		
USUN	Staff Asst to the Rep		
CIA	Exec Sec		
JCS	Secretary, Joint Staff		

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

June 2, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: KENNETH LIEBERTHAL *KL*

FROM: JAMES KEITH *JK*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for PC Meeting on China

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions from the PC Meeting on China on June 1.

Concurrence by: Malcolm Lee *MLL*

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the summary of conclusions and authorize Glyn Davies to sign the memorandum to agencies at Tab I.

Approve Disapprove

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to Agencies
- Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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Classified by: James Keith
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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *VZ* NARA, Date *7/25/2019*
2015-0724-AM

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Assistant USTR for Policy
Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. JOHN PODESTA
Chief of Staff to the
President

MR. NEAL COMSTOCK
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

~~COL. JOSEPH REYNES, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense~~

MS. LAEL BRAINARD
Deputy Assistant to the
President for International
Economic Policy

MR. JIM DORSKIND
Executive Secretary
Executive Secretariat
Department of Commerce

COL. M. MANNING, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

MS. AMBER BASKETTE
Staff Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

MR. LARRY STEIN
Assistant to the President
and Director for
Legislative Affairs

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Principals Committee
Meeting on China ~~(S)~~

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions for the
Principals Committee meeting on China on June 1. Please pass to
principals. ~~(S)~~

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~

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Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 6/2/09

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 7/17/09
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FROM: BRADTKE

DOC DATE: 07 AUG 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
AGENDA

PC

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SUBJECT: AGENDA FOR PC MTG ON CHINA ON AUG 9

ACTION: BRADTKE SGD MEMO

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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August 7, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
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Security Affairs

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Assistant USTR for Policy
Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. JOHN PODESTA
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
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Executive Secretariat
Department of Commerce

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Secretary, Joint Staff

MS. STEPHANIE SYPTAK
Staff Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on China ~~(S)~~

There will be a Principals Committee Meeting on China on Monday, August 9, 1999 from 4:00-5:30 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. An agenda is attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~


Robert A. Bradtke
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

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SUBJECT: <u>AUG 9 PC MTR ON CHINA -</u>		PAGES: <u>3</u>
<u>AGENDA</u>		(w/ Cover)

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August 4, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: KENNETH LIEBERTHAL *KL*

FROM: JAMES KEITH *JK*

SUBJECT: Agenda for PC Meeting on China

This memorandum requests your approval of an agenda for the August 9 PC meeting on China.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the agenda and authorize Robert Bradtke to sign the memorandum to agencies at Tab I.

Approve *A* Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to Agencies
Tab A Agenda

w changes

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. draft	Agenda. [duplicate of 001a] [Record ID: 9905900] (1 page)	08/07/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3896

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0358 PC Meeting on China, August 9, 1999

2015-0221-M
rs1194

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: BERGER

CHRON FILE

FROM: LIEBERTHAL
KEITH

DOC DATE: 06 AUG 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R

PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BRIEFING PAPER FOR 9 AUG PC MTG ON CHINA

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER

DUE DATE: 11 AUG 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: LIEBERTHAL

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP: *PC0558*

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

JOSHI
KEITH
LIEBERTHAL
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *VZ* NARA, Date *7/15/2015*
2015-0721-11

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP CLOSED BY: NSTSM DOC 1 OF 1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001



Z 99080617 FOR INFORMATION
X 99081719 NOTED BY BERGER

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

3/6

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 5935
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG Full A/D

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
 GIRE	_____	_____	_____
JACOBSON	_____	_____	_____
POWELL	_____	<u>SES for 8/6</u>	_____
SARGEANT	<u>1</u>	_____	_____
BRADTKE	<u>2</u>	<u>AM 8/6</u>	_____
KERRICK	_____	_____	_____
STEINBERG	<u>3</u>		_____
BERGER	<u>4</u>	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	<u>5</u>	<u>EWK 8/17</u>	<u>N</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>6</u>	<u>B 8/17</u>	<u>NFA</u>

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC: _____

COMMENTS: PC - China - 9 Aug

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

Net! Sec Advisor
has seen

August 6, 1999



INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: KENNETH LIEBERTHAL *KL*

FROM: JAMES KEITH *JK*

SUBJECT: Discussion Paper for Principals Committee Meeting
on China, August 9, 4:00 p.m.

I. OBJECTIVE

You are scheduled to chair a Principals Committee Meeting Monday, August 9 to discuss our strategy for returning some normalcy to our relations with China, especially:

- our priorities as we prepare for the President's mid-September meeting with Jiang Zemin;
- obstacles that might prevent us from achieving our goals.

You will want to underline that over the next five weeks or so before the President's meeting in Auckland every substantive issue in U.S.-China relations is of interest to the White House. The closest possible coordination with NSC staff will be imperative.

II. Context

The evidence suggests that Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji want to move beyond the impasse in U.S.-China relations that has stalled progress in our bilateral relationship.

The "rough patch" began well before our accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. Friction started with China's crackdown on the China Democratic Party beginning last fall and winter and our subsequent tabling of a China-specific resolution at the UN Human Rights Commission, continued through Congress' focus on the Cox Committee's report, increased due to the PLA's alarm over U.S. and other NATO members' use of force to resolve the humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo, and became greater with

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: James Keith
Reason: 1.5 (b), (d)
Declassify On: 1.6x6

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0221-M (2.71)
3/11/2020 VDE

our refusal to sign a WTO agreement with Zhu on 8 April. In between, the DoD reports on TMD in Asia and on the cross-Strait military balance added to China's consternation. The accidental bombing of the PRC embassy thus imploded a relationship already under severe pressure.

Taiwan remains a serious cause for concern. For the moment, however, indications are that Beijing perceives the issue to have provided at least a short-term improvement in U.S.-China relations. China appreciated our quick response and firm reaffirmation of our "one China" policy in the wake of Lee Teng-hui's July 9 statement.

III. PRIORITIES

WTO. The primary unfinished business and the best candidate for a centerpiece for the President's meeting with Jiang is conclusion of our WTO deal. Charlene anticipates re-engagement at the Cassidy level around the 23rd of this month, followed by her intervention at the end of a short negotiating process to wrap up a deal based on the April 8 documents.

If this scenario pans out, Jiang will be looking for a firm commitment from the President in Auckland to pull out all the stops to accomplish permanent NTR. If the above scenario proves too optimistic, the two Presidents might only be able to announce the resumption of our talks with a view to settling differences as rapidly as possible.

We rate the chances good for PRC readiness to conclude a deal for the Presidents' meeting. We base this on: the short time left before the November/December WTO ministerial in Seattle and China's desire to accede this year; the progress that Beijing has had since April in preparing domestic opinion on the issue; and the importance to Jiang and Zhu of our agreement on China's WTO accession as a vehicle for increasing international confidence in China's troubled economy.

Advancing a Full Bilateral Agenda. Some elements of our bilateral ties are already coming back on-line. David Aaron's trip to China last month represented the "normalization" of our commercial ties (excepting WTO). We should be able to conduct our annual economic and S&T ministerials in the fall, expand our high-level exchanges in areas related to strategic (i.e., foreign policy) dialogue, and begin to introduce the nonproliferation and military-to-military agendas.

Human rights dialogue no doubt will take longer to re-establish, although Beijing has already scheduled resumption of its human rights dialogue with the EU for October. There is scant hope for progress any time before or even immediately after the President's meeting with Jiang, but we need to focus Beijing's attention on this element of the prospective debate on permanent NTR in the fall.

Finally, we may require senior exchanges with the Chinese should the North Koreans launch a long-range missile. This is a key element that could be put at risk if we are unable to establish a positive overall agenda with the PRC.

IV. POTENTIAL STUMBLING BLOCKS

Taiwan. We have discussed the Taiwan issue and will be providing you with a separate memorandum to follow up our discussion in your office this week. Should the Taiwan issue go seriously awry, it could upset our ability to have a successful bilat or, later on, to achieve permanent NTR. The greater danger here appears to be after October 1. Our equities in keeping this issue at no more than a low boil are very considerable.

Falungong. Jiang is personally associated with the determination that the Falungong sect is a subversive movement that threatens Party authority and social stability. He was shocked and embarrassed by the sect's April 25 mass demonstration in Tiananmen Square and is clearly wary of the proven organizational skills and discipline of sect members. Jiang may believe, moreover, that his handling of this group will be seen as a test case by the conservative opposition to ambitious economic reform, an opposition that takes the primacy of social order as its touchstone. The leadership's resolve to control this sect despite costs internationally and domestically is cause for concern. If this becomes a test of wills, the central authorities will act on the conviction that they must win. It appears, in any case, that we can expect at least some long-term jail sentences meted out to key organizers of the Falungong, with very strong reactions from our domestic advocacy groups.

V. CONCLUSION

The President's meeting with Jiang in September is the most important opportunity in the foreseeable future to make up lost

ground in the relationship. It is critical that all elements of the USG pull together to make the most of it. The major deliverable would be a WTO agreement.

The stakes are high. If we do not manage this relationship well we could lose any serious ability to repair U.S.-China relations during this Administration. Damage control would be a daunting task, entailing risk to important regional and bilateral objectives, including:

- China's control of WMD-related and conventional weapons proliferation;
- the prospect of tougher PRC tactics in the Taiwan Strait;
- the challenge of handling Taiwan's application to the WTO first, before the PRC's accession;
- and further diminishment of our ability to influence Beijing's human rights policies, including the Falungong case, treatment of dissidents and religious, and potential ratification in the future of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Concurrences by: Joe Bouchard, Steve Naplan, Matthew Schaefer

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V. CONCLUSION

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TO: AGENCIES

FROM: BRADTKE

DOC DATE: 07 SEP 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
SOC

PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SOC FOR 9 AUG PC MTG ON CHINA

ACTION: SARGEANT SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 16 AUG 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: LIEBERTHAL

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP: 90358

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BAKER
EXECSEC
JOSHI
LIEBERTHAL
NSC CHRON
POWELL
RUDMAN
SARGEANT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 7/15/06
2015-0221-14

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSEMK CLOSED BY: NSTSM DOC 3 OF 3

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICERCAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER	Z 99081115 FOR DECISION
001 LIEBERTHAL	Z 99081413 FOR SIGNATURE
002 BERGER	Z 99081912 FOR DECISION
002	X 99090716 BERGER APPROVED RECOM
003	X 99090716 SARGEANT SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION DISPATCH FOR INFO

003	990907	FUERTH, L	
003	990907	KENNEY, K	
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003	990907	CRIBBS, M	
003	990907	DORSKIND, J	
003	990907	SYPTAK, S	
003	990907	MONTGOMERY, F	
003	990907	PODESTA, J	
003	990907	WOLFE, T	
003	990907	BRAINARD, L	
003	990907	WHITE, D	

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE**

*Rec'd
8/20 @
8:00am
Redo*

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 6046
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG ENK A/O 01

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JACOBSON	_____	_____	_____
POWELL	<u>1</u>	<u>8/19</u>	secret
SARGEANT	<u>5</u>	<u>8/17</u>	<u>signature I</u>
BRADTKE	_____	_____	_____
RUDMAN	<u>2</u>	<u>8/19</u>	_____
STEINBERG	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____
BERGER	<u>4</u>	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	<u>6</u>	<u>8/17</u>	<u>D</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	_____	_____	_____

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

99AUG 19 PM 12:21

COMMENTS: SOC of PC on 8/9 on
China

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE**

PROOFED BY: *[Signature]* LOG # 6046
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PPRS INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 12 A/O _____

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SARGEANT	<u>5</u>	<u>8/17</u>	_____
BRADTKE	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
KERRICK <i>Rudman</i>	<u>2</u>	<u>MS/12</u>	<u>redo</u>
STEINBERG	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>whr</u>
BERGER	<u>4</u>	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	<u>5</u>	<u>8/14</u>	<u>STAFF</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	_____	_____	_____
<i>Lieberthal</i>	<u>6</u>	_____	<u>see notes</u>

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

99 AUG 11 PM 1:12

COMMENTS: *Summary of Conclusions
PC China 9 Aug 99*

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE *up*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: B LOG # 6046
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 12 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
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JACOBSON			
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SARGEANT	<u>5</u>	<u>8/17</u>	
BRADTKE	<u>4</u>		
KERRICK Radman	<u>2</u>	<u>MS/12</u>	<u>redo</u>
STEINBERG	<u>3</u>		<u>redo</u>
BERGER	<u>4</u>		
SITUATION ROOM			
WEST WING DESK	<u>5</u>	<u>8/14</u>	<u>STAFF</u>
RECORDS MGMT.			
Lieberthal	<u>6</u>		<u>see notes</u>

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

PAGE 11 of 12

COMMENTS: Summary of Conclusions
 PC China 9 Aug 99
 EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE

Rec'd
8/20 @ 8:00am
Redo

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 6046
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 12 A/O 01

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
GIRE			
JACOBSON			
POWELL	<u>1</u>	<u>8/19</u>	<u>Secret</u>
SARGEANT	<u>5</u>	<u>8/17</u>	<u>sign tal I</u>
BRADTKE			
RUDMAN	<u>2</u>	<u>MS/12</u>	
STEINBERG	<u>3</u>		
BERGER	<u>4</u>		
SITUATION ROOM			
WEST WING DESK	<u>6</u>	<u>8/17</u>	<u>D</u>
RECORDS MGMT.			

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'99 AUG 19 PM 12:21

COMMENTS: SOC of PC on 8/9 on
 China
 EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

6046

September 7, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Assistant USTR for Policy
Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. JOHN PODESTA
Chief of Staff to the
President

MR. NEAL COMSTOCK
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. MARIA I. CRIBBS
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. LAEL BRAINARD
Deputy Assistant to the
President for International
Economic Policy


MR. JIM DORSKIND
Executive Secretary
Executive Secretariat
Department of Commerce

COL. DAVID C. WHITE, USA
Secretary, Joint Staff

MS. STEPHANIE SYPTAK
Staff Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Principals Committee
Meeting on China (C)

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions for the
Principals Committee meeting on China on August 9, 1999. Please
pass to principals. (C)


Robert A. Bradtke
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

Classified by: Robert A. Bradtke
Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)
Declassify On: 08/11/09

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBNARA, Date 11/23/2021
2015-0221-11

~~SECRET~~

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. memo	re: Summary of Conclusions of PC Meeting on China [partial] (1 page)	08/09/1999	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3896

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0358 PC Meeting on China, August 9, 1999

2015-0221-M
rs1194

RESTRICTION CODES

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

6046

~~SECRET~~

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: August 9, 1999

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 4:00-5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of PC Meeting on China (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR

Samuel R. Berger

CHIEF OF STAFF

Laura Marcus

OVP

Rick Saunders

Ted Osius

CIA

DCI George Tenet

STATE

Secretary Madeleine Albright

Stanley Roth

NEC

Gene Sperling

Lael Brainard

Robert Wescott

TREASURY

Secretary Lawrence Summers

Ted Truman

JCS

General Shelton

Charles Wald

DOD

Secretary D. William Cohen

James Bodner

WHITE HOUSE

James Steinberg

Mara Rudman

Commerce

Secretary William Daley

NSC

Kenneth Lieberthal

USTR

Robert Novak

USUN

Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS/NY)

Alan Romberg

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Robert Bradtke

Reason: 1.5(b) (d)

Declassify on: August 11, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0221-M (2.73)
3/11/2020 KDE

~~SECRET~~

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

1. With regard to a potential Chinese devaluation of the RMB, the United States should position itself so that we neither are seen as supporting devaluation nor are seen as asking China not to devalue. (Action: **TREASURY**) ~~(S)~~
2. On the World Trade Organization (WTO): The NEC and USTR should develop wording to use to answer the questions: Do you expect a WTO deal by New Zealand? Will the United States accept anything less than the package available as of 8 April? The responses should keep expectations low concerning a U.S.-China bilateral accession accord being reached in time for the Clinton-Jiang summit at the APEC meeting in New Zealand on September 11 and portray the two presidents as meeting to reengage on the WTO issue. (Action: **NEC/USTR**) ~~(S)~~
3. There is still a need to develop a strategy around the embassy property compensation issue. (Action: **NSC/STATE**) ~~(S)~~.
4. Given the importance of the coming period in Sino-U.S. relations, all agencies must make special efforts to coordinate on any matters affecting China and to let the NSC know about issues and initiatives that are coming up. (Action: **NSC/STATE/DOD**) ~~(S)~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9906046
DATE 07 SEP 99

SUBJECT: SOC FOR 9 AUG PC MTG ON CHINA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL W/ SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506 OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME:	_____
		COPY: <u>1</u>	
MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520 DEPARTMENT OF STATE	_____	_____	_____
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MR. NEAL COMSTOCK ROOM 3408, MAIN TREASURY BLDG 1500 PENNSYLVANIA AVE, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20220 DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY	_____	_____	_____
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MR. JIM DORSKIND EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 5516 14TH & CONSTITUTION AVE, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20230 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE	_____	_____	_____
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MS. STEPHANIE SYPTAK USUN/W ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON D.C. 20520-6319 U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS	_____	_____	_____
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Initials: VR Date: 7/27/2019

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9906046
DATE 07 SEP 99

SUBJECT: SOC FOR 9 AUG PC MTG ON CHINA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL W/ SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. FRED MONTGOMERY ROOM 416, WINDER BUILDING 600 17TH STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20506 U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u>
MR. JOHN PODESTA 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WHITE HOUSE	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u>
MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
MS LAEL BRAINARD 2ND FLOOR WEST WING NATL ECONOMIC COUNCIL	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u>
COL. DAVID C. WHITE SECRETARY JOINT STAFF ROOM 2E865, PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB
PAGE 02 OF 02 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

**WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM**

PRECEDENCE
FLASH
IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC # 6046

FROM: <u>National Security Council</u>	PHONE: <u>202-456-9425</u>	ROOM: <u>WHSR</u>
SUBJECT: <u>SOC FOR 9 AUG PC MTG ON CHINA</u>		PAGES: <u>5</u> (w/ Cover)

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
<u>USUN New York</u>	<u>Ms. Stephanie Syptak</u>	<u>212-415-4407</u>	<u>212-415-4177</u>

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Stephanie Syptak for hand delivery to Ambassador Holbrooke.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: RL Date: 7/24/05

~~SECRET~~
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TIME OF TRANSMISSION:

TIME OF RECEIPT:

**WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM**

PRECEDENCE

CLASSIFICATION:

RELEASER: _____

ROUTINE

~~SECRET~~

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

FROM: <u>NSC</u>	PH: <u>456-9425</u>	ROOM: <u>WWD</u>
SUBJECT: <u>SOC FOR 9 AUG PC MTG ON CHINA</u>		PAGES: <u>5</u>

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DELIVER TO</u>	<u>ROOM</u>	<u>PHONE</u>
<u>DOS</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	_____	_____
<u>TREASURY</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	_____	_____
<u>DOD</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	_____	_____
<u>COMMERCE</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	_____	_____
<u>USUN</u>	<u>Staff Asst to the Rep</u>	_____	_____
<u>CIA</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	_____	_____
<u>JCS</u>	<u>Secretary, Joint Staff</u>	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

August 19, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: KENNETH LIEBERTHAL *KL*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of PC Meeting
on August 9, 1999

Attached at Tab I is the summary of conclusions for a meeting of the NSC Principals Committee on August 9, 1999.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the summary of conclusions and authorize Robert Bradtke to sign the memorandum to agencies at Tab I.

Approve *R* Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to Agencies
- Tab A Summary of Conclusions

m/changes
have been made WEA

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. draft	re: Summary of Conclusions of PC Meeting on China [partial] (1 page)	08/09/1999	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3896

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0358 PC Meeting on China, August 9, 1999

2015-0221-M
rs1194

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: August 9, 1999

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 4:00-5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of PC Meeting on China ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR

Samuel R. Berger

CHIEF OF STAFF

Laura Marcus

OVP

Rick Saunders

Ted Osius

CIA

George Tenet

(b)(3)

STATE

Secretary Madeleine Albright

Stanley Roth

NEC

Gene Sperling

Lael Brainard

Robert Wescott

TREASURY

Secretary Lawrence Summers

Ted Truman

JCS

General Shelton

Charles Wald

DOD

Secretary William Cohen

James Bodner

WHITE HOUSE

James Steinberg

Mara Rudman

Commerce

Secretary William Daley

NSC

Kenneth Lieberthal

USTR

Robert Novak

USUN

Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS/NY)

Alan Romberg

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
0015-0201-M (2.76)
3/11/2006 KDE

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

1. With regard to a potential Chinese devaluation of the RMB, the United States should position itself so that it does not appear that we have been the losers if the Chinese do devalue, and at the same time we should not be seen as supporting devaluation. (Action: TREASURY) ~~(S)~~

2. On the World Trade Organization (WTO): The NEC and USTR should develop wording to use to answer the questions: Do you expect a WTO deal by New Zealand? Will the United States accept anything less than the package available as of 8 April? The responses should lowball expectations about a U.S.-China bilateral accession accord being reached in time for the Clinton-Jiang summit at the APEC meeting in New Zealand on September 11. Should portray as the two presidents meeting to reengage on the WTO issue. (Action: NEC/USTR) ~~(C)~~

*the
"the"
where
is this*

3. There is still a need to develop a strategy around the embassy property compensation issue. (Action: NSC/STATE) ~~(C)~~

4. In Administration rhetoric, should note the areas in which U.S.-China cooperation remains important, as well as commenting on areas in which there are problems to resolve. (Action: NSC/STATE) ~~(C)~~

5. Given the importance of the coming period in Sino-U.S. relations, all agencies must make special efforts to coordinate on any matters affecting China and to let the NSC know about issues and initiatives that are coming up. (Action: NSC/STATE/DOD) ~~(C)~~

This is not professional.

What does this mean? Not what was discussed - Point was we still 4

are paying for or that they are doing as a favor to us.

August 11, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: KENNETH LIEBERTHAL *KL*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of PC Meeting
on August 9, 1999

Attached at Tab I is the summary of conclusions for a meeting of the NSC Principals Committee on August 9, 1999.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the summary of conclusions and authorize Robert Bradtke to sign the memorandum to agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to Agencies
- Tab A Summary of Conclusions

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Assistant USTR for Policy
Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. JOHN PODESTA
Chief of Staff to the
President

MR. NEAL COMSTOCK
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. MARIA I. CRIBBS
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. LAEL BRAINARD
Deputy Assistant to the
President for International
Economic Policy

MR. JIM DORSKIND
Executive Secretary
Executive Secretariat
Department of Commerce

COL. DAVID C. WHITE, USA
Secretary, Joint Staff

MS. STEPHANIE SYPTAK
Staff Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Principals Committee
Meeting on China ~~(S)~~

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions for the
Principals Committee meeting on China on August 9, 1999. Please
pass to principals. ~~(S)~~

Robert A. Bradtke
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:


1. With regard to a potential Chinese devaluation of the RMB, the United States should position itself so that we neither are seen as supporting devaluation nor are seen as asking China not to devalue. (Action: TREASURY) ~~(S)~~

2. On the World Trade Organization (WTO): The NEC and USTR should develop wording to use to answer the questions: Do you expect a WTO deal by New Zealand? Will the United States accept anything less than the package available as of April 8? The responses should keep expectations low concerning a U.S.-China bilateral accession accord being reached in time for the Clinton-Jiang summit at the APEC meeting in New Zealand on September 11 and portray the two presidents as meeting to reengage on the WTO issue. (Action: NEC/USTR) ~~(S)~~

3. There is still a need to develop a strategy around the embassy property compensation issue. (Action: NSC/STATE) ~~(C)~~

4. In Administration rhetoric, should note the areas in which U.S.-China cooperation remains important, as well as commenting on areas in which there are problems to resolve. (Action: NSC/STATE) ~~(C)~~

4. Given the importance of the coming period in Sino-U.S. relations, all agencies must make special efforts to coordinate on any matters affecting China and to let the NSC know about issues and initiatives that are coming up. (Action: NSC/STATE/DOD) ~~(C)~~



A large handwritten scribble in the bottom left corner, possibly indicating a time schedule or a list of items. The numbers 2:00, 2:30, 3:45, and 9:00 are visible within the scribble.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
8015-0221-M (2.79)
3/11/2000 KDE

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003d. draft	re: Summary of Conclusions of PC Meeting on China [partial] (1 page)	08/09/1999	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3896

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0358 PC Meeting on China, August 9, 1999

2015-0221-M
rs1194

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: August 9, 1999

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 4:00-5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of PC Meeting on China ~~TC~~

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR

Samuel R. Berger

CHIEF OF STAFF

Laura Marcus

OVP

Rick Saunders
Ted Osius

CIA

George Tenet
[REDACTED]

STATE

Secretary Madeleine Albright
Stanley Roth

NEC

Gene Sperling
Lael Brainard
Robert Wescott

TREASURY

Secretary Lawrence Summers
Ted Truman

JCS

General Shelton
Charles Wald

DOD

Secretary William Cohen
James Bodner

WHITE HOUSE

James Steinberg
Mara Rudman

Commerce

Secretary William Daley

NSC

Kenneth Lieberthal

USTR

Robert Novak

USUN

Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS/NY)
Alan Romberg

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0221-11 (R.82)
3/11/2020 KDE

60046

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

1. With regard to a potential Chinese devaluation of the RMB, the United States should position itself so that we neither are seen as supporting devaluation nor are seen as asking China not to devalue. (Action: **TREASURY**) ~~(S)~~

2. On the World Trade Organization (WTO): The NEC and USTR should develop wording to use to answer the questions: Do you expect a WTO deal by New Zealand? Will the United States accept anything less than the package available as of April 8? The responses should keep expectations low concerning a U.S.-China bilateral accession accord being reached in time for the Clinton-Jiang summit at the APEC meeting in New Zealand on September 11 ~~and~~ should portray ~~as~~ the two presidents' ^{as} meeting to reengage on the WTO issue. (Action: **NEC/USTR**) ~~(S)~~

3. There is still a need to develop a strategy around the embassy property compensation issue. (Action: **NSC/STATE**) ~~(S)~~

4. In Administration rhetoric, should note the areas in which U.S.-China cooperation remains important, as well as commenting on areas in which there are problems to resolve. (Action: **NSC/STATE**) ~~(S)~~

5. Given the importance of the coming period in Sino-U.S. relations, all agencies must make special efforts to coordinate on any matters affecting China and to let the NSC know about issues and initiatives that are coming up. (Action: **NSC/STATE/DOD**) ~~(S)~~

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

1. With regard to a potential Chinese devaluation of the RMB, the United States should position itself so that we neither are seen as supporting devaluation nor are seen as asking China not to devalue. (Action: **TREASURY**) (S)

2. On the World Trade Organization (WTO): The NEC and USTR should develop wording to use to answer the questions: Do you expect a WTO deal by New Zealand? Will the United States accept anything less than the package available as of 8 April? The responses should keep expectations low concerning a U.S.-China bilateral accession accord being reached in time for the Clinton-Jiang summit at the APEC meeting in New Zealand on September 11. Should portray as the two presidents meeting to reengage on the WTO issue. (Action: **NEC/USTR**) (S)

3. There is still a need to develop a strategy around the embassy property compensation issue. (Action: **NSC/STATE**) (S)

4. In Administration rhetoric, should note the areas in which U.S.-China cooperation remains important, as well as commenting on areas in which there are problems to resolve. (Action: **NSC/STATE**) (S)

5. Given the importance of the coming period in Sino-U.S. relations, all agencies must make special efforts to coordinate on any matters affecting China and to let the NSC know about issues and initiatives that are coming up. (Action: **NSC/STATE/DOD**) (S)

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0221-M (2.85)
3/11/2020 KDE**

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. FRED MONTGOMERY
Assistant USTR for Policy
Coordination
U.S. Trade Representative

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. JOHN PODESTA
Chief of Staff to the
President

MR. NEAL COMSTOCK
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. MARIA I. CRIBBS
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. LAEL BRAINARD
Deputy Assistant to the
President for International
Economic Policy

MR. JIM DORSKIND
Executive Secretary
Executive Secretariat
Department of Commerce

COL. DAVID C. WHITE, USA
Secretary, Joint Staff

MS. STEPHANIE SYPTAK
Staff Assistant to the
Representative of the U.S.
to the United Nations

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Principals Committee
Meeting on China ~~etc~~

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions for the
Principals Committee meeting on China on August 9, 1999. Please
pass to principals. ~~etc~~

Robert A. Bradtke
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003f. draft	re: Summary of Conclusions of PC Meeting on China [partial] (1 page)	08/09/1999	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 3896

FOLDER TITLE:

PC0358 PC Meeting on China, August 9, 1999

2015-0221-M
rs1194

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

6046

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: August 9, 1999

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 4:00-5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of PC Meeting on *China*
~~August 9, 1999 (C)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR

Samuel R. Berger

CHIEF OF STAFF

Laura Marcus

OVP

Rick Saunders
Ted Osius

CIA

George Tenet


STATE

Secretary Madeleine Albright
Stanley Roth

NEC

Gene Sperling
Lael Brainard
Robert Wescott

TREASURY

Secretary Lawrence Summers
Ted Truman

JCS

General Shelton
Charles Wald

DOD

Secret
William Cohen
James Bodner

WHITE HOUSE

James Steinberg
Mara Rudman

Commerce

Secret
William Daley

NSC

Kenneth Lieberthal

USTR

Robert Novak

USUN

Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS/NY)
Alan Romberg

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Robert Bradtke
Reason: 1.5(b) (d)-10, ~~2009~~
Declassify on: August 11, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By NARA, Date

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0821-M (a.08)
3/11/2020 KDE

Band paper

spell out

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

1. With regard to a potential Chinese devaluation of the RMB, the US should position itself so that it does not appear that we have been the losers if the Chinese do devalue, and at the same time we should not be seen as supporting devaluation. **(Action: TREASURY)** ~~(S)~~

spell out

2. On the World Trade Organization (WTO): The NEC and USTR should develop wording to use to answer the questions: Do you expect a WTO deal by New Zealand? Will the U.S. accept anything less than the package available as of 8 April? The responses should lowball expectations about a US-China bilateral accession accord being reached in time for the Clinton-Jiang summit at the APEC meeting in New Zealand on 11 September. Should portray the two presidents meeting to reengage on the WTO issue. **(Action: NEC/USTR)** ~~(S)~~

3. There is still a need to develop a strategy around the embassy property compensation issue. **(Action: NSC/STATE)** ~~(S)~~

4. In Administration rhetoric, should note the areas in which U.S.-China cooperation remains important, as well as commenting on areas in which there are problems to resolve. **(Action: NSC/STATE)** ~~(S)~~

5. Given the importance of the coming period in Sino-U.S. relations, all agencies must make special efforts to coordinate on any matters affecting China and to let the NSC know about issues and initiatives that are coming up. **(Action: NSC/STATE/DOD)** ~~(S)~~

A.