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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

27-Apr-1994 15:33 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Kristen K. Cicio	(CICIO)
Samuel R. Berger	(BERGER)
Katherine M. Veit	(VEIT)
Richard A. Clarke	(CLARKER)

FROM: Richard A. Clarke
(CLARKER)

SUBJECT: PAPER SANDY ASKED FOR ON HAITI

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0362-M (1.01)
5/11/2018 KBH

SECRET

Haiti Peacekeeping: What, if any, protection should be afforded to Haitians?

Background

There is a consensus that a UN peacekeeping force introduced after a political agreement should do the following:

create and train a police

train and modernize the Army (including new non-lethal equipment, housing and other incentives to cooperate)

protect the international presence, including the PKO itself, the humanitarian aid workers, and the human rights monitors

Issue: Any protection for Haitians?

There needs to be clarity both in the minds of the peacekeepers and in those of the US Principals and the President about what we would expect the PKO to do, or not do, in certain circumstances where it would be within their capability to prevent actions against Haitians.

This analysis is not meant to deal with a situation in which there is a complete breakdown of order and a state of anarchy or civil war. In that case, the UN force would presumably withdraw and the US would decide if we wanted to engage in unilateral action. Nor is this analysis suggestive of a massive UN occupation force. Rather, this analysis focuses on dealing with the likely case of lesser disorder, within the capabilities of a small/medium size UN force to deal with if they had the authority.

There are two reasons to think about granting the UN force the authority to deal with lesser disorders within its capability:

This lesser disorder could escalate into general chaos if the UN force was tested and did not deal with it.

The President's policy will likely be severely criticized as weak if television cameras film Haitians being beaten to death while UN personnel (who may well be Americans) stand idly by at the scene. It could be akin to the criticism the Administration took when "a small gang of Haitian toughs chased off the Harlan County." Similar criticisms were levelled at Bosnian policy when the UN was only authorized to protect peacekeepers, but had to watch while Bosnian civilians were being killed.

There are a number of circumstances where the small/medium sized UN force we already have in mind could be effective in affording some protection to Haitians and containing an escalation of violence:

o On Scene of Abuse: What should the civilian police trainers, the military trainers, or the human rights monitors do if they are present at a scene where a human rights abuse is about to take place or is taking place and the UN personnel believe they could, consistent with their own safety, act to deter or terminate the abuse?

A similar event has already taken place. UN human rights observers watched as an Aristide cabinet member was dragged from the Cathedral and clubbed to death by a very few attaches. Had a half dozen UNCivPol (police) been present and authorized to act, they could have stopped the Cabinet member from being brutally murdered.

In the absence of clear Rules of Engagement permitting their intervention, UN personnel may merely watch and be watched in turn by CNN. In Rwanda, people fled to the UN compounds and the UN gave them protection even though they had no ROE to do so. In Bosnia, however, UN personnel watched as a senior Bosnian government official was dragged from a UN vehicle and killed.

This problem may be addressed by language in the resolution in the police section. For instance: "The UN CivPol shall train a new civilian police, especially in the control of human rights abuses, and shall provide assistance to the police in the conduct of their duties during the initial training period." This language would permit joint patrolling as on the job training. It would also permit the UN CivPol to act with

their Haitian partners if they see abuses while on joint patrol.

o Pattern of Initiation: Another possibility is that the attaches will continue and increase their assaults on Aristide supporters. The UN will be mocked if, despite its peacekeeping presence, pro-democracy citizens are dragged from their homes and macheted to death on a regular or widespread basis.

The language suggested above for the police could permit the UNCivPol to train the new Haitian civilian police in investigation and arrest by participating in both. UNCivPol could accompany their Haitian counterparts on investigations and arrests of those believed to be involved in political murders that take place after the force is present.

o Assassination/Coup: Both the military leadership and the Aristide government ministers will have good reason to fear for their personal safety. The military leadership may be attacked by the enlisted men or Aristide supporters. The Aristide ministers may be attacked by the military or the attaches (assuming there is much of a difference.) There are two reasons to take these possibilities into account when mandating the UN force:

If some protection is built into the plan, both sides may be more likely to accept the plan.

As with the earlier scenario, the President's policy on Haiti will be severely criticized if Aristide's ministers are killed by attaches while the UN (including Americans) sits idly by, or if there is a military coup that brings to power a group that diavows the settlement.

This scenario could be addressed by adding to the task of the UNCivPol "the creation and training of a non-partisan Executive Protection Service within the civilian police, and provision of assistance to that Service in its duties during an initial period." That language would allow for a small element of the UN force to provide on the job training to body guards for a handful of key officials and on the job training in site protection to a few key installations. The UN personnel could assist in fending off attacks on such personnel and installations. Given the small scale and lack of armament of the Haitian military and other groups, a small UN unit assigned to

the new Haitian EPS Police should be able to deter or deal with these scenarios.

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Additional Header Information Follows

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A1 Folder: APR94
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Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

08-Dec-1993 21:36 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Susan E. Rice
(RICE)

SUBJECT: Haiti-- UN Action

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2015-0362-17 (1.02)
5/11/2018 KBH

Haiti: UNSC Action Required

Your guidance is needed on the following issue:

The original UN resolution (867) established UNMIH (Haiti mission) for 6 months with the following condition:

"...subject to the proviso that it will be extended beyond 75 days only upon a review of the Council...on whether or not substantive progress has been made towards the implementation of the Governor's Island Agreement and the political accords contained in the New York Pact."

This language sounds worse (in light of recent events) than I think it really is. It only requires a pro forma nod to keep the mission going in theory.

(FYI: This language was a Russian addition to the resolution. It is a common feature of recent resolutions, which the U.S. championed in such cases as Georgia, Rwanda and Liberia to avoid endless missions going nowhere fast. Unfortunately, the Russians think what's fine for Georgia is fine for Haiti.)

By USUN's count the 75 days are up on Friday.

Feinberg, Clarke and I agree that we have no choice but to continue UNMIH through the 6 month mandate period for a whole host of political reasons. State agrees. There is no cost to extending UNMIH unless/until the mission redeploys.

To continue UNMIH, we can do one of the following:

- 1) letter from UNSC President to SYG saying the UNSC reviewed the mission and will keep it going;
- 2) UNSC Presidential statement to same effect with some additional rhetoric. (If no action is taken, we risk setting a bad precedent, ie. we may need to end an operation one day.)

State is preparing an instruction cable and will crosshatch it tomorrow. State proposes to instruct USUN to ensure that UNMIH's mandate does not lapse. To do so, it should consult with UNSC members on how to accomplish the "review" and agree

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to a letter or a Presidential statement along the lines outlined above. USUN will consult with Friends tomorrow to ascertain their views.

Do you agree with this approach?? Please let me know if you have a problem, if possible, by noon tomorrow.

Distribution:

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FOR: Samuel R. Berger	(BERGER)
FOR: Nancy Soderberg	(SODERBERG)
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Additional Header Information Follows

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Date Modified: 08-Dec-1993 20:54
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

09-Dec-1993 09:20 EDT

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MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Susan E. Rice
(RICE)

SUBJECT: Haiti: UN Action

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0362-M (1.03)
5/11/2018 KBH

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Al Folder: DEC93
Message Format:
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Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

08-Dec-1993 21:36 EDT

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