

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: The Secretary's Meeting with French FM Juppe, January 24, 1994, Paris (8 pages) <i>Partial release - KBM 9/21/2018</i>	01/25/1994	P1/b(1)
<del>002. cable</del>	<del>re: The Secretary's Meeting in Paris with French Prime Minister Balladur, January 24, 1994 (6 pages)</del>	<del>01/26/1994</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> <i>KBM 9/21/2018</i>
<del>003. cable</del>	<del>re: The Secretary's Meeting with Chinese Vice Premier Qian Qichen, January 24, 1994, Paris: Working Lunch on International Issues (7 pages)</del>	<del>01/26/1994</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> <i>KBM 9/21/2018</i>

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Cables  
 ([Christopher and Qian])  
 OA/Box Number: 505000

**FOLDER TITLE:**

[01/25/1994-01/26/1994]

2015-0386-M

rs1170

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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# Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE  
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 LINE1: OAACZYUW RUCNGHA0011 0250154-CCCC--RHEHAAX.  
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH (CCY TEXT)  
 LINE3: O 250154Z JAN 94  
 LINE4: FM USDEL SECRETARY  
 OSRI: RUCNGH  
 DTG: 250154Z JAN 94  
 ORIG: USDEL SECRETARY  
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9906  
 INFO: RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING  
 RUEHZG/NATO POSTS COLLECTIVE  
 RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV  
 RUFHBE/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE  
 RUFHZG/AMCONSUL ZAGREB  
 RUFHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA  
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK.  
 SUBJ: THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH FRENCH FM JUPPE  
 - JANUARY 24, 1994, PARIS

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
 PER E. O. 13526

2015-0386-M (1.01)  
 5/11/2018 KBN

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 05 SECTO 020011  
 CORRECTED COPY (TEXT)

EXDIS

USVIENNA FOR CSCE; VIENNA FOR BOSNIA; GENEVA FOR CD  
 E.O.12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (CHRISTOPHER, WARREN), PREL, FR, SR, BK

SUBJECT: THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH FRENCH FM JUPPE  
 - JANUARY 24, 1994, PARIS

- 1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
- 2. PARTICIPANTS:

FRANCE

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FM ALAIN JUPPE  
 ALAIN DEJAMMET  
 POLITICAL DIRECTOR, MFA  
 DOMINIQUE DE VILLEPIN  
 FOREIGN MINISTER'S  
 CHEF DE CABINET  
 BRUNO RACINE  
 CABINET ADVISOR  
 AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S.  
 JACQUES ANDREANI  
 RICHARD DUQUE,  
 MFA SPOKESMAN  
 CHRISTOPHE THIERRY,  
 INTERPRETER

U.S.

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SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER  
 AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN  
 GEN.MICHAEL RYAN, JCS  
 STEPHEN OXMAN,  
 ASST. SECRETARY, EUR  
 MICHAEL MCCURRY,  
 STATE DEPT. SPOKESMAN  
 ALEXANDER VERSHBOW,  
 PRINCIPLE DAS, EUR  
 CAROL WOLTER,  
 INTERPRETER

JANUARY 24, 1994, 0800-0905, QUAI D'ORSAY, PARIS

- 3. SUMMARY: THE SECRETARY AND FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER JUPPE REVIEWED A WIDE RANGE OF ISSUES ON WHICH U.S. AND FRENCH POSITIONS LARGELY COINCIDE, AND THEN HAD A MORE

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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001. cable	re: The Secretary's Meeting with French FM Juppe, January 24, 1994, Paris [partial] (2 pages)	01/25/1994	P1/b(1)

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Cables  
([Christopher and Qian])  
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### FOLDER TITLE:

[01/25/1994-01/26/1994]

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CONTENTIOUS DISCUSSION OF BOSNIA. THE FRENCH AGREED WITH THE SECRETARY ON THE NEED FOR RAPID FOLLOW-UP TO THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE AND OTHER NATO SUMMIT INITIATIVES. THE MINISTERS EXCHANGED SIMILAR ASSESSMENTS OF THE SITUATION IN UKRAINE AND RUSSIA. ON CHINA, THE SECRETARY WELCOMED WORD THAT JUPPE HAD RAISED HUMAN RIGHTS IN HIS MEETINGS WITH CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER QIAN. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER URGED THE FRENCH TO ENCOURAGE CHINESE PRESSURE ON NORTH KOREA TO COMPLY WITH ITS IAEA OBLIGATIONS. THE SECRETARY PRESSED THE FRENCH TO PURSUE A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN;

EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

THE SECRETARY BRIEFED JUPPE ON HIS AND THE PRESIDENT'S RECENT CONTACTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

4. ON BOSNIA, JUPPE ARGUED THAT THE PARTIES WOULD NOT REACH A SETTLEMENT WITHOUT OUTSIDE PRESSURE AND THAT THE CONFLICT WOULD SOON ESCALATE, PARTICULARLY IF SOME UNPROFOR CONTRIBUTORS WITHDREW THEIR TROOPS. HE CALLED ON THE EU, THE U.S. AND RUSSIA TO AGREE ON THE TERMS OF A SETTLEMENT AND IMPOSE IT POLITICALLY ON THE PARTIES. HE ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE UNWILLINGNESS OF SOME ALLIES TO IMPLEMENT THE NATO SUMMIT DECISIONS ON USING AIR POWER AT TUZLA AND SREBRENICA. THE SECRETARY SAID THE U.S. WOULD NOT IMPOSE TERMS ON THE MUSLIMS, AND ARGUED THAT THE LOGIC OF JUPPE'S PROPOSAL COULD LEAD TO THE NEED TO ENFORCE A SETTLEMENT WITH A MASSIVE DEPLOYMENT OF GROUND FORCES. THE FOCUS SHOULD BE ON PRESSURING THE SERBS TO GIVE TERRITORY OF BETTER QUALITY TO THE MUSLIMS. THE SECRETARY SAID THE U.S. STOOD FIRMLY BY ITS NATO COMMITMENTS ON THE USE OF AIR POWER; HE NOTED THAT SREBRENICA SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN RESOLVED AND THAT TUZLA REMAINED AN OPEN QUESTION. THE MEETING ENDED WITH AN AGREEMENT TO CONTINUE THE DISCUSSION AMONG EXPERTS. JUPPE SUGGESTED THAT HE COME TO WASHINGTON IN MAY TO PREPARE FOR PRESIDENT CLINTON'S VISIT TO FRANCE IN JUNE. END SUMMARY.

U.S.-FRENCH RELATIONS

5. THE SECRETARY AND FM JUPPE HAD A WIDE-RANGING DISCUSSION OVER BREAKFAST JANUARY 24. THE SECRETARY NOTED WITH SATISFACTION THE EXTRAORDINARY SPIRIT OF COOPERATION THAT NOW CHARACTERIZED THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. HE EXPRESSED HIS GRATITUDE FOR FRENCH SUPPORT IN MAKING OUR PROPOSALS FOR THE NATO SUMMIT A REALITY, AND WELCOMED THE FRENCH DESIRE TO PLAY A LEADING ROLE IN THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE, INCLUDING POSSIBLY OCCUPYING ONE OF THE SENIOR POSITIONS AT THE PARTNERSHIP COORDINATION CELL.

6. THE SECRETARY URGED THE FRENCH TO WORK WITH US AND THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE TO GET THE PFP UP AND RUNNING AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER CITED THE WARM WELCOME FOR THE INITIATIVE DURING PRESIDENT CLINTON'S

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 05 SECTO 020011  
EXDIS

USVIENNA FOR CSCE; VIENNA FOR BOSNIA; GENEVA FOR CD

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (CHRISTOPHER, WARREN), PREL, FR, SR, BK

SUBJECT: THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH FRENCH FM JUPPE

JANUARY 24, 1994; PARIS

VISITS TO PRAGUE, KIEV, MOSCOW AND MINSK, AND THE SUPPORT FOR PFP OF THE CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, AS WELL AS SWEDEN AND FINLAND. THE SECRETARY STRESSED THE NEED TO DISPATCH NATO TEAMS TO EASTERN EUROPEAN CAPITALS QUICKLY TO PUT FLESH ON THE BONES OF PFP. THE SECRETARY SAID THE U.S. ALSO WANTED TO WORK CLOSELY WITH FRANCE TO DEVELOP THE DETAILS OF THE SUMMIT DECISIONS ON CJTF, AND NOTED THAT OUR DELEGATIONS IN BRUSSELS SEEMED TO BE COOPERATING WELL.

7. JUPPE SAID FRANCE FULLY SUPPORTED PFP, AS IT WAS PERFECTLY SUITED TO THE PRESENT SITUATION: IT RESPONDED TO THE DESIRES OF THE NEW DEMOCRACIES IN CEE WHILE KEEPING RUSSIA IN THE GAME. HE AGREED ON THE NEED TO QUICKLY IMPLEMENT PFP AND TO MAKE CONCRETE THE SUMMIT DECISIONS ON CJTF BY THE TIME OF THE SPRING NAC MINISTERIAL.

UKRAINE/RUSSIA  
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8. THE SECRETARY NOTED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE U.S.-RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN ACCORD ON REMOVAL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM UKRAINE. THIS WAS A MAJOR STEP BY PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK, AND WE NEEDED TO HELP HIM GET THE DEAL THROUGH THE RADA, WHERE THE FATE OF THE AGREEMENT WAS STILL IN QUESTION. THE SECRETARY ALSO COMMENTED ON THE TERRIBLE STATE OF THE UKRAINIAN ECONOMY.

9. JUPPE AGREED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TRILATERAL ACCORD AND SAID FRANCE WOULD TRY TO ENSURE THAT IMPLEMENTATION WENT WELL. HE AGREED THE UKRAINIAN ECONOMY WAS IN DISASTROUS SHAPE AND SUGGESTED THAT OUR COUNTRIES SHOULD LOOK FOR WAYS TO GET MORE INVOLVED IN UKRAINE. FRANCE WAS ASSISTING IN THE AREA OF NUCLEAR REACTOR SAFETY, AND THE EU-12 WERE WORKING ON A DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. THE EU MAY HAVE OVERLY FOCUSED ON RUSSIA, JUPPE ADDED.

10. JUPPE SAID DEVELOPMENTS IN RUSSIA RAISED MANY QUESTIONS. FRANCE WOULD CONTINUE TO BACK YELTSIN AS LONG AS HE REPRESENTED THE CAUSE OF REFORM. BUT HE WAS WORRIED BY THE DEPARTURE OF REFORMERS FROM THE CABINET AND THE RISE IN NATIONALIST SENTIMENT IN FOREIGN POLICY, MOST DISTURBINGLY IN THE STATEMENTS OF KOZYREV.

11. THE SECRETARY SAID HE AGREED WITH JUPPE'S ANALYSIS. HE RECALLED YELTSIN'S ASSURANCES TO PRESIDENT CLINTON DURING THE MOSCOW SUMMIT REGARDING HIS CONTINUING COMMITMENT TO REFORM IN THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND FOREIGN POLICY AREAS. BUT CHERNOMYRDIN'S INFLUENCE MAY BE GROWING, AND WE ALL HAD TO WAIT AND SEE WHICH TENDENCY PREVAILS. SLOWING DOWN THE REFORM PROCESS WAS NOT THE ANSWER, THE SECRETARY SAID, ALTHOUGH THERE HAD TO BE MORE SENSITIVITY TO THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF REFORM (WHICH HAD, UNTIL THE RECENT DECLINE IN THE RUBLE, BEEN SHOWING SOME IMPROVEMENT).

12. THE SECRETARY ADDED THAT HE TOO WAS DISTURBED BY SOME OF KOZYREV'S RECENT STATEMENTS, E.G. ON THE PRESENCE OF RUSSIAN TROOPS IN THE REPUBLICS OF THE FSU AND THE BALTICS. THESE DID NOT CORRESPOND WITH YELTSIN'S POSITIVE STANCE DURING THE SUMMIT ON WITHDRAWAL OF RUSSIAN TROOPS FROM THE BALTICS AND HIS AGREEMENT TO COMPROMISE ON THE DURATION OF RUSSIA'S STAY AT THE SKRUNDA RADAR. THIS DISCONTINUITY BETWEEN YELTSIN AND KOZYREV WAS SURPRISING, GIVEN THE LATTER'S POLITICAL DEPENDENCE ON THE FORMER.

13. JUPPE AGREED WE NEEDED TO BE VIGILANT IN CONSIDERING OUR OWN POLITICAL LINE, RECALLING KOZYREV'S STATEMENTS AT

THE CSCE ASSERTING A POLICEMAN'S ROLE FOR RUSSIA WITHIN THE CIS, WITH THE PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS TO BE FINANCED BY THE WEST. HE NOTED THAT THE QUESTION OF A ZHIRINOVSKY VISIT TO FRANCE HAD NOW RECEDED. PLANS FOR HIM TO JOIN A DELEGATION TO THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE (FOR WHICH A VISA COULD NOT BE DENIED) APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN DROPPED.

CHINA

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14. JUPPE SAID HE HAD MET CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER QIAN ON SATURDAY, AND HAD STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRESS TO IMPROVED SINO-FRENCH RELATIONS. JUPPE EXPLAINED THE RECENT FRENCH DECISIONS ON RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN; HE EXPLAINED IT WAS THE "MANNER" IN WHICH FRANCE HAD DEALT WITH TAIWAN, MORE THAN THE SUBSTANCE OF  
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 05 SECTO 020011  
EXDIS

USVIENNA FOR CSCE; VIENNA FOR BOSNIA; GENEVA FOR CD  
E.O.12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (CHRISTOPHER, WARREN), PREL, FR, SR, BK  
SUBJECT: THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH FRENCH FM JUPPE  
JANUARY 24, 1994, PARIS

FRENCH-TAIWAN RELATIONS, THAT HAD COMPLICATED PARIS' RELATIONS WITH BEIJING. THE SECRETARY THANKED THE FRENCH FOR RAISING HUMAN RIGHTS. SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS WERE STILL SHADOWED BY THE EVENTS ON TIENANMEN SQUARE, AND WE FACED A DIFFICULT DECISION ON RENEWAL OF MFN.  
NORTH KOREA

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15. THE SECRETARY WENT ON TO URGE THAT THE FRENCH ASK THE CHINESE TO PRESS THE NORTH KOREANS TO COMPLY WITH THEIR IAEA OBLIGATIONS. THE CHINESE HAD THE MOST INFLUENCE OVER PYONGYANG, AND IT WAS NOT IN THE CHINESE INTEREST TO SEE THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE COME TO A VOTE IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. JUPPE SAID HE HAD RAISED THIS WITH QIAN, WHO HAD RESPONDED CAUTIOUSLY. CHINA WAS RELUCTANT TO PRESS HARD GIVEN NORTH KOREAN SENSITIVITY ABOUT ITS SOVEREIGNTY. JUPPE SAID HE HAD URGED DISCREET PRESSURE, AND QIAN SEEMED TO BE SUPPORTIVE. THE SECRETARY SAID THIS WAS ENCOURAGING. THE KEY WAS FOR NORTH KOREA TO COMPLY WITH THE IAEA'S DEMANDS; WE WOULD NOT SECOND-GUESS BLIX. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ON THE GROUND WERE WORRISOME, ALTHOUGH THE DEADLINE FOR RESOLVING THE ISSUE WAS UP TO THE IAEA.  
CTBT

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16. THE SECRETARY URGED THE FRENCH TO MOVE FORWARD WITH NEGOTIATIONS ON A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN. JUPPE SAID THE FRENCH WERE IN FAVOR OF A CTBT, BUT WERE ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT MAINTAINING AN UP-TO-DATE NUCLEAR DETERRENT, SINCE THIS WAS THE KEYSTONE OF FRANCE'S DEFENSES. FRANCE WAS WAY BEHIND THE U.S. IN SIMULATION TECHNIQUES AND WOULD LIKE TO CONDUCT FURTHER TESTS BEFORE BEING BOUND BY A CTBT.

EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

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17. THE SECRETARY BRIEFED JUPPE ON HIS OSLO DISCUSSIONS WITH PERES AND ARAFAT, AS WELL AS ON SUBSEQUENT ISRAELI-PLO

DISCUSSIONS. HE SAID HE WAS OPTIMISTIC THAT A DEAL COULD BE FINALIZED IN 2-3 WEEKS. HE NOTED THAT ARAFAT SEEMED AWARE HE WAS LOSING THE SUPPORT OF DONOR COUNTRIES AND OF PALESTINIANS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AS THE TALKS DRAGGED ON.

18. IN RESPONSE TO JUPPE'S REQUEST, THE SECRETARY DESCRIBED THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH ASSAD AS LIKELY TO GIVE IMPETUS TO THE ISRAELI-SYRIAN TALKS. ASSAD CLEARLY WANTS TO MOVE AHEAD, ALTHOUGH IT WAS NOT CLEAR HOW THE ACCIDENTAL DEATH OF HIS SON WOULD AFFECT THE PACE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. JUPPE NOTED HIS FORTHCOMING VISIT TO ISRAEL AND JORDAN. THE SECRETARY SAID KING HUSSEIN HAD MET PRESIDENT CLINTON THE PREVIOUS FRIDAY. HE SEEMED READY FOR PROGRESS, BUT DID NOT WANT TO GET OUT AHEAD OF THE REST OF THE PROCESS.

BOSNIA

19. JUPPE OPENED THE DISCUSSION OF BOSNIA BY ASSURING THE SECRETARY THAT, CONTRARY TO HOW IT MAY SEEM, FRANCE'S OBSESSION WITH BOSNIA WAS NOT AIMED AT PUTTING THE U.S. IN A DIFFICULT POSITION. FRANCE WANTED TO WORK WITH THE U.S., AS IT HAD LAST SPRING WITH THE JOINT ACTION PROGRAM AND THE NOVEMBER EU INITIATIVE. THOSE PREVIOUS EFFORTS HAD FAILED, AND WE NEEDED TO DEVISE SOMETHING ELSE. JUPPE ADDED THAT HE HAD NEVER SPOKEN PUBLICLY OF A FIVE-POWER MEETING ON BOSNIA; HE HAD ONLY STRESSED THE NEED TO START FROM SCRATCH AND CALLED FOR U.S.-EU-RUSSIAN CONSULTATIONS.

20. JUPPE THEN LAUNCHED INTO AN EXTREMELY PESSIMISTIC REVIEW OF THE CURRENT SITUATION: THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS HAD FAILED EVEN THOUGH THE PARTIES' POSITIONS WERE CLOSE. MOREOVER, FRANCE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT NO ONE WANTED TO IMPLEMENT THE NATO SUMMIT DECISIONS ON USING AIR POWER TO DEAL WITH TUZLA AND SREBRENICA; THE CANADIANS, OGATA AND AKASHI WERE ALL AGAINST ANY TALK OF AIR STRIKES; THE UNSYG  
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 04 OF 05 SECTO 020011  
EXDIS

USVIENNA FOR CSCE; VIENNA FOR BOSNIA; GENEVA FOR CD

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SUBJECT: THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH FRENCH FM JUPPE

- JANUARY 24, 1994, PARIS

WAS CAUTIOUS AND ALSO UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE RUSSIANS. SO WE HAD A DEADLOCK, AND CONDITIONS WERE DETERIORATING IN SARAJEVO AND ELSEWHERE. THE STATUS QUO WOULD NOT LAST.

21. JUPPE NOTED THAT SOME UNPROFOR COUNTRIES (UK, SPAIN, CANADA) WERE OPENLY TALKING ABOUT PULLING OUT THEIR TROOPS, WHICH JUPPE SAID WOULD LEAD TO A FURTHER DOWNWARD SPIRAL. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WAS UNDER GROWING PRESSURE TO PULL OUT AS WELL. IF NOTHING HAPPENED WITHIN THE NEXT 4-5 MONTHS, THERE WOULD BE RENEWED FIGHTING AND SARAJEVO COULD FALL. THE QUESTION WAS HOW COULD WE AVOID THIS?

22. JUPPE SAID THAT THE PARTIES WOULD NOT COME TO AGREEMENT ON A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WITHOUT OUTSIDE PRESSURE. HE HAD SPOKEN WITH HURD AND KINKEL ON THIS, AND THEY AGREED THAT THE EU COUNTRIES, THE U.S. AND RUSSIA NEEDED TO DEVELOP A COMMON POSITION ON THE TERMS OF A SETTLEMENT AND TELL THE PARTIES THEY MUST SIGN -- TO IMPOSE IT POLITICALLY UPON THE PARTIES. SUCH A POSITION COULD BE

BASED ON THE EU'S ACTION PLAN OF LAST NOVEMBER THE EU PLAN WASN'T PERFECT AND COULD BE MODIFIED. BUT WITHOUT A COMMON APPROACH, THERE WAS NO WAY TO STOP THE MASSACRE.

23. THE SECRETARY, AFTER COMMENDING FRANCE FOR THE ENORMOUS BURDENS IT WAS SHOULDERING IN THE HUMANITARIAN EFFORT, SAID HE THOUGHT JUPPE HAD PAINTED TOO DIRE A PICTURE. THE NATO SUMMIT DECISIONS SEEMED TO BE HAVING A POSITIVE EFFECT ON RESOLVING THE TROOP ROTATION AT SREBRENICA. THE UN MILITARY AUTHORITIES WERE STILL WORKING ON A MILITARY PLAN FOR OPENING TUZLA AIRPORT, AND SO IT WAS TOO SOON TO JUDGE THE EFFECT OF NATO'S DECISION. THE SECRETARY SAID THE U.S. WAS FULLY PREPARED TO FOLLOW THROUGH ON ITS NATO COMMITMENTS TO USE AIR POWER AT TUZLA IF THE PLANS CALLED FOR THIS. THE AUGUST NATO DECISION ON AIRSTRIKES WAS ALSO STILL OPERATIVE FOR THE U.S. HE ADDED THAT IT WAS IRONIC THAT FRANCE WAS CONCERNED THAT THE UN SYG AND HIS ASSISTANTS WERE DELAYING MATTERS; IT HAD NOT BEEN OUR IDEA TO INTERPOSE THEM IN THE CHAIN OF COMMAND.

24. THE SECRETARY DID NOT DISMISS THE PROSPECTS FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE MUSLIMS WERE DISSATISFIED WITH THE QUALITY OF THE LAND OFFERED BY THE SERBS, NOT THE QUANTITY. THE FOCUS, THEREFORE, SHOULD BE ON PRESSURING THE SERBS TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING. THE SECRETARY EXPLAINED THAT THE U.S. HAD NEVER SOUGHT TO IMPOSE A SETTLEMENT ON THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT, NOR WILL WE DO SO NOW, SINCE THEY WERE THE AGGRIEVED PARTY IN THE CONFLICT AND THE BIG LOSERS UNDER EVEN THE MOST FAVORABLE SETTLEMENT. ONE WAY TO APPROACH THE PROBLEM MIGHT BE TO FIND OUT WHAT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO SATISFY THE MUSLIMS AND PROCEED ON THAT BASIS.

25. JUPPE SAID THE PARTIES HAD BEEN EXTREMELY CLOSE TO AGREEMENT ON MANY OCCASIONS, AND THE LATEST SERB OFFERS MET THE 1/3 REQUIREMENT OF THE MUSLIMS. THE FACT OF THE MATTER, HOWEVER, WAS THAT THE PARTIES DO NOT WANT PEACE. HE AGREED THE SERBS WERE THE AGGRESSORS AND HAD BEEN RIGHTLY PUNISHED WITH UN SANCTIONS. BUT THE MUSLIMS WERE GETTING STRONGER AND WERE TRYING TO GAIN ON THE BATTLEFIELD WHAT THEY COULD NOT GET AT THE TABLE. AS FOR TUZLA AND SREBRENICA, THERE MAY HAVE BEEN SOME PROGRESS, BUT THE WORLD COMMUNITY NEEDED TO SHOW IT WAS CAPABLE OF FACING THE CHALLENGE. IN ANY CASE, THESE WERE HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS THAT WOULD NOT AFFECT THE PEACE PROCESS.

26. JUPPE REPEATED THAT THE EU PLAN REMAINED VALID AND COULD BE MODIFIED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF U.S. CONCERNS. IF THE EU PROCEEDED WITH THE U.S. REMAINING IN THE WINGS, HOWEVER, NO PROGRESS WOULD BE MADE. THE RUSSIANS WOULD TORPEDO THINGS AND INCITE THE SERBS. HE AGAIN URGED THE U.S. TO WORK TOGETHER WITH FRANCE AND THE REST OF THE EU TO AGREE ON A COMMON APPROACH THAT COULD BE IMPOSED ON THE PARTIES.

27. THE SECRETARY AGREED THAT ACTION AT TUZLA AND SREBRENICA WOULD NOT GET AT THE BASIC PROBLEM. AS FOR THE MUSLIMS, ONE HAD TO REMEMBER THAT THEY WERE NOT GAINING, BUT REGAINING TERRITORY THAT HAD BEEN TAKEN FROM THEM. PERHAPS THE U.S. MORAL COMPASS MIGHT BE POINTING IN A SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT DIRECTION THAN THE FRENCH. WHY SHOULD WE IMPOSE A SETTLEMENT ON THE MUSLIMS JUST BECAUSE THEY WERE WINNING?

28. JUPPE SAID THAT THE MUSLIMS HAD OBTAINED THE 33.3  
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 05 SECTO 020011

EXDIS

USVIENNA FOR CSCE; VIENNA FOR BOSNIA; GENEVA FOR CD

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR

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SUBJECT: THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH FRENCH FM JUPPE

- JANUARY 24, 1994, PARIS

PERCENT OF THE TERRITORY THAT THEY HAD DEMANDED. WE COULD NOT ALLOW CHILDREN TO CONTINUE TO DIE OVER TINY FRACTIONS OF ADDITIONAL LAND. THE SECRETARY REJOINED THAT THE ISSUE WASN'T QUANTITY BUT QUALITY. THE SERBS COULD RESPOND, BUT REFUSED TO DO SO. IT MAY BE TRUE THAT THE MUSLIMS OVERESTIMATED THEIR PROSPECTS ON THE BATTLEFIELD, BUT THEY HAVE SURVIVED THE WINTER, CONTRARY TO SOME PREDICTIONS. THUS IT WAS QUESTIONABLE WHETHER THEY COULD BE COMPELLED TO AGREE TO A SETTLEMENT ON UNACCEPTABLE TERMS. INDEED, THE LOGIC OF THE FRENCH PROPOSAL TO IMPOSE A SETTLEMENT COULD ULTIMATELY REQUIRE MASSIVE GROUND FORCES TO ENFORCE ITS TERMS. HE DOUBTED THE FRENCH WERE PREPARED TO DEPLOY TENS OR HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF TROOPS TO DO THIS, ANY MORE THAN THE U.S. THE SECRETARY CONCLUDED BY SUGGESTING THAT POLITICAL DIRECTORS CONTINUE TO DISCUSSION.

29. JUPPE SAID WE SHOULD TRY TO FIND A SOLUTION THAT EVERYONE --THE EU, THE U.S. AND THE RUSSIANS-- COULD SUPPORT, SO THAT WE COULD CHANGE THE ATTITUDE OF THE PARTIES. FRANCE WAS NOT ASKING THE U.S. TO SEND GROUND TROOPS; HE UNDERSTOOD THE CONGRESSIONAL CONSTRAINTS. BUT A UNITED DIPLOMATIC FRONT COULD BE EFFECTIVE. TODAY, EACH OF THE PARTIES THOUGHT IT HAD ONE OF THE GREAT POWERS ON ITS SIDE. IF THESE PARTIES SAID "NO," IT COULD CHANGE THEIR ATTITUDE. JUPPE SAID HE SAW NO OTHER WAY OUT THAN A DISENGAGEMENT BY UNPROFOR THAT WOULD SIMPLY ENCOURAGE THE PARTIES TO FIGHT ON.

30. AFTER THE MINISTERS HAD DISCUSSED HOW TO HANDLE THE PRESS AFTER THE MEETING, JUPPE SAID HE WANTED TO PROPOSE THAT, IN ADVANCE OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO FRANCE IN JUNE FOR THE NORMANDY INVASION COMMEMORATION, THE TWO MINISTERS MEET IN MAY TO PREPARE FOR THOSE DISCUSSIONS. IF THE SECRETARY AGREED, HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO COME TO WASHINGTON, FOLLOWING PREPARATORY DISCUSSIONS BY EXPERTS IN APRIL. THE SECRETARY WELCOMED THIS PROPOSAL.

CHRISTOPHER

BT

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 05

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SIT: BLEICKEN FILE-FRIED HOLL-LEBOURGEOIS SUM2-VAX WADDELL WALKER

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## Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE  
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
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 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
 LINE3: O R 260216Z JAN 94  
 LINE4: FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
 OSRI: RUEHC  
 DTG: 260216Z JAN 94  
 ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC  
 TO: RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0000  
 INFO: ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE  
 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0000  
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0000  
 RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 0000  
 RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 0000  
 RUFHZG/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 0000  
 RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 0000  
 SUBJ: THE SECRETARY'S MEETING IN PARIS WITH FRENCH  
 PRIME MINISTER BALLADUR, JANUARY 24, 1994  
 TEXT:  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 019931  
 EXDIS VIENNA FOR EMBASSY BOSNIA  
 E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR  
 TAGS: OVIP (CHRISTOPHER, WARREN), PREL, FR, SR, BK  
 SUBJECT: THE SECRETARY'S MEETING IN PARIS WITH FRENCH  
 PRIME MINISTER BALLADUR, JANUARY 24, 1994  
 1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.  
 2. PARTICIPANTS:  
 FRANCE  
 -----  
 PRIME MINISTER BALLADUR  
 BERNARD DE MONTFERRAND,  
 DIPLOMATIC ADVISER TO THE PM  
 JACQUES ANDREANI, FRENCH  
 AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S.  
 ALAIN DEJAMMET,  
 QUAI POLITICAL DIRECTOR  
 THIERRY DANA,  
 ADVISER TO THE PM  
 CHRISTOPHE THIERRY  
 INTERPRETER  
 INTERPRETER  
 3. SUMMARY. THE SECRETARY'S DISCUSSION WITH PRIME  
 MINISTER BALLADUR FOCUSSED ON UKRAINE AND RUSSIA, THE  
 BALLADUR STABILITY PACT, AND BOSNIA. BALLADUR FULLY  
 ENDORSED THE SECRETARY'S APPEAL FOR CONCERTED ASSISTANCE  
 TO RUSSIAN REFORMERS BUT CAUTIONED THAT WE OUGHT TO  
 CONDITION OUR AID ON MORE "ACCEPTABLE" RUSSIAN BEHAVIOR  
 TOWARDS ITS NEIGHBORS. ON BOSNIA, BALLADUR WARNED THAT  
 "OUR COMMON INABILITY" TO STOP THE WAR IS SERIOUSLY

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 PER E.O. 13526  
 2015-0386-M (1.02)  
 5/11/2018 KBM

U.S.  
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SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER  
 AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN  
 STEPHEN OXMAN, EUR  
 ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
 LT. GEN. MIKE RYAN,  
 JCS  
 ALEXANDER VERSHBOW,  
 EUR PRINCIPAL DAS  
 WILLIAM BELLAMY,  
 PARIS POLMINCOUNS  
 (NOTETAKER)  
 CAROL WOLTER,

ERODING WESTERN CREDIBILITY. HE URGED THE U.S. TO JOIN IN PRESSURING ALL PARTIES TO REACH A SETTLEMENT NOW -- BASED ON THE EXISTING EU ACTION PLAN, OR A SLIGHTLY MODIFIED VERSION OF IT. THE SECRETARY TOLD BALLADUR THAT THE U.S. REMAINS FULLY COMMITTED TO IMPLEMENTATION OF NATO DECISIONS ON BOSNIA -- INCLUDING POSSIBLE AIRSTRIKES -- BUT THAT THE U.S. WILL NOT PRESSURE THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT, THE AGGRIEVED PARTY IN THIS CONFLICT, TO ACCEPT AN UNFAIR SETTLEMENT. THE SECRETARY DREW BALLADUR ASIDE AFTER THE MEETING TO EXPRESS OUR DISAGREEMENT WITH FRANCE'S RELEASE OF TWO IRANIAN TERRORIST SUSPECTS SOUGHT BY SWITZERLAND. END SUMMARY.

4. THE SECRETARY MET FOR 50 MINUTES JANUARY 24 WITH PRIME MINISTER EDOUARD BALLADUR. AFTER AN EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS, THE SECRETARY OPENED DISCUSSION BY REMARKING ON THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE URUGUAY ROUND AND U.S. APPRECIATION OF EXCELLENT FRENCH COOPERATION AT THE NATO SUMMIT. BALLADUR SAID FRANCE WAS "ENTIRELY SATISFIED" WITH SUMMIT DECISIONS AND NOW LOOKED FORWARD TO THEIR IMPLEMENTATION. THE SECRETARY SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT WORK WAS PROCEEDING WELL ALONG THESE LINES.

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UKRAINE AND RUSSIA  
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5. COMPLIMENTING THE U.S. FOR BROKERING THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGREEMENT BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE UKRAINE, BALLADUR ASKED FOR THE SECRETARY'S JUDGMENT ON UKRAINE AND ON INTERNAL RUSSIAN DEVELOPMENTS. BALLADUR ALSO SOUGHT THE SECRETARY'S VIEWS ON HOW RECENT EVENTS IN RUSSIA MIGHT AFFECT RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY.

6. THE SECRETARY SAID THE U.S. HAD FOR MONTHS MADE STRENUOUS EFFORTS TO HOLD UKRAINE TO ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE LISBON ACCORDS. A TRILATERAL APPROACH, WITH THE U.S. ACTING AS A FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARY, HAD FINALLY LAID THE FOUNDATION FOR AN AGREEMENT. THE SECRETARY OUTLINED HOW THE AGREEMENT WOULD WORK, WITH UKRAINE RECEIVING FUNDS FROM THE U.S. UNDER NUNN-LUGAR, AS WELL AS COMPENSATION FOR THE DISPOSAL OF WEAPONS GRADE URANIUM. THE SECRETARY SAID PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK APPEARS READY TO STAKE HIS POLITICAL FUTURE ON FULFILLING THIS AGREEMENT. WHILE THERE IS SOME CONCERN THAT THE UKRAINIAN PARLIAMENT MIGHT TRY TO OVERTURN THE AGREEMENT, THE STRONG FINANCIAL INCENTIVES OF THE PLAN MAY PREVENT THIS FROM HAPPENING. THE SECRETARY ADDED THAT UKRAINE'S ECONOMIC SITUATION IS GRAVE; UKRAINE BADLY NEEDS WESTERN HELP.

7. BALLADUR OBSERVED THAT FRANCE'S ECONOMIC TIES TO UKRAINE ARE LIMITED. HE THOUGHT THAT IT WAS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT THAT WESTERN ASSISTANCE FOCUS ON NUCLEAR SAFETY IN BOTH RUSSIA AND THE UKRAINE. THE SECRETARY AGREED, NOTING THE UNFORTUNATE IRONY OF SHIPPING NUCLEAR FUEL TO UKRAINE -- AS PART OF THE AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA -- WHEN THERE IS DOUBT ABOUT THE SAFETY OF UKRAINE'S REACTORS. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT THE U.S. IS ALREADY INVOLVED IN HELPING TO IMPROVE THE SAFETY OF RUSSIAN REACTORS.

8. TURNING TO RUSSIA, THE SECRETARY SAID YELTSIN APPEARS FULLY DETERMINED TO PURSUE DEMOCRATIC, ECONOMIC AND FOREIGN POLICY REFORMS. THE NEW CONSTITUTION GIVES HIM THE MEANS TO DO SO. BALLADUR INTERRUPTED TO ASK IF THE

U.S. REALLY BELIEVES THAT YELTSIN IS STILL COMMITTED TO REFORMS. THE SECRETARY ANSWERED THAT YELTSIN HAS THUS FAR CARRIED OUT ALL OF HIS COMMITMENTS TO REFORM. THE CURRENT ECONOMIC SITUATION IS NOT ENCOURAGING, HOWEVER. THE SECRETARY ADMITTED THAT, TO KEEP REFORM ON TRACK, YELTSIN WILL HAVE TO ENGAGE IN COALITION-BUILDING IN A VERY DIFFICULT AND TENSE PARLIAMENTARY ENVIRONMENT. DESPITE THESE PROBLEMS, THE U.S. WILL SPARE NO EFFORT TO ADVANCE THE REFORM PROCESS. WE HOPE THAT OTHERS, SUCH AS FRANCE, WILL DO LIKewise.

9. BALLADUR FULLY AGREED WITH THE NEED TO ENCOURAGE RUSSIAN REFORMERS. HE WONDERED, HOWEVER, IF THE WEST SHOULD INCREASE AID TO RUSSIA WHILE DECISIONS REACHED AT THE TOKYO SUMMIT REMAIN TO BE IMPLEMENTED. BALLADUR ALSO ASKED IF THE WEST SHOULD CONSIDER LINKING AID WITH RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY PERFORMANCE. FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV'S RECENT DECLARATIONS ON RUSSIAN POLICY TOWARDS ITS NEAR ABROAD WERE PARTICULARLY WORRISOME. SO WAS YELTSIN'S BRUSQUE "NYET" AT THE DECEMBER RUSSIAN-EU SUMMIT TO THE IDEA THAT POLAND MIGHT DRAW CLOSER TO NATO. SUCH BEHAVIOR SUGGESTS IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO OVERLOOK AN "UNACCEPTABLE" FOREIGN POLICY FROM THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT SIMPLY BECAUSE WE FEAR THE FOREIGN POLICY OF A DIFFERENT RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT. REPEATING HIS TOTAL AGREEMENT WITH THE SECRETARY'S APPEAL TO AID RUSSIAN REFORMERS, BALLADUR NONETHELESS THOUGHT THAT THE WEST MUST SIGNAL THAT AID WILL BE CONDITIONED TO SOME EXTENT ON RUSSIAN BEHAVIOR TOWARD ITS NEIGHBORS. BALLADUR POINTED OUT THAT THE STABILITY PACT HE HAD PROPOSED WAS ONE METHOD OF DEALING WITH RUSSIAN ASSERTIVENESS.

10. THE SECRETARY WELCOMED SUCH EFFORTS AND SAID THE U.S. WISHES TO PARTICIPATE AS THE BALLADUR PLAN IS ELABORATED. THE U.S. IS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN THE PLAN'S EMPHASIS ON THE SANCTITY OF BORDERS. WHILE WE HAVE QUESTIONS ABOUT HOW THE BALLADUR PLAN WILL RELATE TO EXISTING EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS CSCE, THESE CAN BE EXPLORED OVER TIME. AS FOR THE INAUGURAL CONFERENCE, THE U.S. WOULD BE REPRESENTED IF INVITED.

11. BALLADUR SAID THE U.S. WOULD CERTAINLY BE INVITED TO THE INAUGURAL MEETING IN PARIS IN MAY. THE AIM OF THE BALLADUR INITIATIVE -- NOW THE EU STABILITY PACT -- IS THE NEGOTIATION OF COMMITMENTS TO RESPECT FRONTIERS AND THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES. THE INITIAL FOCUS IS ON TWO SPECIFIC AREAS: HUNGARY AND THE BALTIC STATES. BALLADUR AGREED THAT THE RELATION BETWEEN THE STABILITY PACT AND INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS CSCE, NATO, THE EU AND THE WEU IS POTENTIALLY COMPLICATED. THE PURPOSE OF THE PACT IS NOT THE CREATION OF NEW EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS; EXISTING INSTITUTIONS WILL IMPLEMENT THE PACT.

12. RETURNING TO THE RUSSIAN QUESTION, THE SECRETARY SAID WE ARE NOT UNCRITICAL OF RUSSIAN BEHAVIOR AND DO NOT BELIEVE THAT AID SHOULD BE UNCONDITIONAL. THE U.S. SEEKS A MATURE RELATIONSHIP WITH MOSCOW IN WHICH WE CAN EFFECTIVELY EXPRESS OUR CONCERNS ABOUT POLICY DIRECTIONS. WE, TOO, ARE PERTURBED BY KOZYREV'S STATEMENTS AND BY NATIONALISTIC ASSERTIVENESS IN THE NEAR ABROAD. OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT YELTSIN DID NOT APPROVE OF KOZYREV'S STATEMENTS AND THAT THERE MAY BE SOME DIVERGENCE WITHIN

THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT ON THIS ISSUE. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT YELTSIN HAD ACCEPTED PRESIDENT CLINTON'S COMPROMISE PROPOSAL ON RUSSIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM LATVIA.

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BOSNIA  
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13. BALLADUR TURNED THE DISCUSSION TO BOSNIA, NOTING THAT HE HAD SEEN IN THE FRENCH PRESS REPORTS THAT THE U.S. HAD QUESTIONS ABOUT THE "COHERENCE" OF FRENCH POLICY. HAD THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER JUPPE CLEARED UP OUR QUESTIONS?

14. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT HE SAW NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND FRANCE REGARDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NATO SUMMIT DECISIONS ON BOSNIA. THAT INCLUDES A WILLINGNESS TO CONDUCT AIRSTRIKES, AS AUTHORIZED IN THE AUGUST NATO DECISIONS AND REAFFIRMED AT THE SUMMIT, IF AND WHEN UNPROFOR REQUESTS THEM OR IF SARAJEVO IS THREATENED WITH STRANGULATION. THESE COMMITMENTS REMAIN FULLY OPERATIVE, THE SECRETARY ASSERTED.

15. AS FOR SREBRENICA AND TUZLA, THE SECRETARY SAID, NATO HAD AGREED TO STUDY OPTIONS. IT NOW APPEARS THAT THE CANADIANS WILL BE ROTATED OUT OF SREBRENICA; THAT IS A POSITIVE RESULT OF THE SUMMIT. ON TUZLA, WE ARE STILL WAITING FOR UNPROFOR'S JUDGMENT ON WHAT ACTION IS FEASIBLE. WHATEVER THE JUDGMENT, THE U.S. WILL FULLY SUPPORT IT IN LINE WITH OUR NATO COMMITMENTS. IN THAT REGARD, THE SECRETARY CONTINUED, WE FIND IT DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND HOW AN UNNAMED FRENCH DEFENSE OFFICIAL COULD COMPLAIN TO THE MEDIA THAT THE U.S. IS NOT HONORING ITS COMMITMENTS ON TUZLA. HOW COULD THIS BE SO IF THERE WAS THUS FAR NO UNPROFOR PLAN FOR TUZLA?

16. THE SECRETARY ADDED THAT FOREIGN MINISTER JUPPE HAD CORRECTLY POINTED OUT THAT ACTION ON TUZLA AND SREBRENICA ADDRESSES A HUMANITARIAN PROBLEM BUT NOT THE OVERALL POLITICAL ONE. THE FRENCH SEEM TO BE SUGGESTING A JOINT EFFORT BY THE U.S., THE EU AND RUSSIA TO DEVISE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. POLITICAL DIRECTORS HAD DISCUSSED THIS EARLIER TODAY. THE SECRETARY WARNED THAT THE IMPOSITION OF A SOLUTION IN BOSNIA POSES DIFFICULTIES FOR THE U.S. AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, THE U.S. REJECTS IMPOSING A SETTLEMENT ON THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT, WHICH IS THE AGGRIEVED PARTY.

17. BALLADUR ASKED WHAT OTHER SOLUTION THERE WAS. WHAT MORE CAN THE MUSLIMS EXPECT TO GET AT THIS STAGE?

18. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT AT THE GENEVA TALKS THE BOSNIANS HAD OBJECTED NOT TO THE QUANTITY OF LAND OFFERED IN THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT BUT TO ITS QUALITY. IT IS NOT AN UNREASONABLE CONCERN, GIVEN THE HISTORY OF THIS CONFLICT AND THE FACT THAT THE BOSNIANS HAVE EFFECTIVELY LOST THEIR COUNTRY.

19. BALLADUR ADMITTED THAT MINOR ADJUSTMENTS TO THE OFFER MADE TO THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT ARE POSSIBLE BUT WORRIED THAT, IF WE SUPPORTED WHATEVER THE BOSNIANS CLAIMED, "THERE WOULD NEVER BE A SETTLEMENT." IF THAT HAPPENED, UNPROFOR'S CONTINUED PRESENCE WOULD MAKE NO SENSE. THE MUSLIMS ARE ALREADY TARGETING UNPROFOR, BALLADUR NOTED, LEADING MANY TO QUESTION WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THE UN MISSION IN BOSNIA.

20. BALLADUR ACCEPTED THAT THE SERBS WERE THE ORIGINAL AGGRESSORS, BUT ADDED THAT THERE WOULD NEVER BE A "PERFECT" SETTLEMENT IN BOSNIA. DID WE REALLY BELIEVE THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE TO ROLL BACK THE SERBS IN BOSNIA? IF OUR POLICIES ENCOURAGED THE MUSLIMS TO PURSUE THAT GOAL, THE CONSEQUENCES COULD BE QUITE SERIOUS, INCLUDING A PULLOUT BY THE UN AND A POSSIBLE WIDENING OF THE WAR TO INCLUDE AREAS SUCH AS KOSOVO. BALLADUR ARGUED THAT THERE ARE MANY INCENTIVES TO REACH A SETTLEMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

21. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT SUSTAINED PRESSURE ON THE SERBS COULD INDEED RESULT IN ROLLING BACK SOME OF THEIR GAINS, THUS GIVING THE MUSLIMS AN INCENTIVE TO MAKE PEACE. WE, HOWEVER, HAVE NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT ANY OF THE PARTIES' READINESS TO SETTLE AT THIS TIME. DESPITE DISCOURAGING TRENDS, THE SECRETARY SAID WE ARE AS DETERMINED AS EVER TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THE FRENCH AND OTHER ALLIES TO EXPLORE SOLUTIONS.

22. BALLADUR SAID THAT "OUR COMMON INCAPACITY" TO END THE FIGHTING CREATES A BAD IMAGE IN EUROPE AND "THROUGHOUT THE WORLD". IT INDICATES AN INABILITY TO MANAGE A SERIOUS EUROPEAN SECURITY PROBLEM, A WEAKNESS WHICH WILL NOT COMFORT EASTERN EUROPEANS. BALLADUR ADDED THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL FOR THE WEST TO UNITE TO PUT PRESSURE ON ALL THE PARTIES. PERHAPS IT IS POSSIBLE TO "RECTIFY" THE SETTLEMENT CURRENTLY ON OFFER, BUT IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO RESTORE THE FRONTIERS OF THE "OLD" BOSNIA. BALLADUR CONCLUDED BY WARNING THAT, IN ANY CASE, IT MIGHT NOT BE IN OUR COMMON INTEREST TO FOSTER THE CREATION OF A PURELY "MUSLIM" STATE IN EUROPE.

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CHINA AND NORTH KOREA  
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23. THE SECRETARY CLOSED THE MEETING BY TURNING TO CHINA AND URGING BALLADUR, DURING HIS UPCOMING TRIP TO BEIJING, TO ASK THE CHINESE TO TRY TO EXERT A RESTRAINING INFLUENCE ON NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR AMBITIONS. BALLADUR ASSURED THE SECRETARY THAT HE HAD MADE THIS POINT IN A MEETING WITH CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER QIAN EARLIER IN THE DAY. HE HAD ALSO DISCUSSED HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS WITH THE CHINESE. BALLADUR SAID QIAN HAD ASSURED HIM THAT THE CHINESE WOULD CONSIDER IT "VERY WORRISOME" IF NORTH KOREA DEVELOPED NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

24. THE SECRETARY SAID HE HAD EXPLAINED TO QIAN THAT NORTH KOREAN TALKS WITH THE IAEA WERE STALEMATED AND THAT, ABSENT A BREAKTHROUGH, THE ISSUE WOULD BE TAKEN BACK TO THE UN IN A VERY "EMPHATIC" WAY.

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IRANIAN TERRORIST SUSPECTS  
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25. ON THE WAY OUT OF THE MEETING, THE SECRETARY PULLED BALLADUR ASIDE TO SAY WE WERE "PUZZLED AND DISCONCERTED" BY BALLADUR'S DECISION TO RELEASE THE IRANIAN TERRORIST SUSPECTS SOUGHT BY SWITZERLAND. BALLADUR OFFERED NO EXPLANATION, BT SAID THE TWO IRANIANS ACCUSED OF MURDERING BAKHTIAR WOULD BE BROUGHT TO TRIAL ON TIME IN FRANCE. BALLADUR COMPLAINED THAT THE U.S. WAS ALLOWING ALGERIAN FIS LEADER HADDAM TO OPERATE IN THE U.S. THE

SECRETARY SAID THERE WAS NO COMPARISON BETWEEN THE TWO  
CASES. UNDER U.S. LAW, WE COULD NOT ACT AGAINST HADDAM,  
BUT HE WAS UNDER FBI SURVEILLANCE. BALLADUR AGREED THE  
TWO CASES WERE NOT COMPARABLE.

CHRISTOPHER

BT

#9931

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**SECT:** SECTION: 01 OF 01

**SSN:** 9931

**TOR:** 940125222731 M0843186

**DIST:**

PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH KENNEY LAKE REED SIT{C2} SODERBERG

SIT: BLEICKEN FILE LEBOURGEOIS SUM2 VAX WALKER.

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## Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE  
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
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 LINE3: O P 260314Z JAN 94  
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 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0000  
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0000  
 RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 0000  
 RUEHPF/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH 0000  
 RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0000  
 RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0000  
 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0000  
 RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0000  
 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0000  
 RUCNTXE/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR 0000  
 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0000  
 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0000  
 RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0000  
 RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 0000  
 RUESLE/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 0000  
 RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 0000  
 SUBJ: THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH CHINESE VICE  
 PREMIER QIAN QICHEN, JANUARY 24, 1994, PARIS:  
 WORKING LUNCH ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

## TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 019944  
 BEIJING PLEASE PASS CHENGDU  
 E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR  
 TAGS: OVIP (CHRISTOPHER, WARLEN), PREL, CH, RU, HK  
 SUBJECT: THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH CHINESE VICE  
 PREMIER QIAN QICHEN, JANUARY 24, 1994, PARIS:  
 WORKING LUNCH ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES  
 1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.  
 2. PARTICIPANTS:  
 U.S. PARTICIPANTS:  
 -----  
 THE SECRETARY  
 AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN  
 AMB. WINSTON LORD, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE,  
 EAP  
 LTG MICHAEL RYAN, USAF, ASST TO CHAIRMAN, JCS  
 JOHN SHATTUCK, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, HA  
 MICHAEL MCCURRY, DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN  
 DON KEYSER, DIRECTOR, EAP/CM (NOTETAKER)  
 VIVIAN CHANG, INTERPRETER

**DECLASSIFIED  
 PER E.O. 13526**

2015-0386-M (1.03)  
 5/11/2013 KSH

## CHINESE PARTICIPANTS:

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QIAN QICHEN, VICE PREMIER AND MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

CAI FANGBO, CHINESE AMBASSADOR TO FRANCE

LIU HUAQIU, VICE FOREIGN MINISTER

MA ZHENGANG, DIRECTOR, NORTH AMERICAN AND OCEANIAN DEPT, MFA

SHEN GUOFANG, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, INFORMATION DEPT, MFA

ZHANG HAIFENG, PERSONAL ASSISTANT TO VICE PREMIER QIAN

LIU XIAOMING, DIRECTOR, U.S. AFFAIRS DIVISION, MFA

LIU JIEYI, DIRECTOR, DISARMAMENT DIVISION, MFA

JIANG JIANG, INTERPRETER

## INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.

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3. BY PRIOR AGREEMENT, THE SECRETARY AND VICE PREMIER QIAN ADDRESSED BILATERAL ISSUES IN A MORNING SESSION (SEPTEL) AND REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS DURING A WORKING LUNCH AT THE CHINESE EMBASSY IN PARIS. IN A FREE-FLOWING, CORDIAL AND OCCASIONALLY EVEN HUMOROUS EXCHANGE ON -- AS QIAN PUT IT -- "EVERY REGION OF THE WORLD EXCEPT LATIN AMERICA," THE SECRETARY SHARED U.S. POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON RUSSIA, THE NATO PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE, VIETNAM AND INDOCHINA, SOMALIA, ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM, AND BOSNIA AND INVITED QIAN'S COMMENTS. QIAN SEEMED TO APPRECIATE THE RANGE AND CANDOR OF THE SECRETARY'S REMARKS, OCCASIONALLY INTERJECTING A PERSONAL INSIGHT -- PARTICULARLY ON RUSSIA AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, HIS CAREER SPECIALIZATION. BY AND LARGE QIAN'S COMMENTS SHED NO NEW LIGHT ON CHINESE POLICY DIRECTIONS OR ASSESSMENTS. THE DIALOGUE TACITLY UNDERSCORED A POINT THE SECRETARY AND QIAN HAD MADE EXPLICITLY EARLIER IN THE DAY: THAT THE TWO, AS SENIOR MINISTERS OF GREAT NATIONS AND FELLOW PERMANENT UNSC MEMBERS, BEAR A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR MANAGING INTELLIGENTLY BILATERAL DISPUTES AND FOR COORDINATING RESPONSIBLY THEIR RESPECTIVE APPROACHES TO KEY INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS.

4. THE SECRETARY REITERATED TO QIAN THE POINT ON HONG KONG HE HAD MADE DURING THE APEC MEETING IN SEATTLE: THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, AND U.S. BUSINESSMEN, AMONG OTHERS, HOPED THAT CHINA-U.K. TALKS ON HONG KONG WOULD RESUME AND THEREBY BOLSTER CONFIDENCE IN A STABLE AND PROSPEROUS TRANSITION IN 1997. QIAN ESCHewed A POLEMICAL REPLY, OPTING RATHER TO SKETCH IN A MATTER-OF-FACT WAY THE LIKELIHOOD THAT CERTAIN NEWLY-ELECTED LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL MEMBERS WILL BE OBLIGED TO RELINQUISH THEIR SEATS IN 1997. QIAN ASSURED THE SECRETARY THAT BEIJING HAS VERY MUCH IN MIND THE STABILITY AND PROSPERITY OF HONG KONG, AND HE ALLOWED THAT THE CURRENT SINO-BRITISH IMPASSE ON GOVERNOR PATTEN'S ELECTORAL REFORM PROPOSALS WOULD NOT ALTER THIS SITUATION.

5. AS THE SITUATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA HAD BEEN ADDRESSED SERIOUSLY AND AT LENGTH DURING THE MORNING

SESSION AND THE ONE-ON-ONE (SEPTELS), THE SECRETARY AND QIAN DID NOT REVISIT THE ISSUE OVER LUNCH AS ORIGINALLY PLANNED.

END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY  
RUSSIA AND FORMER SOVIET UNION  
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6. SHORTLY AFTER THE WORKING LUNCH COMMENCED, THE SECRETARY ALLUDED TO THE IMPORTANT NUCLEAR DISMANTLEMENT AGREEMENT THE U.S. AND RUSSIA HAD RECENTLY CONCLUDED WITH THE UKRAINE. WHEN QIAN SHOT BACK "BUT HOW LONG WILL IT TAKE TO DISMANTLE THEM," THE SECRETARY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT QIAN HAD ASKED A GOOD QUESTION -- AND ONE WHICH COULD NOT NOW BE CONFIDENTLY ANSWERED. IT WAS, THE SECRETARY CONCEDED, A SENSITIVE SUBJECT IN THE UKRAINE. IN ANY EVENT, THE IMPLEMENTATION SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN LESS THAN THE STIPULATED SEVEN YEARS.

7. THE SECRETARY, OBSERVING THAT QIAN IS WIDELY RECOGNIZED TO BE AN EXPERT, SOPHISTICATED OBSERVER OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, ASKED THE VICE PREMIER FOR HIS ANALYSIS OF THE RECENT RUSSIAN ELECTION. QIAN ACKNOWLEDGED THE COMPLIMENT BUT REPLIED SMILINGLY THAT "NOBODY CAN SAY THAT HE HAS AN ACCURATE UNDERSTANDING OF THE CURRENT SITUATION, AND SO FAR THERE ARE NO SOLUTIONS IN SIGHT TO THE TWO KEY ISSUES: THE STAGNATION OF THE ECONOMY, AND THE INSTABILITY OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION."

8. THE SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT THE U.S. CONTINUES TO FIND REASSURANCE IN THE ATTITUDES OF PRESIDENT YELTSIN, SPECIFICALLY IN HIS ONGOING COMMITMENT TO ECONOMIC, DEMOCRATIC AND FOREIGN POLICY REFORM. MOREOVER, THE NEW RUSSIAN CONSTITUTION GIVES YELTSIN CONSIDERABLE POWERS, ESPECIALLY IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS. WHILE YELTSIN WILL CLEARLY BE OBLIGED TO BUILD COALITIONS IN THE NEW PARLIAMENT, HE HAD DEMONSTRATED PREVIOUSLY HIS FORMIDABLE ARRAY OF POLITICAL SKILLS.

9. AS FAR AS THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY IS CONCERNED, THE SECRETARY CONTINUED, THE RUSSIANS UNDOUBTEDLY LOOKED TO CHINA WITH ENVY. NEVERTHELESS, THERE HAD BEEN SOME SIGNS OF PROGRESS RECENTLY, PRINCIPALLY IN THE AREA OF PRIVATIZATION OF SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED INDUSTRIES. NO DOUBT, THE SECRETARY OBSERVED, THE CHINESE APPROACH OF FIRST PRIVATIZING THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR MADE GREAT SENSE IN CHINA -- AND PERHAPS WOULD HAVE IN RUSSIA, TOO, HAD THIS BEEN LAUNCHED SOME YEARS AGO. NOW THE RUSSIANS DID NOT ENJOY THE LUXURY OF THAT OPTION, SO THE RUSSIAN PROCESS HAS BEEN MORE CHAOTIC THAN THAT OF THE CHINESE.

10. QIAN RECALLED THAT YELTSIN'S PLANNED VISIT TO CHINA'S VERY SUCCESSFUL SHENZHEN SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE HAD BEEN ABORTED WHEN HE HAD TO RETURN TO MANAGE A DOMESTIC CRISIS IN DECEMBER 1992. NEVERTHELESS, SOME OF HIS ENTOURAGE HAD VISITED SHENZHEN AND PERHAPS TAKEN HOME SOME USEFUL LESSONS. DESPITE ALL THE PROBLEMS IN RUSSIA, QIAN REMARKED, IT WAS AN INTERESTING FACT THAT THE VOLUME OF SINO-RUSSIAN TRADE TODAY EXCEEDED THE PEAK VOLUME IN RECENT YEARS

OF TOTAL CHINESE TRADE WITH THE FORMER SOVIET UNION. THAT TRADE WOULD BE GREATER, AS WOULD CHINESE INVESTMENT, WERE THERE MORE CONFIDENCE IN THE STABILITY OF THE RUBLE. THE SECRETARY INTERJECTED THAT U.S. BUSINESS REPRESENTATIVES ALSO HAD CONCERNS ON THIS SCORE, AS WELL AS ABOUT THE ABSENCE OF A LEGAL FRAMEWORK TO SAFEGUARD THEIR INVESTMENTS.

11. WHEN THE SECRETARY ASKED HOW QIAN EVALUATED THE REBIRTH OF NATIONALISM IN RUSSIA, QIAN LAUGHED AND SAID "WHAT YOU ARE ASKING IS WHAT DO I THINK OF ZHIRINOVSKY." THE SECRETARY RIPOSTED THAT MR. ZHIRINOVSKY WAS ONLY A PART OF THE PROBLEM.

12. QIAN ALLOWED THAT, IN HIS ASSESSMENT, NATIONALISM AROSE FROM TWO PRINCIPAL FACTORS: THE DECLINING AND UNPREDICTABLE ECONOMIC SITUATION, AND THE PRESENCE OF SOME 25 MILLION ETHNIC RUSSIANS IN NEWLY INDEPENDENT, NON-RUSSIAN STATES CARVED OUT OF THE OLD SOVIET UNION. EVEN SO, QIAN SAID, NATIONALISTIC SENTIMENTS IN RUSSIA PRECEDED THE BOLSHEVIKS. SO IT WAS WITH CHAUVINISM -- RUSSIAN OR SOVIET; THIS WAS PART OF THE NATIONAL CULTURE, QIAN SAID.

13. THE SECRETARY RELATED THAT, IN THE U.S. VIEW, ZHIRINOVSKY ALMOST ALONE OF THE NEW POLITICIANS IS "BEYOND THE PALE." HENCE HE WAS THE ONLY POLITICAL LEADER NOT INVITED TO THE U.S. EMBASSY DURING PRESIDENT CLINTON'S RECENT VISIT. THE SECRETARY TOLD QIAN THAT PRESIDENT CLINTON HAD IN FACT BEEN IMPRESSED BY THE NEW BREED OF POLITICIAN IN RUSSIA -- AT LEAST BY THEIR YOUTH AND VIGOR, IF NOT NECESSARILY BY THEIR POLITICAL PHILOSOPHIES AND PROGRAMS.

14. REPLYING TO A QUESTION PUT BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY LORD, QIAN CHARACTERIZED CHINESE TIES WITH THE NEW CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS AS BEING QUITE GOOD ON THE WHOLE. THERE IS A GREAT DEAL OF BORDER TRADE, THOUGH CURRENCY FLUCTUATIONS ALSO IMPOSED CONSTRAINTS ON LONGER-TERM ARRANGEMENTS.  
ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM  
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15. ASKED BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY LORD HOW CHINA PERCEIVES THE PHENOMENON OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM, QIAN REPLIED THAT THE INFLUENCE EXISTED BUT WAS NOT CURRENTLY A MAJOR FACTOR IN ANY OF THE CENTRAL ASIAN STATES -- EXCEPT TAJIKISTAN. QIAN POINTED TO A NUMBER OF BRANDS OF ISLAM WHICH ARE IN EFFECT COMPETITIVE IN A GEOPOLITICAL SENSE: IRANIAN FUNDAMENTALISM, PAN-TURKIC SENTIMENTS, AND PAKISTANI ISLAM. SO FAR, QIAN SAID, ONLY THE TAJIKI-IRANIAN LINKS WERE WORRISOME. KAZAKHSTAN AND TURKMENISTAN WERE, IN CHINA'S JUDGMENT, LESS ISLAMIC THAN TRADITIONAL NOMADIC CULTURES. THERE WAS A STRONG ISLAMIC INFLUENCE IN UZBEKISTAN, QIAN CONTINUED, BUT THE UZBEK LEADERS HAD TAKEN A STRONG AND EXPLICIT STAND IN OPPOSITION TO THIS.

BOSNIA

16. WHEN QIAN INQUIRED ABOUT THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA AND THE POSSIBLE U.S. RESPONSES, THE SECRETARY RESPONDED: "IT IS HARD TO SETTLE A FAMILY FEUD IF THE FAMILY DOESN'T WISH TO SETTLE IT." SECRETARY

CHRISTOPHER DESCRIBED THE KEY FACTORS IN THE SITUATION, AND THE PRESSURES ARISING FROM A PUBLIC OPINION INFLAMED BY PERIODIC REPORTING OF ATROCITIES SUCH AS THE DEATH OF SCHOOLCHILDREN BY ARTILLERY FIRE WHILE THEY WERE SNOW SLEDDING. THE SECRETARY WRYLY STATED HIS ENVY OF CHINA, WHICH HAD MANAGED NOT TO HAVE OTHERS ASKING "WHY DOESN'T CHINA DO SOMETHING ABOUT THIS SITUATION?" QIAN INQUIRED WHETHER ANY MUSLIM COUNTRIES WERE AIDING BOSNIA, AND THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT MALAYSIA AND INDONESIA WERE SEEKING TO BE HELPFUL, WHILE IRAN WAS SUPPLYING ARMS -- OF MORE DUBIOUS UTILITY. PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN ALSO HAD LENT SUPPORT TO THE BOSNIAN MUSLIMS, THE SECRETARY SAID, WHICH, TAKEN AS A WHOLE, MIGHT ACCOUNT FOR THE BETTER MILITARY SHOWING RECENTLY BY THE BOSNIAN MUSLIMS. QIAN EXPRESSED ASTONISHMENT WHEN LTG RYAN INTERJECTED THAT EVEN ALBANIA WAS SENDING SOME ASSISTANCE TO FELLOW MUSLIMS IN BOSNIA. SOMALIA

17. THE SECRETARY AND QIAN EXCHANGED VIEWS ON THE COMPLEXITIES OF THE SOMALI SITUATION ON THE GROUND, AND THE DIFFICULTY OF DEVELOPING AN EFFECTIVE POLICY RESPONSE. QIAN REMARKED THAT DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO AFRICA A NUMBER OF POINTS HAD BECOME CLEAR TO HIM: -- OF THOSE QIAN MET WITH MOST WANTED THE U.S. TROOPS TO STAY, FEARING THAT A BLOODBATH AND GREATER INSTABILITY WOULD FOLLOW THEIR SCHEDULED DEPARTURE; -- THE RESPONSE OF THE TWO PRINCIPAL SOMALI FACTIONS TO THE U.N. WAS DIRECTLY LINKED TO THE PERCEIVED IMPACT A GIVEN U.N. ACTION MIGHT HAVE ON THE RELATIVE STRENGTH OF THAT FACTION, AND NOT AT ALL LINKED TO ANY LARGER SENSE OF THE BEST RESULT FOR THE GREATEST NUMBER OF PEOPLE; AND -- THE CHARACTER OF AIDEED WAS COMPLEX, WITH SOME AFRICAN NATIONS SUPPORTING AND ADMIRING HIM, OTHERS REGARDING HIM AS SIMPLY "NO GOOD." THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT THERE IS VIRTUALLY NO LIKELIHOOD THAT U.S. FORCES WILL REMAIN IN SOMALIA AFTER MAZRCH 31.

HONG KONG

18. TAKING UP AN ISSUE HE HAD ADDRESSED WITH QIAN IN SEATTLE LAST NOVEMBER, THE SECRETARY EXPRESSED A STRONG HOPE THAT SOME ARRANGEMENT MIGHT BE WORKED OUT BETWEEN CHINA AND THE BRITISH TO ENSURE A STABLE AND PROSPEROUS TRANSITION OF HONG KONG TO CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY IN 1997. WHAT, HE ASKED QIAN, ARE THE PROSPECTS FOR THIS? THIS WAS A MATTER OF IMPORTANCE TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND TO THE U.S. BUSINESS COMMUNITY, AMONG OTHERS, THE SECRETARY ADDED.

19. QIAN REPLIED NON-POLEMICALLY THAT "SINO-BRITISH TALKS ON THE 1994-1995 ELECTIONS HAVE STOPPED. ACKNOWLEDGING THAT THE BRITISH COULD ARRANGE ELECTIONS AS THEY PLEASED IN THOSE YEARS, QIAN ADDED THAT THE PROBLEM IS THAT UNDER THE CONSTITUTION THESE NEWLY ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES WOULD SERVE UNTIL 1998 OR 1999. HENCE DISCUSSION WAS NECESSARY. SINCE THE BRITISH HAD OPTED TO PRESS AHEAD UNILATERALLY WITH THEIR ELECTORAL PLANS, QIAN CONTINUED, WITH

EQUANIMITY, IT WAS EQUALLY CLEAR THAT "SOME MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL WILL END THEIR TERM OF OFFICE ON JULY 1, 1997." NEVERTHELESS, HONG KONG'S PROSPERITY AND STABILITY IN OTHER ASPECTS CAN BE MAINTAINED, QIAN ASSURED THE SECRETARY. INDEED, THE ECONOMIC SITUATION CURRENTLY IS QUITE GOOD, AND WOULD CONTINUE TO BE SO.

VIETNAM

20. THE SECRETARY OUTLINED FOR QIAN THE CURRENT STATE OF U.S. THINKING ABOUT RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM. LAST YEAR, IN RESPONSE TO VIETNAMESE COOPERATION OF MIAS, WE HAD UNDERTAKEN TO CHANGE OUR RELATIONS: WE CEASED TO BLOCK INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTION LENDING ARRANGEMENTS WITH VIETNAM, AND WE ALSO GAVE THE GO-AHEAD TO AMERICAN FIRMS TO BID ON CONTRACTS FUNDED BY IFIS. RECENTLY WE RECEIVED VERY GOOD COOPERATION ON POW-MIA MATTERS, AND INDEED, IN 1993 WE HAD THE BEST COOPERATION YET FROM HANOI. LTG RYAN INTERJECTED THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT SIMILARLY APPRECIATED CHINA'S EXCELLENT COOPERATION ON MIA AFFAIRS. THEREFORE, THE SECRETARY SAID, WE ARE NOW CONSIDERING POSSIBLE NEXT STEPS, INCLUDING WHETHER TO LIFT THE REST OF THE TRADE EMBARGO, BUT ON A SEQUENTIAL BASIS.

21. QIAN AFFIRMED THAT, IN CHINA'S JUDGMENT, THAT WOULD BE A VERY POSITIVE STEP. TURNING TO CHINA'S OWN RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM, QIAN PAINTED A PICTURE OF RAPIDLY IMPROVING TIES. THE TWO HAD HELD LONG TALKS ON THEIR BORDER DISPUTES, AND WHERE THEY COULD NOT RESOLVE THEM -- E.G., ON THE NANSHA OR SPRATLEY ISLANDS -- THEY WERE DISCUSSING JOINT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. SINO-VIETNAMESE ECONOMIC TIES WERE GENERALLY ON THE UPSWING, QIAN SAID.

CAMBODIA

22. QIAN RECOUNTED THAT SIHANOUK HAD BEEN OBLIGED TO CELEBRATE HIS 71ST BIRTHDAY IN A BEIJING HOSPITAL UNDERGOING CANCER TREATMENT. ALTHOUGH HIS PROGNOSIS HAD BEEN "NOT GOOD," SIHANOUK HAD RESPONDED WELL TO CHEMOTHERAPY, QIAN SAID, AND THE CHINESE PHYSICIANS HAD OPTED NOT TO PROCEED WITH RADIATION TREATMENTS. STILL, THE FACT WAS THE SIHANOUK WAS GETTING OLDER, AND WAS THE SOLE INDIVIDUAL TO WHOM ALL FACTIONS LOOKED FOR GUIDANCE. IN RESPONSE TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY LORD'S QUERY, QIAN EXPRESSED SOME OPTIMISM THAT UNITY WOULD SURVIVE SIHANOUK'S DEATH. HE NOTED THAT THE KHMER ROUGE HAVE SOME DIRECT CONTACTS WITH THE SIHANOUK CAMP, AND THAT THERE ARE SOME POINTS OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE KHMER ROUGE. THE UNITED NATIONS, QIAN OBSERVED, HAD PLAYED PERHAPS ITS MOST CONSPICUOUSLY SUCCESSFUL ROLE IN ARRANGING AND PRESERVING THE CAMBODIAN PEACE SETTLEMENT.

NATO PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE

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23. THE SECRETARY ELABORATED FOR QIAN PRESIDENT CLINTON'S CONCEPT FOR A NATO PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE. IN RESPONSE TO QIAN'S QUESTIONS -- HERE HIS INTEREST WAS IN NO WAY FEIGNED -- THE SECRETARY SAID THAT EACH

OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND FORMER SOVIET UNION REPUBLICS WOULD ATTAIN THIS STATUS, VIRTUALLY AUTOMATICALLY, THROUGH SIMPLY APPLYING. RUSSIA WAS NO EXCEPTION. PARTICIPANTS WOULD TRAIN, PLAN AND EXERCISE WITH NATO -- AT LEVELS AND FREQUENCIES OF THEIR OWN CHOICE. THE DEGREE OF PARTICIPATION WOULD FACTOR HEAVILY INTO THE CONSIDERATION OF A PARTICULAR NATION'S SUBSEQUENT APPLICATION FOR FULL-FLEDGED NATO MEMBERSHIP. BECAUSE THE CONCEPT IS NOT DISCRIMINATORY, THE SECRETARY SAID, RUSSIA IS NOT OPPOSED. WHEN QIAN ASKED EXPLICITLY WHETHER CENTRAL ASIAN NATIONS WHICH HAD BEEN PART OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION MIGHT ALSO QUALIFY, THE SECRETARY AFFIRMED THAT THEY COULD.  
MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH AFRICA  
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24. THE SECRETARY AND QIAN CONCLUDED THEIR TOUR D'HORIZON WITH A BRIEF EXCHANGE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE EVOLVING SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA. WHEN QIAN ASKED WHETHER THE SECRETARY ENVISAGED AN END TO "TWISTS AND TURNS IN THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS," THE SECRETARY ELICITED THE GREATEST MERRIMENT OF THE DAY FROM QIAN (AND OTHERS ON THE CHINESE SIDE) BY HIS PITHY REPLY: "I THINK I CAN FLATLY SAY NO TO THAT."  
CHRISTOPHER

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