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4TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS  
GROUP (AIRBORNE)

*Ellen*

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## SPECIAL PSYOP STUDY

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# PSYOP ASPECTS OF DECISION MAKING IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN. (S)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
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SPECIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS STUDY



**PSYOP ASPECTS OF DECISION  
MAKING IN THE ISLAMIC  
REPUBLIC OF IRAN (U)**

This study was prepared by

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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
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
# PSYOP ASPECTS OF DECISION MAKING IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN (U)

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## THE PURPOSE AND PARAMETERS OF THIS STUDY (U)



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### SHI'I POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE CREATION OF AN ISLAMIC STATE (U)

(U) Iran today is unique in the Islamic world in that it is in theory a theocracy and in practice a hierocracy; i.e., a country ruled by an elite stratum of Shi'i clerics. The Islamic Revolution of 1978-79 toppled a despotic monarch and replaced him with a charismatic Shi'i jurist-theologian and his clerical and lay supporters. Throughout the history of Iran, successive dynasties created their own dynastic ideologies to serve as firm conceptual foundations for their rule. The Safavi dynasty (1501-1722) buttressed its power and authority by developing a dynastic ideology that included the establishment of Twelver Shi'ism as the state religion. The long-term consequence of this critical decision was that the Safavis inadvertently introduced a competing religiopolitical theory about the nature of sovereignty and legitimacy. According to its own self-concept, the government of the Islamic Republic, especially the Supreme Leader, represents the Imam Mahdi (the Twelfth Imam, or Hidden Imam, and the expected one of the Shi'is) and ultimately God himself. The Islamic Republic of Iran is the first Twelver Shi'i state in history ruled by clerics rather than by a monarch and the closest thing in modern Islam to a union of church and state.

(U) The issue of decision making in Iran is bound up with the problems of sovereignty and legitimacy. Sovereignty poses the question, Where does authority ultimately reside? In a related way, decision making focuses on the question, Who in the state apparatus exercises authority most effectively? Legitimacy, like

sovereignty, is an ideological issue. Any political theory, Twelver Shi'i religiopolitical theories included, deals with how those in power justify their control of the functions of the state: On what legal basis or moral authority does the ruler (or rulers) claim to hold and exercise sovereign power? When the first prime minister of Revolutionary Iran, Mehdi Bazargan, suggested that the official name of the country be the Democratic Islamic Republic of Iran, Khomeini vetoed the idea and told Bazargan to drop the word *democratic*. This decision reflected Khomeini's view that sovereignty ultimately resides with God and not with the people. It reflected the notion that all authority comes from God and that those in authority should be God's appointed emissaries.

(U) The principle of imamate underpins Shi'i theories of sovereignty and legitimacy, and it also separates Sunni from Shi'i political theory. The division of the Islamic community between Sunnis and Shi'is goes back to the immediate successors of the Prophet Mohammad. Shi'is claim that the Prophet designated his cousin and son-in-law Ali ibn Abi-Talib (Imam Ali) as his rightful successor. Twelver Shi'is assert that Ali and his male descendants were the only legitimate rulers of the Islamic community even though none of Ali's offspring actually held political power. Ali and his male descendants are the Twelve Imams, the last of whom went into hiding, or occultation, and has come to be known as the Hidden Imam. Since the beginning of the Greater Occultation in 940, Shi'i *mojtaheds*, or prominent jurist-theologians, have held the view that any government other than that of the Hidden Imam is illegitimate and that they, the *mojtaheds*, represent the Hidden Imam in his absence. In brief, this describes the principle of imamate. The *mojtaheds* have disagreed among themselves, however, about who can legitimately exercise authority in the absence of the Hidden Imam.

(U) In 1971 Khomeini began to propound a Shi'i political theory stating that in the absence of the Hidden Imam, responsibility for governing the community of Muslims (*umat/ummah*) rests with the Supreme Leader. His doctrine of *velayat-e faqih* challenged the standard Shi'i political theory that during the occultation of the Twelfth Imam, there could be no truly legitimate temporal authority. Grand Ayatollahs Abol-Qasem Kho'i in Najaf, Mohammad

Kazem Shari'at-Madari in Qom, and Hasan Tabataba'i Qomi in Mashhad, disagreed with Khomeini about the legitimacy of a ruling jurist, but through superior political power and sheer force of personality Khomeini eventually pushed aside his clerical opponents and their arguments.

## THE CONSTITUTION AND DECISION MAKING (U)


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(U) Last, Khomeini and his associates inserted into the decision-making framework four vitally important state councils dominated by clerics. The first of these was the Assembly of Experts (*Majles-e Khobregan*) that decides on succession to the position of Supreme Leader; the second was the Council of Guardians that determines whether or not laws passed by the Islamic Consultative Assembly (*Majles-e Shura-ye Eslami*) are Islamic and constitutional; the third was the Assembly for the Determination of Exigencies, which has the power to override the constitution and referee differences between the Majles and the Council of Guardians; and the fourth was the Supreme Council for National Security chaired by the president. Members of the last body include two representatives of the Supreme Leader, the head of the judiciary, the speaker of the Majles, the chief of staff of the General Command, the head of the plan and budget organization, and the ministers of foreign affairs, interior, and intelligence and security. The Supreme Council of National Security makes major policy decisions, but the Supreme Leader must give final approval. The imam also established the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution to oversee the Islamization of society and to verify that the laws of Islam are respected and obeyed.

(U) The judiciary is responsible for administering justice, which means the investigation of injustices, the prosecution of cases, the issuing of verdicts, and the administration of punishments. Such a system allows summary justice and invites abuses. The Supreme Leader (*faqih* or *rahbar*) appoints the head of the judiciary, who must be a *mojtahed* and who creates a Ministry of Justice; presides over the composition of laws; and employs prosecutors and judges, including a Supreme Court and a Prosecutor General. One of the accomplishments of the Islamic Revolution has been the gradual replacement of civil law codes and civil courts with Islamic courts that follow the Shi'i legal system. Complete clerical control of the judiciary reflects an Islamic ideology that rejects the Western notion of separation of church and state and affirms the total relevance of Islamic law and teaching in the quest for justice in social affairs.

(u) Today the Majles is a powerful branch of government. The Iranian constitution calls for a popularly elected Islamic Consultative Assembly of 270 members (Articles 62-90). Members serve four-year terms. Legislators elect a speaker to lead the assembly. The function of the Majles is to pass legislation, inquire into the affairs of the country, and to approve international treaties, protocols, contracts, and agreements.



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(u) The revised 1989 constitution differs in two important respects from the 1979 constitution. Khomeini formed the Assembly for Reconsideration of the Constitution in 1989 to revise articles pertaining to the Supreme Leader and the president. The assembly rewrote articles 107 to 112 detailing the qualifications, powers, responsibilities, and manner of selecting the Supreme Leader. (See the following section on the succession issue.) The assembly also redefined the powers of the president. The office of prime minister was eliminated, and the largely ceremonial presidency was replaced with a powerful presidential office responsible for most executive functions of government. The 1989 constitution continues to emphasize the doctrine of *velayat-e faqih* and to uphold the rule of the clerical elite.

(u) The popularly elected president is head of the executive branch and the second highest ranking

official in the Islamic Republic after the Supreme Leader. The president may serve a maximum of two four-year terms and may or may not be a cleric. He presides over a cabinet appointed by him and approved by the Majles, is responsible for national planning and the budget, and conducts foreign relations. President Rafsanjani's adept handling of domestic affairs has enhanced the power and prestige of the office of president. As observers had expected, he was reelected for a second term in the June 1993 presidential election.

(u) Appreciating the significance of the rule of the Supreme Leader is one of the keys to understanding decision making in Iran, because he is theoretically and constitutionally the most powerful figure in the Islamic Republic. Article 2 maintains, "The Islamic Republic is a system of government based on faith in . . . the uninterrupted imamate and leadership (*rahbari*) and its fundamental role in the perpetuation of the Islamic revolution." Article 5 asserts, "During the occultation of the *vali-ye asr* [the Twelfth Imam] the *velayat-e amr* [mandate of the designated authority] and the imamate of the *omatummah* is entrusted to the just and pious *faqih* fully aware of the circumstances of his age, and courageous, resourceful and possessed of administrative ability . . ." Hence, the ruling jurist (*faqih*) is designated the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic and the Islamic Revolution and the *vali-ye amr*. The term *vali-ye amr* refers to one who is entrusted with authority by the Hidden Imam in the latter's absence. Thus, the notion of *vali-ye amr* does not conflict with the Shi'i belief that only the rule of the Hidden Imam is legitimate. Theoretically, anyone ruling in place of the Hidden Imam should have tremendous authority and decision-making power. In fact, much depends on the qualifications of the Supreme Leader, on his perceived charisma, on his decisiveness, and on historical circumstances.

(u) According to Article 110 of the constitution, the Supreme Leader has the responsibility and authority to set general policies, supervise the execution of policies, call for national referenda, function as commander in chief of the armed forces, declare war and peace, appoint jurists to the Council of Guardians, appoint the head of the judiciary, name commanders of the armed forces and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), resolve differences between the

three branches of government, confirm that a presidential candidate is qualified for the office, and dismiss the president in a manner consistent with the constitution. On paper, such responsibility and authority is awesome. In fact, given the institutional development of the three branches of government, the state councils, and the armed forces, it is difficult for Khomeini's successor to exercise arbitrary authority.

## THE ISSUE OF SUCCESSION (U)

(U) The death of Imam Khomeini in 1989 ended an era in the history of the Islamic Republic of Iran and led to major changes in the constitution and the decision-making process. While he was alive, Khomeini was the undisputed leader of the Islamic Republic. His followers recognized him as a *marja'-ye taqlid* (source of exemplary conduct), referred to him as Imam Khomeini (a designation implying a special relationship to the Twelve Imams, including the Hidden Imam), and accepted him as the *vali-ye faqih*. He was the primary architect of domestic and foreign policy and the final arbiter in disputes between heads of branches of government. Khomeini was a charismatic leader with the religious and political authority to make crucial decisions for the nation, even controversial decisions that seemed to fly in the face of either reason or tradition.

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(U) From the early days of the Islamic Republic and the creation of a constitution, everyone recognized that choosing Khomeini's successor would be difficult.

Khomeini and the clerical ruling elite wished to provide for the succession during his lifetime so as not to be faced with a crisis following his death. Khomeini named Ayatollah Hosein Ali Montazeri, his disciple and trusted colleague, as his successor. Although Montazeri was not generally recognized as a grand ayatollah (the highest rank among *mujtaheds*), he was highly respected for his scholarship and piety. The hierarchy loyal to Khomeini began a propaganda campaign to enhance Montazeri's status. The media invariably referred to him as a grand ayatollah, and Montazeri began to "hold court" much as Khomeini did. Although Montazeri was a Khomeini loyalist, he had his own interests and views. When he criticized the government (and implicitly Khomeini himself) over certain "mistakes" of the revolution, however, Khomeini felt he had no choice but to remove Montazeri as heir apparent (28 March 1989). Once again, the prospect of a succession crisis loomed.

(U) When Khomeini died on 3 June 1989, however, the Assembly of Experts moved within twenty-four hours to name a successor. At the time of Khomeini's death, a revision of the constitution was in progress. The standing constitution allowed for the selection of three or five jurists to rule in the event that no single prominent ayatollah qualified for the position. But the Assembly of Experts opted for a single Supreme Leader rather than a collective leadership and named President Hojatoleslam Ali Khamene'i to that post. Khamene'i instantly became "Ayatollah" Khamene'i. The 1979 constitution stated that during the occultation of the Hidden Imam, the Supreme Leader must be a just and pious *faqih* recognized by the majority of Iranians as their *marja'-ye taqlid*. Only a small number of the most learned and pious clerics reach the pinnacle of the Shi'i hierarchy and become grand ayatollahs (*ayatollah ozma*). These men are revered and emulated as *marja'-ye taqlid*. It is incumbent upon the Shi'i faithful to select one among the few *marja's* as their model of moral conduct. Since Khamene'i did not have the qualifications to be a *marja'-ye taqlid*, and in order to deal quickly with the issue, a venerable ayatollah in his nineties, who had been a teacher of Khomeini, was named *marja'* for Khomeini's followers. The speedy resolution of the question of succession did not lead to an ideal solution, but it did prevent a succession crisis and indicated the institutionalization of the revolution.


(v) In 1989, following the selection of Khamene'i as Supreme Leader, the Assembly for the Reconsideration of the Constitution followed Imam Khomeini's instructions and deleted the requirement that the Supreme Leader be a *marja'-ye taqlid* from Articles 107 and 109 of the constitution. The revised constitution (Article 107) provides for the selection of a Supreme Leader upon the death or removal of his predecessor. The members of the Assembly of Experts (popularly elected every eight years) deliberate on the qualifications of candidates for the position of Supreme Leader. They choose whomever best fulfills the requirements of Articles 5 and 109 of the constitution. The Supreme Leader thus chosen is invested with all the power of *velayat-e amr*. Article 107 of the constitution mentions that Khomeini himself had been a *marja'-ye taqlid*, but it does not stipulate that his successor must be one.

(w) During and after the debate on the revision of the constitution, many delegates "expressed serious concerns about the possible consequences of separating the *marjaeyat* [Shi'i religious authority] from the political leadership," which could be tantamount to the separation of church and state. The worst case scenario would arise if the majority of Iranians emulated a grand ayatollah who contradicted the rulings of the *faqih*. This could lead to the delegitimation of the Supreme Leader and ultimately undermine the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic.<sup>1</sup> This fear explains some of Khamene'i's and the regime's decisions and indecisions. The regime's reaction to the statements of Ayatollah Montazeri in Qom in February 1993 stem from concern about independent religious authority. Nevertheless, there are few signs that the Islamic regime is unstable. Observers of the Iranian scene should be cautious in evaluating the analysis of the Persian language newspaper *Keyhan* (London) that "the power struggle among the clergy these days has reached a peak, and what is bringing on these kinds of issues is the controversy over leadership and sources of emulation [*marja'-ye taqlid*], which remains unresolved."<sup>2</sup>


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PERSONALITIES AND FACTIONS (v)

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


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


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
**THE ONGOING ISLAMIC CULTURAL  
REVOLUTION (U)**



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**SHI'I IRANIAN NATIONALISM AND  
DECISION MAKING (U)**

(U) For the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the concepts of Iranian nationalism and Shi'i Islam are psychologically interwoven. There is no dichotomy between the two. Shi'ism has become such a part of the cultural fabric of Iran over the past five centuries that it is now one of the essential elements of Iranian national identity—especially for the clerics. This phenomenon could be described as Shi'i Iranian nationalism. Shi'i Iranian clergy appear to be unable to think of Shi'ism without Iran or Iran without Shi'ism. While the Shah professed his secular nationalism, the religious leadership in Iran views the welfare of the Iranian state and of Shi'i Islam as one and inseparable. In other words, what is beneficial for Iran must be good for Shi'ism and what is good for Shi'ism must be beneficial for Iran. (Or to use a familiar Western example, what is good for the Vatican must be good for Catholicism and what is good for Catholicism must be good for the Vatican.)

(U) At the same time, however, radical Shi'i Islam claims that it is the true Islam, which is universally applicable. Thus within the very nature of radical Iranian Shi'ism is a contradiction between the concepts of Islamic universalism (Pan-Islamism) and Iranian Shi'i nationalism. The clerics have found that exporting radical Shi'ism has proven detrimental to the economic welfare of Iran, while not exporting the revolution denies the principle of Islamic universalism. Since Shi'i Muslims have always been in the minority (10 percent in the Islamic world), Shi'i religious practices have been used to protect the Shi'i community. One such mechanism in Shi'ism involves the practice of dissimulation (*taqiya*) whereby a Shi'i, if his life or well-being is endangered, is permitted to hide his true beliefs and feelings. This practice can be observed in national and international policies of the clerics to safeguard the Islamic Revolution and to maintain power. Imam Khomeini accepted a cease-fire with Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War even though it was like 'taking poison.' He did so not on the principle of Islamic universalism but because it was in the best national interest of Shi'i Iran. Continuation of the war with Iraq might have led to the disintegration of the country and to the end of the Islamic Revolution. Ideologically, Khomeini desired to take the holy cities of Iraq and even wanted to lead the Friday prayer in a Jerusalem liberated from the Jews. Nonetheless, Iranian national interests dictated a different outcome.

(U) Another defense mechanism in Shi'ism involves friendship with those who love Ali and animosity toward those who do not. These practices, referred to as *tavela* and *tabara*, respectively, were originally targeted toward the Sunni Muslims who were considered hostile. The Sunni Muslims do not believe in Ali as the imam and second in rank after the Prophet Mohammad as the Shi'is do, nor do they believe in the other eleven Shi'i imams.

(U) The primacy of Shi'i Iranian nationalism is also seen in the debates and factional fighting in the regime. The hard-liners insist on the full implementation of Islamic principles, whereas the pragmatists believe doing so is not always in the best interest of the country. The latter clerics in the regime maintain that national interest should come first, even if it means bending ideology a little. In other words,


religious ideology should be used for nationalistic ends. For example, ideologically, the Islamic Republic should take sides with the former Soviet Azerbaijanis against the Armenians since the former are Shi'is and the latter are Christians, but the regime has not done so because it is not in the best interest of the country. Religious ideology also dictates that the regime should not help the opposition groups in Tajikistan since they are not Shi'is. Instead, it should assist the Shi'is in Afghanistan, but the national interest of the Islamic Republic dictates otherwise.

(U) In addition, there are some clerics who privately talk about Pan-Iranianism and the revival of a Persian Empire. This may explain why Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and the other Central Asian Republics are so important to the regime. Iran has opened consulates and is sending food and other assistance to Herat and Mazar-e Sharif, which were once a part of Iran. The ties to these countries are more cultural than religious, since they are mostly Sunni areas. In Tajikistan, too, the Iranian regime is providing military and financial support to the Islamic Revival Party, the opposition party against Tajikistan's communist-dominated central government. In fact, if it had not been for Uzbekistan and other former communist states, the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan, which had come to power with the help of Iran, would still be in control.


(U) Trying to balance the interests of Islamic universalism and Shi'i Iranian nationalism has been a problem for the radical clerics ever since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Iranian clerics have been trying to downplay nationalism and instead to emphasize Pan-Islamism in order to hide its nationalistic agenda. However, the Sunnis in the Community of Muslims know full well that since the revolution Iran has been indirectly working hard to expand its own influence and domination by making Khomeini appear as the leader for the entire Islamic world and Iran as the source of ideas for establishing Islamic governments.

(U) Thus, Iranian clerics' actions are often contradictory, continuing to reflect the conundrum they face. There is no solution to this problem in the long run except choosing one or the other—supporting the welfare of the Islamic Republic of Iran or exporting the revolution to the detriment of Iran's national interest.

The clerics have not decided; they are trying to have it both ways.



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(U) Another factor affecting clerical decision making is the result of Shi'ism, which teaches the believer to be secretive and on guard against enemies at all times. To the Shi'is, the whole world, including Christians, Jews, and even Sunni Muslims, is out there to destroy them—hence the practices of *taqiya* and *tavela* and *tabara*. This outlook makes the clerics suspicious of others, especially Christians and Jews. Many clerics habitually think of conspiracies and sabotage in the offing. Of all the enemies of Shi'ism, the United States is considered the "Great Satan" and must not be trusted.

(U) Shi'ism also emphasizes social responsibility. Unlike the Sunnis, Shi'is do not believe in fate. Instead they stress free will and God's justice. Individuals are responsible for their own actions. An implication of this conviction is that one must be extremely careful in one's decision making and in one's actions—which results in vacillation.

(U) Culture, too, has an important role in decision making. One relevant cultural trait is *partibazi* (lit. party playing). Like all the families in Iran, the cleric compete for power, wealth, and influence in society. Family loyalty dictates that one is obligated to help family members even if it means breaking the law. *Partibazi* also refers to loyalty to classmates, companions, and those with similar political or religious beliefs. Obviously this has some bearing on the clerical decision-making process. The most important factors, however, are Shi'i Iranian nationalism and the concept of *velayat-e faqih*.

**THE THINKING PROCESS IN DECISION MAKING (U)**




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
### SOCIETAL INFLUENCES ON DECISION MAKING (U)

(U) Societal influences on decision making include public opinion, the media, family ties, exchanges of ideas at mosques, religiopolitical associations, regionalism, and ethnicity.

(U) Public opinion is a Western notion and alien to the traditional mentality of Muslims in general and of Iranians in particular. Public opinion polling presupposes a democratic form of government where the people are involved in electing public officials and in making decisions, at least indirectly. In an Islamic Republic where sovereignty resides in God rather than in the people, public opinion falls into a sort of limbo. In Islamic Iran the opinions that matter are those of the clerical elite and of elected lay officials. Prominent clerics insist, of course, that their opinions are not in the least capricious, but rather informed by their study of the Qur'an, the *Nahjolbalagheh* of Imam Ali, and other sayings and actions of the Prophet and imams.




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### DECISION MAKING AND NATIONAL SECURITY (U)




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
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**CONCLUSION (U)**

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# APPENDIX - MAJOR OFFICEHOLDERS IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC <sup>(U)</sup>

(This Appendix Is Unclassified)

Leader of the Islamic Revolution .....	Khamene'i, A. Ali Hoseini-
President .....	Hashemi-Rafsanjani, Ali Akbar
Speaker of the Majles .....	Nateq-Nuri, Ali Akbar
Head of the Judiciary Branch .....	Yazdi, Ayatollah Ali
Chairman of the Assembly of Experts .....	Meshkini, Ayatollah Ali Akbar
Secretary of the Assembly of Experts .....	Taheri-Khorramabadi
Member of the Assembly of Experts .....	Jannati, Ayatollah Ahmad
First Vice-President .....	Habibi, Dr. Hasan Ebrahim
Deputy President for Atomic Energy .....	Amrollahi, Dr. Reza
Deputy President for Civil Service .....	Rezavi, Mansur
Deputy President for Environment .....	Manafi, Hadi (M.D.)
Deputy President for Executive Affairs .....	Mirzadeh, Hamid
Deputy President for Legal and Parliamentary Affairs .....	Mohajerani, Hojat. Ataollah
Deputy President for Planning and Budget .....	Roqani-Zanjani, Masud
Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development .....	Kalantari, Dr. Isa
Minister of Commerce .....	Vahaji, Abdol Husein
Minister of Construction Jihad .....	Foruzeh, Qolam Reza
Minister of Cooperatives .....	Shafei, Qolam Reza
Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance .....	Larijani, Dr. Ali
Minister of Defense .....	Torkan, Akbar
Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance .....	Nurbakhsh, Dr. Mohsen
Minister of Education and Training .....	Najafi, Dr. M. Ali
Minister of Energy .....	Namdar-Zangeneh, Bijan
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D.F.M. for Arab and African Affairs .....	Hosein, Sheikholeslam
D.F.M. for Asia-Pacific Affairs .....	Borujerdi, Ala'eddin
D.F.M. for Euro-American Affairs .....	Va'ez, Mahmud
D.F.M. for International Affairs .....	Zarif, M. Javad
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Minister of Housing and Urban Development .....	Kazeruni, Serajoddin
Minister of Industries .....	Nematzadeh, M. Reza
Minister of Intelligence and Security .....	Fallahian-Khuzestani, Ali
Minister of Interior .....	Nuri, Abdollah Hamid
Minister of Justice .....	Shoshtari, M. Esmail Hojat
Minister of Labor and Social Affairs .....	Kamali, Hosein
Minister of Petroleum .....	Aqazadeh, Qolam Reza
Minister of Post, Telegraph and Telephone .....	Qarazi, Mohammad
Minister of Roads and Transport .....	Sa'idi-Kia, Mohammad
Governor, Central Bank .....	Adeli, M. Hosein

### JOINT STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC

Chief, Joint Staff ..... Shahbazi-Zolqadr, MG Ali  
 Commander, IRI Air Force ..... Satari, BG Mansur  
 Commander, IRI Ground Forces ..... Najafi, BG Abdollah  
 Commander, IRI Navy ..... Shamkhani, RAdm. Ali

### REGULAR ARMED FORCES OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC

Commander in Chief, IRI Army ..... Shahbazi-Zolqadr, MG Ali  
 Commander, IRI Air Force ..... Satari, BG Mansur  
 Commander, IRI Ground Forces ..... Najafi, BG Abdollah  
 Commander, IRI Navy ..... Mohtaj, RAdm. Abbas

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 Chief, Central Headquarters ..... Zolqadr, Mohammad Baqer  
 Commander, IRGC Air Force ..... Jalali, BG M. Hosein  
 Commander, IRGC Ground Forces ..... Afshar, BG Ali Reza  
 Commander, IRGC Navy ..... Shamkhani, RAdm. Ali  
 Commander, Basij Resistance Force ..... Afshar, BG Ali Reza

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 Commander, Gendarmerie ..... Sohrabi, BG M.  
 Chief, Police Force ..... Mortazavi, BG Aminollah  
 Head, Revolutionary Committees ..... Kalantari, Moktar

## ENDNOTES (U)

(These Endnotes Are Unclassified)

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