
Clinton Presidential Records Mandatory Declassification Review

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3.5c


EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)

Scud TEL

Tehran, Iran
22 September 1990

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PER E. O. 13526

2015-06411-M (4-80)
2/27/2017 KBH



Z-29370/95

3.5c

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National Intelligence Council

National Intelligence Officer for Europe

(F)
Turkey

6 April 1993

NOTE FOR: Martin Indyk

FROM: Roger Z. George
National Intelligence Officer for
Europe

Attached is a copy of the estimate I mentioned to you the other night. I would be more than happy to bring a group of "young Turks" down to share our views on Turkish foreign policy as part of the PRD process. Let me know what I can do for you.

It was good to see you again. Best regards.

EO 13526 3.5c

Roger Z. George

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
2015-0641-M (1.66)
2/27/2017 KBH

**US Exports to Iran
(A Commodity Breakdown)**

1990 = \$165 million (a)


1991 = \$530 million (b)

1992 = \$715 million





a) US imports from Iran were negligible in 1990, standing at roughly \$10 million and comprised entirely of manufactured goods.

b) US imports jumped to \$260 million in 1991 as a result of Washington's relaxation of its ban on Iranian oil imports. Washington stipulated, however, that the proceeds from these sales could only be used to replenish the security account managed by the Hague Tribunal and used to pay claims against Iran. Tehran did not add appreciably to the account through oil sales in 1992, presumably because it hoped to persuade the Tribunal to require funding at a level substantially below \$500 million. If Tehran is unsuccessful in this effort, it may resume oil sales in 1993 to bring the account up to the required level.



Iran: Foreign Trade, 1988-91

Billion US \$




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Iran: Economic Indicators


Debt Service, FY 1985-91

Percent of exports




External Debt Position, 1985-91

Billion US \$



Current Account, FY 1986-92

Billion US \$



^a Estimated.

^b Projected.

3.5c

336322 1-93

3.5c

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

3 February 1995

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: The Impact of Russian Arms Sales to Iran 3.5c

1. The Russian arms that Iran is acquiring will contribute to Tehran's efforts to redress its military weaknesses relative to Iraq, increase Iran's military advantage over the Gulf Arab states, and bolster Iran's capability to interfere with the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. 3.5c

2. Iran's acquisition of substantial numbers of new T-72S tanks, BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles, and related production technology, along with its numerical advantage in artillery, could eventually give Iran a slight edge over Iraq on the ground. However, neither state is likely to gain a decisive battlefield advantage because of logistic shortcomings, the difficult terrain along much of the border, and the low likelihood of attaining strategic surprise. Iraq's quantitative advantage in armored vehicles would be offset by the qualitative edge and sustainability advantages provided by Iran's newer, more modern equipment and its expanding production and repair capability. In any future war, neither air force is likely to have a major impact on the outcome of the ground battle--probably the most significant combat arena for these states. Iran is already capable of overwhelming the almost non-existent Iraqi Navy. 3.5c

3. Iran's acquisition of armored vehicles does not significantly increase the military threat to the Gulf Arab states because of the intervening presence of Iraqi forces, Iran's logistic weaknesses, and Iran's limited amphibious capability. However, 1.4c, 1.4d press reports indicate that Iran's expanding air and naval forces, including its Kilo-class submarines, are intimidating to the Gulf Arab states, and Tehran is attempting to exploit its strength in its efforts to gain a dominant role in Gulf security arrangements. 3.5c

1.4c, 1.4d

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SUBJECT: The Impact of Russian Arms Sales to Iran

3.5c

1.4c, 1.4d, 3.5c

4. Iran's capability to interdict the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz is being significantly enhanced by the addition of Russian Kilo-class submarines, DM-1 bottom influence mines, strike aircraft, and precision-guided munitions. New interceptors and surface-to-air missile systems, such as the MiG-29 and SA-5, also would play a role in such operations.

1.4c, 1.4d, 3.5c

3.5c